Existence, Fiction, Assumption: Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy 9783110453270, 9783110451368

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Existence, Fiction, Assumption Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy

Meinong Studies/ Meinong Studien

Edited for/Herausgegeben für Alexius-Meinong-Institut der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz by/von Mauro Antonelli, Marian David Editorial Board/Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Liliana Albertazzi, Ermanno Bencivenga, Johannes Brandl, Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Evelyn Dölling, Kit Fine, Jaakko Hintikka, Herbert Hochberg, Dale Jacquette, Wolfgang Künne, Winfried Löffler, Johann Christian Marek, Kevin Mulligan, Roberto Poli, Matjaž Potrč, Venanzio Raspa, Maria E. Reicher-Marek, Robin Rollinger, Edmund Runggaldier, Seppo Sajama, Peter Simons, Barry Smith, Erwin Tegtmeier Editorial office/Redaktion Jutta Valent

Volume/Band 6

Existence, Fiction, Assumption

Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy Edited by Mauro Antonelli, Marian David

ISBN 978-3-11-045136-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-045327-0 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-045151-1 ISSN 2198-2309 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Layout: Johannes Friedl, Ulf Höfer Printing: CPI books GmbH, Lech ♾ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Contents / Inhalt STEFANIA CENTRONE Relational Theories of Intentionality and the Problem of Non-Existents ............................................................ 1 PETER ANDRAS VARGA The Non-Existing Object Revisited: Meinong as the Link between Husserl and Russell? ................................................................. 27 DALE JACQUETTE Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke’s 1973 John Locke Lectures ................................................... 59 MICHELE PAOLINI PAOLETTI Paradise on the Cheap. Ascriptivism about Ficta ................................... 99 XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ Meinong’s Theory of Assumptions and its Relevance for Scientific Contexts ......................................................... 141 JUTTA VALENT Christian von Ehrenfels. Eine intellektuelle Biographie: Neue Forschungsergebnisse aus dem Nachlass ..................................... 175 MARKUS ROSCHITZ Zu Ernst Mallys Lebensgang, Umfeld und akademischer Laufbahn .... 207

RELATIONAL THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF NON-EXISTENTS Stefania Centrone

Summary This paper presents three different accounts of intentionality that are widespread in the literature: the relational, the parametric and the adverbial. It presupposes that a relational account of intentionality gives a plausible justification of our knowledge procedures. Two historically important relational theories of intentionality are discussed: the Bolzanian and the Meinongian. Both encounter difficulties when faced with the problem of non-existents. The Bolzanian theory fails to account for some important uses of non-existent talk; the Meinongian theory turns out to be contradictory. The latter is shown here against the background of the Meinong-Russell debate. The paper pursues the goal of adding an amendment to one of two theories that turns out to be the most coherent from a theoretical point of view, i.e. Bolzano’s theory of intentionality.

Introduction Discussions about the nature of mind generally agree that many of our mental acts or states share a particular essential feature: they refer to something; they are directed at something; and they are about something. Philosophers “follow a long philosophical tradition in calling this feature of directness or aboutness ‘intentionality’” (Searle 1983, 1). Husserl and some contemporary researchers (Searle among them) maintain that intentionality is not the same as consciousness. They take intentionality to be the distinctive mark of a well-determined class of our mental acts-orstates, which are to be distinguished from what reaches our sense organs (Husserl) or from mental acts-or-states such as nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety (Searle’s examples, in Searle 1983). Questions arise about the nature of intentionality. Is it a relation? If so, what is its nature?

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What are its relata? Connected with these are questions about the nature of the something “intended” and the kinds of existence thereof. For, it is quite natural to expect that a good theory of intentionality gives a uniform explanation of the relation of referring to in the case in which the something intended is a concrete object (spatio-temporally located), an abstract one (such as a number, a class, …), a possible non-existent object (such as the golden mountain) or an impossible non-existent object (such as the round square). The problem of non-existent objects turns out to be a much more complex problem than one might think, however. It includes, as I will try to show, intentional acts or states based on error, those based on make-believe, intentional states of subjects who reason about non-existent objects without knowing that they are non-existent, as well as intentional states of subjects who think about objects while being fully aware that they do not exist. In Section 1, I present three different accounts of intentionality that are current in the literature: the relational, the parametric and the adverbial account. I assume that this tripartite division covers all accounts of the nature of intentionality since Brentano. In other words, I assume that all accounts of intentionality since Brentano are variants of one of the three presented in Section 1. To take a single example, a theory of intentionality that acknowledges objectless intentional acts, but assigns to every mental act an intentional content (of the kind both Husserl and Searle seem to hold) would fit under the heading “relational theory of intentionality”. I also assume that the relational account of intentionality is the most suitable one for our knowledge procedures. The idea is nicely captured by John Stuart Mill in his famous example in Chapter II of his A System of Logic: “[t]here seems good reason for adhering to the common usage, and calling […] the word sun the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of the sun” (Mill 1843, Ch. II, § 1). Since I believe that most of the arguments that arise in connection with contemporary discussions about the nature of intentionality had already been made long ago, I present two of the most coherent relational theories of intentionality, the Bolzanian and the Meinongian, along with the difficulties they face with the problem of non-existent objects. Section 2 is dedicated to Bolzano’s theory of intentionality. Section 3 clarifies some difficulties Bolzano’s account confronts with some important uses of non-existent talk. Section 4 is

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devoted to Meinong’s theory of intentionality. Section 5 shows that Meinong’s theory is contradictory against the background of the MeinongRussell debate. Section 6 proposes an amendment of what is, in my opinion, the most coherent of these two theories, i.e. Bolzano’s theory of intentionality. Indeed, Meinong’s approach violates Ockham’s razor (entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem) and so do all neo-Meinongian attempts that escape the charge of inconsistency. Perhaps more importantly for the theory of intentionality, Meinong’s approach does not explain the intentional relation, but rather creates many more intentional objects with respect to which the intentional relation must be explained.

1. Alternative Conceptions of Intentionality In general, a relational statement, as for instance, ‘Paris loves Helen’, can be analyzed in three conceptually distinct ways (which are logically equivalent only under suitable assumptions): besides the “standard” way – the binary relation is in love with occurs between the individual Paris and the individual Helen in the order their names appear in the sentence –, it can also be read as a parametric predication – ‘Paris has the property of Helen-loving’ – or as an adverbial predication – ‘Paris has the property of loving-helenly’ (see Casari 2009, 53–54). Let me attempt a rough characterization of these divisions. In the first and most obvious reading, ‘Paris loves Helen’ is a binary predication saying that a binary relation L (‘is in love with’) obtains between the object denoted by ‘p’ (Paris) and the object denoted by ‘h’ (Helen), in this order. The logical form is hence ‘L(p,h)’. In the second reading (parametric reading), the form of the statement is that of a monadic predication, ‘Paris has the property of Helen-loving’, ‘Lh(p)’, where the unary predicate Lh is the parameterization by the name h (‘Helen’) of the binary relation L of loving. In this reading the directedness in question is not a genuine relation, but a kind of property of the objects involved. In the third reading (adverbial reading) the form of the statement is, as in the preceding reading, that of a monadic predication, but now the property that is predicated of Paris is obtained (at least conceptually) in a different way: ‘Paris has the property of loving-helenly’, ‘([h](L))(p)’. The predi-

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cate [h](L) is not obtained from the relation L through parameterization, but from an adverbial modification of the derelativization1 L* of L – i.e. by modifying the property of loving (someone) adverbially.2 Without imposing restrictions to the linking-conditions 

∀x (Ra(x) ↔ R(x,a))

and

∀x (([a]R*)(x) ↔ R(x,a))

the three readings are extensionally equivalent. However, there are deep conceptual differences between them (in logical form at least) and, if we restrict those conditions, then the equivalence would be broken. On the basis of the above analyses we can identify three alternative understandings of the intentional relation (that we can represent by an arrow ‘→’); i.e. three alternative readings of the statement ‘subject s thinks about object o’: – Relational: s [→] o (s) [thinks about] (o) – Parametric: s [→ o] (s) [thinks-about-o] – Adverbial: s [→] o

(s) [thinks o-ly]

At first blush, the standard relational reading seems to be committed to a naturalistic solution of the problem of knowledge, i.e., roughly, to the existence of a subject of cognition, a thinking-about-relation and a referredto object. The history of philosophy offers two most coherent examples of relational theories of intentionality: the Bolzanian one and the Meinongian one. Let us consider them both, along with the problems encountered when the object that is referred to is non-existent.

1

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The derelativization R* of a binary relation R is the property possessed by an individual x when there is at least one individual y to which x bears the relation R: ∀x (R*(x) ↔ ∃yR(x,y)). A (monadic) adverb can be abstractly conceived as an operator X that associates predicates to predicates (P ⇒ X(P); e.g., if X = ‘fast’, X(running) = the predicate ‘running fast’). In this context, we assume that for every name a there is an associated monadic adverb ‘a-ly’, in symbols [a], such that for every binary predicate R: ∀x (([a]R*)(x) ↔ R(x,a)).

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2. Bolzano on Intentionality Bolzano’s universe is a universe of objects (Gegenstände) alone. Object is defined by Bolzano as “what has qualities”. Quality (Beschaffenheit), in turn, is conceived of as “what can belong (zukommen) to something” (quodcumque habetur) – see WL I, 379. Real and ideal objects are distinguished. Real objects have spatial and temporal determinations and stand in causal relation, ideal objects do not. Further, the real objects are divided into two subclasses: substances (Substanzen) and individual accidents or adherences (Adhärenzen). Adherences can be characterized as particulars that occur at a certain time and need a bearer. They are in turn divided into non-psychical and psychical adherences. The latter include judgments, apprehensions, sensations, wishes and decisions. The most important denizens of the realm of ideal objects are objective ideas or concepts (Vorstellungen an sich) and propositions (Sätze an sich). Propositions can be said to have the following features: (i) they are the meanings of sentential utterances; (ii) they are the contents (Stoffe) of acts of judgment; (iii) they are the bearers of truth and falsehood; and (iv) they have no existence (Dasein, Existenz, Wirklichkeit). Having existence, as conceived by Bolzano, is having causal impact (Wirksamkeit), so it is not expressed by the existential quantifier. According to him, only substances and their adherences have existence. Thus, he would accept that “there are objects that do not exist”, such as the components of the logical realm. Let us now look at concepts. Concepts are (i) the meanings of nonsentential parts of sentential utterances; (ii) they are the contents (Stoffe) of acts of apprehension (subjektive oder gehabte Vorstellungen); (iii) they have no real existence (Dasein, Existenz, Wirklichkeit); and (iv) they can be empty or not, depending on whether there is an object that stands under (steht unter) them. The same concept can be the content of many acts of apprehension. Since Bolzano explicitly admits that certain concepts actually never become the content of such an act, a concept can also be characterized as “what can become the content of an act of apprehension”. Abstract logical entities determine, according to Bolzano, which object(s), if any, our mental acts-or-states and linguistic utterances refer to, similarly for what they are about. If a non-propositional mental act-orstate is about a non-existent object Bolzano says that the concept, that is

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the content (Stoff) of the mental act-or-state, is empty or objectless (gegenstandslos). Similarly, if a non-sentential utterance does not denote anything, Bolzano says that the concept that is expressed by the nonsentential utterance is empty. Thus, the Bolzanian way of preserving the relational reading of intentionality is to conceive the referring-to relation as a relation composed of two relations, one that obtains between the mental act-or-state and the abstract logical concept and one that obtains between the concept and the referred-to object; similarly, on the linguistic side, the referring-to relation splits up into two relations, one that obtains between the linguistic utterance and the abstract logical concept and one that obtains between the latter and the referred-to object. In other words, Bolzano reads the statement ‘the subject s represents or thinks of the object o’ as the composition of the two statements: (i) ‘s has a mental actor-state with a certain abstract logical content c’ and (ii) ‘the content c refers to the object o’; or as a composition of the statement (i) ‘s has a mental act-or-state with a certain abstract logical content c’ with the predication (ii) ‘the content c is objectless’ (cf. Casari 2009, 43–44). The following schemas depict the semiotic relations, in the case of nonsentential mental acts-or-states and utterances, both when there is an object the subject refers to and when there is no such object: Figure 1. Semiotic relationships in the case of non-empty concepts Mental Act (thinking of Socrates) has as content (Stoff ) represents

(arouses)

Sign (utterance of “Socrates”) (expresses)

concept ([Socrates])

falls under Object (SOCRATES)

designates

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Figure 2. Semiotic relationships in the case of empty concepts Mental Act (thinking of the chimera)

Sign (utterance of “chimera”)

(arouses)

has as content (Stoff )

(expresses) concept ([chimera])

3. The Relational Bolzanian Theory and the Problem of Non-Existents The Bolzanian theory encounters problems that become evident when an account of truths and valid arguments about non-existents is requested. There are many kinds of statements and valid arguments involving nonexistents. Here are few examples. Statements: (1) The Chimera does not exist. (2) The ancient Romans worshipped Jupiter. (3) Tony Buddenbrook is a divorced woman. (4) The Buddenbrooks are more famous than any real mercantile family. (5) Eugénie Grandet is as famous as Madame Bovary. (6) The Phlogiston was used to explain combustion. (7) Bacchus = Dionysus. (8) Teams of scientists have searched for Vulcan, but since it doesn’t exist, no one will ever find it. (9) Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth, and though it doesn’t exist, he believed that it existed.

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Valid Arguments (cf. Reicher 2006, 8–12): (10) [Existential Generalization]3 Cerberus is a three-headed hound ⇒ There is something, which is a three-headed hound. (11) The ancient Romans worshipped Jupiter ⇒ The ancient Romans worshipped something.

Let us closely examine the above examples before considering which kinds of statements receive a satisfactory explanation within a Bolzanian theory.4 (1) is an ontological statement. It seems to say something about the being of a certain object. (2) seems to establish a relation between some real objects, the Romans, and a certain non-existent, Jupiter. We could call it a “trans-fictional statement”. (3) seems to be an example of simple predication. It seems to say that a certain non-existent, Tony Buddenbrook, has a certain property. (4) is a trans-fictional statement, too. It seems to establish a relation between a non-existent and an existent object. At variance with (2) the term referring to the non-existent object occurs at the subject- and not at the object-place. (5) seems to assess a relation between two characters belonging to different stories. We could call it an “inter-fictional statement”. (6) seems to express an historical truth whereas (7) seems to express an identity statement. The sign ‘=’ is placed between two singular terms and appears to feature a linguistic counterpart of ‘is identical with’. (8) seems to be an example of anaphoric (backward) reference, where the pronoun ‘it’ appears to be co-referential with the term in the subject position, which refers to a non-existent entity. (9) shows the use of a term referring to a non-existent in a referentially opaque context. As to (10) – (11), they are not a complete list of all arguments in which instantiation of terms referring to non-existents in the subject- and/or in the object-place in the premises leads into outright contradictory conclusions. They are, however, those arguments that the standard discussion focuses on. (10) says that if a certain predicate ‘P’ applies to a 3

4

In the literature it is customary to refer to inferences as those instantiated by (10) and (11) with the name of existential generalization. This terminology comes from Quine 1953, VIII. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to talk of existential introduction for (11). For the following distinctions, see Künne 2007, 54.

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certain object, then there is something to which the predicate applies. (11) says that if a certain object (or, as in our example, a whole of objects conceived collectively) is in the relation R with another object, then there is something the former is in relation with. Let us see which of these statements and arguments the Bolzanian theory offers a plausible solution for. According to Bolzano, every proposition can lead back to the canonical form ‘A has b’,5 where ‘A’ expresses the subject-concept of the proposition, ‘has’ expresses the copula-concept and ‘b’ expresses the predicateconcept. A proposition is true if and only if the subject-concept is nonempty and every object that falls under the subject-concept has at least one of the qualities falling under the predicate-concept.6 At variance with Frege (cf. Frege 1918, 68), Bolzano works with a determinacy-principle: “every proposition is either true or false, and remains that way always and everywhere” (WL II, 7). There are no truth-valueless propositions. Bolzano would say that (1) is not a statement about a certain nonexistent, the Chimera, but is rather a statement about a certain concept, the concept [Chimera]7 namely, and that this concept is empty. Like Frege,8 Bolzano interprets ‘exists’ as a second order predicate. 9 Thus, ‘the Chimera does not exist’ is a comfortable paraphrase for ‘the concept [Chimera] is objectless’. I think this is something we can live with. As far as our example (2) is concerned, Bolzano would say that the logical components of the proposition expressed by each utterance of (2) are: the general concept (Gemeinvorstellung) [the Romans], the copula 5 6

7

8 9

[T]he expression ‘A has b’, is the general form of any proposition whatever, since all propositions can be represented by this concatenation of signs (WL I, 393). WL II, 26–27: “The proposition ‘A has b’ has no other sense than that every object under A has one of the qualities that fall under b; and if there are several of the latter it remains undetermined, which of them belong to every A” (my emphasis). Also cf. BGA II A, 12/2, 61 & 105; Übersicht, 30–31. As customary in the Bolzano literature, I use square brackets to designate the concept that is expressed by the filling of the brackets. Cf. e.g. Morscher 2007, 29. Künne 2008, 238. This use derives from Quine 1960, 165, 168–9, 194. As to ‘exists’ as concept of concepts, see e.g. Frege 1884, § 53; 1892, 200; 1903, 373; 1910, 18. Cf. WL II, 53f. As to Bolzano’s conception of the universal quantifier – that is at variance with Bolzano’s existential quantifier and with both quantifiers by Frege, it is not a second-order predicate – see WL I 246–251; II 216–218.

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[has] and the predicate-concept [worshipping Jupiter] and that this proposition is true if and only if the Romans, as a collectively conceived whole made up of discrete objects, have the quality of worshipping-Jupiter.10 Thus (2) is not a trans-fictional statement establishing a relation between some real objects, the Romans, and a non-existent, Jupiter, but is a statement saying of the Romans, collectively conceived, that they have a certain property. This is – I believe – a good solution to the problem represented by statements such as (2) through conceptual analysis. Predications about non-existents such as (3) as well as trans-fictional statements such as (4) and inter-fictional statements such as (5) are, instead, problematic for a relational theory à la Bolzano. Bolzano would reject them all as false, for their subject-concept is empty. However, rejection of (3) and (5) strikes against our natural intuitions about Tony being divorced and Eugénie Grandet being as famous as Madame Bovary, at least within the relevant story, while rejection of (4) fails to do justice to the widespread intuition, at least among all readers of Thomas Mann, that The Buddenbrooks are more famous than any real mercantile family. Even more serious is the objection represented by (6) for, analyzed in the Bolzanian way, this historically true proposition turns out to be false. Also (7) is, according to the Bolzanian theory, false: the name ‘Bacchus’ expresses an empty concept and so does the name ‘Dionysus’. However, we are inclined to give our assent to the fact that Bacchus is Dionysus. (Incidentally, note that co-referential terms referring to non-existents encounter apparently the same problems in opaque and relational contexts as properly referential expressions.) As to the problem represented by (8) and (9) the Bolzanian theory is able to offer a very good solution based on conceptual analysis. Ad (8). A Bolzanian conceptual analysis that would “really render the very thought” (WL II, 54) expressed by an utterance of (8) would be the following: (i) the quality of having searched for Vulcan belongs to some of the objects falling under the concept [teams of scientists]; 11 (ii) the 10 11

In this case the object that falls under the subject-concept is the collection of the Romans. Incidentally, note that in (*) ‘Teams of scientists have searched for Vulcan’ we use ‘teams of scientists’ in exactly the sense considered by Bolzano at WL I, 248: “In my opinion, […] we […] use [the words ‘any’ and ‘every’] when it is our purpose

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concept [Vulcan] is empty. Thus, (iii) it is impossible to find an object that falls under it (the concept [Vulcan]). Here there is a shift in mode of significance of the pronoun ‘it’ that, in the paraphrase, doesn’t point back any more to ‘Vulcan’. Bolzano would probably maintain (WL II, 54): It might be objected that it is unlikely that my explication and the linguistic expression which it explicates both indicate the same thought, since they are composed of entirely different words. I do not wish to quarrel about this matter; we only need to admit that the sense connected with the original formulation is equivalent with my explication, i.e. that if one of them is true then the other is also.

Ad (9). Finally, a Bolzanian-style paraphrase of (9) would be: the individual denoted by ‘Ponce de Leon’ has the property of searching for the fountain of youth. The concept [fountain of youth] is empty, though Ponce de Leon believed that it (the concept) is not empty. Ad (10) and (11). A Bolzanian reading of (10) doesn’t threaten the validity of the argument-schema of which (10) is an instance, since the premise of (10) is simply false. Thus, the validity of the nexus between premise and conclusion is not affected. On the other hand, (11) can be saved by means of conceptual analysis: (11B) The ancient Romans, insofar as collectively conceived of as entirely made up of discrete objects, have the quality of worshipping Jupiter ⇒ There is a quality that convenes the ancient Romans.

In other words, we read (11) as follows (11B) A has b ⇒ ∃b (A has b).

to clear a word from additional concepts generally associated with the word ‘some’ […]. I take it that the expression ‘any man’ means no more that what we think by the expression ‘man’ alone, indeed what we must think by the word ‘man’ if we do not want to limit it arbitrarily to one or the other class of men; the only point of the addition ‘any’ is to prevent such a limitation.” What we are saying with (*) is: “the quality [of having searched for Vulcan] belongs to some, but not to all […] [teams of scientists]” (WL II, 216).

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4. Meinong on Intentionality Another way to save the relational reading of intentionality is the Meinongian one. This basically consists in enlarging the ontological sphere both with factually non-existent objects, such as the golden mountain, and with lawfully non-existent objects, such as the round square. Meinong proceeds from the observation that every object can be the subject of predication independent of its ontological status. From this observation he concludes that every object is a bearer of properties independent of whether or not it exists. Thus, the golden mountain has the properties of being a mountain and of being made of gold, the round square has the properties of being round and of being square, and so on. As Meinong puts it, every object has a being-so (Sosein) which is independent of its being (Sein), the being-so consisting in all the properties of an object up to the fact of its existence. He follows his student Ernst Mally in calling this principle “independence of the being-so from the being”: “the Sosein of an Object is not affected by its Nichtsein”.12 This sounds like a principle of unlimited comprehension for objects: for each cluster of properties there is an object that instantiates (exemplifies) all and only those properties. Like Bolzano, Meinong distinguishes between (i) having spatial and temporal determination, which he calls “existence (Existenz)”, and (ii) having a logical abstract existence, which he calls “subsistence (Bestand)”.13 At variance with Bolzano, he maintains that any object whatsoever is somehow given to us, independent of its ontological status. He introduces a third sphere, which he calls “Außersein of the pure object”,14 whose inhabitants are all objects including “homeless objects (heimatlose Gegenstände)”, as Meinong will later call them (Meinong 1907, 214ff.), that is, factually non-existent objects, such as the golden mountain; lawfully nonexistent objects, such as the round square; fictional objects such as Tony 12

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Meinong 1904, 489. Engl. transl. in Chisholm 1960, 82. Cp. Mally 1904, ch. 1, § 3. On the principle of independence of the being-so from the being see: Chisholm 1960, 6ff. & 1982, 39–40; 52; Lambert 1983 18–23; Casari 2009, 46–47. Meinong 1904, 486ff. Engl. transl., 78ff. Cp. Lambert 1983, 13; Smith 1985, 307. Meinong 1904, 490ff. Engl. transl., 83ff. Cp. Chisholm 1982, 39f.; 53f.; Lambert 1983, 14–15.

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Buddenbrook; but also objects of sensation (Empfindungsgegenstände), such as the object picked up by the expression ‘something red’. As Meinong puts it: “there are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects” (Meinong 1904, 490; Eng. trans., 82). Thus, while for Bolzano the existential quantifier ranges from objects that exist to objects that subsist, according to Meinong the range of the existential quantifier includes all objects. And whereas, according to Bolzano, an utterance of ‘Chimera’ expresses an empty concept that is the meaning of the name ‘Chimera’ and vouches for the inter-subjectivity of the cognitive situation, according to Meinong an utterance of ‘Chimera’ expresses a content and designates an object, a non-existent one, the Chimera namely, which has the properties of having a lion’s head, a goat’s body, a tail that ends in a snake’s head, of breathing fire, of being the daughter of Typhon and Echidna, etc. Note that Meinong psychologizes (following Höfler and Twardowski) the Bolzanian triad: non-propositional act – logical content (concept) – object (respectively: non-sentential utterance – logical content – object) transforming it to the triad: non-propositional act – mental content – object (respectively: non-sentential utterance – mental content – object). As a consequence, the semiotic relations are, according to Meinong, as follows: a non-sentential utterance expresses a mental act [!] (usually a presentation) and designates an object that is the meaning of the uttered expression. Similarly, a sentential utterance expresses a propositional mental act (usually a judgment or an assumption) and refers to an object, which Meinong calls “objective (Objektiv)”. The expressed act [!] always has (i) an immanent or mental content, which is what Meinong means by “Inhalt”, and (ii) a referred-to object.15 Thus, the Meinongian way of preserving the relational reading of intentionality is to say that there is no plausible way to interpret the statement ‘the subject s represents or thinks of the object o’ other than as a statement asserting a relation between the subject and the object, independent of the kind of being of the object. We should – as Meinong expresses himself – renounce the “prejudice in favor of the actual” which 15

For the difference between content (Inhalt) and object (Gegenstand) see Meinong 1899, 381–387. For the semiotic relations see Meinong 1902, 21–41. Hereto cp. Simons 1988, 401. As to the psychologization of the Bolzanian Inhalt see Höfler 1890, § 6; Twardowski 1894, 11 fn.

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affects all positive sciences and we should set up a pure theory of objects that has the object as such, the Relatum as such of the intentional relation, as the object of investigation. He writes (Meinong 1904, 486; Eng. trans. 79): [T]he totality of what exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the objects of knowledge. This fact easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing – or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any worth.

To this view Meinong is led by the consideration of true sentences involving terms referring to non-existents, as for instance, ‘there is no round square’, ‘the golden mountain does not exist’. For, “if I should be able to judge that a certain object is not, then I appear to have had to grasp the object in some way beforehand, in order to say anything about its nonbeing, or more precisely, in order to affirm or to deny the ascription of non-being to the object.”16

5. The Relational Meinongian Theory and the Problem of Non-Existents Meinong’s theory encounters two principal problems: the problem of incomplete objects and the problem of factually and lawfully non-existent objects (cf. Casari 2009, 47–48). Let us first look at the former. 17 Incomplete objects are objects that are not determined with respect to all properties. While existent objects are always determined with respect to all properties, non-existents often are not (though Meinong admits the possibility of complete objects that do not exist).18 Let us consider an ex16 17 18

Loc. cit. 491. Engl. transl. 84. Cp. Lambert 1983, 36ff. On incomplete objects see Meinong 1907, 118–123; Meinong 1915, 168ff. Hereto cp. Chisholm 1982, 48–52 & 56–57. Consider, for instance, the set of properties constituted of all my properties, except that the one of being black-haired is replaced by that of being blond-haired. According to the principle of independence of the being-so from the being, there is an object that has all these properties and no others. This object will be com-

RELATIONAL THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

15

ample. Dr. Rieux is the main character of the novel The Plague by Albert Camus. Of him we know that he is a man of action, in whose eyes the most important thing is to do his own job well, that he entered the field of medicine haphazardly, that he is a non-cleric and practical. However, we don’t know how much he weighs, how tall he is, and so on. Fictional objects are not the only incomplete objects. Objects of sensation and traditional universals are incomplete, too. The object denoted by the expression ‘something red’ is neither extended nor unextended, neither heavy nor light, etc. It does not hold for this object that for each property P, either it has P or it has non-P. The same applies to universals that are multiple exemplifiable objects. The triangle-in-general is neither right-angled, nor isosceles, nor scalene. It is not possible to measure the radius, or the diameter, or the circumference of the circle-in-general. Thus, the price to be paid to include incomplete objects in the ontology is to give up the law of excluded middle.19 The second problem concerns, as we said, factually and lawfully nonexistent objects.20 It is on this very issue that the Meinong-Russell controversy21 focuses. The Meinong-Russell controversy begins in 1904 with Russell’s review of Meinong’s monograph On Assumptions, published in Mind with the title “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions”. In this early exchange of views between Russell and Meinong the problem of non-existents is not discussed. It is mentioned for the first time in a letter of Russell to Meinong of 15.12.1904 in which Russell thanks Meinong for sending him his Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. In this letter Russell gives a Fregean solution to the problem of non-existents. According to his views at that time, names such as ‘the golden mountain’ have a sense but not a meaning. Russell writes: 22

19 20

21 22

plete but it will not be existent. Cf. Parsons 1980, 20–21; Reicher 2006, 17. Russell 1905, 485 & Letter to Meinong of 1906 in: Meinong 1965, 151–152. Eng. trans. in: Smith 1985, 348–349. This section of the paper partially originates from a talk I gave at the University of Hamburg at a seminar headed by Wolfgang Künne. I owe reconstruction of the below arguments I, II and II* to Wolfgang Künne. As to the course of the controversy, see Simons 1988. Also cf. Ryle 1972, 256ff. (though less rich in details from an historical point of view). In: Meinong 1965, 150–151. Eng. trans. in: Russell 1973, 15–16. Cf. Simons 1988, 410.

16

STEFANIA CENTRONE My dear Sir, Many thanks for your friendly letter, and for the treatise “On The Theory of Objects”. I have read this treatise […] with the greatest interest. […] I find myself in complete sympathy with its general standpoint, and the problems which it treats are such as seem to me important. I am accustomed to use the word “Logic” for what you call “the theory of objects”; and the reasons that you present against this use seem to me hardly decisive. But this is unimportant, and I concede that a new standpoint should be given a new name. I have always believed until now that every object must in some sense have being, and I find it difficult to accept unreal (nichtseiende) objects. In such a case as that of the golden mountain or of the round square one should distinguish between sense and reference (to use Frege’s terms): the sense is an object, and has being, the reference, however, is not an object.

A short time later, Russell explains in On Denoting that nominal phrases such as ‘the golden mountain’ and ‘the round square’ abbreviate definite descriptions, and shows how these are to be paraphrased away in terms of existence and uniqueness claims. He maintains that he stated the theory to get around the difficulties brought about by a relational theory of the kind of Meinong’s.23 His main objection against Meinong’s theory of objects is that it is contradictory:24 The [theory of definite descriptions] gives a reduction of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur […] The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus “the present King of France”, “the round square”, etc. are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round and also not round; 23

24

Cf. Russell 1944, 13: “The desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being led me to the theory of descriptions”. This “official view”, promoted by Russell himself, is a controversial issue in the literature. For arguments in favour of the view that Russell’s theory of definite descriptions was stated to solve problems which have little connection with Meinong, see Cartwright 1987; Hylton 1990; Griffin 1996, 57; Boukema 2007. Russell 1905a, 482–483. Cf. Smith 1985, 309–310; 311.

17

RELATIONAL THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.

Russell’s critique in the quoted passage considers a factually non-existent object (the present king of France) and a lawfully non-existent object (the round square). Let us first look at the latter kind of objects. Here the contradiction originates by assuming an unlimited comprehension principle (independence of the being-so from the being) together with the general validity of the law of contradiction. We can reconstruct Russell’s argument as follows: Argument I [1] The round square is round.

PI25

[2] The round square is square.

PI

[3] x (x is square   (x is round)). [4]  (the round square is round).

From 2,3

[5] The round square is round ∧  (the round square is round).

From 1,4

[6] [5] is a contradiction.

In Russell’s eyes the first premise of the argument is false, for the definite description does not denote. Meinong 1907 answered as follows: 26 B. RUSSELL puts special emphasis on the fact that by the acknowledgement of such objects the law of contradiction loses its general validity. I cannot avoid this consequence in any way: whoever admits a “round square”, cannot be afraid of a square or whatever object that is at the same time round and not-round. As far as I can see, one would hardly have reason to be shocked (of this): no one has ever applied the law of contradiction to anything else than the actual and the possible. And this, above all, for the reason that hardly something else has ever been taken into consideration besides the actual and, at most, the possible. But as reasoning basically involves in his sphere also the impossible, what has raised a claim of general validity in the narrower field demands, with respect to the wider field, a further exam, whose possible negative outcomes in no way compromise the validity of the principle within the old limits.

Hereto Russell observes in a review from the year 1907 (Russell 1907, 439): 25 26

Principle of Independence. Meinong (1907), 222. Translation mine.

18

STEFANIA CENTRONE There is an argument in defence of impossible objects such as the round square, against criticism passed in a previous review in Mind. As the subject is important, I shall briefly state Meinong's contentions and indicate why they seem to me inconclusive. Impossible objects, it is admitted, do not obey the law of contradiction; but why should they? For after all, this law has never been explicitly asserted except of the actual and the possible, and there is no reason for assuming that it holds also of the impossible. This reply seems to overlook the fact that it is of propositions (i.e. of “objectives” in Meinong's terminology), not of subjects, that the law of contradiction is asserted. To suppose that two contradictory propositions can both be true seems equally inadmissible whatever their subjects may be.

Meinong should not have touched the principle of contradiction, to invalidate argument I. He could have maintained that premise [3] holds only if the domain of quantification is that of possible objects. However, in his 1905 review of Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie published in the same issue of Mind a few pages after On Denoting, Russell had already brought against Meinong an argument that could not have been met thus (Russell 1905b, 533): [T]he difficulty is that impossible objects often subsist, and even exist. For if the round square is round and square, the existent round square is existent and round and square. Thus something round and square exists, although everything round and square is impossible.

We can reconstruct this argument as follows: Argument II [1]  (A round square exists). [2] The existing round square is square, is round and exists.

PI

[3] A round square exists.

From 2

[4]  (A round square exists) ∧ (A round square exists).

From 1,3

[5] [4] is a contradiction.

Meinong’s answer to this argument is to be found in the following passage (Meinong 1907, 223. Translation mine): The difficulty here does not concern only the round square, that is, in general, the impossible objects. For exactly the same does hold, for instance, of the “golden mountain”, to which one would hardly deny the status of a lawful object: also the existing golden mountain “exists”, and this is scarcely more com-

19

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patible with what experience teaches us than the assertion of the existence of round squares.

To this Russell replies (Russell 1907, 439): The next point urged by Meinong is that my objections apply equally to such objects as “the golden mountain”, which are not impossible, but merely nonexistent. This I, of course, admit; indeed the object I specially attempted to demolish was “the present King of France”, who is on a level with “the golden mountain.”

Thus, Russell reminds the reader that, as he argued in On Denoting, the contradiction was brought about, in the case of possible non-existents, by assuming an unlimited comprehension principle and by treating, at the same time, existence as a property of objects. For, given the properties of being existent and being the present King of France, there is an object that exists as existent present King of France and does not exist as present King of France (cf. Lambert 1973, 228). We can spell out the argumenttraces to be found in the above quoted passage of On Denoting as follows: Argument II* [1]  (A golden mountain exists). [2] The existing golden mountain is a mountain, is golden, and it exists.

PI

[3] A golden mountain exists.

From 2

[4] (A golden mountain exists) ∧  (A golden mountain exists). From 1,3

[5] [4] is a contradiction.

Hereto Meinong responds with a distinction (Meinong 1907, 223. Translation mine): [One can] also add such existential determinations as the participle “existent” to other determinations and talk, for instance, of an “existent golden mountain” in just the same way as of a “high golden mountain”, thus ascribing the predicate “existent” in the former case just as the predicate “high” in the latter case. Nevertheless the existent golden mountain exists just as little as the high golden mountain: “being existent” in the sense of the existential determination and “to exist” in the ordinary sense of “being” are absolutely not the same.

Russell finds this distinction wholly implausible, and breaks up the discussion at this point (Russell 1907, 439):

20

STEFANIA CENTRONE Meinong’s next argument is an answer to my contention that, on his principles, “the existent round square” exists. To this he replies that it is existent but does not exist. I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent; and beyond this I have no more to say on this head.

Meinong himself admits that his answer to Argument II* is not very helpful, when he writes (Meinong 1907, 224. Translation mine): Incidentally, I have to admit that my contributions relative to the issue of the “existential determinations” are in the best case an extremely awkward attempt to solve the problem that has been posed to knowledge since so many centuries by the ontological argument.

By this account of the quarrel Russell seems to be the winner of the controversy. However, the theory of definite descriptions appears to be defective in the treatment of statements, like (2) above that seem to assess a relation between existent and non-existent objects. For if we analyze away the name ‘Jupiter’ by a definite description such as ‘the most powerful roman god’, then the historical truth (2) The ancient Romans worshipped Jupiter turns into the falsehood (2) There is a most powerful Roman god and it is unique and the Romans worshipped it.

6. A Husserlian Amendment to the Bolzanian Theory The Bolzanian theory appears to be the nearest to common sense, for it gives a naturalistic solution of the problem of knowledge. As John Stuart Mill puts it, there seems to be good reason for adhering to the common usage, and claiming that we are talking of the sun, when we use the word ‘sun’. According to the Bolzanian theory every word expresses a meaning (concept). Sometimes it happens that the concepts expressed are empty, when the object one is thinking or talking about is missing. As we saw, the Bolzanian theory is, prima facie, not able to give a satisfactory explanation of some important uses of non-existent talk, in particular predica-

RELATIONAL THEORIES OF INTENTIONALITY

21

tions about non-existents such as (3), trans-fictional statements such as (4), inter-fictional statements such as (5), historically true predications like (6) as well as identity statements like (7). Perhaps we are not yet completely lost, and there is a way to save the relational theory of intentionality without violating Ockham’s razor. Early Husserl, who in the last decade of the 1800s is strongly influenced by Bolzano,27 comes to the aid. In an 1894 text entitled “Intentional Objects”28, while arguing against the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw school Kasimierz Twardowski that there are objectless concepts, Husserl offers a very interesting solution of our problem. Let us try to render concisely its train of thought by means of an example. Compare the two intentional acts that are communicated to the hearer by the two following utterances: (i) I am thinking of the sun, (ii) I am thinking of the golden mountain. Twardowski says that both in (i) and in (ii) there is an intentional act, an intentional content (a picture of the sun, respectively of the golden mountain, that he takes to be the meaning of the utterance (sic!)) and an intentional object. In (i) the intentional object is the sun, in (ii) the intentional object is the golden mountain, which exists only in the intentio of the speaker and of the hearer. Husserl argues against Twardowski that the act of thinking is the same in (i) and (ii). In (i) we have an intentional act, a content (which is the sense or meaning of each utterance of (i)) and a referred-to object. In (ii) we have no referred-to object. We can split up the act of thinking as we like, and we will never find neither an intentional golden mountain nor the sun in it. But, the opponent could object, we talk of the golden mountain in the same way in which we talk of the sun. Well, Husserl would answer, yes! The point is that in (ii) the semiotic relations are in some way altered or suspended, though not arbitrarily but in a way that is presupposed in all kinds of improper speech (mathematical speech, fictional speech, mythological speech and so on). Husserl suggests that intentional27 28

Cp. the tripartite structure of Husserl’s 1896 Logic Lectures (Husserl 2001), and what Husserl himself says in the Prolegomena (Husserl 1900/01, 29; 225–227). Husserl 1894.

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objects-speech is an improper (uneigentlich) speech that points to a modification of the ordinary relations between words and objects. 29 There is only […] one world, but a lot of […] hypothesis, fictions and so on and the whole difference boils down to the fact that for reasons of practical convenience we talk as if the judgments that we do would be unconditioned […] This happens in a natural way where a group of statements stands under a fictional (arbitrary, poetical, mythological) or scientific assumption […] (Husserl 1894, 328–329).

Thus, we can stick to the Bolzanian theory: our mental acts or states and linguistic utterances always have an (abstract logical) content and sometimes refer to an object. We add the Husserlian amendment that in case of predications about non-existents such as (3), trans-fictional statements such as (4), inter-fictional statements such as (5), historically true predications like (6) as well as identity statement like (7) the words have their ordinary meaning, but the usual semiotic relations are not in force. They are altered in a lawful way.

Stefania Centrone Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg [email protected]

29

Husserl 1894, 311.

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23

References Bolzano, Bernard (1837), Wissenschaftslehre. Versuch einer ausführlichen und größtentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter, 4 vols., Sulzbach: Seidel [abbrev.: WL], New edition: Wissenschaftslehre, J. Berg (ed.), BernardBolzano-Gesamtausgabe, Series 1, vols. 11/1–14/3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1985–1999 [abbrev.: BGA]. Bolzano, Bernard (1841), Wissenschaftslehre und Religionswissenschaft in einer beurtheilenden Uebersicht, Sulzbach: Seidel [abbrev.: Übersicht]. Boukema, Harm (2007), “Russell, Meinong and the Origin of the Theory of Descriptions”, in: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 27, 41– 72. Cartwright, Richard (1987), “On the Origin of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions”, in: R. Cartwright, Philosophical Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 95–133. Casari, Ettore (2009), “Logiche del non-essere” , in: Rivista di Filosofia 100, 43–66. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1957), Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1960), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1982), Brentano and Meinong Studies, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Frege, Gottlob (1884), Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Breslau: Koebner. Frege, Gottlob (1892), “Über Begriff und Gegenstand”, in: G. Frege, Kleine Schriften, I. Angelelli (ed.), Darmstadt: Olms. Frege, Gottlob (1903), “Über die Grundlagen der Geometrie”, in: G. Frege, Kleine Schriften, I. Angelelli (ed.), Darmstadt: Olms, 368–375. Frege, Gottlob (1910), “Vorlesung über Begriffsschrift”, in: “Vorlesungen über Begriffsschrift: Nach der Mitschrift von Rudolf Carnap”, History and Philosophy of Logic 17, 1–48.

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Frege, Gottlob (1918), “Der Gedanke. Eine logische Untersuchung”, in: Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 2, 58–77. Griffin, Nicholas (1996), “Denoting Concepts in the Principle of Mathematics”, in: R. Monk and A. Palmer (eds.), Bertrand Russell and the Origin of Analytic Philosophy, Bristol: Thoemmes, 23–64. Hylton, Peter (1990), Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Höfler, Alois (1890), Logik. Unter Mitwirkung von Dr. Alexius Meinong. Wien: F. Tempsky / G. Freytag. Husserl, Edmund (1894), “Intentionale Gegenstände”, in: Husserliana. Gesammelte Werke, vol. XXII, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 303–338. Husserl, Edmund (1900/1901), Logische Untersuchungen, Bd I: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Halle: Max Niemeyer (Nachdruck Tübingen 71993). Husserl, Edmund (2001), Logikvorlesung 1896, edited by E. Schuhmann. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Künne, Wolfgang (2007), “Fiktion ohne fiktive Gegenstände: Prolegomenon zu einer Fregeanischen Theorie der Fiktion”, in: Fiktion, Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, M. Reicher (ed.), Paderborn: Mentis, 54–72. Künne, Wolfgang (2008), Versuche über Bolzano / Essays on Bolzano. Sankt Augustin: Academia. Lambert, Karel (1973), “A Review discussion of J. N. Findlay’s Meinong’s theory of objects and values”, in: Inquiry 16, 221–230. Lambert, Karel (1983), Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mally, Ernst (1904), “Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens”, in: A. Meinong (ed.), Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth, 121–262. Meinong, Alexius (1902), Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung, in: MGA II, 377–469. Meinong, Alexius (1902), Über Annahmen, 2nd edition 1910, in: MGA IV. Meinong, Alexius (1904), Über Gegenstandstheorie, in: MGA II, 481–530. Engl. transl. in Chisholm (1960), 76–117.

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Meinong, Alexius (1907), Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, in: MGA IV, 197–366. Meinong, Alexius (1915), Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, in: MGA VI. Meinong, Alexius (1965), Philosophenbriefe: aus der wissenschaftlichen Korrespondenz von Alexius Meinong, R. Kindiger (ed.), Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt. Meinong, Alexius (1969–1978). Alexius-Meinong-Gesamtausgabe. R. Haller / R. Kindiger / et al. (eds.), vols. 1–7. Graz: Akademische Druckund Verlagsanstalt [abbrev.: MGA]. Mill, John Stuart (1843), A System of Logic, New York: Harper & Brothers. Morscher, Edgar (2007), Studien zur Logik Bernard Bolzanos, Salzburg: Sankt Augustin. Parsons, Terence (1980), Nonexistent Objects, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Quine, Willard v. O. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press. Reicher, Maria (2006), “Nonexistent Objects”, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nonexistentobjects/ Ryle, Gilbert (1972), “Intentionality-Theory and the Nature of Thinking”, in: R. Haller (ed.), Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 7–15. Russell, Bertrand (1905a), “On Denoting”, in: Mind 14, 479–493. Russell, Bertrand (1905b), “Review of Meinong’s Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie”, in: Mind 14, 530–538. Russell, Bertrand (1907), “Review of Meinong’s Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften”, in: Mind 16, 436– 439. Russell, Bertrand (1944), “My Mental Development”, in: P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

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Russell, Bertrand (1973), “Three Letters to Meinong”, D. Lackey (ed.), in: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 93, 15–18. Searle, John (1983), Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Simons, Peter (1988), “Über das, was es nicht gibt: Die Meinong-RussellKontroverse”, in: Semiotik 10-4, 399–426. Smith, Janet Farrell (1985), “The Russell-Meinong Debate”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, 305–350. Twardowski, Kasimir (1884), Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, repr. München-Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1982.

THE NON-EXISTING OBJECT REVISITED: MEINONG AS THE LINK BETWEEN HUSSERL AND RUSSELL? Peter Andras Varga

Summary Husserl’s involvement in the debate on intentionality by the School of Brentano raises the hope of establishing an indirect link between him and the early analytic philosophy, since Russell, in the course of formulating his theory of descriptions, extensively discussed Meinong’s theory of objects. I examine whether Husserl could be connected to the position Russell criticized. I also study an unpublished manuscript of Husserl from 1907 which proves that he read Russell’s critique of Meinong, and I try to connect it to Husserl’s own critique of Meinong and to Husserl’s earlier position. Although Husserl was finally reluctant to consider Russell’s arguments, I believe that this analysis could still provide important insights into Husserl’s unique transcendental phenomenological position.

1. Introduction: Russell’s Debate with Meinong By around 1920, Husserl successfully ruined the two most promising chances for an interaction between his phenomenology and the nascent analytic philosophy. As recent advances in Husserl scholarship show, both Bertrand Russell’s planned review of the Logical Investigations1 and the 1

Since this episode is surrounded by various myths, it might be worth a closer look. “A new edition of your ‘Logische Untersuchungen’”, Russell wrote to Husserl in 1920, “was one of the books I had with me in prison” (Husserl 1994, vol. 6, 367; this fact is also confirmed by Russell’s handwritten list of “Philosophical Books read in prison”, Russell 1986, 316). Contrary to a widespread view, however, in this letter Russell makes no mention of his earlier intention to review Husserl’s book in the Mind, which is mentioned only in a prison letter of

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PETER ANDRAS VARGA

reception of Husserl’s guest lectures in London 2 were jeopardized by what were almost conscious decisions on Husserl’s part to prefer forays into his

2

Russell containing a message to G. F. Stout: “Please tell Professor Stout […] that if he still wants review of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, I will do it in time for the October ‘Mind’. I have only 1 st volume & half of 2nd. If the other half of 2nd has appeared & he has it, will he please send it?” (Bertrand Russell’s letter to Frank Russell et al., June 10, 1918 (unpublished), Ms. Russell, Class: 730 Document No.: 079973, unnumbered 3) This message seems to confirm that it was Husserl’s questionable editing policy of his Logische Untersuchungen what impeded Russell’s review: In 1913 Husserl decided to elevate his earlier work to the position of transcendental phenomenology by progressively revising its parts for a new edition. He published a partially edition in October, which was in Russell’s hand, carrying a preface in which Husserl claimed that the closing part is “now in the press” (Husserl 1975, 15, (orig. XVI); quoted English translation (hereafter abbreviated as: ET): Husserl 2001, 8). This was, however, far from being the case, and already in December Husserl opted for a tabula rasa rewriting of the remaining part (see e.g. Husserl 1994, vol. 3, 531), which ended inconclusively in the summer. The closing volume appeared only in 1921. It is not only that the resulting situation must have rightly annoyed Russell, but Husserl’s decision to elevate his work to a different philosophical position via piecemeal changes in the text (see his own declaration: Husserl 1975, 10 ff.) would have seriously confused Russell, had he written this review (of which no extant manuscript is known). Already Herbert Spiegelberg, a post-war pioneer of the Anglo-Saxon reception of phenomenology, was convinced that Husserl’s lectures (published almost 70 years later: Husserl 1999) were instrumental in jeopardizing the benevolent interest of early analytic philosophers towards phenomenology: “The first lesson from the London lectures one might be tempted to draw is simply: How not to do it. [...] [I]t is now perfectly clear that Husserl was not so much interested in helping a specifically British audience, but in working out a general introduction into his evolving ‘system’ of transcendental phenomenology, something he had not yet tried before on this scale.” (Spiegelberg 1970, 12–13) What Spiegelberg was not yet aware, however, is that in the beginning of the manuscript preparation Husserl had asked a Canadian student of him, Winthrop Packard Bell, for advices on contemporary British philosophy (Husserl 1994, vol. 3, 36–38; Husserl’s excerpts of Bell’s advices were hidden in a manuscript file); but then he has apparently abandoned his intention of catering for the specific needs of his audience (cf. ibid., 49). One of Bell’s remarks even concerned Bertrand Russell, who “helped logical intuition gain recognition” in England (ibid., 37). Husserl’s drive for systematic philosophy and his proverbial perfectionism (“I cannot sell my soul for a pottage of lentils of ‘famousness’ in England”, ibid., 45) prevented him not only from preparing the text of his lecture for publication at the Cambridge University Press but also led him, when Gilbert Ryle, who was not present at the London Lectures, later visited Husserl to lecture to Ryle “twice for an

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29

transcendental phenomenology rather than presenting it to foreign audiences. Given this regretful history of missed chances, it is compelling to look elsewhere for the signs of a relevant link between Husserl and the early analytic philosophy. As it is widely known, it suffices to open the issue of the journal Mind which published Bertrand Russell’s celebrated paper “On Denoting” in 1905, and turn circa 40 pages in order to find Russell’s appreciative review about Alexius Meinong.3 Meinong also figures in Russell’s main paper as a proponent of the “simple” theory which “regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus ‘the present King of France,’ ‘the round square,’ etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects” (Russell 1905b, 482–483). Russell’s paper is based on logical “puzzles” to test the logical theories against them, and the theory that is attributed to Meinong in Russell’s main paper apparently fails even the most basic test, as it “infringes the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that [...] the round square is round, and also not round; etc.” (ibid., 483). This is obviously claimed to be “intolerable” and any other theory must be preferred over Meinong’s one. However compelling this setting might be, it immediately raises suspicion, since Meinong appears to have been reduced here to the role of a mere representative of an inherently indefensible doctrine (“a wellworked out instance of how not to philosophize”, as J. N. Findlay once put it).4 Interestingly, Russell was obviously aware of the merits of Meinong’s philosophy, as, in the aforementioned review of Meinong in the same issue, Russell openly admitted that the “value of [Meinong’s theory] appears to me to be very great” (Russell 1905c, 530). Meinong’s philosophy, as it is widely recognized today, was indeed far from being reducible to the representation of a manifest absurdity. 5 Meinong tried to

3

4 5

hour on ‘Mein System’” (Schuhmann 1977, 340; this report is based on Ryle’s post-war recollections). Russell 1905c. – In order to facilitate the cross-checking of Husserl’s references to Meinong and Russell (see Section 3), I prefer to cite the original editions of their works. Findlay 1952, 16. For a classical exposition of the debate that also takes Meinong’s real position into account, see: Simons 1992.

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grant full citizenship to non-existing objects like the ‘round square’ – i.e. to establish a third class of objects besides actually existing, real objects and subsisting, ideal objects – by strictly separating objects and sentences about objects (the so-called objectives). Every conceivable thing, even the ‘round square’, can validly be regarded as an object, but the objective “The round square does not exist” is true and, at the same time, a subsisting ideal entity. It is also important to keep in mind that Meinong did not argue for the introduction of the third class of existence – Außersein – on the basis of the dubitable claim that since non-existing objects could be constituents of valid sentences, they must be admitted as existing objects 6 (this form of argumentation was called by Russell in his debate with the Scottish logician Hugh MacColl “the existential import of propositions” 7). Actually, it was Russell himself, who had taken this position some years earlier and later falsely attributed it to Meinong. This confusion is particularly visible in Russell’s book My Philosophical Development, in which he claims the following: Meinong […] pointed out that one can make statements in which the logical subject is ‘the golden mountain’ although no golden mountain exists. He argued, if you say that the golden mountain does not exist, it is obvious that there is something that you are saying does not exist – namely the golden mountain; therefore the golden mountain must subsist in some shadowy Platonic word of being, for otherwise your statement that the golden mountain does not exist would have no meaning. I confess that, until I hit upon the theory of descriptions, this argument seemed to me convincing. (Russell 1995, 64)

The latter part of Russell’s claim is undeniably true: he did find this argument convincing, as his writings preceding the “On Denoting” and his letter to Frege in 1904 demonstrate.8 But Meinong introduced the third class of existence precisely in order to avoid fallacious argument like this 6

7 8

This is clearly stated by Meinong already during the first presentation of the full-fledged Gegenstandstheorie in 1904: “the being of an objective does not depend at all on the being of its object” (Meinong 1904, 12). He considered this type of fallacious argument to be based on a false mereological analogy which misconceives the constituents of the objective as real parts. See Russell 1905a, 400. For a concise overview of Russell’s development between 1903 and 1905 see Hylton 2003.

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and to properly account for the status of ‘golden mountain’ in the sentence ‘No golden mountain exists’: namely ‘golden mountains’ are nonexisting and non-subsisting objects and nothing more. Russell’s engagement with Meinong raises the idea to use it to construct an indirect, multistage link between early analytic philosophy and early phenomenology. It was remarked already at the dawn of the postwar Meinong renaissance – by John N. Findlay in the 1952 Meinong memorial volume – that Meinong’s “influence in Anglo-Saxon countries […] has possibly been greater than that in the German-speaking world” (Findlay 1952, 11). Findlay had already pointed out Russell’s articles in the Mind (ibid., 12) and Husserl’s Logical Investigations, “in which he [Husserl] comes nearest to the standpoint of Meinong” (ibid., 19). Gilbert Ryle similarly opened his keynote at the international Meinong conference in 1970 with the evaluation: “one important part of Meinong’s contribution to twentieth-century thought is precisely the anti-Gegenstandstheorie with which he vaccinated Brentano, Russell and Wittgenstein” (Ryle 1972, 2). Meinong’s philosophy could thus provide mediation between Russell and his continental counterparts. The enthusiasm for such a program surged after a text by Edmund Husserl was published in 1979 in which he discussed precisely the problem of non-existing objects confronting Kazimir Twardowski, who was closely associated with Meinong during his Vienna period. Even the editor of Husserl’s text drew attention to the possible links to Russell (see Husserl 1979, XXX), and since then there have been repeated attempts to establish a multistage link between Husserl and Russell using Russell’s critique of Meinong and Husserl’s critique of Twardowski. In what follows, I first revisit this classical attempt in order to evaluate its chances in the light of the advances of Husserl and Brentano scholarship. Although Husserl’s confrontation with the Brentano-School’s debate on intentionality through Twardowski was indeed instrumental in the formation of his own notion of intentionality, I think that the chances of this program have been overestimated, and Husserl’s critique of Twardowski cannot serve as a direct link between early analytic philosophy and phenomenology. There is, however, a hitherto unknown text, written by Husserl on the occasion of his revisiting of Meinong’s philosophy after his breakthrough to transcendental phenomenology, which could be con-

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sidered as Husserl’s direct confrontation with Russell’s debate with Meinong. I analyze this text in Section 3, and conclude that even if the immediate results of the analysis are negative, its lessons – together with some observations made during the investigation, including the remark of the contemporary editor of another version of Husserl’s text – could be used to make an important aspect of Husserl’s specific transcendental phenomenological position more understandable.

2. The Indirect Link Through Husserl’s “Reaction Against Twardowski” The focal point of Husserl’s famous text is the problem raised by nonexisting objects or, to phrase it in the terminology of this debate, by presentations lacking an object (the so-called objectless presentations, gegenstand(s)lose Vorstellungen).9 The case of objectless presentations – e.g. the round square, the green virtue, or even the golden mountain10 – was highlighted by Bernard Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre in 1837, although it should be noted that objectless presentations did not pose any problem in the objectivist ontology of Bolzano.11 The other aspects of Bolzano’s notion of objectless presentation are also worth a detailed look. Objectless presentations lack extension (Umfang), rather than having an empty extension. Bolzano formulates this as “a presentation having no object and […] being a presentation of nothing [nichts vorstellen]” (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 304), which already anticipates why these presentations are going to occupy a central position in the debate on intentionality. Bolzano 9 10

11

As Wolfgang Künne has noted (Künne 2011, 84, n. 30), Husserl had actually misquoted Bolzano’s term, because Bolzano did not use the linking element “s”. Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 304 – I refrain from using an explicit notation for presentations, as Bolzano himself did not resort to it and the lack of it is not going to cause misunderstandings in uncomplicated contexts. This is already indicated by the fact that the corresponding section (§ 67) was not underexposed by Bolzano, as if it would represent an inner contradiction or an aporetic passage. Quite the contrary; this section was marked by an asterisk, indicating that it belonged to the core of the work. Bolzano also listed it among the essential sections in a letter in the penultimate year of his life (Bolzano 2008, 158).

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explicitly introduced the notion of objectless presentations in order to clarify the relations between an object, the mental realization of a presentation – which he called a subjective or thought (gedachte) presentation –, and the objective presentation, which constitutes the matter (Stoff) of a subjective presentation. Even the presentation of nothing “has a matter, namely the objective concept [i.e. an objective conceptual presentation] of the nothing” (ibid.), but this presentation lacks any object. It is not to imply, however, that Bolzano’s notion of objectless presentation was entirely unproblematic. In a diary note recorded after the publication of the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano himself came to recognize that the property of objectlessness must be understood in an atemporal sense (otherwise objective presentations would undergo contingent temporal alterations, thereby endangering the objective propositions [Sätze] about them).12 There is, however, a more sophisticated difficulty which Bolzano faced already in a subsequent paragraph of the Wissenschaftslehre. An important class of objectless presentations is formed by the so-called “imaginary presentations”, which are composite presentations consisting of contradicting partial presentations (e.g. the round square). While in the latter case the lack of object is immediately evident, Bolzano had to admit that there are presentations, like the regular pentahedron, which might require us to perform a complex chain of reasoning to be classified as objectless (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 318). Bolzano recognizes that this is an indication that the names of objectless presentations are not meaningless (bedeutungslos), unlike “abracadabra”, and that they could be thought of (even if we cannot always attach clear accompanying sensuous pictures (sinnliche begleitende Bilder) to them). While this seemed to have satisfied Bolzano, there is still an important aspect which remains unresolved here. The problem of objectless presentations is apparently not a static one, but there is a dynamic side as well: it might require us to perform a complex chain of reasoning in order to classify a presentation as objectless (which, again, introduces the question of temporality). This does not 12

See Bolzano 1979, 65. In the Wissenschaftslehre he cites the “actually blossoming grapevine” as a presentation “that could be objectless” (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 305), even though it was in the previous section (§ 66,4) where he laid down that the extension of an objective presentation is temporally invariable (Bolzano 1837, vol. 1, 299).

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endanger Bolzano’s objectivist ontology, but it highlights the need to philosophically capture this “subjective” side as well. It is compelling to conceive the intense discussion on the intentionality by the students of Brentano as a result of the collision between Brentano’s principle of the universal validity of intentionality – i.e. that every presentation is the presentation of something (cf. Brentano 1874, 115– 116) – and Bolzano’s claim that objectless presentations have no object. The feasibility of this often invoked historical picture depends on the nontrivial question as to whether Brentano himself perceived objectless presentations as an anomaly calling for further explanation, or whether he regarded them as easily explicable, maybe because he was committed to the thesis that the intentionality of a presentation merely involves the presentation having an immanent mental object. In the latter case the problem would only emerge if intentionality is understood in the sense of aiming at the object itself, rather than at its mental substitute. This move is usually credited to the distinction between the content and object of a presentation, introduced in the early 1890s by Alois Höfler and Kazimierz Twardowski, the semi-orthodox disciples of Brentano. This historical view has been increasingly questioned in recent Brentano scholarship, as Brentano’s specific notion of intentionality turns out to be richer than previously assumed.13 In any case, it could be safely said that there was a distinct debate about the notion of intentionality among Brentano’s disciples, which could be temporally and geographically circumscribed. For example, Carl Stumpf’s psychology and logic lectures in Halle in 1888– 1887, which the young Husserl preparing for his habilitation examination attended, definitely antedate this debate (Schuhmann 2000, 65), which

13

See e.g. Rollinger 2012, who makes the point that the proper reconstruction of Brentano’s notion of intentionality presupposes a reliable chronology and edition of his manuscript notes (262 ff.), especially that of the planned continuation of his epoch-making Psychology. This would explain why Chrudzimski deemed the “historical question” concerning Brentano’s notion of intentionality “practically unanswerable” (Chrudzimski 2005, 18). The first philologically sound interpretations of Brentano’s notion of intentionality which went beyond the immanentist thesis were offered around the millennium (Antonelli 2000, Chrudzimski 2001).

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would explain why Husserl ascribed this debate to a wing of the school, rather than to his masters.14 It is also hard to precisely locate the origins of this debate, as it would involve answering the elusive question as to how Brentano’s disciples came to recognize the significance of Bolzano’s general theoretical philosophy. Brentano himself was, of course, aware of Bolzano’s achievements and he referred to him extensively in his lectures, as Husserl’s lecture notes from 1884–1885 demonstrate.15 However, Brentano’s references had been mostly confined to Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite, and he reacted in an extremely hostile way when he was later confronted with the growing preference towards Bolzano among his former students.16 The fateful rediscovery of Bolzano was probably made by several disciples of Brentano, especially by Benno Kerry and Alois Höfler (maybe independently of each other),17 and the debate on the definition of content and object is perceptibly marked by the presence of Bolzano and his idea of objectless presentations. This historical overview of the origins of the debate already hints at the possibility of a subtle but significant displacement of Bolzano’s original position, and it is indeed worth taking a closer look at Höfler logic handbook published in 1890 under the nominal co-authorship of Meinong, which is usually considered the first document of the contentobject-distinction. Höfler’s handbook, originally intended for secondary school use in the Habsburg Monarchy, explicitly contained the distinction between the content (Inhalt) of a presentation and its object (Gegenstand). The content is an immanent mental entity and the object, which is not a mental entity, is referred by the presentation in virtue of its object (Höfler 1890, 7). In a part of Höfler’s handbook, which Husserl annotated 14

15 16

17

It is hard to decide which notion of intentionality Husserl has encountered during his studies at Brentano, since his student notes, which he had donated to the Brentano Archives in Prague in 1935, were destroyed during the Second World War. See Ms. Husserl Y 3 / 10 ff. Cf. Kraus 1919, 157. See Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 31 and Brentano 1946, 125, where Brentano uses the same condemnation (Bolzano “als Lehrer und Führer”). Shortly after the second letter he assured Oskar Kraus, his loyal disciple, that he “has never ever experienced the slightest influence” from Bolzano (Brentano 1966, 202). For an overview see Künne 1997, 31 ff.

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in his own copy, we find a detailed classification of presentations including the distinction between intuitive and non-intuitive presentations. The latter presentations are the results of abstraction based on intuitive components, e.g. the temperature of the sun, a green dodecahedron or a tone that is ten octave higher than the highest tone ever heard (ibid., 26). This classification inevitably leads to the question of presentations like the round square, which Höfler termed incompatible (unverträgliche) presentations (ibid.). There is, however, a telling passage in the text when Höfler raises the question as to whether incompatible presentations “could be presented [vorstellen] at all?” (ibid.). He opts for an affirmative answer by using an argumentation that may sound familiar: For how could I judge […] that a round square cannot exists, if I were not able to present it somehow [wenn das zu Beurtheilende nicht irgendwie vorgestellt werden könnte]? (ibid.).

The stage is also set for the return of the existential import of propositions. Before turning our attention to Husserl’s role in this debate, it is worth taking a quick look at Twardowski’s book which prompted Husserl’s response. Twardowski belonged to a later generation of Brentano disciples and had probably no personal contact with Husserl in Vienna. 18 18

Even this basic fact was hitherto unclear in the Husserl and Brentano scholarship. Robin D. Rollinger once conjectured that “[d]uring the year 1885, when Husserl and Twardowski were both studying under Brentano, they must have had some contact with another” (Rollinger 1999, 139). This, however, could not have been the case, since Twardowski began his university studies at the Faculty of Law in WS 1885/86, and in this semester he did not attend any class by Brentano (see Brożek 2011, 99 ff.). Furthermore, Brożek believes that Twardowski did not actually attend his classes in this semester (ibid., 101). In any case, already in December 1885 Twardowski moved to the Galician settlement Yezupil (Polish: Jezupol). He only spent two months in Vienna in the SS 1886, when he officially enrolled for some courses (ibid., 113), which, however, do not coincide with Husserl’s courses in this semester. Twardowski returned to the University of Vienna only in WS 1886/87 (ibid., 114), but at that time Husserl was already in Halle in Germany. Although it would be theoretically possible that Twardowski attended Brentano’s unannounced advanced private seminar during his stay in the spring of 1886 (where he could have met Husserl), it seems to be highly improbable, since his first documented encounter with Brentano took place only in WS 1887/88 (ibid., 119). Had he attended Brentano’s advanced

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However, he demonstrably sent his doctoral thesis to Husserl around December 189119 maybe as a gesture to capture the benevolence of an older disciple of Brentano, who possessed a higher academic rank. Twardowski either similarly sent his habilitation thesis to Husserl in 1894, or Husserl himself became aware of it while preparing for a review of recent logical literature that Natorp had assigned him. 20 Twardowski himself admitted that his habilitation thesis was motivated not only by “the spirit of Brentano” but also by Bolzano, whom he had discovered through Benno Kerry (Twardowski 1991, 11). Twardowski’s declared goal was to develop the distinction between content and object, as proposed precisely by Höfler’s handbook. It must be taken into account, however, that Twardowski’s position was far from being invariable. It is not only that he left Vienna in the winter semester of 1895, but he was at that time continuously experimenting with new configurations of contemporaneous logical ideas. 21 For the purposes of this paper, the most important aspect of Twardowski’s habilitation work is that he tried to solve these difficulties by advancing the bold claim that most of the objectless presentations actually do have an object. How is that possible? In case of some presentations, like the

19

20 21

seminar in SS 1886 without any previous studies at Brentano (which is improbable on its own), he surely should have registered himself for Brentano’s announced lectures in the subsequent WS 1886/87. So it seems that Husserl and Twardowski did not study together in Vienna, let alone at Brentano. These conclusions are also reinforced by the results of my research in the archives of the University of Vienna (cf. Ms. UA Vienna Phil. Nationalen 1886– 1887), which indicate that Twardowski did not officially register himself for a course by Brentano between SS 1886 and SS 1887 (but he attended several classes of Robert Zimmermann). None of the courses Twardowski registered for in SS 1886 were attended by Husserl (cf. Varga 2015). This is proved by Husserl’s unpublished letter of thanks dated December 22, 1891, in which he acknowledged the receipt of Twardowski’s book. This letter was apparently hitherto unknown (cf. Schuhmann 1993, 41; Rollinger 1999, 139), so I quote it in full: “Sehr geehrter Herr[,] [i]ch sage Ihnen meinen besten Dank für die freundliche Zusendung Ihrer Abhandlung, die ich in diesen Ferientagen mit Interesse lesen werde. Hochachtungsvoll ergebenst[,] Dr. E[dmund] G[ustav] Husserl[.] Halle, a[n dem] T[ag] 22[.] XII. [18]91” (Ms. Twardowski 1771 (K-021-11 174r)). The tone of Husserl’s letter also points to the fact that there was little (if any) personal acquaintance between them. See Schuhmann 1993, 41–42. In an 1897 letter to Meinong he announced his intention to “combine the Brentano-Meinong-Höfler theory with that of Sigwart” (Meinong 1965, 144).

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presentation of ‘nothing’, Twardowski employed a transformation that is very similar to Russell’s theory of descriptions. Instead of the sentence ‘Nothing is forever’ one should mean, according to Twardowski, the sentence ‘There is not any thing which is forever’ (cf. Twardowski 1894, 23). He might have opted for this solution concerning every objectless presentation, which would have brought him close to Bertrand Russell’s transformation of the sentence ‘The present king of France is bald’ (apart from the logical apparatus used by Russell, of course). But Twardowski chose a different solution by claiming that other types of objectless presentations do have an object, but only in a modified sense.22 It is thus justified to consider Twardowski’s habilitation thesis a forerunner of Meinong’s fullfledged Gegenstandstheorie, which raises the question as to where Husserl is situated in this debate. Until the middle of the 1890s, circa 6 years before the Logical Investigations, Husserl was not particularly concerned about the problem of intentionality. In fact, the word intentionality is barely mentioned in Husserl’s philosophical writings. 23 The first reported philosophical writing of Husserl addressed the “problem of continuum” (Brentano / Stumpf 2014, 260), a rather mathematical topic, which corresponds to the earliest known manuscript of Husserl, titled “Homogeneous and inhomogeneous continua” (Ms. Husserl K I 50 / 47a), which hardly goes beyond the domain of mathematics. Husserl’s first surviving work, a part of his habilitation thesis published under the title “On the Notion of the Number”, similarly to his Philosophy of Arithmetic, published in 1891, could be classified as a treatment of foundational problems of mathematics, including numbers, calcu22

23

Twardowski distinguished between proper existence, which the objects of objectless presentations lack, and existence in a modified sense, which is assigned to the objects of objectless presentations (Twardowski 1894, 24 ff.). He explained the modified sense by analogy to the modification of the word ‘friend’ in the noun phrase ‘false friend’ (a ‘false friend’ is not a friend proper, in contrast to e.g. a ‘true friend’, which preserves the proper sense of ‘friend’). This distinction belongs to the shared Brentanoian doctrines (see Brentano 1874, 288; although Husserl – and maybe even Twardowski encountered it through Brentano’s lectures, cf. Ms. Husserl Y Brentano 2 / 42). It must be added that this distinction was familiar to Bolzano as well, who, interestingly, also used it in one of his last letters to analyze the status of subjective presentations (Bolzano 2006, 229). See Schuhmann 2004, 119.

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lus etc., by the devices of a general philosophical psychology. It is telling that his habilitation thesis was subtitled “psychological analyses” and his latter book “psychological and logical investigations”. In fact at the beginning of the 1890s, Husserl could have started a career in mathematical logic as he proposed an intensional translation of extensional logic in a journal called Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie (Quarterly for Scientific Philosophy). Unfortunately for the young Husserl, but fortunately for the history of philosophy, his attempt proved to be a catastrophic failure, and he even became involved in a priority and plagiarism debate. In the following years, Husserl was writing a book on space, which, seen in retrospect from his mature genetic phenomenology, could be considered as the anticipation of the analysis of the constitution of space, but, at that time, it was still conceived as a contribution to the descriptive psychological foundation of mathematics. However, this project also came to a standstill around 1893–94, due to, as Husserl has noted, “difficulties with the notion of intuition, the intuitive presentation in contrast to conceptual ones” (Husserl 1979, 452). This led Husserl to address the problem of presentations in general, penning a series of essays, two of which were published under the title “Psychological Studies” at the turn of the year. But even these attempts ended inconclusively. Husserl had spent the early 1894 with reading William James, until Twardowski’s book was published in Vienna, which was explicitly dedicated to the structure and anomalies of intentional acts. Husserl was apparently so excited about this book that he immediately wrote down “a reaction against Twardowski”, as he described his text later (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 144). Husserl repeatedly revisited and reworked this text, so it could be safely considered one of the key texts of the genesis of Husserl’s philosophy. The beginning of the surviving portion of the text clearly sets Husserl in the context of this debate: If every presentation presents an object, then there is an object for every presentation, and therefore: Every presentation has a corresponding object. On the other hand, it is considered to be indubitably true that not every presentation has a corresponding object; there to speak with Bolzano, ‘objectless presentation’ […] for instance […] a ‘round square’. 24

24

Husserl 1990, 142; ET: Rollinger 1999, 251. Note that the version published in

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First of all, it is important to see, as mentioned above, that this is a relatively new development in Husserl’s thinking. In fact, before his reading of Twardowski’s book in the summer of 1894. Husserl did not share the basic principles that raise the problem of the intentionality of objectless presentations. This is nicely illustrated by a less-known passage, which Husserl wrote in 1891: [There are] two very different things: namely (1) whether a signification [Bedeutung …] belongs to a name, and (2) whether or not there exists an object corresponding to a name. ‘Meaningless’ names in the strict sense are names without a signification – pseudo names such as ‘Abracadabra’. But ‘round square’ is a univocal common noun to which, however, nothing can in truth correspond. (Husserl 1979, 12; ET: Husserl 1994b, 60)

In other words, Husserl could have easily chosen the most simple solution: there is no problem at all, objectless presentations simply lack objects. The fact that he did choose this option in 1891 clearly indicates that he was not at all concerned about Brentano’s thesis of intentionality after he had left Vienna. In 1894 Husserl’s relation to Brentano’s notion apparently underwent a complete change. Husserl himself explains this transition in the following passage: [I]t seems that we may […] ascribe to every presentation a meaning, but not a reference to something objective. This tendency is however counterbalanced by a new consideration, It is […] correct for us to say ‘»a round square« presents an object which is at the same time round and square, but there is certainly no such object’.25

The question we must answer, however, is how Husserl’s own solution compares to the theories of other disciples of Brentano. What is relatively easy to see is which solutions were opposed by Husserl. There is a naive solution which would introduce a mental picture (“geistiges Abbild ”, Husserl 1990, 143) that it supposed to mediate the intentional relation. According to this popular view, the problem of objectless presentations is easy to solve since the mental pictures are immanent:

25

the critical edition (Husserl 1979, 303–348) is unreliable for our purposes, since it was based on the last developmental stage of the text. Husserl 1990, 142; ET: Rollinger 1999, 251.

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[T]he phantasy picture is inside the presentation and the object is, or not is, outside. In either case the presentation is not at all affected by whether or not the object is, will be, or has been.26

Besides that these mental pictures could neither be found in the consciousness nor would a picture alone explain the mechanism of intentional reference, the main problem with this compellingly easy solution is that it overlooks the real challenge of the paradox: But does not the sense of the […] statements discussed above imply that it is in each case the same object which is presented and exists or does not exist? The same Berlin that I present also exists, and the same would no longer exist if judgment were brought it down as in the case of Sodom and Gomorrha. 27

In other words, the intentional object is the real object and there is no other object behind it. The proposed disjunctive solution only begs the question. Husserl’s clear-cut rejection of the disjunctive solution already exemplifies the phenomenology’s basic commitment, but what is at stake is how to implement it – especially with respect to anomalies like the case of objectless presentations. Husserl explicitly rejects the solution Twardowski proposed which, he says, shares the same mistake: Here I see again the false duplication which became fatal to the picture theory: The immanent object […] cannot be anything but the true object wherever truth corresponds to the presentation. […] Whether we merely present Berlin or judge it as existing, it is still Berlin itself.28

Husserl is apparently unaware of the real nature of Twardowski’s solution. His critique might apply at Brentano’s notion of intentionality, which, according to usual interpretation, identifies the intentional object with an immanent object although, as discussed earlier, it is far from being certain that Brentano himself was committed to such a simplistic view. But Höfler and Twardowski were definitely not committed to this thesis. Quite the contrary, they have introduced the content-object distinction precisely in order to account for the difference between the real object and an immanent mental entity. 26 27 28

Husserl 1990, 143; ET: Rollinger 1999, 252. Husserl 1990, 144; ET: Rollinger 1999, 252–253. Husserl 1990, 146; ET: Rollinger 1999, 255.

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At the end of his argumentation, Husserl explicitly accuses Twardowski of committing a serious breach of the laws of logic: If a round square is immanent in the presentation […], then there would be a round square in the presentation. […] Since the presentations really exist, then the existence of each and every absurdity also would have to be fully and completely admitted. The realm of the objects and states of affairs immanent in the presentations would not be subject to mathematical and logical laws.29

In a remark written a decade later Husserl even added: “Precisely this is what Meinong has recently proposed in his book on Gegenstandstheorie in 1907.”30 However, as discussed above, Husserl’s critique completely misses the point. Twardowski was far from advocating a disjunctivist solution. Quite the contrary, he tried to solve the problem of the intentionality of objectless presentation by assigning them an existence in a modified sense, which anticipates Meinong’s introduction of Aussersein, a mode of being beyond actual existence and ideal subsistence. This is particularly visible in Twardowski’s first university lecture course in Vienna, which he hold in the winter semester of 1894/1895, after finishing his book in late 1893 and successfully passing his habilitation examination in July 1894 (Brożek 2011, 148f.). In this unpublished lecture, Twardowski first considered whether objectless presentations have an empty extension (Ms. Twardowski 54, 56). This position is reminiscent of Höfler’s handbook, according to which the objectless presentations have an empty “logical extension” (cf. Höfler 1890, 30), and it already diverges from Bolzano’s original definition of objectless presentations. Then he introduces an argument which reminds us of the existential import of proposition in order to reject Höfler’s position: Cannot we say that as the round square is a geometric figure that cannot be drawn. Here I make a judgment – yet not on my presentation of the round square, but on the round square itself, the object of my presentation of the round square. [...] So an object corresponds to these presentations, but this object does not exist. Yes, not only an object but an infinite number of objects correspond to these presentations. I can imagine a round square with the area of about 2 square centimeters or 3, 4, 5 and so forth in infinitum. 31 29 30 31

Husserl 1990, 147; ET: Rollinger 1999, 256. Husserl’s marginal note in pencil (Ms. Husserl K I 56/10, not part of the editions quoted above, cf. Husserl 1979, 458). Ms. Twardowski 54, 57 (italicization corresponds to underlining in original).

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Twardowski also explicitly acknowledges that judgements (Urteile) require us to assume the object we are judging – it is just that this object does not exist. This is where Twardowski clearly anticipates a philosophical position that Meinong would take some years later (even if Meinong’s stance on the existential import was more differentiated). Had Husserl directly confront the solution Twardowski proposed, his text could have been used for building a multistage link between his notion of intentionality and Meinong’s position, which in turn could have been connected to Russell’s criticism. But Husserl failed to do so. There is, however, an interesting claim in Twardowski’s treatment of objectless presentations in his unpublished Vienna lectures. He rightly points out that the extension is actually infinite, rather than empty, as it is possible to imagine various round squares. This again highlights the significance of the aspect that was classified by Bolzano as being merely subjective.

3. The Direct Link: Husserl on Meinong and Russell in 1907 By the time of Russell’s debate with Meinong, the relationship between Husserl and Meinong seriously deteriorated, burdened by conflicts over priority and, implicitly, even over plagiarism. 32 These conflicts also pre-

32

“Kann ich nicht sagen: das runde Viereck ist eine geometrische Figur, die man nicht zeichnen kann. Hier fälle ich ein Urteil – aber nicht über meine Vorstellung des runden Vierecks, sondern über das runde Viereck selbst, den Gegenstand meiner Vorstellung des runden Vierecks. […] Also auch diesen Vorstellungen entspricht ein Gegenstand, nur existiert er nicht. Ja, nicht nur ein Gegenstand, sondern unendlich viele entsprechen diesen Vorstellungen. Ich kann mir ein rundes Viereck vorstellen von etwa 2 □cm [Quadratzentimeter] Fläche, von 3, 4[,] 5□cm u.s.w. in infinit[um].” On this infamous episode of the history of the Brentano-School see Carlo Ierna’s excellent recent study (Ierna 2009). Although Ierna opts for the charitable conclusion that “great minds think alike” (ibid., 8), i.e. the “similarities in their theories […] seem to point rather in the direction of common sources than to suggest plagiarism in some sense or other” (ibid., 28), his discovery of Husserl’s lapsus calami at a page reference to Mill in Husserl’s habilitation thesis (ibid., 14) clearly indicates that Husserl took over a quote from Meinong without properly referencing him. Husserl’s tendency to underexpose his indebtedness to Meinong, coupled with his sweeping claim that there is no “generally accepted

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vented Meinong from reading the aforementioned 1894 text that Husserl offered him in 1902 (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 147). At the same time, the years after the turn of the century constituted a crucial period for the formation of Husserl’s own philosophy. It was in his 1906/07 lecture on logic and epistemology that he first correctly formulated the phenomenological reduction, which concluded the transformation of his phenomenology from descriptive psychology into a full-fledged philosophy. This lecture course was preceded by a period of recollection, rereading and organizing his earlier manuscripts during the autumn of 1906. It was in the summer of 1906 that Husserl secured a stable academic position, as he was promoted to a university position comparable with full professorship and his salary was also raised. In the course of making an inventory of his philosophical tasks, Husserl also explicitly mentioned Meinong: A discussion with Meinong will, for obvious reasons, be necessary and unavoidable – not to mention the fact that it must at some point be shown that in actuality the domains of investigation and the most essential points established are common to both sides. We are like two people traveling in one and the same dark continent. Naturally we frequently see and describe the same things, but often differently, corresponding to our different masses. 33

In academic circles it has been assumed so far hat Husserl’s planned confrontation with Meinong’s philosophy did not eventually happen. There is, however, a critique of Meinong written by Husserl in the late summer of 1907 that is relatively or probably completely unknown, as it has previously not been transcribed from Husserl’s idiosyncratic shorthand.34

33 34

theory of relations” (Husserl 1970, 66, cf. 328), definitely suffices to justify Meinong’s anger, which is mirrored in the letter he wrote in his first outrage but later apparently restrained himself from sending it (Meinong 1965, 94–96). Husserl 1984, 444; ET: Husserl 1994b, 492. The text is preserved in the manuscript convolute Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25–27. While the preceding manuscript subdivision (28–31) was already recognized by K. Schuhmann as being Husserl’s excerpt of his copy of Meinong 1907 (see Schuhmann 1977, 108), the preceding subdivision seems to be hitherto unknown. It was not even mentioned in Robin D. Rollinger’s discussion of Husserl’s reaction to Meinong’s book (Rollinger 1999, 206–207). The subdivisions between 21 and 34 are missing from the early handwritten transcription of K III 33. There is a clear terminus post quem for Husserl’s text on Meinong and Russell, since one of its page is written on the reverse side of an invitation to a fa culty meeting, dated July 23, 1907 (26b).

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What makes this short piece of text entitled “The confrontation between Meinong and Russell over the law of noncontradiction” 35 especially interesting is that Husserl directly reads, excerpts and comments upon Russell’s articles on Meinong. One might remark that Husserl’s reading of Russell’s reviews published in the July issue of Mind would probably be a quick reaction time even in our age. 36 Russell’s last two reviews of Meinong, published in 1905 and 1907, already mark the ascending phase of his interest in Meinong’s philosophy. Having arrived at his own theory of eliminating non-existing objects, Russell was no more interested in motivations he believed to have received from Meinong, and started to formulate serious objections against Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie. Already in his 1905 review, published in the same issue as “On Denoting”, Russell formulated his own “master arguments” against Meinong’s admission of impossible objects: [T]he difficulty is that impossible objects often subsist, and even exist. For if the round square is round and square, the existent round square is existent and round and square. Thus something round and square exists, although everything round and square is impossible. (Russell 1905c, 533)

A year later, Meinong wrote a programmatic summary of the merits of his full-fledged Gegenstandstheorie (Meinong 1907), first published between 1906 and 1907 in three installments, in which he tried to answer his critics, including Russell, whose objections, as he admitted, “were especially penetrating” (Meinong 1907, 16). Meinong was defenseless against Russell’s master argument, and he could only resort to invoking the distinction between existence as a predicate and as a copula (ibid., 17). Having received the first installment of Meinong’s treatise, Russell immediately wrote him a letter (Meinong 1965, 151–152) signalizing that he finds this distinction unconvincing – 35 36

“Auseinandersetzung zwischen Meinong und Russell über den Satz vom Widerspruch”, Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a. While Husserl owned copies of several books by Meinong and Russell, he did not subscribe to the Mind itself. He probably read it in the library of the University of Göttingen, where he had been teaching since October 1901 (a full historical series of the journal is present in the university library), which testifies the longstanding Anglophone orientation of this university. In contrast, Hugh MacColl, Russell’s other debate partner had problems with obtaining copies of Mind in Northern France.

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something he already said in his 1905 review. It is indeed very hard to reply to Russell’s master argument, since, as John Findlay has already pointed out in his pioneering book on Meinong (Findlay 1963), even if one replies by distinguishing between the predicate ‘existence’ and the property of being existent, Russell’s argument could be iterated by predicating the latter property and so forth in infinitum. One might use formalized logical devices to construct a version of Meinong’s theory that avoids this consequence, but the Gegenstandstheorie would certainly loose much of its intuitive appeal.37 For Russell it was not necessary to have recourse to iterating his master arguments, as he was, justly, convinced that his theory of descriptions provides a superior solution to the original problem. Husserl was reading Meinong’s treatise in parallel with Russell’s review of it (Husserl made German excerpts of them), and he was observing, with morose delectation, the increasing difficulties Meinong was running into and he called the controversy “truly entertaining”. 38 Husserl apparently agreed with Russell’s point that Meinong cannot elude the law of contradiction by claiming that it only applies to actual or possible objects – as Meinong argued in a text (1907, 16) which Husserl also excerpted at length (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a) including Russell’s earlier objection (Russell 1905c, 533) –, because “[t]his reply seems to overlook the fact that it is of propositions (i.e. of ‘Objectives’ in Meinong’s terminology) […] that the law […] is asserted” (Russell 1907, 533). Husserl also noted this page number and excerpted the summary of Russell’s argument, adding the marginal note “sehr richtig!” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a). What makes this especially interesting is that it is this particular text passage (Russell 1907, 533) in which Russell referred the readers to his main paper “On Denoting”. Husserl, however, apparently ignored this hint and returned to Meinong’s argumentation against Russell in his 1907 book. He spoke ironically of Meinong’s “profound” (tiefsinnige) attempt at avoiding Russell’s master argument, and constructed an even more complex – though 37

38

M. Thrush has recently considered a slightly amended version of Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie and concluded that there are indeed unavoidable, though artificially constructed examples which entail contradiction (Thrush 2001). See also note 39 below. “wirklich amüsant”, Ms. Husserl K III 33/ 26a.

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not necessarily decisive – counterexample: “a non-existing existing something”.39 Husserl then turned to another attempt by Meinong to elude Russell’s critique. In a text excerpted by Husserl Meinong argued: “By the way, Russell’s whole argumentation is about impossibilia [unmögliche Gegenstände], thereby he himself provides the evidence that our thinking may very well engage in such objects.” (Meinong 1907, 18) This was, however, a particularly ill-fortuned argument by Meinong which clearly shows what a bad debater he was. In the review written by Russell in 1905, which Meinong was explicitly answering, Russell was still aware that Meinong was not committed to the existential import of proposition, though Russell believed it would have spoken for Meinong’s case: There is, Meinong admits […], one -strong argument in favour of [Meinong’s position …]. But this argument, he says, depends upon regarding a proposition as a complex, and its subject as a constituent of it; and such a view, he thinks can only be taken figuratively. I should have thought the subject of a proposition was a constituent of a complex […], and that therefore the argument would be sound.40

In his book of 1907 Meinong then jumped at this “sound argument”, which was actually contrary to his position as he knew at best, 41 thereby walking into the trap of Russell, since by that time Russell had already moved beyond the existential import of propositions. In 1907 he was able to answer Meinong triumphantly: 39

40 41

“Ein nicht-existierendes Existierendes” (Ms. K III 33 / 26a). At first sight, it is not obvious whether Husserl’s challenge is harder than Russell’s master argument. Husserl might have tried to point at an object possessing contradicting properties, but this is not considered posing a special difficulty for Meinong’s theory (Thrush 2001, 162 ff.), which is only endangered by a special “exportation” construction that efficiently undermines Meinong’s distinction between an object and the objectives relating to it. Russell 1905c, 532–533. The passage to which Russell referred is quoted in note 6 above. In his earlier book, to which Russell referred, Meinong was still clearly aware that such an argument would lead to an “existing object” (Meinong 1904, 12), but he must have also been alerted by the fact that in the above quote Russell rendered his position as “the subsistence of the [non-existing] objects” (Russell 1905c, 533). This was, of course, contrary to Meinong’s aim to ascribe only Aussersein to such objects (which Russell, actually, knew very well, since he immediately added a clause: “which he [Meinong] regards as non-subsistent”, ibid.).

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PETER ANDRAS VARGA To this I reply that I was careful to provide an interpretation of propositions in which such objects seem to occur and that therefore Meinong’s argument was answered by anticipation. (Russell 1907, 439)

Husserl carefully noted down Meinong’s attempt as well as Russell’s answer.42 This is the very sentence where Russell inserted a footnote with a reference to his famous theory of descriptions (Russell 1905b, 490). Husserl wrote down this reference as well, but he, unfortunately, did not comment upon that.43 The only remark Husserl made, at the very end of his text, is “Compare my letter to Meinong on May 22, 1891.” 44 This is an interesting reference which closes the circle, since it leads back to Husserl’s prephenomenological days. In the early 1890, as discussed in Section 2, Husserl was working on topics mainly concerning foundational problem of mathematics, which he addressed by descriptive psychological means. 1891 is precisely the year of Husserl’s deepest foray into the philosophy of logic and mathematics, when he tried to join the ongoing German debate between intensional and extensional logic. Husserl sided with those who, like Wilhelm Wundt, tried to preclude the priority claims of Englishstyle, i.e. pre-Russell, class logic by trying to shows that it necessarily presupposes intentional concepts. Not only did Husserl review the book by the mathematician Ernst Schröder, a pioneer of the German reception of 19th century English logic, but he also published a logical treatise in the same year in which he attempted to provide a concrete transformation that reduces extensional class-relations between concepts into intensional relations, i.e. claims about the contents (Inhalte) of these concepts understood as a collection of features (Merkmale). Husserl’s foray finally ended 42

43

44

“Ferner auf das letzte , dass mit all dem Russell doch Aussagen über unmögliche Objekte mache und sie so implicite zugesteht, antwortet Russell: Er sei sorgfältig bekümmert gewesen, to provide eine Interpretation von Propositionen, in welchen solche Objekte aufzutreten scheinen, und dass somit Meinongs Argument nichts besage (Mind, Oktober 1905, 490).” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 27a) It is unclear whether Husserl also had the 1905 issue of Mind in his hands. His only reference to this volume (Russell 1905c, 533, cf. Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 25a) might have directly been copied from Meinong 1907, 16, n 3, especially since in the next sentence Husserl went on to excerpt precisely this passage of Meinong. “Vgl. dazu meinen Brief an Meinong vom 22. 5. 91.” (Ms. Husserl K III 33 / 27a)

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in a bitter priority and plagiarism debate with one of his German colleagues, but at that time he sent his treatises to Meinong, whose response prompted him to write a lengthy letter further developing the details of his proposed transformation. Apparently this is the letter he considered relevant 16 years later. In the original treatise, one of the points Husserl clarified explicated was related precisely to the deductive properties of the empty set, which Husserl identified with the extension of the “concept of non-existence”. (Husserl 1979, 59; ET: Husserl 1994b, 107) Thereby he had to address the validity of sentences predicating a property about a non-existing object (e.g. ‘A round square is red’). In alignment with the existentially nonbinding class-logical interpretation of such sentences, Husserl allowed for any feature to be predicated about such objects, in fact, if n is non-existent, then that same n is a non-existent as a red, sweet, or non-red (etc.) thing; and to the non-existent as such, therefore, all properties actually belong. (Husserl 1979, 35; ET: Husserl 1994b, 83)

It is worth noting that, as Hugh MacColl’s paper testifies (see e.g. MacColl 1905, 78), this was a problem inherent in the Boolean systems which had general currency at that time, and Russell attacked MacColl precisely using a rudimental version of his theory of descriptions (cf. Russell 1905a, 399). In his letter Husserl corrected this view, precisely because by then he thought that the predicative sentence ‘S is P’ is false in case of non-existing subjects, i.e. the predicative sentence implies that “something is presented as having the feature” (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 124). In the original treatise, he had an axiom, which allowed for any feature to be predicated about non-existing objects. He still believed that such a claim could be proved by substituting negative properties and using double negation, but it is far from being an axiom. It is rather a “paradox”, allowing for the deduction of contrary sentences, which, as Husserl says, highlights the absurdity resulting from “hypostatizing the existence of something non-existing, which directly violates the fundamental logical principles” (ibid.). In this letter, which represents Husserl’s final opinion in this matter, Husserl thus committed himself to the view that non-existing objects could not be admitted as valid objects; and, 16 years later, in retrospect this seemed to be the adequate explanation for him for the absurd conse-

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quences Meinong’s theory was facing. One might say that Husserl was actually getting very close to Russell’s solution, especially since he was using the formulation “if there is anything possessing the feature A ...”. There was, indeed, a certain degree of similarity. Actually, there was an abundance of attempts by contemporaneous German and Austrian philosophers at eliminating non-existing objects by transforming sentences containing them into sentences about the properties of existing objects (including, as discussed earlier, one of the options partly utilized by Twardowski). So it could be safely assumed that such a transformation – of course, without the corresponding logical apparatus – would have been available to the members of the School of Brentano, including Husserl, had they wished to use it. This further underlines the strange fact that in 1907 Husserl was not paying any attention to Russell’s solution. This is something he shared with Meinong, who did not say anything relevant about the solution proposed by Russell either, which probably led Russell to lose his interest in Meinong once and for all. Therefore, at least from the Russell’s point of view, it was not regrettable that Husserl’s conversation with Meinong and Russell in 1907 remained a soliloquy.

4. Concluding Remarks It seems that the prima facie lesson of the above historical investigation is of negative nature. Given the missed chances of a real interaction between Husserl and the philosophers at the other side of the Channel, it is compelling to use the shared context of these philosophies around the turn of the previous century to establish a meaningful link between the philosophical movements that later gave rise to analytic and continental philosophy. A quick glance at the last pages of the issue of Mind in which Russell’s celebrated “On Denoting” was published could suffice to dispel the myth of isolation and hostility between Russell and his Continental counterparts. What is less obvious, however, is how Russell’s critique of Meinong could be used to construct a relevant connection to Husserl’s phenomenology. My paper has considered the main path through Husserl’s critique of Twardowski in 1894. While Twardowski’s book criticized by Husserl is undeniably situated in the main debate on intentionali-

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ty by the disciples of Brentano, and the most charitable reading of Twardowski’s position points towards Meinong’s later full-fledged Gegenstandstheorie, Husserl seriously misconstrued Twardowski’s position, overlooking precisely the aspect which makes Meinong’s theory worth considering. It is thus theoretically possible to trace the path between Russell’s and Husserl’s positions, but it would require a considerable broader – and less linear – chain of incremental position changes. This is why Husserl’s hitherto unknown direct confrontation with Russell’s critique of Meinong in 1907 initially sounded promising. Husserl closely followed Meinong’s struggle with Russell’s critique indeed, which itself was burdened by unfortunate choices on Meinong’s part. Husserl’s stance toward this debate was again marked by a stubborn resistance against considering Russell’s actual argument. He only referred himself to his earlier correspondence with Meinong on the interpretation of sentences about non-existing objects, in which he moved from an initial permissive position resembling the ones attacked by Russell in early 1905 to a more prohibitive one. Despite this reference, he refrained himself in 1907 from utilizing any of the techniques which would have brought him closer to Russell’s theory of descriptions. While such a negative conclusion could be regarded as an important addition to our historical understanding of the complex interrelation of the early phenomenology and the nascent analytic philosophy; it is still possible to highlight a philosophically relevant lesson. This, however, lies not in the ontology of the non-existing object, but rather in the achievements required for the cognizance of such objects. I have already highlighted occasions when such a requirement was formulated by Bolzano and Twardowski, but it is also worth looking at what Paul Natorp, the Neo-Kantian philosopher who edited another text of Husserl on Twardowski, said: […] the judgment ‘There are no round squares’ is not a judgment about the object corresponding to the concept ‘round square’ […], but rather about the concept, namely that there is no object corresponding to it. But even this concept is an improper one. It is […] actually the concept of something that would have been simultaneously round and square, had it been possible – rather than a concept of something that actually unites these two features. (Husserl 1994a, vol. 1, 46)

Natorp thus highlighted an aspect of the problem my paper has already encountered above: the failed achievement to form such a concept. This

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letter was written in 1897, at the time when Husserl was already working on the Logical Investigations, and it was precisely Natorp to whom Husserl declared that the main aim of his work in progress was not only to combat psychologism, but also to render the relation between pure logical laws and psychological acts comprehensible (Husserl 1994a, 5, 52–53). The terminus of this journey is Husserl’s mature position on the intentionality of non-existing objects, which is to be found in the Ideas III, marking the end of his development to the full-fledged transcendental phenomenology: […] we see now that what is thought as such (logical signification in the noematic sense) can be ‘countersensical’ that it – which, after all, ‘exists’ within the category of being ‘logical signification’, and more generally, ‘noema’ – has its actual being, as for example, the thought signification ‘round rectangle’. […] the essence of what is signified is also something other than the signification. There is no essence ‘round rectangle’; but in order to be able to judge this, it is presupposed that ‘round rectangle’ is a signification existing in this unitariness.45

A round square can be thought of (phenomenologically speaking, this process is described by the noetical correlates of the noema ‘round square’), but there is no such object ideally taken (in phenomenological parlance: there is no essence ‘round rectangle’). Even though there is no direct continuous path connecting Russell’s critique of Meinong and the development of Husserl’s mature, transcendental notion of intentionality, the problem of non-existing objects is not accidental to the latter either. 46 Peter Andras Varga Husserl Archives of the University of Cologne Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences [email protected]

45 46

Husserl 1952, 85–86; ET: Husserl 1980, 73. I am grateful to Dieter Lohmar (University of Cologne) and Dirk Fonfara (Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities / University of Cologne) for their kind support and help with not transcribed manuscripts of Husserl, to Ullrich Melle (KU Leuven) for his kind permission to quote from unpublished manuscripts of Husserl, to Renu Barrett (McMaster University) for his assistance with Bertrand Russell’s manuscripts, and to Judit Mudriczki for proofreading my text.

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Unpublished Sources Ms. Husserl

Husserl-Archief te KU Leuven, Belgium

Ms. Russell

The Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University, Canada

Ms. Twardowski

Archives Numériques de l’École de Lvov et de Varsovie, Archiwum Kazimierza Twardowskiego, France

Ms. UA Wien

Archiv der Universität Wien, Austria

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Meinong, Alexius (1907), Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, Leipzig: R. Voigtländer. Meinong, Alexius (1965), Philosophenbriefe, R. Kindinger (ed.), Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt. Rollinger, Robin D. (1999), Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Rollinger, Robin D. (2012), “Brentanos Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: its Background and Conception”, in: I. Tanašešcu (ed.), Franz Brentano’s Metaphysics and Psychology, Bucharest: Zeta Books, 261–309. Russell, Bertrand (1905a), “The Existential Import of Propositions”, in: Mind 14 (55), 398–402. Russell, Bertrand (1905b), “On Denoting”, in: Mind 14 (56), 479–493. Russell, Bertrand (1905c), “Review of Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. Mit Unterstützung des k. k. Ministeriums für Kultus und Unterricht in Wien herausgegeben von A. Meinong”, in: Mind 14 (56), 530–538. Russell, Bertrand (1907), “Review of Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften by A. Meinong”, in: Mind 16 (63), 436–439. Russell, Bertrand (1986), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, J. G. Slater (ed.), London: Allen & Unwin. Russell, Bertrand (1995), My Philosophical Development, London: Routledge. Ryle, Gilbert (1972), “Intentionality-Theory and the Nature of Thinking”, in: R. Haller (ed.), Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 7–14. Schuhmann, Karl (1977), Husserl-Chronik. Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Schuhmann, Karl (1993), “Husserl and Twardowski”, in: F. Coniglione / R. Poli, / J. Woleński (eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy. The LvovWarsaw School. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 41–58.

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Schuhmann, Karl (2000), “Stumpfs Vorstellungsbegriff in seiner Hallenser Zeit”, in: Brentano Studien 9, 63–88. Schuhmann, Karl (2004), Selected Papers on Phenomenology, C. Leijenhorst / P. Steenbakkers (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer. Simons, Peter (1992), “On What There Isn’t: The Meinong-Russell Dispute”, in: P. Simons, Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 159–191. Spiegelberg, Herbert (1970), “Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons”, in: The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1 (1), 4–15. Thrush, Michael (2001), “Do Meinong’s Impossible Objects Entail Contradictions?”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1), 157–173. Twardowski, Kasimir (1894), Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung, Wien: Alfred Hölder. Twardowski, Kasimir (1991), “Selbstdarstellung”, J. Woleński & T. Binder, eds., in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 39, 1–26. Varga, Peter Andras (2015), “Was hat Husserl in Wien außerhalb von Brentanos Philosophie gelernt? Über die Einflüsse auf den frühen Husserl jenseits von Brentano und Bolzano”, in: Husserl Studies 31 [DOI: 10.1007/s10743-014-9155-z; forthcoming in print, already available online].

ANTI-MEINONGIAN ACTUALIST MEANING OF FICTION IN KRIPKE’S 1973 JOHN LOCKE LECTURES Dale Jacquette

Summary A critical exposition is offered of Kripke’s actualist interpretation of the meaning of fiction, against the background of his actualist modal metaphysics. Kripke is committed to the proposition that Sherlock Holmes not only does not happen to exist in the actual world, but for that reason cannot possibly exist in any nonactual merely possible world. Difficulties in Kripke’s analysis are highlighted, and contrasted with the Meinongian alternative account of the intended objects of fictional discourse as nonexistent objects satisfying the same generic intensional Leibnizian identity criteria, despite their relevant predicational incompletenesses, as any existent entities. Kripke emphasizes the role of pretending in creating and experiencing works of fiction, which is correct as far as it goes. However, Kripke does not take into account the fact that pretending is itself an intentional relation, and that there is no satisfactory solution in Kripke’s lectures as to how pretending that Anna Karenina has actually been named and actually has the other properties associated with her in one novel is different from pretending that Sherlock Holmes has actually been named and actually has different properties associated with him in another novel can be explained, without bringing the distinct intended fictional nonexistent Meinongian objects Sherlock Holmes and Anna Karenina into the referential semantic domain by which the meaning of fictional discourse is explained.

1. Kripke’s Locke Lectures Saul A. Kripke delivered the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 1973, shortly after his three 1970 Princeton University lectures on Naming and Necessity. Unlike Naming and Necessity, the Locke Lectures, titled Reference and Existence, have been available in the intervening forty

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years only in bootleg photocopies of the transcript on deposit at the Oxford University Library. The original text was supposed to be permitted for study only at the library, and not otherwise reproduced. By some wrongful avenue, in the nobler interests of scholarship, a copy of the transcript was leaked and circulated fearlessly, if not widely. The contents of Kripke’s Locke Lectures consequently no longer come as much of a surprise with this edition as they might have forty years ago. It is an important event nonetheless to have an authorized text of Kripke’s 1973 Locke Lectures, one that can now be publicly more freely discussed and criticized. The talks represent Kripke’s actualism applied, as in his metaphysics of modal logic, in this case, among other interesting topics in epistemology and perception theory, to the meaning of fiction. The latter discussion is of particular significance for anyone interested in Meinong’s philosophy, because, in the semantics of fiction, Kripke’s actualism is the philosophical antipode to a Meinongian object theory analysis of the meaning of fiction. The Locke Lectures volume is the second publication issued by the Saul Kripke Center (SKC) at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY), under the editorship, in this case, of Gary Ostertag, SKC Director. The book, now published in this first imprint, contains an edited version of the original transcript of Kripke’s Locke Lectures, lightly salted with explanatory footnotes and minimal related scholarly apparatus, a preface, list of references, and index. Kripke in the Preface explains that: Although I have added most of the footnotes, replaced passages that could use clarification, compressed some that now seemed too long (or difficult to comprehend), and even extended some that seemed too short, I can say that the final text remains faithful to the lectures as they were delivered. This is so even though the view of negative existentials stated at the end was highly complicated and one that I was not wholly satisfied with, even at the time, nor yet today. But it is not as though, at present, I am wholly satisfied with or prefer my alte rnative (Kripke 2013, x).

Unless I misunderstand, Kripke is saying that the 2013 publication of the 1973 Locke Lectures is in some crucial respects substantially modified in comparison with the Oxford University transcript, although the new publication contains no concordance with the original document. It would be

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interesting to know word for word exactly what changes from the deposited manuscript have been made. Kripke’s Locke Lectures complement and carry forward vital topics of Naming and Necessity, and of Kripke’s March 1973 lecture on “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”. The latter was presented at a conference on Language, Intentionality, and Translation Theory, at the University of Connecticut, which was in some ways a Locke Lectures dress rehearsal. In the first SKC edition of papers, Philosophical Troubles, Collected Papers Volume 1, Kripke describes “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities” as “essentially a precursor of my John Locke lectures at Oxford” (Kripke 2011, 52). In reading Reference and Existence, we have an edited compilation of these six lectures by Kripke over as many weeks in the late Fall of 1973. The lectures are enormously rich and rewarding. Especially intriguing are Kripke’s positive suggestions toward an actualist logic, semantics and metaphysics or ontology, adapted to explain the meaning of fiction, without giving himself over to what he perceives as the Meinongian dark side of semantics.1

2. Meaning of Fiction and Realm of Modality We cannot dismiss fiction as meaningless, particularly when it is hard from the texts alone to distinguish works of fiction from works of history. Supposing fiction to be the meaningful expression of something, the question is what are the semantics of fiction? How does a work of fiction have meaning? What meaning can be written into and read from any random choice of imaginative literature? There is sure to be a fundamental opposition between, under any banner, some forms of actualism and nonactualism. Kripke’s lectures show how far and with what adjustments an actualist metaphysics can propose to explain the meaning of fiction. Kripke’s 1

Kripke mentions Meinong or Meinongianism no less than 9 times in the 1973 lectures, which might be interpreted as Kripke’s tacit recognition that Meinong’s object theory is the intensionalist alternative to the actualist theory of fiction and fictional characters Kripke develops.

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actualist metaphysics of modality allows only those rigid-designator-stipulated transworld identities of actual objects in possible worlds where actual objects can have different accidental properties than they happen to have in the actual world. There is a Kripkean possible world where I (under some designation) am covered in tattoos, and another where I died in childbirth. Harsh as it seems, there can apparently be no Kripkean actualist possible world where I have children, if I never actually had children. Actualism shows some of its limitations already in this application, since having or not having children appears to be one of life’s insuperable contingencies. If I have not had children, then there is no one in the actual world to baptize, capable of having adventures in another possible world. The actualist answer in Kripke is that if I do not actually have children, then, like Sherlock Holmes and unicorns, there is no possibility of their existence. It does not serve to predicate of me as actually existent entity the accidental or essential (natural kind) property (ceteris paribus) of possibly having children, and thereby populating at least some nonactual possible worlds with my nonactual possible children, riding piggyback ontically on my actual acccidental or essential properties. For the actualist, for Kripke, there can be no property of possibly having children, except a fortiori, where the accidental properties of actual children are considered. There can be no property of possibly having actually nonexistent entities of any kind. To speak of them at all, they are beyond the reach of naming, with no place on the causal-historical network by which intended reference is spread from language user to language user within a sociolinguistic community. Hence for the nonactual there can be no projected transworld identity achieved by means of stipulation through the use primarily of such devices as proper names functioning as rigid designators. There are no proper names for nonactual entities, Kripke’s actualism maintains, but, as in works of fiction, at most and at best pretend proper names. The reason has more to do with Kripke’s sense of the distinction between essential and accidental properties than any developed theory or criterion in Kripke’s modal metaphysics. I can imagine, but, if Kripke is right, then it cannot possibly be the case, that I should have different parents than I have. Being in particular Matt and Mabel’s beaming boy is

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among my essential properties, not something that could be different in another Kripkean possible world. Equally, I can in some sense imagine or pretend, but it cannot possibly be the case, if Kripke’s modal actualism is right, that I have children that I never actually have. If my actual parents are essential to me as actually existent individual, then so is my actual progeny. If I do not actually have any children, then if actualism is true, I do not possibly have any children. The thing soon gets out of hand anyway, once we begin to ask such questions as who their mother would be, and if she was actual or was also riding piggyback into the referential domain on my actually existent ontic shoulders as one of the possible nonactual mothers of my possible nonactual children, who her parents were, and so on, back to the Garden. If the restriction is not observed, then we quickly get back all of the objects that Kripke wants to exclude from any possible world, if they do not actually exist. All that is needed is for someone actual to have had a great-great-great-great-grandmother, who possibly had a son, who possibly had a daughter, who in that world turns out to be the mother of Sherlock Holmes. These events all take place far away from our prying eyes, with transworld identities that seem to be out of our immediate conscious stipulative control. The point is then that, despite Kripke’s modal and fictional actualism, Holmes would possibly exist, if the metaphysics of modality were to allow possible sons and daughters, and the possible offspring of actual grandparents of all past lineage, of actually existent persons. The attractions of actualism are as palpable as the robust sense of realism. Nevertheless, it seems inherently wrongheaded to ground all of possibility on actuality. If Kripke is right, then we can only pretend that there are actually uninstantiated individuals and natural kinds. That can hardly be the end of the story, however. Understanding the semantics of such intentional states as imagining or pretending cannot be trusted to take care of itself in a general program for advancing actualism. What is the actualist explanation of imagining or pretending? These are usually considered intentional states, defined and distinguished from one another in intensionally fine-grained ways by virtue of intending distinct intended objects. Where the intended objects of pretending and imagining manifestly do not exist, we are already deep in Meinongian object theory logic and semantics, whether the actualist likes to admit it or not. Kripke’s actu-

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alism needs to hold the line at projected possibilities stipulatively managed by judicious use of rigid designators, in order to predicate different accidental properties of actually existent objects than those they contingently have in the actual world. What then is the semantics of pretending and imagining? If these are intentional states, what intended objects do they intend if not beingless Meinongian objects, the nonexistent intended objects of fiction and fantasy, invention, and pretense? Kripean rigid designation is rigid also in being limited exclusively to actually existent intended objects as individual things capable of being named, referred to, or made the intended objects of true constitutive property predications. Holmes as a fictional intended object is ruled out of the Kripkean actualist domain, including all nonactual possible objects in all Kripkean rigid designator stipulated possible worlds, because there is no Kripkean rigid designator “Sherlock Holmes”. No one in the actual world is named Holmes, and if there were that person would not be identical to anyone we pretend is named Holmes in the Doyle stories and novellas. There is no causal-historical chain of like-intending communication extending through a linguistic social community that terminates in any perceivable person Sherlock Holmes. In fiction, makers and consumers of fiction pretend that there is someone named Holmes, just as we pretend that there was a hound of the Baskervilles or Viktor Frankenstein’s monster. Kripke’s actualism should not leave things here, without saying something more about the intentionality of pretending. How is pretending something about Holmes different than pretending something about Anna Karenina? In lieu of invoking nonexistent fictional intended objects in what is effectively a Meinongian nonactualist referential semantic domain, it appears difficult to put weight on the manifestly intentional mental act of pretending. Remarkably, Kripke speaks also in this context of “characters”, and we shall always say “Kripkean characters” when his concept is discussed. Kripkean characters, whatever else they are, exist in real time as the creations of their authors. They cannot be abstract sets of properties, but they must actually exist in some form in order for fictional Kripkean characters to be said to be actual. Meinongians do not suffer this burden, because they understand fictional characters differently as intended nonexistent objects, for which the actual existence of a document trail is not logically or semantically relevant.

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Actualism stretches thin at exactly this point. The inscriptions of authors, and presumably their inventive nonexistent object-intending thoughts, although thoughts are not much mentioned, are invoked as something concrete that you already know exists. You can get your hands on an actual intended object, be it only the manuscripts and printed copies of texts and other documents related to the artistic creation and distribution of a work of fiction. Memory trace as much as inventive intentionality would seem to be important also in the account, although it is the perceivable written word that seems more essential for Kripke. Compared with Meinongian nonactualism in intended object theory, there does not seem to be much to recommend Kripkean actualism in understanding the meaning of fiction, except in the bare knuckles choice of referential actualism over any referential nonactualism. Kripke clearly excludes the nonactual Sherlock Holmes from inhabiting any possible world. What is less clear is exactly why he does so. Kripke stands for actualism, but the proposition that semantics must involve exclusively actually existent objects in a logic’s referential semantic domain is unargued. Kripke’s banishment of Holmes from every possible world, if sound, would apply as well to the modality of nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended objects. Failing to exist in the actual world, these Meinongian objects, for very different reasons, would also fail to exist in any Meinongian logically possible world. Existence, in contrast, is no qualification requirement for reference and true predication of properties to nonexisent Meinongian fictional intended objects like Sherlock Holmes and Anna Karenina, and nonexistence is no semantic disadvantage. If philosophy is at least partly about the exploration of concepts and dialectical spaces, then, in order to better understand both sides, we should not discount the juxtaposition of Kripke’s actualism and Meinongian nonactualism, a semantics of nonexistent intended objects that satisfy the same intensional self-identity requirements as any existent entity, actual or abstract. We must consider possibilities defined over nonactual possible worlds, where differential accidental properties among actual objects only can be meaningfully stipulated by means of such rigid designators as proper names exclusively for existent entities. Where the semantics of fiction is concerned, Kripke’s emphasis on authors and consumers pretending to achieve reference and true predica-

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tion of constitutive properties to fictional objects by means of their pretend names, is exactly right, but by itself it does not distinguish the intuitively distinct pretending that one does in the case of Sherlock Holmes as in the case of Anna Karenina. If I pretend that there is someone named Sherlock Holmes who is an English detective, and I pretend that there is someone else named Anna Karenina, who is not an English detective, then do I not pretend different things about different nonexistent intended objects? It may be a problem for Kripke, as it is not for Meinong, to explain how the distinct intentionalities in pretending about Holmes and pretending about Karenina can be explained without allowing Holmes and Karenina into the referential semantic domain as distinct nonexistent fictional intended objects.

3. Kripke’s Actualist Semantic Analysis of Fiction Kripke’s six lectures begin in Lecture I with the task of tying up what he calls “some loose ends” of his 1972 lectures on Naming and Necessity (1980). Kripke’s principal target, as he clears the ground for his alternative picture of how referential meaning functions in a language, is an ondemand description theory of reference. Kripke seeks to overturn what in the late 1960s and early 1970s he perceives as a predominant descriptive theory of the referential meaning of proper names. He associates the description theory of reference with an assumption attributed in common to the otherwise diverging semantic theories of Frege and Russell. It is the questionable proposition that thinkers and speakers should need to be able to provide on-demand the definite descriptions by which the referents or intended objects of their speech act uses of names are specifically determined. When in many practical situations they are imagined not to be able to do so satisfactorily, the referential theory in general terms is blamed and the way supposedly prepared for a different approach. Neither Frege nor Russell ever held such a view. The spirit and occasionally some of the content of Russell’s 1918 lectures on The Philosophy of Logical Atomism permeates Kripke’s Locke Lectures, as do parts of Wittgenstein’s 1922 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. However, in these

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sources there is no on-demand description theory of reference to be found. Kripke rightly attacks the adequacy of the on-demand description theory of reference. He observes that individual speakers who refer to a specific object by a variety of terms in a variety of speech acts are often unable to articulate the description of individuating distinctive properties that the named object is supposed to have. They somehow correctly intend the Fregean Bedeutung, but they lack, at least at the tips of their tongues, the connecting Fregean Sinn. Unfortunately, for Kripke’s objections, neither Frege nor Russell suppose that we as genuinely referring name users must be prepared to specify the properties that would truly and uniquely apply to the intended objects of nominal reference. Michael Dummett argues the point persuasively in the 2nd edition of Frege: Philosophy of Language.2 The on-demand description theory may have originated as the projection of a speech act model onto a historically defensible abstract platonic Fregean-Russellian description theory of reference. If so, then it would seem to have been supported ahistorically by philosophers like John R. Searle among others. They followed a then currently popular understanding of the later Wittgenstein circulating in philosophical discussions at the time of Kripke’s lectures. None of which changes the fact that the ondemand description theory of reference cannot be conscientiously laid at Frege’s or Russell’s doors. The corruption of Frege’s and Russell’s more pristine, cognitively and epistemically independent platonic account of referential meaning conditions for names, disregards our subjective psychologistic opinions about the objects we refer to by name or other singular referring expression. Our facility or lack thereof in describing the intended objects of referential uses of names is considered irrelevant. Awareness of these limitations long precedes Kripke’s inheriting a subjectivized version of a more abstract Fregean-Russellian description theory of reference, in the ondemand form Kripke undertakes to criticize. That in the abstract there exists a definite description or complete explication in any other form of the sense or Fregean Sinn of a proper name, is a very different requirement from a name user’s being able in practice to present such specification of 2

Dummett 1981, Appendix to Chapter 5, “Note on an Attempted Refutation of Frege”, 110–152.

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the named object’s distinctive characterizing properties, if called upon to do so, or as a precursor to successful reference in using the name. What is more, as Kripke rightly emphasizes, literally everything that we poor mortals may think we know about the intended object of a meaningful use of a proper name, its referential meaning as an existent entity in a logic’s referential semantic domain, could turn out to be false. Such false beliefs would nevertheless still be beliefs about the existent object. Those thoughts must somehow intend the relevant object, even in the absence of the language user’s having any true beliefs about the object’s actual properties, or about the actual state of affairs in which the existent intended object does not have the property it is imagined or pretended to have. The semantic situation is the same, even if all relevant language users called upon are altogether lacking so much as a single true distinguishing description on which to build.

4. Actualism versus Meinongianism in Semantics of Fiction Fiction, as Meinongians appreciate, is a difficult business to bring under universal semantic principles. It is especially challenging without invoking the inclusion of nonexistent objects in a referential extraontology, an ontically neutral semantic domain of existent and nonexistent intended objects that can be referred to, and to which we can truly predicate characterizing properties. Fictional Meinongian referents are distinct intended objects potentially intended by multiple thinkers, stereotypically by authors and their readers or audience as producers and consumers of literature. Despite their nonexistence, fictional Meinongian objects belong to an ontically neutral referential semantic domain of intensionally propertyrelated distinguished existent and nonexistent intended objects, about which those who read and write works of fiction can pretend to refer and pretend to truly predicate constitutive properties. Kripke says confusing things in the Locke Lectures about the ontic status of fictional characters. He univocally asserts that fictional characters like Sherlock Holmes, unlike Holmes considered as fictional nonexistent intended object, are actually spatiotemporally existent creations of literary imagination. Although, with respect to another set of ontic cat-

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egories, Kripke in some places affirms while in others he denies that fictional characters, as he understands the concept, are abstract. Kripke appropriately emphasizes that fictional characters are created in time by the energy and imagination of the authors of fictions and myths. If so, then it is hard to see how Kripkean fictional characters as something made could possibly be abstract, in the sense of transcending space and time, like the Platonic individual mathematical and logical objects and relations, properties, universals, propositions, sets, possible worlds, that are sometimes posited. All of these familiar abstracta, whether or not we agree that they exist, are anyway all supposed to be eternal, changeless, existing beyond space and time in Platonic heaven and not in the world of spatiotemporal phenomena. Kripke cannot have his fictional characters turn out to be abstract entities in this sense, because then the Kripkean fictional character Sherlock Holmes would not have begun to exist, as Kripke also wants to say, only when Arthur Conan Doyle imagined some of the elements of his character and decided what to write in putting pen to paper. There is more to be said about Doyle’s acts of creating Holmes. Doyle at some time must have intended to create the character Holmes, or to make a character that later evolved into Holmes, to make that pretend detective and none other the intended object of his detective stories. To say so is nevertheless to speak Meinongian, truly predicating constitutive properties of the nonexistent intended fictional object Holmes. Kripke is right that fiction involves pretense on the part of fiction and myth creators and their readers and audience. Remarkably, Kripke does not further ask how we can even in principle distinguish one act of pretense from another, if we do not regard these as distinct tokens of intentional states that intend distinct intended objects, Sherlock Holmes in one favorite instance and in another Anna Karenina. If we are speaking of nonexistent intended objects, then we are already in Meinongian semantic territory, and this is precisely what Kripke repeatedly says he wants to avoid. Kripke in 1973 by his own admission does not seem to have read Meinong. He offers no text-based argument, but only unsupported semantic prejudice against a Meinongian approach to the meaning of fiction, which he has not troubled to study, but is certainly thickly in the air. At the time, analytic philosophers and logicians, taught to reverence especially Frege and Russell, did not know much of anything correct or posi-

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tive about Meinong. There was little reliable discussion of the idea of a Meinongian referential semantic domain, an ontology absorbing ontically neutral extraontology of existent and nonexistent, altogether beingless, intended objects. The concept was wrongly thought to be psychologistic, and as such anathema to mind-independent logic and formal semantics. Kripke echoes the anti-Meinongianism of time. For which he is to be forgiven, much as we forgive nineteenth and early twentieth century English language authors for excessive use of masculine pronouns. How, then, does Kripke propose to explain the intended object of pretending that Sherlock Holmes satisfies Kripkean naming requirements, as distinct from the intended object of pretending that Anna Karenina satisfies Kripkean naming requirements, or any other that a thinking subject as it happens may intend? Suppose that the Kripkean fictional meaning of “S pretends that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a genuine name” ≠ the Kripkean fictional meaning of “S pretends that ‘Anna Karenina’ is a genuine name”. How can the nonidentity of meanings be understood except as a nonidentity of intended nonexistent objects on the part of S, intending in one instance Sherlock Holmes and in another Anna Karenina? That is presumably how the semantics would work if S was pretending that an existent neighborhood dog does not exist, or that the dog is of a different breed, or friendly toward him rather than hostile, as distinct from S pretending that a tax audit letter open on the kitchen table does not exist, or that the envelope contains instead a cordial invitation to spend the summer all expenses paid on a tropical island. Nonexistent intended objects, Meinongian objects, popularly so-called, are what acts of pretending pretend, and hence of what they intend. Pretending about and projecting nonexistent objects and states of affairs does not make its first appearance in semantics with the invention of fiction, let alone with attempts to provide its formal semantic interpretation. It enters semantic interpretation and explanation instead with actual mental acts or psychological episodes of imagining and pretending that the tax audit is a nonexistent invitation, that the neighborhood dog is not a hateful beast but a charming obedient engaging canine, that “Anna Karenina” is a genuine name, and that “Sherlock Holmes” is a genuine name, thinking about, referring to and predicating properties of these nonexistent intended Meinongian objects, just as we do in the case of any existent intended object.

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5. Kripkean Actualism in the Semantics of Modal Logic and Fictional Discourse Kripke’s actualism is semantically-ontically solid stuff only insofar as it supports a good explanation of the apparent reference and true predication of properties to what a Meinongian considers as nonexistent fictional objects. These are the intended Meinongian objects encountered through their constitutive properties, described in a work of fiction, and satisfying Leibnizian intensional property-based self-identity conditions as distinct intended fictional objects. Fictional objects in a Meinongian nonactualist semantics are precisely the nonexistent intended objects of an author and readership or audience in the acts of imagination and pretending that Kripke rightly emphasizes as vital to understanding the meaning of fiction. The fundamental idea of a Meinongian logic of fiction is to consider fictional objects at intuitive face value as nameable, countable, quantifiable nonexistent “Meinongian” objects. These, despite their ontic disadvantages, not only deserve, but finally need to be treated as the particular intended objects of specific thoughts. They must be objects in a referential semantic domain that includes both existent and nonexistent objects of intentions, if we are to arrive at a fully general semantics for meaningful expression in language covering all true and false sentences. We require nothing more of nonexistent objects in a semantic referential domain than we do in a semantics limited to actual physical entities and abstract formal properties. We should expect for both general categories of existent and nonexistent intended objects that they be Leibnizian Lawabiding residents if not citizens of the extraontology housing all existent or nonexistent states of affairs needed to explain the possible truth or falsehood of all existentially positive and negative propositions. A general semantics must serve the interpretive needs of every logically possible predication of properties to every possible intended object of any possible intention. These include not only existent objects like Napoléon Bonaparte and J. S. Mill, but Sherlock Holmes and Anna Karenina. There is more to developing a Meinongian semantics of fiction than saying that Holmes is a nonexistent Meinongian object. If Holmes is a nonexistent Meinongian object, what does it mean, and what follows from

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such a matter of fact classification? It must at least be true of Holmes in that case that he is a Meinongian object. If it is true of Holmes that he is a Meinongian object, then many other things must also be true of Holmes. To be a Meinongian object is to have a distinguishing intensional Sosein of distinguishing constitutive properties that is semantically independent of membership in the higher-order categories of Sein and Nichtsein, the most general ontic domain and its complement, under one of which any intended object in principle must fall. Holmes possesses a distinguishing choice of properties, a so-being, or being thus-and-so, in order to satisfy Leibnizian identity conditions. If he is a Leibnizian Law-abiding intended object associated with distinctive identity conditions, then, however ontically impoverished Holmes may be, he can at least semantically be the distinct object of particular intentions. We can always in principle explain what it means to say that a thought is about Holmes rather than about any other existent or nonexistent object, by referring to their distinct identity conditions, their distinct so-beings of constitutive properties. If they are semantically different intended objects, then, regardless of their ontic status, there must be at least some discrepancy among their constitutive properties by which they satisfy unique identity conditions. They must do so, even to be intelligibly considered as nonexistent intended objects. The intentions of Holmes’s literary creator, and thereafter of readers’ imaginations as they entertain themselves enjoying the stories, appears to be that Holmes is one continuous character of whom we have episodic glimpses in Watson’s fictional reportage. Holmes is thus and so, rather than having other properties. Holmes has a character, although I would not say with Kripke that he is a character, except in the banal sense of being mentioned in something like the List of Characters that a book might contain on a front leaf to aid the reader or theatre-goer in keeping all fictional persons mentioned straight throughout the story. Kripke does not fully motivate his disallowing the referential sense in which Holmes and Watson or Karenina are nonexistent intended objects that can and should be treated semantically precisely on a par with existent intended objects, irrespective of their ontic status.

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6. Intentionality of Pretending in the Meaning of Fiction The philosophical question that arises in contrasting Kripke’s actualism with a Meinongian intensionalist semantics of fictional intended objects and their properties, is how actualism could conceivably account for the apparent fact that it is a different thing to pretend something ostensibly about Sherlock Holmes than it is to pretend that the same or something altogether different is true ostensibly about Anna Karenina. Thought is free to fantasize that Holmes jumps novels and rescues Anna from both Vronsky and her unfeeling prideful husband, Alexei Alexandrovich Karenina, not to mention the locomotive. No such pretending touches in the sense of altering the Kripkean character of any of these ostensibly distinct fictional intended objects. They can then be said to have the character created for them and by and through the objectintending intentional act of which they are created as nonexistent fictional intended objects. To do so naturally requires imagination and pretense, a certain inventiveness. Like lying, it is parasitic on conventions for factual communication exploited for its entertainment potential by describing nonexistent intended objects that give readers and writers something novel and interesting to think about, to admire as a work of art. It is these creations that become the objects of fiction possessing rather than being identical with a fictional character in a different sense than Kripke’s. With Kripkean character eliminated in understanding the difference between reader’s or audience member’s pretending one thing or another about Holmes, and pretending the same or something else altogether about Anna Karenina, we are left only with the orthographic difference of their pretend names in a strategic application of the use-mention distinction, in a Quinean semantic ascent (Quine 1960, 271–6). Names by themselves will not quite do, if there are situations where we must pretend different things about identically named characters, as happens sometimes in works of fiction. As I enjoy a work of fiction, phenomenologically speaking, I do not pretend that names or Kripkean characters as existent collections of existent properties solve crimes or throw themselves under the St. Petersburg Express, but only that the non-Kripkean characters of these stories and novels, in the Meinongian sense of beingless fictional intended objects, are caught up in these imaginary adventures.

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It is historically and philosophically interesting to learn what Kripke has to say about Meinong and Meinongianism at this early date in 1973. Unsurprisingly, he says quite explicitly what many other mainstream analytic philosophers also say at roughly this time. Kripke’s case typifies the phenomenon, maintaining that a Meinongian domain of existent and nonexistent objects is either semantic nonsense, psychologistic, or incapable of coherently supporting any true characterizing predications when pretending that fictional nonexistent intended Meinongian objects with fictional names fictionally have fictional properties, while acknowledging not having invested the effort of working through Meinong’s writings. What is interesting in part is that, despite the distortions, there are distant reverberations of Meinong’s object theory even at the time of Kripke’s 1973 lectures (unless these are later additions of Kripke’s to the lectures transcript), during the darkest of the Meinongian Dark Ages before the Renaissance of more recent years. Meinong, at his most disrespected, has not entirely disappeared from the causal-historical chain of intended usages, even if more often than not during this time he comes to be mentioned only to be disparaged. Kripke abhors the domain of nonactual objects. Accordingly, he stretches actuality as far it will go, in two different ways, in order to avoid what he explicitly describes as a “Meinongian, shadowy land” (Kripke 2013, 78). First, Kripke emphasizes that there is no genuine naming or true predication in understanding the meaning of fiction. There is only the pretense of these legitimate semantic activities and extant semantic relations in the case of actually existent entities. The problem of understanding distinct intentions of different token pretenses in creating and appreciating fiction, what makes one pretense different from another, among thought’s various sometimes criss-crossing intentions, cannot easily be solved without invoking distinct nonexistent intended objects. These nonexistents are just what Kripke wants to avoid: Inhabitants of the shadowy Meinongianville that Kripke rejects without critical examination. He does so purely on the grounds, if we are to take the lectures literally, that he does not know much about the early phenomenologists and object theorists. Second, Kripke rightly emphasizes the real-time existence of fictional characters in the sense of actual things that are created and can be destroyed or lost in the evolution of cultures, when all records and

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memory of them have evaporated. Kripkean fictional characters, unlike putative fictional objects, are real, actually temporally existent things, although their usefulness in explaining the meaning of fiction appears rather limited. We are wont to say that fictional intended objects have characters that are created for them by their authors and experienced vicariously by literary consumers. When we speak of the characters in a play, we do not always mean to speak of any particular actual persons, nor to the physical inscriptions scratched or printed on a page, by which we often say instead that a fictional character is defined. There may be a list of characters presented as the performance’s dramatis personæ. These “characters” are also not patterns of ink or magnetic information, but the intended nonexistent objects of pretense originating in the thoughts of the play’s author, to be interpreted by direction of the performance and diction of each actor and actress. To maintain as a truth about Holmes that Holmes solves a crime is not to speak falsely, although Kripke is surely right that the meaning of fiction depends heavily on the intentionality of semantic pretending. Consider the Kripkean fictional character of Holmes, the actual authoritative writings about Holmes in any medium, and suppose the none too exciting discovery that among these documents there occurs in Doyle’s handwriting, the sentence, “Holmes solves a crime”. It is not enough just to have the sentence inscribed somewhere in the manuscript book. The meaning of the sentence needs to be sufficiently explained so that it can be considered as making a specific contribution to Holmes’s actual Kripkean fictional character. How is the meaning of Doyle’s sentence “Holmes solves a crime” to be understood, if Holmes is not a nonexistent Meinongian intended fictional object who is said to have the property of having solved a crime? Is that not precisely what Kripke would have the creator and consumer of fiction pretend? If we are to pretend such things, then we will be hard-pressed to explain their distinct intentions without invoking nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended objects such as Holmes. On a Meinongian object theory logic and semantics, Holmes is the nonexistent intended object to which the property of solving a crime is predicated in articulating his character, in both non-Kripkean and Kripkean senses. It is not just the easiest thing to say that fictional characters are

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nonexistent nonactual intended objects in a logic’s properly comprehensive Meinongian referential semantic domain. Although in comparison with the actualist alternative Kripke offers, it is worth emphasizing the naturalness with which the Meinongian categorization in terms of nonexistent intended objects is made in understanding the meaning of fiction, and of a non-Kripkean sense of fictional characters. If characters are in any sense individualizable objects of thought, then the non-Kripkean character of Holmes is a nonexistent intended object of certain works of fiction, whereas the Kripkean character Holmes actually exists and has a definite spatiotemporal history. The character of Holmes, according to Kripke, is not merely described in but constituted by the writings Kripke mentions. It is the work of a semantics of fiction to explain more precisely how pretend fictional reference and pretend true predication are supposed to work, whether by invoking a referential semantic domain of exclusively actually existent intended objects, or of both actual and nonexistent intended objects. Kripke might have been expected to require that when we engage in fiction-pretending we pretend that a fictional character is actual. Obviously, Kripke cannot say this, because for Kripke a fictional character qua Kripkean character is already actual. Kripkean actualist possible worlds are stipulated by use of rigid designators, implying that Kripkean possibilities are limited to a spectrum of differential accidental properties among exclusively actually existent objects. Kripkean actualist meaning of fiction is similarly and more righteously circumscribed to what is unfortunately an incompletely semantically analyzed intentional state of pretending, and to a concept of fictional characters that are not fictional intended objects, but the concrete expressions of the pretendings of creative authors and consumers of fiction. These handwritten documents and printed texts are actual things in which we can take less shadowy ontic comfort. The trouble is that at least in the Locke Lectures, Kripke does not pursue the inquiry further into the semantics of the documents and printed texts. When I say that Holmes solves a crime, I mean that the detective Doyle writes about solves a crime. I do not mean that the Kripkean character of Holmes imagined and written about and circulating among the literate in printed copy, electronically and in other media, solves a crime, but that the intended object of those stories, considered as tokens or types, and of Doyle’s originating creative

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acts of imagination in dreaming up Holmes, solves a crime, and that Holmes solving the crime further characterizes Holmes as a particular intended object. The fact that the paper has inscribed by Doyle on it the sentence, “Holmes solves a crime” presupposes that this arrangement of words has meaning, and it is hard to account for the sentence’s meaning in purely inscriptional terms, but only as the predication of the property of having solved a crime to an actually nonexistent intended fictional object Sherlock Holmes. If Doyle wrote down on paper the sentence, “Holmes solves a crime”, then this is undoubtedly what he meant to express. What Kripke’s account leaves unaddressed takes us immediately back to the first question as to the best explanation of the meaning of works of fiction. An actualist semantics of fiction fails because it does not do justice to our actual grasp and use of the meaning of fiction, as precisely on a par with the ordinary reporting of facts and historical narrative and chronology. Fictional objects and events are understood not to exist, but their predicational structures are indistinguishable from those applied in describing the properties of actual and abstract existent objects, suggesting the desirability of a universal semantics. If a friend joins a discussion mid-conversation about events described in a novel, then it usually suffices to say at some point that the subject of predication is just a nonexistent character in a fictional story.

7. Leibnizian Identity Conditions for Fictional Objects Like existent objects, nonexistent objects are permitted into a Meinongian logic’s reference domain only if they satisfy Leibnizian intensional identity conditions, by virtue of possessing or being nominally associated with distinctive sets of characterizing constitutive properties. Conditionally, they can be referred to, says the Meinongian, even if they do not exist, provided that we can distinguish them from other intended objects, so as to be able to refer to and say true and false things specifically about them. Their names can conventionally abbreviate their distinguishing constitutive properties, in a nominalization of what Meinong speaks of as an intended object’s so-being. Without satisfying identity conditions, nonexistent intended objects do not hold still semantically to dress them truly or falsely with

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constitutive property attributions. A partial grasp of an intended object’s so-being is all that we can ever manage to achieve, even in the case of existent objects. Also we never completely know their properties, nor are we ever prepared to disclose these in their entirety whenever we use their names, as we would need to be able to do if the on-demand referential theory of proper name meaning were ever supposed to be true. Nonexistent intended objects can be named “Zeus” and “Sherlock Holmes”. They can be counted in a certain context, if it is made clear by sortals what kind of counting is wanted. Nonexistent intended objects can be quantified over in universal and “existential” quantifications, ranging across the broad ontically neutral reach of the logic’s referential semantic domain. Thereby are generally included all possible existent and fictional intended objects, existent and nonexistent intended objects, rubbing elbows together as potential referents of actual and possible thoughts in the Meinongian Außersein. Characterizing properties can be truly or falsely attributed to such objects. I can falsely but significantly say, using narrow scope placement of negation, that Sherlock Holmes is not a detective, rather than it is not the case that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, just as on the present assumptions I can truly say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Unless I am trying to be clever with some kind of equivocation, then it will be true of one intended fictional nonexistent “Meinongian” object that it has the property of being the god of storm, thunder and lightning, and, in another case, of being a violin-playing cocaine-shooting nineteenth century London detective. Speaking loosely of the Brentanian phenomenological tradition that underwrites Meinong’s object theory, Kripke explains: I mean figures such as Bolzano, Brentano, and the like, as well as Meinong, who are sometimes said to be in the ‘background of phenomenology.’ I confess to knowing very little about them (Kripke 2013, 63, note 5).

Kripke forthrightly acknowledges this lacuna in his philosophical education at the time, and anyone reading these words can point to similar even more substantial historical-philosophical gaps in their own background. Points for honesty, and we do not blame Kripke for not knowing his Brentano, Bolzano, Meinong, and Husserl, for starters. He does not propose to cover every side of the question historically, and it is doubtful that anyone could. Instead, among other topics, including perception and

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sense data theory, Kripke presents with great ingenuity and resourcefulness a philosophical program for an actualist semantics of fiction. We can say conditionally but unqualifiedly that if Kripke’s actualist semantics of fiction succeeds, then the nonactualist Meinongian object theory interpretation of the meaning of fiction is obviated. For this reason alone, Meinongians cannot afford to ignore what Kripke’s anti-Meinongian actualism in the 1973 John Locke Lectures has to say about the meaning of fiction. It is interesting to observe that, while Kripke cannot cover all the relevant philosophical literature, especially in traditions that have been downplayed in recent analytic myopia, he is nevertheless so confident in his actualist semantics of fiction that he mentions but does not much discuss, and claims not to know, precisely the tradition that stands in direct opposition to his modal actualism and actualist explanation of the meaning of fiction. The suggestion is that all nineteenth early twentieth century writing on phenomenology and the intentionality of thought is destined for the scrapheap of arcane texts and topics, some of them hard-going anyway and more literary than scientific, in this particular sidebranch deadend in the recent history of philosophy. The concepts, whatever sense their authors may pretend to make of them, become irrelevant with the triumph of an actualist semantics of fiction. Despite admitting unfamiliarity with the intentionalist and phenomenological tradition, Kripke does not give Meinong sufficiently wide berth in heaping anti-Meinongian abuse (contrary arguments would be fair game) on a philosophical position he claims not to have studied. Kripke recognizes that a Meinongian logic and semantics of existent and nonexistent intended objects stands in opposition to his own semantic-ontic actualism. The dialectical opposition suggests that Meinong’s object theory should be essential background for Kripke’s actualism in semantics, just as Kripke’s Locke Lectures and all his writings should finally be considered, especially for the confirmed Meinongian. Effectively, Meinongian semantics with its intensionalist Leibnizian self-identity comprehension principle, extends Quine’s famous dictum that there is no entity without identity. It proposes instead that there is referentially and quantificationally speaking no entity or nonentity without identity. Kripke’s Fregean actualism will have none of this, and it is

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instructive to see him make the contrary case for a more complicated nonMeinongian account of the semantics of fiction, when contrasted against a Meinongian alternative. Kripke distinguishes between nonexistent fictional objects and existent fictional characters, and he emphasizes throughout the role of pretending in explaining the meaning of fiction, from both author creative and reader appreciative standpoints. These factors in the semantics of fiction are discussed in light of his picture of referential meaning and the modal implications of naming. A Meinongian can find Kripke’s reasoning and the proposal it supports fascinating and insightful, without accepting Kripke’s controversial solutions to some of these ontically and semantically momentous questions. What do Kripke’s remarks on the meaning of fiction imply for a Meinongian object theory of fictional intended objects? Does Kripke, in comparison with a Meinongian semantics, present a superior, inferior, comparatively advantageous or disadvantageous, alternative explanation of the meaning and metaphysics of fiction? What is the Meinongian counterpart to Kripke’s actualist modal logic and semantics of fiction that Kripke himself does not provide?

8. Intentionality and Intending Fictional Objects It begins to appear that the essential referential element in naming is what leading members of the Brentano school in all its branches would have referred to as a conceptually irreducible intentionality, extending from the thoughts of thinking-intending subjects to correlated thought-intended objects. Pretending that the objects in a work of fiction are named and have the properties that the story ascribes to them on Kripke’s explanation of the meaning of fiction is for a Meinongian already a primary psychological state, both in the creation and appreciation of imaginative literature. It is the intentionality of imagination and pretending, the presumed connection of such psychological states with intended objects in works of fiction that needs to be understood or explained away in demystifying the logic and semantics of fiction. The question is whether this further step can be managed by Kripkean actualism, or only by a Meinongian extraontology or ontically neutral referential semantic domain. By extension, and in contrast with Kripke’s pretense-dependent analysis of the meaning of fic-

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tion, the unintended falsehoods and ostensible reference to beingless objects in science and history, including such scientific law-related ideal entities as the frictionless surface or moving projectile unimpeded by impressed forces, are easily dealt with by minor appropriate tweaking within a Meinongian logic and semantic framework. Kripke, again in his Preface to the Locke Lectures, writes: I took natural language as my guide, which just quantifies over these things. Thus, I did not intend to apply the notion to ‘Vulcan,’ ‘phlogiston,’ or other vacuous theoretical names of a more recent vintage, which are ‘mythological’ objects only in a highly extended and perhaps even metaphorical sense of ‘mythological.’ However, I am not entirely sure of the difference in principle between such erroneously postulated scientific entities and the figures of myth which were, after all, genuinely, though wrongly believed to be real. So perhaps I should have extended the treatment to them as well, as some have assumed I did. But the use of natural language as a guide perhaps reveals an essential difference (Kripke 2013, x).

The problem, repeatedly emphasized, but not yet addressed, is that when we have acknowledged with Kripke that fiction involves pretending rather than normal successful reference and predication of properties to ontically respectable existent objects in a logic’s referential semantic domain, we must still satisfactorily explain within the alternative competing actualist and Meinongian semantics, how it is that pretending that Sherlock Holmes is a drug-addicted English detective is not the same as pretending that Anna Karenina is a tragic Russian love-torn adulterous suicidal mother, if the pretending in each case does not intend a distinct nonexistent fictional object. Meinongians as neo-Brentanians consider pretense to be yet another intentional state that intends a specific existent or nonexistent object. I can pretend that my existent dog has X-ray vision, just as I can pretend that Anna Karenina is a psychologically troubled member of the lower Russian aristocracy. In Meinongian terms, the names “Sherlock Holmes” and “Anna Karenina” in their respective works of fiction manage to refer to distinct beingless Meinongian objects to which distinct properties are fictionally ascribed. For Kripke, in the Locke Lectures and in “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”, as in Addendum (a) to the 1980 republication of Naming and Necessity, the act of pretending that certain fictionally named fictional objects satisfy the conditions for naming and true constitutive predications is supposed to explain away the intuition that there are

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nonexistent fictional entities. Non-authoritative pretenders, readers and other consumers of fiction, who can think whatever they like, including making false and consequently still meaningful predications, are not permitted reference to or predication of characterizing properties to beingless “Meinongian” objects as individual nonexistent referents in a Kripkean actualist semantics of fiction. How, then, does Kripke’s actualism explain the meaning of fiction? Prior to this point, in his 1963 essay, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, Kripke had adopted the commonsense attitude that although Holmes does not exist in the actual world, Holmes exists in alternatively nonactual merely possible worlds.3 By the 1973 Connecticut essay, and Addendum (a) to the 1980 publication of the lectures on Naming and Necessity, Kripke had radically changed his mind, and concluded that Holmes, like mythological natural kind unicorns, is not possible in the sense of not existing in any nonactual merely possible world. The reasons for this change of opinion are not easily found in Kripke’s explicit statements, although it is clear that for Kripke there are no causal-historical referential chains of intended linguistic usages for nonexistent objects such as Holmes. If there is no actual Holmes, then there is no referential terminus for the networks of usages of the proper names “Sherlock Holmes” extending out through the social world, by which picture the workings of reference are supposed to be understood after the refutation of the (on-demand) referential theory of proper name meaning. The pretend name “Sherlock Holmes” is not a genuine proper name for Kripke. Hence, it cannot be a rigid designator, designating the same thing in every possible world in which the designated thing exists. For Sherlock Holmes does not exist even in the actual world. With no genuine proper name “Sherlock Holmes” to serve as rigid designator, there is no using the pretend name in Kripke’s actualist modal metaphysics to stipulate another possible world where Sherlock Holmes has some difference among his accidental properties than in the actual world. Holmes is at an insurmountable modal ontic disadvantage, because in the first place, he does not happen to inhabit the actual world. For these among other rea3

Kripke 1963. Kripke in 1980, Addendum (a), 158, refers to a reprinting of his 1963 in Linsky (ed.) 1971, 65.

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sons, Kripke between 1963 and 1973 recognizes the need to disallow Holmes or any other putatively nonexistent object to be referred to, except in pretense, in accounting for the meaning of fictional discourse. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Kripke makes no adequate provision to explain why it is that pretending that Holmes satisfies naming requirements is different from pretending that Anna Karenina satisfies the same requirements, without bringing nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended objects into the account. The Kripkean fictional characters of Holmes and Karenina already exist for Kripke, as he technically understands the concept. The characters are actual, as opposed to the corresponding putative fictional intended objects, once the characters of Holmes and Karenina are dreamed up by Doyle and Tolstoy, and, better, written down and inscribed, by their respective creative authors in some more or less permanently or indefinitely reproducible printed document. There is no saying in this semantic framework that authors and readers of fiction pretend that these fictional characters exist. What one knows as a matter of fact to be true one cannot sensibly pretend to be true. Intuitively in Kripke’s semantics of fiction, what happens instead is that one pretends that a fictional character is an existent object. The sticking point throughout is that there must be a reasonable difference to be made out between pretending that the existent fictional character of Holmes belongs to an existent object, and pretending that the existent fictional character of Anna Karenina belongs to another existent object, where in both cases there are actually no such distinct existent objects. The result is that the semantics of fiction is driven back to nonexistent, beingless “Meinongian” objects. Existent fictional characters that are not the characters of nonexistent fictional intended objects, together with existent objects only, do not explain how it is that pretending one thing of Holmes is different than pretending something else of Anna Karenina, unless they are distinct intended objects of distinct intentional states of pretending. What makes such fictional intended objects distinct, such that Sherlock Holmes ≠ Anna Karenina, appears to be their differentially satisfying the same general Leibnizian intensional identity and individuation requirements. These distinct collections of properties are precisely what Kripke considers to be distinct existent characters introduced in a work of fiction. They are not sets, and they are unlike Fregean Sinn, and unlike

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again the Meinongian category of Sosein or so-being, because, Kripke observes, they are created by their authors in time, and can and do presumably pass out of existence again when their tokens and all memory trace of them have disappeared. Further pressed, Kripke does not have either a Meinongian or nonMeinongian answer as to what these fictional characters are supposed to be characters of if not of distinct nonexistent intended objects. Holmes, we want to say, is a fictional character who, and because he, has a fictional character. Kripke’s fictional characters, above all, cannot be nonexistent fictional Meinongian intended objects, because they exist in space and time when their creators write down their ideas for them. If the answer is not just that, and anyway not that easy, then we are still owed an account in Kripke’s semantics of fiction as to how pretending that something is named Sherlock Holmes is different as an act or psychological episode of pretending from pretending that something is named Anna Karenina. It would be necessary, but seemingly impossible, to accomplish this purpose without allowing that thought is capable of intending distinct fictional objects with distinct pretended names associated with distinct existent Kripkean fictional characters. No one thinks of any of this in reading fiction, and few would ever be able to conjure such complicated semantic divisions forth. Any given thinker, although presumably not all at all times, might be mistaken about any – and hence in the limit case all – of the properties actually belonging to a particular intended object. Such mistaken thoughts would nevertheless be mistaken thoughts about the object in question. As John R. Searle and others have objected, it seems to be intending that does the heavy lifting, if it does not finally bear exclusive burden, in Kripke’s causal-historical social networking picture of meaning (Searle 1979, 155–7). That each speaker situated on the spreading web of usages of a rigidly designative proper name or other singular reference fixing term in a language refers back to the subject of an original naming ceremony or first use of the name of a named object, appears a perfectly plausible but equally altogether detachable supplement to the core idea in Mill’s Logic, that names name things without further connotation when and only when a thinking subject capable of intending a named object intends by the use of a term in a language so to refer.

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Kripke offers a perfunctory nod in the direction of an actualism-antipodal Meinongianism, which he does not pursue: There was a considerable discussion in the literature, of course, especially in the Meinongian or German ‘pre-phenomenological’ literature, on intentional objects of this sort, involving the postulation of objects of desire when someone wants something which doesn’t exist (63).

He states early on in Lecture I: No problem has seemed to represent a more perplexing philosophical conundrum than that of the use of names which have no reference – or, not to beg the question against Meinong (though I will beg it perhaps practically from here on out), names which appear to have no reference (Kripke 2013, 4).

Meinongians, even on reading olive branch statements like this, should be squirming in their chairs. Kripke seems to think he is not begging the question against Meinong by considering “names which appear to have no reference”. Meinong, however, like other philosophers of meaning, understands full well that names need to name something. The question is whether names need to name, and hence to refer to, something existent, or whether they can also name and hence refer to nonexistent intended objects of thought. Meinong thinks they can, provided that the objects satisfy the same general Leibnizian intensional identity conditions as existent entities, when they are nominalized and made intended objects of reference and predication. As a phenomenological starting-place, consider thoughts exemplified by flights of imagination. Provided they satisfy identity conditions, they should intend specific objects defined by reference to a particular set of properties that no other object by any name can also possess. There are no names without reference for Meinong. There are only some names with and some without reference to existent entities. To attribute to Meinong, even in graciously acknowledging the alternative as Kripke does here, the idea that names need have no reference, is already to put the wrong foot forward with respect to a highly developed semantic philosophy for both existent and nonexistent, including fictional, objects, that stands most instructively in contrast with Kripke’s. It is to use the word “reference” in a way that no Meinongian would, as though it necessarily implies reference to an actually existent or abstract entity.

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9. Ontic Neutrality of Identity Conditions for Fictional Intended Objects Intensional Leibnizian identity conditions in and of themselves are ontically neutral, as Meinong understands them. The most general logic must consider them as content-free, and hence in pre-theoretical purely logical form and multi-applicability. If self-identity relations are satisfied by nonexistent objects, as they are for solid dependable existent objects, then there is no logical justification for excluding nonexistent objects from a logic’s referential semantic domain. The Meinongian characteristically maintains, contrary to Kripke, on this essential point, that any candidate intended objects that satisfy ontically neutral intensional identity conditions should be considered nameable referents. These referents, in turn, regardless of whether or not they exist, and however they may be excluded by conversational implicature in practical situations of language use, can be included in some and excluded from other conditional quantifications, but not from universal quantifications over all intended objects. We rely on this assumption when we speak of two distinct associates in a Doyle story, among the major cast of figures with distinct Kripkean characters, and distinguish Watson from Holmes accordingly as different individual nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended objects. We can count and quantify over the number of times Holmes saves someone’s life or solves a crime in the canonical stories. All the while, we fully understand that none of these things exist, neither the persons nor the events, as concrete or abstract objects, but appear intuitively and phenomenologically notwithstanding to be distinct nonexistent intended objects of distinct intentional states, and in particular of intentionally directed distinct pretendings by author and reader. They appear phenomenologically in all other ways to behave like other objects to which we can refer. We can distinguish fictional intended objects from all other referents, to which we can predicate certain kinds of properties. We can count them, and quantify over them in domains and distinguished subdomains, that make them unique among all objects of reference in a logic’s semantic domain. The proof is that we can do all of these things phenomenologically exactly alike regardless of whether the objects we intend turn out later

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to be existent or nonexistent, as our knowledge increases, as the history of natural science testifies, and as we know from reading works of fiction. If we did not know better, picking up Daniel Defoe’s 1722 novel, A Journal of the Plague Year, from the library shelf, we might suppose we were reading an account of those desperate times written as an account by someone who had lived through those days. Such realistic works of fiction are capable of such verisimilitude as to be internally indistinguishable in every way from historical documents and narrative works of history. Meinongians are comfortable with the idea that nonexistent objects can be named, referred to descriptively, and generally identified and individuated from all other intended objects, regardless of their ontic status. It is in this sense that the intension of the predicate “being a detective” is considered in a Meinongian semantics to comprehend both actually existent and nonexistent fictional detectives, in an ontically neutral extraontology of objects beyond being and non-being. Not so Kripke, who concludes that “Sherlock Holmes” (pari passu for mythological natural kind terms like “unicorn”) is only a pretend name to which no existent or nonexistent object corresponds. The fact that Kripke in the Locke Lectures hesitates to develop in detail an extension of his semantics of fiction to the ostensibly nonexistent including ideal intended objects of science, true and false, suggests that he may be uncertain how to bridge the gap between pretending in deliberately creating or enjoying fiction, and whatever happens in science when theorists posit an entity or kind of entity that in the end turns out not to exist. Scientists like Le Verrier do not seem to have been pretending that the planet Vulcan existed between Mercury and the Sun. Nor did Le Verrier’s readers and critics pretend that this was so, or think that Le Verrier was only pretending. Hypotheses, for the Meinongian, whether they turn out to be true or false, like assumptions generally in many kinds of inquiry, are once again yet another intentional state in which intended objects are intended. Whatever connection Kripke might hope to forge between the pretending in his account of the meaning of fiction and the semantics of false scientific hypothesis and historical explanation, he will need to identify another more specialized intentional attitude  to replace pretending in order to account for what scientists and historians do when they get things wrong. This intentional attitude  will still ostensi-

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bly involve the intending of nonexistent intended objects, so that -ing phlogiston ≠ -ing vortices. It is unclear how the actualist can surmount these difficulties without giving in at some point to the need for a referential semantic domain of nonexistent fictional intended objects such as a Meinongian object theory affords. In reading the Holmes stories, Kripke argues, we merely pretend that the words “Sherlock Holmes” satisfy the requirements for naming an individual, as they would if Holmes were a real person and “Sherlock Holmes” were a genuine rigidly designating proper name. Kripke’s fictional characters are created in real time by the sweat and ingenuity of inventive, imaginative thinkers and writers. Concerning the actual existence of fictional characters created in real time as opposed to the concept of nonexistent or beingless fictional objects he rejects, Kripke further explains: So my view is that ordinary language quantifies over a realm of fictional or mythological entities. They don’t exist, so to speak, automatically: that is, they are not Meinongian in the sense that whatever is an object of thought exists in some second-class sense. On the contrary, it is an empirical question whether there was such and such a fictional character (Kripke 2013, 71).

Doyle writing about Holmes remains the classic if overworked case. Doyle establishes the character of Holmes, according to Kripke, not as a Meinongian object, a nonexistent fictional intended object, from the very concept of which Kripke energetically distances himself. Eventually he echoes Russell’s description of Meinong’s supposed lack of a robust sense of reality in commitment to a kind of shadowy, later he says, secondary being for intended objects, like the golden mountain and round square. These ideas are nowhere to be found in Meinong’s Gegenstandstheorie. Kripke’s fictional characters, as distinct from fictional objects, are metaphysically respectable ontically nonshadowy existent entities. We know this because they are invented at particular times and in particular places by writers of fiction whose works have been preserved or otherwise transmitted at least into the periphery of our culture. When we read about or see fictional characters acted on the stage or screen, according to Kripke, we enter into the performance by pretending that these persons, places, situations and events are real, just as we pretend that in the work

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of fiction they are referred to by name, that they stand as objects of true predications, that Holmes plays the violin and shoots a little coke. What, according to Kripke, do we then pretend is so named? If we are Kripke’s friends on this point, then we cannot say that we pretend that the nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended object Holmes is named, and we cannot say that the Kripkean fictional character Holmes is pretended to be named, for the Kripkean character Holmes is already actual, and is presumably actually named Holmes. We can only pretend that something is named “Sherlock Holmes”, without attaching to the nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended object Holmes any of the constitutive properties Doyle putatively ascribes to Holmes in creating his character. To argue, x[Nx(‘sh’)], will obviously not do for Kripke’s purpose, where Na(‘bc’) means that intended object a is named ‘bc’. For then we can (falsely, Kripke is clear) say that some (existent, no less) intended object is named “Sherlock Holmes”. By expanding these conventions, pretense by pretender a as wide scope qualifier is now expressed, whereby the falsehood of the existential becomes the true statement of a thinking fiction-making creator or fiction-enjoying patron a, who is pretending that the existential is true, in Pax[Nx(‘sh’)]. All perfectly reasonable, but not obviously adequate to the data, when we reconsider, as previously more informally expressed, the equally true proposition ostensibly intending Anna Karenina (ak), that, Pax[Nx(‘ak’)]. Different intentions in the two instances of pretending can only be extensionally understood if, [x[Nx(‘sh’)]  x[Nx(‘ak’)]]. For Kripke, in his thoroughly existence-presuppositional referential actualism, it must be true that both x[Nx(‘sh’)]  x[Nx(‘ak’)], from which it follows trivially that x[Nx(‘sh’)]  x[Nx(‘ak’)]. The pretend context Pap, for any proposition p, must therefore be intensional, as it is intentional. The trick is to explain the expected truth functional equivalence without bringing distinct Meinongian fictional objects

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into the semantics, such that sh ≠ ak. Quinean semantic ascent, agreeing all around that ‘sh’ ≠ ‘ak’, will still not serve, because generally ◊[‘sk’ ≠ ‘ak’ sk = ak], as witness, among existent named entities, observing a standard usemention distinction for names of objects and the objects themselves, “Mark Twain” ≠ “Samuel Clemens”  Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens. No nonexistent intended objects are nameable in Kripke’s actualist semantics. We only pretend to name them, as we would otherwise do in the case of actually existent intended objects. The problem is that we can only make sense of pretending to name fictional objects if we can refer to them as distinct intended, and, in the nature of the case, nonexistent, fictional intended objects. Doyle in creating the hero of his fictions does not actually but only pretends to name Sherlock Holmes. We pretend that the fictional characters in certain works of fiction have histories and are living through whatever local circumstances are supposed to prevail at the fictional time and fictional place in which their experiences are described. Fictional persons in works of fiction have fictional conversations with one another, they may try to outwit, or escape from the feeling of falling in love, or even shoot at each other or knuckle it out in the interests of justice or unlawful gain, tragic love, or the like, none of which being mutually exclusive. We may do much the same in entertaining hypotheses of reductio ad absurdum reasoning for specialized conclusions, in supposing that there is a greatest prime number, in order to expose a contradiction in the reductio hypothesis against more firmly entrenched background assumptions. We might as well say, pretend for the moment, that there is a greatest prime number, in order to see what would follow then. Meinongians tend to take a more aerial perspective on the interpretation of intentional states, including, but by no means limited to, pretending, in a scientific phenomenology or descriptive psychology. Invoking pretending, in which we certainly do engage when writing or reading a work of fiction, does not avoid the problem of explaining whether a complete referential semantic domain for understanding the meaning of fiction should or should not include nonexistent intended “Meinongian” objects. They should be the intended objects of pretending, as in flights of fantasy, imagination, and abstract mathematical or counterfactual assump-

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tion, as well as existent intended objects of other more mundane less theoretical kinds of thoughts, in science, history, philosophical theorizing, and everyday semantic interactions. This is one of the primary and most fertile research grounds for Meinongian object theory, as for a generically scientific phenomenology, where distinguishing certain thoughts and kinds of thoughts seems impossible without referring to their respective distinct beingless intended objects. We must be able to name such objects, as we do when we mythologize about Zeus and Pegasus, unicorns and mermaids. We must be able to count them in a story, or the number of incidents in which they are described as being involved, the number of gods in one religion’s pantheon as opposed to another’s. We can sometimes but not always accomplish such reference, counting and quantification by counting names or blocks of ostensibly referential and predicational discourse. If we can meaningfully do these things, even if in playfully entertaining pretend propositions, in which we pretend to name and refer to and count gods, then we may need to include nonexistent intended objects in a logic’s referential semantic domain, in order to distinguish one act of pretending in its specific meaning from that of any other. 4

10. Equivocal Ontic Status of Kripkean Fictional Characters Kripke does not say as much as one might like concerning the nature and metaphysical status of fictional characters. We know that they are not supposed to be abstract sets. Nor are they beingless Meinongian objects, possible or impossible. Kripke has already been quoted as saying: Thus, their [fictional Kripkean characters’] existence is not like that of numbers, abstract entities which are said to necessarily exist, independently of empirical facts (Kripke 2013, 72).

If we are being charitable, then we must consider it a slip of the tongue for Kripke to say, as he does at the end of Lecture III: So in this sense, instead of saying that the name ‘Hamlet’ designates nothing, we say that it really does designate something, something that really exists in 4

See Thomasson 1999 and 2003.

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Even in the Preface, Kripke had already written, carelessly or deliberately, possibly involving a different sense of “abstract” than he troubles in the 1973 Locke Lectures to explain: Probably the most substantial contribution of the lectures was the ontology of fictional and mythical characters conceived as abstract objects whose existence depends on the existence or non-existence of various fictional or mythological works (Kripke 2013, x).

Fictional characters must therefore be somewhere in between these categories in a semantic and ontic middle territory that Kripke has regrettably not said enough about so far to explain. They are created in time by human invention, although they are presumably not merely the marks on paper or magnetic patterns on a computer disk by which they are expressed, in the uses of concrete media or sheer imagination that accompany their creation. If Kripkean fictional characters are abstracted rather than platonically abstract in the sense of numbers and the like that he already discounts, then what are Kripkean fictional characters abstracted from? The only answer can be the works of fiction and myth including oral traditions in which these pretendings are culturally disseminated. The character of Holmes must somehow be related to the movement of Doyle’s pen on paper, and perhaps to the imaginative thoughts construed as brain events in a neurophysiological supervenience base of mental activity that inspires and is inspired by his writing down sentences containing a pretended name, pretended anaphoric reference, and the like. If the Kripkean Holmes character is neither abusively “Meinongian”, by virtue of being created in real time, if the Holmes character is not merely inscriptional, not existing merely in the scratchings of ink or other methods of linguistic expression Doyle used in writing the Holmes stories, then a Kripkean semantics of fiction may find itself at a loss to explain exactly what kind of thing a Kripkean fictional character is supposed to be, and how it is supposed to be included in a logic’s referential semantic domain, except as a nonexistent Meinongian object. Roman Ingarden, in his 1960 essay, investigates a similar ontology for fictional ob-

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jects. He also describes fictional objects as occupying a conceptual and metaphysical middle space between the usual two ontic benches. 5 Kripke cannot directly avail himself of Ingarden’s concept, even if he should want to, because Kripke does not consider fictional intended objects as accessible for semantic application, but only existent fictional characters, which are not the fictional characters, in the more usual non-Kripkean sense, created by their authors in real space-time of or belonging to any fictional intended objects. Kripke’s actualism rules nonexistent fictional intended objects altogether out of consideration, but does not offer a better understanding in its place that allows the semantics of fiction to explain how it is that pretending Sherlock Holmes is named is different than pretending that Anna Karenina is named without finally appealing to a referential semantic domain that includes nonexistent Meinongian fictional intended objects Sherlock Holmes and Anna Karenina. A Meinongian Kripke is as yet a fictional intended object. One nevertheless imagines the possibility of Kripke reading Meinong some day, and absorbing the surrounding literature. Perhaps since 1973, Kripke has done so assiduously. I speak throughout only of respectful possibilities among Kripke’s accidental properties. He may in the process have thereby softened his position on the unintelligibility of beingless Meinongian intended objects of fiction. The characters of those Meinongian objects will then be their existent characterizing properties, their so-beings, as Meinong would say, their sayso properties as John Woods in his 2009 [1974] study, The Logic of Fiction, reasonably maintains, that an author expresses in composing a work of imaginative fiction in a series of creative decisions in real time and place. Kripke quotes with qualified approval a statement made by Douglas Lackey in the “Introduction” to his edited volume, Russell, Essays in Analysis, 1973, 19: In this controversy [between Russell and Meinong] Russell has usually appeared to be an apostle of common sense while Meinong has appeared as a wild ontologizer hypostasizing entities at will. But Meinong’s theory says that ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’ is true, while Russell says that this assertion is false. The average man, if he knows his mythology, would probably agree with Meinong (Kripke 2013, 55). 5

Ingarden 1960. See Smith 1980.

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It is exactly the hope of a Meinongian logic and semantics that Kripke here perceives to do justice to the meaning of empirically encountered ordinary thinking and colloquial language usage of the sort and in the kinds of judgment contexts that Lackey mentions, including all the semantic structures involved in the consideration of fiction. Whereas in certain sciences we can cover meaning and the truth values of sentences by correlating terms with the entities in a referential semantic domain of existent intended objects only, we cannot or not as readily do so in the case of thought and its linguistic expression. The meaning of fiction poses an especially important test case, but one that can be found in many other applications also, as reflected in responses like Lackey’s remark that Kripke seems to weigh with some sympathy. At another later stage of clarifying his concept of existent fictional characters, Kripke anticipates the objection that he is after all invoking the equivalent of intended nonexistent or beingless fictional objects. “‘Ah,’ so it is said, ‘so you agree with Meinong after all! There are entities which have only a secondary kind of existence.’ No, I don’t mean that,” Kripke continues, “I mean that there are certain fictional characters in the actual world, that these entities actually exist” (Kripke 2013, 70). Along with deprecating the Meinongian Außersein as “shadowy”, echoing the words of Russell’s lectures on logical atomism, Kripke also remarks: Novels and dramas do not exist in some weak Meinong-land: there actually have been many novels in the ordinary world. On my view, to write a novel is, ordinarily, to create several fictional characters, as Twain, by writing Huckleberry Finn, brought both a novel and a fictional character into being. It is not that fictional characters exist in one sense but not in another. The fictional character Huckleberry Finn definitely exists, just as the novel does: I would withdraw the statement only if my impression that there was any real novel was mistaken. Thus, their existence is not like that of numbers, abstract entities which are said to necessarily exist, independently of empirical facts (Kripke 2013, 72).

It is true that novels and dramas do not exist in some weak Meinong-land. Whatever rhetorical effect such formulations might be expected to have on Meinongians who know their subject, it is easy to agree with Kripke that novels and dramas (also comedies and many other kinds of fictional works in a large variety of entertainment and edutainment genres) are not beingless Meinongian objects. Meinong-land in Kripke’s comment might be intended to mean Meinongian Außersein or ontically neutral referential

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semantic domain, including both existent and nonexistent potentially intended but theoretically mind-independent intendable objects. Why, though, should any of that be considered weak? Weak, first of all, in what sense? To be weak, especially for the Fregean-Russellian-Quinean-Kripkean semantic-ontic actualist, something has to exist. (If I am dead, by analogy, I am past being weak because I no longer exist, although I might have been weak up to that point.) That rules out beingless Meinongian intended objects as incapable of weakness, as much as of strength, or any other constitutive property. It does so, moreover, without the benefit or comfort of a good reason why, beyond the extensionalist dictum that nonexistent intended objects cannot be referred to or truly have constitutive properties. Readers are equally left to wonder why Kripke considers in the first quotation immediately above, the nonexistence of some intendable objects as nevertheless possessing a “secondary kind of existence”. This is a phrase that does not appear in Meinong, and, since Kripke claims not to have looked deeply into Meinong’s philosophy, it is unclear what is meant. The point of a Meinongian semantic domain combining existent and nonexistent objects is to provide for the reference to and true predication of characterizing properties to objects independently of whether or not they exist. Nonexistent objects do not have a secondary kind of existence, according to Meinong. Rather, they are nonexistent objects because they do not have any kind of dynamic or abstract existence at all. If Meinong is right, then that ontic inconvenience does not prevent nonexistents as individual intended objects capable of being referred to, named, described in predications of properties to them, counted, quantified over, and the like, just as do the existent objects in an actualist semantic domain. Nor is it clear why there is what Meinong himself spoke of as a “prejudice in favor of the actual” in semantic philosophy typified by Frege, Russell, Quine, and also Kripke. It is not as though beingless Meinongian objects take up any space, as in Quine’s grudging doorway. They are there unobjectionably like any other object in a logic’s referential semantic domain, as intendable objects of naming, describing, counting, predication and quantification. There is no question of ontic excess in Meinongian semantics. Quite the contrary. The Meinong referential semantic domain of all existent and nonexistent intended objects can be made ontically as

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streamlined as any purely extensional actualist semantics, insofar as the subdomain of existent entities as potential intended objects is concerned, which alone, after all, is the ontology. If the division that Kripke contra Meinong invokes holds between the actualist referential domain of existent entities only, and the object theoretical referential domain of both existing and nonexisting, intendable objects of thought, especially when the pretendings of fiction are at play, then, from Kripke’s standpoint, nothing ontically “weak” exists to further criticize. Objects in Meinong-land simply do not exist, for Kripke and Meinong. That eventuality, one would think, a semantically conservative actualist ought to find satisfying enough. Kripke considers this the death-knell for beingless Meinongian objects, without really explaining why or arguing for the position, whereas Meinongians just as resolutely and intuitively, from another contrary perspective, do not. A Meinongian never sensibly supposes that anything exists, even in an ontically “weak” sense, whatever that would be, in a Meinongian referential semantic domain of nonexistent objects. We need only be able logically to designate beingless objects as distinct individuals, by virtue of their having or being nominally associated in each case with particular distinguishing totalities of Leibnizian Law-qualifying characterizing properties. The concept is easily extended as well to the Außersein category of pure referentiality, altogether independent of an object’s ontic status. These potentially intended objects take their place in an ontically neutral pure referential domain alongside despite being ontically distinct from any existent objects of reference. Nonexistent objects, by virtue of satisfying the same intensional property-distinguishing Leibnizian identity conditions, can in both cases be individually designated by names, definite descriptions, and in other ways, made the intended objects of predications. The most basic predications can then be combined into molecular expressions by truth functions and quantifiers, property abstraction, formalized identity principles, modalities, and many other devices besides, in all the usual ways and by all the same properly expanded mechanisms as in classical logic. This is not an on-demand description theory of reference, of the sort Kripke is right to criticize, but wrong to attribute to Frege and Russell. It is a view of mind-independent correlations between intendable or potentially intended objects and the characterizing property bundles by

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which their distinctive identity conditions are satisfied for logical and semantic purposes, have properties even in pretending to name, count, predicate and quantify over an ontically neutral logic’s referential semantic domain of existent and nonexistent intended objects.6 Dale Jacquette University of Bern [email protected]

6

I am grateful to members of my weekly reading group on Kripke’s Locke Lectures at the University of Bern, for insightful commentary on Kripke’s arguments, working systematically through his text during Herbstsemester 2013.

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References Dummett, Michael (1981) [1973], Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ingarden, Roman (1960), “Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21, 289–313. Kripke, Saul A. (1963), “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, in: Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16, Modal and Many-Valued Logics, 83– 94. Kripke, Saul A. (2011 [1974]), “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”, in: Kripke, Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 52–74. Kripke, Saul A. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Kripke, Saul A. (2013), Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures 1973, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linsky, Leonard (ed.) (1971), Reference and Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Quine, W. V. O. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press. Searle, John R. (1979), Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Barry (1980), “Ingarden vs. Meinong on the Logic of Fiction”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41, 93–105. Thomasson, Arnie L. (1999), Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomasson, Arnie L. (2003), “Speaking of Fictional Characters”, in: Dialectica 57, 205–223. Woods, John (2009 [1974]), The Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic, The Hague: Mouton; Reissue with a Foreword by Nicholas Griffin, London: College Publications.

PARADISE ON THE CHEAP. ASCRIPTIVISM ABOUT FICTA Michele Paolini Paoletti

Summary In this article I shall present a Meinong-inspired theory of fictional objects. This theory is based on two ideas: fictional objects are mental objects, i.e., they depend for their identity conditions on minded subjects thinking of them; they bear properties in two different ways, i.e., by instantiating properties and by having properties “ascribed” to them. In my perspective, ascription relations hold (at least) between an object, a property and a minded subject. After having presented some data about fictional discourse, I shall defend the thesis that fictional objects are mental objects. Afterwards, I shall introduce ascription relations and I shall outline in detail my theory and a comprehensive ontology of fiction. Finally, I shall define the identity conditions of fictional objects, I shall deal with the aforementioned data and I shall summarize the advantages of my theory over rival theories of fictional objects.

This paper presents an ascriptivistic theory of fictional objects, that is partly inspired by P. van Inwagen 1977’s notion of ascription and by Fine 1982, but that accepts that there are objects that do not exist (e.g., fictional objects). According to my theory, such objects have properties in two different ways: on the one hand, they instantiate properties (e.g., fictional objects instantiate the property of being fictional); on the other hand, some properties are ascribed to them by minded subjects thinking of them. However, this theory is not simply a version of instantiation-centered Meinongianism. It does not assume that there is a primitive distinction between two ways of having properties (e.g., Zalta 1983’s exemplification and encoding or Rapaport 1976’s and 1978’s exemplification and constitution), but it claims that there are some relations (ascription relations) that hold (at least) between minded subjects, fictional objects and proper-

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ties. Secondly, it does not introduce existing objects’ fictional correlates in order to make it true, for example, that Lord Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock Holmes. Thirdly, it provides us with a unified account of thinking of objects as having properties, since such ascription relations may involve existent objects too. Fourthly, it deals with fictional contexts defined by stories, by thinking of them as fictional worlds that are involved within ascription relations1. After having introduced some data (§ 1) and after having defended the thesis that ficta are mental objects (i.e., objects that depend for their identity conditions on minded subjects) (§ 2), I shall present the theory (§ 3) and an ontology of fiction grounded on it (§ 4). Furthermore, in order to reply to Quine 1948’s objection about the lack of identity conditions of non-existents, I shall deal with the identity-conditions of ficta (§ 5). Finally, I shall interpret the truth-conditions of our initial data (§ 6) and I shall summarize some advantages of ascriptivism over other theories (§ 7).

1. The Data Let me consider one definite fictional object: Sherlock Holmes. It seems true that (1) Sherlock Holmes does not exist, and that (2) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character. However, many philosophers maintain that fictional characters exist (see, for example, Kripke 2013, van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999 and 2003), so that it is literally false that (1), even if there is an interpretation of (1) 1

Moreover, my theory could be considered a constructivist theory of fictional items. Along these lines, for example, it partly accepts Roman Ingarden’s constructivism and the idea that we should distinguish between the properties of an object and its ascribed characteristics, even though my theory does not imply that there are properties that can be only possessed by – and not ascribed to – objects. For more details on Ingarden’s view of fictional objects, see, for example, Smith 1980.

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that turns out to make this statement (seemingly) true (e.g., if (1) claims that Sherlock Holmes is not man). Moreover, artifactualists such as Thomasson hold that ficta are abstract artifacts. I shall not deal with such an approach.2 I shall only assume that (1) and (2) claim something true about Sherlock Holmes. Secondly, it is also true that (3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective, even if it is not true that Sherlock Holmes is among existing detectives (I would not look for him in order to solve any real crime!). Yet, if Sherlock Holmes is not an existing detective, how can we claim that it is true that he nevertheless is a detective? In fact, the property of being a detective seems to be an existence-entailing one: for everything that has that property, that thing exists. On the other hand, the property of being a fictional character in (2) seems to be a non-existence entailing property: for everything that has that property, that thing does not exist. Furthermore, other (seemingly) true statements seem to concern fictional objects. For example, it seems true that (4) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes’ creator, even if the relation of being some fictional object’s creator is far from being clear: what does this relation imply with regard to Sherlock Holmes’ ontological status? If it is true that (1), Sherlock Holmes does not literally turn out to exist when he is created by Conan Doyle. Finally, Sherlock Holmes is the protagonist of many stories written by Conan Doyle. Namely, it is true that (5) Conan Doyle is the author of Sherlock Holmes’ stories. Yet, what does this relation imply with regard to those stories’ ontological status? Concerning other features of fictional objects, it is worth noticing 2

For some problems concerning this approach, see Deutsch 1991, Yagisawa 2001, Brock 2010 and Sainsbury 2010. Among other, they claim that this approach does not offer adequate paraphrases for true negative existential statements concerning ficta and that it does not explain how and when ficta start to exist, since they are taken as abstract objects (i.e., necessarily and atemporally or omnitemporally existing objects).

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that such objects always seem to be incomplete and that they sometimes seem to be impossible. This seems to be problematic, since it implies that the laws of bivalence, of excluded middle and of non-contradiction do not hold for every object. When we read Sherlock Holmes’ stories, we all believe that Sherlock Holmes does not exist and that he is somehow bounded to his stories. Yet, there are fictional objects that are not story-bounded and/or that are believed to exist, even though they do not exist. For example, Greeks believed that mythical gods such as Apollo existed. Furthermore, we do not believe that Santa Claus exists, even if he is not explicitly bounded to any story. Thus, what does the relation of story-boundedness amount to? And what is a story? Furthermore, partly following A. Voltolini’s list of sentences involving fictional objects3, we can individuate, at first, internal fictional sentences (and the corresponding propositions), such as the aforementioned (3) and (6) Sherlock Holmes exists, that seem to express true propositions at least in some story, even though, as we have already noticed, they express false propositions outside stories. There are problematically true internal fictional sentences, that seem to imply the migration of real objects into fictional stories: (7) Sherlock Holmes lives in London; (8) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone. On the one hand, it seems that Conan Doyle refers to the real London and to the real Lord Gladstone when he talks about them in his stories, so that the real London and the real Lord Gladstone should respectively have the properties of having been inhabited by and of having had a tea with Sherlock Holmes – at least, if it is true that (7) and (8). Yet, the real London and the real Lord Gladstone do not have such properties. Thus, by the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, they cannot be identical with London and Lord Gladstone in Conan Doyle’s stories. 3

See Voltolini 2006: 127–186. For another detailed exposition of the ontology of fiction, see Sainsbury 2010.

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Internal fictional sentences should be distinguished from internal metafictional sentences, such as (9) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Internal fictional and metafictional sentences can be explicit (they can be present in the list of a story’s sentences) or implicit (they can be deduced by that list). For example, (10) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English seems to express a true proposition, even though Conan Doyle (perhaps) does not explicitly claim that Sherlock Holmes is English. Are such inferences acceptable? And to what extent are they acceptable? Finally, there are sentences in which fictional objects are considered independently of their stories. These are external metafictional sentences. For example, (1), (2), (4)–(6) can be classified into this category. Other examples of such sentences are (11) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary; (12) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader; (13) John admires Sherlock Holmes; (14) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective; (15) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character; (16) Ulysses inspired both Dante Alighieri and James Joyce; (17) the Faust of Goethe’s Faust is an aspect of Faust itself; (18) the Sherlock Holmes of The Hound of the Baskervilles is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of A Study in Scarlet; (19) the Sherlock Holmes of Conan Doyle’s stories is the same as the Sherlock Holmes of a recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie; (20) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character since The Murder of Gonzago is a story within the story Hamlet.

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In particular, in order to justify the truth of the propositions expressed by (18) and (19), it seems necessary to define a criterion of identity for fictional objects. J. L. Borges, for example, imagined a fictional character which had all the properties of Cervantes’ Don Quixote but which was created by another (fictional) author, Pierre Menard. Are Cervantes’ Don Quixote and Pierre Menard’s Don Quixote identical or not? Are they the same fictional object?

2. Nothing but Mental My theory is grounded on two assumptions that I cannot defend here. First, existence, as it is involved in the truth-conditions of (1) and of (21) Obama exists, is taken as a first-order informative property (i.e., a property of objects that some objects have and that other objects do not have). Second, it is legitimate to quantify over objects, regardless of their existence or non-existence: what is requested by quantification simply is that whatever we quantify over has definite identity-conditions. Thus, Sherlock Holmes is a non-existent object, i.e., he does not instantiate the first-order, informative property of existing. Yet, he is an object. What kind of object? In my perspective, Sherlock Holmes is a mental object, i.e., an object that depends for its identity conditions (for its being an object) on the activity of some minded subject. In order to argue for such a thesis, let me consider Sherlock Holmes’ story in the actual world. Sherlock Holmes was invented by Arthur Conan Doyle: if Arthur Conan Doyle had not written Sherlock Holmes’ stories, we would not have known any object such as Sherlock Holmes. This does not imply that Sherlock Holmes could not have had any other author. Yet, it is true that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes’ author. Without Arthur Conan Doyle’s mental activity, we would not have known that Sherlock Holmes is a detective who lives in London and who has a friend named Watson. We would not have known that Sherlock Holmes is different from Anna Karenina and from Watson and from Emma Bovary, since there would not have been such a fictional character, i.e., Sherlock

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Holmes would not have had any identity condition making it different from any other non-existent object and from any existent one. On the other hand, why would we have to argue that Sherlock Holmes is an object, regardless of his author’s mental activity? Perhaps, because he continues being an object even if Conan Doyle is now dead and because he might have had another author, i.e., he might have been invented by someone else’s mental activity. Yet, this does not exclude that Sherlock Holmes actually identity-depends on Arthur Conan Doyle and that we can now quantify over him since Conan Doyle invented him. Yet, an orthodox Meinongian could argue that it was true that Sherlock Holmes did not exist even at a time t0 that preceded the time t1 at which Conan Doyle first thought of him. Thus, in order for the proposition [Sherlock Holmes did not exist at t0]4 to be true, Sherlock Holmes had to be an object at t0. Yet, if now consider that proposition, it is now true since Sherlock Holmes now has definite identity conditions – and he has them, since he was defined in his identity conditions by Arthur Conan Doyle. What seems to be implied by the orthodox Meinongian argument is that, provided that it is now true that [Sherlock Holmes did not exist at t0], there was a true proposition at t0, such as the present tensed proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist], and that proposition was made true at t0 by Sherlock Holmes’ not instantiating existence (and, moreover, it referred to something, i.e. its truth-value, only if [Sherlock Holmes] referred to something, i.e. Sherlock Holmes, given the Fregean Principle of Compositionality). However, there is no need to posit at t0 such an extra entity, i.e. the present tensed proposition [Sherlock Holmes does not exist]: what is requested in order for [Sherlock Holmes did not exist at t0] to be true simply is that Sherlock Holmes was invented by Arthur Conan Doyle at t1 and that t0 precedes t1.5 In my perspective, authors do not properly create fictional objects, i.e., they do not make them existents. Minded subjects (such as authors) 4 5

I use square brackets [ ] in order to distinguish propositions from statements. I cannot discuss here all the arguments given by Twardoski 1894 (1977) and Meinong (e.g., in Meinong 1904 (1960)) for the mind-independence of non-existent objects. For more details, see also Findlay 1933 and Grossmann 1974. I have only introduced one strong reason for doubting about the mind-independence of ficta.

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simply establish their identity conditions, i.e., they simply make them objects. Given the truth of such premises, it is easy to argue that Sherlock Holmes is a mental object: (arg.1) for every object, that object is a mental object iff it depends for its being an object on some minded subject(s); (arg.2) Sherlock Holmes depends for his being an object on some minded subject; (arg.3) thus, Sherlock Holmes is a mental object. Yet, someone could claim that not every mental object is a non-existent object: for example, I could think of my girlfriend, and she would not become a non-existent object because of my thinking of her! However, in order for something to be a mental object, it is not sufficient that it is thought of as being such-and-such by some minded object. It must be defined in its identity conditions by some minded object and my girlfriend is (luckily) not defined in her identity conditions by my thinking of her. If you wish, we can claim that something is a weak mental object iff it is thought of as being such-and-such by some minded subject, while something is a strong mental object iff it is defined in its identity conditions by (i.e., it depends on its being an object on) some minded subject. Weak mental objects exist or do not exist, while strong mental objects do not exist. Sherlock Holmes and other fictional characters are strong mental objects and they do not exist6.

3. Ascription Relations Let me recall my aforementioned example of a true statement involving a fictional object: 6

One could object that social objects – such as institutions – can be considered strong mental objects, even though they seemingly exist. I reply that, within my perspective, social objects do not properly exist. This does not exclude that they have properties, that they can bear relations, and so on. However, I cannot discuss here such a thesis.

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(3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective. It has already been remarked that there is no detective named “Sherlock Holmes”, since the property of being a detective seems to be an existenceentailing one: for every object, that object is a detective only if it exists. However, many Meinongians have argued that there are detectives who do not exist (e.g., Sherlock Holmes), that the instantiation of the property of being a detective does not imply anything about the ontological status of objects that instantiate it 7. In other terms, the Sosein of an object (that comprehends, in Sherlock Holmes’ case, his being a detective) is independent of its Sein. However, things are not so easy. In fact, our commonsense might reply that, if there were a murder in our town, Sherlock Holmes would not be able to investigate on it and that, since every detective is able to investigate on a murder (at least, since every detective has the power of investigating on a murder), Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. Meinongians might then distinguish between real and fictional murders (or between real and fictional investigations) and they might claim that, even if Sherlock Holmes is not able to investigate on real murders (or to really investigate on murders), since he is only a fictional detective, he is able to investigate on fictional murders (or he is able to fictionally investigate on murders). Thus, he is a detective, since he is able to (fictionally or really) investigate on (fictional or real) murders. There are real murders and fictional ones, real detectives and fictional ones but, in order for something to be a murder, it does not have to be real, and in order for someone to be a detective, s/he does not have to be real. However, there are features of real murders that are not features of fictional ones; there are features of real detectives that are not features of fictional ones. For example, it seems that real detectives are complete, while fictional ones are somehow incomplete: it seems to be neither true, nor false that Sherlock Holmes had a grandfather named Daniel, while, for every real detective, it is true or false that s/he had a grandfather named Daniel. Furthermore, as we have already remarked, some fictional objects are inconsistent (e.g., round squares or, better, round and non-round circles). In order to avoid complications introduced by the inconsistency and incompleteness of fictional objects and in order to maintain that they are 7

See, for example, Routley 1979 and Parsons 1980.

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objects, one might choose among different solutions. For example, as it is claimed by ascriptivism, s/he might accept that there are some relations (some ascription relations) between those objects and those properties that they have according to stories. Since, as I have already argued, fictional objects are mental objects, such relations should include minded subjects too. The basis of an ascriptivistic theory of fictional objects is thus represented by the introduction of a family of ascription relations, that hold at least between some object, some property and some minded subject (even if I shall introduce an ascription relation that does not hold for objects). Furthermore, since fictional objects do not have within the actual world (but within some other fictional world) some properties that are ascribed to them, there are ascription relations that involve fictional contexts too (i.e., fictional worlds defined by stories, as we will see in the next section). Here are some examples of ascription relations: A1 (a 3place relation that holds between some object, some property and some minded subject); A2 (a 4-place relation that holds between some object, some property, some minded subject and some fictional context); A 3 (a 4place relation that holds between two objects, some two-place relation and some minded subject); A4 (a 5-place relation that holds between two objects, some two-place relation, some minded subject and some fictional context); and so on. It is worth remarking that: ascription relations do not only involve fictional objects, but existing objects too, as we will see; not every property had by a fictional object is an ascribed property, but there are properties that they simply instantiate (e.g., the property of being fictional). Let me consider Sherlock Holmes’ example. Even if it is not true that Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of being a detective, i.e. it is not true that (3ins.) ~DEh (where “h” stands for Sherlock Holmes and “DE” for the property of being a detective), it is nevertheless true that there is some minded subject that ascribes to him the fictional property of being a detective within some fictional context, i.e. it is true that (3ascr.) ∃m∃cA2DEhmc

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If it is true that (3), it seems that (3ascr.) expresses its proper logical reading and the logical form of its truth-conditions: if there is some minded subject that ascribes to Sherlock Holmes the property of being a detective within some fictional context, then it is true that (3). It is not necessary that Sherlock Holmes’ author (Conan Doyle) ascribes to him that property within some fictional context (some fictional context defined by Conan Doyle’s stories) in order for (3) to be true: one and the same Sherlock Holmes might have that property within some other fictional context defined by some other author’s stories or by the interpretation of some story about Sherlock Holmes that has not been written by Conan Doyle. For example, if I watched the movie directed by Guy Ritchie about Sherlock Holmes and if I did not know that Sherlock Holmes was constituted as a fictional object by Conan Doyle, I could nevertheless ascribe to Sherlock Holmes (to Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes) the property of being a detective within the fictional context defined by that movie. When I shall deal with the identity conditions of fictional objects, this point will become clearer. Ascription relations also hold when some minded subject ascribes to some (fictional or existent) object some property. In fact, ascription relations can involve both existent and non-existent objects. For example, when I think that Obama is the President of the United States in 2013, I ascribe (by A1) to Obama (the existing Obama) the property of being the President of the United States in 2013. My ascription is veridical iff Obama instantiates the property of being the President of the United States in 2013; otherwise, it is not veridical. A 1 does not involve any fictional context: it only involves me (a minded subject), the property of being the President of the United States in 2013 and Obama. The same happens with fictional objects: I ascribe (by A 1) to Sherlock Holmes the property of being a fictional object, and my ascription is veridical, since Sherlock Holmes instantiates the property of being a fictional object. Fictional objects are always incomplete and sometimes inconsistent, even if we do not have to deny that the laws of the excluded middle and of non-contradiction hold for them. In fact, it is legitimate to distinguish between two kinds of negation: property-negation (where the property̅) and asnegation of some property P is the negative property non-P, or P cription-negation (where the ascription negation of some ascription rela-

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tion A corresponds to its not holding between its relata). Fictional objects are always incomplete as a matter of fact: (incompleteness) for every fictional object, that object is incomplete iff, for at least one n-adic property P, for every minded subject and for every fictional context, neither P is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context (i.e., it is not true, by ascriptionnegation, that P is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context), nor its nega̅ (i.e., it is not true, by ascription-negation, that P ̅, tion P i.e. the property-negation of P, is ascribed to that object by that minded subject within that fictional context). The axiom (incompleteness) neither implies the denial of the law of excluded middle, nor of the law of bivalence. In fact, for every n-adic property (ascription-relations included) and for every fictional object, it is always either true or false that that property is instantiated by that object. Every fictional object is incomplete as a matter of fact, since there is no (finite) minded subject that can think of it as being thus determined with regard to every (ascribed) property. With regard to inconsistency, it seems to me legitimate to claim that there are different kinds (and different degrees) of it. For example: (inconsistency-1) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-1 iff, for every minded subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context;

(inconsistency-2) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-2 iff, for some (but not every) minded subject, for every fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context;

(inconsistency-3) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-3 iff, for every minded subject, for some (but not every)

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fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context;

(inconsistency-4) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-4 iff, for some (but not every) minded subject, for some (but not every) fictional context, for some (but not every) property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context.

The round non-round circle is inconsistent-1, since both the properties of being round and of non-being round are ascribed to it within every fictional context by every minded subject. On the other hand, the round square can be inconsistent-2, inconsistent-3 or inconsistent-4, since there can be minded subjects that do not know the rules of geometry and that do not ascribe to it the property of non-being round in virtue of its being a square (inconsistency-2), or there can be fictional contexts where such rules do not hold, so that it is not legitimate to ascribe to it the property of non-being round in virtue of its being a square within those contexts (inconsistency-3), or both (inconsistency-4). Inconsistent fictional objects do not “explode”, since no kind of inconsistency implies (inconsistency-0) for every fictional object, that object is inconsistent-0 iff, for every minded subject, for every fictional context, for every property P, it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object P within that context and it is true that that minded subject ascribes to that object ̅ P within that context.

Furthermore, it is not necessary to deny the law of non-contradiction in order to admit inconsistent-0 objects, since it is not the case that, with regard to one and the same n-adic property, that property is both instantiated and not instantiated by an object. Thus, even inconsistent-0 fictional objects are not contradictory: it is neither necessary to admit impossible worlds, nor true contradictions within the actual world in order to deal with them.

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4. Stories and Authors It has already been argued that fictional objects are mental objects and that they are constituted as objects by minded subjects’ thinking about them. Thus, it seems to me fair to accept (constitution) ∀x(Fx → ∃mCmx)

(where “F” stands for the property of being a fictional object and “C” stands for the relation of constituting, that holds between some minded subject and that object). The axiom (constitution) does not exclude that there are objects that are constituted by minded subjects and that are not fictional objects. Intuitively, something is a fictional object iff it is a nonexistent character of a story. Yet, in order to grasp what is for an object to be a fictional object and what is for it to be constituted by some minded subject, it is necessary to introduce further notions. Firstly, I shall take stories as sets of propositions. Secondly, I shall assume that, for every object and every minded subject, that minded subject thinks of that object iff it ascribes to that object by A 1 some property, i.e. (thinks of) ∀x∀m(THmx ↔ ∃PA1Pxm)

(where “TH” stands for the relation of thinking of). If Conan Doyle thinks of Sherlock Holmes, then he ascribes by A 1 to him some property: for example, the property of being a detective according to some story. If I think of Obama, then I ascribe by A 1 to him some property: for example, the property of being the President of the United States in 2013. Thirdly, for every proposition and every story, that proposition is true within that story iff it is part of that story, i.e. (true in story) ∀p(TSps ↔ PAps)

(where “p” is a variable ranging over propositions, “TS” and “PA” respectively stand for the relations of being true within a story and of being part of). I cannot dwell here on the identity conditions of propositions, even though I think that propositions identity-depend (at least in part) on logical operators such as negation, so that, if one claims that the proposition ~p is part of a story (or, equivalently, that that proposition is true in a story), this does not imply that p is part of that story too.

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The identity of stories depends on propositions that are part of them, i.e. two stories are identical iff all and only the same propositions are part of them: (story-id.) ∀s1∀s2((s1 = s2) ↔ ∀p(PAps1 ↔ PAps2))

(where “s1” and “s2” are variables ranging over stories) 8. The original author of a story is the minded subject that grounds, by its activities, the identity of that story. Let me now introduce the notion of context and the relation that holds between stories and fictional contexts: (def.story-context) ∀s∀c(Dsc ↔ ∀p(TSps → TCpc))

(where “c”, “s” and “p” are variables respectively ranging over fictional contexts, stories and propositions, “D” stands for the relation of defining, that holds between stories and fictional contexts, “TC” stands for the relation of being true within a context). Intuitively, the idea behind (def.storycontext) is that fictional contexts are fictional worlds different from stories: minded subjects, in fact, tend to distinguish between stories and contexts in which what is asserted by those stories is true. It is not necessary that, for any proposition that is true or false in the actual world, that proposition is true or false within stories too: there are (true or false) propositions in the actual world that are not part of any story and, for every story, it is not necessary that it comprehends any proposition of the actual world and that it claims that it is true or false within the fictional context defined by that story. On the other hand, there are propositions that are true within fictional contexts defined by stories and that are not part of those stories: a good interpreter of the story A Study in Scarlet, for example, might claim that it is true in the fictional context defined by A Study in Scarlet that London is in England, even if the proposition [London is in England] is not part of A Study in Scarlet. 8

One could ask: is the story uniquely constituted by the proposition [Romeo loves Juliet] identical with the story that is uniquely constituted by the proposition [Juliet is beloved by Romeo]? Intuitively, I would reply that they are the same story, since the proposition [Romeo loves Juliet] is identical with the proposition [Juliet is beloved by Romeo], though this proposition is expressed by two different statements. However, I cannot justify here this reply.

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For every object, that object is a character of a story iff the original author of the story ascribes to it some property within the fictional context defined by that story: (character) ∀x∀s(CHxs ↔ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc))

(where “CH” stands for the relation of being a character within a story and “AUOS” stands for the relation of being the original author of some story). Thus, a fictum is a non-existent object that is a character of some story:

(fictum) ∀x(Fx ↔ (~Ex & ∃sCHxs))

(where “E” stands for the property of existing). Furthermore, I shall define the context of origin of a fictum as follows: (cont.or.) ∀x∀c(COcx ↔ (Fx & ∃s1(CHxs1 & Ds1c & ~∃s2(~(s1 = s2) & CHxs2 & PRs2s1))))

(where “CO” and “PR” respectively stand for the relations of being the context of origin and of preceding). The relation of preceding holds between two stories s3 and s4 iff s3 is constituted as a story at a time t3 that precedes the time t4 at which s4 is constituted as a story. The original author of a fictum is the original author of the story that defines the context of origin of that fictum, i.e. (or.author obj.) ∀x∀m(AUOOxm ↔ ∃s(AUOSms & ∃c(Dsc & COcx)))

(where “AUOO” stands for the relation of being the original author of a fictional object). The original author of a fictum is the minded subject that constitutes that fictum as an object. Furthermore, by using the relation of being the original author of a story, it is legitimate to introduce the relation of being the original author of a fictional context: (or.author con.) ∀x∀m(AUOCxm ↔ ∃s(AUOSms & Dsc))

(where “AUOC” stands for the relation of being the original author of a fictional context). The author simpliciter of a fictional object is some minded subject that is the author of a story that defines a fictional context within which some property is ascribed to that fictional object, i.e.

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(sim.author ob.) ∀x∀m(AUOmx ↔ (Fx & ∃P∃s∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc)))

(where “AUO” stands for the relation of being the author simpliciter of an object). After having defined contexts of origins, it is possible to introduce original story-boundedness and story-boundedness simpliciter. Some fictional object is originally story-bound to some story iff that story defines its context of origin: (or.story-bound.) ∀x∀s(BOxs ↔ (Fx & ∃c(COcx & Dsc)))

(where “BO” stands for the relation of being originally story-bound to), while it is story-bound simpliciter to some story iff there is some property that is ascribed to it by the original author of that story within the fictional context defined by that story: (sim.story-bound.) ∀x∀s(Bxs ↔ (Fx & ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & Dsc & A2Pxmc)))

(where “B” stands for the relation of being story-bound simpliciter to). Finally, it is acceptable that someone is a good interpreter of some story iff, for every proposition and every fictional context, that story defines that fictional context and that proposition is true within the story and is part of that story and s/he ascribes to that proposition the relation of being part of that story iff s/he ascribes to that proposition the relation of being true within the fictional context defined by that story, i.e. (good inter.) ∀m∀s(ISms ↔ ∀p∀c((Dsc & TSps & PAps & A3PApsm & A3TSpsm) ↔ A3TCpcm))

(where “IS” stands for the relation of being a good interpreter of some story). All these notions will turn out to be useful for outlining the truthconditions of our initial data.

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5. Identity Conditions for Ficta In this section, I shall outline four different criteria of identity for fictional objects: fictional object x is identical with fictional object y iff at least one of such criteria holds for them. I do not think that I will be exhaustive about this topic (further criteria of identity for ficta might be found out) and I acknowledge that such criteria cannot be established a priori. I have only looked for the truth-conditions of our true statements about the identity of fictional objects and I have restricted my investigation to those cases in which such an identity seems certain (or almost certain). Fictional objects x and y are identical whenever they have the same original author that establishes their identity (ficta-identity-1). It follows that anyone who acknowledges that original author’s authority over those fictional objects should recognize their identity. Yet, some fictional objects’ identities are not only established by their original authors. Let me suppose that we both think of some fictional object: how can we establish that it is one and the same fictional object, even if we ascribe to that object different properties? It seems to me legitimate to introduce one further situation in which those fictional objects can be identified. According to the criterion (ficta-identity-2), fictional objects x and y can be identified whenever, for any two minded subjects, both subjects think of them and they ascribe to one another the relation of thinking of those objects and they both ascribe to the fictional object they think of the relation of being identical with the fictional object thought of by the other subject. I have to remark that (ficta-identity-2) works from an intrasubjective perspective too. In fact, I can ascribe to some fictional object I am thinking of the relation of being identical with some other fictional object I am thinking of. Thirdly, there are some identities of ficta that are grounded on univocally identifying fictional properties. Let me assume that the variable “x” ranges here only over fictional objects (so that I shall assume a version of (character) that is implicitly restricted to fictional objects). For every fictum x and for every property, I shall define as follows the property of being a univocally identifying fictional property of that fictum:

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(un.fic.property-1) ∀x∀P(PUFPx ↔ ∀m∀c∀s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc → ∀y(THmy → ((A3Ixym ∨ A3Ix̅ ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ ym))))))

(where “PUF” stands for the relation of being a univocally identifying fictional property, “I” and “I”̅ respectively stand for the relations of being identical with and of being non-identical with and the variable “x” ranges only over fictional objects, while “y” ranges over every object). Thus, the third situation in which ficta x and y can be identified is whenever they have the same univocally identifying fictional property (ficta-identity-3). For example, a univocally identifying fictional property of Sherlock Holmes is the conjunctive property of being a detective and of having a friend named “Watson” and of living in London. In this situation, there should be sufficiently elastic properties in order to deal with difficult cases of identity between ficta. Yet, one caveat is: do not introduce disjunctive properties. In fact, if minded subjects introduced disjunctive properties for this purpose, by the rule of introduction of disjunction applied to ascribed properties, then every fictional object would turn out to be identical with any other. Thus, I shall reform (un.fic.property-1) as follows: (un.fic.property-2) ∀x∀P(PUFPx ↔ (~DIP & ∀m∀c∀s((CHxs & ISms & Dsc) → (A2Pxmc → ∀y(THmy → ((A3Ixym ∨ A3Ix̅ ym) & ~(A3Ixym & A3Ix̅ ym)))))))

(where “DI” stands for the property of being a disjunctive property). The criterion (ficta-identity-3) holds in virtue of (un.fic.property-2), i.e. in virtue of the possession of the same univocally identifying and nondisjunctive fictional property. We can deal with other cases of identity by introducing one further situation that is grounded on story-boundedness. In this situation, the identity between fictional objects x and y holds whenever one of those objects is story-bound to some story and some minded subject, thinking of the other object, ascribes to it some property within some fictional context that has that subject as its original author and that is different from the fictional context defined by the former story and that subject ascribes to those objects the relation of being identical with one another (fictaidentity-4). For example, writing a story, I might define a fictional context

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(i.e., I might be its original author) where the same Sherlock Holmes that is a character in Conan Doyle’s stories does something. Thus, my Sherlock Holmes would be identical with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes. Put together, these four criteria can establish the identity between fictional objects x and y iff at least one of such criteria holds for those objects, i.e. (by taking the variables “x” and “y” as now ranging over every object) (ficta-identity) ∀x∀y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃m1∃m2(THm1x & THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) ∨ ∃P(PUFPx & PUFPy) ∨ ∃s(Bxs & ∃P∃m∃c(A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm)))

On the other hand, fictional objects x and y are different iff no criterion holds for those objects. No contradictory result is obtained regarding the identity of fictional objects x and y if only one criterion applies to them and other criteria do not apply: in this case, x simply is identical with y. There is no degree of identity between fictional objects (perhaps, there is only some degree of similarity without identity between them). Yet, if one wished to preserve the intuition according to which there seemingly is some degree of identity between them, s/he could claim that there seemingly is some increasing degree of identity whenever more than one criterion holds. One could object against such an account that many minded subjects are not conscious of ascribing properties and identity in such ways. Sure! Yet, I have not claimed that they have to ascribe to themselves the ascription-relations of ascribing properties in such ways, i.e. I have not introduced self-consciousness about ascription. I have only claimed that, as a matter of fact, such criteria of identity ground identity between fictional objects from an ontological viewpoint. Furthermore, one should ask whether some character in some fiction is identical with or different from some existing object. I shall firstly introduce the criterion (ex.fic.identity-1), according to which, roughly, some character within a story is identical with some existing object whenever the original author of that story ascribes to that character the property of being identical with that existing object (ex.fic.identity-1).

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Secondly, one might introduce univocally identifying properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated only by one definite existing object (and that are not disjunctive): (un.property) ∀x∀P(PUPx ↔ (Px & ~DIP & ~∃y(~(x = y) & Py)))

(where “PU” stands for the relation of being a univocally identifying property). It is worth remarking that such properties are univocally identifying as a matter of fact, not necessarily, since there might be possible worlds in which an object’s univocally identifying properties are different. Thus, the second criterion I shall introduce (ex.fic.identity-2) asserts that some character within a story that has some minded subject as its original author is identical with some existing object whenever that existing object has some univocally identifying property that is ascribed by the original author of that story to that character within the fictional context defined by that story. Finally, the third criterion is based on good interpreters: some character within a story is identical within some existing object whenever every good interpreter of that story ascribes to that character the property of being identical with that existing object (ex.fic.identity-3). Such an identity is not simply grounded on some (but not all) or most (but not all) good interpreters’ ascriptions, since there would remain in such a case a shadow of doubt about the truth of some identity statements. On the other hand, different degrees of similarity without identity can be grounded in these latter situations. Put together (and assuming that our variables “x” and “y” range over every object), the final criterion of identity between some existing object and some character within a story asserts that: (ex.fic.identity) ∀x∀y∀s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOSms & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & PUPx & Dsc & A2Pxmc) ∨ ∀m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym)

Yet, accepting (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity), some problems arise concerning the transitivity of identity. In fact, let me consider a case in which, by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes turns out to be identical with some character of some fictional context that has me as its original author. Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4) and

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still in virtue of my power of identifying fictional objects, is identical with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. A different case: by (ficta-identity-4), Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes turns out to be identical with some character of some fictional context that has me as its original author. Furthermore, that character, by (ficta-identity-4), is identical with Conan Doyle’s Watson. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes is identical with Conan Doyle’s Watson. Still another case: besides my character that is identical with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, let me assume that another minded subject identifies, by (ficta-identity-4), some character of some fictional context that has that subject as its original author with Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. Furthermore, by (ficta-identity-2), we establish that my character and that subject’s character are identical. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes and Flaubert’s Emma Bovary are identical. Finally, considering a case involving (ex.fic.identity-1), I identify, by (ex.fic.identity-1), some character of some story that has me as its original author with the existing Lord Gladstone. Later on, I identify that character, by (ex.fic.identity-1), with the existing Obama. It turns out, by the transitivity of identity, that Lord Gladstone is identical with Obama. Thus, one should amend (fictaidentity-2), (ficta-identity-4), (ex.fic.identity-1), (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) in order to avoid such problems. I shall introduce the notion of a legitimate identifier as follows: for any minded subject, for objects x and y, that subject is a legitimate identifier of those objects (I shall use “IL” as standing for the relation of being a legitimate identifier) iff it is legitimate that, if that subject ascribes to those objects the relation of being identical, then those objects are identical. Furthermore, it seems to me that, for any minded subject and for objects x and y, that minded subject is a legitimate identifier of x and y iff at least one of the following conditions holds: –

that minded subject is the original author of both x and y, or (vel)

–

there is no other object z, such that there is a criterion of identity not for ficta (e.g., a criterion of identity between existing things), such that x is identical with z iff that criterion holds between them and, as a matter of fact, that criterion does not hold between them and that

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minded subject nevertheless ascribes the identity between x and z (or the same for y), or (vel) –

intuitively, there is no other object z, that is originally authored by another minded subject or that has a fictional context not originally authored by the former minded subject as its context of origin, such that the former minded subject ascribes the identity between z and x, even though the original author of z does not ascribe the identity (or s/he ascribes the non-identity) between y and z, or even though the contexts of origin of y and z – not originally authored by the former minded subject – are different (or the same for y).

Put formally: (leg.) ∀m1∀x∀y(ILmxy ↔ ((AUOOm1x & AUOOm1y) ∨ ~∃z∃w(CINFw & (~HOwxz & ((z = x) ↔ (HOwxz)) & A3Iyzm1) ∨ (~HOwyz & ((z = y) ↔ (HOwyz)) & A3Ixzm1))) ∨ ~∃z((A3Ixzm1 & ∃m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) & (A3Iy̅ zm2 ∨ ~A3Iyzm2))) ∨ (A3Iyzm1 & ∃m2(AUOOm2z & ~(m2 = m1) & (A3Ix̅ zm2 ∨ ~A3Ixzm2))) ∨ (~AUOOm1z & A3Ixzm1 & ∃c1∃c2(COc1z & COc2y & ~(c1 = c2) & ~AUOCm1c1 & ~AUOCm1c2)) ∨ (~AUOOm1z & A3Iyzm1 & ∃c1∃c2(COc1z & COc2x & ~(c1 = c2) & ~AUOCm1c1 & ~AUOCm1c2)))))

(where “IL” stands for the relation of being a legitimate identifier, “CINF” stands for the property of being a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects, “HO” stands for the relation of holding, that holds between a criterion of identity and objects x and y. I have put the major disjunctions in bold font). Thus, (ficta-identity-2), (ficta-identity-4) and (ex.fic.identity-1) should be amended, by adding that the two minded subjects are legitimate identifiers of those objects (ficta-identity-2a), that the minded subject that establishes the identities is a legitimate identifier of the objects involved in those identities, so that we obtain (ficta-identity-4a) and (ex.fic.identity1a). Accordingly, (ficta-identity) and (ex.fic.identity) should be amended as follows:

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(ficta-identity-a) ∀x∀y((Fx & Fy & x = y) ↔ ∃m(AUOOmx & AUOOmy & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃m1∃m2(THm1x & THm2y & A3THm2ym1 & A3THm1xm2 & ILm1xy & ILm2xy & A3Ixym1 & A3Iyxm2) ∨ ∃P(PUFPx & PUFPy) ∨ ∃s(Bxs & ∃P∃m∃c(ILmxy & A3Bxsm & ~Dsc & AUOCmc & A2Pymc & A3Iyxm)))

(ex.fic.identity-a) ∀x∀y∀s(Ex & CHys & x = y) ↔ ∃m(ILmxy & AUOSms & A3Ixym) ∨ ∃P∃m∃c(AUOSms & PUPx & Dsc & A2Pxmc) ∨ ∀m(ISms ↔ A3Ixym)

The fact that the third major disjunct of (leg.) is negated and no other disjunct is true excludes the first, the second and the third case (e.g., I cannot identify my strange Sherlock Holmes-Watson (x) with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes (y), since there is an object z (Conan Doyle’s Watson) that I identify with x, such that both y and z are not originally authored by me and their author ascribes to them the property of non-being identical). The fourth case is excluded by the fact that (leg.)’s second major disjunct is negated, since it is established by a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects that Obama is distinct from Lord Gladstone, and no other disjunct is true. The criterion (leg.) is not an ad hoc criterion: it preserves the idea that one cannot identify in every case objects x and y by simply establishing that they are identical. There are problematic cases of identities between fictional objects. In a first case, the original author of some story is competently acquainted with some fictional object that is constituted within some other story, but s/he attributes to that fictional object properties that are completely different from the ones that are ascribed to it according to the latter story: there might be a literary work where a fictional character named “Sherlock Holmes” is a rapper who lives in New York. Following our criteria of identity, the first fictional object is identical with the second one not in virtue of (ficta-identity-3) but (if the original author of the first story ascribes such an identity) in virtue of (ficta-identity-1) (if both stories have the same original author) or in virtue of (ficta-identity-4a) (if they have different authors). In a second case, two different authors (without respectively knowing their works) constitute fictional objects x and y that are qualitatively really similar. Are they the same fictional object? Yes, if (ficta-identity-3) holds for them, given some univocally identifying fictional property. If they are qualitatively identical (a really implausible, but not

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impossible case), (ficta-identity-3) certainly holds. On the other hand, if some author thought of a story about some fictional object qualitatively identical with (or very similar to) some other fictional object already constituted by another author and if the former author thought of both objects as identical with one another, then their identity could hold in virtue of (ficta-identity-3) and (ficta-identity-4a). It follows from these solutions that it is not necessary that, for every fictional object, that object has one and only one original author: there might be cases (implausible, I should repeat, but not impossible ones) in which one and the same fictional object has two or more different original authors. If two different authors ground the identity of one and the same story, that story has two different original authors. Furthermore, (ficta-identity-3) makes it possible to think that some fictum could have had a different author. If there is some possible world in which Conan Doyle does not exist and there is some fictional object that is qualitatively identical with (or at least very similar to) Sherlock Holmes, but that is authored by some other minded subject (let me call such an object Sherlock Holmes-2), Sherlock Holmes-2 is identical with our Sherlock Holmes in virtue of (ficta-identity-3), so that one and the same object has – in some other possible world – some other author. One further case can be introduced by thinking of three (fictional) characters: within different fictional contexts or within the same context, their original author(s) ascribe(s) to the first one the properties of being a detective and of living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of not having a friend named Watson; to the second one the properties of being a detective and of having a friend named Watson and of not living in Baker Street 221B, London; to the third one the properties of having a friend named Watson and of living in Baker Street 221B, London, and of not being a detective. Are such objects identical with one another? Are they all identical with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes? The answer to the first question depends on further contextual information, e.g. about their authors. Concerning the second question, it seems difficult to establish whether they are identical with Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, at least according to (ficta-identity-3), since we cannot use disjunctive properties. However, one might use other criteria to establish their identity or difference, provided further contextual information.

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Finally, let me analyze a case inspired by one of K. Fine’s objections against Parsons’ Meinongianism.9 Let me assume that there are two qualitatively identical, yet numerically distinct fictional objects within the same story. How can we ground their being different from one another? Firstly, one should think that this story is incomplete: naming such objects, if we do not have any property in virtue of whose ascription we can understand that the author talks of the former and not of the latter object, then it is hard to distinguish them. Yet, let me assume that the original author does name such objects and that s/he does not ascribe such a property to them, so that we cannot use the negation of (ficta-identity-1) and the fact that no other criterion holds to ground their distinction. Do they turn out to be identical? It seems to me that they do not. In fact, it is legitimate, following (un.fic.property-2), that a good interpreter of the story, in order to preserve their distinction, introduces some univocally identifying fictional property that is ascribed to one of them and whose negation is ascribed to the other, so that, considering that the negation of (fictaidentity-3) is true and that no other criterion holds, they turn out to be different fictional objects.

6. Saving the Data It is now possible to provide the truth-conditions for our data, i.e. for the plausibly true statements that I have mentioned in § 1. It is worth remarking that my interpretation is a reformative one: it aims at showing what propositions are expressed by those statements and to define their truthconditions. Ascriptivism can preserve both the intuition that it is not necessary to refer to some author or to some definite story in order to claim that (3) Sherlock Holmes is a detective is true (since I could think of Sherlock Holmes as a detective, even if I did not know anything about Conan Doyle or about Conan Doyle’s stories) and the intuition that there is some reading of such statements, according 9

See Fine 1984: 103–104.

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to which the propositions that are expressed by them are made true by something involving Conan Doyle and his stories. Let me call the truth-conditions that respect the first intuition “minimal” truth-conditions and the truth-conditions that respect the second one “qualified” truth-conditions. In order for (3) to express a true proposition, it is sufficient that there are minimal truth-conditions, so that (3) expresses (as we have already seen) a proposition that has such a logical form (that implies its having such-and-such truth-conditions): (3ascr.) ∃m∃cA2DEhmc

However, one might be dissatisfied with such a result: s/he might claim that, for example, by stating that it is true that (3), s/he aims at showing that, according to Conan Doyle or according to his stories or according to some story about Sherlock Holmes, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Thus, there should be some qualified readings of (3) that express such interpretations. I propose the following readings: (3ascr.qual.-1) ∃m∃c(AUOOmh & A2DEhmc) (3ascr.qual.-2) ∃c(AUOOdh & A2DEhdc)

(3ascr.qual.-3) ∃c∃s(CHhs & Dsc & ∀m(ISms → A2DEhmc))

(3ascr.qual.-4) ∃c∃s(AUOSds & CHhs & Dsc & ∀m2(ISm2s → A2DEhm2c))

(where the constant “d” stands for Conan Doyle). By (3ascr.qual.-1), it is claimed that there is some original author of Sherlock Holmes’ that ascribes to him the property of being a detective within some fictional context, while, by (3ascr.qual.-2), it is added that such an author is Conan Doyle. By (3ascr.qual.-3), it is explained that Sherlock Holmes is a character in some story and that every good interpreter of that story ascribes to him the property of being a detective within the fictional context defined by that story, while, by (3ascr.qual.-4), it is added that Conan Doyle is the original author of the story (or of the stories) according to which Sherlock Holmes is such-and-such. What reading should we choose? It depends on the contextual information. However, every qualified reading simply seems to specify, to add further information (e.g., to select some fictional context and/or some minded subject) to the minimal reading.

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Since there are non-existent objects and there are fictional objects, it is legitimate to read (1) Sherlock Holmes does not exist as (1ascr.) ~Eh and (2) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character as (2ascr.-1) Fh With regard to (4) Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes’ creator, it is legitimate to claim that it simply asserts that Conan Doyle is Sherlock Holmes’ original author, i.e. that (4ascr.) AUOOdh The statement (5) Conan Doyle is the author of Sherlock Holmes’ stories expresses the idea that Conan Doyle is the only original author of Holmes’ native stories (i.e., those stories that define Sherlock Holmes’ context of origin) and it seems to imply that he is the original author of Holmes too. Thus, it might be rendered as (5ascr.) AUOOdh & ∀s∃c((CHhs & Dsc & COch) → (AUOSds & ~∃m(~(m = d) & AUOSms)))

It is worth remarking that, according to this reading, every story about Holmes defines some context that is Holmes’ original context, but this context can be common (and should be common) for all those stories. Otherwise, it could not be the common fictional context of origin of Holmes. There can be both minimal and qualified readings of

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(6) Sherlock Holmes exists, (7) Sherlock Holmes lives in London, (8) Sherlock Holmes had a tea with Gladstone, (9) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is a detective. Restricting our interpretation to minimal readings, we will have: (6ascr.) ∃m∃cA2Ehmc (even if he does not instantiate existence) (7ascr.) ∃m∃cA4LIhlmc

(8ascr.) ∃m∃cA4HThgmc & Eg

(9ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHc & A2DEhmc)

(where the constants “g”, “l” and “sH” respectively stand for Lord Gladstone, London and the story The Hound of the Baskervilles, while “LI” and “HT” respectively stand for the relations of living in and of having a tea with). Concerning (8), we do not have to introduce any fictional duplicate of Gladstone and we do not have to block the inference from (8) to (8’) Gladstone had a tea with Sherlock Holmes, since it is true that the relation of having a tea with is ascribed by some minded subject both to Sherlock Holmes and to Gladstone within some fictional context, even if it is not true that they instantiate such a relation. Furthermore, the theory does not have to introduce any distinction between fictional objects and their existing correlates (e.g., between the fictional Gladstone and the real one). The interpretation of (10) in The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes is English, even if such a statement is not present in Conan Doyle’s story, can be given as follows. Firstly, I shall assume that there is a relation R, i.e. the relation of being reasonable that some minded subject ascribes some property to some object within some fictional context. The instantiation of this relation is governed by this equivalence:

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(reasonable) ∀x∀P1∀m1∀c(RA2P1xm1c ↔ ∃m2(AUOCm2c & ~AP1xm2c & ~∃P2(~(P2 = P1) & AP2xm2c & (AP2xm2c → AP1xm2c)) & ∃P3(~(P3 = P1) & AP3xm2c & (AP3xm2c → AP1xm2c))))

(where “P1”, “P2” and “P3” are variables ranging over properties). This equivalence is grounded on three ideas: a property that it is reasonable for some minded subject to ascribe to some object within some fictional context is a property (a) whose negation is not ascribed to that object within that context by its original author, (b) whose negation is not implied by the ascription of any other property, (c) whose ascription is implied by the ascription of some other property. It is difficult to interpret stories and their authors’ intentions, so that it turns out to be difficult to interpret their ascriptions too. Yet, it is difficult from our viewpoint, i.e. from interpreters’ viewpoint, not from authors’ viewpoint, and this latter viewpoint is what grounds the truth of (10). Thus, (10) can be minimally read as (10ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHc & RA2ENhmc)

(where “EN” stands for the property of being English). Among our data, there are also statements that involve intentional properties, such as the properties of being more beloved than, of being more famous than, and so on: (12) Sherlock Holmes is more beloved than Darth Vader, (13) John admires Sherlock Holmes. Since such properties are not existence-entailing (in order for something or for someone to be loved or admired, it or s/he does not have to exist), one might simply introduce relations such as the relation of being more beloved than and of admiring: (12) BEhdV (13) ADjh (where “BE” and “AD” respectively stand for the relations of being more beloved than and of admiring, while the constants “dV” and “j” respectively stand for Darth Vader and John). I shall leave to the reader the task of determining the equivalences that rule the instantiation of such rela-

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tions (e.g., someone is more beloved than someone else iff it is the case that...). Things become quite different with (11) Sherlock Holmes is more intelligent than Emma Bovary, since the n-adic properties of being intelligent and of being more intelligent than someone else seem to be existence-entailing: in order for every object to instantiate those n-adic properties, it has to exist. Yet, one might think of degrees of intelligence too and minimally read (11) as follows: (11ascr.) ∃m(∃c1(A2INT1hmc1) & ∃c2(A2INT2bmc2) & GRINT1INT2 & A7GRINT1INT2m)

(where “INT1” and “INT2” respectively stand for Sherlock Holmes’ and Emma Bovary’s degrees of intelligence, “GR” stands for the relation of being greater than, A7 is some special ascription relation that holds for relations between properties outside fictional contexts, even without involving objects, and the constant “b” stands for Emma Bovary). It is not necessary that Sherlock Holmes and Emma Bovary “live” in the same fictional context in order to compare their intelligence: it is only sufficient that some minded subject ascribes to them some degrees of intelligence, that s/he compares such degrees and that such a comparison actually holds. The statement

(14) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective can be interpreted with regard to degrees of fame. Thus, we shall have (14ascr.) ∃m∃c∃s(CHhs & Dsc & A2DEhmc) & FAM1h & ~∃x(DEx & FAM2x & (GRFAM2FAM1 ∨ (FAM2 = FAM1)))

(where “FAM1” and “FAM2” respectively stand for different degrees of fame and “DE” stands for the property of being a detective). With regard to (15) Sherlock Holmes is still the paradigmatic detective character, I shall set “still” apart (since I have not dealt here with the relationship between ascriptions and times) and I shall rewrite it as

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(15’) Sherlock Holmes is the paradigmatic detective character. How can we deal with the property of being a paradigmatic character with regard to some property (e.g., with regard to the property of being a detective)? First, I shall recall univocally identifying fictional properties, in order to claim that they can be conjunctive. Secondly, I shall introduce the relation of inspiring as follows: (inspiring) ∀x∀m(INSxm ↔ (Fx & ∃P1∃P2∃P3...∃PN(PUFP1x & CONP1 & PRCP2P1 & PRCP3P1 & … & PRCPNP1 & ∃y∃c(AUOCmc & (A2P2ymc ∨ A2P3ymc ∨ … ∨ A2PNymc)))))

(where “INS” stands for the relation of inspiring some minded subject, “CON” stands for the property of being a conjunctive property and “PRC” stands for the relation of being a conjoined of a conjunctive property). An original author of a fictional context is maximally inspired by some fictional object when s/he “copies” it, i.e. when s/he puts the same fictional object within his/her originally authored context. Furthermore, it follows from (inspiring) that there are degrees of inspiration, connected with the number of properties that are conjuncts of the univocally identifying fictional property. In order for something to be the most paradigmatic detective character, one has to think that it is a fictional character and that the majority of those that are the original authors of fictional contexts that involve detective characters are inspired by Sherlock Holmes or that the number of such authors that are inspired by Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of those that are inspired by any other detective character. Yet, the same point can be made with regard to readers or interpreters or (more generally) minded subjects thinking of fictional characters: whenever they think of fictional detectives (i.e., whenever they ascribe to some object the property of being a detective within some fictional context and that object is a fictional character), the absolute majority of them think of Sherlock Holmes or the number of those who think of Sherlock Holmes is greater than the number of those who think of any other fictional detective. I shall not formalize here (15’), since I would have to introduce some further technical devices such as plural quantification, but I think that the ascriptivistic interpretation of this statement is now sufficiently clear.

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On the other hand, one might simply formalize (16) Ulysses inspired both Dante and Joyce as (16ascr.) INSudA & INSujJ (where the constants “u”, “dA” and “jJ” respectively stand for Ulysses, Dante and Joyce). Furthermore, it seems to be acceptable that Ulysses inspired Dante more than Joyce, since Dante’s Ulysses (i.e., Ulysses within the context defined by Dante’s Divina Commedia) has more properties that are part of the conjunctive univocally identifying fictional property of Ulysses (I would rather say that they are identical, following (fictaidentity-3) and/or (ficta-identity-4a)). With regard to (17) the Faust of Goethe’s Faust is an aspect of Faust itself, one does not have to introduce any general Faust-character in order to deal with the truth of this statement. It seems to me plausible to claim that (17ascr.) Ff & CHfsF & AUOSgOsF & ∃P1∃P2...∃PN∃PN+1∃s∃m∃c1∃c2(DsFc1 & A2P1fgOc1 & A2P2fgOc1 & … & A2PNfgOc1 & ~A2PN+1fgOc1 & ~(m = gO) & ~(s = sF) & ~(c2 = c1) & AUOSms & A2PN+1fmc2) (where the constants “f”, “gO” and “sF” respectively stand for Faust, Goethe and Goethe’s Faust). (17ascr.) affirms that there are some properties that are ascribed by Goethe to Faust within the fictional context defined by his Faust but that there are other properties (at least one) that are not ascribed by Goethe to Faust within that fictional context (properties that are thus different from the former ones, if the law of non-contradiction is true) and that are ascribed to Faust within some other fictional context defined by some other story, authored by some other author. On the other hand, if there were some general Faust-character, one would have to introduce some arbitrary fictional context (not defined by any story) where that Faust would have his properties, and s/he would have to define some relation between that general Faust-character and Goethe’s (and other authors’) Faust-characters.

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Statements (18) Sherlock Holmes in The Hound of the Baskervilles is the same as Sherlock Holmes in A Study in Scarlet and (19) Sherlock Holmes of Conan Doyle’s stories is the same as Sherlock Holmes of a recent movie directed by Guy Ritchie are two different identity-statements. From an ascriptivistic perspective, the former can be minimally interpreted as follows: (18ascr.) ∃x∃y∃c1∃c2(DsHc1 & DsSc2 & CHxsH & CHysS & ∃m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & x = y)

(where the constants “sS” and “NH” respectively stand for the story A Study in Scarlet and for some property such as the property of being named “Sherlock Holmes”). The identity between the first Sherlock Holmes and the second one is made true by (ficta-identity-1). On the other hand, (19) might be minimally interpreted as (19ascr.) ∃x∃y∃z∃c1∃c2∃s1∃s2(MOx & DRxgR & MAxs1 & CHys1 & AUOSds2 & CHzs2 & Ds1c1 & Ds2c2 & ∃m(A2NHxmc1 & A2NHymc2) & y = z)

(where “MO”, “DR” and “MA” respectively stand for the property of being a movie, for the relation of being directed by and for the relation of being the material support of some story, while the constant “gR” stands for Guy Ritchie). Our last datum concerns fiction within fiction, namely the statement (20) in Hamlet, Gonzago is a fictional character, which can be minimally interpreted as (20ascr.) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc)

(where the constants “sHA” and “gON” respectively stand for the story Hamlet and for Gonzago). Yet, with regard to (20) and with regard to other similar data, one might object: there are minded subjects that ascribe to Gonzago the proper-

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ty of non-being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet. Perhaps, they have misunderstood the story, but if it is minimally sufficient that there is a minded subject that ascribes such a property to Gonzago in order for (20) to be true, it might be nevertheless sufficient to claim that there is some minded subject that ascribes its negation to him in order for (20) to be false, so that it is not the case that it is true that (20). Yet, this objection is a non-sequitur. In fact, if we consider minded subjects that ascribe to Gonzago the property of non-being fictional within the fictional context defined by Hamlet, this situation seems to be expressed by (20ascr.neg.1) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2F̅gONmc)

which does not contradict (20ascr.), and not by (20ascr.neg.2) ∃m∃c(DsHAc & ~A2FgONmc) nor by

(20ascr.neg.3) ~∃m∃c(DsHAc & A2FgONmc) which would contradict (20ascr.), while (20ascr.neg.1) and (20ascr.neg.2) do not/would not contradict it. It is not true that (20ascr.neg.3), since there is, at least under some qualified reading, some minded subject (e.g. Shakespeare) that ascribes that property to Gonzago within the fictional context defined by Hamlet. Furthermore, given that that qualified reading is true of (20), (20ascr.neg.1) expresses a bad interpretation of Hamlet (i.e., the minded subject that makes it true that (20ascr.neg.1) is a bad interpreter of Hamlet) and (20ascr.neg.2) expresses an incomplete one.

7. Paradise on the Cheap Ascriptivism can provide identity conditions for ficta and it can deal with many data and problems. Furthermore, it is not forced to admit that there are violations of the law of non-contradiction, of excluded middle and of bivalence10. It preserves the intuition that ficta are somehow “created” by 10

While modal Meinongians such as Priest 2005 and Berto 2011 and 2013 maintain that there are such worlds and/or such true contradictions. Thus, Everett 2005’s

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their authors without affirming that they exist, so that it does not have the problems that are typically associated with abstract artifactualism 11. It performs all these tasks without heavy ontological price: ascriptivism neither admits that the objecthood of ficta precedes their authors’ thinking of them, nor that there are unnamed and undiscovered non-existent objects. Ascriptivism is neither forced to introduce fictional correlates of real objects, nor to deny that the converses of relations between ficta and real objects hold. It accepts that there are existence-entailing properties and it does not take the distinction between two ways of having properties as a primitive fact. Moreover, regarding the constitution of objects, it does not need to distinguish between assumptible and non-assumptible properties12. Finally, many authors who deny that there are ficta admit that there are (seemingly) mind-dependent entities grounding fictionality, such as games of make-believe (see Walton 1990), fictional intents (see Currie 1990) or denoting concepts (see Landini 2012 and Orilia 2012). If there are such entities and if ficta can be considered mind-dependent too, why is it not legitimate to claim that there are ficta?13 Michele Paolini Paoletti Università degli Studi di Macerata [email protected]

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complaints about the indeterminacy of every fictum and the inconsistency of some ficta are not justified within my theory: ascriptivism neither introduces true contradictions, nor indeterminacy (for every object – and for every fictum too – and for every n-adic property – ascription relations included –, that object instantiates or (aut) does not instantiate that property). For example, ficta are not abstract objects that necessarily exist and that cannot be caused to exist – as it seems to be problematically claimed by abstract artifactualists (see Deutsch 1991). Furthermore, they are not properly caused to exist: they are simply constituted as objects by their original authors at the time at which they are thought of by them and their authors somehow govern their identity with other objects (see Brock 2010). There is no ambiguity and no need for paraphrases concerning ficta’s non-existence: they simply do not exist, since they do not instantiate the property of existing (see Deutsch 1991) and Yagisawa 2001. See Routley 1979, Parsons 1980 and Jacquette 1996. I would like to thank Francesco Orilia and Johann Marek for their useful obje ctions and comments.

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Appendix. What do the Symbols stand for? Variables ranging over… c, c1, c2, … m, m1, m2, … P, P1, P2, … ̅ P p, p1, p2, … s, s1, s2, … t, t0, t1, t2, … x, y, z, …

fictional contexts minded subjects n-adic properties negative property non-P propositions stories times objects

Object constants b d dA dV f g gO gON gR h jJ l sF sH sHA sS u

Emma Bovary Conan Doyle Dante Darth Vader Faust Lord Gladstone Goethe Gonzago Guy Ritchie Sherlock Holmes Joyce London Goethe’s Faust the story The Hound of the Baskervilles the story Hamlet the story A Study in Scarlet Ulysses

Property and Relation Constants (and items that instantiate them) A1 A2 A3 A4 A7 AD AUO AUOC

… is ascribed to … by … (property, object, minded subject) … is ascribed to … by … within … (property, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, object, object, minded subject) … is ascribed to … and … by … within … (2-place relation, object, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is ascribed to … and … by … (2-place relation, property, property, minded subject) … admires … (object, object) … is the author simpliciter of … (minded subject, object – fictional) … is the original author of … (minded subject, fictional context)

136 AUOO AUOS B BE BO C CH CINF CO CON D DE DI DR E EN F FAM1, FAM2 GR HO HT I I̅ IL

INS INT1, INT2 IS LI MA MO N NH PA PR PRC PU PUF R T TC TH TS

MICHELE PAOLINI PAOLETTI … is the original author of … (minded subject, object – fictional) … is the original author of … (minded subject, story) … is story-bound simpliciter to … (object – fictional, story) … is more beloved than … (object, object) … is originally story-bound to … (object – fictional, story) … constitutes … as an object (minded subject, object) … is a character in … (object, story) … is a criterion of identity that is not for fictional objects (object) … is the context of origin of … (fictional context, object – fictional) … is a conjunctive property (property) … defines … (story, fictional context) … is a detective (object) … is a disjunctive property (property) … is directed by … (object – movie, object) … exists (object) … is English (object) … is a fictional object (object) (different degrees of fame) … is greater than … (different properties as degrees) … holds between … and … (object – criterion of identity, object, object) … has a tea with … (object, object) … is identical with … (object, object) … is non-identical with … (object, object) … is a legitimate identifier of … and … (minded subject, object, object) … inspires … (object, minded subject) (different degrees of intelligence) … is a good interpreter of … (minded subject, story) … lives in … (object, object) … is the material support of … (object, story) … is a movie (object) it is necessary that … has … (object, property) … is named “Sherlock Holmes” (object) … is part of … (proposition, story) … precedes … (story, story) (year, year) (time, time) … is a conjunct of … (property, property – conjunctive) … is a univocally identifying property of … (property, object) … is a univocally identifying fictional property of … (property, object – fictional) it is reasonable … (ascription relation, property, object, minded subject, fictional context) … is true (proposition) … is true in … (proposition, fictional context) … thinks of … (minded subject, object) … is true in … (proposition, story)

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References Berto, Francesco (2011), “Modal Meinongianism and fiction: the best of three worlds”, in: Philosophical Studies 152 (3), 313–334. Berto, Francesco (2013), Existence as a Real Property. The Ontology of Meinongianism, Dordrecht: Springer. Brock, Stuart (2010), “The Creationist Fiction: the Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters”, in: The Philosophical Review 119 (3), 337–364. Currie, Gregory (1990), The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deutsch, Harry (1991), “The Creation Problem”, in: Topoi 10 (2), 209– 225. Everett, Anthony (2005), “Against Fictional Realism”, in: Journal of Philosophy 102 (12), 624–649. Findlay, John Niemeyer (1933), Meinong’s Theory of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fine, Kit (1982), “The Problem of Nonexistents. I. Internalism”, Topoi 1, 97–140. Fine, Kit (1984), “Critical Review of Parsons’ Non-Existent Objects”, in: Philosophical Studies 45 (1), 95–142. Grossman, Reinhardt (1974), Meinong, London & New York: Routledge. Inwagen, Peter van (1977), “Creatures of Fiction”, in: American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4), 299–308. Jacquette, Dale (1996), Meinongian Logic. The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, Berlin & New York: de Gruyter. Kripke, Saul (2013), Reference and Existence. The John Locke Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Landini, Gregory (2012), “Fictions are all in the mind”, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 66 (4), 593–614. Meinong, Alexius von 1904 (1960), “Über Gegenstandstheorie“, in: Meinong, Alexius von (ed.), Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und

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Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth. Eng. Transl. “On the Theory of Objects”, in: Chisholm, Roderick M. (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe (IL): Free Press, 76–117. Orilia, Francesco (2012), “A Theory of Fictional Entities Based on Denoting Concepts”, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 66 (4), 577– 592. Parsons, Terence (1980), Nonexistent Objects, New Haven (CO): Yale University Press. Priest, Graham (2005), Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Clarendon. Quine, Willard van Orman (1948), “On What There Is”, in: Review of Metaphysics 2 (5), 21–38. Rapaport, William J. (1976), Intentionality and the Structure of Existence, Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University. Rapaport, William J. (1978), “Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox”, in: Noûs 12 (2), 153–180. Routley, Richard (1979), Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond: an Investigation of Noneism and the Theory of Items, Canberra: Australian National University. Sainsbury, R. Mark (2010), Fiction and Fictionalism, London & New York: Routledge. Smith, Barry (1980), “Ingarden vs. Meinong on the Logic of Fiction”, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16, 93–105. Thomasson, Amie L. (1999), Fiction and Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomasson, Amie L. (2003), “Speaking of Fictional Characters”, in: Dialectica 57 (2), 207–226. Twardowski, Kazimierz 1894 (1977), Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine Psychologische Untersuchung, Vienna: Hölder. Eng. Transl. On the Content and Objects of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation, The Hague: Nijhoff. Voltolini, Alberto (2006), How Ficta Follow Fiction. A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, Dordrecht: Springer.

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Walton, Kendall (1990), Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Yagisawa, Takashi (2001), “Against Creationism in Fiction”, in: Noûs 35 (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 15, Metaphysics), 153–172. Zalta, Edward N. (1983), Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: Reidel.

MEINONG’S THEORY OF ASSUMPTIONS AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR SCIENTIFIC CONTEXTS Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez

Summary1 Meinong’s book On Assumptions is not only one of Meinong’s main works, but also one of the few works on the issue of assumption, which is – I would say – an important topic for the philosophy of mind, particularly for the analysis of cognitive attitudes. In the present article, I aim at discussing the central tenets of Meinong’s theory of assumptions by examining the argument according to which assumptions cannot be judgments. We will consider Russell’s criticism against Meinong’s theory and arrive at the conclusion that Meinong is right in saying that (i) an assumption is a propositional attitude that requires from the subject an active participation which in turn requires having reasons and, therefore, other thoughts; because of this, assumptions could not, pace Russell, consist in mere (re)presentations. And also that (ii) an assumption is a mental act which is very much like a judgment except for the fact that it does not demand from the subject having a degree of conviction in the proposition assumed; it rather consists in provisionally imagining something as being true. We will also see the relevance of Meinong’s theory for the analysis of scientific assumptions and we will see how our own analysis of scientific cases may capture some of Meinong’s central ideas.

1

The present paper has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Research Project “The Explanatory Function of Abstract Objects: Nature and Cognoscibility” FFI2013-41415-P). I also want to thank my colleagues from the Area of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Santiago de Compostela and the audiences in Madrid and Santiago where previous versions of this paper were presented. More specifically, I have to mention John Corcoran from Buffalo, Concha Martínez and José Miguel Sagüillo from Santiago, Julián Zubimendi from Tarragona and an anonymous reviewer of this journal for their helpful comments and valuable remarks. Of course, I remain responsible for all possible mistakes.

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Introduction Meinong’s book On Assumptions is not only one of Meinong’s main works, but also one of the few works on the issue of assumption, which is – I would say – an important topic for the philosophy of mind, particularly for the analysis of cognitive attitudes. Meinong’s book may be not so well known now, but at the time of its publication it received a long critical review by Bertrand Russell. The consideration of Russell’s article is instructive in order to explore Meinong’s own ideas. A part of what I attempt to do in this article is to examine Meinong’s theory of assumption and to evaluate if Russell is right in his criticism against it. We will arrive at the conclusion that (i) an assumption is a propositional attitude that requires from the subject an active participation which in turn requires having reasons and, therefore, other thoughts; because of this assumptions could not, pace Russell, consist in mere (re)presentations, and that (ii) an assumption is a mental act which is very much like a judgment except for the fact that it does not demand from the subject having a degree of conviction in the proposition he or she is assuming; it rather consists in provisionally imagining something as being true. In section 2, I examine Meinong’s theory and defend it from Russell’s criticism. In section 3, I will explore its relevance for the study of scientific assumptions, which Meinong himself considers but not in a very detailed form. I will defend my own analysis of what scientific assumptions are and how they work in order to say at the end that it captures the central tenets of Meinong’s theory.

1. Meinong on Assumption Meinong’s theory of assumption is one of psychological analysis (see Meinong 1921/1978, 7). As the English editor of the work says, Assumptions was conceived as a psychological work, and in the second edition it is still primarily concerned with mental (psychische) facts or states of affairs. Such is Meinong’s informal way of speaking of the primarily subject matter of psychology (Heanue 1983, xi).

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In other words, what Meinong attempts to do in this work is to formulate a psychological theory of assumption. More specifically, he wants to determine in which mental state we are when we assume something. That is, which kind of mental state it is to make an assumption. This theory is part of a general psychological theory, in which he distinguishes between different kinds of mental phenomena, being assumptions one of these kinds.

1.1 Representation, Judgment, and Assumption After the first edition of the book, the author adopted the general term of “experience” (Erlebnis) for any kind of mental event. Meinong distinguishes between two general kinds of mental events (or experiences): intellectual and emotional. Intellectual experiences may be of two types: representations (Vorstellungen) and thoughts (Gedanken). Representations are divided into perceptive (Wahrnehmungsvorstellungen) and reproductive (Einbildungsvorstellungen)2 and thoughts are divided into judgments (Urteile) and assumptions (Annahmen). If representing something is to have an idea of that something, representation is nothing more than the act of having an idea and the idea in question would be the content of that act. Brentano (1874/1924, 81) says that to be represented is to appear in one’s consciousness (Bewuβtsein). This “appearing” in consciousness is what Meinong calls a “presentation” (Präsentation). Brentano’s use of the term “representation” is then closer to Meinong’s concept of presentation, whereas the way in which Meinong uses the term “representation” (Vorstellung) certainly seems more narrow, as Heanue (1983, xii) points out correctly. To be presented is, for Meinong, to be offered for consideration as to judgment. Understanding Meinong’s theory of assumption in an appropriate way depends on understanding this issue and also requires understanding Meinong’s conception of judgment, which could be interestingly compared with other conceptions of judgments, both classical and contemporary of him (Aristotle, Hume, Kant, J. S. Mill, Brentano, Marty, Frege, Russell, or Husserl). Meinong’s conception of judgment departs

2

Reproductive representations are those of imagination (Phantasievorstellungen) and memory (Erinnerungsvorstellungen).

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from Brentano’s.3 Like him and like Frege4 as well, Meinong makes an effort to distinguish between representation and judgment. His argumentation follows in part that of Brentano (1874/1924, chap.VII). A judgment is a mental phenomenon of a radically different kind of a representation (or even of what he calls a “presentation”). As Brentano, Meinong thinks that, in order to judge something, one has first to represent oneself something in the mind. That is, to have a representation is a necessary condition for judgment and, in fact, for every experience. This idea is not new. We can already find it, for instance, in Kant’s or in Mill’s philosophy. Furthermore, and in this he agrees with Frege, Peirce and Husserl, a judgment (but not a representation) always involves a kind of conviction of the subject that is judging. In fact, Meinong uses sometimes the terms Glaube (belief) and Überzeugung (conviction) as synonymous with “judgment”, nevertheless he can refer to suppositions (Vermutungen) as those judgments in which the degree of conviction is very weak. In general, Meinong contends that every judgment involves some degree of conviction.5 On the other hand, a judgment (but not a representation) is always determined with respect to its polarity or “logical quality” (i.e. the affirmation or the negation) and is always expressed by using sentences or clauses, whereas a representation is expressed by means of a word or a noun phrase. Finally, a judgment is always an activity, a mental act, whereas a representation is always something passive, it never involves an action of the mind. We are certainly aware of our representations, but we do not have them voluntarily (at least not always). Judgment is then an experience that needs of a representation in order to be held; in other words, representation is a prerequisite for judgment. 6 3 4

5

6

A good contribution to the study of Brentano’s conception is to be found in Parsons 2004. See Frege 1918/19, 68–75. See specially the paragraph which begins “is thought a representation?...” and the discussion that precedes the introduction of the notion of a third world. It would be interesting to distinguish between supposition and assumption. Meinong seems to distinguish between them in the sense that the first, but not the second, has a certain, minimal degree of conviction. Every (re)presentation has a content (the intentional content that always exists) and an object (what is represented and may exist, or alternatively only subsist, or even may not have being).

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Let us go a little bit further. A judgment is always directed upon an object that is represented. That what is being judged, the content or the object of the judgment, is what Meinong calls an Objekt, which – importantly – can be real or not. For instance, if I express the judgment that there is a cat wandering around my garden, my judgment is directed upon (is about or refers to) a certain cat which is represented in my mind as wandering outside around my garden. In order to refer to the state of affairs, possible or actual, that is being judged (i.e. that there is a cat wandering around my garden) Meinong uses the term Objektiv (objective), which is then not to be confused with the object the judgment is about. One judges an objective (Objektiv) by judging about an object (Objekt). An objective can never subsist without an object just as a judgment cannot be accomplished without having a representation. Instead of “objective” and “object” we could likewise use the phrases “judicative object” and “representational object”, respectively. Interestingly, Anton Marty, in an article on the topic of assumptions he wrote in reply to Meinong’s text, charges Meinong of unnecessarily coining a new term, Objektiv, for the same that was commonly known as the “content of a judgment” by the philosophers of that time. Marty (1904, 19 footnote) is here thinking of Brentano, for whom the content, contrary to Frege and Russell, is not exactly a proposition, but the immanent object of a mental phenomenon. Brentano also refers to this when, in an appendix to his book, says that what he refers to by “content of a judgment” (which he explicitly distinguishes from a proposition) is what Meinong calls “objective” (Brentano 1874/1924, 292). Meinong himself considers this issue (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 14, 74) when he discusses the adequacy of the term introduced by him in comparison with those used by Bolzano, Carl Stumpf, Brentano and Marty. What Meinong calls an “objective” would in his opinion resemble to what Bolzano (1837/1972, § 19, 20) calls a “proposition in itself” (Satz an sich), to what Stumpf (1906, 30) calls a “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt)7 and to what Brentano and Marty call “content of a judgment” (Urteilsinhalt). Meinong says that Bolzano, with his notion of “proposition in itself”, is the one who is closer to him: 7

Stumpf is, by the way, the introducer of the term “state of affairs” in the history of philosophy.

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XAVIER DE DONATO-RODRÍGUEZ Dass vor allem Bolzanos Satz an sich dem Objektiv sehr nahe kommt, wenn nicht kurzweg damit zusammenfällt, scheint mir im ganzen ausser Zweifel und findet in den neuesten Darstellungen der Lehre Bolzanos seine Bestätigung (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, 99–100).8

Later on he explains that a proposition (Satz) is an objective (Objektiv) which is apprehended and perhaps also expressed in words. In principle, this coincides with the definition given by Bolzano of his “proposition in itself”: by proposition in itself [Satz an sich] I mean any assertion that something is or is not the case, regardless whether or not somebody has put it into words, and regardless even whether or not it has been thought.9

In other words, a proposition in itself, understood as the content of a thought or a judgment, must be clearly distinguished from what Bolzano calls a “mental proposition” (i.e. the proposition as thought by someone) and from what he calls a “spoken proposition” (i.e. the sentence uttered by someone expressing that proposition). 10 The proposition in itself is hence neither linguistic nor mental. We can say that Meinong follows Bolzano in emphasizing that objectives are neither physical nor psychological.11 Analogously, Stumpf’s states of affairs are something objective, independent of any mental act. In any case, Meinong (1902/1910/1977, 101–102; Meinong 1983, 77) insists in this point against any possible interpretation of Bolzano’s and Stumpf’s concepts in psychological terms. 12 More specifically, objectives belong to a different ontological category which, in Meinong’s ontology, in part corresponds to that of “ideal objects” (objects having being and subsistence, but not existence). 13 In fact, 8

9 10

11 12 13

In Heanue’s translation: “Concerning Bolzano’s ‘proposition in itself’, it seems, on the whole, beyond doubt that this above all approximates the objective very closely, if it is not out-and-out identical with the objective” (Meinong 1983, 75). Rolf George’s translation: Bolzano 1837/1972, 20. Bolzano 1837/1972, § 19, 20–21. Bolzano seems then to distinguish between proposition and assertion. Frege will be the one who will make a clear distinction between proposition, judgment and assertion, an assertion being the expression of a judgment (see Frege 1918/19, 62). Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 14, 102–103; Meinong 1983, 77. See Rojszczak 2005, 51ff.; 84ff. for an analysis of all these concepts according to different authors. Cf. Meinong 1899, § 6; 1910, § 12; 1915, § 11, 63; 1915, §§ 25–7, 169–202.

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not all objectives subsist. Only factual objectives (Tatsachen), that is, only objectives that are facts (really happened in the world) can be said to subsist. Those objectives that are not factual, that is, that do not correspond to real facts happening in the world, do not really subsist. Non-factual objectives are called Untatsachen by Meinong. They are beyond being or have non-being. From the point of view of some conceptions of propositions, it could seem strange that Meinong puts propositions and states of affairs at the same level, given that a certain philosophical tradition has accurately distinguished between propositions as truth-bearers and states of affairs as truth-makers. At this point, it is worth noting that, for Meinong, truth is primarily a predicate that can only be attributed to objectives to the extent that they are apprehended by a conscious mind by means of a thought, that is, of a judgment or, as we are going to see, of an assumption. However, once he admits that truth is also independent from any conscious mind, Meinong commits himself to a more objective notion of truth as the class of all subsisting objectives (i.e. facts), what amounts to say, of all the true propositions. Interestingly, the first clear distinction between propositional meaning and states of affairs is due to Adolf Reinach, who relies on Meinong to elaborate a platonic theory of the states of affairs in which the extramental and extratemporal realm of the totality of the states of affairs are the truth-makers of all the past, present and future judgments.14 As we have said above, judgments are experiences that, in Meinong’s typology, belong to the category of thoughts. But Meinong contends that assumptions also belong to this category. Assumptions are thoughts. So, what is the difference? According to Meinong, the difference consists in that only judgments involve a conviction on the part of the subjects of such judgments (whatever is their degree of conviction), whereas assumptions do not. As all judgments involve some degree of conviction, one could think that assumptions would be a limiting case of judgments, zero being their degree of conviction (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 59, 344; Meinong 1983, 245). In fact, at the end of the book, Meinong speaks of assumptions as “imaginary judgments” (Phantasieurteile). That is, they 14

For this particular issue, see Rojszczak 2005, 99.

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would be judgments in which what is being judged is not accepted as true with any degree of conviction, but is simply addressed as if it were true. It is just imagined as being true or provisionally pretended to be true. 15 To this kind of judgments (imaginative judgments), Meinong opposes those he calls “serious judgments” (i.e. those which are properly called “judgments”, as there is in them some degree of conviction). Judgments can also be considered as assumptions with a conviction moment (of some degree) and assumptions may be said to show a moment, which is not yet properly conviction, but is so similar to it. There are different assumptions with different degrees of this “glaubensähnlichen Moment”. 16 As we will see, this is also in accordance with our analysis of idealization in section 3.2 of this paper. Hereby we arrive at the centre of our topic. Meinong considers assumptions to be thoughts and, like judgments, they have a propositional content. That means, the judicative object (objective) is given by a proposition. But, in the case of assumptions, what is judged is not apprehended as being the case, but merely as if it were the case (i.e. the proposition at issue is not stated as true, but just presented as if it were true). A judgment is a deliberative act of the mind by which we decide to accept or reject, believe or disbelieve a content, a judicative object, but such an acceptation (or rejection) is not an acceptation (or rejection) without further ado, but it involves to have reasons to accept or reject something with a certain degree of conviction. This is precisely what is not happening in the case of assumptions. So, analogously to judgment, an assumption would have a state of affairs as an objective, but contrary to judgments, such a state of affairs is merely supposed to obtain. It is never considered as real or factual. What kind of examples has Meinong in mind? He devotes an entire chapter of his book (chapter 4 entitled “Die nächstliegenden Annahmefälle”) to the discussion of some examples: 17

15 16 17

Cf. Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 64, 384; Meinong 1983, 273. See also Meinong 1917/1968, § 6, 47–53. See Meinong 1917/1968, 333f. Cf. Meinong 1902/1910/1977, chap. 4, §§ 15–19, 106–130; Meinong 1983, 80– 97. In the first edition it is the chapter 3.

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(i)

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Mathematical suppositions of the kind that are employed, for example, in geometrical demonstrations, as for instance “let it be a triangle with such and such properties…”; (ii) Assumptions used in scientific contexts, such as those which are involved in the construction of models, the formulation of idealized laws, or the formation of ideal concepts (harmonic oscillator, rigid body, ideal pendulum, etc.) (iii) Assumptions in playing, that is, the case of make-believe and imagining situations in children’s plays (children may assume the role of a policeman, or of a thief in a cops-and-robbers play). Meinong emphasizes the fact these practices are not delusive, that is, children do not suffer a delusion when they’re playing. They know perfectly well the difference between play and earnest. (iv) Assumptions in art and literature; though Meinong means art in general (the relation between assumptions – in Meinong’s sense – and fictionalizing in art is obvious), he only discusses the example of the actor who assumes a role in the theatre in the sense of imagining that she is the person being portrayed in the play she is acting in and thereby knowing that she must behave in the scenario as if she were that person. (v) The case of the lie: when someone tells a lie he or she acts as if what he or she tells were in fact true, i.e. he or she assumes the appearance of believing what he or she is saying. (vi) Assumptions in questions and in other desires: Meinong thinks here in the case of presuppositions in ordinary speaking, mainly when we ask someone for something we want to know. Clearly, someone who is asking a question is not making a judgment. He or she is just presenting the one asked with an object for judgment. Presuppositions in many kinds of questions can be treated as assumptions, though there is not a wide difference with suppositions involving a judgment to a certain extent. “When someone asks me what times the railroad trains stop in the vicinity of the house I live in, he is maintaining, albeit only ‘implicite’, that I live in the vicinity of a train stop” (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, chap. 4, § 18, 121; Meinong 1983, 90).

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(vii) Assumptions evoked by suggestion. Meinong speaks here of the case of suggestions caused by fiction stories, such as the attitude of a reader we can suppose to be an educated person towards a certain book of fiction he or she is reading: his or her attitude towards the characters of the story and their actions usually are pretty much like those he or she would have if the characters and their actions were real. First, it must be noticed that Meinong’s inquiry seems more to be one of philosophy of language rather than one of philosophy of mind. He is interested, for example, in determining how we use certain expressions of natural language in ordinary speaking. But, at the same time, he is also interested in the mental states that lie behind. He wants to determine what kind of mental state it is to assume something in different contexts in order to examine if there are other senses of assumption that relate to judgment in a different way as he thinks. His conclusion is that, in all these cases, assumptions are entirely like judgments except for lacking any degree of conviction. He is also implicitly characterizing assumptions as suppositions in which there is no degree of conviction or even in which the subject knows that what he or she is supposing is false. As we will see, the supposition would in these cases consist in imagining counterfactual situations for many different purposes (for example, to explain and predict phenomena in the case of science, or to play a game and have fun in it in the case of children’s games). Of course, this is only implicit in Meinong’s considerations, but it is important to note this from the beginning (we discuss this point later). I think that cases (i) and (ii) are of the most importance as they rely on many of the reasoning processes that are crucial in science and mathematics, for example in the construction of models or in the design of certain kinds of demonstrations. But Meinong’s theory would already be of the most relevance if he had focused just on (iii)–(vii). An accurate comparison between Meinong’s analysis and theories of speech acts would help to examine whether presuppositions and implicatures in asking something actually involve the kind of mental act Meinong is thinking of. For the purposes of the present article I want to focus just on (ii), i.e. the case of assumption in scientific contexts. But before we do it and pass to

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the next section, let me make both an observation and a question. With this we will finish the present section. (a) The observation is that Meinong’s theory seems to have many points of contact with Vaihinger’s theory of fiction (see Vaihinger 1911/ 1924), which was published only one year after the publication of the second edition of Meinong’s book. The main difference between Meinong’s assumptions and Vaihinger’s fictions is that Meinong’s concept is broader than Vaihinger’s: whereas Meinong allows for cases in which what is being assumed can be consistent with one’s other beliefs and even with what is actually the case, Vaihinger is taking into account imagined situations that contravene (what we know from) reality and even may contradict themselves. 18 Meinong allows for different cases, from cases in which we are only making suppositions or attempting to test a certain hypothesis to cases in which we assume the existence of impossible objects (a round square, for example). Meinong explicitly recognizes this when he says that “there are assumptions of being and assumptions of non-being; assumptions of being and those of so-being, assumptions of existence and those of subsistence” (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, chap. X, § 59, 341; Meinong 1983, 243). In the analysis of Meinong’s ideas we will attempt later on we aim at capturing this crucial difference. (b) The question is: are there other cases of mental acts or processes of reasoning that can be captured with Meinong’s concept of assumption? As we have seen, Meinong also thinks of scientific cases and science is precisely a place full of processes that can be described in a very similar way as Meinong describes the cases he is concerned with. Anyway, he is considering the “most obvious” cases of assumptions, not the only possible ones. Later in the article we list some of these procedures that are good candidates to be captured also in Meinong’s terms (at least prima facie). The central question to ask here is whether there is one conceptual structure common to all these procedures.

18

See Fine 1980, 5.

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1.2 Meinong and Russell on Assumption Primarily, we have to say that, according to Meinong, in all these attitudes (i)–(vii) we have seen above (see section 2.1), the subjects have thoughtassumptions whose content is an objective, i.e. a state of affairs which can be factual or not, and whose constituents may be (1) really existing, (2) not really existing or even (3) impossible. Examples of non-existing things would be the golden mountain or the current king of France, whereas examples of impossible things would be the perpetual motion machine, the round square or even a logical contradiction that is provisionally assumed as a supposition in an indirect prove or reductio ad absurdum.19 As Bertrand Russell correctly points out in his review of Meinong’s book, [t]he introduction of assumptions in place of judgments enables us […] to give objectivity even to such presentations as the round square, for assumptions are not bound by the law of contradiction (Russell 1904, 344).

Interestingly, Russell20 agrees with Meinong in that objectives or states of affairs can be apprehended by assumptions, but disagrees with him in contending that assumptions are mere (re)presentations of states of affairs (or propositions). Here is what Russell says: I do not see that the attitude towards a proposition, when it is assumed, differs in any way from the attitude towards objects which is called presentation (Russell 1904, 345).

Russell seems to say this as he thinks that a (re)presentation is nothing more than the consideration of an object. Analogously, assuming a proposition is to consider a state of affairs as if it were the case, as if it were factual. What Russell does not understand is that according to Meinong’s theory there cannot be (re)presentations of propositions or states of affairs (this is explicitly excluded by Brentano and Meinong: states of affairs are thought, never (re)presented). Let us see again what Russell says: 19

20

The first of the last three cases would be impossible according to the laws of physics, the second would be mathematically contradictory, and the third would be logically self-contradictory. Of course, the modalities which are here involved are substantially different. Russell 1904, part II, 348, 351ff.

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A curious difficulty arises for Meinong from the conclusion that there is no presentation of a proposition. The Objective, in his theory, cannot be the object of any presentation; and yet it can be the object of a judgment, as in “p is certain”, where p is an Objective. It would follow that we can think of something, namely an Objective, without having any presentation of it (Russell 1904, 350).

Russell believes that this involves a paradox, but the paradox dissolves when we think that, for Meinong, a (re)presentation is an experience in which what is represented is an object and not a complex such as an objective. This is not a mere dispute of words. Mental acts involving propositions require, if Meinong is right, the activity of a mental attitude and not the mere passivity of a representation. In any case, even if Russell is right in thinking that there can be representations of propositions, what we can legitimately put into question is whether he is right in thinking that an assumption is just (consists in) a mere representation of a proposition. The mere representing of a certain state of affairs for oneself does not per se involve a decision for one’s part in the sense of provisionally accepting a state of affairs as factual (or making as if the proposition at issue were true), which is what an assumption seems to consists in. On the other hand, Russell (1904, 345) does not accept that there can be two objects of a judgment or an assumption (namely the Objekt and the Objektiv). According to Russell, the only object in both cases is a proposition.21 Russell (1904, 349) adds that assumptions do not differ from judgments in virtue of their object (which is only one: the proposition which is judged or assumed), but both with respect to the act (as assuming and judging are two different acts of the mind) and with respect to the content (Russell here understands the “content” as the mental event corresponding to each particular mental act, which is obviously different in the case of a judgment and in the case of an assumption).22 Meinong would agree in 21 22

According to Russell himself, this idea comes from G. E. Moore (cf. Moore 1899). This distinction comes from Meinong himself, who took it from Twardowski. In effect, Meinong introduced this distinction in an essay from 1899, in which he maintains that every experience or mental phenomenon is a complex that has three kinds of constituents: the act, the mental content – which is always a particular and always exists, as it is immanent to the act (as in Brentano) –, and the object. The ideal relation between contents and objects is that of adequacy. The content of a proposition would be the mental Erlebnis (about this see chapter 2

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that an assumption and a judgment may have the same objective or propositional content (we can judge or merely assume that p), but he would insist in the necessity of distinguishing between what is the objective (or the content) of our attitude when something is assumed (or judged) and what is the assumption (or the judgment) about.23 But Russell’s main objection to Meinong’s ideas on the nature of assumption has to do, as we have already seen, with the fact that, for Russell, an assumption is a mere (re)presentation of a proposition. Here Russell speaks again: the main thesis to be established is that affirmation and negation can occur without conviction, and do so occur in what are to be called “assumptions” (Annahmen) (pp. 2–3). An assumption or hypothesis might seem at first sight to be a mere presentation, but this view Meinong, erroneously in my opinion, believes to be capable of disproof (Russell 1904, II, 336).

As Russell says, for Meinong it would suffice the case of (direct) perception to establish the difference between assuming and a mere (re)presenting, though he also considers the case of negative assumptions (“suppose Napoleon had not lost Waterloo’s battle”, or “suppose this table is not green”). They cannot consist in the mere presentation of objects that are only characterized in a negative way (for example, as being notgreen). Russell’s argument against Meinong deals with the true nature of negative judgments (and assumptions) as well as with his own conception of the nature of propositions and their unity. His argumentation, which occupies a big part of Russell’s article (Russell 1904, part II), starts with a discussion of Meinong’s original argument to the extent that assumptions cannot be mere (re)presentations. My aim in this paper is not to discuss this point (which I will explore elsewhere). Here I will rather focus on the two theses and will favour Meinong’s, because it is going to be central for my own conclusions on the nature of assumptions in scientific contexts. As we have seen, though this is just one of Meinong’s arguments, the only consideration of the passive nature of representations prevents us from speaking about judgments and assumptions as being mere (re)present-

23

of Über Annahmen, in which he exposes his theory of meaning). By the way, we should take into account that the concept of “objective” receives a very different treatment in both editions of Über Annahmen.

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ations of states of affairs. It seems reasonable to consider assumptions and judgments as being distinctive kinds of mental acts (or cognitive attitudes) that equally require an active and conscious participation of the mind, which is not required in the case of (re)presentations. Assuming and judging are thus propositional attitudes involving an active participation of the subject who is judging or assuming something (a proposition, let it be p) surely after a deliberation, that depending on the case may be short or long, but that in any case it lasts during an interval of time. During such an interval the subject evaluates a series of reasons which his or her judgment (or assumption) that p may rely on.24 More particularly, we can agree with Hall (1958, 52–53) and Sayre (1997, 22–23) in that assumptions are attitudes of propositional stance, as Sayre calls them, or positing attitudes, to use Hall’s term25). In this sense, they would be at the same level as affirming, asserting, attesting, believing, conceding, stating, contending, declaring, denying, disbelieving, presuming, suspecting, supposing, or testifying. All these attitudes are subject to the possibility of being evaluated as correct or incorrect 26and about them it makes sense to ask “why…?” (for example, “why do you suspect that John is not coming?” or “why do you believe that philosophers say absurd things?”). This is because all these attitudes are subject to reasons, contrary to those attitudes that Sayre calls “of assessment”, such as calculating or computing. We can get a wrong result in calculating something and I can have many motivations to make those calculations, but it simply makes no sense to ask why I calculate the way I do. They also differ from attitudes “of access”, such as perceive and knowing. It makes no sense to ask, for example, why I perceive that the table is green. In general, that the subject has a position with respect to p requires from the subject having reasons, good or bad, to adopt that position with 24

25 26

As Hall (1958, 57) says, assuming something involves, as in the case of other similar attitudes, the reasonability of what is assumed: “I cannot say ‘I wrongly (rashly, uncritically) assume…’”. Strictly, he speaks about “positing words”, as his interest is more focused in the use of words rather than in the attitudes or mental acts themselves. We must distinguish between the fact that it is true or false that we assume that p and the truth or falsity of what we assume, i.e. the truth or falsity of p. As Hall (1958, 58) points out, it is not right to say that truth and falsity cannot be pred icated of assumptions.

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respect to p. And this altogether implies that the subject, in order to have that attitude and not another one, must have other judgments or beliefs (and perhaps makes other assumptions) that, for him, constitute reasons to adopt the attitude in question. Though it seems a very plausible idea, I do not aim at evaluating whether Meinong is right in saying that there are two fundamental attitudes, both being distinctive kinds of thoughts, namely judgments and assumptions (being the only difference the existence of a certain degree of conviction in the case of judgments). What I aim at contending for the purposes of the present contribution is that (i) an assumption is a propositional attitude that requires from the subject an active participation which in turn requires from him having reasons and, therefore, other thoughts; and, because of this, assumptions could not, pace Russell, consist in mere (re)presentations. And also that (ii) an assumption is a mental act which is very much like a judgment except for the fact that it does not demand from the subject having a degree of conviction in the proposition she is assuming; it rather consists in provisionally imagining something as being true. At this point, I propose to distinguish between cases in which of what is assumed (the content of the assumption or the proposition which is assumed), (1) we know that is false, (2) we do not know its truth value, and (3) we judge that content as being little probable. Case (1) is what we call an idealization. It is a counterfactual deformation of reality or, better, of what we consider or think to be real. Case (2) gives rise to a hypothesis, i.e. to something which is being asked for, to something which we want to explore about, to something we want to test. Case (3) gives rise to a special case of subjunctive hypothesis which is similar to (1) in the way we use it. In the analysis that follows in the next section of the present article, I want to capture all these distinctive cases, as all of them seem important in scientific contexts. I do not include the case in which we know that p is the case. In this sense, I do not consider, as Meinong seems to do sometimes, that assuming is a limiting or special case of judging. It simply does not make sense to say “assume that p” when we already know that p is true.27

27

This point is also correctly made by Hall (1958, 63).

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Now we would like to know: if, following Meinong, assumptions are thoughts without any conviction, what are their limits? Meinong’s position is very clear at this point: no assumption is restricted by any empirical evidence in the sense that no empirical evidence could favour or disfavour an assumption better than another and no assumption could be refuted by any empirical evidence. In my opinion, as we are going to see, there is a sense in which Meinong is wrong and a sense in which he is right. According to Meinong, we may assume what we want without any restriction (even things that are conceptually or physically impossible: like a round square, a sphere made of uranium and having a diameter of more than a mile, the greatest prime number, etc.). This is what Meinong (1902/1910/1977, § 60, 346; Meinong 1983, 246) calls the “principle of unrestricted liberty of assumptions” (Prinzip der unbeschränkten Annahmefreiheit). The only restriction Meinong accepts is logical consistency within the class of our assumptions (or internal consistency among the assumptions): Seltsamerweise steht nun aber dieser Freiheit in betreff isolierter Annahmen eine ganz unverkennbare Gebundenheit gegenüber, wenn man eine oder mehrere Annahmen als vorgegeben betrachtet und dann weitere Annahmen auf sie bezieht. Habe ich einmal angenommen, dass A B sei, dann steht es mir nicht mehr frei, auch noch anzunehmen, dass irgendeines dieser A nicht B sei (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 60, 346; Meinong 1983, 246–247).28

We can then assume what we want, but we must respect logical consistency in our assumptions. Notice that the consistency requirement does not prevent us from provisionally assuming a proposition inconsistent with our premises in order to prove by reductio that it must be false. Meinong himself discussed the possible limitations of this principle. 29 In fact, Meinong is right to the extent that any assumption is possible given a context broad enough for assuming something that, though seeming crazy at first sight, may make sense to consider it provisionally as be28

29

In Heanue’s translation: “Oddly, however, this freedom in isolated assumptions is matched by a quite unmistakable constraint when one regards one or more assumptions as already given and then makes further assumptions in relation to them. Once I have assumed that A is B, then it is no longer open to me to assume that one of these A’s is not B” (Meinong 1983, 246–247). See Meinong 1915, § 37, 281; 1917, § 2; 1978, 377–378.

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ing true. This only means that in that context it is relevant (for some good reason) to provisionally assume that it is true. If we are on a level on which even logical or conceptual truths do not matter anymore, as we have (again for some well reason) parenthesized them, then we may indeed assume anything we want. Nevertheless, if we are on a level on which we are compelled by nomological and empirical constraints, it seems that Meinong’s principle of unrestricted liberty cannot be applied anymore (at least not in this context). Anyway, no matter what he has in mind, he would be wrong with respect to the fact that no assumption could be refuted by any empirical evidence. He would be right if he simply refers to the fact that, at the moment of assuming something, no empirical evidence could cancel our assumption if this assumption were the result of a decision that has taken into account the evidence in question: the subject simply considers that it is worth to act as if that evidence were not available. He is wrong if he thinks that, no matter in which situation we are (no matter which is our context), no evidence could refute any assumption, because this is clearly false. We could consider many examples in which the consideration of a certain evidence or the availability of a certain information would render irrelevant or even incorrect (for example, from a scientific point of view) to make a given assumption. Furthermore, Meinong tends to include scientific hypotheses among the class of assumptions (though sometimes he also casts some doubts with respect to this) and they are, in a very obvious sense, falsifiable by the empirical evidence. As we will see, even assumptions of type (1) – distinguished before – can be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. Meinong omitted this issue from his consideration, as he was interested in other aspects of the concept of assumption, and did not really deal with scientific cases. Notwithstanding, in the case of scientific contexts assumptions do have a real relevance and an adequate analysis is needed in order to understand their nature and their role in scientific knowledge. What I am trying to say is that Meinong’s analysis can certainly be of help in order to undertake this work.

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2. Assumptions in Science 2.1 Meinong and Scientific Assumptions We have seen that Meinong at some place refers to scientific assumptions. He does not devote an extended paragraph to this particular kind of assumptions, but it is clear that he has them in mind. One of his few examples is the case of the estimation of the direction of the magnetic needle’s deflection by the galvanic current using the “Amperian rule” (Meinong 1902/1910/1977, chap. 4, § 15, 109; Meinong 1983, 82). Meinong refers here to Ampère’s law relating a magnetic field with the electric current which is the source of it. An electric current flowing through a conductor always produces a magnetic field around it and this magnetic field will exert a force on a magnet placed in its vicinity. The magnet so affected, according to Ampère, will likewise exert an equal and opposite force on the current-carrying conductor. The direction of the displacement of the needle can be calculated following a simple rule. The fact is that in order to apply Ampère’s law we need to introduce some idealizations, as rejecting the causal contribution of other distorting magnetic forces and considering the contribution of certain internal elemental forces as negligible. 30 It is clear from this example than every model, every law could analogously be said to involve very specific assumptions, which commonly come in the form of counterfactual or hypothetical suppositions and provisos (ceteris paribus clauses). In my opinion, if we want to analyse scientific assumptions we should perhaps go a step further beyond Meinong’s project of elaborating a psychological theory of assumptions as mental acts. It is not that Meinong’s approach is not correct. Quite on the contrary, we also need a psychological study of cognitive attitudes in the sense of an analysis of what kind of mental attitudes scientists need to adopt regarding the products of their minds (particularly theories). We may for instance want to know, as van Fraassen, if accepting a theory involves believing that the theory is true or just that the theory is empirically adequate. But this is not the only thing that is relevant in the case of the philosophical study of assumption. We 30

See Graneau / Graneau 1996, 8.

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must attempt to develop an ontological and a pragmatic theory of assumptions in science that helps us first to determine what an assumption is (beyond the mental correlate that corresponds to it) and second to give an account of its role in scientific reasoning. Assumptions (and, more particularly, idealizations) can be considered from at least two points of view: (1) as a mental process or a certain procedure of reasoning (that I think to be counterfactual in nature), and (2) as the product of that process (for example, a law, a model, or a simple hypothesis in the case of science). It does not suffice then to focus on (1). We must also have a theory that explains the nature of the product and the role this product plays in scientific contexts. It is not only that I do not attempt to elaborate an analysis of the concept from a psychological perspective. I do not attempt at a linguistic analysis neither, of the kind of examining which kind of linguistic expressions we use to adopt the attitude of an assumption. This is by the way what Hall (1958, 55) seems to try to do. It is true that Meinong, in chapter four of his book, describes several uses of assumption (from ordinary language cases to more technical cases), but it is clear that his attempt is at analysing the mental content of those attitudes. Meinong’s is neither a theory that accounts for the nature of assumption as a product. Speaking specifically about scientific contexts, it seems strange that Meinong pays just little attention to the difference between hypotheses and assumptions. Meinong (1902/1910/1977, § 15, 108; Meinong 1983, 82) speaks of suppositions (Vermutungen) and hypotheses (Hypothesen) as judgments with a rather weak degree of conviction, but he quickly wants to emphasize that: Es wird dabei freilich nicht immer leicht sein, den Punkt genau namhaft zu machen, wo derjenige, der sich mit einer solchen Hypothese beschäftigt und sie etwa an der Wirklichkeit zu verifizieren unternimmt, aus dem Zustande des Annehmens in den des Vermutens übergeht (Meinong, Gesamtausgabe IV, 108).31

31

In Heanue’s translation: “With regard to someone who is occupied with such a hypothesis and who is perhaps undertaking to verify it in reality, I admit that it will not always be easy to specify the exact point where he makes the transition from the state of assuming to the state of surmising” (Meinong 1983, 82).

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Interestingly, in my analysis hypotheses are integrated as limiting cases of assumptions. This has the consequence that hypotheses can be considered, according to my analysis, as not being judgments, instead of being judgments with a weak degree of conviction (as in Meinong) and I tend to think that this is even more coherent with Meinong’s original view. The difference between a hypothesis and an assumption will rely on a deeper level (as I am going to explain in what follows). This is by the way the same distinction that appears in Vaihinger between hypothetical assumptions and fictional assumptions, which he ordinarily refers to as “fictions”. Vaihinger (1911/1924, 144–145) explains that both terms express two possible meanings of the Greek term “hypothesis” and that the Romans were those who for the first time in the history of thought, when they realized the difference between both meanings, wanted to distinguish explicitly between them by using two distinctive terms, respectively suppositio and fictio. Before we pass to the scientific cases, let me try to fix the difference between a presupposition, a supposition and an assumption. In a first attempt, a presupposition is a supposition which is implicit in an argument or an implicature in a conversation. In this sense, a presupposition can be viewed as a hidden premise in an enthymematic argument. This is the sense as understood by Ennis (1982). When we deal with a conversational implicature we deal with what Stalnaker (1974) calls a “pragmatic presupposition”. There is another acceptable sense of presupposition, which was introduced by Strawson (1950 and 1952), according to which a concept refers to all those conditions that must be fulfilled in order to be possible for a statement to be considered true or false (see Strawson 1952, 175). A supposition is more like a substantial thesis (explicit or implicit) that is needed in an argument as a premise and, if the context is clear enough, we do not need even to make explicit. A supposition can also be seen as a conjecture (though not all the uses of the word have this meaning), a hypothesis for which there are just few elements of judgment. This is precisely the meaning that Meinong confers to the German word “Vermutung” (which is usually translated as “supposition”). An assumption (Annahme) is, in opposition, more like a counterfactual supposition (when we know that what we are assuming is false) or a supposition for which there are no elements of judgment (it is because of this that the degree of

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conviction can only be zero). This interpretation is consistent with all Meinong’s uses of the German word “Annahme”. I realize that these distinctions may seem a little bit arbitrary, but they are just provisional and serve to fix some terminology. Meinongian assumptions seem to be more like Vaihinger’s fictions (1911/1924), except for the fact that all of them must not be necessarily counterfactual (in the strict sense of the word, that is, subjunctive conditionals with a falsehood as antecedent). Vaihinger’s fictions have a counterfactual character which is implicit in the “as if” reasoning that underlies them. 32 This can be seen by comparing Meinong’s examples with Vaihinger’s. The need of a fixation and a clarification analysis of the vocabulary used by philosophers would be here of help, as there are many uses that are not standard. For instance, Walhout (1960) and Rescher (1961) speak of “suppositions” to refer to what Meinong and myself call “assumptions”. My “assumptions” correspond to what Rescher (1961) calls “belief-contravening suppositions”.

2.2 A Counterfactual Analysis of Scientific Assumptions I am going to understand an assumption as the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional (where the antecedent may be false and sometimes will be known to be false, in which case we would speak of a genuine counterfactual). In concordance with what Meinong says, assumptions cannot be judgments, as for Meinong the antecedent of the traditionally called “hypothetical judgments” (counterfactual or not) are not judgments at all, but assumptions (see Meinong 1902/1910/1977, § 31; Meinong 1983, § 31). And this is plainly meaningful, because if we follow Meinong in saying that assumptions are thoughts without degrees of conviction, what can be our degree of conviction assigned to a condition about which we know that it is false or about whose truth value we do not have any element of judgment?33 32 33

For a recent exposition of fictions in science, see Suárez (ed. ) 2009. See also Cartwright 1983. The analysis of idealization we are about to present is pretty much in concert with Meinong’s theory of the degree of truth exposed in Meinong 1915/1972, 92ff., where Meinong introduces the notion of subfactuality. In the present article, we cannot compare our analysis with this part of Meinong’s work. This will

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Genuine counterfactual assumptions would correspond to what in the literature of the philosophy of science has been called an “idealization” (see Nowak 1980, McMullin 1985, Laymon 1985, Cartwright 1989, Weisberg 2007). As we have said, we need to distinguish, as in the case of other cognitive attitudes,34 an idealization as a mental act or operation by means of which we counterfactually assume something and an idealization in the sense of being the result or the product of performing that operation (typically, a scientific model, a law, or even a theory). Now this operation is performed in many relevant cases, it may adopt several forms that give rise to different practices. What Meinong calls “assumptions” and what Rescher calls “belief-contravening suppositions” always have a counterfactual character, but may adopt several distinctive forms in scientific contexts. Here we have some paradigmatic examples: 





34

Argumentations “for the sake of the argument”: “assume for the sake of the argument that this theory were true” (our assumption is in this case obviously counterfactual as we want just to explore the consequences that this theory would have if it were correct). Proofs by reductio: “assume that the diagonal is commensurable with the side of the square”. “If there were no assumptions, inference would be inexplicable; and this is particularly evident where, as in the case of a reductio ad absurdum, premises and conclusion are actually disbelieved” (Russell 1904, 343). Thought experiments: 1. (refuting thought experiments, as in the case, for example, of Galileo versus Aristotle): “assume that Artistotle’s theory of movement is correct”; 2. (heuristic thought experiments, as in the case of Maxwell’s demon and the Second Law of Thermodynamics). Popper (1959) established a basic condition for the use of thought experiments in scientific contexts according to which in a thought experiment there cannot be assumed anything that the opponent could not accept on her own criteria. According to Williamson (2008) be made in a future paper. As Ryle (1949, 257) said in reference to mental acts (what Ryle calls “judicative acts”): “judgments conclude with sentences; they do not consist in sentences”. Obviously, it is legitimate to speak of judgments as being the result of the process. Analogously in the case of assumption and idealization.

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or Sorensen (1992), there are philosophical thought experiments that consist in valid arguments about counterfactual scenarios that, as mere conceptual modalities affect only those who are interested in the concepts and not “in the real thing” and, as epistemic or metaphysical modalities, usually beg the question which is being disputed. Although Norton (1991 and 2004) contends that thought experiments are reducible to arguments, other authors, like Brown (1991/ 2010) and Sorensen (1992) tend to think that there is an operation of the imagination which is involved in all of them and is not reducible to an argument. In both cases counterfactual assumptions would be involved. Learning situations in which a belief is incorporated (Rescher 1961, § III) – this is what other authors have called “belief revision” (Alchourrón / Gärdenfors / Makinson 1985, Gärdenfors 1988, Olson / Enqvist 2011): “changes in our beliefs are by nature gradual and evolutionary rather than abrupt and revolutionary. New ideas and new beliefs do not spring up full blown like Athena from the head of Zeus; they ‘dawn upon us’. Gradually a ‘shadow of doubt’ creeps over some old belief and then, slowly and tentatively, we go about the work of rebuilding the widening gap left by its gradual demise” (Rescher 1961, 180). The adoption of the new belief does not only involve a process of assuming of the sort “imagine that this were true…”, but also involves a process in which the addition of the new belief amounts to the rejection of a previous belief. This is a usual process in scientific contexts, especially when there is a substitution of a theory for a new one, which is thought to be more accurate. Rott (1990, 1994 and 2001) has focused on this relation precisely in the case of idealizing assumptions having a role in intertheoretical reduction (for example, Kepler vs. Newton’s laws). Max Weber’s ideal types in human sciences. Simulating tools and computer simulation models always require a lot of counterfactual assumptions (Winsberg 2006, Humphreys 2009, Frigg / Reiss 2009, Batterman 2009). Instead of idealization Winsberg (2006) prefers to speak of “falsification” in order to highlight the counterfactual character of the reasoning involved, but it is clear that the sense is the same.

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My hypothesis is, though this is not a place to show the whole idea, that all these cases have a common conceptual structure or common content which, given their counterfactual character, could be captured by an analysis in terms of counterfactuals. 35 Briefly speaking, the idea involves the reference to a process which is a kind of counterfactual deformation. By imagining hypothetical and counterfactual conditions we are departing more or less from the actual world, that is, we can remain farther or closer to it (being the hypothetical conditionals the limiting-case). This idea resembles Lewis’ notion of distance between possible worlds where the actual world is fixed by the context. According to Lewis, if we speak about physical necessity, we are restricted to worlds where the actual laws of physics hold true: the accessible worlds are those constrained by these laws of physics that are said to be met in the actual world (Lewis 1973, 5). My colleague Arroyo-Santos and myself have maintained elsewhere (de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012, 16) that this should be understood more in an epistemic than in a metaphysical sense. The context that fixes the actual world may be given by the principles of a certain (accepted) scientific theory or by the background knowledge at a certain time. Therefore, to speak about the “actual world” does not commit us necessarily to a form of realism. The “actual world” is simply fixed by the context and is represented by that part of our knowledge that we can take for granted in some particular field (physics, biology, or some parts of them). Suppose we are taking physical knowledge for granted. With respect to this world, scientists may want to idealize in different degrees: it is not the same to make the idealization that there is no friction or that there are no external forces acting on a particular system as to make the idealization that bodies are like point masses, in which all the mass is concentrated in an infinitesimal point which lies at the centre of the body, because, according to classical physics, no body can have zero mass. In the context of a broader discussion, Nozick (2001, 148–155) has introduced the idea of different degrees of contingency, meaning that statements that are contingently false can be true in possible worlds that differ in different ways from our actual world. As my colleague Arroyo-Santos 35

I have defended this view elsewhere. See de Donato-Rodríguez / Zamora-Bonilla 2009 and de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012.

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and myself have suggested (see de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012, 16), Nozick’s term can be used to mean that idealizations can differ in many different ways from the actual world and, therefore, can exhibit different degrees of contingency (from those closer to our world to those farther apart from it). Now, there is an immediate problem with the idea of telling what is closer or farther from the actual world, because there is not a successful metrics that allows to measure these differences. But I still believe it is possible to consider a qualitative indicator based on whether the conditionals can be tested empirically or not. It is clear that certain conditions will be amenable to experimentation or direct test in nature, whereas other conditions will be met only in an approximate way. Finally, for other conditions it would remain impossible for us even to approximate them. Let me now introduce some terminology which in part goes back to Barr (1971, 261ff.).36 Hypothetical / idealizing assumptions will be considered as statements that are the consequent of certain subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, in which the antecedent expresses the ideal or hypothetical conditions under which the idealization / hypothesis holds. This is of course a (meta-)idealization in itself and I am not saying that idealizations are just statements. I believe nevertheless that it is correct to consider them in this way for the present purposes. Turning back to the analysis, for the whole conditional I will use the term “ideal-hypothetical case”, whereas for the antecedent I will use the term “ideal-hypothetical conditions”. The consequent will be called an “idealization” (or alternatively, a “hypothesis”). The structure will then be: C1,…,Cn → S, where C1,…,Cn are the ideal-hypothetical conditions, S is the assumption (or the idealization / hypothesis), and the connective → stands for a counterfactual conditional. The idea is that the hypothetical-ideal conditions should make explicit the possible worlds in which the idealizations / hypotheses hold. Also, it is important to note that this formulation can also be applied to other notions of idealization that do not involve considering idealiza36

See de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012, 16–17. Arroyo-Santos and myself use this terminology and the apparatus I am about to describe in order to explain how idealization functions in science. We show this by taking an example from biology into account: the Wright-Fisher Model in population genetics.

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tions as statements, as the important matter is that scientific idealizations are formed by a network of concepts, ideas, or epistemic goals. As my colleague Arroyo-Santos and myself have established (in de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012, 17–18), the ideal-hypothetical conditions can have different degrees of contingency: (1) At the highest degree of contingency, we find cases in which C1,…,Cn are completely idealized, in the sense that they are ideal-types or limiting-conditions that conflict with some theoretical principle. Take the point mass as an example from physics. (2) At the next step, we have cases in which C1,…,Cn are contingently false, conflicting with a well-established scientific regularity or lawlike statement. For instance, take the case when physicists neglect the influence of the force of attraction, though being aware of the fact that this contravenes Newton’s principle of action and reaction. (3) Then we have cases in which C1,…,Cn are also contingently false though they do not explicitly conflict with a well-established regularity. Nevertheless, we have strong empirical reasons to believe that they are false in the actual world. Even though we know that there are actual friction forces, we may approximate a state of practical void. (4) At the end of the chain, we can distinguish cases in which C1,…,Cn are purely contingent and we cannot even exclude the possibility that C1,…,Cn can be fulfilled, now or in a next future. This typology is by no means exhaustive. The different forms of hypothesizing / idealizing come in degrees. There is a continuum of possible idealizations (or hypothetical assumptions). In relation to the present contribution, what is important to see is that, through this analysis, we can include hypothesis as a limiting case of assumptions. The conditions in the case of hypothesis would be subjunctive, though not genuinely counterfactual (in the sense of the antecedent not being satisfied). So, in this analysis, assumptions could be (i) merely hypothetical, or (ii) counterfactual (in the sense of not being satisfied their antecedent). So, in conclusion, if this is correct, hypotheses could not be considered as judgments, but as assumptions of the kind “act as if it were true and let us see the empirical consequences”. This sense must be seen as being entirely coherent with scien-

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tific practice, at least when there are no elements of judgments that may guarantee to have any degree of conviction towards the hypotheses at issue. Not only that, the most interesting thing is that this analysis allows us to explain the explanatory and heuristic use of assumptions (see de Donato-Rodríguez / Arroyo-Santos 2012 for details). We could even say that a certain assumption is justified because we have good reasons to make it and then simply enumerate the scientific benefits (both theoretical and practical) that follow from making that assumption (see Laymon 1985 for a nice approach to the empirical testability of idealizations).

3. Conclusion Let us now conclude by turning back to Meinong. According to the analysis defended here, scientific assumptions (counterfactual or hypothetical) would not properly be judgments, as the conviction that they are true cannot go with them. On the contrary, in many cases we know that they are false, that is, we know we are assuming a falsehood. In the case of hypothetical assumptions, we cannot say that they are judgments neither, as we really do not know whether they are false (as it has always been the case when the hypotheses were formulated for the first time). When a hypothesis is empirically tested, the situation usually changes if it receives some empirical support after the experiment / observation. What we may call “idealizing assumptions” are not judgments, because of a different reason: of a statement that holds only under hypothetical or counterfactual conditions we know either that it does not hold or that it holds under conditions that are very hard to meet. This is the sense in which Cartwright (1983) said that laws of physics lie, though those who lie are the scientists that use them, not the laws themselves. (Idealized) laws are lies, but not all lies lie in the same way.

Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez University of Santiago de Compostela [email protected] [email protected]

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References Alchourrón, Carlos E. / Gärdenfors, Peter / Makinson, David (1985), “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”, in: Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530. Barr, William F. (1971), “A Syntactic and Semantic Analysis of Idealization in Science”, in: Philosophy of Science 38, 258–272. Batterman, Robert W. (2009), “Idealization and Modeling”, in: Synthese 169 (3), 427–446. Bolzano, Bernard (1837/1972), Theory of Science, Berkeley: University of California Press. Brentano, Franz (1874/1924), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, English translation: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge 1997. Brown, James R. (1991/2010), Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences, 2nd edition, London: Routledge. Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cartwright, Nancy (1989), Nature’s Capacities and their Measurements, Oxford: Clarendon Press. De Donato-Rodríguez, Xavier / Zamora-Bonilla, Jesús (2009), “Credibility, Idealisation, and Model Building: An Inferential Approach”, in: Erkenntnis 70, 101–118. De Donato-Rodríguez, Xavier / Arroyo-Santos, Alfonso (2012), “The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model”, in: Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43, 11–27. Ennis, Robert H. (1982), “Identifying Implicit Assumptions”, in: Synthese 51 (1), 61–86. Fine, Arthur (1993), “Fictionalism”, in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy XVIII, 1–18. Frege, Gottlob (1918/19), “Der Gedanke: eine logische Untersuchung”, in: Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 1, 58–77.

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Frigg, Roman / Reiss, Julian (2009), “The Philosophy of Simulation: Hot New Issues or Same Old Stew”, in: Synthese 169, 593–613. Gärdenfors, Peter (1988), Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Graneau, Peter / Graneau, Neil (1996), Newtonian Electrodynamics, London et al.: World Scientific Press. Hall, Roland (1958), “Assuming: One Set of Positing Words”, in: The Philosophical Review 67 (1), 52–75. Heanue, James (1983), “Editor’s Introduction”, in: A. Meinong (1983), On Assumptions, edited and translated by J. Heanue, Berkeley: University of California Press, ix–xlviii. Humphreys, Paul (2009), “The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods”, in: Synthese 169, 615–626. Laymon, Ronald (1982), “Scientific Realism and the Hierarchical Counterfactual Path from Data to Theory”, in: Proceedings of the 1982 Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1, 107– 121. Laymon, Ronald (1985), “Idealizations and the Testing of Theories by Experimentation”, in P. Achinstein and O. Hannaway (eds.), Experiment and Observation in Modern Science, Boston: MIT Press / Bradford Books, 147–173. Lewis, David (1973), Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell. McMullin, Ernan (1985), “Galilean Idealization”, in: Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 16, 247–273. Marty, Anton (1904), “Über Annahmen”, in: Zeitschrift für Psychologie 40, 32–51. Meinong, Alexius (1899), “Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung”, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. II, bearbeitet von R. Haller, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 377–480. Meinong, Alexius (1902/1910/1977), Über Annahmen, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. IV, bearbeitet von R. Haller, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.

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Meinong, Alexius (1904/1971), “Über Gegenstandstheorie”, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. II, bearbeitet von R. Haller, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 481–535. Meinong, Alexius (1915/1972), Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. VI, bearbeitet von R. Chisholm, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt. Meinong, Alexius (1917/1968), “Über emotionale Präsentation”, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. III, bearbeitet von R. Kindinger, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 283–467. Meinong, Alexius (1921/1978), “Selbstdarstellung”, in: A. Meinong, Gesamtausgabe Bd. VII, bearbeitet von R. Haller, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1–62. Meinong, Alexius (1983), On Assumptions, edited and translated, with an Introduction, by J. Heanue (translation of the second edition of Meinong 1902/1910/1977), Berkeley: University of California Press. Moore, Georg E. (1899), “The Nature of Judgment”, in: Mind, New Series 8 (30),176–193. Norton, John D. (1991), “Thought Experiments in Einstein’s Work”, in: T. Horowitz and G. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 129–148. Norton, John D. (2004), “On Thought Experiments: Is there more to the Argument?”, in: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Philosophy of Science 71, 1139– 1151. Nowak, Leszek (1980), The Structure of Idealization, Dordrecht: Reidel. Nozick, Robert (2001), Invariances: the Structure of the Objective World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Olson, Erik J. / Enqvist, Sebastian (eds.) (2011), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Berlin: Springer. Parsons, Charles (2004), “Brentano on Judgment and Truth”, in: D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168–196.

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Popper, Karl R. (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. Rescher, Nicholas (1961), “Belief-Contravening Suppositions”, in: The Philosophical Review 70 (2), 176–196. Rojszczak, Artur (2005), From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski, edited by J. Wolenski, Berlin: Springer. Rott, Hans (1990), “Approximation versus Idealization: the KeplerNewton Case”, in J. Brzeziński et al. (eds.), Idealization II: Forms and Applications (= Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities vol. 17), Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi, 101–124. Rott, Hans (1994), Reduktion und Revision. Aspekte des nichtmonotonen Theorienwandels, Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang. Rott, Hans (2001), Change, Choice and Inference. A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Russell, Bertrand (1904), “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (I–III), in: Mind, New Series 13 (50), 204–219 (part I); 13 (51), 336–354 (part II); 13 (52), 509–524 (part III). Russell, Bertrand (1905), “Review of Meinong and Others, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie”, in: Mind, New Series 14, 530–38. Russell, Bertrand (1907), “Review of A. Meinong’s Ueber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften”, in: Mind, New Series 16, 436–39. Ryle, Gilbert (1949), The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson. Sayre, Kenneth M. (1997), Belief and Knowledge. Mapping the Cognitive Landscape, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Sorensen, Roy A. (1992), Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, Robert (1974), “Pragmatic Presuppositions”, in: M. Munitz and P. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy, New York: University Press, 197–214. Strawson, Peter F. (1950), “On Referring”, in: Mind 59, 320–344.

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Strawson, Peter F. (1952), Introduction to Logical Theory, London: Methuen. Stumpf, Carl (1906), “Erscheinungen und Psychische Funktionen”, in: Abhandlungen der Königlich-Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Bd. IV, 3–40. Suárez, Mauricio (ed.) (2009), Fictions in Science, London: Routledge. Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Vaihinger, Hans (1911/1924), The Philosophy of “As If”, English translation by C. K. Ogden, London: Routledge (reprint 2000). Walhout, Donald (1960), “Suppositions”, in: The Journal of Philosophy 57 (10), 317–326. Weisberg, Michael (2007), “Three Kinds of Idealization”, in: Journal of Philosophy 104 (12), 639–659. Williamson, Timothy (2008), The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. Winsberg, Eric (2006), “Models of Success vs. the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth”, in: Synthese 152, 1–19.

CHRISTIAN VON EHRENFELS. EINE INTELLEKTUELLE BIOGRAPHIE: NEUE FORSCHUNGSERGEBNISSE AUS DEM NACHLASS Jutta Valent

Zusammenfassung Der österreichische Philosoph Christian von Ehrenfels ist in der einschlägigen Literatur als „Vater der Gestalttheorie“ bekannt. Dieser biographische Beitrag schildert den Menschen Ehrenfels – als Kind, als Student und schließlich als reifer Philosoph, der seinen eigenen Weg ging, – und lässt seine großmütige, leidenschaftliche Natur erahnen. Er hebt seine künstlerischen Begabungen (Dichtung und Musik) hervor, die er auf großartige Weise mit seinen philosophischen Überzeugungen vereinigen konnte. Die in der Nachfolge Wagners komponierten Chordramen basieren auf seinen revolutionären Konzepten einer neuen Form des Zusammenlebens von Mann und Frau, eng verquickt mit der Idee einer allgemeinen Regeneration der abendländischen Menschheit. Sie entstanden um 1900 und waren das eigentliche Anliegen von Ehrenfels bis zu seinem Tod, das er der Menschheit mitteilen wollte. Aus seinem akademischen Lebensfluss leuchtet immer wieder die enge Verbundenheit mit seinem Lehrer Alexius Meinong, wovon etliche Briefauszüge aus dem Nachlass Zeugnis geben.

Christian Freiherr von Ehrenfels (Maria Christian Julius Leopold Freiherr von Ehrenfels) wurde am 20. Juni 1859 in Rodaun bei Wien geboren. Seine Kindheit verbrachte er bis zu seinem 11. Lebensjahr im Stammschloss Brunn am Walde im niederösterreichischen Waldviertel. Es war 18081 von seinem Urgroßvater Joseph Michael Freiherr v. Ehrenfels (1767–1843) 1

Fabian 1986, 1. Die Jahreszahlen schwanken: Der Wikipedia-Artikel „Lichtenau im Waldviertel“ nennt 1812 als Erwerbsjahr. Bernhart Ehrenfels, der Bruder von Christian, schreibt in seiner Chronik zu Brunn und anderen Schlössern, dass Brunn 1803 oder 1805 gekauft worden sein muss, da sein Großvater Karl 1805 schon dort lebte. Ehrenfels, B. v. 1904, 71.

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gekauft worden. Dieser stammte aus Zwettl in Niederösterreich, war bürgerlicher Abstammung und hieß vor seiner Heirat 1790 mit Magdalene Luise Gräfin von Schönburg-Rochsburg „Judtmann“2 Durch die Heirat erhielt er als Nachnamen einen der ruhenden Titel seiner Frau, „Ehrenfels“. Er wurde 1819 bzw. 1822 in den sächsischen bzw. österreichischen Freiherrenstand erhoben.3 Joseph Michael v. Ehrenfels war ein ausgezeichneter Landwirt. In der Schafzucht leistete er Pionierarbeit durch den Einsatz des australischen Electoralschafs, das er zum feinsten Schaf Europas erklärte. Er erwarb sich auch große Verdienste um die österreichische Bienenzucht.4 Über die aus der Praxis gewonnenen Erfahrungen schrieb er Bücher, die bis heute verlegt werden. 5 In Wien ist die „Ehrenfelsgasse“ im 12. Bezirk nach ihm benannt.6

1. Kindheit Die Sehnsucht nach Brunn und seiner behüteten Kindheit begleitete Christian bis zu seinem Lebensende. 7 Als Knabe hatte er ein besonders inniges Verhältnis zu seinem Vater, Leopold Freiherrn von Ehrenfels. Dieser nahm ihn oft zu Ausritten auf die Jagd in der waldreichen Umgebung mit und erzählte ihm abends, auf einem Bärenfell liegend, Ritter- und Jagdgeschichten. Leopold von Ehrenfels gehörten auch die Schlösser und Landgüter von Lichtenau, Rastbach und Allentsgschwendt, die sich ebenfalls im niederösterreichischen Waldviertel befinden. Die Mutter, Clothilde 2 3 4 5 6 7

Vgl. die Eintragung im Gothaischen Genealogischen Taschenbuch der Freiheitlichen Häuser, B. 1941, 91. Jg., 102f. Urkunde mit Adelswappen, das eine Biene zeigt, Staatsarchiv Wien, Akt-Nr. 4422/797 (Kopie). Wurzbach 1858, 7. Vgl. Löbe 2014, 1. Eine „Ehrenfelsgasse“ gibt es auch in Graz (Österreich). Der Nachlass von Ch. v. Ehrenfels enthält eine Sammlung von Familiendokumenten, die von seiner Frau Emma v. Ehrenfels angelegt wurden. Der folgende Aufsatz stützt sich teilweise auf diese Materialien. Daraus wird in der Folge zitiert als „Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, Mappenangabe in römischen Zahlen / Blatt“. Bei sämtlichen in diesem Beitrag angeführten Zitaten wurde die damals übliche Schreibweise der deutschen Sprache beibehalten.

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von Coith, stammte mütterlicherseits aus dem französischen Hofadel. Ihr Vater war der vermögende Spinnereibesitzer von Coith. Sie hatte ein leidenschaftliches Wesen, war lebhaft, witzig, geistreich, aber auch „von mütterlicher Strenge“. Christian war das älteste von fünf Kindern. Auf ihn folgten Ferdinand, Lili, Bernhart und Marie. Der Knabe Christian fiel durch seine Gutherzigkeit auf. So wünschte er sich zum Beispiel, es sollte alle Viertelstunden ein Mann durch die Gegend gehen, der alles repariert und kuriert: kranke Menschen und Tiere und Werkzeuge.8 Sein kindlich-festes Gottvertrauen, das ihn sogar besorgt machte, weil der Vater nicht in die Kirche ging, sollte später eine tiefe Erschütterung erfahren. Die Wintermonate verbrachte die Familie stets in der Stadtwohnung in Wien, wo sie an den geselligen Veranstaltungen der Saison teilnahm. Das Schloss und seine Umgebung, die Jagd- und Wilderergeschichten des Vaters, sowie Sagen- und Märchenwelt beeinflussten stark das spätere dichterische Schaffen von Ehrenfels. Die Auswirkungen der südamerikanischen Baumwollkrise 1861–1864, besonders auf die Börse in Paris, führten dazu, dass vor allem die Mutter ihr ganzes Vermögen verlor. Daher musste die Familie die Stadtwohnung in Wien aufgeben und verbrachte fortan – zur Freude der Kinder – auch den Winter im Schloss Brunn. Der Anblick der Mutter, die Blumen malend in einem Lehnstuhl versunken dasaß, hinterließ einen tiefen Eindruck auf den Sohn und legte vielleicht den Grund für seine spätere große Liebe zu Frauen und zum Weiblichen überhaupt.9 Da Christian in Krems a. d. Donau die Realschule besuchen sollte, übersiedelte die Familie dorthin in ein neu gebautes Haus. Von nun an wurden nur noch die Sommermonate im Schloss Brunn verbracht. Ehrenfels war ein sehr aufmerksamer, fleißiger Schüler. Während der Schulzeit zeigte er bereits großes Interesse an deutscher Dichtung und Literatur. Der Herbst 1873 brachte Unheil. Der Bruder Ferdinand starb 12-jährig „an Entkräftung“10, bald danach die 2-jährige Schwester Marie an Diphtherie. Christian selbst erkrankte an Scharlach mit so hohem Fieber, dass er in Lebensgefahr geriet. 8 9 10

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, I, Bl. 5. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, I, Bl. 47. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, I, Bl. 58.

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Als die Krise überstanden war, begann er mit dem Schreiben von Gedichten („Die wilde Jagd“, „Verzweiflung“, „Drang“, „Der erste Finkenschlag“, „Abendruhe“, „Heilung“, etc.). Seine künstlerische Seite begann sich zu zeigen. Sie sollte sein ganzes Leben lang eine bedeutende Rolle spielen, als Werkzeug zur Realisierung seiner weltanschaulichen Ideen. Im Sommer 1876 beendete Christian erfolgreich die Schule. Im selben Jahr entstanden drei Trauerspiele zu historischen Persönlichkeiten („Hadmar von Kuenring“, „Brutus“ und „Richard Löwenherz“). Schon damals, noch weit entfernt von seinem leidenschaftlichen Kampf gegen die Monogamie, nahm Ehrenfels eine betont kritische Haltung gegenüber der Ehe ein, die die Liebe ersticke. In „Hadmar von Kuenring“ schreibt er: Ist Minne nicht die freie, selbstgewählte, Die, von dem ird’schen Leben weit entfernt, Ihr Reich begründt in dem Land der Sehnsucht? Soll Minne sich an ird’sche Fesseln kehren? Soll in der Seelen himmlischen Gesang Ein ird’scher Klang mit rauhem Misston fallen? Was knüpft die Ehe, ist’s des Herzens Mahnen? Das Herz verstummt und laut befiehlt das Leben. Was hält die Ehe, ist’s der Liebe Eintracht? Die Liebe schweigt, die Sitte hält zusammen. Wohin soll denn das arme Herz sich wenden, Das, tausendmal gekränkt, verletzt, missachtet, Aus tausend Wunden gießt sein Blut ...? 11

2. Als Student in Wien und Graz. Richard Wagner Christian war zur Übernahme des Gutes Brunn vorgesehen, daher sandte der Vater ihn 1877 nach Wien, wo er an der Hochschule für Bodenkultur studieren sollte. Dort „erlebte“ er seine erste Wagneraufführung („Die Walküre“). Sein Interesse für Richard Wagner hatte aber schon der junge Alois Höfler im Sommer davor ausgelöst, der als Gast des Verwalters nach Brunn gekommen war und sehr von Wagner geschwärmt hatte. Christian wurde sich nun aber auch immer mehr seiner Liebe zur Philosophie be11

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, I, Bl. 79f.

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wusst. Er inskribierte 1879/80 an der Wiener Universität zwar noch – auf Wunsch des Vaters – Rechtswissenschaften, besuchte aber bereits Philosophiekollegien, vorzugsweise von dem damals noch jungen Privatdozenten Alexius Meinong, von Thomas Masaryk und Franz Brentano, dessen Lehre ihn anfänglich sehr begeisterte. Außerdem war er ein eifriger Hörer des Physiker Franz Serafin Exner und stand auch Ludwig Boltzmann und Ernst Mach nahe. Von Brentanos Lehre distanzierte er sich aber bald und schlug einen eigenen Weg ein. Er lehnte vor allem dessen Aufstellung eines allgemeinen und absoluten Moralgesetzes ab, wie auch dessen rationalistisch begründeten Monotheismus. Dessen ungeachtet entwickelte sich eine enge Freundschaft mit Brentano, die bis zu seinem Tod 1917 dauerte und sich in vielen Briefen und wechselseitigen Besuchen äußerte. Mit dem um 10 Jahre älteren Alexius Meinong, von dem er wichtige philosophische Anregungen erhielt, entstand ebenfalls ein enger, freundschaftlicher und lebenslanger Kontakt bis zu dessen Tod 1920. Davon zeugt auch eine umfangreiche Korrespondenz. Ehrenfels bewunderte an Meinong besonders seine Liebe zur Wahrheit. Er war für ihn ein Mann, dem es um die Wahrheit zu tun ist, und um nichts anderes, als die Wahrheit. Der so ganz von der einen Leidenschaft nach Wahrheit erfüllt ist, daß er alles andere darüber vergißt, – und nichts anderes für ihn Wert und Bedeutung zu 12 besitzen scheint.

Meinong war – wie Brentano – kein „Wagnerianer“, aber er liebte die Musik und war eine Zeitlang erster Geiger in einem ambitionierten „Dilletanten“-Streichquartett. Ehrenfels sandte ihm immer die Texte seiner Dramen zur Lektüre und Stellungnahme zu und Meinong führte dies auch stets ehrlich und gewissenhaft durch. Aber er vertrat in moralischer Hinsicht einen ganz anderen Standpunkt als Ehrenfels und warnte ihn sogar manchmal vor der Veröffentlichung der Dramen. Wenn man die Ehrenfelssche moralische und weltanschauliche Einstellung um die Jahrhundertwende und danach kennenlernen will, sind diese Werke aber besonders beachtenswert, weil er darin seine Ideale sehr deutlich und ungeschminkt ins Licht stellte. Er verstand sich ohnehin mehr als Künstler

12

Zitiert nach Fabian 1986, 10.

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denn als Philosoph, jedoch entschied letztlich die real eindeutig bessere materielle Aussicht seine endgütige offizielle Lebensbahn. Als Künstler stürzte er sich neben dem Philosophiestudium ins dichterisch-musikalische Schaffen. Sein großes Vorbild war Richard Wagner. Er nahm Privatstunden bei Anton Bruckner in Kompositionslehre.13 Unter Anlehnung „an den Meister“ wollte er „den eigenen Ton finden“. Sogar ein Klavier wurde gemietet, auf dem er nächtens Klavierauszüge aus Wagner-Opern spielte. Die ersten „Chordramen“ entstanden. Aber bald musste er einsehen, dass ihm doch die nötige Begabung fehlte und so suchte er die Dramen auf andere Weise, aber genau nach seinen Vorstellungen, zur Vertonung zu bringen.14 Seine Begeisterung für Philosophie und Dichtkunst führte schließlich dazu, dass er 1882 zugunsten seines jüngeren Bruders Bernhart auf sein Erbe verzichtete. In einem ausführlichen Brief 15 erklärte er sich dem enttäuschten Vater, der ihm ein kurzes Antwortschreiben schickte unter dem vorangestellten Motto: Das ist im Leben häßlich eingerichtet, Daß bei den Rosen gleich die Dornen stehn, Und was das arme Herz auch sehnt und dichtet, 16 Zum Schlusse komt das Voneinandergehn.

So wurde Bernhart, der ein labiles, leichtfertiges und „mitunter hartes“ Wesen hatte, nach dem Tod des Vaters, 1888, Besitzer von Brunn am Walde und Christian behielt Lichtenau. 1882–1883 unterbrach Ehrenfels sein Universitätsstudium und rückte als einjährig Freiwilliger zum 4. Dragoner-Regiment ein. Im Wintersemester 1884 folgte er Meinong nach Graz, um dort sein Studium fortzusetzen. Meinong hatte zuvor einen Ruf als Extraordinarius an die Grazer Universität erhalten. Er gründete die Grazer Schule zur wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der Gebiete der Gegenstandstheorie, der experimentellen Psy13 14

15 16

Vgl. Ehrenfels 1923, 7. Man beachte hierzu die mehr als 40 Seiten umfassende „Nachschrift“ zu den „Allegorischen Dramen“, in der Ehrenfels sehr klar seine Vorstellungen zur Aufführung seiner Dramen darlegte. Christian v. Ehrenfels an seinen Vater Leopold v. E., [o.O.], 15.–29.10.1882, HS (56 S.) und TS (21 S.). Antwort des Vaters, Brunn, 21.8.1883.

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chologie und der Gestalttheorie. Zu ihren Mitgliedern zählten u. a. außer Ehrenfels Alois Höfler, Stephan Witasek, Ernst Mally und Vittorio Benussi. 1885 promovierte Ehrenfels bei Meinong mit der Dissertation Über Größenrelationen und Zahlen. Ihr war ein heftiger Briefwechsel mit seinem Doktorvater vorausgegangen, der u. a. die Wahl des Dissertationsthemas beinhaltete. Ehrenfels war wie viele seiner Zeit zunächst ein Anhänger der Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers gewesen, bevor er Meinongs Hume-Studien kennenlernte, die ihm der Freund und Lehrer zugesandt hatte. Dies war bereits während seiner Wiener Zeit geschehen. Unter diesem neuen Einfluss schreibt er an Meinong: Lieber Freund! Ihr Brief hat eine kleine Revolution in meinen Dispositionen für die nächste Zukunft hervorgebracht, für deren Anregung ich mich Ihnen nun nach deren Ablauf zu Dank verpflichtet fühle. Mit der Veränderung in der Wal des Dissertationsthemas hängt es zusammen, dass ich als Specialfach für das Rigorosum statt der Ethik die Psychologie auserkoren habe, und dass bei der Frage nach dem Hauptphilosophen mein Blick statt auf Schopenhauer auf Locke und Hume ge17 richtet ist, zwischen welchen er noch hin und herschwankt.

In seiner Wiener Zeit war Ehrenfels Mitglied des von Felix Mottl 1873 gegründeten Akademischen Wagner-Verein geworden, dem auch Guido Adler, Alois Höfler, Anton Bruckner, Hugo Wolf und Houston Stewart Chamberlain angehörten. Begeistert wurden alle Werke Wagners von seinen Anhängern begrüßt und es wurde keine Mühe gescheut, den Aufführungen persönlich beizuwohnen. Emma von Ehrenfels berichtet: Als damals die Götterdämmerung zum ersten Mal als Konzert aufgeführt wurde, war immerhin – und das ist ein Zeichen der Leidenschaftlichkeit um Wagner – der große Musikvereinssaal wochenlang zuvor ausverkauft und der Enthusiast Höfler bekam nur durch Bestechung des Portiers einen Platz unter dem Orchesterpodium. […] Damals hat auch Hugo Wolf, um R. Wagner den Wagenschlag zu öffnen, vor dem Grand-Hotel gewartet, ist dann bis zum Musikvereinssaal 18 gelaufen und hat ihn dort wieder dem Meister aufgetan.

17 18

Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Wien, 6.2.1884. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, II, Bl. 67.

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Sein ganzes Leben lang blieb Ehrenfels ein treuer Verehrer Richard Wagners und seiner Kunst.19 1882 war er sogar in seiner Begeisterung vom „Vaterhaus“ Brunn nach Bayreuth zum Festspielhaus gewandert, um dort der Uraufführung des „Parsifal“ beizuwohnen. Unterwegs lernte er das Textbuch auswendig. Jahre später, 1912, beschrieb er dieses Ereignis in der kleinen Abhandlung „Eine Pilgerfahrt nach Bayreuth“20, weil es besonders prägend für sein weiteres geistiges Leben wurde. Neben der philosophischen Arbeit verfasste Ehrenfels zwei dramatische Dichtungen, „Die Brüder von Hartenstein“21 und das Gedicht „Melusine“22, die er als Textbücher zu musikalischen Kompositionen vorgesehen hatte. Seine wichtigsten Dichtungen gab er 1895 als „Allegorische Dramen“23 heraus. Das Hauptstück darin ist „Der Kampf des Prometheus“24, das sich formal ganz bewusst an Wagners „Ring des Nibelungen“ anlehnt. Er stellt darin eine neue Christusinterpretation vor, die er von Wagner übernommen hat. Sie beweist seine Abwendung vom katholischen Glauben, ausgelöst durch die Parsifal-Aufführung in Bayreuth.

3. Der Dichterphilosoph. Glaubenszweifel Als Ehrenfels 1879/80 mit dem Philosophiestudium begann, wollte er noch die Richtigkeit der katholischen Lehre gegen allen Zweifel absichern, wie er später an Meinong schrieb. 25 In dem bereits erwähnten Brief an seinen Vater betont er, dass er in Hinblick auf seine spirituelle Haltung so bleiben wolle, wie er war, nämlich in jener einen Beziehung, in meinem Streben, welches nach einem Ding gerichtet ist, das ich nicht beim Namen nennen kann, weil noch keiner dafür erfunden worden ist, das aber der Religion sehr nahe steht. Dieser über alles sie19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Gegen Ende seines Lebens plante Ehrenfels noch eine Schrift: „50 Jahre Wagner-Gefolgschaft“, vgl. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, II, Bl. 66. Ehrenfels 1912, 33–34. Ehrenfels 1895. Ehrenfels 1887. Ehrenfels 1895. Ehrenfels 1893 (1895). Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Wien, 6.2.1884.

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gende Drang, der mich einst in die Kirche und zum Beichtstuhl, dann in meiner Stube zu den Trauerspielen, dann ins Theater zu den großen Werken der Kunst getrieben hatte, er rief mich mit unwiderstehlicher Gewalt weg auf seine eige26 nen Pfade, die mir nicht fremd vorkamen.

Dann entdeckte er die Musik Wagners und immer mehr ersetzte das Erleben dieser Musik das Katholische in ihm, das er so gut aus seiner Familientradition kannte. Auf seiner Wanderung nach Bayreuth zur Uraufführung des „Parsifal“ 1882 traf er auf einen Wanderer, der ihn durch sein kindliches Gottvertrauen an seinen eigenen früher so einfachen Herzenszugang zur Religion erinnerte. 27 Danach – wieder heimgekehrt – erkannte er plötzlich, dass der Gefühlsrausch, in den ihn die Musik Wagners immer versetzt hatte, kein Ersatz für Religion war. Der schwelende Zweifel an Religion, der durch seine wissenschaftlichen Studien ausgelöst worden war, und die Erkenntnis, dass auch die Kunst Religion nicht ersetzen könne, lösten bei ihm schließlich einen „Abfall vom Glauben“ überhaupt aus.28 Damit begann die „agnostische Mittelphase seines Lebens“. 29 Dazu muss angemerkt werden, dass Ehrenfels anscheinend nur die katholische Ausprägung von Religion kannte und er sich schließlich vom katholischen Dogma abwendete. Er setzte damals Religion und das Religiöse mit dem katholischen Christentum gleich. Irrtümlich war er daher eine Zeitlang sogar von seinem eigenen Glaubenszweifel überzeugt. Im „Kampf des Prometheus“30 aber wird deutlich, dass das Religiöse in ihm sehr wohl lebte, er aber mit der ihm bekannten Ausprägung der Religion in der Gesellschaft, nämlich der Kirche, nichts mehr anfangen konnte. Zu diesem Werk schreibt er in der „Nachschrift“ der „Allegorischen Dramen“, dass er an keine „Allmacht“ mehr glauben könne, welche das einmalige sündige Vergehen im flüchtigen Zeitenverlauf mit endloser Verdammnis und Höllenqual entgelten, ja ihren Rachedurst sogar auf die schuldlosen Nachkommen des Frevlers erstrecken soll, um sie bis ins letzte 31 Glied mit dem Fluch der Erbsünde zu belasten. 26 27 28 29 30 31

Brief von Ehrenfels an seinen Vater Leopold v. E., [o. O.], 15.–29.10.1882, 4. Bodmershof 1960, 428. Ehrenfels 1912, 33, bzw. vgl. Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong vom 6.2.1884. Ehrenfels 1916, 180. Ehrenfels 1893 (1895). Ebd. 1895, 360.

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Er schildert, wie Christus den allmähligen Verlust eines im höchsten Sinne beglückenden, aber trügerischen Wahngebildes [erfährt], die Überzeugung, dass alles Unheil und alle Sünde nur aus dem menschlichen Irrtum entstammen und der Mensch es nur nötig habe, an die Allliebe von Christus zu glauben und im eigenen Herzen zu erwecken. Christus setzt dafür die ganze Kraft seiner mächtigen Individualität ein, und erreicht es, eine gewaltige Menge mit sich fortzureißen und zu einem seligen Freudentaumel zu begeistern, den er als wahre Anhängerschaft und Erleuchtung deutet, bis die erwachenden, ungebändigten rohen Instincte des Volkes ihn 32 der Täuschung entreißen.

Der über die Verblendung des Volkes, das einen weltlichen Führer sucht, am Kreuz leidende einsame Christus (Mein Gott, mein Gott, warum hast du mich verlassen?) erfährt, dass der wahre Wille Gottes durch die Engel noch nicht ausgesprochen werden kann, „welcher sich in seiner allliebenden Macht dem Himmel, der Erde und der Hölle zum Trotz noch offenbaren werde.“33 Ehrenfels weist hier den Gott des Alten Testaments vehement zurück und ersetzt ihn durch die liebevolle Heilandsgestalt des Christus, der immer im eigenen Inneren wohnt und darauf wartet, dass man sich seiner erinnert. Das Drama schließt mit dem Chor: Herz, nun ermanne dich mutig der Klage! den du beweinest, – er lebet in dir! – Und ihr, die treulich dem Sange gelauscht; – Den ihr im Bilde siegend erschaut, der euch im Bilde liebend entschwand, – suchet ihn auf in der eigenen Brust, suchet ihn auf im Strome der Zeit, suchet ihn auf in der stralenden Sterne weltumschlingendem Reigen, – 34 suchet, – ihr findet ihn wieder!

Sein hier vorgeführtes Verständnis der christlichen Religion erinnert an gnostisches Christentum. Auch dort wird Jahwe, der Gott des Alten Tes32 33 34

Ebd., 363. Ebd., 363. Ehrenfels 1895, 176.

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taments, als Schöpfergott der Welt dargestellt, deren Existenz irrtümlich für wirklich gehalten wird, die aber bloßer Schein ist im Gegensatz zur allgegenwärtigen einzigen göttlichen Realität. Christus ist nicht der Sohn dieses „Demiurgen“, sondern wohnt als „Geistfunke“ im Herzen aller Menschen.35

4. Vorakademische Intermezzi Nach der Promotion 1885 reiste Ehrenfels nach Venedig, um „den Kopf zu lüften“36, und um seinen Freund Graf Carl Albrecht Coronini zu treffen, den er während seines Freiwilligenjahres kennengelernt hatte. Aus Mentone scheibt er an Meinong am 11. April mit schlechtem Gewissen, weil er sich nicht früher bei ihm gemeldet hat: Wenn es nicht eine allzu häufige Selbsttäuschung wäre, welche den Unterlassungssünden der simplen Faulheit oder Bequemlichkeit tiefere Motive unterlegt, so würde ich mit dem Geständnis herausrücken, daß mir, als sich auf nächtlicher Meeresfahrt von Triest nach Venedig, der wolkenlose, südliche Himmel auftat wie ein weites Tor, etwas wie einem dem Käfig entflohenen Vogel zu Mute wurde, welcher fürs erste nicht allzu gerne an die strengen, geraden Querstäbe des einengenden Gitters zurückdenkt, mag er seinem treuen Hüter und Pfleger auch 37 noch so viel Dank und Liebe hegen.

Im November d. J. wurde sein Drama „Die Brüder von Hartenstein“ 38 veröffentlicht. In philosophischer Hinsicht beschäftigte sich Ehrenfels nun mit dem Werk von Du Bois-Reymond und veröffentlichte 1886 darüber seine erste philosophische Arbeit: „Metaphysische Ausführungen im Anschlusse an Emil du Bois-Reymond“39, in der er dafür plädierte, den 35

36 37 38 39

„Gnosis“ bedeutet „Kenntnis“. Gnostische Strömungen sind sehr alt; es hat sie in allen Menschheitskulturen gegeben (Iran, Indien, Ägypten, China; in Europa als Gegenbewegung zur herrschenden Kirche bis in die Gegenwart). Im christlichen Mittelalter wurden ihre Anhänger als „Ketzer“ verfolgt, grausam gefoltert und ermordet, wie z. B. die Katharer im 12. / 13. Jhd. oder Giordano Bruno.) Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, II, Bl. 129. Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Mentone, 11.4.1885. Ehrenfels 1885. Ehrenfels 1886.

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okkulten Phänomenen ihren Platz zu lassen und sich gegen das Modell einer strengen Wissenschaft aussprach.40 Seine Habilitation erfolgte 1888 mit der psychologischen Studie Über Fühlen und Wollen. In jenem Jahr starb der Vater und Christian bezog mit seiner Mutter und der Schwester Lili das Schloss Lichtenau. Diese hatte sich mit Carl Lichtenstern verlobt. Das Schloss war bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt als Lichtenauer Volksschule genutzt worden und befand sich in sehr schlechtem Zustand. Ehrenfels übertrug den Besitz seiner Mutter. Diese ließ es restaurieren. Er hielt vorerst keine Vorlesungen in Wien, sondern begab sich viel auf Reisen. 1889 fuhr er nach Berlin, um philosophische Kollegien zu besuchen, war aber enttäuscht davon. An Meinong schreibt er: Du wirst Dir von den philosophischen Leistungen Berlins wol kaum einen „höheren Begriff“ gebildet haben, als ich schon vor meiner Herkunft; erstaunt war ich aber doch darüber, dass man hier Conversatorien nach unserer Art gar nicht kennt, und in dem einzigen, welches abgehalten wird, (von Paulsen) die Hörer buchstäblich „Hörer“ bleiben. Und nun erst die Vorträge! 200 Zuhörer; mehr als die Hälfte Theologen, welche eben ihre Philosophie bekommen müssen! Gerade die Philosophie ist aber die schlimmste Seite, von welcher sich mir Berlin bis 41 jetzt darstellt.

In Berlin kam Ehrenfels mit den Ideen der aufbrechenden sozialdemokratischen Bewegung in Kontakt. Er besuchte Vorträge des Historikers Heinrich von Treitschke zur Gesellschaftswissenschaft und dem Sozialismus. Diese Thematik beeinflusste seine Gedankengänge, ebenso die neue literarische Kunstrichtung des Naturalismus, dessen Hauptvertreter, Gerhart Hauptmann, er persönlich kennen lernte. Seine aufsehenerregenden Dramen schätzte Ehrenfels außerordentlich. 42 Eine umfangreiche Korrespondenz entwickelte sich mit dessen Bruder Carl Hauptmann in den Jahren 1888–1896. Von 1890 bis zum Jahr 1893 förderte Ehrenfels die Zeitschrift Freie Bühne finanziell, um darin eigene Aufsätze zum Naturalismus und zu 40

41 42

Vgl. dazu seine späteren Werke: „Kosmogonie“, 1915, in der er „Überseelen“ annimmt und seinen Aufsatz „Die metaphysische Bedeutung der parapsychischen Probleme“, 1931. Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Berlin, 21.11.1889. Valent 2012, 193f.

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Richard Wagner zu veröffentlichen.43 Die Freie Bühne war von Samuel Fischer und Otto Brahm als Wochenschrift zur Förderung der naturalistischen Literatur gegründet worden. 44 Aber Probleme in mehrfacher Hinsicht, u. a. mit Otto Brahm, die diesen dazu veranlaßten, aus der Zeitschrift auszuscheiden, führten dazu, dass Samuel Fischer Ehrenfels als neuen Herausgeber ernannte. Unter der Mitarbeit von Wilhem Bölsche, der sie redaktionell betreute, erschien die Freie Bühne dann noch drei Jahre lang, vom August 1890 bis zum September 1893.

5. „Vater der Gestalttheorie“ 1890 erschien die kleine Studie „Über Gestaltqualitäten“. 45 Diese Schrift rief ungeahnte Auswirkungen hervor – ohne dass Ehrenfels selbst es bemerkte, denn er wandte sich bald nach ihrem Erscheinen wieder anderen Themen zu. Verwundert erfuhr Ehrenfels immer wieder „zufällig“ von seinem Ruhm. So hörte er, wie ein Fremder zu einem Fremden sagte, er habe in Rom in die Aula geschaut und dort ein Kolleg über die „forme di qualità“ von Ehrenfels in Prag angeschlagen gesehen, […] ein anderes Mal, […] als ein Prof. [Otto?] Pötzl seine Antrittsvorlesung in der Urania hielt, war der Saal, wohl durch den interessanten Gegenstand „Traumpsychologie“ gesteckt voll, Ehrenfels stand in aller Bescheidenheit aus Platzmangel an der Seite der Sitzplätze, als Pötzl den Vortrag einleitete: „Ich bin mir der Ehre vollauf bewußt, in der Stadt eines Christian Ehrenfels vorzu46 tragen …“

Diese kleine, so bedeutsame Abhandlung begründete die Berliner Gestaltbewegung und bewirkte, dass Ehrenfels als „Vater der Gestalttheorie“ in die Geschichte einging. Er hatte durch Beobachtungen erkannt, dass eine Gestalt, z. B. eine Melodie, mehr ist als die Summe ihrer einzelnen Töne, weil sie, wenn man sie in eine andere Tonart transponiert, immer noch als 43 44 45 46

Ehrenfels 1891a, 337–341, 372–376; 1891b, 489–495; 1891c, 737–742; 1891d, 857–862; 1892a, 918–926, 1049–1060; 1892b, 756–758. Susen 2010, 22–63. Ehrenfels 1890, 249–292. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, III, Bl. 85.

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die gleiche erkennbar ist. Die „Gestaltpsychologie“ entstand als neue wissenschaftliche Disziplin am Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Verschiedene Schulen wurden gegründet, zunächst im deutschsprachigen Raum („Grazer“ oder „Österreichische Schule“, „Berliner“, „Leipziger“ und „Würzburger Schule“ der Gestaltpsychologie), bevor sie dann durch die Forschungen des Österreichers und Ehrenfelsschülers Max Wertheimer in Prag nach seiner Emigration 1933 weitere Verbreitung in den USA fand. Wertheimer war der Begründer der „Berliner Schule“, die die einflussreichste deutsche psychologische Schule im 20. Jahrhundert war.

6. Beginn der akademischen Laufbahn 1891 kehrte Ehrenfels als Privatdozent nach Wien zurück, um seine erste Vorlesung mit dem Titel „Allgemeine Werttheorie mit spezieller Berücksichtigung der Ethik“ zu halten. Anfänglich hatte er nur drei Hörer: „Otto Höfler, einen Russen und einen Serben“. 47 Bis 1896 lehrte er nur in den Sommersemestern und reiste in den übrigen Monaten, besonders nach Deutschland und nach Italien. In philosophischer Hinsicht standen in den folgenden Jahren, angeregt durch Meinong, werttheoretische Fragen im Mittelpunkt seines Interesses. 1897/98 veröffentlichte er ein „System der Werttheorie“ in zwei Bänden.48 Darin vertrat er einen relativistisch-subjektivistischen Standpunkt: Einem Gegenstand komme nur insofern Wert / Unwert zu, sofern es ein Subjekt gibt, das den Gegenstand begehrt oder ablehnt. Die neu entstandene Schule der österreichischen Nationalökonomie (C. Menger, F. v. Wieser, E. v. Böhm-Bawerk) beeinflusste ihn in methodischer Hinsicht, speziell die Lehre vom Grenznutzengesetz, ebenso der Darwinismus.

47 48

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, IV, Bl. 44. Ehrenfels 1897 und 1898.

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7. Heirat Zum Freundeskreis von Ehrenfels zählten damals u. a. Alois Höfler, Michael Pidoll (Freiherr von Quintenbach), Friederich Hasenörl, der Musiker Guido Peters, Ernst Böck und H. S. Chamberlain. Dieser und Ehrenfels übten eine unbestimmbare Anziehung aufeinander aus: Chamberlain trachtete stets bei den Versammlungen im Wagnerverein seinen Platz neben Ehrenfels zu erhalten, denn es geht ein Charme der Reinheit und 49 Reinlichkeit von ihm aus, der bei jungen Männern nicht allzu häufig ist.

1894 lernte Ehrenfels im Rahmen eines Wagner-Vortrags von Chamberlain, den dieser im Akademischen Wagner-Verein in Graz hielt, die junge Witwe Emma von Hartmann, geb. André, kennen. Sie heirateten 1894 und ließen sich mit Emmas Kind aus erster Ehe, Elfriede, vorerst in Graz nieder. Christian und Emma wurden zwei Kinder geboren, Imma (1895– 1982), und Rolf (1901–1980). Imma verlobte sich später mit dem Hölderlinforscher Norbert von Hellingrath. Er fiel im 1. Weltkrieg. 1925 heiratete sie Wilhelm von Bodmershof und wurde als Schriftstellerin bekannt. Sie verfasste Romane, Erzählungen und Haiku-Dichtungen.50 Rolf war in erster Ehe mit Elfriede von Bodmershof verheiratet, der Schwester von Wilhelm von Bodmershof. Er trat zum Islam über und nahm den Namen „Omar“ an. Als der zweite Weltkrieg ausbrach, flüchtete er 1939 nach Indien und war dort für mehr als 20 Jahre als Anthropologe und Orientalist tätig. Er wurde Ordinarius und Vorstand des Anthropologischen Institutes in Madras (Südindien).51 1961 zog er mit seiner zweiten Frau, Mireille Abeille, nach Heidelberg. Die warmen Sommermonate verbrachten sie immer in Lichtenau. Nach seinem Tod übersiedelte Mireille Ehrenfels nach Lichtenau und befasste sich intensiv mit der Restaurierung der durch 49 50

51

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, V, Bl. 50. An einer gedruckten Biographie zu Imma von Bodmershof wird zurzeit gearbeitet. Biographische Hinweise finden sich außer in online-Quellen vereinzelt im Nachlass von Chr. von Ehrenfels, sowie im Literaturarchiv Marbach, wo der Hauptteil des Nachlasses von I. v. Bodmershof liegt. Dieser befindet sich in noch ungeordnetem Zustand. Hinsichtlich biographischer Veröffentlichungen s. auch: Bodmershof 1941, 5 und Nenning 2003, 34–35. Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf 1933, 1936, 1961, 1964 und 1967; Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf Parte 1980; Jettmar 1980; Ehrenfels, Leela 2004.

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die Kriegsschäden stark beschädigten Schlösser Rastbach und Lichtenau, sowie mit der Sammlung von wissenschaftlichen und Familiendokumenten.

8. Als Professor in Prag 1896, zwei Jahre nach seiner Verheiratung mit Emma von Hartmann, erhielt Ehrenfels den Ruf als Extraordinarius an die deutsche Universität in Prag als Nachfolger Friedrich Jodls. Er nahm ihn sofort an, weil er, beunruhigt durch die besorgte Mutter, die materielle Notwendigkeit einer Professur erkannt hatte. Er wäre auch bereit gewesen, nach Czernowitz oder nach Freiburg zu gehen. Parallel zu der nun beginnenden philosophischen Karriere war er weiterhin als Dichter tätig. 1895 waren die Allegorischen Dramen, für musikalische Composition gedichtet 52 bei Konegen in Wien erschienen, 1900 veröffentlichte er das Chordrama „Ulrich“, das in Prag im Selbstverlag gedruckt wurde. 53 Ehrenfels war von den akademisch-philosophischen Verhältnissen in Prag enttäuscht. Im November 1896 schreibt er an Meinong: Mir kommt das ganze Wesen [bezüglich Kraus und der Brentano-Schule] merkwürdig steril vor; steril auch die ganze Philosophie überhaupt, und wieder regt sich in mir, was ich schon so oft empfunden: dass ich eigentlich nur Philosophie 54 treibe, um ihrer los zu werden.

Zu Beginn hatte er nur fünf Hörer, von denen drei – Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus und Benno Urbach – überzeugte Anhänger Brentanos und seiner Lehre waren. Ehrenfels erfassten verstärkt Fluchtgedanken: Er überlegte nach München zu gehen, um sich dort neu zu habilitieren. Nach einigem Hin und Her, auch lokal, entschied er sich letztendlich aber doch dafür, „vorläufig“ in Prag zu bleiben. Nach ca. einem Jahr, im Oktober 1897, holte Ehrenfels seine Familie in die inzwischen adaptierte Wohnung nach Prag, in der auch der Natio52 53 54

Ehrenfels 1895. Ehrenfels 1900. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, VII, Bl. 29.

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nalökonom Friedrich von Wieser mit seiner Frau lebte. Schließlich wuchs auch die Freude zum Lehramt und Ehrenfels gewann den Kontakt mit der Jugend so lieb, dass er selbst in schweren Zeiten die Kollegien seine besten Stunden nannte. Er war anfänglich so eifrig, daß er vorzutragen begann, während er noch Rock und Hut versorgte – erst das Lächeln der 55 Jünglinge erzog ihn zum würdevollen usus des Katheders.

Ehrenfels lehrte an der deutschen Universität in Prag über 30 Jahre lang. Einer seiner Hörer, Max Brod, schildert ihn in seinen autobiographischen Aufzeichnungen als „stürmisch originellen Professor“ folgendermaßen: Die Dämonie des Außerordentlichen, Genialen, völlig Eigengesetzlichen umgab die hohe Gestalt des vollbärtigen Mannes, der durch die Prager Straßen energischen Gangs hinstrich. Man begegnete ihm häufig. Er trug Kleider, die wie vorweltlich aussahen. Nie war ein solcher klobig brauner Winterrock Mode gewesen; er machte nicht den Eindruck, vom Schneider angefertigt, eher wie von einem 56 Holzfäller mit einem Beil zurechtgeschnitzt zu sein.

Sein Studienkollege Felix Weltsch sah in Ehrenfels einen Philosophen, der vom Leben her zum Denken kam. Er schuf nicht im Kontakt mit Büchern, sondern in unmittelbarer Anschauung des Weltgeschehens. Er saß nicht am Schreibtisch, er durchwanderte Stadt und Land. Dieser Professor der Philosophie war nicht der Typ eines Professors, überhaupt nicht eines Gelehrten. Er war vielmehr ein genialer Einsiedler, ein Mann, den die Musik geweckt hatte und den Eros 57 trieb, der mit aller Kraft darum rang, Leben und Welt ins Bessere zu heben.

Ehrenfels war für seine Studenten keine Führernatur, sondern blieb ein Forschender, der aber auch gern, im Anschluss an seine Lehrveranstaltungen, mit dem einen oder anderen seiner Hörer privat diskutierte und auch bereit war, den eigenen Standpunkt zu ändern. Neben seiner großen Wahrheits- und Gerechtigkeitsliebe zeigte sich auch immer wieder seine Warmherzigkeit, wenn er z. B. erkrankte Studenten zu Hause besuchte. Von großer philosophischer Belesenheit hielt er nichts, sondern vertrat statt55 56 57

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, VIII, Bl. 33. Brod 1969, 209. Brod 1969, 209f.

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dessen in seinem immer frei gehaltenen Vortrag seine eigenen Anschauungen: „Viel wichtiger als alle Bücher sind das Leben und Erleben.“58 Seine Vorlesungen behandelten Themen zur Ästhetik, Ethik, Werttheorie, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie. Ab 1899 bekleidete er die Stelle des zweiten Ordinarius für Philosophie neben Anton Marty. Zu seinen Hörern zählten unter anderem der schon erwähnte Max Wertheimer, Rudolf Kampe, Max Brod, Franz Kafka, Felix Weltsch, Oskar Kraus und Alfred Kastil. Ein weiterer Anhänger von Ehrenfels war der Sohn seiner Schwester, Christoph von Lichtenstern, der zwar nicht Philosophie studierte, aber als Regierungsrat die Lehren seines Onkels in Berlin in privaten kleinen Kreisen weitergab. Im Hause Ehrenfels verkehrten Gäste mit klingenden Namen, wie z. B. die Schriftstellerin Ellen Key, Rainer Maria Rilke, der Indologe Moritz Winternitz, Franz Brentano, der bereits erwähnte Hölderlin-Forscher Norbert von Hellingrath, Hugo Wolf, Maurice Maeterlinck, Frank Wedekind, Gabriele Reuter, Clara Viebig, Bertha von Suttner und Rabindranath Tagore.59

9. Vom Reformideal erfüllt: Die Verbesserung der westlichen Menschheit Um die Jahrhundertwende erfolgte ein erstaunlicher eindeutiger Wandel in den philosophischen Bestrebungen von Ehrenfels. Bis zu seinem Lebensende war er von nun an fortan theoretisch bemüht, das Los der westlichen Menschheit zu verbessern, und zwar mit Hilfe ganz klarer, methodisch durchdachter Vorstellungen: 1898/99 hatte Ehrenfels das Manuskript zu einem neuen Chordrama fertig gestellt („Siegmar und Heliea“ 60), in dem er „sein Lebensideal“ vorstellte, nämlich die strikte Ablehnung der monogamischen Lebensform 58 59

60

Brief von Ehrenfels an Brentano, Prag, 4.1.1904. Vgl. dazu die Korrespondenz im Nachlaß von Chr. v. Ehrenfels als auch in der (nur grob geordneten) Sammlung zu Emma v. Ehrenfels in Lichtenau, die zurzeit nicht öffentlich zugänglich ist. Ehrenfels 1905, 1–76.

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zugunsten zeitlich begrenzter polygamer Bindungen in Hinblick auf bestmögliche Nachkommenschaft. Dafür erachtete er ein besonderes Ausleseverfahren und die Einbettung in spezielle Institutionen für Mütter und Kinder als notwendig. Meinong riet ihm allerdings dringend von der Veröffentlichung des Werkes ab. Ehrenfels lenkte ein und entschied, zunächst die theoretische Basis dafür zu verfassen und dann beides gemeinsam zu veröffentlichen. Das Arbeitsprogramm für die nächsten 10 Jahre umfaßte mehr als 50 Arbeiten zum Thema „Gedanken über die Regeneration der Kulturmenschheit“. Er widmete sich im Detail Themen wie Darwinismus, Selektionstheorie, Ehereform und Eugenik. Ein weiteres Chordrama mit gleicher Tendenz („Ulrich“) publizierte er jedoch 1900.61 Seine Reformvorschläge, die ein neues Sexualverhalten propagierten, wurden allerdings generell – mit wenigen Ausnahmen – abgelehnt. Die verständnislosen Angriffe von links und rechts schmerzten ihn, besonders aber das eisige Schweigen seiner Kollegen an der Universität. „Sie brachten ihn in die Lage eines Ritters, der kampffreudig, mit offenem Visier zum Tournir um hohen Preis einhersprengt, – und keinen Gegner vorfindet.“62 Sigmund Freud, mit dem er in Kontakt stand, befürwortete einige seiner Ideen, hielt sie aber für praktisch undurchführbar. Ehrenfels war jedoch von seinem neuen Weg nicht mehr abzubringen. An Meinong schreibt er 1906, dass er auf eine „soziale Neuschöpfung“ hinstrebe, nämlich „die Frauenassoziation“, die jedenfalls verwirklicht werden muß, aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen, wenn auch wahrscheinlich zunächst auf monogamischer Grundlage. – Ist sie aber einmal verwirklicht, – dann ists nur eine Frage der Zeit, daß auch auf dem Gebiete der sexuellen Moral (nicht wie gegenwärtig Unmoral) – dem Manne sein Recht werde, – und damit auch der Rasse ihr Recht. Das näher auszuführen soll nun 63 meine zukünftige Aufgabe sein.

Ehrenfels veröffentlichte „Siegmar und Heliea“ zusammen mit anderen Dramen 1905 („Die Stürmer“).64 Ein zweiter Band Dramen folgte 1911.65 Am 23.3.1911 wurde sein Sprechdrama „Die Sternenbraut“ am deutschen 61 62 63 64 65

Ehrenfels 1900. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, XVII, Bl. 8. Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Warnemünde bei Rostock, 10.8.1906. Ehrenfels 1905, 1–76. (Wiederabdruck in 1911b) Ehrenfels 1911d.

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Theater in Prag mit großem Erfolg aufgeführt. 66 Der Berliner Komponist Otto Taubmann vertonte das Drama „Sängerweihe“, das schon 1894 im Selbstverlag von Ehrenfels erschienen war.67 Es wurde nach einigen erfolglosen Versuchen, es zur Aufführung zu bringen, in einem kleinen Theater in Deutschland (Elberfeld) 1904 uraufgeführt, zur großen Freude von Ehrenfels. Er verstand sich ja nach seinen eigenen Worten mehr als Dichter denn als Philosoph und sah in seinen Dichtungen nur „das gehorsame Werkzeug höherer Macht, deren unbedingten Geboten er seine persönlichen Kräfte frag- und wahllos unterordnet.“68 In seinem akademischen Alltag war Ehrenfels bemüht – entsprechend dem Wunsch von Meinong – Alois Höfler aus seiner bedrückenden Situation als Mittelschullehrer herauszuhelfen und ihn als Nachfolger Otto Willmanns für den pädagogischen Lehrstuhl an der Prager Universität zu gewinnen. Höfler hatte in Wien bei Brentano studiert und in Graz bei Meinong promoviert. Die Bemühungen trugen schließlich Früchte und Höfler wurde zum „Professor für Pädagogik“ ernannt. Dadurch kam es zu Parteienkämpfen der Anhänger Brentanos auf der einen Seite, zu denen Josef Eisenmeier, Oskar Kraus und Alfred Kastil zählten, und den Anhängern Meinongs auf der anderen Seite, wie Stefan Witasek, Eduard Martinak und Emil Arleth, zu denen Ehrenfels ja auch selbst gehörte. Die politische Situation war damals in Prag und auch an der deutschen Universität von drei Gruppierungen bestimmt, den Deutschnationalen, den Jüdischnationalen und den Sozialdemokraten. Ehrenfels schloss sich keiner einzigen davon an. Er war – wie in seiner Philosophie – ein Einzelgänger, dem nur die Regeneration des seiner Meinung nach kulturell und konstitutiv erschöpften westlichen Abendlandes am Herzen lag. Da er die Ursache dafür in der Monogamie vermutete, plädierte er in vielen Schriften und Vorträgen für eine „Durchmischung der Rassen“, speziell (nach dem Krieg) durch die Slawen. Er hatte keinerlei Vorurteile gegenüber den Juden, sondern betonte im Gegenteil ihre außerordentliche Intelligenz und kaufmännische Geschicktheit. Franz Kafka notierte in seinem Tagebuch: 66 67 68

Ehrenfels 1911c. Ehrenfels 1894. Wiederabdruck in 1895 und 1904. Ehrenfels 1911a, 4.

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Komische Szenen, als Professor Ehrenfels, der immer schöner wird und dem sich im Licht der kahle Kopf in einer gehauchten Kontur nach oben abgrenzt, die Hände aneinander gelegt und gegenseitig drückend, mit seiner vollen, wie bei einem Musikinstrument modulierten Stimme, vor Vertrauen lächelnd, für 69 Mischrassen einsetzt.

Ehrenfels sprach sich auch öffentlich für seine jüdischen Kollegen an der Universität aus, obwohl ihm dies Nachteile und Anfeindungen im antisemitischen Lager einbrachte. Im Mai 1912 nahm Ehrenfels am Vortragsprogramm der „Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität Wien“ teil. Er trug an drei Abenden „neue Beweise vom Dasein Gottes“ vor. Seine Gedanken dazu, die eine Welterklärung beinhalteten und schließlich zu einer ersten Fassung der Konzeption einer neuen Religion wurden, veröffentlichte er in seinem Werk „Kosmogonie“ 1916.70 Sie sollte „eine Wiedergeburt des Christentums“ auslösen, wie er in einem Brief an Meinong schreibt: Glaube aber nicht, daß ich etwa zum orakelnden Mystiker geworden bin. Es geht alles ganz klar und vernünftig zu und – natürlich denke ich nicht an eine Wiedergeburt etwa im Sinne der Anerkennung des christlichen Dogmas irgendeiner Konfession. Aber doch soweit „christlich“, daß dem Christentum eine metaphysische Präponderanz zuerkannt wird – über alle Erscheinungen, welche 71 sonst noch in den Bereich unserer historischen Erfahrungen fallen.

Er vertrat einen strikten Dualismus, lehnte ein absolutes Kausalprinzip ab und suchte neue Ansätze zur Klärung des Kausalbegriffs, zu den Wahrscheinlichkeitsschlüssen und zum Theodizee-Problem. Bis zu seinem Lebensende hatte er vor, eine „Religion der Zukunft auf wissenschaftlicher Basis“ zu begründen. Danach unternahm er in einer achtteiligen Artikelserie in der Prager Presse neuerliche Versuche zur Gründung der „Religion der Zukunft“. Sie erschienen 1922 als „Gedanken über die Religion der Zukunft“. 72

69 70 71 72

Brod 1974, 154. Ehrenfels 1916. Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Prag, 17.3.1911. Ehrenfels (1922), 23. April, 7. / 14. Mai, 28. Mai, 4. Juni, 18. Juni, 2. Juli, 16. Juli, 27. August..

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10. Depression und neuerlicher Aufbruch Den Ausbruch des 1. Weltkriegs verband er mit der starken Hoffnung auf Erfüllung seiner Reformpläne nach Beendigung des Krieges. 1914 schreibt er an Meinong: Über das Persönliche des Krieges hinaus spannt sich meine Erwartung auf die Zeit nach dem Friedensschluß – auf die moralischen Kräfte, die dann noch wach sein werden, und vielleicht fähiger als sonst, Ungewohntes aufzufassen. – Wenn das Schicksal der weissen Rasse noch eine Chance geben wollte, zur Erweckung ihres generativen Gewissens, so ist es dieser Krieg! – Daraufhin schmiede ich 73 jetzt schon meine Waffen.

Der Verlauf des Krieges aber zerstörte all seine Hoffnung. Im Sommer 1916 fiel er in eine schwere Depression. Nach einer Zeit des völligen Stillstands seines geistigen Schaffens, die mehr als drei Jahre dauerte, konnte er im Sommersemester 1919 endlich wieder Vorlesungen abhalten. In einem „Brief an die Freunde“ von 1920 erklärt er seine Jahre des Schweigens.74 Während seiner Krankheit hatte er sich auf spielerische Weise mit der Primzahlenbildung beschäftigt. Nun versuchte er mit Hilfe des Gestaltprinzips ein sie begründendes wissenschaftliches Gesetz aufzustellen. 1922 publizierte er die Abhandlung: „Das Primzahlengesetz, entwickelt und dargestellt auf Grund der Gestalttheorie“. 75 Die neue politische Lage nach dem Krieg beflügelte Ehrenfels zu einer neuen Utopie, nämlich dass von den slawischen Völkern die heilbringende kulturelle Regeneration erfolgen würde. Daher setzte er sich für die Verbindung von Tschechen und Deutschen ein, um eine neue panslawische Kultur zu begründen. Sie sollte in der jungen, tschechischen Republik unter dem Präsidenten T. G. Masaryk erblühen. Er stieß aber auf heftigste Kritik und Proteste, auch von deutsch-nationaler Seite. Zur Verbreitung dieser neuen Überzeugung schrieb er das Sprechstück „Die Mutter des Legionärs“, das er besonders Präsident Masaryk widmete. Es wurde

73 74 75

Brief von Ehrenfels an Meinong, Lichtenau, 14.10.1914. Ehrenfels 1920. Ehrenfels 1922.

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1925 am Prager Theater uraufgeführt, jedoch rigoros abgelehnt, auch von seiner Familie, besonders aber von seiner Frau. 76 Wie die tiefe Enttäuschung über den Krieg und die Zerstörung seiner Illusionen Ursache für seine erste schwere Depression war, so löste nun die Verzweiflung über die negativen Reaktionen der Öffentlichkeit und seiner Familie auf sein Werk neuerlich eine tiefe Depression aus, aus der er erst nach vier Jahren und wiederholt durch die tatkräftige Hilfe seiner Frau herausfand.77 1929 publizierte er den Aufsatz „Die Religion der Zukunft“. Er griff darin sein Vorhaben, eine neue Religion für die gesamte Menschheit zu gründen wieder auf. Sie sollte sich auf den wissenschaftlichen Beweis des Dualismus stützen Dabei berief er sich einerseits auf die „Philosophie der Organischen“ von Hans Driesch andererseits auf Oswald Spenglers Herleitung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft „aus dem mystischen Gefühlsaufschwung der mittelalterlichen Kunst“. 78 Die neue Religion, der „Realkatholizisms“, fußt auf dem Glauben an die Einheit aller Religionen auf der Basis der einen alle und alles umfassenden Liebe. Als Stifter und Verbreiter hätte Ehrenfels gern den tschechischen Präsidenten T. G. Masaryk gewonnen, denn er verehrte ihn persönlich sehr. In einem „offenen Brief“ legte er ihm seine Bitte vor. Masaryk antwortete freundlich, aber abschlägig.79 Er sah sich mehr als „Politikstifter“, nicht als „Religionsstifter“. 1929 wurde Ehrenfels emeritiert, hielt aber noch Vorlesungen bis zum Wintersemester 1931/32. In dem Aufsatz „Sexualmoral der Zukunft“ (1930) griff er wieder seine sexualreformerischen Ideen auf.80 Nun nahm er sie als zu anspruchsvoll für den Durchschnittsmenschen zurück. Er war aber nach wie vor überzeugt von der drohenden Gefahr der Degeneration der westlichen Kulturvölker. Ehrenfels plädierte für die Einsetzung künstlicher Befruchtungsmethoden anstelle der natürlichen Zeugungstätigkeit und sprach von einem „Weg, den es allen Ernstes zu beschreiten gilt“, er glaubte aber, dass es mit der Umsetzung noch „ein Jahrtausend“ dauern 76 77 78 79 80

Ehrenfels 1925. Ehrenfels 1929. Ehrenfels 1929, 6. Brief von Masaryk an Ehrenfels, Lany, 23.12.1929, in: Fabian 1990, Bd. 4, 294– 295. Ehrenfels 1930, 292–304.

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würde.81 Wieder einmal hatte Ehrenfels Gedanken geäußert, die sich später als Realität manifestierten. In einem letzten Diktat vom März 1932 bekennt er ganz freimütig: Wenn ich ganz aufrichtig sein soll, so war der Ausgangspunkt für meine sexualreformatorischen Bestrebungen die Opposition gegen die Ehegebote, die aus meinen subjektiven Neigungen hervorgingen. Ausdruck dieser Opposition waren zunächst die Dichtungen der „Stürmer“, Siegmar und Heliea, Ulrich und Agathe. Doch kommt schon hier zum Ausdruck, was sich dann später immer deutlicher manifestierte, daß ich in dem Ziel der Eugenik eine mächtige Bestätigung meiner instinktiven Opposition gegen die Forderungen der monogamischen Moral ge82 funden zu haben glaubte.

Die Befürwortung der Eugenik führte Ehrenfels zum Darwinismus und zur Biologie. Er war überzeugt davon, dass Nietzsches „Übermensch“ nur durch Züchtung zustande kommen könne. Eine geistige Entwicklung zum „bewussten Menschen“ („Übermensch“) durch stete Zunahme an Erkenntnis durch innere Einsichten, wie es Zarathustra lehrt, war für Ehrenfels nicht vorstellbar.83 Gegen Ende des Diktats plädiert er in Anlehnung an ein Zitat Schillers84 für den Sozialismus und im Falle der Liebe für andere Formen der Liebe als der gegenwärtigen. Was Ehrenfels sich immer gewünscht hatte, war eine „Wirkung in die Breite“85 , die sich aber nicht einstellte. Am 24. Jänner 1931 bezeichnete er Emma gegenüber sein gesamtes literarisches Schaffen als „schon geprägten Mißerfolg“.86 Im Sommer d. J. schenkte er auf Wunsch seiner Frau das Schloss Lichtenau seinem Sohn Rolf, der als Verwalter bei seinem Onkel Bernhart 81 82 83

84

85 86

Ehrenfels 1929, 3. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, XVII, Bl. 100. Zarathustra: „Wahrlich; ein neues Gutes und Böses ist sie [die neue Tugend]! Wahrlich, ein neues tiefes Rauschen und eines neuen Quelles Stimme! […] Macht ist sie, diese neue Tugend: ein herrschender Gedanke ist sie, und um ihn eine kluge Seele: eine goldene Sonne, und um sie die Schlange der Erkenntnis“, Nietzsche 1921, 112. „Einstweilen, bis den Bau der Welt Philosophie zusammenhält / Erhält sie das Getriebe / Durch Hunger und durch Liebe.“ („Die Weltweisen.“), Schiller 1960, 223. Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, XXXI, Bl. 2. Ebd.

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in Brunn unentgeltlich arbeitete. Zuletzt setzte Ehrenfels noch große Hoffnung auf die Verbreitung seiner Ideen durch den Film. Er selbst war ein eifriger Kinobesucher und ging oft zweimal am Tag zum gleichen Film. Am 27. November 1931 hielt er in Prag einen Vortrag zum Thema „Die religiöse Mission des Filmes“. Anfang des Jahres 1932 erkrankte Ehrenfels an einer Grippe, die eine Brustfellentzündung zur Folge hatte. Die Depression erfasste ihn wieder. Akute Atemnotanfälle und Schwindel häuften sich. Eine Lungenentzündung wurde festgestellt. Er wurde immer schwächer. Am 7. September 1932 verstarb er in Lichtenau mit den Worten: „Gelobt seist Du, Gott mein Herr!“87 Jutta Valent Alexius Meinong-Institut Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz [email protected]

87

Ehrenfels, Familiendokumente, XXXII, Bl. 32.

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Literatur 1. Unveröffentlichte Materialien aus dem Nachlass a) Manuskripte: Ehrenfels, Christian von, „Vorwort zu [einer dramatischen Dichtung]“, Handschrift, Kurrent, 4 S., Durchschrift. Provenienz: EhrenfelsPrivatarchiv. b) Familiendokumente: Provenienz: Ehrenfels-Privatarchiv, nicht inventarisiert und nur z. T. geordnet und paginiert. Ein Teil dieser Materialien befindet sich in Kopie an der Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie (FDÖP). c) Korrespondenz: Alle zitierten Briefe stammen aus dem EhrenfelsNachlaß und befinden sich als Kopien in der FDÖP. HS: Handschrift, TS: Typoskript Urkunde mit Adelswappen, das eine Biene zeigt: Staatsarchiv Wien, AktNr. 4422/797 (Kopie). 2. Veröffentlichte Materialien Bodmershof, Imma von (1941), „Übersiedlung“, in: Neue Rundschau, September 1941, 5 S., ohne Paginierung. Bodmershof, Imma von (1960), „Christian von Ehrenfels. Eine Skizze“, in: Gestalthaftes Sehen. Ergebnisse und Aufgaben der Morphologie. Zum hundertsten Geburtstag von Christian von Ehrenfels, hg. von Ferdinand Weinhandl, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 427–435. Brod, Max (1969), Streitbares Leben. 1884–1968, München, Berlin, Wien: F. A. Herbig. Ehrenfels, Bernhart von (1904), Geschichte der Schlösser und Güter Brunn am Walde, Lichtenau, Allentsgschwendt, Eppenberg und Rastbach, Graz: Leykam. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1885), Über Größenrelationen und Zahlen, Diss. Univ. Graz.

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Ehrenfels, Christian von (1885), Die Brüder von Hartenstein. Trauerspiel in fünf Aufzügen. Graz: Im Verlag des Verfassers. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1886), „Metaphysische Ausführungen im Anschlusse an Emil du Bois-Reymond“ in: Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, phil.-hist. Klasse, Bd. 112, 429–503. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1887), Melusine. Ein dramatisches Gedicht. Wien: Konegen. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1887), „Über Fühlen und Wollen. Eine psychologische Studie“, in: Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, phil.-hist. Klasse, Bd. 114, 523–636. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1890), „Über Gestaltqualitäten“, in: Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Jg. 14. 249–292. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1891a), „Richard Wagner und der Naturalismus“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 2, 337–341, 372–376. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1891b), „Richard Wagner als Dichter“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 2, 489–495. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1891c), „Wahrheit und Irrtum im Naturalismus“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 2, 737–742. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1891d), „Das musikalische Drama der Zukunft“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 2, 857–862. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1892), Bruno, Wien: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers (Wiederabdruck in Ehrenfels 1895). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1892a), „Werdende Moralität“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 3, 918–926, 1049–1060. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1892b), „Zur Philosophie des reinen Mittels“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 3, 756–758. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1893), „Der Kampf des Prometheus“, in: Freie Bühne für den Entwicklungskampf der Zeit, Jg. 4, 330–349, 406–420, 526–542, 646–664, (Wiederabdruck in: Allegorische Dramen, Ehrenfels 1895).

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Ehrenfels, Christian von (1894), Sängerweihe, Augsburg: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers (Wiederabdruck in Ehrenfels 1895 und 1904). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1895), Allegorische Dramen, für musikalische Composition gedichtet, Wien: Konegen. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1897), System der Werttheorie. I. Band: Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des Begehrens, Leipzig: Reisland. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1898), System der Werttheorie. II. Band: Grundzüge einer Ethik, Leipzig: Reisland. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1900), Ulrich. Chordrama, Prag: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers (Wiederabdruck in Ehrenfels 1905a und 1911c). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1904), Sängerweihe. Chordrama in zwei Aufzügen, in Musik gesetzt von Otto Taubmann. 59 S. (Wiederabdruck aus Ehrenfels 1895). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1905a), „Siegmar und Heliea“, in: Die Stürmer. Drei Chordramen (= Ehrenfels 1905b), Brünn: als Manuskript gedruckt, S. 1–76. (Wiederabdruck in Ehrenfels 1911b). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1905b), Die Stürmer. Drei Chordramen, Brünn: als Manuskript gedruckt, 234 S. (Nachdruck Ehrenfels 1911b, 1911c). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1911a), „Die Sternenbraut. Drama in vier Akten“, Prag: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers (Wiederabdruck in Ehrenfels 1911b). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1911b), Die Stürmer. Band I: Drei Chordramen, Prag: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers. Ehrenfels , Christian von (1911c), Die Stürmer. Band II: Drei Sprechdramen, Prag: im Selbstverlag des Verfassers. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1912), „Eine Pilgerfahrt nach Bayreuth“, in: Bohemia, Jg. 85, Nr. 96 (Prag, 7. April 1912), 33–34. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1916), Kosmogonie, Jena: Diederichs. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1920), „Brief an die Freunde“ (aus dem Nachlass), abgedruckt in: Fabian, Reinhard (Hg.) (1990), Metaphysik. Philosophische Schriften, Bd. 4, 439–442.

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Ehrenfels, Christian von (1922), Das Primzahlengesetz, entwickelt und dargestellt auf Grund der Gestalttheorie, Leipzig: Reisland. (Enthält Wiederabdruck von Ehrenfels 1890). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1922), „Gedanken über die Religion der Zukunft“ (8 Artikel), in: Prager Presse, 23. April, 7. Mai, 14. Mai, 28. Mai, 4. Juni, 18. Juni, 2. Juli, 16. Juli, 27. August. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1923), „Persönliche Erinnerungen an Anton Bruckner“, in: Prager Tagblatt, Jg. 48, Nr. 38 (16. Februar 1923), 7. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1925), Die Mutter des Legionärs. Ein Festspiel, Prag: Kocí. (Tschechische Übersetzung von A. Fuchs: Matka Legionárova. Praha: Koci, 1925). Ehrenfels, Christian von (1929), Die Religion der Zukunft. Zwei Funksprüche und ein offener Brief an den Präsidenten der Cechoslowakischen Republik T. G. Masaryk, Prag: Calve. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1930), „Die Sexualmoral der Zukunft“, in: Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie, Bd. 22, 292–304. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1931), „Die metaphysische Bedeutung der parapsychischen Phänomene“, in: Wissenschaft und Okkultismus, Prag: Bund proletarischer Freidenker, 25–38. Ehrenfels, Christian von (1982–1990), Philosophische Schriften in vier Bänden, hg. von Reinhard Fabian, München / Wien: Philosophia, Bd. 1: Werttheorie (1982); Bd. 2: Ästhetik (1986), Bd. 3: Psychologie, Ethik, Erkenntnistheorie (1988), Bd. 4: Metaphysik (1990). Ehrenfels, Leela: „Ali & Nino Copyright“, in: Azerbaijan International, Winter 2004, 10, 12, 14–15. Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von (1933), „Why Have I Become A Muslim“, in: The Muslim Revival, March 1933, Vol. II, No. 1, Lahore, 19–34. Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von (1936), „A European Muslim Convert“, in: The Messenger, Vol. IV, No. 8 & 9, 137–142. Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von (1961), „The How And Why Of Conversion To Islam“,in: The Islamic Review, June 1961, 23–24. Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von (1964), „Paryar in Indien“, in: Süd-Asien-Institut der Universität Heidelberg, Sonderdrucke der Mitglieder, Nr. 17; 179–189 (aus: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Bd. 89, H. 2, 1964).

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Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von (1967), „Wie ich gerettet wurde (eine Erinnerung, geschrieben: 5.1.1967)“, Typoskript, unveröff., 1 S. (FDÖP). [Ehrenfels, Umar Rolf von]: Parte, 7. Februar 1980 (FDÖP). Fabian, Reinhard (1986), „Leben und Wirken von Christian v. Ehrenfels. Ein Beitrag zur intellektuellen Biographie“, in: Christian von Ehrenfels: Leben und Werk, hg. von Reinhard Fabian, Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi (= Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie; Bd. VIII). Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschenbuch der Freiheitlichen Häuser, B, 1941, 91. Jg. Jettmar, Karl (1980), „Umar Rolf von Ehrenfels (1901–1980) †“, Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien, CX, 99–101. Kafka, Franz (1974), Tagebücher 1910–1923, hg. von Max Brod, Frankfurt a. Main: Fischer. Löbe, William: „Ehrenfels, Josef Michael Freiherr von“, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, URL = http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/ ADB:Ehrenfels,_Josef_Michael_Freiherr-von, Stand per 30.1.2014. Nenning, Günther (2003), „In 17 Silben die ganze Welt. Günther Nenning über Imma von Bodmershof“, in: Kronenzeitung, Wien, 8. Juni 2003, 34–35. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1921), Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen. Erster Theil, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner. Ohne Verfasserangabe (2014a), „Bodmershof, Imma von“, in: Wikipedia, URL = http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imma_Bodmershof, Stand per 30.1.2014. Ohne Verfasserangabe (2014b), „Lichtenau im Waldviertel“, in: Wikipedia, URL = http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/lichtenau_im_Waldviertel, Stand per 30.1. 2014. Schiller, Friedrich (1960), Sämtliche Werke, I, Gedichte, hg. von Fricke, Gerhard / Göpfert, Herbert, München: Hanser. Susen, Gerd-Hermann (Hg.) ( 2010), Wilhelm Bölsche. Briefwechsel. Mit Autoren der Freien Bühne, Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag. (= Wilhelm Bölsche, Werke und Briefe. Wissenschaftliche Ausgabe, Hrsg. von Hans-Gert Roloff, Briefe I).

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Valent, Jutta (2012), „Chaos und Licht. Über die ‚natürliche Religion‘ des Christian von Ehrenfels und seinen Plan der Verbreitung durch W. Bölsche und T. G. Masaryk“, in: Was wir im Verstande ausjäten, kommt im Traume wieder.“ Wilhelm Bölsche 1861–1939, hg. von Gerd-Hermann Susen und Edith Wack, Berlin: Königshausen & Neumann, 193–224. Wurzbach, Constant von (1858), „Ehrenfels“. in: ders., Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, Vierter Theil, Wien: Druck und Verlag der typogr.=literar.=artist. Anstalt, 7.

ZU ERNST MALLYS LEBENSGANG, UMFELD UND AKADEMISCHER LAUFBAHN Markus Roschitz

Zusammenfassung Ernst Mally (1879–1944) wuchs in der Untersteiermark auf und studierte ab 1898 an der Universität Graz. In der Frühphase seines Denkens war er stark von Meinong beeinflusst, bei dem er 1903 seine Doktorarbeit einreichte und sich 1913 habilitierte. Seinen Lebensunterhalt verdiente Mally ab 1906 aber als Mittelschullehrer an einem Staatsgymnasium in Graz. Der Erste Weltkrieg, an dem Mally als Offizier teilnahm, verhinderte die Aufnahme der Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität. Erst nach Kriegsende konnte Mally an derselben Fuß fassen, sein schrittweiser Aufstieg gelangte 1925, mit der Ernennung zum Nachfolger auf Meinongs Lehrstuhl, zu einem Abschluss. Ab den beginnenden 1930er Jahren suchte Mally philosophisch einen eigenen Weg. Er entwickelte recht fern von gegenstandstheoretischen Fragen seine eigene Wirklichkeitsphilosophie, die er 1935 im Buch Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit der Öffentlichkeit vorstellte. 1938 trat Mally auch politisch hervor; er wurde Mitglied der NSDAP, publizierte und hielt Vorlesungen im NS-Sinne. Mallys Emeritierung mit Ende September 1942 war aus gesundheitlichen Rücksichten notwendig. Seinen Lebensabend verbrachte der Philosoph im weststeirischen Markt Schwanberg, wo er bis zuletzt an seinem unvollendet gebliebenen Hauptwerk arbeitete.

Ernst Ignaz Maria Mally1 erblickte als Sohn des k. k. Bezirksarztes Dr. Ignaz und seiner Ehefrau Luzia Mally (geb. Kristof) in Krainburg / Kranj 1

Vgl. Fragebogen, 30.10.1938, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Vorliegender Aufsatz geht aus meiner Diplomarbeit mit dem Titel „Zauberbuch“ und „Zauberkolleg“. Ernst Mallys dynamische Wirklichkeitsphilosophie hervor, konnte aber infolge weiterer Recherchen und neuer Quellenfunde um wesentliche Abschnitte erweitert werden; vgl. Roschitz 2014, besonders 5–25.

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(Untersteiermark) am 11. Oktober 1879 das Licht der Welt. 2 Ignaz Mally (*1816) war nicht nur ein angesehener und hochgebildeter Arzt (er beherrschte insgesamt sechs Sprachen), sondern konnte auch von einem ereignisreichen und bewegten Leben erzählen. In seinen jungen Jahren hatte er Philosophie in Graz gehört, studierte dann aber Medizin in Wien, Padua und Prag, bevor er wegen finanzieller Schwierigkeiten eine Stelle als „Corrector“ in einer Wiener Druckerei annehmen musste. Über Umwege als Sekretär konnte er 1849 oder 1850 sein Studium wieder aufnehmen und wurde am 13. März 1852 in Padua zum Doktor der Medizin promoviert. Es folgte ein Wanderleben, das ihn in verschiedene Länder Europas (u. a. nach Galizien und Bosnien) führte, bis er 1867 zur Ruhe kam und sich in Krainburg niederließ, wo er bis zu seinem Tod im April 1888 verblieb. Es würde uns zu weit führen, alle Anerkennungen und Belobungen anzuführen, welche Mally in allen seinen dienstlichen Stellungen für seine hervorragenden Leistungen erhielt,

heißt es in einem Nachruf der Laibacher Zeitung.3 Hervorgehoben wird aber, dass Mally noch 1887 in den k. k. Landes-Sanitätsrat als ordentliches Mitglied berufen wurde, in dem er „wiederholt die Gelegenheit fand, sein reiches Wissen und seine vieljährige Erfahrung an geeigneter Stelle zur Geltung zu bringen“4. Dr. Ignaz Mally hinterließ eine Witwe und zehn Kinder. Es steht zu vermuten, dass Ernst der jüngste Spross der Familie Mally war. Zumindest drei weitere Geschwister Ernst Mallys sind namentlich bekannt: Julius (*1861), Hugo (*1862) und Otto (*1872) Mally. Alle drei verdienten ihren Lebensunterhalt als Berufsoffiziere in der k. u. k. Armee. Und auch der Vater versah in den 1850er und -60er Jahren in mehreren Feldspitälern und als Arzt bei der Rekrutierung freiwilliger k. k. Landesschützen seinen Dienst.5 Nach Ignaz Mallys Ableben übersiedelte seine Familie noch 1888 nach Laibach / Ljubljana, wo Ernst das dortige Staats-Obergymnasium besuchte. In einem Lebenslauf, wohlgemerkt des Jahres 1938, schrieb Ernst Mally über diese Zeit: 2 3 4 5

Fragebogen, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Laibacher Zeitung 14.4.1888, 715. Ebd.; vgl. auch Laibacher Zeitung 14.6.1887, 1122. Laibacher Zeitung 24.7.1866, 1129, und 9.7.1866, 1042.

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Die nationalen Kämpfe griffen allmählich auf die Schulen über. Wir deutschen Schüler waren Anhänger Schönerers und wurden vom slowenischen Direktor und vom unduldsamen Religionslehrer in den letzten Jahren argwöhnisch über6 wacht.

In diese Zeit dürfte auch bereits sein Entschluss gefallen sein, Philosoph zu werden. Nach Absolvierung des Gymnasiums verzog Ernst Mally 1898 nach Graz, um bei Alexius Meinong Philosophie zu studieren, er hörte jedoch auch Germanistik, Mathematik und Physik. Bereits als Studierender publizierte er 1900 seinen ersten und bemerkenswerten Aufsatz, „Abstraktion und Aehnlichkeits-Erkenntnis“, im Archiv für systematische Philosophie.7 Im Mai desselben Jahres meldete sich Ernst Mally, durchaus der militärischen Familientradition folgend, als Einjährig-Freiwilliger zum k. u. k. Präsenzdienst und machte im Infanterie-Regiment „Leopold II. König der Belgier Nr. 27“ Dienst. Die Offiziers-Prüfung legte er mit „vorzüglichem Erfolge“ ab und wurde im Dezember 1901 als Leutnant der Reserve wieder in das Zivilleben entlassen. 8 Die Fortsetzung der Studien in Graz wurde durch finanzielle Zuwendungen seines Bruders Julius Mally, Hauptmann i. R. und Baumeister in Agram / Zagreb, wesentlich erleichtert.9 Julius Mally war in seiner aktiven Militärdienstzeit Ausbildner in einer Einjährig-Freiwilligen Schule und ab 1889, als Oberleutnant, „Bauleiter der Reconstructions-Arbeiten am Elementar-Schießplatz in Fiume“.10 Seine militärische Karriere wurde im Jänner 1891 jäh durch die Verwicklung in ein schweres Eisenbahnunglück beendet. 11 Für jeden mili6 7 8 9

10

11

Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Mally 1900. ÖStA/KA Pers Quall HR, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879 (Kt. 1886). Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. „Privat-Verhältnisse [Ernst Mallys]: ledig, besitzt kein Vermögen, Hörer der philosophischen Facultät in Graz; – wird von seinem Bruder – pensionierten Hauptmann u. Baumeister Mally in Agram erhalten.“ (ÖStA/KA Pers Quall HR, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879 (Kt. 1886).) Überdies „verfaßte [Julius Mally] das Elaborat für die Reconstruction des Elementar-Schießplatzes in Karlstadt, bearbeitete Demolierungs-Minen Angelegenheiten.“ (ÖStA/KA Pers Quall HR, Mally Julius *13.2.1861 (Kt. 1886).) Vgl. Laibacher Zeitung 22.8.1891, 1584.

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tärischen Dienst ungeeignet wurde Julius Mally im Alter von nur 30 Jahren, unter gleichzeitiger Verleihung des Dienstgrades eines Hauptmanns (ad honores), in den dauernden Ruhestand versetzt . Nach seiner Rückkehr an die Grazer Universität beschäftigte sich Ernst Mally nun auch mit Pädagogik. Gemeinsam mit einem Hauptvertreter der frühen Gegenstandstheorie, Rudolf Ameseder, veröffentlichte er 1902 den Aufsatz „Zur experimentellen Begründung der Methode des Rechtschreib-Unterrichtes“ in einer pädagogischen Zeitschrift. 12 Anschließend versuchten die beiden Verfasser, unter großer Beteiligung der Lehrerschaft von Graz es selbst [zu] unternehmen, durch psychologische Massenversuche zur Lösung der genannten Frage einen 13 positiven Beitrag zu liefern.

Als eifriger und talentierter Schüler Meinongs machte sich Mally bereits früh um die Gegenstandstheorie verdient. Ab 1902 bearbeitete der gebürtige Krainburger das Thema „Das Wesen des Messens ist psychologisch und gegenstandstheoretisch zu untersuchen“, welches er im November 1903 als Dissertationsschrift vorlegte. Begutachter waren Hugo Spitzer und Alexius Meinong. Spitzer äußerte sich zu Mallys Leistung sehr ambivalent: Scharfsinn u[nd] Subtilität sind in der Art u[nd] Weise, wie der Verf[asser] seine Ideen durchführt, nicht zu verkennen. Aber die Erfolge des Scharfsinns werden beeinträchtigt durch eine eigenartige Denkrichtung, welche namentlich in dem einleitenden Abschnitte zu Tage tritt. […] Die Conceptionen des Verf[asser]s stehen in Bezug auf Kühnheit oft den gewagtesten Ideen Hegel’s u[nd] seiner Schule nicht nach. Trotzdem u[nd] obwohl manche Sätze […] Mally’s auch inhaltlich ein specifisch Hegel’sches Gepräge an sich zu tragen scheinen, würde man ihm doch Unrecht thun, wenn man ihn […] für einen Adepten der speculativen Philosophie erklären wollte. Das phantastische Wesen dieser Philosophie liegt ihm ganz ferne u[nd] es ist nur seiner manchmal etwas gar zu abstracten einzelnen Momente, statt an die ganze Sache sich haltende Gedankenrichtung, […] woraus sich jene Absonderlichkeiten der Arbeit erklä14 ren, die immerhin approbirt [!] werden kann.

12 13 14

Ameseder / Mally 1902. Handgeschriebenes Gesuch Mallys um Verleihung einer Lehrstelle, Graz 17.1.1907, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-7554/1906. Kurrenthandschriftliches Gutachten von Hugo Spitzer, Graz 20.11.1903, UAG

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Ganz anders Meinong: Die „formelle[n] Mängel“ der Arbeit würden ganz und gar zurück[treten] gegenüber der Tatsache, dass hier eine Reihe fast durchaus selbständiger Untersuchungen niedergelegt ist, in denen sich eine Sachkenntnis und Beherrschung der Forschungstechnik verrät, wie sie nur bei ungewöhnlich glücklicher Veranlagung und auch da nur als Frucht jahrelanger eifriger Vorarbeit anzutreffen ist.

Meinong hebt von Mallys Resultaten u. a. die „Feststellung der principiellen Unabhängigkeit des ‚Soseins‘ vom Sein“ hervor, die er bald zu einem Kernsatz der Gegenstandstheorie erheben sollte. „Im Ganzen“, so Meinong, hat man es hier also mit einer ganz hervorragenden Leistung zu tun, über deren Würdigkeit, mit dem Wartinger-Preise gekrönt zu werden, kein Zweifel auf15 kommen kann.

Und tatsächlich wurde Mallys Arbeit 1903 mit dem Wartinger-Preis dekoriert. Nach dem mit Auszeichnung abgelegten Rigorosum in Philosophie und Physik wurde Ernst Mally im Dezember 1903 zum Doktor der Philosophie promoviert.16 Die Dissertation überarbeitete Mally anschließend für die Veröffentlichung im 1904 von Meinong herausgegebenen Sammelband Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie und versah sie mit dem neuen Titel „Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens“. 17 Bertrand Russell reißt bei der Besprechung dieses Bandes in der Zeitschrift Mind auch Mallys Abhandlung an: Mallys Aufsatz behandelt […] erneut alle Grundlagen der Gegenstandstheorie; in einer Reihe von Definitionen werden (so denke ich) viele wichtige Ideen festgehalten, aber so obskur formuliert, dass es schwer ist, sie zu fassen. Ich werde keine Zusammenfassung wagen, weil keine Zusammenfassung dichter

15 16

17

Doktorats-Akt Z. 510. Gutachten von Alexius Meinong, 7.11.1903, UAG Doktorats-Akt Z. 510. Handgeschriebenes Gesuch Mallys um Verleihung einer Lehrstelle, Graz 17.1.1907, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-7554/1906. Vgl. auch Laibacher Zeitung 15.1.1904, 86. Mally 1904.

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Mally strebte ein Lehramt in der Universität an, fand aber zunächst nur bei Meinong Verwendung als Privatassistent. Daneben war Mally weiterhin außerordentlicher Hörer, nicht zuletzt bei Meinongs bekannten „Seminarübungen für Vorgeschrittene“,19 in denen auch die „Gegenstandstheorie des Messens“ als Diskussionsgrundlage diente. Für seine Teilnahme erhielt Mally auf Antrag Meinongs vom Ministerium für Kultus und Unterricht eine „Seminarprämie“ von 200 Kronen bewilligt. 20 Die Fortsetzung seiner Studien bis 1906 ermöglichte aber erst eine staatliche Unterstützung, welche mit der Verpflichtung einherging, sich an einer österreichischen Universität zu habilitieren.21 Um „seinen Lebensunterhalt zu erwerben“ unterrichtete Mally ab Semesterbeginn 1906 am k. k. II. Staatsgymnasium in Graz als supplierender Lehrer, obwohl er erst am 15. November desselben Jahres die Lehramtsprüfung für Mittelschulen in Philosophie, Mathematik und Physik ablegte. Wenige Tage nach der Prüfung, am 24. November 1906, verehelichte sich Ernst Mally mit Elisabeth Giriczek, die zwei Kinder gebar (Doris *1909 und Silvia *1913).22 Im Jänner 1907 bewarb sich Mally um die ausgeschriebene Lehrstelle für Mathematik und Physik am k. k. III. Staatsgymnasium23 in Graz. Mallys großes philosophisches Talent blieb dem Landesschulrat, der ihn beim Besetzungsvorschlag an die erste Stelle (von neunzehn) reihte, nicht verborgen: 18

19 20 21 22 23

“Mally’s essay […] treats afresh all the fundamentals of the theory of objects; it does this in a series of definitions, often (I think) embodying important ideas, but so obscurely expressed that it is very hard to understand what they mean. I shall not attempt a summary, as no summary could be more condensed that the original, in which single pages contain more matter that one usually finds in twenty.” (Russell 1905, 533; übersetzt von mir.) Vgl. hierzu Dölling 2001, 153f. k. k. Ministerium für Kultus und Unterricht, 14.8.1904, ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 956, Universität Graz, GZ 30.017/1904. Lebenslauf von Ernst Mally, Graz 12.11.1912, ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879, 7. Fragebogen, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Später wurde es in k. k. II. Staatsgymnasium umbenannt.

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Es handelt sich in diesem Falle um wirksame Förderung eines jungen Lehrers von außergewöhnlicher Begabung, dem Gelegenheit geboten werden soll, sich 24 an der Grazer Universität zu habilitieren.

Aus den Bewerbungsunterlagen geht hervor, dass Mally, mit deutscher und slowenischer Sprache aufgewachsen, auch gute Kenntnisse in Englisch und Französisch vorweisen konnte. 25 Überdies habe Mally am 4. November 1906 einen Vertrag mit einem Verlag unterzeichnet, der das baldige Erscheinen der (ebenfalls zusammen mit Ameseder verfassten) größeren Schrift „Elemente der Gegenstandstheorie“ belegen sollte. 26 Diese Arbeit wurde aber nie publiziert und das Manuskript gilt heute als verschollen.27 Jedenfalls erhielt Mally die Stelle am Staatsgymnasium und trat im September 1907 den Dienst als provisorischer Lehrer an. Der Kontakt zur Universität brach mit dieser Anstellung freilich nicht ab. Dass Mally beruflich vor allem die Habilitation anstrebte, war dem Landesschulrat aber klar. Dennoch musste Mally für den Unterricht im Staatsgymnasium die Ergänzungsprüfung aus Physik (als Hauptfach) nachholen, was mit 13. Juni 1911 als erledigt galt. Die Beschäftigung mit der Schule, namentlich die Einrichtung ihrer physikalischen Lehrmittelsammlung, hat mich neben der Vorbereitung auf die genannte Prüfung so in Anspruch genommen, daß in dieser Zeit nur wenige, kleinere Ar28 beiten zur Veröffentlichung gediehen sind.

Von diesen „kleineren Arbeiten“ sind vor allem die beiden Referate „Grundgesetze der Determination“ und „Gegenstandstheorie und Mathematik“ einer Erwähnung wert, gehalten im September 1908 am III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie in Heidelberg.29 Im zweiten Referat wies Mally auf den Unterschied von „formalen“ und „außerformalen“ Ei24 25 26 27 28 29

Referat zu Z. 31/40, 41 ex, Graz im Februar 1907, gez. L.-Sch.-I. Leopold Lampel, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-7554/1906. Spätere Schriften zeugen auch von profunden Latein- und Griechisch-Kenntnissen. Handgeschriebenes Gesuch Mallys um Verleihung einer Lehrstelle, Graz 17.1.1907, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-7554/1906. Vgl. Reicher 2001, 176f. Lebenslauf von Ernst Mally, Graz 12.11.1912, ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879, 7. Mally 1909a und 1909b; vgl. auch die im selben Band wie diese Arbeiten enthaltenen Diskussionsbeiträge Mallys zu anderen Referaten.

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genschaften an den Gegenständen hin, der in der Gegenstandstheorie, unter Meinongs Bezeichnungen „konstitutorische“ und „außerkonstitutorische“ Eigenschaften, noch einige Bedeutung erlangen sollte. Mit 1. September 1911, also nach Ablegung der Ergänzungsprüfung, wurde Mally zum wirklichen Lehrer ernannt. Der Direktor des Staatsgymnasiums begründete dies wie folgt: Mally sei ein „ebenso fachtüchtiger wie geschickter Lehrer“ und sein Vortrag ist in hohem Grade klar, leicht verständlich und sehr anregend; die Schüler beurteilt er einsichtsvoll milde und gerecht und behandelt sie mit wohltuender Ruhe und freundlichem Ernste; seine Lehrerfolge sind recht befriedigend. Allen seinen Dienstespflichten kommt er genau und gründlich nach; sein 30 übriges Verhalten in u[nd] außer der Schule ist tadellos.

Dieses Avancement fällt in eine Zeit, in der Mally erstmals und schwer an Gelenksrheumatismus erkrankte31 – ein Leiden, das ihn sein Leben lang begleiten sollte. Vorerst wurde er vom Schuldienst über ein halbes Jahr beurlaubt. 1912 stellte Mally die für seine weitere philosophische Entwicklung wegweisende Arbeit Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik fertig, die noch im selben Jahr veröffentlicht wurde.32 Im Vorwort nimmt er auf die ungedruckten „Elemente der Gegenstandstheorie“ Bezug, die zum Teil in diese Arbeit eingeflossen sein werden. Da Mally die Gegenstandstheoretischen Grundlagen als Habilitationsschrift einreichen wollte, vergewisserte er sich bei Meinong über den Umgang mit Ameseders Anteil daran.33 Am 14. November 1912 stellte Mally dann das Ansuchen um Zulassung zur Habilitation mit ebendieser Schrift. 34 Der anlässlich dieses Antrages angefertigte Kommissionsbericht, gezeichnet u. a. von Alexius Meinong, Eduard Martinak und Hans Benndorf, gibt einen ausführlichen Rück- und Überblick über Mallys bisherige wissen30

31 32 33 34

Kurrenthandschriftliches Gutachten an den k. k. steiermärkischen Landesschulrat in Graz, Graz 18.7.1911, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-7554/1906. Definitiverklärung z. Z. 3 5660/46 vom 27. Juli 1911, Wien 29.8.1911, ebd. Im August 1911; vgl. staatsärztliches-Parere ad GZ. 3 51 (kurrenthandschriftlich), 60/48 1911, Graz 23.9.1911, ebd. Mally 1912. Vgl. die Bemerkungen von Reicher (2001, 176). Handgeschriebenes Ansuchen Mallys, Graz 14.11.1912, UAG Phil. Fak. Z. 458 ex. 1912/13.

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schaftliche Leistungen und beruflichen Werdegang, und würdigt vor allem seine Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie. Mally’s ausgereifteste und nach Forschungsweise wie nach Ergebnissen wertvollste Leistung ist seine Habilitationsschrift […]. Eigenart und Hauptverdienst dieser Arbeit besteht darin, dass hier zum ersten Male die wichtigsten Resultate der modernen symbolischen Logik der längst entbehrten gegenstandstheoretischen Bearbeitung unterzogen wurden.

An den konstatierten „innerlichen Mängeln“ der Arbeit treffe den Autor aber keine Schuld, denn auch heute noch kann man von keinem Forscher auf dem ebenso neuen als auch schwierigen Gebiete der Gegenstandstheorie verlangen, dass er über dem Stoffe stehe.

Insgesamt könne kein Zweifel aufkommen, dass die vorliegende Arbeit in allen ihren Teilen durchaus auf der Höhe billiger Anforderungen steht, indem sie für Gegenstandstheorie wie für Logik und Logistik einen namhaften Schritt nach vorwärts bedeutet.

Der als hervorragend zu bezeichnenden wissenschaftlichen Qualifikation des Habilitationswerbers steht gutem Vernehmen nach auch eine ungewöhnliche didaktische zur Seite: E. Mally geniesst in Graz den Ruf eines anerkannt vorzüglichen Mittelschullehrers […]. Ihn auch der Universität als Lehrkraft zu gewinnen, scheint 35 also nur in jeder Hinsicht wünschenswert sein zu können.

Am 22. Jänner 1913 wurde das Habilitationskolloquium mit den Prüfern Meinong, Martinak und dem Mathematiker Sterneck abgehalten, das einen ausgezeichneten Verlauf nahm. Nach dem ebenso erfolgreich gehaltenen Probevortrag36 bestätigte das k. k. Ministerium für Kultus und Unterricht im Mai 1913 den Antrag des Professoren-Kollegiums, Ernst Mally die Venia Legendi für Philosophie zu erteilen. 37 35 36 37

Kommissionsbericht, 9.1.1913, UAG Phil. Fak. Z. 792 ex. 1912/13. Thema des Probevortrages: „Über die Unabhängigkeit der Gegenstände vom Erkennen.“ (Protokoll, Graz 22.1.1913, UAG Phil. Fak. Z. 846 ex. 1912/13.) ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879, 12f.

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Die Gegenstandstheoretischen Grundlagen wurden von zeitgenössischen Fachkreisen günstig aufgenommen, 38 aber auch gegenwärtig findet Mallys darin erstmals formulierte Unterscheidung, ob ein Gegenstand bloß durch Bestimmungen determiniert ist, oder ob ein Gegenstand seine Bestimmungen auch tatsächlich erfüllt, namhafte Vertretung. 39 Die Habilitation änderte vorerst nichts an Mallys Anstellungsverhältnis am Staatsgymnasium und auch einen Lehrauftrag an der Universität erreichte er damit noch nicht. Für 1914/15 wurde ihm dann ein „Arbeitsurlaub“ vom Schuldienst erteilt,40 offenbar für philosophische Studien, der aber durch den Kriegsausbruch hinfällig wurde. Meinong schrieb darüber an Guido Adler: Der Krieg habe Privatdozent Prof. Mally […] mitten aus seiner Arbeit gerissen […]. So hat er 41 erst wenig publiziert; ich weiß aber, was er kann und Höfler z. B. weiß es 42 auch.

Mally wurde in der Armee zwar als „Felddienstuntauglich“, aber für den „Lokaldienst geeignet“43 gemustert und stand ab Juli 1915 im Kriegsdienst. Auch von seinen Brüdern Hugo und Otto Mally ist die Teilnahme am Weltkrieg belegt. Hugo Mally stand seit 1881 im Dienst der Armee und lehrte über zwanzig Jahre Mathematik, Physik, Chemie und Französisch am k. u. k. Militär-Knabenpensionat Sarajevo. Nach dem Kriegsausbruch meldete er sich zur Front und wurde am 1. Mai 1915 zum Major befördert. Am 20. Mai desselben Jahres fiel er als Bataillonskommandant in Krukienice (Mittelgalizien) durch einen Kopfschuss.44 Otto Mally, seit 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

Im Philosophical Review beispielsweise heißt es: “The theory of the concept is very ingeniously treated by means of ideas of objective, case, thing, and fulfillment.” (Fisher 1914, 470f.) Besonders von Edward Zalta, der aber statt von „determinieren“ und „erfüllen“ von „encoding and exemplification“ spricht; vgl. etwa Zalta 1985/86, 448. Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Gemeint ist der Pädagoge und Philosoph Alois Höfler (1853–1922), der auch gerne unter die Meinong-Schüler gereiht wird; vgl. Reicher 2001, 173. Alexius Meinong an Guido Adler, Graz 2.7.1917, in: Meinong / Adler 1995, 260. Kassaverfügung anläßlich der Einrückung zum Landsturmdienste, Zl. 3 5296/1 1915, o. D. [1915], StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Vgl. den ausführlichen Nachruf in Danzer’s Armee-Zeitung 2.9.1915, 9: „Noch zwei Tage vor seinem Tode schrieb er eine launige Karte, daß er sich soeben im

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1893 in der Armee, stand ab Kriegsbeginn als Generalstabsoffizier mit dem Dienstgrade eines Oberstleutnants im Feld. Er machte 1914 die erste Offensive nach Russland mit und ist dabei auch „tatsächlich im Feuer gestanden“. Im Mai 1915 wurde er zum Oberst befördert, welchen Dienstgrad er bis Kriegsende innehatte. In der Qualifikationsbeschreibung des Jahres 1918 heißt es: Hat sich als Kommandant einer über 10.000 Mann zählenden Artilleriegruppe auf dem Marsche Primiero, Bruneck und bei der Vorbereitung des Abtranspor45 tes dieser Gruppe von Lienz besondere Verdienste erworben.

Ernst Mally wurde im Weltkrieg hauptsächlich zu Ausbildungsdiensten und im Küstenschutz im Bereich der italienischen Front eingesetzt. Im November 1915 wurde er zum Landsturm-Oberleutnant befördert.46 In seinem Lebenslauf schreibt er, dass er sich 1916 freiwillig zum Frontdienst gemeldet habe, aber wegen seines Gesundheitszustandes nicht angenommen wurde. Im August 1917 erkrankte Mally erneut an Gelenksrheumatismus; dennoch verblieb er im Militärdienst, zuletzt sogar als Landsturmhauptmann, und rüstete nach Kriegsende schließlich mit einer Invalidität von 70% ab. 47 Über die Schwere der Krankheit schreibt sein Schüler Karl Wolf Folgendes: Ältere Leute, die Mally noch von der Vorkriegszeit her kennen, schildern ihn als sportliche Erscheinung, sie sehen ihn mit dem Racket zur Universität kommen in beschwingtem Schritt. Wir, seine Schüler aus der Zeit zwischen den Kriegen, haben das Bild eines an den Beinen Gelähmten vor uns, der sich auf Krücken zum Hörsaal schleppt, der zur Universität gefahren und ins Philosophische Insti48 tut getragen werden muß.

45 46 47

48

Schützengraben die Majorsdistinktion aufnähen ließ, und man möge ihm die besten Sorten nachsenden, Geld habe er wie Heu.“ Siehe auch Laibacher Zeitung 1.7.1915, 1098; Reichspost 20.6.1915, 6; Deutsches Volksblatt 20.6.1915, 8, und die Qualifikationsliste ÖStA/KA Pers Quall HR, Mally Hugo *28.11.1862 (Kt. 1886). Vormerkblatt für die Qualifikationsbeschreibung, 15.11.1918, ÖStA/KA Pers Quall HR, Mally Otto *22.10.1872 (Kt. 1886). Neue Freie Presse (Morgenblatt) 7.11.1915, 33. Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Der Direktor des II. Staatsgymnasiums, Graz 15.12.1918, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Wolf 1952, 146.

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Erst nach dem Krieg begann die eigentliche Universitätskarriere von Ernst Mally. Für das Studienjahr 1918/19 wurde er, als Privatdozent, mit der Supplierung der vierstündigen Pädagogik-Vorlesung von Eduard Martinak beauftragt,49 der zum Leiter der Reformabteilung für Mittelschulen im Bundesministerium für Unterricht bestellt wurde. 50 Mallys universitärer Lehrauftrag wurde im Einvernehmen mit der Direktion des II. Staatsgymnasiums erteilt; einzige Bedingung war es, dass derselbe „ohne Störung des Schulbetriebs“ ablaufen müsse.51 Auch an einer anderen Einrichtung der Universität fasste Mally nun Fuß: Der soeben promovierte Ferdinand Weinhandl, ebenfalls ein Meinong-Schüler, verzichtete im Juni 1919 auf den Weiterbezug des Demonstrator-Stipendiums52 für das Grazer psychologische Laboratorium53 und nahm die Stelle als Lektor eines Münchner Verlages an.54 Auf „Antrag des Herrn Hofr. Prof. Dr. Alexius Meinong“55 ging dieses Stipendium auf Mally über. Meinong verstarb am 27. November 1920. Am 6. Dezember 1920 hielt Mally in Graz vor der „Deutschen philosophischen Gesellschaft“ – Meinong war „Ehrenvorstand der Grazer Zweigstelle“ 56 gewesen – einen Nachruf auf den „Meister“57. Mally schloss den Vortrag mit den Worten: Wissenschaft bleibt immer unvollendet. Und doch liegt hier ein Lebenswerk vor 58 uns, dem Vollständigkeit nicht abzusprechen ist.

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Der Minister für Kultus und Unterricht, Z. 36281/18-VIII b (Abschrift), Wien 20.10.1918, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Brezinka 2003, 158; Martinak kehrte 1922 an die Universität Graz zurück, was Mallys Anstellungsverhältnis aber nicht mehr beeinflusste. Der Minister für Kultus und Unterricht, Zl. 22956 – Abt. 10 a, Wien 11.11.1919, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Dasselbe hatte er seit dem 13.12.1918 bezogen. Vgl. Lebenslauf, Kiel 24.7.1927, BArch R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand). Dekanat der Philosophischen Fakultät Graz, Z. 1468 ex. 1918/19, Graz 14.6.1919, StLA Statth. C 31a1-1944/1918. Curriculum vitae, Graz 21.6.1946, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 6. Dekanat der Philosophischen Fakultät Graz, Z. 1468 ex. 1918/19, Graz 14.6.1919, StLA Statth. C 31a1-1944/1918. Weinhandl 1921/22, 34. Mally 1921/22, 34. Ebd., 37.

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Genau dies, die Vollständigkeit, sollte Mally, zu seinem großen Bedauern, beim eigenen Gesamtwerk versagt bleiben. Noch vor seinem Tode verfasste Meinong die autobiographische „Selbstdarstellung“, die 1921 publiziert wurde. Darin findet er überaus lobende Worte für Mally; darin wird aber auch klar, dass Meinong in Mally kaum je seinen Nachfolger auf dem Lehrstuhl erblickt hatte. Vielmehr hatte Meinong diesen Platz seinem „treuesten“ Freund Stephan Witasek59 zugedacht, dem er im Herbst 1914 die Leitung des psychologischen Laboratoriums übertrug. Witasek verstarb jedoch 1915 mit nur 44 Jahren an einem „tückische[n] Magenleiden“. Nun ging die Leitung auf einen weiteren Meinong-Schüler, den gebürtigen Triester Vittorio Benussi über. Er „hat sich dieser Aufgabe rühmlich entledigt, bis der Wandel der Dinge im Herbste 1918 ihn in seine südliche Heimat abberief“ 60. Doch glücklicherweise konnte Meinong in der Person des Gymnasialprofessors E. Mally noch einen dritten Schüler präsentieren, der seit ungefähr fünfzehn Jahren als anerkannt ausgezeichneter Gymnasiallehrer der Mathematik, Physik und Philosophie tätig und seit 1913 habilitiert ist, des Krieges und seiner dabei zugezogenen Erkrankung wegen zwar nicht besonders viel, aber hervorragend Tüchtiges produziert hat und zur Zeit die Agenden des psychologischen Institutes, obwohl er auch die PädagogikSupplentur für Freund Martinak bestens durchführt, in gewissenhaftester Weise versieht. Er scheint mir, schon ganz ohne Rücksicht auf die sonstige Sachlage betrachtet, die Ernennung zum Universitätsprofessor in unzweifelhaftester Wei61 se zu verdienen.

Im Wintersemester 1920/21 wurde Ernst Mallys universitärer Lehrauftrag um zwei Übungsstunden in Pädagogik erweitert 62 und nach Meinongs Tod avancierte Mally im November 1920 auch zum provisorischen Leiter des psychologischen Laboratoriums,63 das sein Lehrer (anfangs aus eigenen Mitteln) bereits 1894 – als Erstes überhaupt in Österreich – ins Leben ge59 60 61 62 63

Vgl. den Nachruf von Mally in Mally 1915. Meinong 1921, 100. Benussi war ab Mai 1919 an der Universität Padua tätig; vgl. Antonelli 1994, 27. Meinong an Herrn Ministerialrat (1920), zitiert nach Dölling 1999, 209. Staatsamt für Inneres und Unterricht. Unterrichtsamt, Zl. 19272.-I-Abt. 2, Wien 19.10.1920, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Siegel Karl *19.8.1872, 9.

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rufen hatte.64 Im April 1921 erhielt Mally den Titel eines außerordentlichen Professors65 und mit 1. Oktober 1923 wurde er zu ebendiesem ernannt.66 Die Ernennung zum außerordentlichen Professor schien Mallys bisherigen Hauptberuf als Mittelschullehrer entbehrlich gemacht zu haben, schließlich war das finanzielle Auskommen nun vonseiten der Universität gesichert. Demgemäß ging mit seiner Ernennung zum a. o. Prof. die gleichzeitige Entpflichtung vom Schulbetrieb einher, der Landesschulrat sprach ihm für die „langjährige ausgezeichnete Tätigkeit im Mittelschuldienste die volle Anerkennung und den wärmsten Dank aus“ 67. Ernst Mally stand genau 11 Jahre und 304 Tage im Schuldienst. Ab dem Wintersemester 1922/23 konnte sich Mally endlich seiner eigentlichen Profession, der Philosophie, zuwenden: An Stelle der pädagogischen Vorlesungen und Übungen wurde er nun mit der Abhaltung von fünf Stunden aus Philosophie betraut.68 Spätestens zu diesem Zeitpunkt war mit Mally der designierte Nachfolger auf Meinongs Lehrstuhl erwachsen. Von seinem Lehrer war er, wie angedeutet, erst nach den Verlusten von Witasek und Benussi in Frage gekommen. Mit 1. September 1925 wurde Mally dann, unter ausdrücklicher Erwähnung der „nach Hofrat Prof. Meinong freigewordenen ordentlichen Lehrkanzel“, zum ordentlichen Professor ernannt69 und war damit (auch amtlich) Nachfolger seines Lehrers geworden. Mally war ab Oktober 1925 der einzige Ordinarius für Philosophie an der Fakultät, da Hugo Spitzer mit Ende September desselben Jahres in den Ruhestand versetzt wurde. Die Übernahme der Leitung des philosophischen Seminars im April 1926 70 setzte unter Mallys Aufstieg an der Universität Graz einen vorläufigen Schlussstrich. 64 65 66 67 68 69

70

Vgl. Meinong 1921, 95, und Dölling 2001, 162f. Bundesministerium für Inneres und Unterricht. Unterrichtsamt, ad Z.13.451-IAbt. 2, 11.4.1921, StLA Statth. C 31a1-1944/1918. Der Bundespräsident, Z. 5797/Pr. K., Wien 31.8.1923, ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879, 24. L.Sch.R. Steiermark, o. Zl., Graz 21.9.1923, StLA LSchRa C 40a1-1506/1923. Bundesministerium für Inneres und Unterricht. Unterrichtsamt, Wien 7.6.1922, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. BMU, Z. 19351/I-Abt. 2 (Abschrift), Wien 24.8.1925, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Das originale Ernennungsdekret liegt ein in ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879, 33. [BMU], Z. 25.021/I-2/1925, Wien 28.4.1926, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally

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Bei der Neubesetzung von Spitzers Lehrkanzel 1927 hatte Mallys Wort in Graz bereits einiges Gewicht. Für den Lehrstuhl kamen drei Bewerber in Betracht: Ferdinand Weinhandl, nunmehr Privatdozent in Kiel, Carl Siegel, ordentlicher Professor in Czernowitz, und der außerordentliche Professor Erich Rothacker in Heidelberg. Der Kommissionsbericht, gezeichnet u. a. von Mally, Martinak und Benndorf, lautete dahin, dass „primo et aequo loco Carl Siegel und Ferd. Weinhandl“ vorgeschlagen werden, aber „mit dem ausdrücklichen Zusatz, dass […] Weinhandl’s Ernennung in erster Linie gewünscht wird“ 71. Das Bundesministerium kam diesem Wunsch allerdings nicht nach. Mitentscheidend dürfte ein Auskunftsschreiben von Robert Reininger (Wien) gewesen sein, der einerseits „Siegels Befähigung ein Ordinariat zu bekleiden außer Zweifel“ stellte, andererseits aber „Weinhandl doch wohl nur als ‚Anfänger‘ bezeichne[n]“ könne. Überdies sei ihm Weinhandls überaus starke Schulgebundenheit an die Richtung u[nd] Methode Meinongs unangenehm aufgefallen. Diese Richtung, welcher kaum eine große Zukunft bevorstehen dürfte, ist aber in Graz durch Mally ohnehin hinreichend vertreten.

Die Geschichte der Philosophie würde durch Weinhandls Berufung überhaupt keine Vertretung in Graz haben, da sie „in der Meinong-Schule überhaupt nicht gepflegt“ werde, was wieder damit zusammenhängt, daß Meinong selbst recht geringschätzig über sie sich geäußert hat, ja ihr überhaupt nicht den Rang einer philosophischen 72 Disziplin zugestehen wollte.

Das Ministerium schloss sich Reiningers Meinung in den wesentlichen Punkten an und fragte bei Siegel nach, ob er geneigt wäre, die Stelle in Graz anzunehmen.73 Da dieser zustimmte, wurde Carl Siegel mit Wirk-

71

72 73

Ernst *11.10.1879. Kommissionsbericht für das BMU, 11.3.1927, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 27. Ein separates Gutachten Mallys zu Weinhandls Arbeit findet sich im Sammelakt BArch R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand). Kurrenthandschriftlicher Brief von Robert Reininger, 11.4.1927, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 10f. Ebd., 8 und 34.

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samkeit vom 1. Juni 1927 zum ordentlichen Professor für Philosophie in Graz ernannt.74 Sieht man von der posthumen Herausgeberschaft von Meinongs Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie 75 ab, hat Mally in den Jahren seines Emporkletterns auf der universitären Karriereleiter vergleichsweise wenig (Nachhaltiges) publiziert.76 Ja, man kann sagen, dass mit Meinongs Tod in Graz gerade die Gegenstandstheorie eingeschlafen ist. Wenn jemand dieser Aufgabe, nämlich der Weiterführung von Meinongs Lebenswerk, gewachsen gewesen wäre, dann war es Mally; der aber zeigte in diese Richtung keinen besonders großen Eifer. Sein 1926 veröffentlichter Markstein, die Grundgesetze des Sollens, trägt zwar noch das Kleid der Gegenstandstheorie: in der Einleitung weist Mally darauf hin, dass „Urteilen und Wollen […] bestimmte Weisen [sind], zu Gegenständen Stellung zu nehmen“77. Dennoch kann dieses Werk als etwas Eigenständiges und Neues begriffen werden, in dem gegenstandstheoretische Fragen durchaus nicht im Vordergrund stehen. Das Frühwerk des Grazer Rechtsphilosophen Johann Mokre, zusammen mit Karl Wolf der bekannteste Mally-Schüler, wurde durch diese Schrift entscheidend beeinflusst. In seinem Lebenslauf des Jahres 1929 schrieb Mokre: Ich hatte Gelegenheit mit Professor Mally gerade zu der Zeit in Fühlung zu kommen, als er mit seiner sollenstheoretischen Arbeit beschäftigt war, und akti78 ven Anteil daran zu nehmen.

In diesem Jahr inskribierte auch der engagierteste Mally-Schüler, der gebürtige Leibnitzer Karl Wolf 79 an der Grazer Universität und hörte die Vorlesung „Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Philosophie“. Wolf schreibt, dass Mally bereits in dieser Vorlesung leise Kritik am Gegenstandsbegriff Meinongs übte.80 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Der Bundespräsident, Zl. 3689, 31.5.1927, ÖStA/AdR Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Siegel Karl *19.8.1872. Meinong 1923. Zumindest harren die Studien zur Theorie der Möglichkeit und Ähnlichkeit (Mally 1922) noch auf eine breitere Wahrnehmung. Mally 1926, 1. CV von Johann Mokre, 13.12.1929, zitiert nach Goller 2001, 629. Zur Biographie vgl. Wolf 2012, 9–19, sowie die vorangestellten Lebensdaten 7f. Wolf 1972, 65 und 68.

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Immerhin nahm Mally am von John N. Findlay 1933 publizierten Überblickswerk zu Meinongs Philosophie mit dem Titel Meinong’s Theory of Objects81 rege Anteilnahme. Findlay erinnert sich in einem autobiographischen Abriss über seine Zeit in der steiermärkischen Landeshauptstadt: Ich schrieb mein Buch über Meinong hauptsächlich 1931, aber ich stellte es 1932 in Graz fertig und veröffentlichte es 1933 in der Oxford Press. Von vielen Personen erfuhr ich großes Entgegenkommen und Wohlwollen, intellektuell und auch in anderen Dingen; […] nicht zuletzt von Professor Mally selbst, der mir eine große Gastfreundschaft entgegenbrachte und mit großem Interesse verfolg82 te, was ich schrieb.

Für das genannte Buch, das sich für die Wahrnehmung Meinongs im englischsprachigen Raum lange Jahre als zentral erweisen sollte, schrieb Mally im Jänner 1933 das Vorwort. Hier ist von „bestimmten Fehlern“ in Meinongs „Lehre“, die Findlay aufgedeckt habe, die Rede; aber auch von einem „bleibenden Wert“ der Gegenstandstheorie, wenn sie von ebendiesen Fehlern befreit würde.83 Auf mehreren Seiten skizziert Findlay dann auch Mallys neuere Vorschläge, die „viele Schwierigkeiten in Meinongs Theorie beheben“ würden.84 Im gleichen Jahr reichte Findlay diese Schrift bei Mally als Dissertation ein, wovon das Gutachten in der Nachlass-Sammlung erhalten ist.85 Dieses Gutachten unterscheidet sich im Grundton wesentlich vom Vorwort des Buches: 81 82

83

84 85

Findlay 1933. “I wrote my book on Meinong mainly in 1931, but I completed it at Graz in 1932, and it was published by the Oxford Press in 1933.” (Findlay 1985, 22.) “I received kindnesses and intellectual and other benefits from a great number of persons […]; and, not least, Professor Mally himself, with his great hospitality and extreme interest in all I had written […].” (Ebd., 23; übersetzt von mir.) “The work is, however, not merely valuable in the historical sense, in so far as it deals with the author of the Theory of Objects, but, principally, on account of the very important material content of the doctrines of Meinong, whose abiding worth will appear more clearly when they are freed from certain errors, which Mr. Findlay’s intelligent criticism has exposed.” (Mally, Vorwort zu Findlay 1933.) Findlay 1933, besonders 110–112, auch 176 und 182–184. Gutachten zu Findlay. Ich danke Professor Johann C. Marek für eine Kopie dieses Gutachtens.

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MARKUS ROSCHITZ Er [Findlay] macht den schwierigen Meinongschen Begriff des Gegenstandes so klar, wie man einen solchen Unbegriff überhaupt klar machen kann.

Findlays Bezugnahme auf die Vorschläge Mallys findet ebenfalls Erwähnung: Herr Findlay hat meinen Versuch, die Gegenstandstheorie von diesen widersinnigen Begriffen [wie etwa vom „Außersein“; M. R.] zu befreien, kurz erwähnt. Freilich lagen ihm nur die Anfänge einer Theorie vor, die erst in jüngster Zeit in einer befriedigenden Weise durchgeführt und bisher nur in Vorlesungen mitge86 teilt worden ist.

Direkte Kritik an Meinongs Philosophie übte Mally lediglich in solchen Gutachten, in privaten Korrespondenzen und gegebenenfalls in Vorlesungen. Publizistischen Niederschlag fand dieselbe erst später, namentlich (und auch dort noch vergleichsweise verhalten) in Mallys ausführlichstem Werk, Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit.87 Im Juni 1933 begutachtete Mally eine weitere erwähnenswerte Dissertation, nämlich Wirklichkeit und Wert von Karl Wolf.88 Mallys Urteil fiel überaus positiv aus, schließlich rezipiert Wolf hierin bereits die noch junge „Lehre von den werthaften Tendenzen einer dynamischen Wirklichkeit“89. Wolf war aufmerksamer Hörer des „Zauberkollegs“ im Sommersemester 1932 gewesen, in dem Mally erstmals seine eigene dynamische Wirklichkeitsphilosophie der Öffentlichkeit vorstellte. Karl Wolf trat nach der mit Auszeichnung bestandenen Promotion eine Stelle als Privatmittelschullehrer in der Neulandschulsiedlung in Wien an, als Universitätslehrer konnte er erst in der Nachkriegszeit wirken. Die im Zauberkolleg ausgesprochenen Gedanken verarbeitete Mally später in Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit, von ihm selbst auch gerne „Zauberbuch“ genannt. Es trägt den Untertitel Einleitung zur Philosophie der Natürlichen Weltauffassung. Mally hatte 1934/35 ein vierbändiges Werk vor Augen, das er in geplanter Form 90 nie realisiert hat. Dem Zauberbuch war 86 87 88 89 90

Gutachten zu Findlay, 2 und 5. Mally 1935. Wolf 1933; Zweitgutachter war Carl Siegel. Gutachten über Herrn Karl Wolfs Dissertation „Wirklichkeit und Wert“, 26.6.1933, UAG Doktorats-Akt Z. 1900. „In vier Hauptteilen soll sie [die Philosophie der Natürlichen Weltauffassung; M. R.] entwickelt werden. Sie werden der Reihe nach von den Formen der Ge-

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nur die Rolle einer Einführung in diese neue Philosophie zugedacht, in der alles Wesentliche aber wenigstens „als Anlage schon enthalten“ sei. 91 In drei einschlägigen (deutschsprachigen) Zeitschriften wurde Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit rezensiert. 1936 erschien eine Besprechung von Aloys Wenzl (München) im Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie.92 Dieser erachtet Mallys Vorwort, in dem es u. a. heißt, dass das „Leben unserer Zeit […] von der Philosophie mehr und Wesentlicheres [verlangt], als seit dem Mittelalter von ihr gefordert wurde“, als bemerkenswert. Mally gehöre damit in die Riege gegenwärtiger „Fachphilosophen“, die einen „Weg zwischen einem sinntauben und letztlich inkonsequenten Positismus [!] und einem vagen geistfeindlichen Vitalismus“ suchen. Die ersten beiden Abschnitte des Buches, welche sich um Mythos und Magie drehen, enthielten „viel psychologisch und phänomenologisch fein Beobachtetes“. Im dritten Abschnitt, der sich mit Religion, Sitte, Kunst, Wissenschaft und Philosophie auseinandersetzt, finden sich „Sätze von wahrhafter Weisheit und Endgültigkeit“. Dennoch würden „[g]rundsätzliche und einzelne Einwände naheliegen“, die Wenzl aber nicht näher benennt und erläutert. Insgesamt sei das Buch jedoch „zu reich an Wahrheiten, um dadurch entwertet zu werden.“ Im selben Jahr rezensierte der bis dahin noch in Wien tätige Psychologe Egon Brunswik in der Zeitschrift für Psychologie Mallys Werk.93 Brunswik, im Grundtenor wohlwollend, beginnt seine Besprechung – wie Wenzl – mit einer Bezugnahme auf die „gegenwärtige Zeit“, die „im Zeichen einer fortschreitenden Besinnung auf das ursprünglich und in unbefangener Einstellung Erstgegebene“ stehe. Dies sei als positive Entwicklung zu werten und für die Psychologie und Philosophie „von weittragender Bedeutung“. Mallys Betrachtungen passen hier ins Bild: Sie seien nicht den

91 92

93

genstände und des Denkens, von der Wirklichkeit und dem Erfahrungswissen, von Sinn und Geist, vom Seelenleben handeln.“ (Mally 1935, 10.) Mally 1935, 10. Wenzl 1936. Wenzl, der sich 1926 in München habilitiert hatte und Mitglied der SPD war, wurde 1938 die Lehrbefugnis aus politischen Gründen entzogen; vgl. hierzu Tilitzki 2002, 305, 584 und 752. Brunswik 1936, 385.

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MARKUS ROSCHITZ [a]nalytischen Überkünstelungen und unversehenen Verwebungen mit einer physiologisch-funktionalen Betrachtungsweise, wie sie Mach oder auch Russell eigentümlich sind

verpflichtet, sondern sie gehen von einer „gesünderen Linie aus, nämlich der empirischen Entwicklungspsychologie.“ Brunswik findet besonderes Interesse an Mallys Ausführungen über Urmagisches und lobt die „vielfach bildhafte und an Beispielen reiche Darstellung“, welche dem „Leser bisweilen anschaulich an ein Verstehen der urmagischen Erlebensweise heranzuführen“ vermöge. Brunswik schließt seine Besprechung mit der Hoffnung, dass „eine nähere Ausführung mancher Punkte zu erwarten [ist]“, wenn die vier geplanten – aber eben nicht verfassten – Bücher zur „Philosophie der Natürlichen Weltauffassung“ erscheinen werden. Vergleichsweise spät, aber dafür am ausführlichsten widmete sich Wilhelm Grebe (Frankfurt am Main) in einer Rezension Mallys besagtem Buch, erschienen 1938 in den Blättern für deutsche Philosophie.94 Mallys rückblickende Erkenntnisse über das Urmagische seien mittels eines „einwandfreien Verfahrens“ gewonnen worden. Grebe sieht in der „Mallyschen Herleitung der späten Entwicklungsformen des menschlichen Geistes aus Mythos und Magie“ eine „überraschende Kraft der Durchleuchtung und Klärung“. Die für die zeitgenössische Philosophie relevanten Abschnitte des Buchs seien von den rückblickenden Analysen aber zu scheiden und „[g]änzlich anders […] zu beurteilen“. Allerdings kann Grebe diesen Kapiteln kaum mehr Positives abgewinnen. Mallys eingenommene Haltung [ist] ohnmächtig, wo es sich um Vollzug, um Schöpfung, um Tat handelt. Die Tat, auch im Felde der Philosophie, wird aus anderer Haltung geboren; der schöpferisch Tätige, derjenige, der in der Tat steht und weiß, wie er zu handeln hat, und der allein in dieser Weise zu werten berufen ist, ist dem Erleben gerade abgewandt, sieht nicht – wie es Mally in seiner Einstellung tatsächlich tut – auf das Erleben hin, sein Blick geht in gänzlich andere Richtung.

Mit Mallys Buch haben diese Bemerkungen aber nur mehr mittelbar etwas zu tun, unschwer sind in Grebes Kritik politische Motive – der Frankfurter galt als ausgesprochener NS-Philosoph95 – zu erkennen. 94 95

Grebe 1938. Tilitzki 2002, 16 und 812.

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Alles in allem wurde Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit von den drei Rezensenten positiv aufgenommen. Das gilt auch für Wilhelm Grebe, der Mally zwar vorwirft, sich keiner „Philosophie der Tat“ verschrieben zu haben, aber seinen Analysen über das Urmagische großen Wert beimisst. Einig sind sich die drei Autoren darin, dass Mallys Werk als Produkt seiner Zeit gesehen werden muss. Und als solches will es auch der Grazer Philosoph selbst verstanden wissen: Zur Gegenwart hat dieses Buch und was es einleitet den Bezug, den jedes lebendige und fruchtbare Erzeugnis zu seiner Zeit hat: es geht aus ihren inneren 96 Strebungen hervor und will beitragen zu klarer Fügung.

Zu zeitgenössischen Fragen hatte sich Mally bis zum 1931 erschienenen Aufsatz „Gehalt, Gestalt und Wertung des Kunstwerkes“ kaum auf publizistischem Wege geäußert. Darin erfährt nun die „geistige Mittelschicht des Liberalismus“, die „zuviel zu wissen glaubt und zu wenig weiß“, harsche Kritik. Ihre „Haltung“, die Mally als überkommenen Rest des 19. Jahrhunderts ansieht, gelte es zu überwinden: Soll eine neue Kultur aus unserer Zeit erwachsen, nicht auf den Trümmern dieser Zeit erstehen, so wird sie die ungeheure Mannigfaltigkeit und Spannung al97 ler positiven geistigen Kräfte der Zeit ihrer Harmonie einzufügen haben.

Konkrete politisch-weltanschauliche Ziele scheint Mally mit diesen Aussagen aber noch nicht zu verfolgen. Anders sieht es bei dem 1934 im Volksspiegel veröffentlichten Aufsatz „Wesen und Dasein des Volkes“ aus. Mally vertritt hierin einen Volksbegriff, der mit der nationalsozialistischen Volksauffassung höchst kompatibel erscheint, da als Kriterium, wann man sich als „Glied“ des Volkes fühlen dürfe, auch die „Abstammung“ herangezogen wird. 98 In Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit bleiben aber so gut wie alle politisch verfänglichen Passagen ausgespart. Meinong war stets bemüht gewesen, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung sauber zu scheiden. Freilich – er mag ein „aufrechter deutscher Mann

96 97 98

Mally 1935, 5. Mally 1931, 81; vgl. auch Sauer 1998, 170. Mally 1934, 74f.; siehe auch Roschitz 2014, 106–110.

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durch und durch“ gewesen sein, wie es sein Kollege Martinak formulierte.99 Aber, wie Meinong in der Rückschau schreibt, [i]ch habe eben unter dem Namen „Philosophie“ mein Absehen jederzeit nur auf Wissenschaft, also insbesondere auch nicht auf „Weltanschauung“ außer der 100 Wissenschaft gerichtet.

Die Aktualität dieser Haltung schien nun Mally zunehmend fraglich zu werden. Im Jahre 1936 schreibt er rückblickend über Meinongs Werk und Denken: Meinongs Philosophie will Wissenschaft sein, mit dem ganzen Ernst, der ganzen Strenge und Verantwortlichkeit, die ihr auferlegt ist. Die Wurzeln seines Denkens waren im wissenschaftlichen 19. Jahrhundert, und eine Weltanschauung zu geben schien ihm eine außerwissenschaftliche Angelegenheit. […] Nun bietet es Erkenntnis, die einer Weltanschauung klaren Grund geben kann und das sichere und lebendige Ethos des Geistes, dem ein Festes, Unbedingtes bestimmte und 101 doch unendliche Aufgaben stellt.

Zu diesem Zeitpunkt war Mally, wie die allermeisten Staatsbediensteten, bereits Mitglied der „Vaterländischen Front“ (VF). 102 Der Beitritt zur nunmehr einzigen erlaubten Partei in Österreich ist jedoch nicht zwangsläufig als Anzeichen für eine „österreichisch-vaterländische“ Gesinnung zu interpretieren.103 Vielmehr war Mally – er selbst schreibt seit der Schulzeit – deutschnational eingestellt und auch Mitglied der Großdeutschen Volkspartei gewesen.104 Die politischen Ereignisse des Jahres 1933 (Verbot der NSDAP in Österreich, Errichtung des „Ständestaates“) und die (damit verbundenen) Veränderungen in der österreichischen Universitätslandschaft 105 haben in 99 100 101 102

103 104 105

Martinak 1925, 18. Meinong 1921, 131. Mally 1936, 100. Eintrittsdatum war der 12. Juli 1934 (Fragebogen, 30.10.1938, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879.). Höflechner schreibt, dass bei den Universitätsangestellten „nahzu 100% […] Zugehörigkeitsquoten zur Vaterländischen Front“ erreicht worden seien. (Höflechner 1985, 54.) VF- und NSDAP-Doppelmitgliedschaften waren keine Seltenheit (Letztere geheim). Fragebogen, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Genauere Daten zur Mitgliedschaft liegen nicht vor. Zur allgemeinen Geschichte der Universität Graz vgl. Höflechner 2006, beson-

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Mallys Biographie, äußerlich betrachtet, keine bedeutenden Spuren hinterlassen. Er hat sich eben lediglich einem gewissen Konformitätsdruck des „neuen Österreichs“ mit dem Beitritt zur VF gebeugt. Offene Kritik Mallys am vorherrschenden politischen System ist nicht belegt. In einem Brief vom 5. Jänner 1934 an den Greifswalder Professor Hans Pichler, der sich ebenfalls in Graz bei Meinong habilitiert hatte, beklagt Mally lediglich die „allgemeinen Nöte der Zeit“ 106. Aber auch umgekehrt, offene Sympathie für die NSDAP erlaubte sich Mally nicht. Selbst in „Wesen und Dasein des Volkes“ finden sich keine direkt nazistischen Textstellen.107 Ernst Mally hatte vor 1938 im Allgemeinen keine Berührungsängste mit dem reichsdeutschen Wissenschaftsbetrieb, solange dies im Rahmen dessen blieb, was für einen österreichischen Professor der Philosophie tunlich erschien. Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit, das Zauberbuch, veröffentlichte Mally im Klinkhardt-Verlag, Leipzig. Auch Korrespondenzen des Grazer Philosophen mit der reichsdeutschen Kollegenschaft sind erhalten. 1935 wurde Mally etwa vom Dekan der Kieler Universität kontaktiert und um ein Gutachten über Ferdinand Weinhandls philosophische Arbeit gebeten, der als Kandidat für eine ordentliche Professur dieser Universität in Frage kam. Mally antwortete, es sei ihm wegen seines „schlechte[n] Gesundheitszustand[es]“ derzeit „unmöglich“, dieser Bitte nachzukommen. Allerdings könne er ein Gutachten aus dem Jahre 1927 über Weinhandls Arbeit beifügen, welches er anlässlich des Berufungsvorschlages für Graz angefertigt hatte.108 Wenn es um den weltanschaulichen Gegner ging, ist ab 1936 zumindest in Mallys privaten Korrespondenzen eine Verschärfung in seinem Ton bemerkbar. An die Landesbibliothekarin Gertraud Laurin 109 schrieb der Philosoph im September dieses Jahres:

106 107 108

109

ders 136–153 und 258–263. Mally an Pichler. Vgl. Sauer 1998, 177. Mally an den Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät in Kiel, Graz 11.5.1935, BArch, R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand). Vgl. auch Tilitzki 2002, 624– 627. Mit der Enkelin Peter Roseggers pflegte Mally ab 1935 Schriftverkehr, sehr rege dann ab 1941.

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MARKUS ROSCHITZ In solchen [!] Bemühen führe ich, für meinen Teil, den Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, der die eigentliche Gefahr der Menschheit ist, im Geistigen und im Natürlichen, und für ein so natürliches wie geistig echtes Leben. Ich kann es nur 110 im Bereich des wissenschaftlichen Denkens tun.

Am Grazer Philosophischen Institut und am davon erst 1927 abgelösten pädagogischen Seminar111 wirkten im Jahre 1936 drei ordentliche Professoren: Ernst Mally, Carl Siegel und der Pädagoge Otto Tumlirz. Siegel stand in diesem Jahr nach eigenen Angaben vor seiner Pensionierung: Es hatte anknüpfend an eine meiner Vorlesungen eine Denuntiation seitens eines 112 Hörers stattgefunden, auf die hin auch ich mich zu äußern hatte.

Nach Höflechner war es in Siegels Vorlesungen bei der Erwähnung von Fichtes Reden an die Deutsche Nation öfters zu demonstrativem Beifall und sogar zu „Heil Hitler“-Rufen gekommen, 113 was schließlich das Bundesministerium für Unterricht im April 1937 dazu veranlasst haben dürfte, Siegels Pensionierung in Aussicht zu stellen. Tumlirz war zu diesem Zeitpunkt Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät. Er verfasste im Namen des Professorenkollegiums einen Brief an das Bundesministerium mit dem Antrag, dass Herr Professor Dr.Carl Siegel auch nach Vollendung des 65.Lebensjahres in seinem Lehramte belassen werde. […] Trotz seiner 65 Jahre steht Prof. Siegel noch in der Vollkraft seiner Leistungsfähigkeit und wird von Professoren und Hörern als Lehrer und Forscher hochgeschätzt, […] sodass sein Rücktritt vom Lehramt einen schweren Verlust für die Fakultät bedeuten würde, ganz abgesehen davon, dass es für ihn selbst bitter ist, sein Amt zu verlassen, das er noch voll auszufül114 len imstande ist.

110 111

112

113 114

Mally an Laurin, 3.9.1936. Ähnliches schrieb er ein Jahr später, am 17.9.1937, auch an Fritz Kern. Siehe Brezinka 2003, 163f., und ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Siegel Carl *19.8.1872, 9–11. Mally hatte entscheidenden Anteil an der Abtrennung des Pädagogischen Seminars. Lebenslauf von Carl Siegel, Wien 15.3.1940, zitiert nach Schönafinger 1994, 32. Im Personalakt Siegel des UAG liegt dieser Lebenslauf allerdings entgegen Schönafingers Verweis nicht ein. Höflechner 2006, 172f. Dekanat der philosophischen Fakultät Graz, 20.5.1937, ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 938, Universität Graz PA Siegel Carl *19.8.1872, 16.

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Die Eingabe blieb wirkungslos, und so wurde Siegel mit Ende September 1937 in den dauernden Ruhestand versetzt. 115 Mally war zu dieser Zeit „in der Arbeit ganz vergraben“; er hatte eine naturwissenschaftliche Arbeit soeben fertiggestellt (es kann sich nur um Wahrscheinlichkeit und Gesetz 116 handeln), und [j]etzt beginnen die Sorgen der Unterbringung und dann noch viel ärgere: Wie Siegels Lehrstuhl zu besetzen sei! […] Wir suchen einen Philosophen, der die Geschichte der Philosophie ordentlich pflegt und sie in klarer Darstellung leh117 rend vertreten würde.

Die Nachfolgediskussion zog sich noch bis zum März 1938 hin und nahm schließlich die Wendung, dass Siegels Ruhestand außer Kraft gesetzt wurde und er im Zuge der im NS-Staat ins Leben gerufenen „Wiedergutmachung“ wieder an der Universität Verwendung fand. 118 Der dritte Ordinarius, Otto Tumlirz, hatte sich – wie Mally – ebenfalls bei Meinong habilitiert und war seit September 1930, als Nachfolger Martinaks, ordentlicher Professor der Pädagogik. 119 Nach einem Fragebogen des Jahres 1938 begann seine Hinwendung zur NSDAP bereits in der „illegalen Zeit“: Der Pädagoge sei nämlich am 1. September 1937 120 der Partei beigetreten und habe sich überdies für den „Schutz der n.s. Studenten gegen die Schädigungsabsichten der Sachwalterschaft und Landesführung der Vaterländischen Front“ eingesetzt. Ausdrücklich erwähnt Tumlirz auch die „Gründung der Ortsgruppe Graz der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft (Frühjahr 1937)“, die als „getarnte Stätte n.s. weltan115

116 117 118 119

120

Ebd., 13–15. Über die konkreten Gründe und Umstände der Pensionierung geben die hier einliegenden Akten des BMU keinerlei Aufschluss. Vom Unterrichtsministerium wurde Siegel aber für sein „vieljähriges ersprießliches Wirken im akademischen Lehr- und Forschungsbetriebe“ der „wärmste Dank und die volle Anerkennung“ ausgesprochen. Mally 1938a. Mally an Kern, 9.9.1937. REM, WP Siegel 2 1 (a), Berlin 16.2.1942, UAG PA Siegel Carl 19.8.1872. BMU Ernennungsdekret (Abschrift), 15.9.1930, UAG PA Tumlirz Otto *27.7.1890. Mally hatte, als Berichterstatter, Tumlirz für den Lehrstuhl vorgeschlagen; vgl. Brezinka 2003, 172. Dieses Datum wurde nicht anerkannt. Tumlirz hat nach der Reichskartei der NSDAP erst am 27. Mai 1938 um die Aufnahme angesucht und wurde mit 1. Mai 1938 – dem Tag der „nationalen Arbeit“ – rückdatiert aufgenommen. (BArch (ehem. BDC), Reichskartei, Tumlirz Otto *27.7.1890.)

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schaulicher Schulungsvorträge und gegen die V.F. Schulungsvorträge der Studenten gedacht“ gewesen sei.121 Tatsächlich war Tumlirz Vorsitzender der im Mai 1937 gegründeten Ortsgruppe der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft (DPhG); sein Stellvertreter war Carl Siegel und Schriftführer (zusammen mit Othmar Sterzinger und Otto J. Hartmann) Ernst Mally. 122 In den Satzungen der Grazer Zweigstelle heißt es, dass der „Zweck des Vereins […] ein philosophisch-weltanschaulicher“ sei, „nämlich den Ideengehalt des Deutschen Idealismus zu ergründen, stetig weiterzubilden und für das Leben der Gegenwart fruchtbar zu machen“ 123. – Nun hat Tumlirz 1938, was seine bisherigen Leistungen für die NSDAP angeht, gewiss übertrieben;124 seine Angaben über die „Schulungsvorträge“ in der DPhG werden damit aber keineswegs haltlos. Mally hat als Schriftführer offenbar keine besonderen Tätigkeiten in dieser Gesellschaft entfaltet. Er scheint nur im Vereinsakt auf,125 nennt diese Mitgliedschaft aber in kei121 122

123

124

125

Personal-Fragebogen, Graz 27.6. [?] 1938, ÖStA/AdR ZNsZ GA Nr. 24.498 (Tumlirz Otto), 6. Sluga 1993, 23. Wie das Staatspolizeiliche Büro der Bundespolizeidirektion vor der Gründung der Grazer Zweigstelle bekanntgab, bestünden „[g]egen die Tätigkeit des […] Vereines und der namhaft gemachten Vereinsfunktionäre […] vom staatspolizeilichen Standpunkte aus keine Bedenken.“ (Bundespolizeidirektion Graz, Zl.Stp.B.Ver.VI/177-3-1937, Graz 27.4.1937, StLA L.Reg. 206 Pi/1939.) Dieses Ziel erfordere eine „regelmäßige Abhaltung weltanschaulicher Vorträge mit Wechselreden“. Vgl. die Satzungen der DPhG in Graz, StLA L.Reg. 206 Pi/1939. Über Tumlirz wurde im Dezember 1936 von einem V-Mann der „Gauwaltung Steiermark des NSLB [Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund]“ ein vertrauliches Gutachten angefertigt und an das Hauptamt für Erziehung der Reichsleitung der NSDAP gesandt: Die „allgemeine Beurteilung der Persönlichkeit des Professors Tumlirz [ist] durchweg günstig, sowohl was seine Fachleistungen als auch was seine nationale Einstellung anbelangt. Soweit eine Beurteilung des Prof. Tumlirz möglich ist, geht seine Grundrichtung dahin, daß er versucht, die völkischen Bestrebungen mit den Forderungen der katholischen Kirche in Einklang zu bringen. Er soll vor allen Dingen sehr gläubig sein.“ (Gauwaltung Ausland des NSLB Steiermark, Berlin 1.12.1936, BArch NS 12, 14.268 (Tumlirz Otto).) Und 1938 lautete eine politische Beurteilung folgendermaßen: Tumlirz „war […] in der illegalen Zeit in seinen politischen Äusserungen sehr vorsichtig, er soll konjunkturmässiges Verhalten an den Tag gelegt haben. Ist kein Parteikämpfer. Von seinen Hörern und Kameraden doch beliebt.“ (Bericht der Gauleitung Wien, 19.10.1938, ÖStA/AdR ZNsZ GA Nr. 24.498 (Tumlirz Otto), 10f.) Otto Tumlirz an die Landeshauptmannschaft Steiermark, Graz 29.6.1939, StLA

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nem Fragebogen, wiewohl Mally seine Mitgliedschaften (etwa bei einem deutschen Sprachverein)126 genau anzugeben pflegte. Dennoch kann sein Beitritt zu dieser Gesellschaft als Anzeichen eines Zurücknehmens der Zurückhaltung gelesen werden. Ob er zu diesem Zeitpunkt jedoch gesinnungsmäßig bereits Nationalsozialist war – formell war er es nicht –, lässt sich schlichtweg nicht belegen. Und selbst nach dem „Umbruch“ verneinte der ordentliche Professor der Philosophie die Frage nach illegaler Arbeit für die NSDAP. Das Jahr 1938 brachte auch in Ernst Mallys politische Biographie Bewegung. Die zeitgenössischen Quellen vermitteln den Eindruck, dass Mally den Regimewechsel, der sich mit dem „Berchtesgadener Abkommen“ bereits abzeichnete, geradezu herbeigesehnt hatte. Im Februar 1938 schloss ich mich dem „Volkspolitischen Referat“ an, trat auch vor dem Umschwung dem N.S. Lehrerbund bei, sobald ich von dessen Bestand 127 erfuhr.

Die offenbar selbst auferlegte Zurückhaltung war nun wie mit einem Schlag völlig dahin. Der „Anschluss“ Österreichs an das Deutsche Reich im März 1938 führte am Grazer Philosophischen Institut, im Vergleich zu anderen Universitäten, zu keinen größeren Standesveränderungen. 128 Allerdings legte Konstantin Radaković seine Dozentur wegen „gegenteiliger politischer Überzeugung“ freiwillig zurück. Er emigrierte 1941, fand aber nach Kriegsende wieder den Weg nach Graz. 129 An der Universität mit den weltanschaulichen Vorlesungen im Sinne der „vaterländischen“ Regierung betraut war der ehemalige Mally-Schüler und dezidierte Katholik Johann Mokre.130 Er engagierte sich vor 1938 aktiv gegen den National126 127

128 129 130

L.Reg. 206 Pi/1939. Fragebogen, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879; Hervorhebung von mir. Mally seines Beitritts zum NSLB im Februar 1938 wegen zu den „illegalen Nationalsozialisten“ zu zählen, erschiene nicht ganz haltbar, da sich Nationalsozialisten nun zu ihrer Gesinnung öffentlich bekennen konnten, wenn auch pro forma nur „im Rahmen der Vaterländischen Front“. Zu den Bestimmungen vgl. Wiener Zeitung 19.2.1938, 1. Tilitzki 2002, 772f. Vgl. Müller 1994. Höflechner 2006, 172. Zu Mokres Biographie vgl. Müller 1993, 12–17. Vgl.

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sozialismus, indem er etwa im März 1934 ein Verzeichnis mit 29 namentlich angeführten Personen an das Bundeskanzleramt sandte, die er, teils aus eigener Beobachtung, verdächtigte, sich nationalsozialistisch zu betätigen. Er fügte bei, dass „nach meiner Auffassung die hiesigen Sicherheitsbehörden der beregten [!] Sache nicht mit dem nötigen Nachdrucke“ nachgehen und forderte ein, dass gegen die Nationalsozialisten eindlich [!] einmal noch schärfer und gründlichst sowie mit allen zur Verfügung stehenden Machtmitteln vorgegangen und die Ruhe etc. nicht weiter gestört wird, was gerade hier in Graz, wo die Zahl der staatsfeindlichen Nationalsozialisten zumal in Kreisen der Intelligenz gross ge131 nug ist, ein unbedingtes Gebot der Notwendigkeit ist.

Mokre wurde 1938 von seiner Tätigkeit an der Universität entbunden, 1939 zwangspensioniert und noch im selben Jahr wanderte er in die USA aus. Johann Mokre kehrte 1948 nach Graz zurück und nahm seine Lehrtätigkeit an der Universität wieder auf. Carl Siegel wurde, wie angesprochen, 1938 wieder aus dem Ruhestand geholt und mit der vierstündigen Vorlesung „Die Grundlagen der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung“ betraut.132 Otto Tumlirz wiederum war nach dem „Umbruch“ aussichtsreicher Kandidat für die Nachfolge des verhafteten und entlassenen Karl Bühler in Wien. Daselbst supplierte Tumlirz im Sommersemester 1938 sogar dessen Lehrveranstaltungen, musste aber ab Herbst, nach Beschluss des Reichsministers, wieder ausschließlich in Graz lesen. 133 Demgegenüber verbrachte Mally die Märztage des Jahres 1938 geradezu unspektakulär. Er konnte sich wohl in Ruhe an den „grossen Begebenheiten in Graz“134 erfreuen, denn der Vorlesungsbeginn wurde bis zum Mai aufgeschoben.135 Im Sommersemester 1938 hatte Mally die Vorlesung

131 132 133

134 135

auch den Nachruf von Weinberger (1982). Brief von Hans Mokre, Graz 2.3.1934, ÖStA/AdR BKA-I SR 22/Stmk. GZ 131.580/1934 (Kt. 5138). Schönafinger 1994, 32–34. Siegels Wiederindienstnahme war aber nur als Übergangslösung gedacht; vgl. Tilitzki 2002, 785. Heiß 1993, 134f. und 155f. Tumlirz las im SS 1938 auch in Graz, pendelte also nach Wien. Tumlirz „wurde deshalb, weil er nach Wien ging, von seinen Kollegen in Graz angefeindet.“ (Bericht der Gauleitung Wien, 19.10.1938, ÖStA/AdR ZNsZ GA Nr. 24.498 (Tumlirz Otto), 10.) Mally an Laurin, 17.3.1938. „Auch ist das Zuhausesitzen mir schon langweilig, der Vorlesungsbeginn ist

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Psychologie und zwei Lehrveranstaltungen für den philosophischen Einführungsunterricht zu halten.136 Nichts von dem war ihm neu,137 jedoch gab er diesen Veranstaltungen, besonders der Psychologie, eine völlig neue Ausrichtung: „Es wird Psychologie gemacht, doch bring ich unter diesem Namen lauter Ketzereien gegen fast alle schulmässige Lehre.“ 138 Das Interesse am philosophischen Einführungsunterricht hielt sich allerdings stark in Grenzen, sodass Mally diese Veranstaltung im Wintersemester 1938/39 und im darauffolgenden Sommersemester wegen Hörermangel gar nicht mehr las.139 Es besteht kein Grund zu der Annahme, dass Mally seine zahlreichen positiven Bekundungen zum NS-Regime nicht mit vollem Ernst ausgesprochen hat. Vor allem, da diese nicht auf öffentliche Vorlesungen und Publikationen beschränkt blieben, sondern sich in gleicher Weise auch im privaten Schriftverkehr wiederfinden. „Im neuen grossen Vaterland gibt’s Arbeit“ schrieb Mally an Gertraud Laurin, das spür ich auch und bin froh, dass ich mittun darf. […] [E]s gibt täglich neue Aufgaben, und ich ergreife sie mit Freude – ganz anders als in der toten, unseli140 gen Zeit.

Seit dem 1. Mai 1938 wurde Ernst Mally als Mitglied der NSDAP, Ortsgruppe Graz-Schützenhof, geführt.141 Auch der NSV142 war er beigetreten und, wie erwähnt, schon im Februar dem NSLB. In einem Fragebogen über seine bisherige politische Betätigung gab Mally zu Protokoll: „Keine praktische; auf geistigem Gebiete Kampf gegen den sog. Positivismus

136 137

138 139 140 141

142

wieder hinausgeschoben auf den 2. Mai.“ (Mally an Laurin, 22.4.1938.) Vorlesungsverzeichnis der Philosophischen Fakultät, SS 1938. Faksimile in Tschinkel 2009, 120. Die Vorlesung Psychologie hatte Mally bereits 1931/32 und 1935/36 gehalten. Vgl. das Bestandsverzeichnis des Mally-Nachlasses unter URL: http://sosa2.unigraz.at/sosa/nachlass/person/mally/verzeichnis.php (abgerufen am 31.12.2014). Mally an Laurin, 13.5.1938. Brief von Mally an das Dekanat, 16.6.1939, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Mally an Laurin, 21.5.1938. Mally beantragte laut der Gaukartei am 3.6.1938 die Aufnahme in die NSDAP und wurde – wie Tumlirz – rückwirkend mit dem 1. Mai 1938 aufgenommen; Mitgliedsnummer 6.282.300. (BArch (ehem. BDC), Gaukartei, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879; BArch (ehem. BDC), PK, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879.) Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt.

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und verwandte Lehren, gegen Intellektualismus und Individualismus.“ 143 In einem Lebenslauf vom September 1938 konkretisiert Mally diese Angaben und gibt einen ausführlichen Rückblick über seine bisherige akademische Laufbahn: Mein philosophisches Arbeiten und meine Lehrtätigkeit waren Anfangs [!] stark bestimmt durch meinen Lehrer Alexius Meinong; ich hatte Anteil an der von ihm gegründeten „Gegenstandstheorie“ und suchte sie für exakte Logik und Erkenntnislehre fruchtbar zu machen. Ich trieb, auch darin zunächst der Tradition der „Grazer Schule“ folgend, immer auch Psychologie. Meine Hauptvorlesungen erstreckten sich auf Logik, Wissenschaftslehre, Erkenntnislehre, allgem[eine] Wertlehre u[nd] Ethik, Psychologie. Es war eine ihrer Hauptaufga144 ben, subjektivistische, jüdisch-positivistische und verwandte Lehren, die das wissenschaftliche Denken der Zeit stark beeinflussten, zu bekämpfen und durch Gesunderes zu ersetzen. Meinong hatte sich vom Psychologismus frei gemacht, aber den Intellektualismus und den individualistischen Atomismus seiner Zeit nicht überwunden, was mich von seiner Lehre immer mehr entfernte.

Auch zum Zauberbuch nimmt Mally hierin Stellung: In meinem Buche „Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit“ (1935) konnte ich eine „Enletung [!] zur Philosophie der natürlichen Weltauffassung“ geben. Der systematische, kritisch gesicherte Ausbau der dort noch unvollkommen vertretenen dynamischganzheitlichen Grundauffassung ist meine Aufgabe für Gegenwart und Zu145 kunft.

Die besondere Erwähnung des Zauberbuchs sagt einiges über den hohen Stellenwert dieses Werkes in Mallys späterer Philosophie aus. Im Mai 1938 machte er sich mit neuem Schwung daran, dieses Projekt mit einer „Denkschrift zur Erhaltung des Philosophie-Unterrichts an den Mittelschulen“146 weiterzuführen. Hierbei handelt es sich um die Anfangsgründe der Philosophie, bereits im Oktober desselben Jahres gedruckt. 147 Die erstmals im Zauberkolleg vorgestellte Wirklichkeitsphilosophie wird in dieser Schrift nicht nur terminologisch, sondern auch inhaltlich auf die nationalsozialistische Ideologie ausgerichtet. Und dies aus eigenem Antrieb. 143 144 145 146 147

Fragebogen, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Zum Antisemitismus bei Mally vgl. Sauer 1998, 173. Persönlicher Lebenslauf, 23.9.1938, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Mally an Laurin, 21.5.1938. Mally 1938b.

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In einem 1938 vom Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS (SD) angefertigten Dossier148 wurde Mally der Gruppe der „Liberalen Philosophen“ zugerechnet. In der SD-internen Werteskala waren nur „[k]onfessionell gebundene bzw. Konkordats-Philosophen“ noch weiter unten angesiedelt.149 Schließlich sei Mally politisch „[w]eder Nat. soz. noch Systemanhänger“. Wie Ilse Korotin bemerkt, wird Mally damit eine gewisse „Gesinnungslosigkeit“ bescheinigt.150 Er selbst wird dieses Dossiers niemals ansichtig geworden sein und er hätte wohl vor allem gegen die Zuschreibung „liberal“ – den Liberalismus hatte er schon 1931 heftig kritisiert – einiges einzuwenden gewusst. Die Selbst- und Fremdwahrnehmung (zumindest des SD) deckten sich jedenfalls nicht. Zu Mallys Freude ging im „Umbruchsjahr“ endlich Wahrscheinlichkeit und Gesetz in Druck.151 Im Vorwort, das Mally bereits im März 1938 verfasst hatte, dankt er für das endliche Zustandekommen der Veröffentlichung „Herrn Prof. A. Baeumler“, zu dem er auch persönlichen Kontakt gehabt haben muss.152 Alfred Baeumler, „Rosenbergs Hofphilosoph“ (E. Klee), zählte als Leiter des „Amtes für Wissenschaft“ zu den exponiertesten Naziphilosophen des Dritten Reichs.153 Die Leistungen der 1937 ins Leben gerufenen Grazer Ortsgruppe der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft wurden von Baeumler aber nicht gewürdigt. 1939 kam es zur von ihm befürworteten Selbstauflösung, nachdem Vertreter der Partei 148

149

150 151 152 153

Wie diese „Dossiers“ im Einzelfall konkret zustande kamen, ist nicht mehr nachvollziehbar; vgl. aber Anm. 124. Die Beurteilung von Tumlirz im Dezember 1936 wurde offenbar von einem – freilich unbekannten – Grazer V-Mann angefertigt. Es ist zumindest möglich, dass auch zu Mally schon über einen längeren Zeitraum Material gesammelt wurde. Zur näheren Charakterisierung der Dossiers als Quelle vgl. Leaman / Simon o. J. „I. Gruppe: Konfessionell gebundene bzw. Konkordats-Philosophen. II. Gruppe: Liberale Philosophen. III. Gruppe Indifferente Philosophen. IV. Gruppe: Politisch positive Professoren. V. Gruppe: Nationalsozialistische Philosophen (Versuche eine ‚nat. soz. Philosophie‘ aufzubauen). VI. Gruppe: Positive Nachwuchskräfte.“ (Zitiert nach Korotin 2007, 167.) Ebd., 171. „So ist doch etwas fertig geworden; vor einem Jahre war’s noch fast aussichtslos.“ (Mally an Laurin, 2.9.1938.) Korotin (2007, 172) kann diese Vermutung mit einem weiteren Dokument erhärten. Klee 2007, 24.

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(und insbesondere Gauleiter Uiberreither) der in Graz geplanten „Ersten Großdeutschen Tagung“ auf jeden Fall fern geblieben wären. 154 Trotz der fortschreitenden Verschlechterung von Mallys Gesundheitszustand erweckt der Blick auf sein Vorlesungs- und Publikationsverzeichnis der Jahre 1938 bis 1941 den Eindruck eines engagierten Lehrenden. Im Wintersemester 1938/39 hielt Mally wieder zwei Seminare und die Vorlesung „Weltanschauung und Philosophie“, im Semester darauf eine zur „Wertlehre“.155 1940 konnte er den längeren Aufsatz „Zur Frage der ‚objektiven Wahrheit‘“156 vorlegen, der seine letzte zu Lebzeiten veröffentlichte Schrift bleiben sollte. Auch Mallys „philosophisches“ Interesse am „Volk“, das bereits 1934 schriftlichen Ausdruck gefunden hatte, wurde unter dem nationalsozialistischen Regime neu geweckt. Im dritten Trimester 1940 las Mally die „Leitgedanken der Völkerpsychologie“; wie das Kollegheft zur Vorlesung belegt, vertrat Mally nun einen in der Hauptsache durch „Rasse“ bestimmten Volksbegriff. 157 Schließlich war auch noch Mallys Expertise gefragt, als es galt, für Siegel einen Nachfolger zu finden. Dabei beklagte er, dass „immer wieder neue Anfragen, Prüfungen von Arbeiten, politische Gutachten“ 158 ausgestellt und eingeholt werden müssten. Langsam aber sicher musste sich Mally auch um seine eigene Nachfolge Gedanken machen. „Ich brauche wegen meines schweren Kriegsleidens eine längere Kur in Baden bei Wien“ schrieb Mally im August 1940 an das Hochschul-Kuratorium,159 welche auch genehmigt wurde. Aber es war nicht die erste derartige Kur, und Mally musste der Universität nun öfters fernbleiben; dennoch versuchte er nach Kräften, dem Lehrplan nachzukommen. Wegen seiner angeschlagenen Gesundheit begab sich Ernst Mally „auf dringende ärztliche Empfehlung“ 160 im August 1941 in den weststei154 155 156 157 158 159 160

Vgl. Leske 1990, 108f. Vgl. Mally 1971, 333. Mally 1940. Siehe Leitgedanken. Kommissionsbericht zur Wiederbesetzung der Lehrkanzel Siegel, o. D. [Herbst 1939]. (Zitiert nach Tilitzki 2002, 785f.) Mally an das Hochschul-Kuratorium, Graz 1.8.1940, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Handgeschriebene Eingabe Mallys an den Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät Graz, 11.4.1942, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879.

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rischen Kurort Schwanberg, genauer in die Pension „Thea“. Er stellte sich auf ein „strenges Einsiedlerdasein“ ein, denn „es gibt keine regelmässigen Heimsuchungen aus der Nachbarschaft, nur ab und zu wird es einen Besuch aus Graz geben“161. Eine Weile wird Mally noch zwischen Schwanberg und Graz, wohl per DRK 162-Krankentransport, gependelt sein.163 Auch wenn der Philosoph im April 1942 versicherte, „jetzt geht’s mir nicht schlecht, besser als in Graz“ 164, entschloss er sich noch im selben Monat, die Emeritierung zu beantragen. Die hierauf vorgenommene amtsärztliche Untersuchung liest sich so: Es handelt sich um einen übermittelgroßen für sein Alter jung aussehenden Mann. Sämtliche Gelenke sind durch eine chronische Entzündung mehr oder minder stark versteift […]. Ein Sitzen ist unmöglich, sondern es kann nur ein halbes Liegen ausgeführt werden. Die Fortbewegung erfolgt mit zwei Krücken mehr dahin schleppend als gehend. […] Der Mann ist praktisch bewegungsun165 fähig und mithin nicht mehr geeignet seinen bisherigen Dienst zu versehen.

Ob dieser Diagnose erscheint es mehr als fraglich, dass Mally, wie beabsichtigt, noch sein Kolleg im Sommersemester 1942 zu Ende zu lesen in der Lage war. Dekan Otto Maull richtete im Mai 1942 an den Reichsminister für Wissenschaft Mallys Entpflichtungsgesuch, das die Emeritierung nach der „Vollendung seines 63. Lebensjahres (11. Oktober 1942)“ vorsah. 166 Rektor Polheim befürwortete ebenfalls den Antrag von „Kamerad Mally“ und fügte bei, „[s]eine Lehrtätigkeit und seine wissenschaftliche Leistung berechtigen ihn, den Dank des Führers zu erhoffen“ 167. So kam es auch.168 161 162 163 164 165

166

167 168

Mally an Laurin, 24.8.1941. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz. Handgeschriebene Eingabe Mallys an den Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät Graz, 11.4.1942, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Mally an Laurin, 1.4.1942. Der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt der Volkserhebung. Gesundheitsamt, Zl. Dez.V/1-636/1-1942, o. D. [1942], StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Der Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät, Zl. 86 ex. 1942/43, Graz 18.5.1942, ebd. Das originale Entpflichtungsgesuch liegt dem UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879 bei. Der Rektor der Karl Franzens-Universität Graz, Rekt.-Z. 553 ex. 1942/43, 20.5.1942, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. In einem nur in Abschrift vorliegenden Schreiben wurde Mally vom „Führer“

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Allerdings wurde Mally, nicht wie gewünscht, mit Ablauf des Monats Oktober, sondern bereits mit Ende September 1942 vom Dienst entbunden. Wie Karl Wolf erwähnt, traf Mally die seit längerem absehbare Emeritierung „dennoch hart“169. Mally war bis zu seiner Entpflichtung immer noch formeller Leiter des psychologischen Laboratoriums. Der praktische Betrieb wurde aber bereits seit Jahren von Othmar Sterzinger aufrecht erhalten. 170 Im November 1941 schrieb Mally an den Dekan, dass „durch viele Monate auch keine Hilfskraft für den Laboratoriumsbetrieb zur Verfügung stand“, welche aber „umso dringender gefordert“ sei, seit „Heeresdienst, Technik und Wirtschaft in steigendem Maße praktische Psychologen brauchen“. 171 Neue Impulse erhielt die Psychologie in Graz mit Otto Tumlirz’ Erweiterung der Lehrbefugnis um dieses Fach im November 1940. 172 Er richtete die Psychologie, man kann sagen, zeitgemäß aus, was auch in einem SDBericht des Jahres 1941 positiv erwähnt wird: Die alte Psychologie an der Grazer Universität ist im Aussterben begriffen (Prof. Mally und Sterzinger stehen an der Altersgrenze). […] Der Erziehungswissenschaftler Tumlirz wurde daher vom Ministerium mit der Psychologie betraut. Er hat grosse Pläne, so die Schafffung [!] eines modernen, auf Rassenpsychologie aufgerichteten Institutes, in dem die Kriegserfahrungenund [!] andere Ergebnisse verwertet werden sollen. T. ist derzeit beim Heer Eignungsprüfer und untersuchte auch die Gefangenenlager Lienz und Spital an der Drau […]. Durch diese Tätigkeit hat er eine Reihe von Erfahrungen[,] Anregungen und Gedankengänge mitgebracht, mit welchen er sich teilweise schon vor dem Krie-

169 170

171

172

entpflichtet und ihm „für seine erfolgreiche akademische Wirksamkeit und dem Deutschen Volke geleisteten treuen Dienste“ der „besondere Dank“ ausgesprochen; vgl. REM (Abschrift), WP Mally a (a), Berlin 3.10.1942, Führerhauptquartier gez. Adolf Hitler, ebd. Wolf 1971, 4. Sterzinger war seit 1925 vom Mittelschuldienst beurlaubt und Assistent am ps ychologischen Laboratorium; vgl. Persönlicher Lebenslauf, o. D. [1938], UAG PA Sterzinger Othmar *1.4.1879. Mally an den Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät, Graz 19.11.1941, UAG PA Sterzinger Othmar *1.4.1879. Zur Situation der Hilfskräfte im psychologischen Laboratorium siehe auch ÖStA/AVA Unterricht UM allg. Akten 956, Universität Graz GZ 354.474/1939. REM, WP Tumlirz a, Berlin 18.11.1940, UAG PA Tumlirz Otto *27.7.1890.

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ge beschäftigte, so dass eine neue Ausrichtung in der Psychologie zu erwarten 173 ist, wobei T. ausserdem noch eine gute parteiliche Schulung mitbringt.

Mit der Entpflichtung Mallys ging die Leitung des psychologischen Laboratoriums im November 1942 erwartungsgemäß auf Tumlirz über. 174 Offen blieb aber weiterhin der Nachfolger auf Mallys Lehrstuhl. Sein Favorit war der im Juni 1939 von der Universität München gekommene Franz Kröner, der sich erst in diesem Jahr mit der (größtenteils bereits 1935 verfassten) Schrift Versuch einer Logik der Philosophie175 habilitiert hatte. Dauernden Aufenthalt nahm Kröner jedoch in Welsberg bei St. Martin im Sulmtal, von wo aus er mit der Bahn nach Graz anreisen konnte. Kröner war bereits seit dem 1. Mai 1933 Mitglied der NSDAP und wurde nach seiner Übersiedelung nach St. Martin auch formell der dortigen Ortsgruppe überwiesen.176 Nach der erfolgreichen Absolvierung der Lehrprobe wurde Kröner im April 1940 die Lehrbefugnis für Philosophie an der Universität Graz erteilt.177 Die Freundschaft von Mally und Kröner geht aber bereits weiter zurück, schließlich fand Mally schon im Vorwort von Wahrscheinlichkeit und Gesetz (1938) dankende Worte für ihn.178 Auch philosophisch standen sie sich, besonders in der vehementen Ablehnung des Positivismus, durchaus nahe. Schließlich befand Mally Kröners jüngere Schriften nicht nur als „für die wissenschaftliche Philosophie“, sondern auch „in weltanschaulicher Hinsicht bedeutsam“ 179. In der Lehre arbeiteten Mally und Kröner eng zusammen, die Vorlesung „Wissenschaft 173

174 175 176

177 178 179

III. Hochschule und Wissenschaft. Lage der Psychologie, 14.3.1941, 3f., StLA SLG 20. Jh., Kt. 403, Heft „Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer SS, SDAbschnitt Graz, Lageberichte 1941“. Brezinka 2003, 188. Kröner 1939. BArch (ehem. BDC), Gaukartei, Kröner Franz *12.12.1889. Kröner nahm aktiv am parteipolitischen Leben im Bezirk („Landkreis“) Deutschlandsberg teil. Noch im März 1945 schwadronierte er bei einem von Kreisleiter Dr. Hugo Suette einberufenen Appell über die „keinerlei Außenseiter mehr duldende Dringlichkeit des Einsatzes jedes Einzelnen im Rahmen des Volksganzen“. (Weststeirische Rundschau 24.3.1945, 3.) Der Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät Zl. 1229, Graz 4.4.1940, UAG PA Kröner Franz *12.12.1889. Zur Biographie Kröners vgl. Tilitzki 2002, 729–733. Später rezensierte Kröner dieses Buch, vgl. Kröner 1942. Beilage 2 zur Drucklegung der Habilitationsschrift, Graz 16.12.1940, UAG PA Kröner Franz *12.12.1889.

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und Weltanschauung“ im Sommersemester 1941 hielten sie gemeinsam.180 In der Folgezeit übernahm Kröner dann die einschlägigen weltanschaulichen Lehrveranstaltungen.181 Was nun die Nachfolge angeht, wurde vom Reichsminister entschieden, dass die Fakultät den einstweiligen Vertreter von Mally selbst zu bestellen habe.182 So wurde Kröner im Wintersemester 1942/43 zumindest mit der Abhaltung von Mallys Pflichtlehrveranstaltungen betraut. Gleichzeitig wurde aber festgehalten, dass die zeitweilige Vertretung der freien Lehrkanzel mit ihrer [Kröners; M. R.] künftigen Besetzung in keinem Zusammenhange steht und keinen wie immer 183 gearteten Anspruch begründet.

Offenbar erfreute sich Kröner an der Fakultät keiner besonderen Wertschätzung, denn Dekan Maull reihte ihn gar nur unter die „zweit- und drittrangigen Leute“ ein.184 So bevorzugte die Mehrheit der Fakultät bei der Besetzung von Mallys freigewordenem Lehrstuhl den in Gießen tätigen Hermann Glockner. Mally nahm von Schwanberg aus Anteil an der Nachfolgeregelung, ohne darauf aber entscheidend Einfluss nehmen zu können: „Auf wie wenig Dinge ist Verlaß“ schrieb er im März 1943, [i]ch glaubte meine Nachfolge im Lehramt recht gesichert, so wie ich sie mir unter den herrschenden Verhältnissen wünschen konnte. Jetzt erfahr ich, daß alles in höchster Gefahr ist, vielleicht schon umgeworfen – durch ein plumpes 185 Tier.

Im Dezember desselben Jahres notierte Mally fast schon resignierend:

180 181

182 183 184 185

Tilitzki 2002, 1259. „Deutscher Geist und westlicher Geist. Philosophiegeschichte in zeitgemäßer Auffassung“ (SS 1941), „Ethik im Geiste des Nationalsozialismus“ (WS 1941), „Die Philosophie unserer Zeit, gesehen vom Standpunkt des Nationalsozialismus“ (SS 1942) und noch weitere; vgl. Sauer 1985, 83. REM WP Nr. 2546/1946 (Abschrift), Berlin 17.10.1942, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Der Rektor der Reichsuniversität Graz, Rekt.-Z. 1935 ex. 1942/43, Graz 13.11.1942, UAG PA Kröner Franz *12.12.1889. Zum Grazer Berufungsverfahren vgl. Tilitzki 2002, 786–789. Mally an Laurin, 20.3.1943.

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Kröner ist leider nicht durchgedrungen; Herm[ann] Glockner wird mein Nachfolger – wenn der Lehrstuhl sich nicht aufbäumt und ihn gewaltsam abwirft. 186 Bisher hat er dem Kampf gegen den Widersinn gedient…

Letztlich sollte das Verfahren um die Berufung doch noch eine Wendung nehmen, die Mally aber nicht mehr erlebte. Durch die umfangreiche (im Nachlass aufliegende) Korrespondenz mit Gertraud Laurin hat man in der Tat, wie Mally selbst schrieb, ein „sehr genaues Bild meines Schwanberger Lebens“ 187. Nach dem ersten längeren Aufenthalt ab August 1941 übersiedelte Mally am 21. Juli 1942 nun auf Dauer in den weststeirischen Markt. Er fand sich in der Pension „Thea“ unter „vielen Kindern, Müttern und Grossmüttern“ 188 wieder, und das nicht zufällig: Bereits 1941 wurden von der NSV acht Zimmer für die „Beherbergung luftgefährdeter Familien“ aus dem „Altreich“ beschlagnahmt und belegt.189 Eben in der Zeit, in der Mally nun seinen Wohnsitz nach Schwanberg verlegte, war unter den „Bombenflüchtlingen“ ein mitunter heftiger Streit ausgebrochen. 190 Erst nach dem energischen Einschreiten des NSV-Kreisamtsleiters konnte man sich mit der Pensionsinhaberin Grete Wojatschek mehr schlecht als recht auf eine Hausordnung einigen.191 „Mütter und Kinder machen die Thea nicht gerade angenehmer“, wusste Mally in einem Brief dann auch auszusetzen und witzelte, „die Mütter sind nicht ganz so ordentlich, wie man sich die gerühmte Deutsche [!] Hausfrau denkt“192. Der Philosoph konnte (und wollte) sich

186 187 188 189 190

191

192

Mally an Kern, 2.12.1943, 8. Mally an Laurin, 24.4.1942. Mally an Laurin, 22.7.1942. Brief von Grete Wojatschek (Inhaberin der Pension „Thea“), Schwanberg 22.11.1942, StLA BH Deutschlandsberg, 6 B Ki 6-3/1942 (Kt. 291). Die Pensionsbewohner hatten sich gegenseitig sogar „mit Zucker beworfen“ (Amtsvermerk des Landrates Deutschlandsberg, 31.10.1942, StLA BH Deutschlandsberg, 6 B Ki 6-4/1942 (Kt. 291)). „Abgesehen davon, fährt Frau Wojatschek auch weiterhin fort, die Frauen durch kleine versteckte Schikanen zu quälen.“ Vgl. den Bericht über das „Verhalten der Pensionsinhaberin Grete Wojatschek in Schwanberg“ von der Leiterin der Stelle Familienhilfe Deutschlandsberg, o. D. [Dezember 1942], StLA BH Deutschlandsberg, 6 B Ki 6-3/1942 (Kt. 291). Mally an Laurin, 9.7.1942.

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also nicht immer in Ruhe seiner vornehmlichen „Aufgabe“ widmen, „faul zu sein und gesund zu werden“193. Auch seines kleinen Zimmers konnte sich Mally auf Dauer nicht gewiss sein, denn mehrmals wurde es „angefordert […] für Mutter und Kind“194. Im April 1943 stand Mally offenbar vor der Delogierung: Die Zimmer sind, bis auf wenige, von der Partei beansprucht, man sagt für Bombengefährdete, und die restlichen sind, soviel bis jetzt zu sehen, nicht für 195 mich zu haben.

Nach längerem hin und her konnte sich Mally seinen Platz in der „Thea“, u. a. durch Vorweisung eines Zeugnisses, das die „Notwendigkeit des Landaufenthaltes und der Badekur“ 196 nachdrücklich bestätigte, endlich sichern. Untätig und faul war Mally in seinem Schwanberger Zimmer, „in dem es sich leben und arbeiten lässt“197, aber bestimmt nicht. Mally schrieb seit Juli 1942 an seinem (so geplanten) Hauptwerk, dem „Opus Magnum“. Im Jänner 1943 konnte Mally bereits so etwas wie ein Zwischenresümee geben: Ich bin auf klare Wahrheit aus, auf solche, die fruchtbar ist, daß das Opus, wenn wir’s erleben, ein rechter Gegensatz zu jenem Zauberbuch von 1935 werden 198 muß.

Mit Ausnahme von Franz Kröner, der ja fast schon in der Nachbarschaft wohnte, erhielt Mally eher selten Besuche von den Kollegen. Zu den Wenigen gehörten der Bonner Geschichtsphilosoph Fritz Kern und der Wiener Honorarprofessor Josef Krug, dessen Universitätskarriere überhaupt erst mit dem „Anschluss“ ihren Ausgang genommen hatte. 199 Von den Zusammenkünften mit Kern sind einige mitstenographierte Protokolle im Nachlass erhalten. Der Grazer Philosoph brachte Kern geduldig seine Lo193 194 195 196 197 198 199

Mally an Laurin, 4.8.1942. Mally an Laurin, 3.8.1942. Mally an Laurin, 3.4.1943. Mally an Laurin, 29.4.1943. Mally an Laurin, 30.12.1942. Mally an Laurin, 20.1.1943. Krug, seit 1932 Mitglied der NSDAP, war bis 1938 Mittelschullehrer. (Heiß 1993, 143–144.)

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gik und Sinnphilosophie nahe. 200 Daneben begutachtete Mally in Schwanberg noch einige Dissertationen und nahm auch vereinzelt Prüfungen ab.201 „Sonst hab ich mit der Hohen Schule von Graz so gut wie keine Verbindung und mir ist’s recht.“202 Diese Abgeschiedenheit vom Grazer „Betrieb“, wie Mally nun gerne etwas abschätzig zu sagen pflegte, 203 brachte es mit sich, dass er vom Tode Carl Siegels204 im Februar 1943 erst durch die Zeitung erfuhr. 205 Die Nachricht von Siegels Tode hat mich freilich betrübt, und auch nachdenklicher gemacht. […] In jedem Fall fühl ich die Mahnung; es ist nötig zu arbeiten 206 bevor es zu spät wird.

Mally blickt in den Schwanberger Briefen öfters auf sein Leben zurück. Dieses sei „immer noch so fern vom Fertigsein“ 207 und „in unerfülltem Streben stecken geblieben“208. Seine Gesundheit hatte sich in Schwanberg zwar öfters kurzfristig, aber alles in allem nicht zum Besseren gewandt; die „rheumatischen Teufeleien“209 zwangen Mally in den Rollstuhl. 210 Im Bewusstsein um seinen gesundheitlichen Zustand und im starken Wunsche, der Nachwelt ein voluminöses, reifes Werk zu hinterlassen, rang sich Mally noch einmal alles ab.

200

201 202 203 204

205 206 207 208 209 210

„Der Kern ist doch ein Ungeheuer. […] [W]enn er da ist, lässt er sich nicht zu menschlichen Maßen seines wilden Philosophierens bändigen.“ (Mally an Laurin, 28.8.1942.) Mally an Laurin, 10.4.1943 und 28.11.1943. Mally an Laurin, 15.12.1942. Ebd. Siegel kam bei einem Straßenbahnunfall ums Leben. Vgl. Grundbuchsblatt, o. D., UAG PA Siegel Carl *19.8.1872 und die Nachrufe in der Tagespost (Graz), 16.2.1943, 4, und der Kleinen Zeitung 17.2.1943, 6. Mally an Laurin, 18.2.1943. Mally an Laurin, 17.2.1943. Mally an Laurin, 13.11.1942. Mally an Laurin, 8.5.1943. Mally an Laurin, 19.7.1943. „Neu ist in meinem äußeren Dasein, daß ich des öfteren eine kleine Spazierfahrt unternehme, leider nur auf eine sehr passive Weise, im Rollstuhl.“ (Brief Mallys an Robert Unterkreuter, Schwanberg 1.7.1943, UAG PA Mally Ernst *11.10.1879.)

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Im März 1943 war Mally anlässlich der feierlichen Überreichung seiner Entpflichtungsurkunde vermutlich das letzte Mal in Graz. 211 Auch wenn Mally in mehreren Briefen das – verglichen mit Graz – „wohltätige“ und geruhsame Schwanberger Landleben pries, machten sich auch hier im Alltag des Jahres 1943 Kriegsverlauf und Kriegsdauer bemerkbar. Am unmittelbarsten wohl durch die „Luftgefahr, die wir immer mehr zu spüren bekommen“212. Auch die Situation in der „Thea“ wurde nicht gerade günstiger, mit Jahresanfang 1944 kündigten sich weitere „Kriegerfrauen“ und Urlauberinnen an. Zudem war Mally im Jänner gesundheitlich bereits so angeschlagen, dass er beim Ankleiden auf fremde Hilfe angewiesen war.213 Seinen letzten Brief, natürlich an Gertraud Laurin, verfasste er am 3. März 1944: Bettlägerig darf ich bei den gegenwärtigen Verhältnissen nicht werden. Es ist ja niemand für die Gesunden da, und zur Pflege eines Kranken wäre niemand auf214 zutreiben.

Am 8. März 1944 um etwa 7:30 verstarb Ernst Mally, 64-jährig, in Schwanberg infolge einer fiebrigen Erkrankung.215 Innerhalb eines Jahres muß die Universität Graz den Tod aller drei früher an ihr wirkenden Ordinarien der Philosophie und Pädagogik beklagen

schrieb Otto Tumlirz im ausführlichen Nachruf am 13. März 1944 in der Grazer Tagespost, „Carl Siegel und Eduard Martinak 216 ist nun auch Ernst Mally nachgefolgt“. Tumlirz, nach Mallys Tod der einzige verbliebene Ordinarius am „Institut für Philosophie, Psychologie, Pädagogik“ (so hieß es ab dem WS 1943/44)217, gab sich im Nachruf zuversichtlich, dass „Mallys Werk nicht ein Bruchstück bleiben wird“, da „seine Freunde über 211 212 213 214 215

216 217

Marburger Zeitung 30.3.1943, 6. Mally an Laurin, 11.12.1943. Am 3.2.1944 schrieb Mally an Laurin: „Gern machen die Feinde uns am Sonntag Alarm – sonst auch fast jeden Tag.“ Mally an Laurin, 27.1.1944 und 3.2.1944. Mally an Laurin, 3.3.1944. Sterbeurkunde, Schwanberg 20.3.1944, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879; vgl. auch Wolf 1971, 4, sowie Tagespost (Graz) 16.3.1944, 4. Martinak, bereits seit 1930 im Ruhestand, ist am 4. August 1943 in Klagenfurt verstorben. (Brezinka 2003, 169.) Schönafinger 1994, 30.

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den Fortschritt der Arbeit und seine Gedankengänge genau unterrichtet“ gewesen seien.218 Darin sollte Tumlirz recht behalten, wenn bis dahin auch noch einige Jahrzehnte vergehen mussten. An die Abhaltung einer Gedenkveranstaltung zu Ehren des Verstorbenen war angesichts des ressourcenknappen Kriegsalltags offenbar nicht mehr zu denken. Auch das sollte spät, aber doch nachgeholt werden. Für Mally war bereits im Dezember 1943 absehbar gewesen, dass Franz Kröner sich nicht als sein Nachfolger durchsetzen wird. Im Frühjahr 1944 schienen sich Kröners Chancen allerdings wieder deutlich gebessert zu haben, da Hermann Glockner dem Ruf in die steiermärkische Landeshauptstadt, wohl wegen Wohnungsmangel, nicht nachkam. Das Nachrücken Kröners wusste einmal mehr Dekan Maull zu verhindern: Er bekundete nun beim zuständigen Reichsministerium (REM) telefonisch sein Interesse am zuletzt in Frankfurt am Main wirkenden Ferdinand Weinhandl.219 Dieser war, wie bereits erwähnt, nach der Promotion bei Meinong 1919 nach München verzogen und habilitierte sich schließlich 1922 in Kiel. Nachdem 1927 die Berufung nach Graz nicht zustande kam, wurde er noch im selben Jahr in Kiel zum außerordentlichen Professor ernannt.220 Ab dem Jahre 1933 erarbeitete sich der gebürtige Judenburger zielstrebig den Ruf eines führenden Nazi-Philosophen.221 Bereits bei der Bücherverbrennung in Kiel am 10. Mai 1933 setzte er als einer der Hauptredner ein Ausrufezeichen. 222 Von 1936 bis 1938 war Weinhandl als Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät in Kiel am Höhepunkt seiner universitären Karriere angelangt. Im April 1942 wurde er nach Frankfurt berufen, 218

219 220 221

222

Tumlirz 1944, 3; Max Holthausen vom „Wissenschaftlichen Pressedienst“ übernahm Tumlirz‘ Text fast wortwörtlich; vgl. Hochschulkorrespondenz, Wissenschaftlicher Pressedienst Nr. 64, 16.3.1944, StLA Hochschulreferat 1945, Mally Ernst *11.10.1879. Einen kurzen Nachruf, mit dem Hinweis auf Mallys untersteirische Herkunft, druckte auch die Marburger Zeitung 15.3.1944, 4. Tilitzki 2002, 789. Curriculum vitae, Graz 21.6.1946, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 6. Seit 1. Mai 1933 war Weinhandl Mitglied der NSDAP, Mitgliedsnummer 2.730.351. (BArch (ehem. BDC), Gaukartei, Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896.) Seit November 1933 gehörte er auch der SA an. Vgl. etwa den Abriss „Ferdinand Weinhandl als Beispiel nationalsozialistischer Geisteswissenschaftler“, URL: http://www.uni-kiel.de/ns-zeit/allgemein/weinhandl.shtml (abgerufen am 31.12.2014).

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und noch im Februar 1943 war Weinhandl im „Reichskommissariat Ostland“ sowie in Kroatien als Redner mit Themen wie „Geistesströmungen im Ostraum“ im Einsatz.223 Im Sommer 1944, Glockner hatte der Universität Graz bereits eine Absage erteilt, war Weinhandls Stern in Frankfurt im Sinken begriffen. Das hatte nach einem zeitgenössischen Bericht des dortigen Studentenführers folgenden Grund: Ich habe weiter den Eindruck, dass Professor Weinhandl gegenüber dem Gauleiter nicht zu halten ist, ja, er ist konfessionell sehr stark gebunden, sodass er 224 auch kaum mehr in Frage kommt.

Überdies war Weinhandls Wohnung in Frankfurt durch einen Bombenangriff fast völlig zerstört worden. Der Ruf nach Graz kam ihm daher wohl sehr gelegen, zumal er bei seiner Mutter Aufnahme finden konnte. 225 Das REM brauchte dem beiderseitigen Berufungswunsch nur mehr zu entsprechen und verlieh Weinhandl „die durch das Ausscheiden des Professors Mally freigewordene planmäßige Professur für Philosophie“ an der Universität Graz.226 In dieser Eigenschaft verblieb Weinhandl bis zu seiner Entlassung aus dem Dienstverhältnis im Juli 1946. 227 Mit Weinhandl als seinem Nachfolger hatte Mally jedenfalls nicht gerechnet. Nach dem Grazer Berufungsverfahren 1927 war Weinhandl offenbar aus seinem Blickfeld verschwunden, denn Weinhandls spätere Arbeiten kannte Mally nur mehr „teilweise genauer“228. Glaubt man aber den Angaben von Viktor 223 224

225 226 227 228

Der Rektor der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main 22.12.1942, BArch R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand). NSDStB [Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund] (Auszug), Frankfurt am Main 23.7.1944, BArch VBS 307, 8200003374 (Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896). Weinhandls Angaben im 1946 verfassten Lebenslauf über sein Ausscheiden in Frankfurt scheinen damit den Tatsachen zu entsprechen. Vgl. Curriculum vitae, Graz 21.6.1946, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 6. Vgl. die Eingabe Weinhandls an Rektor Fischl, Graz 6.2.1949, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 60. REM WP 1779/44, Berlin 13.11.1944, BArch R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand); vgl. auch Marburger Zeitung 2.4.1945, 2. Rückwirkend mit 5. Juni 1945. (ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 44.) Mally an den Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät in Kiel, Graz 11.5.1935, BArch, R 4901, 25.609 (Weinhandl Ferdinand).

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Geramb229, dann wäre Mally der Berufung Weinhandls sehr positiv gegenübergestanden: Über Weinhandls wissenschaftliche Qualität brauche ich nicht zu reden, ich teile dazu nur mit, daß Ernst Mally, der nichts weniger als ein Nazi gewesen ist, mir schon 1930 gesagt hat, daß er niemanden lieber als seinen Nachfolger sehen würde als Wein230 handl.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der NS-Herrschaft gingen lediglich aus dem engeren Freundeskreis Mallys einige Impulse zur Wachhaltung seiner Philosophie aus. Sein ehemaliger Schüler Karl Wolf, der von 1940 bis 1945 in der Wehrmacht diente, veröffentlichte 1947 die Ethische Naturbetrachtung, die er „[d]em Andenken Ernst Mallys“ widmete. Hierin greift er u. a. die Wertphilosophie seines Lehrers auf und entwickelt sie weiter.231 Dieses Buch reichte Wolf zusammen mit einer kleineren Abhandlung 1948 als Habilitationsschrift an der Philosophischen Fakultät in Graz ein; das Habilitationsverfahren zog sich bis zur positiven Erledigung aber noch bis 1950 hin.232 Es benötigte auch wieder die Initiative von Wolf, bis im November 1950 an der Universität Graz eine Gedenkveranstaltung für Ernst Mally abgehalten wurde. 233 Mallys Nachlass wiederum war nach seinem „Letzten Willen“ 234 an Martha Sobotka übergegangen, die daraus im März 1948 die schriftliche Fassung des Vortrags „Das Wesen der Naturgesetzlichkeit“ veröffentlichte.235 Mallys weitgediehenes, aber eben nicht fertiges „Opus“, blieb vorerst noch unbearbeitet. In den Folgejahren war in der philosophischen 229

230 231 232 233

234 235

Professor für Volkskunde an der Universität Graz. 1939 wurde Geramb von seiner Lehrtätigkeit entbunden, nach Kriegsende 1945 konnte er dieselbe wieder aufnehmen. Erklärung Gerambs über Weinhandl, 2.2.1949, ÖStA/AdR UWK BMU 2Rep PA Weinhandl Ferdinand *31.1.1896, 70. Wolf 1947. Brezinka 2003, 220–222; hauptberuflich war Karl Wolf bis 1960 in Grazer Gymnasien tätig. Karl Wolf referierte über „Wirklichkeit und Wert“, dazu sprach Johann Mokre, nunmehr ordentlicher Professor für Rechtsphilosophie in Graz, über „Gegenstandstheorie und Logistik“. (Kleine Zeitung 15.11.1950, 9.) Martha Sobotka, Vorwort in: Mally 1971, 31f. Mally 1948; diesen Vortrag hielt Mally (erstmals) bereits im November 1932 an der Universität Graz.

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Fachliteratur nur sehr wenig über Ernst Mally zu lesen. In der Hauptsache war es eben einmal mehr Karl Wolf, der sich weiterhin mit den Schriften und dem Nachlass seines Lehrers beschäftigte und dazu auch einiges publizierte.236 „Und mein Arbeiten ist auch nicht umsonst“ schrieb Mally einen Monat vor seinem Tod, „oder nur für eine dämmrige ferne Zukunft“ 237. 1971 war es unter der Federführung von Karl Wolf und Paul Weingartner endlich soweit, dass Mallys „O. M.“ akribisch editiert als Großes Logikfragment erscheinen konnte.238 Gleichzeitig war dies die erste große Publikation zu Mallys Philosophie in der Nachkriegszeit, die auch die Beschäftigung mit derselben wieder langsam in Gang brachte. Markus Roschitz Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz [email protected]

236 237 238

Angemerkt wird, dass sich Wolfs Aufsätze über Mallys Philosophie in wesentlichen Teilen, teils sogar wortwörtlich, gleichen. Mally an Laurin, 12.2.1944. In diesem Werk macht Mally nun kein Hehl mehr daraus, wie sehr er sich von der Gegenstandstheorie entfremdet hat; vgl. Mally 1971, besonders 56.

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Literatur Ameseder, Rudolf / Mally, Ernst (1902), „Zur experimentellen Begründung der Methode des Rechtschreib-Unterrichtes“, in: Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie, Pathologie und Hygiene 4, 381–441. Antonelli, Mauro (1994), Die experimentelle Analyse des Bewusstseins bei Vittorio Benussi (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie Bd. 21), Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi. Brezinka, Wolfgang (2003), Pädagogik in Österreich. Die Geschichte des Faches an den Universitäten vom 18. bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, Bd. 2: Pädagogik an den Universitäten Prag, Graz und Innsbruck, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Brunswik, Egon (1936), „[Rezension von] Ernst Mally, Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit“, in: Zeitschrift für Psychologie 139 (4–6), 384–386. Dölling, Evelyn (1999), „Wahrheit suchen und Wahrheit bekennen.“ Alexius Meinong: Skizze seines Lebens (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie Bd. 28), Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi. Dölling, Evelyn (2001), „Alexius Meinong. Von der Philosophischen Societät zum Philosophischen Seminar“, in: Th. Binder et al. (Hrsg.), Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Graz (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie Bd. 33), Amsterdam / New York: Rodopi, 149–172. Findlay, John N. (1933), Meinong’s Theory of Objects, London: Oxford University Press. Findlay, John N. (1985), „My Life 1903–1973“, in: R. S. Cohen et al. (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of J. N. Findlay, New York: State University of New York Press, 1–51. Fisher, Donald F. (1914), „[Rezension von] Ernst Mally, Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik“, in: The Philosophical Review 23 (4), 470–471. Goller, Peter (2001), „Rechtsphilosophie an der Universität Graz (1848– 1945). Eine Disziplin im Sog kulturwissenschaftlicher Strömungen?“ in: Th. Binder et al. (Hrsg.), Bausteine zu einer Geschichte der Philo-

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sophie an der Universität Graz (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie Bd. 33), Amsterdam / New York: Rodopi, 641–656. Grebe, Wilhelm (1938), „[Rezension von] Ernst Mally, Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit“, in: Blätter für deutsche Philosophie. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft 11, 217–219. Heiß, Gernot (1993), „‚… wirkliche Möglichkeiten für eine nationalsozialistische Philosophie?‘ Die Reorganisation der Philosophie (Psychologie und Pädagogik) in Wien 1938 bis 1940“, in: K. R. Fischer / F. M. Wimmer (Hrsg.), Der geistige Anschluß. Philosophie und Politik an der Universität Wien 1930–1950, Wien: WUV-UniversitätsVerlag, 130–169. Höflechner, Walter (1985), „Zur Geschichte der Universität Graz“, in: K. Freisitzer et al. (Hrsg.), Tradition und Herausforderung. 400 Jahre Universität Graz, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 3– 76. Höflechner, Walter (2006), Geschichte der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz. Von den Anfängen bis in das Jahr 2005, Graz: Grazer Universitäts-Verlag. Klee, Ernst (2007), Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945, zweite Auflage, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer. Korotin, Ilse (2007), „Deutsche Philosophen aus Sicht des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichsführers SS – Dossier: Ernst Mally“, in: C. Klingemann (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 167–175. Kröner, Franz (1939), Versuch einer Logik der Philosophie, Habilitationsschrift, München, Univ. Kröner, Franz (1942), „[Rezension von] Ernst Mally, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Gesetz“, in: Blätter für deutsche Philosophie. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Philosophischen Gesellschaft 15, 218–220. Leaman, George / Simon Gerd (o. J.), „SD über Philosophie-Professoren“, URL = http://homepages.uni-tuebingen.de/gerd.simon/philosophen-dossiers.pdf, abgerufen am 31.12.2014. Leske, Monika (1990), Philosophen im „Dritten Reich“. Studie zu Hochschul- und Philosophiebetrieb im faschistischen Deutschland, Berlin: Dietz.

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Mally, Ernst (1900), „Abstraktion und Aehnlichkeits-Erkenntnis“, in: Archiv für systematische Philosophie 6 (3), 291–310. Mally, Ernst (1904), „Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens“, in: A. Meinong (Hrsg.), Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth, 121–262. Mally, Ernst (1909a), „Grundgesetze der Determination“, in: Th. Elsenhans (Hrsg.), Bericht über den III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg 1. bis 5. September 1908, Heidelberg: Winter, 862–867. Mally, Ernst (1909b), „Gegenstandstheorie und Mathematik“, in: Th. Elsenhans (Hrsg.), Bericht über den III. Internationalen Kongress für Philosophie zu Heidelberg 1. bis 5. September 1908, Heidelberg: Winter, 881–886. Mally, Ernst (1912), Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik, Ergänzungsheft zu Bd. 148 der Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, Leipzig: Barth. Mally, Ernst (1915), „Stephan Witasek“, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 158, 95–97. Mally, Ernst (1921/22), „Alexius Meinongs philosophische Arbeit“, in: Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus 2 (2), 31–37. Mally, Ernst (1922), „Studien zur Theorie der Möglichkeit und Ähnlichkeit. Allgemeine Theorie der Verwandtschaft gegenständlicher Bestimmungen“, in: Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien. Philosophisch-historische Klasse Bd. 194, 1–131. Mally, Ernst (1926), Grundgesetze des Sollens. Elemente der Logik des Willens, Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. Mally, Ernst (1931), „Gehalt, Gestalt und Wertung des Kunstwerkes“, in: Vierteljahresschrift für Jugendkunde 1 (2), 81–98. Mally, Ernst (1934), „Wesen und Dasein des Volkes“, in: Volksspiegel. Zeitschrift für Deutsche Soziologie und Volkswissenschaft 2 (2), 70– 77. Mally, Ernst (1935), Erlebnis und Wirklichkeit. Einleitung zur Philosophie der Natürlichen Weltauffassung, Leipzig: Klinkhardt.

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Mally, Ernst (1936), „Alexius Meinong“, in: Neue Österreichische Biographie Bd. 8, 90–100. Mally, Ernst (1938a), Wahrscheinlichkeit und Gesetz. Ein Beitrag zur wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretischen Begründung der Naturwissenschaft, Berlin: de Gruyter. Mally, Ernst (1938b), Anfangsgründe der Philosophie. Leitfaden für den Philosophischen Einführungsunterricht an höheren Schulen, Wien / Leipzig: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. Mally, Ernst (1940), „Zur Frage der ‚objektiven Wahrheit‘“, in: Wissenschaftliches Jahrbuch der Universität Graz, Graz: Steirische Verlagsanstalt, 177–197. Mally, Ernst (1948), „Das Wesen der Naturgesetzlichkeit“, in: Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Pädagogik und Psychologie 2 (1), 1–17. Mally, Ernst (1971), Logische Schriften. Großes Logikfragment – Grundgesetze des Sollens, hrsg. von K. Wolf und P. Weingartner, Dordrecht: Reidel. Martinak, Eduard (1925), Meinong als Mensch und als Lehrer. Worte der Erinnerung, Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky. Meinong, Alexius (1921), „A. Meinong [Selbstdarstellung]“, in: R. Schmidt (Hrsg.), Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen Bd. 1, Leipzig: Meiner, 91–150 (zitiert nach: R. Haller / R. Kindinger (Hrsg.), Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe Bd. VII, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt 1978, 1–62). Meinong, Alexius (1923), Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie, hrsg. von E. Mally, Graz: Leuschner & Lubensky (zitiert nach: R. Haller / R. Kindinger (Hrsg.), Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe Bd. III, Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt 1968, 469–656). Meinong, Alexius / Adler, Guido (1995), Alexius Meinong und Guido Adler. Eine Freundschaft in Briefen, hrsg. von G. J. Eder (= Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie Bd. 24), Amsterdam / Atlanta: Rodopi. Müller, Reinhard (1993), „Johann Mokre (1901–1981). Rechtsphilosoph und Soziologe“, in: Archiv für die Geschichte der Soziologie in Österreich, Newsletter Nr. 8, 12–17.

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Unveröffentlichte Quellen / Siglen239 BArch = Bundesarchiv Berlin BDC = Berlin Document Center BMU = Bundesministerium für Unterricht Gutachten zu Findlay = Sondersammlung der UB Graz, Nachlass Ernst Mally, III. Varia, 2) Gutachten zur Doktorarbeit J. N. Findlays „Meinong's Theory of Objects“ 1933. Leitgedanken = Sondersammlung der UB Graz, Nachlass Ernst Mally, II. Vorlesungen, A) Kolleghefte zu Vorlesungen, 29) Leitgedanken der Völkerpsychologie 3. Trimester 1940. Mally an Kern = Sondersammlung der UB Graz, Nachlass Ernst Mally, IV. Angereicherter Nachlass, III. Abschriften von Briefen und Gesprächen, 1) Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel Mally und Fritz Kern. Mally an Laurin = Sondersammlung der UB Graz, Nachlass Ernst Mally, IV. Angereicherter Nachlass, III. Abschriften von Briefen und Gesprächen, 3) Briefe an Gertraut Laurin. Mally an Pichler = Sondersammlung der UB Graz, Nachlass Ernst Mally, IV. Angereicherter Nachlass, III. Abschriften von Briefen und Gesprächen, 2) Wissenschaftlicher Brief Mallys an Franz Pichler. ÖStA/AVA = Österreichisches Staatsarchiv / Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv ÖStA/AdR = Österreichisches Staatsarchiv / Archiv der Republik ÖStA/KA = Österreichisches Staatsarchiv / Kriegsarchiv PA = Personalakt REM = Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung StLA = Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv UAG = Universitätsarchiv Graz UB Graz = Universitätsbibliothek Graz 239

Abkürzungen, die nur Teile von Archivsignaturen sind (wie etwa „Pers Quall HR“ oder „UWK“), wurden hier nicht aufgelöst.