Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy 3030409465, 9783030409463

Table of contents :
Editorial
Contents
Part I: Brentano and Austrian Philosophy
Chapter 1: Introduction: Franz Brentano in Vienna
1.1 Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl
1.2 Brentano and the Vienna Circle
1.3 Brentano and the History of Philosophy
Chapter 2: Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality
2.1 Ancient and Medieval Background
2.2 Husserl, Bolzano and Frege
2.3 Bolzano
2.4 The Tripartite Distinction Act-Noema-Object
2.5 Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality
2.6 Some Further Features of Husserl’s View
2.7 Object
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality and the Interpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy
2.8.1.1 Aristotle
2.8.1.2 Husserl
2.8.1.3 Conflicting Interpretations of Aristotle
2.8.1.4 Aristotle and Husserl
References
Chapter 3: Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: From Brentano to Husserl to the Logic of Consciousness
3.1 Introduction: Brentano’s Legacy in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind
3.2 Descriptive Psychology, Phenomenology, and the Structure of Consciousness: From Brentano to Husserl
3.3 From Psychology to Phenomenology: Ideal/Logical Content in Consciousness
3.4 The Logic of the Phenomena of Consciousness: Meaning and Modality
3.5 The Ontology of Contents: From Phenomena to Their Species to Their Meaning
3.6 “Intentional In-Existence”: A Modal Theory
3.7 “Inner Consciousness”: A Modal Theory
3.8 Coda: Phenomenal Consciousness in Recent Philosophy of Mind
References
Chapter 4: Brentano’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology
4.1 Franz Brentano’s Family Connection to Newman’s Catholic University
4.2 Brentano’s New Psychology
4.3 Husserl’s Conception of Descriptive Psychology (1891–1902)
4.4 Wilhelm Dilthey’s Concept of Descriptive Psychology
4.5 Brentano’s Mereological ‘ABC of Consciousness’
4.6 The Priority of Descriptive Psychology as a Science
4.7 Introspection and Inner Perception
4.8 The Fundamental Class of Presentations
4.9 Brentano on Mental Content and Intentional Object
4.10 Husserl’s Emerging Concept of Phenomenology and His Rejection of Descriptive Psychology
4.11 Husserl’s Departure from Descriptive Psychology (c. 1902)
Chapter 5: Brentano on Phenomenology and Philosophy as a Science
5.1 The Grand Project of Philosophy as a Science
5.2 Theoretical Exactness and Empirical Research in Psychology
5.3 The Complementarity of Descriptive and Genetic Psychology
5.4 Some Cases of Complementarity
5.5 Final Remarks
References
Archive Materials
Chapter 6: Brentano’s Appointment to the University of Vienna
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Brentano’s Background
6.3 Brentano’s Call to Vienna
6.4 Brentano’s Inaugural Lecture: Its Content...
6.5 ... and Its Reception
6.6 A Brief Look at Brentano’s Work in Vienna
Unpublished Sources
Universitätsarchiv Wien (UAW)
Haupstaatsarchiv Wien (HstAW)
Franz Brentano-Archiv Graz
References
Chapter 7: Intentionality in the Vienna Circle
7.1 Cautionary Remarks About Two Received Views
7.2 Relations of First Vienna Circle Members to the Brentano School
7.3 Schlick on Intentionality
7.4 Carnap’s Aufbau on the Intentional Relation
7.5 Carnap’s “Behaviorism”: Its Precursors and Its Meaning
7.6 Carnap’s Later Position: Psychological Terms as Theoretical Terms
7.7 Neurath on Intentionality
7.8 Summary
Appendix: Carnap, Intentionality and the Thesis of Extensionality
References
Chapter 8: (Dis-)Similarities: Remarks on “Austrian” and “German” Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century
References
Chapter 9: Learning from Lasaulx: The Origins of Brentano’s Four Phases Theory
Chapter 10: Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Contact Between Philosophers
10.3 Direct Influence
10.4 Indirect Influence
10.5 Identification of Influence
10.6 Brentano’s Contact with Other Philosophers
10.7 Twardowski’s Case
10.8 Direct and Indirect Successors of Brentano in Poland
10.9 Brentano’s Followers and Critics in the Lvov-Warsaw School
10.9.1 Conception of Philosophy: Various Interpretations
10.9.2 Analytic Method
10.9.3 Elements of Bretano’s Thought in the Logical Branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School
10.9.3.1 Idiogenic (or Existential) Conception of Judgments
10.9.3.2 Syllogistics
10.9.3.3 Theory of Truth and its Criteria
10.9.3.4 Definition vs Verdeutlichung
10.9.4 Brentanian Elements in the Psychological Branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School
10.9.4.1 Descriptive Versus Physiological Psychology
10.9.4.2 Psychic Phenomena: Their Specifics, Classification and Regularities
10.9.5 Ontology
10.9.5.1 Conception of Existence
10.9.5.2 Ontic Categories
10.9.6 Ethics
10.9.7 Historiosophy
10.10 Brentano in the Eyes of Representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School
10.10.1 General Rating of Brentanism
10.10.2 Awareness of the Novelty of Brentanism
10.11 The Scale of Brentano’s Influences in Poland
References
Chapter 11: How Many Terms Does a Judgement Have? Jerusalem Versus Brentano
11.1 Two Conceptions of Judgement
11.2 Jerusalem’s Circularity Argument Against Brentano’s Judgement Primitivism
11.3 The Token Complexity Thesis and the Linguistic Articulation Argument
11.4 The Argument from the Judgement Function
11.5 Responding to the Argument from the Judgement Function
11.6 Conclusion
References
Chapter 12: Brentano and J. Stuart Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism
12.1 The Background of Brentano’s Relationship with Mill and Positivism
12.2 Mill’s Permanent Possibilities of Sensation
12.3 The Case of Pain in Psychology
12.4 Phenomenalism vs. Indirect Realism
12.5 Final Remarks on Intentional Correlation
Chapter 13: Ist die Unterscheidung von Ganzheit und Summe eine sachliche? Bemerkungen zum Vortrage Prof. Schlicks „Über den Begriff der Ganzheit”
13.1 Editorial Note
Chapter 14: Franz Brentanos Kritik der Antimetaphysiker
14.1 Editorial Note
Chapter 15: Gestaltpsychologie
15.1 Editorische Vorbemerkung
Part II: General Part
Chapter 16: Carnap’s Second Aufbau and David Lewis’s Aufbau
16.1 Carnap’s Second Aufbau
16.2 The Construction Basis
16.3 The Construction Method
16.4 Is the Physicalist Aufbau Philosophically Viable?
16.5 Historical Questions
References
Chapter 17: Carnap and Wittgenstein on Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932. Some Further Aspects of the Priority-Dispute Over Physicalism
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Carnap’s Views on the Meaning of Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932
17.2.1 The Aufbau
17.2.2 Scheinprobleme
17.2.3 The ‘‘Universalsprache” and the ‘‘Psychologie”
17.2.3.1 The Arguments Against the Phenomenalistic Account of Physical Objects
17.2.3.2 Carnap’s Argument for the Physicalistic Account of Heteropsychological Sentences in the ‘‘Psychologie”
Carnap’s Arguments for (Kc)
Carnap’s Arguments for (Lc)
17.3 Wittgenstein’s Views on the Meaning of Autopsychological and Heteropsychological Sentences: 1929–1932
17.3.1 Wittgenstein’s Arguments
17.3.1.1 Wittgenstein’s Arguments for (Kw)
17.3.1.2 Wittgenstein’s Arguments for (Lw)
17.4 A Comparison of Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s Views
17.4.1 The Arguments for (Kw) and (Kc)
17.4.2 The Arguments Grounding (Lw) and (Lc)
17.5 The Priority-Dispute Between Carnap and Wittgenstein
17.6 Conclusions
References
Chapter 18: Scientific Communities. A History of Theories and Concepts
18.1 Introduction
18.2 “The Republic of Science”: Defending Scientific Integrity
18.3 The Scientific Community: Institutionalized Norms and Systems of Reward
18.4 Thought Collectives: Teaching or the Relevance of Audiences
18.5 A Political Theory of Science: Conflicts as Unifying Mechanisms
18.6 Investing in the Market: The Scientific Profit of Credibility
18.7 Regimes of Truth: Political Technologies, Imaginaries, and Dispositifs
18.8 Actor-Networks: ANT’s Case Against Social Explanations
18.9 Epistemic Cultures – or Transepistemic Arenas of Research?
18.10 Scientific Fields: Habitus, Scientific Capital and Common Interests
18.11 Gender, Diversity, and Innovation: The Problem of Embeddedness
18.12 Conclusions
References
Part III: Reviews
Chapter 19: Paolo Mancosu, Abstraction and Infinity. Oxford University Press, 2016
Chapter 20: Jordi Cat, Adam Tamas Tuboly (Ed.) Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives. Cham: Springer Nature, 2019
Index