European Governance and Democracy: Power and Protest in the EU 0742529347, 9780742529342

Citation preview

Richard Balme

and Didier Chabanet

European Governance and Democracy Power and Protest in the EU

European Governance and Democracy

GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE SERIES EDITOR: GARY MARKS

Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European Experience Edited by Jeffrey J. Anderson

Europeanization and Multilevel Governance: Cohesion Policy in the European Union and Britain By Ian Bache

European Governance and Democracy: Power and Protest in the EU By Richard Balme and Didier Chabanet

A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement By Michael J. Baun

Between Europeanization and Local Societies: The Space for Territorial Governance Edited by Jeanie Bukowski, Simona Piattoni, and Marc Smyrl

A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe Edited by Alan W. Cafruny and Magnus Ryner

Governing after Communism: Institutions and Policymaking By Vesselin Dimitrov, Klaus H. Goetz, and Helmut Wollmann

The New Political Economy of EMU Edited by Jeffry Frieden, Daniel Gros, and Erik Jones

Democracy beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order Edited by Michael Th. Greven and Louis W. Pauly

Common Goods: Reinventing European Integration Governance Edited by Adrienne Heritier

Differential Europe: The European Union Impact of National Policymaking By Adrienne Heritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christophe Knill, Dirk Lehmku!' Michael Teutsch, and Anne-Ct~cile Douillet

Multilevel Governance and European Integration By Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks

Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums, and European Integration By Simon Hug

Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Integrating Europe Edited by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow

Flexibility and European Unification: The Logic of Differentiated Integration By Alkuin Kolliker

Wiring Europe: Reshaping the European Telecommunications Regime By Giorgio Natalicchi

Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy Edited by Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer

How to Democratize the European Union . .. and Why Bother? By Philippe Schmitter

A Europe of the Air? The Airline Industry and European Integration By Martin Staniland

The European Parliament: Moving toward Democracy in the EU Edited by Bernard Steunenberg and Jacques Thomassen

The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union Edited by Amy Verdun

European Governance and Democracy Power and Protest in the Ell

Richard Balme and Didier Chabanet

ROW MAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

ROWMAN & L1TILEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2008 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Balme, Richard. European governance and democracy: power and protest in the EU / Richard Balme and Didier Chabanet. p. cm. - (Governance in Europe) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-2934-2 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7425-2934-7 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-2935-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7425-2935-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. European Union countries-Politics and government. 2. European Union. 3. Political participation-European Union countries. 4. Pressure groups-European Union countries. 5. Lobbying-European Union countries. I. Chabanet, Didier. II. Title. JN40.B35152008 322.4094-dc22 2007045934 Printed in the United States of America

@r The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

To Sidney Tarrow, an American friend

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Xl

Preface

xiii

List of Abbreviations

xv

Introduction: Collective Action and European Democracy Party Democracy in Crisis Interest Group Politics beyond Corporatism Changing Forms of Contention Collective Action and State Building European Integration and European Democracy Methodology of the Book Book Outline Notes

1

5 8 9 12 14 15 17 18

1

Approaching Collective Action The Politics of Organized Interests Understanding Social Movements Pluralism, Corporatism, and Protest: Collective Action Regimes Public Policy and the Mobilization of Interests Conclusion: Collective Action in an Expanding Polity Notes

21 22 24 28 35 39 40

2

Collective Action and Civil Society in Europe Civil Society Density Europe of Religions Organized Labor

45 47 50 53

vii

viii

Contents

Structure and Change in Civil Societies Mapping Protest and Its Repertoires Civil Society and Protest Behavior Social and Institutional Foundations of Collective Action Conclusion Notes

3

4

5

6

The Making of a Polity: Interests' Mobilization around European Institutions Policymaking in a Complex Environment Brussels: The European Interests Fair Toward a Limited Europeanization of Protest Paths of Access to European Influence Conclusion Notes European Integration and Varieties of Capitalism: The Brussels Consensus The Different Worlds of European Capitalism Business Interests and the Single Market Negotiating Social Europe The Integration of European Capitalisms Conclusion Notes

55 60 62 65 71 72

75 75 77

82 85 89 90 93 94 100 103 107 112 114

117

The European Burden: Unemployment and Political Behavior Twenty Million Unemployed: Social Exclusion and Labor Instability (Un)employment Policies at Domestic and EU Levels Mass Unemployment and Voting Behavior Organizing the Unemployed within the Member States European Marches and Altermondialist Movements Conclusion Notes

117 120 123 128 133 136 137

Beyond State-Building: Centers and Peripheries in the European Union The Organization of Territorial Interests in Europe The EU Regional Policy Structure Mobilization of Territorial Interests in the EU Current Features of European Territorial Integration Conclusion Notes

141 142 145 150 155 161 162

Contents

ix

7

Collective Action and New Rights A Window of Opportunity for Women's Rights The Environment: Think GlobaL Act Local Immigration and Citizenship: Building the Fortress Conclusion Notes

165 166 172 178 185 188

8

Interests' Mobilization in the Constitutionalization of Europe The EU Constitution and the Framing of Collective Action Gender, Citizenship, and Religion: Controversies Regarding the Values of the EU The Social Dimension Making Up the EU Democratic Deficit Alternative Mobilizations Conclusion Notes

191 193

9

The Regulation of Interest Groups in the European Union The Abortive European Parliament Initial Attempt at Regulation Implementing the Ford and Nordmann Reports: No Easy Matter The European Commission and the "Organized European Civil Society" Interest Groups, Ethics, and the Construction of the General Interest Transparency at the Heart of European "Culture Shock" Emergence of the Alter-EU Movement Conclusion' Notes

196 198 202 204 206 207 209 210 212 216 219 223 225 229 229

Conclusion: European Democracy and Social Justice Patterns of Europeanization of Collective Action Interests' Influence and the European Polity Insiders and Outsiders Social Justice as a Challenge for Europe Note

235 236 239 241 247 248

Bibliography

249

Index

263

About the Authors

267

Figures and Tables

FIGURES Structuring Collective Action Interests Mobilization and Policymaking Civil Society Density, 2000 Patterns of Secularization 2.3. Labor Protection in OECD Countries 2.4. The Structure of Civil Society 2.5. Protest Behaviors 1999 2.6. Repertoires of Protest Behavior 2.7. Civil Society and Protest Behavior 3.1. Creation of Eurogroups by Year (frequencies) 3.2. Creation of Eurogroups by Year (cumulative frequencies) 3.3. Creation of Eurogroups by Sectors (%) 3.4. Creation of Eurogroups by Period 5.1. Assessment of the Employment Situation by Country 5.2. Reasons for Rejection of the EU Constitution in France 7.1. Membership in Women's Rights Organizations, 1999 7.2. Membership in Environment Protection Organizations, 1999 1.1. 1.2. 2.1. 2.2.

32 36 49 52 56 59 61 63 66 78 79 80 81 126 127 170 176

TABLES 1.1 Union Membership as Percentage of Eligible Workforce 1.1. Three Regimes of Collective Action in Europe xi

8 34

xii

Figures and Tables

2.1. Correlation Table between Protest and Socio-economic Indicators 2.2. Correlation Table for Protest, Growth, and Inequality 2.3. Correlation Table between Protest and Political Opportunities 2.4. Linear Regression of Protest with Executive Dominance, Civil Society Density, and Local Autonomy 4.1. The Different Worlds of European Capitalism 5.1. Rates of Transition from Employment to Unemployment in Europe 6.1. Cohesion and Convergence among EU-15 Member States: GDP 1986-2001 6.2. Cohesion and Convergence among EU-15 Member States: Unemployment and Poverty 6.3. Regional Disparities (Standard Deviation) in GDP per Head and Unemployment among EU-15 Member States C.1. Case Studies Summary

67 68 70 71 94 118 156 157 159 240

Preface

After several years of erosion ofthe general public's "permissive consensus" supporting European integration, the European Union entered a deep institutional crisis precipitated by the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands during the spring of 2005. At least two precepts were proven wrong during this period: the belief that European citizens have little interest in European integration, and the idea that citizens can hardly influence the politics of the European Union. However, this new context has left citizens with a high level of distrust in integration, and the EU institutions with limited capacities to cope with issues the public considers priorities, primarily unemployment and social inequalities. This book explores the complex nature of this evolving relationship between citizens and European institutions over the last decades. It shows how European-arena interest groups formed, and how protesters were able to mobilize in some areas. It argues that disappointment with European integration stems from Europe's changing political economy, and the impact that this has had on different social interests. It claims that this contentious politicization has also been nourished by the European Union policy process itsel£ which leaves more room for interest groups and protest politics than for political parties and representative democracy. The collaborative research presented here originated several years ago, in a somewhat different Europe, and owes much to a number of people and institutions. Nuffield College, with the Maison Fran

~

•

~

;a

.:l

•

w

§

80

]~ ~~

ue

..£

...,

"::;;; N O

,"

~~

Collective Action and Civil Society in Europe

67

Table 2.1 shows that if country size estimated by total population does not significantly matter, both CDP per capita (r = 0.583) and human development (r = 0.778) exert very significant effects. The larger impact of HDI compared to CDP per capita shows that education and standards of living captured through life expectancy add a specific influence to income alone. As a general trend, collective action engages individuals when knowledge, money, and time are available and provide capacities for protest. On the other hand, a currently widely accepted critics' perspective of the mobilization of resources states that "objective" static resources cannot be sufficient to explain collective action. Rather, from A. de Tocqueville to Ted Curr 19 and more recent advocates of framing theory, a long tradition stresses the dynamics of subjectivity as the key factor of collective action development. Although quantitative data are not always easy to match with such perspectives, a series of indicators are definitely worth considering. To take into account the dynamics rather than the overall level in living conditions, we first consider changes in CDP (annual growth rates 1990-2002). Low levels of economic growth are detrimental to employment and limit capacities for accumulation as well as redistribution. We hypothesize that among rich countries, citizens are affected by marginal

Table 2.1.

Correlation Table between Protest and Socio-economic Indicators

Total Protest Score 1999 Total Protest Score 1999

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)

N Population 2002

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)

N GDP per Capita 2002

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)

N HDI2002

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed)

N

Population 2002

COPper Capita 2002

HOI 2002

0.237

0.583(**)

0.778(**)

0.234 27 1

0.001 27 -0.053

0.234 27 0.583(**)

31 -0.053

0.778 31 1

0.001 27 0.778(**)

0.778 31 -0.018

31 0.805(**)

27 0.237

0.000 27

0.924 31

0.000 31

0.000 27 -0.018 0.924 31 0.805(**) 0.000 31

31

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Sample: EU-2S plus applicant countries and Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland whenever data is available. Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004, New York: United Nations Development Program, 2004.

68

Chapter 2

trends in unemployment and revenues, and in this sense particularly sensitive to politico-economic cycles. Social conflicts are therefore more likely to emerge within countries with low rather than high growth in CDP. In the same perspective, social inequality, more than income or human development, is also a possible source of political protest. We consider three different potential impacts of inequality: the overall extent of income and revenues inequalities measured through aCini coefficient,20 the Human Poverty Index (HPI) measuring social exclusion for a limited number of countries,21 and the preference for equality among citizens.22 Table 2.2 shows that none of the indicators retained is significant. Overall protest is not affected by the average growth rate, or by the different measures of inequality we selected. Moreover, coefficients suggest a negative, rather than the expected positive, relation between inequality and protest. The data does not provide support for the hypothesis of collective action Correlation Table for Protest, Growth, and Inequality

Table 2.2.

Total Protest Score 1999 Annual Growth Rate 1990-2002 Inequality (Gini)

HPI2002

Equality Above Freedom (%)

* Correlation

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N

Total Protest Score

Annual Growth Rate

1999

1990-2002

1.000

0.056

-0.138

-0.267

-0.079

0.787 27 0.056

0.503 26 1.000

0.401 26 0.044

0.707 12 0.420

25 0.172

0.787 26 -0.138

30 0.044

0.825 28 1

0.153 13 0.674(*)

0.421 24 0.161

0.503 26 -0.267

0.825 28 0.420

29 0.674(*)

0.011 13 1.000

0.454 24 0.207

0.401 12 -0.079

0.153 13 0.172

0.011 13 0.161

13 0.207

0.519 12 1.000

0.707 25

0.421 24

0.454 24

0.519 12

25

Inequality (Gini)

HPI

2002

Equality Above Freedom (%)

is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Sources: Data from United Nations Development Programs. Human Development Report 2004, New York: United Nations Development Program, 2004; World Values Survey (1999-2000), www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed 25 June 2005).

Collective Action and Civil Society in Europe

69

rooted in changing living conditions, the extent of inequalities, or social preferences for equality. Finally, we consider the effect of institutional variables generally grouped under the broad category of the POS. Access to the political system is more or less favored by different institutional designs considered through a number of features. We already noticed that civil society density favors political participation in general and protest in particular. Due to the proximity of decision-making and coordination, state decentralization is expected to facilitate collective action. Majoritarian electoral rule and executive dominance in the policy process are likely to nourish reactive protest from social movements, while proportional rule, the use of referendums as an element of direct democracy, and judicial review, in limiting the room for executive maneuvering, are more likely to temper the potential for political protest. Table 2.3 presents results obtained with a number of selected indicators. It is worth noticing that protest is highly correlated with civil society density, and to a lesser extent to the level of autonomy devoted to local government within the political system, and to executive dominance in the legislative process. In other words, collective action is more likely when the government can act with a limited control from the parliament, when civil society is more organized, and state institutions more decentralized. Neither the electoral rule, the type and color of government (not figured in the table), the use of referendums, the extent of constitutional review, nor constitutional rigidity are significantly correlated. This set of results clearly gives some support to the idea of mobilizing structure (the state of civil society), and to the notions of threats (executive dominance) and opportunities (decentralization) as crucial elements in shaping collective action. Despite difficulties due to the limited number of cases and multi-colinearity among independent variables, we used linear regression models to estimate the respective influence of these different factors with a sample composed of EU-25 member states, applicant countries, and non-EU members from western Europe. Civil society density (r = 0.697) and HPI (r = 0.77 8) are both correlated with protest. Although HPI has a stronger effect on protest, it is significantly correlated with local autonomy (r = 0.557). We therefore used civil society density in the equation. The results presented in table 2.4 indicate that when considered simultaneously, the effects of local autonomy and executive dominance are nearly canceled. In other words, institutional factors do not make a difference when considered at the same level of civil society density. From a theoretical perspective, institutional opportunities (decentralization) or threats (executive dominance) exert a limited influence on the general level of protest at the country level. Their effect is indeed eclipsed by the strong impact of resources (HDI) and social structures (civil society density) as determinants of mobilization processes.

Table 2.3.

Correlation Table between Protest and Political Opportunities Local Autonomy

Local Autonomy

ExLegBal

Electoral Rule

Type of Government Referendums

Constitutional Review

Civil Society Density 2000

Total Protest Score 1999

Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (Hailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N

ExLegBal

Electoral Rule

1.000

-0.062

-0.423**

37 -0.062

0.724 35 1.000

0.724 35 -0.423**

Type of Government

Referendums

Constitutional Review

Civil Society Density 2000

Total Protest Score 1999

0.075

0.381 *

0.071

0.009 37 0.191

0.672 34 0.506**

0.020 37 0.024

0.677 37 0.148

0.024 33 -0.155

0.038 32 -0.403*

35 0.191

0.271 35 1.000

0.003 33 0.342*

0.890 35 0.060

0.398 35 0.038

0.396 32 -0.015

0.025 31 -0.237

0.009 37 0.075

0.271 35 0.506**

37 0.342*

0.048 34 1.000

0.725 37 0.047

0.825 37 0.166

0.936 33 0.038

0.191 32 -0.092

0.672 34 0.381 *

0.003 33 0.024

0.048 34 0.060

34 0.047

0.790 34 1.000

0.348 34 -0.329*

0.840 30 -0.048

0.637 29 0.240

0.020 37 0.071

0.890 35 0.148

0.725 37 0.038

0.790 34 0.166

37 -0.329*

0.047 37 1.000

0.790 33 0.238

0.186 32 0.215

0.677 37 0.393*

0.398 35 -0.155

0.825 37 -0.015

0.348 34 0.038

0.047 37 -0.048

37 0.238

0.182 33 1.000

0.238 32 0.696**

0.024 33 0.369*

0.396 32 -0.403*

0.936 33 -0.237

0.840 30 -0.092

0.790 33 0.240

0.182 33 0.215

40 0.696**

0.000 38 1.000

0.038 32

0.Q25 31

0.191 32

0.637 29

0.186 32

0.238 32

0.000 38

0.393*

0.369*

39

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Sources: Data from Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge, Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-7998): Composition, Duration, Personnel, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; World Values Survey, www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed 25 June 2005).

Collective Action and Civil Society in Europe

71

Table 2.4. linear Regression of Protest with Executive Dominance, Civil Society Density, and Local Autonomy Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients B Std. Error Beta

Model (Constant) ExLegBal Civil Society Density 2000 Local Autonomy

Sig.

41.801 -16.676 0.317

11.708 8.418 0.073

-0.281 0.625

3.570 -1.981 4.365

0.002 0.060 0.000

3.073

3.965

0.113

0.775

0.447

Dependent Variable: Total Protest 1999-2000. Adjusted R-square = 0.528.

Sources: Data from jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge, Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; World Values Survey, www.worIdvaluessurvey.org.

CONCLUSION This chapter analyzed the main comparative dimensions of civil society in European countries. We showed that civil society widely differs in density and structure with national contexts, following variations in patterns of secularization and labor organization. We also established that, despite the existence of distinctive patterns at the national level, the different forms of both social membership and protest behavior are more cumulative than exclusive. The typology of collective action regimes-pluralism, corporatism, and protest-presented in chapter 1 is therefore a useful tool to map inflections within the same continuum rather than purely alternative patterns of social mobilization. Moreover, the density of civil society favors, rather than contains, the development of protest, as well as other types of political participation. However, its influence is more effective on non-confrontational types of protest, and not sensitive to industrial conflicts. In this respect, the organization of civil society acts as social capital, enabling, channeling, and to a certain extent civilizing political mobilization. Considering the influence of different factors on the level of protest, we found some support for the resources mobilization perspective with the strong impacts of the level of CDP and HDI. Various indicators of changes in living conditions, the extent of inequalities and social exclusion, and preferences for equality proved insignificant. Although more research would be needed on this issue, the contrast with the strong effect of CDP and HDI gives more support to an integrationist perspective, where participation is mainly dependent on social capacity, than to the prevalence of social conflicts in explaining protest movements. Finally, institutions do matter, as significant correlations can be found between the level of protest and

Chapter 2

72

the dominance of the executive in the policy process on the one hand, and with the degree of decentralization of the state on the other hand. However, their effect is not significant when considered simultaneously with the one exerted by CDP or HDI. The influence of institutional opportunities and potential threats matters far less than resources and mobilization structures for collective action. National cultures and collective action regimes have been affected by European integration, both with the introduction of new issues on the political agenda, and with their varying capacity to react to EU public policies at the domestic level as well as in Brussels. The next chapter considers the mobilization of interests around European institutions.

NOTES 1. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989 (1st ed. 1963); Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A SevenNations Comparison, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978; Russell J. Dalton, Citizens Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies,

Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1996. 2. Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Civic Italy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 3. Information and data from the World Values Survey can be accessed through the website www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed 15 April 2007). 4. Wording of the question for the 1999-2002 wave was the following: Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Social welfare services for elderly, handicapped or deprived people Religious or church organizations Education, arts, music or cultural activities Labor unions Political parties or groups Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality Third world development or human rights Conservation, environment, animal rights groups Professional associations Youth work (e.g., scouts, guides, youth clubs, etc.) Sports and recreation Women's groups Peace movements Voluntary organizations concerned with health Other groups Belong to none

Collective Action and Civil Society in Europe

73

5. Unless specified otherwise, we use in this chapter the last available data from the 1999-2000 wave. We also conducted the same analysis with pooled data from the different waves between 1981 and 1997, and obtained very similar results. We also checked data of previous surveys for specific years, in particular when countries were missing in the last wave, and considered other indicators of membership (percentage declaring belonging to at least one organization in particular). 6. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la democratie en Amerique, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture. 7. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work. 8. See also Sjoerd Beugelsdijk and Ton van Schaik, "Participation in Civil Society and European Regional Economic Growth," in The Cultural Diversity of European Unity, ed. Wil Arts, Jacques Hagenaars, and Loek Halman, Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2003, 119-46. 9. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, Building States and Nations, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1973. 10. Loek Halman and Veerle Draulans, "Religious Beliefs and Practices in Contemporary Europe," in European Values at the Turn of the Millennium, ed. Wil Arts and Loek Halman, Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2004, 283-316. 11. Nevertheless regional variations in Turkey are likely to be significant, and probably not reflected in the survey result. 12. Differences of membership in religious groups as well as in other organizations across categories of countries defined through their dominant religion are significant at .01 using a one-way ANOVA procedure. 13. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Trade Union Membership 1993-2003, www.eiro.eurfoun.eu.int (accessed 22 April 2007). 14. For methodology of measurement see International Labour Organisation, "Technical Notes: Industrial Relations Indicators," World Labour Report, 1997-98, www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/03/update/tn0403105u.html (accessed 22 April 2007). 15. European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line, "Trade-Union Membership 1993-2003," www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/03/update/tn0403105u.html (accessed 15 April 2007). 16. Union density as measured by OECD based on data provided by unions and reported to the eligible workforce is strongly correlated to union membership assessed by the WVS through individual interviews (r = 0.797 with average union membership score for waves 1981-1997). See OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Paris: OECD, 2004. 17. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999; Yves Meny and Yves Surel, Politique comparee: Les democraties occidentales, Paris: Editions Montchrestien, 2001. 18. Socio-economic data used here are from United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004, New York: United Nations Development Program, 2004. We used alternative measures of collective action from the WVS as dependent variables to check these relations, including specific measures of petitioning, boycott, strikes, demonstrations, building occupations, and total protest

74

Chapter 2

score in 1999-2000, or average scores for similar variables over the period 1981-1997. Results presented only retain the total protest score for 1999-2000. 19. Ted R. Gun, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. 20. The Gini index measures inequality over the entire distribution of income or consumption. A score of 0 represents perfect equality, and a value of 100 perfect inequality (Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004, 188 sq.). 2l. HPI for selected high income OEeD countries includes life expectancy, access and effectiveness of education, standard of living, and social exclusion (Source: United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2004, 150 sq.). 22. Percentage of respondents claiming to value equality above freedom (Source: WVS 1999-2000).

3 The Making of a Polity: Interests' Mobilization around European Institutions

Having characterized the different patterns of group membership and protest behavior at the national level, we now turn to the effects of European integration on social and political mobilization processes. The most direct incidence of integration is exerted by the development of the EU institutions and public policies, analyzed in this chapter. The state of collective action at the EU level has to be apprehended "from above," by considering the targets and access of organized interests to EU institutions, as well as "from below," looking at the processes of group formation and social mobilization related to European integration. This chapter first presents the policy characteristics of the EU relevant to the understanding of the changing forms of collective action. We then turn to interests' mobilization with the development of lobbying in Brussels, and with the question of the Europeanization of protest, before reviewing the distribution of these mobilizations among the different EU institutions.

POLICYMAKING IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT With the progress of European integration, particularly since the Single European Act (SEA), public policy in Europe has been significantly transformed by the diversification of its normative sources. The legal frame where policymaking unfolds is no longer national, but takes on a European space in which European Community law acquired precedence over the legislations-and more arguably on constitutional orders-of the member states. This picture is nonetheless complicated by the fact that European law does not simply take over national norms through a substitution process. 75

76

Chapter 3

Rather it supplements and progressively transforms them by determining the lines along which they develop. Although Community law legally imposed its supremacy, the situation is still one of normative pluralism, especially if one considers the case of member states with federal Constitutions. Furthermore, the EU's competencies in different areas (environment, agriculture, competition, etc.) widely differ, yielding uneven interactions with public policy networks. At the very heart of the European "institutional triangle" (Commission, Council, Parliament), and within a single sector of public policy, decisive regulations are very different across issues and are technically specific. In addition, in comparison to the parliamentary regimes of the member states, EU decision-making follows a higher degree of separation of powers, offering more opportunities for vetoes (in particular, with the persistence of the unanimity rule in the Council in a significant number of areas, with the co-decision procedure in the EP, and with the direct access to the ECl, acting as entry points for interest groups and social movements). The political opportunities today offered to interests' mobilization in Europe is, therefore, extremely complex. It is distributed on several levels. The "upper floor" of the Union is marked by a significant institutional dispersion, varying across policy areas, programs, and sometimes measures. This feature underscores the weak integration of the territorial, sectoral, and institutional components of the European political system when compared to national regimes, where they tend to coincide more easily. However, this opportunity structure has been considerably reinforced and developed in the aftermaths of the European revival of the 1980s. The competencies of EU institutions were enlarged by the SEA and the Treaty of the EU in almost all community domains, and later on in the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy), and third (Justice and Home Affairs) pillars. The EU and its member states are also represented by the Commission in the international arenas where the liberalization of trade is negotiated-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then World Trade Organization (WfO)-largely impacting on domestic socio-economic and political affairs. Finally, from an institutional perspective, the Amsterdam Treaty brought about a very sensitive extension of the QMV in the Council and of the co-decision procedure in the EP, while the draft (constitutional treaty, and later the Lisbon Treaty) proposed to use both of these procedures by default in the legislative process. Although member states clearly limited such a development in the different Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) preparing for the institutional reform, the extension of QMV and co-decision procedures incontestably represent a progressive but significant development of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, mode of decision-making, offering new potentials for interests' mobilization. Mobilization clearly varies according to

The Making of a Polity

77

policy sectors, issues involved, European institutions' prerogatives, cultural framing, and organizational constraints to collective action of groups considered.!

BRUSSELS: THE EUROPEAN INTERESTS FAIR The development of the interest group system in Brussels is documented by the database we constructed on the basis of the directory established by the EC.2 The data used here cover a population of 889 interest groups in September 2000. Using the database involves a few methodological considerations. We have included transnational organizations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International, and Eurogroups-that is, federations and confederations of interests organized at the European level-without counting their national members. Although national groups frequently engage in European politics by themselves, the database gives a picture of collective action specifically organized at the European level. Interest groups can spontaneously register in the directory of the Commission, and although their degree of activity and range of membership significantly vary, the inventory can be thought as quasi-exhaustive at the time considered. As groups were sometimes logically registered under several of the categories defined by the Commission, it was necessary, in elaborating the typology used below, to check for the coherence of the classification, correct errors, and avoid double counts. Finally, this database can only give a picture of the final expression of interests organization at the European level, without considering its history (fusions or ruptures, temporary freezing, or changes in locality, composition, or status). Such a qualitative and longitudinal analysis remains for the most part to be carried out. lt may firstly be indicated that interests' mobilization in Brussels is as old as the European Community's institutions. 3 The UNICE was created in 1958, following the initial business organizations established in the framework of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the ECSC. The Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA) was established in 1958 within the preparation of the Common Agricultural Market. The CEEP was set up in 1961 and the European Bureau of Consumers Unions (EBCU) in 1962. Although the ETUC did not appear as such until 1973, its creation was the outcome of more fragmented forms of trade union integration in Europe, particularly the birth of regional organizations at the heart of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) or the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (ICCTU). European integration also gave rise in this way to a reconstitution of international unionism, the ETUC in 1973 emerging to mobilize the great majority of social-democrats or

Chapter 3

78

autonomous union federations and those who had broken with the communist World Union Federation (WUF). The French Confederation Generale du Travail's (CCT) joining of the ETUC in 1999, after its disaffiliation from the WUp, constitutes one of the last events in this realignment of cleavages at the heart of the international trade union movement nourished by European integration. In a different domain, more recent in political development, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) was created in 1974. This early constitution of the European system of interests is corroborated by quantitative analysis. Half of Eurogroups existing today were created before 1974. The rate at which they were set up closely follows the progress of European integration. Some of these groups have a long history. This, among others, is the case of the Delegation for Europe (1843) or of the International Union of Public Transport (1885). Intensive industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries motivated early forms of transnational cooperation between firms and organizations, particularly in order to favor technological development and to deal with problems of standardization (for example, the International Union of Electrical Energy Producers and Distributors was initiated in 1925). However, the post-war era obviously saw the beginning of the contemporary European interests system, with a significant growth between 1945 and 1954 associated with the establishment of the ECSC. It may be thought that the failure of the European Defense Community explains the decrease noted between 1954 and 1956, followed by the estab50~------------------------------------------------~

40

30

20

10

1843 1905 1919 1925 1930 1937 1946 1950 19541958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 198219861990

Date of Creation

Figure 3.1.

Creation of Eurogroups by Year (frequencies)

19941~

The Making of a Polity

79

lishment of the Common Market that led to the initial "big bang" from 1955 to 1962. The period of Gaulism and the "empty chair" crisis later coincided with the inauguration of a less active phase until the beginning of the 1980s. From 1986 on, the Single Act produced a new explosion of Eurogroups formation until 1992. The period following the Maastricht Treaty was marked by a new settling down, interests' mobilization falling back to its pre-Single Act rhythm. Overall, the curve points out two peaks with the treaty of Rome and the SEA representing the two-pronged opportunity by means of which the European system of interests was, for the main part, constructed. This picture should not overshadow the cumulative nature of this process, more clearly readable in figure 3.2. The analysis supports an interpretation in terms of POS, the investment of interests being much more notable during phases when European competencies were significantly expanded, and when public decision-making has been more sensitive to interests' activity. The diminishing rate of creation during the final phase testifies both to the maturity gained by the interests' system, and to the institutional stagnation of integration, at least from the point of view of the main internal policies relevant to organized groups.

1000

800

»

g '-