Centre-left parties and the European Union: Power, accountability and democracy 9781526120342

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Centre-​left parties and the European Union

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Centre-​left parties and the European Union Power, accountability, and democracy

Isabelle Hertner

Manchester University Press

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Copyright © Isabelle Hertner 2018 The right of Isabelle Hertner to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN  978 1 5261 2033 5  hardback First published 2018 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Out of House Publishing

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To the memory of my mother, Sylvia Hertner, and my grandmother, Liselotte Schumpelt. And to my aunt, Kristin Schön.

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Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

page viii ix xi

1 Centre-​left parties and the European Union

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2 Labour, the PS, and the SPD: organising for multi-​level governance

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3 The European policies of the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD

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4 Principals, agents, and the delegation of power inside political parties

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5 Cheerleaders or players? Centre-​left parties on the ground and the EU

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6 Lions or toothless tigers? The parties in central office and the EU

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7 Winners or losers? The parties in public office and the EU

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8 Centre-​left parties and the European Union: what next?

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References Index

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Illustrations

Figures 3.1 British parties’ net support for the EU, 1945–​2015 (MARPOR data) 3.2 French parties’ net support for the EU, 1945–​2012 (MARPOR data) 3.3 German parties’ net support for the EU, 1949–​2013 (MARPOR data) 4.1 Four modes of power delegation inside political parties

page 49 60 68 83

Tables 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 5.1

The three parties and their status Number of interviews with EU specialists The parties on the ground, in central office, and in public office SPD membership per Landesverband in 2014 The PS and the EU at the grassroots: EU working groups and secretaries 5.2 SPD EU working groups at the grassroots

5 8 16 34 109 115

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Acknowledgements

Writing this book has been a long journey, one that wouldn’t have been so happy and inspiring without the support of my family and friends. I would first like to thank my father, Peter Hertner, and my brother, Christoph Hertner, for their encouragement and support. Next, this book would not have been possible without my friends. Anna Bologna, Øivind Bratberg, Sarah Emily Duff, Ricardo Grau Crespo, Gloria Iniesta Arias, Carlos Martinez Rico, Nina and Alex Mayrhofer, Katrin Metz-​van Ißem, Selma Nielsen, Joost Postma, Ana-​Iuliana Postu, Kirsteen Shields, Luis Simón, and Katherine Twamley: you are wonderful. I also take the opportunity to thank my many interviewees and survey respondents for taking so much time to share their expertise and experience with me. Without their input, I could not have written this book. A number of colleagues have also helped me with this research. Dr Simon Lightfoot, Dr Michael Holmes, and Professor Robert Ladrech have been very supportive over the years, and their work has inspired me. I was also lucky to have been a member of a research and reading group on political parties at the University of Birmingham. I  thank my former colleagues Dr Tim Haughton, Dr Karin Bottom, and Dr Daniele Albertazzi for the many insightful and enjoyable discussions we had. The two anonymous reviewers helped me to clarify my ideas and focus on what is important. The team at Manchester University Press has also been extremely helpful and a pleasure to work with. Thank you! Last but not least, I owe an enormous debt of love and gratitude to Nick, my husband, for always believing in me and supporting me in everything I do.

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Abbreviations

AfD Alternative für Deutschland BfB Bund freier Bürger –​Offensive für Deutschland CAE Commission des Affaires Européennes CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CLP Constituency Labour Party CLPD Campaign for Labour Party Democracy CLV Campaign for Labour Victory DUE Délégation pour l’Union Européenne EMU Economic and Monetary Union EP European Parliament EPLP European Parliamentary Labour Party EPP European People’s Party ESC European Scrutiny Committee EU European Union FB Federal Bureau FC Federal Council FN Front National LPC Labour Presentation Committee MARPOR The Manifestos Project NEC National Executive Committee NPF National Policy Forum OMOV one-​member-​one-​vote PCF Parti Communiste Français PES Party of European Socialists PiP ‘Partnership in Power’ initiative PLP Parliamentary Labour Party Pro-​DM Initiative Pro D-​Mark –​Neue Liberale Partei PS Parti Socialiste SFIO Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière SGCI Secrétariat Général de Coopération Interministerielle

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SI SPD TTIP UDF UMP

Abbreviations

Socialist International Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Union pour la démocratie française Union pour un movement populaire

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Centre-​left parties and the European Union

Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-​ party democracy? This book is about improving our understanding of political parties as democratic organisations in the context of multi-​level governance. More specifically, it analyses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on intra-​party power dynamics. The book takes as its focus the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS), and the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). These are three major centre-​left parties of government, operating in the three biggest member states of the EU. Studying centre-​left, or social democratic, parties is particularly interesting because the process of European integration places particular policy constraints on them. As part of the social democratic/​socialist/​labourite party family, they seek to reconcile market capitalism with social responsibility. In its different forms, social democracy is ‘a set of intuitive ideas about fairness and equality and a moral economy that refuses to accept the automatic primacy of markets or the need for inequality’ (Keating and McCrone, 2013: 2–​3). However, the EU, in recent decades, has arguably done more to promote market capitalism and economic competitiveness than to enhance social responsibility and address increasing levels of social inequality. Thus, when they are in government, the EU’s centre-​left parties have to respond to the challenges created by the European Single Market, which demands the reduction of state subsidies to struggling industries, and by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which sets limits to public debt. The 19 member states in the Eurozone, including France and Germany, have committed themselves permanently to limiting their budget deficits to 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and their national debt to 60 per cent of GDP. This ‘conservative straitjacket’ (Wall, 2014: 73) has been particularly challenging for centre-​left parties in government. The SPD and PS, both of which were in office during the peak of the Greek debt crisis, struggled to formulate and implement a social democratic strategy at the European level. Yet, a European crisis can only be solved by a European response.

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Indeed, many important decisions relating to policy areas such as international trade, environmental protection, health, and consumer protection are now taken at the European level by the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. Next, national parliaments get to transpose EU legislation into national laws. Hence, an increasing amount of legislation has become ‘Europeanised’ over the past decades. We still lack a systematic, pan-​European study of legislative Europeanisation, but we have some estimates of the effects EU membership has had on formerly national legislation. For example, in the United Kingdom, between 1997 and 2009, about 6.8 per cent of primary legislation (statutes) and 14.1 per cent of secondary legislation (statutory instruments) had EU origins (Miller, 2010). Yet, the degree of legislative Europeanisation varied significantly between sectors, with agriculture and the environment being highly Europeanised, and education and health policy showing very little EU input. Meanwhile, in France, the yearly share of Europeanised laws has increased from less than 3 per cent in 1986 to 13.3 per cent in 2006. The highest shares of Europeanised legislation can be identified in the fields of space, science, and technology (39 per cent), as well as banking, finance, and domestic commerce (28 per cent; see Brouard et al., 2007: 19, quoted by Töller, 2010: 423). According to an official report by the German parliament, the Bundestag, 31.5 per cent of all legislation pronounced and ratified by the German parliament between 2005 and 2009 had EU origins (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2009, 3 September). Again, there were significant differences between policy areas, as 23 per cent of laws in the area of justice and home affairs emanated from the EU, whilst in agriculture, 52 per cent were of EU origin. The focus of this study is contemporary and embraces the period since the early 2000s when all three parties have been both in government and in opposition. This allows us to investigate power dynamics inside parties that were at times constrained by being in government, and at other times were in opposition and could take time to develop new policies and strategies. Through the use of a principal–​agent framework, this book studies the delegation of the power to formulate European policy and select candidates for the European parliamentary elections and other EU specialists within the Labour Party, the PS, and SPD. In short, this book connects to the broader debate in political science of how membership of the EU affects domestic political institutions. The rise of anti-​political sentiment across Europe over the past decades has focused the attention of journalists and scholars on voters’ mistrust of politicians and political institutions such as long-​established parties. Indeed, electoral support for mainstream parties on the centre-​left and centre-​right of the political spectrum keeps shrinking, whilst anti-​establishment parties such as the UK Independence Party, the Front National, and the Alternative für Deutschland are gaining support. Still, political parties remain fundamental to democratic governance in Europe (Dalton et  al., 2011). They connect citizens with the

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Centre-left parties and the European Union

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institutions of the state and thereby represent ‘a central linkage between citizens’ preferences and actions of democratic governments’ (Poguntke, 2005: 43). Thus, understanding the internal workings of parties is crucial because of the importance of parties to the realisation of democracy (Cross and Katz, 2013: 5). Indeed, studying intra-​party power dynamics in the European context is particularly interesting because in the EU, political parties operate in a challenging system of multi-​level governance:  an ever-​increasing amount of policy is made at the European level, whilst party politics takes place primarily at the national level of governance (Schmidt, 2006). This situation creates problems of democratic representation and accountability. Above all, this narrowing of the policy space can lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of policy competition between political parties at the national level (Mair, 2000, 2007). It results in the convergence of mainstream centre-​left and centre-​right parties on economic issues (Ladrech, 2010:  137). Ultimately, this dampening down of differences between parties in government has led to an increasing de-​politicisation of political competition at the national level (Mair, 2007: 160) and has opened up the space for more extremist parties on the left and the right. But what impact does the EU have on the internal workings of political parties? Recent studies found that European integration has generally empowered party elites in government (Raunio, 2002; Poguntke et al., 2007; Carter and Poguntke, 2010). But there is still much we do not know, especially in terms of the impact, if any, of EU membership on the power dynamics within parties from the grassroots to the EU level. The distribution of power is crucial for understanding intra-​party democracy. The latter concept lacks a single, agreed-​ upon definition, but ultimately goes back to the question of who determines party policy (Katz, 1997). Hence, this book investigates who within the three social democratic parties is involved in the formulation of EU policy. Another important aspect of intra-​party democracy is related to the selection of candidates, as the ways in which a party selects its candidates for public office reflects its internal democracy (Bille, 2001). This book therefore investigates who within the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD selects the candidates for the European parliamentary elections and other EU specialists in parliament and inside the party bureaucracy.1 Hence, the two main research questions that will guide this study are as follows: (1) To what extent has European integration impacted upon the power dynamics within centre-​left parties? In particular, which level(s) and which face(s) of the party organisation have been empowered as a consequence of European integration, and who has lost out in the process? (2) How inclusive/​ exclusive are the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD in the selection processes of European parliamentary candidates and other EU specialists, and what does this tell us about the state of intra-​party democracy? Of course, the question is not only one of selection procedures; it is also closely linked to the power remit of these EU specialists. Do they hold much influence? More broadly, by focusing on

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EU specialists we also understand how widely spread EU expertise is within the three parties across the different levels and faces. Most national parties in Europe, and in particular centre-​left parties  –​the majority of which have their historical origins in the labour movement –​claim to be internally democratic organisations. Many of these parties refer to intra-​party democracy in their constitutions. For instance, the SPD declares itself a ‘demokratische Volkspartei’, a ‘democratic catch-​all party’, in its statutes (SPD, 2014, 26 January). The Labour Party, on its website, describes itself as a ‘democratic, socialist party’ (Labour Party, 2014a), whilst the PS refers to itself as a ‘democratic and decentralised’ party that ‘allows everyone to be active and express herself within the party’ (PS, 2015a). But what is it that makes a party internally democratic? Political parties across Europe organise differently and, if asked, would give different answers to this question. Some would argue that a model of power delegation from the bottom to the top is the most democratic form of organisation, as it resembles representative democracy. This type of democracy has also been described as ‘assembly-​ based’ as it allows party delegates at different levels to deliberate, amend policy proposals, and take repeated rounds of voting (Poguntke et  al., 2016). Others would view direct or plebiscitary democracy as most democratic. This type of intra-​party democracy typically involves membership consultations (referendums) as a means to formulate policy. In reality, many national parties combine the two types of democracy with each other, although it must be stressed that overall, social democratic parties favour assembly-​based, delegative democracy (Poguntke et al., 2016: 672). Hence, what makes a party internally democratic is contested, and the concept of intra-​party democracy still lacks a single, authoritative definition. As Cross and Katz (2013: 2) point out: ‘Like democracy itself, the definition of [intra-​party democracy] is essentially contestable. Is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, centralization, accountability, or something else altogether? Should the emphasis be on outcomes or on process?’ If the definition of intra-​party democracy is contestable, so is its measurement. Intra-​party democracy cannot be measured quantitatively. However, a comparison of parties that are (roughly) similar in size, have similar historical origins, and have recently been in government and opposition allows us to determine how democratic they are in relation to each other. Broadly speaking, a highly democratic party is understood as one that is inclusive in its decision-​making processes. This study thus draws on the concept of the ‘party family’, which is a very useful analytical tool for the comparison of parties with similar historical and ideological roots (Mair and Mudde, 1998). To be sure, parties belonging to the social democratic family come in many shapes and sizes and use different and changing labels. The Parti Socialiste, for instance, has long treated the term social democrats with disdain, preferring its socialist label, as it sounded more leftist. Meanwhile, Labour Party elites at the end of the 1990s, after having rebranded

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Table 1.1  The three parties and their status Party

Parliamentary representation 1997–​2015

European parliamentary representation 1994–​2014 (seats and % of votes)

Labour Party

Single-​party government (1997–​2010); opposition (2010–​)

Parti Socialiste (PS)

Five-​party coalition government (1997–​2002); opposition (2002–​2012); single-​party government (2012–2017)

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)

Two-​party coalition government (1998–​2009); opposition (2009–​2013); two-​party coalition government (2013–2017)

1994: 62 seats (44%) 1999: 29 seats (28.03%) 2004: 19 seats (22.6%) 2009: 13 seats (15.7%) 2014: 7 seats (24.4%) 1994: 15 seats (14.49%) 1999: 22 seats (21.9%) 2004: 31 seats (28.9%) 2009: 14 seats (16.48%) 2014: 13 seats (13.98%) 1994: 40 seats (32.2%) 1999: 33 seats (30.7%) 2004: 23 seats (21.5%) 2009: 23 seats (20.8%) 2014: 27 seats (27.3%)

the party as New Labour, avoided the use of the label social democracy (Keating and McCrone, 2013: 3). Perhaps it sounded too old-​fashioned and leftist for a party leadership that was keen to be seen as modernisers and that embraced globalisation. Only the SPD has the social democratic label in its name and has never distanced itself from it. Yet, despite certain hesitations about the term social democracy, the three parties share some basic values and beliefs and sit together in the European Parliament where they usually vote together (McElroy and Benoit, 2012) and are all full members of the Party of European Socialists (PES). What is more, they have bilateral relationships going back many decades. Thus, it still makes sense to study parties belonging to the same family. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the three parties’ (European) parliamentary representation since the end of the 1990s. In this study, European integration is interpreted as an external constraint on national parties, or as a top-​down pressure that forces party organisations to adapt to a dynamic environment. At the same time, it is also important to recognise that European integration offers new opportunities for cooperation amongst national parties. For instance, the PES is a platform for exchange and cooperation for Labour, the PS, and the SPD. European politics can open up new spheres of influence for national political parties. Also, whilst it is undeniable that members of national parliaments have lost a certain amount of influence, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have gained influence in the making of EU-​wide

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laws. For national parties, European integration is therefore not a zero-​sum game in which the winner –​in this case the EU –​takes it all. At a first glance, isolating the ‘EU effect’ on national party organisations might seem tricky, as there are other factors of party change at work, some of which are internal and down to the parties themselves, and some of which are external. Scholars of historical institutionalism argue that institutions (such as political parties) tend to be ‘sticky’, or resistant to change for extended periods of time, even if there are demands or pressures for change (Bell, 2011). However, despite institutional stickiness, party organisations have changed significantly over the years. In order to trace organisational change back to EU membership, this study will focus exclusively on the parties’ dealings with the EU. National political parties are often treated as monolithic organisations. In practice, however, they operate at multiple levels and in three distinct arenas. On the one hand, European multi-​level governance requires the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD to be organised at the subnational (e.g. the local and regional), the national, and the European levels. On the other hand, the parties operate in three arenas: in public office (in parliament and/​or government), in central office (in the central party headquarters), and on the ground (at the grassroots level; see Katz and Mair, 1993). As Katz and Mair point out, the three faces interact with each other because membership often overlaps (e.g. when the party leader is also a Member of Parliament (MP)). Out of the three faces, the party in public office has, according to Katz and Mair (1994, 1995, 2009), become increasingly powerful to the detriment of the party in central office, whilst the party on the ground has arguably become the weakest of the three faces. This book will investigate this claim and check whether, in the formulation of European policy and the selection of EU specialists, the party in public office has become the most powerful face. Thus, in order to avoid ‘a simple parliamentary versus extra-​parliamentary dichotomy’ (Katz and Mair, 1993), this book is the first to conceptualise Labour, the PS, and the SPD as multi-​level and multi-​faceted parties and to focus on internal power dynamics across these levels and faces. Rather than describing how each individual party deals with the EU, this book provides a general framework for comparison for parties of government. To this end, it utilises a principal–​agent framework, such as has been employed in other studies for the study of power delegation within parties (see, for example, van Houten, 2009; Aylott et al., 2013). Principal–​agent frameworks are often used to study democracies as chains of relationships in which one actor (the principal) delegates power to another (the agent). The agent thus acts on the principal’s behalf. In this book, the delegation of the power to formulate European policy and to select and nominate EU specialists across the three levels of the party organisation (European, national, and subnational) and between and within the three faces (in public office, in central office, and on the ground) will thus be investigated.

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Power dynamics matter. If only the highest levels of the party organisation are involved in the formulation of European policy and the selection of EU specialists, the gap between the leadership and the party on the ground widens. This gap could lead to a situation in which members and supporters of social democratic parties become indifferent towards the EU, or even Eurosceptic. If, by contrast, the key policy and personnel decisions relating to the EU are taken by the membership through referendums, this can create problems for the leaderships in public and central office. Methodology The material for this book has been collected from six principal sources of information. First, secondary materials such as academic books and articles on multi-​level party politics in the EU more generally, and on the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD in particular, were used to obtain information about the challenges political parties face in Europe. In addition, the emerging literature on the role of the PES is used to study the three parties as multi-​level organisations. Furthermore, the growing body of literature on principal–​agent frameworks and political parties informs the theoretical framework of power delegation described in Chapter 4. Second, internal party documents were used, particularly as they set out the official procedures in place for policy-​making and the selection of candidates. This refers to party statutes, internal regulations, and organisational charts. However, political parties, like all big organisations, do not always follow their own rule books, and much of what happens inside parties is informal. Hence, my third source of information is a series of 66 semi-​structured interviews conducted with EU specialists from the Labour Party, PS, SPD, and the PES between 2009 and 2015.2 Interviewees include officials dealing with EU and international affairs at the parties’ central headquarters, EU advisors to the party leaderships, MPs, and MEPs.3 Table 1.2 lists the number of interviews. The interviewees were essential sources of information, as they were participants or observers in the formulation of EU policy and/​or the selection of MEP candidates. Details of the interviews appear in the References section of the book. Most interviewees wished to stay anonymous, so their names have been removed to protect confidentiality agreements. There is, of course, always the risk that interviewees forget facts or distort them intentionally or unintentionally. Where possible, the information provided by interviewees was therefore cross-​checked with other interviewees. Perhaps unsurprisingly, fewer interviews were conducted with Labour politicians than with politicians from the other parties. As a party used to being attacked by a largely Eurosceptic opposition and media, many Labour politicians took a defensive approach during the interviews, and many did not agree

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Table 1.2  Number of interviews with EU specialists Position of interviewee

PES

Labour

PS

SPD

Total

Party officials Government officials and advisors Parliamentary staff Members of Parliament Members of the European Parliament Former ministers Party activists (incl. MP and MEP candidates)

10

1 2 1 1 1

3 2 2

3

17 4 8 4 15 1 17

5

4

6 1 5

5 3 8 3

to being interviewed at all. Given the apparent prevalence of such attitudes, there is inevitably a risk that those who did agree to be interviewed were unrepresentative of the broader population from which they were drawn. PS politicians were generally more willing to be interviewed and speak their mind. The exceptions were the socialist MPs with EU expertise who all replied that they had no time for interviews. By contrast, SPD politicians were most enthusiastic about being interviewed and were, generally speaking, very positive about this research project. Therefore, some sections of this book, mainly the ones dealing with the SPD, contain more original data and are therefore more detailed than those on the PS and Labour. The interviews were supplemented with a fourth source of information: email questionnaires, sent to the three parties on the ground. The questionnaires focused on the grassroots EU policy-​making practices and their involvement in the selection of candidates for the European parliamentary elections. As Labour, the PS, and the SPD together have thousands of local wards, it would have been impossible to conduct personal interviews with all of them. What is more, many of them cannot be easily contacted online as their websites are often very basic and contain little and/​or out-​of-​date information. Instead, for reasons of practicality, I chose to send questionnaires to Labour’s 533 constituencies (CLPs) and nine Euro-​constituencies in England, the PS’s 95 federations in mainland France, and the SPD’s 20 regional associations (Landesverbände) between November 2014 and July 2015. Again, there is always a risk that those who replied to my questionnaire were unrepresentative of the broader party organisation. Still, the results show a high degree of variety within and amongst the three parties’ EU dealings on the ground and can therefore be seen as indicative. The SPD and PS on the ground were easy to contact via email. By contrast, not all Labour constituencies had a (functioning) website with the contact details of the CLP secretary or chair made

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available. I therefore had to be more investigative and decided to send messages via Facebook, a number of which were answered. In those cases where the constituency was represented by a Labour MP, I contacted the MP directly, as no other contact details of CLP members were made available online. Seven MPs and four parliamentary assistants or advisors responded to my email. The vast majority of replies, however, came from CLP secretaries, chairmen, former MP candidates, and/​or local councillors, who, in some cases, were former MP candidates. Unsurprisingly, the email responses varied in length. This, however, is an advantage of using questionnaires, as it gives the respondents the freedom to write as much or as little as they please. As MPs and MEPs get many requests for interviews and surveys from scholars, I wanted to keep the questions as brief as possible, in the hope that they would be answered. A number of email exchanges led to telephone interviews and I even received an invitation to speak at a CLP meeting about the EU and the approaching referendum –​an experience I thoroughly enjoyed. Two CLP secretaries also wrote back saying that my email had encouraged them to discuss the EU in their next constituency meeting, and to invite their MEP to brief them beforehand. To be sure, this interest in the EU has to be understood in the context of the UK’s June 2016 EU referendum. Many Labour respondents had the EU on their agenda. This study also draws on articles from the leading newspapers and news magazines in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These provided important accounts of the day-​to-​day developments in the three parties as well as the PES. Last but not least, a number of weblogs (‘blogs’) were consulted to investigate and pinpoint some of the internal party debates that parties do not wish to disclose on their official websites. In the past decade, social scientists have made increased use of blogs as data sources. Blogs are useful as they are publicly available, low-​ cost, often anonymous platforms for online self-​representation (Hookway, 2008). For instance, Labour Uncut provides valuable insight into the Labour Party’s internal debates on candidate selection, processes of policy-​making, and other essential issues. Some former MEPs from the PS also used their personal blogs to share their experience of the internal candidate re-​selection processes, which has proved very useful for this book. The format of this book might seem somewhat unusual. Many comparative studies of political parties deal with each party in a separate chapter. This book, however, follows a slightly different logic. I wanted to put the three parties’ internal politics into a more immediate comparative context, thereby highlighting their similarities and differences. Therefore, one chapter is devoted to each of the three faces of the party organisation: the party on the ground, in public office, and in central office. This structure allows us to follow the chains of delegation of power from the principal to the agent, or from one face of the party organisation to the other, and across the different levels of the party organisation.

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Structure of the book The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides some essential contextual information on the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD’s organisations. It describes how the three parties are spread over three levels (subnational, national, European) and across three faces (on the ground, in public office, and in central office). It will be argued that amongst the three parties, Labour has become the most ‘centralised’, as the leadership at Westminster has assumed much power in the formulating of policy. The PS is also a highly centralised party, as the most important decisions are taken by a small circle of leaders in Paris. At the same time, the PS continues to be dominated by rival factions that form around potential presidential candidates. The SPD, by contrast, is a more decentralised party in which power is shared by the regional associations and the national party federation. Thus, the three parties –​whilst being centre-​left, multi-​level, and multi-​faceted parties of government –​organise very differently. Chapter 3 analyses and compares Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s EU positions. The chapter first draws on the Manifesto Project data in order to map the parties’ degrees of ‘Europhilia’ over the past decades. It shows that the three parties’ EU enthusiasm peaked in the mid–​late 1990s when they entered office, but that these high levels of support were not sustained afterwards. Second, the chapter provides a short historical overview of the three parties’ relationships with the EU since the beginnings of European integration. It shows that in the immediate post-​war years, the three parties were rather suspicious of the European Coal and Steel Community, the notion of pooling sovereignty and creating a free trade zone. From the 1960s onwards, however, the three parties took different paths. Labour only started to unconditionally support European Community membership in the mid-​1980s, almost two decades after the PS and three decades after the SPD’s ‘conversion’ to European integration. Third, Chapter 3 investigates some of the three parties’ recent EU policies and strategies, highlighting more differences than commonalities. In its Eurohostile environment, the Labour Party defended Britain’s EU membership by declaring it to be in the national (economic) interest. At the same time, the party used a strongly reformist language when talking about the EU. Increasingly, since the mid-​2000s, the party also avoided talking about its relationship with the EU. This lukewarm EU support culminated before and during the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, when Eurosceptic party leader Jeremy Corbyn was barely visible. Meanwhile, the PS and the SPD had other ‘fish to fry’:  France and Germany, being the biggest Eurozone members, had to deal with the implications of the Eurozone crisis and the danger of Greece’s default. Overall, it becomes clear that the EU creates challenges for centre-​left parties as their room for manoeuvre in government is severely limited –​especially when the majority of EU member states, the European Commission, and the European Parliament are dominated by conservative and liberal parties.

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Chapter 4 begins by briefly reviewing the existing political science literature on the principal–​agent chain of delegation within democracies in general, and political parties in particular (Lupia, 2003; Strøm, 2003; Aylott et al., 2013; Katz, 2014). The chapter then outlines the principal–​agent framework that will be applied to Labour, the PS, and the SPD in order to investigate the delegation of power from the bottom of the party organisation to the top, and from one face to another. The principal is the party membership, and the agents are the party in central and public office. It then introduces four modes of power delegation. The first refers to the delegation of power from one face of the party organisation to another at the same level of the party organisation. An example would be the delegation of the power to formulate European policy from the party members to the party in public and/​or central office, or the power to select MEP candidates from the party members to the party in central office. The second mode examines the delegation of power across the levels of the party organisation (but within the same face). An obvious example is the delegation of policy-​making from MPs to MEPs. The third mode refers to power delegation across the levels and faces, such as the delegation of the power to formulate European policy from national party members to the PES. The fourth and last mode examined in this book refers to the delegation of power within the same face and at the same level of the party organisation. An example would be the delegation of policy-​ making from individual Members of (the European) Parliament to committee chairs and/​or the group leader. This comparative study into the internal lives of social democratic parties is primarily descriptive and does not lend itself to formal hypotheses testing. It is, however, guided by a number of research questions and expectations. The two principal research questions that will guide the empirical analysis are: to what extent has European integration impacted upon the power dynamics within centre-​left parties? In particular, which level(s) and which face(s) of the party organisation have been empowered as a consequence of European integration, and who has lost out in the process? The research questions are followed by a set of expectations that are rooted in the existing literature on intra-​party democracy. As this book is primarily concerned with power delegation in the processes of MEP selection and the formulation of European policy, both of these activities will be briefly described. Last but not least, Chapter 4 will introduce four factors that are likely to shape the parties’ dealings with the EU, namely: the legal regulations of internal party organisations; the parties’ EU positions; the financial resources available to the parties; and their status as parties in government or opposition. Chapter 5 begins the empirical survey. It investigates the impact of European integration on the role of the party on the ground, which is conceptualised as the party membership in local wards, constituency branches, and regional associations. Chapter  5 thus investigates the delegation of the power to formulate

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European policy and nominate candidates for European parliamentary elections from the party on the ground to the higher levels and the other two faces of the party organisation. Three principal findings are revealed. First, the involvement of the grassroots in the selection of candidates for the European parliamentary elections is rather limited. In theory, Labour, the PS, and the SPD all have fairly inclusive, democratic selection procedures in place. In practice, however, patronage has been indispensable. Also, the grassroots members have usually rubber-​stamped decisions taken by a small group of party officials. This would suggest that grassroots members were ‘cheerleaders’ rather than ‘players’. Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s selection of MEP candidates confirms Gideon Rahat’s statement that ‘candidate selection is democratically inferior to general elections […]. Elections at most times are more inclusive, fair, and free’ (Rahat, 2013: 144). Second, this chapter reveals that the party on the ground is generally interested in EU policy. Both the ‘big’ debates about the EU’s future shape and size and the more topical issues of the day were discussed in local meetings. This interest manifests itself in a surprisingly high number of EU working groups and committees that have been set up, and the many EU spokespersons/​secretaries that the PS’s fédérations and the SPD’s Landesverbände have put in place. By contrast, the Labour Party’s constituencies have not established EU committees but appear to keep in touch with their MEPs to receive regular EU updates. Yet, and third, only very few of the local and regional parties effectively scrutinise the party leaderships’ European policies or attempt to influence them directly. Indeed, only a handful of activists write resolutions on EU topics. Whilst a large majority of survey respondents and interviewees are aware of the formal channels of influence that are available to the party on the ground, they very rarely make use of them. The party on the ground (the principal) has thus delegated much of its EU policy-​making power to the party in central office and in public office. Interviews and questionnaires with activists from the three parties indicate that the grassroots were aware of this power gap, and that some were trying to become ‘players’ rather than remain ‘cheerleaders’. Chapter 6 turns the attention to the power dynamics inside the party in central office. It has been argued that the party in central office’s power over the party’s overall direction has waned over the years. Katz and Mair wrote that the parliamentary party (and government) received more state funding than before, and that it was therefore better resourced to deal with policy than the party in central office or on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). The shift of resources is not the only trend facing party bureaucracies. Since the late 1990s, thanks to European regulation, the Europarties have been empowered (Johansson and Raunio, 2005; Lightfoot, 2006). In this process, they have become policy-​seeking organisations. Most notably, in 2013, the PES, for the first time, ratified a fundamental programme, which was endorsed by all member parties. It is therefore

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legitimate to ask:  To what extent have Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s central bureaucracies delegated their power to formulate EU policy and influence the selection of MEP candidates to the PES? Have they become ‘lions’ or are they ‘toothless tigers’? Chapter 6 analyses each party’s executive committee(s) and the European and international departments’ role in the formulation of European policies. Finally, each section also examines the party in central office’s relationship with the PES. The focus of the analysis lies on the role of the party in central office in the formulation of European policies and, to a much smaller extent, the selection of EU specialists. By doing so, the chapter reveals a complex picture of power dynamics between the different faces of the party. It demonstrates that the parties in central office are not ‘lions’ in the sense that they do not hold the power to formulate EU policies. At the same time they are not entirely powerless in EU matters, as the label ‘toothless tigers’ would imply. Rather, Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office are ‘toothless tigers with claws’ that complement the work of the party in public office. What the three parties have in common is that the power to select candidates for the European elections still lies firmly at the (sub)national level. In addition, all other EU specialists, in public or central office, are (s)elected at the national level. In that respect, virtually no power has been delegated to the PES. Yet, when we consider the formulation of European policies, then the picture is more complicated and diverse. In particular, the SPD’s executive and the PS’s national secretariat are well equipped to formulate long-​term policies about the EU, hence their involvement in the writing of party manifestos. Both the SPD and PS have also tried to involve the parliamentary party and European parliamentary party more in the formulation of European policies, thereby building a European network that spreads across two faces of the party. Meanwhile, inside the Labour Party in central office, EU policy expertise is limited to a very small number of advisors around the party leader. Indeed, in the study of the three parties in central office, Labour stood out as the least EU-​savvy. What is more, whilst the PS and SPD have (albeit to different degrees and at different times) pulled their weight inside the PES and delegated some of their policy-​making power to the PES, Labour has found it difficult to accept the PES as a policy-​seeking organisation. Chapter 6 then explains the differences between the dealings of the three parties in central office with the EU through three interlinked factors: the parties’ status in government or opposition; resources available to the party bureaucracy; and ideological convergence or divergence with the PES. Chapter 7 completes the survey of the three parties by exploring power delegation inside the party in public office, which refers to politicians in elected office, such as MPs and government ministers (who, in the case of the SPD and the PS, are not always MPs). This chapter thus investigates the role played by the party in public office (MPs) in the formulation of European policies and the selection of EU specialists. It first analyses the House of Commons, the National

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Assembly, and the Bundestag’s EU scrutiny powers and the internal organisation of EU affairs. Second, it investigates the three parliamentary parties’ dealings with the EU. The chapter finds that overall, MPs from the Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, and the German Social Democratic Party have delegated a large amount of EU policy-​making power to their respective government and to MEPs, often without exerting much formal control. Especially when in power, MPs tend to leave EU policies to their government. Thus, whilst the party in public office has some obvious advantages over the party in central office and the party on the ground (above all, policy expertise and resources), it is not the clear ‘winner’ in the formulation of EU policy and the selection of EU specialists. It would, however, be wrong to simply dismiss the power of MPs to hold the government to account and to influence the party in central office and the MEPs. Indeed, Chapter 7 identifies a number of important differences between Labour, the PS, and the SPD. Most notably, out of the three parliamentary parties, the SPD stands out in its level of engagement in EU affairs. The SPD group in the Bundestag generally has more influence in the formulation of EU policies and the selection of EU specialists than Labour and the PS. The differences between the three parties is explained by looking at three broad, interlinked factors: the institutional structure the three parties operate in; the way in which the three parties have chosen to organise and prioritise their EU expertise in parliament; and the parties’ general attitude towards the EU. Chapter 8 draws together some of the main lessons of the preceding analysis. It summarises the principal findings of the study and explains the differences and similarities between the three parties. It also highlights the democratic deficit inside the three parties. Next, the normative implications of these findings are stressed and it is argued that parties should be internally democratic organisations. Inclusive processes of EU policy-​making and selection of EU specialists might be time-​consuming and occasionally cause controversy. The EU has become too important to be left to a few specialists in London, Paris, and Berlin. It is up to the parties themselves to engage more with the EU from the bottom to the top. Notes 1 This study concentrates on the PS in mainland France and on the Labour Party in England, as Labour has separate structures in the devolved regions of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. 2 All interviews for this study were conducted in English, French, and German. All French and German interviews were later translated into English, as were other sources, such as manifestos or speeches given by French and German politicians. 3 One additional background interview has been conducted with a former MEP from the UK Conservative Party. This was done in order to put the Labour Party’s MEP candidate selection process into perspective.

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2

Labour, the PS, and the SPD: organising for multi-​level governance

This chapter provides some essential contextual information on the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD), and the Party of European Socialists’ (PES) organisations. It highlights the main differences and commonalities between the parties. Labour, the PS, and the SPD are all ‘multi-​level organisations’ (Deschouwer, 2006), which means that they organise at the subnational (local, regional), national, and the European level inside the PES. They also organise at the global level through their involvement with the Socialist International (SI). The PS and SPD are full members of the SI, the worldwide umbrella organisation for socialist, social democratic, and labour/​workers’ parties. The Labour Party, by contrast, is only an observer member. In the past, the SI was seen as a high-​profile platform for international networking and for releasing statements on pressing global concerns. In recent years, however, the SI has become internally divided between the centrist and leftist member parties, until in 2013 a number of centre-​left member parties (amongst them the SPD) founded a new international organisation, the Progressive Alliance, further accelerating the growing irrelevance of the SI. Today’s SI has little relevance for Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s day-​to-​day dealings with each other and the European Union (EU), which is why this study does not elaborate on it. Labour, the PS, and the SPD are not only spread across several territorial levels; they also operate in three arenas, namely: in public office (parliament and/​or government), in central office (the central party bureaucracy), and on the ground (at the grassroots level; see Katz and Mair, 1993). These three faces are interlinked, as membership often overlaps (e.g. when a locally or regionally elected politician also sits on the party’s national executive committee). The PES also operates in central office (the party headquarters in Brussels), in public office (the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)), and on the ground (most importantly, the national member parties, and additionally, the ‘PES activists’). Thus, although national parties are often analysed as unitary actors in the literature, in reality, they spread across different territorial levels and faces. Table 2.1 depicts the three faces of the parties.

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Table 2.1  The parties on the ground, in central office, and in public office Party

On the ground

In public office

In central office

Labour Party

Local branches; Constituency Labour Party (CLP) branches; Euro-​constituency branches

Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament

Central party headquarters at Westminster

Parti Socialiste

Sections (local branches); fédérations (departmental associations)

Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament

Central party headquarters in Rue Solférino in Paris

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands

Ortsvereine (local branches); Unterbezirk/​Kreisverband (constituency); Landesverband (regional association)

Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament

Central party headquarters in Willy-​Brandt-​ Haus in Berlin

Party of European Socialists

Full member parties; PES activists

Members of the European Parliament

Central party headquarters in Rue Trône in Brussels

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next four sections each focus on the Labour Party, PS, SPD, and PES. They first provide a short overview of each party’s historical background. Second, they briefly describe the four party organisations on the ground, in public, and in central office. Finally, the conclusions highlight some of the key differences between the parties (in terms of where the power lies) as well as the commonalities, such as the challenges posed by a lack of grassroots engagement and the rise of rival left-​wing social movements. The Labour Party: history and organisation Socialism took longer to gain popularity amongst the British working class than it did elsewhere in Western Europe. Donald Sassoon (2014: 15) thus describes the British as the leading candidate for the position of the ‘most anomalous Left’ in Europe. The few people in Britain who supported socialism were overwhelmingly middle class, such as the writer and artist William Morris.

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The Labour Party was founded in 1900 as the Labour Representation Committee (LRC), a parliamentary pressure group that was set up to support working-​class candidates in elections. The LRC had no individual members. Instead, it was made up of affiliated organisations, such as the middle-​class-​dominated Fabian Society and a number of trade unions. At that time, the unions were liberal in their ideology rather than socialist. In 1906, the LRC changed its name to The Labour Party, but it only became a nationwide, organised party in February 1918, when it finally embraced socialism, and it only became a mass membership party during the 1920s and 1930s when it had gained a considerable number of seats in parliament. In 1924, Labour formed its first government in coalition with the Liberals, with Ramsay MacDonald as the first Labour prime minister. Since then, the party has alternated in power with the Conservative Party and remains one of the two major parties in British politics. Since 1945, Labour has been in power for a total of about 30 years. Labour’s membership peaked in the early 1950s when it reported one million members. Afterwards, membership numbers dropped. Between 2010 and 2014, Labour only had approximately 190,000 members left (Keen and Audickas, 2017, 1 September). However, membership jumped from 201,293 on 6 May 2015 –​the day before the general elections –​to 388,407 on 10 January 2016 under the new party leader Jeremy Corbyn (Guardian, 2016, 13 January). Yet, whilst Labour won many new, more left-​wing members under Corbyn, it also lost some long-​ term members who had joined the party under Tony Blair’s centrist leadership in the 1990s. Despite the surges and falls in membership, Labour remains the UK’s largest party. We need to keep in mind, however, that the UK now has one of the lowest rates of party membership in Europe (van Biezen et al., 2012). Unlike its French and German sister parties, Labour also counts as its members a number of affiliated trade unions (ATUs), socialist and cooperative societies, as well as individuals. The number of union-​affiliated Labour members was always higher than that of individual members (Webb, 2000), and as a consequence, of all the mass membership parties in Europe, Labour was perhaps the one that took membership recruitment the least seriously (Ware, 1987: 146). The relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party has been the focus of heated debates in the past decades. In particular, the unions’ influence over party policy (e.g. their voting power at the annual party conference) and over candidate selections and leadership elections has been controversial. At some point, the unions were accused of dominating the party conference, as they held a 50 per cent share of the vote at the annual party conference and contributed a significant amount of fees. For example, in 2011, the party received £8 million from its affiliated groups, compared with a membership income of £5.2  million (Keen and Audickas, 2017, 1 September).

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Two recent events have triggered a major reform of the relationship between the party and the unions. This reform was ratified by a special party conference in March 2014. The first event triggering the reform was the process through which Ed Miliband was elected party leader in 2010. Ed Miliband was not the favourite candidate of his colleagues in parliament or the individual party members, but he was elected largely through the unions’ support (Quinn, 2012: 72). His position as party leader was therefore weakened from the outset. The second event leading to the reform was UNITE’s (one of Labour’s biggest member unions) rigging of votes in the Scottish constituency of Falkirk during the candidate selection process (BBC News, 2013, 4 November). Ed Miliband then announced reforms to the relationship between the party and the unions, following an internal review by former Labour Party secretary general Ray Collins (Collins, 2014). The subsequent reforms, which aimed to make the links with the unions ‘more transparent’, included the adoption of a one-​member-​one-​vote (OMOV) system for leadership elections and a system in which Labour would only accept affiliation fees on behalf of those individual levy payers who had consented to their payment (Quinn, 2016: 761–​762). Thus, union members were now charged £3 a year to actively opt into Labour Party membership, and the OMOV rule was introduced for leadership elections in order to avoid another situation in which a leader was elected primarily by the unions. Labour on the ground

Labour ‘on the ground’ refers to the party’s many wards, branches, and constituencies. All registered Labour members are part of a ward, and it is the ward that selects candidates for the local council. Wards are then grouped together in branches, of which there exist a few thousand in England. Branches vary in size, but most are small, which is unsurprising, given the overall rather small membership of the Labour Party. Most branches meet several times a year to discuss policies, organise campaigns, and select local councillor candidates. Yet, the role and purpose of Labour branches has become contested in recent years. For instance, some voices inside Momentum, which is a left-​wing social movement that emerged as the successor to the campaign to elect Corbyn as party leader in 2015, had plans to abolish Labour branches. Momentum in the London borough of Lambeth thus argued that branches were no longer ‘effective political spaces’ and should be replaced by Momentum-​style ad hoc activism until Labour became ‘politicised’ (Daily Telegraph, 2016, 16 February). These plans were not met with the approval of long-​standing Labour activists. Despite the existence of wards and branches, it is the Constituency Labour Party (CLP) that plays a crucial role in the day-​to-​day life of the party. The CLP is made up of several branches and is based on the electoral area for the election of Members of Parliament (MPs). Via their CLP, Labour members can choose

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the delegates for the annual party conference and vote for their parliamentary candidate. There are 650 constituencies in the UK, 533 of which are in England. According to Labour’s rule book, the CLP has five tasks: (1) to unite and organise the party organisation at the CLP level; (2) to secure the return of Labour representatives to parliament and local government bodies; (3) to promote the policies of the party within the constituency; (4) to provide the opportunity for all individual members of the party within the constituency to contribute to the development of the party’s aims and policies; (5) to establish local policy forums in order to take policy-​making initiatives that are to be put forward for consideration as part of the national policy-​making process. Despite such ambitions, CLP meetings are not always well attended. Especially younger party members often stay away. As the then Young Labour chair, Simon Darvill (2013, 14 January), explains:  ‘local Constituency Labour Parties are a hard nut to crack’. He also criticises the fact that CLP meetings lack openness and accessibility to newcomers who do not understand the many acronyms and cultural references used by long-​standing members. He also writes that the use of social media tends to be underdeveloped on the ground, which is something the party needs to address if it wants to attract and keep new members (Darvill, 2013, 14 January). Labour’s formally supreme decision-​making body is the annual conference, which takes place every autumn at the end of September or in early October. Conference delegates are appointed by Labour’s CLPs, the affiliated trade unions, and the affiliated socialist societies. In the case of the trade unions and socialist societies, one delegate is appointed for each 5,000 members. The rules for appointing CLP delegates differ slightly. CLPs can appoint one delegate for the first 749 individual members in the constituency, and one further delegate for every additional 250 individual members in the constituency. The annual conference is attended by the great and the good of the party, which includes: the members of the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP), the National Policy Forum (NPF), the national chair of Young Labour, etc.1 Ahead of the conference, the CLPs, Young Labour, and the affiliated organisations can each send a motion to the conference. These motions must be submitted in writing and cannot be longer than 250 words. The Conference Arrangements Committee submits all motions received to a priorities ballot at the start of conference. The party conference then votes on resolutions made by the NEC and the NPF as well as reports, amendments, and proposals. The CLPs hold 50 per cent of the voting power and the affiliated organisations, such as the trade unions, hold the other 50 per cent. Thus, the formal role of the annual conference is to ensure that party policy is formulated with the input of the grassroots and the affiliated organisations in a bottom-​up, delegative process. The Labour Party was founded on the basis that party policy would be determined by its members, brought together in an annual conference, rather than

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by the party’s parliamentary leaders. However, as McKenzie (1955: 485) notes, in reality the party conference has very limited control over the parliamentary party or the government. Labour’s annual conference tends to be dominated by a loose coalition of major trade union leaderships and parliamentary elites, and not by its individual members (Webb, 1994: 119). Recent Labour conferences were highly managed events with a great deal of leadership intervention (Shaw, 2002). Indeed, the Labour leadership spends a lot of time controlling membership input, thereby ‘trying to keep controversial issues off the agenda and defeat those they failed to keep off ’ (Pettitt, 2007: 242). Labour in central office

Labour in ‘central office’ refers to the party executive and the central bureaucracy, which are located at the headquarters in Brewers Green, Westminster. On paper and in practice, Labour’s decision-​making processes are complex, as there are a number of coexisting and interlinked committees and forums that try to facilitate an inclusive and bottom-​up process. The key actors that will be briefly introduced in this section are the NEC and the NPF. These form part of the party in central office, but many of their members are also elected politicians and grassroots activists, which means that there is an overlap with the party in public office and on the ground. On its website, the Labour Party describes the NEC’s role as follows: The National Executive Committee is the governing body and the administrative authority of the Labour Party that oversees the overall direction of the party and the policy-​making process. It carries out this role by setting strategic objectives on an annual basis and meeting regularly to review the work of the party in these areas. (Labour Party, 2016b)

The NEC is also responsible for upholding the rules of the party and for overseeing Labour’s candidate selection processes. The NEC’s composition has changed over the years, giving more or less representation to the different parts of the party. In 2016, the NEC was composed of 33 members, including the party leader, the deputy party leader, and the treasurer, in addition to 12 members of trade unions; one member representing the socialist and cooperative societies; six CLP members; two members representing local governance; three members from the PLP and the leader of the EPLP. The NEC has been described as ‘the hub of a network of policy advisory committees and so oversaw the development of party policy in the longer term’ (Ingle, 2008: 82). Yet, the NEC’s influence began to wane in the 1980s under the party leadership of Neil Kinnock (1983–​1992), and continued to decline under John Smith (1992–​1994). Nevertheless, when Tony Blair was elected leader in 1994, the NEC was still an important institution that produced policy documents and made recommendations to the party

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conference. Blair therefore viewed the NEC (and, in particular, the trade union group within it) with suspicion. Over time, after Labour had entered office, the NEC developed ‘a more flexible policy process with much less respect for formality and protocol and much more attuned to the needs and convenience of the Leader’ (Minkin, 2014: 229). In 1990, the NPF was established to formally oversee the development of policy and broaden the involvement of the party organisation. The aim was to give ordinary party members a chance to discuss policy more frequently outside the party conference (Kelly, 2001: 331). The NPF meets twice to three times a year for a weekend, and the 186 representatives serving on the NPF are elected for two years in an all-​member ballot. They represent the different levels and faces of the party, including: the CLP; the affiliated trade unions; the Scottish, Welsh, and English regional conferences or regional policy forums; Labour local government; socialist societies; the PLP, etc. (Labour Party, 2013: ­chapter 4, clause 3). Still, despite the input of the grassroots, the NPF has been dominated by the party leader and his entourage, and even more so when Labour was in government (Krell, 2009: 103). For this reason, Jeremy Corbyn was said to be critical of the NPF and in favour of abolishing it in order to have more open policy debates at the annual conference (Independent, 2015, 12 December). Over one year into his leadership, Corbyn had not abolished or disempowered the NPF. However, changes in the way policy would be formulated were discussed by the NPF and the NEC (Perry, 2016, 18 November). Although Labour’s rule book mentions factions, it does not provide further details or rules. Still, a number of groups have emerged informally on the left and the right side of the Labour Party spectrum, but these do not enjoy constitutionally enshrined rights. The most important group on the left of the party has been the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD). The campaign was formed in 1973, initially in an attempt to lobby for more intra-​party democracy and hold the parliamentary leadership to account, and later to mobilise support amongst left-​wing trade union activists for left-​wing policies such as Britain’s unilateral nuclear disarmament or public ownership of key industries (Russell, 2005: 16–​ 20). With Corbyn, a member of the CLPD was elected party leader in 2015, and part of his agenda was to democratise the Labour Party, mainly by empowering the membership. On the right (or, ‘moderate’) side of the party, the Manifesto Group was founded in 1974 inside the PLP as well as the Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV) in 1977. Both groups lost many members when senior leaders with pro-​European, moderate views left Labour to form the Social Democratic Party. As a consequence, in 1982, the remaining members set up a new group, the Labour Solidarity Campaign, which sought to regain the support of the trade unions and reform the party organisation (Russell, 2005: 19–​21). The group was discontinued in mid-​1988, by which time it was considered to have secured most of its original objectives. Indeed, with Neil Kinnock, John Smith, and Tony Blair,

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moderate politicians had taken over the party leadership and steered it into a more centrist direction. With the election of Ed Miliband, a more outspokenly left-​wing social democratic leader had come into power in 2010. Surprisingly, under Miliband’s leadership, Labour’s internal divisions were contained. In a piece for the Guardian, Andrew Rawnsley writes: Though his senior team seethes with plenty of personal rivalries, the lid has been kept on them for most of the time. That is one of the lesser sung achievements of his leadership of a historically fissiparous party. It doesn’t mean that Labour is not divided. The difference is that the fault lines these days are more complex and various. (Guardian, 2014, 30 April)

Still, Miliband failed in his ambitions to transform or renew the party (Goes, 2016), and with Corbyn’s nomination and election as leader in 2015, Labour became starkly polarised between Corbyn’s grassroots supporters and a small number of Corbyn-​supporting MPs on the one side, and the vast majority of MPs on the other. These were not organised into specific factions or groups, but were simply referred to by the media as Corbynites versus Blairites –​a rather unhelpful distinction between the traditional left and the moderate wing of the party. Labour in public office

In the ‘Westminster’ system of the United Kingdom the parliamentary agenda is controlled by the government (Budge et al., 2004) and the de facto veto power of the House of Commons is minimal. The influence of the PLP on the formulation of Labour’s day-​to day policy has been limited. This is because the party leadership has taken a stronger grip on the development of policy in the past decades. Since the mid-​1980s, consecutive party leaders have reformed and transformed the Labour Party. Krell (2009) mentions five key organisational changes. First, the Labour leader now uses his personal office (the leader’s office) and an increasing amount of personal advisors for advice and support rather than the official party committees, such as the NEC or the NPF. This has led to a strengthening of the leader’s authority and autonomy since the 1980s. Second, the influence of Labour’s affiliated trade unions has waned over the years. The unions have become less influential in the nomination of candidates for public office, and their voting share at the annual conference has also declined. Third, the role of the party in public and central office has been strengthened in the formulation of policy since the 1990s, despite the introduction of the NPF and the ‘Partnership in Power’ (PiP) initiative. The PiP was an ambitious system of policy development that was designed to involve as many members and affiliates as possible in the process of policy formation through continued dialogue and consultation between the party on the ground, the public, and government.2 In practice, however, the PiP was dominated by Labour ministers and MPs who were able to

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shape policies to a large extent (Webb, 2000). Fourth, under Blair’s leadership, Labour introduced internal referendums that increased the power of individual members but which led to a further centralisation of power (as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). For instance, referendums on the changing of the party rule book served to legitimise the party elites’ decisions and circumvented the broader party organisation (Webb, 1999, 2000). Fifth, Labour’s communications and campaign strategies became more professionalised under Blair’s leadership in the 1990s as the party started hiring ‘spin doctors’ who managed and controlled the communication processes. This led to the further empowerment of the party elite. After the electoral defeat of 2010, the newly elected party leader Ed Miliband initiated further party reforms, such as the new OMOV rules for the Labour leadership elections. The involvement of the members in the formulation of policy became a priority (Gauja, 2013a). This development has been further enhanced since Jeremy Corbyn’s election as leader in 2015. For example, Corbyn took the debate over whether to back UK airstrikes in Syria to Labour members by polling them directly via email in November 2015 (Independent, 2015, 28 November). Meanwhile, Labour MPs were divided on the issue, and Corbyn gave them a free vote in parliament. Thus, recent years have seen the empowerment of Labour’s individual members at the expense of the formal policy-​making structures. At the same time, however, the party leader and his close personal advisors have become more powerful. The Parti Socialiste: history and organisation The PS’s predecessor, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), was founded in 1905 as a merger of different groupings. The SFIO was a highly decentralised, ideologically heterogeneous organisation without a mass membership (Schild, 2005). Instead, it was organised locally, had no factory groups, and was more an electoral front than a party. Factionalism was rife. The organisational weakness of the SFIO can also be explained through the fact that it was not linked to the trade unions, as French unions rejected formal links with organised political parties (Sassoon, 2014: 13). At a party conference in Tours in 1920, the majority of members left the SFIO to form the Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF), which still exists today and became the party of the working classes with strong links to the trade unions, whilst the SFIO relied on the support of the lower-​middle class (Müller-​Brandeck-​Bocquet and Moreau, 2000). The SFIO had all the structures of a mass party, but was always light on members and was in reality dominated by a small elite of professionals (Hanley, 2002: 140). After the Second World War, the SFIO became increasingly unpopular with the voters and started to slowly disintegrate (Escalona and Vieira, 2013).

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The 1970s then became a golden age of rejuvenation, consolidation, and modernisation for French parties (Bartolini, 1984). In 1971 the party was united and re-​launched as today’s Parti Socialiste at the party conference of Epinay. The key figure behind the re-​launch and unification was François Mitterrand, who managed to integrate different factions and facilitate ideological and organisational change (Bell and Criddle, 1984; Moreau, 2000). The PS was nevertheless rebuilt as an explicitly factional party in 1971 as the right to free expression of the factions (courants) was anchored in the party’s constitution. Sferza (2002: 168) argues that the PS’s factionalism of the 1970s helped the party widen its appeal and deepen its organisation, thereby transforming itself from a ‘historical underachiever into a major winner’. In the 1980s, however, the factions turned into a source of ‘paralysis and dysfunction’ (Sferza, 2002: 176). Until today, membership of a faction is necessary if one wants to achieve any kind of political post within the PS (Desmeuliers, 2005). Officially, factions are defined in ideological terms, by support of a text. In practice, however, ideology, power, and personality are intertwined within the factions. Importantly, today’s factions are an organised system of presidential candidate selection that tends to revolve around personal rivalries rather than strong ideological differences (Crespy, 2008: 27). Knapp (2004: 167) thus describes the factions as ‘the very stuff of the internal life of the PS’, as they are organised at the grassroots and at the top of the party. At their best, they have allowed for pluralism and intra-​party democracy, but at their worst, they have led to self-​destructive infighting and, therefore, unelectability. Since the foundation of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, the PS has held the presidency for about 19 years and government for 20 years. Yet, it has never been a mass party in the Duvergerian sense, because –​unlike Labour –​it could not count on the trade unions for membership and support. As a consequence, since the 1930s, the PS has lacked an industrial working-​class clientele (Bell and Criddle, 1984: 146). Today’s PS is mainly a party of public-​sector workers, teachers, and civil servants (Sawicki, 2013: 104). Like all French parties, the PS has tended to ‘organisational weakness’. Andrew Knapp explains: ‘They have usually had few members […]. French parties are prone to split, or to be relaunched under different names. They have had difficulty in monopolising political recruitment, in disciplining their parliamentary élites, and in articulating central organisations and the grassroots (Knapp, 2004: 21). Party membership levels in France have always been low, so the PS is no exception (Offerlé, 2000). What is more, as French parties are not legally obliged to publish their membership statistics, the numbers they provide tend to be unreliable and differ significantly from those published by newspapers and researchers (Billordo, 2003). In November 2014, the PS claimed 150,000 members but admitted that only 60,000 of them were paying their fees (Le Figaro, 2014, 30 November). The PS is only the third largest party in France, behind the centre-​right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) with 237,000 paying members, and the right-​wing extremist National Front with

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83,000 paying members (Le Figaro, 2014, 30 November). Thus, today’s PS has a much smaller membership base than the Labour Party (and the SPD, as will be discussed later on in this chapter). For that reason, Juhem (2006) argued that since the 1950s, the PS has resembled a cadre party rather than a mass party. Bell and Criddle (2014: 39) explain that: ‘Overall, the pattern of membership is one of a slow building of the support base when in opposition, followed by an upsurge at the time of presidential elections generated by the enthusiasm for the Left’s candidate, and then a subsequent deterioration of the position when in power.’ The PS’s lightweight organisation has meant that although it has some of the most democratic structures of any French party, they have historically been prone to manipulation by notables: mayors and local councillors who are able to use the powers and prerogatives of their elective offices for personal and factional purposes (Knapp, 2004: 158–​159). The PS on the ground

On the ground, the PS is organised into 3,200 ‘sections’, which were inherited from the SFIO but stripped of their former powers when the PS was re-​founded in 1971 (Stephan, 2001). Sections need to be made up of a minimum of five members. They can be located within a specific geographical area (e.g. in a borough or a canton) or within a company or university (PS, 2015b, Statute, c­ hapter 2). Each section has a secretary who is elected in a secret ballot by all party members registered with the section. The secretary is joined by a treasurer and supported by a bureau. The PS rule book describes the role of the section as follows: ‘The section is the forum for debate and meetings of all members. This essential structure of the members’ life is responsible for promoting real grassroots activism.’ One of the federations describes the role of the local sections in the following terms:  ‘Being a member of a PS section involves attending regular meetings in order to exchange views on specific topics or guest speakers. It means participating in the PS’s life, be it in the activities of the section (distribution of leaflets or local newspaper, political cafés, website, etc.) or the federation’ (PS Haute Garonne, 2016). Thus, the section is where activists meet and campaign. Yet, the  average section’s size is small and their power is very limited. In fact, much of the PS’s activity at the local level revolves around elected mayors. They tend to be the most visible politicians in their localities and enjoy high levels of trust and popularity. Sawicki (1997: 319) even goes so far as to say that where Socialists hold locally elected positions, these local officials might be the party. Nevertheless, the most important decisions, such as the selection of candidates and the formulation of party policy, are taken by a small group of national-​level elites (Elgie and Griggs, 2000: 100). The next higher level of the PS, the federation, mirrors the geographical and administrative boundaries of the departments, of which there are 101 in France.

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Unlike the sections, the federations have legal status inside the PS and can adopt their own statutes and rules (in accordance with PS rules). The federation brings together all the sections within a department. The Federal Council (FC) is the most important policy-​making body inside the federation. The FC’s members are elected by the federal conference, which gives each faction a proportional number of votes. The FC also elects the members of the Federal Bureau (FB), whose main role it is to implement the policy decisions taken by the council. It is supported by the federal secretariat, which is headed by the first federal secretary. He or she tends to be a member of the majority faction inside the federation and is elected by the members of the federation in a two-​round majoritarian contest. In his or her tasks, the first secretary of the federation is supported by a number of federal secretaries. Each of them is in charge of a particular portfolio –​such as European policy, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Also, federations can set up a number of working groups to which members are invited to contribute. Depending on the membership size of the federation, the federal congress sends a certain number of delegates to the PS’s national conference. On paper, all federations are equal in their rights and obligations, but in practice, some are more equal than others. Some federations are important power bases for particular factions. These tend to be the big federations such as Nord and Nord-​Pas-​de-​Calais. The federations’ first secretaries can assume a significant amount of power and act as patrons, running their own networks in a long-​standing system of patronage (Knapp, 2004:  165). The federations also group together to form ‘regional unions’ in accordance with the 18 French regions. This adds another level to the party organisation, but one that is primarily administrative and concerned with organising regional election campaigns. A development challenging the future success of the PS was the launch in 2016 of En Marche (On the Move). En Marche was founded as a social movement by former minister for the economy, Emmanuel Macron (2014–​2016). Macron, a centrist, more liberal than socialist politician, made no secret of his frustration with the PS. In 2015, he stated publicly that he was no longer a party member. In 2016 he stepped down as a minister and declared that he was considering running as an independent candidate for the 2017 presidential elections. En Marche gained further support, and Macron entered the second round of the 2017 presidential elections with 24.01 per cent of the votes. Meanwhile, Benoît Hamon, the PS’s candidate from the party’s left wing, only won 6.63 per cent of the votes and did not enter the second round. Formally, the party conference (congrès national) is the PS’s highest authority. It used to rally every three years, but since 2010, a party conference is convened within six months after a presidential election and halfway through the five-​year-​ long presidency. In addition, a special conference can be convoked at any time. The conference elects the party’s steering bodies, the National Bureau (bureau national) and the National Council (conseil national). Here again, the factions’

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strength determines the make-​up of these bodies. PS conferences are thus organised around the factions, and the most important negotiations take place behind closed doors and are undertaken beforehand (Bell and Criddle, 2014:  41). The factions each table a policy document (‘contribution’) in advance to the National Council, which reviews them and passes them to the membership for discussion. After a few months, the National Council decides which of these contributions can be put together to become ‘motions’. These will then be presented to the membership for a vote, and then to conference. The aim of the conference is to unite the party behind one single motion, which then acts as the principal guidelines for the party until the next conference. If, however, at the end of the conference, the factions have failed to unite behind a motion, the party members are asked to cast their vote. Whenever ‘a façade of unity’ can be maintained, as in 2003, the conference is in a position to formulate policy guidelines (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 44). These tended to be broad, leaving enough room for interpretation to the party leadership. Occasionally, however, PS conferences have revealed and exacerbated the deep divisions between the factions and their presidential candidates. The conferences of Rennes (1990) and Reims (2008) stood out for the high level of infighting as the factions clashed and the majority of delegates failed to unite behind a programme and candidate. In other words, the party leadership ‘fought itself to a standstill’ (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 35). During François Hollande’s presidency, infighting at the conference was kept under control. Indeed, at the 2015 party conference, motion A (supported by Prime Minister Manuel Valls, party leader Jean-​Christophe Cambadélis, and almost all cabinet ministers) won the majority support, thereby confirming the work of the ruling party elite in government. The PS in central office

Like Labour, the PS has a complex and complicated process in place for the central administration of the party. The three key bodies that will be briefly introduced in this section are: the National Secretariat (secrétariat national) at the top of the party organisation; the National Bureau (bureau national), which is the steering committee; and the National Council (conseil national). The National Secretariat is the executive of the PS, comparable to Labour’s NEC. Since 1980, it has been located at Rue Solférino in Paris, although the party took the decision to sell their headquarters in September 2017. The party leader (premier secrétaire) is the head of the National Secretariat where he/​she is surrounded by about one hundred or so permanent employees. Yet, the real power lies with the private office ‘cabinet’ of the party leader, where the important decisions are taken (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 46). The party leader has the power to propose the members of the National Secretariat (called national secretaries) and their assistants. The list of secretaries is then presented to the National Council for a vote. In the National Secretariat, the PS leader is mainly surrounded by supporters

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from the same factions, but some posts are given to other faction supporters in order to avoid conflict. The national secretaries are not necessarily Members of Parliament. Traditionally, however, many national secretaries have been elected to public office at the European or local level. It is worth noting here that the PS’s leader, unlike his or her counterpart from the Labour Party, is not the prime minister or the president. In fact, the party leader does not even have to be a member of parliament, as the example of Martine Aubry shows. During her party leadership (2008–​2012) she was the mayor of Lille, but did not have a seat in the National Assembly. As a consequence of this separation of roles, PS leaders are nominees of the president and stand in his shadow when the party is in government. Still, they do the groundwork inside the party, which includes the difficult task of managing the different factions, whilst the president and prime minister govern the country. The National Bureau is the PS’s steering committee. It meets once a week and its main role is to ensure the administration and the direction of the party in between the sessions of the National Council. This is where the party leader regularly reports on the politics of the previous week. The National Bureau is elected by the National Council. It is made up of 73 members, amongst them the party leader, 54 representatives of the different factions, and a college of 18 representatives of the federations. Thus, again, the different levels and factions of the party are brought together. Clashes between the factions occasionally occur here, depending on the party leader’s ability to steer resolutions and maintain support. In between party conferences, the PS is administered and directed by the National Council. It is made up of 204 members that are elected by the party conference and the 102 first secretaries of the federations. Again, the party ensures that the different factions are represented inside the National Council. The regional secretaries are also invited to attend, but their votes are not binding. Each PES member party is also invited to send a delegate to the National Council’s meetings, but their vote is not binding. The role of the National Council is to execute the decisions made by the party conference. For this purpose, it convenes at least four times per year. On its website, the PS describes the National Council is the ‘party’s real parliament’ (PS, 2016, La vie du PS). The National Council is thus a forum for discussion and networking between different levels of the party organisation and the different factions. In reality, the National Council is a ‘large and unwieldy’ organ that is normally badly attended (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 45). In addition, it is often dominated by majority faction supporters, which means that it supports the leadership and remains uncritical of their proposals. The PS in public office

Since 1981, the PS has been France’s dominant party of the left. Alongside the ­centre-​right Gaullists, the Socialists have been the largest parliamentary group.

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The parliament of the Fifth French Republic is considered a relatively weak legislature that is dominated by government (Da Conceição-​ Heldt, 2005; Kerrouche, 2006). Therefore, expert committees play a limited role inside the National Assembly (Raunio, 2005: 324). Due to the parliament’s overall weakness vis-​à-​vis the executive, French parties’ parliamentary branches tend to be weak. In general, the party in central office is the dominant face in the policy-​ ­making process (Thiébault and Dolez, 2000). This, however, does not automatically translate into huge amounts of influence. Indeed, Thiébault (1993) and other party scholars have argued that French parties follow a ‘presidentialised party model’. According to this model, parties do not exert much influence on the formulation of policy. Instead, policy is made by the executive and, above all, the president. The presidentialised party model suggests that the government and the party are separate physical units and that the party is deemed to be subordinate to the president (Elgie and Griggs, 2000: 103–​104). This can be explained through the fact that the directly elected president has a personal mandate that is separate from the party political mandates in the French parliament. As everything revolves around the president, French parties have turned into little more than presidential electoral machines (Criddle, 1987). This applied to periods when the PS was in government. But even in opposition, the parliamentary party’s influence over policy tends to be small, as power lies with the National Secretariat. This section has demonstrated that the PS is a multi-​level and multi-​faceted party that delegates power from the sections all the way up to the party leaderships in public and central office. The most influential body inside the party is the National Secretariat. Yet, more than any other socialist or social democratic party in Europe, the PS’s internal life continues to be dominated by factions, whose rights are guaranteed in the party rule book. The factions spread across all levels and faces of the party. In good times, the PS has been united in diversity, but when a strong, popular, and unifying leadership is lacking, open conflicts between the factions have prevented the party from being elected. The SPD: history and organisation The SPD is Germany’s oldest party, and it is also older than Labour and the PS. The SPD’s organisational roots lie in Ferdinand Lasalle’s 1863 General German Workers’ Association which existed until 1875, when it joined forces with August Bebel’s and Karl Liebknecht’s Social Democratic Workers’ Party to found the Socialist Workers Party. In 1890 the party changed its name to Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, which it has kept until today. In 1891, Marxism became the official ideology of the SPD, partly as a response to Bismarck’s anti-​socialist legislation dating from 1878 (Sassoon, 2014:  9). ‘The SPD was unquestionably the best organised socialist party in Europe’, writes Sassoon (2014: 11). By 1914, the

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SPD was a mass party with one million members and its success had inspired the creation of other socialist parties in Western Europe. Until today, the SPD takes pride in its unanimous resistance to Hitler’s Enabling Act of 23 March 1933, which gave Hitler the power to enact laws without the involvement of the Reichstag (Walter, 2002:  95). The SPD was banned by the Nazis in June 1933, and many of its leading figures and members were persecuted, imprisoned, and sent to concentration camps (Crespy, 2013). In 1945, the SPD was re-​launched in the occupied areas of West Germany whilst social democrats in the East were forced to join the single party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland, SED). In West Germany, the SPD’s leadership took a strictly anti-​communist stance in the post-​war era. Hence, a key moment in the SPD’s post-​war history was the adoption of the Bad Godesberg programme in 1959, which the party used as a declaration of its values until German reunification in 1990. The programme marked an ideological turning point away from Marxism, towards the market economy (SPD, 1959). After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, social democrats in the East re-​launched themselves but had to start from scratch. They were no longer rooted in the working class, so they chose to re-​ establish themselves in the Protestant community (Walter, 2002: 122). Since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, the SPD has been in government for about 31 years, but always in coalition with another party. The SPD has governed either as a senior partner (together with the FDP for 13 years and the Greens for seven years) or as a junior partner in a grand coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDU) for 11 years. Thus, the SPD has ruled at the federal level together with either the Liberals, Greens, or CDU. The last time the SPD was in a position to form a government was from 1998 to 2005, when the party ruled in coalition with the Greens under the chancellorship of the centre-​ left pragmatist Gerhard Schröder. The move towards the centre of the political spectrum arguably peaked under Schröder. His ‘Agenda 2010’, a package of far-​ reaching labour market de-​regulation and welfare reforms that was ratified in 2003, alienated the more leftist members and the trade unions (Braunthal, 2003; Camerra-​Rowe, 2004). His Keynesian finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, soon quit his job and left the SPD in anger to found the Left Party (Die Linke), a merger of the West German WASG (Electoral Alliance for Labour and Social Justice) and the East German Socialist Party, the PDS, in 2007. The SPD has lost supporters to Die Linke, mainly in East Germany. After the SPD’s 2005 defeat in its heartland of North Rhine-​Westphalia, Schröder triggered new federal elections after he lost a motion of confidence. The SPD then very narrowly lost the 2005 federal elections, and since then, the party has not managed to gain enough seats to form a government. In 2009, votes plummeted in federal and European elections (23 per cent and 20.8 per cent respectively), making it the worst result in the SPD’s post-​war history. Political scientists Peter Lösche (2009) and Franz Walter (cited in Zeit Online, 2010, 18

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March) started to question the SPD’s status as a catch-​all party (Volkspartei). Not only had the SPD lost important elections; it had also lost half of its members since the 1990s (Niedermayer, 2011). The newly elected leader, Sigmar Gabriel, used the crisis to initiate a major party reform with the overall aim of giving members more participatory rights in the decision-​making processes and to open the party up to non-​members (‘supporters’) in an effort to reach out to the voters and attract new members (SPD, 2011, 26 September). The 2011 reform has been described as the most open, bottom-​up consultation in the SPD’s post-​war history (Totz, 2011). The results of a survey of local branches and thematic workshops with members and supporters were fed into high-​level working groups that designed the reform plan.3 The result was a compromise between the different levels and factions of the party. It has achieved some of its ambitious aims. For instance, the SPD now has a supporter base and a ‘guest membership’. What is more, all members can now participate in consultations/​referendums. In addition, the leadership structures at the very top of the party have been restructured slightly, as will be discussed below. In the aftermath of the 2011 reforms, the SPD described itself as a ‘modern reform party’ in a brochure (SPD, n.d.). Whilst a huge surge in new party members did not occur, the SPD has slowly recovered from its all-​time low. In 2012, the party had 477,037 members and was once again Germany’s biggest party, but only slightly ahead of the CDU, which had 476,347 members (BPB, 2013, 28 August). Like many other mainstream parties in Europe, the SPD suffers from an ageing membership (BPB, 2013, 28 August). In 2014, the average age of the SPD’s membership was 59  years (Welt Online, 2015, 22 February). The SPD on the ground

The German party literature has traditionally focused its attention on the analysis of the national level of the party organisations. Only more recently have party organisations and party systems at the level of the 16 regional states (Länder) received more scholarly attention. Post-​war (West) Germany has been described as a multi-​level governance, and so have German parties, whose organisations mirror that of the state (Kropp, 2010: 76). And yet, in the immediate post-​war years, the SPD was re-​launched as a highly centralised party that allowed for districts, but not for regional branches. Only after a 1958 organisational reform could the SPD be described as a truly federal (or multi-​level) party (Haas et al., 2008: 19). On the ground, the SPD is divided into (roughly) 8,227 local branches (Ortsvereine), though the party itself continues to insist on a higher number (Welt Online, 2015, 22 February). The number of local branches keeps shrinking. The party rule book stipulates that each Ortsverein elects a chair and delegates to the conference at the next higher level of the party, the Unterbezirk. The SPD’s

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official guidebook for the Ortsvereine, which the party updates regularly, reads as follows: ‘The Ortsverein informs about and discusses politics; influences policy at the local level; offers a fun and entertaining social life; makes local politics easier to grasp; has an established network made up of local organisations and people’ (SPD, 2013a). Yet, the SPD’s 2010 membership survey highlights that the majority of local Ortsvereine were very small, only having between 10 and 19 members (SPD, 2010a). In order to speak with a stronger voice and bundle their powers, several Ortsvereine can get together to create city branches (Stadtverbände). Still, despite this option, the role and purpose of the Ortsverein is contested these days. Most notably, the lack of decision-​making power is often bemoaned. Writing for the SPD’s monthly membership magazine, Vorwärts, SPD activist and former MEP candidate Karsten Wenzlaff criticises the party’s lack of interest in its grassroots. He states: ‘The Ortsvereine are needed’ is the mantra repeated with every party reform. They establish the link between members. But honestly speaking, the Ortsvereine only continue to exist because they ensure that someone puts up posters, lets him/​herself be shouted at whilst manning the party stalls on the high street or distributes leaflets. The Ortsvereine have become mere instruments to fight election campaigns. Which meaning do Ortsvereine have when at the party conference, bottom-​up democracy meets the steered political power at the top? When content-​based discussions that take place inside the Ortsvereine and that are then translated into resolutions, are destroyed and ignored by the conference? When Ortsvereine are only mobilised before elections when posters need to be put up? The basic problem is that the SPD does not really take its Ortsvereine seriously. (Wenzlaff, 2010, 22 October)

Thus, whilst the SPD’s local branch is still –​officially –​the place where like-​ minded party activists meet, discuss politics, and campaign, their existence is no longer taken for granted as their influence on the SPD’s overall direction is small. The next higher level of the party is the sub-​district (Unterbezirk, which in some regions is called Kreisverband). There are 350 SPD sub-​districts across Germany. The Unterbezirk often corresponds with the administrative unit of the local council or the municipality, and its main job is to send delegates to the regional party conference (Landesparteitag). It is the next higher level of the party organisation, the Bezirk (district), which is normally referred to as the regional association (Landesverband), that is very relevant. The 20 Landesverbände are powerful players in the SPD’s internal life, and their position has to be understood in the context of Germany’s federal structure. The 16 Länder have a ‘state-​ like’ quality (Wehling, 2006) within the political system of the Federal Republic. They are represented in the lower house, the Bundesrat, where they can amend and veto legislation that touches upon their legislative competences. At the beginning of the 1990s, when the Treaty of Maastricht was ratified, the Länder

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successfully argued that they should have the right to participate in the formulation of German EU policy in all the policy areas that had earlier been their competence (Jeffery, 1996; Jeffery and Rowe, 2014). As a consequence, all Länder governments have had a department for European and international affairs and an EU liaison office in Brussels since the 1990s. The Länder also elect their assemblies and governments, which can decide on important issues such as education and policing (Auel, 2010). As the SPD is traditionally represented in all 16 regional assemblies, the party’s regional associations play a more important role than their counterparts in the Labour Party or the PS. For instance, the SPD Landesverband convenes the regional party conference that elects the 600 delegates for the federal party conference, which is the highest decision-​making organ of the SPD. What is more, a number of regional party leaders are always represented in the SPD’s national executive bodies. The Landesverbände are also a training ground for party elites for federal office (such as the chancellery or cabinet). Still, measuring the actual influence of the Landesverbände on the party is a difficult undertaking. Holtmann (1998) describes the Landesverbände as ‘the mouthpiece of the conflicts between the centre and the periphery’ of the party. At the regional level, they play an important role in the formulation of policy, campaigning, and recruiting candidates for public office. The ability of the Landesverbände to influence national party policy, however, depends on three main factors: the membership size of the Landesverband; the number of SPD MPs represented in the Bundestag; and whether the SPD is in government or opposition at the regional and federal level. For a start, the SPD Landesverbände vary significantly in size. The largest, North Rhine-​Westphalia, had 117,756 members in 2014, whilst the smallest, Mecklenburg-​Western Pomerania, only counted 2,767 members (for an overview of the SPD’s membership, see Table 2.2). North Rhine-​Westphalia is also much more densely populated than Mecklenburg-​Western Pomerania, and, as a consequence, elects more (SPD) MPs to the Bundestag. For instance, after the 2013 general elections, the SPD North Rhine-​Westphalia was represented by 54 (out of a total of 142) MPs, whilst Mecklenburg-​Western Pomerania elected only three social democrats to the Bundestag (out of a total of 13 MPs). These numbers matter for power relations inside the party, as they determine both the number of candidates on the SPD’s nationwide party list for European parliamentary elections and the representations of regional party elites in the SPD’s national committees. In accordance with § 9 of the German party law, the SPD’s highest decision-​ making body is the national, or federal, party conference (Bundesparteitag), which convenes every two years and is made up of 600 delegates (elected by the Landesverbände) and the members of the party’s executive committee. In contrast to Labour’s annual conference, the SPD’s Bundesparteitag is not open to ordinary members. It elects the executive committee (Vorstand), nominates the

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Centre-left parties and the European Union Table 2.2  SPD membership per Landesverband in 2014 SPD Landesverband Bavaria Berlin Brandenburg Bremen Baden-​Württemberg Hamburg Hesse Lower Saxony Mecklenburg-​Western Pomerania North Rhine-​Westphalia Rhineland Palatinate Saarland Saxony Saxony-​Anhalt Schleswig Holstein Thuringia

Number of SPD members 62,133 17,038 6,230 4,437 35,835 10,802 55,383 59,855 2,767 117,756 38,527 19,192 4,416 3,578 17,841 4,112

Source: Niedermayer (2015, 1 September).

chancellor candidate, and also takes fundamental policy decisions. Importantly, it ratifies the so-​called ‘principal guidelines’ (Grundsatzprogramm) in which the party formulates its core values. These principle policy guidelines remain general, and, most of the time, are based on suggestions made by the party executive. In line with §  15 of the SPD’s statute, 10 per cent of the party’s MEPs are automatically invited to the conference. However, their role is merely to consult, and they do not have the right to speak. In reality, the majority (three-​quarters) of the SPD’s MEPs attend conferences, since many of them are district delegates (Stroh, 2004:  131–​132). Conferences are forums for networking and debate, where the leadership and selected members of the party on the ground can meet to exchange ideas. Lösche and Walter (1992) argue that the party conference has been disempowered since the 1960s and replaced by federal conferences and symposia dealing with specific topics (including European affairs). However, while the conference might not play a significant role in the SPD’s day-​to-​day policy formulation, it does provide general guidelines for the party leadership. When in 2011, the SPD introduced its most far-​reaching reform of the past decades, the party created a new ‘mini’ party conference, the party convention (Parteikonvent), which convenes two to three times per year. It is made up of 200 delegates from the regional party conferences and the SPD’s executive committee. The party convention’s role is to enact decisions taken by the conference and to make resolutions on salient issues. The aim was to enable the party to react

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more swiftly to current events and also to involve the regional associations more closely in its business. The SPD in central office

In the day-​to-​day management of the SPD, the executive committee (Vorstand), which has been located at the modern and spacious Willy-​Brandt-​Haus in central Berlin since 1999, plays a central role (Bukow, 2013: 172–​173). The Vorstand is made up of the party leader; his/​her six deputies; the general secretary; the treasurer; the party’s EU advisor; and a number of other members to be named by the executive committee, but the overall size of the executive committee has to be limited to 35 people. The Vorstand acts as the roof of the party and is largely utilised to negotiate compromises between the different territorial levels, faces, and factions inside the SPD. Before 2011, the SPD also had a presidency, which was the SPD’s real powerhouse and played a crucial role in the formulation of policy (de Deken, 1999: 84). It could do so because, with its 17 party elites, it was smaller than the executive committee and met more often. The presidency’s policy proposals were usually confirmed by the Vorstand without much debate. Because the presidency had assumed so much power, party leader Sigmar Gabriel and his colleagues of the Vorstand campaigned to have it abolished with the SPD’s 2011 reform. Thus, the presidency was abolished and the Vorstand strengthened and made smaller (Bukow, 2013: 136; Bukow and Poguntke, 2013: 182). Only two years later, however, some at the top of the party played with the idea of reintroducing the presidency, arguing that it gave the Landesverbände a stronger voice than the newly established party convention (Handelsblatt, 2013, 7 October). Still, the presidency no longer exists, and the Vorstand has seen its role strengthened. It represents the SPD in central office, although most of its members are MPs, MEPs, or members of the regional assemblies, and are therefore also part of the party in public office. In contrast to the PS, the SPD’s constitution does not explicitly permit factions. However, there are three well-​established ‘wings’ inside the party: the left-​wing, Keynesian Parliamentarian Left (Parlamentarische Linke), the ­centrist-​ conservative Seeheim Circle (Seeheimer Kreis), and the pragmatic, reformist Network Berlin (Netzwerk Berlin). These groupings revolve around ideology rather than candidates for the chancellorship. Still, the membership of a faction is an important selection criterion for parliamentary committee chairs and other important posts inside the party. There were times when the factions openly fought against each other, but in recent years, SPD leader Gabriel had an easier task unifying and managing the party than his colleagues from Labour and the PS. For some, this is mainly due to the SPD’s weakness and unpopularity, which has arguably caused the factions to remain more silent than usual and express

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their loyalty to the leadership (Welt Online, 2016, 21 June). The structural cause for greater party unity is Germany’s electoral system of proportional representation, which makes smaller parties such as the Left Party and the Greens viable options for left-​wing voters. For this reason, the SPD accommodates a slightly smaller spectrum of views than Labour and the PS. On the one hand, this makes it easier to manage the party, but on the other hand, the SPD has lost many votes to the smaller parties and now finds it difficult to increase its vote share to over 30 per cent and form a government at the national level. The SPD in public office

Compared to many other parliaments in the EU –​and particularly the House of Commons and the National Assembly –​the Bundestag is considered a relatively strong legislature (Börzel and Sprungk, 2007:  124; Rudzio, 2011). It is much closer to what Polsby (1975:  277) labels a ‘transformative’ legislature, which possesses the ‘independent capacity, frequently exercised, to mould and transform proposals from whatever source into laws’. It shares the power to control the agenda with the government. The Bundestag is also characterised by a high degree of professionalisation, which manifests itself in expert committee work and an exceptionally high number of full-​time paid parliamentary staff (Poguntke et al., 2016: 666). Despite changing electoral fortunes, the SPD has always been the largest or second largest party group in the Bundestag. In the formulation of the SPD’s day-​ to day policy, the parliamentary group tends to play an important role. This is because although the party headquarters are relatively well staffed, they cannot deal with policy content in great detail. Such debates are led in the Bundestag’s 23 permanent committees and the SPD’s corresponding parliamentary working groups. This policy expertise feeds back into the party in central office because some of the SPD’s parliamentary elites, such as a deputy chair of the parliamentary group, also sit on the executive committee and are therefore part of the party in public and central office. In contrast to Labour and the PS, the SPD remains a fairly decentralised party. In the early 1990s, German party scholar Peter Lösche described the SPD as strongly decentralised, fragmented, and flexible. He wrote that ‘the three levels, local, regional, and federal, are almost not bound to each other’ (Lösche, 1993: 35). Due to this fragmentation and decentralisation, the party leadership, which is represented inside the executive committee, has a high degree of autonomy in the formulation of policy. The extent to which this applies to European policy will be discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Recent organisational reforms, which have introduced elements of direct democracy and more fluid types of membership and affiliation, have not led to radical organisational change or a surge in new members. The next section will briefly describe the history of the

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PES and its current internal workings. The relationship between the PES and the Labour Party, PS, and SPD will feature in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The Party of European Socialists Cooperation between the socialist and social democratic parties of the six founding EU member states started in the early 1950s when the Socialist International set up a Study Group on European Unity in order to discuss the Schuman Plan. In 1957, a liaison office was set up in Luxembourg that would organise regular meetings for the party delegates from the six founding states’ socialist/​social democratic parties, including the SPD and PS (Hix and Lesse, 2002). Yet, it took until 1973 for the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community to be created. The new confederation now also included the Labour Party. Cooperation inside the cooperation was, however, loose, and the organisational structures were weak. Only in 1992, when the Treaty of Maastricht was written and ratified and the so-​called party article (138a) included, the confederation re-​launched itself and became the Party of European Socialists (PES). Still, the party’s organisational and logistical infrastructure remained slight, which was an index of the PES’s ‘weak institutionalisation’ (Moschonas, 2009: 270). There was no party in central office to speak of, as the secretariat was located inside the European Parliament and depended heavily on the parliamentary group for staff and other resources. The PES’s role has evolved since, and its gradual empowerment can be seen as the result of the Europarties’ lobbying for legal recognition (Raunio and Johansson, 2005). Most importantly, since 2003, Europarties have a legal status that regulates their funding, which comes out of the European Parliament’s budget and fees paid by the national member parties.4 The clarification of their financial situation had an important impact on the activities of the PES and the other Europarties. The regulation’s requirement that the Europarties obtain a legal basis in an EU member state meant that they had to move into an office outside the European Parliament buildings and could no longer ‘borrow’ staff from the parliamentary group. The PES’s grant from the European Parliament has more than quintupled within the space of 11 years, increasing from €1,093,853 in 2004 to €5,828,179 in 2015 (European Parliament, 2016). The more generous budget has triggered a professionalisation of the PES’s infrastructure, personnel, and communication. In 2008, the regulation was amended to allow Europarties to use their funds for campaigning during the European parliamentary elections and to set up affiliated political foundations (Gagatek, 2009).5 Due to their emancipation from the party groups in the European Parliament, today’s Europarties ought to be taken seriously as actors in their own right (van Hecke, 2010). They coordinate member party policy positions by writing common European manifestos containing pledges, and they shape the EU policy

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agenda. Europarties have therefore become policy-​seeking institutions (Timuş and Lightfoot, 2014). What is more, ahead of the 2014 European parliamentary elections, all Europarties proposed for the first time a Spitzenkandidat (lead candidate) for the presidency of the European Commission (see Hobolt, 2014). The PES elected the SPD’s Martin Schulz (as will be discussed in Chapter 6). Despite these recent developments, the notion of whether Europarties are ‘real’ parties remains contested. Donald Sassoon, for example, argues that ‘The Party of European Socialists (PES) may comprise more than 30 social democratic parties, but it is not a party in any of the accepted senses of the word since it does not even contest the elections for the European Parliament, which are always contested by national parties and never by a European party’ (Sassoon, 2014: xvii). Other scholars, notably Hix and Høyland (2011: 141), argue that the party federations have gradually developed into genuine Europarties, ‘albeit with limited power over their constituent national member parties or the political groups in the European Parliament’. Whatever label we choose to give the PES, it is important to note that it remains a ‘party of parties’ or a ‘party aggregate’ whose policies result from a process of accommodation and synthesis of the national members’ positions (Bressanelli, 2013). Katz and Mair’s typology of the three faces of the party organisation, although originally intended for national parties, can ‘travel’ to the PES. Yet, with Europarties being parties of parties, there is one major difference: the PES’s party on the ground is primarily made up of its full member parties. In addition, there are the ‘PES activists’, a type of individual but indirect membership. More straightforward is the designation of the party in central office and public office, as will be demonstrated below. The PES on the ground

The PES’s party on the ground is, first and foremost, the member parties. The most powerful and influential inside the PES are the 33 full member parties from the 28 EU member states and Norway. These have full voting rights and are involved in all policy and candidate selection decisions. Delegates from the member parties attend the PES Congress, which is the party conference and as such the highest decision-​making body. It adopts the PES’s European election manifestos and all changes to the party statutes, and elects the PES president, vice-​ presidents, and the presidency, which is the executive body. The PES Congress convenes only twice within the five-​year European parliamentary term. Between congresses, the PES Council meets once a year to define the party’s broad policy guidelines. It gathers around 500 participants, amongst them the PES leadership, national member party delegates, and international guests. The Council also adopts resolutions on salient political matters. In 2013, for the first time in the PES’s history, the Council adopted a Fundamental Programme in which the

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party outlines its core values and principles. All PES member parties provide their input into PES manifestos. Still, research conducted by Klüver and Rodon (2013) demonstrates that the PES’s manifestos are often more in line with those of the large member parties. When it comes to filling important posts inside the PES, Labour, the PS, and the SPD have certainly pulled their weight. For instance, amongst the most recent PES secretary generals were Philip Cordery (PS, 2004–​2012) and Achim Post (SPD, 2012–​). Labour’s Robin Cook was PES president from 2001 until 2004. This, however, is not to say that smaller member parties do not stand a chance of obtaining key posts. The most recent PES presidents were members of the Danish Socialdemokraterne (Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, 2004–​2011) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (Sergei Stanishev, 2011–​). The PES on the ground also consists of the ‘PES activists’, which were introduced in 2005 under the leadership of then president Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. He described the PES activists as ‘the bridge builders between the national and the European scenes’ (Rasmussen, 2009). All members of the PES’s member parties are automatically members of the PES, but have to register with the PES online (PES, 2015, Statutes, Article 18). The PES then leaves it to the member parties to decide whether and how they choose to integrate the activists, which means that there is a lot of variety in Europe: some parties have welcomed the activists, whilst others have shown little interest. The PS, especially, has integrated the PES activists into its local party structures (as discussed further in Chapter  5). By contrast, the SPD took much longer to accept and support the PES activists, and Labour never really did. By the time of the 2014 European parliamentary elections, about 200 city groups had been launched by PES activists across Europe and many of them campaigned. By November 2014, the PES had about 30,000 registered activists across Europe. However, in contrast to other Europarties, such as the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the PES only offers individual membership to the members of their national member parties and it does not charge membership fees. When it comes to the participation in the formulation of policy, the PES activists’ power is limited: They are allowed to attend the party congress but do not have voting rights. Yet, the PES allows for policy consultations. For instance, the activists contributed actively to the writing of the 2009 and 2014 PES European election manifestos by sending in written contributions. In addition, in 2010, the PES introduced the ‘PES activists initiative’, which is based on the concept of the European Citizens Initiative: If 2.5 per cent of PES activists from at least 15 member parties or affiliated organisations sign a political proposal or a comment on policies, the initiative is tabled at the PES presidency. Yet, organising such an initiative is a challenging undertaking, as it needs to involve a topic that is within the realm of the PES presidency and mobilises the activists. Another caveat is the

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language of the document, as the initiative needs to be translated into different European languages in order to reach activists across the EU. So far, out of five activist initiatives, only one was successful, namely the ‘European Charter for a Committed Social Democracy’, parts of which made it into the PES (2013) fundamental programme.6 Overall, on the ground, the key players remain the PES’s full member parties, not the activists. Still, the launch of the activist scheme tells us something about the PES’s ambition to become a ‘real’ party. Having members is seen to enhance the party’s legitimacy. In the past, most national party members were unaware of the PES’s activities, and by introducing the activists, the PES hopes to become a recognised brand on the ground. The PES in central office

The PES in central office refers to the secretariat in rue Guimard in Brussels, which is led by the secretary general and coordinates the party’s daily political affairs. The secretariat’s principal role is to organise the PES presidency meetings, which take place every two to four months between congresses in order to take decisions on the daily management of the PES. It consists of the PES president (who chairs the meetings), one representative of each full member party, one representative of each full member organisation (PES Women, Young European Socialists, Foundation for European and Progressive Studies), the secretary general and the president of the parliamentary group of the PES. In addition, the president of the European Parliament (if she/​he is a member of the Socialist & Democrats (S&D) group) and one representative per associate party/​organisation take part in presidency meetings. The PES secretariat also hosts the Leaders’ Conference on the eve of the European Council in Brussels. The Leaders’ Conference used to be a rather informal affair, but it was formalised in the 1990s after the PES’s re-​launch and is now anchored in the party statutes. It is attended by the national party leaders, heads of government, socialist members of the European Commission, the chairperson of the S&D group, and the PES leadership. These conferences, which form part of the Brussels ‘summitry’, are used to discuss the major issues on the Council agenda. At the end of each conference, the PES releases common positions on the major issues of the day. But, first and foremost, Leaders’ Conferences provide the opportunity to network and take a ‘family picture’, thereby displaying the power and unity of the centre-​left party family. It is therefore telling that both Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder, when they were in power, refused to attend the PES Leaders’ Conference (van Hecke and Johansson, 2013:  67), probably not deeming it important enough. Meanwhile, François Hollande, after he was elected president in 2012, still attended some of the PES Leaders’ Conferences, as did the Italian prime minister, Matteo Renzi.

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The PES in public office

The PES in public office refers to the MEPs who sit in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group. Together with the EPP group, S&D has been the biggest and most dominant force inside the European Parliament. Amongst the European Parliament’s 30 presidents since its establishment in 1952, nine were socialists. The S&D has also held many other influential posts, such as the vice-​presidency of the European Parliament and the chairmanship of powerful committees. Despite their shrinking electoral fortunes in recent years (see Table 1.1), Labour, the PS, and the SPD are still more numerous inside the S&D group than parties from small member states and have therefore been able to make their voices heard. In general, the S&D group plays a stronger part in the day-​to-​day policy-​ making processes than the party in central office. There are three reasons for this power imbalance inside the PES. The first relates to the lack of funding. Despite the regulation of Europarty funding and the steadily increasing funds, the PES’s annual budget remains modest compared to that of its national member parties.7 As a consequence, the PES secretariat remains small and understaffed, with only a few policy experts –​especially when compared to Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office. Second, the PES has struggled at times to be taken seriously by its bigger member parties who are reluctant to give away power to the European level. During interviews, Labour and SPD officials in particular have made it clear that attending PES conferences, promoting PES campaigns, and using PES manifestos and logos were not a priority. Third, in recent years, the PES leadership in central office, including president Sergei Stanishev, has been outshone by the European Parliament’s president Martin Schulz, who gained prominence during his time as S&D group leader (2004–​2012), his campaign as the PES Spitzenkandidat in 2014, and his time as European Parliament president (2012–​2016). Conclusions This chapter has provided a broad overview of the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste, and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands as multi-​level parties that spread across the local, regional, national, and European levels. In all three parties, a system of power delegation from the bottom to the top is in place. This is not entirely unsurprising, given ‘the sheer uniformity in basic organisational structures and rules’ of parties in Western democracies (Poguntke et al., 2016). Yet, the devil is in the detail, and this chapter has identified a number of differences between Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s organisations. The first difference refers to the parties’ degree of centralisation. Amongst the three, the SPD is the most decentralised party that guarantees its regional

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associations, the Landesverbände, a considerable degree of autonomy and power. A ‘loosely-​coupled anarchy’, to use Peter Lösche’s term, is still a suitable depiction of the SPD. By comparison, Labour and the PS are more centralised, with the centre of power located at the top of the party in public and central office. Whilst Labour and the PS’s regional associations play a certain role, they are not very powerful in the parties’ day-​to-​day lives. As party organisations often mirror that of the state, this finding is not surprising: the federalised, decentralised structure of the German state is reflected in the SPD’s structure, whilst England and France remain highly centralised. Another important difference between the three parties is their internal power allocation. In the case of the PS, the party in central office overshadows the parliamentary party. This can be explained through the weakness of the National Assembly and the fact that party elites, and, above all, the party leader, do not always hold seats in parliament. The PS’s leader is surrounded by trusted colleagues in the National Secretariat, where the most important decisions are taken. By comparison, Labour and the SPD’s parliamentary parties are more powerful, as many –​if not all –​party leaderships are also MPs and therefore involved in the legislative process. Still, despite these differences, the three parties have in common the recent empowerment of the grassroots members. As all parties have introduced elements of direct democracy, the power shifts away from the activists attending meetings and assemblies to the entire membership, which is occasionally invited to cast its vote in internal referendums and –​in the case of Labour and the PS –​leadership elections. A third difference between the three parties relates to factionalism. At all levels, the PS is run by its factions (courants), whose rights are enshrined in the party statutes. In theory, factionalism can lead to healthy pluralism and ideological renewal. In the case of the PS, it has caused intense infighting and destabilisation, as power struggles between potential presidential candidates have done much damage to the party’s electability. Whilst both Labour and the SPD have a number of factions that occasionally voice their disapproval with the way the party is run, these factions do not have constitutional rights. They are critical voices rather than the very stuff the two parties are made of. Still, the internal divisions between the majority of moderate Labour MPs, on the one hand, and the party leadership under Jeremy Corbyn and the grassroots, on the other hand, have caused Labour problems in the aftermath of the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum. The fourth difference between the parties is their relationship with trade unions, which goes back to the historical roots of the parties. Amongst the three parties, only Labour has affiliated trade unions that make up a large part of the membership. Although the influence of the unions has decreased over the past decades, they still play a significant role in the selection of candidates (as will be discussed in Chapter 5) and the formulation of policy. If, for some, the unions

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have been too influential inside Labour, then the PS could be said to have suffered from its lack of trade union (and working-​class) support. Differences aside, this chapter has also identified two main challenges to the organisational success of Labour, the PS, SPD, and other centre-​left parties in Europe. The first challenge is the traditional party on the ground’s struggle to stay alive and kicking. Labour, the PS, and the SPD are facing a crisis at the grassroots, or on the ground. As the SPD’s members get older and pass away, fewer new members are joining and, as a result, the SPD membership keeps shrinking. Meanwhile, the PS never had a large membership basis and shrank even further during François Hollande’s presidency. Labour, after a period of shrinkage in the early 2000s, has experienced a recent surge in membership since 2015. Most of the new members are more radical and left-​wing than the traditional, long-​standing Labour members and supporters, and joined because of Jeremy Corbyn’s appeal. Whether the new members are there to stay will depend on the success of Corbyn’s leadership. What applies to all three parties (and most other mainstream parties in Europe) is that the younger generation of party members does not always want to engage in the traditional way, for example, by attending branch/​constituency meetings, canvassing, leafleting, etc. Unless the three parties find ways of attracting and keeping younger members and making their organisations more accessible and attractive, they will keep shrinking. The second challenge is the pressure from social movements. Like other centre-​ left parties in Europe, both Labour and the PS have been faced with new, leftist and liberal social movements that sympathise with a particular politician but are not affiliated to the party. A number of Corbyn’s supporters set up Momentum in 2015 and organised numerous well-​attended events across the UK, such as anti-​ austerity marches. Meanwhile, En Marche was launched by Emmanuel Macron, the then economics minister who was neither elected nor a PS member, in 2016. Whilst Momentum positioned itself on the far left, En Marche could be described as a social-​liberal movement to the right of the PS. Thus, both Labour and the PS have faced extra-​parliamentary rivalry and pressure by successful social movements that gather around and strongly support a particular politician rather than the party as a whole. Notes 1 In addition, Labour’s rule book (­chapter  3, clause 1)  lists the following ex officio conference delegates: the parliamentary Labour candidates for Westminster and European elections whose candidatures have been endorsed by the NEC; candidates for Police Commissioner; the General Secretary of the Labour Party; accredited organisers employed by the party; the lay members of the NEC committees; members of the National

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Constitutional Committee; officers of the Local Government Association Labour group and the convenor of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities Labour group; members of the Labour groups of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly of Wales; and members of the Executive Committee of BAME (Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic) Labour. 2 For more information on Labour’s ‘Partnership in Power’, see Labour Party (2010a), Partnership into Power: The Annual Conference’s Review of Labour Party Policy-​Making. 3 The grassroots survey and the workshops will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 4 Regulation (EC) No. 2004/​2003 of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding, Official Journal of the European Union, L297/​1–​4, 15 November 2003. 5 Regulation (EC) No. 1524/​2007 of the European Parliament and the council of 18 December 2007 amending Regulation (EC) No. 2004/​2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding, Official Journal of the European Union, L343/​5–​8, 27 December 2007. 6 For ‘A European Charter for a Committed Social Democracy’, see: www.eurosocialdemocrats.eu/​index.php?page=charte (accessed on 20 November 2014). 7 Indeed, the Political Party Database Project highlights that amongst all the major party families, the social democrats are the richest in terms of the mean income of their national head offices (Poguntke et al., 2016: 664).

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3

The European policies of the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD

This chapter provides background information on the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland’s (SPD) European policies and recent EU strategies. Recent scholarship has shown more interest in why Eurosceptic parties oppose the European Union (EU), while mainstream parties’ EU positions have received less scholarly attention. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that social democrats, alongside liberals and conservatives, tend to support European integration (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Bakker et  al., 2015). When we scratch the surface, however, we notice that the centre-​left’s attitude towards the EU has often been ambiguous. On the one hand, as Kriesi (2007: 85) points out, centre-​left parties embrace the cultural dimension of European integration because the cultural aspects of denationalisation chime with the left’s internationalist tradition. On the other hand, social democrats face a dilemma when they are confronted with the economic dimension of EU integration, as it poses a threat to the left’s social achievements at the national level. Thus, although the leaderships of Europe’s social democratic parties have come to accept European integration, the parties remain internally divided on the economic effects of EU membership (Kriesi, 2007). Marks and Wilson (2000) recognise these internal divisions but also highlight the ‘dual character’ of European integration. The authors argue that, on the one hand, EU economic integration threatens social democratic achievements at the national level by promoting international economic competition and undermining Keynesian responses to it. On the other hand, however, they highlight that political integration can create opportunities for regulation at the European level and thereby benefit social democrats (Marks and Wilson, 2000). The extent to which the EU is seen as an opportunity rather than a constraint has differed between and within the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD across time. This chapter first investigates the extent to which the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD have supported European integration over the past decades. To this end, data from the Manifestos Project (MARPOR) is used to map the parties’ degrees of ‘Europhilia’. The MARPOR uses election manifestos as official and authoritative policy statements, as they have usually been agreed by the whole party organisation in a democratic progress (Budge, 2001). It seeks to establish estimates of

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manifesto content according to a pre-​determined set of policy-​related categories.1 MARPOR’s approach to data collection and coding is not without its critics (Gemenis, 2013). Nevertheless, visualising the MARPOR data in graphs gives us a rough estimate of changing levels of EU support over the past decades and puts the three parties’ EU support in direct comparison. This is followed by a short overview of the parties’ historical relationship with the EU since the beginnings of European integration. Next, Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s recent EU policies are analysed. For this purpose, party manifestos, other official policy statements, and speeches and interviews given by party leaderships are used to highlight the differences and similarities between the three parties. ‘European policy’ is used as an umbrella term embracing parties’ policies about the EU and those policies that are made at the European level and through the EU (Hertner, 2015). Policies about the EU refer to parties’ official positions towards the purpose and future of European integration and questions such as the deepening and widening of European integration and reforms to the EU’s constitution and institutional structure. Policies made through the EU refer to parties’ positions on the large number of formerly domestic policy issues that now require coordination through the EU legislative processes. By considering both types of policies we will get an overall understanding of the three parties’ recent relationship with the EU. As each of the three parties prioritises slightly different EU issues, each section will focus on different policy areas. Last but not least, this chapter will briefly discuss the parties’ recent EU strategies. It is demonstrated that although the three parties have, in recent decades, supported their country’s EU membership and have, by and large, been in favour of deepening and widening the European Union, they have failed to formulate long-​term visions for the future of the EU. Amongst the three parties, the SPD has been the most enthusiastic about the EU, but recent challenges, such as the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis, have cast a shadow on the SPD’s self-​proclaimed Europhilia. Meanwhile, the Labour Party has constructed the EU as an economic project that serves the national economic interest. The lack of a more coherent and convincing EU narrative became apparent before, during, and after the 2016 EU referendum. The PS, more than Labour and the SPD, has called for the re-​orientation of the EU into an organisation promoting jobs and economic growth, but has failed to achieve its aims at the EU level. What the three parties have in common is their focus on domestic issues rather than EU-​level legislation, despite the EU’s growing importance. While the three parties promoted open and multicultural societies, they struggled to respond coherently to the political realities of open borders and labour markets. The Labour Party and the EU: from rejection to approval to ambivalence The United Kingdom’s ‘awkward’ relationship with the EU is a topic that fills bookshelves. Since the UK joined the EU in 1973, the two main parties, the

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Labour Party and the Conservative Party, have been critical of the UK’s EU membership at various times (George, 1998; Geddes, 2013). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Labour Party was deeply divided over Britain’s EU membership (Byrd, 1975; Daniels, 1998). In 1975, the Labour government organised a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the Common Market in an attempt to settle intra-​party divisions. During the 1990s and 2000s, large parts of the Conservative Party called for Britain’s exit of the EU (Bale, 2006; Lynch, 2015). The Conservatives’ Euroscepticism culminated in October 2011, when 81 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) defied Prime Minister David Cameron to call for a referendum on Britain’s EU membership (Guardian, 2011, 25 October). By this time, the government had already faced 22 rebellions on Europe, involving over 60 Conservative backbenchers in total (Bale, 2016, 23 June). In January 2013, Cameron succumbed to the pressure and promised a referendum on the UK’s continued EU membership. After being re-​elected as prime minister in May 2015, Cameron promised to re-​negotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU. On the basis of his negotiation result, the British electorate would be asked to cast their votes. In February 2016, to many commentators’ surprise, Cameron achieved a number of concessions from his European partners. For a start, the reference to an ‘ever-​closer union of peoples’ in the EU treaty would no longer apply to the UK. In particular, Cameron won confirmation from other EU leaders that this ‘special status’ would be enshrined in the next EU treaties. Cameron also achieved an ‘emergency brake’ where a member state could apply to the European Commission for permission to suspend EU migrants’ benefit payments for seven years if they were placing too much burden on the social services of a member state. Last but not least, key to Cameron’s demands were new rules to protect countries outside the Eurozone against regulation made by those inside the group that could disadvantage them. Specifically, he wanted any non-​Eurozone country, such as the UK, to be able to stall new regulations for the currency union, by triggering further discussions amongst EU leaders of the proposals. This was principally designed to protect the City of London from an attempt by the Eurozone countries to challenge its dominance as Europe’s financial hub. In a surprising win for Cameron, only one member state outside the Eurozone would be needed to force a debate amongst EU leaders about ‘problematic’ laws. These protections would eventually be written into the EU treaties, so the UK could –​if it needed to –​challenge a decision in the European Court (Independent, 2016, 20 February). Following the negotiations, the UK’s second referendum on continued EU membership took place on 23 June 2016, and a majority of 51.9 per cent of voters voted to leave the EU, with an electoral turnout of 72.2 per cent. The UK is therefore the first country to leave the EU, at a time when many others were queuing to join. In few other member states has EU membership been as controversial amongst mainstream parties and within the press as in the UK. Not only have

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many Conservatives been sceptical about the EU, the recent successes of the right-​wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP), which called for EU withdrawal and won one seat in the general elections of 2015 as well as a considerable number of seats in local and European elections, has contributed to a EU-​hostile environment (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013). Eurosceptics inside UKIP and the Conservative Party tend to denounce the UK parliament’s loss of sovereignty. Moreover, they vigorously opposed the UK joining the single currency (Baker et  al., 2008:  24). More recently, the loss of control over intra-​EU immigration has been the main concern of Eurosceptics of all British parties. The UK had opted out of the EU’s Schengen Agreement and still has border controls in place,2 but it is part of the European Single Market where workers from across the EU can move freely and come to the UK to live and work. Eurosceptics hoped that by leaving the EU, the UK would no longer have to allow large numbers of EU migrants into the country and allow them to work. What contributes to this Eurohostile environment is the British press, which has been ‘forthright in their opposition towards the EU and its perceived threat to Britain’s sovereignty’ (Usherwood and Startin, 2013:  10). It was therefore unsurprising that the three most widely read daily newspapers, the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, and Daily Telegraph, were overwhelmingly in favour of ‘Brexit’ (Huffington Post, 2016, 22 June). Perhaps as a consequence of such high levels of party-​based and print-​media-​ based Euroscepticism, EU issue voting, or ‘the process in which attitudes towards European integration translate into national vote choice’ (de Vries, 2007: 364), has been higher in the UK than in most other EU countries. Still, overall, EU policy is not very salient amongst the British electorate (Clements et al., 2013). Interestingly, levels of public Euroscepticism are not overwhelmingly high in the UK, compared to some other member states. The UK, however, stands out with its low levels of EU knowledge amongst the British public (Oppermann and Brummer, 2014). A great majority of British voters are ‘EU-​agnostic’ and change their EU views over time (Copsey and Haughton, 2014). This became apparent ahead of the EU referendum, as the polls were constantly shifting. In recent years, Labour has been portrayed as a ‘Europhile’ party. For instance, The Economist referred to Labour’s ‘proud Europhilia’ under Ed Miliband’s leadership (The Economist, 2014, 15 March). Yet, how Europhile has the Labour Party really been? Figure 3.1 depicts the levels of EU support in British legislative elections since 1945 using MARPOR data. The graph shows that the Liberal Democrats have generally been more supportive of the EU than Labour. EU membership has caused deep divisions at all levels of the Labour Party (Daniels, 1998). The 1945–​1951 Labour government under Prime Minister Clement Atlee regarded European integration suspiciously, associating it with the continental political right and ‘suspecting it would serve as a Trojan horse for European capitalism to mobilize against a Labour government’ (Baker et al.,

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Support for EU score %

10 8 6 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6 2015

2010

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1992

1987

1983

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1974 Oct

1974 Feb

1970

1966

1964

1959

1955

1951

1950

1945

–8

General election Conservatives

Labour

Lib Dems

Figure 3.1  British parties’ net support for the EU, 1945–​2015 (MARPOR data)

2008: 95). Labour was against joining the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as the UK’s coal and steel industries (amongst others) had recently been nationalised, and the notion of transferring power over these industries to the supranational level was strongly opposed (Leitolf, 1995: 275). What is more, consecutive Labour leaders saw the Commonwealth as the more relevant platform for international trade and political engagement. When in 1961, Anthony Eden’s Conservative government started to apply for European Economic Community (EEC) membership, Labour still opposed the idea. The party feared that the EEC would turn into a federal European state and argued that entry would compromise national sovereignty, particularly in the economic sphere (Labour Party, 1961; George and Haythorne, 1996). In the following year, opposition to the EEC hardened further, in particular following party leader Hugh Gaitskell’s conference speech which envisioned membership as ‘the end of Britain as an independent European state […] the end of a thousand years of history’ (Labour Party, 1962, cited by Featherstone, 1988: 54). In any case, French President De Gaulle vetoed the UK’s 1963 EEC membership on economic and political grounds. Within five years, the Labour government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson made Britain’s second application for EEC membership. It did so without significant Eurosceptic dissent within the cabinet, the parliamentary party, or the annual conference. Baker et al. (2008: 95) argue that this owed more to the expectation of a second French veto, Wilson’s party management, and Britain’s

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growing economic decline rather than a dramatic shift in attitudes within the party. Indeed, Labour’s policies quickly reverted to Euroscepticism. The party held a special conference in 1971 opposing the EEC accession terms negotiated by the Conservatives. However, when 69 Labour MPs defied the Labour whip to vote in favour of EEC entry, the intra-​party divisions became explicit. Britain joined the EEC in 1973, and one year later, Labour returned to office under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, promising a ‘fundamental renegotiation of the terms of entry’ and to present these terms for public approval in a referendum (Byrd, 1975). This succeeded, temporarily, in preventing the issue from paralysing the party and the government. Nevertheless, the divisions within the cabinet and the parliamentary party remained deep. Mainly those MPs on the far left of the party were opposed to the Common Market, although some on the centre and the right also joined the Leave campaign (Byrd, 1975: 480). Whilst the cabinet approved the renegotiated terms by a majority of 16 to 7, Labour MPs were almost equally divided, with 133 in favour, 145 opposed, and 33 abstaining (Baker et al., 2008). With public endorsement of the renegotiated terms in the June 1975 referendum and with increasing economic problems, the party’s divisions faded from view. And yet, Labour’s Eurosceptics had not given up. Defeat in the 1979 general election saw Labour’s left win control of the party’s National Executive Committee and conference. At the annual conference in 1980, five million members voted to withdraw from the EEC (with two million members voting against). In particular, Labour’s trade unions were critical of European integration on the grounds of loss of sovereignty; expected unemployment; the fall in industrial production; the high price of the Common Agricultural Policy; the UK’s disproportionately high contribution to the EU budget; and the argument that the EEC was no platform for socialist change (George and Haythorne, 1996). However, following Labour’s 1983 election defeat under left-​wing leader Michael Foot, the party conference anticipated Britain’s increasing integration into the EEC and accepted that withdrawal should no longer be an irrevocable objective but contingent upon the EEC’s future trajectory (see Labour Party, 1983: 13). Thereafter, Labour accepted membership but nevertheless maintained that EEC interference in the economic strategy of a future Labour government would not be accepted. Under Neil Kinnock’s leadership (1982–​1992), Labour gradually shifted to a pro-​European position. This shift developed as part of a policy review undertaken by the party following its third successive general election defeat in 1987 (Daniels, 1998). The 1989 Policy Review thus confirmed that ‘Britain’s future is in the European Community as it develops’ (Labour Party, 1989: 180). In the document, Labour accepted the UK’s membership of the European Single Market and called for coordinated policies amongst member states on environmental protection, workers’ rights, social benefits, and reflationary programmes. From then

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onwards, Labour focused on the opportunities that European integration offered to a social democratic party. The trade unions were won over by the then president of the European Commission, the French socialist Jacques Delors, who gave a speech to the British Trades Union Council (TUC) in 1988 in which he stressed the need for a ‘social dimension’ of the internal market. He supported the establishment of a platform of guaranteed social rights; the creation of a Statute for European Companies, which would include the participation of workers or their representatives; and the extension of the right to lifelong education to all workers (Delors, 1988). Still –​and in contrast to the SPD during this period –​Labour continued to oppose the notion of a federal Europe, seeking instead ‘A Europe which is a union of independent member states, coming together because they share common interests, not because they want to submerge themselves in a single European government’ (Labour Party, 1995:  1). Despite Labour’s gradual conversion to Europhilia since the mid-​1980s, a few small Eurosceptic groups remained and emerged within the party. For instance, the Labour Euro Safeguards Campaign, which was founded in 1962, remained opposed to EU membership in general and the adoption of the euro in particular. During the 1990s and early 2000s, a few anti-​single-​currency organisations also emerged within the party, such as the People’s Europe Campaign or Labour Against the Euro (LATE). In July 2003, Labour for a Referendum was launched to campaign for a referendum on the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty. By and large, however, by the time Tony Blair became party leader in 1994, Labour was supportive of the EU. Much has been written about New Labour’s EU policy record in office (Forster, 2002; Bulmer, 2008; Daddow, 2011, 2015). It is often argued that under Blair’s leadership, the Labour Party became particularly pro-​European (Heffernan, 2001). Yet, the Europeanist discourse of the elites was not always followed by action. Blair’s former EU advisor, Roger Liddle, argues that the Labour leaderships lacked an EU strategy when it took office in 1997, and that due to their lack of experience in government, they missed the opportunity for Britain to join the euro (Liddle, 2014). Thus, despite high aspirations, Blair’s EU policy record in office has been described as ‘at best mixed’ (Smith, 2005). The next two party leaders, Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband, distanced themselves from Blair’s ‘trumpeted Euroenthusiastic rhetoric’ and instead moved closer to the ‘cautiously and unenthusiastically pro-​European social democracy’ of Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson in the 1960s and James Callaghan in the 1970s (Schnapper, 2015). When Jeremy Corbyn took over the party leadership in the autumn of 2015, European policy became salient as the UK’s EU membership referendum was in the offing. In the past, Corbyn had made his name as a rebel Eurosceptic backbencher who had voted against the UK’s continued EEC membership in the 1975 referendum. In 2016, despite his formal backing of the UK’s continued EU membership, he remained largely absent during the referendum campaign and made

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lukewarm statements about the EU, often emphasising the EU’s need to reform over its achievements. Whilst Labour officially campaigned to remain in the EU, the campaign lacked visibility and the strong support of the leader. Overall, Labour has supported the UK’s EU membership and called for more integration in some areas. Its EU support, however, was always linked to reformism. Indeed, Labour’s policies both about and through the EU have been characterised by a strongly reformist language in the past decades, as will be demonstrated in the next sections. It’s in the national interest: Labour’s policies about the EU

Already under Tony Blair, Labour sold EU membership as a matter of ‘national interest’ (Krell, 2009: 251). The discourse did not change when Brown and then Miliband took over the party leadership. Indeed, the last chapter of Labour’s 2015 election manifesto was entitled ‘Standing up for Britain’s Interests in Europe and the World’. The ‘national interest’ tends to be defined in economic terms. Indeed, consecutive Labour leaders continuously stressed the economic benefits of membership of the European Single Market (Hertner and Keith, 2016). Labour’s case for EU membership has, above all, been an economic one. This is highlighted in Ed Miliband’s speech to the CBI in which he stated: There are some people in our country who advocate exit from the EU. […] It is a betrayal of our national interest. It is a clear and present danger. A clear and present danger to businesses like yours that trade with Europe every single day. You know that leaving the single market and stepping away from a trading block that allows us to work with the new economies, like Brazil, India and China, would be a disaster for our country. It would risk billions of pounds in lost profits, risk millions of jobs and would make Britain weaker, not stronger, in the world. (Miliband, 2014, 10 November)

Some other benefits of Britain’s EU membership have also been acknowledged, such as Britain’s interest in a European response to climate change, social inequality, and security threats, but these considerations have come second and third. What is more, despite the call for more collective action in some policy areas, Miliband dismissed the idea that Labour ever wanted a federal Europe (BBC News Online, 2011, 25 September), thereby echoing Blair’s preference for an intergovernmental rather than a supranational EU (Coates and Lawler, 2000). Miliband (2014, 12 March) was also keen to stress that ‘under Labour, Britain will not be part of an inexorable drive to an ever closer union’. When Prime Minister David Cameron announced his referendum pledge, the Labour leader was under pressure to set out his party’s strategy. He did so in March 2014, declaring that the next Labour government would legislate for a lock that guarantees that there can be no transfer of powers from Britain to the

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EU without the consent of the British public through an in/​out referendum –​a promise that was enshrined in Labour’s 2015 manifesto. Yet, Miliband believed it to be ‘unlikely this lock will be used in the next parliament’ as a new EU treaty was not likely to be drafted (Miliband, 2014, 12 March). However, after Labour’s defeat in the 2015 elections, when Miliband stepped down as leader, the party underwent a ‘change of heart’ (BBC News Online, 2015, 24 May) and started backing the EU membership referendum announced by Cameron. Interim leader Harriet Harman emphasised that Labour would still campaign for the UK to stay in the EU (BBC News Online, 2015, 24 May). Many senior leadership figures were concerned when, during Labour’s 2015 leadership campaign, Corbyn stated that he would not rule out campaigning for a no vote in the UK’s future EU membership referendum owing to Cameron’s position on workers’ rights (Guardian, 2015, 28 July). After his election, Corbyn was pressurised by some of his colleagues and the media to set out his position, which he finally did when he stated that he was in favour of the UK’s continued EU membership. Despite their overall support for European integration, consecutive Labour leaders have stressed the EU’s need to reform its institutions (Kohler-​Koch, 2000; Bulmer, 2008). Blair’s former EU advisor, Roger Liddle, refers to the ‘familiar Blairite mantra of “reform” when discussing Blair’s political arguments for Europe’ (Liddle, 2014: 89). This reformist line of argument has continued over recent years as, in each manifesto, Labour has called for EU institutional reform. The 2014 European manifesto was the first to contain a separate chapter entitled ‘Reform and Value for Money’ in which the party argued that ‘European institutions must be reformed to be more effective and better suited to meet the needs of its Member States, including the UK. Labour has a robust European reform agenda which seeks to achieve this’ (Labour Party, 2014b: 24). Yet, Labour’s EU institutional reform plans have remained vague, and the key reform project was a ‘red card system’, which would allow national parliaments to express concern with a piece of EU legislation and force the EU to either abandon or amend it (Miliband, 2014, 12 March). Moreover, there were some vague suggestions as to making the workings of the European Parliament and Commission ‘more streamlined and effective’, for example, through decreasing the number of commissioners and portfolios. Labour’s manifestos and speeches lack emotive references to shared European values and culture, which stands in contrast to the SPD and PS’s discourse. After his election as party leader, Corbyn, in a joint statement with his shadow foreign secretary, Hilary Benn, briefly outlined their EU reform plans, including the protection of the National Health Service (NHS) from EU competition law, reform of the EU’s state-​aid rule, the introduction of a red-​card system (if sufficient member state parliaments object to an EU Commission proposal then it would not go ahead), a reform of the EU budget, increased flexibility on transitional controls, and better protection of workers’ rights. Corbyn also sought to

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address levels of corporate taxation across Europe, thereby supporting a more outspokenly left-​wing EU agenda than his predecessors. It’s all about reform: Labour’s policies through the EU

Two core EU policy areas best illustrate Labour’s ambiguous relationship with the EU: the euro and intra-​EU migration. Each of them will be briefly addressed in this section. Under Tony Blair’s leadership, Labour was principally in favour of joining the euro. However, the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto’s section on the euro was ‘a piece of studied ambiguity to see Labour through an election’ (Liddle, 2014: 74), and Blair was, soon after the election, under pressure to announce a euro strategy. Under Chancellor Gordon Brown, the ‘5 tests’  –​a Treasury-​led economic assessment –​had to be met if Britain was to join the single currency, and the public had to be consulted in a referendum. The introduction of the euro thus depended on whether the British and European economy had converged; whether there was a high level of business and workforce flexibility in the UK; whether by joining the euro the UK would create better conditions for firms to invest; whether the British financial industry would benefit from the introduction of the euro; and whether joining the euro would promote economic growth and employment. For a number of reasons, the Labour government never put the euro to a referendum. Amongst these reasons were Blair’s initial indecisiveness and the lack of public engagement on this issue (Geddes, 2004:  151), as well as the highly publicised rivalry between Blair and Brown. After Blair stepped down in 2007, the Labour leadership under Brown did even less to promote the adoption of the euro. In their 2009 EU manifesto, Labour stated that ‘in principle we are in favour of membership of the single currency’, provided that the five economic tests are met. Yet, from then onwards, the party was less and less committed to the euro. In its 2010 general election manifesto, Labour made the following statement: ‘on the Euro, we hold to our promise that there will be no membership of the single currency without the consent of the British people in a referendum’. This statement has to be understood in the context of the Eurozone crisis, which had exposed the weaknesses in the original set-​up of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In their 2015 general election manifesto, Labour further clarified their position on the euro by stating that ‘we will not join the Euro, and we will ensure EU rules protect the interests of non-​Euro members’. It is thus interesting to note that Labour not only abandoned plans for euro membership, but also that, despite the salience of the Eurozone crisis, the party barely mentioned the topic in its manifestos and speeches. With the election of Corbyn in 2015 came a more critical discourse on the EU’s handling of the Eurozone crisis. Corbyn disapproved of the EU’s and International Monetary Fund’s management of the Greek debt crisis and austerity

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politics more generally. The adoption of the euro had disappeared entirely from Labour’s EU agenda. Last but not least, Labour’s recent policy shift on intra-​EU migration is worth discussing here, as it stands apart from the positions held by the PS, the SPD, and the Party of European Socialists (PES). From a pro-​immigration stance during the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the Blair government decided to give EU migrants from the eight new Central and Eastern European member states immediate and unrestricted access to the UK labour market, the party moved to a much more restrictive position. Labour’s 2014 European manifesto thus reads: Labour has learned the lessons from past East European migration. We will ensure maximum transitional controls to place restrictions on workers from any future countries joining the EU […]. We are also committed to working with the EU to give Member States more flexibility over the transitional arrangements that they sign up to –​including significantly lengthening the maximum permitted period of transition beyond the current seven years. (Labour Party, 2014b: 16)

In 2014, Labour’s chief concern over intra-​EU immigration was that the influx of cheap labour (mainly from Central and Eastern Europe) would cause a ‘race to the bottom’ of the wage scale. Ed Miliband thus declared: We should ensure that the law on the minimum wage is properly enforced. We should stop companies using tied housing as a way to sidestep the minimum wage. We should take action here at home on loopholes in rules for agency workers which allow wages to be unfairly undercut. And we should be looking at EU directives, like the posted workers directive, to make sure they are effective. We must also look at the issues raised by new countries coming into the European Union. To be clear, there is no likely prospect of new entrants in the short term. But this gives us a chance to take stock of existing transitional arrangements to avoid the race to the bottom. (Miliband, 2014, 12 March)

What came as a surprise to some was that Labour also supported increasing the period of time for which people had to be present in the UK before they could claim unemployment benefits from three months to six months. Labour also stated that it ‘would pursue reforms in Europe so that child tax credit and child benefit are no longer paid to families living abroad’ (Labour Party, 2014b: 17). Thus, on the one hand, Labour used the traditional social democratic mantra that wage dumping in the internal market must be avoided. On the other, the party followed the Conservative Party’s call for restricted access to welfare provisions for EU migrants. During the 2016 EU referendum campaign, the Labour leadership appeared divided over the handling of intra-​EU migration. This was highly problematic, as immigration became the most salient issue of the campaign. Jeremy Corbyn made it clear that the UK’s membership of the EU single market would always come with the free movement of people. He also defended EU migrants, stating

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that they were not responsible for the lack of opportunities for working-​class people in deprived areas. In a speech he gave one week before the referendum, Corbyn said: The insecurity of work, the lack of good well-​paid jobs, the high cost of housing, whether to rent or to buy, how we adjust to, and pay for, an ageing society, the failure to ensure decent economic growth in all parts of the country and in which we all share. That is the failure of politicians, not of the EU or of EU migrants for that matter. Too many voices in this debate are only playing that old trick the blame game. And when politicians play the blame game, it’s usually because they have nothing serious to offer themselves. (Corbyn, 2016, 16 June)

Meanwhile, deputy party leader, Tom Watson, said that while he supported the UK remaining in the EU, the issue of uncontrolled migration was ‘coming up on the doorstep’ and that people needed to be reassured that a Remain vote did not mean the end to reforms in Europe (BBC News Online, 2016, 19 June). Thus, whilst immigration had become the most salient topic of the EU referendum campaign, Labour failed to put across a unified message. This lack of a clear position became apparent again in the aftermath of the referendum when leading Labour politicians made conflicting statements on the free movement of people post-​‘Brexit’. To leave or not to leave? Labour and the 2016 EU referendum

In Tony Blair’s 1997 election campaign, the EU played no major role. Instead, the campaign focused on domestic issues such as education and health (Labour Party, 1997; Holden, 2002). Since the early 2000s, the Labour Party, operating in a Eurosceptic domestic environment, has done much to downplay and defuse EU policy for fear of losing votes (Oppermann, 2008). The Labour leadership avoided talking about the EU not only in everyday political life, but also in its election campaigns. Even during Labour’s 2009 and 2014 European campaigns, EU issues were kept at a barely visible profile. The campaigns focused almost exclusively on domestic issues, such as the future of the NHS. This EU avoidance strategy was further highlighted by Labour’s decision to abstain in their vote for the PES’s Spitzenkandidat for the presidency of the European Commission in 2014. Labour portrayed the candidate, Martin Schulz, as a fiscally irresponsible federalist (Guardian, 2014, 1 March). Moreover, Ed Miliband refused to join a number of EU debates, broadcast on radio, with Liberal Democrats leader Nick Clegg and UKIP leader Nigel Farage in an attempt to keep the EU issue at a low profile. It is therefore not surprising that the UK’s relationship with the EU played no major role in Labour’s 2015 election campaign, despite the looming EU referendum. Once again, the focus was almost exclusively on health policy and the rising costs of living. The following, from the ‘Europe’ section of Labour’s

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2015 election manifesto, illustrates the avoidance strategy: ‘Labour’s priority in government will be protecting the NHS and tackling the cost-​of-​living crisis. It is not to take Britain out of Europe’ (Labour Party, 2015: 77). The explanation for Labour’s EU containment strategy is twofold. First, during my interviews, Labour politicians usually referred to the Euro-​hostile political environment, and, in particular, the press, that made it challenging to defend a Europhile position in public. Second, intra-​party divisions on EU issues within the party leadership under Miliband, but also between the leadership and the broader party organisation, had re-​emerged and made it more difficult for Labour’s leaderships to send out a strongly Europhile message. In 2013, the party leadership had rejected a referendum on EU membership, but a campaign was launched by a number of former and incumbent MPs and local councillors who called for a referendum. What is more, polls showed that in September 2014, 45 per cent of Labour supporters backed a referendum against 36 per cent who opposed it (Guardian, 2014, 23 September). Miliband’s promise to keep the referendum lock can thus be interpreted as a response to these demands from the party and its supporters. Still, following the 2015 general election, a party member survey found that 84.7 per cent of Labour Party members would vote in favour of the UK remaining in the EU regardless of any terms of renegotiation (Webb and Bale, 2015). Despite being Labour’s most Eurosceptical leader in decades, Corbyn decided to back the ‘in’ campaign. He insisted in an interview that he was ‘proud’ to support Labour’s campaign, adding: ‘Labour has campaigned to make sure our place in Europe has led to better protection and rights in the workplace, and we will continue to fight for jobs and security for all the British people’ (Guardian, 2015, 17 September). Labour’s Remain campaign was launched on 1 December 2015 by former home secretary, Alan Johnson. It was supported by a large majority of Labour MPs (213 out of 231, including Corbyn) and backed by the party conference through a vote. In appointing the pro-​European, experienced, and popular Johnson, Labour seemingly took the decision to stand up against the Eurosceptic opposition. However, when it came to the contents of the campaign, there was more continuity than change. Johnson, who called Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum ‘a distortion of Parliamentary democracy’, also declared EU membership to be ‘in the national interest’ (Johnson, 2015, 21 October). Again, the case for EU membership was primarily economic, with emotive language missing entirely. Meanwhile, the Leave campaign appealed to emotions such as anger and fear. As the referendum campaign unfolded in 2016, Jeremy Corbyn was criticised for being invisible and not making a sufficiently positive case for the UK’s EU membership. For example, Tim Roache, leader of the GMB, the third largest Labour-​affiliated trade union, urged Corbyn to be ‘bolder and braver’ in making the case for immigration in the UK if he wanted to win over Labour voters to the cause of remaining in the EU (Guardian, 2016, 2 June). Indeed, much of

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the criticism was directed at Corbyn, who was accused of not giving enough speeches and leaving much of the campaigning, including TV debates, to his colleagues. For example, three weeks ahead of the referendum, on 3 June 2016, a letter signed by all living former Labour leaders or acting leaders was published in the Guardian. The letter urged party supporters to cast their vote in order to avoid ‘Brexit’. After the result of the referendum was announced, 20 members of Corbyn’s shadow cabinet stepped down, including former shadow foreign secretary Hilary Benn, thereby expressing their disapproval of Corbyn’s campaign performance. Documents were leaked to the BBC revealing the deep divisions between Corbyn’s office and Johnson’s Remain campaigners. According to these sources, Corbyn’s office was reluctant to give full support to the EU campaign (BBC News Online, 2016, 26 June). Labour MP Phil Wilson vented his frustration, accusing Corbyn of sabotaging Labour’s Remain campaign: Corbyn made only a smattering of campaign appearances, and they were lacklustre in delivery and critical of the EU in tone resulting in Labour voters not knowing the party’s position or hearing our argument. Corbyn’s infrequent campaign appearances and narrow focus, in turn limited the party’s appeal. He kept saying that the economic shock of Brexit was not real. It is. And it is working people and Labour communities that will pay the price. A price that is being felt right now. (Wilson, 2016, 26 June)

What made Labour’s post-​referendum strategy even more difficult was the conflicting message sent by Labour supporters and members. After all, many Labour supporters (35 per cent) had voted to leave the EU, whilst 65 per cent had voted to remain (YouGov, 2016, 27 June). By contrast, 90 per cent of Labour members had voted to remain in the EU, and only 9 per cent voted to leave (YouGov, 2016, 30 June). Pleasing the leave voters, many of whom voted against the freedom of movement, whilst trying to accommodate those who voted to remain, most of whom supported and cherished the freedom of movement, became an almost impossible task for the Labour Party. Under these difficult circumstances, it was unsurprising that ‘Brexit’ was not on the agenda of the first post-​referendum party conference in September 2016. Britain’s future relationship with the EU was one of many subjects on the ballot, but it did not make it onto the formal agenda, which highlights both Labour’s unease with the EU and the lack of a strategy after the referendum. And yet, although Labour members avoided a formal debate on ‘Brexit’, the 2016 conference unanimously passed the following motion: [Conference] recognises that many of those who voted to leave the EU were expressing dissatisfaction with EU or national policy and were voting for change, but believes that unless the final settlement proves to be acceptable then the option of retaining EU membership should be retained. The final settlement should

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therefore be subject to approval, through Parliament and potentially through a general election or a referendum.

This motion, proposed by the TSSA railways union, did not mean that a second EU referendum became Labour’s official policy. In fact, Corbyn argued against a second referendum, stating in his long-​awaited Peterborough speech in January 2017: ‘Some people argued that we should have a second referendum. That case was put to our party’s membership last summer and defeated’ (Corbyn, 2017, 10 January). Corbyn thereby created more confusion than clarity about Labour’s official ‘Brexit’ strategy. He also avoided taking a clear stance on the issue of EU migration after Brexit, making conflicting statements. This section has demonstrated that despite Labour’s conversion to Europe in the mid-​1980s, the party never subscribed to the notion of a federal Europe, or to Europe as more than an economic community. Instead, Britain’s EU membership was primarily sold on economic grounds, and the EU’s need to reform was continuously emphasised over its past achievements and future potential. After the early 2000s, Labour avoided speaking about the EU altogether, in fear of the Eurosceptic opposition and press. Therefore, the Labour leadership’s lack of a coherent strategy ahead of, during, and after the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum was a display of continuity rather than change. The Parti Socialiste and the EU: je t’aime moi non plus France’s mainstream parties have not been as critical towards the EU as their British counterparts. Neither the centre-​right Gaullists (Les Républicains)3 nor the Socialist Party have put France’s EU membership into question. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, the EU’s role and purpose have become increasingly contested amongst French parties and the public. During the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Eurosceptics on the left and right of the party spectrum pointed out the danger of France’s loss of sovereignty (Criddle, 1993). During the referendum campaign on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Eurosceptics on the right deplored the loss of national sovereignty whilst left-​wing Eurosceptics inside the PS and the far left argued that the treaty threatened the protection of the French welfare state against the increasingly liberalised European single market. Fringe parties on the far left and right have thus become very vocal in their Euroscepticism. In contrast to the British press, French newspapers tend to be more positive about the EU, although EU policies are rarely prioritised over national themes and are often treated as exotic foreign policy subjects (Baisnée, 2005). As regards the PS, the data collected by the MARPOR (see Figure 3.2) reveals that the party has supported the EU since the beginnings of European integration, but to varying degrees. Most notably, the graph shows that net support

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Support for EU score %

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Greens

FN

Figure 3.2  French parties’ net support for the EU, 1945–​2012 (MARPOR data)

for European integration peaked in 1997, when the PS won the parliamentary elections and entered government under Lionel Jospin. After 1997, the PS’s EU enthusiasm, however, decreased to a lower level than that of the Gaullists or the Green Party. Figure 3.2 also shows that the far-​right National Front (FN) has traditionally been the least supportive of the EU. The PS’s relationship with the EU has always been ambiguous, and has led to some serious intra-​party divisions over the years. Indeed, the PS, more than Labour and the SPD, has been faced with the fundamental challenge described by Kriesi (2007): the party has embraced the cultural aspects of European unity and internationalism, but has struggled to accept the EU’s economic and monetary policies. The 1950 Schuman Plan to establish a European Coal and Steel Community was not met with great enthusiasm by the PS’s predecessor, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO). In the end, however, Guy Mollet, Socialist prime minister from 1956 until 1957, performed a leading role in negotiating and ratifying the Treaty of Rome. The SFIO supported the treaty as a means to enhance Franco-​German rapprochement and supranational control over the production of coal and steel (Haas, 1958: 116). At the same time, there was a feeling of unease about the liberal, capitalist association of nations, and the loss of national sovereignty was also a cause for concern for the SFIO (Cole, 2001: 22). A majority of socialist MPs also voted against the creation of a European Defence Community, fearing a re-​militarised, dominant West Germany (Criddle, 1969). Still, the SFIO supported the creation of the European Economic Community

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(Padgett and Paterson, 1991:  251). Thus, despite concerns over economic liberalism and German dominance, the SFIO eventually supported the idea of European integration. With the advent of the Fifth French Republic in 1958, the SFIO entered a period of opposition and electoral decline. Being a slight organisation, weakened by internal divisions, meant that the party had become unelectable. Only with the founding of the new Parti Socialiste in 1971, under the leadership of François Mitterrand, did the party begin a process of ideological renewal (Bergounioux and Grunberg, 2005). Still, and in contrast to the SPD, which had distanced itself from Marxism in 1959, the PS supported a decidedly leftist agenda during the 1970s and accused social democracy of emptiness (Ladrech, 2001: 38). In 1981, when François Mitterrand became the first socialist president of the Fifth Republic, a ‘re-​interpretation of the EU’ began inside the PS (Ladrech, 2001: 38). Faced with a trade and financial crisis, President Mitterrand decided that a semi-​autonomous socialist domestic economic strategy was too risky. Instead, he chose realpolitik and linked the French currency, the franc, to the deutschmark, and pursued a European policy aimed at ‘both enhancing France’s role within the EU and to “shape” the EU towards policies itself amenable to French domestic interests’ (Ladrech, 2001:  40). Europe was thus a ‘constant theme’ of the Mitterrand presidency (Criddle, 1993: 230). Meanwhile, the party had no choice but to support Mitterrand’s European policies, even though it was not always EU-​enthusiastic. An example was the 1986 Single European Act, which was accepted by the PS without any real debate, as the membership was keen to show solidarity with Mitterrand ahead of the 1988 presidential elections. ‘So pronounced was the French President’s pre-​eminence in European affairs that Europe was traditionally considered to form part of a “reserved presidential sector” ’ (Cole, 2001: 19). President Mitterrand decided to put the Maastricht Treaty to a referendum, hoping that the EU debate would assert his authority whilst simultaneously exposing the EU divisions within the Gaullist party and the centrists (Union pour la démocratie française, UDF). The PS, after a decade in office, was virtually united on the issue of European integration, with the exception of a small Marxist faction (Criddle, 1993:  229). Mitterrand supported the Maastricht Treaty as it had given the French government much of what it had sought: the EMU would remove the threatened domination of the European economy by the deutschmark and bind the unified Germany into a European system harnessing German economic and industrial strength (Criddle, 1993: 230). Still, the ‘yes’ camp, led by Mitterrand, only won with a wafer-​thin majority of 51 to 49 per cent of the votes. The fact that Mitterrand was very unpopular at the time partly explains the extremely narrow victory (Franklin et al., 1994: 467–​468). Of socialist voters, 76 per cent voted in favour of the treaty and 24 per cent against (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 517).

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When the PS was in opposition between 1995 and 1997, Jospin became party leader and presidential candidate for the 1995 elections. Jospin was described by his colleagues as being moderately pro-​European. As the PS’s then national secretary for international and European affairs explained in an interview: Jospin is a Européen de raison. He very much mistrusts the European Union because the European Union is not democratic. I remember very well our tensions between 1995 and 1997 when we prepared the election manifesto, in particular the section on the single currency and the stability pact. Jospin is much more reserved when it comes to the stability pact. We have had long discussions before bringing the topic up in the national bureau. Jospin asked me to see him at his place where we had long discussions. He asked me: ‘in the end, what is it about, this stability pact? Who created it?’ I said: the European Council. And Jospin tells me: ‘When was it decided? And in particular, the three percent, the conditions…?’ You and I. We were in government [Nallet replies]. ‘And when was it discussed?’ [Jospin asks]. ‘Never’. (PS 4, interview with author)

Prime Minister Jospin was thus no Européen de Coeur. Neither was François Hollande, who led the PS for a period of over ten years (1997–​2008). According to the PS’s then national secretary for international and European affairs, Hollande did not show much interest in EU affairs: When I was international secretary of the PS, François Hollande asked me to speak about EU affairs every three months at the national bureau. So every three months I  delivered a report on European policy. They asked me to speak at the end of the meeting. There was general indifference. The majority of the party leadership showed very little interest in European and international policies. Those who were interested in those issues were the ministers –​Hubert Védrine, Élisabeth Guigou, Pierre Moscovici. (PS 4, interview with author)

After he was elected president, Hollande, perhaps by choice, but certainly by necessity, showed greater interest in European affairs. Two months into his presidency, he gave a speech on Bastille Day in which he declared: ‘I no longer make the distinction between foreign policy, European Policy, and domestic policy. It’s the same idea, the same method and the same objectives: growth, justice and employment’ (Elysée, 2012). As will be discussed in the following sections, President Hollande tried to change the EU’s course of direction during the Eurozone crisis but had very little success. Raising France’s status: the PS’s policies about the EU

Since the 1980s, the PS has supported the deepening of European integration and pursued the goal of ‘political union’, but the party never went into the details of what this political union would entail (Guérot, 1996). The party has endorsed deeper European integration but at the same time stressed the importance of

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national sovereignty. The PS has seen the EU as a platform to enhance the international status and power of France. This perception of the EU is summarised in a statement written by PS elites on the occasion of Europe Day, 9 May 2016, and published in Le Monde: ‘Indeed, Europe is an indispensable tool for regaining our sovereignty and facing the challenges and threats of the 21st century’ (Cambadélis et al., 2016, 9 May). Hence, the loss of national sovereignty is not an issue only for British parties; their French counterparts share similar concerns. Still, the PS’s elites see the EU as a means of regaining lost sovereignty, as the above statement illustrates. On the widening of the EU, the PS leadership has been divided. For most French parties including the PS, the biggest concern is Turkey’s potential EU membership. Whilst the former Minister for Economy and Finance and EU Commissioner, Pierre Moscovici, was in favour, Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius declared himself against Turkey joining the EU (Lequesne, 2013: 52). There was also little enthusiasm within the PS for a rapid enlargement to Western Balkan countries. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that EU enlargement was not a priority during Hollande’s presidency. Regardless, any further EU enlargement will depend to a great extent on the French voters. In 2005, under the presidency of Gaullist President Jacques Chirac, the French constitution was amended, and it now postulates that a referendum be held in order to ratify any future EU enlargement. The only means of bypassing a referendum is to get the agreement of three-​fifths of each legislative chamber in favour of a parliamentary ratification (Rozenberg, 2012), which in the case of Turkey’s EU membership seems highly unlikely. Overall, like Labour (and the SPD, as we will see later on in this chapter), the PS has not formulated a broader vision for the EU’s future. What is more, the PS’s EU policy agenda has often lacked detail. For a start, manifestos for presidential and parliamentary elections have been wordy but vague on the EU. What is more, for recent European parliamentary elections, the PS has not produced separate manifestos, but has chosen to use the Party of European Socialists’ manifestos –​which, of course, can be read as a sign of Europeanisation. Despite a lack of detailed policy documents, we can pinpoint the PS’s policies through the EU: the ‘Social Europe’ agenda and the PS’s position on the management of the EMU. These two policy areas will be discussed in one section, as they are very closely linked. The fight for ‘Social Europe’: the PS’s policies through the EU

After its re-​launch in 1971 the PS repeatedly stressed the need for a more ‘social Europe’, or a ‘Europe for the workers’ that would be fundamentally different from the existing model of European integration (Wielgoß, 2002: 76). However, after the PS entered office in 1981 under Mitterrand, the party had a change of mind, deciding that European integration and socialism did not have to be mutually

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exclusive, and that the EEC could become more socialist (Guérot, 1996). ‘Social Europe’ as understood by the PS is a broad concept that includes issues such as: workers’ rights, wage policy, labour market policy, and EU regional and structural funding. For example, when in opposition at the beginning of the 1990s, the PS called for the introduction of EU-​wide funding for employment measures, the introduction of a European minimum wage, four-​day working weeks, and the harmonisation of tax across the union (Wielgoß, 2002: 84). The PS has traditionally supported the EMU, but the main motivation had less to do with the economy. Rather, it was about containing unified Germany’s economic and monetary power in an enlarged Europe. François Mitterrand and the rest of the party were initially very critical towards the creation of an independent European Central Bank as envisaged by Germany (Müller-​Brandeck-​ Bocquet, 2004). What is more, the PS was not enthusiastic about the introduction of the ‘Maastricht criteria’ that oblige national governments to keep their deficits and debt levels under control. Despite such concerns, Mitterrand supported the Treaty of Maastricht (part of which was the creation of EMU) for mainly political reasons and saw it as a means to contain German power (Stephan, 2001). Only after the Maastricht Treaty was ratified did the PS start to discuss its implications for the French economy and criticise the EU’s liberal orientation (Wielgoß, 2002). In 1995, the PS designated Lionel Jospin as their presidential candidate. Jospin belonged to the moderate section of the PS. As we have discussed above, he was moderately pro-​European overall, but no Europhile. He was critical of the Maastricht criteria, arguing that they limited the government’s room for manoeuvre in the fight for economic growth and against unemployment (Müller-​ Brandeck-​Bocquet, 2004). The PS lost the 1995 presidential election and entered a two-​year period of opposition in which EU themes were discussed more intensely than under Mitterrand. The PS called for a more left-​wing economic and social order for Europe that would focus less on creating price stability and more on promoting economic growth and employment (Wielgoß, 2002). The party rejected the existing proposals for EMU and made four demands: (1) that in addition to the stability pact there needed to be an EU-​wide pact for solidarity and employment; (2) that EMU needed to include Italy and Spain; (3) that a ‘gouvernement économique’ needed to be created cushioning the effects of EMU; (4) that the euro ought not to be over-​valued vis-​à-​vis the dollar and yen. The PS’s position in opposition was thus described as ‘Eurorealist’ (Milner, 2004). When Jospin unexpectedly became prime minister in 1997 after an early election, the PS became more moderate in its criticisms of EMU and the EU in general. Accepting the government’s limited room for manoeuvre, Jospin signed the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Still, he achieved the inclusion of the employment chapter in the treaty, which, however, did not meet the expectations of his party (Wielgoß, 2002:  99). When, ahead of the 1999 European parliamentary elections, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder published a joint declaration, the

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Schröder–​Blair paper, in which they called for a Third Way or the renewal of social democracy, Jospin distanced himself from his colleagues and presented a counter-​paper in which he called for a more left-​wing EU that stimulates growth and jobs (Krell, 2009: 259). Under François Hollande’s party leadership and later presidency, the PS continued to focus its EU agenda on economic growth and employment. In his 2012 manifesto, Hollande called for a re-​negotiation of the European Fiscal Compact, an EU treaty that became operational in 2013 and commits signatories (including France) to having national budgets that break even or are in surplus (Hewlett, 2012: 411). Hollande maintained that the Fiscal Compact should promote economic growth rather than budgetary restraint. He also noted that the new treaty would undermine French budgetary sovereignty (Drake, 2013: 229). Once elected, however, Hollande launched ‘very pragmatic policies’ (Lequesne, 2013: 45). He agreed with his EU partners that the European Fiscal Compact would not be re-​negotiated (which, in any case, was not acceptable to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel). Drake (2013) explains this position through the contradictory domestic, European, and international forces Hollande faced. The PS and the electorate at large were divided on the Fiscal Compact (and the EU project in general) in the aftermath of the 2005 referendum, and Hollande tried to balance these contrasting positions. Also, Hollande achieved an additional ‘Pact for Responsibility, Governance and Growth’ worth €120 billion, announced at the European Council in Brussels on 29 June 2012. This addition, though described as ‘very modest’ in comparison to US President Obama’s $830 billion stimulus (Wall, 2014: 75), was enough for the socialist government to convince a majority of MPs to ratify the European Fiscal Compact in parliament, though not all socialist MPs. Against the German Chancellor’s preferences, President Hollande also called for the mutualisation of sovereign debts through the creation of Eurobonds and more direct intervention by the European Central Bank in the management of national debt. Thus, under Hollande, the PS promoted a left-​wing agenda, but one that could not be implemented in an EU that was dominated by centre-​right heads of government and a conservative-​liberal European Commission. Outsourcing the EU debate? The PS’s EU strategy

EU issues are generally not very salient in French politics, and presidential and parliamentary election campaigns tend to focus on domestic topics (Kriesi, 2007). Some highly controversial EU topics, such as the ratification of new EU treaties, have occasionally been ‘outsourced’ by presidents to the public through referendums, such as the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and the 2005 referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty. For the PS, this ‘outsourcing’ strategy was risky in 1992, when Mitterrand almost lost the Maastricht referendum.

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Again, in 2004/​2005, a new EU treaty created trouble for the PS as the party leadership was divided on the EU Constitution. In 2004, former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius decided to challenge the party leadership surrounding François Hollande by voicing his opposition to the EU Constitutional Treaty. He argued that the treaty was promoting economic liberalism, favoured the market, and promoted free trade rather than protecting the French social model (Spiegel, 2005, 13 June). At the time, Fabius struck a chord, because numerous PS activists were flirting with the anti-​globalisation movement. The ‘yes’ camp, on the other hand, focused on non-​economic arguments, stressing that the new treaty would bring positive changes for EU foreign policy as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Fabius was by no means a Eurosceptic, nor did he belong to the minority left wing of the PS. His move can be best understood as an attempt to become the PS’s leading presidential candidate for 2007. The 2004 debate over the EU Constitutional Treaty thus split the PS into three camps:  the left-​wing minority factions, the opponents of the treaty within the majority faction (such as Fabius), and the supporters of the treaty, such as party leader Hollande (Wagner, 2008: 262). The latter, unable to discipline the factions, decided to put the treaty to an internal referendum, which took place on 1 December 2004. Some 83.2 per cent of party members participated and a majority of 58.6 per cent voted in favour of the Constitutional Treaty (BBC News, 2004, 2 December). Hence, again, an important decision about the EU was outsourced, only this time to the party members. Unsurprisingly, however, this referendum did not settle the tensions within the PS. Despite the pro-​Constitution majority, the ‘no’ camp continued their campaign until the national referendum took place on 29 May 2005. The party was once again divided over the Lisbon Treaty. The French Constitution had to be changed before the Lisbon Treaty could be adopted, and although the PS leadership had recommended abstention, only 142 socialist parliamentarians followed this advice, while 121 voted against and 32 voted in favour of the constitutional revision (Wagner, 2008: 272). As the PS’s former national secretary for European and international affairs under Jospin argued in an interview, ‘EU issues were recently instrumentalised for internal power-​seeking’ (PS 4, interview with author). Lequesne (2013: 44) notes: ‘The Parti Socialiste, split on the 2005 referendum, has never overcome the consequences of the cleavage: it remains a very divided party on the European issue.’ For this reason, the party leadership has tried to contain the salience of EU topics as much as possible. In some respects, this containment strategy was more challenging for the PS than for Labour, as France is a leading member of the Eurozone. Hollande has felt the economic consequences of the Eurozone crisis. This section has demonstrated that for the Parti Socialiste, the EU presents major challenges. The PS embraces cultural internationalism. It also sees the EU as the solution to the loss of national sovereignty in times of globalisation. In opposition, PS leaders tend to make grand and wordy statements about the EU

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and how they will change it once they get elected. In these ambitious endeavours, they have often failed. When in government, the PS has been much more pragmatic, much to the dismay of its left-​wing factions. The PS remains internally divided on the EU’s economic and monetary policies and how these impact France. Former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin summarised this sentiment when he wrote: ‘The Socialist Party has always been European, and the European idea is essential for the identity of socialism. The discrepancy between what we expect and the reality of Europe has sometimes led us to ask ourselves some questions, but we have never said no’ (Jospin, 2004, 23 September). Thus, the PS’s position towards the EU can be described as a love–​hate relationship veering between general, at times abstract support for European integration as an idea and frustration with the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ trajectory. This brings to mind the famous French song, ‘Je t’aime … moi non plus’ (‘I love you … me neither’), a duet written by Serge Gainsbourg and performed with Jane Birkin. The SPD and the EU: Deutschlands Europapartei? In no other large EU member state has the elite consensus on European integration been as stable as in Germany (Lees, 2002; Poguntke, 2007). The mainstream parties’ long-​term ‘permissive consensus’ on the EU is nicely illustrated by the MARPOR data, compiled in Figure 3.3. In the past, EU issues were not very salient in Germany (de Vries, 2007) and party-​based Euroscepticism was almost absent until the beginning of the 2000s. The exceptions were two short-​ lived fringe parties, the Bund freier Bürger  –​Offensive für Deutschland (BfB) and the Initiative Pro D-​Mark  –​Neue Liberale Partei (Pro-​DM) in the 1990s, both of which were against the adoption of the euro. When, in 2007, the Left Party was founded and criticised the EU for being too neoliberal, it stood out amongst the parties represented in the Bundestag. Yet, even the Left Party, despite being a critic of the market-​oriented EU, has become increasingly supportive of European integration, as Figure 3.3 illustrates. More recently, in 2013, the right-​wing Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) emerged. The AfD called for Germany’s exit of the Eurozone, a demand that needs to be understood in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Although it narrowly failed to enter the Bundestag in 2013, the party won seven out of 96 German seats in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, as well as a number of seats in a majority of regional parliaments. Figure 3.3 depicts how far outside the mainstream’s EU consensus the AfD was in 2013. Since then, the deep internal divisions between the economically liberal and the socially conservative wings have led the party to split. AfD founder, Bernd Lucke, who wanted to pursue economic liberalism rather than a strong anti-​immigration and anti-​abortion agenda, left the AfD to launch the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch, ALFA) in 2015.

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Support for EU score %

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Figure 3.3  German parties’ net support for the EU, 1949–​2013 (MARPOR data)

A  year later, in 2016, ALFA had to be renamed after litigation with a pro-​life organisation that uses the acronym. The party, which is now called the Liberal-​ Conservative Reformers (Liberal-​Konservative Reformer), calls for Greece’s exit from the Eurozone and is against any kind of mutualisation of debt in the EU. Whether these fringe parties will be successful in the long term remains to be seen. Regardless, the AfD’s focus has shifted away from the EU to the issue of immigration, and the Liberal-​Conservative Reformers are also known for their anti-​immigration rhetoric. Figure 3.3 also depicts the SPD’s support of European integration since the mid-​1960s. Support peaked in the late 1990s after the SPD entered office under Gerhard Schröder, but dropped in the early 2000s in line with Labour and the PS. This was a time of change, when the controversial EU Constitutional Treaty was drafted; when eight Central and Eastern European and two Mediterranean countries joined the EU; and when the European Commission issued its controversial directive on the liberalisation of services in the internal market. The latter was highly politicised in Germany. Since then, the SPD has not regained its high levels of Europhilia of the late 1990s. In the early 1950s, the SPD, like the PS and Labour, was critical of the Schuman Plan that formed the basis of the ECSC and the plans for a European Defence Community (Padgett and Paterson, 1991:  247–​250). This criticism was less directed at the notion of West European cooperation or integration in general. Rather, the SPD under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher saw German reunification as the number one priority and therefore the most important precondition for the process of European unification in general (Krell, 2009: 146–​147).

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What is more, the SPD leadership was not convinced of the EEC’s trajectory, criticising it for being a capitalist organisation (Baker et al., 1981). In the following years, the SPD gradually changed its position and supported the ratification of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, hoping that the creation of the EEC would help steer national economies and provide a common platform for trade union activism (Hrbek, 1972). By the early 1960s, the SPD had recognised the importance of the Federal Republic’s integration into Western Europe, and from 1966 onwards, the SPD was in government and actively shaped Germany’s European policies (Featherstone, 1988). SPD leader and Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, strongly supported European integration. At the same time, he stressed the need for more democratic EEC institutions and supported a directly elected European Parliament with stronger budgetary powers (Bulmer and Paterson, 1987). Willy Brandt then became one of the SPD’s first directly elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (1979–​1983). During the 1980s, European policy became more salient inside the SPD, as the party supported the deepening of European integration in areas such as foreign and security policy, monetary policy, and the single market (Krell, 2009: 161). The party leadership argued that at a time of accelerating globalisation, the nation state was no longer in a position to deal with the most pressing issues. This thinking is reflected in the SPD’s 1989 Berlin programme, which states: ‘The United States of Europe, stipulated by the Social Democrats in their Heidelberg Programme in 1925, remains our aim. The democratic states have to bundle their powers in order to assert themselves, but also, in order to create a pan-​European peace framework’ (SPD, 1989). When the SPD was in opposition between 1982 and 1998, the party supported the creation of a European federal state. Still, the left wing criticised the European Single Market for favouring big multinational corporations. Despite such concerns, the party supported the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and sold it as a ‘historical opportunity for Germany’ (Krell, 2009: 170). And yet, the creation of EMU was not without its critics, as a number of SPD elites, amongst them party leader Gerhard Schröder, argued that the time frame for EMU, and in particular the introduction of the euro, was too tight (Krell, 2009: 174). Thus, when in opposition, the SPD was not always coherent in its EU policies, with some leaderships supporting EMU and others arguing that it was premature. By the time Schröder became chancellor in 1998, the SPD’s long-​term vision of a United States of Europe had been buried. In fact, instead of formulating a long-​ term vision for the EU, the SPD now became more pragmatic and focused on short-​term EU issues. Given how pro-​European the political elites in Germany were at the end of the 1990s, it is surprising to note how little emphasis the SPD leadership placed on European policy. Before and during the general election campaign in 1998, Schröder showed little to no interest in European policy. The paper he co-​published with Blair in June 1999 (‘Europe:  The Third Way/​Die

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neue Mitte’) was an exception. In this paper, the two heads of government called for a move away from both the radical free market policies of Thatcherism and the traditional socialist state based on ‘tax and spend’. Welfare policy, they argued, had to shift from its focus on social inequality and redistribution towards a social investment approach, by way of a policy of ‘no rights without responsibility’ (Nachtwey, 2013: 239). This call for a move towards the centre was heavily criticised by the SPD’s left wing (Tagesspiegel, 2000, 10 May). During his initial years in office, Schröder was a more openly assertive actor at the European level than his predecessor, the arch-​European Helmut Kohl. Schröder was more concerned with the way his European policy might generate domestic political capital when he demanded a reduction of Germany’s contribution to the EU’s 2000–​2006 budget. Yet, he underwent a learning process over the years in government. Constrained by the Franco-​German friendship, Schröder accepted in 2000 that Germany’s contribution to the EU’s 2000–​2006 budget would not be lowered (Harnisch and Schieder, 2003). However, he never delivered any high-​profile speeches outlining his EU visions, either at home or abroad. He left this task to Joschka Fischer, the Green foreign secretary who was the most pro-​integrationist cabinet member between 1998 and 2005. A  closer look at Schröder’s leadership also reveals that his involvement in the more detailed, day-​to-​day aspects of EU policy remained rather modest, which also applied to most other policy areas (Helms, 2005: 119). In this regard, Schröder differed from Blair, who showed a stronger interest in the EU. After Schröder’s defeat in 2005, when the SPD became the Christian Democrats’ (CDU) junior partner in a grand coalition, the SPD experienced a leadership crisis, having four different leaders in four years. In 2009, the centrist moderniser Sigmar Gabriel became party leader and brought stability to a party struggling with electoral defeat and a shrinking membership. Gabriel’s SPD has described itself as ‘Deutschlands Europapartei’ (Germany’s European party; SPD, 2009), although this status has also been claimed by the CDU. If anything, the MARPOR data in Figure 3.3 suggests that the SPD is not Germany’s only Europapartei, but one amongst several Europaparteien. In the following two sections, the SPD’s recent policies about and through the EU will be briefly discussed. Widening and deepening the EU: the SPD’s policies about the EU

Since the 1960s, the SPD has strongly supported the widening and deepening of European integration, thereby promoting the ratification of all EU treaties. Whilst since the 1990s the SPD’s vision of a United States of Europe, or a European federal state, has disappeared, the party has not questioned its European vocation. For instance, in its 2014 European manifesto, the SPD writes: ‘Europe and the European process of unification are part of the German raison d’état. Therefore,

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for us there is no alternative to a European Germany. Germany has the responsibility to strengthen the trust in Europe’s future’ (SPD, 2014). Even the EU’s Constitutional Treaty, which had caused the PS much trouble and would almost certainly have caused Labour problems if it had been put to a referendum, was enthusiastically embraced by the SPD. In its 2004 European manifesto, the party declared: Through the European constitution the EU becomes more transparent, democratic, and efficient […]. We support the quick ratification of the constitution that was drafted by the convention. It is the new basis for the EU and demonstrates that the EU is a community of values and brings a new balance into the relationship between the member states and the union. (SPD, 2004)

In contrast to Labour, the SPD has always used emotive language when referring to European unification in manifestos and leaders’ speeches. The party always refers to Europe’s violent past and Germany’s historical responsibility to secure a peaceful future. The EU is often described as a ‘force for peace’ (‘Friedensmacht’; SPD, 2007, 2014). Nevertheless, despite such high levels of EU enthusiasm, the SPD has a rather detailed EU reform agenda. In contrast to Labour, the SPD wants to strengthen the European Parliament by giving it more control over the European Commission and by granting it the right to initiate legislation (SPD, 2007). Due to the (relative) Europhilia amongst German mainstream parties and the media, the SPD has not felt the need to defend Germany’s EU membership. On the contrary, the deepening of integration is supported, as well as a widening. Unlike the CDU, the SPD had no objections to Turkey’s EU membership, provided that Turkey met the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for accession. In recent years, however, different SPD leaderships have criticised Turkish President Erdogan’s authoritarian rule and have argued that Turkey’s EU accession negotiation might have to be stopped (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2016, 24 July). What’s left? The SPD’s policies through the EU

Much of the SPD’s recent EU vision has revolved around ‘Social Europe’, the stricter regulation of banks and the financial markets, and –​due to Germany’s pivotal role in accepting over one million migrants, including Syrian refugees, in 2015 –​creating a European asylum policy. Next, each of these three policy areas will be briefly discussed. Under the heading of ‘Social Europe’, the SPD has supported a host of initiatives in the past decades, although not as vigorously as the PS. Especially under Schröder’s chancellorship, the SPD showed little interest in EU social policy (Wielgoß, 2002: 111). After Schröder’s departure in 2005, the party demanded the creation of a ‘social union’ balancing the effects of EMU and the single market

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(SPD, 2007). In addition, more powers for workers on company boards and the strengthening of European workers’ councils were supported in the SPD’s 2007 Hamburger Programme. At the same time, the SPD has not always defended the free movement of workers in the EU. Most notably, under the chancellorship of Schröder, the SPD demanded a seven-​year transition period before workers from the new member states in Central and Eastern European would be allowed access to the German labour market without restrictions. Schröder argued in 2001 that Germany’s unemployment rate was too high and that the labour market wouldn’t be able to accommodate large numbers of workers from the new member states (Schröder, 2001, 19 January). The SPD’s position shifted somewhat under Sigmar Gabriel’s leadership, when the party defended the free movement of workers inside the EU and demanded equal access to public services for all EU citizens (SPD, 2007). In January 2014, when Bulgarian and Romanian citizens were granted unlimited access to all EU countries’ labour markets, the Bavarian sister party of the CDU, the CSU, called for measures to stop this ‘poverty migration’ (Armutsmigration) and ‘cheating’ by limiting the new migrants’ access to state benefits. The SPD’s foreign minister, Frank-​Walter Steinmeier, disapproved of such measures and declared in an interview that ‘The European freedoms are at the core of our idea of Europe, the freedom of movement of workers is an essential part of European integration. Germany has hugely benefited from this, and certainly more than others’ (Tagesschau, 2014, 2 January). Two-​and-​a-​ half years later, the SPD’s minister for labour and social affairs, Andrea Nahles, drafted a bill that would limit EU migrants’ access to benefits. The aim of the bill was that EU migrants living in Germany would have to wait for five years before they were entitled to social benefits (as compared to the current period of six months; see Zeit Online, 2016, 12 October). This would only apply to those persons who had never worked in Germany. Still, we can observe significant shifts, or even swings, in the SPD’s policy on intra-​EU migration and workers’ rights since the late 1990s. The most recent shift to the right could be explained by two factors: the rise of the anti-​immigration AfD, and the protests voiced by local councils, which complained about the extra expense. During the Eurozone crisis, the SPD wanted to strengthen the common currency by creating a strong banking union and by imposing stricter European regulations on banks and financial markets (SPD, 2014). Importantly, and in contrast to the governing CDU/​CSU, the SPD also supported cutting the debts of insolvent Eurozone member states such as Greece, thereby arguing that ‘solidarity is important for the stability of our common currency’ (SPD, 2013b). Thus, like the PS, the SPD formulated a social democratic vision of the EU in light of the currency crisis (Miklin, 2014). Yet, despite its vocal criticism of Chancellor Merkel’s approach to the Greek bailout crises, the SPD largely supported her ‘austerity politics’ when the party was in opposition. Wendler (2014) argues that the

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SPD’s hands were tied, as it was forced into a role of ‘critical cooperation’, not wanting to risk the collapse of the Eurozone. During the 2015 Greek bailout negotiation crisis, CDU finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who had previously strongly supported Greece’s euro membership, now argued that Greece had to leave the Eurozone if they didn’t present a convincing reform agenda (Spiegel Online, 2015, 12 July). The scenario of a possible ‘Grexit’ caused immediate outrage inside the SPD, with party leader Gabriel openly criticising his cabinet colleague. Yet, as the crisis peaked in the summer and autumn of 2015, and much to the surprise and dismay of many SPD politicians, Gabriel no longer excluded the possibility of a ‘Grexit’. The SPD leadership became divided between those supporting a Grexit and those arguing that Greece needed its debt cut (Zeit Online, 2015, 13 July). The line from the SPD’s 2013 manifesto that ‘solidarity is important for the stability of our common currency’ had thus become negotiable as the crisis worsened, and the SPD had failed to come up with a coherent narrative. In 2015, when over one million migrants from countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Albania, and Kosovo reached the shores of the EU and made their way to Germany, party leader Sigmar Gabriel and the SPD’s foreign minister, Frank-​Walter Steinmeier, published an article outlining a ten-​point agenda for a common European asylum policy. They demanded common European criteria for asylum seekers, a fair quota system that establishes how many refugees each member state needs to accept, as well as a common European border management that ensures the swift registration and care of newly arrived refugees (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2015, 23 August). On its website, the SPD also stated: We certainly won’t be able to solve all the problems of this world. Europe and the international community will have to do more. But when people come to us in an emergency situation, then it is clear for us social democrats: we want to help –​and we will always take the side of those who are in need. […] We want an immigration law and more solidarity all across Europe. […] ‘Germany welcomes you’ is our motto that can be used by all those who want to help us and set an example for an open, tolerant, and peaceful Germany. (SPD, 2015)

And yet, a few SPD leaderships made it clear that there had to be a limit as to how many refugees Europe could accept. Most notably, the deputy chairman of the SPD group in the Bundestag, EU expert Axel Schäfer, was quoted as saying that ‘we are reaching the limit and have to close the EU’s external borders’, because otherwise the refugee crisis will cause the ‘de-​solidaritisation’ of the EU (Welt Online, 2015, 28 October). Again, the SPD’s notion of solidarity had changed in a crisis situation, and the party was divided over its approach to the European refugee challenge.

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Despite its long-​standing support for the widening and deepening of European integration, the SPD has done relatively little to make the EU a salient topic in its everyday life or during election campaigns (Krell, 2009). This lack of interest in and engagement with EU policies is a cause of frustration amongst the SPD’s MEPs and Europhile MPs. In particular, the SPD’s European parliamentary election campaigns have mostly focused on domestic topics and politicians rather than EU themes and MEP candidates. The national focus was most pronounced during the 2009 European campaign, which, despite its ‘Social Europe’ theme, was directed against the CDU/​CSU and FDP rather than EU-​level parties and politicians. The PES and its manifesto played no role during the campaign (Hertner, 2011). This lack of EU focus can be explained by the fact that in 2009 local, European, and federal elections all took place. The SPD treated the European elections in June 2009 as a ‘warm up’ for the general elections three months later and spent three times more on its federal campaign than on the European campaign. The party achieved its worst result ever, gaining only 20.8 per cent of the vote. All of the SPD’s MEPs and a few other outspoken party elites blamed the defeat on the campaign’s lack of ‘Europeanness’ (SPD, interview 3, 4, 6 with author). The same mistake was not repeated in 2014, when the SPD led the most EU-​ focused European parliamentary election campaign in its history. Arguably, the main driver for this change of strategy was the PES’s decision to select Martin Schulz as their ‘Spitzenkandidat’ for the presidency of the European Commission; at the time he was the SPD’s EU advisor, had been an MEP since 1994, and was the incumbent president of the European Parliament. In contrast to the Labour Party, the SPD put Schulz at the forefront of their campaign. Schulz also appeared on many TV shows commenting on a range of EU issues, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Eurozone crisis. In contrast to the British press, German newspapers reported Schulz’s campaign very widely and mostly positively (Hertner, forthcoming). Yet, one of the SPD’s 2014 election posters was criticised in the press and social networks at home and abroad. The poster showed a photo of Martin Schulz, and next to it was written: ‘Only if you vote for Martin Schulz and the SPD can a German become the next president of the European Commission.’ One of Germany’s weekly magazines, Stern, criticised the poster, writing: The top candidate of the European Socialists for the European elections, Martin Schulz, often enjoys stressing the fact that he is a convinced European. Just like his strongest rival, the candidate of the European Christian Democrats, Jean-​ Claude Juncker. Presumably, this has to be the case if one wants the EU’s top job in Brussels, the presidency of the European Commission. However, a poster of the SPD makes us doubt whether for the party, nationality is really such a small detail. (Stern, 2014, 23 May)

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Thus, even in 2014, when the SPD led its most EU-​focused election campaign, it sought to gain points by stressing Schulz’s Germanness and the advantages a German president of the European Commission could bring for German voters. In the SPD’s everyday life, EU issues often take a backseat. Domestic policies, although they often have a European dimension, dominate the party’s debates. It is only in moments of acute crisis that EU issues suddenly become salient, prominent examples being the Greek bailout crises and the 2015 refugee crisis. This section has highlighted that amongst the three parties, the SPD has been the most enthusiastic about the EU. It has also operated in a political system that had experienced very little Euroscepticism. And yet, when we scratch the Europhile surface, we find that the party has not been able to formulate a coherent vision for the future of the EU. The examples of the SPD’s positions on Social Europe, economic and monetary policies, and EU asylum policy have revealed divisions at the top of the party. What is more, the SPD has responded to the recent crises by changing its positions on fundamental issues such as solidarity in the EU. Conclusions This chapter has provided a broad overview of the positions of the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste, and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands on the EU. First, based on Manifesto Project data, it has mapped the three parties’ overall degrees of Europhilia, thereby revealing differences and commonalities. It has thereby demonstrated that Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s EU enthusiasm peaked in the mid–​late 1990s when they entered office, but that these high levels of support were not sustained afterwards. In Britain, the Liberal Democrats have almost consistently been more Europhile than Labour, while in France, the centre-​right Gaullists and the Green Party have been more Europhile than the PS since the late 2000s. In Germany, the strong elite EU consensus has meant that the SPD’s EU position has stayed in line with the other mainstream parties. Hence, describing the three centre-​left parties as ardent Europhiles would be an exaggeration. Second, the chapter has provided a short historical overview of the three parties’ relationships with the EU since the beginning of European integration. It has explained that in the immediate post-​war years, the three parties were rather critical of the ECSC. Western Europe’s social democratic parties were suspicious of the pooling of sovereignty and the notion of a free trade zone, fearing the creation of a capitalist, supranational organisation that would threaten national trade unions and social cohesion. From the 1960s onwards, Labour, the PS, and the SPD took different paths. Certain members of Harold Wilson’s Labour government campaigned to leave the (recently joined) EEC in the UK’s 1975 referendum. Labour only started to unconditionally support EEC membership in the

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mid-​1980s, almost two decades after the PS and three decades after the SPD’s ‘conversion’ to European integration. Third, the chapter has investigated some of the three parties’ recent EU policies about and through the EU as well as their EU strategies. Due to differing and changing domestic circumstances, the three parties focused their attention on different EU policy areas. In a Eurohostile environment, the Labour Party spent much of its time defending Britain’s EU membership by declaring it to be in the national (economic) interest. At the same time, the party used a strongly reformist language when talking about the EU. Increasingly, since the mid-​ 2000s, the party has also avoided talking about its relationship with the EU. This lukewarm EU support culminated before and during the 2016 EU referendum. Meanwhile, the PS and SPD had ‘other fish to fry’: France and Germany, being the biggest economies inside the Eurozone, had to deal with the implications of the Eurozone crisis and the dangers of Greece’s potential default. Overall, it becomes clear that the EU creates challenges for centre-​left parties and that in government social democrats find it difficult to realise their ambitions at the European level. As Moschonas (2009: 176) has argued, the EU can be a hostile environment especially for social democrats, as they try to correct or change the dominant economic paradigm. This was particularly felt by the PS’s Prime Minister Lionel Jospin at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s, and by President François Hollande after 2012. Both tried to push for a more social Europe but achieved very little, as they faced opposition amongst their European colleagues. What is also notable is that whilst PS elites have often used emotive language in support of the EU as project of international cooperation, the more left-​wing factions of the party cannot reconcile themselves with the ‘neoliberal’ economic order promoted by the EU. Thus, whilst they have promoted internationalism, cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and openness –​all of which are in line with the process of European unity –​social democrats have failed to deliver on their economic promises. In particular, the presidency of François Hollande has highlighted how limited the room for manoeuvre is for centre-​left parties in government when most other EU member states and the EU institutions are dominated by conservative and liberal parties. Notes 1 The MARPOR’s approach is predicated on the concept of saliency theory, which is essentially the idea that the more importance a party attaches to a given policy, the more likely they are to mention it repeatedly (Budge et al., 2001: 78–​85). The content analysis relies on the manual coding of manifestos. The texts are broken down into ‘quasi sentences’, which are then coded on the basis of the pre-​determined categories. To measure parties’ support for European integration, two coding categories were used:  positive and negative references to the EU. In all cases, the latter score (reported as a percentage of

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all quasi-​sentences in the manifesto) was subtracted from the former (also reported as a percentage of all quasi-​sentences). For the data, see Volkens et al. (2016). 2 The 1985 Schengen Agreement abolished the EU’s internal borders and passport controls. Germany and France joined the Schengen Area immediately. Currently, the UK, Ireland, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Croatia remain outside it. 3 The Gaullist party has changed its name several times over the course of the past decades. Between 1976 and 2002 it was called ‘Rassemblement pour la République’ (RPR). Between 2002 and 2015 the party called itself ‘Union pour un Mouvement Populaire’ (UMP). In May 2015, it changed its name to ‘Les Républicains’.

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Principals, agents, and the delegation of power inside political parties

This chapter sets out the principal–​agent framework of power delegation that will be applied to the Labour Party, Parti Socialiste (PS), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Over a hundred years ago, the German sociologist Robert Michels (1911) pioneered the study of centre-​left party organisations, with a focus on the SPD. He argued that, due to the growing membership size, members could no longer participate directly in the parties’ decision-​making processes. Instead, he observed, parties with an increasing membership (such as the SPD at the time) needed a delegative and representative system of decision-​making. This ‘oligarchic’ party structure, Michels argued, is less democratic and therefore less desirable than direct member participation. Michels also argued that if real democracy is unachievable in mass membership organisations such as political parties, democracy as a system of government would be unachievable. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the SPD was a large party that was set up for attracting and managing a mass membership. In the twenty-​first century, the SPD can no longer claim this status. Still, it would be difficult to involve even a reduced membership, of some hundreds of thousands of people, in the day-​to-​day decision-​making processes of a party. Therefore, a system of power delegation from the bottom to the top has been established, not just within the SPD, but inside all social democratic (and most other internally democratic) parties across Europe. Party statutes and regulations dictate the official decision-​ making rules, but we still do not know enough about how, in practice, power is delegated inside political parties. A useful concept to address this knowledge gap and to analyse power relations inside the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD is a principal–​agent framework. Principal–​agent frameworks were first used by economists to study power dynamics inside big companies. For instance, the relationship between corporate management and shareholders has been analysed as one between a principal and an agent (Jensen, 1986). More recently, political scientists have started to employ principal–​agent models to study democracies as chains of relationships in which one actor (the principal) delegates power to another (the agent). The agent thus acts on the principal’s

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behalf. In contemporary parliamentary democracies, voters delegate power all the way up to civil servants who implement public policy. Delegation has become the norm, as voters lack the time and expertise to make policy. Strøm (2000) identifies four chains of delegation and accountability at the national level: from the voters to the Members of Parliament (MPs); from parliament to the cabinet; from the cabinet as a whole or from the prime minister to individual ministers; and from ministers to civil servants. These chains of power delegation within national democracies already seem complex enough, but they have become even longer and more complicated in the member states of the European Union (EU). As Bergman (2000) points out, EU membership adds another chain of delegation from the national to the European level. A complex system of power delegation exists not only in democratic political systems as a whole, but also within political parties. Party structures tend to mirror those of the political system they operate in, and in a multi-​level governance like the EU, political parties operate at the subnational, the national, and the European levels of government. At the same time, and as outlined Chapters 1 and 2, parties operate in three distinct but overlapping spheres: in central office, in public office, and on the ground. Analysing intra-​party power relationships as a chain in which the party membership (the principal) delegates power to elected politicians and party officials (the agent/​s) will help us understand the internal workings of political parties and reveal the dynamics of power, internal democracy, and accountability. To be sure, principals can have more than one agent. For instance, Simon Hix describes Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) as agents with two principals:  first, national parties, who control the selection of candidates for European parliamentary elections; and second, the political groups in the European Parliament who control leadership positions, committee assignments, speaking time, and the legislative agenda (Hix, 2002: 688). Yet, not only can a principal have two agents, an agent can also serve several principals. Richard Katz (2014), for example, argues that the contemporary party in public office serves two principals (or ‘masters’): on the one hand, they serve the voters and supporters, and on the other, the party on the ground. As the party membership base is shrinking across Europe and parties increasingly rely on the state for funding (Poguntke et al., 2016), many have opened up their candidate selection processes to their supporters or even the entire electorate (in the case of open primaries). Katz argues that the interests of the party activists on the ground and the broader supporter base/​electorate are often competing with each other, which makes it impossible for elected politicians to please both principals. This is a problem faced by the Labour Party after the EU referendum, as was identified in Chapter 3, This study, whilst recognising the existence of two principals, is concerned with the internal party processes and power dynamics and therefore focuses on the party membership as the main principal.

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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents some general information on principal–​agent relationships inside political parties in the EU. This is followed by the description of the principal–​agent framework used in this book. To this end, four possible modes of power delegation from the principal to the agents inside Labour, the PS, and the SPD are introduced. Third, the two key activities that will be investigated throughout this book, namely the formulation of European policy and the selection of EU specialists such as MEP candidates, will be briefly discussed. Fourth, and based on what we know about power dynamics inside national parties in Europe, a number of research questions and expectations will be formulated. Last but not least, the chapter introduces some of the contextual factors that might influence the way the three parties deal with the EU. These are: national and European party regulations, EU positions and strategy, resources, and the parties’ status in government and opposition. The principal–​agent relationship and political parties in the EU Recently, principal–​agent frameworks have been employed for the study of power delegation within political parties. Some authors study power delegation from the top of the party organisation to the lower levels. For instance, van Houten (2009) proposes a conceptual framework for the delegation of power from the national level down to the regional level. In his study, the principal is the national party branch, and the agent is the regional party federation. With his top-​down approach, van Houten is the exception, as most authors investigate chains of delegation from the grassroots to the top of the party (see, for example, Aylott et al., 2013). As social democratic parties were founded as grassroots organisations and still like to portray themselves as such, this study investigates power delegation from the bottom (the principal being the party membership) to the top (the agents being the leaderships in public and central office). On paper, chains of power delegation inside parties look fairly straightforward. Party statutes, regulations, and organisational charts, many of which are available online, help us map and visualise the internal workings of parties. In practice, however, power delegation in any big organisation is often messy and does not work according to the rule book. This is usually caused by (1) conflicting interests between the principal and the agent, and (2) what is called ‘asymmetric information’ (Müller, 2000: 320). First, it can happen that principals and agents have different policy positions. Thus, the party on the ground may differ in its policy positions from the party leadership in public or central office because local activists might have other reasons or motivations for participating in party politics than elected politicians whose career and income depends on being elected (May, 1973; Norris, 1995). Strøm (2003: 62–​85) describes this phenomenon as ‘policy divergence’. Second, Strøm also refers to a phenomenon

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known as ‘adverse selection’, which occurs when the principal lacks the means to ensure that power delegation succeeds because he/​she does not have the means to scrutinise the agent sufficiently because of information asymmetry. This information asymmetry refers to the notion that the agent, or the party in central and public office, has an information advantage over the principal (i.e. party members), who lacks the resources, knowledge, and expertise needed to ensure effective policy scrutiny. Yet, as Katz (2014: 189) reminds us, information asymmetry might be less common today than it once was: While some ‘information asymmetry’ is inevitable in any principal–​agent relationship, the increases in education and information accessibility through broadcast media, and more recently through the Internet, make it more likely that party members will feel competent to question their leaders. This trend is strengthened by the decline in prominence of party-​controlled media and the lessened capacity of parties to encapsulate their supporters in environments in which most information is filtered through the party.

Still, despite better access to information, most citizens in Europe know little about the EU’s polity, policies, or politics (Hobolt, 2007). Information asymmetry therefore remains a challenge for political parties in the EU, where much policy is made at the EU level on highly technical matters that require knowledge and expertise (Raunio, 2002). How to control the agent(s)?

The risk of the principal’s loss of control over the agents can be minimised. Principals can control agents before they delegate power (ex ante control) or afterwards (ex post control). Both types of control will now be briefly examined. A party’s election manifesto can be seen as a form of ex ante control, or as a contract between a party and its voters. In manifestos, parties commit themselves to certain policy goals, should they win the elections (Aylott et al., 2013: 29). Within parties, however, any kind of written contract between members and elected politicians is rather rare. Müller (2000) mentions four other control mechanisms that parties use instead. Two of them are ex ante (contract design; screening and selection mechanisms) and two are ex post (reporting requirements and monitoring; institutional checks). Contract design refers to party discipline and occurs, for example, when whips oblige MPs to follow the party line, or when unruly MPs are not re-​nominated by their constituencies. Screening and selection mechanisms refers to the fact that most candidates –​be it for local, regional, national, or European office –​have been active in the party for a few years and have therefore gone through a period of ‘apprenticeship’ where parties have checked their moral values and their political outlook, and made sure the candidates have acquired a certain level of professionalism (Müller, 2000: 327). As

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an ex post control mechanism, the principal can ask the agent to report relevant information and action taken. For instance, MPs and MEPs send e-​newsletters and press briefings to their constituency, so that interested voters and party members can follow their activities. To be sure, these newsletters and briefings can always be used as propaganda, as the agent is more likely to stress successes rather than failures or breaches of contract. Hence, there are other, more effective ways for party members to scrutinise elected or appointed politicians ex post. For instance, voting behaviour has become much more transparent in recent years, and many domestic parliaments and the European Parliament make voting data publicly available, so that voters and party members can scrutinise their MPs and MEPs (Faas, 2003). In the context of party politics in the US Congress, this type of agent monitoring is also referred to as ‘police patrol oversight’, whilst information received by the principal from third parties is called ‘fire alarm’ (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Hence, whilst power delegation has its risks, the principal has a number of control mechanisms at his or her disposal. The next section will present the principal–​agent framework that will later be applied to the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD. Power delegation inside the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD This book is concerned with the impact of EU integration on social democratic parties, and the focus lies on two ways of determining intra-​party power relationships: first, the power to formulate European policy; and second, the power to select EU specialists such as MEP candidates, parliamentary spokespersons, or EU advisors. Power delegation will be studied across three levels (from the subnational to the national and European levels of the party organisation) and across three spheres (from the party on the ground to the parties in public and central office). In particular, four different modes of power delegation will be investigated throughout the book, each of which will now be introduced briefly. The first mode refers to the delegation of power from one face of the party to another, at the same territorial level of the party organisation. An example would be the delegation of the power to formulate EU policy from the party on the ground to the party in public office (e.g. the parliamentary party) and/​or the party in central office (bureaucrats working in the central party headquarters). Second, power can also be delegated within the same face of the party, but across different levels. An example would be the national party activists delegating the power to formulate European policy or select MEP candidates to Party of European Socialists (PES) activists. The third mode refers to power delegation across different faces and levels of the party organisation. This would occur if the party on the ground delegates the power to select MEP candidates to the PES.

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Level of party activity National level The face of party

EU level

Party on the ground

organisation

Party in central office

Party in public office

Mode 1: At the same level, but across faces Mode 2: Within the same face, but across levels

Mode 3: Across levels and across faces Mode 4: Within the same face and at the same level

Figure 4.1  Four modes of power delegation inside political parties

Last but not least, power delegation can occur within the same face and at the same level of the party organisation. An example would be the parliamentary party delegating the power to formulate EU policy to their EU spokesperson or the chair of the EU scrutiny committee. The four modes do not exclude each other. On the contrary, they are likely to coexist within the same party at the same time. Figure 4.1 depicts the arrows pointing in the direction of possible power delegation.

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Intra-​party democracy is about who formulates party policy. Across Europe, party leaders have assumed much autonomy in the formulation of policy. Still, when it comes to European policy, we lack a complete picture of who else is involved in the process, and how power delegation works in practice. European policy is particularly interesting as it crosses over all formerly domestic policy areas, albeit to varying degrees, as some policy areas have become more ‘Europeanised’ than others (Töller, 2010). Although often thrown in the same pot, European policy differs from foreign policy, as it encroaches upon all formerly domestic policy areas, such as health, education, or welfare. The extent of the Europeanisation of policy areas is a matter of scholarly and political debate, and there is still no uniform measurement tool. Still, scholars and politicians agree that the amount of policy that originates from the European level has increased. As the EU has become more powerful over the past decades and makes an increasing amount of policy, European policy has become a more important policy area that requires more investigation. As explained in Chapter 3, this study uses ‘European policy’ as an umbrella term embracing parties’ policies about the EU and those policies that are made at the European level and through the EU. Policies about the EU refer to parties’ official positions towards the purpose and future of European integration and questions such as the deepening and widening of European integration and reforms to the EU’s constitution (the treaties) and institutional structure. They are documented in authoritative documents such as election manifestos. Labour, the PS, and SPD all dedicate a section of their manifestos to the EU. The principal (the party membership) has a certain level of ex ante control over manifestos. Manifestos need to be approved by the party conference or other delegative bodies before they become the party’s official policy (Budge, 2001). This study will therefore investigate the membership’s input into the writing of manifestos. What is more, parties may decide to hold internal referendums or policy consultations on ‘big’ questions, such as the ratification of a new EU treaty, or future EU enlargement. A binding membership ballot would be an important ex ante control instrument at the principal’s disposal. Policies made through the EU refer to parties’ positions on the large number of formerly domestic policy issues that now require coordination through the EU legislative processes. In practice, these are the votes and bargaining positions taken by politicians in the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and domestic parliaments. Ex ante control of such policies is more difficult for party members, as it requires detailed knowledge of the EU legislative process as well as expertise in some highly technical policy areas. It is, however, not impossible. For instance, activists can write resolutions on a particular EU policy issue, which they can submit directly to the party in public

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or central office, to the party conference, or to their MEPs and the party group in the European Parliament, thereby highlighting their particular concerns or preferences. In the process of EU policy formulation, the party membership also has a few ex post control instruments at their disposal. For instance, if there is a vote on a particular EU policy in the House of Commons, the Assemblée Nationale, or the Bundestag, party members can find out how their MP voted. If the MP voted against their preferences, members can try to hold her to account afterwards, in constituency meetings or online. In extreme cases, members could put even put pressure on the local/​regional/​national selection committee to reject the re-​ selection of the MP. These ex post control mechanisms might only work in the long term, as parliamentary elections only take place every four to five years. Hence, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will investigate the power dynamics of European policy-​making in the three social democratic parties and determine the extent to which the membership has delegated power to the party leadership in public and central office. As already discussed in Chapter 1, there is no agreed definition of an internally democratic party. Some would argue that delegative, representative, assembly-​based processes of policy-​making are most democratic, whilst others would prefer direct, plebiscitary democracy (e.g. membership referendums) as an instrument as it enhances the powers of individual members. In this book, a democratic EU policy-​making process is understood as one that includes all levels and faces of the party and that allows the principal to scrutinise the agents and hold them to account, ex ante and ex post. Selecting MEP candidates and other EU specialists

Intra-​party democracy is also about who selects candidates for public office, and this study investigates and compares the selection processes of MEP candidates and other EU specialists within Labour, the PS, and the SPD. In particular, it analyses which level(s) and face(s) of the party organisations are most powerful in the selection process, and what the implications of these power dynamics are for intra-​party democracy. Since 1979, when the European Parliament was elected directly by the citizens for the first time, national parties have taken control over the selection of candidates. Norris and Franklin (1997), drawing on the 1994 European Election Study, demonstrate that the MEP candidate selection procedures varied significantly between EU member states. The voters were asked who within their national parties had most power to select candidates for the European elections. In the case of the UK, the answer was ‘party members’, for France it was ‘national party leaders’, and for Germany it was ‘regional party leaders’. It will be interesting to find out whether these processes have changed since the late 1990s, as the

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European Parliament has become more powerful and some parties have changed their selection procedures. In a large-​N comparative study on the centralisation of candidate selection for legislative election processes in 21 democracies, Lundell (2004) comes to the conclusion that contextual factors, such as the electoral system or district size, do not explain parties’ internal selection rules. Instead, Lundell demonstrates that what matters most is the size of the party and the country it operates in. For instance, in southern Europe, candidate selection processes are highly centralised, which means that the party leadership has a tight grip on the processes. In the Nordic countries, local party organisations are the key actors in the selection of candidates. The UK and France lie somewhere in the middle, and Germany is excluded from the study, due to the strict legal provisions for candidate selection. Large-​N quantitative studies such as those by Norris, Franklin, and Lundell provide a very useful general overview of candidate selection processes in Western democracies. At the same time, however, more focused and detailed small-​N studies can reveal the parties’ internal lives. Also, just because Germany has strict legal provisions for candidate selection, it does not necessarily mean that parties have no leeway in interpreting them in different ways. Hazan and Rahat (2010:  137) argue that candidate selection is to the party what elections are to the democratic state: parties and (sometimes) individual candidates compete in democratic legislative elections while individuals and, sometimes, party factions compete for a candidacy in internal party selection. Thus, the selection of (MEP) candidates reflects on the state of intra-​party democracy. It is therefore interesting, but not surprising, to note that selection processes often take place ‘far away from the glare of public scrutiny’ (Lundell, 2004: 25). MEP candidate selection processes vary between parties, depending not just on rules laid out in national laws and party statutes, but also on informal practices. In fact, formal party rules can sometimes ‘disguise the de facto control’ over candidate selection, as Norris and Franklin (1997: 198) remind us. Hence, in order to reveal the de facto control over MEP candidate selection, this study draws not only on the formal regulations, but also on original interviews with MEP candidates who were willing to share their individual experiences. This research will thus investigate the ‘selectorate’ of MEP candidates inside the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD. The selectorate is the body that selects a party’s candidates for public office (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 33). The key selectors of MEP candidates can be party supporters; grassroots members; delegates at local conventions; regional officers; factions; affiliated interest groups; or national leaders –​depending on each system (Norris, 1997). The selectorate can thus be very inclusive (when it involves all voters, as in the case of open primaries), very exclusive (when it only involves the party leader), or something in between the two. There is no agreement in the literature when it comes to the definition of democratic candidate selection. Some scholars argue that it is about the process,

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meaning that the inclusiveness of the process is most important (Cross, 2008), whilst for others the outcome is more relevant, in the sense that fair, free, competitive selections are more democratic than inclusive ones (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). As this study focuses on the selection processes inside the three parties, the key factor is the inclusiveness. An inclusive selection processes enables the principal to control the agents. In fact, the key ex ante control instrument of the membership is their involvement in the MEP candidate selection process: Can they propose a candidate? Can they sit on the shortlisting panel? Can they vote for/​against a list of candidates, or rank the candidates in their preferred order? Members can also control their agents ex post. For instance, they can scrutinise their MEPs’ voting behaviour in the European Parliament, and if they don’t agree with the votes taken by their MEPs, they might be able to hold the MEPs to account and/​or reject their re-​selection. But MEPs are not the only EU specialists, which is why this research also considers parliamentary EU specialists and EU specialists working inside the parties’ central bureaucracies and those advising the party leadership. Again, the question is: who selects, elects, or appoints these EU specialists? Research questions and expectations This comparative study into the internal lives of social democratic parties is primarily descriptive and does not lend itself to formal hypotheses testing. It is, however, guided by a number of research questions and expectations. The first research question is:  To what extent has European integration impacted upon the power dynamics within centre-​left parties? In particular, which level(s) and which face(s) of the party organisation have been empowered as a consequence of European integration, and who has lost out in the process? It has been argued that the party in central office’s power has waned over the years. Describing the rise of the ‘cartel party’, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) wrote that power dynamics inside parties had shifted. As the membership base was declining steadily and parties earned fewer membership fees, they depended more on state funding. The beneficiary, the authors argued, has been the party in public office, which now received more state funding than ever before. This has led to a growth in the number of staff employed by parliamentary parties, whilst the number of staff working for the central bureaucracy has stagnated (Mair and Katz, 2002: 444–​445). The party in public office, one might expect, is therefore in a stronger position to formulate EU policy than the party in central office or on the ground. Indeed, formulating, scrutinising, and transposing EU policy requires a high level of expertise and specialisation in some of the very technical areas such as consumer protection and environmental law. The party in public office tends to have more resources at its disposal (e.g. research staff or contacts in Brussels) to deal with such technical EU legislation. Importantly, when parties

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are in government, they can also draw on the civil service’s long-​standing EU expertise. Due to the better resources, the party in public office can therefore be expected to be a very powerful, if not the most powerful, player inside Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s EU policy-​making processes. The party on the ground’s role in the formulation of EU policies has not yet been systematically researched. It is often assumed that grassroots activists care most about issues close to home rather than European and foreign policies (Sloam, 2005; Holtkamp, 2007), but we lack data confirming this claim. Still, we know that EU issues tend not to be highly salient amongst the wider public, and we might therefore expect the party on the ground to delegate much of the power to formulate EU policy to the parties in central and public office. At the same time, the period since the late 1990s has witnessed the empowerment of Europarties. As the PES and the other major Europarties have lobbied for constitutional recognition, they have achieved European regulation stipulating their budget and competences (Johansson and Raunio, 2005; Lightfoot, 2006). In this process, Europarties have become policy-​seeking organisations. Most notably, in 2013, the PES for the first time ratified a fundamental programme outlining their values and principles, which was endorsed by all member parties. What is more, ahead of the 2014 European parliamentary election, the PES (like all other major Europarties) selected a common candidate for the European Commission presidency, thereby claiming a stronger leadership role in EU politics than ever before. Against the backdrop of these recent developments, we can expect the PES to play a bigger role in the formulation of the three parties’ EU policy. The second research question relates to the selection of EU specialists. How inclusive/​exclusive are the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD in the selection processes of MEP candidates and other EU specialists, and what does this tell us about the state of intra-​party democracy? Of course, the question is not only one of selection procedures; it is also closely linked to the power remit of these EU specialists. Do they hold much influence? More broadly, by focusing on EU specialists we also understand how widely spread EU expertise is within the three parties across the different levels and faces. By answering these research questions, we will first of all compare the extent to which the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD differ in their dealings with the EU, and second, explain the differences and commonalities. The three parties do not operate in a vacuum, and a number of factors are expected to shape the three parties’ dealings with the EU. These are: the legal regulations of internal party organisations; the parties’ EU positions; the financial resources available to the parties; and their status as parties in government or opposition. To be sure, a direct causal relationship between these factors and the parties’ dealings with the EU cannot be established. These factors rather set the broader context in which the parties formulate European policy and select their candidates for the European parliamentary elections. Each factor will now be briefly outlined.

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The legal regulation of party organisations

In recent years, many European democracies have introduced laws defining or prescribing the activities, behaviour, and internal organisational structures of national political parties (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007; van Biezen and Piccio, 2013; van Biezen and Rashkova, 2014). Even Europarties, such as the PES, have become more regulated, although this process is still far from finished, as they are still lobbying for the introduction of an EU-​level party statute (Raunio and Johansson, 2005). Alongside Finland, Portugal, and Norway, Germany has the most prescriptive and strictest party laws, making it the ‘heartland of party law’ (Müller and Sieberer, 2006: 435). Article 21 of the German Basic Law is labelled the ‘party article’. It stipulates that parties’ ‘internal organisation must conform to democratic principles’. In addition, there exists a federal party law (Parteiengesetz), which dates from 1967 and has been amended several times since. It was the first of its kind in post-​war Europe to regulate party organisational structures and candidate selection processes in a very detailed manner (Merten, 2013; Niedermayer, 2014). What is more, the ‘European election law’ (Europawahlgesetz), which was drawn up in 1978, ahead of the first direct European parliamentary elections, and has been amended several times since, regulates the MEP candidate selection process. It is in this legal context that we will study the SPD’s EU policy-​ making and MEP candidate selection processes. In the UK, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 regulates the registration of parties and party financing. Yet, the Act does not define or prescribe intra-​party democracy, which means that parties in the UK can choose more freely the kind of structure that suits their interests. The same applies to French parties. Article 4 of the 1958 French Constitution merely provides that:  ‘Political parties and groups shall contribute to the use of suffrage. They shall be freely established and carry on their activities freely. They shall comply with the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.’ Whilst a law regulating party finance was introduced in 1988 (Piccio, 2014: 211), there is no law in France regulating the internal workings of parties. French parties are thus free to set up their own decision-​making structures. Any investigation into parties’ internal policy-​making and candidate selection processes needs to take these legal provisions into consideration. EU positions and EU strategy

Chapter 3 highlights the extent to which Labour, the PS, and the SPD differ in their EU positions and strategies. It demonstrates that their positions on the general process of European integration, and on specific policies going through the EU’s legislative process, differ considerably. For instance, the Manifestos

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Project data has illustrated how the SPD has consistently been more Europhile than Labour and the PS. More recently, the Eurozone crisis has revealed the extent to which the three parties envisage a different kind of EU. As Labour has detached itself from the EU and the euro, the PS has called for the introduction of Eurobonds to share the debt burden, whilst the SPD has generally supported Chancellor Merkel in her management of the Eurozone crisis, including ‘austerity politics’ for Greece. It is in this context that we need to understand the three parties’ EU policy-​making and EU specialist selection processes. Not only will the three parties’ EU positions matter, their EU strategies will also be relevant. As argued in Chapter 3, the three parties differ in how much importance they have placed upon the EU in their manifestos, speeches, and election campaigns. Whilst recent Labour leaders have tried to avoid mentioning the EU, the SPD leadership has been more comfortable with it. The PS was somewhere in between Labour and the PS, but still suffered the consequences of the internal divisions that came to the surface over the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004/​2005. The three parties’ EU positions are therefore likely to influence their EU policy-​making practices and MEP selection processes. For instance, we can expect a more Europhile party like the SPD to put a stronger emphasis on EU expertise across all levels and faces of the party organisation. A more Europhile party might also be more inclusive in its EU policy-​making processes and candidate selection procedures than a party that is often divided over EU issues –​such as the PS –​or tries to avoid talking about the EU, such as the Labour Party, for fear of provoking the Eurosceptic press and opposition. Another important issue to be raised in this context is the three parties’ relationships with the PES. The extent to which Labour, the PS, and SPD are willing to interact with the PES is likely to depend on their policies and personal contacts. If it is a relationship of mutual benefit and trust, based on shared policy preferences, then the three parties can be expected to delegate some policy-​ making power to the PES. Resources

Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s dealings with the EU could also be shaped by the resources they spend on EU matters. For instance, party funds can be spent on hiring EU specialists to work for the central party bureaucracy (the party in central office) or in parliament (the party in public office) –​a decision that might affect the power balance within the three parties as well as the overall level of EU knowledge and expertise. Party funding rules differ considerably across Europe, as does the amount of public (and private) funding parties receive (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007). For instance, German parties are ‘awash with funds’ and can afford ‘exceptionally large bureaucracies’ (Gallagher et al., 2011: 350). In Germany, public funds

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are distributed based on both a party’s success in the most recent elections and the amount of private donations received (the ‘matching funds’ rule). As a consequence, German parties rely more on membership fees and private donations and less on public funding than their French counterparts (Piccio, 2014: 224). By contrast, parties in the UK rely mainly on private donations, as public funding is very limited (Pinto-​Duschinsky, 2002). What is more, the UK provides direct public funding only for the parliamentary party (Piccio, 2014: 223). The three parties also have different budgets at their disposal to spend on European parliamentary election campaigns (Hertner, 2011). This might affect not only the overall visibility of the campaign but also the resources available to MEP candidates to lead successful campaigns. Thus, resources might affect power relations as well as the overall degree of EU knowledge and awareness of the three parties. Being in government or opposition

Another factor that is likely to influence Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s dealings with the EU is their being in government or opposition. When a party is in government, the leadership is directly involved in EU-​level policy-​making. Cabinet ministers make policy in the Council of Ministers, and heads of government set political guidelines in the European Council, often outside the control of their party. European integration, it has therefore been argued, strengthens the (already strong) agenda-​setting powers of party leaders (Raunio, 2002). Indeed, Carter and Poguntke (2010) conducted a survey with national parties in 15 EU member states and demonstrated that national party elites were relatively powerful vis-​à-​vis their parties when they were involved in EU policy-​making. This power gap exists because national parliaments and party organisations have less information about specific EU policies than cabinet ministers, who tend to rely on the expertise of the civil service (informational asymmetry). The parties seem aware of the increased leadership autonomy, but acknowledge that their leaders need some discretion when negotiating policy at the European level (Carter and Poguntke, 2010: 312). Hence, when a party is in government, the leadership is likely to spend less time on involving the broader party organisation in the making of EU policy. In opposition, by contrast, the party leadership has more time and freedom to engage the party organisation in the formulation of policy. In recent decades, many national parties in Europe have adopted some elements of direct democracy in an attempt to engage their members. For example, they let members participate directly in the election of party leaders, and/​or they give them a say in the formulation of policy (Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010). However, involving the entire membership in the policy-​making process can be time-​ consuming and troublesome for a party in government that needs to take decisions swiftly. Thus, a party in opposition is more likely to involve its membership through the use of referendums or policy consultations in the formulation of

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European policy than a party in government. As Labour, the PS, and the SPD have been in government and opposition in the recent past, we will be able to observe the power dynamics under changing conditions. Conclusions This chapter has presented a brief overview of the growing body of literature that uses principal–​agent frameworks to analyse power delegation inside political systems and political parties. Next, it has highlighted the problems that power delegation can cause inside parties, and explained how parties can address them. The chapter then introduced the conceptual framework that will be applied to the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD. In particular, four possible modes of power delegation between the three faces of the party organisations (public and central office, and on the ground) and the three levels (the subnational, national, and European level) were presented. These were followed by two research questions that will guide the empirical analysis in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. As this book is primarily concerned with power delegation in the formulation of European policy and the processes of selecting EU specialists, both of these activities have been briefly described. Last but not least, this chapter has introduced a number of factors that are likely to shape the parties’ dealings with the EU, namely: the legal regulations on internal party organisations; the parties’ EU positions; the financial resources available to the parties; and their status as parties in government or opposition. The next three chapters investigate the power dynamics inside the party on the ground, in central office, and in public office.

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Cheerleaders or players? Centre-​left parties on the ground and the EU

This chapter investigates how the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) deal with the challenges of European integration ‘on the ground’ of the party organisation in recent years. In particular, it investigates the involvement of the parties’ grassroots in the selection of MEP candidates and the formulation of European policy. Katz and Mair (1993) define the ‘party on the ground’ as the regular activists, financial supporters, and even loyal voters –​whether or not they are formally enrolled as party members. For the purpose of this book, the party on the ground is understood as the membership (‘ordinary members’) and the organised party on the ground, which is a useful differentiation made by Mair (1994: 16). The organised party on the ground thus refers to local constituency and regional party branches and individuals with full membership. It excludes voters and various categories of registered supporters –​people who pay a smaller fee and possess very limited rights, for example, to vote for party leaders only –​since neither Labour, the PS, nor the SPD have granted anyone other than full members a formal say in the selection of candidates for public office or the formulation of party policy. Poguntke et al. (2007) have investigated how party leaderships deal with EU affairs, but the lower levels of the party organisation tend to be overlooked. The assumption is often made that EU matters are of little interest to grassroots activists (Holtkamp, 2007: 3–​4). Indeed, Sloam (2005: 69) writes, ‘The lower levels of the SPD are uninvolved in the European policy of the party to any meaningful extent, due to a lack of expertise and a lack of interest in EU politics –​local associations wish to concentrate on local issues.’ Some might also argue that the party on the ground is irrelevant in a study on social democratic parties and the EU, given their shrinking membership (see Chapter 2). Interestingly, however, the loss of members has gone hand in hand with the empowerment of the remaining party members. Indeed, many parties in Europe have recently sought to re-​engage with their members by giving them new political rights, such as the power to help select candidates, leaders, and policies (Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010; Gauja, 2013a, 2013b; Scarrow, 2015).

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Studying the party on the ground is also relevant because the majority of party activists are politically active at the grassroots level. As a Labour activist put it: ‘local activists are the only members of a political party most people will ever meet, the only people they can argue with on their own doorsteps’ (Guardian, 2015, 16 June). Hence, despite the importance of televised campaigns and the use of social media, grassroots activists in the UK still knock on voters’ doors and distribute leaflets during campaigns (Fisher and Denver, 2009; Low, 2014), and their German counterparts still put up party stalls on high streets and distribute leaflets (Brettschneider, 2013). Most parties still rely on their activists to fulfil important tasks (Scarrow, 2015: 103). But does this mean that the party on the ground plays a key role in the parties’ MEP selection and EU policy-​making processes? This chapter investigates the extent to which the party on the ground (the principal) engages in these activities, and the extent to which it has delegated these powers to higher levels and/​or other faces of the party. More specifically, it examines the extent to which the party on the ground scrutinises the parties in central and public office. Ultimately, this chapter asks whether the party grassroots are ‘cheerleaders’ supporting the party’s top ‘players’ (the leadership), or whether they are players in their own right in the game of EU policy-​making and the selection of MEP candidates. The next section of this chapter investigates how MEP candidates are selected inside the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD. It demonstrates that the three parties have very different selection procedures in place. This is mainly due to legal restrictions (in the case of the SPD) as well as party culture and traditions (in the case of all three parties), rather than the EU as an external force of constraint. The second section examines the involvement of the party on the ground in the formulation of EU policy. Drawing on Gauja’s (2013a, 2013b) four modes of member involvement in the formulation of party policy, the second section demonstrates that, by and large, the party on the ground’s influence on European policy is very limited. Interviews and surveys with activists indicate, however, that the social democratic grassroots care about a variety of EU issues. Still, there appears to be a general feeling of disempowerment on the ground, as the activists have left it to the party leadership in central and public office to formulate EU policy. Selecting MEP candidates: the Labour Party The way in which the Labour Party selects its candidates for the European parliamentary elections has changed over the past decades, revealing some of the power dynamics inside the party rather than the changing dynamics of European integration. Until 1999, the UK was divided into single-​member Euro-​ constituencies. Labour candidates were elected through the first-​past-​the-​post

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system that was traditionally used for national parliamentary elections, and the candidates were selected directly by their constituency without much interference from the party leadership at Westminster (Messmer, 2003: 213). This had led to a situation where the European Parliamentary Labour Party ‘had loose internal discipline and its centre of political gravity was well to the left of the new Blairite leadership […]. It was also, oddly, much more Eurosceptic’ (Minkin, 2014:  382). In July 1997, the new Labour government under Blair announced that it would change the UK’s electoral system for European parliamentary elections by introducing proportional representation, which was already in use in all other member states (Russell, 2005: 68–​71). For the 1999 European parliamentary elections, the Labour government thus chose a closed list proportional representation system. The UK was divided into 12 Euro-​constituencies. Nine of them were in England, whilst Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were one constituency each. These constituencies were given less of a say in the selection of their MEP candidates. Instead, the party leadership at Westminster and, most notably, the National Executive Committee (NEC), controlled the nationwide list of candidates and their ranking order. The selectorate of Labour’s MEP candidates had thus become more exclusive, or what Hazan and Rahat (2010) refer to as an ‘in-​between’ status, consisting of a party committee. The party leadership had made it clear from the start, however, that the candidate selection procedure used in 1999 would be a one-​off, ‘devised to make the transition between the old electoral system and the new one as smooth as possible for the party and the sitting MEPs’ (Carter and Ladrech, 2007: 69). Since the 2004 European parliamentary elections, the selectorate of MEP candidates has reverted back to being more inclusive:  Labour’s 12 Euro-​ constituencies have been given back the power to select their own candidates without much interference from the party leadership. Labour’s regional boards in each Euro-​constituency have appointed a small panel that selects the new candidates to be put on their list alongside re-​selected sitting MEPs. Individuals interested in running for the European Parliament (EP) submit their written application to the panel, which then decides who it will shortlist for an interview. After the interview, the panel decides who will be on the constituency’s list. The final ranking order of the candidates is determined by the party members in each Euro-​constituency in a one-​member-​one-​vote ballot. Members can select as many candidates as there are seats in each constituency, which means between three and ten. Rahat (2013: 138) describes this as a ‘multi-​stage selection process that starts, many times, with a small screening committee, continues with a delegate-​nominated shortlist, and ends with membership selection’. Sitting MEPs wishing to stand for re-​election have to pass a trigger ballot, involving the affiliated organisations (the trade unions) and Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs; Labour Party, 2013, ­chapter 5, clause V). In practice, however, sitting MEPs wishing to stand again for office –​regardless of their performance in

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the EP or their engagement with the constituency –​are usually put at the top of the new list. There are several reasons for this practice. According to a Labour activist and former MEP candidate, this happens because few people inside the party closely scrutinise their MEPs’ work in the EP. What is more, collecting votes against a sitting MEP would be perceived as a ‘lack of collegiality’ (Labour Party 12, interview with author). From the party’s perspective, re-​selecting incumbents can be advantageous as voters already know the candidate, have therefore more trust in them, and expect the candidate to bring more experience and knowledge to the office than a new candidate (Hobolt and Høyland, 2011: 481). The almost automatic re-​selection of incumbents is common practice in many parties, as the example of the SPD will confirm. It also applies to incumbent British Members of Parliament (MPs) and local councillors who are ‘rarely removed and are even virtually irremovable’ (Rahat, 2013: 143). A study into any party’s candidate selection procedures reveals how political the process is. For instance, three former Labour MEP candidates from different constituencies in England stated that their EU knowledge and expertise had played no role whatsoever during the selection process (Labour Party 10, 12, 13, interviews with author). This lack of interest in the MEP candidates’ EU expertise does not apply to all British parties. As a former long-​standing Conservative MEP explains, EU attitudes and expertise play a major role in the selection of Conservative MEP candidates, the reason being that certain constituencies, mainly in the south-​east of England, were dominated by Eurosceptic local constituency chairmen who wanted Eurosceptic candidates at the top of their list, whilst in other Euro-​constituencies, pro-​Europeanness and EU expertise were important selection criteria (Conservative Party 1, interview with author). Labour’s lack of interest in the MEP candidates’ European credentials is reflective of a party that has tried to downplay and defuse EU issues in recent years (Oppermann, 2008). What mattered most, according to the three former MEP candidates, was the support of the trade unions and patronage inside the party. Indeed, Labour’s affiliated trade unions have played a major role in the selection of candidates for party leadership (Quinn, 2012:  57–​96) and for the House of Commons (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993). Their influence on the selection of MEP candidates is therefore unsurprising. Half of the panel that shortlists and selects Labour’s MEP candidates is made up of union representatives. Without their endorsement, becoming a Labour MEP candidate is virtually impossible. The unions also provide the funds needed for candidates to run a campaign. To be sure, the unions’ involvement can raise a few questions about intra-​ party democracy. For instance, in London in 2013, the unions were accused of having chosen their MEP candidates before the official shortlist was drawn up. Labour’s London selection panel for the 2014 European elections was accused by party insiders of using ‘opaque selection criteria’, of ‘botching’ the process, and of simply relying on ‘political judgment’ instead of establishing transparent

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selection criteria (Labour Uncut, 2013, 29 April). One of the applicants explains that she was rejected by the union representatives for not being ‘sufficiently left-​wing’ (Labour Party 12, interview with author). Yet, according to the three former MEP candidates interviewed, the unions’ support depended not only on the candidates’ ideology, but also on their chances of being elected. For instance, in one English constituency, in 2013, the unions backed the two candidates who were most likely to be elected: a former MP with close ties to the party leadership at Westminster, and a former MEP. The influential role played by the trade unions in the selection of MEP candidates has led to frustration and resignation amongst many former candidates and those who wished to become candidates but failed to meet the unions’ approval. As a consequence, a number of critical motions were passed from CLP branches in London in 2013 condemning the lack of transparency in the selection of MEP candidates. Following these accusations, the party leadership promised a review into the selection practices, but so far none has taken place (Labour Party 12, interview with author). In any case, ‘Brexit’ means that Labour will no longer select MEP candidates. Not only union support, but also patronage is important in Labour’s MEP candidate selection process. A former candidate explains: ‘You need a patron in the Labour Party. Patronage is the key thing in the Labour Party, above everything else. It’s not about how good you are, but about who you know’ (Labour Party 13, interview with author). Labour’s MEP candidate selection reflects on the state of intra-​party democracy more generally. On paper, the selection process looks like a fairly inclusive, democratic, bottom-​up, multi-​stage process involving a relatively broad selectorate. In practice, the members have delegated the power to compile the lists to regional party boards, and the latter leave it to a small committee of party and trade union representatives. This chain of delegation is, without doubt, less time-​consuming than conducting closed primaries. Whilst being rather efficient, Labour’s selection process lacks transparency and accountability. The EU’s system of multi-​level governance cannot be made responsible for this lack of intra-​party democracy; it is rooted in the party’s organisational traditions. Selecting MEP candidates: the Parti Socialiste In France, the electoral system for European elections used to be proportional representation, based upon one single national list. ‘In the PS, the selection of MEP candidates and their place on the list was negotiated between the party leadership and the factions, or courants’, Ladrech (2007:  96–​97) writes. Since 2004, France has been divided into eight Euro-​constituencies, each of which has its own list of MEP candidates. The change to regional lists in 2004 might have affected the PS’s MEP selection procedures, and power could have shifted to the Euro-​constituencies.

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On paper, the PS follows a fairly democratic, bottom-​up process of candidate selection. First, each Euro-​constituency compiles its own list. These are then presented to and adopted by the PS National Council, which is a large forum attended by the great and the good of the party, including the secretaries of the federations, who, however, do not have voting rights. Thus, in contrast to Labour, the PS leadership in central office keeps the selection process under control. Once the electoral lists are adopted by the National Council, they are given to the members in each constituency for approval. Yet, in contrast to Labour members, PS members cannot determine the order of the candidates; they can merely approve or reject the whole list. Finally, the PS convention, which meets twice a year, adopts all lists ahead of the European parliamentary elections. Whilst in theory the local, regional, and national levels of the party are all involved in the selection of MEP candidates, the PS’s ‘real’ selectorate is very exclusive. In practice, the power to select MEP candidates continues to lie with the factions, the courants. Indeed, the selection processes regularly turn into proxy wars between the party’s bigwigs, some of whom wish to use the momentum to position themselves as candidates for the next presidential elections. Competition is fierce as the PS’s percentage of votes in European parliamentary elections has plummeted since the late 1990s and the number of safe seats has steadily decreased. For instance, before the 2014 European parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Ayrault and President Hollande intervened in the selection process to ensure their preferred candidates were put at the top of the list. One survey respondent, the secretary general of a PS federation, expressed his anger with the party leaderships’ intervention, stating: ‘We were highly mobilised [in the selection of our MEP candidate] but were disappointed because in the end, our candidate was retrograded to the 4th rank on the list to allow for the parachuting of some apparatchik from the Paris region.’ A survey respondent from another federation writes: [The federations have] no power whatsoever when it comes to the selection of MEP candidates. The selection is the result of the secret ploys in Paris between the faction leaders, without any real input from the federations. It is in Paris, in the electoral commission, according to the strength of the factions, where the lists [of candidates for the 2009 European parliamentary elections] were finalised. Preference is usually given to former politicians (ministers, mayors of big cities, etc.) or friends (to secure influence) or socialist ‘barons’ […]. Their background and their EU expertise don’t play any role […]. There’s no professionalism in the selection criteria.

Since its foundation, the fights between the factions have been part and parcel of the PS, and the selection of MEP candidates reflects this practice. The role of grassroots members is to rubber-​stamp the electoral lists, rather than to participate and exert influence. Hence, in practice, the selection of MEP candidates is a top-​down process lacking transparency, accountability, and democracy.

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As a result of these internal power struggles, the patronage of a faction leader is key for any person wishing to become an MEP. Like Labour, the PS does not always value EU knowledge and expertise much when selecting candidates. This also manifests itself in the high turnover rates of French MEPs. Not re-​selecting sitting MEPs is common practice in the PS, no matter how successful they were in their job. For instance, ahead of the 2014 European parliamentary elections, only half of the MEPs wanting to stay in office were re-​selected. The party leadership described this practice as a ‘renewal’, and PS spokesman David Assouline (2014) stressed that the renewal of the party’s EP delegation was ‘necessary’. In contrast to their British and German counterparts, very few French MEPs ever complete three mandates in the European Parliament. This, however, is not only due to the faction leaders’ influence over the candidate selection. Rather, many MEPs leave the European Parliament mid-​term because, for them, the Brussels job is only one of a few, as they still hold mandates at the local or national level, an enduring phenomenon known as ‘cumul des mandats’ (multiple office-​holding; see Foucault, 2006). For instance, in 2003, 43.7 per cent of French MEPs held one or more local office, compared to 14.1 per cent of their German and 4.6 per cent of their British counterparts (Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006). MEPs from all French parties are known to leave Brussels as soon as a more prestigious job becomes available at home. Thus, by keeping their job(s) in domestic politics, they keep one foot in the ‘French door’. Overall, the PS’s MEP candidate selection process does not reflect positively on the PS’s internal democracy. It is a messy and inefficient process, with months of negotiation and conflict preceding the compilation of the lists. We can thus observe the delegation of the power to select MEP candidates away from the membership to the Euro-​constituencies, which in turn have delegated their power to the party leadership, which is made up of faction leaders. The MEP candidate selection process thus highlights the personal divisions inside the PS rather than just the divisions between the party on the ground, in public office, and in central office. The EU cannot be ‘blamed’ for the lack of democracy and accountability; it is deeply rooted in the PS’s organisational culture. Selecting MEP candidates: the SPD Germany is one of the few European countries where electoral law regulates the candidate selection procedures for (European) elections, leaving parties little room for manoeuvre. According to the European election law (Europawahlgesetz, 1994, § 10), lists of MEP candidates need to be decided upon by a special or general assembly of party delegates, and the parties’ rank-​and-​file control the composition of the list either directly or through elected delegates. Hence, as Rahat (2013:  138) stresses, German law requires parties to adopt relatively inclusive selectorates, and the standard is the involvement of party members.

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For European parliamentary elections, German parties can decide whether they want to use one single, nationwide list of candidates, or whether they prefer 16 separate lists, one for each region (Land). The SPD uses one single, nationwide list, but tries to ensure that at least one candidate from each Land has a safe place on it. It is up to each SPD regional party association (Landesverband) to nominate their candidate(s) for the nationwide list. Only very rarely does the central party headquarters in Berlin intervene to ‘parachute in’ their preferred candidates. It has happened in the past that the headquarters pushed for a candidate from an ethnic minority background who would otherwise not have been on the list, as a party official admits (SPD 21, interview with author). Unsurprisingly, such interventions from the top are not appreciated by the Landesverbände, which are used to a high degree of autonomy (see Chapter  2). Each Landesverband has its own statute and can decide, within the limits of the electoral law, how it selects its MEP candidates. As a result, there is some variation. For instance, in Lower Saxony, Bremen, Saxony, and Bavaria, local party branches (Ortsvereine) have the right to propose MEP candidates. Still, it is the regional party conference (Landesparteitag) that selects their candidates for the European Parliament. Other Landesverbände, amongst them Hamburg, Schleswig-​ Holstein, and Mecklenburg-​ West Pomerania, have their MEP candidates selected by the regional party board, which makes for a more exclusive selectorate. Interviews with MEP candidates show that despite Germany’s strict party regulations, the SPD’s candidate selection processes are political, informal, and complex. An interesting example is North Rhine-​Westphalia (NRW), the Land with the largest SPD membership. For the purpose of candidate selection, NRW is divided into four districts, each of which compiles its own list of MEP candidates, which it then submits to the Landesverband which puts together the regional list and submits it to the SPD central headquarters in Berlin. Gender quota and geographical considerations play a role, but it is patronage that matters most when the list is compiled. According to a former MEP candidate, the regional party board (Landesvorstand) can abuse its power in the compilation process: Initially, I experienced the selection as a real bottom-​up process. It was democratic. There was one other candidate from a different district and we competed for the third place on the Landesliste. We introduced ourselves to the boards of the seven sub-​districts, did hustings, and the members then voted in favour of me. It was a time-​consuming process, but it was really good fun and we had lots of EU debates, which was the whole purpose of holding hustings. But then, the Landesvorstand [the regional party board], on the day before the conference where the delegates agreed on the final list, spontaneously changed the ranking order. I  felt blackmailed, but I didn’t want to make a fuss, because I could have lost my and other people’s place on the list. I then realised how difficult it is for a naïve newbie like myself to understand, let alone influence, the system. The compilation of lists is not

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democratic and it prevents new candidates from being selected. (SPD 23, interview with author)

Like their counterparts in the Labour Party, the SPD’s MEPs wishing to stand for re-​election are not automatically re-​selected, as this would go against the law. In practice, however, they often come top of the new list, as three-​quarters of the survey respondents admitted. For example, one respondent from a small Landesverband writes:  ‘Of course we cannot automatically re-​ select sitting MEPs. But until now, in practice, a sitting MEP who applied to run again for the European parliamentary elections has never lost the nomination to a rival candidate at the regional party conference.’ According to a former MEP candidate who twice made it onto the SPD’s list (for the 2009 and 2014 elections), EU knowledge played an important role in his selection: The Landesverband wanted a fresh face, someone younger, and someone who knows his stuff. I had done EU work for many years in the Jusos [Young Social Democrats] and was a member of the Young European Federalists and the Europa Union. So, I also had a EU network outside the party, and that was seen as relevant. I  was their natural candidate. They really encouraged me to stand for election. (SPD 22, interview with author)

The importance of EU expertise is confirmed by another MEP candidate, who explains that, prior to her selection, she had been the chair of a local EU committee for over five years. About her personal experience of the selection process, she says: You need to make a convincing case to the party when you participate in hustings, so you have to know what you’re talking about, and it helps when you’re eloquent. There are no formal selection criteria but you need to stand your ground, have EU expertise, some relevant job experience, and be anchored in the party structures. Patronage is also key. You need a network of people who value, recommend, and promote you. (SPD 23, interview with author)

The SPD’s successful candidates, be it for European or any other elections, have usually gone through the ‘Ochsen-​Tour’ –​the long process of stepping up the party ladder from grassroots activism to elected office (Oldopp, 2001). Hence, the SPD’s MEP candidates, like their counterparts in the Labour Party and the PS, need networks and patrons inside the party. However, the SPD’s recognition of EU expertise stands in contrast to Labour and the PS’s lack of interest in this matter. The reason might be the SPD’s stronger commitment to the EU. Once the Landesverbände have nominated their candidates, the SPD central headquarters compile the nationwide list. According to an SPD official working with the headquarters’ EU department, putting together the list can be a ‘difficult and sensitive’ process that is ‘neither very transparent nor democratic’, but has to be ‘practicable’ (SPD 21, interview with author). The list is compiled through

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a formula, taking into account the size of the party membership in each Land, the size of the Land’s overall population, as well as the SPD’s local results in the last European and national parliamentary elections. However, some positive discrimination is required, because if the list were generated after this formula, the Landesverbände in East Germany, where the SPD has fewer members, would not be represented. Therefore, on the 2014 list, all Landesverbände needed to be represented on the first 26 ranks, as 26 seats were considered safe. Still, some East German Landesverbände complained that they were underrepresented (Zeit Online, 2014, 26 January). Despite complaints, the list was voted on in its entirety by the SPD’s EU delegate conference (Europadelegiertenkonferenz), which has to formally approve it (Europawahlgesetz, 1994, §  10, 2). In the past, occasional fights have broken out over the specific ranking order of MEP candidates, as a party official confirms (SPD 21, interview with author). Yet, despite such conflicts, there seems to be no wish within the party to switch to regional lists, as this would mean that certain parts of Germany, where the SPD lacks a strong electoral basis, would not be represented by social democratic MEPs. Overall, the power to select MEP candidates lies with the Landesverbände. As Poguntke (2007: 118) writes, ‘the regional power base is by far the single most important criterion for individual candidates to be placed in a good position on the list’. Some of the Landesverbände involve local wards in the nomination process, but only a very few of them put candidates forward. Still, the activists do not wish to open up the selection process to the wider public. A survey, conducted by the SPD in 2010, shows that 66 per cent of the Ortsvereine were against including non-​members in the selection of candidates for public office (SPD, 2010a, member survey). Thus, inside the SPD, it is the contacts inside the regional party association, the Landesverband, that matter most for those who want to stand for election. Factions or trade unions do not play a role in the selection process. The power to select candidates has thus been delegated from the party membership to the regional associations. Hence, to some extent, the SPD practises mode 2 of power delegation as it delegates power within the same (on the ground) sphere, from the local to the regional level. This is prescribed by German electoral law, and not by the EU. Thus, the selection process is more inclusive and, hence, more democratic than the PS’s, but it is still deeply political and lacks transparency. In the next section I will focus on the party on the ground’s involvement in the formulation of European policy. Internally democratic parties offer their members different modes of participation in the formulation of policy, reflecting their ideology, culture, and historical origins, but also the size of their membership, social norms and legal regulation, electoral competition, and the challenges of governance (Gauja, 2013b: 117). Gauja identifies four modes of membership participation in the formulation of party policy. The first one, direct participation,

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was traditionally used by small parties in opposition, and especially by those emphasising grassroots democracy, such as Green parties. Direct participation means that individual members can directly participate in policy working groups and/​or cast their votes directly in policy ballots. More recently, large parties of government have also started to use internal referendums. Second and third, there is participation through delegation and representation, where party members choose one or more amongst their peers to represent their views and interests at a higher level of decision-​making, such as party conferences. This is the most common type of participation within parties. It only allows active members, and especially those who are elected to public office, to have their say in the formulation of policy. Fourth, some parties offer their members participation in the policy-​making process by holding policy consultations, forums, or conventions where members can feed in their ideas. Although some parties emphasise a certain type of participation over another, the different types of participation often coexist within one party (Gauja, 2013a: 122). Next, we will investigate the extent to which Labour, the PS, and the SPD have used these modes to involve the party on the ground in the formulation of European policy. European policy-​making: the Labour Party On its website, the Labour Party writes: To newcomers, working out how everything fits together can seem a bit of a maze –​ but don’t let that put you off as there’s a common goal: ensuring the party remains open and democratic and help maintain contact between the party, the people and the government. Our structure, and our open policy development process enables more people than ever before to have their say. (Labour Party, 2016a)

This quotation illustrates that openness, inclusiveness, and intra-​party democracy matter to the Labour Party. Still, Labour has never conducted an internal referendum on EU affairs. Instead, the party has recently opened up policy-​ ­making to the wider public, ‘thereby removing (in part) what was once the privilege of party members’ (Gauja, 2013a: 98). This trend started in November 2003 with the launch of ‘The Big Conversation’ by Tony Blair. Members of the public were asked to comment on a 77-​page policy document entitled ‘A Future Fair for All?’ via an online forum (BBC News, 2003, 28 November). Thirteen wide-​ ranging questions were asked in this consultation, and one of them focused on the UK’s relationship with the EU, namely: ‘How do we make Britain stronger in Europe?’ This policy consultation format has been repeated twice since (‘Let’s Talk’ in May 2006; ‘Fresh Ideas’ in 2011). Whilst Labour’s Parliamentary Party was very supportive of these public policy consultations, grassroots members argued that the views of the membership were further marginalised, and that the

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power of the party conference was further reduced (Gauja, 2013a: 102). Hence, Labour has not given the grassroots members a direct say in the formulation of European policy. Indeed, the party on the ground can only participate through a complex system of power delegation. Labour on the ground includes thousands of local wards, the CLPs (of which there are 533 in England), and the nine English Euro-​constituencies. Especially the CLP plays an important role in the life of the party, as it selects the candidates for national parliamentary elections. The Labour Party Rule Book (2013, Clause VI) specifies that the CLP may set up a women’s forum, an ethnic minorities forum, and ‘other such forums among common interest groups’, which leaves it to each CLP to set up an EU forum. According to the survey respondents, not a single CLP had set up an EU forum, and only three out of 85 respondents wrote that their CLP had a designated EU policy officer. CLPs thus dealt with the EU in a more ad hoc manner, whenever EU topics became salient, mainly before European parliamentary elections. The majority of respondents (71.76 per cent) stated that they sometimes/​occasionally/​rarely discuss EU-​related topics, whilst 21.17 per cent replied that they never deal with the EU in their CLP meetings. Only 4.7 per cent of the respondents stated that they regularly discuss EU topics in their constituency. The CLPs that discussed the EU covered a wide range of issues. The most frequently mentioned topics were: the Transatlantic Trade Partnership Agreement (TTIP, 15 mentions); the referendum on the UK’s continued EU membership (six mentions); and, more generally, the advantages and disadvantages of Britain’s EU membership (four mentions). Other, less frequently mentioned EU topics included: the Common Agricultural Policy, social legislation, (youth) employment policy, and the free movement of people. Thus, whilst EU policy was not a priority for Labour’s grassroots, the survey results indicate that, every now and again, it was on the agenda. One respondent captures the general mood amongst the CLPs when he writes: ‘There is always room for more engagement but European issues have to fight for space with more pressing local and national issues, the one exception being TTIP.’ Interestingly, 12 respondents stressed the pro-​Europeanness of their constituency members, although this was not part of the questionnaire. Some 77 per cent of respondents explained that their CLP is in regular contact with their MEPs (whilst 10 per cent wrote that they were not in contact). Most CLPs referred to the email newsletters that they received regularly from their MEP(s). In most cases, however, the flow of information was one-​sided, from the MEP to the constituency. Only a very few CLPs appeared to scrutinise their MEPs’ activities in the European Parliament ex post. The exceptions were three CLPs that invited their MEP to explain the implications of TTIP for British business and the National Health Service and to clarify Labour’s position on this matter. On these two occasions, activists could ask questions and raise their

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concerns. Five respondents also mentioned EU hustings they had organised or attended ahead of the 2014 European parliamentary elections. One of them writes: Our CLP rarely engages fully with European policy issues. Having said that, we did have a very productive hustings in [CLP name] in which all the Labour Party candidates were questioned by our members. We had some really good candidates and the best, [name of candidate], was elected to the European Parliament. Since her election, [name] has kept us fully updated with key issues, particularly those on which she has taken a stand.

EU hustings are common practice in the Labour Party, and they provide local activists with the unique opportunity to get to know and scrutinise MEP candidates. Still, former MEP candidates have deplored a lack of EU-​focused questions during these hustings (Labour Party 10, 12, 13, interviews with author), which suggests that the members rarely make use of their scrutiny rights. To what extend do the CLPs influence Labour’s EU policy? Nine (out of 85) respondents (10.59 per cent) stated that CLPs had no influence whatsoever, and another 11 per cent were unsure. The remaining 78 per cent of respondents were a bit more optimistic. The most frequently mentioned channel of influence was Labour’s National Policy Forum (NPF) (23 mentions), followed by the more informal influence through MEPs (21 mentions) and the annual conference (11 mentions). Yet, despite knowing some of the formal and informal policy-​making processes, very few CLPs made use of their influence or thought it worthwhile to do so. Only two CLPs declared that they had written EU resolutions to the party conference and the National Executive Committee in recent years, and only one respondent mentioned a policy paper his CLP had written for the NPF not too long ago. He writes: We use the period between general elections to make submissions to the party’s policy making body, the National Policy Forum in the chapter ‘Britain in the World’. On behalf of my CLP I tabled a paper a few years ago that had an effect (not on the EU specifically but, on their pernicious policies of the IMF in Africa.) The reaction showed that the Labour party can listen to CLP’s as did our MEPs who used the paper in the European Parliament with other centre left groups.

This CLP’s attempt to influence the party’s EU policy directly appears to be the exception. The more common responses were more negative. As one CLP secretary writes: ‘A cynical view would be that in reality, the role of the CLP and individual members in any Labour Party policy-​making is very restricted, and seems to be deliberately so!’ Or another, who makes the following statement: ‘Our CLP has representatives on the National Policy Forum, which covers all areas of policy, not just the EU. However since the party stripped the annual conference of its policy making role, its fair to say most members feel somewhat disenfranchised.’ Overall, the survey results indicate that Labour’s CLPs cared about the

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EU and discussed EU-​related themes occasionally, although they rarely tried to exert influence. One level up from the CLP is the Euro-​constituency. Labour has no separate European constituency party, as the Euro-​constituencies are artificial constructs, created solely for European parliamentary elections. Still, Labour’s Euro-​ constituencies coincide with the party’s regional associations. These are much more loosely organised than the SPD’s Landesverbände or the PS’s federations. Three out of four survey respondents from the Euro-​constituencies wrote that Labour’s European policy is formulated at the national level through the formal mechanisms of delegation and representation. Most importantly, the regional Labour Party elects delegates to the NPF, which does the detailed work on policy, not least in preparing the policy for the annual party conference. Six Labour MEPs are elected to sit on the NPF, where they can exert some influence. One survey respondent thus states: All policy, including European is formulated by the Labour Party’s National Policy Forum (NPF). All members are encouraged to participate in this process, by submitting proposals and amendments, as well as vote for representatives to sit on the Forum. The regional representatives take forward proposals from members in the [name of Euro-​constituency] to the NPF.

Still, some Labour MEPs tried to involve their constituency in EU debates. For instance, the Labour Yorkshire and Humber and East Midlands Euro-​ constituencies organised annual European Regional Policy Forums, open to all party members in the region. Usually, around 150 party members attended these forums, as the survey respondent from Yorkshire and Humber explains. What is more, the annual Regional Conference can address European issues. MEPs report their activities to the Regional Conference and the regional party board once per year. One respondent also explained that important party elites had their seats in her constituency and could therefore be influenced informally. Overall, Labour’s Euro-​constituencies were no key players in the formulation of European policy. Much of Labour’s EU debate has been outsourced to the Labour Movement for Europe (LME), which is an oasis for Europhile Labourites. The LME, which has been described as a ‘party political pressure group’ (Mullen and Burkitt, 2003), is known for its outspoken Europhilia. It supported Britain’s membership of the euro in the late 1990s and early 2000s and has campaigned consistently for a more constructive engagement with the EU. In its own words, the LME (2015) aims to ‘improve the quality of debate about Europe in the Labour Party, the wider Labour movement and throughout the UK. It is the home of pro-​Europeans in the Labour and trade union movement.’ The LME was most active in the south-​ east of England, but also had a branch in the south-​west. Ahead of the 2016 EU referendum, the LME also launched a Westminster branch that aimed to lead a pro-​European campaign in parliament. The LME also cooperated with the Party

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of European Socialists (PES) activists, but this was a rather loose relationship, as the PES activist scheme never really gained a strong foothold in the Labour Party. There was a feeling of enthusiasm amongst a handful of mainly London-​ based PES activists who were also active Labour members. In 2008, for example, London-​based PES activists contributed actively to the writing of the 2009 PES manifesto (PES 4, interview with author). Labour elites, however, showed little interest in promoting the PES activists scheme or in integrating them into the party, which meant that the initial enthusiasm has waned. At the time of writing, only a handful of PES activists were still occasionally campaigning with the LME in London and the south-​east of England. Hence, the PES activists were no key players in the formulation of Labour’s European policy. Thus, at the grassroots, Labour’s engagement with EU policy is limited. Whilst the survey results indicate that CLPs care about EU issues and discuss them occasionally, their influence is minimal. Very few Europhile activists have taken the effort to write policy papers or resolutions, or to scrutinise their MEPs, let alone party leaderships at Westminster. European policy-​making: the Parti Socialiste The PS’s former secretary for international relations and Europe under the leadership of Martine Aubry explained in an interview: The European question is treated in a bottom-​up and top-​down manner, even if it reserved to persons who are a bit specialised. What I mean is that the sections [local party, I.H.] do not often discuss European questions. They sometimes discuss them … it is part of their patrimony, their genetic make-​up. At the same time there are highly specialised people who follow the subject. It’s a hybrid system and it is part of the PS history, yet unfortunately, it remains reserved to a certain number of specialists in the Socialist Party. (PS 4, interview with author)

Like an increasing number of parties across Europe, the PS has recently started to experiment with direct democracy. The PS’s candidate for the 2012 presidential elections was selected not just by the party members but by all voters, who had to sign a charter pledging support for the values of the Left and pay one euro (Guardian, 2011, 16 October; Clift, 2013). When it comes to the direct participation of the party on the ground in the making of European policy, the PS’s 2004 internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty stands out (see Chapter  2). Although a majority of 58.6 per cent of party members voted in favour of the treaty, the referendum did not settle the tensions within the party leadership, and the ‘no’ camp continued their campaign until May 2005, when the French electorate was asked to vote on the treaty in a nationwide referendum (Wagner, 2008: 272). Hence, although the membership was given the unique opportunity to directly influence the PS’s

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European policy, their vote was not binding. Not only did the referendum accentuate internal power struggles, it also highlighted the PS’s ambiguity towards the process of European integration, which has been discussed in Chapter  3. It is therefore highly unlikely that the PS will experiment with internal referendums on EU issues in the near future. But what about the other modes of membership participation in policy-​making: delegation and representation? At the local level, in the sections, EU affairs might be discussed occasionally. However, except for one single section (Paris’s 11th arrondissement), PS sections do not have EU secretaries or EU working groups. This does not necessarily reflect a lack of interest in European politics; it is rather due to the small size of most sections. At the next level of the party organisation, the federation, the EU plays a more important role. It is, for instance, interesting to note that over a third of the PS federations in mainland France (35 out of 95) have a designated EU secretary.1 Three of these EU secretaries also convened PES City Groups. Given the number of EU secretaries, it is surprising that only six out of 95 federations had created EU working groups, where –​albeit to varying degrees –​current EU issues were discussed and events and EU election campaigns organised. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the PS’s EU working groups and EU secretaries in the sections and federations. Not surprisingly, the PS federation in Strasbourg, where the European Parliament convenes every month, has an EU working group. Moreover, the PS federation in Paris has set up an EU working group, and there are three staff members working on EU affairs. It seems that those EU working groups that are simultaneously PES City Groups tend to be most active. For instance, PS Federation 69 (Rhône) has launched a regular ‘Café Europe’ together with their PES City Group. On their website it reads: The public debate on Europe should not be limited to the election campaigns every five years. It’s through exchange and communication that our party will deconstruct the ideas we receive and that we will convince the electorate that the anti-​European vote is not a solution, that it isolates us and makes us powerless in Brussels. In order to bring the debate to life and feed our reflections, Joelle Séchaud (federal secretary of EU affairs), the EU working group, and the PES City Group have decided to organise regular and open get-​togethers where we can speak about Europe and create Europe. These Cafés Europe will be moderated by members of the [EU] working group […] and offer the opportunity to discuss the work of our MEPs and Commissioners in order to better understand EU politics. (PS Rhône, 2014)

Overall, however, this high level of EU enthusiasm and activism was rather the exception amongst the federations. It appears that the federations in the more remote areas of France no longer have EU working groups in place because ‘they didn’t assemble many people’, as one survey respondent explains. Instead, some

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Table 5.1  The PS and the EU at the grassroots: EU working groups and secretaries*

EU working groups

Secretaries for EU affairs

Sections

PS Fédérations

Paris: 11th arrondissement. Working group Europe

Federation 22: Côtes d’Armor. Working group Europe, Globalisation, Development Federation 31: Haute Garonne. Working group Europe and International Affairs, joint with PES City Group Federation 67: Bas-​Rhin. Working group Europe Federation 69: Rhône. Working group Europe and International Affairs Federation 75: Paris. Working group Europe Federation 87: Haute Viennes. Working group Europe Federation 9: Ariège (Europe, International Affairs, Human Rights) Federation 11: Aude (International and European Affairs) Federation 13: Bouches-​du-​Rhône (PES and Europe) Federation 14: Calvados (Europe and International Relations) Federation 18: Cher (International Affairs and Twin Cities) Federation 22: Côtes d’Armor (Europe, Globalisation, Development) Federation 23: Creuse (European and International Affairs) Federation 24: Dordogne (European and International Affairs) Federation 28: L’Eure-​et-​Loir (European and International Affairs, Defence, French Citizens Abroad, Cooperation, Cooperation North–​South) Federation 29: Finistère (Europe and PES City Groups) Federation 34: Hérault (European and International Affairs, Development) Federation 35: Ille-​et-​Vilaine (European and International Affairs) Federation 37: Indre-​et-​Loire (Europe) Federation 38: Isère (European and International Affairs) Federation 44: Loire-​Atlantique (Europe) Federation 45: Loiret (Europe and Health) Federation 47: Lot-​Et-​Garonne (Europe) Federation 48: Lozère (Europe) Federation 50: Manche (Europe and Defence) (continued)

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110 Table 5.1 (cont.)

Sections

PS Fédérations Federation 53: Mayenne (European and International Affairs) Federation 54: Meurthe-​et-​Moselle (Europe) Federation 67: Bas-​Rhin (Europe) Federation 69: Rhone (European and International Affairs) Federation 75: Paris (Europe: one secretary and two vice-​secretaries) Federation 77: Seine-​et-​Marne (Europe) Federation 78: Yveslines (European and International Affairs) Federation 79: Deux-​Sèvres (Europe) Federation 81: Tarn (European and International Affairs) Federation 84: Vaucluse (Agriculture and Europe) Federation 87: Haute-​Viennes (Europe) Federation 92: Hauts-​de-​Seine (Europe) Federation 94: Val-​de-​Marne (European and International Affairs, PES) Federation 95: Val d’Oise (Europe and International)

*  As of March 2015 (information available online).

of these federations now organised occasional EU-​themed workshops, open to all activists. For instance, one respondent wrote that his federation had organised a well-​attended workshop on PES’s policies. The survey respondents listed a variety of EU issues that they regularly debated in their federation:  from the fundamental questions, such as ‘France’s role in Europe’, ‘national and European identity’, ‘borders’, ‘federalism’, the ‘future widening and deepening of European integration’, and ‘the transfer of fiscal, political, industrial powers to the EU’, to the more current themes, such as ‘the EU’s role in the Ukraine conflict’, the ‘Eurozone crisis and Greece’, or TTIP. As we will see in the next section, most of these themes were also on the SPD’s local agenda. Yet, the federations’ EU debates did not translate into influence. Some 50 per cent of the survey respondents were optimistic in their assessment and mentioned three possible ways for the federations to influence the PS’s European policy. First, one respondent named policy consultations, where individual members and sections were invited to send their contributions to the PS’s National Bureau, which feeds them into one policy document. This procedure, however, appears to take place only very rarely. Second, a number of respondents mentioned the

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traditional, bottom-​up strategy of writing resolutions or amendments to policy documents drafted by the party leadership in Paris. Third, two respondents mentioned ‘personal contacts’ in Paris as the most effective way of influencing the party’s EU policy directly. Overall, however, the responses conveyed a feeling of powerlessness, despondence, and disillusionment with the party leadership. All respondents wrote that the PS’s European policy is formulated by the party leadership in central office, the bureau national, with 50 per cent of the survey respondents stating that they see ‘no opportunity’ for the federations to influence it. The following survey response summarises the role of the federations in the formulation of European policy: ‘It is difficult to speak of a formulation of European policy at the level of a federation. Nonetheless, locally, we have an EU working group (open to all activists), which meets regularly in order to exchange views, and, in some cases, proposes motions.’ Another respondent writes:  ‘It’s at the national level of the party where the guidelines of European policy are defined. The federation is a forum where these guidelines are merely discussed and where sometimes amendments are made.’ The survey results indicate that the federations rarely write amendments and motions on EU issues. The opportunity to exert influence through MEPs was not mentioned. Interestingly, and in contrast to Labour, the PS has actively promoted the PES activists scheme since its launch in 2004. This might have been a consequence of the PS’s traumatic referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty. As a long-​standing French PES activist explains, the scheme offered PS activists a means of voicing their pro-​Europeanness at a time when the party leadership was divided (PS 7, interview with author). The PS soon integrated the PES City Groups and activists into their federations. PES activists from Paris have campaigned in Berlin (and vice versa) during European and national parliamentary campaigns. At the time of writing, there were approximately 13 PES City Groups across France, most of which were integrated into local or regional party structures, and 42 federations that had a PES liaison officer. Thus, France remained a strong bastion of PES activists and supporters. Still, their influence on the PS’s European policy was very limited. Instead, they provided a forum for EU debate and campaigning. Thus, like Labour, the PS grassroots show some interest in European policy but leave it to a small number of committed Europhiles. Some of them have become increasingly frustrated with the general lack of a European awareness inside their party. One survey respondent shared his grievances, stating: Within the federation, European policy is certainly treated as the poor cousin of the other policy areas, although we are just one hour away from Strasbourg. In particular since the beginning of the 2000s, the activists have become increasingly concerned about the EU. It is true that the Parti Socialiste was divided over the referendum in 2005, and the divisions still exist today but are not talked about for

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the sake of unity. It is convenient to ignore subjects that make people angry. It’s a major weakness, and probably one of the reasons for the Parti Socialiste’s current problems. This lack of clarity in the party’s EU policy is reflected in the lack of EU expertise that we find amongst the majority of party officials working in the federations. Due to the lack of resources, EU experts with a background in political science are not hired. The MEPs hardly ever come to meet the activists or party officials, although we are so close to Strasbourg. Hence, European policy isn’t formulated in the federation, only a few opinions are voiced every now and then, some issues are analysed (when party officials meet) by those who feel interested. But very few share their opinions […] and the exchange is brief. It’s tragic when you come to think about it.

The membership has thus delegated much EU policy-​making power to the agent, the party in central office, and in particular the National Bureau. Ex ante or ex post scrutiny rarely takes place. What is more, and unlike most Labour constituencies, PS federations appear not to be in regular contact with their MEPs, which means that there is little awareness of the MEPs’ activities in the European Parliament, let alone scrutiny. European policy-​making: the SPD In its statutes, the SPD writes: ‘The SPD is organised into local branches, sub-​ districts and districts. Within this organisation, the party’s policy is made from the bottom to the top’ (SPD, 2014, 26 January). This quotation illustrates the SPD’s status as a multi-​level party. Nevertheless, the party membership does not normally participate directly in the formulation of European policy or any other type of policy. The consultation of members is very rare and has been introduced only very recently. Indeed, for the first time in 2013, the SPD leadership organised an internal referendum, asking the members for their approval to form a grand coalition government with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats. The basis of this referendum was the coalition contract (2013), which contained one chapter on Germany’s relationship with the EU. Still, EU policy was only one out of many policy areas stipulated by the coalition contract, and the members were asked to vote on the whole document. To be sure, the internal referendum gave a few hundred thousand SPD members the power to decide on the make-​up of the future German government –​a decision that caused much controversy and was deemed undemocratic by not a few academics and journalists in Germany and abroad (Financial Times, 2013, 19 November). The main argument brought forward by legal experts was that the outcome of the internal referendum was no more legally binding than any decision taken by the party’s executive board, and that only the Bundestag would be in the position to take such a far-​reaching decision on Germany’s and Europe’s future (Handelsblatt, 2013, 28 November). The fact that a large majority of SPD members (75.96 per cent) voted in favour of the

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coalition contract and the SPD’s participation in a grand coalition government cooled down the debate and might have set a precedent for future referendums. In general, however, the SPD’s experiments with direct democracy are very moderate, and are comparable to those of the Labour Party. In recent years, the SPD leadership has conducted policy consultations with party members and citizens in an attempt to reach out to the general public. The most prominent example was the 2010 ‘Workshop on the Future of a Fair Germany’ (Zukunftswerkstatt Faires Deutschland), conducted by the party leadership after the SPD’s 2009 electoral defeat (SPD, 2010b). Six workshops were organised around broad themes, but Europe was not amongst them. However, many themes touched upon the EU, such as the quality of democracy, the economy, the environment, and the labour market. Thus, at a time when the SPD was in opposition, the leadership tried to ‘renew’ the party by touching base with the general public. Members were also allowed to participate in the consultation, but their views did not carry any more weight than those of non-​members. Thus, like Labour, the SPD has started –​to a limited extent –​to outsource the development of party policy. At the same time, in 2010, the party conducted a survey with its local branches (Ortsvereine) asking questions about their organisation, activities, communication strategies, political priorities, and preferences for future participation in party politics. The response rate was 44 per cent. The survey did not provide the opportunity for direct policy input, but it gave the activists the chance to raise some important issues, and the leadership to grasp the situation on the ground. Social equality, education, and health topped the list (‘high priority’), whilst the ‘defence of social and workers’ rights at the EU level’ was merely ranked as a ‘medium priority’ by the activists. This was the only EU-​related survey question. Another interesting finding of the survey is that a majority of branches (79 per cent) was in favour of including non-​members in policy consultations. Yet, a difference was made between binding and non-​binding consultations, as 86 per cent of branches stated that only members should be allowed to take binding decisions. The resistance of party members to giving non-​members formal rights in the policy-​making process is not surprising and corroborates existing findings (see Gauja, 2013b: 108–​109). The SPD’s activist survey also reveals that EU working groups do not exist at the local level. Activists with an interest in the EU tend to pursue their interests and ambitions at a higher level of the party organisation. Yet, the lack of local EU working groups does not mean that EU politics is irrelevant at the grassroots. For example, three long-​standing MEPs stated in interviews that the Ortsvereine in their constituency had generally become more interested in their activities over the years. They added, however, that they usually took the initiative themselves and asked to be invited to speak about current EU topics (SPD 6, 13, 18, interviews with author). It also appears that at the local level, EU policy tends to be debated in the SPD’s 60+ working groups for senior members. These groups

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organised numerous events during the 2014 European parliamentary election campaign, usually involving MEPs. This is unsurprising, given the SPD’s ageing membership and the fact that the most active group now tends to be the senior members (Lösche, 2004). But this is not the whole story. In recent years, the PES activists have become more widespread and visible across Germany. During the 2009 European parliamentary elections, the SPD leadership in central office showed very little interest in them, fearing ‘parallel structures’ rivalling their own EU committee in Berlin (PES 6, interview with author). The party leadership’s support for the PES activists still seemed to be lukewarm five years later (PES 12, interview with author), but the number of activists and PES City Groups kept growing. At the time of writing, in the aftermath of the 2014 European parliamentary elections, there were around 23 PES City Groups spread across Germany. Some of these groups were integrated into the SPD’s local EU committees, such as the SPD Arbeitskreis Europa in Lübeck, whilst others operated independently. The PES activists supported election campaigns and organised campaign exchanges with PES activists in other member states. What is more, they helped organise EU-​themed events. Still, they were not formally integrated into the SPD and their influence on the party’s EU policy remained –​if anything –​informal and small. Rather, they tried to influence the PES’s programme. Hence, the SPD grassroots, including the PES activists, did discuss EU politics, but they had little direct influence on the party’s overall programmatic decisions. The same applied to the next level of the party organisation, the Unterbezirk (sub-​ district), which often corresponds with the administrative unit of the council or the municipality. Only in bigger cities does the SPD have EU working groups, as Table 5.2 illustrates. Some of these EU working groups are more active than others. As the chair of SPD Cologne’s Forum Europa explains: ‘Some sub-​districts are really interested in EU affairs, but it strongly depends on the people there. In general, it’s just a handful of people who are interested in the EU, and the SPD’s European policy lives of them’ (SPD 23, interview with author). EU working groups at the sub-​district level tend to convene several times per year to discuss EU issues and write resolutions on topics they feel strongly about. It is through resolutions that they hope to influence the SPD’s European policy. As the chair of SPD Cologne’s Forum Europa states: I end up writing quite a few resolutions. Sometimes the idea comes from the grassroots activists, but sometimes it’s my idea. First I get an understanding of what the local activists think on the topic, and that forms the basis of the resolution. It’s a really good, democratic process, it’s based on lots of discussion and consultation. Then I make use of my contacts inside the Bundestag to find out what the party group thinks. Because resolutions need to have rhyme and reason if you want them to be read and acknowledged by the higher levels of the party. They also need to be

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Table 5.2  SPD EU working groups at the grassroots* Sub-​district/​district (Unterbezirk/​Bezirk) EU working Bonn (Arbeitskreis Europa, groups since 2006) Düsseldorf (Arbeitskreis Europa, since 2008) Hessen-​Süd (Frankfurt, Europaausschuss) Koblenz (Arbeitskreis Europa) Köln (Forum Europa, since 2009) München (Arbeitskreis Europa und international Politik, since 2005)

Regional association (Landesverband) Berlin (Fachausschuss Europa) Brandenburg (Arbeitskreis Europa) Bremen (Arbeitskreis Europa, since 2013) Hamburg (Forum Internationale Politik und Europa) Nordrhein-​Westfalen (Arbeitskreis Europa) Schleswig-​Holstein (Europaforum)

*  As of March 2015.

clear and well written. Once the resolution is done, I send it to all the levels of the party. (SPD 23, interview with author)

At the same time, the interviewee acknowledged that thematic working groups, such as EU working groups, were ‘politically not very relevant’, and that their influence ‘remains limited’. The SPD at the local and sub-​district levels has delegated the power to formulate EU policy to the regional party associations. In 2015, five out of 20 Landesverbände had EU working groups. The topics they discussed tended to be ‘regionalised European policy, like EU funding for local projects, or issues related to our relationship with neighbouring countries’, as one representative of a small Landesverband explained (SPD 22, interview with author). The Landesverbände have formal and informal ways of influencing the European policy of the SPD. Some 50 per cent of the survey respondents from the Landesverbände referred to the formal, delegative system of policy-​making, which works as follows: the regional party conference (Landesparteitag) issues EU policy resolutions and refers them to the federal party conference (Bundesparteitag), where they are discussed. An example was a resolution written by Berlin’s SPD in which they asked for a ‘change of direction in Europe’, an end to austerity, the introduction of Eurobonds, and more social investment in indebted EU member states (SPD Berlin, 2013, 25 May). However, a quicker, and often more effective, way to influence the direction of the SPD’s EU policy was through the party’s national executive committee (Vorstand) and the recently created party convention. The Landesverbände are represented in both of these forums. What is more, some leaders of the Landesverbände were also deputy party leaders and were directly involved in all major decisions. As a former MEP candidate

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explains: ‘Without the politics of resolutions, it can sometimes be quicker and more effective. It’s not so nice and democratic, but it works’ (SPD 22, interview with author). Overall, the SPD on the ground showed some interest in EU policy, but their power to influence the party’s EU policy was limited. Very occasionally, they made use of their right to write resolutions. Some activists used their personal contacts to influence the party leadership. Still, out of the three parties, the SPD is the most decentralised party, and the Landesverbände are powerful enough to flex their muscles if they need to. European policy is rarely a reason to do so, and many important decisions are taken by the leadership in central office. Yet, a few representatives of the Landesverbände are involved in these decisions as they sit on the national executive committee. Conclusions It is often assumed that on the ground, parties do not care a great deal about the EU. This chapter has investigated this claim. It has examined the involvement of the party on the ground in the selection of MEP candidates and the formulation of European policy, and it has revealed three principal findings. First, the involvement of the grassroots in the selection of candidates for the European elections is rather limited. In theory, Labour, the PS, and the SPD have fairly inclusive, democratic selection procedures in place. In practice, patronage is indispensable, and the grassroots members often rubber-​stamp the nominations made by a small group of people. In the Labour Party, the trade unions play a major role in selecting MEP candidates, as they sit on the shortlisting committee and provide the resources that are necessary to lead a campaign. In the PS, the national party leadership gets heavily involved in the selection of MEP ­candidates, with competing factions trying to secure their friends safe places on the lists, often ignoring the preferences of the constituencies. The SPD central headquarters follow German party laws by letting the regional party ­associations  –​the Landesverbände –​select their own MEP candidates. Intervention by the centre is rare and not appreciated by the Landesverbände. Yet, at the regional level, the  selection procedures are still not always very democratic and transparent. For example, regional party boards have changed the order of candidates at the last minute, thereby ignoring the grassroots preferences. Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s selection of MEP candidates thus confirms Rahat’s observation that ‘candidate selection is democratically inferior to general elections […]. Elections at most times are more inclusive, fair, and free’ (Rahat, 2013: 144). Second, this chapter has revealed that the party on the ground is generally interested in EU policy. Both the ‘big’ debates about the EU’s future (policies about the EU) and the more topical issues (policies through the EU) are occasionally discussed in local meetings, and there is a surprisingly high number of EU working groups and EU spokespersons/​secretaries inside the PS’s fédérations and

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the SPD’s Landesverbände. The Labour Party’s constituencies did not have such EU committees, but the majority keeps in contact with their MEPs to receive regular updates. Yet, and third, only a very few of the local and regional parties effectively scrutinise the party leaderships or attempt to influence them directly. Indeed, very few activists appear to write resolutions on EU topics. The few EU-​themed resolutions cited in this chapter were drafted by a handful of highly motivated, EU-​savvy activists. Whilst a large majority of survey respondents and interviewees are aware of the formal channels of influence, such as the party conference and/​or the national-​level policy forums/​committees, they very rarely seem to make use of them. Rather, they declare that European policy is formulated at the national level and that their input is, at best, minimal. The direct influence of the grassroots on EU policy is even more limited. The PS’s internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004 might have been a one-​off experiment with direct democracy that served the short-​term interests of future presidential candidates, rather than the grassroots. The party members (the principal) have thus delegated much of their EU policy-​making power to the party in central office (the bureaucracy) and in public office (the MPs) without much ex ante or ex post control. This refers to mode 3 of power delegation (see Figure 4.1 in the previous chapter). Despite these trends, there are some significant differences in how the parties deal with the EU. Amongst the three parties on the ground, the SPD appeared to be the ‘EU-​savviest’. For instance, the SPD’s MEP candidates are expected to have relevant EU expertise and European networks inside the party and beyond in order to be considered selectable. The importance of an MEP candidate’s EU expertise should be taken for granted, but the examples of Labour and the PS show that it cannot. It is most certainly a reflection of the SPD’s stronger commitment to the EU, which needs to be understood in the broader context of (West) Germany’s European vocation post-​ 1945 (Paterson, 2011). Meanwhile, the Labour Party, whilst pro-​integrationist since the mid-​1980s, has avoided talking about the EU in recent years, and party leader Ed Miliband tried to avoid a referendum on the UK’s future EU membership. When the referendum took place in June 2016, Labour’s lack of an EU strategy became apparent. The PS, ten years on, was still suffering the consequences of its 2004 internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty. The divisions between the left-​wing and moderate factions over the future of the EU were still visible. ‘The PS and Europe –​it’s like Doctor Jekyll and Mr Hyde’, the Huffington Post (2014, 17 April) writes. Overall, the parties on the ground were not just ‘cheerleaders’ in support of the party leadership. In particular, the PS activists were far too critical of the party leadership’s behaviour to count as cheerleaders. Still, they were no ‘players’ either, as the main decisions related to the EU (policy and personnel) were

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controlled by small circles of regional and national leaderships. The next chapter will focus on the power dynamics within the party in central office. Note 1 As of March 2015. I  relied on the PS federations’ individual websites for information. However, some of the websites had very little or no information available on the local party structures. In some cases, the names of the federal secretaries were listed, but not their portfolio, which made it impossible to know if the federation had a designated EU secretary. My list might not be complete, and some EU working groups and secretaries might have slipped off my radar.

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Lions or toothless tigers? The parties in central office and the EU

This chapter investigates how the European Union (EU) has impacted upon the power dynamics within the party in central office, which refers to the party executive and the central bureaucracy. The Labour Party’s headquarters on Brewers Green, the Parti Socialiste’s (PS) 10 Rue Solférino, and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (SPD) Willy-​Brandt-​Haus are home to the party leaderships in central office and the bureaucratic machines that support them. Each of the three headquarters houses a department or unit dealing with European and international policies led by party officials such as Labour’s international liaison manager or the PS and SPD’s secretaries for European and international affairs. This chapter investigates the extent to which power has been delegated from the party in central office to the party in public office (mode 1 of power delegation) and to the Party of European Socialists (PES) in central office (mode 2 of power delegation). As throughout this book, the focus lies on the power to formulate EU policies and select EU specialists. The central question is whether the parties in central office were ‘lions’ with real decision-​making powers, or whether they were ‘toothless tigers’ instead. As Katz and Mair (1993) remind us, the party in central office consists of two (often overlapping) groups of people: the national executive committee (or several committees, depending on each party) and the central party bureaucracy. The party in central office has a number of core functions. First, it is the nucleus from which the other two faces are formed. Second, it coordinates national campaigns, which might mean that it supervises the party on the ground on behalf of the party in public office. Third, it supervises the party in public office on behalf of the party on the ground. In the same vein, it may aggregate and articulate the demands of the party on the ground, organise party conferences and act in place of the conference on a daily basis (Katz and Mair, 1993). In order to fulfil these roles, the party in central office disposes of a number of important resources, namely:  its centrality, its networks, some long-​standing expertise, and its formal position at the apex of the party organisation. What is more, many of its members tend to be leaders of the other faces of the party, which can add to its strength and centrality.

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It is often argued that the power of the party in central office over the party’s overall direction has waned over the years (Mair et al., 1999). Indeed, Katz and Mair themselves noted that power dynamics inside parties were shifting, as the parliamentary party received more public funding than before, and that it was therefore better resourced to deal with policy than the other two faces of the party (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). Moreover, as Europarties have become policy-​ seeking organisations, it is time to investigate the extent to which Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s central bureaucracies have delegated some of their power to formulate EU policies and influence the selection of MEP candidates and other EU specialists to the PES (mode 2 of power delegation). The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next three sections each analyse the role played by Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office in the formulation of European policies and the selection of EU specialists. Building on Chapter 2, which briefly describes the core roles and functions of the three parties’ executive committees, this chapter focuses on their dealings with the EU. This is followed by an analysis of the role played by the international departments in the formulation of EU polices and the selection of EU specialists. Last but not least, the relationship between each party in central office and the PES is discussed. The chapter reveals some important differences between Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office and their dealings with EU affairs. Still, the overall finding is that the parties in central office are neither ‘lions’ nor ‘toothless tigers’ when it comes to EU matters. Instead, they are ‘toothless tigers with claws’ that bring the other two faces of the party together and establish and strengthen European networks at the highest level of the party (the PS and the SPD). At the same time, the power of the party in central office to formulate EU policy is limited to formulating general EU guidelines. Meanwhile, thanks to better resources and access to expertise, the party in public office is better equipped to deal with the day-​to-​day processes of EU policy-​making. Yet, power dynamics also depend on whether the parties are in government or opposition, and on the resources available to the party bureaucracy. When it comes to the selection of MEP candidates and other EU specialists, the parties in central office play very different roles, with the PS leadership being most hands-​on whilst Labour and the SPD select their candidates at the regional level. In this regard, no power has been delegated to the PES. The Labour Party in central office and the EU As the governing body and administrative authority, Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC) oversees the overall direction of the party and the policy-​ making process. The NEC is also responsible for upholding the rules of the party and for overseeing Labour’s candidate selection processes. The party leader,

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the deputy leader, and the leader of the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) are ex officio members of the NEC. On Labour’s website (2016b) it reads: Throughout the year, NEC members participate with shadow government ministers in Labour Party policy commissions that prepare reports on different areas of policy which are then presented to and consulted on with the party membership before going to annual conference. This forms the basis of Labour’s general election manifesto.

Thus, the NEC could in theory have been the place where policies about the EU –​strategic long-​term decisions –​were formulated. Most notably, the NEC could be the body that writes Labour’s manifestos, all of which contain a chapter on European and international affairs. In practice, however, the Labour leadership has ‘traditionally enjoyed considerable strategic freedom to devise election manifestos and to govern relatively unimpeded by the extra-​parliamentary party once in office’, Heffernan and Webb (2005: 46) write. This ‘strategic freedom’ is confirmed by Bara (2006: 267), who writes that for Labour’s 2005 election manifesto, ‘despite the semblance of consultation, most of the key decisions were taken by the leadership’. In 2010, the party officially announced that its manifesto would be written by Ed Miliband, who was at the time minister for energy and climate change. In reality, according to a former head of 10 Downing Street’s Policy Planning Unit, the different chapters of the manifesto were written by government ministers and civil servants and then polished by 10 Downing Street. Miliband was the senior minister responsible for ‘signing it off, in effect, or for approving the manifesto’ (Labour 4, interview with author). Miliband also wrote most of the introduction and contributed to each of the chapters. Ahead of the 2015 general elections, when Labour had been in opposition for five years, the party did not announce the name(s) of the official author(s) of the manifesto. The New Statesman, however, revealed the behind-​the-​scenes process, explaining that the manifesto was written by Jonathan Rutherford, an academic and advisor to Jon Cruddas MP (then head of Labour’s policy review), and Marc Stears, Ed Miliband’s chief speechwriter and a close friend. In addition, Angela Eagle MP, who led the internal party consultation, and Jon Trickett MP, who led the external consultation, were involved in the writing of the manifesto. Last but not least, Miliband’s senior advisor, Labour’s director of policy, Torsten Bell, dealt with the technical policy details (New Statesman, 2015, 2 February). Labour’s formal policy-​making structures, and most notably the NEC, were not involved in the process. The power to formulate policies about the EU has thus been delegated to the party leader and his close circle of trusted advisors, some of whom –​but not all –​are elected politicians. Since Jeremy Corbyn took over the party leadership, the NEC has become the main site of conflict between pro-​and anti-​Corbyn forces. It has taken some important, high-​profile decisions. For instance, it was the NEC that chose to

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interpret Labour’s constitution favourably for Corbyn when it ruled that, as the incumbent, he automatically qualified as a candidate in the 2016 leadership election (Quinn, 2016, 24 September). Thus, the NEC mainly oversaw the administration of the Labour Party and interpreted the party rule book, but it was not the place where policies about and through the EU were formulated. If the NEC was not the place where EU policies were defined, then the National Policy Forum (NPF) was not either. The NPF meets two to three times a year and includes representatives of CLPs and regions, Labour councillors, affiliated trade unions and socialist societies, the PLP, the EPLP, and other stakeholder groups within the party. The aim is to ensure that policy documents reflect the broad consensus in the party. Yet, despite the input of the party grassroots, the NPF tends to be dominated by the party leader and his entourage, even more so when the party was in government (Krell, 2009: 103). One out of the NPF’s seven policy commissions dealt with international policy, which included the EU. Yet, after Tony Blair’s leadership, EU policy moved more and more into the background of the commission’s work, and under Jeremy Corbyn, after the Brexit vote in June 2016, it was not Britain’s future relationship with the EU that was discussed here. Rather, the focus lay on Britain’s security policy and nuclear disarmament. This was yet another sign of a party that was ambivalent about and uncomfortable with the EU. More generally, since the 1980s, policy-​making and campaigning have become increasingly centralised within the Labour Party (Minkin, 2014). Whilst the NEC and NPF remained important forums for debates, policies about and through the EU were not formulated here. The former head of 10 Downing Street’s Policy Planning Unit thus explains: It would be quite wrong to suppose that the formal policy-​making structure within the party has very much influence at all how policy in the relation to the European Union is made when the Labour Party is in government. And obviously, the orientation shifts, so that the actors who control the process are obviously the senior ministers in conjunction with senior officials and civil servants. And I can think of almost no examples during the course of the 13 years when Labour was in government, when the policy-​making process of the party was able to impose any particular positions on the government in terms of European policy. (Labour 4, interview with author)

Thus, the formulation of European policies –​be it policies about or through the EU –​has been delegated to the party leader and his team of close advisors, in periods of both government and opposition. What role does this leave for the party’s international unit? Since 2003, Labour has employed an international manager (whose job title was changed to ‘head of international liaison’) working at the party central headquarters’ ‘International Unit’. On Labour’s website it is stated that the

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International Unit ‘maintains and develops relations with sister parties and represents the Party at the European and international level through the Party of European Socialists and the Socialist International’ (Labour Party, 2016c). According to a Labour politician who served as the head of 10 Downing Street’s Policy Unit under Tony Blair, ‘The role of the international secretary has changed over the last 20 years. I think in previous eras the international secretary probably would have had more of a voice in some of the discussions about policy. But now they are employed by the party and their major role is to manage different relationships’ (Labour Party 4, interview with author). The main job of Labour’s head of international liaison is thus to liaise with the EPLP, thereby providing a channel of communication between the party leadership and the MEPs. He or she also attends meetings of the PES’s coordination team in Brussels. Labour’s international unit is a comparatively small team of no more than three or four people, most of whom were funded by the ‘Westminster Foundation for Democracy’ to work on projects building the capacity of political parties in developing countries and fragile and emerging democracies. These employees do not deal with EU policy. Instead, European policies are mainly covered by the head of international liaison and an international policy officer who is not part of the team but cooperates closely. Asked about the amount of time dedicated to European issues, Labour’s head of international liaison explains: If you define EU as our bilateral relationships with parties in the EU as well as with our work with the Party of European Socialists at European level, probably it takes up maybe two thirds of my time, so the majority of my time. And I think our international policy officer … maybe it takes up half of her time, but it obviously depends. (Labour 2, interview with author)

An official working for the EPLP (Labour 5, interview with author) explains: ‘Labour’s International Unit is a fairly small department, and obviously its reach is beyond Europe. We tend to do a lot of the European side of things and help them with the information and knowledge, briefings and material on the European side of things.’ The EPLP also supports the International Unit with its work with sister parties. For example, if branches of Labour’s sister parties in the UK want to invite a Labour Member of Parliament (MP) or MEP to speak at a meeting or wanted to support Labour during an election campaign, the EPLP supported the International Unit. It then becomes clear that the International Unit is no key player in Labour’s European policy-​making process –​as the head of international liaison herself confirmed: Well, I  think  –​because we are a party in government  –​it’s obviously the government ministers who define our policies really. They take the lead in terms of policy-​making. They and their advisors, and the Foreign Office. So in terms of the policy-​making, that’s mainly done by government ministers. But we obviously work closely with them, particularly when it comes to relations with sister parties.

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After Labour entered opposition in 2010, the role of the international unit did not change. Whilst the unit still liaises with Labour’s sister parties and the PES, it is not involved in formulating the party’s EU policies. For this, it lacks the authority and resources. What is more, Labour’s international unit is not involved in selecting the party’s EU specialists. If much of the power to formulate European policies has been delegated to the party leadership, where does this leave the PES? Labour’s relationship with the PES has changed over the years, but it has rarely been close. There are three main explanations for the distance between the two parties. First, from the beginning, Labour was hesitant to cede policy-​making powers to the PES. Second, the PES’s position on the party spectrum has usually been to the left of Labour, which made it difficult for Labour to agree on common policy pledges and ‘sell’ them to the electorate at home. Third, and related to the first two points, Labour has seldom selected high-​profile politicians to represent them at the PES. After the death of Robin Cook, who was PES president from 2001 until 2004, Labour became increasingly isolated from the PES and its sister parties. For a start, Labour was against the re-​launch of the PES in 1992, preferring the former, loose cooperation to an organised EU-​level party organisation. After its initial opposition, however, Labour accepted the PES’s new name, but senior officials still insisted that they would not accept the PES as a party and that they did not like the notion of common PES manifestos (Lightfoot, 2005: 34). Labour’s opposition to the PES becoming a ‘real’ party was also obvious when, after 2004, the Labour leadership did little to promote and support the PES activists (Hertner, 2011). With regard to ideological proximity, we find that the PES’s positions post-​ 1992 have been closer to those of continental social democracy than to Labour’s (Moschonas, 2002:  275). The differences were first highlighted when, during the 1994 EP election campaign, Labour had to drop the PES manifesto due to its commitment to the 35-​hour working week, which stood in stark contrast to Labour’s more flexible labour market policies (Lightfoot, 2005: 57). However, it has to be noted that Labour’s shadow foreign secretary, Jack Cunningham, had chaired the drafting committee that produced the PES manifesto. The commitment to the 35-​hour working week was attacked by the Eurosceptic conservative opposition and the British press and led to Labour discarding the PES manifesto altogether (Lightfoot, 2005:  45–​46). After this incident, the Labour leadership became more involved in drafting and scrutinising PES manifestos. Thus, in 2009, in order to prevent criticism, Labour officials negotiated the PES manifesto ‘with greatest attention to the detail’ (Duggan, 2009: 11). For instance, a Labour official conceded that after the 2009 PES manifesto negotiations, ‘you end up with a deal to the left of Labour but you can use it to reassure the left of the party of our commitments on this side. It acts as a signifier to the trade unions and the Social Europe side of the party’ (cited by Duggan, 2009: 32). Overall,

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however, Labour would have preferred a values-​based text to the PES manifesto’s policy commitments, which were still more left-​wing than the Labour leadership had wanted them to be. As a consequence, Labour’s amendments to the PES manifesto were ‘reductionist in nature’, as the party approached the text ‘thinking that anything we give would be picked up and used against us’ (Labour official, cited by Duggan, 2009:  31). Moreover, not only were PES manifestos seen as too left-​wing, they were also perceived as too pro-​integrationist in the British context. Asked why the PES manifesto was not used in the 2009 European election campaign, Labour’s international manager (Labour 2, interview with author) pointed out that the material provided by the PES was often ‘not helpful’ in the British context as it did not break down European issues to the local level. Labour activists, the official stressed, did not want to discuss European integration in general, but focus on local issues such as EU funding. This pragmatic cost–​ benefit analysis of the UK’s EU membership became particularly pronounced during Labour’s campaign to remain in the EU in 2016. As a consequence, PES manifestos played practically no role in Labour’s 2009 and 2014 European election campaigns. Locating the PES manifesto on Labour’s website proved to be a challenge, and it was only uploaded after the EPLP had complained (Labour 1, interview with author). In general, Labour became increasingly introspective in the early 2000s, which meant fewer contacts with the PES and European sister parties. At the working level, Labour and the PES continued to have amiable relations, but at the political level, these relations were sometimes seen as a liability for Labour. The last time Labour was able to pull its weight inside the PES was in 2001–​2004, when former foreign secretary Robin Cook was PES president. Cook was from the soft left of the party (Minkin, 2014: 122) and therefore more in line with the PES’s positions. Labour’s unease with the pro-​integrationist PES was further highlighted in 2014 when the party abstained in the vote for the PES’s Spitzenkandidat, Martin Schulz, on the basis that he was too pro-​European (Guardian, 2014, 1 March). During the European election campaign that followed, Labour did not invite Martin Schulz to the UK. Schulz’s campaign manager explained: ‘I tried to persuade senior Labour Party representatives but I didn’t have any success. There was no interest whatsoever in campaigning with Martin Schulz. They concentrated on a national agenda’ (PES 14, interview with author). Thus, while Schulz campaigned in 25 EU member states and attended about 60 events, Labour led a low-​key campaign focusing exclusively on domestic issues.1 To be sure, the lack of support for and interest in the Spitzenkandidaten also applied to the Conservative Party, which did not support the European People’s Party (EPP) candidate, Jean-​ Claude Juncker, after having left the EPP group in 2009. Amongst the 28 member states of the EU, the British electorate was the least aware of the existence of the Spitzenkandidaten (Turnbull-​Dugarte, 2016).

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Overall, despite Labour’s status as a full PES member party and despite its careful input into the relevant policy documents, PES policies and politicians have played only a marginal role for Labour in central office The power to formulate European policies has not been delegated to the PES. What is more, Labour continues to select its EU specialists at the (sub)national level without any input from the PES. As discussed in Chapter 5, Labour’s MEP candidates are selected locally, and other EU specialists, such as the (shadow) ministers for Europe, are appointed by the party leader. Overall, in relation to Labour’s dealings with the EU, the PES has played a very minor role. The Parti Socialiste in central office and the EU The PS’s National Council is made up of 204 members who are elected by the party conference and the 102 first secretaries of the federations. Its role is to execute the decisions made by the party conference. For this purpose, it convenes at least four times per year. The National Council is primarily a forum for discussion and networking between the different levels and factions of the party. In reality, however, the National Council is a ‘large and unwieldy’ organ that is normally badly attended (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 45). Like Labour’s NEC, the PS’s National Council has taken some important procedural decisions. For example, in June 2016 it approved the party leadership’s plans to hold primaries ahead of the 2017 presidential elections together with the other parties of the ‘Belle Alliance’ between the PS, the Radical Left Party, and the Greens. Highly salient EU issues have occasionally been discussed at National Council meetings. For instance, the PS’s position on the EU Constitutional Treaty was debated between members of the different factions in 2004 (Dacheux, 2005: 131). However, EU-​ focused debates remain the exception, and the National Council was not the forum where the PS’s policies through and about the EU were formulated. A much more important forum for policy-​making has been the PS’s National Bureau, which is the party’s steering committee. It is elected by the party conference and comprises 73 members, amongst them the party leader, a college of 54 members representing the different factions, and a college of 18 members representing the federations. Its main role is to ensure the administration and the direction of the party in between the sessions of the National Council. The National Bureau meets every Tuesday under the chairmanship of the party leader, who regularly reports on the politics of the previous week. During moments of acute crisis, such as the Greek bailout negotiations or the Syrian refugee crisis, EU policies have been on the agenda of the National Bureau. For example, the bureau wrote a resolution demanding the renegotiation of Greek debt in 2015. In the summer of 2015 the National Bureau also set up three working groups, one of them focusing on EU affairs (chaired by the national secretary for Europe, Philip Cordery, and Pervenche Berès MEP). Still, day-​to-​day EU policy through the EU

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has rarely made it onto the agenda of the bureau. The appropriate forum for this was the National Secretariat (secrétariat national), which is the real powerhouse of the PS. It is the executive arm of the party, and includes a secretariat for international relations and Europe, which has played a more prominent role than Labour’s international unit. In opposition between 2002 and 2012, the PS’s international secretariat was rather loosely organised and, at the time, the international secretary’s brief included European and international affairs. After entering government in 2012, the PS leadership decided to re-​structure the National Secretariat and create more internationally oriented posts. The national secretary for globalisation, regulation, and cooperation became the head of the international secretariat, which now employed five national secretaries in charge of: Europe, North/​ South, defence, human rights and humanitarian aid, and international trade. By creating the post of the national secretary for Europe, the PS leadership recognised the importance of EU affairs. In 2012, the job of the national secretary for Europe was given to former PES secretary general Philip Cordery, who had long-​ standing experience in Brussels and close contacts with the PS’s European sister parties. At the same time, he was an MP representing the BeNeLux constituency and sat on the National Assembly’s foreign affairs committee, thereby linking the party in public and central office. Overall, the PS’s national secretary for Europe has had a higher profile than Labour’s international liaison manager, and the job has often gone to elected and experienced politicians, and, sometimes, former ministers. The national secretariat for European and international affairs has also set up an EU working group that meets every Monday at noon to discuss EU affairs. To these meetings, the party invites MEPs, MPs, and former ministers. These working group meetings are important forums for exchange of information and debate, but important decisions are not taken here. When the PS is in opposition, the real decision-​making power lies with the private office, the ‘cabinet’ of the party leader (Bell and Criddle, 2014: 46). Meanwhile, when the PS is in government, policies about and through the EU are formulated by the double-​headed executive (the president and the government) with the support of the civil service and the party leader. Regarding the PS’s relationship with the PES, it is important to note that it has been closer than Labour’s relationship with the PES. This has to do with three interlinked factors: ideological proximity, strategic considerations, and close personal relationships. First, in terms of ideological proximity, it is worth highlighting that the PS has always been a supporter of the PES and its programmatic development. It has also successfully managed to upload some of its policies to the PES (Olivier, 2005:  10–​11). More recently, for the 2009 and 2014 European parliamentary election campaigns, the PS no longer wrote its own manifesto but instead

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exclusively used the PES manifesto. The PS also puts the PES logo on its posters, campaign material, and voting bulletins. These measures had been recommended by the PES in a resolution in 2001 (Lightfoot, 2005: 49) but were not followed up. A long-​standing MEP commented after the 2009 defeat: ‘I don’t see how we could have been more European in our approach to this campaign. The PES was very present in our campaign. Unfortunately this did not translate into better election results’ (PS 2, interview with author). There remains the question as to why the PS has used PES manifestos when Labour did not see the point in doing so. Most importantly, the PS has always been ideologically closer to the PES than Labour. For example, in 2009, relying on the PES manifesto, the PS wanted to lead a campaign on ‘Social Europe’ –​a slogan that the Labour Party did not make much use of. Since the 1970s, the PS has been one of the most fervent advocates of social legislation at EU level, even though, when elected to office, Prime Minister Jospin and President Hollande took a more pragmatic approach than many activists had hoped. In 2009, the very pro-​integrationist PS leader, Martine Aubry, endorsed the key pledges of the PES manifesto. For example, she wholeheartedly supported the PES’s commitment to the regulation of the financial markets –​an issue that was contested amongst the Labour Party leadership. Second, in terms of the strategic considerations, we find that the PES has been utilised by the PS as a unifying force. Especially after the PS’s internal divisions over the EU Constitutional Treaty and the national referendum on the same matter in 2005, ‘Europe was a politically very sensitive topic’ and the ‘use of the PES manifesto seemed to be the most European thing to do’, a long-​standing MEP explains (PS 5, interview with author). Thus, in 2009, the PS wanted to be seen as a united and pro-​integrationist party in line with its European sister parties, and the use of the PES manifesto was seen as a means to strengthen these credentials. Third, and unlike the Labour Party, the PS has pulled its weight inside the PES and developed a close working relationship with the PES secretariat. This was facilitated by the fact that some of the PS’s national secretaries for Europe, such as Philip Cordery, had previously worked for the PES. What is more, in 2012, the PS also created the post of an associate national secretary for the mobilisation of PES activists, thereby strengthening its commitment to the Europarty. Even after 2012, when the party was in government, the commitment to the PES did not wane, and President François Hollande made a point of attending a number of PES Leader Conferences. What also needs to be mentioned is that the party leaders in power during Hollande’s presidency had strong European credentials. The first, Harlem Désir, before becoming party leader in 2012, had been an MEP for 14 years, and in 2014 became secretary of state for European affairs. The second, Jean-​Christophe Cambadélis (2014–​), had previously been the national secretary for European and international affairs and PES vice-​president. Under Cambadélis’ leadership, EU issues were more salient on the PS’s agenda. At the

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PS’s 2014 conference, the party leader stressed the PS’s efforts in uniting socialist parties in Europe and taking the lead inside the PES’s efforts to reform the EU (PS, 2014b). This high level of interest in EU affairs might be taken for granted, but the example of the Labour Party in 2016 demonstrates that even in the aftermath of the EU referendum, the EU was not a priority topic at the party’s annual conference. Thus, on the basis that the PS has used PES manifestos during its campaigns, it can be argued that some of the power to formulate EU policies has been delegated to the European level (mode 2 of power delegation). At the same time, the PS’s European secretary and his team have been actively involved in shaping PES policies. It is a reciprocal relationship between the PS and the PES that has served both parties well. Still, the PS continues to select its own EU specialists, including the MEP candidates, at the national level, without any input from the PES. What is more, the PS leader appoints his team of national secretaries, including the national secretary for European affairs. In this respect, no power has been delegated to the PES. The SPD in central office and the EU The SPD’s national executive committee, the Vorstand, has been involved in European policy-​ making mainly through its international department (which will be explored in the next section) and an EU working group called Europapolitische Kommission. The latter was created at the beginning of the 1980s after the first direct elections to the European Parliament. Its name and membership have changed over time, but its function remains the same: it complements the work of the Bundestag’s EU working group, and according to Stroh (2004: 126) it tends to be dominated by the latter. In an effort to strengthen the European network inside the party the Vorstand introduced a co-​chairmanship of the Europapolitische Kommission. Thus, since 2005 it has been co-​chaired by the deputy party group leader in the Bundestag responsible for EU policy and the leader of the SPD’s delegation to the European Parliament. The purpose of this dual leadership was ‘to bring Bundestag and European Parliament together at the highest level of the party’ (SPD 12, interview with author). The Kommission has between 40 and 50 members and meets approximately every six weeks (SPD 17, interview with author). It brings together MPs, MEPs, civil servants of SPD-​led ministries, academics close to the SPD, and representatives of the Länder governments working in Berlin. According to a party official, the Europapolitische Kommission discusses the content of the SPD’s European election manifestos (SPD 12, interview with author). Yet, when it comes to writing manifestos (be they for European or national parliamentary elections), only a small number of Vorstand members tend to be involved. Here again, the SPD has established a group that spreads

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across the party in central and public office, including the deputy party group leader with EU responsibility, the leader of the Vorstand’s international department, and Martin Schulz. Thus, in the SPD –​like in the Labour Party and the PS –​manifestos are written by a very small group of selected party elites. The SPD’s leadership circle is, however, slightly more inclusive in the sense that it spreads across two faces of the party, thereby reflecting a higher esteem for EU specialists in the Bundestag and the European Parliament. Sloam (2005:  61) has argued that the formulation and coordination of European policy was done by European policy groups under the Vorstand when the party was in opposition. This view is contrasted by Stroh, who stresses the role of the parliamentary party group in the day-​to-​day formulation of EU policies. According to Stroh (2004: 120–​121), the Vorstand merely defines general policy guidelines (policies about the EU) while the party group works on the policies through the EU. She writes that in general, the party headquarters suffer from a ‘lack of efficiency and expert knowledge’, and that EU policy –​which has often been considered a less important topic –​has been neglected in the past. Here it is argued in agreement with Stroh that when the SPD was in opposition, the parliamentary party and the Vorstand were both important and complementary players in the formulation of EU policy. While the Vorstand’s role was to draft manifestos and formulate the party’s long-​term policies about the EU, the parliamentary party group was better equipped to deal with the formulation of the day-​to-​day policies through the EU. However, when the SPD was in office, the majority of policies through the EU was formulated by government ministers, who in turn relied on the civil service’s expertise. Government was then supported by the party group, rather than scrutinised, as the next chapter will demonstrate. One feature that distinguishes the SPD executive’s dealings with the EU from those of Labour and the PS is its installation of high-​profile EU expert Martin Schulz as a member of the party executive. Schulz was an elected member of the presidency before it got abolished in 2011, which was a novelty in SPD history. A policy advisor to Schulz (SPD 8, interview with author) highlighted that ‘it was for the first time that an SPD member dealing exclusively with EU affairs –​who had a seat in the European Parliament –​was striving for a seat in the Präsidium, demanding a seat for a European’. After 2011, Schulz became an elected member of the Vorstand. Indeed, when the party re-​elected the Vorstand in 2013, Schulz was by far the most popular member. He was re-​elected as the party’s EU advisor with 98 per cent of the votes while party leader Sigmar Gabriel only received 84 per cent. After being elected the president of the European Parliament in 2012 and being nominated as the PES’s Spitzenkandidat in 2014, Schulz rose to fame not just inside the SPD but also in the German media. In March 2017, Schulz was elected as the SPD’s chancellor candidate for the 2017 general elections. He received 100 per cent of the

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conference delegates’ votes –​the best result a social democratic chancellor candidate had ever scored post-​1945. Both the Labour Party and the PS lack such a high-​profile EU specialist in their executives; a point that was raised by two of the PS’s MEPs interviewed for this study. What is important to highlight is that the SPD’s international department, the Abteilung IV: Internationale Politik, which works under the roof of the Vorstand, is comparatively well staffed. Like the PS’s secretariat, it has a sub-​section dealing exclusively with European affairs. A party official working for the latter describes its role as follows: It is first and foremost our role to prepare general European policy guidelines for our party leadership in coordination with actors involved in the SPD’s European policy in the Bundestag and European Parliament in order to define the SPD’s general policy guidelines regarding those fundamental issues. We don’t need to deal in detail with every single directive that is discussed at the EU level. We rather enter the game when an issue is of a more fundamental political relevance. Moreover, we liaise with our European sister parties and organise the cooperation with the PES. (SPD 12, interview with author)

This statement suggests not only that Abteilung IV liaised with the PES and its European sister parties, but also that it was in a position to advise the party leadership and formulate policy guidelines. It plays a more active and prominent role in the party’s EU policy-​making than Labour’s International Unit. Four persons work on EU affairs in Abteilung IV:  a policy officer, a research assistant, an administrator, and a secretary. Whilst this might not appear impressive, the SPD’s Abteilung IV is still better staffed than Labour’s International Unit, where only two officials deal with EU and international affairs. Abteilung IV is well connected to the Foreign Ministry’s European policy unit, but the relationship is an informal one, as a party official explains: ‘This relationship isn’t necessarily institutionalised. We occasionally go for lunch; we meet up when there is something on the agenda, or call each other on the phone. It happens very regularly, but there is no institutionalised working group’ (SPD 12, interview with author). And yet, although Abteilung IV is comparatively well staffed, the government has better resources, such as policy expertise and close direct contacts to the European institutions. Hence, when the SPD was in government, European policy was in large part formulated by the relevant ministries (see Chapter 7). This power delegation was confirmed by an official working in the SPD’s international department. He explained: The party leader cannot coordinate European policy alone. He needs support. We are his suppliers, but it’s mostly the Foreign Ministry, which is better resourced. I believe that at the moment we will no longer be in government, the political work of the department and the [Willy-​Brandt-​] Haus more generally, will become more important than it is at this point in time. (SPD 12, interview with author)

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Abteilung IV did indeed become more influential when the SPD was in opposition. In an interview conducted two-​and-​a-​half years later, the same party official stated that the cooperation between social democratic parties had become ‘stronger’ at a bilateral level and within the PES, not only ‘because we are all in opposition now, but also because the EU is growing together and parties need to cooperate more closely’ (SPD 21, interview with author). Yet, the party official also stressed that the party group had become more important after the SPD had entered opposition in 2009 and could no longer rely on the civil service. Thus, Abteilung IV’s influence on the policies through the EU was limited, as these policies were mainly dealt with by the parliamentary party, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Over the past decade, the SPD leadership in central office has also maintained a complex relationship with the PES. The relationship has not been as close as the PS’s, but it has also been less distant than the Labour Party’s, which locates the SPD somewhere between the two. Ideologically, the SPD has traditionally been closer to the PES than Labour, especially on the more traditional social democratic themes such as employment policy (Lightfoot, 2005: 57). Unlike in Britain, PES manifestos have not made negative headlines in the German news media or provoked attacks from the opposition. One obvious reason for the ideological proximity is that the SPD has consistently pulled its weight over the years and been heavily involved in the writing of PES manifestos and other important policy documents. On the other hand, the SPD has not always supported the PES in its endeavour to become a ‘real’ party. For example, the SPD leadership did very little to support the PES activists when they were first launched in 2006. As Germany’s oldest and largest party with a reliable network of grassroots supporters and sound financial resources, the SPD leadership did not see the need for creating a network of PES activists, let alone supporting it. What is more, the SPD leadership has not promoted the use of PES campaign material and manifestos during European parliamentary elections, but instead has always preferred the use of the party’s own campaign material and logos. Yet, the attitude of the SPD leadership towards the PES has shifted in recent years and become more positive and supportive. This change has to do with three factors, namely: the SPD’s shrinking electoral fortunes, the rise of Martin Schulz, and an SPD politician becoming PES general secretary in 2012. First, since 2002, the SPD has not won enough seats in federal elections to select the chancellor and be the senior partner in a coalition government. What is more, since 1999 the party has failed to win more than 30 per cent of the votes in European parliamentary elections. The 2009 European parliamentary election results (20.8 per cent) in particular led to the realisation that every campaigning PES activist might be needed in the future.

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Second, Martin Schulz’s rise from an ‘ordinary’ MEP to the leader of the Socialist & Democrats group and, later, the president of the European Parliament and the PES’s Spitzenkandidat for the 2014 European elections, has contributed both to the salience of EU affairs inside the SPD and to forming a closer relationship with the PES. This was helped by the fact that Achim Post, who was the SPD’s international secretary between 1999 and 2013, became PES general secretary in September 2012. For the SPD, being represented by Schulz in the European Parliament and by Post in the PES at the same time has been helpful in ‘uploading’ policy preferences to the European level. Thus, the SPD has been successful in influencing PES policies. At the same time, the party has not always given the PES due credit and still prefers using its own manifestos and logos. Hence, whilst some power to formulate policies has been delegated to the PES, the SPD has been careful to keep the upper hand in this relationship. What is more, the PES has had no say in the selection of the SPD’s EU specialists. As discussed in Chapter 5, MEP candidates are selected at the regional level (by the SPD Landesverbände, with some input from the lower levels). In addition, parliamentary EU specialists are selected by their colleagues in the Bundestag (as Chapter 7 will explain in more detail) and EU experts on the executive committee, the Vorstand, are elected by the party conference. Conclusions This chapter has investigated the EU’s impact upon the power dynamics within Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office. It has first analysed the role of each party’s executive committee(s) in the formulation of European policies. This was followed by an investigation of the parties’ international departments, which form part of the central party bureaucracy. Finally, each section has also examined the relationship of the party in central office with the PES. The focus of the analysis lay on the role of the party in central office in the formulation of European policies and, to a much smaller extent, the selection of EU specialists. In doing so, the chapter has revealed a complex picture of power dynamics between the different faces of the party. It has demonstrated that the parties in central office were not ‘lions’ in the sense that they did not hold the power to formulate policies about and through the EU. At the same time, they were not entirely powerless in EU matters, as the label ‘toothless tigers’ would imply. Rather, Labour, the PS, and the SPD in central office were ‘toothless tigers with claws’ that complemented the work of the party in public office. What the three parties have in common is that the power to select candidates for the European elections still lies firmly at the (sub)national level. In addition, all other EU

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specialists, in public or central office, are (s)elected at the national level. In that respect, no power had been delegated to the PES (mode 2 of delegation). Yet, when we consider the formulation of European policies, then the picture is more complicated and diverse. In particular, the SPD’s executive (Vorstand) and the PS’s National Secretariat are well equipped to formulate long-​term policies about the EU, hence their strong involvement in the writing of party manifestos. Especially the SPD has also tried to involve the parliamentary party and European parliamentary party more in the formulation of European policies, thereby building a European network that spreads across two faces of the party (mode 1 of power delegation). Meanwhile, inside the Labour Party in central office, EU policy expertise is limited to a very small number of advisors around the party leader. Indeed, in the study of the three parties in central office, Labour stands out as the least EU-​savvy. Whilst the PS and the SPD have (albeit to different degrees and at different times) pulled their weight inside the PES and delegated some of their policy-​making power to the PES, Labour has found it difficult to accept it as a policy-​seeking organisation. The differences between the three parties in central office’s dealings with the EU can be explained through three interlinked factors: (1) the parties’ status in government or opposition; (2) resources available to the party bureaucracy; and (3) ideological convergence with or divergence from the PES. First, when parties are in office, EU policy remains, by and large, government policy, even if the pressure to scrutinise government has increased in the past decade. Thus, when Labour, the PS, and the SPD were in power, government ministers, drawing on the civil service’s EU expertise, were the key players in the formulation of European policies. The role of the party in central office was to formulate long-​term policies about the EU. In opposition, the party in central office still played this role but relied more on the party group for the formulation of day-​to-​day policies through the EU. Second, the parties in central office have different resources at their disposal. Whilst the PS and SPD have designated EU secretaries, Labour has a very small International Unit that deals with both European and international affairs. It is therefore unsurprising that Labour’s international liaison manager only plays a very limited role, whilst the PS and SPD’s EU secretaries tend to be elected politicians with EU experience and extensive European networks. In general, the Labour Party has a slighter bureaucracy. This is because in the UK, public funding for political parties is very low compared to France and Germany. Yet, this can also be explained by the party’s low EU profile and the narrow focus on domestic issues. Third, the fact that the PES has become a policy-​seeking organisation has not been met with general approval by Labour elites. Whilst the PS and SPD have used the opportunity to ‘upload’ their policy preferences to the PES and fill some

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high-​level posts, Labour has gradually withdrawn from the PES, which culminated in the party’s refusal to support Martin Schulz as the PES’s Spitzenkandidat in 2014. Note 1 The three EU member states Martin Schulz did not visit during his 2014 campaign were the UK, Cyprus, and Hungary.

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Winners or losers? The parties in public office and the EU

This chapter analyses the power dynamics inside the Labour Party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) in public office. In particular, it investigates the extent to which Members of Parliament (MPs) have been involved in the formulation and scrutiny of European policy and the selection of EU specialists. In our principal–​agent model, the party membership is the principal that is expected to delegate a large amount of decision-​making power to MPs. As Katz and Mair (1993) remind us, MPs have a number of important resources at their disposal that they can use to their advantage vis-​à-​vis the central party bureaucracy and the party on the ground. Most importantly, MPs have the legal authority to make governmental decisions. They vote on bills and direct the civil servants. Another important set of resources mentioned by Katz and Mair is time, expertise, and information. British, French, and German MPs are paid salaries that allow them to devote themselves full time to politics, which means that they gain experience and expertise. Moreover, they have access to the expertise and information gathering and processing capabilities of the state bureaucracy, especially when the party is in government. Finally, the party in public office has the legitimacy conferred by a public mandate, which puts them in a strong position. As agents, MPs can choose to make use of these resources and become heavily involved in EU affairs. They can scrutinise the government’s EU policies ex ante by obtaining information on EU affairs, and by processing and following up on this information ex post (Neuhold and De Ruiter, 2005: 58). In practice, those MPs with a particular interest in scrutinising the government’s EU policy can sit on the European affairs committee or become EU experts on other select committees (Raunio, 2009: 319). Moreover, every MP can establish contacts with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), MPs from other EU member states, or EU officials to try to influence or become better informed about EU legislation. In practice, however, MPs might only choose to devote their time and energy to EU affairs if it serves their interests, including: re-​election, career enhancement, and real influence on the government’s EU policy (Auel and Christiansen,

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2015: 269–​270; Strelkov, 2015). As we will see in this chapter, EU expertise does not always serve these interests. In addition, whilst MPs are agents with a certain amount of freedom to develop their interests and expertise, join parliamentary committees, and stand for leadership roles, they are enabled or constrained by the environment they work in. Whilst in some national parliaments in Europe, EU expertise is a valued and prestigious asset, other parliaments spend little time and resources on EU affairs. Thus, if we want to understand how Labour, the PS, and the SPD deal with EU issues in public office, we also need to take into account the internal workings of the parliaments they operate in. The role of national parliaments in the EU’s multi-​level governance has attracted much scholarly attention since the early 1990s. Early accounts portrayed parliaments as passive institutions that exerted rather modest influence on their governments’ EU policies. Increasingly, the law-​making powers of national and regional parliaments had shifted to the European level. This means that national parliaments were in a position where they had to transpose EU directives into national law, which set guidelines and goals but leave the choice of means to the member states. This put parliaments in the paradoxical situation of being unable to exert much influence on the directive but of ‘still being politically responsible for its content to the people’ (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002, quoted by Töller, 2006: 6). Additionally, in areas where national parliaments might normally have taken legislative action, the EU treaties and secondary EU law imposed substantial restrictions on national policies, particularly in areas touching upon the European Single Market (Töller, 2006). Yet, while national parliaments in the EU have certainly delegated some power, they have learnt to fight back by increasingly exercising tighter scrutiny of their governments over EU affairs (Holzacker, 2008). Gradually, after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, parliaments across the EU have created new measures allowing them to control, influence, and monitor their governments more effectively. Still, it took until 2009 for the role of national parliaments in EU policy-​making to be mentioned in the EU treaties. The Lisbon Treaty’s Article 12 assigned national parliaments a role within the EU’s legislative process as the guardians of subsidiarity (Auel and Christiansen, 2015). Since 2009, national parliaments have become entitled to better access to information about the EU’s legislative agenda. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a ‘yellow/​ orange card’ subsidiarity early warning mechanism that gives national parliaments an opportunity to object to EU legislative proposals with a view to having them amended or withdrawn. Thus, national parliaments may submit a ‘reasoned opinion’ within an eight-​week period to the European Commission, outlining why the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. If at least a third of EU national parliaments submit reasoned opinions (the threshold drops to a quarter for legislation in the field of cooperation in criminal matters), the Commission is usually bound to review its proposal with a view

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to maintaining, amending, or withdrawing it. If more than half of the member states submit reasoned opinions and the Commission decides to maintain the proposal, it must submit a reasoned opinion in support of this decision to the Council and European Parliament, each of which can strike down the proposal. In 2009, many doubted that national parliaments would make use of the yellow card system, but it was invoked for the first time in May 2012 and several times since, which goes to show that ‘despite claims to the contrary, national parliaments have the capacity and willingness to use their new powers to exercise a collective influence in EU affairs’ (Cooper, 2015). Gattermann et al. (2016) argue that not only the Lisbon Treaty but also the financial crisis have triggered a new phase of parliamentary Europeanisation: one in which EU matters are no longer dealt with only by a small number of experts in EU affairs committees, but by a larger number of MPs. As the distinction between national and European policies has become increasingly blurred, EU affairs scrutiny by national parliaments has become ‘mainstreamed’, the authors argue (Gattermann et al., 2016; see also European Scrutiny Committee, 2013). However, despite these recent constitutional and political changes, national parliaments across the EU still differ with regard to their handling of EU affairs. A  number of studies compare national parliamentary control over EU affairs, and although they use slightly different indicators of control, they agree that the parliaments with the strongest control over EU affairs are those of Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the three Baltic states (for an overview of this literature, see Winzen, 2012). Thus, the Bundestag has comparatively strong EU scrutiny powers, whilst those of the House of Commons and the National Assembly are considered moderate (Auel et al., 2015). Authors such as Auel and Höing (2015) also demonstrate that during the Eurozone crisis, the most powerful national parliaments operating in the economically strongest EU member states (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Finland) had the highest levels of parliamentary engagement in EU affairs. This chapter discusses the differences between the British, French, and German parliaments’ engagement with the EU. The focus lies on the lower houses (the House of Commons, Assemblée Nationale, Bundestag) since they are directly elected and determine government formation. In all three countries, the upper chambers do not. The next three sections deal with Labour, the PS, and the SPD in turn. Each section first explains the EU scrutiny processes inside the three lower chambers. Second, each section investigates the agency of Labour’s, the PS’s, and the SPD’s parliamentary party in the formulation of European policy. Last but not least, each section briefly analyses the MPs’ involvement in the selection of EU specialists, such as committee chairs and EU ministers. It is argued that MPs from the Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, and the German Social Democratic Party have delegated a large amount of EU policy-​making power to their respective government and to MEPs, often without exerting much formal ex ante or ex

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post control. Yet, it is also demonstrated that the three parties operate in very different parliamentary settings and that the ‘EU cultures’ inside the parties themselves are very different. Out of the three parliamentary parties, the SPD stands out with its level of engagement in EU affairs. These differences are explained by looking at three broad, interlinked factors: (1) the institutional structure the three parties operated in; (2) the way in which the three parties had chosen to organise and prioritise their EU expertise in parliament; and (3) the parties’ general attitude towards the EU. The Parliamentary Labour Party and the EU When the UK joined the European Community in 1973, the institutional ‘misfit’ of the House of Commons was obvious. The House of Commons is often described as a ‘debating parliament’ where the focus lies on plenary debates rather than specialised committee work. Debating legislatures are, generally, less consensual, with the opposition using the plenary to criticise the government (Arter, 1999). The non-​existent committee system meant a lack of expertise, and parliament was ill prepared to handle the increasing inflow of legislative acts from the European level (Hansen and Scholl, 2002). The European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) was one of the first permanent committees to be established, and it has been gradually strengthened since its creation in 1974 (Baines, 2004). Still, the EU scrutiny powers of the House of Commons remain comparatively modest. The House of Common’s EU scrutiny process works as follows. The Cabinet Office is responsible for the management of the government’s scrutiny procedures, and for deciding, in consultation with other departments, and with the committee clerks where necessary, which EU documents should be examined by parliament. The government is then required to brief parliament on an EU document’s content and implications, and it does so by an ‘explanatory memorandum’, which must be made available to parliament within ten working days of the document’s deposit. The memorandum (which is a public document) summarises the document, its legal, policy and financial implications, and the likely timetable of its consideration by the Council of Ministers. It must also set out the government’s own view on the proposal (Cabinet Office, 2016). The House of Common’s ESC has 16 members and normally meets every sitting Wednesday to examine EU documents and to report on them to the House with recommendations on the importance of each particular document and on whether further consideration by the committee or by the whole House (i.e. plenary debate) is required. However, it is not in the ESC where EU documents are discussed in depth. Rather, the ECS defers documents to one of three European committees that scrutinise pieces of legislation in greater detail, discuss the respective governmental motion, and make amendments to this motion.

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Each of the three EU committees (A, B, and C) covers a broad policy area. The European committees do not have a permanent membership, and they convene only when the scrutiny committee requests a debate, at which point the Commons’ committee of selection nominates MPs to sit on them. Nominating MPs to sit on these ad hoc committees ‘is not always easy, and the selection committee sometimes struggles to find MPs who are interested in the topic discussed’ (Gostyńska, 2015). Carter and Ladrech (2007: 64) write that these committees have little decision-​making power and ‘really only act as a debating society for those (few) with an interest in European matters’. For motions to become effective, the European committees rely on the government, which tables the final motion on the floor of the House, where it is generally voted on without further debate. Even though a scrutiny reserve ensures that parliament can deal with EU policies before they are negotiated at the EU level, EU debates in the House of Commons have been rather rare. Although the European committees may decide to pass the government’s motion, amend it, or even reject it completely, their motions have no practical effect and do not bind the government. If the government dislikes them it can move a different motion in the House (Auel and Benz, 2005: 381). The British government has firm control over the parliamentary process, including EU policies. However, even if their formal scrutiny rights are modest, British MPs have developed some informal scrutiny strategies. For example, they continuously demand information on EU affairs and the government’s position on them (ex ante control). Ministers are regularly invited before the committees so that backbench MPs can hold them to account (ex post control), or receive letters in which the ESC asks them for more information. Interestingly, this scrutiny mechanism is used by MPs from the parliamentary majority and the opposition, and Labour MPs often attacked their own ministers in committee meetings during their time in government. Especially in recent years, Euroscepticism has been rife inside the ESC, and Gostyńska (2015:  4) shows that the most active ESC members (amongst them Labour MP Kelvin Hopkins) were all in favour of holding an in/​out referendum (albeit for different reasons). In addition, the ESC is not well attended compared to, for instance, the Home Affairs Committee. The overall attendance rate during the 2015–​2016 legislative period was 42.2 per cent (2014–​ 2015: 48.7 per cent; 2013–​2014: 53.3 per cent; see UK Parliament, 2016). These figures are another indicator of the low esteem in which most British MPs hold EU affairs, and this has included Labour MPs. In 2013–​2014, the ESC conducted a review into the House of Commons’ EU scrutiny processes in which it made a number of recommendations: The evidence we took showed how important it is to ensure that the policy expertise of Departmental Select Committees is applied to these complex questions; we propose that there should be a new requirement to appoint ‘Reporters’ to take the

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lead within Committees on EU issues, as well as a more co-​ordinated approach to the Commission Work Programme. (European Scrutiny Committee, 2013)

Thus, the ESC argued for a stronger, more coordinated involvement of the departmental select committees. It also called for an early, thorough reading of the European Commission’s annual Work Programme that would alert MPs. In addition, the ESC demanded that the ad hoc European committees be composed of permanent members and be given more powers in order to become more effective in their work and more attractive for MPs who otherwise show little interest in EU affairs. However, the result of the ‘Brexit’ referendum of 23 June 2016 means that any reform plans of the House of Commons’ European scrutiny process have become redundant. Although this study focuses on the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in the House of Commons, it is important to note that the upper chamber, the House of Lords, plays an important role in scrutinising EU legislation (Baines, 2004; Neuhold and de Ruiter, 2005). Since the UK’s EU accession in 1973, both Houses of Parliament have simultaneously examined EU documents. The House of Commons and the House of Lords have used similar methods of scrutiny (the questioning of government ministers, public debates, and investigative work in the committees). The House of Lords’ EU select committee is a permanent committee that has appointed six sub-​committees, which examine different EU policy areas (House of Lords, 2013). The peers who sit on these committees are often EU experts with previous work experience in Brussels. In the Lords’ scrutiny system, the chair of the EU select committee examines EU documents with the help of administration staff. He or she can decide to clear documents from scrutiny or refer them to one of the sub-​committees. The latter may then decide to ask the relevant minister for further clarification. The sub-​committees may also decide to conduct a full inquiry and produce an evidence-​based report. The Lords’ (often brief) reports outline not only the position of the UK but also those of other EU member states on the issue in question. They can be helpful not only for the British government, but also for the European Commission, which can use these ideas to bridge differences between member states before it comes up with legislative proposals (Gostyńska, 2015). Julie Smith, a Liberal Democrat peer, writes that when it comes to EU scrutiny, ‘MPs are from Mars and peers from Venus’: whereas ‘in the Commons, plenary debates on Europe are heated and often hostile, with Euroscepticism the order of the day’, the Lords EU select committee: has an international reputation for the quality of its reports, which tend to be in-​depth and well-​informed, often directed more at the EU institutions than at the British Government. Membership of this committee and its six thematic sub-​ committees is prestigious and members are frequently already experts in European affairs before they join. (Smith, 2015, 16 October)

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Smith explains that because peers are not elected, they are under less pressure than MPs to take the growing Euroscepticism at the grassroots into account. What is more, peers can specialise in a particular (EU) policy area. Indeed, they are encouraged to focus on specific areas, gaining or retaining expertise, rather than being the generalists that their Commons colleagues are required to be (Smith, 2015). Thus, the House of Lords has gained a good reputation across Europe for its EU expertise and the thorough EU scrutiny process. Labour MPs as agents?

We have seen that the House of Commons is no natural breeding ground for EU engagement, and that the ESC, in particular, has become a forum for Eurosceptic MPs. Yet, to what extent were Labour MPs actively involved in the formulation of policies about the EU and through the EU in recent years? When Labour was in power between 1997 and 2010, decisions on highly salient EU issues (policies about the EU) were taken at the highest level of the party, namely by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and their personal advisors. The two most high-​profile examples were the decisions to put the adoption of the euro and the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty to referendums. Both of these issues were seen as highly controversial amongst the British electorate. Thus, the power to take strategic, long-​term, high-​profile decisions about the UK’s relationship with the EU was delegated from ordinary MPs to the party leadership in government and their advisors. Tony Blair had numerous EU policy advisors who were neither elected MPs nor civil servants. However, government ministers were also in charge of the less salient, day-​ to-​day decisions going through the EU’s legislative process (policies through the EU). In the Council of Ministers, Labour’s cabinet ministers helped to shape policies, largely beyond the control of Labour MPs sitting on the ESC and the different ad hoc European committees. The EU agenda remained under the firm control of the Blair and Brown governments. Also, within government there was an EU decision-​making hierarchy. For instance, Labour’s minister for Europe held a junior position, and the job was sometimes given to politicians without any significant European profile, and replaced every so often. There were eight incumbents under Blair, and four under Brown, so altogether 12 ministers for Europe in 13  years. Blair periodically attempted to exploit the position of minister for Europe more effectively. However, their ill-​defined role, a lack of resources, and the high turnover prevented them from having a strong impact on EU policy (James, 2009). A former EU advisor to Tony Blair (Labour Party 6, interview with author) confirms: I don’t think our ministers for Europe have played a very dominant role in European policy-​making. They have been important in implementing the policies and going

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to lots of meetings, making lots of speeches, but it’s never been a role… Because it’s a number two role in the Foreign Office. You have got an influence there, but you’re not a key player.

In other words, when Labour was in office between 1997 and 2010, the minister for Europe held a junior position and played no major role in the formulation of European policies. Rather, the prime minister, the chancellor of the exchequer, the foreign secretary and their advisors were in charge. In addition, as the European Parliament (EP) has become a powerful co-​ legislator over the past decades, the powers of (Labour) MEPs to scrutinise and amend the European Commission’s legislative proposals have increased significantly. The MEPs’ empowerment was recognised by Tony Blair when he introduced the so-​called ‘link system’. In order to gain more effective control over the MEPs’ voting behaviour whilst at the same time benefiting from their EU expertise, Blair’s team created a formal relationship of policy coordination between themselves and Labour MEPs. At the beginning, it was a system of carrots and sticks, which rewarded MEPs with increased influence over EU policy-​making at Westminster, but limited their independence of vote within the EP (Messmer, 2003). Under the link system, each ministry appointed MEPs to sit on the appropriate cabinet-​level ministerial team according to their policy expertise. To make Labour’s European policy and discourse more coherent, a European Parliamentary Labour official worked at 10 Downing Street to coordinate the work between Labour’s MEPs and government. A European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) official explained: ‘When a Labour Minister is delivering a speech on a key European issue, every MEP will know exactly what is going on. So this will be tied very closely together so we have a narrative that works from local to national to European level’ (Labour Party 5, Interview with author). At the same time, while the Labour government had gained more control over the MEPs, ordinary Labour MPs did little to oversee or scrutinise the work of their MEPs. In general, contacts between Labour MPs and MEPs tended to be informal and irregular. Whilst representatives of the PLP and the EPLP met on a regular basis, MPs only met the MEPs for their constituency on an ad hoc basis, for example, during election campaigns. Thus, Labour MPs’ role was mainly limited to implementing EU legislation and to transposing it into national legislation when the party was in government. When Labour was in opposition from 2010 onwards, the most salient EU decisions were still taken by the party leadership. Between 2010 and 2015, leader Ed Miliband, shadow chancellor Ed Balls, shadow foreign minister Douglas Alexander, and their advisors formulated Labour’s EU policy. The shadow ministers for Europe still lacked influence. Between 2010 and 2016, there were five shadow ministers for Europe, three of whom were at the same time responsible

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for foreign policy and therefore had to cover a very wide range of issues, meaning that they could not focus their time and energy on EU affairs alone. The most prominent example of elite-​level policy-​making was Miliband’s decision to support an ‘EU referendum lock’, which meant that under a Labour government, any future transfer of powers to the EU level (e.g. significant EU treaty changes) would have triggered an in/​out referendum in the UK (Financial Times, 2014, 12 March). The PLP’s input into Labour’s election manifestos was also minimal. Despite Labour’s lengthy policy-​renewal processes that involved wide party consultations, manifestos were still written by a small circle of elites in the leader’s office (Goes, 2016: 8). Also, the PLP has not set up a parliamentary working group where EU issues could be discussed from a partisan angle. Again, this underlines the low standing of EU affairs not just inside the House of Commons, but also within the PLP. Thus, in government and opposition, Labour MPs delegated their power to formulate EU policy to the government and the EPLP. Backbench Labour MPs acted like principals who had delegated their power to the party leadership in government and opposition. When it comes to the selection of EU specialists, Labour MPs also have little influence. Importantly, the chair of the ESC is selected by the committee members themselves rather than the entire House of Commons. Even more importantly, the PLP’s most senior EU specialist, the (shadow) minister for Europe, is not elected by the PLP but is appointed by the party leader as part of his front-​ bench team, as all the other (shadow) ministers are. Thus, with a weak ESC and toothless ad hoc European committees in place, the House of Commons is not the kind of environment that would encourage Labour’s EU expertise. The number of parliamentary EU specialists is very small, and these are not (s)elected or appointed by the PLP. Much of the power to formulate EU policy and appoint EU specialists, such as the minister for Europe, has been delegated to the party leadership in government and opposition. In the UK, party leaderships are often MPs, which means that a large amount of power to formulate EU policy and select EU specialists has been delegated within the party in public office from ordinary (backbench) MPs to the leadership on the front benches (mode 4 of power delegation). The Parti Socialiste’s parliamentary group and the EU The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, drafted by the General de Gaulle and adopted in 1958 via referendum, was deliberately designed to weaken (or ‘rationalise’) parliament. For instance, when its majority is tight, the French government can constrain the National Assembly to adopt laws or vote its censure (Article 49.3). In addition, Article 45 allows the government to give the last word to the National Assembly in situations when the second chamber (the senate) opposes its plans. Article 45 also gives the government the possibility of asking

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for a ‘package vote’ on the entirety of a bill that excludes parliamentary amendments (see Costa, 2013). Grossman and Sauger (2007: 1118) therefore stress that ‘if there is no actual decline or “deparliamentarization”, it is mainly because the parliament is weakened from the outset’. The National Assembly is often considered a ‘talking’ parliament rather than a ‘working’ parliament. France is also an example of a semi-​presidential political system where the president has considerable powers, especially in the field of foreign and European policy. For instance, European Council summits are typically attended by the French president, not the prime minister. It is only in periods of Cohabitation (when the president is from a different political party than the majority of MPs) that the parliamentary parties provide the foundation to the leadership of the country. Otherwise, the president, who is directly elected, is the head of the executive and the prime minister is his or her junior. In this political system, Grossman and Sauger (2007) argue, EU scrutiny cannot be viewed as a chain of delegation from voters (via parliament) to government. The government cannot simply be perceived as an agent of parliament, negotiating France’s European policy at the EU level, as it shares this role with the president. Especially during the Eurozone crisis, many important decisions were taken at EU summits by heads of government, and in the case of France, by the president. Whilst the balance of power has not shifted fundamentally in favour of parliament, a constitutional reform from 2008 has nonetheless strengthened the position of the French parliament vis-​à-​vis the executive (Costa et  al., 2013). The reform, arguably the most important constitutional revision of the Fifth Republic, has introduced a number of changes with regard to the powers and the organisation of parliament (for an overview of the changes, see Costa, 2013: 133). Amongst them, two are particularly relevant for this study. First, the new Article 42 stipulates that the discussion of bills and propositions of laws are made on the text adopted by the committee to which it is referred. Previously, the government’s text was voted on, which meant that parliamentary committees were toothless. Second, the new Article 88.4 stipulates that each chamber should have a European affairs committee, meaning a fully fledged parliamentary committee. According to Rozenberg (2011), the rising levels of Euroscepticism amongst the French public explain the latest constitutional reforms strengthening parliamentary EU scrutiny powers. Regarding the National Assembly’s EU scrutiny processes, it is worth mentioning Article 88.4 of the French Constitution, which obliges the government to transmit to parliament all legislative documents immediately after their reception in the Council. The legislature has, moreover, been granted the right to vote on resolutions regarding these documents. The so-​called reserve d’examen parlementaire obliges the government to enable the parliament to vote on a resolution before a Council decision (Sprungk, 2003: 9). A turning point in parliamentary scrutiny has been the debate on the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty.

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A constitutional amendment of 1 March 2005 recognised for the first time the existence of EU legislation, which means that parliament is now entitled to vote on resolutions on any European Act adopted under the EU’s co-​decision procedure (Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1123). Like the House of Commons, the National Assembly has an EU scrutiny committee, created in 1979. When the PS was in government between 1997 and 2002, it was called the Délégation pour l’Union Européenne (DUE) and was not a fully fledged parliamentary committee. The reason was that the French constitution limited the number of parliamentary committees to six. For the DUE, the procedure to adopt resolutions was somewhat cumbersome as it could not do so on its own, but had to rely on the expert committees. As a consequence of this complication, the average number of resolutions declined and the DUE instead made increased use of opinions and conclusions (Grossman and Sauger, 2007: 1124). The 2008 parliamentary reform made the DUE a ‘proper’ parliamentary committee. It renamed the DUE the Commission des Affaires Européennes (CAE). The revamped CAE has more autonomy for adapting resolutions than its predecessor, as it no longer needs to consult with other committees. Traditionally, the CAE had 36 members, but a revision of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of 27 May 2009 increased the number of members to 48. The large membership, a feature of all other committees, makes focused EU debates difficult. However, the advantage is that the members are selected not just on the basis of their party affiliation, but also on the basis of their membership of a standing committee. The CAE explains: In accordance with the ‘double membership’ principle, each member provides expertise gained in his/​her standing committee, thus contributing to the cross-​ committee nature of the work of the (CAE), which must deal with the vast array of European matters. At the same time, this double membership of MPs fosters the consideration of European matters by the standing committees. (Assemblée Nationale, 2014)

In addition, joint working groups between the CAE and the standing committees have been established to involve the latter more in EU affairs. Also, a European question time in plenary prior to every European Council meeting has been introduced. Thus, the 2008 constitutional reform and 2009 revision of parliamentary procedures have led to an empowerment of the CAE and the ‘mainstreaming’ of EU affairs inside the National Assembly. As a result, EU affairs have become more visible. And yet, despite these recent developments, the level of parliamentary EU scrutiny in France remains low. First and foremost, the role expert committees play is still considered weak. The access to information (in terms of scope and timing) is considered ‘moderate’ (Raunio, 2005: 324). Grossman and Sauger (2007) blame this weakness on three factors: institutional weakness, self-​restraint, and governmental autonomy.

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To facilitate the contact between the French parliament and the EP both the senate and the National Assembly set up a Brussels office in 1999 and 2003. Nevertheless, contact between French MPs and MEPs remains informal and irregular, as interviews with MEPs have revealed. Overall, like their British counterparts, French MPs do not show much interest in EU politics. Rozenberg (2011:  11) thus writes:  ‘Outside the small club of EU Committee members, French MPs do not seems to really care about the EU and hardly ever deal with Community matters. The enactment of EU resolutions is irregular. Committee hearings are poorly attended. Floor debates are scarce.’ In this EU-​indifferent institutional context, to what extent have socialist MPs acted as agents in the formulation of European policies and the selection of EU specialists? Socialist MPs as agents?

The PS party group is generally not much involved in the party’s European policy-​making. The general weakness of the French parliament and its committees is reflected in the weakness of the parliamentary parties. In France, the extra-​parliamentary party tends to be far more influential in the policy-​making process (Thiébault and Dolez, 2000). When the PS was in office between 1997 and 2002, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin tried to involve parliament more in the formulation of EU policy, and on 13 December 1999 he wrote a circular to his cabinet ministers, reminding them of taking parliament’s resolutions into account when negotiating policies at the European level (Grajetzky, 2002: 18, quoted by Krell, 2009: 357). Yet, most of the time, parliament’s influence on the government’s European policy was marginal. European policies were formulated by the executive, with support from the civil service. In order to overcome the sectoral organisation of French ministries, the Secrétariat Général de Coopération Interministerielle (SGCI) was set up in 1948 as a bureaucratic agency of more than 175 elite civil servants (Schmidt, 2006: 78).1 When the PS was in government, the SGCI was the nodal point where French EU policy was formulated and the coordination between administrative bodies, the government, and the EU institutions took place. However, the SGCI was not very efficient in overcoming intersectoral differences, and most SGCI officials were specialised civil servants sent from ministries as watchdogs to protect sectoral interests. The SGCI was subordinated to the prime minister and the ministry for finance. Hence, Jospin oversaw the day-​to-​day process of European policy-​making, but like his British counterpart, the French prime minister only got involved in highly politicised issues whilst the day-​to-​day European legislative matters were dealt with by the SGCI (Menon, 2000). Therefore, Jospin relied heavily on the expertise of civil servants and advisors in the process of European policy-​making. This applied to all major policies about the EU as well as the day-​to-​day policies going through the EU’s legislative process. We have to keep

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in mind that during Jospin’s premiership, EU policy was shared with President Chirac, who attended European Council meetings alongside Jospin. During Jospin’s premiership, the French parliament ratified the Amsterdam Treaty (for Jospin’s input, please see Chapter 3). France also convened the EU presidency in 2000 and took the lead in the drafting of the Treaty of Nice. Yet, these major decisions took place largely outside the control of the (parliamentary) party, and neither the DUE nor its successor, the CAE, had the power to shape the PS’s EU policies. What is more, when the PS was in government, government ministers rarely reported to the DUE. Pierre Moscovici, the then Socialist minister for Europe, did not report to parliament but took his instructions directly from government. The committee’s status and powers might have been enhanced in recent years, but its main role is the scrutiny of government policy rather than influencing party policy. In fact, in 2012, after the Socialists’ victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections, the chair of the CAE became Danielle Auroi, a Green MP. At first sight, this seems surprising, given that past CAE chairs tended to be members of the majority party in parliament. However, when we direct our attention to the more prestigious foreign affairs committee, we notice that from 2012 onwards it was chaired by a well-​known Socialist MP (Élisabeth Guigou, a former cabinet minister and MEP). The incumbent PS leader and former EU secretary, Jean-​Christophe Cambadélis, was also a member of the foreign affairs committee. Thus, the PS’s most prominent EU specialists sat on the foreign affairs committee rather than the CAE. Overall, the PS group’s grip on its own government’s EU policy was rather weak. What is more, much power to scrutinise and amend legislation at the EU level has been delegated to Socialist MEPs with little ex ante and ex post control. Unlike Labour, the PS never put in place a system linking MEPs with government departments or MPs. However, a considerable number of Socialist MEPs were at the same time national secretaries, which gave them the opportunity to retain close links with the party headquarters in Paris. One former MEP and head of the PS delegation to the European Parliament (PS 12, interview with author) argued that MEPs were ‘almost too much involved in the party leadership.’ Still, even when it came to European matters, the key actors in the process of manifesto writing was the party leadership, which ‘constructs a final document from the contributions of the various factions’ (Ladrech, 2007: 97). The international secretary is part of the team that goes over the final text. As mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Jospin tried to involve the Socialist MEPs more in the formulation of European policies. Shortly before the European elections in 1999, the PS organised its third extraordinary party conference on EU affairs within five years. The organisers of this conference, which was entitled ‘Nation  –​Europe’, were MEPs and party officials. Yet, during the conference, divisions between the party in government and activists became apparent. For example, motions brought forward by activists during the conference were

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far less pragmatic than the government’s European policy, calling for an EU-​ wide 35-​hour week2 and minimum wage –​recalling the PS’s rhetoric in times of opposition (Wielgoβ, 2002: 100–​101). This goes to show that the involvement of party activists in EU policy-​making can create problems for parties in government, who tend to be constrained in their options. Nevertheless, the involvement of the party organisation was more important for Jospin than for Mitterrand (Cole, 2001; Clift, 2003a, 2003b; Krell, 2009). Jospin was characterised as a more inclusive leader who made a point of formally associating the party leadership, party group, and the EP delegation with preparing the French EU presidency of July–​December 2000 (Cole, 2001: 22). Overall, however, MEPs were never well integrated into the PS’s decision-​making processes. The PS’s then international secretary explained that ‘The MEPs were men and women who were parked in Brussels without any relationship to the party. Every once in a while we invited an MEP to speak about a certain directive at national bureau meetings. But this wasn’t a priority’ (PS 11, interview with author). The situation did not change much after the PS had entered opposition, as MEPs still did not meet Socialist MPs very often. Exceptions were party conferences (but these took place only every three years) and ‘journées parlementaires’ (parliamentary days), taking place every autumn. As a long-​standing MEP explains: Every time we [MEPs and MPs] meet, we criticise our lack of cooperation, but we still haven’t found a solution. Each assembly has its own calendar. It happens sometimes, in the case of specific texts, such as the debate on the services directive, when the issues discussed at European level will affect the national level in a highly politicised manner. At that point there is a well-​organised interaction. (PS 5, interview with author)

All six (former and incumbent) Socialist MEPs interviewed for this study confirmed the lack of regular cooperation between MPs and MEPs and criticised the lack of visibility of MEPs inside the party and during parliamentary days. One MEP states: ‘Last week the PS delegation had a parliamentary day at Toulouse together with the party groups of National Assembly and Senate. I think we looked a bit like a subgroup … as if we were not a group in its own right’ (PS 8, interview with author). The problem was also recognised by Solférino. A PS party official (PS 9, interview with author) acknowledged that MPs, being in the majority, dominate the agenda of parliamentary days, ‘so it becomes too difficult to Europeanise the debate’. Robert Ladrech explains that French politicians generally pay little attention to the activities of the European Parliament, as there is a long-​standing preference for intergovernmental action at the European level. He writes that ‘the activities of MEPs have been ignored, at least among the party membership and mid-​level leadership bodies’ (Ladrech, 2007: 100). It can thus be concluded that MEPs only played a minor role in the PS’s process of European policy-​making between 1997 and 2002. When the PS was in opposition between

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2002 and 2012, policies about and through the EU were formulated by the party leadership in central office (as explained in Chapter 6). This was also a time of intense infighting. As we have seen earlier, party leader François Hollande decided to put the EU Constitutional Treaty to an internal referendum in 2004 in an attempt to settle the intra-​party divisions. The nationwide referendum followed in 2005, in which the majority of French voters decided against the EU Constitutional Treaty. Thus, through the referendum, the already weak parliament was further circumvented. Socialist MPs are also not involved in the selection of their party’s EU specialists. For a start, the PS’s national secretary for European affairs is chosen and appointed by the party leader. Like all ministers, the minister for Europe and the foreign minister are nominated by the president following the prime minister’s proposal. Furthermore, the chair of the European affairs committee  –​like all committee chairs –​is selected by all committee members. The PS’s parliamentary group also does not select its own EU spokesperson, and it does not have its own EU working group. Overall, we find that despite recent constitutional reforms strengthening EU scrutiny, the National Assembly offers MPs few incentives to engage with EU affairs. Socialist MPs have largely supported their government’s EU policies without being involved in the making. As agents, Socialist MPs have delegated much of their power to the government (mode 4), the party in central office (mode 1), and the MEPs (mode 2). The SPD Bundestagsfraktion and the EU In Germany, institutional reforms have confirmed the EU scrutiny powers of the Bundestag and have over the years improved the parliamentary infrastructure needed to use these powers (Auel and Benz, 2005: 385). Compared to many other parliaments in the EU –​and particularly the House of Commons and the National Assembly –​the Bundestag is considered a relatively strong legislature, or a ‘working parliament’ (Arter, 1999). Working parliaments are characterised by standing orders that emphasise committee work over plenary debates, and a parliamentary culture where MPs focus on the scrutiny of documents in committees instead of grand speeches in the plenary. The Bundestag is characterised by a high degree of professionalisation, which manifests itself in expert committee work. There is strong party competition in a multi-​party system, and the parliamentary majority shares the power to control the agenda with the government. It therefore has considerable influence on the agenda. The pro-​European consensus in the Bundestag and the political elite in general was seen as an integral part of the German ‘raison d’état’ after the Second World War. Due to this ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970), the main questions of European integration have, until today, rarely been an issue for

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party competition or intra-​party division. Not even in 2009–​2015, at the height of the Eurozone crisis, when the Bundestag ratified Greek bailout packages, did the SPD flex its muscles against the Merkel government’s EU policies, despite some serious reservations –​as we have seen in Chapter 3. Against this pro-​European background it becomes more understandable that the EU scrutiny system in the Bundestag only developed slowly and gradually. It took the Bundestag until 1994 to set up a fully fledged European Committee, and the breakthrough was facilitated by the Federal Constitutional Court in the debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The court put pressure on the government to create an EU affairs committee, which was set up in October 1992 with the purpose of paving the way for the ratification of the treaty. The participation rights of the Bundestag and Bundesrat (the upper house) were laid down in the course of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty through amendments to Article 23, the so-​called ‘Europaartikel’, and the related Article 45. Article 23 states that any further transfer of sovereign rights to the EU requires ratification by a two-​thirds majority in both legislative chambers. Moreover, section two states that the Bundestag cooperates with the government in EU affairs. Accordingly, the federal government has the constitutional duty to inform both legislative chambers comprehensively and at the earliest point possible and enable the parliament to submit its opinion before a decision is adopted at the European level. The federal government must take parliament’s opinion into account during negotiations at the EU level. However, the Bundestag has no right to formally mandate the government’s bargaining position in Brussels. The role of the Bundestag was further strengthened in 2009, after Peter Gauweiler, a conservative politician, supported by politicians from the Left Party, challenged the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty before the Federal Constitutional Court. In June 2009 the court rendered its judgment (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/​08 on 30 June 2009), holding that, while the Lisbon Treaty complied with the German Basic Law, cooperation between the government and parliament on EU matters needed to be reinforced so as to ensure that both the Bundestag and Bundesrat enjoyed sufficient scrutiny powers. As a consequence, in September 2009, new accompanying laws were adopted by both chambers, and since then, the government has been obliged to obtain parliamentary consent before transferring new competences to the EU. But major changes in the Bundestag’s EU scrutiny system were not expected. This was confirmed by the SPD’s parliamentary EU spokesperson, who explained that the new accompanying laws merely formalised what had already been practised for years (SPD 15, interview with author). The Bundestag’s EU affairs committee (Europaausschuss, EUA) only deals with fundamental questions of European integration (policies about the EU), such as treaty amendments and decisions of historic importance, such as EU enlargement. The day-​to-​day legislation is considered by (permanent) expert

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committees. Hence, the EUA does not usually transpose European directives into national law –​this is considered to be the task of expert committees. Nevertheless, the EUA enjoys a prominent role inside the Bundestag. There are currently 22 standing committees in the Bundestag. Only four of them are mandated by the Basic Law, and the EUA is one of them. Its establishment is therefore not subject to the Bundestag’s Parliamentary Standing Orders, which provided the EUA with the constitutional continuity needed to build up the necessary expertise and to provide a longer-​term career perspective for EU specialists in the parliamentary parties (Saalfeld, 2003). The EUA’s composition is unique, as it consists not only of 34 MPs, but also 15 MEPs (the latter without voting rights). MEPs, however, rarely have the time to attend committee sessions, as the parliamentary schedules often overlap. In cross-​national studies of the EU-​15, the Bundestag has received relatively high scores for its level of parliamentary EU scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2005). The EU scrutiny rights of expert committees in the Bundestag are considered ‘strong’, as is their access to information (in its scope and timing). However, both the EUA and the expert committees only rarely make use of their formal scrutiny rights. They rarely issue opinions that could limit the government’s room for manoeuvre in EU negotiations. An SPD member of the EUA (SPD 7, interview with author) stresses that the work of the EUA was very consensual when the SPD was in government until 2009. In a follow-​up interview one year later, when the SPD was in opposition, the same MP argued that the party hardly ever tried to openly criticise the government’s EU policy for fear of limiting the government’s room for negotiations (SPD 14, interview with author). This sentiment was confirmed by another member of the EUA. Asked whether being in opposition had changed the SPD’s EU strategy in the Bundestag, the MP replied: ‘clearly not’ (SPD 15, interview with author). There are various reasons for the seemingly passive role of the Bundestag. Some scholars argue that the lack of parliamentary opposition (and public opinion) to EU integration is one important variable explaining weak EU scrutiny (Raunio, 2005). Moreover, EU policies have to be dealt with by the expert committees, and MPs on those committees already have a heavy workload and do not always spend much time on EU scrutiny. In addition, there tends to be a lack of coordination between the specialised committees and the EUA, and members of the EUA are not always satisfied with the amount of time and expertise the specialised committees spend on EU legislation. One MP (SPD 7, interview with author) explains: Unfortunately, Europe is not prioritised in the committees for health, work and social affairs, and business, for example. There are differences, and I notice that it very much depends on the individual. In almost every expert committee there is a

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member responsible for Europe, but they deal with it with very different degrees of intensity and knowledge.

Information overload was also seen as a cause for concern. The Bundestag receives about 25,000 EU documents a year (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a), but until 2006 there was no ‘filter committee’ to sort documents through and consider their relevance. This shortcoming was recognised and changed in May 2006 when the Bundestag set up an EU affairs unit, which was further expanded in 2013. It is now made up of six subunits dealing with different EU-​related tasks. For example, P1 is the secretariat of the EU affairs committee, whilst P2 and P3 are responsible for ‘filtering’ EU legislation in different policy areas (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013b). Hence, the EU unit does the same job as the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons: it forwards documents received by the EU institutions and the government to the different party groups and saves them in a database. It also allocates the legislative projects to the relevant committees and assesses whether an EU legislative proposal should be discussed in the Bundestag or not –​ which is done in cooperation with the different party groups, which are all consulted on the matter. Yet, with its 64 members (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013a) the EU unit is much better staffed and resourced to deal with EU legislation than the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee. In addition, in 2005 the Bundestag set up a liaison office in Brussels. This office, which is part of the EU unit service, forwards relevant information about upcoming EU legislative proposals and events to the Bundestag. The SPD, like all other party groups, employs a representative in the Brussels liaison office who informs the party about the activities of the Socialist & Democrats group in the EP. Another explanation for the Bundestag’s reluctant use of its institutional power could be that the procedures laid out in Article 23.3 are still too complicated, and that therefore the EUA has worked out a ‘semi-​formal approach’: after deliberations amongst committee members had been completed and consensus on a specific topic reached, the federal government was notified in writing of the committee’s position and requested to take it into account. The Bundestag’s rules committee, however, classified this practice as an unacceptable bypassing of formal procedures (Töller, 2006: 14). This is related to another explanation: since the composition of the EU affairs committee reflects that of the entire Bundestag, the government can rely on its support. Thus, even if MPs have an incentive to influence their government, the majority parties have no incentive to do so publicly. German EU politics having been largely consensual, the committee has tended to avoid confrontation with the government (Töller, 2006: 15). This situation is beginning to change, as the Eurozone crisis has revealed differences between the SPD (alongside the Greens and the Left Party) and Chancellor Merkel’s policies towards Greece (Wendler, 2014). Also, in the past, whilst plenary sessions dealing with EU issues were rare in the Bundestag and only took place in periods

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when the EU treaties were amended (Saalfeld, 2003), the Eurozone crisis has led to more frequent plenary debates. Thus, the Bundestag has an ‘increasingly active communication function’ towards the general public when it comes to EU affairs (Wendler, 2014: 447). The SPD’s MPs as agents?

As explained above, German MPs rarely make use of their formal EU scrutiny rights. Instead, they explore informal channels of influence, which appear to be effective. For example, all party groups in the Bundestag have their own working groups dealing with different policy areas, mirroring the Bundestag committees. The SPD set up its EU working group (Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) during the 1990s. Members of this group are: MPs sitting on the EU affairs committee and/​or expert committees; MEPs (who, due to schedule overlaps, do not attend meetings very often); the representative of the SPD party group in the Bundestag’s Brussels office; the representative of the SPD’s EP liaison office in Berlin; officials from the party headquarters’ international department (Abteilung IV); a representative of the Foreign Ministry’s European department (when the foreign minister is an SPD politician); a representative of the German trade union federation Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund; and representatives of the Länder governments (who all have liaison offices in Berlin). The main purpose of the working group is to prepare decisions for the entire SPD group on policies both about and through the EU, including issues such as EU enlargement and specific EU directives. The then coordinator of the working group (SPD 5, interview with author) explained: ‘It is also our role to communicate European matters to the entire party group –​even if it creates a certain overlap with the vice chairman of the party group’s role.’ It also needs to be added that, since 2002, the SPD group in the Bundestag has employed a vice party group chair dealing exclusively with European policy. This person is normally not the chair of the EU working group, which has created a ‘double executive’ for EU affairs in the SPD’s parliamentary group (Freitag, 2008:  59). Both politicians meet regularly to coordinate their activities and find a common party line. As discussed in the previous chapter, whilst the EU working group of the party in central office, the Vorstand, discusses the most salient issues, the parliamentary group works on day-​to-​day EU legislation going through the Bundestag. This is essentially a reactive exercise (Sloam, 2005) as parliament (still) depends on the government for information and expertise. For this purpose, the EUA and the parties’ working groups invite civil servants working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Finances to brief them on current EU issues. They do this because they do not always trust the government to inform the EUA. For instance, one MP criticised the fact that Merkel’s 2009–​2013 conservative–​liberal

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government did not inform the EUA early enough and sufficiently about its bailout plans for Greece (SPD 15, interview with author). Another MP (SPD 7, interview with author) complained that the Bundestag still relied too much on the government for information, but did not blame the government for this situation: We need more imagination:  which kinds of regulation do we need, and what should be dealt with at the EU level? And these kinds of reflections hardly take place in parliament, but mostly in the ministries, and parliament relies too much on what the ministries are doing and in many cases does not develop its own ideas, which I regret very much. In European policy, we hold on tight to the executive, and I think that’s bad. It needs to change: parliament would have to become more self-​confident in its European policy.

Thus, despite having its own EU working group, the SPD party group still relies heavily on the government for expertise and largely follows their advice. And yet, MPs sitting on the European affairs committee (and the EU working group) played a certain role in the SPD’s European policy-​making process when the party was in office between 1998 and 2009 and after 2013. They might not always have been key players, but in some instances they were able to influence the government’s European policy. One example was the party group’s influence on the EU directive on services in the internal market. However, according to an MP (SPD 15, interview with author), this was an ‘informal process without formal resolutions’. The party group’s potential to influence government probably lay in the fact that the most prominent MPs involved in EU affairs –​Dr Angelica Schwall-​Düren and Axel Schäfer –​not only were vice-​chairs of the party group but also had a close relationship to the party in central office. Schwall-​Düren, for example, also sat on the SPD’s executive committee (Vorstand), where she could influence EU policy. Schäfer was also the chair of the Vorstand’s EU committee, thereby linking EU expertise in parliament and the central bureaucracy and increasing the influence of the party group. When the SPD was in opposition (2009–​2013), the party in public office played a more important role in the SPD’s EU policy formulation. This was mainly due to the Eurozone crisis, which meant that fast decisions about Greece’s future inside the Eurozone had to be ratified by the Bundestag. This put parliament in a powerful position vis-​à-​vis government. Thus, despite its reliance on government for EU expertise, the SPD party group is relatively well organised and equipped to deal with EU policy. It has its own EU working group, where EU positions are discussed and defined. What is more, the overlap of EU specialists between the party group and the party’s central headquarters makes it easier for MPs to influence the party’s EU positions. As agents, the SPD’s MPs have delegated some of their power to formulate EU policy to the government, but they have relatively strong scrutiny rights and exert informal influence.

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Meanwhile, the relationship between social democratic MPs and MEPs was informal and based on personal contacts rather than formal links and regular meetings. Thus, many MEPs were in contact with the MPs from their constituency, but, as one MEP explained, contacts with MPs were mostly spontaneous and initiated by herself rather than the MP(s) (SPD 9, interview with author). This was confirmed by three other MEPs. And although a number of social democratic MEPs are members of the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee, where they have the right to contribute but not to vote, they rarely attend the meetings. Thus, the SPD’s MPs, although not quite as distant from their colleagues in the EP as those of the French Socialist Party, have still delegated a large amount of power without much scrutiny. Regarding the selection of EU specialists, the SPD party group is in a stronger position than Labour and the PS. For example, the party group’s vice-​chairman, who is also in charge of EU affairs, is elected by the SPD MPs. In addition, social democratic MPs select the spokesperson of their EU working group. Labour and the PS’s MPs could do the same, but would have to create these positions first. Meanwhile, the position of the EU affairs committee chair is negotiated between the party group leaderships on the basis of a mathematical formula, taking into account the size of each group. Ordinary MPs do not have a say in this appointment. Furthermore, both the foreign minister and the secretary for Europe are appointed by the chancellor without the approval of the party. Overall, as the EU scrutiny powers of the Bundestag have been gradually strengthened, and as more resources have gone into EU expertise in the past decade, the SPD party group has also enhanced its EU expertise. In addition to being represented on the EU affairs committee, the SPD has its own parliamentary EU working group, and one of the party group’s vice-​chairs is responsible for EU affairs and is also part of the party in central office. There is thus a European network inside the SPD in public office. In government and opposition, MPs have influenced the party’s EU positions, though not as much as some MPs would have liked. Often, their influence was informal and through contacts rather than through the formal parliamentary channels. Conclusions This chapter has investigated the role played by the party in public office (MPs) in the formulation of European policies and the selection of EU specialists. It has first analysed the House of Commons, the National Assembly, and the Bundestag’s EU scrutiny powers and the internal organisation of EU affairs. Second, it has investigated the three parliamentary parties’ dealings with the EU. The chapter has found that, overall, MPs from the Labour Party, the French Socialist, and German Social Democratic Party have delegated a large amount of EU policy-​making power to their respective government and to MEPs, often

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without exerting much formal control. Especially when in power, MPs tended to leave EU policies to their government. Thus, whilst the party in public office has some obvious advantages over the party in central office and the party on the ground (above all, policy expertise and resources), it is not the clear ‘winner’ in the formulation of EU policy and the selection of EU specialists. It would, however, be wrong to simply dismiss the power of MPs to hold the government to account and to influence the party in central office and the MEPs. Indeed, this chapter has identified a number of important differences between Labour, the PS, and the SPD. Most notably, out of the three parliamentary parties, the SPD stood out in its level of engagement in EU affairs. The SPD group in the Bundestag generally had more influence in the formulation of EU policies and the selection of EU specialists than Labour and the PS. These differences can be explained by looking at three broad, interlinked factors: (1) the institutional structure the three parties operated in; (2) the way in which the three parties had chosen to organise and prioritise their EU expertise in parliament; and (3) the parties’ general attitude towards the EU. First, amongst the three parliaments, the Bundestag has the strongest (EU) powers (Raunio, 2005) and was best resourced to deal with the thousands of EU documents landing in its inbox each year. One of the consequences is that, in the Bundestag, being a member of the EU affairs committee is seen as more prestigious than in the House of Commons or the National Assembly. The Bundestag’s powerful position was highlighted during the Eurocrisis when it had to ratify a number of bailout packages to rescue indebted Eurozone countries on the brink of default. A rejection of these could have risked the future of the Eurozone. In this environment, EU policies have become more salient. The Bundestag administration and the party groups have clearly raised their game in recent years. Yet, we have also seen that the SPD in opposition between 2009 and 2013 had little choice but to support Chancellor Merkel’s conservative–​liberal coalition in their ‘austerity politics’ towards Greece, otherwise risking Greece’s default. Linked to the overarching institutional environment is the second explanatory factor, namely the way in which the three parties have organised themselves with regard to Europe in their respective parliament. On one side of the spectrum lies the House of Commons, where EU expertise is very sparse amongst Labour MPs and EU-​related jobs, such as the chairmanship of the ESC, lack profile and prestige. As a consequence of this disregard, in recent years, the chairmanship and membership of the ESC were left to MPs with Eurosceptic positions. The committee was also poorly attended. Whilst hard Eurosceptic views were less common inside the PS party group, EU expertise was, nonetheless, not a career maker. It has taken the National Assembly a long time to formally recognise the importance of EU policies, and the EU affairs committee has only recently been made a fully fledged parliamentary committee with enhanced powers. Still, the Socialist Party group did not prioritise EU affairs in its organisation. For instance,

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there was no designated Socialist EU working group or other EU network inside the National Assembly, as the PS’s only relevant EU committee was the one convened by the central party bureaucracy at Solférino. Meanwhile, the SPD in the Bundestag has a double executive of EU experts, namely one elected spokesperson of the SPD’s EU working group and one vice-​chairman of the party group whose expertise is EU affairs and who is also closely linked to the party leadership in central office. Thus, inside the SPD group, EU expertise is spread across a number of posts and faces of the party, which has helped Social Democratic MPs influence European policies. Third, and linked to the other two factors, is the fact that the three parties have had very different EU positions and strategies. Chapter  3 has demonstrated that amongst the three parties, the SPD has been the most consistently pro-​integrationist, whilst both Labour and the PS were divided on the future direction of the EU in recent years. For an SPD politician to support the EU is therefore less risky than for a French Socialist or a Labour MP. Also, despite the SPD’s disagreement with some of Chancellor Merkel’s EU policies, the parliamentary party has worked in a consensual environment. Whilst the House of Common’s ESC is famous for giving ministers a hard time over some of the decisions taken in Brussels, the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee works in a much more consensual and cooperative atmosphere. Hence, the SPD did not feel the need to contain the salience of EU affairs, whilst Labour and, to some extent, the PS have tried to avoid uncomfortable confrontations and further divisions inside the party. What are the implications of these findings for intra-​party democracy? Despite the obvious differences between the three parliamentary parties’ handling of EU affairs, and despite the SPD’s stronger organisation for Europe, this is a story of missed opportunities. Centre-​left MPs have, overall, not pulled their weight in the formulation of European policies and the scrutiny of government and MEPs. In Germany and France, the situation is beginning to change slowly. Yet, against the backdrop of the Eurozone, the refugee crises, and the popular opposition to TTIP, it is fair to say that too little has been done too late to involve the directly elected representatives in some key decisions. In the UK, the result of the EU referendum was also caused by the neglect of EU expertise by all major parties in parliament in the past decades. As EU policy was seen as divisive and troublesome, it was often swept under parliament’s carpet, and Labour in parliament did very little in recent years to challenge this situation. Thus, whilst the structure (the power of parliament vis-​à-​vis government, the internal workings of parliament and how it deals with EU affairs) is important, the three parties are actors with the opportunity to change the structures. And yet, many such opportunities to play a greater role have been missed in the discussion and formulation of EU policies.

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Notes 1 In 2005 the SGCI was reformed and renamed ‘Secrétariat général des affairs européennes’ (SGAE). 2 The 35-​hour working week  –​the ‘Loi Aubry’, named after minister of work, Martine Aubry –​was adopted at the national level by the Jospin government in 2000. The reduction of the working week from 39 to 35 hours also involved reducing employers’ social contributions with the aim of creating jobs. For a detailed discussion of the Loi Aubry, see Clift (2004: 168–​172).

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Centre-​left parties and the European Union: what next?

Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-​party democracy? This book has provided an insight into the dynamic power relationships inside the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, and the  German Social Democratic Party. It has demonstrated that European ­integration –​as an external constraint –​cannot be held solely responsible for the erosion of intra-​party democracy. Rather, the three centre-​left parties have (to varying degrees) missed the opportunity to adapt their organisations to this multi-​level reality. Despite recent attempts by the leaderships of the three parties to empower the grassroots, for example through the use of referendums and policy consultations, deep and meaningful debates on the European Union (EU) remain rare. As a consequence, the broader party organisations lack EU-​savvy and the means to scrutinise the leadership. EU membership has had a profound impact on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. It has affected the workings of domestic political institutions, the scope and content of public policy, and even culture. Indeed, the aftermath of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum revealed just how entangled the UK had become with the EU. The question of how many years the process of disentanglement would take, and how it should be done, triggered a major crisis in British politics. And yet, the UK has been far less integrated into the EU than France or Germany. It has never adopted Europe’s common currency, the euro, or joined the Schengen Agreement that abolished many of the EU’s internal borders and enabled passport-​free movement across most of the EU. Thus, even the most detached member state has been deeply affected by the EU. In this context, it is important to understand how and to what extent major political parties deal with the challenges and opportunities of EU membership. Whether they are in government or in opposition, parties need to formulate their EU positions and (s)elect EU specialists. This book has focused its analysis on Europe’s three largest centre-​left parties, namely the British Labour Party, the French Parti Socialiste (PS), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). Traditionally, parties of the centre-​left have been amongst the most pro-​European of the party families (Bakker et al., 2015). Yet, EU membership

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presents a dilemma for the left. On the one hand, as Kriesi (2007: 85) points out, centre-​left parties embrace the cultural dimension of European unity, because the cultural aspects of denationalisation chime with the left’s internationalist tradition. On the other hand, however, social democrats have problems when they are confronted with the economic dimension of EU integration, as it poses a threat to the left’s social achievements at the national level. Thus, although the leaderships of Europe’s social democratic parties have come to accept European integration, many parties remain internally divided on the economic effects of EU membership (Kriesi, 2007). This book has illustrated how, despite initial periods of doubt and scepticism, the PS and the SPD started to support European integration from the late 1950s and early 1960s onwards, while the Labour Party took until the mid-​1980s. Yet, despite the three parties’ overall support for European integration, which sits well with their ideas of internationalism, they have not been fervent Europhiles. On the contrary, the EU has caused some deep divisions inside the Labour Party and the PS over the years. In particular, the two parties’ left-​wing factions have taken issue with the EU’s lack of demos and its economic and monetary policies. For example, Arnaud Montebourg, a former French minister of industrial renewal (2012–​2014) who campaigned against the EU Constitutional Treaty in 2004/​2005, frequently expresses his disproval of the EU. Shortly after the ‘Brexit ‘ referendum, he stated in an interview: ‘In the past twenty years, each time the people have been consulted, they have expressed their rejection of the European construction that is being imposed upon them. The European Union has constructed itself against the people, around a liberal project, which is obsessed with the reduction of public deficits and debt’ (Montebourg, 2016, 28 June). This ambivalence towards the EU makes centre-​left parties interesting research subjects. What is more, Labour, the PS, and the SPD describe themselves as internally democratic parties that offer their members a say in the decision-​making processes. This book has investigated how the three parties’ complex relationships with the EU sit with notions of intra-​party democracy. It has done so by asking two research questions. The first research question was: to what extent has European integration impacted upon the power dynamics within centre-​left parties? In particular, which level(s) and which face(s) of the party organisation have been empowered as a consequence of European integration, and who has lost out in the process? The second research question related to the selection of EU specialists. How inclusive/​exclusive are the Labour Party, the PS, and the SPD in the selection processes of MEP candidates and other EU specialists, and what does this tell us about the state of intra-​party democracy? Of course, the question was not only one of selection procedures; it was also closely linked to the power remit of these EU specialists. By focusing on EU specialists we could also understand how widely spread EU expertise is within the three parties, across the different levels and faces.

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Hence, this study has concentrated on two activities at the core of intra-​party democracy: the formulation of EU policies and the selection of EU specialists. It has utilised a principal–​agent framework to investigate the delegation of power inside the three parties across multiple levels (the local/​regional, national, and European levels) and across three faces (the party on the ground, in public office, and in central office). In order to apply the principal–​agent framework, four different but potentially overlapping modes of power delegation were investigated throughout the book. The first mode referred to the delegation of power from one face of the party to another, at the same territorial level of the party organisation. Second, power can also be delegated within the same face of the party, but across different levels. The third mode referred to power delegation across different faces and levels of the party organisation. Last but not least, power delegation can occur within the same face and at the same level of the party organisation. By using a principal–​agent framework to study the four modes of power delegation, this study has found some important commonalities and differences that are worth highlighting and discussing. This concluding chapter first summarises the key findings of this book, thereby answering the two research questions. It then reflects on their implications for intra-​party democracy, power dynamics, and accountability. Last but not least, this chapter highlights the current challenges faced by the centre-​left in Europe. It argues that the diagnosis has been made, but that the cure is still lacking. Formulating policies about and through the European Union Overall, we have seen that European policy –​similar to foreign policy –​has remained in the hands of the party leadership in central and public office, in times of both government and opposition. This refers to mode 1 of power delegation (from the party on the ground to the party in central office and in public office). The empirical findings of this study suggest, however, that the party grassroots are interested in the EU and occasionally discuss topical issues such as the Eurozone crisis, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and –​in the case of Labour –​the implications of Britain’s exit from the EU. It thus appears wrong to assume that the EU, as a matter of high politics, does not concern party activists. At the same time, interest at the grassroots does not necessarily translate into influence. In fact, so large is the ‘information asymmetry’ between the principal (the party membership) and the agent (the party in central and public office) that effective EU scrutiny rarely takes place. To some extent, this is likely to apply to all policy areas, but we would need more empirical data to confirm it. To be sure, the PS and the SPD on the ground have invested more in EU expertise than the Labour Party, which has tried to contain the salience of EU integration since the early 2000s (Oppermann, 2008). For instance,

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a growing number of PS federations and SPD regional associations have set up EU working groups and/​or occasionally organise EU-​themed workshops. As a result, interest in and knowledge about EU affairs is –​slowly –​becoming more widespread amongst the PS and the SPD on the ground. The PS also stands out for its grassroots engagement with the Party of European Socialists (PES) and, in particular, the integration of the PES activists’ City Groups into local party organisations. Whilst in the eyes of many survey respondents, more has to be done to ‘Europeanise’ the grassroots, the foundations have been laid. Amongst the three parties, only the PS can be said to have delegated a small amount of EU policy-​making power from the party on the ground to the PES in central office (by using the PES manifestos during European election campaigns) and on the ground (the PES activists). Here we can see instances of modes 2 and 3 of power delegation. This book has also revealed that the formulation of policies about the EU (long-​term strategies towards European integration, the purpose and future of European integration) has to a large extent been delegated to the party leadership in central office, which includes the party leader, his or her bureau and close personal advisors, and, in the case of the PS and the SPD, the secretary for EU affairs. It is this small circle of party elites that drafts manifestos for general and European parliamentary elections and takes decisions about future referendums on matters such as new EU treaties. Meanwhile, Members of Parliament (MPs) deal with the day-​to-​day EU legislation that is transposed into national legislation (policies through the EU). It was highlighted that amongst the three parties in parliament, the SPD is the best ‘organised for Europe’. In contrast to Labour and the PS, the SPD has established its own EU working group in the Bundestag, which meets regularly to discuss the issues on the parliamentary agenda. The SPD also employs a vice party group chairperson dealing exclusively with European policy, thereby recognising the importance of the EU and spreading EU expertise across the parliamentary party. And yet, despite the stronger focus on EU expertise, even the SPD’s MPs rarely make use of their scrutiny powers. Not only do they rely on the government and civil servants for instructions and EU expertise, they also do little to follow and scrutinise their MEPs’ activities in the European Parliament. Labour is the exception as it makes the most of the weak scrutiny powers of the House of Commons. It holds ministers to account before they attend the Council of Ministers (ex ante scrutiny) and afterwards (ex post scrutiny). Still, in recent years, many Labour MPs sitting on the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) were Eurosceptic backbenchers with little influence on the party’s EU policies and strategies. Overall, neither the House of Commons nor the National Assembly are breeding grounds for EU expertise and knowledge. The differences between the three cases were explained through three interlinked factors: first, the institutional structure the three parties operated in; second, the way in which the three parties had chosen

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to organise and prioritise EU expertise in parliament; and third, the parties’ general attitude towards the EU. First, amongst the three parliaments, the Bundestag has the strongest (EU) powers. It is a working parliament where legislative scrutiny is conducted in expert committees by MPs from all parties. What is more, the Bundestag is the best resourced to deal with the growing numbers of EU documents. Meanwhile, it has taken the National Assembly a long time to formally recognise the importance of EU policies, and the EU affairs committee has only recently been made a fully fledged parliamentary committee with enhanced powers. Second, and linked to the overall working environment, is the way in which the three parliamentary parties have chosen to deal with EU affairs. For instance, EU expertise is very sparse amongst Labour MPs, and EU-​related jobs, such as the chairmanship of the ESC, lack a high profile and prestige. As a consequence of this neglect, in recent years the chairmanship and membership of the ESC were left to MPs with Eurosceptic positions. Whilst hard Eurosceptic views were less common inside the PS party group, EU expertise was, nonetheless, not a career maker. Still, the Socialist Party group did not prioritise EU affairs in its organisation. For instance, there was no designated Socialist EU working group or other EU network inside the National Assembly, as the PS’s only relevant EU committee was the one convened by the central party bureaucracy at Solférino. Hence, much of the power to formulate EU policies has been delegated from ordinary MPs to EU specialists in parliament and government (mode 4 of power delegation). Meanwhile, inside the SPD group, EU expertise is spread across a number of posts and faces of the party, which has helped social democratic MPs in their attempts to influence European policies. Third, the three parties’ very different EU positions and strategies can explain their dealings with the EU in parliament. Amongst them, the SPD has been the most consistently pro-​integrationist, whilst both Labour and the PS have been divided on the future direction of the EU in recent years. For an SPD politician to support the EU is therefore less risky than for a French Socialist or a Labour MP. Also, despite the SPD’s disagreement with some of Chancellor Merkel’s EU policies, the parliamentary party has worked in a consensual environment. Whereas the House of Common’s ESC is renowned for giving ministers a hard time over some of the decisions taken in Brussels, the Bundestag’s EU affairs committee works in a much more consensual and cooperative atmosphere. Hence, the SPD did not feel the need to contain the salience of EU affairs, whilst Labour and, to some extent, the PS have tried to avoid uncomfortable confrontations and further divisions inside the party. Overall, it was demonstrated that ordinary MPs have thus delegated a large amount of power to formulate European policy to their party leaderships and MEPs. Social democratic and socialist MPs sitting in the Bundestag and the National Assembly acknowledge this problem, but

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it appears to create less cause for concern than for some of their British counterparts. A  number of Labour MPs, including Labour MPs Kate Hoey, Kelvin Hopkins, and Graham Stringer, were amongst those who campaigned for Britain to leave the EU in 2016. The loss of sovereignty of the British parliament was one of their main concerns about the EU. Yet, whether leaving the EU will enhance Labour’s intra-​party democracy remains questionable. Selecting EU specialists National political parties can employ EU specialists to work for them in central office, public office, and on the ground, and the manner in which EU specialists are selected tells us something about the state of intra-​party democracy. This book has concentrated on the selection processes of candidates for European parliamentary elections, but it has also investigated how EU specialists in parliament and the central party bureaucracy are selected or appointed. First, regarding the selection of MEP candidates, this book has demonstrated that Labour, the PS, and the SPD’s rule books prescribe fairly inclusive and democratic selection procedures, but that in practice, patronage is indispensable. What is more, this study has revealed that grassroots members often rubber-​stamp the nominations made by a small committee. To be sure, there are some major differences between the three parties’ MEP selection processes. In the Labour Party, for instance, the trade unions play a major role in selecting MEP candidates, as their representatives sit on the shortlisting committee and provide the resources that are necessary to lead a campaign. Meanwhile, the PS’s party leadership in Paris gets heavily involved in the selection of MEP candidates, with competing factions trying to secure their friends safe places on the lists, often ignoring the preferences of the constituencies. What is also worth noting is that EU knowledge appears to play a negligible role for those applying to become MEP candidates for Labour or the PS. Having experienced the Labour Party’s selection committees’ lack of interest in EU affairs and some of the hustings where the EU was barely mentioned, those candidates with extensive EU knowledge and expertise were put off applying again, as interviews with former MEP candidates have shown. In the case of the SPD, the central headquarters follow Germany’s strict laws by letting the regional party associations –​the Landesverbände –​select their own MEP candidates. Intervention by the central party headquarters in Berlin is rare and, when it happens, not appreciated by the Landesverbände. Yet, at the regional level, the selection procedures still do not always conform to the highest levels of democracy and transparency. For example, a former candidate revealed how the regional party board had changed the ranking order on the list of candidates at the last minute, thereby ignoring the grassroots preferences. Hence, whilst

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Labour and the SPD on the ground are in charge of selecting their MEP candidates, the processes still lack transparency and accountability. Amongst the three parties, the PS has the least inclusive MEP candidate selection processes in place –​a situation that enhances the sense of frustration and powerlessness amongst the grassroots. Here again, the principal (the party membership) has delegated a large amount of decision-​making power to the agent (the party in central office, mode 3 of power delegation). Still, what the three parties have in common is that the power to select MEP candidates still lies firmly at the (sub)national level. In this respect, no power has been delegated to the PES. Turning our attention to the selection or appointment of EU specialists in parliament, we have seen that ordinary MPs from the Labour Party and the PS have little say. This is mainly due to the fact that the House of Commons and the National Assembly do not appoint high-​profile EU specialists other than the chair of the EU affairs committee. MPs are also not in charge of appointing government ministers, such as the minister for Europe, who are appointed by the executive, not the legislature. In the case of the SPD, the situation is slightly different. As mentioned earlier, the SPD party group selects its vice-​chairperson who is exclusively responsible for European policy as well as the chair of its own EU working group. The PS could follow the SPD’s example, if the party chose to make EU integration more salient in parliament. For the Labour Party post-​ ‘Brexit’, such suggestions might come too late. Similar tendencies were observed in the case of the three party bureaucracies’ appointments of EU specialists. Again, Labour stood out for not prioritising EU expertise in central office, as its international liaison manager has a low profile and deals with European and international affairs at the same time. By contrast, the PS and the SPD employ EU secretaries and a team of staff members assisting them in their work. The PS also employs a secretary responsible for liaising with the activists of the PES. These EU specialists are not selected by the grassroots, but by the party leader. But then, the SPD and PS have a growing number of EU working groups and PES City Groups on the ground, whose chairpersons are selected by grassroots activists. It is therefore a matter of agency: if parties choose to prioritise EU affairs on the ground, they can let their grassroots activists select their own EU specialists who set up EU working groups and organise EU-​related events. The fact that Labour has not done so reflects its ambivalence towards the EU. Power, democracy, and accountability Intra-​party democracy is about the maximal involvement of party members in the decisions that are central to a party’s political life, including programme writing, personnel selection, and other intra-​organisational decision-​making

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(Poguntke et al., 2016: 670). This book has described how Labour, the PS, and the SPD have  –​to varying degrees  –​implemented assembly-​based systems of democracy that allow party delegates at different levels to deliberate, amend policy proposals, and take repeated rounds of voting. In addition, the three parties have introduced some instruments of plebiscitary democracy in recent years, such as membership consultations (internal referendums), as a means to formulate policy. The findings of this study suggest that the three parties will need to find more effective ways of balancing the two different types of democracy. As regards the formulation of EU policies, both types of democracy have their advantages and disadvantages. First, membership consultations, such as the PS’s 2004 internal referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, can enhance divisions between factions rather than create consensus. What is more, like nationwide referendums, membership consultations can be hijacked by ambitious politicians seeking to put themselves forward as future party leaders or presidential candidates. In such cases, internal referendums risk becoming plebiscites rather than the much-​needed platforms for EU policy-​focused discussions. Consultations encourage party members to cast their votes in favour or against a certain policy, often without sufficient debate and deliberation. Thus, whilst internal referendums certainly empower the party membership, they should be employed sparsely and cautiously. Meanwhile, assembly-​based democracy can be slow and cumbersome, as decisions are taken through deliberation and delegation, from one level of the party to the next. This creates problems for party leaders in government under pressure to take fast decisions at the EU level. For instance, the EU’s bailout packages for Greece were agreed at the last minute, preventing the broader party organisation from getting involved. What is more, we have seen that EU information asymmetry between the grassroots and the party leadership makes it very difficult for local activists to scrutinise elected politicians and come up with their own policy proposals. Still, if centre-​left parties describe themselves as democratic bottom-​ up organisations, assembly-​based democracy should be kept in place. During branch/​constituency meetings and party conferences, activists get the chance to meet and discuss EU matters. If debates, workshops, and question-​and-​answer sessions with MEPs and other EU specialists are organised on a regular basis, activists can enhance their knowledge about the EU and might be in a better situation to influence party policy, both formally (through the representation in policy forums, or through motions and resolutions) and informally (mainly through contacts with MPs and MEPs). At times, this might become uncomfortable for the party leadership, which is used to a high degree of freedom in the formulation of EU policies (Carter and Poguntke, 2010). In the long term, however, it is worth the effort. If the party leaderships do not do enough to encourage and enhance EU-​savvy on the ground, then it is time for the agent to show more agency and set up working groups, select an EU spokesperson, and organise

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EU-​related events. The EU needs to be explained and discussed at all levels of the party, in conjunction with all other policy areas. By doing so, parties would not only address their internal democratic deficits, but also create an EU-​literate generation of activists. A diagnosis, but where is the cure? This study has highlighted the key problems the EU raises for intra-​party democracy. It has also demonstrated that the EU creates ideological and strategic problems for centre-​left parties. Labour, the PS, the SPD, and their sister parties face a number of tough EU policy decisions. Whether it is about their long-​term EU visions, concerning the future purpose, shape and size of the EU, or their responses to current crises, the parties struggle for answers. The most pressing challenges are: securing the future of the Eurozone (and Greece’s position in it); implementing a common European refugee policy; and addressing the social and economic implications of the free movement of people inside the European Single Market. The manner in which parties in government and opposition deal with these urgent problems will determine the voters’ support for European integration. For example, this study has demonstrated that Labour and the SPD have supported limiting EU migrants’ access to in-​work benefits, thereby changing their previous positions and adopting centre-​right policies. After the 2016 EU referendum, Labour also failed to formulate a position on the future access of EU citizens to the British labour market. As (EU) migration was the key theme of the referendum campaign, formulating a common, coherent position is tantamount for Labour’s reputation as a serious party of government. But Labour, like other centre-​left parties, struggles to make the case for the free movement of EU migrants. The reason is that many Labour supporters voted to leave the EU, especially in areas with a large influx of EU migrants over a short period of time. Although after ‘Brexit’, Labour is unlikely to be involved in EU decision-​making, the party will still need to set out its views on the UK’s future relationship with the EU. What is more, EU expertise will still be needed after ‘Brexit’, as the EU is too important to be ignored. The party leaders of the centre-​left recognise the EU’s main problems and challenges, but fail to offer solutions. In this final section, the last words are left to the three incumbent party leaders in order to highlight the current difficulties. Former SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel, for instance, made the following statement to his party: Europe has remained alien to the people. This is also due to the fact that Europe does a lot of things, and sometimes focuses on the negligible. Only where the people of Europe need their interests to be internationally represented we are voiceless and incapable of action. From the regulation of the banks, to foreign and security

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policy. Regarding the environment as well as global war and peace. Europe as the representation of its people’s interests in the world is something different from the mere glorification of a single market. (Gabriel, 2012, 16 June)

Unsurprisingly, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn takes a more critical stance towards the EU. In his 2016–​2017 New Year address, he declared: People didn’t trust politicians and they didn’t trust the European Union. I understand that. I’ve spent over 40 years in politics campaigning for a better way of doing things, standing up for people, taking on the establishment and opposing decisions that would make us worse-​off. We now have the chance to do things differently. To build an economy that works and builds for everyone, across all our nations and all our regions. Labour respects and accepts the result of the referendum. We won’t be blocking our country leaving the EU. But we won’t stand by. Those in charge today have put the jobs market, housing, the NHS and social care in crisis. We can’t let them mess this up. It’s about everyone’s future. A Brexit that protects the bankers in the City and continues to give corporate handouts to the biggest companies is not good enough. (Corbyn, 2016, 30 December)

Thus, the party leaders have identified some of the EU’s current problems, such as the lack of popular support and the EU’s prioritisation of the Single Market over global environmental protection and peace. Yet they do not offer concrete solutions and do little to address these problems. In a statement made shortly after the UK’s EU referendum, the PS’s leader, Jean-​Christophe Cambadélis, expressed the hope that after Brexit the EU will concentrate on further integration and unity rather than market deregulation. In a video message he declared: ‘It is the English version of Europe that has died with the Brexit vote. It was the notion of Europe as a large market without regulation, without the possibility to build common references for the people of Europe. So now it is necessary to concentrate on what makes European unity possible’ (Cambadélis, 2016, 27 June). Yet, blaming the British will not solve the centre-​left’s crisis of ideas and solutions. Labour may, in recent years, have been an awkward and detached member of the PES, but it cannot be made solely responsible for the lack of common EU policies and strategies. The electoral success of left-​wing and right-​wing populist parties and movements across Europe means that centre-​left parties have no time to lose. The result of the ‘Brexit’ referendum has highlighted the new conflict line between those who want an open society versus those who push for a closed society (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 75). In France, the Eurosceptic and xenophobic Front National gathers support, and in Germany, the Islamophobic, Eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland attracts illiberal voters favouring a closed society. If the centre-​left wants to remain relevant and distinguish itself from the right, it will need to defend openness. Avoiding debates about the EU will not help them achieve this aim; the only way to go forward is to discuss the EU at all levels and across all faces of the party. More intra-​party democracy is needed.

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Abteilung IV: Internationale Politik 131–​132, 154 Agenda 2010 30 Alexander, Douglas 143 Allianz für Fortschritt und Aufbruch (ALFA) 67 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 2, 67–​68, 169 Amsterdam Treaty 64, 148 Arbeitsgruppe Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union 154 Arbeitskreis Europa 114–​115 Assemblée Nationale 85, 138, 146 see also National Assembly Atlee, Clement 48 Aubry, Martine 28, 107, 128, 159n2 Auroi, Danielle 148 austerity 43, 54, 72, 90, 115, 157 Bad Godesberg 30 Balls, Ed 143 Basic Law 89, 151–​152 Berès, Pervenche 126 Blair, Tony 17, 20–​23, 40, 51–​56, 64–​65, 69–​70, 95, 103, 122–​123, 142–​143 Blairite(s) 22, 53, 95 Brandt, Willy 69 Brexit 10, 48, 56, 58–​59, 97, 122, 141, 161, 166, 168–​169 Brown, Gordon 51–​52, 54, 142 Bund freier Bürger –​Offensive für Deutschland (BfB) 67

Bundesparteitag 33, 115 Bundesrat 32, 151 Bundestag 2, 14, 33, 36, 67, 73, 85, 112, 114, 129–​131, 133, 137–​138, 150–​158, 163–​164 Cabinet Office 139 Callaghan, James 51 Cambadélis, Jean-​Christophe 27, 63, 128, 148, 169 Cameron, David 47, 52–​53 Chirac, Jacques 63, 148 Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) 30, 31, 68, 70–​74 Clegg, Nick 56 Cohabitation 145 Collins, Ray 18 Commission des Affaires Européennes 146, 148 Congrès national 26 Conservative Party 14, 17, 47–​48, 55, 96, 125 Constituency Labour Party (CLP) 8–​9, 16, 18–​21, 95, 97, 104–​107, 122 Cook, Robin 39, 124–​125 Corbyn, Jeremy 10, 17–​18, 21–​23, 42–​43, 51, 53–​59, 121–​122, 169 Corbynite(s) 22 Cordery, Philip 39, 126–​128 Council of Ministers 2, 91, 139, 142, 163 courants 24, 42, 97–​98 Cruddas, Jon 121

198

198

Index

de Gaulle, Charles 49, 144 Délégation pour l’Union Européenne (DUE) 146 Delors, Jacques 51 Désir, Harlem 128 Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 154 Die Linke 30 see also Left Party directive on the liberalisation of services in the internal market 68, 149, 155 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 1, 54 Eden, Anthony 49 En Marche 26, 43 EU Constitutional Treaty 51, 59, 65–​66, 68, 71, 90, 107, 111, 117, 126, 128, 142, 145, 150, 161, 167 Europaauschuss 115, 151 Europarty 41, 128 Europawahlgesetz 89, 99, 102 see also European Election Law European Central Bank (ECB) 64–​65 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 49, 68, 75 European Commission 2, 10, 38, 40, 47, 51, 56, 65, 68, 71, 74–​75, 88, 137, 141, 143 European Council 40, 62, 65, 91, 145–​146, 148 European Defence Community 60, 86 European Election Law 89 European Fiscal Compact 65 Europeanisation 2, 63, 84, 138 European Parliament 2, 19, 10, 11, 15, 37–​38, 40–​41, 44, 53, 69, 71, 74, 79, 82, 84–​87, 95, 99–​100, 104–​105, 108, 112, 129–​131, 133, 136, 138, 143, 148–​149, 163 European parliamentary elections 2–​3, 8, 12, 33, 37–​39, 63–​64, 67, 79, 88–​89, 94–​95, 98–​101, 104–​106, 114, 132, 163, 165

European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP) 19, 95, 121, 143 European People’s Party (EPP) 39, 41, 125 European Regional Policy Forum 106 European Scrutiny Committee 138–​139, 141, 153, 163 European Single Market 1, 48, 50, 52, 55, 59, 69, 71, 137, 168, 169 Europhilia 10, 45–​46, 48, 51, 68, 71, 75, 106 Euroscepticism 47–​48, 50, 59, 67, 75, 140–​142, 145 Eurozone 1, 10, 47, 66–​68, 72–​73, 76, 155, 157, 168 Eurozone crisis 10, 46, 54, 62, 66, 67, 72, 74, 76, 90, 110, 138, 145, 151, 153–​155, 162 Fabius, Laurent 63, 66 Farage, Nigel 56 Federal Bureau 26 Federal Constitutional Court 151 Federal Council 26 federal party law 89, 33, 116 see also Parteiengesetz Fédérations 8, 12, 16, 25–​26, 28, 38, 98, 106, 108–​112, 116, 118, 126, 163 Fifth French Republic 24, 29, 61, 144 Fischer, Joschka 70 Foot, Michael 50 Front National 2, 169 Gabriel, Sigmar 31, 35, 70, 72–​73, 130, 168–​169 Gaitskell, Hugh 49, 51 Gaullists 28, 59–​60, 75, 77n3 General German Workers’ Association 29 Greece 10, 68, 72–​73, 76, 90, 110, 153, 155, 157, 167–​168 Grundsatzprogramm 34 Guigou, Élisabeth 62, 148 Hamon, Benoît 26 Hoey, Kate 165

199

Index Hollande, François 27, 40, 43, 62–​63, 65–​66, 76, 98, 128, 150 Hopkins, Kelvin 140, 165 House of Commons 13, 22, 36, 85, 96, 138–​142, 144, 146, 150, 153, 156, 157, 163, 166 House of Lords 141–​142 immigration 48, 67–​68, 73 see also migration information asymmetry 81, 162, 167 Initiative Pro D-​Mark –​Neue Liberale Partei (Pro-​DM) 67 intra-​party democracy 3–​4, 11, 21, 24, 84–​86, 88, 89, 97, 103, 158, 160–​162, 165–​166, 168–​169 Johnson, Alan 57–​58 Jospin, Lionel 60, 62, 64–​67, 76, 128, 147–​149, 159n2 Juncker, Jean-​Claude 74, 125 Kinnock, Neil 20–​21, 50 Labour Movement for Europe (LME) 106 Labour Uncut 9, 97 Lafontaine, Oskar 30 Landesparteitag 32, 100, 115 Landesverband 8, 12, 16, 32–​35, 42, 100–​102, 106, 115–​117, 133, 165 Landesvorstand 100 Lasalle, Ferdinand 29 Left Party 30, 36, 67, 151, 153 see also Die Linke Les Républicains 59, 77n3 Liberal Democrats 48, 56, 75 Liberal-​Konservative Reformer 68 Liddle, Roger 51, 53 Liebknecht, Karl 29 Lisbon Treaty 66, 137–​138, 151 Maastricht Treaty 59, 61, 64–​65, 69, 137, 151 Macron, Emmanuel 26, 43

199

Manifesto Project (MARPOR) 45–​46, 48–​49, 59–​60, 67–​68, 70 Marxism 29–​30, 61 Member(s) of the European Parliament (MEP) 5, 7–​9, 11–​15, 32, 34–​35, 41, 69, 74, 79–​80, 82, 85–​91, 93–​102, 104–​108, 111–​117, 120, 123, 126–​129, 131, 133, 136, 138, 143, 147–​150, 152, 154, 156–​158, 161, 163–​167 Merkel, Angela 65, 72, 90, 112, 151, 153–​154, 157–​158, 164 migration 54–​57, 59, 72, 168 see also immigration Miliband, Ed 18, 22–​23, 48, 51–​53, 55–​57, 117, 121, 143–​144 minimum wage 55, 64, 149 Mitterrand, François 24, 61, 63–​65, 149 momentum 18, 43 Montebourg, Arnaud 161 Moscovici, Pierre 62–​63, 148 multi-​level governance 1, 3, 6, 31, 79, 97, 137 multi-​level party/​parties 7, 31, 41, 112 National Assembly 28–​29, 36, 42, 127, 144–​145, 147–​150, 156–​58, 163–​164, 166 see also Assemblée Nationale National Executive Committee (NEC) 19–​20, 50, 95, 105, 120 National Health Service (NHS) 53, 56–​57, 169 National Policy Forum (NPF) 19, 105–​106, 122 National Secretariat 13, 27, 29, 42, 127, 134 Netzwerk Berlin 35 New Labour 5, 51 notables 25 one-​member-​one-​vote (OMOV) 18, 23 Ortsverein 16, 31–​32, 100, 102, 113

200

200

Index

Parlamentarische Linke 35 Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 19–​22, 122, 141, 143–​144 Parteiengesetz 89 see also federal party law Parteikonvent 34 Parti Communiste Français (PCF) 23, 60 Partnership in Power (PiP) 22, 44 Patronage 12, 26, 96–​97, 99–​101, 116, 165 Party of European Socialists (PES) 5, 7–​9, 11–​13, 15–​16, 28, 37–​41, 55–​56, 63, 74, 82, 88–​90, 107–​111, 114, 119–​120, 123–​135, 163, 166, 169 PES activists 15–​16, 38–​39, 82, 107, 111, 114, 124, 128, 132, 163 PES City Group 108–​109, 111, 114, 166 PES Leaders’ Conference 40 Policy Unit 123 Post, Achim 39, 133 power delegation 4, 6–​7, 11, 13, 41, 78–​84, 92, 102, 104, 117, 119–​120, 129, 131, 134, 144, 162–​166 principal-​agent framework 2, 6–​7, 11, 78, 80, 82, 92, 162 Progressive Alliance 15, 41 Radical Left Party 126 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup 39 Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) 77n3 Rawnsley, Andrew 22 refugee crisis 46, 73, 75, 126 Renzi, Matteo 40 Schäfer, Axel 73, 155 Schäuble, Wolfgang 73 Schengen Agreement 48, 77n2, 160 Schulz, Martin 38, 41, 56, 74, 125, 130, 132–​133, 135n1 Schuman Plan 37, 60, 68 Schröder, Gerhard 30, 40, 64–​65, 68, 69, 70, 71–​72 Schröder-​Blair paper 65 Schwall-​Düren, Angelica 155

Secrétariat Général des Affairs Européennes (SGAE) 159n1 Secrétariat Général de Coopération Interministerielle (SGCI) 147, 159n1 Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) 23, 25, 60–​61 Seeheimer Kreis 35 selectorate 86, 95, 97–​100 Single European Act 61 Smith, Julie 141–​142 Social Democracy 1, 5, 40, 44, 51, 61, 65, 124 Social Europe 63–​64, 71, 74–​76, 124, 128 Socialist International 15, 37, 123 Solférino 16, 27, 119, 149, 158, 164 Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED) 30 Spitzenkandidat 38, 41, 56, 74, 125, 130, 133, 135 Stanishev, Sergei 39, 41 Steinmeier, Frank-​Walter 72, 73 Stringer, Graham 165 Third Way 65 trade union(s) 17, 19–​24, 30, 42–​43, 50–​51, 57, 69, 75, 95–​97, 102, 106, 116, 122, 124, 154, 165 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 74, 104, 110, 158, 162 Treaty of Rome 60, 69 UK Independence Party (UKIP) 2, 48, 56 Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 24, 77n3 Volkspartei 4, 31 Vorstand 33, 100, 115, 129–​134, 154–​155 Watson, Tom 56 Willy-​Brandt Haus 16, 35, 119 Wilson, Harold 49–​51, 75 Zukunftswerkstatt Faires Deutschland 113