Britain and the European Union 9781474411790

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Britain and the European Union

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Britain and the European Union Second Edition

Alistair Jones

Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: www.edinburghuniversitypress.com © Alistair Jones, 2007, 2016 First edition published 2007 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road 12 (2f) Jackson’s Entry Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/13pt Monotype Baskerville by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 8368 0 (paperback) ISBN 978 1 4744 1179 0 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 0 7486 8372 7 (epub) The right of Alistair Jones to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).

Contents

  List of boxes    List of tables   Acknowledgements 

viii ix x

1 Introduction  Introduction  Content of the book 

1 2 4

2 History and Development of the EU  The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community From ECSC to EEC The first enlargement – Britain joins Enlargement to the south The European Union The northern enlargement The European Union grows to the east The euro crisis Who is the ‘reluctant European’?

11 12 14 15 18 19 23 24 27 28

3 Institutions of the European Union The Commission The European Council The Council of Ministers COREPER The European Parliament The Court of Justice The Committee of Regions The European Economic and Social Committee The European Ombudsman The ‘democratic deficit’

34 35 41 43 47 48 54 55 57 58 60

4 Common Policies of the European Union Why have common policies? The Common Agricultural Policy

67 68 68

­viii   Britain and the European Union



The Common Fisheries Policy Competition Policy and Trade Policy The Common Foreign and Security Policy The development of the single currency

74 76 80 83

5 Europeanisation92 What is Europeanisation? 93 The effects of Europeanisation 95 Europeanisation and the British state 98 Thinking about Europe 100 Conclusion 101 6 Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism 105 What is supranationalism? 106 Supranationalism and the European Union 107 Supranationalism and the United Kingdom – a troubled relationship? 110 What is intergovernmentalism? 112 Intergovernmentalism and the European Union 113 Intergovernmentalism and the United Kingdom 115 Conclusion 116 7 Expansion versus Integration What is integration? How is the European Union promoting integration? The United Kingdom and integration The expansion of the European Union – what are the limits? The United Kingdom and enlargement

120 121 121 126

8 The Influence of the European Union on Britain The constitutional relationship between Britain and the European Union The European Union and the British Parliament The European Union and regional government in the United Kingdom Local government and the European Union Conclusion

139

129 133

140 141 145 152 154

Contents   ­ ix

9

Political Parties and the European Union Conservative Party Labour Party Liberal Democrat Party United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) The minor parties

159 160 164 168 170 172

10 The British Media and the European Union What is the media? Reporting on the European Union ‘New’ media Conclusion

181 182 182 188 189

11  Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union British public opinion on the European Union Pressure groups and the European Union How do pressure groups lobby the European Union? Public opinion across the European Union Turnout for European Parliamentary elections Conclusion

193 194 199 202 205 211 214

12  Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?  What is a ‘reluctant European’? The case for Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ The case against Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ Are any other EU members ‘reluctant Europeans’? Conclusion – If Britain is not reluctant, then how can the relationship be labelled?

References Bibliography Index

218 219 220 225 227 229 234 240 254

Boxes

 1.1 A perspective on UK–EU relations   3.1 The laws of the European Union   3.2 Complaining to the Ombudsman   4.1 The principles and instruments of the CAP   4.2 The policy areas of the Common Fisheries Policy (2014–20)   4.3 The timetable to the single currency   5.1 Extract from Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the College of Europe, in Bruges, on 20 September 1988   6.1 Breakdown of an ideological transnational grouping of the European Parliament   7.1 The chapters of the acquis communautaire for the 2013 enlargement   8.1 Components of the British constitution   8.2 Membership of the House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny (as of January 2015)   8.3 House of Lords Committees on Europe   8.4 The British legislative process   9.1 Vote on EEC membership in the House of Commons (1971–2)  12.1 What is a ‘reluctant European’?  12.2 Europe or America?  12.3 Is Britain really reluctant? 

4 36 59 69 75 85 95 108 122 141 142 143 144 161 219 222 230

Tables

 2.1 Summary of the enlargements of the European Economic Community/European Union   3.1 The Juncker Commission (appointed October 2014)  3.2 Rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers   3.3 Weights of votes in the Council of Ministers (2014)   3.4 The number of MEPs for each member state (2014 elections)   3.5 Make-up of the European Parliament (May 2014)  3.6 Membership of the Committee of Regions (September 2014)   4.1 Budgetary expenditure on the CAP   9.1 Party support at European Parliamentary elections   9.2 Northern Ireland European Parliamentary election results  10.1 Tabloid newspaper headlines  11.1 Survey of members of the Common Market (1971)  11.2 Survey of members of the Common Market (1974, 1975)  11.3 UK referendum on EEC membership (6 June 1975)  11.4 Is the UK’s membership of the EU a good thing?  11.5 How much trust do you have in the European Union?  11.6 Pro- and anti-EU pressure groups in the United Kingdom  11.7 British pressure group delegates in the European Economic and Social Committee (October 2010 to September 2015)  11.8 In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?  11.9 Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?  11.10 Referenda results on EU issues  11.11 Turnout for elections to the European Parliament 

25 37 44 45 49 51 56 71 171 176 185 195 195 196 197 198 200 203 206 208 211 213

Acknowledgements

There are many people that I wish to thank for their support during the writing of this book. Top of the list is my wife, Claire, who has been so tolerant of my rather eccentric approach to writing this book, as well as the piles of journal articles strewn around the house. Thank you so much! I would also like to thank current and former colleagues at De Montfort University for all of their support and advice. In particular, I would like to thank Alasdair Blair, Alison Statham, Chris Goldsmith, Clive Gray, David Wilson and Tor Clarke. I would also like to thank all of my students who passed comment on earlier draft chapters. Thanks must also be extended to Martin Holland, at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. It was he who first whetted my interest in the EU, and I thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to lecture his students about the EU in 2014. Many thanks go to the staff at Edinburgh University Press, including Nicola Ramsey, Jen Daly and Michelle Houston. I must also thank the series editor, Duncan Watts, for asking me to write the book in the first place. Finally, as always, I must thank my pets: Tiny, Miss Kitty Fantastic and the chickens. Their persistence in demanding attention, walks, food, company and entertainment constantly reminds me that there is more to life than writing. To everyone who looked at draft chapters or the whole manuscript, I extend my thanks. As ever, if there are any errors or omissions, the fault lies with me. Alistair Jones September 2015

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Contents Introduction

Content of the book

Overview The relationship between Britain and the European Union is phenomenally complex. There appear to be inconsistencies in the attitudes of the British Government, the British media and the British people towards the EU – and vice versa. The label that is often bandied around when describing the relationship is ‘reluctant European’. Throughout this book, we shall return again and again to this theme. The basic problem is that a specific definition or explanation of the concept often eludes most people. Such an inconsistency fits in well with Britain’s overall relationship with the EU. As with terms such as ‘pro-European’ or ‘Eurosceptic’, ‘reluctant European’ can be twisted and contorted to fit whatever issue is being examined. This chapter is going to introduce some of these themes, which are then addressed throughout the book.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • An introduction and an overview to this book • An outline of the key terms and concepts • Issues and concerns which will be addressed in the book

2 4

­2   Britain and the European Union

Introduction The way in which Britain’s relationship with the European Union (EU) is portrayed in much of the British media is such that many people seem to be of the opinion that Britain is not even a member of the Union. Membership of the EU, it seems, is to be avoided at all costs. Britain has a long history and tradition of looking far beyond Europe to the rest of the world – there is the Commonwealth (formerly the British Empire) as well as the special relationship with the USA. These are seen to be of far greater importance. Yet in the early post-war years, Winston Churchill described the Western world’s defence against communism as being dependent upon three concentric circles: the United States, the Empire and Europe. Where these three circles intersected, that was Britain. Britain had a ‘special relationship’ with the United States; the British Empire covered a third of the world; and Britain was the strongest European power, having won World War II. Of the three concentric circles, the United States and the Empire were seen to be of far greater importance than the relationship with Europe – and, of course, English was spoken in most of these places! Europe, by comparison, was almost inconsequential. Britain was a global power that had stood up single-handedly against the tyranny of Hitler and the Nazis. Britain would never be dragged down to the European level. The fact that on 1 January 1973, Britain joined what was then known as the European Economic Community (EEC) – sometimes described as the Common Market – is often conveniently overlooked. After all, there is the perception that when fog appears in the English Channel it cuts Europe off from Britain, not vice versa. What is also disheartening about these attitudes is that very few people appear willing to stand up and contest them. As Nick Clegg said, after the second of his debates with Nigel Farage on EU membership in April 2014, this was the first time somebody had publicly argued the case for membership in over twenty years. There has been a near-endless dripping of anti-EU sentiment in the media that has not been contested. Conversely, it is also possible to refute the importance of the socalled ‘special relationship’ and of the role of the Commonwealth. For example, the ‘special relationship’ is not exactly a two-way

Introduction   ­ 3

relationship. It seems to be far more a case of Britain standing up to express support for whatever US policies are being condemned by other countries. The USA, in reality, has many ‘special relationships’ apart from the one with Britain: with Germany, China and Japan to name but three.1 When turning to the Commonwealth – an organisation which contains fifty-five members – Britain is merely one member of the organisation. There is no longer a British dominance of the Commonwealth – if there ever has been since its formation. Britain may still be the sixth largest economy in the world, and has punched well above its weight for many years. Yet the reality is that Britain is in a gradual decline in relation to the rest of the world. Politically and economically Britain is now a regional power, and the region to which Britain belongs is Europe. The problem is how to convince people this is so. None of this really presents the case as to why the EU is so important for Britain or why British membership is so important to the EU. At best, it highlights the other options as flawed, but then so is the European option. The case for Europe needs to be presented, but presented even-handedly. Portraying the relationship through rose-tinted spectacles is likely to do more harm than good. The intention within this book is to try to raise the profile of the EU in the United Kingdom and vice versa. There are many ­benefits – and problems – that come as a result of British membership of the EU. Only the negative aspects appear to gain publicity. Similarly, the European Union has benefited from British membership but all that tends to be bandied around is Britain being a reluctant European and that the British are not committed to the European project, as can be seen in Box 1.1.2 The reasons for such negativity include the fact that people are ill-informed about the relationship between Britain and the EU, as well as what sometimes appears to be d ­ eliberate attempts to damage the relationship. The approach taken in this book will be, first, to examine the historical development of the EU. This will be followed by an evaluation of the institutions and the common policies of the EU. Thereafter, the focus moves specifically to the relationship between Britain and the EU – how each influences the other. The role of political parties, public opinion and the media are each examined later in the book.

­4   Britain and the European Union

Box 1.1  A perspective on UK–EU relations ‘Britain’s relationship with the European Community can be summed up as follows. The government lacks any sense of purpose about Britain’s role in Europe, and consequently its policies are riddled with contradiction and ambiguity. Any initiative that might result in Britain becoming more deeply involved in European institutions brings these inconsistencies to the surface, with the government then moving into a state of disarray accompanied by bitter party conflict and occasional resignations. There are those who put their Europeanism above party loyalty whilst others, including the Prime Minister, seem prepared to sacrifice Europe for any short-term party political advantage. The Prime Minister’s position on the EC issue has invited challenges from political rivals for the key to No. 10. For many, fundamental hostility towards the EC masquerades as arguments about the sovereignty of Parliament, about alien ideologies being thrust upon Britain by the unelected bureaucrats of Brussels or about the undesirable national characteristics of our partners, particularly the French and Germans … This state of affairs, of course, refers to the last days of the Wilson government …’

Prior to this, some theoretical concepts are assessed. Terms such as Europeanisation, supranationalism and integration are defined, and then the British position on each is evaluated. Thus, in the concluding chapter, it will be possible to assess the extent to which Britain is still a ‘reluctant European’. At the end of each chapter, there is a summary of key points. As well as this, there are definitions of important terms that were used in that chapter. There are also lists of useful websites and supplementary readings. These can be used to access primary sources of material to enable readers to formulate their own opinions on the various aspects of this book.

Content of the book The history and development of the EU, which are examined in Chapter 2, saw a lack of British involvement until the 1970s, and this contributed to Britain earning the label ‘reluctant European’. Yet

Introduction   ­ 5

this lack of participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and in the EEC did not mean that Britain failed to influence their development. British actions outside both of these o­ rganisations – particularly in the formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – had an impact upon them. Added to this, Britain participated in other European ventures such as the European Defence Community. While such an organisation was outside the ambit of the ECSC, British willingness to participate highlighted a degree of commitment towards Europe that has really gone unreported. Thus the label ‘reluctant European’ may have been applicable only to certain aspects of Britain’s relationship with Europe. Yet, even after joining the then EEC, the label ‘reluctant European’ did not go away. This was despite full participation in all of the institutions of the EEC – as can be seen in Chapter 3. There was no empty chair presidency from the British – as had been the case when France was the presiding nation in the mid-1960s. The label did seem to appear warranted over some of the common policies of the EEC and EU. Successive British Governments have been anything but enthused about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as some of the other common policies and the development of the single currency, the euro. Britain has long argued for reform of the CAP and other policies, as is detailed in Chapter 4. British Governments have also negotiated opt-outs of particular policies such as the euro and the Social Charter. While the British are castigated for doing so, it must be noted that other member states, such as Denmark, have also negotiated opt-outs over joining the euro. And when it comes to reform of common policies, Britain is often to the forefront in the fight against the more reactionary, conservative member states. Yet the fight for reform is often presented as Britain attempting to change long-established policies, to make Europe operate in a manner closer to that of the United States – particularly with regard to issues such as employment law. Thus Britain is presented as not being committed to the European social democratic economic model but rather to the American free market, laissez-faire model, where the rights and freedoms of the individual are crushed beneath the corporate animal of big business. One of the interesting things about being in the EU is the extent to which it has influenced British politics and society, and vice versa.

­6   Britain and the European Union

All this is part of the Europeanisation of Britain. Yet there are many different perspectives on Europeanisation which are examined in Chapter 5. There is no single definition of this concept, and the different perspectives highlight the different ways in which Britain has become Europeanised. Britain has a key role to play in the future development of the EU. Issues such as the extent to which the EU moves further down a supranationalist or integrationist route are examined in Chapters 6 and 7. Britain’s role here can be pivotal. As one of the four largest member states, Britain has the opportunity to influence the integrationist agenda. Which other powers, if any, could (or should) be ceded to Brussels? Alternatively, via subsidiarity, which powers could (or should) be returned to member states? Similarly, Britain will play an important role in any future expansion of the EU. While a unanimous decision is required to support any enlargement, Britain has played a key role in brokering deals. Countries such as Iceland, Serbia and Turkey are keen to join. Previous British Governments have been enthusiastic about enlargement and have been prominent in paving the way for these countries to apply. Added to this, smaller countries (such as Portugal), which carry less weight or influence in the Council of Ministers, are often happy to see Britain stand up and fight for a particular issue. If it were left to the smaller countries, it is likely their opinions would be crushed under the juggernaut of the larger member states – specifically France, Germany and Italy. So, while some Europeans are not enthused about British membership, and many Britons appear unenthused about EU membership, what is interesting is the extent to which each has had a positive impact upon the other. Britain’s role in trying to modernise the EU has already been noted above. Yet the EU has had a huge impact – and more often than not an unreported one – upon the UK. While this impact is assessed in Chapter 8, it is important to note here that the impact of the EU in Britain has both positive and negative aspects. Negative aspects include the increase in bureaucracy or ‘red tape’ that has resulted through membership. Yet much of the reason for this is the more legalistic approach of other EU member states towards issues such as regulation. In the past, much British regulation was done through a ‘hands off’ approach, where one simply

Introduction   ­ 7

trusted a chap’s word. If you could not trust a chap’s word, what could you trust? As a result of this approach, much regulation in Britain was carried out ineffectively. The more legalistic approach, adopted by the other EU member states, provided far greater information and protection for people. Britain has been compelled to step into line in areas such as health and safety. As a result, the regulation seems to be more effective. The downside of this is that it is a slow, bureaucratic process. Where Europe has had an important impact upon the UK is at the level of subnational government. Although Britain is still considered to be a unitary and heavily centralised state, with all power focused upon Parliament, membership of the EU has enabled regional and local government to develop some roles without excessive interference from the centre. The Blair Government pushed this along by holding successful referenda in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London for political devolution. These devolved bodies are able to participate within the EU through such institutions as the Committee of Regions. Pre-1997, such participation would have been considered to be a pipe dream. Regional government (specifically the Regional Development Agencies) in England was also able to interact with the EU, and gain valuable investment for different regions. Their abolition has left this role to English local government. Yet all of this seems to presuppose that there is a consistent British position within the EU. This is not the case. Even within individual political parties in the UK, there is no uniform position. As will be seen in Chapter 9, each of the major British political parties is divided over the issue of Europe. The Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats each have representatives who are enthusiastic about the EU, but also those who are more likely to desire British withdrawal. While many MPs seem willing to toe the line of their party leadership, there have been growing numbers who have questioned the party leadership over the EU – most notably among Conservative MPs. Added to this is an apparent apathy in the positions of some of the party leaders – especially from the Conservatives and Labour – who refuse to be drawn on European issues, even during a European Parliamentary election campaign. Instead, they try to focus upon national issues such as the economy. Thus it becomes very difficult for the public to get any sort of prompt from

­8   Britain and the European Union

the larger political parties on the issue of Europe. This leaves the field open for the smaller parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) to present near unchallenged positions on EU membership. The election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party may see a more Eurosceptic message come forward. The extent to which MPs toe this new line remains to be seen. The apparent apathy appears linked to the role of the media in reporting European issues, as will be seen in Chapter 10. Most of the print media appears strongly Eurosceptic if not Europhobic. The broadcast media has a requirement to be more even-handed. Yet the reality is that bad news makes news, and any mistakes made  by the EU are writ large in the tabloid media. Successes may make the inner pages of some of the broadsheets. It is in the tabloid media where we can see the constant chipping away against the EU, which has a profound impact on public attitudes to Europe. Thus it is to public opinion on Europe that we finally turn in Chapter 11. This chapter goes beyond simply British public opinion. It will also focus upon public opinion in other member states. The British public are often presented as being ill-informed or even uninformed on EU issues, but the reality is that they are not the only ones. There is a lack of knowledge as to what the EU actually ‘does’ across all of Europe. The problem for the EU is how to influence public opinion without being presented as a propagandist. In the final chapter, we return to the question of the ‘reluctant European’. Specifically, it is about the extent to which Britain may still be considered worthy of such a label. As noted earlier, the problem is over the definition. With a clear definition, it would be easy to assess the extent to which Britain is still the ‘reluctant European’. The problem is that there is more than one definition, and utilising different definitions gives different results. Sitting on the fence and saying ‘maybe’ does not address the issue either. Yet wariness in casting the label may be the way forward. Britain might be a ‘reluctant European’ in certain policy areas, but not so in others. Possibly the label ought to be the ‘cautious European’. Yet the actions of the David Cameron-led coalition government suggested that ‘cautious’ is not the right word either. In wanting to renegotiate the terms of entry, and to put these new terms to a national referen-

Introduction   ­ 9

dum, David Cameron is portrayed as a ‘reluctant European’, and is presented as wishing to cherry-pick which EU laws Britain should follow and those which should not apply to Britain. Since winning the 2015 general election, Cameron has attempted to gain support from across the EU for his renegotiation. This raises a question mark against him being a ‘reluctant European’; perhaps ‘cautious’ is a more appropriate description, or even ‘pragmatic’. Conversely, however, Cameron could be seen as being a positive European. In trying to renegotiate the terms of entry for Britain, he is stimulating debate across Europe as to how much the EU interferes in domestic politics. This renegotiation for Britain may turn into a fundamental overhaul of the role and function of the EU. Thus Cameron may be prompting a Europe-wide debate about its future. This is hardly the action of a ‘reluctant European’, or even a ‘cautious European’. From this perspective, Cameron is trying to lead the debate on the future of Europe.



What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • There is a debate over what is a ‘reluctant European’. • In the United Kingdom, the negative aspects of the European Union tend to be highlighted far more frequently than the positive ones. • There are different ways of interpreting key terms and concepts.



Glossary of key terms Europeanisation  This can be seen as being part of the process of integration, whereby European ideas are spread across all member states. Yet it is a complicated term, with many interpretations. It can be perceived as the EU telling everyone what to do; alternatively, it can be about the institutions of the EU learning from the member states or encouraging thinking about the EU in a positive or negative manner. Integration  The idea here is of combining a range of different pieces into a single body. Within the context of the EU, this is where the different member states move closer and closer together, and may eventually become one. Reluctant European  This is a phrase used to describe the lack of British commitment to the EU. Britain was considered a reluctant European by not joining the original European Coal and Steel Community when it was formed. When Britain did eventually join, the label remained because

­10   Britain and the European Union Britain did not appear committed to developing the European project. It is a little surprising that only Britain appears worthy of such a label. Special relationship  A phrase used to describe the importance of the relationship between Britain and the USA. From a British perspective, it highlights that Britain, and British opinions, are considered to be of great importance to the most powerful country on this planet. Supranationalism  Such an approach sees countries working closely together. They cede sovereignty in certain areas to a higher authority, which will co-ordinate and police the making and implementation of policies in those specified areas across the organisation.

? Likely examination questions Why are the positive aspects of Britain’s relationship with the European Union so rarely presented? ‘Britain looks across the pond to the USA rather than across the ditch to Europe.’ Why have successive British Governments continued to do so?



Helpful websites One of the best places to obtain information about the EU is its own websites. There are many of them; http://europa.eu/index_en.htm is a useful starting point. For a positive perspective on British membership, look also at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website at www.fco. gov.uk. A more negative slant is available at www.bullen.demon.co.uk/ index.htm, from which there are numerous links.



Suggestions for further reading There are many textbooks on the EU. The best of these are M. Cini and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (eds) (2013), European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, 4th edition); N. Nugent (2010), The Government and Politics of the European Union (Palgrave, 7th edition); and I. Tömmel (2014), The European Union: What it is and how it works (Palgrave). For Britain’s relationship with the EU, see D. Watts and C. Pilkington (2005), Britain in the EU Today (Manchester University Press, 3rd edition). Two other texts worth considering, both of which look beyond merely Britain and the EU, are A. Blair (2015), Britain and the World since 1945 (Routledge) and A. Gamble (2003), Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Palgrave).

CHAPTER 2

History and Development of the EU Contents The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community From ECSC to EEC The first enlargement – Britain joins Enlargement to the south The European Union The northern enlargement The European Union grows to the east The euro crisis Who is the ‘reluctant European’?

Overview The European Union has developed gradually from a collection of states pooling their coal and steel resources through to the more integrated union that exists today. This process has been anything but smooth. National interests have conflicted with Community aims and objectives. The various periods of enlargement have also changed the EU from a group of six countries working fairly closely together to a rather unwieldy twenty-eight member states that exist today. In this chapter, we examine the origins and the development of the organisation since World War II. The role of the United Kingdom is very important, both as a non-participant in the early years and as an apparent ‘reluctant European’ ever since joining. The outside interests, particularly those of Britain, have also influenced how the EU developed. The historical overview presented in this chapter is essential for a clear understanding of the institutions and common policies of the EU which are analysed in subsequent chapters.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • Origins and development of the European Coal and Steel Community • Development of the EEC • From EC to EU • Britain’s non-participation • Enlargement • The ‘reluctant European’

12 14 15 18 19 23 24 27 28

­12   Britain and the European Union

The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community The origins of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) can be seen not just in the ruins of World War II but really from the aftermath of World War I. The fear of repeating the same mistakes, leading to the rise of fascism in Europe, haunted many politicians. Added to this was the fear of the growth of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the threat they seemed to pose to life and liberty in Western Europe. Mix into this the memories of two world wars fought across the European continent, and the carnage left in their aftermath. Nobody wished to endure such devastation again. The question was where to start in the rebuilding of Europe in the aftermath of World War II? Apart from US money – almost $13 billion – being pumped into Western Europe via the Marshall Plan (also known as the European Recovery Program), there was a feeling that Europe really needed to help itself. While the Marshall Plan was able to provide aid to assist in the rebuilding of different countries’ economies, the basis of any reconstruction of Europe ultimately required Franco-German reconciliation. The person credited with planning this reconciliation through intertwining the resources of heavy industry was Jean Monnet. Monnet was not a politician but a bureaucrat. He developed a plan to integrate the French and West German economies, which he passed on to the French Prime Minister, René Plevin, and to the French Foreign Secretary, Robert Schuman. It was Schuman who gave the political weight to Monnet’s proposals, and thus there was the Schuman Plan. Before anything could be started, Schuman required the support of both the Americans and the West Germans. Konrad Adenauer, the West German Chancellor, was very enthusiastic about the proposals, realising it was a way in which the rehabilitation of West Germany on the international scene could be hastened. The concept of pooling sovereignty over the coal and steel resources was pivotal. American support was lukewarm at first but soon grew. The next question for the French and West Germans was over which other countries should be invited into the ‘club’. Eastern

History and Development of the EU   ­ 13

Europe was under Soviet domination and would not be asked. Many other countries, particularly those in northern Europe, treasured their neutrality and feared upsetting the Soviet Union, not to mention their reservations over supranationalism. Other countries were under the control of military regimes. This, in effect, left the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), Italy and Britain. The British response was dismissive. The view from London was that Britain was one of the world’s leading powers, with a global empire. Added to this, its ‘special relationship’ with the United States was far more important. At best, Britain saw itself as a bridge between the United States and continental Europe. Mere trifles in the continental backyard were not to be entertained. Besides, in the aftermath of World War II, the British had only just nationalised their coal and steel industries. Having done this, there was no way in which Britain was willing to then ‘surrender’ ­sovereignty to a ­supranational organisation. The ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris, which was signed in April 1951. Six countries signed up to the organisation – Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The treaty established a number of institutions, including the High Authority, an assembly, a council of ministers and a court of justice. Its headquarters were in Luxembourg, and the first president was Monnet. The ECSC began operating from August 1952, with a fixed lifespan of fifty years. This was a significant first for sovereign states – the idea of ceding aspects of national sovereignty to a supranational body. The ECSC could, among other things, adjust tariff barriers, abolish subsidies and fix prices. There was some national resistance, but the integration of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands made the process much easier. The aim of creating a single market for coal and steel was not achieved but significant steps were taken in this area. It gave some impetus to developing the ECSC into a more diverse body – an economic community rather than specific aspects of national economies. With the relative success of the ECSC came the aim of creating the European Defence Community (EDC). This was a far more ambitious plan to promote co-operation on defence matters while incorporating West Germany into Western European defences. A draft treaty was drawn up in 1952 but was never ratified. A key

­14   Britain and the European Union

reason was French nervousness over (West) German rearmament, along with their reluctance to surrender control over their armed forces to a supranational organisation. Even today, there is still reluctance in this sphere from a number of member states with regard to the development of any collective European military capabilities.

From ECSC to EEC The original idea from Monnet and Schuman was the gradual development of the ECSC. It would be a long process of economic integration. The Benelux countries, however, saw the potential to develop the ECSC far more quickly. They envisaged a full customs union, based on what already existed between themselves but broadened out to include all six ECSC members, along with any others who wished to join. At the Messina Conference in 1955, a committee was established, headed by the Belgian Foreign Minister, PaulHenri Spaak, to investigate such a development. Spaak’s proposals included the creation of a common market, greater integration of national economies, the development of common social policies and the need to work together in developing some sort of common approach to atomic energy. The Spaak Report became the basis for the Treaty of Rome (now known as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union), the founding document of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Agency (Euratom). The treaty was signed in March 1957 and came into force on 1 January 1958. As with the formation of the ECSC, Britain was invited to participate. At the Messina Conference, the British Government sent junior Foreign Office officials in an observer capacity. Several committees were established by the British Government to examine the consequences of the formation of the EEC. One of their conclusions was quite startling – especially when released thirty years after the event. In effect, it said if the EEC was looking like a success, Britain might eventually have to join.1 The creation of the EEC saw the development of the institutions set up under the ECSC. Thus the assembly and the court of justice for the ECSC became those for all three bodies, while the High Authority evolved into the Commission.

History and Development of the EU   ­ 15

Included in the Treaty of Rome was the development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), although the CAP did not get off the ground until January 1962. While the CAP is examined in Chapter 4, it is important to note here that its primary aim was to make the EEC self-sufficient in food production. There was to be no chance of the EEC member states ever being dependent upon food imports. Thus vast sums of money were pumped into the agricultural sector to improve levels of food production. This early development of the EEC is often seen as the heyday of co-operation between the six member states. Yet this is the picture through rose-tinted spectacles; it was not quite as straightforward as presented in some history books. An obvious example of the fraught relationship can be seen in 1965–6, which led to the Luxembourg Compromise. There was a dispute in 1965 over how the CAP should be funded. It had been suggested that the power be taken away from the Council of Ministers and handed to the Commission and the Assembly. The French president, Charles de Gaulle, refused to accept such a move. A meeting was set to resolve the situation. The French were in the chair (as they held the presidency of the Council of Ministers). The meeting broke up very quickly with nothing resolved. The French Government recalled its officials, leaving an ‘empty-chair’ presidency. The situation was eventually resolved by what was called the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’. In effect, this ‘agreement to differ’ gave each member state a veto over any decisions if it was of vital national interest. It was not termed quite so crudely but stated that the members had to work together to achieve unanimity in their decision-making. The dispute over the funding of the CAP was not revisited.

The first enlargement – Britain joins After seeing the initial success of the EEC, the British Government decided to organise an alternative to it. This was the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was set up in 1960. The idea behind EFTA was to promote free trade rather than to create some sort of supranational organisation. For the EFTA countries,

­16   Britain and the European Union

the trade was to be in industrial goods – again a difference with the EEC, which seemed at this stage to be focusing upon agricultural production. There were seven founder members of EFTA – Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Finland joined later. EFTA was not overly successful, especially from a British perspective. The benefits for Britain were marginal when trading with the other EFTA states, whose economies were far smaller than that of Britain. Added to this, Britain traded far more with the Commonwealth. Consequently, Britain and some other EFTA members applied to join the EEC. Britain first applied to join the EEC in 1961 under Harold Macmillan’s Conservative Government; the Chief Negotiator, Edward Heath, led the application. It was, however, vetoed by President de Gaulle. De Gaulle feared that, by letting Britain join the EEC, it would be the ‘Trojan horse’ that would let the United States interfere in European matters. In his opinion, Britain was rather subservient to US whims. In 1956, Britain had backed out of the Suez venture, when Israel, Britain and France had colluded to invade Egypt to re-internationalise the Suez Canal. Britain had backed down as a result of US pressure. When Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent project, Blue Streak, was scrapped, it was to the United States that Britain turned rather than to Europe. It must be noted that while de Gaulle was opposed to British membership, the same could not be said of the other EEC members. They were more enthusiastic, but there was a requirement for unanimous decisionmaking. Added to this, there was a feeling among some EEC officials, with British commitments to the USA (via the ‘special relationship’) and to the Commonwealth, that Britain was not quite ready to join the EEC. Thus, this first application was vetoed in 1963. Britain was not the only applicant country turned down in 1963. Other applicants also refused membership at that time were Denmark, Ireland and Norway. A second application was made in 1967 – this time by the Labour Government of Harold Wilson. Again, de Gaulle vetoed this application (and, again, other applicant states – Denmark, Ireland and Norway – were also refused membership). Britain had been forced to devalue the pound in mid-1967, and de Gaulle claimed he could not let such a weak currency enter the EEC and drag down the collective

History and Development of the EU   ­ 17

European economy. Added to this, de Gaulle felt Britain was still too ‘Atlanticist’ rather than ‘European’. The ‘special relationship’ with the United States was still seen as being paramount to Britain, despite the fact that it was under great strain and made worse by Britain’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam. It made it easy for de Gaulle to veto Britain’s second application. Again, as with the first application, only the French Government seemed to oppose British membership. The other five member states had all expressed an interest in starting negotiations for British membership. In 1969, de Gaulle stood down as French President. His successor, Georges Pompidou, called for a summit meeting to be held on future developments of the EEC, focusing upon enlargement and greater integration. This was held in The Hague. At the Hague Summit, plans were introduced to stimulate further integration of the member states. These focused upon the development of a single currency (the Werner Plan) as well as increased political co-operation (the Davignon Plan), possibly leading to political union. Plans were also outlined for direct elections to the European Parliament. There was a clear commitment to enlargement at the Hague Summit. In fact, to make the process of enlargement far smoother, a collective EEC negotiating position was established. In both 1961 and 1967, all the applicant states had to negotiate with each individual member state. Thus, when Britain made a third application in 1971, the major obstacles to membership were missing. Pompidou was far more enthusiastic about enlargement to include Britain than de Gaulle had ever been. One reason for Pompidou’s support was that in Britain he would have an ally to slow down the process of political integration being proposed by the other member states. In 1971, there were again four applicant countries: Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. In the 1970 General Election, both major political parties in Britain committed themselves to negotiating terms of entry – although neither committed itself to joining. Thus, Prime Minister Edward Heath arguably did not have a mandate to take Britain into the EEC. This position was highlighted with all of the other applicant countries holding national referendums on membership.

­18   Britain and the European Union

Denmark and Ireland registered strong support for membership in their respective referendums, but the Norwegians voted against by a margin of 54 per cent to 46 per cent. On 1 January 1973, after some tortuous negotiations2 and referendums, Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EEC. Yet the tale of Britain’s application does not end here. In the February 1974 General Election, the Labour Party committed itself to renegotiating the terms of entry and then putting these new terms to a national referendum. Harold Wilson argued that the Heath Government had not got the best possible deal for Britain or the Commonwealth. Added to this, there had never been a mandate to enter the EEC, and the public needed to be consulted. Thus, upon gaining office, Wilson ordered that the terms of entry be renegotiated. Once done, these would be put to a referendum – which was held in June 1975. Arguably, the referendum had little to do with the EEC, and everything to do with keeping the Labour Party in office. Both major parties were divided on whether or not to remain in the EEC. Therefore, the party whip was suspended for the referendum. It was agreed that once the people had decided this issue, it would be put to rest. With the party whip suspended, there were some curious bedfellows on each side of the referendum debate. On the ‘No’ side were Enoch Powell and Tony Benn. Powell was well to the right of the Conservative Party, while Benn was definitely on the left of the Labour Party. In the ‘Yes’ camp, there were key members of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. This strong central base won through. The ‘No’ camp was presented as the extremes of British politics, including Marxists and fascists, as well as some prominent British politicians, as mentioned earlier. The ‘Yes’ camp was portrayed as representing the centre ground of British politics, that is mainstream, common-sense politics. On a turnout of 63 per cent, two-thirds of voters supported continued membership of the EEC.

Enlargement to the south The first enlargement comprised north European countries. The next two enlargements (Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986) have been described as the southern or Mediterranean

History and Development of the EU   ­ 19

Enlargements. All three states had been under the control of military juntas for many years. Portugal had been under a dictatorship since the 1920s, Spain since the 1930s, while the Greek military had been in control of the country for only seven years (1967–74). In the 1970s, democratic elections were held (Greece in 1974, Portugal in 1975 and Spain in 1977). A key step in strengthening these fledgling democracies was seen to be Community membership. There were, for example, electoral commitments from many Greek politicians to join the EEC at the earliest opportunity. An attempted coup in Spain in 1981 highlighted just how tenuous were the democratic elements in the country. Not only were the economies of all three countries underdeveloped, they were strongly agrarian, although parts of northern Spain were quite industrialised. All three economies were also quite weak – well below the Community average. In 1980, the GDP per capita of Spain was half that of France or Germany (or two-thirds that of Britain). Greek GDP per capita was slightly less than that of Spain, while Portugal was around half that of Spain. Their respective dependence on agriculture was to put some strain on the CAP. Over a fifth of Spaniards worked in the agricultural sector at that time, as did over a quarter of Portuguese and almost a third of Greeks. On top of this, there were also a number of issues, particularly with Spanish membership, over fishing rights. There was strong pressure to grant development funds to all three states, but this was to be phased in. To have done otherwise would have damaged many regions of the nine member states which were dependent upon regional development funding. There were also concerns about economic migrants – people leaving these poorer countries in search of jobs in the wealthier member states. The overarching aim of getting Greece, Spain and Portugal more integrated into Western Europe prevailed.

The European Union The European Community (EC) was not just getting larger, it was also gradually becoming more integrated. There were stepping stones towards the creation of the European Union – most notably the Single European Act (SEA), the creation of the Single Market

­20   Britain and the European Union

and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed at Maastricht and also known as the Maastricht Treaty. The whole issue of integration versus expansion is examined in greater detail in Chapter 7; the steps towards the formation of the EU are noted here. The SEA was the launch pad for the Single Market – the idea of no internal frontiers within the EC. This was a small step in the integration of the Community members, and it quickly became clear that much more was needed. The SEA became law in 1987 and the Single Market came into effect in 1993. The idea of the Single Market was based upon what were described as the ‘four freedoms’: freedom of movement for goods, people, capital and services. States could no longer interfere in cross-border transactions between member states. There was also a political aspect to the SEA. Most notably, while it did not challenge the Luxembourg Compromise, it did extend qualified majority voting to the Single Market programme. The SEA also increased the importance of the European Parliament. Although some member states were resistant to this move, increased consultation between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament was introduced – known as the ‘co-operation procedure’. This is examined in greater detail in Chapter 3. In retrospect, the SEA was a springboard towards the formation of the EU and the introduction of the single currency. Had this been so obvious at the time, it is highly unlikely that the British Government, led by Margaret Thatcher, would have forced the legislation through the House of Commons on a guillotined debate and a three-line whip. Thatcher saw the SEA as an economic agreement, and seemingly ignored the politics. The TEU extended the economic developments of the SEA but also gave added powers to the European institutions. The European Parliament, for example, had its powers extended from ‘co-­ operation’ to ‘co-decision maker’. Other areas of structural development included the creation of a European Ombudsman and the formation of the Committee of Regions. As well as structural developments to the EU, there were also policy changes. Included in the TEU was the plan to develop a single currency for the organisation. At this time, it was only a proposal. There were no steps outlined, nor a timetable proposed. There were

History and Development of the EU   ­ 21

other policy developments, including the Social Charter (to which Britain negotiated an opt-out), public health policy and transport. This move towards an EU saw the development of the idea of the three pillars. The first ‘pillar’ was the organisation that already existed – the EC, with the single market, common policies, the structural funds, and so on. The second ‘pillar’ of the EU was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy is examined in Chapter 4. Briefly, it covers how the EU tries to influence foreign affairs – in some respects it is to do with the development of the identity of the EU at the international level. It also covers the possibility of developing some form of common defence policy. Any moves here – in defence or foreign policy – needed to be taken through unanimous decision-making. The third ‘pillar’ of the EU is Justice and Home Affairs. If the CFSP is to do with external security, the Justice and Home Affairs pillar is about internal security. As with the CFSP, this third pillar tries to establish common positions rather than a common policy. Subject areas include asylum, drugs, police co-operation, and so on. Both the second and third pillars of the EU are very much intergovernmental – the different governments of the member states working together (see Chapter 6). Collectively, the EC, the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs combined as the three pillars of the EU. Throughout the negotiations for the TEU, Britain appeared to adopt a far more positive approach. Prime Minister John Major went into the negotiations with a wish list, as well as a list of things to which his government objected. The results were such that Major was praised for his negotiating skills by both pro- and anti-TEU campaigners alike. Having said this, Major had severe difficulties in getting the TEU ratified by Parliament. A paving motion – to debate the treaty in advance of any proposed legislation – was passed with a majority of only three. Had Major lost this vote, it was later revealed, he would have stepped down as prime minister. Unlike in Denmark, there was no referendum. The Danes initially rejected the TEU before a second referendum ratified the treaty. Subsequent to the TEU, there have been three other treaties – Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon – as well as the failure to adopt an EU constitution. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) developed the TEU further. This was carried out after the northern enlargement (see

­22   Britain and the European Union

below). There had been plans for the Amsterdam Treaty to develop a proper political union, in line with what had been developed in the economic sphere by the SEA and the TEU. Yet these plans were never realised. There were some changes to areas such as asylum seekers, immigration, social policy and the environment. Added to this, Britain repealed its opt-out from the Social Charter. There were also attempts to make the EU more transparent in its operations. The Treaty of Nice (2001) prepared the EU for further enlargement – to the East. There were very complicated negotiations, which included a complete overhaul of the structures of the EU. This was needed to cope with a proposed enlargement of twelve member states, with others also queuing to join. The structures and processes of the EU could not cope with a potential membership of as many as twenty-seven or thirty countries. As with the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty of Nice failed to live up to expectations. There was much tinkering done to the institutions (as will be seen in Chapter 3), but the larger countries were unwilling to surrender their dominant position within the EU – and the whole process was further complicated by the Republic of Ireland. According to the Irish constitution, the Treaty of Nice had to be subject to a referendum. The Irish, like the Danes in 1992, voted against the treaty. Instructions issued from the Commission were that the Irish had to hold a second referendum and to get the right result! This was duly done. A draft EU constitution was submitted to the European Council in 2003. Part of this proposed treaty was to simplify many of the roles and functions undertaken by the EU; in effect, to make the EU more accessible to the people of Europe. It would have replaced all existing treaties. Each article within the proposed constitution was based on a pre-existing provision in another treaty. It even included plans to reduce the size of the Commission. While much of this constitution was about making the EU more like a state, there was also some increase in the powers of the EU as a whole. In particular, there was to be an extension of the range of areas using qualified majority voting (see Chapter 3), including the common transport policy, border checks and asylum. The draft constitution was ratified in fifteen of the then twentyfive member states. Both France and the Netherlands held national referendums that returned ‘No’ votes. Some members, including

History and Development of the EU   ­ 23

Britain and Poland, had planned to hold referendums on the draft constitution but, after the two ‘No’ results, decided not to hold them. Instead, the legislation was left in limbo. The EU decided to revisit aspects of the draft constitution. This became known as the Lisbon Treaty or the Reform Treaty. To many Eurosceptics, the Lisbon Treaty is the draft constitution marginally amended. It is, in reality, a much-reduced version of the draft constitution, with many similar stated aims and objectives. Supporters of the Lisbon Treaty argue that it streamlines the institutions of the EU. For example, included in the treaty was the introduction of a new President of the European Council (see Chapter 3). Rather than having a rotating presidency, where every country in turn held the presidency for six months, a new post was created, with the post holder in place for two-and-a-half years. A post was also developed to enhance the presence of the EU in foreign affairs – the High Representative. This was a lot more controversial because anything to do with foreign affairs is seen as a national competence rather than that of the EU. Hence many Eurosceptics saw this post as a power grab by the EU. The one prominent success story, although even this may be contested, in the development of the EU was the successful introduction of the single currency – the euro – in 2002. The criteria for joining had been laid down in the TEU, although no timetable had been laid out. The convergence criteria – to harmonise all currencies that were to be replaced by the euro – appeared quite stringent. There were limits on national budget deficits, as well as on public debt. There were also constraints upon interest rates. Britain and Denmark opted out of the final stage of the single currency at the time of the TEU negotiations. Of the twelve states that originally joined the euro, all had allegations made against them of fudging the convergence criteria. Regardless, the single currency went ahead. The consequences of this are examined below.

The northern enlargement After the success of creating the EU, there came the opportunity for further enlargement. This must be seen in conjunction with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe

­24   Britain and the European Union

and the reunification of Germany. German reunification took place in 1990, prior to the creation of the EU. Through reunification, East Germany was able to join the then EC without even applying or meeting any of the criteria for joining. As a result, not only did many East European countries request membership – especially in the light of the treatment of East Germany – but also countries that had remained neutral throughout the Cold War period. Four countries’ applications were considered – Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway. The Norwegians, as in 1973, were accepted into the Union but then held a referendum whereby the people voted against membership. Thus, in 1995, the Twelve became Fifteen. This enlargement was the easiest of all. The three countries were economically advanced, were not dependent upon the CAP and would become net contributors to the EU budget. As members of EFTA, they had already taken steps to align their economies with that of the EU. EFTA members have associate membership of the EU. Added to this, they had already taken on board much of the EU legislation that applied in all member states (known as the acquis communautaire).

The European Union grows to the east The next series of enlargements have been to include countries formerly under Soviet domination, along with Malta and Cyprus. (A summary of all enlargements is presented in Table 2.1.) Whereas the 1995 enlargement was fairly straightforward, the 2004 and 2007 versions were anything but. Originally, there were ten East European applicants, along with the two Mediterranean island states. The Bulgarian and Romanian applications were put on hold as neither country was considered to have a sufficiently developed economy to join. Initially, they failed the Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria had been applied in the previous enlargement process. As the countries had sufficiently developed economies, this posed little problem. For the countries of Eastern Europe, it was far more complicated. Having introduced a market economy after Soviet withdrawal, all East European economies were fragile. This was exacerbated by the political circumstances in these fledgling democracies. In fact, the political situation was remark-

History and Development of the EU   ­ 25

ably similar to that of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As at that time, there were fears in many of the fifteen member states of economic migrants fleeing Eastern Europe in search of jobs in the wealthier West. Parts of the British media predicted that millions of East Europeans would enter Britain within months of joining the EU. There are three strands to the Copenhagen Criteria. The first focuses upon the political institutions. Here the emphasis is upon democratic rights for all citizens, the importance of the rule of law and protection of minority rights. The second strand is economic. There is a need for a functioning market economy. This economy must be able to cope with the rigours and demands set on it through complying with all EU law. Finally, there are the obligations of membership – this is the third strand. Here the emphasis is upon adhering to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The Eastern enlargements were the most problematic of all. In 2004, the eight East European countries were underdeveloped economically, especially when compared to the rest of the EU. The enlargement was so big that all of the EU institutions needed Table 2.1  Summary of the enlargements of the European Economic Community/European Union Date Country 1 January 1973

Denmark, Ireland, UK

1 January 1981

Greece

1 January 1986

Portugal, Spain

1 January 1995

Austria, Finland, Sweden

1 May 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 1 May 2007

Bulgaria, Romania

1 July 2013

Croatia

­26   Britain and the European Union

to be r­e-evaluated. Thus, there were huge changes to all the EU institutions. For example, the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from each member state was reassessed, as was the number of Commissioners. All of this is examined in greater detail in Chapter 3. The two subsequent enlargements saw little more than tinkering with Union structures. As with the enlargements to the South (Greece, Spain and Portugal), EU monies from such things as the CAP were to be phased in gradually over a period of ten years. Most of the newcomers argued they had the right to receive the full amount from the budget upon gaining membership (although no complaints were made about the phasing in of budgetary contributions). In this, they were to be disappointed. Full funding had been phased in during the Mediterranean enlargement; thus a precedent had been set. The new member states had to continue modernising their economies from within. There would only be some EU money to help. A consequence of this was an upsurge in feeling against EU membership in most of the new member states. The later Eastern enlargements raised more concerns about the strength of the economies of the new member states. Bulgaria and Romania were far less developed than any of the earlier eight East European countries. There was much scaremongering in the West European media about the social and economic impact of the Bulgarian and Romanian enlargement. In comparison – and this may be due to the size of the country – there were fewer concerns raised about Croatian membership, although Slovenia proved to be something of a stumbling block. Croatia has a number of border disputes with other former republics of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was the only former Yugoslav republic that was a member of the EU. It was willing to veto Croatia’s application until their border dispute was resolved. The other border disputes remain unresolved but did not impact upon the membership bid. Economically, Croatia was more developed than many other East European members, although concerns have been expressed about the high rates of unemployment – at the time of accession, they were the third largest in the EU, behind Greece and Spain. With Bulgaria and Romania, there were concerns about the extent of organised crime in both countries; a requirement was

History and Development of the EU   ­ 27

placed on each of them to combat such crime. Six-monthly reports have to be submitted by both countries to demonstrate what they are doing in this regard, and failure to make progress in tackling organised crime may see EU monies be temporarily withheld until better progress is made.

The euro crisis Although the establishment of the single currency may be seen as one of the major success stories of the EU, the euro crisis has brought into question the extent of the success. Between 2009 and 2014, questions were being raised as to whether or not the euro could continue as a viable currency. The origins of the euro crisis lie in the financial crisis that hit the world in 2008. With many banks either failing or on the brink of failing, individual governments bailed them out. As a result, this ran up huge levels of public debt, resulting in a sovereign debt crisis, where there was the possibility of some countries failing to meet their financial obligations and, in effect, going bankrupt. In Europe, the worst offender was Greece – successive Greek governments had previously hidden the extent of the country’s national debt, which was well in excess of the limits set under the criteria to join the single currency. Other countries, most notably Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, were also in dire financial straits – and all five countries used the euro as their currency. Consequently, these countries were unable to adjust interest rates or devalue their currency in an attempt to rebalance their respective economies. This left the only option of cutting public spending in the hope of reducing the levels of debt. It was this inability of these weaker countries to meet their financial obligations that brought into question whether or not the euro could continue as a currency. The European Central Bank (ECB) had to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Commission to bail out Greece, while at the same time imposing austerity measures on the Greek Government as a pre-condition of receiving a bail-out. Other eurozone countries received bail-outs too, but on nowhere near the scale of Greece. These austerity measures caused individual economies to contract, resulting in an even deeper recession. The problem here is that the monetary policy (interest

­28   Britain and the European Union

rates) had to be set to benefit seventeen different countries. One possible solution, which was not introduced, was for the EU to take over the fiscal policy (taxes and public spending) of all eurozone members. In effect, this would mean the creation of a superstate in all but name. Unsurprisingly, there was a near total lack of support for such a measure. In August 2013, the eurozone countries collectively moved out of recession. By 2014, there was guarded speculation that the euro crisis might be over.

Who is the ‘reluctant European’? This is an important aspect of this book, and one which will be returned to repeatedly. The final chapter will address the question in full, but several important points need to be noted. First of all, there is the question of ‘what is a reluctant European?’ The answer to this question will then determine who are labelled the reluctant Europeans. For example, if a ‘reluctant European’ is a country that does not want to be a member of the EU, then there are a number of candidate countries. Top of the list would be Norway, who have applied four times, been accepted twice but then rejected both offers in national referendums. Another country that does not seem to want to take part in the European experiment is Switzerland. The Swiss have even refused to join the European Economic Area (EEA), which co-ordinates free trade across all of Europe. Finally, there is Greenland. As part of Denmark, Greenland gained EEC membership in 1973, but withdrew in 1982. It could be argued that during the early years of the ECSC and the EEC, Britain was a ‘reluctant European’ – using the same criteria applied to Norway and others. In the 1950s, Britain chose not to join. That this position was reversed in the 1960s would clearly show that, if being a ‘reluctant European’ meant not being involved with the organisation at all, then by 1961, Britain was no longer a ‘reluctant European’. At the other end of the scale is the idea of a ‘reluctant European’ as a country that does not participate in the European experiment with any degree of enthusiasm. There is participation – that is, membership – but there seems to be a dragging of feet at times. While

History and Development of the EU   ­ 29

this is still a rather vague description of a ‘reluctant European’, it highlights a problem. Almost every member state could be described as a ‘reluctant European’ at some time or another. The French could gain the label over forcing the Luxembourg Compromise or voting against the proposed EU constitution, the Danes for not ratifying the TEU at the first attempt and opting out of the euro, the Irish over the Nice Treaty and not supporting the East European enlargement, the Swedes for voting against joining the euro, the Dutch for voting against the proposed EU constitution, all the members who are unenthusiastic about further enlargement (or even previous enlargements) or even those who are unenthused about reforming the CAP. Yet the country that has received the label ‘reluctant European’ is Britain. There is a long list of reasons as to why such a label has been used. At first, there was reluctance to join. Upon joining, the terms of entry were renegotiated. There was a demand from one particular prime minister for ‘our money back’, and she repeated this demand frequently before getting a special budgetary rebate, which has since been guarded zealously. There were frequent refusals throughout the 1980s to join in the European Monetary System. During the negotiations on the TEU, John Major refused to allow the word ‘federal’ to be used in the treaty – although he was willing to allow ‘ever closer union’, which is a phrase with far stronger connotations of a single superstate. Britain refused to join the euro. Specific barriers, notably Gordon Brown’s ‘Five Economic Tests’, made it increasingly difficult for Britain to join, and subsequent governments ruled out joining altogether. On top of all of this, as feared by de Gaulle, Britain continually looks to the USA rather than to Europe. The war in Iraq is a clear example. Finally, in a situation reminiscent of the 1970s, a British prime minister has demanded to be able to renegotiate the terms of entry and to put those new terms of membership to a national referendum. The above list seems quite comprehensive. Britain is a ‘reluctant European’. Yet it is also proactive at times in its membership of the EU. For example, Britain has been to the forefront in combating fraud in the EU. Britain has been one of the strongest advocates for reform of the CAP. During the negotiations on the TEU, it was the British Government that proposed a European Ombudsman. Britain was eager to develop a European Rapid Reaction Force

­30   Britain and the European Union

to work alongside NATO, to enhance the EU’s role as a ‘regional police force’, but not to supplant the role of NATO. All of this would suggest that Britain is not as reluctant a European as is sometimes portrayed. So who is the ‘reluctant European’? The answer is not obvious. It could apply to almost any member state. Britain earns the label as it is one of the largest countries in the European Union, and one of the most vocal when it comes to opposing some schemes that have been proposed by the EU. Yet, once decisions are made, Britain is consistent in enforcing the EU decisions. The label is harsh. Arguably, it was justified prior to EEC membership and even during the Thatcher years. During the Major and Blair years, it was not nearly so clear cut, although domestic politics clearly influenced the positions of these two prime ministers. The current regime appears to have taken a step back to the more Thatcherite or Gaullist position of putting national priorities ahead of anything to do with the EU. It may be that other members’ foibles are not so widely and loudly pointed out, but there are times when Britain appears to want to be seen as a ‘reluctant European’. This appears most evident with David Cameron’s repeated demands to renegotiate the terms of entry.



What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The European Union of today has developed from the European Coal and Steel Community of the early 1950s. The founding father was Jean Monnet. The process of moving from ECSC to the EU has been gradual. • There have been several stages of enlargement. The first, in 1973, included Britain. The most recent included East European countries which had previously been under Soviet domination, as well as the island states of Malta and Cyprus. • The concept ‘reluctant European’ is one that has been given to Britain. There are, however, a number of problems here. The first is the difficulty in explaining the concept. Different interpretations mean that different countries may be worthy of the label. The second is that, while Britain appears to be reluctant at times, many other member states do too.

History and Development of the EU   ­ 31



Glossary of key terms Acquis communautaire  This is the packet of treaties and legislation which has already been passed by the EU that any new member states must accept as part of joining the EU. Cold War  This is the period of dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. It is described as a ‘cold’ war as there was no actual fighting between the protagonists. At times there was fighting between proxies. The war itself was ideological – capitalism versus communism – and was over hearts and minds, rather than involving actual fighting. When there is fighting, a war is described as a ‘hot’ war. Copenhagen Criteria  These are the criteria any member state must meet to be able to join the EU. They look at political institutions (democracy), the economy (it must be market-dominated), and an applicant state must be able to cope with the rigours of membership. Enlargement  This is where the EU increases the number of members. There have been several enlargements – 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2013. European Atomic Agency (Euratom)  The European Atomic Agency was set up alongside the EEC. Its aim was to focus upon developing a nuclear energy programme for economic purposes. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)  The original founding body of the EU was the ECSC. It was created by the Schuman Plan, which led to the Treaty of Paris. The ECSC came into being in 1952 with a life expectancy of fifty years. European Defence Community (EDC)  This was a European defence pact that was drawn up in 1952 to include West Germany in the defence of Western Europe against possible Soviet invasion. It was never ratified. European Economic Community (EEC)  This organisation was set up in 1957 to integrate further the economies of the ECSC members beyond simply coal and steel. The Treaty of Rome (now known as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) is the founding document. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)  This is a body set up to counteract the EEC. The emphasis was upon free trade, particularly in industrial goods. There was to be no surrender of sovereignty. European Union (EU)  The EU was established via the Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed at Maastricht in 1991. It extended the economic integration of the member states, as well as the political integration. More powers were given to the EU institutions, especially the European Parliament. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  The person occupying this post is the EU spokesperson for foreign affairs.

­32   Britain and the European Union Luxembourg Compromise  All member states have a veto over policy proposals if they constitute a serious threat to national interests. Monnet, Jean  He is the founding father of the ECSC. Monnet was the brains behind integrating aspects of the French and West German economies to prevent further wars between the two countries. He became the first President of the ECSC High Authority. Reluctant European  This is a phrase used to describe the lack of British commitment to the EU. Britain was considered a reluctant European by not joining the original European Coal and Steel Community when it was formed. When Britain did eventually join, the label remained because Britain did not appear committed to developing the European project. It is a little surprising that only Britain appears worthy of such a label. Schuman Plan  This was the plan developed by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet which led to the creation of the ECSC. Sovereignty  This is the right of a state to pass laws within its own territory. It is suggested that EU membership undermines national sovereignty as all members have to cede a range of powers to the EU. Added to this, EU law overrides national law when the two conflict. Special relationship  A phrase used to describe the importance of the relationship between Britain and the USA. From a British perspective, it highlights that Britain, and British opinions, are considered to be of great importance to the most powerful country on this planet. Supranationalism  When powers are ceded to the EU institutions, this suggests a movement towards supranationalism. This is especially the case when the EU is able to force member states to adopt particular policies, even if there is national reluctance.

? Likely examination questions Britain has been described as the ‘reluctant European’. To what extent is this label justified? ‘The EU is too big and too unwieldy. There should be no further enlargements. Instead, a two-speed Europe should be introduced.’ Discuss. Why are the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) perceived as stepping stones towards creating a federal Europe? ‘The EU Constitution Treaty was a step too far down the integration process.’ Discuss.

History and Development of the EU   ­ 33



Helpful websites The EU has a calendar of key events at http://europa.eu/about-eu/ eu-history/index_en.htm The coverage is a comprehensive timeline, going beyond the EU, but with no analysis. For a brief potted history of the development of the EU, going back to 1919, a very useful site is www.historiasiglo20.org/europe Although this is a Spanish site, this particular section is in English.



Suggestions for further reading The history of Britain’s relationship with Europe has been well documented. Sources that cover the relationship before Britain joined include S. Burgess and G. Edwards (1988), ‘The Six Plus One: British Policy-making and the Question of European Economic Integration, 1955’ International Affairs vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 393–413 and M. Camps (1964), Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Oxford University Press). On the negotiations to join the then EEC, there is U. Kitzinger (1973), Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (Thames and Hudson) and S. Young (1973), Terms of Entry: Britain’s Negotiations with the European Community 1970–1972 (Heinemann). On the British referendum, an excellent overview is presented in U. Kitzinger and D. Butler (1976), The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan). Finally, for a very good overview of the relationship, see A. Blair (2015), Britain and the World since 1945 (Routledge) and S. Nello (2005), The European Union: Economics, Policies and History (McGraw-Hill).

CHAPTER 3

Institutions of the European Union Contents The Commission 35 The European Council 41 The Council of Ministers 43 COREPER47 The European Parliament 48 The Court of Justice 54 The Committee of Regions 55 The European Economic and Social Committee 57 The European Ombudsman 58 The ‘democratic deficit’ 60

Overview The institutions of the European Union have evolved as the organisation has developed. Each of them has acquired new powers, although there has also been some movement towards sharing power. The whole idea of sharing power between the institutions of the EU has not always been greeted enthusiastically. Added to this, member states are often reluctant to cede powers to the EU institutions. Where new bodies have been created, the older, more established bodies have been reluctant to share power with them. This has caused some problems for the EU as a whole. This chapter will examine how the different institutions have evolved from those set up in the 1950s. There will be a greater focus upon the current powers of the major EU institutions.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • The major institutions of the European Union – Commission, Council of Ministers, COREPER, European Council, Parliament and the Court of Justice • How these bodies have developed • The powers of these different bodies • The newer bodies – Committee of Regions, Ombudsman and the European Economic and Social Committee • Britain’s role within all the EU institutions • The ‘democratic deficit’

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 35

The Commission The European Commission receives much bad press in the UK. It is often portrayed as a giant octopus, attempting to get its tentacles into every aspect of our lives. Thus we hear stories of the Commission issuing regulations to ban the British sausage, or compel donkey owners working on beaches to put nappies on their donkeys in order to keep the beaches clean. The problem is there may be a grain of truth in the proposals, but not in the way in which many of these stories are reported. What makes the situation even worse is that the Commission is anything but transparent; it is very difficult to find out what it actually does. On top of this, the Commission is appointed. It then appears very difficult to hold the Commissioners to account for their actions. Perhaps it is no wonder the Commission receives such bad press. The Commission was set up under the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). Arguably, its predecessor was the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). With the merger of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom in 1967, the High Authority and the Commission were merged into a single body. The Commission is involved in the decision-making processes of the European Union (EU) at all levels. While it is often presented as being the civil service of the EU, its role is actually far more complicated. The Commission does draw up legislative proposals, but these are for the consideration of the other EU institutions. Once the laws are ‘passed’, the Commission is then involved in their implementation – although this is done at the national level rather than at the EU level. The different types of laws are outlined in Box 3.1. As well as being involved in the law-making processes of the EU, the Commission is also known as ‘the Guardian of the Treaties’. This means that the Commission attempts to make sure all member states uphold the various treaties of the EU – to the letter as well as the spirit of the treaties. The Commission also works towards developing ‘ever closer union’ within the EU. A major problem for the Commission is that it stands at the crossroads between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.

­36   Britain and the European Union

Box 3.1  The laws of the European Union Many different laws are passed by the European Union. They are often portrayed as being some sort of blanket legislation covering the entire EU, but this is not always the case. The EU can make legislation in a number of areas, and these are growing. There are a number of ­different types of legislation: • Regulations These are the most powerful of the EU laws. They are binding on all member states in every respect. This means that the EU is telling all member states not only what to do but also how to do it. An example of a regulation is Council Regulation no. 510 (2006). This was about the protection of products from specific geographical areas, for example Parma ham and Melton Mowbray pork pies. • Directives These are binding on the member states. How they are implemented is left up to the national governments. Thus, the aim or objective of the legislation is made clear but the way in which this is achieved is left to the discretion of each national government. An example of a directive is Council Directive 93/104/EC, which was then amended by Directive 2000/34/EC. These directives focused on minimum requirements covering certain aspects of the organisation of working time connected with workers’ health and safety. • Decisions These are binding on the member states, organisations or individuals to which they are addressed. An example of a decision is Council Decision 33/2003/EC. This established criteria and procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfill sites. It was addressed to all member states. Another example is Decision 2007/53/EC against the Microsoft Corporation for abusing a dominant market position. • Recommendations and Opinions These are purely advisory and are not binding in any way whatsoever. Recommendations and opinions are often used to ‘test the water’ on new EU proposals. Examples of Commission Recommendations are SEC (2009) 580 and 581. These focused on remuneration policies in the financial services sector, with particular regard to risk-taking.   The Committee of Regions issued an Opinion on achieving European Climate Change and Energy Goals (CdR 388/2008), with a special focus on the covenant of mayors.

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 37

This debate is examined in Chapter 6, but a brief point needs to be made here. The supranational aspect of the Commission (which tends to dominate) sees the Commission as working towards greater integration and ultimately towards a proper European union. The Commissioners are all supposed to work towards this goal. Yet there is also an intergovernmental aspect as well. Each member state gets to nominate its own ‘national’ Commissioner – every member state has its own Commissioner. Each Commissioner is supposed to work for the Commission rather than his or her own national government but the national nomination has some impact. Currently, there are twenty-eight Commissioners. With each future enlargement, the number of Commissioners is likely to grow unless there is some fundamental reform of the Commission which breaks away from the national nomination – and whenever such an idea is raised, national governments suddenly become very reluctant to agree. No country wants to be the first not to have its own Commissioner. The Commission is headed by a president. This post is currently held by Jean-Claude Juncker, who replaced José Manuel Barroso in 2014. The membership of the Commission is listed in Table 3.1. Each commissioner is allocated a portfolio by the president. National governments may nominate their member but they have limited input into the allocation of portfolios. At best, they can lobby the president for specific posts but there is no compunction for the president to listen. With regard to the 2014 appointments, there were concerns with four nominees, one of whom was the British nominee, Jonathan Hill (Lord Hill of Oareford). He was recalled by the European Parliamentary interview panel because the panel members were not wholly convinced that he was capable of filling his designated portfolio. After the second interview, his nomination was approved. The only body that can block the appointment of Commissioners is the European Parliament – and this happened in 2004. The then president, José Manuel Barroso, presented his nominations to the European Parliament. The Parliament can either accept or reject the proposed commission; it cannot veto an individual appointment. Many Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) took exception to the Italian nominee (Rocco Buttiglione) and his specified p ­ ortfolio.

­38   Britain and the European Union

Table 3.1  The Juncker Commission (appointed October 2014) Name

Country Portfolio

Jean-Claude Juncker

Luxembourg

Frans Timmermans

Netherlands First vice-president for Better Regulation, Inter-institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights

Andrus Ansip

Estonia Vice-president for the Digital Single Market

Valdis Dombrovskis

Latvia Vice-president for the Euro and Social Dialogue

Kristalina Georgieva

Bulgaria Vice-president for Budget and Human Resources

Jyrki Katainen

Finland Vice-president for Jobs, Growth, Investment and Competitiveness

Federica Mogherini

Italy High Representative for Foreign Policy

Maroš Šefcˇovicˇ

Slovakia

Vice-president for Energy Union

Vytenis Andriukaitis

Lithuania

Health and Food Safety

Dimitris Avramopoulos

Greece

Migration and Home Affairs

Elzbieta Bienkowska

Poland Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Space

Violeta Bulc

Slovenia

Transport

Miguel Arias Cañete

Spain

Climate Action and Energy

Corina Cret¸ u

Romania

Regional Policy

Johannes Hahn

Austria Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement

President

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 39

Name

Country Portfolio

Phil Hogan

Ireland Agriculture and Rural Development

Jonathan Hill

UK

Ve˘ra Jourová

Czech Justice, Consumers and Gender Republic Equality

Cecilia Malmström

Sweden

Neven Mimica

Croatia International Co-operation and Development

Carlos Moedas

Portugal

Pierre Moscovici

France Economic and Financial Affairs, and Taxation Customs Union

Tibor Navracsics

Hungary Education, Culture, Youth and Sport

Günther Oettinger

Germany

Karmenu Vella

Malta Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

Christos Stylianides

Cyprus Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management

Marianne Thyssen

Belgium Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility

Margrethe Vestager

Denmark

Financial Services

Trade

Research, Science and Innovation

Digital Economy

Competition

He was opposed to gay rights and some aspects of women’s rights, and was being proposed to the post of Justice, Freedom and Security. Neither Barroso nor the Italian Government would retract the nomination to the portfolio, so the European Parliament rejected the entire Commission. Buttiglione stood down and the Italian Government presented an alternative nomination. A few other changes were made and the European Parliament accepted the p ­ roposed Commission.

­40   Britain and the European Union

As already noted, Britain’s appointment to the 2014 Commission is Jonathan Hill. He is a close Cameron ally, but did not fit with the profile that Jean-Claude Juncker wanted for the new Commission. Juncker wanted high-profile personnel, as well as a much better gender profile. Hill fits neither. There was speculation that two former Conservative Party leaders – William Hague and Michael Howard – had been offered the post but turned it down. There was also speculation that Hill did not want the posting either. His interviews after his appointment parroted the official UK government position on the EU, instilling little confidence in the appointment. The Commission has a number of roles to play and a variety of powers. The first of these, which has already been noted, is the power to propose and develop legislation. Arguably, this is the most important role played by the Commission. The power to propose legislation lies with the Commission alone – although any proposals must be accepted by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. A second power is responsibility for the EU budget. Not only does the Commission draft the budget and guide it through the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, but it also administers the spending of the EU. The Commission makes sure that revenue is collected and that accounts are accurate where there is spending. The Commission is also the external representative of the EU. Like any country, the EU has established embassies (or, more accurately, offices) around the world. The Commission deals with the United Nations and other international organisations, including the G8. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, there has been a specific post entitled the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which is normally shortened to the High Representative. Holders of this post have included Javier Solano and Catherine Ashton; the latter was succeeded in October 2014 by Federica Modherini. The High Representative speaks for the EU on foreign policy, after the policy has been agreed by the member states. There is a prominent role for the Commission as the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’. In effect, this means the Commission has to make sure all member states are upholding both the spirit and the letter of

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 41

the various treaties that have been drawn up, for example the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty on European Union, as well as other legislation ratified by the EU. Finally, the Commission acts as the conscience of the EU. This can be seen as the role of mediator between conflicting interests – be they between member states or member states and other EU institutions. The whole idea of the Commission is to promote the general interests of the EU. It has to act above simple national interests and perform a supranational role.

The European Council The European Council is sometimes perceived to be little more than an extension of the Council of Ministers. It could also be seen as the upper tier of the Council of Ministers. In this respect, the European Council is far more powerful than the Council of Ministers. It can set the agenda for the Council of Ministers and for the Commission, and can override or even ignore the European Parliament as well. The European Council is not, however, part of the Council of Ministers. It merely has the power and authority to override the Council of Ministers. Since its formalisation as an institution via the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has become far more prominent. The European Council started to meet in 1974, although it was not until the Single European Act that these meetings or summits were given formal recognition. These summits were held twice a year, and were originally chaired by the country holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers. The summits only lasted for two days but were very intensive. In the past they have been held in regional cities of the host state, but now they tend to be held in Brussels. Today, the summits are chaired by the President of the European Council, whose role is explained below. All heads of government attend, along with their foreign ministers. The President of the Commission and the vice-presidents also attend. Added to this, there are numerous other informal meetings. Some of these may be related to specific issues, such as, in 2014, the ongoing crisis in Gaza, or the Russia-Ukraine situation. In the past, every summit was a high-profile event, but it led to

­42   Britain and the European Union

accusations that European Council meetings were little more than public relations exercises where all the member states got together and mouthed platitudes of agreement on a number of issues, knowing full well nothing would actually be done. The reality was somewhat different. The European Council sets the strategic policy direction for the EU. In a number of areas, the European Council is able to make key decisions. These areas include political and economic integration, foreign policy, budgetary disputes and new applicants. Thus the origins of the Treaty of Nice (2000) – which enabled the 2004 enlargement to go ahead – were in a European Council summit. More recently, the European Council examined ways to alleviate the effects of the global financial crisis on all of the EU, but especially Greece. Country-specific recommendations have often been set. Added to this, the European Council sets the EU priorities for meetings of the G20 group. The European Council performs in an intergovernmental and a supranational fashion. It is an intergovernmental body in that national interests are defended. At the same time, it is a supranational body in that, when the decisions are taken, they affect all members, as well as potential future members, of the EU. The European Council is able to influence all aspects of the EU. Where there has been a significant change in the European Council is in the creation of a post of president. The European Council elects from its members a president (using qualified majority voting, which is explained later in this chapter). The president is elected for a two-and-a-half-year term, which may be renewed once. The first President of the European Council was Herman Van Rompuy. He was replaced by Donald Tusk on 1 December 2014. To take up the post of President of the European Council, Tusk had to stand down as prime minister of Poland. The Lisbon Treaty detailed the role of the President of the European Council. It includes: • chairing and driving forward its work • ensuring the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in co-operation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 43

• endeavouring to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council • presenting a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council The chairing of the European Council replaces the rotating presidency, held by each member state, in turn, for six months. The establishment of this presidency presented an opportunity for a more open European Council, with a leader driving forward their agenda. Under Van Rompuy, this did not happen. Dinan described him as ‘a non-voting executive chairman’,1 a first among equals rather than a leader. His successor, Tusk, is somewhat more dynamic, in that he appears to have a vision as to how the European Council should develop.

The Council of Ministers This body is also known as the Council of the European Union, or simply the Council. Such terminology often confuses people, especially when the European Council is included in discussions. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, the term Council of Ministers will be used in this book. The Council of Ministers is still the dominant body of the EU. It is the major decision-making body, although since the Treaty on European Union, it has been forced to cede some powers and influence to the European Parliament. They are now co-decisionmakers (a concept explained later in this chapter). The Council of Ministers is assisted by a body known as COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives). The role and function of COREPER is examined in the next section of this chapter. Although the label ‘Council of Ministers’ is used, arguably there are several councils. For example, when agriculture is under discussion, each member state’s agriculture minister will attend. If it is energy, then the energy ministers will attend. When finance is under discussion, it will be the finance ministers who attend. Thus, when there are council meetings, it is not necessarily going to be the same personnel in attendance on each occasion. It is impossible to make a complete list of the membership of any given council. This can

­44   Britain and the European Union

Table 3.2  Rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers Year

January–June July–December

2015 Latvia

Luxembourg

2016 Netherlands Slovakia 2017 Malta

UK

2018 Estonia

Bulgaria

2019 Austria

Romania

2020 Finland Source: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/at yourservice/infosheets/faces

be due to national elections, national coalition changes and cabinet reshuffles.2 To complicate matters further, a rotating presidency is used, as can be seen in Table 3.2. Each country takes a turn for a six-month period. The rota is predetermined and agreed through unanimity in the Council of Ministers. When holding the presidency, a country can set the agenda for the Council of Ministers. This may be limited, however, by the increased role of the European Council – especially as it sets the strategic policy direction of the EU. Decision-making in the Council of Ministers can be quite complicated. Each country has a number of votes, linked to its population size. This is presented in Table 3.3. Decisions are taken either through simple majorities, qualified majorities or unanimity. Minor decisions, for example on anti-dumping legislation, are taken using simple majority voting. Issues such as enlargement are taken through unanimity – hence the difficulties that the Turks have continued to face in their application. Many decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV). To get any decisions made through QMV requires 260 out of the 352 votes. Alternatively, to block any proposals there is a need to get ninety-three votes.

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 45

This means that three of the largest countries are not able to block any ­proposals. The UK, Germany and France would need the support of at least one other country to block a proposal that they did not like. Since 2014, a system of ‘double majority voting’ has been utilised. This requires a majority of countries (at least fifteen) and a majority of the total EU population (countries supporting the legislation must represent at least 65 per cent of the total EU population). Although not directly elected, the Council of Ministers is the legislative part of the European Union. This was formally acknowledged in the Lisbon Treaty. Since the Treaty on European Union, the Council of Ministers has had to share aspects of the legislative process with the European Parliament. As noted earlier, they are now co-decision-makers. The co-decision procedure is examined in the section on the European Parliament. Where the Council of Ministers is unable to resolve an issue, it is then moved on to the agenda of the European Council. The decision of the European Council then becomes the decision of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is normally perceived to be a part of the intergovernmental aspects of the EU. It is in this body that national concerns are raised and often protected. Commitments to ‘ever closer union’ may often be mouthed but in many cases it is often to be NOT at the national expense. The intergovernmental aspects may dominate, but there is also a gradual movement towards a more supranational approach as well. With the Union now standing at a membership of twenty-eight, and a number of other countries applying to join, it is getting more and more difficult to protect national interests. Margaret Thatcher complained that Britain had surrendered too much sovereignty. It is even more the case now than when Thatcher was speaking in the late 1980s that the only way to protect a country’s sovereignty is to ‘surrender’ some of it. Except in cases of extreme national importance, where the veto can be used, the only way for a country to achieve its objectives is to work with other members. It took successive British Governments a very long time to realise that collaboration is far more effective than confrontation. Under the premiership of David Cameron, we have seen a move

­46   Britain and the European Union

Table 3.3  Weights of votes in the Council of Ministers (2014) Country

Population (millions)

Votes

Germany  80.5  29 France  65.6  29 UK  63.9  29 Italy  59.7  29 Spain  46.7  27 Poland  38.5  27 Romania  20.0  14 Netherlands  16.8  13 Belgium  11.2  12 Greece  11.1  12 Portugal  10.5  12 Czech Republic  10.5  12 Hungary   9.9  12 Sweden   9.6  10 Austria   8.5  10 Bulgaria   7.3  10 Denmark   5.6   7 Finland   5.4   7 Slovakia   5.4   7 Ireland   4.6   7 Croatia   4.3   7

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 47

Country

Population (millions)

Votes

Lithuania   3.0   7 Slovenia   2.1   4 Latvia   2.0   4 Estonia   1.3   4 Cyprus   0.9   4 Luxembourg   0.5   4 Malta   0.4   3 Total

505.7*

352

*numbers do not add up because of rounding

back to a more antagonistic relationship between Britain and the EU. Like Thatcher, Cameron appears to enjoy confronting the EU on a range of issues – from bailing out the Greek economy to the nominations for the Commission presidency. Unlike Thatcher, Cameron does not seem to get his own way. Yet standing up to the EU seems to be far more about his position in British politics and the British media rather than endearing himself to his European partners (see Chapter 10). With the eastern enlargements, there are now more member states closer in line to Britain’s way of thinking as to how the EU should be run both politically and economically. The British Government needs these allies in the Council of Ministers to be able to achieve its aims, be it when introducing reforms or blocking new legislative ­proposals. Yet the Cameron approach to the EU seems to be ­alienating these potential allies.

COREPER COREPER, or the Committee of Permanent Representatives, is the body that assists the Council of Ministers. It comprises civil servants

­48   Britain and the European Union

and diplomats who are there to assist their governments. They are the resident national representatives – for example, UKREP are the British representatives. Much of COREPER’s work is secret. The permanent representatives (who are the national ambassadors to the European Union) and their teams meet with their counterparts on a regular basis – normally weekly. In general terms, these permanent representatives prepare for meetings. Thus, they do all the legwork prior to a meeting of the Council of Ministers. This in itself suggests that these representatives may actually be involved in behind-the-scenes decision-making, although officially they have no such power. Since 1962, with the huge increases in work for COREPER, the body has been divided in two. COREPER 1 comprises the deputy permanent representatives, while COREPER 2 comprises the permanent representatives. There is a rigid division of work. Once a particular subject area has been designated to COREPER 1, for example, COREPER 2 then has nothing to do with it. COREPER  1  deals with social and economic issues – sometimes described as the more ‘technical’ matters. COREPER 2 deals with political or institutional matters, as well as foreign affairs and ­financial issues. COREPER appears to be the symbol of intergovernmentalism; each member state has these officials there to protect national interests in behind-the-scenes negotiations. Yet this very role is also a symbol of supranationalism, as COREPER may have made the decisions prior to the meeting of the Council of Ministers. They simply have to sell the end result to the politicians. The fact that unelected officials are making decisions instead of the elected politicians is seen as a cause for concern, highlighting further the democratic deficit of the EU.

The European Parliament The European Parliament is the only body within the EU that is directly elected – and this has only been the case since 1979. Its origins lie in the old assembly of the ECSC. Until 1979, members were appointed from national assemblies and parliaments. Originally, the European Parliament was perceived as little more

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 49

than a talking shop. MEPs could discuss whatever issues they liked but the other institutions were under no obligation to listen to their advice. The situation today is totally different, with the European Parliament having been granted the power of co-decision in the Treaty on European Union. The co-decision procedure is examined below. Although the body is known as the European Parliament, it is unlike any national parliament. For most countries, the national parliament or assembly is the legislative body. The European Parliament has never played such a role. Even today, as co-decision-maker, it is still dependent upon the Council of Ministers and the Commission in generating and ratifying legislative proposals. The number of MEPs for each country is dependent upon ­population – just as with the number of votes each member state has in the Council of Ministers. The number of MEPs for each member state is listed in Table 3.4. Although Germany has the largest number of MEPs (96), in relation to population size it is still underrepresented when compared to Luxembourg or Malta. When elected, the MEPs do not sit in national groups. Rather, they sit in what are termed ideological transnational groupings. To put it more simply, they sit with like-minded MEPs from other member states. In Table 3.5, you can see the different ideological groupings after the 2014 elections, as well as the location of the British MEPs within this. The 2014 elections saw a significant rise in support for Eurosceptic parties – including UKIP in the United Kingdom, Front National in France and Golden Dawn in Greece. Even in Germany, eurosceptic MEPs were elected for the first time ever. While there is clearly a growth in support for such parties, there are two key points to note. First, collectively these parties are still largely on the fringes of the EU. The two main groupings – the European People’s Party and the Socialists – still hold sway. Second, and perhaps more importantly, most European Parliament elections are fought on ‘domestic’ issues rather than ‘European’ ones – in other words, the British part of the elections to the European Parliament focus upon British issues rather than those to do with the EU; in France, the issues will be to do with French politics, not the EU, and so on. Thus, immigration was an issue in some countries, austerity in others. There was no concerted p ­ an-European

­50   Britain and the European Union

Table 3.4  The number of MEPs for each member state (2014 elections) Country

Number of MEPs

Germany  96 France  74 UK  73 Italy  73 Spain  54 Poland  51 Romania  32 Netherlands  26 Greece  21 Belgium  21 Portugal  21 Czech Republic   21 Hungary  21 Sweden  20 Austria  18 Bulgaria  17 Denmark  13 Finland  13 Slovakia  13 Ireland  11 Lithuania  11 Croatia  11 Latvia   8 Slovenia   8 Estonia   6 Cyprus   6 Luxembourg   6 Malta   6 Total 751

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 51

Table 3.5  Make-up of the European Parliament (May 2014) Transnational grouping

Number of MEPs British MEPs within the group

European People’s Party

220

–

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

191

20 Labour

European Conservatives   70 and Reformists

19 Conservative 1 Ulster Unionist

Alliance of Liberals and   68 Democrats for Europe

1 Liberal Democrat

European United Left   52 and Nordic Green Left

1 Sinn Féin

Greens and European   50 Free Alliance

3 Greens 2 Scottish Nationalist 1 Plaid Cymru

Europe of Freedom   48 and Direct Democracy

24 UK Independence

Non-attached   52

1 Democratic Unionist

anti-EU campaign. This can be seen in UKIP refusing to ally themselves with Front National, who, in turn, refused to ally themselves with Golden Dawn. The elections to the European Parliament are held on a fixed fiveyear term. These elections were usually held in June, but were moved to May in 2014. This was to enable the newly elected European Parliament to appoint the new President of the Commission, rather than it being done by the outgoing European Parliament. Part of this is about making the EU more transparent, and possibly even more accountable for its actions. The European Parliament does not use a single electoral system for the elections. In fact, the elections are not even held on a single

­52   Britain and the European Union

day. Some countries hold their election on a Thursday (for example, the United Kingdom) while others hold theirs on a Sunday (for example, France). The Czech Republic holds its on a Friday and a Saturday afternoon. Regardless as to the polling day, no ballots are counted until all polling stations are closed. Thus British votes, although cast on a Thursday, are not counted until the following Sunday. All EU states utilise some form of proportional representation for their elections to the European Parliament, although different countries use different electoral systems. Note, however, that mainland Britain used simple plurality until 1999 when it changed to the d’Hondt (closed) party list system. The UK actually utilises two electoral systems. The ballot in Northern Ireland is conducted under the single transferable vote (STV) and always has been since direct elections started in 1979. In the 1994 elections (when there were only twelve member states), eight different electoral systems were used across the EU. In 2014, thirteen different systems were used. Some member states used national lists (for example, Germany), while others used constituencies (for example, the United Kingdom). Some countries used closed lists (for example, the United Kingdom) while others had preferential voting (for example, Italy). There were variable thresholds to gain representation (for example, none in the United Kingdom but 5 per cent in Latvia), and there were also different rules on the ages for candidacy (for example, 18 in the United Kingdom, but 25 in Italy). The powers of the European Parliament have grown over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was dismissed as little more than a talking shop where national MPs had another forum in which to raise their voices. It did, however, have some supervisory powers which it could wield. One of these powers was known as ‘the power of the purse’. In effect, from the mid-1970s the European Parliament was given a supervisory role over the Community budget. The Commission puts forward its budgetary proposals and these can either be accepted or rejected in their entirety by the European Parliament. A rejection would mean that the EU then works on a series of twelfths from the previous year’s budget – one twelfth of that budget each month. This happened on two occasions in the 1980s, and then in 2011 and 2013.

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 53

Another supervisory power has been over the appointment of the Commission. The European Parliament can either accept or reject proposed appointments to the Commission. As noted earlier in this chapter, the first Barroso Commission was rejected in 2004. Juncker had similar problems with his first Commission. The Slovenian nominee, Alenka Bratušek, withdrew her nomination after a phenomenally poor performance in front of the European Parliament’s committee on Commission appointments, and a resounding rejection of her nomination in the European Parliament. She was replaced by Violeta Bulc. Although not a legislative (law-making) body, the European Parliament has also increased its role in the legislative process. It can, for example, suggest new policies or even laws to the Commission. Yet within the actual process of making the law, the European Parliament has acquired powers over time. The Treaty of Rome gave the European Parliament the power of consultation. This meant that the European Parliament could give an opinion on laws being proposed. Their opinion, however, was non-binding. This was enhanced in the Single European Act (1986) which developed the power to that of co-operation. In other words, this was akin to giving the European Parliament a ‘second reading’ of legislative proposals. Within this process the Council of Ministers had to explain why any proposed amendments suggested in the first ‘consultation’ had been rejected. Again, there was no requirement for the European Parliament’s opinions to be incorporated into any legislation. The difference here was that the Council of Ministers had to be unanimous in rejecting the opinion of the European Parliament. The co-operation process was developed further in the Treaty on European Union where the European Parliament was given the power of co-decision. The co-decision procedure was like a ‘third reading’ of some legislative proposals. The label suggests that the European Parliament became an equal co-decision-maker with the Council of Ministers. The co-decision procedure is now known as the ordinary legislative procedure in the EU. Finally, there is the power of assent. This means that, in certain areas, the European Parliament must not only be consulted but must also give its agreement for policies to proceed. These areas include enlargement and signing of international agreements. For

­54   Britain and the European Union

the European Parliament to support these decisions, a simple majority of MEPs is required. There is a perception that the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers are on an equal legislative footing – especially in light of the co-decision process. This is definitely not the case. Any amendments at the first reading stage require a simple majority of MEPs. Yet any amendments to the common position of the Council of Ministers after the second reading require an absolute majority of all MEPs – and not merely of those in attendance. The same applies if the MEPs wish to reject the legislation. Failure to achieve this results in the adoption of the position of the Council of Ministers.3 What has been interesting about the development of the European Parliament is that as it has acquired new or extended powers, it has been loath to surrender any powers to any other bodies. Thus with the development of the Committee of Regions, the European Parliament made sure that this new body (which is examined below) only received powers of consultation.

The Court of Justice The Court of Justice is based in Luxembourg. Its role is to make sure all member states uphold EU laws as well as the various treaties of the EU. This is not just the letter of the law but also the spirit of the law. The Court of Justice is, however, restricted in what it can investigate. First of all, the Court of Justice cannot be proactive in what it investigates. Cases must be referred to the Court. These cases can be referred by other institutions within the EU, by member states or even by private organisations or individuals. Second, the Court of Justice is restricted in what it can investigate. Law-making in the EU is divided into what are national competences and what are EU competences. Under the principle of subsidiarity, some decision-making is devolved to the most appropriate level. If it is devolved to national, regional or even a local tier of government, then it is not covered by the Court of Justice. The membership of the Court of Justice demonstrates the extent to which it is still an intergovernmental body, even though all members are supposed to be independent of their national governments.

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 55

Currently, there are twenty-eight judges, one from each member state. Unlike the US Court of Justice, they are all ­non-political appointments. Each judge is appointed for a renewable six-year term, although he or she can stand down at any time. The judges are assisted by Advocates General. There are nine of these advocatesgeneral; this number may be increased at the request of the Court of Justice but only if the Council of Ministers agrees unanimously. It is their job to review cases that come to the Court of Justice, and to deliver opinions prior to judges seeing the cases. In some respects, the advocates general act as a filter. As the workload for the Court of Justice has increased, some reforms have been introduced. In 1988, the Court of First Instance was established to assist the Court of Justice. Originally, the Court of First Instance was attached to the Court of Justice, but that is no longer the case. In 2009, the Court of First Instance was renamed the General Court. The role of the General Court is to improve the judicial scrutiny of factual matters. Thus, the General Court examines points of fact, while the Court of Justice examines points of law. As with the Court of Justice, the General Court has twenty-eight judges – one from each member state. There are, however, no advocates general to assist the General Court.

The Committee of Regions The Committee of Regions was created by the Treaty on European Union and came into being in 1994. It is an indirectly elected body, comprising delegates from all member states who have been elected (or in some cases, appointed) to regional or local tiers of government. Currently there are 353 members, with each country having membership corresponding to its population size (although not all countries have filled their quota of members). This is detailed in Table 3.6. As can be seen in that table, the largest members each have twentyfour representatives; the smallest (Malta) has five. The British members of the Committee of Regions come from local government across the UK, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Greater London Assembly. There is a requirement that the representation of any country includes delegates of different political persuasions. The

­56   Britain and the European Union

Table 3.6  Membership of the Committee of Regions (September 2014) Country

Number of members

France, Germany, Italy, UK

24

Poland, Spain

21

Romania

15

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden

12

Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia

 9

Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia

 7

Cyprus, Luxembourg

 6

Malta

 5

members do not sit in national groups. As in the European Parliament, they sit in ideological groupings. Arguably, this is an attempt to develop the supranational characteristics of the Committee. The Committee of Regions has to be consulted on any policy proposals relating to local or regional government. This is to make sure the idea of subsidiarity works effectively. While the body is purely advisory, it still has to be consulted on a number of areas. These include: • • • • • • • •

civil protection climate change cultural policy economic and social cohesion education employment environment health

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 57

• • • •

social policy trans-European networks transport vocational training

When the body was first formed, there was some hope that it might become akin to a second chamber, working alongside the European Parliament. The European Parliament, however, was reluctant to share any of its newly acquired powers, and the idea of this regional upper chamber was dropped. What the Committee of Regions tries to do is to bring the EU closer to the people. By having representatives from regional and local government, it also brings the people closer to the EU. This is the idea of proximity. Much policy implementation is carried out at the regional or local level, therefore it seems sensible to have local and regional input. This should be carried out in partnership between the different tiers of government.

The European Economic and Social Committee Unlike the Committee of Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) dates back to the Treaty of Rome, although its role has been adapted by various treaties, including the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of Nice. The number of delegates from each member state is identical to that of the Committee of Regions. The representatives, however, are all unelected. They are nominated by the national governments, and appointed by the Council of Ministers, for renewable five-year terms. The EESC comprises representatives from three different groups: employers, workers and pressure groups. Each of the three groups is broadly similar in size. In 2014, of its twenty-four members, Britain contributed eight to the employers group, eight to the workers group and seven to the various interest group, with one vacancy on the committee. In 2014, the employers were drawn from both the public and private sectors. Professions include commerce, trade, transport and agriculture. From the British delegation, there are private businesspeople such as bankers and lawyers, and the Chief Executive of African & Caribbean Diversity. The workers are mostly drawn

­58   Britain and the European Union

from trade unions, most of which are affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation. The unions cover both the public and private sectors. The group of various interests covers all aspects of life. It works to highlight cultural or social issues which might not fall within the ambit of the other two groups. One of the British members is the Chief Executive of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations. Others are consultants for a range of organisations. As with the Committee of Regions, the EESC is an advisory body. Its claim, however, is that it draws in experts from different aspects of social and economic life – acknowledging that elected politicians and civil servants are not always experts. The input given from the EESC encompasses aspects of life that may not be covered in any of the other EU institutions, making it a valuable asset to the Commission when drawing up legislative proposals. In fact, it is mandatory for the EESC to be consulted on a number of policy areas, for example regional or environmental policy. There is, however, no requirement for the advice of this body to be incorporated into the policy. The EESC is arguably a supranational organisation. It may be nominated by national governments, but the way in which it operates goes far beyond national self-interest.

The European Ombudsman The European Ombudsman was created in the Treaty on European Union and came into being in 1995. During the treaty negotiations, Britain was one of the member states most enthused about creating such a body. The current holder of the post is Emily O’Reilly, who has been in post since 2013. She was elected by the European Parliament, and was re-elected at the beginning of the new European Parliamentary term for a further five-year period. The idea of the Ombudsman was to help bring the EU closer to the people. The Ombudsman investigates maladministration. Although this is a very difficult term to define, it is broadly to do with the way in which policies are implemented, as noted in Box 3.2.4 It is not to do with whether a policy is good or bad but simply about how the policy has been applied. Investigations can cover any part of the EU, although it is the Commission that has been most frequently investigated. In 2012, there were 456 inquiries

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 59

Box 3.2  Complaining to the Ombudsman The web pages of the European Ombudsman give a clear explanation as to how a person or organisation can complain: Maladministration means poor or failed administration. This can occur, for example, in the framework of EU-funded projects or programmes. Businesses and other organisations are also frequently in direct contact with EU institutions in the context of tenders and contracts, participation in consultation procedures, lobbying activities, or attempts to gain access to important documents or information concerning their area of activity

opened. Added to this, over 22,000 individuals were helped with complaints, either through setting up a complaint or providing information to resolve a possible complaint. Most inquiries concerned the Commission. What makes the European Ombudsman an interesting body is that it can initiate its own inquiries. These must, however, be to do with the EU. National concerns are beyond the remit of the European Ombudsman. This ability to start investigations gives the Ombudsman far more power than the Court of Justice, which must be asked to investigate any concerns within its remit. Decisions by the Ombudsman, particularly when proving maladministration, tend to be followed through and addressed. For example, there have been numerous cases about a lack of transparency. One of these was against the European Aviation Safety Agency over documents about aircraft maintenance service providers in Asia. The Ombudsman found that the defence of ‘protection of commercial interests’ was not sufficient, and the documents were released. There are many examples where the Ombudsman has not found in favour of the complainant. A complaint was lodged against the European Medicines Agency over a refusal to give marketing approval to a non-prescription anti-migraine drug. There was a full investigation, which lasted over a year. The European Ombudsman finally ruled that there was no maladministration. When a case of maladministration is found, it is very rare for the European institution involved not to act. Should such a

­60   Britain and the European Union

c­ ircumstance arise then the Ombudsman will write a special report to the European Parliament. This is the ultimate weapon of the Ombudsman. It is then, however, left to the European Parliament to follow up the report, becoming a political issue rather than an administrative one. The only example from 2013 saw the European Parliament support the Ombudsman against the Commission with regard to an investigation about inadequate environmental impact assessments for a development at Vienna airport by the Austrian authorities, where the Commission failed to conduct infringement proceedings against Austria.5

The ‘democratic deficit’ When examining the different institutions of the EU, one of the most noticeable things is that almost all of them are unelected. The only body which is directly elected is the European Parliament. Members of the European Council, the Council of Ministers and the  Committee of Regions may have been elected to national, regional or local bodies, and could be described as indirectly elected. The vast majority of posts are appointed. To make matters worse, there is little transparency as to how each of the institutions functions and how it can be held to account. The European Parliament and the European Ombudsman can try to hold other institutions to account but there is always the possibility of them being overruled by the Council of Ministers or the European Council. The lack of transparency, along with the limited opportunities to hold the different institutions to account via direct elections, has led to accusations that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. Even with the European Parliament acting as a co-decision-maker, there is still limited opportunity for the general public to get involved with the EU. The idea of a democracy in very simple terms is that the people rule. Normally, this would mean our elected representatives. As the European Parliament is not a proper legislature, there is negligible opportunity for the people to ‘rule’. Arguably, with the creation of the Committee of Regions and the continuing role of the EESC, steps have been taken to draw different aspects of society into the policy process. It could be argued,

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 61

however, that these committees represent vested interests and that the general public is still ignored. A counter-argument to this is the lack of interest shown by the public when they are given the opportunity to vote in the direct elections to the European Parliament. Turnout in many countries is woefully poor. The UK turnout in the 2014 elections was 35.4 per cent, up marginally on the 2009 turnout. Yet across the EU as a whole, the turnout in 2014 was 42.5 per cent, which was the lowest in any European Parliament election. Belgium had the highest turnout with 89.6 per cent, followed by Luxembourg and Malta – all three of whom had their lowest European Parliament turnouts. The poorest turnout was in Slovakia (13.1 per cent), followed by the Czech Republic and Poland. Only eight of the twenty-eight member states had a turnout surpassing 50 per cent. Therefore, drawing in other non-elected persons via the EESC, and locally and regionally elected representatives via the Committee of Regions, may be the only way to address the democratic deficit in the short term. The problem is that these bodies are only influential under certain conditions.6 These bodies may be ‘heard’ when their expertise is clear, but the advice is non-binding. In the longer term, there is a real need for the EU to address the democratic deficit. The problem is how to do so. Making people aware of what the EU does could be one way forward. The Ombudsman has utilised this approach and as a result there have been many more complaints about the lack of transparency in the EU. The greater number of complaints may not be solely to do with the problems of the EU but may also result from a greater awareness of the European Ombudsman system. How should such success stories be publicised? As will be seen in Chapter 10, most mass media are unlikely to publish or broadcast such news – it is bad news that makes news. In the UK, stories such as banning British sausages or bent cucumbers are more likely to be seen or heard than EU investments into the UK infrastructure. Thus it is likely that the democratic deficit will remain.

­62   Britain and the European Union



What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The different institutions of the EU have clear roles to play. There is some overlap between them. They are also all mutually dependent upon each other. • The most important institutions within the EU are the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the European Parliament. • There is much concern that the EU suffers from a ‘democratic deficit’. Only one institution is directly elected – the European Parliament. All the others are appointed. Added to this there is great concern that the different EU institutions are very difficult to hold to account. This is partly to do with the lack of elections, but is also because of the lack of transparency in their operations. • To counter the accusations of a ‘democratic deficit’, a number of bodies have been drawn into the policy-making process – the Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee. The problem here is that these bodies are purely consultative. The European Parliament is now a ‘co-decision-maker’. By giving it a more prominent and more influential role, it is hoped that the accusation of ‘democratic deficit’ will be diminished. • The British role in each of these bodies is significant. As the EU gets larger, it gets more difficult to protect national interests should they conflict with those of the EU. However, by working with representatives from other member states, British representatives can promote policies that will benefit the entire EU.



Glossary of key terms Co-decision  The power of co-decision means that the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have become almost equal partners in the legislative process of the EU. In effect, the European Parliament is consulted on three occasions (similar to the three readings of a bill in the British House of Commons) on legislative proposals. If the opinions of the European Parliament are not accepted, the Council of Ministers is now compelled to explain its reasoning. The Council of Ministers must also be unanimous in its rejection of the advice of the European Parliament. Commission  This body is sometimes perceived as the civil service of the EU, although it is far more important. The Commission draws up legislative proposals for consideration by other EU institutions – most

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 63

notably the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The Commission is also ‘the Guardian of the Treaties’. This means the Commission tries to make sure all member states uphold both the letter and the spirit of the agreements made in key treaties (such as the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty on European Union, and so on). Commissioners are appointed by national governments, although they are supposed to work to further the aims of the EU, not national aims. The European Parliament has to approve the Commission before the Commissioners enter their posts. Committee of Regions  An advisory body created by the Treaty on European Union. Delegates come from regional and local government from all member states. The Committee of Regions must be consulted in a number of specified policy areas, although its advice is just that and need not be heeded. The existence of this body, however, highlights the importance of regionalism and subsidiarity to the EU. Council of Ministers/Council of the European Union  The Council of Ministers is considered to be the most important body within the EU. In effect it is the law-making body of the EU, although it is now a co-decision-maker with the European Parliament. When the Council of Ministers meets, each member state sends a representative. Thus, when agriculture is under discussion, each member state will send its Minister of Agriculture; when the issue is transport, the Transport Ministers will attend, and so on. Decisions can be taken by simple majority, qualified majority or unanimity. Court of First Instance  This body was created to assist the Court of Justice in 1988. The Court of First Instance deals with matters of fact, as opposed to legal interpretation. It now works independently of the Court of Justice. Its membership is currently made up of twenty-eight judges, one from each member state. Court of Justice  The role of the Court of Justice is as a final court of appeal. It also makes sure that all member states uphold the treaties that have formed the EU. It is not proactive, which means that it must be asked to investigate a particular issue. The Court of Justice deals with matters of law, as opposed to matters of fact. There are twenty-eight judges, one from each member state, assisted by eight advocates general. Democratic deficit  This is a difficult term to explain, although at a basic level it suggests a lack of democracy. This could be because there is little or no electoral accountability, or that there is a lack of transparency in the decision-making process – which again suggests a lack of accountability to the people. European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)  An unelected body which draws in people from different aspects of economic and social life: employers, employees and pressure groups. It is a consultative body and its opinions are not binding.

­64   Britain and the European Union European Economic Community (EEC)  This organisation was set up in 1957 to integrate further the economies of the ECSC members beyond simply coal and steel. The Treaty of Rome (now known as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) is the founding document. European Council  This body is sometimes considered to be the upper tier of the Council of Ministers, although it is not actually part of the Council of Ministers. It comprises the various heads of government, and has the power to overrule the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. European Parliament  This is the only directly elected institution in the EU. The European Parliament is a ‘co-decision-maker’ with the Council of Ministers. This means that the European Parliament has a significant input into the legislative process of the EU, although its opinions can still be overruled by the Council of Ministers or the European Council. The European Parliament also has a power of veto over the budget and appointments to the Commission. In both cases it is a case of accept or reject in entirety. General Court  The new name for the Court of First Instance. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy  This is the post of EU spokesperson for foreign affairs. Intergovernmentalism  This is the idea of the different governments of the EU working together. There is no ceding of sovereignty to a higher body. Each member state remains sovereign and may well work to protect its national interests. An intergovernmental approach would see the different member states working together to achieve some form of compromise. Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)  This system is used for much decisionmaking in the Council of Ministers. Each member state is given a specified number of votes, dependent upon the population size of the country. Since 2014, under QMV, a policy proposal passed has required 260 out of 352 votes. Alternatively, ninety-three votes are needed to block a proposal. Sovereignty  This is the right of a state to pass laws within its own territory. It is suggested that EU membership undermines national sovereignty as all members have to cede a range of powers to the EU. Added to this, EU law overrides national law when the two conflict. Subsidiarity  This is the process of devolving decision-making down to the most appropriate tier of government. At its most basic level, the aim of subsidiarity is to take decision-making away from the EU and return it to national governments. Some aspects of subsidiarity could see decisionmaking being devolved to regional or local government. Supranationalism  Such an approach sees countries working closely together. They cede sovereignty in certain areas to a higher authority,

Institutions of the European Union   ­ 65

which will co-ordinate and police the making and implementation of policies in those specified areas across the organisation.

? Likely examination questions What is a ‘democratic deficit’? Why is such a label used to describe the EU? In what ways should the powers of the European Parliament be increased? What are the major obstacles to such moves? ‘The Commission is still the powerhouse behind the development of the EU.’ Discuss. The European Union suffers from a perceived lack of transparency. In what ways could this perception be improved?



Helpful websites There are a number of useful websites for the different EU institutions: http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies is the web page that leads to all of the institutions of the European Union. http://www.europarl.org.uk/en/home.html;jsessionid=28D76849723E3CFE AF8C97A617405386 is the British home page of the European Parliament. Here you can find much information about British MEPs and their roles in the European Parliament. All of the election results going back to 1979 are included here as well. http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom is the British home page of the Commission. From here you can find information about current issues, policies and staff of the Commission, and all of it geared towards a British perspective.



Suggestions for further reading There are numerous sources of information on the different EU institutions. For general overviews, see N. Nugent (2010), The Government and Politics of the European Union (Palgrave, 7th edition), J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds) (2012), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 3rd edition) and A. Kreppel (2011), ‘Looking “Up”, “Down” and “Sideways”: Understanding EU Institutions in Context’ West European Politics vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 167–79. On the European Parliament, see D. Judge and D. Earnshaw (2008), The European Parliament (Palgrave, 2nd edition).

­66   Britain and the European Union On the Commission, see N. Nugent (2001), The European Commission (Palgrave), G. Brandsma and J. Blom-Hansen (2010), ‘The EU Comitology System: What Role for the Commission?’ Public Administration vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 496–512 and A. Wille (2010), ‘Political-Bureaucratic Accountability in the EU Commission: Modernising the Executive’ West European Politics vol. 33, no. 5, pp. 1093–116. On the Council of Ministers and other related bodies, see F. HayesRenshaw and H. Wallace (2006), The Council of Ministers (Palgrave, 2nd edition), J. Tallberg (2004), ‘The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negotiations’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 999–1022 and J. Cross (2013), ‘Striking a Pose: Transparency and Position Taking in the Council of the European Union’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 291–315. On the Committee of Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, see C. Hönnige and D. Panke (2013), ‘The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee: How Influential are Consultative Committees in the European Union?’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 452–71.

CHAPTER 4

Common Policies of the European Union Contents Why have common policies? The Common Agricultural Policy The Common Fisheries Policy Competition Policy and Trade Policy The Common Foreign and Security Policy The development of the single currency

68 68 74 76 80 83

Overview Although sometimes seen as controversial, the common policies of the European Union are an important feature of the organisation. The best known is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), yet there are others, including Fisheries, and Foreign and Security. For the most part, attitudes in Britain towards these common policies are anything but positive. Yet many of the criticisms may appear unjust. The problem is not necessarily the common policies but rather the way in which they have, or have not, developed to suit the modern era. For example, one of the aims of the CAP was to make Europe self-sufficient in food production. This was in an era prior to genetically modified crops or the industrialisation of agriculture. The aim was – and still is – worthy but the way in which the CAP is structured needs reconsideration. This chapter will examine the origins and development of a number of common policies, with British perspectives on each being evaluated.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • The origins and development of the Common Agricultural Policy, along with an analysis of the various reforms • The problems with developing the Common Fisheries Policy • The aims and objectives of the Competition Policy will be evaluated. This will be done in conjunction with the idea of the free market. Therefore, trade policy will also need to be assessed • How the foreign, defence and security policies have been developed, along with their current aims and objectives • The development of the euro will be evaluated, along with its predecessors • An evaluation of the British position on each of these common policies

­68   Britain and the European Union

Why have common policies? In the modern world, the idea of developing a common policy and then applying it to twenty-eight different countries seems a little peculiar. This is even more so when a central body funds such policies. Yet the development of common policies has been a feature in the advance of the European Union (EU). Such common policies are utilised around the world – although they are not necessarily labelled as such. The vast majority of countries utilise the free market, and there are rules and regulations which they have to follow. These are policed by bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Within the EU, there are particular areas of policy where the EU has the ‘competence’. This means the EU is responsible for developing policies in this area rather than the individual member states; an example of this would be agriculture. At the same time, there are other competences which come under the remit of national governments, such as social security. Each country, for example, can develop its own benefits system. Where the EU is the chief policy-maker, the idea is to get all member states to work towards the goals being set by the EU. One of the easier ways of doing this is to develop a common policy platform. This may be done via the development of an EU treaty, and can then be applied to all member states. Yet there are times and particular policy areas where this may not be feasible. In such circumstances a common position may be developed instead; an example of this is the use of a licensing system for arms exports. Either way, the EU sets the parameters in which all of the member states have to operate, unless an opt-out has been negotiated. For example, Britain and Denmark opted out of joining the euro.

The Common Agricultural Policy The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was actually part of the Treaty of Rome (1957) which laid the foundations for the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). The aims and objectives of the CAP are detailed in Box 4.1. It was not until January 1962, however, that the CAP came into being.

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Box 4.1  The principles and instruments of the CAP Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome laid down the key points of the CAP: 1. to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical ­progress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural production 2. to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons working in agriculture 3. to stabilize markets 4. to assure the availability of supplies 5. to ensure that the supplies reach the consumers at reasonable prices

To make the CAP work, the original six member states of the EEC had to develop a single market in agriculture. Linked to this were common prices across all member states and free trade in agricultural goods between them. Without such market unity, the policy would be doomed to failure. What the CAP tried to do – and was successful in doing so – was to guarantee minimum prices for farmers. Rather than the market setting the prices, the EEC would fix the prices centrally. If prices fell below a certain level, surpluses would be bought up by the EEC to keep the prices at a reasonable level. Linked to this development of market unity was the idea of community preference. Given a choice between an agricultural product from the EEC and a non-EEC equivalent, all EEC member states would be expected to buy the Community product. To make sure this happened, non-EEC competitors were only able to enter the market at a pre-determined price. In other words, tariff barriers were set up around the EEC to protect it from external competition. It would be impossible for a flood of cheaper agricultural imports to enter the market. This system kept agricultural prices higher but was implemented to ensure that farmers had a reasonable income. There was a fear that, if agricultural incomes were not sufficiently high, many people might leave their jobs in the agricultural sector to find work elsewhere. A consequence of this could be the EEC becoming dependent upon

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imports of food. Such a situation had existed in the immediate aftermath of World War II, where there had been severe food shortages that had left many Europeans starving. There was no way that the EEC was going to let such conditions ever happen again. To ensure this, the EEC aimed to become self-sufficient in food production. All this expenditure on agriculture came from a specific source: originally, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), replaced in 2007 by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The EAGF is used to finance direct payments to farmers and measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets (worth about €317 billion between 2014 and 2020). The EAFRD finances the EU’s contribution to rural development programmes (worth €101 billion over the same period). Between 2014 and 2020, UK farmers will receive around €27.6 billion. Of this, €25.1 billion will go in direct payments to farmers, and most of the remainder in the rural d ­ evelopment fund. Some will be spent on marketing measures. Under EAGF funding over this period, in relation to hectares farmed, the UK will be ranked around nineteenth. Using similar criteria, the UK is last in the EAFRD funding. In terms of actual money received via the CAP, the UK is the fifth largest cash r­ ecipient under the EAGF, and eleventh in rural development monies. The impact of the CAP was phenomenal. Agricultural production rose to the extent that the EEC started to produce more than was required – this is termed overproduction. Today, the EU is self-sufficient in almost every aspect of food production (of products grown in the EU). For example, in the year 2014, the EU was selfsufficient in cereals, dairy products, meat and beverages. There have been seemingly endless calls for the reform of the CAP. Even the Luxembourg Compromise (see Chapter 2) had its origins in a dispute over the reform of the CAP. One of the major reasons has been that of cost. As a percentage of the budget, the CAP has always taken a huge proportion. This has been heightened by the percentage of the workforce actually employed in the agricultural sector. In 2010, around 5 per cent of the collective workforce was employed in agriculture – although this masked significant variations between member states.

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Table 4.1  Budgetary expenditure on the CAP (€ billions) 2012

2013

2014

Total EU budget

147.2

150.9

142.6

Direct payments and market measures

 44.4

 43.7

 43.8

Rural development

 14.6

 14.8

 14.0

Total CAP budget

 59.0

 58.5

 57.8

Agricultural spending as a percentage of total EU budget

 40.08

  38.77

  40.53

When Britain joined the EEC in 1973, the CAP took up around 90 per cent of the budget. This has been reduced over time, as can be seen in Table 4.1, to the extent that the CAP now takes up less than half of the budget. Yet there is concern that so much is being spent on around 5 per cent of the EU workforce. The agricultural output contributes around 2 per cent of the total EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP). There have been steps taken to reform the CAP, although it is argued by some that much more work is needed. The 1972 Mansholt reforms (proposed by the then Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt) introduced the Guidance aspect of the EAGGF, which directed a small amount of funding away from guaranteeing funds for farmers to providing some funds to restructure agriculture. While the amount of money spent on rural development has increased, it is still only a small part of agricultural spending. What has been noticeable with the CAP is that the large farms and the wealthy farmers have all done exceedingly well out of it. In 2013, fifty-two organisations in the UK received CAP funding of over £1 million. The largest recipient was the National Trust, which received over £8.8 million.1 In the early 1990s, Ray MacSharry, the Commissioner for Agriculture at that time, introduced plans to reform the agricultural

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support systems. He proposed replacing the guarantee funds with a form of income support. This idea was known as decoupling, where the relationship between production and funding would be reduced. This was a move from price support to income support. Such a proposal caused a furore within some member states of the  EU. The farmers involved, however, received generous payments to make up for any shortfall in income. One aspect that received some support was in taking land out of agricultural production. Farmers were given the opportunity to set aside 15 per cent of their land. The idea was to reduce the overproduction of some crops. Any farmers involved were compensated for their loss of income – in fact the compensation led to an increase in running costs for the CAP even though it reduced output. The set-aside policy was effectively abandoned in 2007–8 when payments were set at zero. Subsequent to the MacSharry reforms were the Agenda 2000 reforms. The plans included further cuts to the price supports, especially in beef, milk and cereals. Again there was generous compensation for farmers – leading to an increase in CAP spending. There were also moves to improve the rural environment and to protect the rural heritage. Around 10 per cent of CAP funding was set aside for such schemes. Added to this, Agenda 2000 attempted to increase competition between farmers in the hope of forcing prices down. Finally, there were issues of food quality and food safety. A European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was established in 2002. Part of this involved making feed and food operators aware of their responsibilities, as well as increased surveillance of the operators. In brief, the EFSA is an autonomous body that focuses upon all risks to do with the food chain. For example, the EFSA carries out risk assessments on genetically modified organisms, including a focus upon environmental issues and human health issues. Overall, the Agenda 2000 reforms proposed the transformation of the CAP from ‘farm commodity support into an integrated policy for rural development and environmental enhancement’.2 In June 2003, further decoupling was introduced and support for farmers was changed. Each farm would receive a single payment. This was to be dependent upon the size of the farm and the amount of subsidy received between 2000 and 2002. There were a host of other requirements, including set-aside. This decoupling saw a

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further erosion of the common prices and guaranteed minimum prices that has underpinned the CAP. Despite these measures, there has still been pressure from beyond the EU for further reform to the CAP. It is argued that the CAP undermines both free trade and open competition. The United States, in particular, demands that the CAP be reformed, while conveniently ignoring the subsidy of US agriculture. US subsidies total around $19 billion per year. Countries such as New Zealand, which have very little state subsidy of agriculture, have also been prominent in demanding reforms. Conversely, China’s agricultural subsidies are estimated at $160 billion.3 The EU has moved slowly in meeting demands of subsidy reform, especially as many rivals are increasing their subsidies at a substantial rate. What stimulated reform of the CAP was the enlargement process. With the Eastern enlargements, the vast majority of pre-2004 EU states acknowledged the urgent need for reform. With heavy dependence upon agricultural subsidies, it appeared likely that the CAP would bankrupt the enlarged EU. These agricultural supports for the new member states were phased in gradually, while at the same time more aspects of the CAP were reformed. This was not to the liking of the new member states. On examining the CAP, there seems to be a notion that there is  a  common EU position on the policy. That is anything but the case. Within the EU there are clear divisions between member states who wish to have a radical overhaul of the CAP and those who wish for it to remain largely unchanged. Britain, for example, is in the former camp; France the latter. During the British presidency of the EU in the second half of 2005, attempts were made by the Blair Government to reform CAP funding as part of a total overhaul of the EU budget. In this, Blair was generally seen to be unsuccessful. More recently, David Cameron has been to the forefront in demanding less spending on agriculture, as part of his drive to cut the overall budget of the EU. He claims that the CAP spends too much money and should be phased out. The cost to the EU is estimated at over €400 billion for the period 2014–20. Much of this money could be better spent elsewhere. The subsidies distort world trade, and keep many of the world’s poorest countries in a state of underdevelopment.

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The Common Fisheries Policy The Common Fisheries Policy is one of the least evaluated of the EU’s common policies. One of the reasons for this is that it affects a very small percentage of the EU workforce – just 0.2 per cent. Yet this workforce is highly concentrated in member states, where entire communities may be dependent upon fishing. Fisheries contribute less than 1 per cent to the overall EU GDP. Bearing in mind that fish and chips is still considered to be one of the UK’s favourite meals, one might think that there would be more interest in this policy. The Common Fisheries Policy came into being in 1983. Prior to this, there had been common positions developed on fishing, dating back to the early 1970s. The fishing industry has been quite resentful of the amount of money spent on agriculture. There were expectations that the Common Fisheries Policy would deliver similar wealth to the fishing industry. This has not been the case. What the Common Fisheries Policy has attempted to do is settle issues such as territorial fishing rights and the amount of fish caught by each member state. The rationale behind the Common Fisheries Policy is quite simple. There are three components: • to ensure fishing stocks are not overexploited • to care for the marine ecosystem • to protect the interests of fishermen and of consumers Within this rationale, there are a number of clear policy areas. These have changed over time as a result of a greater awareness of environmental issues related to fishing. The Common Fisheries Policy is reviewed around every decade, and changes are made. An overview of the most recent of these is presented in Box 4.2. The Common Fisheries Policy has been able to resolve some differences between different national fishing fleets. For example, there has been trouble between the Spanish on the one hand, and the British and French on the other. When Spain was not in what was then the EC, there was a lot of concern over Spanish boats fishing in EC waters – the Spanish fleet was as big as that of the EC in 1985. The negotiations for Spanish accession to the EC included specific detailed negotiations on fishing. One of the problems for the Common Fisheries Policy is that

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Box 4.2  The policy areas of the Common Fisheries Policy (2014–20) 1.

Fisheries management • safeguard stock reproduction • lay the foundations for a profitable industry • conserve marine resources • rules on access to fishing waters •  control on the amount of fish caught, known as the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) 2. International policy • fishing agreements with non-EU states • setting of tariff quotas on certain fish and fish products 3. Market and trade policy •  establishment of the Common Organisation of the Markets (COM), which has been in place to manage both markets and aquaculture since the 1970s • within the COM, producer organisations guide producers on issues relating to aquaculture and sustainable fishing • clear consumer information on all fish products being sold, including, for example, how the fish was caught 4. Funding • establishment of the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) for 2014–20 • the EMFF helps the fishing industry in the transition to sustainable fishing •  there is funding for the economic diversification of coastal ­villages and communities • each member state must draw up an operational programme as to how the money will be spent

it is very difficult to police. Short of having an individual on every single boat to monitor all catches, it is almost impossible to know how much fish is actually being caught. Instead, catches have been monitored as they are landed. Such a policy has been deemed ineffective. It has been alleged that many boats filter their catches prior to landing them, discarding any fish they are not permitted to catch. There appears to be an unwillingness to reform the monitoring of such actions.

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From a British perspective, the Common Fisheries Policy appears to have had a detrimental effect upon the British industry. Around half of the British ‘white fish’ fleet has been tied up, and those boats which are still fishing have had their time at sea reduced by half. On top of this, there are stringent restrictions on the national quotas, which contribute to the overall EU Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The proposed TACs in 2014 (compared to 2013) for the UK industry saw a number of changes. The most prominent were cuts to North Sea haddock (– 8 per cent) and whiting (– 10 per cent), but increases in North Sea cod (+ 5 per cent) and Western mackerel (+ 82 per cent). There were cuts across all types of fish being caught in the Irish Sea. No cod was allowed to be taken from the West of Scotland waters in 2014, the same as in 2013. One of the problems with the Common Fisheries Policy is that it has, to date, failed to implement a regime aimed at achieving a healthy and sustainable fishing sector. Quotas have been set too high, resulting in overfishing. In turn, this has caused a huge amount of damage to the ecosystem. The scientific advice is often disputed, or over-ridden by short-term political considerations at both local and national levels.4 While conservation of fishing stocks is seen as the foundation of the Common Fisheries Policy, the success the EU has had can be questioned. Between 1982 and 2012, ‘the EU has witnessed a significant increase in the number of species and stocks at risk from overexploitation’.5 The latest version of the Common Fisheries Policy appears to acknowledge the extent of damage to aquaculture and the ecosystem. Means have been highlighted to prevent or reduce such damage, but the success of these remains to be seen. Fishing stocks can recover quickly if they are left alone for a few years, but this is a mediumterm  – or even a long-term – strategy. For many employed in the fishing industry, or those industries dependent upon fishing, shortterm survival is paramount.

Competition Policy and Trade Policy Competition Policy and Trade Policy are closely linked. A third area that is also closely related is the Common Commercial

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Policy. Each of these also has a profound impact upon other common policies, particularly the CAP. Competition Policy and the Common Commercial Policy have their origins in the Treaty of Rome. In fact, the Competition Policy can also be seen in the Treaty of Paris. Within the Treaty of Rome, Article 113 focuses upon a common tariff and common trade agreements with third countries. The common tariff requires a single market to operate effectively. A single market was in existence from 1968, but it was after the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) that both Competition Policy and the Common Commercial Policy grew in importance. The aim of the Competition Policy is to prevent distortions in competition caused by private firms or by government actions. Thus there are two parts to the policy: (1) activities of the private sector; and (2) the activities of the state or state-sponsored sector. While the EEC – and later the EU – could propose ways in which these distortions could be prevented, the reality was that all of this was complementary to national governmental action. As the EU has developed, these national principles on competition have moved into alignment with those of the EU. Ultimately, this can be seen as a stepping stone in the integration process of the EU. The Competition Policy is also applicable externally, that is beyond the EU. The principles behind the Competition Policy (which are examined below) are built into many of the trade agreements that the EU constructs with non-EU members. For example, Canada and the EU have an agreement regarding the application of their respective competition policies, dating back to 1999. The Competition Policy covers a wide range of issues. It tries to prevent the abuse of a dominant market position. This is where a single business may have little or no competition and is therefore in a position to charge whatever price it likes for the goods or service that it provides. The Competition Policy can be utilised to prevent such organisations from overcharging customers. In 2007, for example, Mastercard was found guilty of overcharging its customers for cross-border transactions in Europe. Mastercard cut the fee without accepting any wrongdoing. In addition, the Competition Policy can also be used to prevent businesses from attempting to eliminate their competition by

­78   Britain and the European Union

­ eliberately undercharging for their product. Many businesses, such d as Telefonica of Spain and France Telecom, have been found guilty of undercharging for their products. Even mergers between businesses may be prevented under the Competition Policy if they are likely to have an adverse effect on consumers or on the competition in that area of business. All proposed mergers must be examined. Thus, the Commission approved the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook in 2014. Another area is the problem of cartels. This is where a group of companies from different countries get together and rig prices. As a result, consumers would have to pay higher prices for the goods or service provided. Under the Competition Policy, such actions are not permitted. Microsoft have been investigated by the EU on several occasions and have been fined over €1.6 billion for a number of offences relating to the sales of their products and the bundling of packages. The Competition Policy can also be used to prevent governments from undermining competition. For example, if a country passes laws restricting which businesses may compete for a government tender to businesses from that country, this goes against the idea of open, free and fair competition. Under Competition Policy rules, national monopolies may also be opened up to competition, especially if they are deemed inefficient. The Common Commercial Policy originally focused upon the common external tariff and quotas of goods entering the EEC/ EU. This remit has widened over time, and is now much more widespread. Areas covered by the Common Commercial Policy now include regulatory issues such as product conformity. The idea here is to make sure that products entering the EU market conform to such things as EU safety standards. Added to this, the emphasis is also moving away from trade in goods to trade in services, which is a lot more difficult to monitor. This is further complicated by the growing importance of issues such as the environment, as well as the continuing development of technology. The Commission plays a key role in competition, commercial and trade policies. For organisations that break the Competition Policy guidelines, it is the Commission that will try to persuade the organisation to change their methods. If this is unsuccessful, then

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the Commission can order the organisation to change, and can even impose a fine on it, as was the case with the Microsoft example cited earlier in this chapter. In many respects, with regard to the breaking of Competition Policy, the Commission can be seen as prosecutor, judge and jury. There is, however, a right of appeal for the organisation. Such an appeal would be dealt with by the Court of First Instance (see Chapter 3). Under the Common Commercial Policy, the Commission has been given the power to negotiate with third parties on trade deals, and so on. Any decisions proposed by the Commission must, however, be approved by the Council of Ministers. This makes trade negotiations with the EU very cumbersome. An example of this problem arose over the trade dispute between the EU and China in 2005. A deal was reached by the then Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, but it had to be approved by the Council of Ministers – and some member states were not overly happy with the deal that had been negotiated. One of the big issues about the Common Commercial Policy and the Competition Policy is that they do not seem to fit in with the ideas of the CAP. The Competition Policy places an emphasis upon trade liberalisation, which among other things is meant to ensure that the internal market is not distorted. It also highlights how state aid may distort competition. On the issue of state aid, the Competition Policy states: ‘By giving certain firms or products favoured treatment to the detriment of other firms or products, state aid seriously disrupts normal competitive forces.’6 Arguably, the subsidies given to farmers via the CAP seriously disrupt normal competitive forces. Some state aid is permitted, however, and there are a number of areas under which the CAP might therefore be exempt, including important projects of common European interest and the development of certain areas. Britain’s position on Competition Policy and the Common Commercial Policy is broadly supportive. The British Government, along with the Netherlands and many East European states, is a strong supporter of trade liberalisation. The idea of state subsidies undermines the free market, and they should be removed. Competition should be open, free and fair. In this respect, Britain sees many benefits for all EU members through trade liberalisation

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and a reduction in dependency upon the state. This perspective is fundamentally different from that of the French Government, which is very much in favour of protectionist policies. The EU ends up trying to strike a balance between these diametrically opposed positions.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy Developing a common policy in the areas of foreign affairs and security has proved to be rather difficult. In 1969, at the Hague Summit, the idea of European Political Co-operation (EPC) was established. This came into effect in 1970. The idea was to develop a consensus on foreign policy, based around intergovernmental cooperation. All of this was established outside the framework of the EEC. There were no votes on any issues, nor were any decisions binding. Added to this, military and security matters were omitted. Despite all this, the aim was to develop a common position on foreign affairs. Although EPC was formalised under the Single European Act, it was its evolution into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – as part of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – that saw a huge step forward in co-operation between member states on foreign matters. This has since changed into a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with the Foreign Policy being made separate. The aim of the CFSP, like EPC, had been to encourage cooperation between member states on foreign policy. Where this co-operation was achieved, the idea was that it would lead to joint action by member states. The problem was that the CFSP was not really a proper ‘common policy’. In all of the other common policies cited in this chapter, there is a pooling of responsibilities by the member states, and it is all co-ordinated by the Commission. In the case of CFSP, there was no pooling of resources, and the decisionmaking process was led by the Council of Ministers. Rather than being a supranational agreement, CFSP was intergovernmental. Even the language used in the policy was very loose, especially when compared to other common policies. There were phrases such as ‘common values’, ‘fundamental interest’ and ‘to preserve peace and

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stability’. Yet, despite all of this, there was some movement towards a more co-ordinated approach to foreign policy by EU member states. There were a number of problems with the CFSP. One of these was the issue of neutrality. Countries such as Ireland and Sweden have maintained that they are neutral states that do not get involved in wars. This has made it very difficult to develop a common position, especially when unanimity is required with any decisions made. The unanimous decision-making was changed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999). Instead of unanimity, there were two alternatives: (1) constructive abstention and (2) emergency brake. Constructive abstention gave the opportunity for member states to ‘not support’ a particular policy proposal under CFSP. Under the rules of unanimity, the options were ‘support’ or ‘oppose’. Constructive abstention enables up to one-third of member states to abstain without defeating the policy proposal. Under the emergency brake, decisions are taken under qualified majority voting. If a member state wishes to veto a decision, it is referred to the European Council. Should this happen the European Council has to operate under unanimity, which gives all member states the opportunity to rethink their positions. Should a proposal go that far, it is unlikely to be passed. Despite some setbacks, the idea that the CFSP is evolving and developing holds some truth. In Helsinki in December 1999, there was a move to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force as part of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This ESDP strengthens the CFSP. Not only does it focus upon security and defence, but also humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. The Rapid Reaction Force was perceived as a putative European army. Yet it was not. Most EU member states acknowledged the primacy of NATO in their defence policies. The Rapid Reaction Force worked alongside NATO, enabling the EU to increase its global role without seemingly being tied to US apron strings. The Rapid Reaction Force or, more accurately, EUFOR (EU Force), is now part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The CSDP came into effect as a separate policy through the Lisbon Treaty. This saw a degree of separation between foreign policy on the one hand, and security and defence on the other. Both, however, still came under the auspices of the High Representative

­82   Britain and the European Union

of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Thus there remains the intertwining of the two sets of policies into a far clearer package, enabling the EU to play a much greater role in both foreign affairs, and defence and security matters. The stated ambitions of the CSDP are twofold. First, there is the aim of enhancing the EU’s ability to intervene in international security. Second, there are the practical means of doing so. This could be, for example, through the pooling of military resources.7 As of 2014, via the CSDP, the EU was involved in a number of military operations and civilian missions across parts of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. It must be noted that the CSDP is not just about military intervention; tools available to the EU under this policy include political, economic, legal, diplomatic, developmental and trade instruments. The British position on the CFSP has been interesting. At all times, the British Government has argued that NATO is paramount. Any developments in the CFSP are not to be at the expense of NATO. Fears have been expressed that the CFSP will lead to Britain being dragged into wars by our European partners about which we know nothing, or that the CFSP would lead to a Common Defence Policy and the development of a European army. All British troops would then be under the control of the EU. There is, however, no European army, and nor would Britain relinquish control of British troops to the EU. Despite the expression of such fears, Britain has been to the forefront in backing the development of EUFOR. EUFOR was an Anglo-French idea, but much of the emphasis must be placed upon the ‘Anglo’. Tony Blair saw this as an opportunity for the EU to get involved properly in any regional problems; the disaster of Kosovo must not be repeated. When the country of Yugoslavia disintegrated in the early 1990s, ethnic tensions came to the fore. Among the many atrocities committed in subsequent wars, war crimes by Serbian paramilitary forces against non-Serbs living in Kosovo were among the worst. Blair wanted Europe to resolve these and any future problems, and EUFOR would be the vehicle to do so. However, EUFOR would also mean less dependence upon the United States. Where we may see a change in Britain’s position on EUFOR is with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader. Corbyn has advocated British withdrawal from NATO. He wishes also to

Common Policies of the European Union   ­ 83

remove Britain’s nuclear deterrent and to spend more on conventional forces. His enthusiasm for the EU as a whole is little more than lukewarm. Thus a further British presence in EUFOR may be at risk should Corbyn become prime minister. The problem with the CFSP is that there is still a need for agreement between twenty-eight member states. In global terms, the EU is definitely an economic power. The military aspects, however, are nowhere near as impressive. There is an EU Battle Group, comprising around 1,500 troops. There is also a commitment to be able to deploy around 60,000 EUFOR troops within sixty days of a major operation – this could be linked to the provision of humanitarian aid or a peacekeeping role. The reality is that this is a small force. Collectively, the EU is a civilian power, although some of the individual member states have fairly impressive military muscle.

The development of the single currency There is sometimes a perception that the formation of the single currency, the euro, was something new. Such ideas had, however, been around for many years, including the Werner Plan in 1969. Pierre Werner, the prime minister of Luxembourg, envisaged a staged development of a single currency by 1980, although his plans did not come to fruition. The idea of European monetary union has been around since the 1970s. The whole idea of monetary union requires a range of factors. The first of these is a single monetary policy. In effect, all member states have to agree to the amount of money in circulation and the standardisation of a single interest rate and a single inflation rate. Added to this, there would need to be a single authority – one body to be in charge of setting interest rates and so on. Obviously, this would have to be a central bank. Third, there would need to be a harmonisation of macro-economic policies. This would lead to the full development of a single market. Finally, there would need to be a single currency. As noted above, the idea of a single currency is not new. The Werner Plan established the ‘snake in the tunnel’. This pegged all EEC currencies (those of the six member states and the countries involved in the first wave of enlargement) against the US dollar.

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There was a bracket within which the currencies could fluctuate of +/– 2.25 per cent. There had been massive speculation against the US dollar in 1971, and the hope was that the snake in the tunnel would protect the European currencies. To protect them still further, there was also to be limited divergence between the strongest and weakest EEC currencies (at +/– 2.25 per cent). This system was unsuccessful as individual currencies were unable to keep within the set parameters and were forced to float freely. The next attempt was the establishment of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as part of the European Monetary System (EMS). This was established in 1979. It was hoped that the EMS would create a degree of stability within the EC currencies. A European Currency Unit (ecu) was established as the focal point of the EMS. All trade between EC partners was carried out in ecus. The idea of the ERM was to create this stability by enabling EC currencies to fluctuate by +/– 2.25 per cent from an agreed point of parity, which was their value against the ecu. This was very similar to the ‘snake in the tunnel’ but was not tied to the US dollar. If a currency was unable to keep within its given rate of fluctuation, the banks were expected to intervene. Ultimately, the idea of the ecu was to enable Europeans to come to terms with the idea of a single currency. In 1989, this whole system was taken a step further with the Delors Plan. Jacques Delors, the president of the Commission at the time, pointed out that, of the four basic elements of monetary union (see above), only one was missing. There was a single market, competition policy and other common economic policies. Only macro-economic policy co-ordination was lacking. Thus Delors put forward the steps required to achieve the single currency. This was then timetabled within the TEU, as detailed in Box 4.3. The challenge was to get the different currencies and economies of the EU to converge. To enable this to happen, specific convergence criteria were established. These were detailed in the Treaty on European Union (Article 109j). The convergence criteria focused upon interest rates, inflation rates, currency exchange rates and the levels of public deficit. Inflation had to be kept to no more than 1.5 per cent above the average of the three member states (who wished to sign up to the single currency) with the lowest rates of inflation. Interest rates had to be kept to no

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Box 4.3  The timetable to the single currency Stage 1 (July 1990 to December 1993) Free movement of capital in the EC. Closer co-operation on macroeconomic affairs. Stage 2 (January 1994 to December 1998) System of central banks launched to monitor and co-ordinate national monetary policies. Increased supervisory powers for the institutions of the EC/EU. Narrowing of margins of fluctuation within the ERM. Stage 3 (January 1999 onwards) Establishment of fixed exchange rates. Granting of full monetary authority to EC/EU institutions. The ecu was converted into the euro (which was launched in January 2002).

more than 2 per cent above the average of the same three states. The exchange rates had to be kept to within the +/– 2.25 per cent band, while the public debt of the country had to be less than 60 per cent of national GDP, with the national budget deficit to be no more than 3 per cent of GDP. There were waivers for the last two as they are technically fiscal policy not monetary policy. A European Central Bank (ECB) was effectively operating from June 1998, with the euro being utilised in tandem with national currencies from 1999. On 1 January 2002, twelve member states began using the euro as their national currency. Britain and Denmark had opted out (the Danes after an overwhelming referendum vote against adoption) during the negotiations on the TEU. Sweden held a referendum on joining the euro and returned a resounding ‘No’ vote. All countries that join the EU must run their economies in such a way as to join the euro at the earliest opportunity. As of 2014, eighteen member states were using the euro. The British position on the developments towards the single currency has been confused. For example, Margaret Thatcher, as Leader of the Opposition in the late 1970s, committed Britain to joining the EMS. Upon gaining office, she reneged on the commitment. Britain did eventually join the ERM in the late 1980s, only to be unceremoniously kicked out in September 1992 (Black Wednesday). On

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the day that Britain left the ERM, the then Chancellor, Norman Lamont, issued the statement while being flanked by one of his advisors, David Cameron. Even during the negotiations on the TEU, the British position, as it had been with the issue around joining the EEC (see Chapter 1), was one of ‘wait and see’. This was an astute move by the then prime minister, John Major, who allowed the process to go ahead in return for concessions in other policy areas. It is unlikely that Britain will join the euro in the near future. Gordon Brown proposed five ‘economic tests’ that had to be met before a referendum on Britain joining the euro could go ahead. Subsequent governments have ruled out joining the euro altogether. The coalition government, for example, refused to even discuss the issue for the lifetime of that Parliament (2010–15). The newly elected Conservative government is so focused on renegotiating the terms of entry that the idea of even thinking about joining the euro is not even being considered. Support for the euro in Britain is not strong. As prime minister, Tony Blair was keen for Britain to join. His Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was somewhat obdurate in his opposition. For Blair, joining the euro was a symbol of Britain’s commitment to playing a prominent role in the development of the EU, if not as the new leader of the EU, supplanting the Franco-German axis. As with many things, Blair seemed to believe that he would be able to persuade all opposition that he was right and they were wrong over British membership of the euro, and that he would win a referendum on membership. The opportunity never arose. Opposition to the euro in Britain is built around the symbol of nationality. The pound is a symbol of Britain as an independent sovereign state and there is a perception that surrendering the pound would signify the death knell of Great Britain as a global economic and political player. The euro crisis was grist to the mill for those who were fundamentally opposed to Britain joining the single currency. It highlighted very clearly, at least in their opinion, that the euro was doomed to fail. Such a perspective may be a little premature. There are major issues around the euro that need to be addressed. The primary one concerns the eurozone being a monetary union and not a fiscal

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union. Thus, monetary policy (that is, interest rates) is under the control of the ECB. Fiscal policy (taxation and public spending), on the other hand, remains under the control of the national governments. While the two are not interlinked, there will be problems for the eurozone states. There is a perception in the UK that the euro is not a strong currency. It is true that its value diminished rather rapidly upon formation, but it subsequently picked up. If anything, the euro is sometimes seen as being stronger than the dollar, although the relationship between the two fluctuates. There has been a similar relationship between the pound and the euro. The basic problem with the single currency is the difficulty in assessing its success or failure. European countries have different economic cycles and different economic problems. These are being harmonised, but it is being done rather more slowly than originally anticipated. There is a feeling that the single currency was a natural step in the process of European economic policy-making. The completion of the single market necessitated a single currency. The use of the single currency does not have to be seen as a stepping stone to a single Europe. With gradual economic harmonisation, all member states are moving closer together and integrating more. Yet with different languages, cultures and the strength of national identities, the single currency is not sufficient on its own to lead to a single Europe.

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What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • There are a number of different common policies. They have differing aims and objectives. Most of them are co-ordinated by the Commission. • The CAP has been one of the most successful of the common policies. It is still in need of reform because of the technological changes that have taken place since the time the CAP was drawn up. Around half of the EU budget is still spent on agriculture. • The Common Fisheries Policy is working to preserve fishing stocks while also trying to protect national fishing industries. Some member states, most notably Britain, are unconvinced by the claims of the EU. Half of the British (white fish) fishing fleet has been tied up. The other

­88   Britain and the European Union half is restricted in its operations. The Common Fisheries Policy is seen as destroying British fishing. • The Competition Policy and the Common Commercial Policy are working towards protecting both EU industry and the rights of the consumer. The EU is very keen to quash anti-competitive practices, and expects any of its trading partners to do the same. • The CFSP is different from the other common policies. It is co-ordinated by the Council of Ministers rather than the Commission. In some respects the CFSP can be seen as a blueprint for a common foreign policy. A part of the CFSP has been the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy, both of which are under the remit of the High Representative. • Moves to create a single currency for the EU have been around for many years. The Delors Plan, which was timetabled in the Treaty on European Union, led to the formation of the euro. Twelve member states adopted the euro from 1 January 2002, and there were eighteen using it by 2014.

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Glossary of key terms Agenda 2000  This is part of the agricultural reforms that were agreed in 1999. It cut the amount of subsidy for farmers in a number of different areas, although there were generous compensation packages. Aquaculture  This is the creation or rearing of aquatic (water) life forms. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)  The CAP was part of the Treaty of Rome, although it did not formally come into existence until 1962. The aim was to protect European farming livelihoods, while also trying to make Europe self-sufficient in food production. Common Commercial Policy  This common policy focuses upon the common external tariff and the quotas of goods that can enter the EU. Over time the remit of this policy has been broadened to regulatory issues such as product conformity. Common Fisheries Policy  The Common Fisheries Policy came into being in 1983. It focuses upon preserving fishing stocks and the marine ecosystem, as well as the rights of consumers. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)  The idea of the CFSP is to encourage co-operation between member states on foreign policy matters. Unlike other common policies, this one is co-ordinated by the Council of Ministers, not the Commission. Common position  This is a step short of a common policy. A common position can be established by the EU but it is very difficult to enforce. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)  This was part of the Lisbon Treaty, which developed the CFSP but saw a degree of separation

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between foreign policy on the one hand, and security and defence on the other. Both come under the auspices of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. A key aim of this policy is to enhance the EU’s ability to intervene in international security. Community preference  If there is a choice between an agricultural product from the EU and that of a non-EU state, Community preference means that you should buy the community product. To ensure this happens there is a common tariff barrier around the EU to make sure that the non-EU competition is of a higher price. Competition Policy  This policy aims to prevent distortions in competition between private businesses or within the public sector. Decoupling  This was part of the MacSharry plans to reform the CAP. It separated the amount of money paid to farmers and the amount that they produced. It was a move from price support to income support. Delors Plan  The Delors Plan was the timetable to move from the EMS and ERM to a single currency for the EU. European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)  This fund finances the EU’s contribution to rural development programmes. European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF)  This fund is used to finance direct payments to farmers and measures regulating or supporting agricultural markets. European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) This was the scheme that paid out the money for the CAP. The Guarantee aspect took the larger share of the money, focusing upon the payments to farmers for their products. The guidance aspect looked at issues to do with farming infrastructure. It has been superseded by the EAFRD and the EAGF. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  EFSA is an autonomous body that focuses upon all risks to do with the food chain. European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)  The EMFF was established to help the fishing industry in the transition to sustainable fishing. European Monetary System (EMS)  This was the system of partially fixed exchange rates that was the precursor to the euro. European Political Co-operation (EPC)  EPC was a precursor to the CFSP. It emphasised co-operation between member states in the area of foreign policy. European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  This is part of the CFSP. The Rapid Reaction Force comes under this policy. However, it focuses not just upon security and defence, but also upon humanitarian aid and peacekeeping. Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)  This was part of the European Monetary System (EMS). The ERM was supposed to reduce fluctuations in the exchange rates between the member states involved in the EMS.

­90   Britain and the European Union All exchange rates were fixed in a banding system against the European Currency Unit (ecu), so they could fluctuate within their band but not beyond. Fiscal policy  Taxation and public spending. Luxembourg Compromise  All member states have a veto over policy proposals if they constitute a serious threat to national interests. Monetary policy  This looks at the amount of money in circulation, and the ways and means by which it can be controlled, most obviously through interest rates. Opt-out  An opt-out can be negotiated by any member state with regard to a policy that may adversely affect national interests. Thus the UK, Denmark and Sweden opted out of the euro. Overproduction  Quite simply, this is where too much of a product is being supplied. With regard to the CAP, overproduction meant that more food was being produced than was actually required. Rapid Reaction Force/EUFOR  The Rapid Reaction Force is the EU’s military response unit. It comes under the Common Security and Defence Policy. Total Allowable Catch (TAC)  TACs are set for each member state. They are national quotas for each type of fish or other marine life. Werner Plan  This was the first plan to develop a single currency. It was detailed in 1969–70, and tied all EEC currencies to each other, as well as pegging them against the US dollar.

? Likely examination questions Why is there little likelihood of a future British Government proposing to join the euro? ‘The Common Agricultural Policy may have been fit for purpose when it was first established, but it is no longer the case. It should be abolished.’ Discuss. ‘The creation of the post of High Commissioner is little more than a flagrant attempt by the European Union to usurp more powers.’ Discuss.

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Helpful websites http://europa.eu/pol/index_en.htm is a starting point to access the range of policies under the competence of the EU. members.tripod.com/~WynGrant/WynGrantCAPpage.html is the home page for Wyn Grant’s CAP website. This is one of the best non-EU sponsored websites on the CAP. www.efsa.europa.eu/ is the European Food Safety Authority home page.

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Suggestions for further reading There are many sources which cover different EU policies. For a general overview, consider M. Cowles and D. Dinan (eds) (2004), Developments in the European Union 2 (Palgrave) which has specific chapters on several of the EU’s common policies. For coverage of the CAP, see W. Grant (2010), ‘Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy’ West European Politics vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 22–38 and J. Candel, G. Breeman, S. Stiller and C. Termeer (2014), ‘Disentangling the Consensus of Food Security: The Case of the EU Common Agricultural Policy Reform Debate’ Food Policy vol. 44, pp. 47–58. The CFP has some excellent coverage in specialist journals, for example R. Froese (2011), ‘Fishing at the Edge of Collapse: 27 Years of Common Fisheries Policy in Europe’. Background material for R. Froese (2011), ‘Fishery Reform Slips Through the Net’ Nature vol. 475, no. 7. Available at www.fishbase.de/rfroese/FishingEdge6.pdf. See also D. Symes (2012), ‘Regionalising the Common Fisheries Policy: Context, Content and Controversy’ Maritime Studies vol. 11, no. 6. Available at www. maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/11/1/6. For the combination of foreign, defence and security policies, see A. Deighton (2002), ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 719–42; C. Jensen, J. Slapin and T. König (2007), ‘Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy? Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform’ European Union Politics vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 387–410; and K. Smith (2008), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Polity, 2nd edition).

CHAPTER 5

Europeanisation Contents What is Europeanisation? 93 The effects of Europeanisation 95 Europeanisation and the British state 98 Thinking about Europe 100 Conclusion101

Overview The aim of this chapter is to explore the concept of ‘Europeanisation’. There are many different interpretations of this concept (for example, from a British perspective and from a European perspective). The chapter will examine how parts of the British state have been gradually integrated into the European Union’s ways of doing things, for example the bureaucracy. This process of ‘Europeanisation’ is not always very open. In many respects, this chapter will form a basis for all subsequent chapters. How political parties, pressure groups and the different parts of the United Kingdom interact with the EU, as well as what people think about the European Union, is all part of the Europeanisation process.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • • • •

Definitions of Europeanisation Different interpretations of Europeanisation Europeanisation and the British state Europeanisation with regard to thinking about and understanding the EU

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What is Europeanisation? The concept of Europeanisation is rather complicated. There is no definitive agreement as to what it may include. Consequently, there is much academic debate around the subject. Conversely, the concept is often oversimplified in the media. Europeanisation is reduced down to the EU telling everyone, and Britain in particular, what to do. Yet such an interpretation is rather legalistic; the focus is upon obeying rules and regulations.1 It could be argued that this approach is too narrow; Europeanisation is so much more. What tends to be seen under the label of Europeanisation is a ‘top down’ process, whereby ideas and policies are disseminated from the EU to the member states, who follow them through. Not only is it seen to be ‘top down’, but it also appears to be a one-way process. Part of the process of Europeanisation involves some sort of feedback loop. If the process of Europeanisation is solely about the EU telling everyone what to do, how does the EU know if their instructions are being followed through? Are they being followed through correctly, as envisaged by those Eurocrats who drew up the legislation? Have there been any problems with implementation? To address all of these questions means that there must be a two-way process, even if it is ‘top down’ led. A minimum requirement will be the imparting of knowledge with regard to the impact of the legislation. If there is a policy disaster, where the impact of the legislation has gone horribly wrong, there is a need for this information in order to be able to react and address the situation. This would comprise the minimum of feedback. Yet the feedback loop can offer so much more, highlighting how Europeanisation can be a two-way process. The feedback may include ideas on how to improve policies, or to highlight omissions in the current policies that need correcting. This feedback could even be a proactive way of member states developing new policy proposals for the rest of the EU to follow – akin to the dissemination of good practice in any organisation. Radaelli (2000) questions the extent to which Europeanisation is about telling everyone what to do. He asks: ‘Is Europeanization making the member states more similar? Or do different domestic political structures “refract” Europeanisation in different ­directions?’2

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It may well be that different member states react in different ways to this idea of Europeanisation. In the UK, for example, with a history of laissez-faire, the imposition of EU rules and regulations is often perceived as an all-out assault on the British way of life; for businesses, that British approach is based on informality with self-regulation, and the idea of trusting a person’s word rather than rigid rules and regulations. This Europeanisation is presented as undermining and changing everything that is British, compelling European-based conformity. There is an important point about Europeanisation. With there being different interpretations of the concept, and different member states reacting in different ways to the whole process of Europeanisation, it may actually be better to ascertain what Europeanisation is not.3 With there being so many different ways of, for example, implementing rules and regulations – and this supposedly being part of the idea of Europeanisation – it becomes very clear that it is not about ‘making everyone the same’. This was the fear expressed by Margaret Thatcher at the College of Europe in Bruges in September 1988 (see Box 5.1),4 where she spoke of the creation of ‘some sort of identikit European personality’.5 Europeanisation is definitely not about this, in whatever political, social or economic form it is being discussed. It is not about the harmonisation of life across the member states, or the political integration that may go with it. In fact, as will be seen with ‘ideational’ Europeanisation later in this chapter, such an approach to Europeanisation may in fact do the exact opposite. So far, the issue of Europeanisation has been applied to member states of the EU. This may be seen as a rather narrow approach; Europeanisation may go much further. Applicant states and countries aspiring to join the EU, such as Armenia, Kosovo and Morocco, will undergo a high degree of Europeanisation, as they adapt their political infrastructure, their democratic processes, their economy and their society to conform with the acquis communautaire. The current applicant states in late 2014 – including Iceland and Serbia – are working through these laws and processes to be able to join. All of the countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (see Chapter 7) will be exposed to some forms of Europeanisation.

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Box 5.1  Extract from Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988 My first guiding principle is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community.   To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve.   Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

This process goes further still. Countries that trade with the EU will be exposed to Europeanisation as well, be it the powerful trading countries such as China, Japan and the United States, or much smaller countries – and not just the former European colonies – all around the world. EU trade rules and regulations apply, be it about food labelling (for example, whether or not GM crops have been used in the product must be noted) or the components of manufacturing (for example, children’s toys may not be painted with lead-based paints). Failure to comply may result in the product not reaching the EU market. All of this is part of the process of Europeanisation. In a final point of pedantry, there is a problem with the concept of Europeanisation. It is not about all of Europe. Rather, it is perceived to be about how the EU impacts upon the member states of the organisation – and even if this is a two-way process: ‘Europeanization concentrates on the impact of the EU upon member states, something which might more accurately be defined as “EU-ization”’.6 As the concept of Europeanisation is clearly about the impact of the EU on other countries, perhaps ‘EU-isation’ would indeed be a more accurate term.

The effects of Europeanisation Two conditions have been highlighted by Börzel and Risse (2000) about Europeanisation.7 The first is that Europeanisation must be

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inconvenient; it is about the EU rectifying a perceived mistake or ‘misfit’ within a member state. Thus something needs to change. The second is that there must be some sort of process whereby there is a response to the EU’s demand to rectify the perceived mistake or ‘misfit’; that institutions react to this demand for change. A series of degrees of change can be perceived.8 These highlight the different ways in which a government may respond to this ‘top down’ process of Europeanisation. They are absorption, accommodation and transformation. • Absorption is where, as the word suggests, the changes are accepted and absorbed into the political structures. There is a negligible impact. Changes are made to policies or ideas as if they were part of the national processes of policy-making and implementation. • Accommodation is where changes are made by adapting existing policies or institutions, without necessarily changing them completely. It is more than a case of tinkering round the edges, but not necessarily wholesale change. There is, however, a noticeable impact – be it on policies or institutions. It is an obvious inconvenience that things have to change, and that inconvenience is both felt and noticed. This is part of the reaction to the perceived ‘misfit’. • Transformation is about total change. New policies or institutions may well replace the old ones. If there is no replacement, there is instead a fundamental change to what is already in place. This change is obvious, potentially invasive and will have a high degree of impact on domestic politics. These are the potential different effects upon domestic politics that may result through the process of Europeanisation. These reactions may well depend upon the issue or institution that is undergoing the reaction to the perceived ‘misfit’. Different policy ideas will generate different responses in each member state. In just the same way as there are different approaches to Europeanisation, there is also a myriad of responses, falling into three broad categories.9 The important thing to note is that these categories are not rigid. How a member state responds to the process of Europeanisation may depend upon the issue at stake. It may also

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depend upon the politicians involved, and their relationship with the EU. The first category is ‘pace setting’. This is where domestic politics and policies may actually shape the EU agenda. In this respect, rather than seeing the traditional ‘top down’ interpretation of Europeanisation, this is much more a ‘bottom up’ approach. Member states may not just actively attempt to shape the policies emanating from the EU, but may also prompt the Commission into developing such policies. At the other extreme is ‘foot dragging’. This is often seen as being the default British position. There is a clear refusal to comply with the EU, or a stubborn reluctance to accept change. In fact, domestic policies may continue in place, even when they run counter to those being set by the EU. The threats of fines and penalties tend to have little effect; such threats often further entrench the resistance to change. This foot dragging may overlap with the previous set of categorisations of government response. In this particular circumstance, if the response to Europeanisation is about transformation or total change, there may well be a high degree of foot dragging. The third category is that of ‘fence sitting’. In such a circumstance, the member state appears indifferent to the policies emanating from the EU. There is no enthusiasm for the policies, or even an attempt to influence the development of such policies. The policies are accepted, implemented as need be and life moves on. It is possible to observe how Britain changed categories with regard to environmental policy.10 In the 1980s, Britain was very clearly a foot dragger. Any proposals on the environment were fought over and resisted. There was that stubbornness to comply; Britain was the reluctant, or even recalcitrant, European. Conversely, a decade later, Britain was one of the pace setters on European environmental policy, with a much more proactive approach. The British Government was active in setting the environmental agenda, through such things as the Kyoto Agreement, across the EU and beyond. More than a decade later, in the dog-end days of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, Britain sat somewhere between pace setting and fence sitting. This demonstrates how domestic politics can affect the process of Europeanisation. At that time, there was an enthusiastic Secretary of State for the Environment, Ed Davey, having to

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persuade a coalition government of the merits of a more proactive approach to environmental policy, many of whom were resistant to any such ideas. The new Conservative government of 2015 appears to prioritise energy security at the expense of the environment. There is therefore enthusiasm for fracking for gas and oil, despite the environmental costs. It is likely we will see Britain as much more of a foot dragger on environmental issues.

Europeanisation and the British state Europeanisation has had a significant impact upon the British state. Using the labels mentioned earlier,11 the impact has been a mixture of accommodation and transformation. Much of this will be examined in Chapter 8, but it is worth noting some key points here. The first of the noticeable impacts upon the British Parliamentary system have occurred with the introduction of EU select committees and public bill committees in both Houses of Parliament. These committees examine the legislation coming from the EU and scrutinise it most thoroughly. Public bill committees have been bolted on to the existing structures – a clear example of accommodation. Particular government departments are also most heavily influenced by the EU. Obviously, the Foreign Office has a close relationship with the EU, but so do a number of other departments, including the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (which deals with the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, as well as issues to do with trade and commerce), the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (with a focus upon the Common Commercial Policy, Competition Policy and so forth), and the Ministry of Defence (with regard to the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy). The processes and features of Europeanisation impact upon more than just central government; subnational government is also affected. As will be seen in greater detail in Chapter 8, the devolved bodies across the UK, as well as local government, have developed relationships with many of the EU institutions. Some, such as the Committee of Regions, encourage the development of these relations – it is part of their raison d’être. There is local and regional input into the decision-making processes of the EU (see Chapter 3).

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What is interesting to note here is that while there are many critics of UK membership of the EU who cite Britain’s budgetary contribution as being a problem, many subnational bodies would disagree. The EU is a potential source of extra funding for them, over and above their grant from central government. These bodies may attempt to access structural fund monies for particular projects. For example, Leicester City Council has redeveloped part of the city centre – the Humberstone Gate East section – at a cost of £3.5 million. This was part-funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). It is most likely that this project would not have been undertaken but for the ERDF monies. One of the stranger impacts of Europeanisation on the British state can be seen with the issue of gold plating legislation. This applies to the national as well as subnational governments. Although not a direct result of Europeanisation per se, it is a clear and obvious by-product. In addition, it demonstrates how Europeanisation does not lead to standardisation or harmonisation. The gold plating of legislation, of which Britain has been one of the worst offenders in the EU, is where EU legislation is implemented with undue vigour. There have even been suggestions that UK governments have blamed the EU for introducing excessive regulations, when the blame should have fallen on the government’s interpretation. Alexander Ehmann, the Head of Regulatory Affairs for the Institute of Directors, noted: ‘Despite … very real concerns regarding legislation originating in the EU, far too many UK Governments have hidden their own regulatory zeal behind a “fig leaf” of enforced European requirements’.12 An example of such gold plating was evident in the treatment and pay of temporary staff, with the implementation of the Temporary Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC). Quite simply, temporary staff have the right to the same statutory pay and benefits as permanent staff. This was taken by some businesses in the UK to include the right to performance-related bonus payments – something that was not intended in the original EU law. The then Business Minister, Michael Fallon, claimed that as of April 2013 gold plating of EU legislation would no longer occur in the UK. Instead, Britain implements the minimum necessary legislation required to conform with any EU ruling. This, it was suggested,

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would bring Britain in line with most EU partners. How effective the legislation to stop gold plating will actually be remains to be seen. By 2014, there were still suggestions of gold plating being applied by the British Government, in this case over the imposition of plain packaging of tobacco products.

Thinking about Europe An aspect of Europeanisation that is often neglected relates to what people think about the EU and their understanding of the concept of ‘Europe’ or the European Union.13 Such an understanding carries some emotional baggage. Implicit in this approach to Europeanisation appears to be a positive interpretation of all things European. It could almost be perceived as a form of brainwashing: to persuade people that the EU is a good thing, and that it is essential for us all to be good Europeans. ‘Ideational’ Europeanisation is very much about thinking about Europe and the EU, as one of a range of interpretations of Europeanisation.14 In today’s context, with the prominence of Nigel Farage and UKIP, ‘ideational’ Europeanisation is very helpful. It is about getting people talking about the EU and its merits and demerits. With Farage having such a large media presence, he is able to keep the issue of EU membership in the public eye. With the election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader, the issue of EU membership may become more prominent. Corbyn has been opposed to EU membership, but wants to generate a debate on the issue rather than impose his own position. From the ‘ideational’ perspective, this is a good thing: both Farage and Corbyn can generate discussion about the EU. The hope might be to develop a more fully informed debate as opposed to some of the rants that can be seen on social media. From the ‘ideational’ perspective, it is very much about the debate taking place. One of the interesting things to note about this ‘ideational’ approach is that it is about the actual thinking on the subject, as opposed to what is being thought. Arguably, there is a need for a degree of balance. As has been noted earlier, Nick Clegg claimed to be the first politician in twenty years to stand up and defend the EU when he debated with Nigel Farage.

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Such apparently negative thinking about Europe and the EU is not problematic. For example, almost everyone will have an opinion on whether or not Britain should stay in the EU. That there is a public discussion on the subject is a good thing. Yet thinking about Europe goes further. There needs to be a consideration of the consequences of the action – in this case staying in or leaving the EU. Those arguing to leave need to consider how Britain’s role in the world may change. What will be the new role for Britain on the world stage as well as on the European stage, be it politically, economically or culturally? Conversely, those arguing to stay in the EU need to think about the future development of the EU and Britain’s role within it. Is the emphasis, for example, to be on enlargement or integration? In simple terms, Europeanisation can be little more than thinking and talking about Europe and the EU. It does not have to be positive; the important thing is merely that a discussion of the idea of the EU is taking place at all. Another way in which this thinking about the EU can be seen is through the concept of diffusion. This is ‘a process through which ideas, normative standards, or … policies and institutions spread across time and space’.15 Europeanisation can be seen as a form of diffusion, but not just of policies and institutions; it is also about the ideas behind the organisation. While this approach may focus more upon the pro-European aspects of discussing ideas, both sides of any argument need to be heard.

Conclusion Europeanisation covers a wide range of interpretations. At a very narrow level, it is about the EU passing rules and regulations and compelling the member states (and prospective member states) to follow them. This narrow interpretation presents very little leeway for the member states to respond, beyond the act of implementation. A much wider interpretation sees the opportunity for Europeanisation to be more of a two-way process, as opposed to a ‘top down’ process. Member states may be proactive in generating proposals for the EU, to have them implemented across all member states. There is also a very clear feedback loop, whereby member

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states can communicate very easily with the EU on the impact of legislation, with the clear intention of improving the quality of the legislation. As well as a variety of interpretations of Europeanisation, there are also a variety of responses. These may depend upon the issue and its impact on the domestic politics of a member state. An issue whereby a member state feels there ought to have been a national veto (due to a clear impact upon national sensibilities) may see that member state dragging its feet in the implementation process. The member state most associated with such a position, rightly or wrongly, is Britain. Finally, in its broadest interpretation, Europeanisation can simply involve thinking about Europe and the EU, and discussing issues surrounding the subject. With this particular interpretation, there is no hidden agenda of trying to convert everyone into being Europhiles. Rather, it is to encourage the debate. Anti-EU perspectives are just as important when discussing the future development, or even future membership, of the organisation. It is through such fully informed debate that new ideas may be considered to better develop the EU.

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What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • There are a range of different interpretations of the concept of Europeanisation. Some are very narrow, such as the imposition of rules and regulations on member states, which tends to be a ‘top down’ approach. Others are much broader. • The more effective interpretations of Europeanisation see a two-way relationship between member states and the EU. This may be through a feedback loop, but could also encourage a more proactive approach by member states to propose ideas for legislation. • Europeanisation affects more than just EU membership. Prospective members are also affected, as are, arguably, all countries that interact with the EU, whether politically, socially or economically. • A consequence of Europeanisation has been the gold plating of some regulations, where governments enforce EU legislation to excess. • Even being anti-EU can be part of the idea of Europeanisation. Thinking about, and discussing, issues to do with the EU is all part of the process of Europeanisation, even where very negative aspects of membership are highlighted.

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Glossary of key terms Acquis communautaire  This is the packet of treaties and legislation which has already been passed by the EU that any new member states must accept as part of joining the EU. Committee of Regions  An advisory body created by the Treaty on European Union. Delegates come from the regional and local government of all member states. The Committee of Regions must be consulted in a number of specified policy areas, although its advice is just that and need not be heeded. The existence of this body, however, highlights the importance of regionalism and subsidiarity to the EU. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)  The ENP focuses upon helping countries which are geographically close to Europe, and enabling them to benefit from the EU. Due to their lack of economic (and political and social) development, these countries are unlikely to be able to join the EU in the near future. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)  This is one of the structural funds. The ERDF focuses upon developing and improving the infrastructure of regions across the EU. Europeanisation  This can be seen as being part of the process of integration, whereby European ideas are spread across all member states. Yet it is a complicated term, with many interpretations. It can be perceived as the EU telling everyone what to do; alternatively, it can be about the institutions of the EU learning from the member states or encouraging thinking about the EU in a positive or negative manner. Gold plating legislation  This is where EU legislation is implemented with undue vigour, and may well go beyond the letter and the spirit of what was desired. Structural funds  These funds are used by the EU to develop regional policy. In particular, structural funds are used to narrow some of the disparities between the richest and poorest regions of the EU. There are four specific aspects: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund; the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and part of the Common Fisheries Policy. These have now been incorporated into ESIF.

? Likely examination questions Why is there such a reluctance to see any positive aspects in the Europeanisation of Britain? In what ways, if at all, could a fully informed debate about Britain’s relationship with the European Union be established?

­104   Britain and the European Union ‘As the European Union imposes its will on to Britain, Britain is losing its identity. The process of Europeanisation undermines everything good about Britain.’ Discuss.

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Helpful websites www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332 gives the full text of Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the College of Europe, Bruges, in September 1988. The speech itself has become the founding document of many anti-EU groups in the UK, most notably the Bruges Group. http://eiop.or.at/ is the website of the European integration papers. A number of these consider the concept of Europeanisation. If you use any internet search engine and enter the word ‘Europeanisation’, you will be able to access many academic articles. From here, it is possible to examine a range of different interpretations of Europeanisation that go far beyond the remit of this chapter.

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Suggestions for further reading A number of authors have written extensively on the concept of Europeanisation, among whom Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse and Claudio Radaelli are the most prominent. Samples of their excellent work include T. Börzel (2002), ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 193–214; T Börzel and T. Risse (2000), ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 15. Available at http://eiop. or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm; T. Börzel and T. Risse (2012), ‘From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction’ West European Politics vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 1–19; and C. Radaelli (2000), ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 8. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000008a.htm For a British perspective on Europeanisation, consider B. Rosamund (2003), ‘The Europeanization of British Politics’ in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, R. Heffernan and G. Peele (eds), Developments in British Politics 7 (Palgrave), pp. 39–59.

CHAPTER 6

Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism Contents What is supranationalism? 106 Supranationalism and the European Union 107 Supranationalism and the United Kingdom – a troubled relationship? 110 What is intergovernmentalism? 112 Intergovernmentalism and the European Union 113 Intergovernmentalism and the United Kingdom 115 Conclusion116

Overview Having examined the structures and the policies of the European Union, it is now important to set them inside a theoretical context. The EU is pulled in different directions. This chapter will focus upon the debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The future development of the EU is linked to these two approaches. Some of the EU institutions are seen as being intergovernmental; others are perceived to be more supranational in character. There is a clear conflict between these two approaches – they may be seen as contradictory and even irreconcilable. Despite this conflict, the EU seems to function more than just adequately. From a British perspective, the debate between these two approaches is very important. An organisation seen as being supranational may be viewed as a threat to national sovereignty. Such a threat does not exist to the same degree, if at all, in an intergovernmental organisation.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • • • •

Definition of the concept ‘supranationalism’ Definition of the concept ‘intergovernmentalism’ How these two approaches affect the institutions and the policies of the EU The impact of these two approaches on British membership of the EU

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What is supranationalism? To detractors of the EU, the concept of ‘supranationalism’ carries much emotional baggage. Supranationalism means loss of national sovereignty, greater integration and ultimately the formation of a United States of Europe. The EU, as a supranational organisation, is to be questioned, resisted and perhaps even ostracised. Nations must resist this idea, otherwise they will be subsumed within this monster. The problem is that such emotive language actually distorts the idea of supranationalism. In the long term, there may eventually be an ultimate move to form a United States of Europe, but a supranational approach does not necessarily guarantee that such a union will occur. So what is supranationalism? This is where some states have ceded some decision-making powers to a higher authority – in this particular case, the EU. These decision-making powers are only in specified areas, however, such as agriculture and thus the Common Agricultural Policy. It is important to note that although these decision-making powers have been ceded to the EU, they can be returned to the individual states. So, although critics may see this ceding of decision-making powers as a ceding of sovereignty to the EU, the reality is that a state can withdraw from the organisation at any time. The individual states may, acting collectively, decide to return some decision-making powers back to the member states – something for which David Cameron has been lobbying. Part of the perceived problem with supranationalism is that the authority to which powers are ceded is independent of the member states. Its decisions are binding on all member states – in fact, they override national law should the two conflict. Such a situation highlights the fact that supranationalism is far greater than mere cooperation between countries. In specified areas, the higher authority is the supreme decision-making body. The effects of supranationalism, however, go much further than this. Linked to the idea of supranationalism is that of spillover. This concept focuses upon the consequences of supranationalism – the knock-on effects of the decisions being taken. In some respects this can be seen as being related to Adam Smith’s idea of ‘the invisible

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hand’. Smith’s idea was that the consequences of a specific decision taken benefit everyone. Yet these consequences were not intended by the decision-makers. Had the decision-makers tried to achieve such an outcome, it is most likely that they would have failed to achieve their original target. Thus, there was an invisible hand influencing the outcome, which Smith attributed to God. With regard to supranationalism and the EU, movements in specific policy areas have unintended outcomes in others. For example, decisions taken in the environmental sector may have unseen consequences for agriculture (or vice versa). The creation of the single market has had an impact on employment law in all member states. In each case, the spillover speeds up the process of EU integration.

Supranationalism and the European Union Within the EU there are supranational institutions – although not all of the institutions are supranational in nature. It could actually be argued that no individual EU institution is totally supranational or, for that matter, intergovernmental, but rather they are all a combination of the two. The institution most associated with the concept of supranationalism is the Commission. There is full coverage of this institution in Chapter 3. It is useful, however, to reiterate some of the supranational aspects of the Commission here. The first thing to note about the Commission is although there is one Commissioner from each member state (which appears to be intergovernmental), all Commissioners take an oath of loyalty to the Commission. Thus, although Lord Hill of Oareford is Britain’s Commissioner, he is first and foremost the Financial Services Commissioner for the EU. The same applies for all Commissioners with regard to their relationship with their state and their portfolio. One of the aims of the Commission is to promote greater integration within the EU. The concept of integration is examined in Chapter 7. In brief, it is about getting the member states to work more and more closely together. By doing this, there is a greater need for co-ordination at the supranational level to ensure that there is consistency in policy implementation across all EU member states. This co-ordinating role has been taken on by the Commission. In

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doing so, the Commission is in a position to make policy proposals (for consideration by the other institutions of the EU). This leaves it clearly in the role of a supranational policy-maker. Other bodies that could be seen as at least partly supranational include the Court of Justice (as well as the General Court) and the European Parliament. Like the Commission, the members of both Courts are selected from each member state. Once on either Court, however, the members are expected to put the position of the EU ahead of any national interest. Decisions taken by the Courts may affect the entire EU, not necessarily just one member state. The European Parliament is the only directly elected body in the EU. As a parliament, one might expect the members to have a mandate from the European people to make laws on their behalf. This is not the case. As can be seen in the example in Box 6.1, the members sit in ideological transnational groupings (like-minded thinkers from different member states).1 The problem is that the actual elections are all held at the national level, on different days and utilising different electoral systems. Thus, within each ideological grouping of the European Parliament, there are a wide range of opinions covered. For example, the British Conservative and Unionist Party is not overly enthused about working towards ‘ever closer union’, so it left the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) after the 2009 elections and established a new centre-right, Eurosceptic grouping called the Conservatives and Reformists. After the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, the EPP remained the largest individual grouping with MEPs from every member state except the UK. Box 6.1  Breakdown of an ideological transnational grouping of the European Parliament Group of the European People’s Party (May 2014) Centre Démocrate Humaniste (Belgium) Chrëschtlech-Sozial Volkspartei/Parti chrétien-social (Luxembourg) Christen Democratisch Appèl (Netherlands) Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams (Belgium) Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V (Germany)

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Christlich Soziale Partei (Belgium) Coalición por Europa (Spain) Coalition: Nova Slovenija + Slovenska ljudska stranka (Slovenia) Coalition: Nuovo Centrodestra + Unión de Centro Democrático + Popolari per l’Italia (Italy) Coalition: Partido Social Democrata + Centro Democrático Social/ Partido Popular (Portugal) Coalition: TOP 09 + Starostové a nezávislí (Czech) Det Konservative Folkeparti (Denmark) Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός (Cyprus) Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (Estonia) Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt (Hungary) Fine Gael Party (Ireland) Forza Italia (Italy) Граждани за европейско развитие на България (Bulgaria) Hrvatskademokratskazajednica + Hrvatskastrankaprava dr. Ante Starcˇevicˇ + HSS Hrvatska seljacˇka stranka (Croatia) Kansallinen Kokoomus (Finland) Krˇest’anská a demokratická unie – Cˇeskoslovenská strana lidová (Czech) Krest’ansko demokratické hnutie (Slovakia) Kristdemokraterna (Sweden) Moderata Samlingspartiet (Sweden) Most-Híd (Slovakia) Νέα Δημοκρατία (Greece) ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei (Austria) Partido Popular (Spain) Partidul Democrat Liberal (Romania) Partidul Mis¸carea Populara˘ (Romania) Partidul Nat¸ional Liberal (Romania) Partit Nazzjonalista (Malta) Реформаторски блок (Bulgaria) Platforma Obywatelska (Poland) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Poland) Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (Romania) Slovenska demokratska stranka (Slovenia) Slovenská demokratická a krest’anská únia - Demokratická strana (Slovakia) Strana mad’arskej komunity - Magyar Közösség Pártja (Slovakia) Te˙vyne˙ssa˛junga - Lietuvos krikšcˇionys demokratai (Lithuania) Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France) Vienotıˉba (Latvia)

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As can be seen in Box 6.1, it could be argued that by bringing so many disparate parts of the EU together, the European Parliament actually performs a supranational role. Thus, in many respects, each political grouping within the European Parliament has to function like any other national political party (except for the fact that it is EU-wide) in trying to draw together a wide range of political perspectives under one broad umbrella. In doing this, there is a hope that proper trans-European political parties will start to develop across the EU. At the time of writing, this is only just beginning to happen – and not in all member states. Where there has been a notable change is in the appointment of the President of the Commission. Prior to the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, it was agreed among most party groupings that the grouping that ‘won’ the election – that is, the grouping that was the largest in the European Parliament – would have their nomination for the post of President of the Commission accepted. In the aftermath of the elections, this caused an uproar in Britain as David Cameron refused to accept the agreement in light of the election results. In a number of member states, Eurosceptic and ­anti-European parties had made inroads but this was not evident in the way in which the Commission was being appointed. Cameron’s objections were overridden, but the new Commission looks s­ omewhat more reformist than was first anticipated.

Supranationalism and the United Kingdom – a troubled relationship? Within British politics, the idea of supranationalism is equated with the development of a European superstate. Much of the British media can be particularly vitriolic when it comes to any aspect of supranationalism. Unsurprisingly, much of this opinion within the British media is ill-informed (see Chapters 10 and 11). It can be boiled down to a pseudo-patriotic, anti-foreigner bias. Anything that comes from Europe must be bad – and if it is not, then it is not mentioned. Whenever powers are ceded to the EU, the focus is upon the loss of British sovereignty. The EU, or more specifically the Commission, is portrayed as a group of faceless bureaucrats in

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Brussels taking over British people’s lives and telling everyone what to do – to use grams and kilograms rather than pounds and ounces; to use centimetres and metres rather than inches and yards. Soon it will be kilometres rather than miles, and we will have to drive on the right-hand side of the road! This was exemplified in the television series Yes, Minister, when the Minister for Administrative Affairs, Jim Hacker, in an anti-European outburst, talked of the British being compelled to eat salami and bratwurst rather than traditional British sausages. In 2001, court cases were brought against a group of people who sold products on market stalls. They were prosecuted because their weighing equipment used imperial measurements only. According to EU rules, all weights and measures should be in both imperial and metric, even if only imperial has been used previously. Those convicted were eventually pardoned, as the EU decided to fudge the rules on the use of metric and/or imperial weights and measures. Conversely, in 2008, a case was brought against a restaurateur who only sold his beer by the litre. This case was thrown out. The British identity arguments were epitomised by Margaret Thatcher. In a speech to the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 September 1988, Thatcher stated that Britain had surrendered enough sovereignty and spoke of the creation of identikit Europeans. The suggestion was that as the member states moved closer and closer together, they would lose their national identities. This apparent fear in Britain of supranationalism is rather difficult to source. There is some conjecture that it stems from our being an island nation – but that falls apart somewhat when attitudes towards supranationalism in the Republic of Ireland are taken into account. Ireland is even further away from the rest of Europe but has a far more positive outlook on supranationalism. An alternative perspective is the idea that Britain is an ‘old’ state. History books tell us that Britain has not been invaded since 1066. All other European states are relatively new, as most of Europe had to be reconstructed both economically and politically after World War II. Britain did not suffer any of the political reconstruction. Thus, it is suggested that ‘surrendering’ sovereignty and national identity to a supranational organisation comes somewhat more easily to those on the Continent.

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Yet all this might be more of an ‘English’ thing. The Scots and the Welsh seem far more enthusiastic about the EU. The Scottish National Party (SNP) has conducted general election campaigns under the slogan ‘An Independent Scotland within Europe’. During the independence referendum campaign in 2014, the ‘Yes’ side argued that Scotland could stay in the EU but retain the pound (as opposed to adopting the euro). ‘No’ campaigners argued that Scotland would have to apply for membership of the EU. It may well be that many people in Scotland and Wales see Britain being run for the benefit of England – and possibly even London. Consequently, they are exploited. Within British politics, for example, the poll tax was introduced into Scotland as an experiment a year before it was introduced into the rest of the United Kingdom. There are also many stories of economic exploitation of the Scots (North Sea oil and gas) and the Welsh (coal and steel industries) by the English. To prevent such perceived abuse from the dominant partner within the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales look more and more to Europe (see Chapter 8). Therefore, to the Scots and the Welsh, supranationalism at the European level may be little different from that at the UK level.

What is intergovernmentalism? If the concept of supranationalism carries with it much baggage, the same cannot be said of intergovernmentalism. Quite simply, intergovernmentalism is about different national governments working together. There are many different intergovernmental organisations around the world, including the United Nations, NATO, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations). The emphasis is very much upon the individual state or government. Whereas the concept of supranationalism includes ceding of sovereignty to a higher authority, there is no such commitment with intergovernmentalism. The individual states remain sovereign. They are the supreme decision-making bodies. In the post-war years, many intergovernmental organisations were established. Apart from the United Nations, the most prominent were the defence pacts around the world – the two most obvious

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being NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the case of NATO, there was no compunction to remain a member. Thus France was able to withdraw in 1966 and rejoin in 2009. Such freedom for manoeuvre was not so available for those under Soviet domination – although Albania did withdraw from the Warsaw Pact in 1968. Economic trading blocs have also been established. Again, these are intergovernmental organisations with no ceding of sovereignty to a supranational centre. Examples of such trading blocs include CER (Closer Economic Relations, a trade agreement between New Zealand and Australia) and EFTA (see Chapter 2).

Intergovernmentalism and the European Union There is an unresolved debate in the EU as to whether it is a supranational organisation or an intergovernmental one. As has been noted earlier in this chapter, there are aspects of the EU which are supranational; there are, however, also aspects of the organisation which are clearly intergovernmental. The Council of Ministers and the European Council (both of which are examined in Chapter 3) are the most obvious examples of intergovernmental institutions within the EU. While the Council of Ministers is still seen as the most important EU institution, the reality is that its role is far more about protecting national interests rather than furthering the aims and objectives of the collective body. Even disputes in the early years of the organisation, such as the Luxembourg Compromise (see Chapter 2), highlighted the extent to which national interests were prioritised. The idea that any country could veto any legislative proposals that were not in its national interest demonstrated that, despite any degree of integration, national self-interest would predominate. While there may be some ‘surrendering of sovereignty’ within the EU, no national ­government is going to legislate for its own demise. As the name suggests, intergovernmental conferences are little more than the member states gathering to hammer out any differences prior to attempting to agree a common position. It is even possible for states to agree opt-outs; for example, at the Maastricht Summit, Britain opted out of the Social Charter, and both Britain and Denmark opted out of the single currency.

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Looking at the Treaty on European Union, one term in particular highlights the extent to which the EU is an intergovernmental body: subsidiarity. This concept was promoted by the then British prime minister, John Major. The idea of subsidiarity is to devolve decisionmaking away from the centre to the most appropriate level of government. For Major, this meant taking decision-making powers away from the EU/Brussels and handing them back to national governments. Admittedly, some member states saw subsidiarity as also devolving decision-making away from national governments to regional or local tiers of government. Regardless of which interpretation of subsidiarity is used, both show that the EU is quite clearly an intergovernmental organisation. The European Council, where the different heads of government meet, is often seen as the symbol of intergovernmentalism. While some may see this as the symbol of national co-operation under the banner of the EU, at the end of the day it is still the heads of the ­different governments working together. A prominent symbol of the EU as an intergovernmental body was the presidency of the Council of Ministers. As noted in Chapter 3, this was on a six-monthly rotation, with each member state getting its turn. When holding the presidency, each member state was in a position to push its national agenda for the EU. With the new presidency of the European Council, there has been an attempt to downplay these differences and to try to create a greater degree of collegiality. For some cynics, this may be the first step in transforming the European Council and the Council of Ministers into more supranational bodies. All the EU institutions have an intergovernmental aspect. The European Commissioners are selected from each member state; MEPs are chosen in elections held within each member state; members of the Court of Justice, the General Court, the Committee of Regions and the Economic and Social Committee are all selected at a national level. While there may be some EU input into these various selection processes, the fact is that there is always going to be a national element retained. If this were to be dropped then some member states might feel their national input was not necessary, which could lead to their withdrawal from the EU. For example, although the Commissioners are all national nominations, the European Parliament has the power to sack the whole Commission.

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It cannot target a particular individual as that would be likely to harm national sensibilities. Thus, the intergovernmental aspects appear to override those of a supranational slant.

Intergovernmentalism and the United Kingdom Within British politics, the idea of the EU as a predominantly intergovernmental organisation sits far more comfortably than regarding it as a supranational one. In this way, the British government is able to portray itself as protecting British interests within the EU. Sovereignty is protected, and the British Parliament remains supreme. There are times when Britain does not get its own way in the EU – but the same applies to all member states. If there appears to be a threat to national interest, however, any member state can attempt to veto the policy proposals. Thus, in the negotiations on the Treaty on European Union, the British position on the single currency was to opt out, but not to block such a move. There was a similar position with the Social Charter. Any plans to make the European Parliament into a legislative body were, however, blocked with the threat to veto the entire treaty. This was one of the British red lines; it was non-negotiable. The intergovernmental aspects of the EU mean that the British Government has to negotiate with other governments to get legislative proposals accepted (or blocked, when it is not in the national interest). Thus intergovernmentalism is often about negotiation and compromise, of ‘pressing the flesh’ as ministers or the prime minister visit their counterparts in other EU states. Tony Blair was particularly good at this, developing a close rapport with many of the new member states such as Poland. David Cameron, on the other hand, appears far more isolated from most heads of government in the EU. Such intergovernmental alliances, however, can be fickle. In the negotiations to reform the CAP in 2005 (under the British presidency of the EU), when it was suggested that all the new member states receive less money in return for Britain giving up part of its budgetary rebate, Blair was suddenly isolated from almost all members of the EU. David Cameron endured a similar experience when the EU was trying to find a way to resolve the economic crisis that had begun

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in 2008 and, in particular, how it had affected Greece. In June 2011, Cameron argued that only the eurozone countries should be involved in bailing out the Greek economy. Britain would only take part in the bailout via the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this particular circumstance, despite being in a distinct minority, the other member states of the EU acceded to Cameron’s demands. By December 2011, Cameron’s intransigence on the EU plans to deal with the crisis was such that he had become even more isolated, with only the Hungarian government backing his position. Such isolation was epitomised by the refusal of the then French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, to shake the hand of David Cameron – labelled ‘Le Snub’ by parts of the British media – at the EU summit. A different perspective on Cameron became more prominent after the 2015 general election. He and his Chancellor, George Osborne, visited the other heads of government in the hope of building a consensus around the idea of EU reform. Consequently, Cameron seemed somewhat less isolated – even in relation to those who fundamentally disagreed with his position – as he started to develop a rapport with other heads of government.

Conclusion In sum, the EU represents a mix of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, with the different institutions carrying examples of each. The supranational aspects of the EU appear to be working towards greater integration – a subject which is examined in the next chapter. Where intergovernmentalism dominates, the emphasis is far more upon the interests of the individual member state. From a British perspective, the supranational institutions and common policies of the EU are sometimes portrayed as being a threat to British sovereignty. An intergovernmental approach sees a greater emphasis placed upon protecting British interests. Different British prime ministers have come back from intergovernmental conferences and treaty negotiations proudly proclaiming to have got the best possible deal for Britain, such as David Cameron’s triumphant return in 2011 when he claimed to have blocked an EU treaty on bailing out the Greek economy (among others), that would not be in British interests. Conversely, the benefits for the collective EU are

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underplayed – they may even seem inconsequential to a national media, especially parts of the print media that sometimes appears almost Europhobic in nature.

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What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The differences between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism are quite clear cut. Supranationalism sees some aspects of sovereignty ceded to a higher body. Intergovernmentalism focuses upon the different governments working together (while protecting their national interests) without ceding any sovereignty. • Some institutions of the EU are predominantly supranational in nature, for example the Commission. Others, such as the Council of Ministers, are more intergovernmental. All EU institutions, however, have a mix of both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. • Britain appears very wary about any aspects of supranationalism. This is often portrayed as ‘surrendering’ sovereignty. Many people are far more comfortable with the intergovernmental aspects of EU membership – the idea of the British government working with others but ultimately protecting British interests. Much of the British print media is virulently opposed to almost any aspect of EU supranationalism.

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Glossary of key terms Integration  The idea here is of combining a range of different pieces into a single body. Within the context of the EU, this is where the different member states move closer and closer together, and may eventually become one. Intergovernmentalism  This is the idea of the different governments of the EU working together. There is no ceding of sovereignty to a higher body. Each member state remains sovereign and may well work to protect its national interests. An intergovernmental approach would see the different member states working together to achieve some form of compromise. Luxembourg Compromise  All member states have a veto over policy proposals if they constitute a serious threat to national interests. Red line  In any form of negotiations there are red lines. These are the points which are non-negotiable. There will be no compromise over them. If this cannot be achieved then the negotiations will be vetoed. Sovereignty  This is the right of a state to pass laws within its own territory. It is suggested that EU membership undermines national

­118   Britain and the European Union sovereignty as all members have to cede a range of powers to the EU. Added to this, EU law overrides national law when the two conflict. Spillover  The idea of spillover is a possible consequence of supranationalism. A policy implemented in one area may have unseen consequences in another. Thus agricultural policy, for example, spills over into environmental policy. Spillover also helps to speed up the integration process. Subsidiarity  This is the process of devolving decision-making down to the most appropriate tier of government. At its most basic level, the aim of subsidiarity is to take decision-making away from the EU and return it to national governments. Some aspects of subsidiarity could see decisionmaking being devolved to regional or local government. Supranationalism  Such an approach sees countries working closely together. They cede sovereignty in certain areas to a higher authority which will co-ordinate and police the making and implementation of policies in those specified areas across the organisation.

? Likely examination questions ‘Supranationalism is the process of creating a United States of Europe. It must be resisted at all costs.’ Discuss. Evaluate the extent to which ‘spillover’ actually occurs within the EU. ‘The European Union is primarily an intergovernmental organisation. Any supposed ceding of sovereignty is merely a sop to supranationalists and those working for a United States of Europe.’ Discuss.

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Helpful websites The website www.brugesgroup.com will give you some interesting material highlighting negative aspects of EU membership, that is, opposition to supranationalism. The Bruges Group is not overly enthusiastic about all aspects of the EU although the website does provide a range of both pro- and anti-EU links. Another website with a slightly more balanced approach is The European Foundation at www.europeanfoundation.org. This website links to the European Journal, which is labelled ‘Bill Cash’s European Journal’. It claims to be pro-Europe but anti-EU. Finally, http://eiop.or.at/ is the website of the European integration papers.

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Suggestions for further reading For general overviews of integration and supranationalism, see J. Colomer (2002), ‘The European Union: Federalism in the Making’ in J. Colomer (ed.), Political Institutions in Europe (Routledge, 2nd edition), pp. 279–307, C. Jensen (2003), ‘Neo-functionalism’ in M. Cini (ed.), European Union Politics (Oxford University Press), pp. 80–92, P. de Wilde and M. Zürn (2012), ‘Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50, S1, pp. 137–53 and M. Haverland (2000), ‘National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points’ Journal of Public Policy vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 83–103. For different perspectives from political parties, consider C. Arnold, E. Sapir and C. de Vries (2012), ‘Parties’ Positions on European Integration: Issue Congruence, Ideology or Context?’ West European Politics vol. 35, no. 6, pp. 1341–62 and M. Helbling, D. Hoeglinger and B. Wüest (2010), ‘How Political Parties Frame European Integration’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 496–521.

CHAPTER 7

Expansion versus Integration Contents What is integration? How is the European Union promoting integration? The United Kingdom and integration The expansion of the European Union – what are the limits? The United Kingdom and enlargement

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Overview The whole debate of expansion versus integration is often reduced to a wider European Union (that is, more members) versus a deeper EU (that is, greater integration and more supranationalism). This is often presented as a ‘zero sum’ game – a choice of one or the other. To attempt to achieve both is not seen as being feasible, although it could be argued that the EU is indeed trying to do both. As the EU member states develop an integration programme, it does become more difficult for other countries to join. Yet there is a position which says that twenty-eight member states is already too many and that such a large membership is slowing down the integration programme. There may be moves at some time in the future towards developing a two-speed or a multi-speed Europe. On the one hand, there will be those who desire greater integration, and on the other, there will be those who do not.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • • • • • •

Definition of integration How is the European Union developing a programme of integration? The British position on greater integration Definition of expansion How can the European Union expand further? The British position on further expansion

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What is integration? Many commentators talk about integration without necessarily defining the term. It is often associated with the idea of ‘deepening’ an organisation. This ‘deepening’ could be of policies or institutions. Without doubt, the idea of integration can be linked to supranationalism (a term which was examined in the previous chapter). Integration can be seen as a process of bringing disparate parts together and uniting them into a single body. Once this body is operating, the different parts can be pulled closer and closer together  – that is, greater integration. The more this integration process continues, the more difficult it will become for any individual member to be able to withdraw. Each member becomes tied in to the organisation. This process of integration can be via common institutions or common policies. It is a form of uniting a group of actors to work for a common goal; the goal could be economic, political, military, and so on. Different organisations can have differing degrees of integration. The EU is seen as the most highly integrated of all international organisations. Other organisations, with lesser degrees of integration, include NATO, which is a defence pact between a number of European and North American countries; CER (Closer Economic Relations), which is an economic and trade agreement between Australia and New Zealand; and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), which is an economic and political pact between a number of nations in South East Asia.

How is the European Union promoting integration? The integration of member states has always been an important aspect of the EU. The issue has always been over the extent of the integration, that is, how deep? Arguably, the ultimate end in the integration process will be a United States of Europe – although that is not really a short-term, or even a medium-term, strategy. Any prospective member state is expected to sign up to the acquis communautaire. The acquis communautaire comprises all the prior legislation that has been passed by the member states. Any country that wishes to join the EU has to pass this entire legislative

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package. In doing so, the prospective member state is integrating into the pre-existing structures and is also accepting all the prior legislation that has already been passed. There are no ‘opt-outs’ available for the acquis communautaire. There was an acquis communautaire of sorts even when Britain joined in 1973. By the time of the last enlargement to include Croatia in 2013, it had grown into a package of around 80,000 pieces of legislation. In the 2013 enlargement negotiations, the acquis communautaire was divided into thirty-five separate chapters, each of which had to be accepted. These chapters are detailed in Box 7.1.1 As can be seen, the various chapters are rather extensive, covering all aspects of political, economic and social life. They comprise a comprehensive package of often complex legislation. Looking at the history and development of the EU, the idea of integration has always been in the background. The original European Coal and Steel Community required a degree of integration from the founder members for it to be a success. As governments, businesses and trade unions saw the benefits of this organisation, plans were made for similar projects in other sectors. This was how spillover (see Chapter 6) was intended to happen. Successful integration in one aspect of the economy would lead to other sectors trying to do the same. Thus an integrated agricultural policy required something similar in transport and the environment for it to be fully integrated. The end result would be a fully integrated economy. Such an ideal seemed to falter in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was talk of the integration programme foundering. Some cynics have attributed this to Britain joining the EEC, but the problems went far deeper. There were serious economic and social problems across the Community but there appeared to be no European leadership in addressing them. Instead, each of the member states went its own way. Radical leadership was needed to rejuvenate the membership in the form of some sort of concerted pan-European programme. Instead, the EC appeared to sit back and wait for ­something to happen. There was an attempt to kick-start the integration process at the Hague Summit in December 1969. Not only was enlargement considered, but also policies to rejuvenate and reinvigorate the ­organisation.

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Box 7.1  The chapters of the acquis communautaire for the 2013 enlargement Chapter 1: Free movement of goods Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services Chapter 4: Free movement of capital Chapter 5: Public procurement Chapter 6: Company law Chapter 7: Intellectual property law Chapter 8: Competition policy Chapter 9: Financial services Chapter 10: Information society and media Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy Chapter 13: Fisheries Chapter 14: Transport policy Chapter 15: Energy Chapter 16: Taxation Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy Chapter 18: Statistics Chapter 19: Social policy and employment Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy Chapter 21: Trans-European networks Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security Chapter 25: Science and research Chapter 26: Education and culture Chapter 27: Environment Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection Chapter 29: Customs union Chapter 30: External relations Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy Chapter 32: Financial control Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions Chapter 34: Institutions Chapter 35: Other issues

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The Davignon Plan focused upon the institutions and increased ­political co-operation. The Werner Plan focused upon the idea of greater economic integration and the introduction of a single currency (see Chapter 2). One of the reasons why these plans stalled was the global economic crisis of 1973, which happened when the price of oil was quadrupled. Within the European economy, the enlargement of the EEC to include the UK was also a contributing factor. The integration programme was given something of a kick-start with the Single European Act (SEA) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These looked at ways in which the idea of greater European integration could be taken forward. Not only was there the idea of the single market, but also a social agenda was pushed forward, with schemes such as the Social Charter. The introduction of the single currency has been seen as one of the largest steps in the integration processes. Although not all member states have signed up to the euro, all of those who joined in the Eastern European enlargement (and any other future members) are expected to work towards joining the single currency – Chapter 17 of the acquis communautaire covers this point (as noted in Box 7.1). It is unlikely that all the new member states will join the euro in the near future but there is an expectation, if not a requirement, that they will join eventually. Slovenia was the first of the 2004 enlargement states to adopt the euro in 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015). There are plans for Romania to join by 2019. While the SEA and the TEU gave a clear kick-start to the integration process, it appeared to falter again with the failure to adopt the EU constitution. This document, in effect, codified much of the legislation the EU had already passed. In many cases, the constitution simplified what already existed. Failure to get the constitution ratified in France and the Netherlands – where referenda were defeated – and members such as the UK and Poland declining to even attempt to ratify the constitution meant that the integration process had stalled again. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty saw a more tentative approach to greater European integration. It was presented as streamlining policies that were already in existence. The creation of two new posts – the President of the Council and the High

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Representative – on the other hand, suggested that there was still a clear integration agenda. Where the idea of integration has taken great steps forward is through the concept of governance. This is where the different tiers of government can feed into each other. The different inputs can come to (or from) the various tiers of government – local, regional, national or European. They interact with each other. Some decisionmaking processes have moved to the centre, such as agriculture, while others have moved in the opposite direction through the concept of subsidiarity. Under the principle of subsidiarity, national parliaments have a right to object when legislation is being drafted by the Commission if the principle of subsidiarity has not been observed. They may even contest legislation on similar grounds. In particular circumstances to do with family law, national parliaments can oppose decisions, especially if there are cross-border implications. The idea of governance should not be restricted solely to the roles of the different tiers of government. It means far more. Across the EU, no longer is it seen that ‘government’ must be the sole provider of goods and services. Rather, there can be a range of providers, and not all of them from the public sector. With bodies such as the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) (see Chapter 4), special interests have an input into the decision-making process. Admittedly, the ESC is only an advisory body but it has expert opinion which can be useful not only in policy formulation but also in implementation. Thus we see a new form of integration as the different sectors work together. It is not just at one tier of government that we see this occurring. There is multi-level governance both across the different tiers of government (as noted above) and with non-governmental organisations being drawn into the processes. Thus, in the UK private companies can be involved in service delivery at the local level. For example, Biffa (formerly part of Severn Trent Water) empty the refuse bins in Leicester. Prior to Biffa winning this contract, it was a French company (SITA) who provided this service. In Peterborough, refuse is collected by the Birmingham-based company Amey plc. Bids, or tenders, are put in for these types of services. Guidelines are issued to give advice on what is required in the service provision. The local authorities examine the tenders, looking for the best value for money

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and quality of service. Thus Amey plc have won the contracts not only in Peterborough, but also in fourteen other towns and cities across England, including the City of London. In many respects, multi-level governance can be seen as the epitome of the integrationist ideals. Not only are the different tiers of government working together, the different sectors – private, public and voluntary – are too. Such integration was probably beyond the expectations of many of the founders of the European ideal. Yet there is still the question of how much further integration is needed, a question that might be summed up as ‘what is the end-goal of integration?’ To these questions there is no clear and definitive answer. Some Euro-enthusiasts might argue that the ultimate goal is a United States of Europe: a single country with one federal government and beneath that a number of state governments. Arguably, this could be the end result if the integration process continues. The different member states tie themselves closer and closer together under the EU institutions. Such an end result is unlikely to happen, however, because of the extent of intergovernmentalism (see Chapter 6) within the EU. Many member states – most notably Britain – are protective of their national sovereignty. The idea of greater integration will be resisted. Some proposals could even be vetoed if the threats to national sovereignty were perceived to be too great.

The United Kingdom and integration The apparent position of all UK Governments on the issue of integration has been one of reluctance. The idea of the reluctant European will be examined in detail in Chapter 12. On the issue of integration Britain’s reluctance appears to come to the fore. As noted earlier in this chapter, much of the debate around the idea of greater integration is very similar to that of supranationalism. The British position on supranationalism was covered in Chapter 6. There are, however, a few key points that ought to be mentioned with specific regard to integration. Most British Governments – and especially those under Thatcher, Major and Cameron – were seen as being alarmed over the process of integration. It was associated with the idea of surrendering

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s­overeignty. Yet there were aspects of the process of integration where these and other administrations have actually been enthusiastic. One such example is over the development of the single market. The idea of having free trade across all member states, with no tariffs or duties, has appealed to governments of all natures. Such a set-up ties in all of the member states economically – their economies integrate more easily under a single market. It was over political integration that there were (and still are) stumbling blocks. This is where the idea of ‘surrendering sovereignty’ appears. With political integration, the result is a supranational set-up. As the member states of the EU integrate politically, it is the EU structures that take over many aspects of policy formulation. This is particularly important when bearing in mind the constitutional position – EU law overrides national law when the two conflict. Thus, most British governments have been rather reluctant to support aspects of political integration (and sometimes economic integration). Major, for example, negotiated opt-outs from the single currency and the Social Charter. Such ideas were seen as going too far down the integration line and were to be resisted. The UK was quite happy for the other member states to proceed and made no attempt to stop the integration of other members if that was what they wished to do. Similarly, Cameron refused to support the bailing-out of Greece and was able to impose his will on the rest of the EU. He wanted the member states to take responsibility, not inflict it upon those who had not yet joined the euro (and in the case of Britain and Denmark, did not intend to). One result of the British lack of enthusiasm over integration has been the talk of a two-speed Europe. The idea here is those member states that wish to pursue greater integration should be allowed to do so and those that do not should not be obliged to. Yet there is a surprising lack of support in Britain for such an approach. One such reason can be linked back to spillover. As the part of Europe that desires deeper integration goes ahead with such plans, the consequences of its actions and policies would be likely to draw the less enthusiastic members down the integrationist path. An alternative could be the exact opposite. A two-speed Europe could lead to the fragmentation of the EU into two autonomous ­organisations – one that has integrated, the other that is a loose ­ collection of

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states. Neither approach is particularly appealing to the British Government, nor to any other member state for that matter. Thus, whenever there is talk of a two-speed Europe, it is never greeted with much enthusiasm. Despite this, a situation arguably exists where we do have a twospeed Europe: those who have joined the euro and those who have not. Although all member states are expected to run their economies in a manner that will enable them to join the euro at the earliest opportunity, Britain and Denmark have negotiated an opt-out of stage three of monetary union. Ultimately, this opt-out could be ­perceived as the creation of a two-speed Europe. One way of fighting the idea of greater integration which has been utilised by British Governments is support for increased membership of the EU. With a larger number of members, it is more difficult to go down the integrationist line. This could be a reason why previous British Governments have been particularly supportive of proposed Turkish membership. A wider trading bloc, with only limited political integration, seems to appeal to many in the British Government. The integration process can be slowed down, and is then easier to sell to the British people. Where British Governments have been more enthusiastic over  integration is through the concept of governance. In many respects, it is the UK that has been leading the way in drawing private-sector organisations into public sector service delivery. The idea in Britain is that private sector organisations are more effective and more efficient than those in the public sector. Yet what has been utilised in the UK is a combination of both. Britain has been trying to sell this approach to the rest of the EU. There has been considerable reluctance from some members – most notably France. The new influx of members from Eastern Europe is far more enthusiastic about the British approach to governance. They also wish to encourage the use of private sector organisations in service delivery. This is likely to lead to even greater economic integration and further strengthen ties within the single market. As a result, the regulatory powers of the EU will need to be increased. Consequently, there will be a degree of spillover into increased political integration – something the British Government would be distinctly unenthusiastic about.

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The expansion of the European Union – what are the limits? The debate about the expansion of the European Union – or, more accurately, EU enlargement – is often seen as an opposite to integration. The more member states in the EU, the more difficult it becomes to increase the degree of integration. Yet the debate about widening the EU is still important in its own right. How big can the EU become? What states could join? There have been six stages of enlargement to date. Each of these earlier enlargements has already been examined in Chapter 2. The most recent enlargement saw Croatia join. The enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania was a continuation of the 2004 enlargement. In 2004, eight former communist, East European countries joined, along with Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania were not permitted to join at that stage because they were unable to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria – the criteria needed to be met in order to join the EU, explained in Chapter 2. Currently, a number of countries have expressed an interest in joining the EU. Those whose applications are being considered, as of 2015, are Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. A number of other countries have also expressed an interest in joining. These include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Ukraine – although, in the case of the latter, the situation within the country, as well as its relationship with Russia, is such that it is most unlikely that it will be able to join in the foreseeable future. Added to this, Armenia and Georgia have also expressed an interest in future membership. Finally, Morocco and Algeria have also raised the possibility of an application too. If Turkey is able to join, even though most of Turkey is geographically outside of Europe, Morocco and Algeria argue that they too should be eligible to apply. Geographically, Morocco is closer to Continental Europe than the UK is. Such interest from all these countries raises the question of the limits of the EU. Where can the final boundaries be drawn? A final point to note about any future enlargements is that such decisions are taken by unanimous voting. All member states must support an application for it to go ahead. Thus, as more countries join the EU, it will become more difficult to achieve unanimity.

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Turkey There have been a number of Turkish applications to join the EU. Until recently, they have all been vetoed. The EU has outlined to Turkey a number of issues that need to be addressed in order for Turkish membership to be considered. Most of these are encapsulated in the Copenhagen Criteria. On top of this, specific mention has been made of human rights issues and the extent to which Turkey has become an open, liberal and secular state. A final question over Turkish membership has been whether or not Turkey is even part of Europe. For many commentators, the Bosphorus Straits are the boundary between Europe and Asia. Most of Turkey is situated on the Asian side and so Turkey should not be considered as part of Europe. It has even been suggested that if Turkey joins the EU, then its neighbours may also be eligible – this includes Syria and Iraq! Such a debate on geography is, however, a little disingenuous. Turkish history is linked to Europe. In fact, the Ottoman Empire at one time stretched as far as Vienna. Developments in the Balkans, both past and present, have been influenced hugely by Turkey. What is of greater concern to some members of the EU is that Turkey is an Islamic country. There is a fear that by allowing Turkey into the EU it may enable the spread of Muslim fundamentalism across Europe. Such scaremongering diminishes the point that there are already millions of Muslims living across Europe, while the ‘fundamentalist’ label is used to suggest possible terrorist activity. Ultimately, the Turkish application will hinge on its fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. The economic underdevelopment of Turkey is such that this is not likely to happen in the near future. Membership was at one stage pencilled in for 2014 (alongside the Croatian application). Britain, one of Turkey’s biggest supporters in the EU, argued that such a timescale gave Turkey time to develop and modernise its economy, as well as to improve its human rights record. In 2010, David Cameron argued that Turkish membership of the EU was an imperative. In 2012, the Foreign Affairs select committee declared that Turkish membership of the EU was still a goal of the British Government. By 2013, the rhetoric had been somewhat watered down, to the extent that the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs suggested that Turkey may never be allowed to join the EU.2 Britain still supports Turkish membership, but the 2014

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European Parliamentary election results, in conjunction with concerns over immigration, meant that this support has not been made too public within the UK. Currently, there is no longer a clear date for membership. Western Balkans The EU has made it clear that all countries in the Western Balkans can join the EU once the Copenhagen Criteria have been met. This grouping covers the countries that used to comprise Yugoslavia – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Slovenia, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of (FYR) Macedonia – along with Albania. Slovenia and Croatia are already members of the EU. All the other countries are at different stages along the EU application process. FYR Macedonia and Serbia are the furthest advanced; Albania the least. All the former Yugoslav Republics have similar issues to address, most of which stem from events that occurred during the war in Bosnia in the early 1990s. There are alleged war criminals in each country, and potential EU membership is conditional upon them being surrendered to The Hague to stand trial for these crimes at the International War Crimes Tribunal. Steps have been taken to encourage all of these countries to join in the peaceful rebuilding of the region. The ‘carrot’ of encouragement is possible EU membership. Much of this was detailed at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. It included areas such as human rights, economic reform and regional co-operation, all of which go on top of the Copenhagen Criteria. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo see their futures within the EU. For the Bosnians, membership of the EU would enable the rebuilding of the country to continue apace. Serbia’s desire to join can be linked to a need to rebuild civilised contact with the rest of Europe, particularly after the problems during the Milošević regime. That it is now an official applicant state is a huge step forward in this process. For Kosovo, EU membership would be part of the process of recognising and securing its identity as an independent state. As of 2015, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still seen as potential applicant states. The Thessaloniki Summit instilled the whole Western Balkans region with both hope and expectation. Development of the region is

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going to be a long slow process, particularly with regard to the extent of the economic underdevelopment. Croatian inclusion in the EU is a spur to the other countries in the region. Former Soviet Republics It is not just in the Western Balkans that there are aspirations to joining the EU. Some former Soviet Republics have seen the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) join the EU and this has sparked greater enthusiasm for EU membership. Ukraine has been to the forefront in pushing for EU membership, and it is not alone. Countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have also expressed interest. Russia, however, has made it known that these countries all come under its sphere of influence, and potential EU membership would put a great strain on Russo-EU relations. This has not stopped the EU from developing an Eastern Partnership with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The situation in Ukraine has highlighted a number of issues surrounding the push eastwards by the EU. The Russian Government is not going to sit by and watch its sphere of influence be diminished by the West. This sounds very much like a repeat of the Cold War. It could be argued that collectively, the West pushed too much in encouraging Ukraine to consider EU membership and Russia’s reaction should not have been so surprising. It is still a clear warning to the EU and the West that countries such as Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan will not be removed from the Russian sphere of influence in the way that happened with the Baltic States. The EU position is clear: these countries are part of a wider Europe and should not be excluded from the benefits of such a Europe. This comes under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), of which the Eastern Partnership is but one strand. The ENP is all about helping the political, economic and social development of countries that have little chance of EU membership in the near future.3 It includes countries that are not geographically part of Europe (such as those in North Africa; see below). For the likes of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, there is a carrot – albeit a distant one – of potential EU membership, but this is based on the premise that they will be able to extract themselves from the Russian sphere of influence.

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North Africa and the Middle East A number of countries have expressed interest in joining the EU despite not being part of Europe. Certain North African countries, particularly Morocco and Algeria, have expressed an interest in joining – in fact, a Moroccan application for membership was rejected in 1987. The rejection was on the grounds that Morocco was not a European country. Instead, these countries have a preferential trading status via the Euro-Med partnership, as do countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. The EU-MED12 agreement was signed in 1995 – although two of the countries who signed have since joined the EU (Malta and Cyprus) and another (Turkey) has entered into negotiations for membership. The agreement covered a number of areas including trade and regional security. These Southern Mediterranean countries are also included in the ENP (see above), although it is unlikely that an offer of EU membership will be extended to these countries. Any future developments may hinge upon Turkey joining the EU, and the development of EU relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Morocco, in particular, is awaiting the result of the Turkish application. Should Turkey be successful, it is most likely that Morocco will reapply for membership, despite the geographical reasons for exclusion in 1987. In Morocco’s defence, geographically it is closer to Continental Europe than Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, the applicant state Iceland or even the UK. Added to this, its largest trade partner is the EU, and much of its recent history is tied in with Europe rather than Africa. Interestingly, the EU is developing closer economic links with a number of North African countries. There are ongoing negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as with Jordan. Much of this has transpired as a result of the Arab Spring. These economic agreements will arguably help to maintain political and economic stability in these developing countries.

The United Kingdom and enlargement The United Kingdom is probably one of the most enthusiastic supporters of increasing the membership of the EU. Prime Ministers

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Thatcher and Major, for example, were keen to widen rather than deepen the European bonds. Enlarging the EU was also something of a priority for the Blair Government and even for the Cameronled coalition government, subject to certain caveats. To date, the new Conservative government elected in 2015 has said nothing on enlargement. It is unlikely, however, that it will oppose any enlargements so long as restrictions can be placed on migration from any new member states. Cynics could argue that this is little more than a subtle plan to stop further integration. The more members there are in the organisation, the more difficult it becomes to deepen the union. The British position is quite clearly not to let just any country join. The Copenhagen Criteria are a key part of the British position on enlargement. Applicant states must meet these criteria and accept the acquis communautaire to be allowed to join the EU. Thus the Turkish application could easily stall if its human rights record is not markedly improved upon. Similarly, any of the West Balkan countries wishing to join the EU will have to comply in full with the demands to send all indicted war criminals to The Hague for trial. Failure to do so will be a bar to EU membership. Added to this, successive British Governments have placed restrictions on citizens from new accession states being able to travel and work in the UK. While there were no restrictions in the 2004 enlargement, there were in 2007 and 2013, with both enlargements seeing restrictions for seven years. British support for enlargement can be seen as part of a larger game plan. With more countries joining, and with the vast majority likely to be net beneficiaries from the EU budget, this will give Britain the opportunity to argue for a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as the budget as a whole. Many of the pre-2004 members of the EU who were net beneficiaries from the budget are likely to see that position change with each subsequent enlargement. Spain is one country that has seen its revenue from the EU decline, as has Ireland. The various structural funds are being redirected to the less well-off regions of Eastern Europe. Members who are net contributors to the budget have not seen their net contributions increase markedly, but they have tended to increase. It is difficult to ascertain the extent of this increase as all

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economies contracted in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. Overall, vested interests will demand reform of the budget and the CAP as part of working out how to better fund the EU. This is very much a long-term strategy. Where Britain may have a problem over subsequent enlargements is with regard to the eventual boundaries of the EU. There is an argument that Europe stretches from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains in Russia, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. This would include countries such as Norway and Switzerland (who do not want to join the EU) but could be seen to exclude Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (who do wish to join), and possibly even Turkey. The possible membership of Turkey could enable Armenia and Georgia to join as they border Turkey. Azerbaijan would probably be included as a ‘group package’.  Added  to this are other former Soviet states such as Moldova and Belarus which are geographically part of Europe. The UK would arguably like to see the opportunity of membership extended to all of these countries, subject to their fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. The possible drawback of such an increased membership would be that Britain’s voice in Europe would be further diluted. Although it is one of the ‘Big Four’ member states, with each enlargement Britain’s voice in the EU is diminished. An EU with between thirty and forty member states would potentially see any one individual state as little more than a bit player in the region. This would apply as much to Britain as to France or Germany. Any future enlargements will also see the epicentre of Europe move further and further east. From a British perspective, this may not be a good thing as the demands of northern and western Europe are significantly different from those in the south and east. With Bulgaria and Romania having joined in 2007 and Croatia in 2013, there do not appear to be any further enlargements in the short term. Iceland may be the next country to join, and would possibly be a net contributor to the EU budget. Thereafter, it is back to the Western Balkans and Turkey – all of whom will be net recipients from the EU budget, will have immigration restrictions placed upon their populations upon joining and are significantly less developed economically when compared to the EU as a whole.

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What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The idea of integration means bringing together a range of bodies and gradually uniting them. It is sometimes described as ‘deepening’ an organisation. • The EU promotes integration via the development of common policies such as agriculture or the Foreign and Security Policy. • Britain is often seen as rather reluctant about greater EU integration, which is often perceived as leading to further loss of sovereignty. • Enlarging the EU is about increasing the membership of the organisation. There are strict requirements (the Copenhagen Criteria) which have to be met before a country can join the EU. • Britain is quite keen to have further enlargement of the EU, subject to the Copenhagen Criteria being fulfilled. There is a suspicion that British enthusiasm for enlargement may be in part a way to prevent greater integration.

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Glossary of key terms Acquis communautaire  This is the packet of treaties and legislation which has already been passed by the EU that any new member states must accept as part of joining the EU. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)  The ENP focuses upon helping countries which are geographically close to Europe, and enabling them to benefit from the EU. Due to their lack of economic (and political and social) development, these countries are unlikely to be able to join the EU in the near future. Governance  At one level, governance is about the different tiers of government feeding into each other. It can, however, also include non-governmental bodies such as private businesses or voluntary organisations. All of these have a stake in both policy formulation and implementation. Integration  The idea here is of combining a range of different pieces into a single body. Within the context of the EU, this is where the different member states move closer and closer together, and may eventually become one. Spillover  The idea of spillover is a possible consequence of supranationalism. A policy implemented in one area may have unseen consequences in another. Thus, agricultural policy, for example, spills over into environmental policy. Spillover also helps to speed up the integration process.

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Subsidiarity  This is the process of devolving decision-making down to the most appropriate tier of government. At its most basic level, the aim of subsidiarity is to take decision-making away from the EU and return it to national governments. Some aspects of subsidiarity could see decisionmaking being devolved to regional or local government. Supranationalism  Such an approach sees countries working close together. They cede sovereignty in certain areas to a higher authority, which will co-ordinate and police the making and implementation of policies in those specified areas across the organisation. Two-speed Europe  This approach is where different parts of the EU integrate at different rates. There would be a fast track of deeper integration and a slow track of more gradual integration. Arguably, there could be a multi-speed Europe.

? Likely examination questions ‘The EU’s integration programme has the ultimate aim of creating a United States of Europe.’ Discuss. ‘Even though the European Union continues to expand, this has not slowed the integration process. The problem is that the European Union may now be too large to integrate fully all member states.’ Evaluate this perspective. Greater integration will diminish Britain’s voice in the EU. Further enlargements will do the same. Evaluate possible courses of action for future UK Governments. ‘Britain wants more enlargements of the EU to slow down the integration process.’ Comment.

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Helpful websites An interesting debate on integration can be accessed at www.civitas.org. uk/eufacts/OS/OS16.php Pittsburgh University also has a fascinating website at http://aei.pitt.edu The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s home page at www.fco.gov.uk is a useful starting point on Britain’s position on enlargement. Go to the Britain and Europe section, and then on to enlargement. http://eiop.or.at/ is the website of the European integration papers.

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Suggestions for further reading There are a wide range of sources that cover issues surrounding enlargement and integration. On integration, there is L. Cram (2001),

­138   Britain and the European Union ‘Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process’ in J. Richardson (ed.), EU Power and Policymaking (Routledge, 2nd edition), pp. 51–73, and from the same edited book, S. Mazey (2001), ‘European Integration: Unfinished Journey or Journey Without End?’, pp. 27–50. On enlargement, there is M. Cremona (ed.) (2003), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford University Press), J. Karlas (2012), ‘National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement’ West European Politics vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 1095–113 and H. Sjursen (2002), ‘Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 491–514.

CHAPTER 8

The Influence of the European Union on Britain Contents The constitutional relationship between Britain and the European Union 140 The European Union and the British Parliament 141 The European Union and regional government in the United Kingdom 145 Local government and the European Union 152 Conclusion154

Overview Earlier chapters focused upon the institutions and some of the policies of the European Union. This chapter examines how the EU has had an impact upon Britain. The EU has a profound influence not just on Parliament, but across all of the UK, including local government. In fact, it could be argued that the EU has been a spur to those parts of subnational government that feel distanced – or even ostracised – by central government. Through structural development funds, sub-national government has benefited from EU membership, although this point is often missed by most parts of the British media. Another important aspect of which we need to be aware is the changing constitutional relationship between the UK and the EU. The EU has had an impact on the British constitution – and some have argued that this may be irreversible.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • The constitutional relationship between Britain and the European Union • Parliament and the European Union • The impact of the European Union on regional government in the United Kingdom

• Local government and the European Union

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The constitutional relationship between Britain and the European Union The underpinning of the British system of government is very clear: parliamentary sovereignty. In effect this means that the British Parliament is the supreme law-making body in the land. No other institution can challenge the laws of Parliament; only Parliament can overturn decisions taken by Parliament. In addition, Parliament can allocate powers to other institutions such as local government or regional assemblies, but it can also take these powers back. In sum, this means that the British constitution is unitary in nature. There is only one source of power: Parliament. In contrast, a federal system of government (as utilised in Australia, Germany and the United States) dissipates some of the power away from the centre. Such dispersion of power may also be protected by the constitution. It has been suggested that the Human Rights Act (1998) challenges the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty as it means the judiciary may be able to challenge Parliament on some of the decisions taken. It is Parliament, however, that granted the judiciary this ‘right’ (or perhaps ‘privilege’ is a better term), however, and a future Parliament could simply repeal the legislation. There is a similar situation with the legislation enabling devolution. Powers have been granted to the devolved bodies but these powers could be suspended or rescinded – as has been the case with the Northern Ireland Assembly on four separate occasions to date. Membership of the EU (or the European Economic Community (EEC) as it was when Britain joined in 1973) has also provided a challenge to the British constitution. By joining the organisation, the British Government accepted that EEC (or EU) law overrides British law when the two conflict. In effect, if there is any legislation in the United Kingdom that runs counter to that of the EU, it must be repealed. Thus, it could be argued that Britain has surrendered sovereignty to the EU in any areas where the EU has the right to legislate. In effect, Parliament is no longer the supreme law-making body in all aspects of British (or more accurately English) law. While powers have been ceded to the EU, this does not mean Britain has lost its sovereignty. All the laws imposed by the EU could be repealed if Britain were to withdraw from the EU. The British Government may have ceded some aspects of law-making to the EU

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Box 8.1  Components of the British constitution Statute law Acts of Parliament which override other constitutional sources Common law Judicial decisions which establish legal precedents Conventions Rules, customs and practices which are considered binding (normally applicable to Parliament) EU law This takes precedence over national law (where the two conflict) Law and custom Guidelines as to how Parliament may operate of Parliament Works of authority Books and writings which are considered as expert guidance on the constitution

but any subsequent Parliament can reverse such a decision. The issue here is the likelihood of a British withdrawal from the EU. The way in which EU membership has been incorporated into the British constitution can be seen by examining the different component parts of the constitution, as shown in Box 8.1. Decisions taken by the EU are still only one aspect of the British constitution. Admittedly, it may be a growing part, but statute law and common law are still prominent as well. The best-known example of EU law overriding UK law was the Factortame case. The UK Government passed legislation (the Merchant Shipping Act, 1988) to prevent Spanish fishermen from ‘quota hopping’, which was done by registering their boats as British and thus landing their catches as part of the British quota of the Common Fisheries Policy. The legislation demanded that all boats on the British register be British-owned. This was considered to be discriminatory against Spanish owners and operators, and was against Community law. The secretary of state was prevented from enforcing the law.

The European Union and the British Parliament Membership of the EU has changed some of the ways in which the British Parliament operates. Although the EU issues many ­directives,

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decisions and regulations (which are binding on all member states – see Chapter 3 for more details), they still technically have to be ratified by Parliament. Thus, there are a number of select committees that scrutinise EU legislation. On average, over 1,000 documents are scrutinised each year by the House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny. As with all select committees, this is a bi-partisan or multi-partisan body, although there is an inbuilt government majority. This means that all parties with MPs on such a committee work together as opposed to against each other, although, if the government so wished, it could force any decisions through the committee. The membership of this select committee is detailed in Box 8.2.1 A House of Commons select committee comprises at least eleven MPs. Some MPs may put their names forward but they are usually nominated by their party for a particular select committee. The chair of a select committee is elected by his or her fellow MPs. These elections are not ‘whipped’ (where MPs are compelled to toe their party line) by the political parties. Box 8.2  Membership of the House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny (as of January 2015) Member of Parliament Sir William Cash (Chairman) Andrew Bingham James Clappison Michael Connarty Geraint Davies Julie Elliott Stephen Gilbert Nia Griffith Chris Heaton-Harris Kelvin Hopkins Chris Kelly Stephen Phillips Jacob Rees-Mogg Linda Riordan Henry Smith Mike Thornton

Party Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Labour Labour Liberal Democrat Labour Conservative Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat

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This select committee does not just scrutinise EU legislation; it also examines the potential impact of EU legislation and even has the power to recommend that documents be debated in the House or in a European legislation committee. Further, this select committee scrutinises the performance of British ministers in the Council of Ministers. This is on top of the scrutiny that is performed in the House of Commons through such procedures as Prime Minister’s Question Time. The role of keeping ministers accountable for their actions in the Council of Ministers is very important. The Council of Ministers, collectively, are arguably not accountable to any body. Thus, keeping the British ministers accountable is the only form of scrutiny available to the British Parliament in an attempt to hold the Council of Ministers accountable for its actions. It is not only the House of Commons which has a select committee dedicated to the EU. The House of Lords also has a select committee on Europe as well as six subcommittees, each dedicated to a particular part of the EU. These are listed in Box 8.3.2 The formal EU select committee of the House of Lords, which comprises nineteen members and as of June 2015 was chaired by Lord Boswell of Aynho, covers EU documents and other matters pertaining to the EU. The subcommittees are the specialists. Like the House of Commons, the House of Lords select committees are likely to operate beyond party lines. The House of Lords,

Box 8.3  House of Lords Committees on Europe EU Select Committee EU – Economic and Financial Affairs (Subcommittee A) EU – Internal Market, Infrastructure and Employment (Subcommittee B) EU – External Affairs (Subcommittee C) EU – Agriculture, Fisheries, Environment and Energy (Subcommittee D) EU – Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection (Subcommittee E) EU – Home Affairs, Health and Education (Subcommittee F)

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however, has a distinct advantage over the Commons. There is less party-political pressure within the chamber. This means that the party whips have far less influence. The Lords also tend to be far more thorough with their scrutiny. Much of this is to do with the pressures of time. Members of the House of Lords are able to spend far more time examining legislation from the EU or the actions of British ministers in the Council of Ministers than their House of Commons counterparts. As well as select committees on Europe, there are also public bill committees. A public bill committee examines legislative proposals between the second and third readings of a bill (see the British legislative process in Box 8.4) and will examine the legislation in fine detail. As with select committees, public bill committees are cross-party (but retain an inbuilt government majority). The scrutiny of European legislation does not go to a public bill committee unless so directed by the Select Committee on European

Box 8.4  The British legislative process House of Commons First reading – the bill is introduced Second reading – the thinking behind the proposed legislation is debated Public bill committee – examines the legislation in fine detail Report – report of the public bill committee Third Reading – the wording of the bill is debated House of Lords This House follows the same process as the House of Commons. Any amendments proposed by the House of Lords are referred back to the public bill committee in the House of Commons (and, if accepted, on to a new third reading). The House of Commons is not obliged to accept any proposed changes to legislation from the House of Lords. Non-contentious legislation may start in the House of Lords and proceed to the Commons before progressing to royal assent. Monarchy Royal assent

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Scrutiny. In such circumstances, any MPs may sit in on the debate and even participate and suggest amendments to the legislation, although they have no voting rights. It is also possible for the debate to be transferred to the floor of the Commons. If it is recommended, there is an obligation for the debate to take place in the public bill committee, but no obligation for the Government to follow any of the public bill committee’s recommendations. Failure to do so, however, could lead to problems in the House as well as potentially in the media. One way out is often to grant a debate on the floor of the House, particularly if it is a controversial issue. In 2013–14, there was a public bill committee for the proposed legislation on an EU referendum bill. This legislation was a private member’s bill proposed by the Conservative MP James Wharton. While this legislation eventually fell, there is speculation that it will be re-introduced after the 2015 general election.

The European Union and regional government in the United Kingdom When examining the relationship between the EU and regional government in the UK, it is rather difficult to examine it all as a single block. The Scottish Parliament has significantly greater powers than either the Northern Ireland or Welsh Assemblies. Added to this, regional government in England no longer exists outside of the Greater London Authority. As a result, respective relationships with the EU differ and it is therefore somewhat easier to examine each region separately. Specific issues will be addressed with regard to each region after highlighting aspects common to them all. One of the first things to note is the regional representation at the EU in the form of the Committee of Regions. This body (examined in Chapter 3) is a purely advisory body; its recommendations and opinions are not binding. It does, however, highlight the importance of regional (and local) government representation across the EU. Formally, the nominations to the Committee of Regions come from the UK central government, although this is after consultation at the regional level in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (all of whom also consult with their respective local government associations) and with the Local Government Association in England.

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There are twenty-four UK delegates, as well as twenty-four alternate members. An alternate member is a substitute if the full member is unable to attend. Like any other regions throughout the EU, the different regions of the United Kingdom can bid for structural fund and cohesion fund monies. Over €348 billion worth of funds was available between 2007 and 2013, of which €278 was for the structural fund. Of the total fund, Britain received over €9.89 billion. This was rebranded in 2014 as the European Structural and Investment Fund (ESIF). Spending from this fund for the period 2014–20 will be €453.2 billion, of which the UK will receive €14.66 billion. Under the old scheme, the UK would have received around €11.84 billion. Within the ESIF, different EU funds have been brought together: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and part of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. On top of this, part of the Common Fisheries Policy has also been brought into alignment. Regions throughout the EU are categorised with regard to their per capita GDP. Any region with a per capita GDP of less than 75 per cent of the EU average is classified as an Objective 1 region. The next rank is Objective 2, which includes regions undergoing social and economic conversion to redress structural problems. Finally, Objective 3 regions are those requiring modernisation of their education, training and employment systems and policies. Ultimately, the idea is to increase the economic well-being of every region and to end many of the disparities. In 2013, within the EU some regions had unemployment levels of less than 3 per cent (Oberbayern: 2.5 per cent; Tübingen: 2.9 per cent; Freiburg: 2.9 per cent; and Salzburg: 2.9 per cent) while others were over 30 per cent (Andalucía: 36.2 per cent; Sur: 35.1 per cent; Extremadura: 33.9 per cent; and Canarias: 33.7 per cent). Many EU regions have long-term unemployment levels (twelve months or more without work) at less than 1 per cent, while others run at over 20 per cent. The ESIF is used to redress some of these imbalances. The regions are also able to bid for monies to improve their infrastructures via the ERDF. Any such bids have to be costed, and the long-term benefits to the region fully explained and evaluated.

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Scotland The devolved government in Scotland has been granted a range of powers. It is able to make primary legislation in many areas. Despite the loss of the 2014 referendum on independence, the UK Government has committed itself to increase the range of powers available to the Scottish Government. This means that the Scottish Parliament may pass laws that differ quite significantly from those in the rest of Britain – including the possibility of varying the rate of income tax by up to 3 pence. In fact, the Scottish Parliament can legislate in any area of policy that is not reserved by Westminster. While foreign matters are one of the reserved areas, this has not stopped the Scottish Parliament from developing its own links with Brussels. The Scottish Parliament has its own European and External Relations Committee. As with the committees in the Westminster Parliament, the Scottish version monitors the implementation of EU legislation. It also scrutinises the Scottish Government to make sure that it is being open and transparent about the way in which it implements EU legislation or examines EU issues. Further, it meets up with the Scottish MEPs to discuss developments in Brussels in order that it can carry out its functions more effectively and efficiently, and in a more informed manner. The European and External Relations Committee has also extended its role. For example, the committee considered evidence on the introduction and implementation of the new ESIF system for the period 2014–20, and how this would impact upon Scotland. It produces an annual report on its relationship with the EU, the Report on the European Engagement of the Scottish Parliament’s Committees. This, in effect, summarises its interactions with the EU. It may also publish other subject-specific reports, which are copied to the other specialist subject committees of the Scottish Parliament, for example, on employment or fishing.3 At the same time as the Scottish Parliament is working on EU relations, so too is the Scottish Government. The Scottish Government has, for example, developed an Agenda for EU Reform. Presented by former First Minister Alex Salmond, it details how the Scottish Government, under the Scottish National Party, sees the future development of the EU. It covers a range of

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policy areas, not all of which are under the control of the Scottish Government, for example climate change, energy security and the Common Fisheries Policy. The Scottish Government has developed two divisions on Europe. The European Relations Team is based in Edinburgh, while the Scottish Government European Union Office (SGEUO) is based in Brussels. The European Relations Team, like the European and External Relations Committee, focuses upon how EU directives are implemented in Scotland. In fact, the two bodies work closely together. The SGEUO works closely with UKREP (see Chapter 3 for more information on this body) in trying to promote and protect Scottish interests in Brussels. The Scottish Government claims that the SGEUO is part of UKREP, but the reality is that there is a concordat that allows all of the devolved administrations – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – to play a role in relevant Council meetings. The Scottish Government has also acted separately to the UK Government. For example, it issued a Nordic Baltic Policy Statement, promoting closer Scottish relations with the Nordic and Baltic states – and this included non-EU members Iceland and Norway.4 There is a strong feeling in Scotland that its future lies looking north, to Scandinavia, but as part of the EU. Wales The devolved government in Wales has significantly fewer powers  than that of Scotland. Whereas the Scottish Parliament has   primary legislative powers, those originally wielded by the Welsh Assembly enabled it to pass only secondary legislation. In effect, this meant that the Welsh Assembly could only adapt laws already passed by Westminster. There were twenty policy areas in which the Welsh Assembly was given these powers. In 2011, there was a second referendum where primary legislative powers were granted to the Welsh Assembly in those specific areas – although with a very low turnout, it was hardly a ringing endorsement of this move. Despite the more limited range of powers for the Welsh, this has not stopped the development of links with Brussels. The Welsh Government has set up an office in Brussels. This office in Brussels,

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which contains European policy specialists, works closely with UKREP. The overarching objective of this office is to promote and protect Welsh interests across the EU. This is done through lobbying the Commission and other decision-makers. In 2012, the Welsh Government launched a new EU strategy. The document, entitled Wales and the European Union – The Welsh Government’s EU Strategy, gives a detailed, if rose-tinted, overview of how Wales has developed its relationship with the EU, as well as looking to the future. The Welsh Government has established a Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO). The aim of this body is to make sure that monies available from the ESIF are allocated. Bodies thinking of bidding for ESIF monies are encouraged to speak with WEFO, which has a range of experts able to give advice. In the 2014–20 allocation, WEFO anticipates receiving around £2 billion. In Cardiff, there is a European and External Relations Division. Originally, it was part of the Department of Economic Development and Transport of the Welsh Government. Now it is part of the Department for the First Minister and Cabinet (DFMC). This Division performs a similar role to that of its Scottish equivalent. Its activities include examining how Directives and Regulations passed by the EU are best implemented in Wales, as well as working closely with the EU office in Brussels. Within the Welsh Assembly, there was a European and External Affairs Committee. This committee examined and reported on anything to do with the First Minister, other ministers or the Welsh Assembly and its relationship with the EU. The committee ceased to exist in March 2011. Northern Ireland The relationship between the devolved bodies in Northern Ireland and the EU is documented very clearly. For the Executive, it is the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (European Division) that promotes Northern Ireland’s interests at the European level. It is focused upon developing better engagement between Northern Ireland and the EU. Other ministers may get involved as European issues that affect their respective departments arise. The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONEIB)

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was established in 2001. It operates in a similar manner to its Scottish and Welsh equivalents. There is also a European Policy and Co-ordination Unit based in Belfast. This body co-ordinates the implementation of EU legislation across the Northern Ireland civil service. The Northern Ireland Assembly scrutinises both the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, as well as the legislation coming from the EU. In the past, there was a specific European committee, but this is no longer the case. Other committees, such as the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee, cover specific EU matters as appropriate. The EU has played a small but crucial role in the development of the peace process. An EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland ran from 1995 to 1999 (Peace I), with a second programme from 2000 to 2004 (Peace II), and a third from 2007 to 2013. They were joint Ireland/Northern Ireland programmes. The main aims of Peace III were, first, to attempt to reconcile the communities in Northern Ireland as well as across the border in the Republic of Ireland, and, second, to address the physical segregation or polarisation of places and communities, again within both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The five cross-cutting themes of Peace III, which were funded through the EU structural funds, were: • cross border co-operation • equality • sustainable development • impact on poverty • partnership.5 The total amount of money spent between 2007 and 2013 was €332.89 million, split 80–20 between Northern Ireland and the border regions of the Republic of Ireland. The Peace programmes have since been integrated into a broader scheme for funding: INTERREG, which focuses upon inter-regional co-operation. There are three such schemes running between 2014 and 2020. All three build on the peace process and the peace programmes, but they extend beyond Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, drawing in western Scotland too.

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London With both the Greater London Authority (GLA) and the London Mayor, there is a twin-track representation for Londoners. Between them, they focus upon the development of London as well as how the EU may impact there. The London Enterprise Panel is the local enterprise partnership for London (such partnerships will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter). It is chaired by the Mayor of London, currently Boris Johnson. Through this body, the office of the mayor is able to work with the different London boroughs, as well as with London businesses and Transport for London. The aim of the London Enterprise Panel is to take a strategic view of the regeneration, employment and skills agenda for London. One of the ways in which this is done is through accessing EU funding via the ERDF and the ESIF. Four specific points have been identified by the London Enterprise Panel with regard to accessing ESIF monies. These are skills and technology; competitiveness; science and technology; and infrastructure. The GLA has a European Programmes Management Unit. This body acts as an intermediary between the GLA and the EU institutions. The European Programmes Management Unit was responsible for delivering the 2007–13 EU programme, and continues to deliver the 2014–20 programme. In Brussels, there is a London European Office. This was opened in November 2001. Like the equivalents from the other devolved bodies, this office looks to represent the interests of London in Brussels. One of the aims of this body is also to promote and utilise London expertise in areas such as housing, regional policy, climate change and social inclusion for the rest of the EU. The London European Office sees a strong reciprocal relationship between itself (as the representatives of London in Brussels) and the institutions of the EU. London’s Europe Office advises both the GLA and the Mayor  of  London on aspects of good practice being developed across the EU for the running of a large city. This is not a one-way passage of information. It is reciprocated, with London’s Europe Office advising many other cities of good practice being developed in London.

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England (outside London) The problem with regional government in England (outside London) is that it no longer exists. There were regional development agencies (RDAs), established in 1999 but abolished in 2012. Each agency had the same powers. Their remit was specified most clearly in the legislation that led to their creation – that of the economic regeneration of their region, as well as improving the skills and competitiveness in the region. The terms of reference were the same for each RDA. Although the different RDAs adopted different strategies, these tended to be geared to meet regional demand. The East Midlands Development Agency (emda), for example, set itself the target of getting into the top twenty EU regions of where people wanted to live and work by 2010. Issues such as jobs, income, regional GDP, the environment and equality were included among the statistics which were – and still are – taken into account when assessing the regions. Since 2012, rather than there being regional involvement and interaction with the EU, it is now a case of local authorities (either individually or as a group) accessing the EU. This is examined below.

Local government and the European Union During the 1980s and 1990s, local government across the UK saw its powers being reduced by central government – part of the Thatcherite ideal of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’. Through access to the EU (or EC as it then was), local authorities were able to access new monies (over and above the central block grant) to develop infrastructure or to create new employment opportunities. These monies came from the various structural funds – particularly the Regional Development Fund and the Social Fund. Today, local authorities work with the EU (often alongside other tiers of government) in aspects of service delivery as well as policy formulation. The most notable point of access in the policy formulation process is via the Committee of Regions. As noted earlier in this chapter (and in Chapter 3), the Committee of Regions gives regional and local government input into the policy-making processes of the EU. This enables all tiers of government to have the opportunity to provide input into EU decisions. In the 2010–15 period, the UK’s

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twenty-four members of the Committee of Regions comprised nineteen from local government across the UK. What is interesting about the relationship between local government in Britain and the EU is that there has been a marked development in collaboration. This collaboration has not only between British local government and the EU but also between the different tiers of local government – particularly on a regional basis – to further their collective interests, and, at least until 2012, drawing in regional governmental institutions. Whereas the old regional development agencies opened offices in Brussels, to aid in the lobbying of the EU, such facilities are probably not needed for individual local authorities. Instead, the old regional development agency offices have been replaced with other bodies. Councils in the East Midlands, for example, access the Local Government Association (LGA) offices in Brussels, as do those in the East of England, the Southwest of England and the Northeast of England. The West Midlands, on the other hand, has a Greater Birmingham and West Midlands Office – although it is run by Birmingham City Council. The local authorities themselves are also very active with regards to the EU. For example, the city of Leicester has Objective 2 status for European Social Fund (ESF) monies (see earlier in this chapter for an explanation). A considerable amount of EU funding is directed into the city. The city council is the body which is accountable for how that money is spent. There is no specific European Office to coordinate interactions with the EU. Instead, this is left to the various departments within the council, some of which have identified specific staff members who will take the lead on any EU interactions. To replace the regional bodies, the coalition government of the UK established local enterprise partnerships (LEPs). There are thirty-nine LEPs across England. These were bodies established to facilitate co-operation between local councils, with the aim of developing economic growth. Interestingly, some councils belong to more than one LEP. For example, the northern part of the Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire (D2N2) LEP overlaps with Sheffield City Region LEP. Several councils – Bassetlaw, Bolsover, Chesterfield, Derbyshire Dales and North East Derbyshire – are covered by both LEP areas.

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Most LEPs have identified the need for inward investment, and specifically identified European funding. To access ESIF funding, they tend to liaise with the specific councils as well as central government departments. Prioritising direct links with Brussels does not seem overly important.

Conclusion What can be seen from this chapter is that all parts of government across Britain have access to the EU and potential funding from the EU. The constitutional relationship between Britain and the EU may be a little blurred at times but membership has had a huge impact on how the different tiers of government across Britain operate. Sub-national government has taken the baton in developing more positive links with the EU. This can be seen at every tier of sub-national government – but most noticeably in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Central government seems to have a less close relationship with the EU. Much of this could be to do with money. Britain is a net contributor to the EU budget – thus, central government loses money. The various tiers of sub-national government are able to access funds from the EU, over and above what they receive from central government. This extra funding can then be targeted at specific regional or local needs. It makes for a rather complex relationship – to the extent that we should perhaps not look too broadly at EU–UK relations but should instead look more closely at the relationships between the EU and the different tiers of g­ overnment in the UK.

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What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The underpinning of the British constitution is Parliamentary sovereignty. This has not been undermined by membership of the EU. No British Government can bind its successors and therefore any future British Government could legislate to withdraw from the EU. • British central government has a number of different committees to scrutinise EU legislation as well as the actions of the British Government within the Council of Ministers. There are committees

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from both chambers of Parliament. The select committees are particularly influential, as they are able to call ministers and civil servants to explain their actions. • At the regional level, the devolved bodies in London, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have opened up offices in Brussels. From these, the different regions of the UK are able to promote their own interests as well as attempt to influence policy-making. For England, there does not appear to be such a coherent or uniform approach to the EU. • The Committee of Regions is the body that tries to promote and defend the local and regional interests of the EU. Although it is only an advisory body, there is a compulsion for its opinions to be sought in specific policy areas. • Local government in Britain has benefited from extra funding from the EU through the various structural funds available. These are monies extra to those received from central government.

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Glossary of key terms Cohesion fund  This fund is used to reduce the economic and social disparities across the EU, focusing in particular upon the most deprived regions. For the period 2014–20, fifteen member states are covered by this fund. Committee of Regions  This is an advisory body created under the Treaty on European Union. Delegates are selected from the regional and local government of each member state. Any policy proposals that affect regional or local government must be put before the Committee of Regions. European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)  This is one of the structural funds. The ERDF focuses upon developing and improving the infrastructure of regions across the EU. European Social Fund (ESF)  This fund is used to develop employment and educational opportunities across the European Union. European Structural and Investment Fund (ESIF)  The rebranded structural fund. This draws in the other funds, such as the ERDF and the ESF. Parliamentary sovereignty  This is the underpinning of the British constitution. In effect, Parliament is the supreme law-making body in the UK. There is no judicial review of parliamentary legislation. No other body can legislate against Parliament – to do so would be to act ultra vires (beyond the law). Only Parliament can repeal legislation made by previous parliaments. Thus Parliament cannot bind its successors.

­156   Britain and the European Union Primary legislation  In the UK, if an institution is given primary legislative powers, this means it can pass any legislation not reserved for Westminster. Bearing in mind the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty, such primary legislative powers can be returned to Westminster. Public bill committee  Within the legislative process of the British Parliament, a public bill committee convenes after the second reading of a bill. The committee works through the proposed legislation in fine detail, trying to find ways of improving the legislation. There is one handicap here – the government has an inbuilt majority on a public bill committee. It is possible that this majority could be used to prevent any amendments to the legislative proposals. Secondary legislation  This is where the broad outline of a law is passed by Parliament but is then fine-tuned by another tier of government to suit its particular needs. Select committee  In Britain’s parliamentary system, select committees were established as an extra form of scrutiny of the executive. Members of these committees can call for any person or paper to be brought before them. Even members of the public could be asked to come before a select committee as a result of their expertise in a given area or even to explain some of their actions. Sovereignty  This is the right to make laws over a given territory. A state is sovereign in that it has this right. There is also external sovereignty, however, where a state would have to be recognised by other states as being sovereign. Such recognition legitimises a regime. Structural funds  These funds were used by the EU to develop regional policy. In particular, structural funds were used to narrow some of the disparities between the richest and poorest regions of the EU. There were four specific aspects: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund; the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD); and part of the Common Fisheries Policy. These have now been incorporated into the ESIF. Subnational government  These are the various tiers of government below national (or central) government. This can comprise regional and local government (of which there may also be multiple tiers). Subnational government is not necessarily elected. Unitary constitution  A constitution allocates power and responsibilities. It is sometimes referred to as ‘the rules of the political game’. A unitary constitution means there is only one source of constitutional power. In the case of Britain, this is Parliament. There are also federal constitutions, where power may be dispersed from the centre. This dispersal of power is normally protected by the constitution, and it can be very difficult to change.

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? Likely examination questions ‘Parliamentary sovereignty has been compromised by EU membership. Britain is no longer a sovereign state.’ Discuss. Membership of the EU has had a profound impact upon the structures of government across the UK. Yet the reality is that this is a reciprocal relationship. In what ways have the different tiers of UK Government had an impact on the operation and policy-making of the EU? The EU appears to be targeting regional and local government in an attempt to bypass central government. Assess the benefits of such an approach. Do we need to retain central/national government?



Helpful websites The House of Lords EU Select Committee website is at www.parliament. uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-selectcommittee- and that of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Select Committee at www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/ www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/923/0021839.pdf is the URL for European Union: Forward Look for 2006, which is a document produced by the EU Office of the Scottish Executive. www.scottish.parliament.uk is the home page of the Scottish Parliament. This is a starting point to see all the different aspects of the Scottish Parliament that are influenced by the EU. For the Scottish Government, see www.scotland.gov.uk www.wales.gov.uk is the website for the Welsh Assembly. To find out about the Welsh Executive, go to http://gov.wales/?&lang=en www.niassembly.gov.uk is the home page of the Northern Ireland Assembly. For the Northern Ireland Executive, see www.northernireland. gov.uk/ There is also the INTERREG home page at www.interreg4c.eu/ programme/ www.london.gov.uk is a starting point to find out about the government of London. From here, it is possible to go to the London Assembly web pages or those of the London mayor. It is also a starting point to find out how the EU and London interact.



Suggestions for further reading Much has been written on the impact of the EU on member states, and specifically on Britain. To read about the general impact see I.

­158   Britain and the European Union Bache (2004), ‘Multi-level Governance and European Union Regional Policy’ in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds), Multi-level Governance (Oxford University Press), pp. 165–78 and, from the same edited text, S. George (2004), ‘Multi-level Governance and the EU’, pp. 107–26. There is also R. Pasquier (2011), ‘Cities, Regions and New Territorial Politics’ in E. Jones, P. M. Heywood, M. Rhodes and U. Sedelmeier (eds), Developments in European Politics Two (Palgrave), pp. 120–37; J. Beyers (2002), ‘Gaining and Seeking Access: The European Adaptation of Domestic Interest Associations’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 585–612; N. Chelotti (2013), ‘Analysing the Links between National Capitals and Brussels in Foreign Policy’ West European Politics vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 1052–72; and R. Eising and T. Poguntke (2011), ‘Government and Governance in Europe’ in E. Jones, P. Heywood, M. Rhodes and U. Sedelmeier (eds), Developments in European Politics Two (Palgrave), pp. 45–64. For the impact on Britain, see M. Smith (2006), ‘Britain, Europe and the World’ in P. Dunleavy, R. Heffernan, P. Cowley and C. Hay (eds), Developments in British Politics 8 (Palgrave), pp. 159–73; N. Bandelow (2008), ‘Government Learning in German and British European Policies’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 743–64; Ø. Bratberg (2010), ‘Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their Home Parties’ West European Politics vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 851–69; S. Bulmer and M. Burch (2005), ‘The Europeanization of UK Government: From Quiet Revolution to Explicit Step-change?’ Public Administration vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 861–90; and P. Sack (2013), ‘The Midas Touch: Gold-plating of EU Employment Directives in UK Law’ Institute of Directors Policy Paper, Institute of Directors.

CHAPTER 9

Political Parties and the European Union Contents Conservative Party Labour Party Liberal Democrat Party United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) The minor parties

160 164 168 170 172

Overview The attitudes of the different political parties in the United Kingdom to the European Union might be described as problematic. A key reason for this is that few parties would even claim to be unified on this subject. While there may be clear guidance as to the position of the party leadership, this is not necessarily followed by all members or representatives of the party. If anything, the EU is one subject that cuts across party lines. It has resulted in what have been described as ‘unholy alliances’ across the British political parties – both in support of, and in opposition to, further developments in the Union. On top of this, as the EU has developed, the major parties have changed their positions on it. In some cases, they have moved from opposition to membership to support of membership and vice versa. The same also applies to some of the minor parties. Yet, as dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties has risen, one party – UKIP – has developed a clear populist, anti-EU platform that appears to have struck a chord with the public.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • An historical overview of the positions of the major British political parties on the EU

• An assessment of the extent to which the positions of the major parties may have changed over time

• An evaluation of the current positions of the parties on the EU • How some of the smaller parties stand on the issue of the EU

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Conservative Party The Conservative Party has traditionally been seen as the flag-waving, patriotic, pro-British political party. It has also been seen as a more pro-European party than its nearest rival, the Labour Party – although both originally opposed entry into the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (EEC). In fact, it was a Conservative government that first applied to join the then EEC in 1961, and it was a Conservative government that took Britain into the EEC in 1973. Even during the early 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher was demanding ‘our money back’, the Conservative Party was still considered to be the party of Europe. Much of this could be attributed to the anti-European stance of the Labour Party at that time, although this position was reversed in the mid-1980s. Yet in the elections to the European Parliament in both 1979 and 1984, it was the Conservative Party that gained most of the British seats. Such a perspective, however, glosses over an important point. Quite simply, the Conservative Party has not been united over Europe. There was dissent among the party ranks – even in the 1961 application, with the likes of Enoch Powell speaking out strongly against EEC membership. In 1971, two junior ministers, Teddy Taylor and Jasper More, resigned over the EEC application of the Edward Heath Government. The Cabinet appears to have been unanimous in supporting the application, if not the rest of the party. Even getting the legislation through the Commons required the support of the Labour Party, as can be seen in Box 9.1. Thus, taking Britain into the EEC was not easy for the Conservative Government of the day. As can be seen in Box 9.1, there were divisions in both the major parties. The first reading of the European Communities Bill was designated a free vote by the Conservative Party, although the Labour Party attempted to enforce a three-line whip. All subsequent votes were whipped. Since the passing of the legislation to get Britain into the EEC, the Conservative Party has appeared to be broadly pro-European. During the Thatcher years, even though there were the endless demands for the return of British money, Thatcher saw Britain’s role as being inside the European Community (EC). In that way, she

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 161

Box 9.1  Vote on EEC membership in the House of Commons (1971–2) First reading (free vote), 28 October 1971 Yes No Abstain Conservative and Ulster Unionist 282  39  2 Labour  69 198 20 Liberal   5   1  – Others  –   6  – 356 244 22 Government majority 112 Second reading (three-line whip), 17 February 1972 Conservative and Ulster Unionist 304  15  6 Labour  – 279  5 Liberal   5   1 – Others  –   6 – 309 301 11 Government majority 8 Third reading (three-line whip), 13 July 1972 Conservative and Ulster Unionist 295   16 Labour  – 263 Liberal   5  – Others   1   5 301 284 Government majority 17

* * 1 – *

* number unknown

would be able to protect British interests far more effectively. British interests would override those of the EC. In this respect, Thatcher was sometimes described as a Tory Gaullist in that she followed the stance of the former French President, Charles de Gaulle, who put national interests ahead of those of Europe. Thus, Thatcher’s attitude to Europe was not so much the problem, but rather it was her modus operandi that caused a stir. In the latter years of her premiership, Thatcher seemed to become a little removed from mainstream thinking within her party.

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She highlighted fears of the creation of ‘identikit Europeans’ in a speech in Bruges on 20 September 1988 (see Box 5.1). Ultimately, it seemed that Europe had moved on and Thatcher was left behind. The problem has been that the Thatcherite legacy left the Conservative Party rather directionless with regard to Europe. All of her successors have had huge problems in trying to unite the party over the issue. John Major was able to pilot the Treaty on European Union through the House of Commons using brinksmanship. He effectively told Conservative MPs who were opposed to the treaty that they had two choices: accept what he had negotiated, with the opt-outs for the single currency and the Social Charter; or oppose what he had negotiated, lose a subsequent general election and have a Labour Government accept the treaty without the opt-outs. Major even withdrew the party whip from eight Conservative MPs over the issue of Europe. They were joined by a ninth, Sir Richard Body (MP for Holland with Boston). The removal of the party whip from these MPs technically left Major with a minority government. Major also had problems within his Cabinet over the issue of Europe. In an unguarded moment, he spoke into a microphone, which he believed to be turned off, of the ‘Cabinet bastards’ – referring to the right-wing Eurosceptic members of his Cabinet. It was generally believed he was referring to Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and Michael Portillo. Subsequent leaders (William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard) each led the party – although it could be argued the party took each of them – down a more Eurosceptic route. William Hague’s 2001 general election campaign focused upon ‘saving the pound’. Such an approach had appeared successful in the 1999 elections to the European Parliament, where the Conservatives became the largest British party. With a turnout of only 24 per cent in that election, too much may have been read into how convinced the British public actually was on the issue. In the 2001 general election, the more Hague pushed ‘saving the pound’, the more steadily support moved away from the party. It was only when he focused upon other issues that support returned to the Conservatives. Michael Howard was somewhat cannier over Europe, highlighting negative aspects of the proposed European Constitution. Yet neither he nor Hague gave serious consideration to realigning the Conservative Party within the European Parliament. Despite their

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 163

often apparently anti-EU rhetoric, the Conservative Party stayed with the grouping of the European People’s Party (EPP). This grouping is broadly in favour of greater integration in the EU, something that most Conservative MEPs do not support. Yet staying in the EPP would give the Conservatives far more influence. The latest leader of the Conservative Party, David Cameron, has been described as the most Eurosceptic leader of the Conservative Party. Within weeks of winning the party leadership, he mooted the idea of leaving the EPP (see Box 6.1 for the full membership of the EPP), which was carried through after the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. The Conservatives were to the fore in establishing the European Conservative and Reformist group – a rightwing, Eurosceptic group in the European Parliament. Leaving the EPP to establish this new grouping has seen Conservative ­influence within the European Parliament diminish. The defence of the move is that the EPP was working towards the creation of a federal Europe – something to which the UK Conservative Party was fundamentally opposed. There have been other problems with the membership of the new grouping. While some Polish MEPs within the group have campaigned to repeal abortion laws, other members of the group can, at best, be described as unsavoury. There is a Latvian MEP, from Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK (the ‘For Fatherland and Freedom’ Party), which commemorates the Latvian Legion Day (a commemoration of the Latvian Legion within the Waffen SS during World War II). Between 1998 and 2000, the Latvian Government permitted such commemorations, but it has not done so since. After the 2014 elections, the European Conservative and Reformist group were the third largest grouping in the European Parliament. There were seventy MEPs in this group, compared to around three times that number sitting in the European People’s Party. The UK Conservative Party is, by far, the largest individual party within the European Conservatives and Reformists. Over the past decade, under David Cameron’s leadership, the position of the mainstream Conservative Party appears to have moved from an apathetic acceptance of EU membership to much stronger Euroscepticism, although without going as far as s­ upporting withdrawal. The demand for renegotiation of the terms of entry

­164   Britain and the European Union

by David Cameron, with those new terms to be put to an ‘In-Out’ referendum in 2017, has alienated many EU partners. The problem for David Cameron is that there are many Conservatives who feel the UK would do far better outside the EU, having negotiated a free trade agreement, without suffering all the burdens of regulation from the EU. His renegotiation of the terms of entry may not go far enough for those Conservatives, who, instead, look more and more to UKIP as an avenue to express their concerns about continued EU membership. To make matters worse for David Cameron, it appears that the renegotiation of the terms of entry will not be completed prior to holding a referendum on membership in 2017. Thus he will be in the unenviable position of campaigning for a ‘Yes’ vote on the promise of what might be done. Not only will this make it difficult to campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote, it will tarnish any ‘Yes’ result – regardless of the margin of victory – and may lead to demands for another referendum.

Labour Party While the Conservative Party has always seemed to broadly accept membership of the EU and its predecessors, the same cannot be said of the Labour Party. Thatcher may have earned the label ‘reluctant European’ because of her attitude towards Europe, but the Labour Party is just as deserving of the label. It has switched between support of membership and opposition to membership on more than one occasion. Even within the Labour Party, there are probably as many divisions on the issue of Europe as in the Conservative Party. Labour originally opposed membership of the European Coal and Steel Community and refused to support Harold Macmillan’s application to join the EEC in 1961. The party’s first U-turn occurred when it applied for membership in 1967 – although it must be noted that not all the party supported this application. In the 1970 General Election, the Labour Party campaigned to ‘negotiate terms of entry’. The wording meant that even those who were less than enthusiastic about possible EEC membership could be placated under such a slogan. In addition, it meant that the Labour Party was not committed to joining the EEC. An agreement on possible terms of entry might not be reached.

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 165

As can be seen in Box 9.1, the Labour Party was divided on whether or not to support the Conservative Government on entry into the EEC. Deputy Party Leader Roy Jenkins led sixty-eight other Labour MPs into the ‘Aye’ lobby, defying a Labour three-line whip in the process. Had the Conservatives ‘whipped’ their vote in the first reading of the legislation, Jenkins would have voted with his party, and the legislation would probably have been defeated. During the legislative process, and after the legislation was passed, the official Labour Party position was to contest the deal Heath’s Government had negotiated. Harold Wilson committed the Labour Party to renegotiating the terms of entry and then to put them to a national referendum. This proposal forced Roy Jenkins into resigning from the Labour Party deputy leadership. After winning both the 1974 general elections, Harold Wilson suspended collectivity over the issue of Europe. This meant that any members of the Cabinet could campaign either for or against membership. Once the referendum was over, however, all members had to accept the outcome. It was an astute move by Wilson, as the Labour Cabinet was deeply divided on EEC membership. Tony Benn was stridently against membership, as was Peter Shore. Barbara Castle, on the other hand, was far more enthusiastic. In the referendum campaign, Benn was willing to share a platform with Enoch Powell in his campaign against membership. With the referendum returning a convincing ‘Yes’ vote, it seemed that divisions over EEC membership had subsided within the Labour Party – ­publicly, at least. All of this changed after the 1979 election defeat. Michael Foot was elected Labour Party leader, and one of the key platforms under his leadership was withdrawal from the EEC. It led to a split in the Labour Party in 1981, with Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodgers and Shirley Williams leaving the party and setting up a new political party that supported continued EEC membership – the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This party is examined under the Liberal Democrats below. The 1983 general election was really the first – and, to date, only  – election where a major party campaigned for withdrawal from the EEC. The Labour Party election manifesto stated: ‘We will negotiate a withdrawal from the EEC, which has drained our natural resources and destroyed our jobs’. The party might have

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clearly stated its position, but it was not overly strident in pushing it. Regardless, the Labour Party suffered one of its worst ever election defeats in 1983. As a result, many of the policies proposed at that time were gradually reversed. Foot’s successor, Neil Kinnock, gradually moved the party to a more positive position on the EEC, to the extent that, by the 1989 elections to the European Parliament, Kinnock was able to claim that the Labour Party was more pro-EEC than the Conservatives. Yet such a claim masked huge divisions within the Labour Party. Some of these came to the fore during the debates on the Treaty on European Union. At this time, MPs such as Tony Benn, Peter Shore, Jeremy Corbyn and Bryan Gould actively campaigned against the treaty. Gould went as far as to share a platform with Margaret Thatcher (who also campaigned against the treaty) to publicise a telephone hotline where people could express their support or opposition to the treaty. As a result of this action, Gould was effectively ostracised by the Labour Party. This was not over what he did, but rather with whom he did it. His actions, and those of others who opposed the treaty, led to accusations of an ‘unholy alliance’ of MPs and members of the House of Lords from all the major parties, who would do anything to derail the treaty. It was interesting that nobody commented on the unholy alliance of all three major party leaders and their front benches in their broad support for the treaty, with John Major, Neil Kinnock and Paddy Ashdown all campaigning in favour of it (although the latter two wanted to include the Social Charter). The subsequent leaderships of John Smith and Tony Blair saw the Labour Party leadership adopt a still more enthusiastic position on EU membership. As prime minister, Blair worked to shed the image of Britain as a reluctant European – although he himself was an anti-EEC campaigner in the 1970s and 1980s. Blair was probably the most pro-European of all British prime ministers, including Edward Heath. For example, Blair signed Britain up to the Social Charter at the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and was to the forefront in campaigning for enlargement and for reform of both the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the budget. The majority of the Labour Party appeared broadly supportive of his position over Europe. There were, however, still those among the Labour Party

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 167

ranks who argued that Blair was not going far enough down the EU route, for example in not joining the single currency. There were also those who argued that he had gone too far, in ceding more powers to Brussels and surrendering part of the British budgetary rebate. Thus, there was perhaps no more than a veneer of unity on the issue of Europe. The position of the Labour Party under the leadership of Ed Miliband appeared a little unclear. This was best exemplified by the rather lacklustre campaign in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. While there was a clear commitment to remain in the EU, it was only in November 2014 that Miliband spoke unequivocally against a referendum on continued EU membership. In a speech to the Confederation of British Industry, he made it clear that he would not risk Britain sleepwalking into withdrawal by holding a referendum. What was less clear was how Miliband saw Britain’s future in the EU, or how he and the Labour Party leadership wished to see the EU develop. The problem was that there are elements within the Labour Party who are far less enthusiastic about EU membership. For now, these elements are very much in the distant background. The Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign, for example, argues that British membership of the EU has not been in Britain’s best interests. This group is committed to supporting an ‘In-Out’ referendum, and would campaign for a ‘No’ vote. Should Eurosceptic parties gain significant representation at Westminster, this group may then become far more prominent. The election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Party leader my see a more Eurosceptic position develop. Corbyn voted against EEC membership in the 1975 referendum, and he campaigned against the Treaty on European Union in the early 1990s. His sceptical position appears out of line with the majority of Labour MPs. Consequently, Corbyn is promising a debate within the Labour Party on future membership of the EU. At this stage, he is clearly not prepared to impose his position on the party. Within the European Parliament, the British Labour Party is a key player in the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Labour Party was important through sheer weight of numbers. These were reduced with the ­introduction

­168   Britain and the European Union

of a proportional electoral system for European Parliamentary elections in Britain. The party’s influence, however, has remained strong. It claims to protect British interests as well as working for a better EU. For the vast majority of Labour Party MPs, there is a tendency to toe the party line. This appears to be particularly the case over Europe: the MPs follow the party leader. This has led to them being described as ‘the soggy middle’ and ‘the ballast in the ship that wobbles’.1 While not very complimentary towards these MPs, it is quite accurate, although we will have to wait and see if this will remain the case under Jeremy Corbyn. MPs of all parties can and do change their opinions on issues, whether through pressure from the party whips or through personal experience. Former leaders of the Labour Party Neil Kinnock and Tony Blair – both of whom would now be considered ardently pro-European – were previously opposed to membership.

Liberal Democrat Party The Liberal Democrats, and their predecessor parties (the SDPLiberal Alliance and the Liberal Party), have been consistently proEuropean in their outlook. Even going back to the original formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, it was the Liberal Party that urged membership. At that time, however, there were only six Liberal MPs, so their opinions were not treated with any degree of seriousness. The Liberal Party was committed to joining the EEC in the 1970 general election. When Parliament voted on British membership in 1971–2, not all Liberal MPs supported the move. One, Emlyn Hooson, voted against membership. The issue of Europe came to the fore in the 1980s with the creation of the SDP. It was not just over Europe that members of this party disagreed with the Labour Party under Michael Foot, but Europe was an important issue. The original party took thirteen Labour MPs and one Conservative MP in party defections. A strong pro-European line was developed by the leader, Roy Jenkins. This was a key factor in enabling the creation of the Alliance with the Liberal Party. Note that Jenkins was the former deputy leader of the

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 169

Labour Party who defied a three-line whip to support British membership of the EEC in 1971. In both the 1983 and 1987 general elections, the Alliance polled around 25 per cent of the votes cast but gained very few seats. It was decided to rationalise the Alliance and merge the two parties – thus the Liberal Democrats were formed. Their first leader was Paddy Ashdown. As noted above, the Liberal Democrats are broadly supportive of continued EU membership. They gave strong support to the signing of the Treaty on European Union – and in doing so, kept the John Major Conservative Government in power. They gave their support even though Major had negotiated opt-outs from both the Social Charter and the single currency. Despite this support for Major in the early 1990s, the Liberal Democrats are most likely to complain that Britain needs to engage further with the EU. They were, for the most part, committed to signing the draft EU constitution and to signing up to the euro, subject to a national referendum. While this is generally the official party line, not all MPs are fully supportive of it. Nick Harvey (former MP for North Devon), for example, campaigned openly against the Treaty on European Union. He was the only Liberal Democrat MP in this position. While Harvey now claims to have moderated his Euroscepticism, he did not always toe the party line – although his promotion to the Lib Dem front benches saw a further moderation of opinion. He was even joined by other Lib Dem MPs in voting against the party line on the issue of Europe. John Burnett (former MP for Torridge and West Devon) and Mike Hancock (former MP for Portsmouth South) have voted against the party on EU issues more regularly than Harvey. Having gone into coalition with the Conservative Party after the 2010 general election, party leader Nick Clegg had problems with his coalition partners over the issue of Europe. As the Conservatives appeared more and more Eurosceptic under the leadership of David Cameron, with commitments to renegotiate the terms of entry and put them to a national referendum, the Liberal Democrats appeared unable to arrest the Eurosceptic slide. In an attempt to do otherwise, Nick Clegg agreed to debate with the UK Independence Party (UKIP) leader, Nigel Farage, on continued EU membership in

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March and April 2014. The two debates – the first on LBC Radio, the second broadcast by the BBC – were rather tetchy affairs, with the two leaders often arguing past each other. Opinion polls immediately after each debate saw support for the Clegg position at around 27 per cent. The disaster for the Liberal Democrats has continued. Although still the most pro-European of all the British political parties, they were almost wiped out in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament – being reduced to a solitary MEP. This position was made worse in the 2015 general election, where the party was reduced to eight MPs – leaving them as a minor party in British politics once again. The question that remains unanswered is whether this can be attributed to their pro-EU position or to being in coalition with the Conservatives in central government.

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Technically, UKIP is a minor party. Yet, in being the largest UK party in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament (see Table 9.1), in terms of both votes and seats gained, along with a continued high level of support in public opinion polls, it needs to be acknowledged separately. Its lack of success in terms of seats won in the 2015 general election – where it held on to one by-election gain but failed to win any other seats – needs to be tempered by the number of votes won. The fact that it outpolled all but the two largest parties in terms of votes received signifies UKIP as a ‘player’ in British politics. The party was created in 1993. It is fundamentally opposed to continued British membership of the EU; this is its raison d’être. All its other policy platforms are linked to this position. It sees the EU as a burden on the British economy and on the British taxpayer. Added to this, UKIP claims to be ‘the only Party telling you the truth about the European Union’.2 In the 2004 elections to the European Parliament, the party campaigned on this platform and gained eleven MEPs, making it the fourth largest British party in the European Parliament. This was followed by a very poor showing in the 2005 general election, when its vote collapsed. There was a similar pattern in the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, when it came second in terms of

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 171

both seats and votes, but its support disappeared in the 2010 general election. The 2014 elections to the European Parliament saw UKIP topping the UK polls in terms of both seats and votes. This momentum did not seem to slow. It had its first-ever MPs elected to the UK Parliament – when Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless resigned as Conservative MPs, which led to by-elections, and then stood for re-election but as UKIP candidates. These two by-election gains for UKIP were followed by huge media publicity, but also a much closer examination of UKIP affairs and membership. By 2015, its support appeared to be beginning to wane. Although the party claimed to be targeting forty seats at the general election, after its second byelection gain, speculation began to grow that it was spreading itself too thinly, with insufficient party membership to get the feet on the

Table 9.1  Party support at European Parliamentary elections (mainland Britain)  

1999

 

2004

2009

2014

% % % % votes seats votes seats votes seats votes seats Conservative

35.8

36

26.7

27

27.7

25

23.9

19

Labour

28.0

29

22.6

19

15.7

13

25.4

20

Lib Dem

12.7

10

14.9

12

13.7

11

 6.9

 1

UKIP

 7.0

 3

16.1

12

16.5

13

27.5

24

Green

 6.3

 2

 6.3

 2

 8.7

 2

 7.9

 3

BNP

 1.1

 0

 4.9

 0

 6.2

 2

 1.1

 0

SNP

 2.9

 2

 1.4

 2

 2.1

 2

 2.5

 2

Plaid Cymru

 1.9

 2

 1.0

 1

 0.8

 1

 0.7

 1

Turnout

24.0

38.5

34.7

34.2

­172   Britain and the European Union

ground, and that it would be lucky to make any further gains come the general election. As has already been noted, UKIP held one seat after the 2015 general election, despite winning an eighth of the votes cast across the country. Within the European Parliament, UKIP is the largest party within the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy grouping. Any grouping within the European Parliament must have twentyfive MEPs from a minimum of seven member states. The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy grouping meets these criteria, but only just. There are MEPs from seven different countries, but only two countries contribute more than two MEPs – the UK and Italy. This grouping could therefore disappear at any time. Nigel Farage may be an influential politician within UK politics, but the grouping – of which he is deputy leader – is peripheral within the European Parliament.

The minor parties There are a number of smaller parties that also have important positions on the EU. These are examined below. Green Party The position of the Green Party on EU membership is broadly supportive, although the party is also very critical of the EU. The Greens highlight many of the benefits and potential benefits of EU membership. Prominent here would be their support of the Kyoto Protocols, and the way in which the EU has set targets for all member states to achieve with regard to reducing carbon emissions. Yet the Greens are also very guarded as to how they feel the EU should develop. For example, the party would like to see a fundamental overhaul of the CAP. It is opposed to the introduction of the single currency across all of Europe, and is also against the development of a European super-state. In fact, it argues for a fundamental overhaul of the structures of the EU, with the Commission to have less power and the European Parliament to be granted greater powers to give it better oversight of the work of the EU. It has been through elections to the European Parliament that the Green Party has been able to have some sort of impact on British

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 173

politics. In 1989, the Greens won 15 per cent of British votes cast in the elections to the European Parliament – although no MEPs, as these elections were fought under simple plurality. Since the ­introduction of the proportional d’Hondt party list electoral system, the Greens have gained electoral representation in every subsequent European Parliament election (see Table 9.1). This provided a solid springboard to greater electoral success in other elections, at the local level, in the Scottish Parliament and, in 2010, the election of their first MP, Caroline Lucas. Since that point, the Greens have stalled a little. Electoral gains have been far fewer, and at the local council level, although Caroline Lucas did hold her seat at the 2015 general election. Scottish National Party Although forming the government in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) is technically a minor party in the context of all of the United Kingdom. As can be seen in Table 9.2, the SNP gains a very small proportion of the total votes cast across the UK. It must be noted, however, the SNP only fights one European Parliamentary constituency – Scotland. In terms of Scottish votes, it has become the dominant party in Scotland. This position was reinforced after the 2015 general election. The SNP was originally opposed to EEC membership, seeing it as some sort of capitalist club that had few, if any, benefits for an independent Scotland. Even during the 1975 referendum on EEC membership, the SNP campaigned for a ‘No’ vote. It was not until after the 1983 general election that the SNP started to revise its position on Europe. In many respects, its movement towards a more enthusiastic outlook on Europe has mirrored the movement of the Labour Party – although, arguably, the SNP has moved far more quickly towards a more pro-European outlook. By 1988, the SNP was campaigning for an independent Scotland within Europe. Much of this move may be to do with the benefits that the Republic of Ireland received as a result of membership. The Irish economy has benefited from a huge level of investment via the structural funds. The SNP is of the opinion that an independent Scotland within the EU would receive similar levels of EU grants. With all of

­174   Britain and the European Union

the Eastern European enlargements, however, these grants would be significantly smaller than those received by the Irish in the 1980s and 1990s. The SNP is not totally committed to everything that emanates from Europe. While there is a commitment to greater integration, the SNP is sometimes a little guarded in its support. For example, it is distinctly unenthusiastic about the Common Fisheries Policy. In fact, it would like to see this particular competence returned to national governments. According to the SNP, the Scottish fishing industry is getting near to the point of collapse as a result of boats being tied up, and total allowable catches (TACs) being reduced. One area where there has been internal disagreement is over the euro. At the turn of the century, the SNP position appeared to be in favour of an independent Scotland joining the single c­ urrency – or at least holding a referendum on the issue. This position, however, was marked by a number of serious divisions within the party, including those who wanted Scotland to join the euro without a referendum, and those who were fundamentally opposed to the single currency. By the time of the referendum on Scottish independence, in September 2014, the official SNP position had changed. The then leader, Alex Salmond, argued that Scotland should retain the British pound in a currency union with the rump of the UK. The Westminster Government argued that this was not viable. Interestingly, neither side argued for Scotland adopting the euro as its currency. Plaid Cymru Like their Scottish counterparts, the Welsh nationalists were originally opposed to EEC membership and also campaigned against membership in the 1975 referendum. As with the Scottish Nationalists, it was in the mid-1980s that Plaid Cymru started to become more enthusiastic about Europe. There was no sudden ‘road to Damascus’ change of position, but rather a gradual change. Originally, the party was opposed to membership. This then changed to tentative support for some sort of pan-European organisation. Much of this may have been as a result of the Thatcher Government and its relative neglect of Wales. The European Community was a potential source of alternative funding for specific projects. Support for Europe was not

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 175

outright at this time; there was criticism of the CAP and the Single European Act. Yet even this position has now changed to more wholesale support for the EU. Plaid Cymru is enthusiastic about EU membership. The EU is able to give much to Wales, and Plaid Cymru politicians believe that Wales has much to give to Europe. At the same time, Europe is an avenue for Plaid Cymru to try to block unpopular policies emanating from Westminster. An example of this is where Plaid Cymru has been campaigning to stop zero-hour contracts for those employed in agriculture, health and social care. Both the Labour-controlled Welsh Assembly and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in Westminster have ignored these proposals. Plaid Cymru is therefore instead campaigning for a Europe-wide ban. Although the party is enthusiastic about the EU, its support is not unqualified. Plaid Cymru would like to see a degree of reform to some of the EU policies, for example the CAP; its position is one of arguing for reform rather than tinkering with cuts to the CAP budget. It would also like to scrap the European Parliament base in Strasbourg and see the EU, as a whole, modernised. Northern Ireland parties Politics in Northern Ireland is phenomenally complex, and the added dimension of the EU does not make things any less so. Many issues may be divided along sectarian lines. As with mainland Britain, Europe does not sit comfortably across the political parties. For example, the two main Unionist parties – the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) – are not overly enthusiastic about the EU. The UUP have not campaigned for withdrawal, whereas in the past some senior members within the DUP perceived the EU as a means by which Catholicism and the Papacy could extend their influence across Europe. It is hardly surprising that the DUP has stated it would like Britain to withdraw. This opposition to the EU, however, did not stop the DUP from putting up candidates for the elections to the European Parliament. Over time, the DUP position has moderated. While still not overly enthusiastic about the EU – it supports the idea of a new referendum on continued EU membership – the DUP has been successful in campaigning to improve Northern Ireland’s position

 

 

28.4

17.6

17.3

28.1

57.0

DUP

UUP

SF

SDLP

Turnout

% first preference votes

1999

1

0

1

1

seats

51.2

15.9

26.3

16.6

32.0

% first preference votes

2004

0

1

1

1

Seats

42.4

16.2

26.0

17.1

18.2

% first preference votes

2009

0

1

1

1

Seats

2014

51.0

13.3

25.5

13.3

21.0

% first preference votes

Table 9.2  Northern Ireland European Parliamentary election results

0

1

1

1

Seats

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 177

in Europe. This includes such things as achieving Objective 2 status for structural funds. Like the DUP, the UUP has also campaigned against particular policies and against Britain joining the euro. Both parties are committed to furthering Ulster’s (and Britain’s) interests within the EU. On the Nationalist side of the fence, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has been quite enthusiastic about membership of the EU. The SDLP is probably the strongest supporter of EU membership in Northern Ireland, seeing it as a useful tool by which the problems in Northern Ireland may be resolved. It has seen the euro introduced in the Republic of Ireland and would like the same for Northern Ireland. In fact, the SDLP adopted a rather interesting position for the elections to the European Parliament in 2004, when it campaigned for a dual currency in Northern Ireland (both the pound sterling and the euro) until the UK made a decision in a referendum. The problem for the SDLP has been the rise in support for the alternative ‘Nationalist’ party, Sinn Féin. The SDLP has become the fourth party in Northern Ireland politics, and only three MEPs are elected from Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin, on the other hand, has been opposed to EU membership. Its current position is more enthusiastic about the EU but opposed to greater integration. The focus of Sinn Féin is upon both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It thus opposes the Common Foreign and Security Policy because it may threaten Ireland’s neutrality and was also opposed to Ireland signing up to the euro as that could result in surrender of economic sovereignty. Yet Sinn Féin would prefer to see Northern Ireland also sign up to the euro as there would then be a single currency in use across all of Ireland. Streamlining of the EU is supported by the party. There are other parties in Northern Ireland apart from these four mentioned. The Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), for example, is opposed to EU membership and campaigns vigorously for British withdrawal from the EU. The TUV came fifth in the Northern Ireland European Parliamentary elections in 2014. Another party which has played a significant role in Northern Ireland politics has been the Alliance Party. It is a non-sectarian party that describes itself as being wholeheartedly in favour of continued EU membership. Its non-sectarian position has resulted in a degree of trust being

­178   Britain and the European Union

extended from the sectarian parties, but with only limited electoral success in Northern Ireland Assembly elections. Today, all four of the major parties in Northern Ireland are committed to participation in the EU – although their degrees of commitment are variable. The SDLP is the only party to have been supportive of membership since the 1970s. The other three parties are seeking to gain from EU membership in an attempt to further their own domestic agenda – and this can be enhanced through engagement with the EU.

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What you should have learned from reading this chapter • The major parties all have internal divisions on the issue of the EU. Some of these are glossed over by the parties. Not all MPs are willing to ‘toe the line’ of their party leadership. • Individual MPs often change their minds on the issue of Europe, including some prominent politicians, such as Tony Blair. • Most British political parties have changed their position on the issue of Europe. Only the Liberal Democrats (and the SDLP in Northern Ireland) have been consistent supporters of membership. • Of the smaller political parties, UKIP, the best known of the anti-EU parties, campaigns for British withdrawal from the EU. • The smaller political parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all try to use the EU to further their own domestic agendas.

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Glossary of key terms Collectivity  This term is used to describe collective decision-making by the British Cabinet. Once a decision has been made by the Cabinet, all members must support the decision publicly, even if they have private doubts. It is only in very exceptional circumstances that collective decision-making is suspended. Free vote  This is where ‘whipping’ of votes is suspended (see three-line whip). MPs get to vote according to their consciences. Free votes are often used for contentious non-partisan legislation. Minority government  In this circumstance, a governing party does not have an absolute majority of seats in the House of Commons. When this happens a party can either form a coalition with one or more other parties, or ‘go it alone’ and form a minority government. Three-line whip  The ‘whipping’ of legislation is used to compel MPs to

Political Parties and the European Union   ­ 179

follow the party line. A three-line whip is the strongest degree of whipping, where attendance and following the party line is considered essential. A one-line whip is the weakest, where attendance and following the party line is requested. Tory Gaullist  This is a Conservative Party MP (or supporter) who believes that the UK should be in the EU but that national interests should override those of the EU. This follows the line of the former French President, Charles de Gaulle, who always put French interests ahead of those of Europe.

? Likely examination questions ‘Europe is a divisive issue within political parties rather than between them.’ Discuss. All the major political parties claim to be pro-European, yet their perceptions of Europe are significantly different. Why is this? What is meant by the term ‘pro-European’? Will the future of British membership of the European Union ever be resolved by any of the political parties?

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Helpful websites All of the UK political parties have their own websites. It is possible to access these and find old manifestos as well as current policy positions on the EU. The three main parties are www.conservatives.com, www.labour. org.uk and www.libdems.org.uk. The Scottish and Welsh nationalists can be found at www.snp.org.uk and www.www.plaid.cymru respectively. UKIP’s web page is www.ukip.org, while the Green Party can be found at www.greenparty.org.uk. The Northern Ireland parties mentioned in this chapter can each be found at www.mydup.com, www.uup.org, www.sdlp. ie and www.sinnfein.ie Other organisations that draw support from MPs include the Campaign for an Independent Britain, which can be found at www.cibhq.co.uk/index. htm, the European Movement (www.euromove.org.uk/), and the Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign (www.lesc.org.uk).



Suggestions for further reading There is extensive literature on political parties and, within that, some very good material on the European Union. For general comments on political parties, see K. Johansson and T. Raunio (2005), ‘Regulating Europarties’ Party Politics vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 515–34; A. Jones (1994), ‘Parties, Ideologies and Issues: The Case of the European Community’

­180   Britain and the European Union in L. Robins, H. Blackmore and R. Pyper (eds), Britain’s Changing Party System (Leicester University Press), pp. 75–92; C. Jensen and J. Spoon (2010), ‘Thinking Locally, Acting Supranationally: Niche Party Behaviour in the European Parliament’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 174–201; and Ø. Bratberg (2010), ‘Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and their Home Parties’ West European Politics vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 851–69. On UKIP, see R. Ford, M. Goodwin and D. Cutts (2012), ‘Strategic Eurosceptics and Polite Xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament Elections’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 204–34.

CHAPTER 10

The British Media and the European Union Contents What is the media? 182 Reporting on the European Union 182 ‘New’ media 188 Conclusion189

Overview This chapter will focus on the relationship between the British media and the European Union. Reference has already been made on a number of occasions to the way in which the tabloid press of the UK has presented the EU. This chapter will examine this in greater detail, as well as how the European Union is reported in the broadsheet press, and in broadcast media. What becomes evident is the extent of the vitriol the majority of tabloid newspapers have for the EU. This is not replicated – at least not to the same degree – anywhere else. The new media – including social media such as twitter, and, more broadly, the internet – presents the full gamut of perspectives on the EU. Much of this is often personal diatribes for or against the EU with little or no supporting evidence. Caution must always be borne in mind when utilising such sources. For the most part, as we progress along the scale from broadcast media to print media to social media such as blogging, the extent to which there is peer review of what is being produced diminishes.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • A definition of the concept ‘media’ • An examination of the portrayal of the European Union across the different forms of media

• Historical coverage of media reporting of the EU as well as more recent examples

• How different forms of the new media impact upon the EU

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What is the media? An examination of Britain’s relationship with the European Union would be deficient without an analysis of the impact of the media. The media comprises a range of methods of mass communication of such things as news, sport and entertainment to a wide variety of audiences. This could be through a satellite television channel, a local newspaper or a blog. Therefore it is important to note that it includes not just print and broadcast media, but also newer forms available via the internet, especially social media. Within the context of this book, the specific parts of the media that are included are those that cover the news and, more specifically, the communication of ‘political’ news. The most obvious communicators of such messages are the broadcast media and the print media. Yet, more and more, the new media of the internet is becoming influential – possibly even setting the news agenda. This political role of the media is very evident, and can be seen in the framing and reporting of news stories (as will be examined later in this chapter). The extent of the influence of the media, however, is not so clear cut. It should always be borne in mind that the vast majority of the British population has, at most, only a passing interest in the EU (as will be seen in Chapter 11). Those who may have this limited interest in the EU are likely to obtain their information, and perhaps reinforcement of their prejudices, from the media. In theory, the role of the media is to inform and educate the public. This is often described as a ‘neutral’ approach, whereby the media reports stories impartially. Such a perspective may be perceived as an ‘ideal’, which is rarely if ever attained. For the broadcast media, specifically during election periods, this balance or evenhandedness is a requirement. For the rest of the time, the print and social media may well report stories from the position of their owners or advertisers.

Reporting on the European Union When examining the role of both print and broadcast media across the EU, the media may provide a forum for exchange of information and opinions.1 In other words, the media can promote discussion and

The British Media and the European Union   ­ 183

debate on the EU. The downside of this is that there is actually very little coverage of the EU in much of the media, across all member states. There is coverage of the big set-piece events such as European summit meetings or the elections to the European Parliament. The day-to-day minutiae of EU politics, however, hardly rate a mention. When the EU does make news headlines, it is normally in relation to bad news. In fairness, it is most likely that the minutiae of domestic national politics are not covered thoroughly by national or local media outlets. The problem is with the breadth of news coverage and greater focus on the lives and goings-on of celebrities. Consequently, in the everpressured ratings war, the mainstream media is being forced to dumb down more and more. Consequently, political news coverage is being squeezed. When watching, for example, Prime Minister’s Question Time in the House of Commons, the soundbites of both major party leaders are very obvious. With there being so much pressure on news coverage, the politicians do whatever they can to get their ten seconds of coverage. Thus coverage of mainstream politics is reduced, and within that, coverage of the EU is reduced even further. The pressure for domestic soundbites is far greater than that for ‘European’ soundbites, although the exception may be a negative soundbite about the EU from a prominent national politician. It is interesting, for example, how much media coverage Nigel Farage gets compared to all the other MEPs collectively, or to any nonfrontbench politician in the UK. The media is able to ‘frame’ any story,2 which, in turn, can influence public opinion. The issue of public opinion is examined in Chapter 11. This framing is very much about how an issue is characterised in the news. For example, the Daily Telegraph talks about Britain’s relationship with Europe, or about the transfer of powers to Europe.3 More generally, the right-wing press in the UK sees the relationship with the EU through such a filter. It is very much an ‘us’ and ‘them’ relationship. Despite the fact that Britain has been a member of the EU (and its predecessors) since 1973, it is still presented as a relationship based on conflict; it is all about the winners and the losers. The framing is very much about the domestic impact of the actions of the EU. Such framing of the relationship between Britain and the EU

­184   Britain and the European Union

has some impact upon the viewers or readers. This framing of news may sometimes be a lot stronger, more a case of priming. In such circumstances, the content of the news may suggest to the audience that they should use certain benchmarks when absorbing and evaluating news stories. Thus the media gives certain prompts to its audience on how to judge a particular story. For example, when analysing how the media reported on David Cameron’s alleged veto on a fiscal compact to bail out Greece, it was noted: ‘The tabloids were filled with Churchillian rhetoric, and the drumbeat of 1940: “Very well, alone”.’4 Again, the idea of conflict between Britain and the EU is presented, if not reinforced, through the representation of Winston Churchill standing alone for Britain against Nazi Germany. The EU is presented as a newer version of that tyranny, with Britain alone willing to stand up to such a menace or capable of doing so. Sometimes, however, the role of the media in reporting on the EU is about agenda-setting. Arguably, the example above of Churchill could be seen in such a light; agenda-setting exists where there is a strong link between the emphasis on an issue by the media and how it is perceived by the audience. From such a perspective, the media tries to set the political agenda, quite possibly through pandering to the whims of its audience, to force the politicians down a certain line. Again, within the British tabloid media, the vitriol with which the EU is presented appears to do little more than stoke up confrontation, as can be seen in Table 10.1. What is apparent within all of the headlines is the sensationalism. The right-wing tabloid press is confrontational when it comes to reporting on the EU; the veracity of the claims does not matter. There is a clear, jingoistic message. The EU is forcing itself upon the UK, and some politicians are complicit in this action. Worse, it undermines the British way of life, and should be resisted. The Churchillian resonances are so very clear. In comparison with the tabloids, there is, perhaps unsurprisingly, a greater degree of sophistication with the national broadsheets. While ‘framing’, ‘priming’ and ‘agenda-setting’ still take place, there tends to be more informed discussion and debate on the issue of the EU. The problem is, however, a limited amount of reporting of EU news. Even when drawing in issues such as the situation in

The British Media and the European Union   ­ 185

Table 10.1  Tabloid newspaper headlines The Sun

1 November 1990

Up Yours, Delors!

The Sun

18 July 2006

EU to rename Bombay Mix

Daily Mail

15 October 2007

Labour’s broken promise of a referendum on the new EU treaty is a betrayal of public trust

The Sun

4 November 2009

Britain betrayed as hated EU treaty becomes law

Daily Express

4 May 2012

EU plot to scrap Britain

Daily Mail

19 April 2013

EU demands access to British police files

Sunday Express 18 August 2013

EU’s bad vibrations tractor directive ‘will destroy farming’

Daily Mail

13 September 2014

A lorry load of trouble: Shortage of truck drivers caused by EU rules puts economic recovery at risk … with Christmas deliveries already under threat

The Sun on Sunday

4 January 2015

Half-baked EU cooker diktat is a ‘threat’ to roasts

Ukraine, either during the Orange Revolution or more recently, the focus has not been upon the role of the EU per se. The European Neighbourhood Policy, as noted in Chapter 7, dangles the carrot of potential EU membership in front of a number of countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. This is seen as something of a threat by the Russian Government. Yet none of this appears in the broadsheet press.5 It is almost as if there would be an information overload. Added to this, of course, is that such EU involvement – and the fact that it may possibly have exacerbated or inflamed the current situation – does not fit in with the other narrative of Russian interference in a westward-looking Ukraine.

­186   Britain and the European Union

The broadsheet press is also more willing to question the actions of the prime minister over the issue of Europe. As noted above, David Cameron was praised in the tabloid media in Churchillian tones for standing up to Europe over bailing out the Greeks. Yet the Guardian, Independent and Financial Times each questioned the ­strategy – or lack of it – adopted by the prime minister. The suggestions in these newspapers, not all of which were from the political left, was that David Cameron had sacrificed long-term strategy for newspaper headlines for domestic consumption. The readerships of these three newspapers, collectively, are dwarfed by that of any one tabloid. Yet all tabloids, adding in the broadsheets of the Daily Telegraph and The Times, are willing to conduct greater investigations into, or analysis of, Britain’s interactions with the EU. Regardless of their respective ideological backgrounds, all of these papers have been critical of the way in which different British Governments have interacted with the EU. Overall, examining the British press shows that it can be perceived as ‘highly partisan and biased’.6 Added to this, the framing, priming or agenda-setting of these news stories has ‘an influence on the attitudes of their readers towards Europe, both positive and negative’.7 While there is only limited newspaper reporting of the EU, the broadcast media is little better. Even the 24-hour broadcast media appears to have problems in reporting on the EU. An examination of the reporting of EU news across an eleven-month period was conducted in 2000.8 The survey covered news reporting in Britain, Germany, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. The findings reinforced so many stereotypes of British news reporting of EU matters. First, it was noted how little EU news coverage, as a proportion of total news coverage, there was in the main evening news bulletins. This was despite the launch of the euro a year earlier and the expectation that the progress of this new currency would be monitored closely. It had been assumed that the proportion of ‘political’ news would be higher. While this was the case in the UK, the amount of EU news coverage was exceptionally low. In fact, within UK news reporting, the focus was upon the ‘domestic implications’ of the EU story.9 Even when focusing upon the euro, the emphasis of the stories tended to be upon the domestic impact for the UK – despite the fact that the country had not joined the euro.

The British Media and the European Union   ­ 187

What caused surprise was the tone set in all this news reporting of the EU. Of all the countries surveyed – admittedly only five – Britain was not the most negative in its outlook on the EU. This was the French and the Dutch. Surprisingly, it was the Danes who had the most coverage of the EU and this coverage did not always focus upon the domestic impact of the EU. Overall, the conclusion appears to be that while we can see Europeanisation in politics, economics and society, it is still not prevalent in broadcast news coverage. There is still a clear national slant.10 One sector where there is a slight difference in reporting the EU comes from the public sector–private sector divide. Public sector broadcasters, across the EU, are more likely to run stories about the EU, and these can be positive or negative. The commercial broadcasters run far fewer stories. This, therefore, raises the question of the extent to which the owners or advertisers are able to influence what is broadcast. The most prominent media mogul within the UK today is Rupert Murdoch. He has admitted to pressuring former prime ministers (he named Tony Blair and John Major) to adopt a more hardline stance over the EU. There are probably many reasons behind his antipathy to the EU, one of which is EU regulation. The EU frowns upon anticompetitive practices, and has set limits as to how much of a national media may be under the control of one provider. In fact, the EU can legislate for greater media pluralism, that is, for there to be more media providers, be it print or broadcast. Murdoch objects most strongly to the EU trying to interfere in the practices of his businesses. What has also been highlighted by different studies across the EU is the lack of visibility of the EU in news reporting.11 There is very little coverage and the reporting of news tends to be very much about domestic issues. At best, when the EU is included it is about the impact of the EU on domestic concerns. The idea of developing a ‘European-ness’ of news simply does not exist. Bad news makes news, and bad domestic news even more so. In the case of the tabloid media, the ‘bad’ Europeans doing harm to ‘us Brits’ is sometimes newsworthy. Benefits of the EU rarely, if ever, surface. An interesting simile may be drawn with Hollywood; the villains tend to be British. In the UK media, and most notably the tabloid media, those villains, collectively speaking, are often the EU.

­188   Britain and the European Union

‘New’ media Where there has been a noticeable growth in both pro- and anti-EU invective is through social media. With the development of Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media, more and more people are able to publicise their views on any given issue. It does not matter how well informed they are, or even how accurate their information is. It is disseminated and re-disseminated, and may start a snowball effect. There is no regulation as to what tales are told, unless there is a clear case of libel. Thus gossip and speculation are often spread as fact. More broadly, the development of the internet has enabled the EU to publicise what it does to a global audience. There are, for example, thousands of web pages on the EU, many of which are run by the EU itself. Thus it has the opportunity to set its own news agenda. The problem, however, is who is willing to go and troll through the EU web pages to find out information? The EU can put out all sorts of news items, but they are dependent upon news broadcasters picking them up and running them. This is where an alternative option is needed; that of actively engaging with the general public across the EU. It is possible, for example, to follow Jean-Claude Juncker (President of the European Commission) or Donald Tusk (President of the European Council) on Twitter, or even Britain’s representative on the Commission, Jonathan Hill. In the case of Donald Tusk, most of his tweets are about him shaking the hands of leaders from around the world. Jonathan Hill’s tweeting is very clearly linked to his portfolio as Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets. This highlights the level of his interactions with the financial world, and the extent to which he appears to have become ‘Europeanised’ can already be seen. What is obvious from even a quick examination of such Twitter accounts is the extent to which the commissioners are very busy in meetings. What they actually do in these meetings, or even what is achieved, is not always publicised. Many of the staff working at the EU, as well as the actual institutions themselves, have Facebook pages too. Again, this is another form of engagement, although it is one that is slightly more wordy

The British Media and the European Union   ­ 189

than Twitter. When examining the accounts of the personnel in the Commission, for example, it can be seen that the information is little more than a duplication of that which is given on Twitter. The assumption is clearly that the Facebook and Twitter audiences comprise different people. Then there is YouTube and Instagram, among many others. Consequently, identical stories are being released repeatedly across all of these social media outlets. Thus the facilities are in place for members of the public, from across the EU, to have access to these decision-makers, to ‘follow’ them or ‘friend’ them and find out what is going on. A cynic may argue, however, that this is little more than a veneer of interaction with the public, the vast majority of whom have little or no interest in following their national politicians, never mind those working in the EU. There appears to be something of a cyber imbalance. As will be seen in Chapter 11, with regard to public opinion, there is a considerable degree of disengagement with the EU. The vast majority of people living in the EU, for example, do not see themselves as ‘European’.12 If there is such disengagement – or even disenchantment – with the EU as an institution, then there is little chance of members of the public choosing to engage with members of that institution. Yet, at the same time, people appear willing to pick up the bad news stories about the EU. As noted earlier in this chapter, the old adage that bad news makes news holds true, and news in cyberspace is no different. Speculation is rife about the extent to which the EU interferes in everyone’s daily lives. In fairness, there is similar speculation and conjecture from EU institutions; scare stories emanate from the EU with regard to what will happen to Britain if it leaves the EU. Interestingly, those British media outlets which hold anti-EU positions are vitriolic in condemning the EU for issuing such stories. The same media outlets are strangely quiet about the bias or inaccuracy in any of the anti-EU stories.

Conclusion In theory, the role of the media is to present news to the public; an informed public is better able to discuss and debate current

­190   Britain and the European Union

events. Within the UK, this happens very rarely on the issue of the EU. The tabloid press are vociferously anti-European: nothing good can come from Brussels, unless it is a British idea that the Europeans have adopted. There is very much an ‘us’ and ‘them’ approach, one that is, in fact, highly visible throughout the Eurosceptic UK media. The broadcast media, conversely, has an obligation to be impartial. Thus, if there is a story on plans for British withdrawal from the EU, the case for withdrawal and the case against must both be covered. This balance is very important, especially given the fact that many people use broadcast news as their first port of call. It is not just the public service broadcasters – that is, all parts of the BBC – that must do this, but all broadcast outlets. It is now less the case that broadcast news is the primary source of news stories. More and more, young people are accessing alternative sources of information for their news. Most of these are internetbased. While the likes of Buzzfeed and the Huffington Post have large followings, the latter having an excellent blog, it is the random blog posts, Facebook stories and tweets that provide the source of so much news. There is no rigour whatsoever to the reporting of so many of these stories. They are often little more than unsubstantiated gossip, but presented as fact. The way in which they are presented often makes the stories appear more believable. Much of this, when focused on the EU, tends to be bad news.



What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The term ‘media’ covers many things. This includes broadcast media (television and radio), print media (newspapers and magazines) and the new media, which is internet-based. • In the UK, broadcast media has an obligation to be even-handed when reporting a story. There is no such obligation for any other media outlets, as long as they are within the bounds of the law. • The majority of the right-wing press within the UK is anti-European. • The EU is actively attempting to engage with the various forms of new media. There are issues surrounding the success of such engagement.

The British Media and the European Union   ­ 191



Glossary of Key Terms Agenda-setting  This is where the media tries to set the political agenda for politicians or governments. The process is carried out by broadcasting or printing a series of stories in an attempt to provoke a government response. Europeanisation  This can be seen as being part of the process of integration, whereby European ideas are spread across all member states. Yet it is a complicated term, with many interpretations. It can be perceived as the EU telling everyone what to do; alternatively, it can be about the institutions of the EU learning from the member states or encouraging thinking about the EU in a positive or negative manner. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)  The ENP focuses upon helping countries which are geographically close to Europe, and enabling them to benefit from the EU. Due to their lack of economic (and political and social) development, these countries are unlikely to be able to join the EU in the near future. Framing  When the media ‘frames’ a story, it presents it in a particular light. This may influence the readers or viewers into thinking similar thoughts about that story. Priming  In this circumstance, the media tries to set a benchmark or a context on a particular story, by which its readers or viewers can then pass judgement. Such a benchmark or context is established over a long period of time. The judgement by the viewer or listener is measured against the backdrop of the media’s benchmarking.

? Likely examination questions Why is the British right-wing tabloid press so opposed to EU membership? The issue of the EU is almost always presented in a negative light. How may such a position be reversed?



Helpful websites There are many media-related websites, some which focus on the role the media plays. See, for example, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/ en/independent-study-indicators-media-pluralism, the homepage of the Media Pluralism Monitor of the EU. To access the Twitter accounts of members of the Commission or European Parliament, follow this link: http://europa.eu/contact/ social-networks/index_en.htm#n:0|i:|e:|t:|s:

­192   Britain and the European Union To ‘friend’ the European Parliament on Facebook, see https://www. facebook.com/europeanparliament?fref=ts. See also the official website of the European Union: http://europa.eu/ index_en.htm. Websites of media outlets include (this is by no means an exhaustive list): www.bbc.co.uk (BBC), www.channel4.com (Channel 4), www. news.sky.com (Sky television home page), www.newsmediauk.org (a directory of British national and local newspapers, as well as many other resources).



Suggestions for further reading A lot has been written about the role of the media in politics, but there has been significantly less coverage of this topic with regard to the EU. There are a number of excellent articles on Britain and the EU, most notably B. Hawkins (2012), ‘Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 561–77 and A. Gamble (2012), ‘Better Off Out? Britain and Europe’ Political Quarterly vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 468–77. There are also some interesting articles on European media: H. Boomgaarden, C. de Vreese, A. Schuck, R. Azrout, M. Elenbaas, J. van Spanje and R. Vliegenthart (2013), ‘Across Time and Space: Explaining Variation in News Coverage of the European Union’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 608–29 and J. Maier and B. Rittberger (2008), ‘Shifting Europe’s Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU’ European Union Politics vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 243–67. For sources that focus specifically on the media, consider A. Chadwick and J. Stanyer (2011), ‘The Changing News Media Environment’ in R. Heffernan, P. Cowley and C. Hay (eds), Developments in British Politics Nine (Palgrave) pp. 215–37 and V. Gibbons (2010), ‘Public Perceptions of the Media’s Reporting of Politics’ Parliamentary Affairs vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 369–76.

CHAPTER 11

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union Contents British public opinion on the European Union 194 Pressure groups and the European Union 199 How do pressure groups lobby the European Union? 202 Public opinion across the European Union 205 Turnout for European Parliamentary elections 211 Conclusion214

Overview There are many reasons why Britain has been perceived to be ‘reluctant’ about participating fully and enthusiastically in the European Union. One has been public opinion. British public opinion on the issue of Europe has fluctuated from one of relative enthusiasm to one of outright hostility. The one time the British public was asked about EEC membership, however, a comfortable majority in favour was returned. More than forty years on, there is greater demand than ever for another referendum. What is also interesting is that many other countries within the EU have also returned less than favourable opinion polls about membership – and some countries have even had referendum defeats on European issues. Yet for some reason it is the British public that is portrayed as being reluctant about participating in the EU, and even opposed to EU membership altogether. What is also interesting is that the British public appear to be among the least wellinformed of all EU citizens.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • • • • •

British public opinion on the European Union Pressure group activity in Britain on the issue of Europe How pressure groups are able to lobby the European Union Public opinion on the European Union from other member states Turnout for the elections to the European Parliament

­194   Britain and the European Union

British public opinion on the European Union What is interesting to note about British public opinion is that so very little appears to be known about Europe. In the media – and in particular the tabloid newspapers – the portrayal of Europeans is often derogatory, as was seen in the previous chapter. Anything about Germany, for example, is likely to allude to World War II and even football matches between England and Germany still make reference to 1966 (when England beat West Germany to win the World Cup) and the war. This is anything but helpful in trying to move on and to nurture any form of positive relationship with our European counterparts. The lack of knowledge about Europe and the European Union is not new. A survey was carried out in 1971, before Britain joined the EEC. Members of the public were asked to name the member states of the Common Market. By using the term ‘Common Market’ there was no hint as to what countries might be involved. The answers are detailed in Table 11.1.1While it was promising to see that the majority of those surveyed could indeed name most of the six member states at that time, it was somewhat more disconcerting to see some of the other responses, including South Africa and Israel. France, West Germany and Belgium were the most correctly identified member states. Unsurprisingly, Luxembourg was identified correctly by less than half of the respondents. This could be attributed to the size and prominence of the country. This poll was repeated after Britain had joined the EEC, which produced some interesting results. As can be seen in Table 11.2, most Britons were more than capable of identifying British membership of the EEC, and that of France and West Germany. Ireland, which joined at the same time as Britain, is not very well identified. Non-EEC states continued to be identified as members of the Common Market.2 Since joining the then EEC, the British public has been subject to the Eurobarometer survey. This takes snapshots of public opinion on a range of issues linked to Europe, with the same or similar questions being asked of the British and European public. Apart from these surveys, British public opinion has only been tested once on

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 195

Table 11.1  Survey of members of the Common Market (1971) Identify the members of the Common Market (%) France

91

West Germany

77

Belgium

72

Holland

64

Italy

57

Luxembourg

43

Switzerland

21

Norway

17

America

 7

South Africa

 4

Russia

 4

Israel

 2

Table 11.2  Survey of members of the Common Market (1974, 1975) Identify the members of the Common Market (%)

1974

1975

France

94

95

West Germany

78

85

Ireland

45

65

UK

91

94

America

 6

 6

South Africa

 3

 3

Russia

 3

 2

­196   Britain and the European Union

Table 11.3  UK referendum on EEC membership (6 June 1975)

Votes cast

Percentage of votes

Yes

17,375,309

67.2

No

 8,480,805

32.8

Turnout: 64.5 per cent

the issue of European membership. This was in the referendum in June 1975. The referendum, which was touched upon in an historical context in Chapter 2, was fought beyond party lines. Thus, there was no official party guidance from the major parties on how votes should be cast. The general public were given booklets explaining both the case for and the case against continued membership of the EEC, as well as the government’s position on renegotiating the terms of entry. The result of the referendum is detailed in Table 11.3. Should David Cameron hold a referendum on renegotiated terms of entry in 2017, it will be interesting to see if he follows the precedent set in 1975 for informing the public about their choices. The 1975 referendum result returned a convincing result in favour of membership. This was something of a surprise, as opinion polls at that time had predicted a much closer result, and some even forecast a ‘No’ vote. Since the referendum, there has been much talk as to the extent of British dislike of Europe. Much of this consists of possibly apocryphal tales, often exacerbated by stories in the media of Brussels banning bent cucumbers or bent bananas (see also Table 10.1). Yet these stories have a knock-on effect. Eurobarometer surveys suggest that people seem to believe there is more than a grain of truth in these tales. In the Executive Summary of the National Report on the UK (2002), it was noted: ‘The UK generally has a low level of interest in the European Union which is not aided by their television viewing habits and the editorial attitude of some of the more widely

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 197

read papers.’3 Subsequent reports on Britain have not made such an overt observation about the biases within the British print media (see Table 10.1 for examples of tabloid scaremongering). This rather pessimistic perspective on British interest in the EU is reinforced in many Eurobarometer surveys. Some of the questions and responses are presented in Tables 11.4 and 11.5.4,5 What they demonstrate quite clearly is a rather Eurosceptical public. As evidenced in Tables 11.4 and 11.5, Eurobarometer has found that more people in Britain think EU membership is a bad thing rather than a good thing. Since 2011, the gap between those who are in favour of membership and those who are against it has decreased sharply. Interestingly, the numbers of respondents who are unsure, citing neither good nor bad, has remained largely static at around a third of all respondents. The ‘don’t knows’ have been similarly static. This Euroscepticism is even more clear in Table 11.4, which asks about the level of trust that people have in the EU. In 2011, almost three-quarters of all respondents in the UK said they did not trust the EU. While distrust in the EU has dropped, so has trust, with the numbers responding ‘don’t know’ clearly on the rise.

Table 11.4  Is the UK’s membership of the EU a good thing? Year

Good thing

Bad thing

Neither

Don’t know

2014

30

32

35

3

2013

22

39

36

3

2012

17

48

33

2

2011

13

49

35

3

2010

29

33

31

7

2009

30

30

34

6

2008

32

30

31

7

­198   Britain and the European Union

Table 11.5  How much trust do you have in the European Union? Year

Trust

Don’t trust

Don’t know

2014

16

61

23

2013

19

67

14

2012

20

69

11

2011

17

73

10

2010

20

64

16

2009

23

62

15

2008

25

57

18

The degree of Euroscepticism in the UK was also highlighted in a YouGov poll carried out in February 2012. In brief, ‘there was a substantial majority of voters who thought the EU was, on balance, a bad thing for Britain, but a clear majority still favoured Britain being in the EU’.6 The problem for Britain is that there appears to be an apathetic acceptance of membership. The desire for withdrawal is not strong but the willingness to participate in the EU appears even smaller. It is the apparent ambivalence of people towards the EU that is most surprising. Bearing in mind that Britain joined the organisation over forty years ago, you would expect there to be more enthusiasm. Some of this can be attributed to the endless dripping of vitriol by the Eurosceptic tabloid press. It might be interesting (or frightening, depending upon your perspective) to rerun the opinion poll to name the member states of the EU. With twenty-eight members, it is unlikely that the average person in the street would be able to name all of them. Eurobarometer polls do ask if Switzerland is a member of the EU, to which a small percentage of UK respondents answer in the affirmative (and there are more ‘don’t knows’). This is still far fewer than

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 199

the poll cited in Table 11.1. If people were to be asked if the United States, Israel and South Africa were member states, the suspicion is that a similar number of people would answer in the affirmative as in the polls prior to membership.

Pressure groups and the European Union Where we might expect to see more informed activity on the issue of Europe is in pressure groups. What is often interesting here is the extent to which the information being peddled by these organisations is accurate. Regardless as to the veracity of the information, those involved in pressure group activity tend to be people who have a keen interest in the subject – either in support of, or against, whatever aspect of Europe is being discussed. Within Britain, what is of note is that the anti-European pressure groups are both more numerous and more active than the proEuropean groups (see Table 11.6, although the lists are by no means exhaustive). Many of these groups operate quite happily without prominent connections to specific politicians or political parties. Some groups feel it may harm their reputation to be too closely connected with either a political party or particular MPs. Across all the different pressure groups, those which are less enthusiastic about Europe appear more likely to have some connections with MPs, former MPs or members of the House of Lords. One such group is the Campaign for an Independent Britain. It should be noted that in Table 11.6 a very crude distinction has been made about these pressure groups. If they stand on any sort of anti-EU platform, then they are listed as anti-EU, although it could be possible for a group to be against joining the euro but still in favour of EU membership. Bill Cash (MP for Stone) once made such a complaint about being pro- or anti-European on the issue of the Treaty on European Union: We are told that the choice is between accepting Maastricht [Treaty on European Union] or repudiating the European Community as a whole. To be anti-Maastricht is said to be anti-European. This is an insular argument, which assumes that the only question for the British is whether they should be in or out … Any argument based on this unreal alternative is untenable and anti-Community.7

­200   Britain and the European Union

Table 11.6  Pro- and anti-EU pressure groups in the United Kingdom Pro-EU pressure groups

Anti-EU pressure groups

•  British Influence

•  British Weights and Measures Association

•  Business for Europe

•  Bruges Group

•  Centre for European Reform •  Business for Sterling •  Conservative Europe Group

•  Campaign Against Euro-Federalism

• Eurofound

•  Campaign for an Independent Britain

•  European Atlantic Group

•  Conservatives Against a Federal Europe

•  European Movement

•  Democracy Movement

•  Pro Europa

•  Free Britain

•  The Federal Trust

•  Free Europe

•  Yes 2 Europe

•  Freedom Association •  Global Britain •  Labour Euro-Safeguards Campaign •  Magna Carta Society •  New Alliance •  Open Europe •  Save British Fish • The European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements •  Youth for a Free Europe

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 201

Those organisations listed under the anti-EU label cover a wide range of issues. For example, the British Weights and Measures Association (BWMA) simply wants Britain to retain the imperial forms of measurement (miles, yards, pints, ounces, and so on) rather than being compelled to move to metrification (metres, kilometres, kilograms, litres, and so on). As a result of joining the EEC, metrification can be forced on the British people through the need to standardise systems across all of the member states. The BWMA will do whatever it can to resist such a move. The BWMA is very much a single-issue organisation; other antiEuropean groups focus far more on a broad range of issues. The Bruges Group and the Campaign for an Independent Britain have a far broader remit on the issue of Britain and the EU. The Bruges Group was established in 1989 after a speech made by the then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, to the College of Europe in Bruges (see Table 5.1), in which she pointed out that Britain had ‘rolled back the frontiers of the State’ and that she did not want them reimposed at a European level. Thus, the Bruges Group campaigns for less state/EU involvement in British affairs; ultimately running a campaign against the establishment of a European state and keen for Britain to disengage from the EU. Its members include Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative MP and former party leader), Daniel Hannan (Conservative MEP), John Redwood (Conservative MP), Frank Field (Labour MP), Lord Lamont (Conservative peer) and Nigel Farage (UKIP MEP and party leader). The Campaign for an Independent Britain has a broader appeal than the Bruges Group. Although the Bruges Group does contain supporters who are not members of the Conservative Party, the vast majority of prominent members do belong to the party. The Campaign for an Independent Britain does not have such close ties to a particular party. It was formed in 1976 as the Safeguard Britain Campaign, changing to the British Anti-Common Market Campaign in 1983 before adopting its current moniker in 1989. It is considered to be one of the groups to the forefront of the campaign to get Britain to withdraw from the EU. Patrons of the group include Lord Stoddard (a former Labour peer) and Lord Lamont. Some of the MPs who are members include Kate Hoey (Labour), Andrew Rosindell (Conservative) and Duncan Carswell (UKIP).

­202   Britain and the European Union

A more pro-European group is British Interest. Its aim is to keep the UK in a reformed EU. Britain benefits from being in the EU economically, socially and culturally, according to British Interest. It has a number of high-profile supporters within Parliament, most notably the three co-presidents: Douglas Alexander (former Liberal Democrat MP), Ken Clarke (Conservative MP) and Lord Mandelson (Labour peer). On the more EU-enthusiastic side, there is the European Movement. As with the anti-EU groups mentioned above, the European Movement is a cross-party organisation. More accurately, it is a pan-European movement. It was founded in 1948 (and chaired by Sir Winston Churchill) with the aim of preventing further war in Europe. The British branch (called the European Movement – UK) was formed a year later. Within the European Movement – UK, there are prominent politicians including Kenneth Clarke (Conservative MP), Lord Kinnock (Labour peer) and the late Charles Kennedy (former Liberal Democrat MP and party leader). The organisation provides a lot of information about the positive aspects of membership, including a section entitled ‘What has Europe ever done for us?’ as well as a list of other pro-European organisations.

How do pressure groups lobby the European Union? When thinking about pressure groups, most people tend to focus on domestic politics and how pressure groups access central government or local government. Yet more and more pressure groups are shifting their focus to the EU. It could be argued that within the EU, the role of pressure groups has to some extent become institutionalised. Within the structures of the EU, there is a specific body that encompasses pressure groups – the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) (see Chapter 3); and the British membership of the ECSC is detailed in Table 11.7. One drawback here is that national governments select the membership for their national delegation. Thus it is likely that delegates in the EESC are considered ‘acceptable’ to their national governments. A further drawback is that the EESC is an advisory body. Although it has expertise and is likely to be consulted, there is no obligation on other EU institutions to follow its advice.

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 203

Table 11.7  British pressure group delegates in the European Economic and Social Committee (October 2010 to September 2015) Member

Organisation

Richard Adams

Consultant in social, environmental and ethical business and project development

Rose D’Sa

Consultant in EU, Commonwealth and International Law/ Consultant in legal education/distance learning

Stuart Etherington

Chief Executive National Council for Voluntary Organisations

Lynne Faulkner

Chartered Fellow, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development; CBI Employment Tribunal Member, UK Ministry of Justice

Tom Jones

Vice-president of the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA); Trustee of the Community Foundation in Wales

Jane Morrice

Vice-president of the ESC; Deputy Chief Equality Commissioner – Northern Ireland; Consultant specialising in communications and international exchange of experience initiatives

Maureen O’Neill Director, Faith in Older People; Member of the Scottish Social Services Council; Member of the Lay Committee of the Royal College of Physicians Michael Smyth

Adviser to the Northern Ireland Assembly; Chairman of Habinteg Housing Association

For all the many pressure groups excluded from the EESC, other points of access to the EU are required. The reality is that a pressure group will target either the Commission or the European Parliament. It is pointless to lobby the Council of Ministers, as this is an intergovernmental body. It would be far easier for a pressure group to lobby its own national government in the hope of those government

­204   Britain and the European Union

­ inisters influencing the Council of Ministers, than for a pressure m group to lobby the Council of Ministers directly. An interesting thing is the extent of pressure group activity in the EU. There are hundreds upon hundreds of organisations that are recognised by the Commission as having particular knowledge, specialisation or contribution.8 These groups are listed in the Commission’s own database.9 This is, again, almost a case of institutionalised lobbying. Yet it appears to work. The Commission actively encourages such pressure group activity. Many of these groups have huge resources and a degree of specialisation that may be lacking within the formal EU institutions. Many of them are also conglomerations of national pressure groups. Added to this is what has been termed ‘the professionalization of interest groups in the European Union’.10 It must be noted, however, that the professionalisation of lobbying does not guarantee a positive outcome for those utilising the lobbyists.11 With the range of different groups in operation, cross-national links are often established. An example of such links can be seen in trade unions. In Britain, for example, there is the TUC (Trades Union Congress). This body could lobby the EU on a range of matters related to the welfare of employees. It helps that a third of Economic and Social Committee members represent workers’ organisations. As part of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), however, they have a far more powerful collective voice. Such ­‘sectional’ groups are much more effective in their ­lobbying than ‘cause’ groups, that is groups about a s­pecific  interest or concern.  These sectional groups have the resources and infrastructure that are lacking in most cause groups.12 The Lloyds Banking Group, for example, spent close to €2 million on lobbying in 2013–14, and a similar amount was spent by Rolls Royce plc.13 Many pressure groups also set up offices in Brussels. This is not dissimilar to the actions of the different tiers of subnational government in the UK which have done the same (see Chapter 8). It basically means that a permanent office is on hand to respond to any given issues or concerns that may arise. With the amount of money being spent on lobbying, an office in Brussels is essential. Thereafter, the lobbying processes are not too dissimilar as in national politics. The key difference is that the focus tends to be upon the Commission rather than the politicians.

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 205

Public opinion across the European Union With public opinion in the UK being somewhat less than enthusiastic about the EU, it is little wonder that Britain retains the label of ‘reluctant European’. When compared with public opinion in other EU member states, however, some of this is a myth that should be questioned. In polls over the last three years, it is quite clear to see that the EU does not have a positive image in a number of EU states. The average across all twenty-eight member states does not surpass 40 per cent in this time period. Yet, rather surprisingly, over half of all member states have a more positive than negative image of the EU. In fact, in 2014, only four member states had a more negative than positive image: Austria, Cyprus, Greece and the UK. Yet the picture is further complicated by those adopting a neutral position. This is the strongest image in many member states. Earlier in this chapter, when looking at British public opinion, the degree of apathy towards the EU was noted. This seems to apply to many countries within the EU. Over half of the respondents in Latvia, for example, had a neutral image of the EU in all three years, as can be seen in Table 11.8.14 The outlook on the EU is further complicated when examining the future of the EU. As noted in Table 11.9,15 the outlook on the future of the EU is more optimistic than pessimistic, and levels of optimism are growing. In 2014, only three member states  – Greece, Italy and Cyprus – recorded a pessimistic outlook  on the future of the  EU, down from eight in 2012. Member states which are ­normally  perceived as being Eurosceptic, for example Denmark and the UK, returned mixed responses. In 2014, the UK was more optimistic than pessimistic, which was a huge turnaround from two years prior. The Danes, on the other hand, returned over  70 per cent  optimism  across all three years. They were surpassed by the Irish, Maltese and Romanians in optimistic outlooks in 2014. In the countries which have been hit worst by the global financial crisis – the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) – you would expect there to be a degree of antipathy towards the EU. This is definitely the case in Greece (and Cyprus). Yet in the other

26

32

56

33

25

21

34

29

22

37

31

18

29

36

Bulgaria

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

positive  

 

Belgium



 

Austria

Country

31

40

33

43

32

45

55

47

43

31

37

28

37

40

neutral  

2012

31

30

49

25

29

32

15

18

35

44

29

13

30

34

negative  

 

40

35

16

34

31

23

34

34

24

17

37

49

37

25

positive  



35

43

29

42

34

50

55

47

42

29

43

34

37

41

neutral  

2013

26

20

54

23

33

27

10

18

33

54

20

14

26

34

negative  

 

53

40

25

38

41

35

45

39

37

24

42

51

42

31

positive  



29

42

32

41

35

48

46

42

40

37

38

30

35

32

neutral  

2014

16

18

44

20

23

17

 7

18

22

38

19

18

22

36

negative

Table 11.8  In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? (percentages, excluding those who responded ‘don’t know’)

34

28

38

36

37

32

40

19

42

36

28

23

28

17

30

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Netherlands

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

UK

EU average

39

33

40

40

42

42

39

31

48

37

36

37

51

54

38

29

48

32

35

29

21

15

40

10

30

23

26

 8

17

26

31

22

31

26

31

30

43

22

45

31

41

40

38

29

26

39

36

42

42

41

43

41

37

43

37

43

40

50

56

38

28

39

27

29

28

25

13

39

10

32

14

20

10

14

34

39

30

40

31

38

39

59

38

61

37

47

51

50

37

34

37

35

38

46

44

42

29

35

32

37

44

32

43

51

35

22

32

22

21

17

19

 9

25

 6

26

 8

16

 6

11

28

–

36

42

72

61

56

44

55

27

Cyprus

Czech

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

64

Bulgaria

Croatia

53

Belgium

Optimistic  

 

48



 

Austria

Country

2012

71

41

52

43

36

25

56

59

–

27

46

46

Pessimistic  

 

2013

29

60

40

58

66

75

48

29

62

60

64

47

Optimistic  



69

34

56

40

30

22

50

66

35

29

35

46

Pessimistic  

 

2014

38

59

50

66

71

73

58

40

67

61

61

54

Optimistic  



Table 11.9  Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU? (percentages, excluding those who responded ‘don’t know’)

60

33

47

32

24

25

40

54

31

29

38

40

Pessimistic

38

58

45

57

65

58

60

61

66

28

61

55

50

48

51

38

50

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Netherlands

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

UK

EU average

45

56

47

45

48

42

33

64

26

38

28

41

28

39

47

35

57

51

45

59

48

54

57

63

31

66

61

67

63

66

59

40

67

46

43

48

39

46

43

42

31

64

25

37

23

35

28

38

52

28

49

56

49

66

53

60

60

74

51

74

68

75

67

73

65

45

78

55

37

42

33

40

36

37

20

44

17

31

17

30

22

31

47

17

40

­210   Britain and the European Union

countries, there is more positivity about the EU, and a surprisingly optimistic outlook. What is also of note is the degree of positivity and optimism across the newer member states, that is, those who have joined since 2004. In this time period, the membership has almost doubled. The ten countries that joined in 2004 have been members for over a decade. There might be an expectation of the gloss of membership being tarnished, but it is not that clear cut. While the levels of ‘neutral’ feelings, as listed in Table 11.7, are quite high, they are not out of kilter with other member states. Surprisingly, the positive feelings outweigh the negative in most ‘new’ member states, and the outlook is very optimistic. It is also interesting to note the returns on various referenda on European issues. Table 11.10 gives the results from a variety of referenda held in EC/EU member states. Those included are just a sample. It is interesting to note that both Denmark and Ireland have returned ‘No’ votes in specific referenda and have been compelled to hold them again. What is of note is that four of these referenda have returned ‘No’ votes – Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, Ireland on the Treaty of Nice, and France and the Netherlands on the draft EU constitution (and this excludes the two Norwegian rejections of membership). Both Denmark and Ireland were compelled to hold their respective referenda a second time, with the Commission instructing the Irish to ‘get the right result’. No such pressure was brought to bear on the French or the Dutch. This may be a consequence of two member states returning negative votes on the same issue. Many of the votes have been very close affairs – most notably the French ‘Yes’ and Danish ‘No’ votes for the Treaty on European Union. Conversely, Spanish enthusiasm for the draft constitution was surprisingly high. Even with all these ‘No’ votes on European issues from a number of member states – including two founder members – the European project marches on. It has been suggested by some cynics that the EU refuses to accept any negative votes, and that it will continue to re-run any referendum until a ‘Yes’ vote is achieved. It is hardly surprising that enthusiasm for the EU struggles to stay above the 50 per cent level.

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 211

Table 11.10  Referenda results on EU issues Issue

  State

  Date

  Yes (%)   No (%)

2 June 1992 18 May 1993 20 September 1992

49 57 51

51 43 49

Ireland

7 June 2001 19 October 2002

46 63

54 37

Euro

Sweden

14 September 2003

43

57

Draft constitution

Spain France Netherlands Luxembourg

20 February 2005 29 May 2005 1 June 2005 10 July 2005

77 45 38 57

23 55 62 43

Enlargement

Ireland Norway Denmark Austria Finland Sweden Norway Malta Slovenia Hungary Lithuania Slovakia Poland Czech Rep. Estonia Latvia Croatia

10 May 1972 25 September 1972 2 October 1972 12 June 1994 16 October 1994 13 November 1994 28 November 1994 8 March 2003 23 March 2003 12 April 2003 10–11 May 2003 16–17 May 2003 7–8 June 2003 13–14 June 2003 14 September 2003 20 September 2003 22 January 2012

83 47 63 67 57 53 48 54 90 84 90 93 78 77 67 67 66

17 53 37 33 43 47 52 46 10 16 10  7 22 23 33 33 34

Treaty on European Union

Denmark

Treaty of Nice

France

Turnout for European Parliamentary elections It has often been suggested that the real enthusiasm, or rather lack of it, can be seen in the turnout for elections to the European

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Parliament. These elections were first held in June 1979, and have been held on a fixed five-year term ever since. In 2014, the elections were moved to May. The reason for this was the appointment of the new commission. Elections could then be carried out by the incoming Parliament for a new President of the Commission. A country which has always had an exceptionally good turnout for its elections to the European Parliament is Belgium. Every single election has had a turnout of over 90 per cent. The reason for this is that there is compulsory voting in Belgium. Other countries with high turnouts include Italy (despite a significant drop over the years), Luxembourg and Malta. The country which has always been criticised for having the poorest turnout for the elections to the European Parliament is the UK. This is not always the case, as can be seen in Table 11.11. However, it has languished near the bottom of the turnout table in every election, at least until 2004. In four of the five elections between 1979 and 1999, the UK was the country with the lowest turnout – the exception was in 1994 when it was third from bottom. In 1994, both Portugal and the Netherlands had turnouts below that of the UK, although only marginally so. In 2004, the UK recorded its highest turnout for elections to the European Parliament (38.9 per cent). The mantle of poorest turnout has been taken over by Slovakia, with turnouts below 20 per cent. Overall in 2004, the average turnout for the EU fell to an all-time low of 44.2 per cent. This has largely been attributed to the poor turnouts in many of the new member states who joined in 2004. While Malta and Cyprus both recorded very high turnouts, none of the East European countries broke the 50 per cent turnout barrier. In the subsequent two elections, turnout has plateaued at 43 per cent. Of the new East European states, only Latvia has recorded a level of turnout above 50 per cent (once). Only Lithuania and Estonia have had turnouts above 40 per cent. In 2004, the reasons given for the poor turnouts in the new East European member states were to do with dissatisfaction with the EU. There had been a perception that the EU was going to pour monies into these states in order to build up their economies and their agricultural sectors in particular. These expectations had not been met.

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 213

Table 11.11  Turnout for elections to the European Parliament (UK turnout in italics, lowest turnout in bold) Country Belgium France (West) Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Denmark Ireland UK Greece* Portugal** Spain** Austria**** Finland**** Sweden*** Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia Bulgaria***** Romania***** Croatia EU average

  1979   1984   1989   1994   1999   2004   2009   2014 91.6 60.7 65.7 85.5 88.9 57.8 47.1 63.6 31.6 78.6 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 63.0

92.2 56.7 56.8 83.9 87.0 50.5 52.3 47.6 32.6 77.2 72.2 68.9 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 61.0

90.7 48.7 62.4 81.5 87.4 47.2 46.1 68.3 36.2 79.9 51.1 54.8 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 58.5

90.7 52.7 60.0 74.8 88.5 36.0 52.9 44.0 36.4 71.2 35.5 59.1 67.7 60.3 41.6 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 56.8

90.0 47.0 45.2 70.8 85.8 29.9 50.4 50.5 24.0 70.2 40.4 64.4 49.0 30.1 38.3 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 49.4

90.8 42.8 43.0 73.1 90.0 39.3 47.9 59.7 38.9 63.4 38.6 45.1 42.4 39.4 37.8 71.2 28.3 26.8 38.5 41.3 48.4 82.4 20.9 17.0 28.3 28.6 29.5 – 44.2

90.4 40.6 43.3 65.1 90.8 36.8 59.5 58.6 34.7 52.6 36.8 44.9 46.0 38.6 45.5 59.4 28.2 43.9 36.3 53.7 21.0 78.8 24.5 19.6 28.4 39.0 27.8 – 43.0

– no elections to the European Parliament as the country was not a member of the organisation * election was held in 1981 ** election was held in 1987 *** election was held in 1995 **** election was held in 1996 *****election was held in 2007

90.0 43.5 47.9 60.0 90.0 37.0 56.4 51.6 34.2 58.2 34.5 45.9 45.7 40.9 48.8 44.0 19.5 36.4 28.9 30.0 44.9 74.8 22.7 13.0 21.0 35.5 32.2 25.1 43.1

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In fact, there was a high degree of disillusionment with the EU across the new member states. This disillusionment was not, however, necessarily a result of EU actions. These countries sold the idea of membership to their respective populations based on the idea that the EU was going to be some sort of cash cow. They did nothing to suggest otherwise and there was little or no attempt by the governments to dampen down expectations. Those who opposed EU membership, and who suggested the expectations of funding were little more than a pipe dream, were dismissed. In retrospect, those forecasters of doom and gloom appeared to be more in touch with reality than the campaigners for joining the EU. This antipathy to the EU has remained. With largely neutral feelings about the future of the EU, and very low electoral turnout to the European Parliamentary elections, there lies an underlying question of why the East European countries joined. Clearly it is more to do with the economic benefits than the political participation.

Conclusion What seems to be apparent across much of the EU is that the public is not overly enthusiastic about Europe. The ‘No’ votes for the draft EU constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 appeared symptomatic of disillusionment. Since then, the disillusionment has increased. It could be seen in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, where anti-EU and Eurosceptic candidates fared better than ever before. The turnout to these elections is now bumping along in the low 40 per cent bracket. This, however, masks wide discrepancies, with Belgium and Luxembourg recording 90 per cent turnouts, and Slovakia just 13 per cent. This malaise and negativity about the EU does not just apply to Britain – it appears to exist across all member states. Yet there is still optimism about the future of the EU – even within Britain. What has been of note is the engagement with the EU by pressure groups and lobbyists. It is apparent that many pressure groups now target the EU with professional lobbyists rather than focusing on lobbying at the national level. There is a degree of openness with regard to such lobbying, with lists of lobbyists freely available. There appears to be something of a disjuncture. The EU is clearly

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 215

seen as being important, but there is a degree of disengagement with much of the public across the whole EU. The EU needs to find ways in which to reconnect with the public. There had been plans to do this through the Constitution Treaty, but this was defeated. The new Commission, in particular, needs to concentrate on this re-engagement. Perhaps the railroading of the process of integration needs to be slowed down considerably, if not stopped, to enable some form of re-engagement to commence. This is not about seeing the EU through rose-tinted glasses; rather, it is about creating an awareness of what the EU can do and has done – both the successes and the failures. Without such re-engagement, the EU could easily founder as a result of the disconnect that appears to exist between the organisation and the public.



What you should have learnt from reading this chapter • The British public is not overly enthusiastic about EU membership and is unclear as to the extent that Britain benefits from EU membership. • The degree of knowledge in the UK about the EU is very low. • Most other EU states are somewhat more enthusiastic about EU membership, although the newer member states are already raising concerns. • Turnouts for elections to the European Parliament have been decreasing from one election to the next. The UK is among the member states with the lowest turnout.



Glossary of key terms Common Market  A term used to describe the original European Economic Community. There was always the suggestion of a single market in name if not in deed. Compulsory voting  Some countries, such as Belgium, require all voters to cast their ballot in an election. Failure to do so can result in a fine or even incarceration. Economic and Social Committee  An unelected body which draws in people from different aspects of economic and social life: employers, employees and pressure groups. It is a consultative body and its opinions are not binding.

­216   Britain and the European Union Turnout  The percentage of the voting population which casts (or spoils) its ballot on polling day.

? Likely examination questions ‘There is no real demand in Britain to leave the European Union, but there is no enthusiasm for staying either.’ Evaluate this statement. Electoral turnout for European Parliamentary elections in the UK is very low. What can be done to turn this around? Is there any enthusiasm for the European project in any member state?



Helpful websites Type the name of any pressure group into Google and you should be able to access its website. Some of the key groups are: The Campaign for an Independent Britain – www.bullen.demon.co.uk The Bruges Group – www.brugesgroup.com The European Movement – UK – www.euromove.org.uk Eurobarometer surveys can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/ public_opinion/index_en.htm A database of consultative bodies and civil society organisations can be found at europa.eu.int/comm./civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm. The European Trade Union Confederation web page is at www.etuc. org/. There is also another list of lobbyists which can be accessed at lobbyfacts.eu/ The European Economic and Social Committee can be found at http:// www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.home



Suggestions for further reading On pressure groups and the European Union, see J. Greenwood (2003), Interest Representation in the European Union (Palgrave); R. Pedler (ed.) (2002), European Union Lobbying: Changes in the Arena (Palgrave); A. Rasmussen, B. Carroll and D. Lowery (2014), ‘Representatives of the Public? Public Opinion and Interest Group Activity’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 250–68; J. Greenwood and J. Dreger (2013), ‘The Transparency Register: A European Vanguard of Strong Lobby Regulation?’ Interest Groups and Advocacy vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 139–62; and M. Vannoni (2013), ‘The Determinants of Direct Corporate Lobbying in the EU: A Multi-dimensional Proxy of Corporate Lobbying’ Interest Groups and Advocacy vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 71–90.

Reluctant Europeans – Public Opinion on the European Union   ­ 217

On the referendum of 1975, see D. Butler and U. Kitzinger (1976), The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan). With regard to public opinion, there are a number of sources. For premembership, see R. Jowell and G. Hoinville (eds) (1976), Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961–75 (Croom Helm). More recent sources include S. Carey and J. Burton (2004), ‘Research Note: the Influence of the Press in Shaping Public Opinion towards the European Union in Britain’ Political Studies vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 623–40 and A. Gamble (2012), ‘Better Off Out? Britain and Europe’ Political Quarterly vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 468–77.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’? Contents What is a ‘reluctant European’? The case for Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ The case against Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ Are any other EU members ‘reluctant Europeans’? Conclusion – If Britain is not reluctant, then how can the relationship be labelled?

219 220 225 227 229

Overview This book has repeatedly referred to the idea of Britain being labelled a ‘reluctant European’. The country was ‘reluctant’ for refusing to join in the 1950s and has been ‘reluctant’ ever since it did actually join. Yet how appropriate is this label? The problem is that the phrase ‘reluctant European’ means different things to different people. It may well be that the phrase is wholly inappropriate to describe Britain’s relationship with the European Union in the twenty-first century. Even the phrase ‘awkward partner’ may not be especially useful. There are deep divisions within British politics over the issue of Europe. It is somewhat inaccurate to describe the British as being, collectively, ‘reluctant Europeans’. To do so drowns out the Euro enthusiasts across the country. The negative aspects of EU membership are always highlighted in the media; the positives tend to be ignored. Perhaps this is why Britain is still considered to be the ‘reluctant European’.

Key issues to be covered in this chapter • • • •

What is a ‘reluctant European’? Why Britain might still be perceived to be a ‘reluctant European’ The case against Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ Are any other EU states ‘reluctant Europeans’?

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 219

What is a ‘reluctant European’? Chapter 2 introduced the issue of how to define a ‘reluctant European’; see also Box 12.1.1 What became apparent was that there are several different types of reluctant European. In different contexts, Britain could be considered as being ‘reluctant’, depending upon the definition being utilised. For example, countries that do not wish to apply for membership or that have turned down membership could easily be considered as ‘reluctant Europeans’. This would encompass countries such as Norway and Switzerland. Under such a definition of ‘reluctant European’ Britain could only be considered as such from the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) until the first application for membership in 1961. Thereafter, with Britain applying for membership repeatedly, and then joining the Box 12.1  What is a ‘reluctant European’? Europe is ‘the source of deep divisions within parties. This is because although England has always been a part of Europe and is deeply European in its culture, its language, its institutions, its religion and its politics, the national identity first of England, and then of Great Britain and the United Kingdom, has generally been formed in opposition to “Europe”, or at least to some suitably frightening manifestation of Europe. It has often been convenient to make Europe the “Other” against which the peculiar qualities of Englishness and Britishness are defined. One of the “Metric Martyrs” (small shopkeepers fined in 2001 for refusing to introduce metric weights and measures in their shops) declared after the court hearing: “I am British; I am not European”, as though the one necessarily excluded the other. The belief that they could be, and should be, exclusive still fuels political debate.’ ‘There were several reasons for Britain’s reputation for awkwardness: domestic political constraints on the positions that British Government’s could adopt; the real problems for the British economy in adjusting to membership, especially the problem of Britain’s contributions to the common budget; an awkwardness on the part of British negotiators in handling the terminology of political debate that had developed amongst the original members; and an instinct of many leading political figures to look first to the United States for partnership.’

­220   Britain and the European Union

European Economic Community (EEC), it does not conform to such a narrow definition of ‘reluctant European’ – and has not conformed to such a definition for over fifty years. An alternative extreme of Europe is to go far beyond simply the EU and its forebear. This definition of Europe would encompass organisations such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). These are all ‘European’ organisations (although NATO also includes some non-European members such as the USA and Canada). Britain has participated in such organisations – and continues to participate in those to which it is eligible for membership. This idea of Europe goes far beyond EU membership. Some EU members, such as Ireland, are not members of NATO. Other European countries (for example Switzerland) do not belong to any of them. It could be argued that by not participating in these European organisations a country is indeed a ‘reluctant European’. Ireland’s policy of neutrality means that the Irish Government will not join a military organisation such as NATO. Arguably, by not joining in this collective defence pact for Europe, the Irish are ‘reluctant Europeans’. These two extremes – of not joining the EU and of not joining other (non-EU) European organisations – are both very narrow. The reality is that the term ‘reluctant European’, while it could be applied to these extremes, is now more readily applied to the way in which European states participate in the EU. There are a range of different things to consider when utilising the label ‘reluctant European’. Is the focus upon signing treaties and the extent to which member states commit themselves to these treaties? Alternatively, it could be about the extent to which member states implement regulations and directives issued by the EU. A third approach could be about the way in which member states’ representatives conduct themselves at EU summits or at meetings of the Council of Ministers.

The case for Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ There are many reasons as to why Britain is still labelled the ‘reluctant European’. As noted earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2 the

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 221

historical arguments still apply. Britain refused to join the ECSC and the EEC, for many valid reasons. The knock-on effect, however, was that Britain had no input into the formative years of the organisation. As a result, when it did eventually join, the modus operandi of the organisation was significantly different to the way in which politics operated in Britain. The consequence of this was that successive British prime ministers found themselves at odds with, or even isolated from, the rest of the organisation. Thus, Britain seemed to be a reluctant partner. A clear example of this was Margaret Thatcher and Britain’s budgetary contributions. Thatcher argued that Britain paid too much into the budget and too much of the budget was spent on agriculture. Thus, she demanded that Britain receive a rebate to enable monies to be directed to aspects of the British economy in far greater need of support than agriculture. Yet there is an argument that the whole idea behind the EEC was to enable the more agrarian economies to benefit from the more industrialised ones. From a more cynical perspective, the original EEC was established to enable French farmers to benefit from the post-war West German industrial miracle. Now this was probably appropriate in the 1950 and the 1960s (in the early days of the EEC). It was probably less appropriate by the 1980s, and is even less so today. This was how the EEC was originally structured – and Britain, as a non-member, has no input into this policy area. Thus Margaret Thatcher argued that Britain needed a budget rebate as recompense for the excessive emphasis placed upon agriculture. Of course this budget rebate – or chèque britannique as described by the French – has become something of a bone of contention. Subsequent British governments have refused to renegotiate this rebate, claiming it as a right. This intransigence over the rebate leaves the image of the British as reluctant Europeans. What makes Britain’s situation rather worse within the EU is the extent of non-EU relations. Most EU member states have some form of relationship with states outside the EU. The French have their former colonies, as do the Belgians, Dutch, Italians, Portuguese and Spanish. The Poles have a close relationship with the Ukraine. All the former communist states have some form of relationship with modern-day Russia, although for many of them the adjective

­222   Britain and the European Union

‘­lukewarm’ would be appropriate. For Britain, it is far more complicated. There is the Commonwealth (which has members from every continent) and the ‘special relationship’ with the USA; see Box 12.2.2 It is the latter that makes Europe suspicious of British motives. It seems that whenever there is a crisis, Britain takes its lead from the United States rather than from the EU. In the 1960s, when Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent failed, it was to the USA that Britain turned for a replacement. Britain’s Skybolt missiles were replaced with the American Polaris missiles, which were, in turn, replaced by Trident. Whenever there is trouble in the Middle East – be it over Suez, Israel, Iraq or Iran – Britain looks to the United States for guidance rather than to Europe. It was not surprising that the former French president Charles de Gaulle refused British entry into the EEC because he felt Britain was a Trojan horse by which the USA could interfere in European affairs. With the way in which Tony Blair was willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with George W. Box 12.2  Europe or America? ‘While it remains true that the choice between Europe and America for Britain can never be an exclusive one, since both European and American influence on British politics is deep and lasting, there is a question of priority for the future, and whether, if the United States continues its pursuit of American primacy, the long-established commitment by the British state to its strategic alliance with the United States will be sustainable. This policy appeared to reach breaking point at the time of the Iraq war, and it raised doubts as to whether any future British government would be able to support the United States in the way the Blair Government has managed to do … Growing criticism of the policy of the United States highlighted the importance of Europe as an alternative pole to the United States in the world order. In a multi-polar world the EU will have a central place, and it is for this reason that the EU continues to grow in importance in British politics … The Blair Government is in any case wedded to the idea of Britain as a bridge between Europe and America, and Ministers have constantly asserted the importance of Britain being at the heart of Europe.’

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 223

Bush over the invasion of Iraq, it could easily be argued that little has changed, likewise when one considers Cameron’s enthusiasm to lead the way in Syria (which was defeated in Parliament). Hence, Britain is reluctant to be a member of the EU. One consistent theme behind Britain as a ‘reluctant European’ has been the way in which successive British governments have complained about membership and organised opt-outs from different policy areas. The Heath Government negotiated the terms of entry, but these were then renegotiated by Harold Wilson’s government – much to the consternation of the EEC. The results were then put to a national referendum. At this stage, it could have been argued that Britain might actually commit itself more wholeheartedly to the European project. It was not to be. Thatcher wanted ‘our money back’. She was accused of ‘handbagging’ her European partners. Added to this, she resisted any moves to develop a social platform within the EEC or to permit the free movement of people around Europe. She also negotiated the British rebate in 1984. This rebate – which was to redress the excessive spending on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – has become a ‘sacred cow’ for Britain. No government is willing to surrender this rebate. To do so would be political suicide, risking the wrath of the British tabloid press. In 2006, however, Tony Blair signalled a willingness to see the British rebate reduced, although not by a significant amount. Thatcher’s successor, John Major, negotiated opt-outs at the Maastricht Summit where the Treaty on European Union was drawn up. These opt-outs were the final step of the process to the single currency, as well as the Social Chapter of the treaty. The opt-out of signing up to the single currency has been maintained by all successive governments. The coalition government stated that it would not be revisited during the lifetime of that Parliament (that is, until after the 2015 general election), and the new Conservative government will not change this position prior to the 2020 general election. All of this suggests that Britain is still not fully committed to the European project. Another area where British reluctance has been perceived is over the proposed EU constitution. The Blair Government promised a referendum on the proposal but then reneged on its promise. Arguably, the ‘No’ votes in France and the Netherlands left the

­224   Britain and the European Union

proposed constitution dead in the water, although this did not stop Luxembourg from holding a referendum. With the EU Constitution Treaty effectively blocked, the new Lisbon Treaty was presented as an alternative. Surprisingly, there was no referendum – or even the promise of one – in the UK, as there was a belief that the treaty would be defeated. Subsequent to this, all British political parties have committed themselves to holding a referendum on any new EU treaties. British reluctance, however, appears to have plumbed new depths, with David Cameron demanding the right to negotiate Britain’s terms of entry. These will be put to a straight ‘In-Out’ referendum in 2017. Cameron has refused to consider the idea that the other EU member states are not interested in such a renegotiation. If it applies only to British membership, then there will be no EU member states supporting such a position. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has made it very clear that none of the foundations of the EU – and that most definitely includes the free movement of people – are up for renegotiation. This has effectively scuppered Cameron’s position. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Cameron has ignored Merkel, and continues to argue that he can renegotiate Britain’s terms of entry. He has travelled the length and breadth of the EU, drumming up support for his renegotiation since gaining re-election in 2015. Yet there is support within the UK not only for a referendum on EU membership, but also for Britain to leave the EU – the so-called Brexit. UKIP, and in particular its leader, Nigel Farage, has tapped into this sentiment. Farage has been able to portray the Cameron plan of renegotiating the terms of entry and putting those to a referendum in 2017 as ‘pie in the sky’. Farage wants an immediate ‘In-Out’ referendum – and there is a lot of support for this position. Farage’s position became stronger when it transpired that the renegotiations would not be finished prior to the referendum, and that therefore the referendum will be based on the promise of reform. Admittedly, the likelihood of Farage getting his way is probably as low as that of David Cameron being able to renegotiate the terms of entry. Yet it is the sentiment into which Farage has tapped that needs to be addressed. Until that is done, or at least a politician other than Nick Clegg attempts to do so, then the issue will continue to fester. It is not an issue of paramount importance. Rather, it is one which

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 225

lies beneath the surface – a very important secondary issue. Until the concerns over EU membership are addressed, this reluctance to continue in the EU will remain. A final aspect where Britain is most clearly seen as a ‘reluctant European’ is in the British media – particularly the tabloid press, as noted in Chapter 10. All the British tabloids, and most of the quality dailies, are far from supportive of EU membership. It is not only the newspaper headlines, as noted in Table 10.1, but also the fabricated stories such as renaming Bombay mix, or even plots to scrap Britain, as noted in Table 10.1. The tabloid press is vitriolic in its sentiment against Europe, even bordering on the xenophobic. These papers influence public opinion about Europe (see Chapter 11). As long as this remains the position of the tabloids then Britain will remain the ‘reluctant European’. Regardless as to which definition is used, Britain is a ‘reluctant European’. Its refusal to join in the early years was followed by complaints and opt-outs after membership. Successive British governments have dragged their heels over a range of different policy initiatives. It could even be argued that Britain’s reluctance has held back the development of the EU as a whole.

The case against Britain being a ‘reluctant European’ While the case for Britain still being labelled a ‘reluctant European’ is relatively straightforward, the case against may appear less clear cut, but it is no less compelling. The issue of Britain complaining about various EU policies is not necessarily about outright opposition to them but rather that the British Government would like them to be thought out more carefully. In some respects, Britain can be seen as being at the forefront of the development of the EU. Successive British governments have been the most enthusiastic supporters of enlargement. Britain, for example, has been one of the strongest supporters of Turkish membership. The argument is that the benefits of EU membership should not be felt by a small minority of states. Rather, they should be extended to any state which meets the criteria to join. Thus, for the British Government, as long as Turkey (or any other applicant

­226   Britain and the European Union

state) meets the acquis communautaire then it should be eligible to join. It is interesting to note that other member states, including some of the founder members, are far less enthusiastic about widening membership. This position of being supportive of broadening the EU is not an isolated example of how Britain has played a key role in EU development. In particular, Britain’s previous prime ministers have attempted to move Britain closer to the centre of the EU. This was phenomenally difficult for John Major. The Conservative Party was split over the issue of Europe prior to him taking over as party leader  – and remains so even today. Yet as prime minister, John Major played a key role in moulding the Treaty on European Union and will be remembered for negotiating the opt-outs for Britain. Yet he ought also to be remembered for the development of the European ombudsman system, as well as the concept of subsidiarity. While these concepts may seem relatively unknown to the British public, the ombudsman system has introduced a greater degree of accountability in the Union. Arguably, it can be seen as a small step in combating the idea of a democratic deficit. Similarly, Major saw subsidiarity as taking some of the powers away from the central EU and returning them to national governments – again, part of the fight against a democratic deficit. Other member states saw subsidiarity as possibly taking powers away from either the EU or central governments and returning them to regional or local governments (whichever was the most appropriate tier). This perspective applied to Britain, post-devolution. Tony Blair, upon becoming prime minister, immediately signed the country up to the Social Charter (thus renouncing one of the opt-outs that John Major had negotiated). This was completed at the Treaty of Amsterdam. Furthermore, Blair was keen to enlarge the EU and to develop its international role. There was thus a high degree of enthusiasm for the European Rapid Reaction Force. Blair saw this as an organisation which would work alongside NATO rather than supplanting it. It would provide the EU with a small military role – most likely as peacekeepers – in any regional conflicts near to, or within, Europe. The Blair Government was also eager to reform some of the  common policies of the EU. Some of this was touched upon

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 227

in Chapter four but is worthy of brief mention again. Paramount for Britain was – and still is – reform of the CAP and the budget. The two areas go hand in hand – reform of one is dependent upon reform of the other. Blair wanted to see European finances utilised in a far better manner. For him, this meant less spending on agriculture and more on development and encouraging enterprise. Blair gained a commitment from Jacques Chirac (French President at the time) to reform the CAP in return for Britain conceding part of the rebate. David Cameron has also been active on the European front. While he has appeared almost Thatcherite in his interactions with the EU, this is not to say that he is not committed to British membership. Cameron would like very much to streamline the EU institutions. He envisages a need for significant reform. For example, he believes that there is far too much regulation issued from Brussels. This has a negative impact upon British (and European) businesses and enterprise. A reduction may enable British and EU businesses to grow. Thus Cameron envisages a much ‘smaller’ EU in terms of imposing its will on all member states, with significant powers being repatriated to member state governments. Thus, in sum, all of this goes to show the British are not ‘reluctant Europeans’. It is important to acknowledge that there are problems, but Britain is not alone in experiencing them. At times, Britain is capable of being a constructive and keen member of the EU. It may even be the case that other EU partners are actually more worthy of the ‘reluctant’ label.

Are any other EU members ‘reluctant Europeans’? It is possible to argue that almost every member state could be considered to be a ‘reluctant European’. The eight East European states who joined in 2004 complained they were being deprived of their rightful subsidies via the CAP and the structural funds when they found them being phased in over a ten-year period. It got so bad in Poland, for example, that the people elected anti-EU parties in the elections to the European Parliament only one month after joining. Added to this, Cyprus has already dug in its heels over the proposed Turkish membership. Bear in mind that in a national referendum

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on the reunification of Cyprus (after Cyprus had joined the EU), it was the Greek side of the island that voted ‘No’, and not the Turkish side. The Danes, the Irish, the Dutch and the French have all at one time or another voted against the EU in national referenda (see Table 11.10). The Danes took two attempts to ratify the Treaty on European Union; the Irish also took two attempts to ratify the Treaty of Nice. Both the Dutch and the French voted against the proposed EU constitution. Each of those votes slowed down or prevented the further development of the organisation. Yet, for some reason, none of them were labelled ‘reluctant Europeans’. This can be taken further with any proposed reforms to the EU. Whether these are institutional or policy-based, there is an outcry from some member states. Even simple issues such as a reduction in milk subsidies saw some member states negotiating preferential treatment to delay the reduction for themselves. The culprits? France, Ireland and Spain. Some proposed reforms have been agreed, but these did not take effect until 2014. This was the year in which all the states that joined in 2004 became eligible for 100 per cent of their subsidies via the CAP, structural funds and others. Unsurprisingly, this caused consternation among the newer member states. All round, it is a case of national interest being placed ahead of the collective EU interest. For countries such as France, reform of the common policies or the budget should not be examined in isolation. The British rebate, or chèque britannique, is a huge problem. The British economy is now more than strong enough to cope without the rebate. Thus, from a French position (although France is not alone here), no substantial reform of the CAP or the budget will commence until the British rebate has ended. This was eventually agreed by Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair. Reforms can take place as Britain has yielded part of the chèque britannique. The list of examples of member states acting in a manner that does not befit committed European partners could go on and on. Every member state will have been guilty of such actions but Britain is the only member to be tarred with the label ‘reluctant European’. It may well be the case that such a label is no longer appropriate. It is also interesting to note how the rise of UKIP has been seen

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 229

as a clear sign of British Euroscepticism, if not actual reluctance to be in the EU – particularly after the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. Yet this is not exclusively a British issue. In France, Marine Le Pen’s Front National ‘won’. In other member states, antiEuropean candidates won seats, most notably in Greece but also in Germany.

Conclusion – if Britain is not reluctant, then how can the relationship be labelled? The problem is that if the British Government questions any proposals from the EU, the immediate response is that Britain is being reluctant. Yet this reluctance may actually serve the EU well, especially if the proposed policies have been poorly thought out. Being able to question a proposal is not necessarily being reluctant; it may simply be exercising caution or being careful. Such an approach is more often than not healthy for a democracy. Bearing in mind the fact that the EU is often accused of suffering from a democratic deficit, such caution may actually be entirely appropriate. The problem for Britain in particular is that any member state that appears to be dragging its feet over EU policies is going to be condemned for doing so. Successive British Governments (but especially those under the Thatcher premiership) appeared to do whatever they could to slow down the integration processes, if not the entire development of the EU. Other countries may have shared British misgivings, but none did so as vocally as the British Government. It was as if the British Government was a lightning rod for dissatisfaction. Consequently, the label ‘reluctant European’ may have been appropriate. The issue around the concept of ‘reluctant European’ can be seen in Box 12.3.3 Yet even allowing for Thatcherite scepticism of the European project, the desire to leave the EU is not that strong. The extremes of British politics – on both left and right – advocate withdrawal. While there is growing support for the likes of UKIP, with its advocacy of withdrawal, the reality is that most British people accept the fact of membership, although it is an apathetic acceptance, and perhaps a reluctant one. There are, however, key concerns over Britain’s membership of the organisation and the organisation per se. One major

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Box 12.3  Is Britain really reluctant? On the one hand, the claim is made that Britain is a ‘good European’, implementing EU legislation and actively working with and through EU institutions; on the other hand, there is the persistent suggestion that Britain cannot be dictated to by the EU and should both challenge and thwart the ‘threat’ posed by Brussels. These differences serve to generate highly contentious politics around the growing influence of the EU in the everyday life of the UK.

problem is regarding the speed of EU integration. Yet what should be asked is whether it is reluctance or merely caution. There is a growing sentiment that the EU is going too far, and definitely too quickly, down an integrationist route. Most Britons would like the process to slow down. There is a fear that the body could disintegrate if all members are forced into some sort of United States of Europe. And Britain is not alone in expressing such sentiment – although only Britain’s voice seems to be heard. This is not reluctance about the European project, but simply caution. The process should be more evolutionary than revolutionary. People need to get used to the current developments within the EU before moving on to the next. This was evident over the proposed EU constitution treaty. The French and Dutch ‘No’ votes should have struck a note of caution within the EU, especially when coupled with some of the member states who then refused to hold their proposed referendums on this issue – Britain and Poland. In the decade since the referendum defeats, many in power within the EU are oblivious to the growing scepticism across Europe. At the 2014 elections to the European Parliament, Eurosceptic parties came first in Britain, France and Greece. Whether these parties won because of their Eurosceptic perspectives or thanks to a backlash against immigration or austerity is immaterial. These should be warning signs that there is a degree of discontent. Perhaps we should stop talking about the ‘reluctant European’ or even the awkward partner. There are positive aspects to Britain’s relationship with the EU as well as negative ones, as is the case for all EU member states. Britain, however, appears to be the member state

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 231

that suggests to the EU that the integrationist programme needs to be slowed down. This is not a sign of reluctance. In the future, a British Government may go down this path, with the support of the British population, but this will not happen for some time. There needs to be a note of caution, and this seems to be provided by Britain. Britain is not a ‘reluctant European’. A far better way to describe the relationship may be that Britain is a ‘cautious European’. The problem, however, is that Britain is not always being cautious about Europe-related issues. Within the Cameron-led coalition government, despite the Liberal Democrats being the coalition partners, there was a significant Eurosceptic edge, and this has sharpened since the Conservatives’ 2015 election victory. In many respects, David Cameron appears to model his approach to Europe on that of Margaret Thatcher rather than John Major. Whereas Thatcher was capable of handbagging eleven other member states, Cameron now deals with twenty-seven. In this respect, Cameron’s approach has seen the idea of Britain as a reluctant European being reinforced, and to the extent that there is speculation about Britain sleepwalking into withdrawal from the EU.

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What should you have learnt from reading this chapter • The phrase ‘reluctant European’ can have more than one definition. It might be applied to a country not wanting to join the EU or to a member state that does not participate fully in the EU. • Britain has been the country branded with the label ‘reluctant European’, yet the actions of other member states have been such that they are just as worthy of the label. • The positive aspects of British membership are rarely highlighted in the media. • The label ‘reluctant European’ may no longer be appropriate for Britain. Phrases such as the ‘cautious European’ may be far more appropriate.

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Glossary of key terms Acquis communautaire  This is the packet of treaties and legislation which has already been passed by the EU that any new member states must accept as part of joining the EU.

­232   Britain and the European Union Democratic deficit  This is a difficult term to explain, although at a basic level it suggests a lack of democracy. This could be because there is little or no electoral accountability, or that there is a lack of transparency in the decision-making process – which again suggests a lack of accountability to the people. European Economic Community (EEC)  This organisation was set up in 1957 to integrate further the economies of the ECSC members beyond simply coal and steel. The Treaty of Rome (now known as the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union) is the founding document. European Free Trade Association (EFTA)  This was a body set up to counteract the EEC. The emphasis was upon free trade, particularly in industrial goods. There was to be no surrender of sovereignty North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)  This was a defence pact signed by West European and North American states in 1948. Originally its aim was to protect Western Europe from a possible Soviet invasion. With the demise of the Soviet Union, many East European states have joined NATO. It now acts as an international peacekeeper. Ombudsman  The ombudsman investigates maladministration – policies that have been implemented badly, poorly or inappropriately. The system acknowledges that people need an avenue for complaint in such circumstances. Opt-out  An opt-out can be negotiated by any member state with regard to a policy that may adversely affect national interests. For example, the UK, Denmark and Sweden opted out of joining the euro. Rapid Reaction Force  The Rapid Reaction Force is the EU’s military response unit. It comes under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Reluctant European  This is a phrase used to describe the lack of British commitment to the EU. Britain was considered a reluctant European by not joining the original European Coal and Steel Community when it was formed. When Britain did eventually join, the label remained because Britain did not appear committed to developing the European project. It is a little surprising that only Britain appears worthy of such a label. Subsidiarity  This is the process of devolving decision-making down to the most appropriate tier of government. At its most basic level, the aim of subsidiarity is to take decision-making away from the EU and return it to national governments. Some aspects of subsidiarity could see decisionmaking being devolved to regional or local government.

? Likely examination questions ‘Britain is no longer the reluctant European.’ Discuss. Britain looks to both the USA and the EU to assist in solving global problems. In doing so, successive British Governments have upset our

Conclusion – Is Britain Still the ‘Reluctant European’?   ­ 233

European partners. How could future British Governments resolve this situation? ‘Britain’s future would be best served outside of the EU.’ Discuss.

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Helpful websites The website Free Britain at www.freebritain.co.uk gives a comprehensive overview of all Eurosceptic websites. The Foreign Policy Centre also has a number of articles on Britain and the EU at www.fpc.org.uk/topics/europe. See also the Independence Britain webpages at www.independence.org. uk

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Suggestions for further reading When looking for literature on the reluctant European, consider A. Gamble (2003), Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Palgrave); W. Cash (1992), Europe: The Crunch (Duckworth); C. Cocker (1992), ‘Britain and the New World Order: the Special Relationship in the 1990s’ International Affairs vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 407–21; N. Copsey (2015), Rethinking the European Union (Palgrave); J. FitzGibbon (2013), ‘Citizens against Europe? Civil Society and Eurosceptic Protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 105–21; A. Gamble (2012), ‘Better Off Out? Britain and Europe’ Political Quarterly vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 468–77; D. Stevens (2013), ‘Issue Evolution in Britain: the Debate on European Union Integration, 1964–2010’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 536–57; and, from a broader European perspective, M. Lubbers and P. Scheepers (2010), ‘Divergent Trends of Euroscepticism in Countries and Regions of the European Union’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 787–817 and S. Usherwood and N. Startin (2013), ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 1–16.

References

Chapter 1  1. C. Cocker (1992), ‘Britain and the New World Order: the Special Relationship in the 1990s’ International Affairs vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 407–21. 2. L. Robins (1992), ‘Britain and the European Community: Twenty Years of Not Knowing’ in B. Jones and L. Robins (eds), Two Decades in British Politics (Manchester University Press), p. 243.

Chapter 2   1. S. Burgess and G. Edwards (1988), ‘The Six Plus One: British Policymaking and the Question of European Economic Integration, 1955’ International Affairs vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 393–413.  2. For an excellent overview of the entire negotiation process, see U. Kitzinger (1973), Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market (Thames and Hudson).

Chapter 3   1. D. Dinan (2013), ‘The Post-Lisbon European Council Presidency: An Interim Assessment’ West European Politics vol. 36, no. 6, p. 1260.   2. A. Kreppel (2013), ‘Legislative Implications of the Lisbon Treaty: The (Potential) Role of Ideology’ West European Politics vol. 36, no. 6, pp. 1178–98.  3. See S. Hagaman and B. Høyland (2010), ‘Bicameral Politics in the European Union’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 811–33.  4. www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/atyourservice/infosheet.faces  5. www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&refer ence=A7-2013-0022&format=XML&language=EN   6. See C. Hönnige and D. Panke (2013), ‘The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee: How Influential are Consultative Committees in the European Union?’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 452–71.

References   ­ 235

Chapter 4  1. http://cap-payments.defra.gov.uk/Search.aspx  2. P. Lowe, H. Buller and N. Ward (2002), ‘Setting the Next Agenda? British and French Approaches to the Second Pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy’ Journal of Rural Studies vol. 18, p. 4.  3. The Guardian, 8 August 2013.   4. See S. Khalilian, R. Froese, A. Proelss and T. Requate (2010), ‘Designed for Failure: A Critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union’ Marine Policy vol. 34, pp. 1178–82.   5. D. Symes (2012), ‘Regionalising the Common Fisheries Policy: Context, Content and Controversy’ Maritime Studies vol. 11, no. 6, p. 5.  6. europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/overview  7. See C. Bickerton, B. Irondelle and A. Menon (2011), ‘Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 1–21.

Chapter 5   1. A. Favell and V. Guiraudon (2011), ‘Sociology of the European Union: An Introduction’ in A. Favell and V. Guiraudon (eds), Sociology of the European Union (Palgrave), pp. 1–24.   2. C. Radaelli (2000), ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change’ European Integration online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 8, p. 1. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm   3. C. Radaelli (2000), ‘Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change’ European Integration online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 8. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm  4. Source: www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332  5. www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332  6. S. Bulmer and M. Burch (2005), ‘The Europeanization of UK Government: From Quiet Revolution to Explicit Step-change?’ Public Administration vol. 83, no. 4, p. 863.   7. T. Börzel and T. Risse (2000), ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 15. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm  8. Ibid.

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 9. T. Börzel (2002), ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, no. 2, p. 196 10. Ibid., pp. 193–214. 11. T. Börzel and T. Risse (2000), ‘When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’ European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, no. 15. Available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm 12. P. Sack (2013), ‘The Midas Touch: Gold-plating of EU Employment Directives in UK Law’ Institute of Directors Policy Paper, Institute of Directors, p. 4. 13. J. McCormick (2014), Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction (Palgrave, 6th edition). 14. Developed from B. Rosamund (2003), ‘The Europeanization of British Politics’ in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, R. Heffernan and G. Peele (eds), Developments in British Politics 7 (Palgrave), pp. 39–59. 15. T. Börzel and T. Risse (2012), ‘From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction’ West European Politics vol. 35, no. 1, p. 5.

Chapter 6  1. Developed from www.results-elections2014.eu/en/seats-group-mem ber-2014.html

Chapter 7  1. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/ chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm  2. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10325218/ Turkey-will-probably-never-be-EU-member.html  3. S. Nello (2005), The European Union: Economics, Policies and History (McGraw-Hill), p. 382.

Chapter 8  1. www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commonsselect/european-scrutiny-committee/membership  2. www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select /eu-select-committee-

References   ­ 237

 3. For more information, go to www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliament arybusiness/CurrentCommittees/66516.aspx#sthash.1kr1ZIlr.dpuf  4. www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/International/Europe/BilateralRelations/Nordic-Baltic-Policy  5. www.seupb.eu/programmes2007-2013/peaceiiiprogramme/overview. aspx

Chapter 9   1. Jones, A. (1994), ‘Parties, ideologies and issues: the case of the European Community’ in Robins, L., Blackmore, H. and Pyper, R. (eds), Britain’s Changing Party System (Leicester University Press), p. 83.  2. www.independence.org.uk

Chapter 10   1. H. Boomgaarden, C. de Vreese, A. Schuck, R. Azrout, M. Elenbaas, J. van Spanje and R. Vliegenthart (2013), ‘Across Time and Space: Explaining Variation in News Coverage of the European Union’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 608–29.   2. See J. Maier and B. Rittberger (2008), ‘Shifting Europe’s Boundaries: Mass Media, Public Opinion and the Enlargement of the EU’ European Union Politics vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 243–67; D. Scheufele and D. Tewksbury (2007), ‘Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: the Evolution of Three Media Effects Models’ Journal of Communication vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 9–20.  3. B. Hawkins (2012), ‘Nation, Separation and Threat: an Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 561–77.  4. A. Gamble (2012), ‘Better Off Out? Britain and Europe’ Political Quarterly vol. 83, no. 3, p. 469.  5. See P. Kratochíl, P. Cibulková and N. Beník (2011), ‘The EU as a “Framing Actor”: Reflections on Media Debates about EU Foreign Policy’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 391–412.   6. S. Carey and J. Burton (2004), ‘Research Note: The Influence of the Press in Shaping Public Opinion towards the European Union in Britain’ Political Studies vol. 52, no. 3, p. 638.   7. Ibid., p. 638.

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  8. J. Peter, H. Semetko and C. de Vreese (2003), ‘EU Politics on Television News: a Cross-National Comparative Study’ European Union Politics vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 305–27.   9. Ibid., p. 310. 10. Ibid., pp. 305–27. 11. Ibid., pp. 305–27; H. Boomgaarden, C. de Vreese, A. Schuck, R. Azrout, M. Elenbaas, J. van Spanje and R. Vliegenthart (2013), ‘Across Time and Space: Explaining Variation in News Coverage of the European Union’ European Journal of Political Research vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 608–29. 12. N. Copsey (2015), Rethinking the European Union (Palgrave), p. 50.

Chapter 11   1. Developed from a Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) poll cited in B. Hedges (1976), ‘The Final Four Years: From Opposition to Endorsement’ in R. Jowell and G. Hoinville (eds), Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961–75 (Croom Helm), p. 68.   2. Ibid., p. 68.  3. Eurobarometer ‘Special Bureaux’ (2002) EB56.3 – National Report – United Kingdom Executive summary, p. 11.  4. Source: Eurobarometer surveys.  5. Source: Eurobarometer surveys.  6. A. Gamble (2012), ‘Better Off Out? Britain and Europe’ Political Quarterly vol. 83, no. 3, p. 472.   7. W. Cash (1992), Europe: The Crunch (Duckworth), p.14.  8. See, for example, Å. Gornitzka and U. Sverdrup (2011), ‘Access of Experts: Information and EU Decision-making’ West European Politics vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 48–70.   9. See europa.eu.int/comm./civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm for the lists. 10. H. Klüver and S. Saurugger (2013), ‘Opening the Black Box: the Professionalization of Interest Groups in the European Union’ Interest Groups and Advocacy vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 185–205. 11. See, for example, H. Klüver (2012), ‘Biasing Politics? Interest Group Participation in EU Policy-Making’ West European Politics vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 1114–33. 12. Ibid., p. 1117. 13. http://lobbyfacts.eu/reports/expenditure/companies

References   ­ 239

14. Source: Eurobarometer surveys. 15. Source: Eurobarometer surveys.

Chapter 12   1. A. Gamble (2003), Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Palgrave), p. 108; S. George (1994), An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition), p. 255.   2. A. Gamble (2003), Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics (Palgrave), pp. 223–4.  3. M. Smith (2006), ‘Britain, Europe and the World’ in P. Dunleavy, R. Heffernan, P. Cowley and C. Hay (eds), Developments in British Politics 8 (Palgrave), pp. 160–1.

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Index

Note: bold indicates the term is defined acquis communautaire, 24, 31, 94, 103, 121–2, 123, 124, 134, 136, 226, 231 Advocates General, 55, 63; see also Court of Justice Blair, Tony, 7, 30, 73, 82, 86, 115, 133, 166, 167, 168, 178, 187, 222, 223, 226–7, 228 Britain/UK, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 61, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 85–6, 87, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97–8, 98–100, 101, 102, 110–12, 113, 115–16, 117, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126–8, 129, 130–1, 133–5, 136, 139–46, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 170, 171, 173, 181, 182–4, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194–202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220–7, 229–31, 232 budget, 24, 26, 40, 52, 71, 73, 99, 115, 134–5, 154, 166, 167, 219, 221, 227 Cameron, David, 8–9, 30, 40, 45–7, 73, 86, 106, 110, 115–16, 126, 127, 130, 133, 163–4, 169, 184, 186, 196, 223, 224, 227, 231 Churchill, Winston, 2, 184, 186, 202 Clegg, Nick, 2, 100, 169, 224 Cold War, 24, 31, 132 Commission, 14, 15, 22, 28, 34, 35–41, 49, 51, 52, 53, 58, 60, 62, 78–9, 80, 84, 107–8, 110–11, 117, 172, 188, 189, 203, 204, 210, 215

Committee of Permanent Representatives see COREPER Committee of Regions, 7, 20, 34, 36, 54, 55–7, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 98, 103, 114, 145–6, 152–3, 155 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 5, 15, 19, 24, 29, 67, 68–73, 77, 79, 87, 88, 89, 98, 106, 115, 134–5, 166, 172, 175, 223, 227, 228 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 70, 89 European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 70, 89 European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), 70, 71, 89, 103, 156 Common Commercial Policy, 76–80, 88, 98 Common Fisheries Policy, 67, 74–6, 87–8, 88, 98, 103, 141, 146, 148, 156, 174 Total Allowable Catch (TAC), 75, 76, 90, 174 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 21, 67, 80–3, 88, 177 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 80, 81–2, 88–9, 98 European Rapid Reaction Force/EU Force (EUFOR), 29, 81, 82, 83, 90, 226 Common Market, 2, 194, 195, 215 Commonwealth, 2, 3, 16, 222 Community preference, 69–70, 89 Competition Policy, 67, 76–80, 84, 88, 89, 98

Index   ­ 255

Conservatives/Conservative Party, 7, 16, 51, 98, 108, 133, 142, 160–4, 165, 168, 169, 171, 175, 179, 201, 202, 223, 226, 231 Conservative and Reformist Group, 51, 108, 163 consultation, 53, 54 convergence criteria, 23, 84 Copenhagen criteria, 24, 25, 31, 129, 130, 131, 134, 136; see also acquis communautaire Corbyn, Jeremy, 8, 82–3, 100, 167, 168 COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives), 34, 43, 47–8 Council of Ministers/Council of the European Union, 6, 15, 20, 34, 40, 41, 43–7, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 79, 80, 81, 113, 114, 117, 143, 144, 154, 203–4, 220; see also European Council Council of the European Union see Council of Ministers Court of First Instance/General Court, 55, 63, 79, 108, 114; see also Court of Justice Court of Justice, 14, 34, 54–5, 59, 62, 63, 108, 114; see also Court of First Instance de Gaulle, Charles, 15, 16, 17, 29, 30, 161, 179, 222 Delors, Jacques, 84, 88, 89 democratic deficit, 34, 48, 60–1, 62, 63, 226, 232 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 51, 175–7 Economic and Social Committee see European Economic and Social Committee England, 7, 145, 152, 155, 194, 219 Enlargement, 6, 11, 17, 18–19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 129–35, 211

euro/single currency, 5, 11, 20, 23, 27–8, 29, 68, 83–7, 88, 113, 124, 127, 128, 162, 167, 169, 172, 174, 177, 186, 199, 211, 218 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, 51, 172; see also United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) European Atomic Agency (Euratom), 14, 31, 35 European Central Bank (ECB), 27, 85, 87 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 48, 64, 122, 160, 164, 168, 219, 221, 232 European Community (EC), 4, 19, 20, 21, 95, 122, 160, 174, 199, 210 European Conservatives and Reformists, 51, 163 European Council, 22, 23, 34, 41–3, 44, 45, 60, 62, 64, 81, 113, 114; see also Council of Ministers European Defence Community (EDC), 5, 13, 31 European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 34, 57–8, 60, 61, 62, 63, 114, 125, 202, 203, 204, 215 European Economic Area (EEA), 28 European Economic Community (EEC), 2, 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 28, 30, 31, 35, 64, 68, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 90, 122, 124, 140, 160, 161, 164, 165, 168, 173, 193, 196, 220, 221, 222, 223, 232 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 5, 15–16, 24, 31, 220, 232 European Monetary System (EMS), 29, 84, 85, 89

­256   Britain and the European Union European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 94, 103, 132, 133, 136, 185, 191 European Parliament/European Assembly, 7, 14, 15, 17, 20, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 48–54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 108–9, 110, 114, 131, 160, 162–3, 166, 167, 168, 169–71, 172–3, 175, 176, 177, 183, 203, 211–14, 215, 227, 229, 230 assent, 53–4 co-decision maker, 20, 43, 45, 49, 53, 62, 64 co-operation procedure, 20, 53 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 26, 37, 49, 50, 51, 54, 114, 147, 163, 170, 172, 176, 177, 183, 201 European People’s Party, 49, 51, 108–9, 163 European Political Co-operation (EPC), 80, 89 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 99, 103, 146, 151, 152, 155, 156, 232 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) see Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) European Social Fund, 103, 146, 152, 153, 155, 156 European Structural and Investment Fund (ESIF), 146, 151, 154, 155, 156 European Union (EU), 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45, 47, 48, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107–110, 113–15, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121–6, 127, 129–33, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140–54, 155,

159, 163, 164, 167, 169, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182–4, 185, 186, 187, 188–9, 190, 191, 193, 196–8, 199–202, 203, 204, 205–11, 212, 213, 214–15, 218, 220–9, 230, 231, 232 Europeanisation, 6, 9, 92–102, 103, 187, 188, 191, 197, 198 Eurosceptic, 1, 8, 23, 108, 162–3, 167, 169, 190, 214, 229, 230, 231 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), 84, 85, 89–90 Farage, Nigel, 2, 100, 169, 172, 183, 201, 224; see also United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) federal/federalism, 29, 126, 140 France, 5, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 29, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 56, 73, 74, 80, 86, 95, 109, 113, 116, 124, 128, 135, 186, 187, 194, 195, 206, 208, 213, 214, 221, 223, 227, 228, 229, 230 General Court see Court of First Instance Germany/West Germany, 3, 12, 13, 14, 19, 24, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 86, 108, 109, 135, 140, 184, 186, 194, 195, 206, 208, 213, 221, 224 governance, 125, 126, 136 Greater London Assembly (GLA), 55, 145, 151 Green Party, 51, 171, 172–3 Heath, Edward, 16, 17, 18, 160, 165, 223 High Representative/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 23, 31, 40, 64, 81–2, 89, 124–5 House of Commons, 20, 142–5, 161, 161, 162, 178, 183 House of Lords, 143–4, 166, 199

Index   ­ 257

integration, 6, 9, 17, 19, 106, 107, 117, 120, 121–8, 136; see also spillover intergovernmentalism, 35, 42, 45, 48, 54, 64, 105, 112–16, 117

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 51, 167–8

Junker, Jean-Claude, 37, 38, 40, 53, 188; see also Commission

Reform Treaty see Treaty of Lisbon Regional Development Agencies, 7, 152 reluctant European, 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 28–30, 32, 126, 164, 166, 193–215, 218–31, 232 Britain as a reluctant European, 28–9, 220–5 Britain not being a reluctant European, 29–30, 225–7

Labour/Labour Party, 7, 16, 18, 51, 100, 142, 160, 161, 164–8, 169, 171, 175, 178, 185, 201, 202 Liberals/Liberal Democrats/Liberal Democrat Party, 7, 18, 51, 142, 161, 165, 168–70, 171, 175, 202, 231 London, 7, 112, 151, 152, 155 Luxembourg Compromise, 15, 20, 29, 32, 70, 90, 113, 117 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union Major, John, 21, 29, 30, 86, 114, 126, 127, 133, 162, 166, 169, 187, 223, 225, 231 Monnet, Jean, 12, 13, 14, 30, 32 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 30, 82, 112, 113, 121, 220, 226, 232 Northern Ireland, 7, 52, 145, 149–50, 154, 155, 175–8, 203 Northern Ireland Assembly, 55, 140, 145, 148, 150, 178 Ombudsman, 20, 29, 58–60, 61, 226, 232 opinion polls/public opinion, 3, 8, 170, 193, 194–9, 205–11 opt-outs, 5, 21, 22, 85, 90, 127, 128 Plaid Cymru, 51, 171, 175–6 President of the European Council, 23, 41, 42–3, 124–5, 188

qualified majority voting (QMV), 44–5, 64

Schuman Plan, 12, 31, 32 Schuman, Robert, 12, 14, 32 Scotland, 7, 76, 112, 145, 147–8, 150, 154, 155, 173, 174, 178 Scottish Government, 147, 148 Scottish Parliament, 55, 145, 147, 173 Scottish National Party (SNP), 51, 112, 147, 171, 173–4 Single European Act (SEA), 19–20, 22, 32, 53, 77, 124, 175 Sinn Féin, 51, 176, 177 Social Charter, 5, 21, 22, 113, 115, 124, 127, 162, 166, 169, 223, 226 Sovereignty, 12, 32, 45, 64, 106, 113, 115, 117, 126–7, 136, 137, 140, 156 special relationship, 2, 3, 10, 13, 16, 32; see also United States spillover, 96–7, 118, 122, 127, 136 subsidiarity, 6, 54, 114, 118, 125, 137, 226, 232 supranationalism, 6, 10, 13, 32, 35, 37, 42, 45, 48, 58, 64–5, 105, 106–12, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 137

­258   Britain and the European Union Thatcher, Margaret, 20, 29, 30, 45, 47, 85, 94, 95, 111, 126, 133, 152, 160–2, 174, 201, 221, 223, 227, 229, 231 Treaty of Amsterdam, 21, 22, 40, 81, 166, 226 Treaty of Lisbon/Reform Treaty, 21, 23, 41, 45, 81–2, 88–9, 124, 224, 232 Treaty of Nice, 21, 22, 29, 42, 57, 210, 211, 228 Treaty of Paris, 13, 31, 77, 88; see also European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty of Rome/Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 14, 15, 31, 35, 41, 53, 57, 63, 64, 68, 69, 77, 85 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 20, 21, 22, 23, 29, 32, 41, 45, 49, 53,

55, 57, 58, 63, 80, 84, 86, 88, 103, 114, 115, 124, 166, 210, 211, 223 Turkey, 6, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 162, 167, 169, 199, 225, 226, 227–8 Ulster Unionist Party, 51, 161, 175–7 unanimity/unanimous decision making, 6, 21, 44, 81, 129 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 8, 49, 51, 100, 159, 164, 169–71, 178, 201, 224, 228–9 United States/USA, 2, 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 29, 31, 32, 55, 73, 82, 83–84, 95, 195, 199, 219, 220, 222 Wales, 7, 112, 145, 148–9, 154, 155, 174, 175, 178, 203 Welsh Assembly, 55, 145, 148, 149, 175 Wilson, Harold, 4, 16, 18, 165, 223