The Politicization of the European Union. From European Governance to EU Politics 9783631902332, 9783631908365, 9783631908372

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Studies in European Integration, State and Society Edited by Zdzisław Mach and Bożena Gierat-Bieroń

Stefano Greco

The Politicization of the European Union From European Governance to EU Politics

The Maastricht Treaty remains a crossroad in the history of European integration. Since its ratification, policy areas at the core of the national sovereignties have been included in the Brussels agenda, the power balance between the European institutions has started to mutate, and the European Union affairs have progressively become a controversial issue in the public debate. The goal of the book is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the politicization of European affairs. The final aim is to assess the institutional and socio-political impact of EU politicization, detecting how the European elites could exploit the saliency gained by European affairs to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European institutions.

Stefano Greco is a Jean Monnet professor of European Union politics and founder director of the Chitkara Spaak Centre for Multidisciplinary European Studies, Chitkara University. His research activities relate to political sociology, EU politicization and European political parties.

ISBN 978-3-631-90233-2

www.peterlang.com

The Politicization of the European Union

STUDIES IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, STATE AND SOCIETY Edited by Zdzisław Mach and Bożena Gierat-Bieroń

VOLUME 17

Stefano Greco

The Politicization of the European Union From European Governance to EU Politics

Lausanne - Berlin - Bruxelles - Chennai - New York - Oxford

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

The book has been published with the support of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet programme.

ISSN 2193-2352 ISBN 978-3-631-90233-2 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-90836-5 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-90837-2 (E-PUB) DOI 10.3726/b21209 © 2023 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne Published by Peter Lang GmbH, Berlin, Deutschland [email protected] - www.peterlang.com All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems.

Contents Preface .................................................................................................. 7 Acknowledgement ............................................................................. 9 Introduction: The politicized post-​Maastricht era ..................... 11 Chapter 1. The EU in the spotlight: The politicization of the European governance ............................................................... 17 1.1. The politicization of the European integration ......................... 17 1.2. A historical perspective of the politicization of European affairs ...................................................................................... 21 1.3. The politicization of European affairs in the theories of regional integration ................................................................. 24

Chapter 2. The causes of politicization: A critical top-​ down assessment .............................................................................. 35 2.1. Political elites in the EU’s multilevel governance system ........... 36 2.2. Crisis, depoliticization and mass media ................................... 40 2.3. Euroscepticism and politicization ............................................ 45

Chapter 3. The origin of European politicization from the bottom ......................................................................................... 49 3.1. Globalization and socio-​economic inequalities ........................ 50 3.2. The emergence of the globalization-​led cleavage ...................... 52 3.3. Cultural-​demographic trends, religion and digital communication ........................................................................ 56

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Contents

Chapter 4. The consequences of the politicization of European affairs ............................................................................... 63 4.1. The side effects of the shift from EU governance to EU politics ..................................................................................... 64 4.2. The opportunities arising from the politicization of the European affairs ...................................................................... 67 4.3. The socio-​political consequences of the EU politicization ........ 70

Chapter 5. Power and legitimacy in the politicized European Union ............................................................................... 77 5.1. The political communities, the nation-​states and the post-​modern polity .................................................................. 78 5.2. The EU democratic legitimacy dilemma between collective identity and politicization ......................................... 82 5.3. Identity, politicization and the European political community . 87

Conclusion: A vision for the politicized European Union ........ 93 Bibliography ..................................................................................... 99 Index of subjects ............................................................................ 123

Preface The discussion on the European Union has moved from the Brussels bubble to mass media and interpersonal communications. Unfortunately, this shift has not been accompanied by increased societal awareness of the role and nature of the European Union. As a result, the spotlight of European Union politics is fated to create a concatenation of false beliefs and stereotypes. Populist parties and nationalism have returned to the European political scene, fomenting nostalgia and supranational immobility. Political, economic, and societal elites are struggling to create a vision for the future of European integration. Rather than imaging the finalité politique of the European project, European and national elites are taking forward the integration through crisis management. During the last decades, the advancement of European integration has not been the output of collective ideas and ideals. Differently, the supplementary powers acquired by the European institutions have been conditional to the resolution of financial, demographic, and sanitary crises that have shaken the foundations of the European institutions. For how long can European integration progress in the absence of supranational leaders and without an emotional link connecting the European elites with its citizens? This book is a humble attempt to analyze and contextualize the occurred politicization of European affairs with the contemporary socio-​political trends influencing European societies. The mission of the author is to invite academic and societal stakeholders to become active players in the intellectual rejuvenation of the integration process. People working outside the European institutions can (and should) provide advice on how the European and national elites could enhance the legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability of transnational policymaking. New ideas and ambitions are required to revive the societal enthusiasm around the integration process.

Acknowledgement The book has been published with the support of the Erasmus+ Jean Monnet programme. My gratitude goes to the Chitkara family and the colleagues that have been supportive during the preparation of this publication.

Introduction: The politicized post-​Maastricht  era Considering that democracy is still confined to the borders of the nation-​ state, European integration and European transnational institutions represent an absolute innovation in the functioning of democratic societies. Thirty years after its signature, the Maastricht Treaty remains a crossroad in the history of European integration. The establishment of the European Union, encompassing the commitment of the national politicians to enlarge the scope of European integration in political and geographical terms, represents an ongoing challenge. The Treaty is a benchmark dividing European integration history into two separate eras. Since its ratification, policy areas at the core of the national sovereignties have been included in the Brussels agenda, the power balance between the European institutions has started to mutate, and the European Union affairs have progressively become a controversial issue in the public debate. Globalization and the inexorable decline of the global influence of the European nation-​states have further contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the techno-​diplomatic model utilized in the governance of European integration. The relationship between the integration process and societal transformations is instrumental in assessing the impact of transnational politicization on the legitimacy and effectiveness of European institutions. From a sociological standpoint, the gradual shift of the societal cleavages, regulating the political life of European society, represents an additional source of instability for the integration process. Despite the resurgence of nationalist elites magnifying the visibility of ethnic identities, global civic movements are indisputably one of the most remarkable novelties of the contemporary socio-​political scenario. The gradual development of the civic post-​materialist and post-​modern movements, or the resurgence of ethnic identity politics, tends to follow a similar path around the globe. The emergence of new cleavages challenging the existence of the modern nation-​state is likely to create conflicts for issues earlier absent in the political debate. In the last decades, the European elites had to provide

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Introduction: The politicized post-​Maastricht era

political solutions despite the absence of a direct link with their citizens. The weak connection between the European elites and society has been overemphasized by a concatenation of crises that have affected the European economic, political, and social spheres. Politicization in the supranational realm represents a novelty. At the local, regional, and national levels, politicization is structured around polities and societies built over centuries. The contemporary politicization of international politics can be attributed to the intersection of the increasing societal impact of decisions taken by international institutions with the gradual erosion of the traditional concept of Westphalian sovereignty. In this regard, it is worth exploring how politicization appeared in the transnational realm. At the beginning of the century, the anti-​globalization and environmentalist movements were the first tangible trace of transnational politicization. Having an equalitarian and leftist connotation, the anti-​ globalization protest represented the first transnational political movement raising concern regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Bretton Wood institutions, questioning (and thus politicizing) the legitimacy of the transfer of sovereignties in favor of international institutions. Demanding democratic and equalitarian reforms, the movement politicized issues rarely discussed in the domestic public sphere (Zürn, 2004). In sync with the global scenario, the governance of the European Union has been increasingly subjected to public discussion and contestation. As perfectly illustrated by Vivien Schmidt (2019), the politicization of EU affairs is noticeable both at the national and supranational levels. The causes of the occurred politicization are numerous. The long-​term unintentional outputs of the economic liberal paradigm and the decisions that the societal elites have taken indirectly changed the relationship between European institutions and society. As illustrated in the following chapters, from a bottom-​up observational point, politicization occurs due to multiple socio-​economic, cultural, and demographic dynamics. Technological and political-​economic transformations deeply affected the social sphere, impacting wealth distribution and transforming ideological orientations and beliefs. At the same time, the politicization of European affairs is the output of top-​down dynamics. The inclusion of high politics in the European agenda, along with the parallel empowerment of the supranational

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institutions, have contributed to enhancing the saliency of the integration process in European society. Often the politicization of European affairs is inaccurately equated to the scepticism over a specific European policy, or mistakenly compared to political movements questioning the legitimacy of the European Union. In reality, the phenomenon is far more complex and articulated. From a historical perspective, the EU politicization is the output of a chain of historical and socio-​political events. As a concept, politicization refers to the saliency acquired in the public debate by the European integration, and to the subsequent polarization of opinions. There is an increasing presence of social and political entrepreneurs communicating on issues related to the European Union, and thereby more citizens have developed consolidated beliefs and emotions toward the European polity. Therefore, EU politicization manifests equally at the societal and institutional levels (De Wilde et al., 2016). Top-​down and bottom-​up dynamics are mutually reinforcing, creating a disaggregated and multilevel European public sphere where controversies related to European integration have become a mainstream topic of discussion. Due to the growing polarization of positions, the European public sphere became the incubator of further politicization, resulting in contestation (or support) towards the European elites and/​or policies. Thus, as a direct consequence of the politicization process, EU affairs acquired salience in the political party agenda, mass media, and interpersonal discussions. In the past years—​while political parties traditionally holding an executive position appeared to be passive actors, unarmed spectators of the post-​ Maastricht scenario—​ the Eurosceptic parties managed to become the driver of the politicization process. The societal unawareness over the functioning and competence of the EU has allowed populist politicians to create a negative fictional link between European institutions and socio-​ economic challenges that national elites have often caused. Meanwhile, despite strongly influencing the European integration process, the pro-​ European elites are failing to build (and communicate) a long-​term vision for European integration. Describing the negotiations occurring within the EU multilevel governance system, the media extensively highlights the inability of the political elites to reach a consensus and finalize compromises. In this framework, EU politicization can be observed by analyzing the

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Introduction: The politicized post-​Maastricht era

political party behavior and the transformation of political discourse. Similarly, the opinion of the citizens has become a focal point for understanding the politicization of European affairs (De Wilde et al., 2016). The politicization has also led to multiple speculations over the disintegration of the European Union. From the empirical analysis, there is no evidence of spill-​back. Conversely, the socio-​economic, geopolitical and sanitary crises led to a significant step-​up of the integration process in policy areas earlier considered exclusive national affairs, expanding the competencies of the European institutions to new domains. If we exclude Brexit, during the entire history of European integration, it has never observed a regression of competencies from the European to the national level. For political and economic reasons, the EU is far from being subjected to a process of disintegration. Nevertheless, in a politicized scenario, the EU requires a vision to improve its effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. The increased salience of the EU affairs in the European public sphere, the emergence of new societal cleavages among the European electorate, the struggle of the political leader to create a coherent narrative for the future of the EU—​or the electoral success of the populist parties—​partially represent the occurred politicization in the supranational realm. In this complex political, economic and sociological scenario, the observer must enlarge the horizon to avoid a biased comprehension of the phenomenon. In line with the complexities and interdependencies of the European multilevel governance, through an integrated interdisciplinary approach, the study of EU politicization requires the combination of multiple perspectives. The goal of the book is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the politicization of European affairs. The final aim is to assess the institutional and socio-​political impact of EU politicization, detecting how the European elites could exploit the saliency gained by European affairs to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European institutions. To achieve this goal, the first chapter provides an exhaustive normative contextualization of the EU politicization with the history and theories of European integration. The second and third chapters investigate the causes of the occurred politicization. To enhance the understanding of the multidimensional nature of the EU politicization, the causes are analyzed by separating the top-​down with the bottom-​up dynamics observed within the European

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institutions and society. The fourth chapter focuses on the consequences of EU politicization. Splitting what in the literature has been identified as threats and opportunities, the chapter analyzes the institutional and socio-​ political consequences of the politicization of the supranational realm. The last chapter is dedicated to a socio-​political study of power, identity and ideology in the European Union. From a socio-​political and economic perspective, the European identity and sociological transformations are introduced to comprehend how the democratic legitimacy issue could influence the development of the European integration process. The conclusion drafts a vision of the future of the integration process in the post-​Maastricht politicized times.

Chapter 1. The EU in the spotlight: The politicization of the European governance The politicization of European affairs is playing a significant role in shifting the EU decision-​making procedures from technocratic to political models. While in the past international institutions were marginalized in the national political agenda, today the policies promoted by intergovernmental and supranational institutions have been embedded into the public sphere. This is even more relevant in the European context, where the development of European integration has created a hybrid polity. The European Union should be considered an undefined political entity, having institutional characteristics related both to a post-​modern supranational state and a regional organization. The politicization of European affairs and the rise of identity politics influence the interactions among the EU institutions, mutating the socio-​ political dynamics behind the integration process. The long-​term impact of these transformations remains a subject matter of investigation. A theoretical excursus in the politics and sociology of the European Union is an essential preliminary step for any researcher interested in investigating the consequences of politicization on the future of European integration.

1.1. The politicization of the European integration Politicization was analyzed and studied by multiple scholars from dissimilar academic backgrounds. The multidimensional nature of politicization is reflected in different definitions and characterizations. Michael Zürn (2019, pp. 977–​978) broadly describes politicization as the act of transporting an issue into the sphere of politics, making previously unpolitical matters political. Similarly, Elmer Schattschneider (1960) associates politicization with issues having a dominant conflictual impact on the political agenda. For an articulated understanding and contextualization, politicization should be presented through the analysis of two complementary

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The Politicization of the European Union

characteristics. In the first place, politicization should be related “to activities or beliefs which ostensibly thrust into politics what was not hitherto already in politics” (Samuels, 1992, p. 311). From this perspective, the matter subject to the process of politicization represents a novelty in the political scenario, and/​or it was consciously marginalized by the political elites and ignored by the citizens. The second normative characteristic of politicization refers “to activities or beliefs which ostensibly recognize an original and continuing political element hitherto ignored and now surfaced” (Samuels, 1992, p. 312). In this case, despite the prolonged exclusion from the political agenda and public spotlight, the matter subject to a process of politicization has a pristine political nature. From these two characteristics, it can be deduced that an issue can be depoliticized until a human-​made (or a natural event) suddenly brings it into the societal discussion. Moving to the milieu of the European scenario, the relationship between European and national politics, the negotiation among the member states, and the interinstitutional relations among European institutions have acquired an unprecedented political (and divisive) nature (De Wilde, 2011). Supranational affairs are progressively becoming a mainstream topic of discussion, increasing the positive and negative emotional bonds of the citizens toward the European polity. Due to its multidimensional nature, defining politicization in the framework of the European Union is not a simple task. Although the concept has been increasingly used in literature, there is an unresolvable ambiguity related to its exact meaning and relevance (De Wilde, 2011). In the context of the integration process, politicization needs to be understood by analyzing the alteration of the power balance among political elites, and at the same time, by contextualizing the complex relationships between socio-​economic trends and societal transformations. The public sphere is not the sole dimension requiring attention. For instance, politicization is also related to the different representations of European issues on the political agenda. Likewise, the politicization of the supranational realm is also connected to the increasing saliency of the political actors and ideologies within the EU governance. To exemplify this multidimensionality, the politicization of European affairs should be associated with the extensive visibility gained by the socio-​institutional polarization of opinions, interests, and values connected

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to European integration (De Wilde, 2011). Thus, EU politicization is a composite phenomenon where top-​down and bottom-​up dynamics—​i.e., demand and supply-​based politics, social-​economic and cultural trends engaging institutional and social actors—​are combined and intertwined. In this scenario, the concept of politicization can be operationalized by assessing the historical trends related to (i) the actors engaged in the EU-​ related debate, (ii) the intellectual and vernacular divergence generated by the European institutions and integration; and (iii) assessing the prominence gained by European affairs in the public debate (De Wilde et al., 2016). In other words, the operational definition of EU politicization entails the simultaneous observation of salience and polarization of EU affairs among an enlarged pool of institutional and social stakeholders. The EU politicization is observed when a macro-​issue (or a macro-​conflict) having a European dimension gains a dominant position in the political agenda, generating socio-​political mobilizations characterized by sharp polarization of opinions. The multidimensional nature of the EU politicization is also the output of the European multilevel political system. For this reason, politicization must also be contextualized at the national level. In the domestic realm, the politicization of European affairs can be associated with the inclusion of supranational conflicts within the national socio-​political debate (Hutter & Grande, 2014, p. 1003). At the national level, the EU politicization has changed the political agenda and the nature of the party competition, creating a domino effect leading to different manifestations of polarization from the bottom. Considering the influence of the national realm, the acknowledgement of intra-​European diversity represents another central element in the theoretical interpretation of the occurred socio-​political transformations. From this angle, EU politicization should be analyzed as a non-​homogeneous phenomenon shaped by regional and national milieus. The multiple faces acquired by the EU politicization are the output of peculiar national/​regional institutional, economic, social, and cultural elements (De Wilde et al., 2016). Without a consolidated and homogenous transnational identity, different historical and cultural backgrounds tend to create fragmented landscapes where the European dimension leads to different local reactions (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Therefore, the politicization of European affairs is the sum of realities co-​existing in a

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The Politicization of the European Union

fragmented transnational public sphere. For instance, these differentiated patterns were evident during the recent asymmetric shocks agitating the EU, causing different reactions (and consequences) at the national level. In this rugged landscape, it does not seem credible to identify a single cause of European politicization. Detecting the roots of politicization requires an investigation combining top-​down analysis with a bottom-​up outlook. The investigation should reflect the multidimensional, multilevel and interdisciplinary nature of the EU politicization, originating from a web of intertwined dynamics co-​occurring at the institutional and societal levels. Consequently, the politicization of European affairs cannot be studied by restricting the analysis to a single event and dimension. Comprehending this phenomenon requires a comprehensive approach investigating the differentiated forms of politicization, combining dissimilar public manifestations, different actors involved in the process, and diverse socio-​political phenomena. Furthermore, the politicization of the EU can be fully understood only when the social origin and consequences are considered and analyzed (Zürn, 2019). Investigating the socio-​ economic fractures in European societies remains a central element in grasping the increasingly confrontational nature of European Union politics. The analysis and the assessment of new societal cleavages can be utilized as a normative tool to explain why European and national actors have instrumentally included European matters in their political agenda (Hobolt & de Vries, 2015; Zürn & De Wilde, 2016). In this framework, EU politicization can be studied by cross-​analyzing socio-​political trends with institutional developments. The analysis of societal cleavage provides an insight into the politicization process by establishing a cause-​effect relationship, allowing the contextualization of global socio-​political and economic mutations with the European integration process. This inductive process allows framing electoral volatility and citizen behavior. In addition, the sociological analysis of the EU politicization provides valuable insight into the possible future paths of European integration. More specifically, it is instrumental in estimating the evolution of the EU-​related debate in the public sphere, contextualizing the political movements emerging in post-​modern Europe, and the implications of these metamorphoses for EU governance.

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1.2. A historical perspective of the politicization of European affairs It is essential to comprehend how politicization has evolved over the years to grasp its time and space specificity. Analyzing the history of the integration process, the establishment of the European communities did not lead to the immediate state of politicization. Therefore, comprehending the politicization of the European Union implies a historical analysis of the casual dynamics beyond this phenomenon. Brigid Laffan (2019) advocates that European integration has always been political. To some extent, this corresponds to the truth. At the same time, it is important to recall Samuel’s (1992) politicization definition, highlighting how issues having a pristine political nature can be subjected to a prolonged process of depoliticization. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, following the marginalization in the mainstream political discourse and the low interest generated in the public sphere, depoliticized matters can be governed with technocratic and diplomatic tools. This is precisely what happened with European integration. Denominated as the political sleeping giant (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2007, p. 189), until the beginning of the 1990s, European integration generated little interest in the public sphere. For a long time, European integration was considered an exclusive responsibility of societal elites. The citizens had an idealistic vision of the integration process associated with the necessity to find political solutions to problems managed with military means during the earlier centuries. During those times, the European Community was described as a polity without politics (Schmidt, 2006; Zeitlin et al., 2019), operating with decision-​making mechanisms based on confidential negotiations and diplomatic etiquette. Shielded from the public spotlight, a limited group of political, economic, and societal elites could conduct (and finalize) confidential negotiations. The actors involved had adequate time and resources to detect win-​to-​win solutions. In this scenario, the success of the integration was associated with the capability of the political, economic, and social elites to agree on common standards for issues confined to the domain of low politics. Restricted to commercial and agricultural policymaking, the integration process was accountable to the national parliaments.

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The Politicization of the European Union

During these decades, citizens supported the European project due to its effectiveness. By the end of the 1980s, the mission of European integration was on the way to completion. The continent experienced the most prolonged historical period without wars, and the economy fully recovered from the war debacle. During the pre-​Maastricht time, the European Community had a marked technocratic, intergovernmental and diplomatic nature, strategically protecting the integration from political competition and contestation. Although multiple scholars (De Wilde et al., 2016; Schmidt, 2019) identify the birth of the politicization to the failed ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty, it is impossible to equate those circumstances to the contemporary scenario. Even the 1965 Empty Chair crisis—​or the cyclical tug of war between EU institutions and the member states—​does not fit within the politicization perimeter. The reason is relatively easy to be explained. These crises led to the temporary attention of media and society without creating a stable socio-​political polarization over the nature and the future of the EU. In other words, the pre-​Maastricht crises did not contribute to permanently enlarging the number of actors discussing and campaigning around European affairs. More precisely, before the establishment of the European Union, the European crises were related to (a) the functional-​ideological struggle between the intergovernmental and supranational approaches; (b) the interests of member states to preserve their sovereignty; and/​or (c) the interest of national executives to impose their will over other member states. The pre-​Maastricht time was characterized by technocratic-​diplomatic governance, where institutional and societal polarizations had extemporaneous connotations. Elites governed the integration process, and the politicization was confined to the debate on the representation of national interests in intergovernmental negotiations. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and the subsequent emergence of the European Union, represent the irreversible change of the status quo. The operationalization of the European Common Market and the start-​ up of the European Monetary Union—​along with the communitarization of domains at the heart of the member states’ sovereignty—​permanently enhanced the saliency of European integration. For the first time, the European leaders agreed to move towards a political union, assigning the European institutions responsibilities beyond traditional regulatory and

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executive duties (Council of the European Union, 2020). The European project embarked on a challenging journey, designed to build a unitary supranational political vision. This new phase—​initiated with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and continued with the constitutional amendments occurred in Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon—​has irreversibly moved the integration process into the political arena. Jeopardizing the principles of Westphalian sovereignty—​and attracting the attention of the elites and the society—​the European Union initiated its attempt to build democracy at a transnational level. As proven by the multiple referendum fiascos, the post-​ Maastricht scenario immediately unveiled a scenario where the European elites were caught in a political trap (Zeitlin et al., 2019). Dealing with the complexities of highly globalized societies, the European elites had to cope with multiple conflictual dimensions facilitated by the increasing misconceptions over the role, functioning mechanisms, and political mission of the Union. The permissive consensus era (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970)—​characterized by widespread popular support and sympathy for the European Community—​suddenly capsized into times of constraining dissensus (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). The decision to progressively build a political union has transformed the European Community—​a regional organization—​ into an innovative and hybrid transnational political system (Hix, 2005). The will to innovate and respond to new challenges with a novel transnational governance model has exposed the European elites to reverse ideological, political and societal reactions. From this perspective, the politicization of European affairs is the historical output of different and combined events (Hutter et al., 2016). Thus, the origin of politicization can be traced back to the beginning of the post-​Maastricht times (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Zürn et al., 2012). The commitment of the European leaders to operationalize the single market has generated multiple spillovers leading to the permanent politicization of European affairs. Similarly, the creation of the eurozone, and the attempt to create European policies in areas at the heart of the Westphalian sovereignties, have contributed to the polarization of public opinion. It is interesting to note how these polarizations follow an oscillating path, and how this path has changed over time. For instance, before (and in the immediate aftermath) of the Maastricht Treaty, the polarization of

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The Politicization of the European Union

opinion peaked during the EU-​related referenda. Nowadays, the scenario has completely mutated. The saliency gained by the EU politics, and the multiple pan-​European crises overshadowing the political agenda, have placed the European institutions in a permanent spotlight. Hence, the key difference with the pre-​Maastricht time is not merely related to the strategic relevance of the policies debated. Indeed, the primary mutation is associated with the impact of European issues on public opinion. In the post-​Maastricht scenario, the irreversible inclusion of European affairs in the national public spheres, and the vital nature of the issues negotiated within the complex EU decision-​making process, have radically jeopardized the techno-​diplomatic nature of the integration process.

1.3. The politicization of European affairs in the theories of regional integration Contextualizing the increased societal saliency, outreach and polarization of European affairs with the theories of regional integration is instrumental in broadening the understanding of the EU politicization process. The baseline assumption is that these schools of thought—​rather than representing opposite positions, leading to an epistemological race among scholars—​offer complementary perspectives that provide a broad insight into the integration process. Considering the galaxy of socio-​institutional actors interacting within the European multidimensional level, the critical analysis of the functionalist, intergovernmental and postfunctionalist theories is central in contextualizing the rising politicization of European affairs. As perfectly summarized by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2019, p. 2), each school identifies key political actors, suggests different paths of inquiry, and situates European integration within a broader literature. On the surface, the theories of regional integration provide a polarized theorization of the dynamics behind European integration. In reality, these theories offer different insights providing a multi-​perspective explanation of a multidimensional phenomenon. Functionalism and neofunctionalism Neofunctionalism is considered the first intellectual attempt to provide a large-​spectrum explanation of regional integration dynamics. Rather

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than portraying international relations as the struggle among opposite national interests, neofunctionalism investigates European integration focusing on the interplay between elites belonging to different social spheres. While collaborating in the framework of the regional organization, neofunctionalism assumes that the elites share the common interest of detecting win-​to-​win solutions. Consequently, European integration and supranational institutions are the structural outputs of this shared interest. From a functionalist perspective, the willingness of the European elites to cooperate within a regional organization is related to the gradual decline of the European nations on the world stage. In the new world order, European integration has been functional to overcome European countries’ difficulties in developing economies of scale in a globalized world. In addition to the economic dimension, neofunctionalism identifies three independent and mutually reinforcing factors contributing to the development of European integration. Firstly, the spillover hypothesis refers to the intentional (and unintentional) Europeanization of multiple policy domains required to achieve a specific goal. A perfect example of spillover is the domino effect generated by the creation, and ongoing consolidation, of the European Common Market. Secondly, the multiple spillovers generated by intergovernmental cooperation would empower non-​state actors—​such as transnational political, technocratic, and societal elites—​in designing and implementing European integration. Thirdly, the development and consolidation of the supranational level would gradually shift citizen loyalty toward European institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Unsurprisingly, neo-​functionalist authors considered politicization as a positive force of integration. Almost half a century ago, the contemporary scenario was envisaged by Philippe Schmitter (1969, 1970), predicting the rise of polarizations around European decisions and the enlargement of the actors engaged in transnational politics. Following the functionalist view, the progress of the integration in policy domains traditionally under the sovereignty of national actors would reshape the domestic political systems, assigning a higher political role to the European supranational and intergovernmental institutions. This vision has been further elaborated under the neo-​ functionalist theory. From this perspective, the transformation of the national political system would be instrumental in advancing the integration process.

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The Politicization of the European Union

Politicization has been associated with the increased controversiality of European decision-​making, leading to the enlargement of stakeholders interested in influencing its governance, and creating socio-​political dynamics linking the masses within the integration process (Schmitter, 1969). Thus, at the national level, politicization would create a sociological spillover, progressively Europeanizing loyalties and individual identities (Börzel & Risse, 2018). From a neofunctionalist perspective, politicization is expected to have a positive impact on the legislative competencies of the Union. The politicized climax would allow pan-​European elites, advocating for the pooling of domestic sovereignties, to develop political and social proxies with national societies. Regarding the increasing controversy generated by EU politics, while functionalist scholars have always identified crisis as fertile for integration advancement (Schmitter, 1970), neofunctionalist tend to be more cautious. More specifically, it has been acknowledged that the increased number of engaged actors—​complemented by an elevated political fragmentation—​could have led to a temporary standby of the integration process. Nevertheless, over the course of time, the necessity to cope with multiple spillovers—​combined with the financial costs of the paralysis and the activism of pro-​European stakeholders—​would ultimately lead to the finalization of pan-​European solutions. Regarding societal politicization and identity politics, functionalist scholars paid little attention to the role that public opinion could play in European integration. During the pre-​Maastricht time, the reason behind the insufficient attention to the role of society could be brought back to the technocratic and diplomatic nature of the decision-​making processes. According to the justification provided by Ernst Haas (1958), citizens do not have the cognitive tools to understand the complex mechanisms behind the integration process and European policymaking. Therefore, the assumption was that the technocratic and diplomatic nature of European policymaking would shelter the transnational polity from public opinion. In early functionalist theory, the functional pressure generated by the elites and the spillover effect was expected to fuel the integration process. In this optimistic scenario, Ernst Haas (1958) predicted the European identity to quietly nestle with the existing national identities. This vision was justified with the assumed non-​conflictual relation between the European and national identities, and with the belief that the European citizens would

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positively assess the impact of the integration on their lives. Nonetheless, politicization from the bottom has not been completely marginalized in the intellectual contributions of functionalist and neofunctionalist scholars. For instance, Ernst Haas (1970), recalling the work of Ronald Inglehart (1967), acknowledged the role that citizens could play in legitimizing (or delegitimizing) the supranational actors. However, in the same work, the scholar has underestimated the detrimental impact of identity politics on European integration. In his view, the absence of a powerful authority at the European level would prevent the quest for democratic legitimacy. These thoughts demonstrate that in the pre-​Maastricht times, the integration process did not generate societal politicization, diverging the focus of functionalist and neofunctionalist theories to the dynamics behind the top-​down politicization. However, a more comprehensive theoretical contribution has been developed by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970). Assuming that highly educated citizens would support the integration process, the scholars conducted an empirical-​ normative investigation of European public opinion. The study draws two parallel estimations related to the impact of politicization from the bottom. In the first scenario, characterized by favorable economic performance and sound income distribution, individuals would endorse the European polity. Conversely, in a scenario distinguished by societal pauperization and amplification of the socio-​ economic fractures, European integration would face the emergence of radical movements capable of creating a hostile mobilization of the public (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 251). Similarly, Philippe Schmitter (1969) foresaw the gradual rise of the saliency of European policymaking in the public sphere and the embedment of European affairs into the existing socio-​political cleavages. Hence, neofunctionalism has related the individual attitudes towards European institutions with the macro-​economic performances, paying particular attention to the role played by income distribution. It can be concluded that despite the solid top-​down connotation placed by the functionalist and neofunctionalist theories, the approach did not fail to address the emergence of bottom-​up politicization. The weakness of the functionalist and neofunctionalist theories is related to the disproportionate expectations over the beneficial impact of the collective identities

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The Politicization of the European Union

on the integration process, neglecting the challenges associated with the creation of a transnational identity (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Kuhn, 2019). Functionalism and neofunctionalism tend to focus on constructive-​rational individual behavior, partially failing to address the rise of a harmful politicization from the bottom, questioning the legitimacy of the European polity. Intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism Similarly to the dichotomy created between realism and liberalism, in the study of European integration, intergovernmentalism is often represented as the antonym of neofunctionalist theories. Based on neorealist assumptions, intergovernmentalism analyses are based on the ontological assumption that member states fully control the integration process. From an intergovernmental perspective, the European Union is characterized by zero-​sum agreements among nation-​states. The progress of European cooperation (rather than integration) can be justified with the interest of national actors to reduce anarchy among the European states (Grieco, 1996). The intergovernmental theory provides a universal interpretation of the EU governance based on the interest of national actors and the power relations between nation-​states. In this context, European institutions and supranational policies are the output of the balance of power among the member states and an answer to the decline of European nation-​states in world politics (Milward, 1992). At the end of the 1980s, following the achievements of European integration and the ambitious goals laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, the intergovernmental theory clashed with the empirical reality. To retune the paradigm to the emergence of the European Union, Andrew Moravcsik (1991, 1993, 1998) conceptualized the liberal intergovernmentalism theory. From this reviewed theoretical perspective, the European Union is described as a successful intergovernmental organization. The empowerment of the supranational institutions is justified by the necessity of the nation-​states to create European bodies managing the economic interdependence among the member states; and acting as a watchdog for the implementation of the agreements among the European nations. According to the liberal intergovernmentalism analysis, agreements are shaped by the

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preferences and influence of the member states. Supranational solutions are ratified once the lowest common denominator has been detected among the national executives. In this framework, the priority of the national elites is to minimize the delegation of power to supranational actors, leaving this option as a last-​resort solution. The key difference with the classic intergovernmental theory lies in identifying a demand and supply bargaining scheme that could turn intergovernmental negotiations into a positive-​sum game. In this scheme, the request to deepen European integration delivered by European political actors and non-​political stakeholders challenges the interest of domestic political players in preserving national sovereignties. In turn, this coalition of transnational actors challenges the power monopoly held by member states in shaping EU politics. However, also in the liberal intergovernmentalism theory, national governments remain the driver of the integration, while supranational institutions are still viewed as technocratic bodies instrumental in executing intergovernmental agreements. Hence, the politicization of the European integration process from a classical and liberal intergovernmental point of view acquires an ontological nature. As supranational institutions possess a marginal role in shaping EU politics, the politicization process at the European level has no reason to emerge. Due to the monopoly of power held by national governments in EU policymaking, sovereignty and legitimacy are firmly anchored at the domestic level (Moravcsik, 2006). Therefore, from an intergovernmental point of view, the politicization of EU affairs represents a naive and misleading phenomenon. More specifically, the growing saliency of European affairs is leading to distorted conclusions since the power of the European institutions is subjected to the will of national governments democratically elected by the citizens. From an intergovernmental and liberal intergovernmental perspective, the debate gravitating around the politicization of European affairs should be considered an attempt by supranational actors to undermine the national control over the governance of the EU. At the same time, liberal intergovernmentalism associates the politicization of the EU with the utilitarian interest of national politicians to move controversial domestic issues into the European realm (Moravcsik, 1998). This assumption represents the theoretical linchpin behind the empirical tendency of using the EU as a scapegoat for problems originating at the national

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The Politicization of the European Union

level. Exploiting the public opinion cognitive limitation on the distribution of the competencies within the intricated European multilevel governance, national political elites arbitrarily ascribe powers to the European institutions not to disperse electoral consensus. Interestingly, intergovernmental theories pay marginal attention to the role of European political parties, mass media, and citizens in the integration process (Hoffmann, 1964; Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998). Domestic elites and political parties at the head of national executives are considered the plenipotentiary actors in European affairs. Moreover, intergovernmental scholars assess politicization as a detrimental phenomenon. For instance, politicization is accused of jeopardizing the negotiation within the Council (Schmidt, 2019). These dynamics become evident when the national governments need to finalize solutions to crises having cross-​border effects. For instance, the negative effects of the domestic politicization of EU affairs were apparent during the debt crisis and the reform of the European asylum mechanism (Biermann et al., 2019; Schimmelfennig, 2015). Shifting the analysis to bottom-​up politicization, intergovernmental theories create an explicit demarcation between low and high politics (Hoffmann, 1966). This separation differentiates the relative facility to handle public opinion when technical competencies are delegated to supranational institutions, with the public setbacks entangled with the delegation of matters at the core of the nation-​state sovereignties. Unlike functionalism, intergovernmentalism considers societal politicization a hampering factor for European integration. At the same time, similarly to functionalism, in the analysis and rationalization of the integration process, liberal and classic intergovernmentalism has the inclination to focus on the top-​down dynamics, marginalizing the role played by societal opinions and beliefs. Nonetheless, by providing an extensive analysis of the resilience of national identities, Stanley Hoffmann (1966) predicted that the development of a pan-​European sense of belongingness would lead to socio-​political polarization. From a liberal intergovernmentalism perspective, national identities represent an obstacle to European integration. The emotions, the nativism, and the narrative embedded in the national identities represent a constraint for the power of the national and European political elites (Hoffmann, 1966). In addition, as part of the demand-​supply

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scheme introduced by the liberal intergovernmentalism theory, public opinion influences the behavior of national politicians, contributing to creating a conflictual environment in intergovernmental negotiations (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015; Schneider & Slantchev, 2018). Restricting the focus on the politicization of European identity, both classic and liberal intergovernmentalism theories have consistently rejected the need (and the existence) of a common European identity. Assuming the low salience of European affairs in the public sphere, Andrew Moravcsik (2002, 2004) associates the absence of a collective European identity with the regulatory nature of the European Union. Differently, Stanley Hoffmann (1964, 1994) rationalizes the absence of European identity by reflecting upon the cultural differences among the national identities, and the absence of pan-​European political leaders able to nurture a transnational sense of belongingness. Overall, classic and liberal intergovernmentalism theories underplay the impact of the politicization of European integration (Kuhn, 2019). Short-​ sightedness and intrinsic pessimism over transnational dynamics are the most common perplexities raised by intergovernmental theories. For instance, intergovernmentalism fails to rationalize cosmopolitan movements cultivating a genuine European identity, nestling local, national and transnational belongingness, advocating for deeper integration in areas at the core of the nation-​state sovereignties (Kleine & Pollak, 2018; Risse, 2010). Nonetheless, classic and liberal intergovernmentalism offers valuable insight into the behavior of the national elites, providing interesting observations instrumental in contextualizing the actions of the different actors involved in the EU multilevel governance, and their positions vis-​à-​ vis the politicization of European affairs. Postfunctionalism In the study of the politicization of European affairs, postfunctionalism emerges as the most relevant theory, providing different insights into the present and the future of the European project. Rather than conceptualizing the power relations among the different actors operating within the EU governance, postfunctionalism prioritizes the citizen’s political behaviour (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Inspired by the cleavage theory advanced

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The Politicization of the European Union

by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), postfunctionalists draw a grand theory of regional integration based on the comparative study of identity politics and domestic contestation (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). Acknowledging the validity of the functional spillover envisaged in the neofunctionalist theories, postfunctionalists base their postulates on the political clash created by the attempt to deepen European integration, and the conservative backlash aiming to preserve national sovereignties (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hooghe et al., 2019). This fracture has created a conflictual process between incompatible belief systems, producing a permanent and profound rupture in society (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 5). Consequently, the European Union moved from its initial stage of permissive consensus to the current status of constraining dissensus, where societal and political polarizations heavily influence the integration process. While in the permissive consensus time, societal elites were able to unilaterally consolidate the integration process, in contemporary times, politicization has provided visibility to populist sentiments, constraining the ability of the European elites to move the integration forward. Probably due to its recent conceptualization, postfunctionalism is the regional integration theory that has dedicated most attention to politicization. According to the postfunctionalist postulates, the emergence of politicization is the direct output of the growing saliency of European affairs in the post-​Maastricht scenario. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2019, pp. 4–​5) developed a three-​step cause-​effect model to analyze the politicization of European Union governance. The first step aims to analyze the effectiveness of the EU decision-​making process in responding to the needs of the citizens. In an attempt to enhance the legitimacy of the Union, the European elites opened the door of policymaking to public scrutiny, taking measures to enlarge the actors involved in EU affairs (Kuhn, 2019). In this framework, it has been theorized that the rise of politicization—​ understood as an increased level of polarization and salience of the matter discussed—​hamper the capability of the European and national elites to reach compromises, negatively affecting the ability of the Union to respond to societal demands. The second step focuses on the locus of power and the actors involved in the decision-​making procedure. Observing the empirical reality, it has been theorized that the higher the number of actors involved, the more the issue discussed is subjected to heated politicization

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and polarization. Also in this case, postfunctionalists refer to the gone permissive consensus time to emphasize how decisions taken among an inner circle of political and technical elites enhanced the probability of detecting compromises. This scenario is counterposed with the post-​Maastricht environment, where a vivid scepticism advanced by novel political and non-​ political actors has jeopardized the effectiveness (and legitimacy) of the traditional governance model based on the community method (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The third step relates to mass politics, political sociology and psychology. The focus is posed on the influence of European integration on socio-​political conflicts. More precisely, postfunctionalist theory assesses politicization analyzing the nature of the polarization in the social and political arena, investigating the correlation between the saliency of European affairs, the rise of nationalism, and new constraints for the consensus-​oriented EU multilevel politics (Dalton, 2018; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2006). Moving the analysis to the orientation towards politicization, postfunctionalism tends to be more pessimistic than neo-​ functionalist theory. In the postfunctionalist view, politicization results in a significant shrink of the capacity of the EU institutions to respond to societal needs, leading to a vicious circle for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the supranational polity (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). In this regard, it is interesting to mention that the successes and failures of European integration always influence the development of theories. Within the postfunctionalist theory, the recent series of crises—​and the success of populist movements—​played a significant role in highlighting the negative consequences of politicization. The debt crisis had created fractures that will be protracted over time, mainly among the Mediterranean citizens. The austerity program generated a polarized debate, creating a long-​standing fracture in European public opinion. Similar dynamics were observed during the mismanagement of the refugee crisis, fueling a pan-​European debate polarized on multiple dimensions. Due to the identitarian and ideological salience of the matter discussed, the European and national elites have been unable to detect and enforce common responses (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Overall, it is clear that the multiple crises that emerged during the last decades have divided European public opinion, creating a status quo that postfunctionalist scholars have mirrored.

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Shifting the analysis to the societal politicization, postfunctionalism seems to be the theory that has better theorized the current state of the art. According to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009, p. 2), the contemporary struggle over identity politics is directly related to the mismatch between efficiency and the existing structure of authority. Here, the baseline assumption is that while the increased competencies of the European institution were relatively abrupt, creating a pan-​ European identity—​ required to legitimize the European polity—​involves generational and cultural transformation. At the same time, in line with the identity nestle assumption (Diéz Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001), postfunctionalist theory considers the emergence of European identity not as a source of conflict. The inputs provided by postfunctionalism on the rise of identity politics in the European continent are instrumental to understanding the politicization from the bottom. According to postfunctionalism, behind the emergence of identity politics in the European Union, a novel societal division juxtaposes citizens holding cosmopolitan values with individuals promoting the restoration of the nation-​states’ competencies (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 2018). Going beyond the traditional economic-​ oriented cleavage, this societal fracture can be seen as part of a new global critical juncture that will profoundly influence European politics in the upcoming decades (Bartolini, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2008). The entrenchment of a new cleavage in European society offers opportunities to political and societal entrepreneurs to gain consensus among individuals willing to preserve the Westphalian nation-​state model. As a result, politicization from the bottom represents a composite socio-​political reaction blending popular contestation and support towards European instit utions.

Chapter 2. The causes of politicization: A critical top-​ down assessment In the past, EU-​related referenda were often identified as the apex of the European political debate. In the contemporary scenario, multiple socio-​ political and economic crises, combined with the rise of illiberal democracy and populism, contributed to polarizing the European integration debate. Crises deepened the fractures between the member states and the European institutions, affecting multiple policy domains and enhancing the stigma of the elites towards the politicization of EU affairs. From a top-​down perspective, EU politicization is the output of a chain of events and political dynamics. Drawing a simplified picture, EU politicization should be linked to different historical moments (Hutter et al., 2016). Rather than following a linear path, the EU politicization has been characterized by saliency hikes. During the last decades, these hikes occurred when conflicts involving national and European institutions were related to policy domains that, in the recent past, were exclusive national competencies. Hence, from a broader historical perspective, the origin of politicization can be associated with the authority transfer occurred during the post-​Maastricht times (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Zürn et al., 2012). The commitment of the national leaders to harmonize high politics domains has created a spillover that has facilitated the embedment of European integration into the socio-​political realm. In other words, the decision to progressively build a political union has transformed the European Community—​a regional cooperation organization—​into an innovative and unique transnational political system (Hix, 2005) physiologically subjected to the societal spotlight. Interestingly, EU politicization is also associated with the struggle between intergovernmental and supranational methods of governance. The constitutional amendments addressing the EU decision-​making mechanisms have gradually empowered the European Parliament. The reinforcement of the supranational methods has created a clash with the national political elites interested in preserving intergovernmental dynamics. From

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The Politicization of the European Union

this perspective, politicization results from the contraposition between European elites—​interested in reinforcing the supranational methods—​ and national leaders willing to preserve their power prerogatives. Hence, the European Parliament has played a central role in mutating the socio-​ political scenario. The supranational institution represents the epicenter of European politics, composed of organizations and actors having an instrumental interest in politicizing the integration debate. To broaden the comprehension, the following sections will examine how the interactions between the national and European political elites, the emergence of the Eurosceptic political movements, and the European crises have represented the principal top-​down causes of EU politicization.

2.1. Political elites in the EU’s multilevel governance system Adopting an intergovernmental approach, the investigation of the sources of top-​down politicization begins from the national realm. Transnational politicization has deeply influenced the national political debate, mutating the approach of the domestic elites towards European integration. As a result of the inclusion of the supranational dimension in the national political agenda, there has been a rise in the saliency of European integration in the domestic public sphere(s) (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Hutter et al., 2016; Schmidt, 2019; Zürn, 2019). At the national level, the EU-​related debate has evolved from the antecedent apolitical state to the contemporary political debate questioning at its extreme the legitimacy of the European Union institutions (Schmidt, 2019, p. 1019). The Europeanization of the domestic political agenda favored the formation of new political movements, creating the structural and institutional precondition for politicizing European affairs. From a national-​oriented perspective, politicization is driven by the debate, discussion and struggle occurring at the domestic level. Unsurprisingly, several scholars reported the increased saliency and polarization over the European Union in the national parliaments (Closa & Maatsch, 2014; Rauh, 2015; Wendler, 2014). The emergence of Eurosceptic political movements, and the inclusion of the European dimension within the agenda of the national political parties, have expanded the interest of the media in transnational affairs.

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Drawing a general picture of the domestic scene is a complex task. At the national level, the politicization of EU affairs acquires different connotations and heterogeneous patterns. This diversity mirrors the distinct domestic political, cultural and socio-​economic status quo, resulting from uneven historical experiences and the asymmetrical capability of national elites to influence the European agenda (De Wilde et al., 2016). Another aspect contributing to diversifying the domestic status quo is the heterogeneity of the national party systems. Directly correlated with the Europeanization of the national political debate, illiberal and populist parties had dissimilar electoral results in the national consultations. While in some member states, Eurosceptic parties managed to collect the popular support required to be included in the governing coalition, in other member states, these political movements are facing difficulties to root in the society. Nonetheless, a common trend observed in national party politics relates to the distress of the Christian-​conservative, socialist and liberal political parties in advancing a narrative countering the impact of populist propaganda (Hix & Høyland, 2013; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). On this aspect, a paradox afflicts the relationship between the EU and domestic party politics. Despite having the most prolonged and profound influence on the decisions taken at the European level, mainstream national parties fail to communicate with the citizens about matters related to the present and the future of European integration. This paradox has tangible consequences. In the first place, national parties traditionally in favor of the EU and first-​line actors in the advancement of the integration—​ instead of developing a vision for the future of the EU—​tend to adulterate their pro-​European stands, advancing Euro-​ambiguous positions as an attempt to tackle populist parties. For instance, this strategy was adopted by David Cameron while proposing the Brexit referendum during the electoral campaign. Similarly, the reluctance of the frugal member states to expand the scope of the EU redistributive policies can be justified by the political desire to limit the scope of campaigning for the Eurosceptic parties. Secondly, national executives create bottlenecks between unachievable electoral promises and the commitment already taken at the European level (Mair, 2013). As a result, the national executives tend to dilute the pre-​existent intergovernmental agreements, jeopardizing loyal

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The Politicization of the European Union

cooperation in the European arena. In the current scenario, Eurosceptic parties seem to be the driver of the EU politicization, while political parties traditionally holding an executive position tend to be passive actors, hesitant participants of heated debates on European integration and national sovereignties. Highly entwined with the national level, another source of top-​down politicization can be identified within the EU decision-​making mechanisms. In the post-​Maastricht era, intergovernmental negotiations became highly politicized, having a significant media resonance in the national realms. Due to the gradual erosion of the veto power and the domestic salience of the matter negotiated, national elites have progressively lost the capacity to find consensus through compromise, confidentiality, and trade-​ off. Moreover, discussions at the European level are routinely influenced by political entrepreneurs seeking to expand and/​or consolidate voter support in the national realm. In this setting, mainly in proximity to electoral consultations, national executives could rationally defy the EU consensus to gain support in the domestic electorate (Schmidt, 2019). Another novelty of the post-​ Maastricht scenario, the enlargement, has increased the politicization of intergovernmental negotiations. As manifested by the emergence of the Visegrád politic-​identitarian alliance, the inclusion of new member states has contributed to accentuating the divisions within the Council (Hosli et al., 2011; Mattila, 2009). As the domestic realm remains the vital source of legitimacy (and power) for the European institutions, politicization is likely to negatively affect the EU in terms of effectiveness. More specifically, if national executives continue to pursue short-​term goals, the governance of the EU will face something comparable to what Garret Hardin (1968) has theorized with the tragedy of commons. Making an analogy with the unsustainable management of natural resources, intergovernmental dynamics merely oriented towards short-​term national interests—​rather than a collective vision for the future of the EU and its citizens—​could ultimately lead to the deterioration of European integration. Moving forward, the conflictual interdependence that has emerged among the European institutions is another relevant source of top-​down politicization. The observed quarrelsomeness of the inter-​ institutional interactions (Gozi, 2001; Pech, 2012) results from the saliency of new

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competencies acquired by the European Union, and equally, is the consequence of the gradual shift toward supranational legislative procedures. The debate among the EU institutions tends to collide over strategic, ideological and cultural issues, creating a Balkanization of positions over the future of the European Union (Schmidt, 2019). Following the introduction of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure and the extension of the Special Legislative Procedure, the relevance gained by the European Parliament altered the power balance within the institutional triangle. Unsurprisingly, the European Parliament alone represents a continuing source of politicization, leading other European non-​majoritarian institutions to adapt accordingly. One of the most affected institutions seems to be the European Commission, which can be represented as an entity between the hammer and the anvil (for a detailed analysis of the transformation of the European Commission, see Nugent & Rhinard, 2016). On one side, the Commission must negotiate with the Council, the institution that has the last word in nearly all policy domains. On the other side, the Commission has to reach a consensus with the European Parliament, determined to play its legislative role through strategies enhancing its powers in supervising the work conducted by the other institutions and member states. To respond to the mutated scenario, under the presidency of Jean-​Claude Junker, the Commission has acquired the most significant political positioning in the history of European integration. Even the technocratic and apolitical European Central Bank (ECB) can be included among the EU institutions involved in the politicization-​led mutations. To validate this statement, it suffices to recall the political debate generated by Mario Draghi’s iconic statement whatever it takes, or the dispute between the Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court over the legitimacy of quantitative easing (Masciandaro, 2020; Tortola, 2020). As for other European institutions, the increased spotlight acquired by the ECB is attributable to the new powers acquired by the institution following the advancement of the integration in the financial and banking domains. In this scenario, a multitude of European and national actors scrutinize the actions of the ECB, questioning the independence and technocratic nature of the European Central Bank (Högenauer, 2019). Considering the increasingly political nature of the inter-​institutional relations, and the diversity that characterizes the domestic landscapes, the

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The Politicization of the European Union

weak intellectual and ideological investments towards the European political parties represent a missed opportunity. Enhancing the representativeness of the European party system would be instrumental in boosting the legitimacy of the European institutions, increasing the programmatic coherence of EU action, de-​escalating the anarchy characterizing the different pro-​European political positioning, and facilitating the harmonization of the domestic party politics landscapes.

2.2. Crisis, depoliticization and mass media The EU is coping with a state of polycleavage (Zeitlin et al., 2019, p. 966). To remark on the sense of doubt and uncertainty created by the crises, the unprecedented cascade of challenges faced by the European political elites was denominated polycrisis by the former President of the European Commission, Jean-​Claude Juncker (European Commission, 2016, p. 1). The crises faced by the European Union have been correlated to the politicization of European affairs. Acquiring a primary position in the political agenda, the European crises (and their governance) have become an additional source of top-​down politicization. This permanent state of endogenous stress has generated a polarized debate involving multiple political issues and institutional actors. In the last decades—​the governance of the European Monetary Union, the immigration policy, the rise of the illiberal democracy, Brexit, the complex governance of the pandemic events, and the Ukrainian war—​has been instrumental in inflating the debate over the European Union. The crises have involved domains at the core of the member state sovereignties, creating divisions and tensions among European and national political elites and reinforcing the pre-​existent structural divisions within the Union (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The inability of the community method to respond quickly to the challenges transformed crises in critical conjuncture, where political entrepreneurs and ideologies played a central role in proposing colliding solutions (van Middelaar, 2016). This scenario has created the ideal terrain for political leaders having the functional interest in mobilizing public opinion against the Union for electoral limelight. Hence, the European crises have generated opportunistic dynamics for elites interested in expanding the electoral base of their political movement. In this scenario,

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once European solutions have been detected, national policymakers are subject to domestic and/​ or European political opponents interested in mobilizing the citizens against the deliberation made. Another source of top-​down politicization intertwined with the management of the crises is related to the attempt of the national and European political elites to depoliticize European policymaking. In simple terms, depoliticization occurs by advancing (and implementing) solutions based on technocratic models. Therefore, depoliticization is not equivalent to stagnation or regression of the integration process. In some instances, depoliticization has successfully moved forward European integration, mainly for portfolios related to technical issues (Jones et al., 2016). For example, the depoliticized governance of the debt crisis led to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, bringing new power to the European Central Bank for monitoring the Banking Union regulations. Nonetheless, the depoliticized approach has produced reverse effects, reinvigorating populist parties, indirectly fueling a politicization having disruptive connotations (Börzel & Risse, 2018). More specifically, the techno-​bureaucratic solutions indirectly endorsed Eurosceptic arguments painting the EU as a soulless polity, far from the people, lacking democratic accountability and legitimacy. This was evident in the depoliticized governance of the immigration crisis. Despite the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency—​entangling a modest delegation of domestic competencies in favor of supranational technocratic bodies—​the EU governance failed to reform the Common European Asylum System, the cause and epicenter of the crisis. Overall, the European and national elites failed to provide a political answer to a political problem. At the top, adopting a weak depoliticized solution to the immigration crisis allowed Eurosceptic movements to mobilize public opinion, undermining the behavior of national executives during the intergovernmental negotiations. As a result, several member states opted to defy a European resolution, implementing uncoordinated political actions at the national level that eventually led to non-​compliance with European policies in the field of migration and asylum (Börzel & Risse, 2018). The deceleration of the spitzenkandidaten procedure represents a supplementary example of the side effects of depoliticization. In line with the argument assessing the potential positive effects of politicization, the

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spitzenkandidaten process was designed to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union, providing political impetus to the election of the European Parliament and the appointment of the European Commission. Despite its unregulated and experimental nature, the outcomes of the pilot implementation were encouraging. Since its inception, the Juncker Commission explicitly declared the political and executive nature of its mandate (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b). The appointment of Commissioners having political leadership experiences, the reinforced figurative-​identitarian relevance of the State of Union speech, the political position taken in the application of the Fiscal Compact—​along with multiple intra-​institutional reforms, and the revision of the inter-​institutional procedures (Kassim & Laffan, 2019)—​has been tangible political results. From this perspective, the institutionalization of the spitzenkandidaten procedure could facilitate the transition of the European Commission from a technocratic institution (Coombes, 1970) to a new model of political leadership embedding features of responsive technocracy (Zürn, 2019). In other words, the procedure seemed functional in updating the role of the European Commission vis-​a-​vis the post-​Maastricht scenario characterized by the political dilemma of creating an ever closer Union. The fact that Eurosceptic parties never opted to participate in the spitzenkandidaten competition leads to further consideration. This aversion can be interpreted as a symptom that the anti-​European establishment considers the linkage between the European Parliament election and the appointment of the Commission potentially able to enhance the legitimacy of the Union. Unfortunately, the member states did not share the same enthusiasm over the political activism of the European Commission. The procedure ideated and introduced following an initiative of the European political parties has been subjected to the Council obstruction. As explained by Hussein Kassim and Brigid Laffan (2019), the creation of a link between the European Parliament elections and the appointment of the European Commission raised objections among the national political elites, frightened to be deprived of their prerogatives in forming the Commission. As factual evidence of this reticence, during the European Parliament election conducted in 2019, a strategic downscaling of the spitzenkandidaten procedure was observed. The willingness of the national elites to depoliticize the procedure was apparent since the inception

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of the electoral campaign. It was evident that the European Council would not consider candidates proposed by the European parties. In addition, compared to the 2014 elections, the nominated candidates conducted a bland electoral campaign. For instance, in contrast with the previous campaign, the candidates opted not to organize a televised debate. As a result, the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen resulted from a long and troubled intergovernmental negotiation, marginalizing the results of the EP elections. The approval by the European Parliament was characterized by a majority reached by a handful of votes. At the top of it, the swing votes were provided by the Italian populist party Movimento Cinque Stelle (Amante & Balmer, 2019). Depoliticization might offer technical-​diplomatic solutions to the issues on the European agenda. However, in the long run, depoliticized approaches could threaten the legitimacy of the EU, allowing Eurosceptic parties to gain consensus and power (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Once again, in the study of EU politicization, we observe a paradoxical status quo where the position held by the pro-​European political elites overlaps with the interest of the anti-​European political movements. Overall, depoliticization, rather than representing a solution for the future challenge of the Union, appears to be a reminiscence of the permissive consensus times. Although some authors consider depoliticization as a tool to circumvent unfavorable EU politicization at the domestic level (Jabko & Luhman, 2019, p. 1038), in times of constraining dissensus, technocratic governance leads to temporary solutions, procrastinating a status quo characterized by the inability of the pro-​European political elites to create an alternative narrative on the present and future of the European Union (Schmidt, 2008). Continuing the investigation on the top-​down causes of politicization, mass media contribute to determining the perception of the European Union in society. Undisputedly, media influence citizen perceptions and voting behavior, enhancing (or limiting) the legitimacy of political power (Druckman & Parkin, 2005; Risse & van de Steeg, 2003; Zaller, 1996). The political impact of mass media among citizens varies according to socio-​ economic and educational indicators. The literature on media and political power (Zaller 1992, 1996; Beck et al., 2002) creates a dichotomy between politically sophisticated and less sophisticated citizens, assuming that the latter are more susceptible to the information provided

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by interpersonal communication and mainstream media. In addition to the role played by mass media in the framework of nation-​states, public communication in the EU acquires an additional value due to the (i) absence of a direct link between the European institutions and citizens; and (ii) the inadequate societal comprehension of the European politics and institutions. In this scenario, collective perceptions—​ created through mass media and interpersonal communication—​acquire a dominant role in shaping vernacular opinions over the European policies and EU tout court (Desmet et al., 2015). In the pre-​Maastricht times, European elites sheltered integration from the public spotlight. The media coverage of the EU was circumscribed to historical political momenta (De Vreese 2001; De Vreese et al. 2007). Reflecting the shift from the permissive consensus time to the constraining dissensus era, since the first difficulties met by the referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the interest of the media towards the EU has progressively increased (Trenz, 2008). Today, a cluster of political leaders anchor their communication strategy to the opposition of the European polity, expanding the coverage of European affairs. This novelty has undoubtedly contributed to broadening the scope and outreach of the politicization process. Among the pro-​European elites, the members of the European Parliament tend to be the most active in the media, while officials from the European Commission and the Council are mostly absent from the mass communication landscape (De Bruycker, 2017; Martins et al., 2011). The communication strategy of the European Commission is criticized for providing a fragmented and anemic technocratic image of European initiatives (Meyer, 1999). Reporters describe European Commission press conferences as heaven for specialized magazines and hell for journalists from a daily broadsheet (Martins et al., 2011, p. 312). Through communication campaigns, Eurosceptic elites exploit EU politicization, simplifying societal problems and instrumentally downscaling the complexity of the issues debated. One of the key communication challenges in the post-​Maastricht era is represented by the sui generis nature of the Union. The complexity of the EU hardly fits the process of simplification operated by mainstream media (Gleissner & de Vreese, 2005; Lecheler, 2008). As a result, the information disseminated by European policymakers tends to be inconspicuous and not instrumental in boosting the knowledge and understanding of European politics (van

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Noije, 2010). In most member states, communication with the media is delegated to the national elites, expected to counterattack the arguments disseminated by the Eurosceptical elites. In reality, this rarely occurs as national parties avoid fulfilling this intermediary responsibility, preferring domestic affairs over expositing themselves on European politics (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). As brilliantly observed by Daniel Innerarity (2018), after decades where populist commentators have monopolized communication over European affairs, there is a complete misunderstanding of the EU competencies and a lack of knowledge over the functioning of the European institutions. The predominance of the populist narrative contributes to developing a politicization having negative consequences. To rebalance the state of the art, European and national leaders require pragmatic efforts, disseminating pro-​European argumentations based on the assumptions that the EU is a complex political system, but complexity does not necessarily entangle incomprehensibility (Innerarity, 2018, p. 41). Moreover, pro-​European elites should reach the most vulnerable strata of the population, which are more susceptible to the misinformation operated by populist forces. As we have seen with depoliticization, when it comes to mass media and communication, the political elites in favor of European integration are in limbo between the pre and post-​Maastricht times. This limbo is marked by the reluctance of the pro-​European elites to mutate habits developed when European integration was based on technocracy and confidentiality.

2.3. Euroscepticism and politicization Following the conclusions of the previous sections, Eurosceptic movements appear to be among the primary sources of top-​down politicization. Populist and extreme right-​wing parties have taken advantage of the EU politicization to expand their electoral base. Based on the theory of issue evolution (Carmines & Stimons, 1989) and the previous studies on political heresthetic (Riker, 1982, 1986, 1996), Sara Hobolt and Catherine De Vries (2015) theorized the issue entrepreneurship to rationalize the appearance of Eurosceptic political movements in the political landscape. From this theoretical perspective, the program and the discourses of the political parties are not limited to the representation of the socio-​economic conflicts

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occurring in society. Similar to the strategic competition theory (Sitter, 2008; Taggart, 1998), the central assumption is that political parties can manipulate the public debate. In this scenario, political entrepreneurs interested in enlarging their electoral base are incentivized to include issues marginalized by the political competitors at the top of their agenda (Evans, 1998; Schattschneider, 1960). Therefore, minoritarian parties, willing to improve their electoral performance, have been better placed to embed European integration at the center of their propaganda. Consequently, as the output of this elite-​driven process led by minoritarian political movements, electoral campaigns experienced a significant growth of political actors expressing their views on the European project, increasing the polarization and the saliency of the European polity and policies in the public sphere. While some empirical studies have analyzed the top-​down dynamics related to the issue entrepreneurship theory and the Eurosceptic movements (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Steenbergen et al., 2007), other scholars focused on the political behavior of the mainstream parties. Regularly holding executive positions at national and European levels and traditional decision-​ takers for the integration process, pro-​European elites intentionally bypass EU affairs during the electoral campaign, leaving free rein to the Eurosceptic forces. This occurs due to the difficulties of the mainstream parties in positioning European integration within the left-​right ideological axis (De Wilde et al., 2016; Hoeglinger, 2015). In simpler terms, mainstream parties struggle to embed a European political vision within the Christian-​ conservative, Social and Liberal ideologies, failing to update their discourse to the mutated scenario. In addition, as observed in the United Kingdom before and during Brexit, national mainstream parties failed to adopt a clear-​cut position over the European Union due to the heterogeneity of opinions among their members and electorate. In other words, European integration has created fractures within the most influential national parties. Consequently, the positions of the mainstream parties tend to be vague in order to preserve the internal cohesion and the loyalty of the Euro-​concerned electorate. In this scenario, Eurosceptical forces are facilitated to disseminate demagogic solutions, demonizing the depoliticized approach promoted by the European elites (Zürn, 2019) and exacerbating among Europeans the perceived sense of crisis (Kriesi, 2018). Executing aggressive

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communication strategies on traditional and digital media, Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs provide over-​simplified solutions to the supranational challenges caused by globalization and economic interdependency. The extensive media coverage and the emotional tones of the political discourse have gradually increased the power of the populist forces. Eurosceptic movements have been able to capitalize on the uncertainty over the future of Europe, building a coherent narrative based on the firm rejection of supranationalism (Noury & Roland, 2020). Hence, as demonstrated by the Eurobarometer data and as explained by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2020), rather than representing nationalism backfire, the success of populism lies behind the capacity of their elites to represent marginalized citizens holding national-​ethnic identities. As summarized by Iskander De Bruycker (2017, p. 604), to link policy outcomes with the orientations of the citizens, elites need to make these outputs apparent in public debates. Mainstream elites failed to build a coherent narrative on European affairs for an extended period. Conversely, populists managed to create a fictional link between contemporary global socio-​economic challenges and European polity. The Eurosceptic parties changed the vernacular perception of European integration by conveying their political messages in TV debates and social media. This representation moves away from the cosmopolitan image of a project that has successfully built peace and cohesion among the European people. As a result, populists have successfully disseminated a frightful image of the EU, portraying the European institutions as despotic, technocratic, and undemocratic. The alternative vision proposed by the Eurosceptic parties is based on the myth of Europe for Europeans. This vision is characterized by the romanticization of the local ethnic identities and the emphasis on the Christian roots of the continent, reinforced by the narrative construction of internal and external enemies portrayed as a threat to traditional values and national sovereignties (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012). As we have seen before, the status of polycrisis affecting the European Union has created an ideal environment for the advent of anti-​establishment elites. The Eurosceptic political messages have made inroads during the immigration crisis, exploiting the fear of ethnic dilution and the public concern over the future of the European welfare state (Börzel & Risse,

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2018, 2020; Risse, 2010). Applying the issue entrepreneurship theory on the ground, the Eurosceptic entrepreneurs were able to strategically manipulate the societal debate, creating a narrative framing micro issues within the macro-​scenario. Consequently, the rising politicization of European affairs resulted in an electoral advantage for the populist elites. Generating a sharp political and social polarization, the impact of the Eurosceptic movements on the politicization of the EU is vividly highlighted by the increasing electoral volatility (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). As noted by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2018), this volatility is reflected in the electoral shift from moderate parties to political entrepreneurs, both from the right and left spectrum, successfully creating a straightforward political narrative over European affairs. In addition, following the perceived withdrawal of the socialist parties from the economic and social inequalities, the Eurosceptic parties have successfully attracted the vote of the labor class (Piketty, 2018). The mainstream parties—​de facto founder fathers of the European Union—​failed to upgrade their political vision in the wake of EU politicization. At the same time, Christian-​conservative, socialist and liberal parties bungled to provide a credible narrative on the social inequalities resulting from globalization and delocalization. This indirectly explains why the politicization of European affairs is often portrayed as a detrimental phenomenon. The asymmetrical adaptation to the new status quo—​characterized by one political wing fully capitalizing on the new socio-​economic and political scenario, contraposed to political founders of the European Union struggling to adapt their discourse to the mutated scenario—​is producing a politicization where the negative consequences are fully manifested, and the potential opportunities remain theoretical assumptions rarely observable in the empirical reality.

Chapter 3. The origin of European politicization from the bottom The politicization of European affairs is a multidimensional phenomenon intertwining multiple social spheres and academic disciplines. In this multidimensional process, top-​ down sources of politicization reinforce bottom-​up polarizing dynamics. From a bottom-​up perspective, individual behavior and belief contribute to politicizing the interactions among the European and national elites. Moreover, economic-​social and cultural factors also represent a primary source of EU politicization. Socio-​economic and cultural behaviors widely affect the political domain, encapsulating European integration and the policies approved by European institutions in the public debate. For these reasons, a complete analysis of EU politicization cannot supersede the causes of EU politicization from the bottom. Drawing a simplified picture, most European citizens perceive the EU as far and mysterious. This status quo can be reconducted to the technocratic nature of the European decision-​making process, and/​or the impossibility of understanding European politics using the lens of parliamentarian democracy (Mair, 2013; Schmidt, 2006, 2019). The European democracy and institutional structure cannot be explained by building analogies with the democratic regimes at the local and domestic levels, and as a result, the nature and the role of the EU remain unknown to the citizens. Nowadays, there is a paradoxical status quo where the salience gained by European integration did not increase societal awareness of the functioning and competencies of European institutions. In the post-​Maastricht era, democratic legitimacy based on effectiveness has proven to be unsustainable. The debate over the European Union is blooming in the public sphere. Presently, societal participation and democratic accountability acquired a primary position in the discussion over the legitimacy and politicization of the integration process (Magnette, 2001). As brilliantly explained by Simon Hix (1999, p. 70), the spotlight acquired by the legitimacy and accountability of the European Union is the byproduct of the graduation from integration to politics occurring since the

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Maastricht Treaty. This issue reflects the post-​Maastricht challenges originating from the decision to gradually build a political union without a precise vision of how to reconcile national sovereignty with post-​modern supranationalism. Unveiling the absence of a direct link between the European institutions and the citizens, the elites-​driven process generated bottom-​up trends questioning the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The disorientation and confusion of the citizens over the nature (and the future) of the European Union are reflected in the fragmentation of public opinion. Most discussions in the public sphere gravitate around the legitimacy—​and the accountability—​of European policies and polity, creating a permanent supply of politicization from the bottom. The following sections introduce different socio-​economic and cultural-​ demographic bottom-​up sources of EU politicization. The aim is to move from the macro to the meso level, providing a detailed analysis of the bottom-​ up dynamics fueling identity politics and politicization of the supranational realm.

3.1. Globalization and socio-​economic inequalities The analysis of the socio-​economic developments driving the shift in political behavior is instrumental in comprehending the EU politicization from the bottom. In the European context, the politicization of the integration process partly overlaps with the politicization of globalization. The socio-​ economic dynamics resulting from the intersection between globalization and regional integration is among the primary source of politicization from the bottom. The growing supranational interdependence, the rising global connectivity, the porosity of national borders, and the de-​industrialization of advanced economies have contributed to encapsulating the integration process in the public debate. The politicization of European affairs did not occur merely due to endogenous causes. In addition to internal dynamics, exogenous variables actively contributed to including European integration in the European public sphere. Undisputedly, globalization represents a significant challenge to the Westphalian model of nation-​states (Held et al., 1999). While economic and civil society players operate in a borderless world, the political domain is firmly anchored to the Westphalian nation-​state paradigm.

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This dyscrasia tends to be more evident in the most globalized societies, where post-​modernism acquired a remarkable relevance in shaping political identities, contributing to expanding the scope of cultural polarization (Zürn & De Wilde, 2016). In high-​income countries, socio-​economic inequalities, environmental issues and nation-​ state sovereignty entered the political and public spheres. Similarly, the emergence of transnational identities and supranational consumption patterns has generated a debate addressing the preservation of cultural and ethnographic heritages. These trends acquire peculiar connotations in the European scenario, where the establishment of the European Union has raised concerns over the future of the nation-​states. As a consequence, the consolidation of nostalgic sentiments among the European population contributes to enlarging the asymmetries in the political-​identitarian scenario. For these reasons, globalization should be considered the primary independent variable in the study of bottom-​ up politicization. In terms of socio-​economic and educational metrics, the liberal economic model is contributing to expanding the inequalities in developed countries (Hodgson, 2015; Krugman, 2019; Piketty, 2014; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). In the US and Europe, the relocation of manufacturing sites in low-​income countries deteriorated job conditions for the most vulnerable strata of the population. From a sociological point of view, liberalization of global trade and technological advancement has created a fracture opposing the losers and the winners of globalization. From this perspective, individuals are increasingly divided by the financial capability (or inability) to sustain high-​quality consumption, exploiting (or watching from a distance) the opportunities arising from the liberalization of the markets and the porosity of the national borders. In Europe, to some extent, this has been observed with the establishment of the European Single Market. The establishment of the Common Market contributed to the creation of socio-​ economic asymmetries among European citizens. As Theresa Kuhn (2015, pp. 79–​82) highlighted, only 7 percent of Europeans had resided in a different member state, while only a minority of Europeans (34%) developed bonds with peers from different nationalities. Although intra-​European cross-​border interactions have dramatically risen in the last decades (Fligstein, 2008; Kuhn, 2015; Recchi & Favell, 2009), most Europeans are still excluded from the transnational dimension, primarily

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due to socio-​economic causes. In this scenario, the perception of social injustice and inequality indirectly generated by globalization leads to a mutation of political behaviors. Socio-​economic disadvantaged citizens contribute to the electoral success of populist parties, while high-​income citizens tend to shift their loyalties toward political movements promoting post-​materialist stances (Burgoon et al., 2018). Consequently, citizens employed in sectors afflicted by high unemployment rates tend to support nostalgic parties, while citizens with weak social protection sympathize with political movements ascribed to the post-​ communist ideological spectrum (Rovny & Rovny, 2017). Searching for better living conditions and disbelieving political and institutional actors holding apical positions during the last decades, the losers of globalization have been instrumental in the ascent of new political movements. In other words, the economic downturn and the multiple political crises resulted in a trust decline for domestic and European institutions, providing political space for new actors willing to exploit the broken link between citizens and mainstream parties (Algan et al., 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Globalization has also sophisticated the governance of public affairs. As brilliantly noted by Michael Zürn and Pieter De Wilde (2016, p. 283), globalization affects the substance of the political conflict and its agency. The socio-​economic complexities and the transnational nature of the issues managed by political elites had empowered technocratic, economic and international actors in the policymaking process. The occurred sophistication complicated the public understanding of the methods deployed by the elites in addressing the political issues in the agenda. These dynamics appear evident in the European multilevel policy making, where individuals can hardly assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions taken at the European level. In such a nebulous scenario, the accountability of elites toward the masses becomes a complex and enigmatic exercise.

3.2. The emergence of the globalization-​led cleavage Introduced by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) to investigate the linkage between society and politics in Western European societies, the cleavage theory aims to correlate the socio-​economic fractures existing in society with party politics. The theory clusters citizens according to the

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diverging socio-​economic status and political demands, encompassing any form of polarization having long-​lasting societal and electoral consequences (De Wilde et al., 2019; Fuchs et al., 2009; Kriesi et al., 2012; Rae & Taylor, 1970; Zürn, 2019). The introduction of universal suffrage—​and the subsequent massification of political identities—​allowed individuals to express their opinions according to their socio-​economic needs and preferences. According to the cleavage theory, individual political behavior (and in turn, party politics) is deeply influenced by the socio-​economic position held by individuals in the community. In partial contraposition with the top-​down theories focusing on the role of political elites (e.g., Carmines & Stimons, 1989; Hobolt & De Vries, 2015), the socio-​economic status of the citizens becomes the central variable shaping the party competition and the party system tout court (Hix, 1999). In this framework, social classes and cultural-​ethical values represent the primary source of political identity, and therefore, political parties are expected to represent the existing fractures in their agenda and ideologies (Fuchs et al., 2009). In the work of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), party politics in Western European societies is theorized upon four macro-​cleavage. In the first place, the establishment of secular nation-​states led to the gradual decline of religious power in society. More specifically, the advent of the nation-​states, based on a gradual process of secularism and democratization, replaced the prior cleavage based on the Catholicism-​Protestantism dualism. As a result, Western European societies got progressively clustered between individuals loyal to secular political powers and citizens demanding the preservation of the guiding role of religious authorities. In the second place, a supplementary fracture emerged following the establishment of the state bureaucracy and the centralization of political power. This mutation created a fracture between the citizens endorsing centralism and the obstructionism from the periphery, demanding the delegation of competencies characteristic of the medieval political structure. In addition to the establishment of the modern nation-​state, the industrial revolutions have been an additional trigger reshuffling European political identities and party politics. The labor migration from the rural areas toward urban centers reinvigorated the center-​periphery cleavage, creating a novel fracture between landowners and entrepreneurs. The condition of the labor force in the manufacturing sector generated a profound cleavage between

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the working class and the urban bourgeois (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). Following the Bolshevik revolution, this fracture was further bifurcated with the separation within the left political spectrum between Marxists and socialists (Rokkan, 1970). This overview emphasizes how socio-​political cleavages undergo continuous mutations resulting from technological progress and historical events. The post-​Maastricht politicization conceals the emergence of a new cleavage in European society (De Wilde et al., 2019). More precisely, during the last fifty years, it is possible to identify two interconnected historical phenomena that have altered the pre-​existent socio-​political scenario. Correlated with the success of the redistributive policies in Western European societies, the first mutation dates back to the end of the 1960s. The unprecedented rise of post-​materialist values—​characterized by the public saliency gained by civic and environmental rights—​is associated by Ronald Inglehart (1971) with the success of redistributive policies and the emergence of the mass consumption society. Manifested with the rise of environmental, gender, minority and pacifist movements, this new political phase was characterized by a more permissive morality on family and sexual issues (Lipset, 1981, pp. 503–​521). The second event transforming the socio-​political texture of European society relates to economic models and technological innovation. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, European societies witnessed the advancement of the market economy as a hegemonic model. The resulting process of globalization generated divisions having both economic and social connotations. Illustrated in the literature through the cosmopolitans/​communitarians dichotomy (De Wilde et al., 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi, 2016; Zürn & De Wilde, 2016), the emergence of a novel globalization-​led cleavage is reflected in the politicization of borders, national sovereignty, international trade, and human rights. Contextualizing the post-​ modern and globalization-​ led cleavage to the integration process, European society is divided between citizens demanding a return to sovereign nation-​states and cosmopolitan individuals supporting the pacifist and unitarian mission of the integration process. In the European context, this societal struggle was theorized in the literature with the integrationist/​demarcationist divide (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012) and the cosmopolitanist/​parochialist dichotomy (De Vries, 2018). This

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novel cleavage surfaces when the debate approaches migration, national sovereignty, civil rights, and transnational solidarity (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Citizens holding a cosmopolitan political identity advocate for the freedom of movements, the protection of human rights, and the democratization of global political governance. This vision is counterpoised by the communitarian beliefs marked by a strong association with traditional values, demanding the restoration (or preservation) of the nation-​state sovereignties. Moreover, from a communitarian perspective, social justice—​ rather than universal—​has to be culturally contextualized to the values and beliefs of the local community (Zürn, 2019). Unlike cosmopolitan beliefs, communitarians reject the ongoing power delegation empowering regional and international organizations. The new socio-​political societal cleavage has a significant impact on the European political agenda, leading to the (i) emergence of new political entrepreneurs; (ii) generating an articulated socio-​political mutation blending bottom-​up with top-​down dynamics; and (iii) questioning the contemporary relevance of the left-​right juxtaposition. The hypothesis behind the dynamics of depoliticization and politicization refers to a structural change in the cleavage structure observed in most advanced societies (Zürn, 2019, p. 981). The depoliticization occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the consolidation of American unipolarity, and the consecration of capitalism as a hegemonic economic model. The contemporary re-​politicization appears to be the bottom-​up reaction to the long-​term consequences of globalization. Therefore, the politicization of European affairs can be construed as the bottom-​up output of the unintentional social-​economic impact of globalization. In a scenario characterized by the asymmetrical possibility to exploit the achievements of European integration, European institutions are increasingly subjected to public scrutiny. The assessment of European policies depends on the educational level and cognitive capabilities of the citizens, basing their evaluation on rational-​utilitarian considerations (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007). The nativist-​communitarian vision has overshadowed the opinions and beliefs of the cosmopolitan integrationist citizens. Emerging all over Europe in diverse forms, populist parties have been instrumental in representing the nativist-​communitarian stances. The populist forces have built electoral success by exploiting the parochial demand to

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defend national, political, social and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule (Hooghe & Marks, 2018, p. 110). The sound representation of the nativist sentiments in the political sphere is behind the spread of a politicization process having critical tones toward the European elites (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Fligstein et al., 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2012). Rather than being associated with the rise of nationalism in the European electorate, the adverse politicization highlights the incapacity of mainstream political elites to establish a pedagogic link with citizens from disadvantaged socio-​economic backgrounds and to fully represent cosmopolitan-​integrationist stances.

3.3. Cultural-​demographic trends, religion and digital communication As a direct consequence of the globalization-​ led cleavage, an additional source of EU politicization from the bottom arises from cultural-​ demographic trends. When the public discussion verges on domains capable of fragmenting European public opinion, it appears clear how cultural factors can accelerate the EU politicization from the bottom. Immigration is probably the social matter that mainly contributes to enhancing the politicization of European affairs. The societal reactions to the asylum seekers crisis—​and the governance of the individuals arriving from third countries tout court—​ represent the most visible battleground among cosmopolitan-​ integrationist and nativist-​ communitarian sentiments (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Exemplifying the socio-​cultural asymmetries and the different ethnic and civil orientations in the political community, the discussion over immigration created a permanent divide in European society. On one side, recalling international law and the rights of asylum, cosmopolitan citizens demand inclusive policies for migrants. This vision is vehemently opposed by nativist-​communitarian beliefs stemming from exclusive nationalism (Citrin & Sides, 2004; McLaren, 2001). As mentioned earlier, the bottom-​up sources of EU politicization represent an output of the endogenous and exogenous complex scenario. This normative assumption can also be applied to the polarization created by immigration policies. In this case, the fear of unemployment and poverty fuels

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anti-​ immigration sentiments in the European population (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Economic considerations are paired with cultural orientations. Individuals from third countries are assimilated as a threat to the preservation of the local culture, and/​or a breaking factor for the ancestral connection between individuals and territory (Noury & Roland, 2020). In the European public sphere, these beliefs are counterpoised by citizens holding a constructive approach toward the multiculturalization of European societies (Curtis, 2014). As observable in the empirical reality, European society is affected by a cultural-​educational polarization, where the positions and beliefs of the different factions seem irreconcilable. As a result, debates often result in intellectual conflicts rather than societal dialogue. The discussion over immigration represents the pinnacle of the European socio-​cultural clash. Indeed, any other policy involving cultural elements of societal innovation (e.g., the introduction of legal rights for the LGBTQ community) instantly becomes a matter of public conflict, highlighting the socio-​political saliency of the cosmopolitan-​integrationist/​ nativist-​communitarian dichotomy. As noted by Mark De Vries and Gary Marks (2012), the globalization-​ led cleavage created a multi-​ dimensional transnational political space characterized by multiple fractures stemming from ethnic and cultural identifications. Religious identities cannot be ignored while contextualizing the impact of novel sociological trends on contemporary European societies. Unintentionally, globalization has reinvigorated religious cleavage. In this regard, the baseline reflection is related to the role that Catholicism plays in defining ethnic-​ancestral boundaries that are intuitively plausible to many Europeans (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009, p. 14). From a historical perspective, secularization, the emergence of nation-​states, and the gradual eclipse of the Catholicism-​Protestantism dichotomy, have contributed to weakening the saliency of religion in political life. Moreover, during the last century, the influence of religion in European public affairs declined due to the implosion of right-​wing totalitarian ideologies, frequently embedding values from the ultra-​conservative Catholic movements (Lipset, 1994). During the last decades, the multiculturalization of European society has indirectly brought back arguments relating Christianity to the preservation of traditional European cultural values. The speculations over the Muslimization of Europe, and the attention generated by the

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sporadic terroristic attacks having a para-​religious matrix, have contributed to revamping the religious fracture in European societies. Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU has indirectly reinvigorated the religious elements in the European demos (Byrnes & Katzenstein, 2006). Analyzing Poland, during the enlargement negotiation, the Vatican played a central role in the accession of the country to the EU (Pobłocki, 2004). In Poland, religious cleavage has never declined due to the contraposition of the forced atheism imposed by the Communist nomenklatura. The Polish Pope John Paul II advocated for the political integration of the country, lobbying to ensure that the catholic instances embedded in the Polish society would be included in a (less secular) European identity (Byrnes & Katzenstein, 2006; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Lipset, 1994). In the post-​Maastricht scenario, another signal of religious revamp was observed during the negotiations of the EU Constitutional Treaty and the Convention on the Future of Europe. During the talks, different social groups have exercised pressing demands to include an explicit recall of Christian principles within the European foundational values (Magnette, 2007). Hence, faith and religious identities are returning to the political scene in a Europe of changing borders. The return of religion in the public debate is creating social tension between conservative Europeans—​blatant in the case of the Muslim minority—​and citizens supporting interfaith dialogue and the creation of a multicultural community. Citizens backing the dermarcationist stances seem closely related to the definition of ethnic identity provided by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996). In their vision, multiculturalism and supranationalism are considered threats to national culture, traditions, and ancestral religions. As an indirect effect of globalization, one side of the society demands the preservation of the Christian-​Judeo roots vis-​a-​vis the influx of migrants holding different religious beliefs. This demand is reinforced by the denial of legislative acts considered against Christian moral values, endangering the role of the family in society. The conservative beliefs collide with the vision of citizens supporting the inter-​faith dialogue and the secularization of the relationship between the political power and the religious elites. The creation of a multicultural society, and the promotion of civil rights clashing with the conservative Christian morale, have become pillars for European citizens having an identity influenced by civic-​cosmopolitan values.

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Nowadays, the values promoted by Christianity have been subjected to a theological debate, reflecting the emergence of fractures even within the ecclesial elites. The Vatican took a u-​ turn, electing a Pope criticized for endorsing progressive political positions considered too close to cosmopolitan integrationist stances. A growing cluster of European citizens—​mobilized by political entrepreneurs and Catholic civil society organizations not aligned with Pope Francis I—​are lifting religious symbols, creating a clear demarcation with the pluricultural and multiconfessional Europe. The intersection between the traditional religious and the post-​ modern cleavages represents one of the pillars of EU cultural politicization from the bottom. Religion is back on the political scene, representing a cultural glue for citizens holding a nativist European ethnic identity, and a source of perplexity for the Europeans supporting the secularization of political power. Moving forward, the bottom-​up politicization of EU affairs has also been fuelled by the ageing of European society. Often underestimated in the literature, the recent demographic trends represent an auxiliary variable influencing the relevance acquired by the EU institutions and policies in European society. Partly ascribable to globalization, technological progress and neo-​liberal doctrines (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2016; Baars et al., 2006), the decreasing fertility rate combined with the increased life expectancy reshuffled the European demography. In addition, reflecting on European demography, the progressive demise of senior citizens—​witnesses of the misery resulting from the success of the nationalist movements—​ represent an additional source jeopardizing the societal perceptions of the integration process. Rather than representing a direct source of EU politicization, the ageing population and the disappearance of the survivors from the atrocities of the two world conflicts should be considered factors indirectly mutating public opinions and the historical interpretation of European integration. A society composed of an electorate with an elevated median age increases the electoral demands towards conservative values, creating a socio-​political framework that privileges preserving the status quo (Baars et al., 2006; Noury & Roland, 2020; Tilley & Evans, 2014). Considering the innovative and post-​modernist nature of the European integration, it is plausible to assume that most senior Europeans would hardly endorse the cosmopolitan integrationist cultural values,

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and/​or comprehend the complicated techno-​political interactions between member states and European institutions. Conversely, a significant share of senior citizens could support the conservative instances promoted by the nativist-​communitarian elites. Older people are less adventurous than younger people, less equipped to network with peers from neighboring countries, and less inclined to interact with people who are “not like” them (Fligstein et al., 2012, p. 110). The alteration of the population pyramid has deprived the European elites of exploiting the Euro-​positive attitudes prevalent among the youths. Nowadays, the pro-​ European attitudes detected among youths since the inception of the integration process (Deutsch, 1969; Haas, 1970) are diluted in a gerontocratic electorate. As a result, European policies are susceptible to a negative process of politicization from the bottom, obstructing the progress of the integration process and limiting the delegation of national competencies in favor of the supranational institutions. In parallel, the demise of the survivors from two world conflicts limits the mission of the European elites to emphasize the positive impact of the integration process on the life and prosperity of the European population. Moving to the following cause of EU politicization from the bottom, a supplementary cultural aspect affects identity politics in the European public sphere. Analyzing the sources of information of the EU citizens, and the commingling between consumption patterns and cultural trends, it becomes challenging to set a clear demarcation between economic, educational and cultural divisions. The development of an economic model promoting laissez-​faire and technological advancements has indirectly created novel cultural dynamics impacting the relationship between the political elites and the citizens. On this aspect, the mutation in the mass media and communication landscape represents an important variable behind the politicization of EU affairs. In contrast with the past, internet and social media have revolutionized public campaigning, creating opportunities for aspirant elites and ordinary citizens to establish direct links with the masses. The mutation of the communication landscape needs to be contextualized in a polarized scenario where a minoritarian proportion of citizens obtain information through newspapers and magazines; while a growing share of the population is susceptible to information acquired

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in social media and tabloids. Hence, a supplementary divisive element is represented by the different cognitive capabilities of European citizens to distinguish between real and fake news. From this perspective, multiple studies draw a direct correlation between new media and the consolidation of nativist-​communitarian sentiments among citizens (Krämer, 2014; Reinemann et al., 2016; Rooduijn, 2014; Van Aelst et al., 2017). In other words, digital media contribute to disseminating inaccurate information regarding European policies, facilitating the engagement of the citizens in EU affairs. As demonstrated by the Cambridge Analytical scandal, social networks provide an ideal platform for disseminating news based on sensationalism and scandals, contributing to the societal polarization over European affairs (Mazzoleni, 2008; Müller et al., 2017). Populist parties were able to capitalize on the mutated public communication landscape disseminating political messages in new and old media, levering societal emotions and anxieties (Engesser et al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017; Krämer, 2014). Digital media contribute to polarizing and politicizing European public opinion, unfolding the cultural and educational inequalities afflicting European society. As a result, the citizens (and by extension the elites) are unable to pursue a constructive and rational dialogue on issues strategical for the future of the continent. On this matter, immigration probably represents the best case study. Despite the objective necessity to attract young workers from third countries due to the steady decrease in the fertility rate, citizens and elites cannot initiate a constructive dialogue to detect legislative solutions to the demographic challenge faced. The empirical reality demonstrates the complexity of advancing solutions capable of integrating the concerns of the nativist-​communitarians with the factual need to build an inclusive multicultural society responding to the status quo of the European demography. Social media has been largely utilized as a battle arena for matters related to immigration. Rather than representing a meeting point between citizens with diverse visions, digital media has become an instrument functional for expressing hedonistic opinions. Involuntarily, the European elites have acquired a centrality in social media, without having the control of rectifying the inaccuracies, neither being in the position of seeding with equal effect information related to the political action of the European institutions.

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Concluding the reflection on the EU bottom-​up politicization, on one side, European affairs are scrutinized by a cluster of cosmopolitan citizens understanding the complexities of an interdependent multipolar world. This position is conducive to a bottom-​up politicization promoting the mission of the integration process, and hence inducing European and national elites to overshadow short-​term national interests to build an operative, transparent, and democratic Union (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). On the opposite side, the beliefs of the nativist-​ communitarian community represent the long-​term consequence of the silent revolution taking place with the de-​industrialization of the European economies (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Citizens affected by the negative consequences of globalization—​and indirectly penalized by the laissez-​ faire elements of the European Common Market—​have developed a dogmatic feeling of distrust over the political elites and European policies. Holding conservative and materialistic values, nativist-​communitarian citizens were instrumental in the emergence of new political entrepreneurs having the ideological mission of preserving the competencies and traditions of the Westphalian nation-​states. The social instances of the nativist-​communitarian sentiments seem better represented at the political level, amplifying the visibility of an adverse EU politicization aiming at the paralysis of the integration process. The recent success of the populist movements also raises two interconnected considerations related to the mainstream parties. The electoral accomplishment of new political parties has quickly enhanced the electoral salience of issues represented within the novel globalization-​led cleavage. In this evolving socio-​political context, mainstream parties partly failed to re-​adapt their ideologies and communication strategies to the sociological and economic mutations. Considering that mainstream parties have failed to fully respond to the challenges arising from globalization and the post-​Maastricht scenario (Hooghe & Marks, 2018), reasons why elites often considered the EU politicization as a threat rather than an opportunity.

Chapter 4. The consequences of the politicization of European affairs As reflected by the increasing number of publications analyzing the EU politicization and Eurosceptic movements, the sequence of crises engaging the European institutions has contributed to enlarging the academic interest in the saliency gained by European affairs in the public debates. Only recently, scholars have begun to empirically assess the effects of politicization on the integration process (for empirical studies, see Bes et al., 2018; Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Drawing a general picture, the envisaged effects of EU politicization are influenced by the ontological vision of the analysts and the theoretical background utilized to conceptualize the integration process. The consequences of the EU politicization have divided the academic community. Schematizing the results of the conducted studies, the opinions of the academic community can be represented with two counterposing scenarios. On the one hand, a cluster of studies considers EU politicization as a negative phenomenon for the integration process. From this point of view, politicization is a detrimental phenomenon jeopardizing the effectiveness of EU governance. On the other hand, scholars have drafted opposite conclusions, highlighting the positive medium-​term effects on EU governance. These scholars consider politicization an inevitable event, representing an opportunity to enhance the input legitimacy of European institutions. From a pragmatic point of view, politicization is de facto entered into the integration process, and it will not vanish. Consequently, the focus of the academic community and civil society should be channeled to the capabilities (and strategies) that European elites require to develop, preserve and deepen the integration process. The scope of this chapter is to critically analyze the arguments portraying politicization as a threat and an opportunity for the integration process. The final aim is to develop a broad understanding of politicization-​driven effects. Rather than verifying the conclusions of the existing studies, the objective is to comprehend the impact of politicization on European institutions, policymaking

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and society. The baseline idea is that academic outputs highlighting the negative consequences of politicization should be deployed to solve the existing challenges. At the same time, the envisaged opportunities should be instrumental in understanding the actions that the European elites should promote in order to exploit the occurred politicization. The governance of the European Union will not revert to the pre-​Maastricht scenario characterized by permissive consensus and technical problem-​solving strategies. Irrespective of its negative or positive nature, the politicization of the integration process is an ongoing process that requires institutional, political and social responses by political and social actors placed at different levels. Based on the scientific findings, comprehensive strategic actions should be taken to enhance the responsiveness of European politics. As Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2018, p. 20) explained, the political controversies that have affected the effectiveness of European decision-​making are connected to foundational questions related to the nature and the final mission of the EU. In this context, the analysis of EU politicization is propaedeutic to comprehend how the European and national elites can cooperate to create a collective sense of belongingness. Acknowledging the shift from European governance to EU politics, nurturing a collective political and geographical identity could represent a societal asset to govern present and future political, social and economic challenges.

4.1. The side effects of the shift from EU governance to EU politics As introduced in the earlier chapters, the politicization of European affairs has contributed to the generation of detrimental dynamics empowering socio-​political actors interested in limiting the scope of European institutions. For this reason, several scholars have prioritized the negative consequences of EU politicization over the potential beneficial effects. To facilitate the illustration of the positions portraying the negative implications of politicization over the integration process, the analysis has been divided into three interdependent and correlated macro arguments. Influenced by intergovernmental theories, the first macro-​ argument associates the EU politicization with the emergence of a political trap for the European and national elites. Inspired by the thought of Fritz Scharpf

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(1998, 2006) on the limitations of the European decision-​making architecture, multiple scholars (e.g., Falkner, 2011; Zeitlin et al., 2019) have operationalized the definition of political trap to explain the inability of national and European leaders of finalizing compromises to the most pressing issues on the EU political agenda. Considered a direct negative consequence of the EU politicization, the political trap affecting the effectiveness of the European institutions is often utilized to contextualize the mismanagement by the national elites of the European governance crises. From this perspective, mainly focused on the consequences of EU politicization on national political players, the saliency and the detrimental polarization gained by the EU affairs have led to the paralysis of intergovernmental negotiations, obstructing the detection of Pareto-​optimal agreements (Majone, 1998), and undermining the stability of the EU due to deficiencies in terms of effectiveness and output legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999; Zeitlin et al., 2019). The political trap can also be illustrated through a historical perspective, highlighting the differences between the pre and post-​ Maastricht times. In the past, intergovernmental negotiations occurred behind closed doors, debating issues related to low politics, and leaving national sovereignties unaltered (Bartolini, 2006; Milward, 1992). After the embedment of high politics in European affairs, intergovernmental negotiation became politicized, undermining the confidentiality sheltering Council meetings from the media attention and providing a public spotlight to the conflicts occurring among the national executive and the European institutions. As a result, the visibility gained by the Council negotiations has jeopardized the consensus-​oriented negotiation methodology developed during the early stage of the integration process. Moreover, the politicization of the intergovernmental negotiations has created a heated bridge between the European level and the political-​propagandistic discussions at the national level. This novelty creates an environment where national elites can consider defying the European consensus for short-​term benefits. Moving to the second macro-​argument, the focal point shifts from the intergovernmental negotiations to the impact of the EU politicization on the intra-​European cultural divides. Based on the postfunctionalist and behavioural theories, the main assumption is that the EU politicization is expanding the fractures of European society. From this point of view, the post-​ Maastricht competencies—​ placing the integration beyond the

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economic and trade regulatory regime toward a political union (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2009)—​are generating a destructive politicization characterized by the rise of a cultural clash between citizens supporting supranationalism and Europeans keen to preserve the Westphalian model. This cultural divide is magnified by the prolonged socio-​political discussions on European integration and national sovereignties, increasing the distance between Eurosceptics and supporters of European integration. These dynamics are increasing the societal polarization affecting the public debate and domestic party politics. In this climax, the European and national elites lose exclusive control of the integration process, making public opinion an important factor influencing the EU decision-​making procedure (Börzel & Risse, 2018). As a result, the integration process has become exposed to negative public sentiments, leading to the risk of bringing the EU into political paralysis or even able to generate a spillback producing a partial disintegration of the Union (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Jones, 2018; Krastev, 2017; Scharpf, 2009). Closely connected with the previous analysis, the third macro-​argument correlates EU politicization with the rise of Eurosceptic political movements. From this perspective, the EU politicization allows minoritarian political movements to emerge as Eurosceptic civic representatives (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015; Zeitlin et al., 2019). The representation of populist-​ Eurosceptic instances is orchestrated by political entrepreneurs who aim to obtain influence in the national and European realms. As mainstream political parties tend to be pro-​European, the hostility toward the European project represents a political opportunity, creating room for maneuver for opposition parties interested in capitalizing the societal scepticism over the European institutions (Zürn, 2019). This also explains why the Eurosceptic movements have dissimilar backgrounds, ideologies and political roots. Hence, the EU politicization has allowed niche political movements to rise, proposing a cultural-​identitarian political agenda based on the defense of Westphalian sovereignties (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Consequently, the negative impact of politicization lies behind the increasing influence gained by Eurosceptic parties at the national and European levels. As a result, Eurosceptic national executives could (and have) used their veto to jeopardize the decision-​making process within the Council (Zeitlin et al., 2019). Similarly, the Eurosceptic national executives could appoint

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commissioners in targeted policy domains to slow down the dynamism of the supranational institutions. Likewise, the constant growth of the Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament elections may lead the supranational institution to be ruled by a political majority having the collective goal of watering down the integration process. In this light, the EU politicization could lead to a paralysis of European governance (Zeitlin et al., 2019), to a scaling-​back of the EU competencies (Zielonka, 2014), or to transform the EU into a marginal intergovernmental cooperation arena (Majone, 2014).

4.2. The opportunities arising from the politicization of the European affairs Moving to the positive consequences, multiple scholars consider politicization as a stimulus for the European and national elites to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU governance. The first positive consequence attributed to the politicization of European affairs is the rising capability of the EU supranational non-​majoritarian institutions to respond to societal needs and citizen preferences. As demonstrated in the analysis conducted by Christian Rauh (2016, 2018), politicization has been an opportunity for the European Commission to enhance its activism vis-​à-​vis citizen needs and public interests. The increased responsiveness of the European institutions could contribute to increasing transnational legitimacy. Linking society to the European level, the saliency gained by European affairs represents a constructive pressure for the European institutions to deliver policies responding to the citizens’ demands and civil society campaigns. From this perspective, by appearing responsive to specific issues affecting the lives of citizens, the controversiality of the of EU-​ affairs in the socio-​political debate represents an opportunity for European supranational institutions to enhance their democratic legitimacy and societal effectiveness (Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Magnette, 2001). Closely correlated to this issue, another central point in this discussion is related to the ability of the European elites to communicate with the citizens. A study conducted by Philippe De Bruycker (2017) supports the hypothesis that the rise of politicization over EU affairs is instrumental in enhancing the abilities of European elites to appear and communicate in mass media.

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The increased capacity of the EU institutions to connect with their citizens is closely related to a correlated argument envisaging the positive consequences of the occurred politicization. This position is grounded on the assumption that European elites could exploit politicization to enhance transnational democratic legitimacy. The enlarged visibility and saliency gained by the European Union, along with the polarization of opinions, could be instrumental in boosting societal awareness (De Wilde & Lord, 2015). Societal polarization has become an important source of transnational mobilization (Magnette, 2001; De Bruycker, 2017). Firstly, polarization stimulates elites to dialogue with the citizens over European affairs. Secondly, it favours and simplifies the citizens’ understanding of the supranational mechanisms and competencies. Hence, politicization could gradually improve the societal understanding of EU governance, enhancing the quality of the public debate on European affairs. Citizens’ unfamiliarity with the role and the functioning of the European Union represents one of the major constraining factors for European integration. It is inherent in human nature to fear and reject what is unknown (Carleton, 2016). In this context, the full-​fledged landing of the European institutions in the domestic public spheres—​matched with a strategic presence of transnational institutional and political actors in the mainstream media—​could support the political mandate of the European institutions (Schmidt, 2019). From this point of view, politicization could be considered positive as far as it unlocks a debate on European politics, establishes a link between the European institutions and the citizen, and creates the precondition for the consolidation of transnational identities (Hix & Høyland, 2013, Risse, 2015; Statham & Trenz, 2015). Along with facilitating the presence of transnational actors in the domestic public spheres, politicization is considered an opportunity to address European democratic weaknesses. More specifically, politicization could represent an opportunity to reinforce the European political dimension, moving beyond the pre-​Maastricht apolitical and technocratic nature of the EU governance (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). The politicization could generate leverages promoting reforms aimed to link the European polity with the citizens. Consequently, politicization could be seen as an opportunity to create a genuine transnational public sphere (Börzel & Risse, 2018), facilitating the development of a fully-​fledged European political

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system. Several scholars (e.g., Risse, 2010; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010) consider politicization as a chance to establish intra and inter-​institutional procedures designed to enhance transnational democracy. By creating a sound link between elites and masses, restructuring the transnational political representation could contribute to consolidating transnational loyalties, instrumental to deepening and optimizing the integration process. In this regard, the development of a consolidated European party system—​along with concrete measures to increase the representativeness of the Europarties and their impact on the EU governance—​could significantly increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Van der Eijk & Mark, 2004). Restructuring the transnational political representation could also epitomize the ideal answer to the Eurosceptic political movements. As suggested by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967, p. 4), the existence and the vitality of the political debate guarantees that grievances and attacks are deflected from the system and addressed by the power-​holders. In other words, ensuring that the political agenda is acknowledged and contestable by the citizens would boost the accountability and legitimacy of the European institutional system (Zeitlin et al., 2019). To avoid the growth of political movements campaigning against the European polity, it is vital to develop a public arena welcoming (and democratically challenging) political opponent (Mair, 2007). From this perspective, the Eurosceptic parties—​rather than a threat to the EU—​ could be viewed as elements enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union. Eurosceptic elites could represent an asset as they could enlarge the citizen representation in the European institutions, mitigating the representation gap at different political levels (Zürn, 2019). As explained by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2020), identity politics is an essential step toward the deepening of integration, mainly if we consider that the current rise of populism can be effectively counterposed by the creation of a narrative linking European integration to the collective interest of the member states.

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4.3. The socio-​political consequences of the EU politicization The saliency gained by the European Union has deeply affected the party competition. The awakening of European affairs into the public discussion shifted the debate around European affairs from the Brussels bubble to the public sphere (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). From a socio-​political perspective, the dilemma related to the impact of politicization over the pre-​existent societal socio-​political fractures had acquired a strategic role in the study of the European Union. The inclusion of high politics within the European arena has contributed to characterizing the globalization-​led cleavage to the European socio-​political milieu. Following the politicization of European affairs, the evolution of the European socio-​political fractures is affecting the representativeness of the domestic party systems. Going beyond the traditional left-​right ideological debate, new issues are embedded into the political sphere, fragmenting public opinion over civil, economic, and environmental challenges. In a society where political ideologies are weakened, new societal actors have instrumentally embraced issues marginally covered in the discourse of mainstream political parties. As observed, European politics is increasingly exposed to socio-​political divisions. The polarization generated by the integration process resulted in the creation of a new cleavage counterposing cosmopolitan citizens with nativist citizens demanding the preservation of the Westphalian nation-​ states (De Vries, 2018; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008, 2012; Zürn, 2014, 2019; Zürn & De Wilde, 2016). Horizontally affecting European society, the novel fracture challenges the nature and representativeness of the pre-​existent cleavages. From a bottom-​up perspective, EU politicization is influenced by the dichotomization of attitudes and beliefs, dividing the winner and the loser of globalization (Teney et al., 2014). In the European context, this division originates from the exposure disparities to the transnational realm. Assuming the irreversibility of the EU politicization and the uneven distribution of the benefits from European integration, it is reasonable to imagine that in the upcoming years, the cosmopolitan-​communitarian fracture will continue to impact the European public sphere and party politics (Zürn, 2014).

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Understanding the political impact of the novel cleavage—​and its relationship with the pre-​existing socio-​political fractures—​is an essential exercise to comprehend the consequences of the EU politicization on the linkage between party politics and citizens. For this reason, the study of the European socio-​political landscape acquires a central role in analyzing the relations between European decision-​makers and citizens. To ensure the representativeness of party politics, European and national elites must cope with the socio-​political transformations within the national communities (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Despite the attempt to depoliticize the decision-​ making process, the EU politicization represents the permanent awakening of issues that have been a political sleeping giant for an extended period of time (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2007, p. 190). Bolstered by the impact of globalization, the sociological consequences of the EU politicization can reshape the electoral behavior in European societies (De Vries, 2007; De Vries & Tillman, 2011; Hobolt & Rodon, 2020; Tillman, 2004; Van der Eijk & Mark, 2004). The socio-​political fractures play a significant role in the democratization of societal conflicts. While the state apparatus is pivotal in shaping collective identities, socio-​economic polarizations provide a supplementary political identity to the citizens. The different political identities are mirrored in the competition among the political parties, creating a direct link between the mass and the elites. Guided by conflicting ideologies, political parties should be considered the intermediate societal bodies representing a constellation of diffuse opinions and providing different answers to diverging demands (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 53). As observed during the last decades, new political movements have emerged, fostering electoral volatility and weakening the power position of mainstream political parties. Due to the novel cleavage, the issues traditionally covered within the left-​right continuum are paired with social pressures demanding more or less European integration (Hix, 1999). Multiple social fractures are aligned into the left-​right axis for a functional purpose (Hix, 1999). Originated at the time of the French Revolution in the National Assembly—​having the representatives loyal to the monarchy sitting on the right of the king’s throne and the republicans occupying the seats located on the left (Hobolt & Rodon, 2020)—​the right-​left scheme is the universal continuum adopted in democratic regimes to schematize the political positioning. The aim is to simplify the collective

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understanding by placing different instances promoted by multiple political parties into a bipolar continuum. Within this scheme, cleavages are represented in politics by separate political parties mirroring the historical, social, and normative peculiarity of each political community. For these reasons, the left-​right structure became a useful heuristic tool, able to simplify the citizens’ belongingness to the party system (Downs, 1957), facilitating citizen participation and in turn, increasing the legitimacy of the ruling institutions. The long-​ term consequences of the EU politicization on the pre-​ existent European societal divides remain unknown. The impact of the novel cleavage on the European political party is a matter of discussion among scholars. According to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2018), cosmopolitan-​ communitarian polarization will progressively acquire a central position in the political debate, profoundly affecting the representativeness of the mainstream parties and ideologies. Differently, Hanspeter Kriesi (2016) expects the novel cleavage to be integrated into pre-​existent ideologies. Overall, there is a general agreement that this transformation will equally affect the national and transnational domains. What is not yet clear are the strategies political elites will deploy to transform the cosmopolitan-​communitarian polarization into electoral consent. On this matter, Michael Zürn (2019) assumes that cosmopolitan elites would opt to exploit the emergence of the novel cleavage at the European level, while demarcationist political entrepreneurs would restrict their campaigning to the national and regional arena. Observing the empirical reality, the populist forces have strongly invested in the European level to promote, and provide visibility, to their instances. This was evident in the circumstances that led to Brexit. Mainly due to the national majoritarian electoral law, UKIP concentrated its campaigning efforts on the European Parliament (proportional) elections. Hence, in the British case, political elites representing the demand of the demarcationist citizens strategically decided to concentrate their political action at the European level. At the same time, the secondary nature of the EP elections has led the mainstream political parties to concentrate their financial and intellectual investments on national ballots. These examples demonstrate the complexity of the phenomena and the difficulties in drawing a general picture. Endogenous and exogenous

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factors shape the strategies political entrepreneurs develop within the multidimensional European political environment. In this regard, the ability and velocity of the political entrepreneurs to adapt to the mutation of society play a central role in electoral success. Undoubtedly, the cleavage generated by the EU politicization and globalization consistently impacts party politics at the national and European levels. The political and economic dynamics behind the rise of globalization, and the liberal doctrine beyond the European Single Market and Monetary Union, have already caused the disappearance of the communist parties and the decline of the Marxist ideology. Considering the role played by the communist parties in Western European democracies, this fact alone represents a major change in party politics. In the last decade, new political parties have been reshuffling electoral behavior. For instance, the Debt Crisis in Greece—​and the impossibility of the Greek executives to negotiate a favorable solution with the European and international financial elites—​led to the electoral victory of Syriza. Similarly, the pro-​European and pro-​multiculturalist stances promoted by Angela Markel indirectly favored the emergence of the ultra-​conservative Allianz für Deutschland. In the Italian scenario, the inability of the national and European elites to agree on solutions combining investments with anti-​deficit policies resulted in a parliamentary majority composed of the nativist-​nationalist Lega and naïve-​demagogic party Movimento Cinque Stelle. These electoral results are factual evidence of how the integrationist-​demarcationist divide is acquiring political space in national and European party politics. The political answer to the emergence of the new social divide seems to have a cross-​cut effect within the traditional left-​right spectrum (Zeitlin et al., 2019). The mainstream left parties have gradually lost their labor-​ class electorate, becoming a party for intellectuals. Similarly, the moderate Christian democratic elites are losing their traditional electorate, gradually becoming parties representing the economic elites (Piketty, 2018). Following the depoliticization after the Cold War, the agendas of the mainstream political parties were subjected to a partial convergence, leaving political space for elites campaigning over EU and transnational affairs (Kitschelt, 2018). Today, European politics entered a new phase marked by the re-​politicization of societal affairs. This is reflected in the work of Russell Dalton (2018)—​ the earlier father of the dealignment

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theory—​advocating for the citizens’ return to politics. The prior depoliticization in Western politics was not the effect of the end of the ideologies as speculated by multiple authors. Differently, depoliticization was a temporary process resulting from the transformation of the cleavages’ landscape and the transitory emergence of North American unipolarity. This restoration process is gradually reshaping the party politics scenario both at the national and European levels (Bartolini & Mair, 2007; Zürn, 2019). On the one hand, the left-​right dimension continues to represent the cornerstone of political competition (Hobolt & Rodon, 2020). The increased electoral volatility (Kriesi et al., 2008)—​matched with the recent evolution of post-​ideological emotive politics (Novelli, 2017)—​collide with the fact that the left-​right continuum remains the only dimension to classify political parties (Van der Eijk et al., 1992). The emergence of the novel cleavage might create conflictual dimensions within the electoral space, blurring the traditional divide between right and left political actors. The complexity grows exponentially in the case of the European Union, where the political domain is the output of the interaction of multiple polities and public spheres. The EU represents a sui-​generis multidimensional political arena, divided into multiple levels of governance, characterized by socio-​economic asymmetries, cultural diversity and a melting-​pot of local identities. At the same time, the left-​right division remains the compass of civic participation in European and national political life. Analyzing the pre-​existent cleavages and the domestic realm, today the same societal divisions are still manifested in the different visions represented by the political parties. Similarly, issues historically characterizing left-​right politics are still preponderant at the European level (Hix, 1999, p. 73). For instance, the political footprint of the previous cleavage appears in the debate over the future goal of European redistributive policies. In other words, national and European politics are still forged by state intervention vs laissez-​faire, center vs periphery, and labor class vs entrepreneurs dichotomies. Political discussions that emerged following the socio-​economic impact of the pre-​existent cleavages are still marking the political identity of the Europeans. Today, irrespective of the end of ideology theory (Jost, 2006), left-​right party politics continues to play a crucial role in framing individual political orientations. The concrete obstacle in embedding, mainstreaming, and consolidating the novel cleavage lies in the capacity of

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political entrepreneurs to update the existing political ideologies. Whether the re-​adaptation of the mainstream political ideologies will occur—​or whether the globalization-​led cleavage will jeopardize the structure of the European party system—​remains a matter of future investigations. Ideologies need minimal coherence with socio-​economic reality and intellectual quality before they can successfully underpin a cleavage (De Wilde et al., 2016, p. 235). If capable of responding to pressing societal issues and widely acknowledged by the citizens, ideologies can act as a bridge between the elites and the voters. In this scenario, the European elites should understand and respond to the undergoing socio-​political transformations. Attempts of depoliticization—​ or similarly the denial of EU politicization—​are not likely to solve the hurdles the integration faces. The socio-​political transformation caused by the EU politicization requires the empowerment of new and old transnational actors to detect (and enforce) comprehensive solutions enhancing the link between the institutions and the citizens. The rise of populism has highlighted the issue, bringing speculation over the return of the nation-​ states and the collapse of the Union. However, the success of political forces capitalizing on the communitarian demands represents only one side of the coin. If pro-​European elites properly channel and ideologically organize cosmopolitan-​integrationist opinions, EU politicization and globalization could lead to a revolutionary post-​modern transformation of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty and identity.

Chapter 5. Power and legitimacy in the politicized European Union One of the most interesting consequences of the EU politicization is the relevance acquired by the transnational democratic legitimization and the European identities. Legitimacy is an inalienable asset of any power regime. At this point in time, the European Union should be considered the most significant attempt to bring democratic legitimacy to the supranational realm. At the same time, the analysis of European identity politics is instrumental in assessing the impact of politicization on the agenda and scope of the political parties. The theoretical framing of European identities is essential for a deeper socio-​economic understanding of the interconnections between identity, power and politics (Bernstein, 2005). From a theoretical point of view, identity politics is often associated with different societal phenomena having both negative and positive connotations. For instance, identity politics is central in investigations analyzing extreme-​right politics and xenophobia (e.g., Betz, 2003). Similarly, it is pivotal in studying gender equality and LGBT rights (e.g., Chan, 2018; Walters, 2018). In general terms, identity politics is a blanket concept, embedding a rainbow of different political contestations and acquiring different connotations according to the nature of the power regime (Bickford, 1997; Heyes, 2018). In the European continent, it is possible to sketch a correlation between democracy, globalization, and identity politics (Brown, 1995). More precisely, the creation and representation of multiple identities within and between European societies is the consequence of the freedom of expression established by liberal democracies. The expansion of European integration in new economic and political domains—​combined with the uncertainty over the future political role of the EU—​indirectly fueled societal claims related to the defense of national sovereignties (Fligstein et al., 2012). Furthermore, the EU governance crises—​ generating heated debates over European solidarity and socio-​ economic inequalities—​significantly contributed to the growth of identity politics in Europe (Kuhn, 2019). These dynamics will continue to affect

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the legitimacy of the European institutions, bringing into the spotlight the discussion gravitating around the European collective identities.

5.1. The political communities, the nation-​states and the post-​modern  polity In abstract terms, Benedict Anderson (1991) describes nation-​states as imagined political communities where individuals develop a collective sense of belonging among strangers. From this constructivist perspective, nation-​states are political communities glued together by a collective ethnocultural feeling of brotherhood. The construction of collective identities follows a hierarchical pattern. Elites are the initiators of the process, as they have the power to disseminate beliefs and values towards an extended cohort of individuals. Hence, the creation and expansion of community identities are the output of community feelings advanced by elites and disseminated through media, societal structures and interpersonal communication. The consolidation of collective senses of belongingness is subjected to the solidity of the pre-​existent networks, belief and structure of the society, and the capacity of the proposed community identity to manipulate inter-​group differences (Kohli, 2000; Risse, 2010; Steenvoorden & Wright, 2018). The interplay between elites and individuals in this process recalls Max Weber’s (1978) conceptual separation between state and nation. While the state refers to the politic-​bureaucratic apparatus, the nation represents the identitarian fusion among individuals and elites. Individuals are oriented by political symbols, public celebrations and any collective commemoration glorifying the political community (Di Mauro & Fiket, 2017). Social symbolism represents an inescapable element beyond the presence of a sense of belongingness within the political community (Fligstein et al., 2012). Collective symbols are a central element for the community’s self-​identification and the development of solidarity within society. The micro-​dynamics generated by the establishment of an identitarian attachment are perfectly summarized in the definition of nationality advanced by Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1953, p. 101). The Czech socio-​political scientist equates nationality with the alignment of individuals from different social classes to the identitarian discourse disseminated by the elites. Thus, creating a communitarian identity implies

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the development of a cross-​classes alliance supporting the consolidation (and the legitimation) of a power structure. In this process, mass media plays a significant role. Traditional and digital media are the ideal locus for elites to shape individuals’ preferences and identities (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). Since its inception, the relationship between society, politics and mass media has been symbiotic. The representation in media of the symbols and myths of the political community is an effective strategy to build a link between the rulers and the ruled (Castells, 2008; De Wilde et al., 2016; Habermas, 1996b; Pfetsch et al., 2010). Within this frame, communitarian identities are instrumental in sustaining the societal, political and economic role acquired by the elites. The legitimacy of the rulers is supported and justified by the sense of belonging nourished among the ruled. The creation of societal myths, and the establishment of a collective sense of brotherhood, are still today the pillars of political legitimacy. Therefore, for political elites, legitimacy is an inalienable goal. The legitimization of the polity allows the elites—​and the established state apparatus—​to hold the power monopoly without exercising violence. Elites become central actors in perpetuating the political community, striving to equip themselves with power and ensuring that the enforcement of their commands is facilitated by the voluntary compliance of societal groups (Deutsch, 1953, p. 101). Dedicated state apparatus reproduces and disseminates foundational myths sustaining the legitimacy of the ruling elites in order to preserve their power, increment their legitimacy and minimize the adoption of coercive measures (Fligstein et al., 2012). The values marking the collective identity are primarily influenced by temporal and geographical variables, varying according to the socio-​ political priorities of the ruling class. Moreover, the collective identity and the political culture are deeply affected by technological advancements and socio-​economic transformations (Schlenker, 2012). For instance, collective memories—​transformed in the context of modern nation-​states into symbols and commemorations—​represent a vital source of legitimization. Collective memories constitute an ideological and mythological interpretation of historical facts, functional for consolidating the collective identity and the political community (Assmann, 2006). Collective memories are rooted in society, disseminated in the form of storytelling, and mainstreamed by dedicated state apparatus. This propagation occurs

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among individuals during the primary socialization phase to ensure that the citizens are integrated into the political community from an early age. To fulfil this goal, the education system plays a pivotal role in preserving the identitarian values of the community. The consolidation of physical and socio-​cultural borders is the transliteration of the identitarian demarcations, instrumental for the recognition of the state authority within (and outside) the political community. Defining and embedding demarcations within a common identity is essential to stabilize the legitimacy of the political community. Collective symbols and myths are functional to create demarcations differentiating the community members from the outsiders (Habermas, 2001). In this process, the role played by elites is sustained by the societal identification in the state institutions, gradually creating what John Erik Fossum (2001, p. 379) defines as the law of the people. The values and beliefs embedded in the law of the people are shaped by a generalized sense of community, as well as by delineating borders between the in-​group and the strangers (Börzel & Risse, 2020, p. 23). Thus, creating and consolidating an identity entangles a demarcation process, identifying and highlighting a collective other (Barth, 1969; Fligstein et al., 2012). Demarcations are essential cement for internal cohesion. Disseminating a simplified vernacular narrative—​ emphasizing the differences existing with individuals placed outside the political community and/​or stereotyping the outsiders—​is instrumental in consolidating we-​feelings within the political community. Moving forward, reflecting the distinction drafted by Friedrich Meinecke (1970) between staatnation and kulturnation, the academic community (Eisenstadt & Geisen, 1995; Smith, 1991; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010) developed two ideal types of identity to simplify the study of political communities. The first ideal type, the ethnic identity, is defined by Kanchan Chandra (2006) as a social construct designed to accommodate a community of individuals linked by a common ethnic root. Both in the work of Jennifer Hochschild (2003) and Kanchan Chandra (2006), ethnic identity is associated with the predominant role acquired by ancestral belonging in identifying the members of the political community. In a community united by ethnic belongingness, the communitarian identity is pre-​assigned according to ancestral and genealogical lineages. Since it tends to dominate and assimilate different cultures and/​or affiliations, ethnic identity

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is mainly exclusive. The proclaimed homogeneity of ancestors, language, religion, and ethnocultural traditions become the pillars of the community, providing legitimacy to the political elites representing the continuity with the ancestral traditions (Fligstein et al., 2012). Ethnic identity is also characterized by its link to certain physical appearances. Linked with fictive super-​family, common heritages and native territory, physical characteristics are dogmatically associated with community membership (Smith, 1991, p. 12). The second ideal type, the civil identity, is based on diffuse and open membership. Using the expression coined by John Erik Fossum (2001, p. 378), civic identity appears thinner when compared to ethnic identity. From a civic perspective, patriotism is transformed from an exclusive concept into an inclusive value. More specifically, civic communitarian identities associate membership with the adherence to the legal, political, and social systems of the community (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). The elements of collective identification are embedded in the routines and traditions of institutional arrangements (Eisenstadt & Giesen, 1995, p. 80). Therefore, while ancestral and ethnic connotations acquire a secondary position, membership is conditional on the alignment of individuals to the values and rules of the community. Civic identities include additional belongingness factors, frequently having universal nature. In particular, civil identities are related to the emergence of cosmopolitan ideas and values. For this reason, civic communities are expected to emerge in societies characterized by a higher level of education and development (Sides & Citrin, 2007; Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). The ancestral roots are replaced by an inclusive civic conception of identity, enlarging the societal membership toward individuals from different ethnic groups and religions. In contemporary nation-​states, ethnic and civic identities have been deployed to create a sense of attachment toward the political community. As with every dichotomy, the contraposition between ethnic and civic identity is utilized to simplify a complex and articulated social phenomenon. In reality, the emotional attachment developed within each political community tends to blend elements from ethnic and civic identities. The two ideal types of identity also share common necessities. For instance, both identities are united by the need to be routed by a state apparatus disseminating a narrative glorifying the present and the past of the political

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community. Similarly, the two types of identity presume the presence of rights and duties for the citizens, the existence of a national economy and internal territorial mobility (Smith, 1991). Overall, in every political community, identity is built over a mix of ethnic and civic elements. The proportion changes according to geographical, historical, political, social, and developmental factors. For instance, ethnic attachment to the national symbols experienced a steep decline in the post-​fascist Italian Republic. For a long time, the national anthem and the flag have been associated with the propaganda of the Fascist regime. A similar experience is shared by the German society, which following the shock of Nazism, had become the cradle of civic identity in the European continent.

5.2. The EU democratic legitimacy dilemma between collective identity and politicization European identities are tightly knitted with the politicization of the integration process and party politics. The legitimization of European polity tends to be a primary issue of discussion both in European identity politics and the EU politicization debates. The momentum gained by the transnational democratic legitimacy directly reflects the enlargement of the EU competencies and the success of Eurosceptic movements. As mentioned earlier, the European policymaking process moved from elites-​oriented dynamics towards the post-​Maastricht necessity for input legitimacy. During the pre-​Maastricht times, the European polity benefited from indirect teleological legitimacy (Magnette, 2000). The teleological component had its roots in the post-​war reconstruction, facilitating the benevolent representation of European integration as a project of peace and prosperity. In this scenario, the democratic legitimacy was surrogated by the success of the European Single Market. The citizens perceived the integration process as a pragmatic project based on the rejection of war and the necessity to stabilize intra-​European political relations. Moreover, the decisions taken by the elites were facilitated by the scarce public interest generated by the technical issues debated within the European arena. In line with the analysis of Fritz Scharpf (2003), the transnational legitimacy in the pre-​Maastricht times was primarily based on the belief that

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the successes of the integration would be sufficient to vindicate the usefulness of the European Community, justifying its existence and ensuring the popular support (Ruchet, 2011, p. 6). In these times, European elites could achieve legitimacy through the effectiveness of their decisions. Through intergovernmental negotiations, national elites moved away from the nation-​state legitimacy scheme, sheltering the integration process from politicization and identity politics (Fuchs, 2011). To circumnavigate the political trap, the European and national elites deliberately avoided equating the European decision-​making process to the functioning of parliamentary democracies (Scharpf, 1999). In this depoliticized scenario, the compromises between diverging national interests and supranational technical solutions were the cornerstone of the community method (Gillespie & Laffan, 2006). During the post-​Maastricht era, the situation radically changed. The European polity became a non-​identified political regime—​a hybrid entity with some features of a regional organization and some characteristics of a post-​modern state—​for which the requirements for community identity, political participation, and source of legitimacy remain debated. The new competencies and the increasing impact of EU politics on the lives of the citizens—​matched with the uncertainty over the finalité politique of the European Union—​contributed to fueling a politicization rotating around issues of identity and legitimacy. The appearance of the legitimacy issue is often associated with the unsatisfactory involvement of the citizens or with the insufficient accountability and effectiveness accredited to European politics (Fuchs, 2011). The legitimacy issue generates a vicious circle impacting the assessment of European polity and policies. Contributing to enhancing the gap between the European elites and the masses, citizens expect European solutions in domains where the Brussels institutions have limited or null competencies, creating an image of the EU assimilable to a technocratic Hydra unsympathetic to the needs of the people (Moravcsik, 2001; Ruchet, 2011). Democratic legitimization is probably one of the most problematic issues EU politicization has raised. While in the pre-​Maastricht times, the transnational legitimacy was merely confined to the effectiveness of the European policies, today the saliency gained by the integration process has transformed the supranational legitimacy into a multidimensional

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issue composed of several interconnected sources of collective entitlement and recognition (Beetham & Lord, 1998). In contemporary democratic societies, legitimacy is associated with the legality, compliance, problem-​ solving capability and power justifiability of the institutional authorities (Follesdal, 2006, pp. 154–​155). In the European transnational scenario, these four interconnected sources of legitimacy are equally (negatively) affected by the current rise of politicization. Intended as the capability of European polity to act within limits imposed by the treaties (Lenaerts & Desomer, 2002), the legality of the EU is challenged by the emergence of societal scepticism over the legitimacy of European supranational mandate. As an indirect consequence, national elites can deliberately decide to obstruct compliance with European legislation and recommendations for opportunistic purposes. This was evident during the management of the Debt Crisis, the intergovernmental tug of war during the (attempted) reform of the Common European Asylum System, or in the conflicts between European institutions and the Hungarian-​Polish executives over the respect of the EU foundational values. As mentioned earlier, the legitimacy issue combined with the EU politicization generates vicious circles deteriorating different sources of democratic legitimization. In this vicious circle, the decreased perceived legality of the European institutions jeopardized the ability of the European and national elites to agree on transnational solutions. In other words, the declining public trust in European institutions is decreasing the capacity of the European elites to solve societal problems. For this reason, the saliency and controversiality acquired by European policymaking are hampering the effectiveness of the community method. At the same time, the emergence of multiple crises—​and the unrealistic societal expectations for issues where the Union has barely supportive competencies—​are contributing to the deterioration of the public image of the EU, its perceived legality, and its ability to persuade national executives to reach agreements. State-​of-​ the-​art is similar while analyzing transnational justifiability—​understood as the citizen acceptance of the coercive nature of the political decisions (Choudhry, 2001)—​and accountability of the EU, referred to the linkage between elected officials and the people’s will (Heidelberg, 2015). Both appear as Achilles’ heels for the democratic legitimacy of the European polity. The scarce civic participation in the democratic life of the Union,

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combined with the secondary nature of the European elections, constitute the essential elements of the supranational legitimacy issue. People feel detached from European polity, and as a result, unpopular decisions taken at the EU level are likely to be perceived as unacceptable. The new competencies allocated to the supranational level have not been matched with the institutionalization of democratic accountability and legitimacy mechanisms comparable to the ones implemented in the national and local realms (Fuchs, 2011). The confusion over the nature of the European polity, and the uncertainties regarding the final mission of the integration process, reinvigorated the debate over the democratic deficit. The democratic deficit has often been strategically flaunted to promote the consolidation of a post-​modern supranational Union, or vice versa, to advocate for the restoration of modern nation-​states. At its origin, the concept was related to the political and legislative irrelevance of the European Parliament (Marquand, 1979). Following the evolution of the integration process, the meaning and the content behind the transnational democratic deficit mutated over time. Nowadays, identity and transnational political power have acquired a central position in the democratic deficit debate. Multiple authors remark on how the inability of the EP to propose legislation represents a democratic vulnus for a transnational assembly impaired by secondary order elections and weak political organizations (Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Mény, 2003; Tsebelis & Moser, 2020). In addition, the democratic deficit is also associated with the scarce accountability of the European Commission, emphasizing the weak interconnection between the intergovernmental appointment of the College of Commissioners, the European electoral campaign and the socio-​political demands (Follesdal & Hix, 2006). The narrow linkage between the citizens and the European political agenda, the feeble extra-​parliamentarian role played by the European political parties and the extemporaneous European electoral campaigns contributed to dissociating the European society with the integration process (Geddes, 1995). Reflecting on the absence of elites capable of linking citizens to European institutions, Dimitris Chryssochoou (1998) raised concerns over the de-​parliamentarization of national and European political systems. From these perspectives, the depoliticization of European governance represents a further argument in the democratic deficit discourse (Börzel & Risse, 2018; De Wilde, 2011; Kriesi, 2016). As argued

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earlier, more than a solution, depoliticization in the politized Union could be assessed as a naïve attempt to restore the pre-​Maastricht dynamics in a time characterized by civil distrust. The last argument advanced by the democratic deficit literature offers a socio-​psychological perspective correlated to transnational legitimacy, EU politicization, and European identity. The no demos thesis suggests that the absence of common European demos—​hence, the dearth of collective European identities—​implies the impossibility of creating a European political community (Chryssochoou, 1996). In reality, this hypothesis tends to oversimplify the complexities of contemporary European society. Nevertheless, it represents a valuable starting point for further reflection. The dilemma of the causal dynamics between polity-​building and the development of a European collective identity has been largely discussed in the literature (Börzel & Risse, 2020; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Delanty, 2003; Habermas, 2012; Kraus, 2004; Scharpf, 1999; Weiler, 1995). The discussion counterposes different opinions and visions without providing a shared conclusion on the causal dynamics between the European identity and the legitimization of the European polity. Following the hypothesis that the pre-​existence of a collective identity is an essential component of any political community, several authors believe that European integration will not be able to progress in the absence of a transnational identity (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Bruter, 2003; Herrmann & Brewer 2004; Scharpf 1999, 2009). More specifically, assuming that citizens are required to accept political decisions taken by the elites on behalf of the entire community, the emotional bond between the masses and the elites is an essential source of legitimacy (Risse, 2014). The collective identity and legitimacy of the political elites play an instrumental role in placing individuals’ interests beneath common good of the community (Verhaegen et al., 2014). From this perspective, the absence of a rooted transnational identity, combined with the faltering legitimacy of the European political elites, represents an insurmountable obstacle to the evolution of the integration process. Nonetheless, the causal relationship between collective identity and polity-​building could work in both ways, generating mutually reinforcing dynamics, or vice versa, causing a dilution of the political and identitarian elements (Börzel & Risse, 2020). In the experiences of the nation-​states, comparable dilemmas were solved through the construction of collective

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myths and cultural references (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). From this point of view, state-​building can occur in parallel with the consolidation of a collective identity. Consequently, the elites should shift the discussion from the presence/​absence of a common transnational identity to assessing the rootedness and dissemination of the European identity. Considering the possibility of mutually reinforcing the integration process and the emotional attachment of the citizens toward the European polity, the final objective would be to advance strategies to gradually mainstream a transnational sense of communitarian identity among European citizens (Fuchs, 2011).

5.3. Identity, politicization and the European political community In the socio-​political study of the European Union, the relationship between identity politics and politicization is symbiotic. The European identitarian landscape tends to be inhomogeneous, complex, and multidimensional. Although the discussion on the European identity can be traced back to the 1950s, in the post-​Maastricht times, political dynamics have placed European society at the center of the integration process (Cerruti, 2003; De Bruycker, 2017). As soon as the European institutions acquired competencies at the core of the nation-​states’ sovereignty, citizens started assimilating EU governance with the national political systems (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016). As an unintentional consequence, the debate around European political affairs has been subject to a progressive process of massification (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). In order to create a structural link between the polity and the masses—​and simultaneously nourish a transnational sense of belongingness—​the saliency acquired by European affairs has brought the dilemmas of reforming the traditional elite-​based policymaking. Studying identity politics in the European Union is not a simple affair. The European case is unique as it reflects the complexities of transnational democracy and globalization. As Olivier Ruchet (2011) noted, politics cannot be disjointed with popular culture. As introduced earlier, collective identities are an essential element of political legitimacy. Reflecting the elitarian, diplomatic, and technocratic nature of the decision-​making

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procedure, researchers marginally investigated the European collective identity during the permissive consensus times. Inspired by the increased transnational role played by mass communication in society, Ronald Inglehart (1970) has been the first scholar to investigate the impact of cosmopolitan transnational networks on the European integration process. Detecting a positive correlation between an elevated level of education, exposure to cosmopolitan information, and the development of transnational identities, the American political scientist empirically demonstrated how education and media persist as essential predictors of pro-​ Europeanism (Inglehart, 1970, p. 51). During the pre-​Maastricht times, economic interdependencies and people-​to-​people interactions were expected to create pan-​ European networks establishing a transnational community (Deutsch, 1953; Deutsch et al., 1957). Like neo-​functionalist scholars, Ronald Inglehart underestimated the identitarian consequences of European integration on ordinary citizens. More specifically, in parallel with the development of transnational networks involving people having cultural and financial resources, the integration process (and the advent of globalization) generated European networks based on disorientation, economic weakness and nostalgia (Kuhn, 2015, 2019). Today, the visibility gained by populist movements changed the perception of identity politics and European integration. In contraposition with the past, identity politics and politicization are often considered a threat to the European Union. Quoting Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2018, p. 4), rather than being a driver of European integration, European society and identity politics are considered significant obstacles to the pooling of national sovereignties. Exploiting contemporary challenges, populist movements benefited from the relevance acquired by identity politics in the integration process. Cultural demarcations have been utilized by political elites interested in electorally capitalizing on societal disorientation (McLaren, 2002). In reality, identity politics does not represent an insurmountable obstacle for the pro-​European elites. In the European public sphere, multiple national and transnational networks endorse the legitimacy of the European polity. Therefore, identity politics represents both a constraint and support for the integration process. Considering the uniqueness of the EU in the contemporary political scenario, the conceptualization of transnational identities would significantly

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differ from the national Westphalian experience. The sophisticated mélange of supranational and intergovernmental traits characterizing the European intra and inter-​institutional relations may be conducive to a wide range of identities and forms of belonging (Fossum, 2001, p. 375). Interestingly, national identities are pivotal in shaping collective European identities (Hopf, 2002). The cross-​national interactions within the EU are limited, and the transnational people-​to-​people interactions are still marginal compared to the socio-​cultural bonds within the member states. For this reason, the creation of the supranational identity is mainly occurring within national networks, influenced by domestic players (Deflem & Pampel, 1996; Citrin & Sides, 2004). The resilience of the local ethnic myths and symbols, combined with the civic values shaping the democratic life of the member states, represents a cultural heritage that will be handed down to the European collective identities (Markell, 2000). However, the relationship between the national and nascent European identities remains debated. The cause of disagreement is represented by the complementary—​or vice versa, by the incompatibility—​between the European and the national identities. On the one hand, the Europeanization of local socio-​political realms could facilitate the complementarity between national and supranational identities. Individuals hold multiple identities. Consequently, citizens could combine national and European loyalties (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Underlining how a Breton feels at the same time French, or how a Sicilian is simultaneously Italian, Juan Díez Medrano and Paula Gutiérrez (2001) exemplify the complementarity of local, national, and European identities based on the nestled sense of belongingness. In a similar vein, Thomas Risse (2005, p. 296) represents multiple identities as overlapping marble cakes. From this perspective, local and national identities gradually intertwine with European identities (Herrmann et al., 2004). On the other hand, opposite conclusions have been drafted on the relationship between the national and European identities. As instrumentally conveyed by Eurosceptical elites, the European identity could threaten local and national identities. From this point of view, preserving local identities is incompatible with developing transnational identities. Subsequently, national and European identities cannot be nestled, nor could the intersection between domestic and transnational belongingness represent a

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positive-​sum game (Castiglione, 2019; Laffan, 2004; Risse, 2004). The consolidation of transnational identities could generate new societal divisions, marked by the distress of citizens having strong identitarian bonds with the local level and weak attachment to the supranational level (Citrin & Sides, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Fligstein et al., 2012). Moreover, the public mobilization—​ascribable to the politicization of the European project—​could hamper the complementarity between the national and European identities, making the former more salient and eroding the latter (Fuchs, 2011a). In the literature, Eurobarometer data is often utilized to support (or to criticize) these assumptions. The surveys conducted by the European Commission portray a polarized society. Most individuals nestled European loyalty upon the pre-​existent national identities. Nevertheless, a significant share of the population refuses any identitarian attachment to European polity. From a historical perspective, identities exclusively anchored on the national and local are gradually eroding (Eurobarometer, 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2019). Thus, national attachment is progressively complemented by European feelings. Despite the pessimistic expectations (e.g., Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016), the crises faced by the EU did not lead to the upraise of nationalistic identities, nor a significant mutation of the European identitarian landscape (Börzel & Risse, 2018). Excluding the debt crisis period, the identitarian support towards European integration has been subjected to minor fluctuations. Analyzing the survey conducted by the European Commission in 2019, the percentage of uncontaminated national identity reached its historical low of 33 percent. About 60 percent of the population has shown some sort of identitarian link with the European dimension (Eurobarometer, 2019). Rebutting the speculation over the detrimental impact of transnational feelings over the pre-​existent domestic identities, the fact that only a marginal percentage of citizens have transnational attachments as a primary source of belongingness indicates the unlikelihood that the European identity will substitute national loyalties. To balance the position of scholars overemphasizing the role of the supranational identity—​and societal actors overstressing the hegemonic role of local and national identities—​it can be concluded that the European identity is present in European society, without being deeply rooted in

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individual beliefs (Risse, 2010). While most Europeans embrace a sort of transnational sense of belongingness, the solidity of this identity remains unknown. The rootedness of the European identity acquires a central relevance when contextualized with the new socio-​political fractures and the absence of a structural link between European elites and citizens. Citizens holding a deep European identity are likely to develop what Jürgen Habermas (1996a) described as cosmopolitan citizenship. As simplified by the polarization between communitarian and cosmopolitan identities, the current state of the art is characterized by a strong correlation between the Europeanization of identities and the globalization-​led cleavage (De Wilde et al., 2019; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kriesi, 2016; Zürn & De Wilde, 2016). The correlation acquires a central role in discussing the consequences of EU politicization. For instance, in the recent cascade of European crises, public opinion played a significant role in the negotiations between the EU institutions and the national executives (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014). Citizens holding a rooted European identity—​or vice versa, individuals having exclusive identitarian attachment to the local level—​influenced the national positions within the European Council, enhancing the responsiveness of supranational non-​majoritarian institutions, and encouraging the European Parliament to mirror the discussions occurring at the societal level.

Conclusion: A vision for the politicized European Union The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty represents a point of no return for the political elites and European integration. The decision to progressively empower the European realm with matters at the core of national sovereignty has placed the European Union at the center of the public debate. In this framework, the politicization of the EU has contributed to elongating and complicating the negotiations within (and between) the European institutions. In addition, the politicization of European affairs is intertwined with socio-​economic metamorphosis. In this multidimensional scenario, understanding the EU politicization corresponds to analyzing identity politics and socio-​political trends in a continent characterized by diversity. Rooted in the socio-​economic impact of globalization—​and stemming from the disorientation generated by the post-​modern nature of the EU—​the revival of nationalism could represent a concrete obstacle in developing inclusive and nestled European identities. As per the anthropological studies conducted by Iver Neumann (1996), when demarcations become the primary source of belongingness to the political community, different identities become conflictual rather than complementary. The politicization of the EU is impacting European and national party politics. At first glance, populist parties have been the stakeholders that better exploited the emergence of the supranational identitarian and representational dilemma. Revamping the nationalistic narrative, populist elites have been able to attract the sympathy of citizens marginalized by globalization and the integration process due to economic, cultural, geographical, and demographic factors. In the post-​Maastricht scenario, the Eurosceptic and populist parties are gaining consensus at the national and European levels exploiting the political and financial uncertainty over the future of the European economy. The vision proposed and promoted by the populist parties is based on the ethnic-​conservative idea of Europe for Europeans. Having the final goal of preserving national sovereignties, the populist propaganda is based on romanticizing local identities and glorifying the Christian roots of the continent. At the same time, the rise

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of the European populist parties cannot be justified with a change in the European identitarian scenario. Electoral success is ascribed to the ability to connect with society—​and thus to collect the consensus—​of citizens exclusively attached to the national level. In other words, the increased visibility of nationalistic stances lies in the political capability to represent the vernacular argumentation justifying the preservation of the Westphalian regime. To enhance the legitimacy of the integration process, the European elites have room for maneuvers to exploit the occurred politicization. At the end of the day, the European Union represents the only option for the national elites to preserve the power and interest of the European nation-​states. In the contemporary scenario, characterized by a chaotic multipolarism moving toward a Sino-​American bipolarism, none of the European nation-​ states is considered a global power. To improve the state of art, the European elites should move away from the politics for the people—​suitable during the permissive consensus times—​to the government by the people (Scharpf, 1999, p. 6). This would allow to structurally embed the will of the people within the EU policymaking process. Besides going against the citizens’ demand, depoliticization seems to deteriorate the relationship between the masses and the societal elites, magnifying the transnational legitimization deficit. In the post-​Maastricht era, depoliticized solutions negatively impacted the Union’s accountability, hindering the citizens’ comprehension, and ultimately favoring the vernacular perception of the EU as a regime privileging corporations and lobbies. Moreover, a collective vision for the future cannot be debated as far as the final political mission of European integration is unknown. As remarked by Fritz Scharpf (1999) and Cathleen Kantner (2006), the causal correlation between the European Union and the common identity needs to be assessed according to the political finality of the integration process. Similarly, the deficits in terms of legitimacy cannot be addressed if the final step of the integration process remains unidentified. A Union based mainly on intergovernmental dynamics could coexist with a thin transnational identity and a legitimacy deficit. Conversely, an integration process aiming to build a federal union should gradually construct collective socio-​ political structures to govern the politicization process and overcome legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness issues.

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The data provided by Eurobarometer draws a mixed picture. Over the last fifteen years, the support for EU membership in national public opinion remained unaltered. Conversely, public trust in the EU has declined. In this regard, it must be said that the drop observed is moderate compared to the trust fall affecting national institutions (Debomy, 2016). Confirming this trend, the data on transnational democratic participation underlines significant political apathy, characterized by the societal unawareness of EU competencies and the low turnout of the European Parliament elections (Magnette, 2001). Nevertheless, the Eurobarometer surveys show that the majority of European citizens are in favor of deepening European integration in the monetary domain—​as well as—​they are supportive of the development of common foreign and defense policies, and they positively assess the integration in the field of migration (Börzel & Risse, 2018; Risse, 2014). Considering the emergence of a novel transnational cleavage and the relevance gained by the European identities, the European Union lacks intermediate social bodies linking its citizens to European institutions. As noted by multiple authors (De Vries & Van de Wardt, 2011; Evans & Butt, 2007; Van de Wardt et al., 2014), despite the increased saliency of the globalization-​led cleavage among the voters, it is not clear if the European mainstream political parties have successfully included the European integration within their ideology, vision and narrative. In this regard, European political parties appear to be the institutional actors overlooked during the post-​Maastricht times. Most of the existing literature on EU party politics focuses on the Europeanization of the national parties, while almost no effort has been invested in studying the extra-​parliamentary role of the European political parties. Nonetheless, Europarties represent an asset in the politicization process, considering that (i) the constitutional amendments for the EU decision-​making mechanisms over the last decades have gradually empowered the European Parliament; and at the same time, (ii) the European Parliament represents the epicenter of the supranationalization of the Union, and (iii) Europarties have an instrumental interest in politicizing transnational affairs to gain influence and power. In the post-​Maastricht scenario, the EU legitimacy—​based on the effectiveness of the technocratic governance (Scharpf, 2003)—​could be integrated with an identitarian legitimacy, originating from some sense of

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inclusivity creating a collective identification shared by elites and citizens (Börzel & Risse, 2020, p. 23). It is important to highlight that loyalty toward the transnational level does not automatically convert into unconditional support for European integration and institutions. The public debate over the European Union has various dimensions, and the support for the European project embeds different gradations (Boomgarden et al., 2011; Stoeckel, 2013). For this reason, some citizens consider themselves Europeans but are nonetheless unsatisfied with the EU political decisions (Kuhn, 2019, p. 1215). This consideration brings us back to the role political entrepreneurs and political ideologies play in fulfilling citizens’ expectations. As mentioned earlier, the national experiences demonstrate that identity politics can facilitate or inhibit the integration of state powers (Börzel & Risse, 2020, p. 29). In this framework, the transnational mobilization operated by populist political elites represents the key novelty of EU politics. Until today, the visibility gained by elites capable of expressing the belief of citizens holding nationalistic identities did not generate a proportionate response from the pro-​European political elites. The more societal challenges acquire a European dimension, the more it increases the necessity for developing a transnational party system capable of enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of European politics. Weak Europarties represent a missed opportunity. Establishing the European party system would be instrumental in boosting the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Union’s political action, increasing the programmatic coherence of the EU governance, and de-​escalating the anarchy characterizing the different pro-​ European political positions. In this context, the weak link between European institutions and citizens is an issue that acquires a central position. In representative democracies, political parties perform this essential task. It is impossible to imagine that the European Union could represent an exception. After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the European decision-​making process is no longer an exclusive prerogative of elites and technocrats. European politics requires the involvement of intermediate organizations capable of orienting and engaging citizens and, at the same time, providing a supranational political direction to the action of the Union. To reinforce the leadership of the European political parties, the first step has to be taken by national political leaders. Similar to the dynamics behind the shift of

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political competencies from the national to the European level, national actors should voluntarily withdraw some of their prerogatives to empower European political parties. Unfortunately, the difficulty of summarizing the different national interests (and cultures) within transnational political organizations represents one of the key obstacles to the empowerment of European political organizations. The conservative position of the national parties might represent a significant obstacle in creating a pan-​ European party system. Despite the impact of politicization, the mutated identitarian scenario—​and the consequences of the sociological mutation on the political competition—​the action of national political leaders is still inclined towards the short-​term goal of preserving power positions in the European realm. Nonetheless, considering the inalienable necessity of creating a stable link between the EU and the citizens, the empowerment of the European political parties can only be postponed. In the long run, the politicization of European affairs—​and the advancement of the integration process induced by the declining power of the national elites in international affairs—​are likely to lead to the establishment of a European political party system.

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Index of subjects causes of politicization  35, 43 cleavages  11, 14, 20, 27, 54, 59, 70, 72, 74 constraining dissensus  23, 32, 43, 44 Council  23, 30, 38, 39, 42–​44, 65, 66, 91 crisis  7, 22, 26, 30, 33, 40, 41, 46, 47, 56, 73, 84, 90 cultural-​demographic trends  56 democratic deficit  85, 86 depoliticization  21, 40, 41, 43, 45, 55, 73–​75, 85, 94 digital communication  56 Euroscepticism  45 European Central Bank  39, 41 European Commission  39, 40, 42, 44, 67, 85, 90 European political parties  30, 40, 42, 85, 95–​97 European identity  15, 26, 31, 34, 58, 77, 82, 86, 87, 89–​91 European integration  7, 11, 13–​ 15, 17, 19–​22, 24–​33, 35–​39, 41, 45–​47, 49, 50, 55, 59, 66, 68–​71, 77, 82, 86, 88, 90, 93–​96 European Parliament  35, 36, 39, 42–​44, 67, 72, 85, 91, 95

globalization  11, 12, 47, 48, 50–​ 52, 54–​59, 62, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 87, 88, 91, 93, 95 inequalities  48, 50, 51, 61, 77 intergovernmental theories  30, 31, 64 intergovernmental negotiation  22, 29, 31, 38, 41, 43, 65, 83 legitimacy  7, 11–​15, 27–​29, 32, 33, 36, 38–​43, 49, 50, 52, 63, 65, 67–​69, 72, 77–​88, 94–​96 legitimacy deficit  94 Maastricht Treaty  11, 22, 23, 28, 44, 50, 93, 96 mass media  7, 13, 30, 40, 43–​45, 60, 67, 79 neofunctionalist theories  27, 28, 32 permissive consensus  23, 32, 33, 43, 44, 64, 88, 94 populism  35, 47, 69, 75 postfunctionalist theory  33, 34 Religion  56–​59,  81 Theories of European integration  14