European Representation in EU National Parliaments (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics) 3030533123, 9783030533120

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS SERIES EDITORS: MICHELLE EGAN · NEILL NUGENT · WILLIAM E. PATERSON

European Representation in EU National Parliaments

Lucy Kinski

Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics

Series Editors Michelle Egan American University Washington, USA Neill Nugent Manchester Metropolitan University Manchester, UK William E. Paterson Aston University Birmingham, UK

Following on the sustained success of the acclaimed European Union Series, which essentially publishes research-based textbooks, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics publishes cutting edge research-driven monographs. The remit of the series is broadly defined, both in terms of subject and academic discipline. All topics of significance concerning the nature and operation of the European Union potentially fall within the scope of the series. The series is multidisciplinary to reflect the growing importance of the EU as a political, economic and social phenomenon. To submit a proposal, please contact Senior Editor Ambra Finotello [email protected]. This series is indexed by Scopus. Editorial Board Laurie Buonanno (SUNY Buffalo State, USA) Kenneth Dyson (Cardiff University, UK) Brigid Laffan (European University Institute, Italy) Claudio Radaelli (University College London, UK) Mark Rhinard (Stockholm University, Sweden) Ariadna Ripoll Servent (University of Bamberg, Germany) Frank Schimmelfennig (ETH Zurich, Switzerland) Claudia Sternberg (University College London, UK) Nathalie Tocci (Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy)

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14629

Lucy Kinski

European Representation in EU National Parliaments

Lucy Kinski Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Düsseldorf, Germany

ISSN 2662-5873 ISSN 2662-5881 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ISBN 978-3-030-53312-0 ISBN 978-3-030-53313-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my mother

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 Purpose of the Book 1.2 State of Research 1.3 The Representative Puzzle 1.4 Outline of the Book References

1 1 7 10 11 12

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Theoretical Framework 2.1 The ‘Standard Account’ of Parliamentary Representation and EU Politics 2.2 National Parliamentary Representation in the EU: The Concept of This Study 2.3 Whom and How to Represent in EU Politics? 2.4 Summarizing the Theoretical Approach References

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Data and Methodology 3.1 Selection of Countries, Topics, Parliamentary Debates and Interview Partners 3.2 Data Collection: Representative Claims Analysis and Qualitative Interviews 3.3 Data Evaluation: Regression Analyses and Typology of MPs

19 30 46 58 63 81 81 90 98 vii

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CONTENTS

3.4 Dependent Variables and Data Structure References

105 109

Focus and Style of Representation in EU Politics 4.1 The Purpose of This Chapter 4.2 Focus of Representation: Whom to Represent in EU Politics? 4.3 Style of Representation: How to Represent in EU Politics? 4.4 Focus and Style of Representation: Whom and How to Represent in EU Politics? 4.5 Conclusions References

117 117

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Explaining MPs’ Representative Behavior in EU Politics 5.1 The Purpose of This Chapter 5.2 Institutional and Party Strategic Factors 5.3 Operationalization 5.4 Behavioral Representative Focus Explained 5.5 Behavioral Representative Style Explained 5.6 Conclusions References

141 141 144 155 159 172 179 186

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Explaining MPs’ Representative Conception in EU Politics 6.1 The Purpose of This Chapter 6.2 Conceptual Representative Focus Explained 6.3 Conceptual Representative Style Explained 6.4 Causal Mechanisms Behind Representative Focus and Style 6.5 Conclusions References

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Discussion and Conclusion 7.1 Cross-Border Representation in an Interdependent World 7.2 The Virtue of Europeanized Parliaments

117 127 133 139 140

193 193 194 213 221 227 231 233 234 237

CONTENTS

From Transnational Representation to Transnational Democracy References

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7.3

243 247

Appendix

253

References

275

Index

305

Abbreviations

BZÖ CDU CON COSAC CSU EAC EFSF EMU ESC EWM FAC FC FDP FF FG FPÖ FRONTEX GAL-TAN IO IPI LAB_IRL LAB_UK LibDem LT MEP

Alliance for the Future of Austria Christian Democratic Union of Germany Conservative Party (UK) Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union Christian Social Union (Bavaria, Germany) European Affairs Committee European Financial Stability Facility Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union European Scrutiny Committee Early Warning Mechanism Foreign Affairs Committee Finance Committee Free Democratic Party (Germany) Fianna Fáil (Ireland) Fine Gael (Ireland) Freedom Party of Austria European Border and Coast Guard Agency Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist International Organization International Parliamentary Institution Labour Party (Ireland) Labour Party (UK) Liberal Democrats (UK) Treaty of Lisbon Member of the European Parliament xi

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ABBREVIATIONS

MP ÖVP PCA PDS QMV RCA SEA SF SNP SP SPD SPÖ TCE TD TEU TFEU

Member of Parliament Austrian People’s Party Political Claims Analysis Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany) Qualified Majority Voting Representative Claims Analysis Single European Act Sinn Féin (Ireland) Scottish National Party Socialist Party (Ireland) Social Democratic Party of Germany Social Democratic Party of Austria Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe Teachta Dála (Irish MP) Treaty on European Union Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1

Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 4.7 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3

Dependent variables: Behavioral focus of representation Dependent variables: Behavioral style of representation Dependent variables: Conceptual focus of representation Dependent variables: Conceptual style of representation European(-ized)/European focus of representation across countries (N = 2099) European(-ized)/European focus of representation across topics (N = 2099) European(-ized)/European focus of representation across parties (N = 2099) Conceptual focus of representation across countries (N = 66) Behavioral styles of representation across countries (in per cent) Behavioral styles of representation across topics (in per cent) Conceptual styles of representation across countries (N = 66) AME plots: binary predictors of European(-ized)/European focus Predicted probability: left–right position on European(-ized)/European focus AME plots: binary predictors republican/pluralist style

106 106 107 108 122 123 124 126 130 131 132 164 165 178

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1 Table Table Table Table Table

3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2

Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6

Focus and style of representation in EU politics Patterns of representation by national MPs in EU politics Number of plenary debates (instances) across countries and topics Party membership of interviewees 2005–2011 Representative claims analysis in this study Conceptual focus of representation: Typology of MPs Behavioral patterns of representation (n = 1823) Behavioral patterns of representation across countries (in per cent) Behavioral patterns of representation across topics (in per cent) Conceptual patterns of representation in EU politics (N = 66) Conceptual patterns of representation across countries (in per cent) Overview of dependent, independent, and control variables Descriptive statistics Logistic regressions of European(-ized)/European focus A closer look at party-level predictors: the general left–right position A closer look at party-level predictors: economic and GAL-TAN position Descriptive statistics, all claims

53 57 89 89 93 101 134 134 135 136 138 158 160 162 168 171 173

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.7 Table 5.8 Table 5.9 A A A A

3.1 3.2 3.2 6.1

Descriptive statistics, pure claims Logistic regressions of representative styles (full dataset) Logistic regressions of representative styles, w/o politico claims Overview of coded debates per country and topic Codebook representative claims analysis List particular vs. general interest representation Anonymized interviewees

174 175 177 254 263 268 273

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Who do national parliaments scrutinising EU decision-making actually speak to? Can they still credibly claim to be representing national citizens only? Or do they represent a collective of national constituencies? Or is the only meaningful constituency some kind of aggregate EU one? (Crum and Fossum 2012, p. 100f.)

1.1

Purpose of the Book

National parliaments continue to be the central representative institutions in European democracies. These age-old institutions have increasingly come under pressure, however, in the European Union (EU) multi-level system of governance. While member states have become deeply interdependent economically and politically, processes of political alignment and collective will-formation remain anchored at the national level (Crum 2016; Hooghe and Marks 2009). We observe an increased politicization of EU issues (e.g., de Wilde et al. 2016a; Hutter et al. 2016), yet this does (so far) not correspond to a transnational reconfiguration of mass politics: “To the extent that European issues raise political conflict, they tend to divide European citizens along national borders, not across them” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016, p. 49). Pooled sovereignty, shared decision-making, and a highly integrated Single Market are a European reality, but so are the rise of (right-wing) © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_1

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Euroscepticism, nationalism, and the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the EU (e.g., de Vries 2018; Leruth et al. 2017). Trust in domestic and EU political institutions is declining (e.g., Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). The much discussed democratic disconnect of the EU system of governance is ever so present (e.g., Cramme and Hobolt 2015; Piattoni 2010; Schmidt 2013). On the one hand, national parliaments have transferred decision-making power to the EU level, which has reduced their capacity to shape national public policy independently (Bardi et al. 2014). On the other hand, their decisions may have far-reaching consequences on the fate and fortune of citizens in other member states as we have seen during the Eurozone crisis and COVID-19 pandemic, for example. This situation challenges existing theories and actual practices of national parliamentary representation in Europe. Essentially, it questions the very adequacy of the so-called ‘standard account’ of democratic parliamentary representation based on territory and elections (Castiglione and Warren 2006; Kröger and Friedrich 2012a). This standard view is exclusively rooted in a formal representative relationship between national voters and their national representatives. National members of parliament (MPs) are formally authorized by and accountable to an electorate defined by the territory of the nation-state (Pollak et al. 2009; Urbinati and Warren 2008). When national representatives become co-responsible within the EU system of governance, it is harder for them to respond exclusively to their national constituencies. The constituencies that political actors are potentially responsible for may well be different from those they are formally responsive to (Mair 2005, 2006, 2009). Put differently, a national parliamentary decision may not only affect the authorizing constituency that is the citizenry defined by the territory of a nation-state (Montanaro 2018; Zürn and Walter-Drop 2011). Effects of policy decisions have increasingly become out of sync with formal democratic authorization and accountability mechanisms. “Decisions made by representatives of nation-states now carry consequences for people in other nation-states, even though they have no say in who is representing them” (de Wilde 2012, p. 118). Against this background, it is far from straightforward that national MPs only represent a unitary national interest in EU governance. Hence, this book asks:

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Whom and how do national MPs represent in EU politics and why do they do so?

There have been repeated calls by representation scholars to move beyond the ‘beaten paths’ of the standard account on national parliamentary representation in the EU (e.g., Crum and Fossum 2012; Piattoni 2013). In recent years, EU scholars have also been focusing on the role of national parliaments in the EU (Auel 2019), yet we still know surprisingly little about (new) patterns of representation within EU national parliaments theoretically, empirically, and normatively. Therefore, this book seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by following three distinct aims: a theoretical, an empirical, and a normative one. The first goal is theoretical. So far, scholars have approached national parliamentary representation in the EU from two angles: Representation theorists have taken the increasing interconnectedness to move beyond formal chains of authorization and accountability (Innerarity 2018; Piattoni 2010). To a greater or lesser extent, these authors advocate the decoupling of the act of representation from its electoral connection. The second group of scholars focuses on the fact that, despite the transand supranationalization within the EU, national parliaments remain the strongest sites of democratic representation that we have. In turn, they advocate a strong involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs to ensure, among other things, accountability of EU politics toward national electorates (Auel et al. 2016; Rauh and de Wilde 2018; Winzen et al. 2018). What we are still lacking to this point, however, is a combination of the two—a comprehensive theoretical re-conceptualization of what representation of national parliaments looks like in the EU multi-level system of governance. This book contributes to filling this theoretical gap by providing an original and thought-provoking argument that rejects the idea of national MPs having but one ‘standard’ mode of representation. In theorizing alternative patterns of representation, this study explicitly starts from the ‘standard’ approach to national parliamentary representation in the EU (Strøm 2000, 2003). Thereby, it acknowledges the importance of the national electoral connection, but at the same time updates the formal model of delegation and accountability to include externalities within the EU multi-level system. The key assumption is the following: whom and how re-election- and policy-seeking MPs choose to represent is, on the

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one hand, driven by their (party-political) positions and individual experiences, and, on the other hand, by their national electorates. In other words, an MP’s choice of representation in EU politics is both agent- and principal-driven. Besides MPs themselves, it may in fact be their national voters who realize and demand the need for a broader representative portfolio that includes other EU citizens. In its theoretical framework, the study couples this rational neoinstitutional approach to representative role (orientations) with a constructivist understanding on representation as dynamic claims-making (Saward 2006, 2010). Against the background of a transnationalization and diversification of politics and societies (Kröger and Friedrich 2012a), it identifies two potentially competing pressures on national MPs and citizens in the EU: interdependencies across national borders and politicization along national lines. Further, it argues that in order to navigate simultaneously being co-responsible within the EU and responsive to their national electorates’ concerns, MPs can assume four ideal-type representative patterns along a focus (whom?) and style (how?) dimension of representation (Wahlke et al. 1962) in EU politics: The National Republican, the National Pluralist, the European(-ized) Republican and the European(-ized) Pluralist. Their representative focus can be either national or European(-ized). Their representative style can be either Republican (unitary public interest representation) or Pluralist (particular interest representation). In doing so, this study remains connected to the ‘standard account’ of national parliamentary representation, while at the same time effectively challenging its exclusive focus on the national representative connection in EU politics. We can in fact not readily assume national parliamentarians to remain within their traditional national mode of representation given the externalities they create within the wider EU system. Put differently: Does Dieter Grimm’s assertion still hold today that “national politicians orient themselves (…) to their national publics, because effective sanctions can come only from them” (Grimm 1995, p. 296)? Or is there a Europeanized representative dimension after all? The second aim is empirical. Looking at the empirical literature in comparative politics and Europeanization research, we know much about how European integration has influenced national institutional arrangements, political processes, and policies (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Poguntke et al. 2007; Radaelli and Exadaktylos 2010). This includes literature on the institutional and behavioral adaption by national parliaments

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(e.g., Auel et al. 2015a; Winzen 2017). It is very surprising, however, that we have not yet seen any empirical research into a possible Europeanization of national parliamentary representation itself . While research on MPs’ representative roles in the domestic context has provided many insights into whom and how parliamentarians represent in national contexts (e.g., Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012a; Önnudóttir 2014, 2016), the questions remain fundamentally unanswered for national MPs whose parliament is embedded in the EU multi-level system. The study contributes to closing this empirical gap by investigating both what national representatives say (the roles they play in parliament) in EU politics and what they think (their self-perception as representatives in the EU context). The two dependent variables, focus of representation (whom?) and style of representation (how?), are analyzed at both the level of speech behavior and attitudes. This study does so within a sophisticated multi-method research design that combines different methods of data collection and analysis for both behavioral and attitudinal patterns of representation. To provide findings that can, on the one hand, be generalized beyond the specific country cases under study, while, on the other hand, recognizing case-specific differences, this study focuses on four EU member states (at the time of investigation): Austria (Nationalrat ), Germany (Bundestag ), Ireland (Dáil ), and the United Kingdom (House of Commons). Based on these diverse and unique data, the study provides a thorough investigation and comprehensive explanation of whom and how national MPs represent in European Union politics. It is able to uncover both general patterns and case-specific causal mechanisms. National MPs’ representative speech behavior is analyzed via a Representative Claims Analysis (RCA) (de Wilde 2013; de Wilde et al. 2014) of parliamentary plenary debates on EU Treaty reforms and the Eurozone crisis. This allows for a systematic quantitative coding of the two dependent variables. Adopting a representative claims-making approach for systematic empirical analysis of parliamentary debates has proven to be useful (e.g., de Wilde et al. 2016b; de Wilde 2020; Erzeel 2012; Kinski 2018; Kinski and Crum 2020; for evaluative claims in national parliamentary debates in EU politics, see Wendler 2016). This content analysis data is subjected to descriptive and multivariate regression analyses to uncover the factors that help explain role choice in parliamentary speech. The representative attitudes are investigated via 66 semi-structured guided interviews with national MPs from the four parliaments’ European

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Affairs Committees (EACs), Budget and Finance Committees (FC). This generates qualitative data that allows for a more fine-grained typology of MPs and an in-depth tracing of causal mechanisms behind representative patterns. It also indicates to what extent the representative behavior we see on the parliamentary floor translates into deeper self-perceptions and representative role conceptions of MPs. In sum, this study’s empirical contribution does not only map and describe representative patterns by national MPs in EU politics, but— most importantly—seeks to explain them. The third goal is normative. Even if the primary aims of this study are to theoretically conceptualize and empirically analyze representative patterns by national MPs in EU affairs, it nonetheless engages actively with the wider normative debate on the reconfiguration of national parliamentary democracy in the EU (Bellamy and Kröger 2015; Bellamy and Castiglione 2013). We discuss which patterns national MPs should follow from different democratic perspectives and what normative implications this has for representative democracy in the EU and international politics more broadly. This refers to the democratic quality of such patterns of representation and the design of representative institutions. Essentially, the book substantiates three reasons why we can consider these patterns normatively desirable: First, it makes the theoretical claim that not only MPs themselves start broadening their representative portfolio. Their voters may also demand alternative modes of representation. Second, empirically the national electoral relationship remains intact, classic national interest representation still plays a major role in what MPs say and think. Third, this study stresses the importance of justification in the process of representation. MPs reconcile pluralist and republican styles of representation and combine a national with a European focus of representation. This may in turn create new representative links that can foster the democratic legitimacy of the EU political system beyond formal institutional chains of representation. Overall, this study, then, offers a distinct theoretical, empirical, and normative contribution to both comparative politics and European Union research. It re-conceptualizes national parliamentary representation to fit the realities of a multi-level EU (and any interconnected international setting really). It empirically investigates and explains so far underresearched practices of representation within EU national parliaments uncovering a diverse range of real-existing alternative forms. Ultimately, it contributes to the normative discussion of the democratic legitimacy

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of such national parliamentary representation in the EU. To embed this study’s main research questions more firmly in existing research on national parliamentary representation in the EU, the next section briefly reviews the state of research that this study speaks to.

1.2

State of Research

The Lisbon Treaty holds that “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (Art. 10 (1) Treaty on European Union (TEU), emphasis added). This representative democracy is based on two channels of representation (Kröger and Friedrich 2013a): citizens “directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament” (direct supranational channel) and member states “represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government (…), themselves democratically accountable to their national Parliaments, or their citizens” (indirect intergovernmental channel) (Art. 10 (2) TEU). Further, national parliaments contribute “actively to the good functioning of the Union” (Art. 12 TEU, emphasis added). Scholars have looked at this ‘active’ contribution to making representative democracy work in the EU from many angles. Yet, they have done so predominately based on the ‘standard account’ of national parliamentary representation in EU politics. National parliaments have increasingly delegated legislative competencies to the EU level, authorized their national governments to act at the EU level on their behalf and negotiate to their benefit. To ensure democratic accountability, they have expanded their rights to scrutinize EU legislation and control their governments’ actions at the EU level (e.g., Karlas 2012; Winzen 2012, 2013). These formal rights are also used more and more often (e.g., Auel et al. 2015a, b). In this logic, the role of national parliaments is to ensure that their governments channel grievances of their national citizens into the EU system. Within this intergovernmental chain of representation, the main points of reference are national interest representation as well as member state sovereignty (Kröger and Friedrich 2013a). The intergovernmental chain of representation has, however, become perforated not only by qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of the EU, but also by co-decision with the European Parliament (EP) becoming the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ (Art. 289 & 294 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), i.e., the ‘default option’ in EU decision-making (Kröger and Friedrich 2013a). The direct

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supranational chain of representation via the EP on the other side makes European citizens the subject of democratic rule, yet this channel alone cannot ensure democratic representation in the EU, either (Kröger and Friedrich 2013a; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Schmitt and Toygür 2016). To try and remedy these deficits in the existing channels of representation, the Treaty of Lisbon (LT) grants national parliaments a direct role at the EU level both individually and collectively (Auel and Neuhold 2017). All these formal mechanisms conceive of national parliaments as representing their national citizens within the traditional national chain of authorization and accountability. Contemporary representation scholars, however, have started to reconsider this narrow notion of representation solely based on the electoral connection in general (e.g., Esaiasson and Narud 2013; Mansbridge 2003; Saward 2010) and with regard to the EU multi-level system of governance in particular (e.g., Piattoni 2013). Since this ‘representative turn’ in EU studies (among many others, e.g., Bellamy and Castiglione 2011; Crum and Fossum 2012; Kröger and Friedrich 2012b, 2013b), research has become more concerned with the precise workings of the relationship between representatives and represented. Scholars do not only investigate representation at the EU systems level (e.g., Lord and Pollak 2010), but as a dyadic and dynamic relationship between those who represent and those who are represented (e.g., de Wilde 2010). While formal representative institutions still matter, EU scholars now also focus on the ongoing representative relationship beyond Election Day (e.g., Lord 2013; see also contributions in Bellamy and Kröger 2015). They shift their attention more toward symbolic representation or ‘standing for’ as a prerequisite for substantive representation as ‘acting for’ (Pitkin 1967). These endeavors call for going beyond the institutional aspects of a formal concept of representation as “X authorizing Y (with regard to Z), and, at the same time, X being accountable to Y (with regard to Z)” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2011, p. 120). These shifts in EU studies are much in line with the broader ‘constructivist turn’ in representation research (for a critical assessment and important differences between the ‘representative’ and ‘constructivist turn,’ see Disch 2015). In this view, representation broadly defined as “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1967, p. 8f., emphasis in original) is not a static fact, but a performative process in which the represented are continuously constructed and ‘made present’ by the representatives

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(Saward 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014). Given these broad developments, the time seems ripe to tackle the question of “Who represents whom and how in European governance” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2011, p. 101). This means that we need to move beyond formal models of representation that are ultimately “insufficient to legitimate the EU” and to “the rescue of the full notion of political and democratic representation” (Piattoni 2013, p. 224). Therefore, this study proposes to broaden our research agenda to look beyond and beneath these formal mechanisms of representation of national parliaments in EU politics at the macro-level. These mechanisms stay within the ‘standard account’ of representation in that they are either designed in a logic of compensation for transferred legislative competencies or in a logic of protection in terms of ‘gate-keeping’ European integration (Raunio 2011) and guarding national competencies with ‘yellow’ and ‘orange cards’ within the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM). Within this standard notion, there seems to be broad consensus that one of the main purposes of Europeanization of domestic democratic institutions is to regain “the capacity of parties and hence parliaments adequately to represent their populations ” (Bellamy and Kröger 2014, p. 443, emphasis added). Instead, in this study, we take a step back and turn to the micro-level, namely to individual national MPs. We investigate their representative behavior and conceptions in EU affairs, because they are the ones breathing life into the institution of parliament (Wessels and Katz 1999, p. 11). Put differently, if existing formal mechanisms of representation in the EU fail to generate democratic legitimacy, because they “collide” rather than “cohere into a defensible system of representation” (Lord and Pollak 2010, p. 126), we need to analyze the actors and processes behind these mechanisms. Do national MPs exclusively follow the ‘standard account,’ when dealing with EU affairs or do they broaden their representative portfolio, thereby opening up new trajectories and avenues for democratic representation in the EU? However, so far there has not been any research into a possible Europeanization of representative patterns by national MPs. In short, we need to move from studying the Europeanization of national representative institutions to the question of a Europeanization of (national parliamentary) representation itself . This asks us to do nothing less than altogether rethink the way we see national parliamentary representation in the European Union.

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1.3

The Representative Puzzle

This study examines national parliamentary representation in the EU. It does so by theoretically conceptualizing, empirically investigating, and explaining patterns of representation by national parliamentarians in EU politics. It defines patterns of representation as both behavioral (representative roles) and conceptual patterns (representative role orientations) (Eulau and Karps 1977; Wahlke et al. 1962). Therefore, representative patterns comprise representative roles MPs play (strategically) in parliament, and representative role orientations they hold as representative self-conceptions in EU politics. These are two sides of the same coin. These patterns contain two elements: (1) focus of representation and (2) style of representation. Thus, this study seeks to answer the two classic puzzles in representation research (Eulau et al. 1959; Pitkin 1967) for the EU context: Whom (focus of representation) and how (style of representation) do national MPs represent in EU politics and why do they do so?

The focus of representation relates to the geographic boundaries of the political community national legislators represent when dealing with EU affairs. The underlying questions are: What is the territorial scope of the relevant democratic constituency MPs speak for? Do these national MPs represent national citizens only or do they Europeanize their representative portfolios and include citizens from other EU member states or an overall European citizenry? Under which conditions do they become such European(-ized) representatives who insert grievances of citizens across Europe into the domestic political decision-making process on EU issues? The style of representation relates to the questions of how legislators make decisions in representative democracies and how the representative relationship works (Bellamy and Castiglione 2011, p. 120). The discussion usually revolves around the infamous ‘mandate-independence controversy’ (Pitkin 1967, pp. 144–167). Does the representative act independently of her constituents in pursuit of what she considers in their collective welfare (the Burkian trustee)? Or is she not rather a delegate mandated by principals such as her constituency or her political party (Converse and Pierce 1979)?

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This study goes beyond this “wrongly put” controversy (Pitkin 1967, p. 165). It rather looks at the universality of MPs’ interest representation. Are these interests “attached to a certain group of people” or “unattached” (Pitkin 1967, p. 156)? That is do MPs promote the ‘common good’ (Republicans) or do they speak for particular interests (Pluralists)? By zooming in on this dimension of the style of representation, we can uncover the aim of MPs’ interest representation in EU politics (Rehfeld 2009, 2016). Accordingly, the main research questions are summarized below: 1. RQ1: Focus of Representation: Whom do national MPs represent in EU affairs? RQ1.1: Do national MPs have a national or European(-ized) focus of representation? RQ1.2: How can potential differences in the focus of representation be explained and what are the factors that explain a national or European(-ized) focus of representation? 2. RQ2: Style of Representation: How do national MPs represent in EU affairs? RQ2.1: Do national MPs have a republican or pluralist style of representation (public vs. particular interest representation)? RQ2.2: How can potential differences in the style of representation be explained and what are the factors that explain a republican or pluralist style of representation?

1.4

Outline of the Book

The second chapter of this book spells out the theoretical framework to analyze national parliamentary representation in the EU. It starts from the ‘standard account’ of representation and updates it to fit the EU context. Building on existing literature on national parliaments’ responses to European integration and extant research on representatives’ roles in domestic and supranational contexts, it deduces national MPs’ four patterns of representation in EU politics. Chapter 3 then describes the study’s comparative perspective. It discusses how the empirical material was selected, collected, and analyzed. The book then contains three

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empirical chapters. The first describes whom and how national MPs represent in EU politics and maps the representative patterns we observe (Chapter 4). The two subsequent chapters then explain MPs’ representative behavior (Chapter 5) and representative conceptions (Chapter 6). The concluding Chapter 7 summarizes the main theoretical and empirical findings of the study. We discuss how we can apply the theoretical model developed for the EU context to the broader challenge of squaring classic nation-based political representation with the internationalized reality of modern politics. The question will also be to what extent we can transfer the empirical instances of trans- and supranational representation in the EU context to other, globalized contexts and interdependent settings. It also relates the findings back to the normative questions of this study. That is it assesses the democratic quality of the uncovered patterns of representation as well as their potentials and perils for sustaining the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. We highlight the broader normative and political implications these patterns have for responsibility and responsiveness of representatives acting in multi-level settings with multiple principals.

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Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Hutter, S., Grande, E., & Kriesi, H. (Eds.). (2016). Politicising Europe: Integration and mass politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Innerarity, D. (2018). Democracy in Europe: A political philosophy of the EU . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Karlas, J. (2012). National parliamentary control of EU affairs: Institutional design after enlargement. West European Politics, 35(5), 1095–1113. Kinski, L. (2018). Whom to represent? National parliamentary representation during the Eurozone crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(3), 346– 368. Kinski, L., & Crum, B. (2020). Transnational representation in EU national parliaments: Concept, case study, research agenda. Political Studies, 68(2), 370–388. Kröger, S., & Friedrich, D. (2012a). Political representation in the EU: A second transformation? In S. Kröger & D. Friedrich (Eds.), The challenge of democratic representation in the European Union (pp. 3–20). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kröger, S., & Friedrich, D. (Eds.). (2012b). The challenge of democratic representation in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kröger, S., & Friedrich, D. (2013a). Democratic representation in the EU: Two kinds of subjectivity. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(2), 171–189. Kröger, S., & Friedrich, D. (2013b). Introduction: The representative turn in EU studies. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(2), 155–170. Leruth, B., Startin, N., & Usherwood, S. (Eds.). (2017). The Routledge handbook of Euroscepticism. Abingdon: Routledge. Lord, C. (2013). No representation without justification? Appraising standards of justification in European Parliament debates. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(2), 243–259. Lord, C., & Pollak, J. (2010). The EU’s many representative modes: Colliding? cohering? Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (1), 117–136. Mair, P. (2005). Popular democracy and the European Union polity (European Governance Papers, C-05-03). http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han dle/1814/3292/egp-connex-C-05-03.pdf. Accessed 9 Apr 2020. Mair, P. (2006). Ruling the void? The hollowing of Western democracy. New Left Review, 42, 25–51. Mair, P. (2009). Representative versus responsible government (MPIfG Discussion Paper 09/8). http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp09-8.pdf. Accessed 9 Apr 2020. Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking representation. American Political Science Review, 97 (4), 515–528.

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Saward, M. (2010). The representative claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Saward, M. (2014). Shape-shifting representation. American Political Science Review, 108(4), 723–736. Schmidt, V. A. (2013). Democracy and legitimacy in the European Union revisited: Input, output and ‘throughput’. Political Studies, 61(1), 2–22. Schmitt, H., & Toygür, I. (2016). European Parliament elections of May 2014: Driven by national politics or EU policy making? Politics and Governance, 4(1), 167–181. Strøm, K. W. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. European Journal of Political Research, 37 (3), 261–289. Strøm, K. W. (2003). Parliamentary democracy and delegation. In K. W. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies (pp. 55–106). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Urbinati, N., & Warren, M. E. (2008). The concept of representation in contemporary democratic theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 387–412. Wahlke, J. C., Eulau, H., Buchanan, W., & Ferguson, L. C. (1962). The legislative system: Explorations in legislative behavior. New York: Wiley. Wendler, F. (2016). Debating Europe in national parliaments: Public justification and political polarization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wessels, B., & Katz, R. S. (1999). Introduction: European Parliament, national parliaments, and European integration. In R. S. Katz & B. Wessels (Eds.), The European Parliament, the national parliaments, and European integration (pp. 3–18). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winzen, T. (2012). National parliamentary control of European Union affairs: A cross-national and longitudinal comparison. West European Politics, 35(3), 657–672. Winzen, T. (2013). European integration and national parliamentary oversight institutions. European Union Politics, 14(2), 297–323. Winzen, T. (2017). Constitutional preferences and parliamentary reform: Explaining national parliaments’ adaptation to European integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winzen, T., de Ruiter, R., & Rocabert, J. (2018). Is parliamentary attention to the EU strongest when it is needed the most? National parliaments and the selective debate of EU policies. European Union Politics, 19(3), 481–501. Zürn, M., & Walter-Drop, G. (2011). Democracy and representation beyond the nation state. In S. Alonso, J. Keane, W. Merkel, & M. Fotou (Eds.), The future of representative democracy (pp. 258–281). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Framework

2.1

The ‘Standard Account’ of Parliamentary Representation and EU Politics

In today’s parliamentary democracies across the EU, representation is structured through national parliaments as the central institutions organizing the democratic transfer of power to elected representatives. This ‘standard account’ of democratic representation through parliaments rests on national elections and the territory of the nation-state (e.g., Castiglione and Warren 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008). It focuses on institutional aspects of authorization and accountability through national elections that ensure the basic democratic principles of political equality of, and public control by national citizens. Therefore, authorization and accountability through electoral representation is linked to citizenship rights and national territoriality. This approach assumes a geographic congruence between the politicians (representatives) and the body politic (the represented), i.e., the sovereign powers of the nation-states and their corresponding national political communities (Zürn and Walter-Drop 2011, p. 262). Specifically, the standard account is rooted in both “input and output congruence” (Zürn and Walter-Drop 2011, p. 262). The former refers to the congruence between those affected by a decision and the representatives they authorize to make decisions. The latter means the congruence between the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_2

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political area a decision is valid in, and the scope of the social interaction that this decision aims to regulate. In an ideal-type sovereign nation-state, electoral representation via parliaments ensures democracy, because those whose self-determination is affected by collective decisions have the chance to influence these on equal terms (among many others, Held 1995, 1996). In Montanaro’s terms (2018), the affected and the authorizing constituency ideal-typically coincide. Within this setting, parliamentary representation becomes a principal – agent relationship between national citizens as principals who authorize their national representatives as agents who in turn act “in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967, p. 209). These representatives then authorize other agents, i.e., governments, to enact public policy (Curtin 2007; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2003). A chain of top-down accountability supplements this chain of bottom-up delegation. Principals have the power to sanction their agents both positively and negatively by re-electing them or ‘throwing the rascals out.’ Such formal authorization and accountability through electoral representation entails both responsibility and responsiveness (Mair 2009). Representatives must channel grievances of their represented into the political process, and the represented have (electoral) means to ensure this preference aggregation. At the same time, representatives possess a certain leeway in making their decisions for the well-being of their represented (Pitkin 1967, p. 209). Therefore, representation in its standard account contains, and tries to reconcile, both elements of autonomy and dependence. As representative institutions, modern parliaments aim to solve this possible tension and strike a vital balance between such responsibility and responsiveness pressures. They do so by providing a forum for discussion and justification (Lord 2013; Pitkin 1967, pp. 209f.). Finally, today’s standard account of democratic parliamentary representation has clear liberal and pluralist elements. In modern democracies, the political process aggregates a plurality of interests, while civil liberties and the rule of law are enshrined in constitutions (Bellamy 2007; Scharpf 2009, pp. 174–176). In sum, the standard account of representative democracy refers to parliamentary representation based on a formal principal–agent relationship of authorization and accountability between elected representatives and their territorially defined constituencies. Periodic elections and

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universal franchise ensure the republican elements of public control, political equality, and ‘common good’ orientation. For these mechanisms to work, we assume a congruence between nation-states and national societies. At the same time, parliaments are conceptualized as plural institutions within a comprehensive system of checks and balances (the liberal/pluralist element). Modern democracies are to balance these two traditions: “republican collectivism is moderated by the protection of individual liberties, whereas libertarian egotism is constrained by the institutions of collective self-determination” (Scharpf 2009, p. 176). This dual configuration is to guarantee both responsibility for and responsiveness to the represented (Castiglione and Warren 2006). The alleged congruence between the state enjoying coercive power over a territory with clear borders and the nation as a homogenous political community subjected to collectively binding decisions, has already been more of a fiction than reality, when the nation-states were created in the first place. It is definitely a fiction today. The landscape and scale of today’s politics and societies have developed in such a way that they increasingly question the standard account’s key components of territoryand election-based representation through parliaments. Specifically, this standard account of nationally organized representative mass democracy has increasingly come under pressure from both above and below (Castiglione and Warren 2006, pp. 1f.; Kröger and Friedrich 2012a, pp. 7–9). Challenges from above include the trans- and supranationalization of politics and societies. The globalization of the international political economy reduces “the political, economic, social, and cultural autonomy of national states” (Dahl 1994, p. 26; see also Held 1991, 1995). Challenges from below refer to a diversification of societies. This entails declining party identification as a problem for traditional cleavagebased democracy (Katz and Mair 2009; Van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), a general disenchantment with politics, and a continuous diversification of interests demanding to be incorporated in decision-making (Auel 2013). Clearly, national representative democracy is under pressure, but “[r]ather than a decline in (the quality of) representative democracy, we seem to be observing a change in kind” (Thomassen and van Ham 2014, p. 416). Responding to these challenges from above and below, modern democracies continue to move from national representative government to representative governance at multiple levels (Jachtenfuchs 2001; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006).

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In today’s transnationalized politics and societies, increasingly complex cross-border problems are tackled at multiple levels. There is a mismatch between the territorially bounded nation-states and the effects of their decisions in an increasingly interdependent world. Transnational realities collide with national representative institutions. “Input incongruence” poses a severe challenge to democratic self-determination due to increasing externalities of decisions on citizens who have no say in their coming about (Zürn and Walter-Drop 2011, p. 262). “The boundaries of a country (…) have become much smaller than the boundaries of the decisions that significantly affect the fundamental interests of its citizens” (Dahl 1994, p. 26). At the same time, “output incongruence” undermines national autonomy and compromises the ability of national representatives to reach the policy goals of their represented, because of forces outside their jurisdiction (Zürn and Walter-Drop 2011, p. 263). Policy problems transcend (national) territories and policy solutions transcend the reach of national parliaments as the central representative institutions. “To propose that all persons significantly affected by these decisions should be included in the process would be seen as fanciful; that they should be included as political equals, democratic citizens if you like, seems an even more utopian claim” (Dahl 1994, p. 32). Additionally, actors claiming to act on behalf of certain group interests have multiplied and new forms of civic engagement lead to (informal) representation by a multitude of both elected and unelected representatives (Maia 2012; Montanaro 2018; Saward 2010). This reflects general diversification processes in society (Castiglione and Warren 2006, p. 2). It follows that formal chains of delegation and accountability based solely on the electoral moment and national territoriality are increasingly insufficient to characterize the reality of representation in modern democracies. “The one project which seems to unite most of those challenges or is even the product, reaction or answer to them, is the European integration process” (Pollak et al. 2009, p. 2). To begin with, the EU challenges national parliaments from above. It is the example of trans- and supranationalization of decision-making arenas and the modern policy process (Kröger and Friedrich 2012a, p. 7f.). In the course of European integration, member states have transferred ever more areas of policy-making to the EU level. Consequently, national parliaments had lost legislative competencies and direct influence on decisions at the EU level. Executives

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negotiate in the Council of Ministers and are strengthened vis-à-vis their parliaments in EU affairs (e.g., Bellamy and Kröger 2014; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). To make matters worse, under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council, governments can be outvoted: “In such a case, national parliaments may be compelled to adopt policies that even their own governments did not agree to” (Auel 2015, p. 367). The European Parliament cannot fully compensate these ‘holes in intergovernmental legitimacy’ despite its continued evolvement into a colegislator alongside the Council. To this day, it remains a second-order locus of political identification and collective will-formation (Schmitt and Toygür 2016). “It is this state between incomplete sovereignty and the lack of compensation at another level that is often perceived as the EU’s democratic deficit by its citizens” (Kröger and Friedrich 2012a, p. 8). All the while, the growing importance of policy issues that, by definition, transcend national borders, coupled with economic and societal interdependence increase the need for collective decision-making at the EU level. When scholars first started debating these gaps in parliamentary legitimacy of the EU, they viewed national parliaments as ‘losers’ or at best ‘latecomers’ to the process of European integration (Maurer and Wessels 2001). Many early observers feared ‘de-parliamentarization’ (e.g., Wessels 1985) and ultimate parliamentary decline due to information asymmetries and power shifts toward the executive. This decline thesis, however, tends to be based on ideal assumptions about parliamentary democracy, and European integration is by no means the only challenge to it (Norton 1994; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Raunio and Hix 2000). Still, European integration did compromise core parliamentary functions. National parliaments were rather passive bystanders to the integration process until the late 1980s/early 1990s. European politics was largely viewed as classic foreign policy and thereby as the prerogative of the executive: “National interests remained protected through national governments” (Norton 1996, p. 177). This attitude changed quite rapidly with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 and especially the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. These treaties saw a massive transfer of competencies to the EU level coupled with an expansion of QMV in the Council (Auel 2015). What is more, they marked the end of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) in the general public (Hooghe and Marks 2009). National parliaments had a

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‘late arrival’ to the European integration process, but they began to ‘fight back’ (Raunio and Hix 2000). We saw quite a remarkable institutional and behavioral adaption of national parliaments to European integration, albeit in different ways and to varying degrees. To compensate the loss of decision-making power, parliaments reformed their institutional infrastructure to be able to oversee, scrutinize, and influence their governments acting in EU affairs. They fought for access to more comprehensive information on EU policy processes by their governments, created European Affairs Committees (EAC), developed mechanisms to process this information and scrutinize these documents and/or the negotiation positions of their governments. They continuously increased their rights to hold the government to account. Along with the ‘late awakening,’ scholars started to pay attention to this formal parliamentary adaption. They investigated the instruments national parliaments have to influence their government in EU affairs. This includes earlier (comparative) case studies on the domestic scrutiny infrastructure and formal participation rights (Auel and Benz 2005; Bergman 1997; Raunio 2005), but also large-N comparisons over time and cross-nationally (e.g., Karlas 2011, 2012; Senninger 2020; Winzen 2012, 2013). Soon, there was a move in scholarly attention from institutional to behavioral adaption of national parliaments to European integration. Research became more interested in actual parliamentary behavior in EU affairs (e.g., Auel and Christiansen 2015; Auel and Höing 2014, 2015; Hagemann et al. 2019; contributions in Hefftler et al. 2015; Senninger 2017). This included the question why some parliaments fulfill their task as scrutinizers better than others (e.g., Auel et al. 2015b). By now, we have substantive knowledge on how and why national parliaments have adapted institutionally and behaviorally to the challenges of trans- and supranational politics within the EU. What all these very insightful contributions have in common, however, is that most of them—implicitly or explicitly—investigate and evaluate the role of national parliaments in the EU from the perspective of the standard account of national representation. National parliaments try to control and scrutinize their governments in EU matters in order to ensure they act in accordance with the national voters’ concerns (Saalfeld 2005). They thereby try to ‘patch’ the perforated chains of delegation and accountability. In this standard view, the EU is “the next step of delegation and accountability” (Bergman 2000, p. 415). The argument behind this is

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seemingly straightforward: National parliaments want to ‘regain’ as much as possible their monopoly to represent their national citizens (Bellamy and Kröger 2014, p. 443). Recently, national parliaments are increasingly seen as communicators of EU politics (Auel 2007). Empirical research has shifted its focus to the functions of public debate and holding the government publicly to account (Auel et al. 2016, 2018; Kinski 2020; Rauh 2015; Rauh and de Wilde 2018; Winzen et al. 2018). The idea is that, being ‘closer’ to their citizens, national parliaments can become the communicative link between national citizens and EU governance (Auel 2013). Especially parliamentary plenary debates have become a subject of analysis (e.g., de Wilde 2010; Maatsch 2017; Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra 2013; Wendler 2016; Wonka 2016). On the one hand, this growing body of literature offers fresh insights and does broaden the way we see national parliaments in EU affairs. On the other hand, scholars tend to ask “Connecting with the electorate?” (Auel and Raunio 2014, p. 1, emphasis added). They see national parliaments as mainly communicating EU politics to their national citizens. Again, this rests on the standard account of representation: public accountability essentially based on national territory and elections. National parliaments are not only scrutinizers and communicators, however. They may also play roles that to some degree go beyond the standard account of national parliamentary representation in EU governance. In the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments became formal players at the EU level. For the first time, they were explicitly acknowledged as key institutions within the main body of the Treaty on the European Union (Art. 10.2, 12, 5.3 (2) Treaty on European Union (TEU)). At first glance, the formal treaty provisions for the representative role of national parliaments (Art. 10 TEU) “tend to primarily focus on the parliamentary control of governments” (Sprungk 2013, p. 561). Yet, when we look at the specific provisions in the two additional protocols on national parliaments, we see elements that go beyond the standard account of representing the national electorate. National parliaments now receive legislative documents directly from the European Commission. With the introduction of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), they are considered watchdogs of subsidiarity. This new role has the potential to open up a direct channel of control at the EU level and, along with it, a ‘new’ representative channel from national citizens via national parliaments to supranational EU institutions.

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The verdict is still out as to whether the EWM has so far lived up to these expectations (Jonsson Cornell and Goldoni 2017). On the one hand, Cooper argues the EWM pools national parliaments into a kind of ‘virtual third chamber’ (Cooper 2015), and Miklin sees positive side effects such that the EWM “encourages inter-parliamentary co-operation” (Miklin 2017, p. 371). Malang et al. (2019) find that national parliaments with the same party family in the majority influence one another in their vetoing during the EWM decision-making process. For Benz on the other hand, “the subsidiarity control procedure reveals the limits of politics of interparliamentary communication” as parliaments “have not found appropriate procedures in order to exchange their views or to come to an agreement” (Benz 2016, p. 7; see also Auel and Neuhold 2017). This more negative view has it that incentives to engage with the EWM remain limited (Gattermann and Hefftler 2015), and if parliaments do engage, they still rather act as agents of their national electorate trying to influence EU policy to their benefit than as European ‘competence monitors.’ Some scholars even argue that national parliaments should stick to their traditional scrutiny function instead of focusing on the EWM (de Wilde and Raunio 2018). Finally, national parliaments are supposed to be networkers in interparliamentary co-operation across the EU multi-level system of governance (TEU Art 12 (f); Protocol No. 1). Scholars have investigated national parliaments’ contacts to parliaments at the sub-national level, to other national parliaments, and the EP. For example, they have looked at the formal framework of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), bilateral meetings of members of parliament (MPs), or national parliaments’ offices in Brussels (Crum and Fossum 2013; Lupo and Fasone 2016). One of the main ideas behind these co-ordination efforts is to hold the Council of Ministers to account more effectively and maybe even transnationally. National parliaments can hold their individual governments to account, but not the Council as a whole who takes its decisions collectively. This does not only blur chains of responsibilities, but severely compromises the ability of national parliaments to exert influence over EU decision-making. The hope is that, by receiving information on other parliaments’ (and their governments’ negotiation) positions, national parliaments can somewhat mimic the Council’s collective decision logic (Fasone 2012).

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Theoretical concepts such as ‘compounded representation’ (Benz 2003) and ‘multi-level parliamentarism’ (Maurer 2002, translated by the author) or more recently the ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum 2009, 2012) and ‘multi-arena players’ (Auel and Neuhold 2017) capture the multi-level networking perspective on national parliamentary representation. Ultimately, they envision a broader representative role for national parliaments in EU governance by questioning that a “‘natural’ division of labour” (Crum and Fossum 2009, p. 250) exists between the intergovernmental chain of representation (i.e., national citizens via national parliaments and national governments in the Council) and the supranational one (i.e., European citizens via the European Parliament). Interparliamentary co-operation may then be a means to promote common trans- and supranational interests over national concerns because it allows national MPs to discuss (and understand) different national positions (Knutelská 2013; Kraft-Kasack 2008). Empirically, however, COSAC has rather become a forum to compare national scrutiny of specific EU policies or national EU scrutiny procedures (Raunio 2011). While this exchange of ‘best practices’ has a virtue in its own right, it stays within the standard account of representation. National parliaments optimize control of their own governments. Therefore, interparliamentary co-operation has so far not fully delivered on its promise to catalyze a transnational and/or supranational collective impetus. In sum, Lisbon Treaty reforms “do not aim at re-enhancing national democracy in the traditional way, but imply new ideas of how parliamentary democracy in the EU should work. [They allow for] a deviation from standard parliamentary roles in European democracies” (Sprungk 2013, p. 560, emphasis added). Scholars have also started to move beyond the standard account of national parliamentary representation as an “impoverished and ultimately insufficient notion” (Piattoni 2013, p. 225). While evidence remains mixed whether national parliaments have actually taken up these new roles in response to the challenges ‘from above,’ there is a second set of challenges that national parliaments in the EU face more ‘from below.’ This challenge further compromises the adequacy of the standard account of representation by national parliaments in EU politics. In diverse and plural societies, national parliaments share their privileged position as central representative institutions with a variety of competitors that represent a multitude of interests and causes in EU governance (Kröger and Friedrich 2012a; Lord and Pollak 2010). These

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include interest and lobby groups, non-governmental actors, and civil society organizations as well as expert bodies, committees, and independent (regulatory) EU agencies such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency FRONTEX. This ‘congestion’ of the representative space can have positive and negative consequences on democratic representation in the EU as a whole (e.g., Kröger 2016). In either case, however, it challenges formal parliamentary representation through authorization and accountability, and blurs the lines between institutional and informal channels of representation (Lord and Pollak 2010). While unelected representative actors may challenge national parliaments’ role as the key representative institution, the difficulty with EU agencies is not so much that they may compete on national parliaments’ ‘representative turf,’ but that they are outside the realm of traditional representative institutions of the nation-state. This in turn poses problems for democratic control and legitimacy in the EU (e.g., Shapiro 1997). Even though EU agencies commonly act as co-ordinators and providers of information rather than full-blown regulatory agencies, their increasing involvement blurs responsibilities and creates problems of ‘agency loss’ (e.g., Kelemen 2002). National parliaments’ (successful) attempts to collectively hold EU agencies to account remain more fragmented. These developments from above and below, albeit by no means confined to the European context, make the EU “a unique set of multilevel, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors” (Hix 1998, p. 39). For national parliaments, this ultimately means that they “lose their exclusivity in representative politics” (Kröger and Friedrich 2012a, p. 8). While it is safe to say that parliaments have never actually had the exclusive responsibility to represent their national citizens, this is what the standard account of democratic parliamentary representation assumes. It does, however, no longer capture the empirical ‘standard’ in the EU multi-level system of governance. It is no longer straightforward that the representative space of national parliaments in EU governance is exclusively national or that they inhabit it alone. In a nutshell, we know quite a lot about what the role of national parliaments in EU governance should be. By now, we also have solid knowledge about how parliaments can and do actually react to the challenges of European integration. Especially research into national scrutiny and communication of EU affairs has stayed within the standard account of national parliamentary representation. In this view, national parliaments

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represent and connect to their national electorate, when working on EU politics. As we have seen, however, this standard view has been eroding in the EU system. We face two types of discrepancies: between those affected and those participating in decisions as well as between the area a policy solution applies to and the area that is affected by a policy problem. What is more, parliaments are not in a position to monopolize the legislative and representative functions. Put differently, parliaments do not only lose (share or pool) the power to make collectively binding decisions in EU affairs, they also—quite literally—lose their collective, the territorially defined body politic to be governed by their decisions. Ultimately, European governance confronts them with a challenge of whom they represent how in EU politics. To grasp this “context of denationalization ‘upward’, ‘downward’ and ‘sideward’” (Maggetti and Gilardi 2014, p. 1293), we have to investigate what takes place beyond and beneath the standard account of national parliamentary representation in EU governance. Whom and how national parliaments in EU governance represent is far from clear both theoretically and empirically. On the one hand, the intergovernmental chain of representation by national parliaments is deeply engrained in the EU’s constitutional and institutional structure. On the other hand, the sui generis character of the EU allows for innovative modes of representation to emerge. Based on the aforementioned research, there is reason to believe that national parliaments can in fact assume broader representative roles in the EU than serving “as agents fighting for particular national public interests” (Benz 2016, p. 6). This is something we know surprisingly little about. Put differently, we need (1) a theoretical re-conceptualization of national parliamentary representation in EU multi-level governance as well as (2) an investigation of empirical patterns of such representation within national parliaments. This then needs to be followed by (3) a normative discussion of the democratic legitimacy of such patterns of national parliamentary representation in EU politics. To achieve this, the book does two things: First, it focuses on “what is going on in representation” (Saward 2010, p. 6, emphasis added). Thereby, it unbundles the seemingly ‘settled’ questions of whom is represented how by national parliaments in EU politics. Second, it zooms into the institution of parliament and conceptualizes as well as analyzes representative patterns from the actors’ perspective. The next section spells out

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this new concept of national parliamentary representation in EU politics, drawing on insights from (comparative) legislative studies and representation research. In particular, it seeks to combine constructivist approaches to representation with strategic approaches to representative roles by MPs.

2.2

National Parliamentary Representation in the EU: The Concept of This Study

To update national parliamentary representation to the EU context, we need to understand the role of national parliaments in modern representative democracies. In political thought and from a historical perspective, political representation as a means to organize political rule (Pollak 2007, pp. 94–96) is gradually coupled with republican and pluralist democratic elements (Scharpf 2009). Eventually, representation and democracy become embodied in the institution of parliament elected by a national body politic (Urbinati 2006). The questions of who belongs to this political community, that is who is entitled to be represented, and, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, how this representation becomes democratic, have long occupied political theorists and modern empirical researchers. We find the origins of the republican democratic tradition in Aristotle’s polis that is to advance the “common good of its citizens” (Aristotle 2009 [n.d.], p. 117, emphasis added). Yet, who is entitled to citizenship, is heavily restricted. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes (1651) and John Locke (1823 [1689]) seek new forms of legitimation for political power through representation. The notion of ‘representative government,’ however, i.e., questions of accountability and responsiveness of the representatives to the represented, only gradually enter the picture in the eighteenth and nineteenth century (Castiglione and Warren 2006, p. 3). John Locke (1823 [1689]) and Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (2001 [1752]), oftentimes referred to as the ‘founding fathers’ of modern liberal thought and constitutional government, introduce rule of law and protection of individual liberties into political thought. “[I]ndividual selfdetermination replaces the value of collective self-determination” (Scharpf 2009, p. 175). Their conception of the political community is restricted to men and favors the nobility’s interest. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (2003 [1762]) stands within the republican tradition of common good orientation and egalitarianism, but denies the legitimacy of representative

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institutions. He claims the volonté générale, the general will of the people as a whole, to be the ‘true’ common good the state was created to maintain (2003 [1762], p. 15). In contrast to liberal thought, the volonté de tous, the will of all, is considered undesirable as it simply is the sum of the volontés particulières, particular wills, or private interests. In the context of the English and American revolutions, pluralist conceptions of representative democracy, such as proposed in the Federalist Papers, acknowledge “society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens” that should adequately be represented and protected (The Federalist 51, Madison et al. 1788). In contrast, in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol on November 3, 1774, Edmund Burke (1854–1856 [1774]) explicitly neglects this pluralist conception of interest representation, and urges representatives to speak for a single unified national interest. “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; (…) but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole (…)” (Burke 1854–1856 [1774], p. 447, emphasis in original). John Stuart Mill (2001 [1859]; 2001 [1861]) develops a comprehensive liberal theory of representative government that sees parliament as the central representative institution (Urbinati 2002). While he conceives of parliament as a deliberative rather than law-making body, he sees its main task in representing the “great public interests of the country (…) where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded” (Mill 2001 [1861], p. 69, emphasis added). Finally, Walter Bagehot (2001 [1867/1873]) combines both pluralist and republican conceptions of who should be represented how. He suggests that to fulfill its five core tasks—“elect a ministry well, legislate well, teach the nation well, express the nation’s will well, bring matters to the nation’s attention well” (p. 111)—parliament has to simultaneously “be an advocate for every particular sect, and a vast neutral body of no sect – homogeneous and judicial, like the nation itself” (p. 17). As this brief synopsis has illustrated, parliament becomes the centerpiece of representative democracy in the nation-state. The questions of whom and how parliaments represent remain vital and contested in present-day representation theory and empirical research (for outstanding overviews and new directions, see among many Alonso et al. 2011; Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008; Brito Vieira 2017; Castiglione and Pollak 2019; Shapiro et al. 2009). Hanna Pitkin’s classic conception of representation (1967) is considered the bedrock of modern representation

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theories. She distinguishes formal representation from representation as ‘standing for’ (descriptive and symbolic) and representation as ‘acting for’ (substantive representation). The latter two forms differ with regard to the questions they are trying to answer: “We may ask what a representative does, what constitutes the activity of representing. Or we may ask what a representative is, what he must be like in order to represent” (Pitkin 1967, p. 59, emphasis added). Two of her insights are most important for our purposes here. First, formal representation as the institutional aspects of authorization and accountability associated with the aforementioned standard account is important, yet not ‘the be all and end all’ of national parliamentary representation (Pitkin 1967, pp. 38–59). Instead, political representation needs to be understood as a complex process that takes place within these formal structures. Second, representation entails both responsibility for and responsiveness to the represented. The formal electoral connection is to ensure responsiveness, but a certain leeway must exist for the representative to pursue what she thinks is in her electorate’s interest, even if that same electorate may disagree. According to Pitkin, the potential conflict between the two is inbuilt in the representative relationship (Pitkin 1967, pp. 144–167), but can be mitigated. The substance of representation is acting in such a way that there generally is no conflict between the representatives and the represented, either because the representative’s actions are responsive to the (short-term) interests of the represented or because the representative can justify her (deviant) actions to be in the (long-term) interest of the represented (Pitkin 1967, pp. 209–210). When representatives explain their deviations, symbolic representation becomes important as it creates a ‘feeling of being represented.’ While Pitkin had a clear focus on substantive representation within formal settings, many political theorists have contributed to refining and developing the notion of representation since then (e.g., Ankersmit 2002; Disch 2011; Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2006). As representation studies accelerated in recent years, we have seen a move away from the prototypical image of political representation. This image focuses on the relationship between a constituency and a parliamentarian who acquires the position of representative by being elected into office, based on a well-specified program, and whose actions are driven by the prospect of re-election. Instead, scholars have shifted their attention to non-electoral,

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self-appointed, informal, aesthetic, and other forms of (symbolic) representation beyond electoral and territorial relationships (e.g., Montanaro 2018, especially Saward 2006, 2010). To structure the discussion on key theoretical advances in this direction and “[i]n an attempt to clarify the concept, we need to concentrate on the prime question: Who represents what by which means?” (Pollak 2007, p. 89, emphasis added). Jane Mansbridge (2003) offers a compelling conceptualization that broadens our understanding beyond the formal electoral relationship between representatives and represented. Her ‘promissory’ and ‘anticipatory’ representation (pp. 516–520) spell out retro- and prospective voting and thereby rest within formal electoral channels of authorization and accountability. Her ‘gyroscopic’ and ‘surrogate’ representation, however, go beyond this. In the former, representatives do not respond to external electoral incentives. They are not directly accountable to the electorate, but rather accountable from within. Voters select representatives based on the latter’s’ visible preferences for ‘good’ representation. ‘Surrogate’ representation does not only go beyond the electoral link, but also beyond the territorial one because it does not hinge on a formal representative relationship (pp. 522–525). Mansbridge argues that this representative relationship rests on ideological convictions to represent a particular political constituency. Surrogate representatives feel a responsibility to these constituents irrespective of whether members of this group live in a representative’s electoral district or not. By stripping representation from its formal beddings, Mansbridge opens her concept to symbolic representation. A surrogate representative relationship is virtual and rests on “[f]eelings of responsibility for constituents outside one’s district (…)” (2003, p. 523). Precisely because these representative relationships cut across formal electoral and territorial boundaries, they may enhance the representative quality of the entire representative system rather than cater to specific territorial interests only. The main argument she makes is that because certain group interests transcend borders of electoral districts, so, naturally, does their representation. This idea of going beyond the narrow territorial electoral connection is by no means new to representation research, but in fact goes back as far as Edmund Burke who proposed the idea of ‘virtual representation’ of so-called ‘unattached interests’ (Pitkin 1967, pp. 168–189). Burke’s conception of representation does not only differ in key respects from modern (democratic) conceptions of representation. His understanding

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of non-territorial representation also only extends to those “who shared in that national interest” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, pp. 41f.). Hence, it ends at the border of the nation-state. Weissberg (1978) concludes that “there is no historical or theoretical reason” to exclude such forms of non-territorial interest representation from the analysis, “though rarely has this type of relationship been deemed to be of special theoretical importance” (p. 537). Like Burke and Mansbridge, he connects this type of representation mainly to organized interests that cut across geographic entities within a national context: “it is self-evident that a legislator ‘looking out’ for, say, his own peanut farmers will also represent peanut farmers not in his own district” (p. 537). Rehfeld (2005) equally argues that representation can go beyond its territorial constituency anchorage, but instead of proposing to leave the electoral connection, he suggests to change the composition of the constituencies themselves. Citizens are randomly assigned to permanent, single-member electoral constituencies that mirror the nation as a whole. This setup is to ensure democratic legitimacy of the representative system by way of an electoral connection to ‘miniature nations’ in each constituency. In doing so, he tries to make sure the interests of everyone affected are included in the decision-making process, but his hypothetical solution is to create a system in which the representative has an electoral relationship with all existing political interests. Overall, contemporary representation theorists have updated our theoretical toolkit and complemented electoral representation with representative relationships that cut across formal territorial settings. This has culminated in the recent ‘constructivist turn’ away from the standard account of representation (Disch 2015). Representation theorists now very openly embrace political representation as a generative relationship that reflects the dynamic and open-ended nature of political decisionmaking (Disch 2011; Urbinati 2006). Since empirical reality has outrun the standard account, many suggest to ‘dig deeper’ into the fabric of representative relationships as ‘between-election democracy’ (Esaiasson and Narud 2013). Some only question the adequacy of the standard account to describe modern-day representation (e.g., Castiglione and Warren 2006), while constructivist approaches go as far as to argue that both representatives and represented are not exogenous to the process of representation, but in fact created during it. In the constructivist, event-based view of representation introduced by Michael Saward (2006, 2010) the very act of representation involves

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political actors putting forward a claim. This claim is always contestable and requires others to take a stand on whether they can identify with it. In that sense, every act of representation essentially involves an intervention in the dynamics of the political process and a call for (re-)alignment of the actors involved. Representation becomes both “constituted” and “constitutive” (Saward 2010, p. 10). Representation is not a given fact resulting from elections, but a constant constructive process of “making and receiving claims (…) – in, between, and outside electoral cycles” (Saward 2010, p. 36). Saward goes beyond Pitkin’s symbolic representation in that, for him, representatives do not only construct symbols to represent their constituencies, but in doing so also construct the constituents themselves as well as their own role as their representatives (Severs 2010). Representatives perform representation rather than act within established formal channels only. As a result, the representative relationship becomes to a great deal “imagined” (Saward 2010, p. 52). This flexible understanding allows us to go beyond the standard view of the represented as the electorate defined by territorial boundaries and citizenship. Parliamentary representatives can now bring a completely new array of constituencies into being. They can constantly re-create political constituencies and communities. In this view, election does not automatically make national MPs legitimate representatives as “being elected does not take away the need to make symbolic claims, it merely establishes a particular frame within which the claims are made” (Saward 2010, p. 37). This study takes this claims-making approach to representation and couples it with insights from empirical research on members of parliament and their representative roles (excellent overview and new perspectives in Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012a). Empirical research into the practices of national parliamentary representation first emerged in the US context in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Naturally, election researchers have focused on causal mechanisms behind the formal electoral connection of authorization and accountability (Mayhew 1974) looking at retro- and prospective voting, i.e., promissory and anticipatory representation, or economic voting patterns (e.g., Campbell et al. 2010; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Party research has investigated national parliamentary representation in terms of candidate selection processes within political parties, and party organizational change in response to changing representative environments (e.g., Poguntke 2002; Scarrow et al. 2017).

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A second dominant strand of research focuses on substantive representation as responsiveness measured by issue congruence between representatives’ actions and their constituents’ wishes (Arnold and Franklin 2012a, b; Golder and Stramski 2010). US scholars have mainly looked at electoral district representation (e.g., Achen 1978; Kuklinski 1979; Kuklinski and Elling 1977), whereas European scholars have found stronger evidence for legislators’ representation of party interests (Converse and Pierce 1979). Research has moved from analyzing dyadic representation via roll-call votes or parliamentary questions to comparing collective representation using public opinion data (e.g., Burstein 2003; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Lefevere et al. 2016; Wlezien 2017). These insightful studies focus on responsiveness toward national voters. They assume exogenous preferences, even though an early study by Miller and Stokes (1963) has suggested that an MP’s actions are oftentimes rather congruent with “his perception of preferences held by the constituency” (p. 56, emphasis added). Saward will later term this reading interests into constituencies rather than reading them off constituencies (Saward 2010, p. 74). A third important contribution to research on national parliamentary representation comes from legislative studies, namely research into “legislative, parliamentary or representative roles” as “patterns of attitudes and/or behavior that result from being a Member of Parliament (…)” (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b, p. 1, emphasis added). Such role research had been prominent in the 1950s and 60s among US scholars (seminal works by Eulau et al. 1959; Fenno 1977, 1978; Mayhew 1974; Matthews 1959, 1960; Wahlke et al. 1962). In the European context (e.g., Katz and Wessels 1999; contributions in Saalfeld and Müller 1997a; Searing 1991, 1994), parliamentary role research only re-emerged with the broader ‘neo-institutional turn’ in political science in the 1990s (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012c). This research distinguishes between legislators’ roles and their role orientations. Roles are a “coherent set of ‘norms’ of behavior” (Wahlke et al. 1962, p. 8, emphasis added), while role orientations are “legislators’ conceptions of a particular component of the role of a legislator” (p. 16, emphasis added). In other words, members of parliament act in their role as elected representatives, which creates certain (sets of) expectations (systematic behavioral patterns). Their role orientation refers to their particular understanding of what it means to be an elected representative (systematic conceptual patterns) (see also Saalfeld and Müller

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1997b, pp. 2, 7). Roles are their observable behavior; role orientations “their inner definitions of what someone in their position should think and do” (Best and Vogel 2012, p. 37). Even though there is no common definition of parliamentary roles, we can broadly subdivide them into legislative and representative roles (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012, pp. 211–214). The former pertain to how representatives organize their work in parliament. The latter revolve around the questions of whom members of parliament represent (focus of representation) and how they represent, that is make policy decisions for these people (style of representation) (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012c, pp. 12–13; Wahlke et al. 1962, p. 269). Put differently, research into legislative roles is concerned with how legislators fulfill their legislative tasks, while representative role research cares about their representative tasks. The focus of representation (who is represented?) commonly includes (1) a territorial (entire country/electoral district), (2) a partisan (party voters/party elite), and (3) a functional dimension (i.e., specific economic, social, religious groups in society) (e.g., Eulau and Karps 1977). The style of representation (how is represented?) revolves around the distinction between trustee and delegate (Wahlke et al. 1962, pp. 272–280). Does the representative act independent of her constituencies in pursuit of what she considers to be in their collective benefit (trustee model) or does she act upon instructions by either her constituents or her political party (delegate model) (Converse and Pierce 1979)? More recently, Rehfeld (2009, 2016) distinguishes three related sub-dimensions in the original trustee-delegate typology: (1) the source of judgment (self-reliance or constituency’s/party view), (2) the aims of legislation (common good in a republican understanding of democracy/particular group interests in a pluralist conception of democracy), and (3) responsiveness to sanctions (more or less responsive to the prospect of re-election). Early empirical investigations into focus and style of representation (Eulau et al. 1959; Wahlke et al. 1962) provide a thick description of legislators’ representative roles. Roles are rather static and sticky; MPs are passive role holders rather than active role players. One of this research’s central findings is that legislators are what they term ‘politicos,’ a middle ground between a trustee and a delegate. In contrast, Fenno (1977, 1978) investigates how members of the US Congress actually behave as representatives, how flexible they are and why they choose certain roles

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rather than others (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012c, pp. 16–18). He finds their ‘home style,’ i.e., their representative role or the way they build representative links with their district, to be driven by vote-seeking incentives. Conversely, their ‘hill style,’ i.e., their legislative role or behavior when acting in Congress, rather depends on institutional opportunities and constraints they face. In Europe, it is the ‘neo-institutional turn’ (Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984, 1989) that has brought research into representative roles back on the agenda (for an excellent discussion, see Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b). Simply put, this turn acknowledges that institutions do not determine political outcomes, but that political actors shape these institutions. These actors do not, however, float in a vacuum, either. Instead, they act within certain institutional settings that can enable, but also constrain certain behavior. These broad developments then spill over into legislative studies. Members of parliament are seen as actors embedded in specific parliamentary contexts. “After all, the institutions provide venues for the interactions between MPs and ministers, rules for the behaviour of participants and above all, role models for the ‘inmates’ of the parliamentary/governmental complex” (Andeweg and Nijzink 1995, p. 157). Parliamentary roles now re-enter the picture in that they can be conceptualized as the ‘glue’ between these institutional rules, individual preferences/attitudes, and MPs’ political behavior “since they are specific to a given institutional setting but interpreted by individuals” (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012c, p. 21). In this view, parliamentary roles are the product of institutional settings and MPs’ preferences, yet at the same time shape MPs’ behavior. Thereby, they provide the flexible link between parliamentary institutions and the behavior of parliamentarians. Here, the rational neo-institutional approach to representative roles by Kaare Strøm (1997, 2012) has become especially influential. In this view, MPs are utility maximizers with exogenous preferences who pursue their goals strategically. The strategies they choose to reach their goals depend on institutional constraints, opportunities, and incentives (Shepsle 1989). The literature distinguishes three sets of goals: vote-, office-, and policyseeking (Müller and Strøm 1999). While re-(s)election is the primary goal, it is at the same time instrumental to (a) having policy influence and making good public policy (de Swaan 1973) and (b) gaining influence through party and/or legislative offices. For Strøm, parliamentary roles

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are “consistent strategies induced by the members’ pursuit of their political objectives” (Strøm 2012, p. 88). MPs choose these roles as behavioral strategies under varying electoral, party-political, and legislative opportunities and constraints (Strøm 1997). In this view, vote-, policy, and office-seeking MPs use parliamentary roles as strategies or “game plans” (Strøm 2012, p. 88) to reach these goals. Empirical investigations into representative roles in the European context include very insightful (comparative) country case studies (e.g., contributions in Saalfeld and Müller 1997a; more recent collection by Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012a; also Bengtsson and Wass 2010, 2011 (citizen perspective); Brack et al. 2016; Costa et al. 2012; MéndezLago and Martínez 2002; Russo 2011). More recently, scholars have also moved toward larger-N comparative studies that are able to systematically consider factors at the political system level (e.g., Önnudóttir 2014, 2016). Important cross-national research surveys of legislators’ representative focus and style include the PartiRep Project (André et al. 2016; contributions in Deschouwer and Depauw 2014) and the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS). The former investigates changing patterns of representation based on data from 73 assemblies at the state and regional level in 15, mostly European countries. The latter comprises information on the focus and style of representation of parliamentary candidates in 35 countries. Given many differences in how representative focus and style are conceptualized, it is difficult to distill common findings, yet a few broad trends stand out (see Chapter 5). Legislators’ roles and role orientations are not fixed or static, but rather flexible and dynamic (e.g., Andeweg 1997). There seems to be a correspondence between the representative roles MPs play and the deeper representative role orientations they hold (e.g., Jenny and Müller 2012). Empirical evidence is mixed as to whether it is socialization that drives MPs’ representative role behavior and conception (e.g., Best and Vogel 2012) or rather strategic (electoral) incentives (e.g., Zittel 2012). Studies that want to explain different foci of representation (all people, party voters, functional groups, electoral districts) find factors at the macro-, meso-, and micro-level. The nature of electoral competition (electoral formula and district magnitude), the ballot structure, and the general type of electoral system matter (Brack et al. 2012; Dudzinska ´ et al. 2014; Erzeel et al. 2014; Pilet et al. 2012) as much as institutional rules of candidate selection (Dudzinska ´ et al. 2014) and seat safety (Russo 2011).

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Positions in the party and in parliament influence an MP’s representative focus (Heitshusen et al. 2005; Ilonszki 2012), but also parliamentary seniority (Best and Vogel 2012; Heitshusen et al. 2005). Party-ideological factors also help us explain an MP’s representative focus. MPs left of center are more likely to represent particular social groups and their own party (Caramani et al. 2014; Damgaard 1997). A party’s governing responsibility has less of a consistent impact on representative foci. Pilet et al. (2012) find a negative effect on an MP’s propensity to express a district orientation, while Dudzinska ´ et al. (2014) find no significant effect of governing responsibility on any representative focus. Sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, and political experience tend not to have a consistent independent impact on the focus of representation, when party- and system-level characteristics are controlled for (Dudzinska ´ et al. 2014). As far as determinants of representative style are concerned (district/voter delegate, party delegate, trustee), electoral incentives such as seat safety and mode of election matter (Brack et al. 2012; Zittel 2012) as well as candidate selection procedures (Önnudóttir 2016) and the degree of party professionalism (Brack et al. 2012). Party-ideological factors and government-opposition dynamics are also found to play a role (Damgaard 1997). For 62 parties in ten countries, Önnudóttir (2016) finds strong party’s leadership control over candidate nomination and party socialization to influence the share of partisans in a given party, while the share of trustees is best explained by the number of times a party has been in government. The higher the share of party voters who identify with a given party, the higher the share of voter delegates in this party. Overall, empirical studies on legislators’ representative focus generate more consistent explanatory factors than those investigating MPs’ styles of representation. While the distinction between certain territorial, partisan, and functional foci of representation is rather uncontested in the national context, many empirical investigations of legislators’ styles do in fact find that the trustee-delegate categories are “constructs that existed in the minds of many social scientists rather than in the minds of many of the politicians we studied” (Searing 1994, p. 13). At the end of the day, it seems that “[e]mpirically, all representatives can be classified as politicos” (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, p. 508). That is they feel bound by their principals to some degree, but also feel they have some leeway, when making policy decisions as to what they think best for these principals.

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Additionally, certain foci and styles of representation are more likely to go together empirically (Dudzinska ´ et al. 2014). Local and party delegates are identified through MPs who seek to represent respectively their constituency, district, or town on the one hand, and their party, party supporters, or party voters on the other hand. The category of trustee often includes MPs who seek to represent the whole population and not their local voters or party supporters. (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012, p. 212, emphasis in original)

Finally, all of these analyses of representative focus and style—as diverse as they might be conceptually, methodologically, and with regard to key findings—share a common trait. They focus on representative roles and role orientations of national legislators in national parliamentary contexts. Within this frame of reference, the expected foci that scholars conceptualize are national; they refer to nations, national voters, and parties as well as groups and districts. National members of parliament are trustees or delegates of national constituencies. Of course, empirical research has also investigated representative roles in the EU context. There are quite a few studies on the focus of representation of members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Do MEPs represent their country of origin or do we see a Europeanization of their representation, and under which conditions do we do so (e.g., Farrell and Scully 2010; Scully and Farrell 2003; Scully et al. 2012)? Do MEPs focus on what their national party wants or on their European party family (e.g., von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013)? Early research (Hagger and Wing 1979) into MEPs’ foci of representation (constituency, interest group, partisan or supranational focus) reveals that ‘nationality factors,’ including geopolitical considerations and political culture, influence role choice more than both party characteristics (left–right orientation) and ‘European Community factors’ (pro-EU attitude of MEPs, Europeanization through socialization). The European Members of Parliament Study (contributions in Katz and Wessels 1999) finds an MEP’s constituency focus best explained by electoral incentives such as district magnitude, electoral competition and safety. For an MEP’s European representative focus the power of a member state matters as well as the length of membership, while there is no effect of an MEP’s sociodemographic characteristics (Wessels 1999). This stands somewhat in contrast to a more recent study on central European MEPs. Here, sociodemographic factors do explain an MEP’s European or national

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focus of representation, along with party-ideological and political socialization factors (Bíró-Nagy 2016). A study by Sorace (2018) finds that political parties in the EP “cluster around the position of the average European voter, at the expense of their average supporter” (p. 3). Scholars have also investigated MEPs’ representative styles. Katz (1997) looks at whether MEPs are trustees or constituency agents. National (electoral) factors help explain the agent orientation, while the trustee style is linked to the MEP’s left–right party position. Two more recent studies (Giebler and Wessels 2013; Wessels and Giebler 2011) based on the European Election Candidate Study 2009 reveal that 47 per cent of MEPs from the then 27 member states have a trustee orientation, while 26 per cent are voters’ delegates and only 23 per cent report to represent party interests in case of colliding opinions. Surprisingly, only the remaining 4 per cent have intransitive preferences, and are therefore classified as politicos. MEPs’ representative styles are explained by electoral competition and party membership duration as well as a party’s left–right placement. In sum, we know a lot about representative roles of national MPs and MEPs. What is utterly surprising, however, is that scholars have not yet had a ‘European look’ at national MPs’ representative foci and styles. That is, they have not yet investigated, whether and under which conditions European integration affects national MPs’ representative roles. What they have investigated is the EU’s effect on legislative roles, i.e., how MPs re-organize their work in parliament in response to EU integration (e.g., Rozenberg 2012) rather than whom and how they represent in the EU system of governance. In the same vein, researchers have looked at whether MEPs have a national focus of representation, but they have neither conceptualized nor investigated the reverse, namely national MPs having a Europeanized representative focus. They have focused on either national representation by national parliamentarians or European representation by members of the European Parliament. Katz and Wessels (1999) surveyed national MPs on their representative focus. While they asked MEPs whether they represented ‘all people in Europe,’ they did not give this representative option to national MPs whom they only asked whether they represented ‘all people in their respective country’ (Katz 1999, pp. 69–72). They assumed a European representative focus not to exist for national MPs and marked it as “not applicable” for national parliamentarians (Wessels 1999, p. 216). MEPs were expected to represent “the people (singular) of Europe,” and national MPs “the peoples (plural) of Europe in national terms” (Katz

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1999, p. 69). Similarly, they automatically related MPs’ ‘communitarian’ style of representation to the common national interest, while it had to be the common European interest for MEPs. With regard to representative styles, scholars have repeatedly deplored the lack of studies that investigate their issue-specific nature (Andeweg 2012) as well as the different facets that underlie it (Rehfeld 2009). Yet they have not explored how national MPs represent, when dealing with EU affairs. While Wessels (2005) linked national MPs’ understanding of parliamentary representation to their attitudes toward European integration, he did not consider the reverse effect, namely how European integration could influence national MPs’ style of representation. Scholars explicitly make the European Union out to be the main challenge to the “model of state-bound, elected and partisan representative democracy” (Deschouwer et al. 2014, p. 2), and stress “difficulties for creating a meaningful linkage between the population and the elites representing them” (p. 6) in the EU. Surprisingly, they have not yet considered it an option for national MPs to alter whom and how they represent within the EU context to remedy such shortcomings. The question “What is the effect of growing multilevel governance, through supra-nationalization and decentralization, on role orientations (…)?” (Andeweg 2014, p. 282) remains fundamentally unanswered. This gap is even more surprising given the pressures the standard account of national parliamentary representation faces within the EU context, and against the background of the corresponding scholarly search for new representative roles of national parliaments in the EU. The theoretical conceptualization and empirical investigation of national MPs’ representative foci and styles in EU affairs have so far not been on the agenda in either legislative or European studies, although the former provides the tools and the latter has identified the need to do so. This study wants to contribute to closing this gap. As a first step, we need to spell out the concept of national parliamentary representation in the EU as understood in this study. It does not provide an all-encompassing definition, but lays the basis for this study’s theoretical framework. In the European Union, the transnationalization of politics leads to incongruences between those who represent and those who are represented, while the diversification of societies and representative actors questions national parliaments’ exclusivity in representation. Europeanization research gives valuable insights into how national parliaments have

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faced these challenges. Most scholars, however, have long used the standard account as a blueprint for the role of national parliaments in the EU. New patterns of national parliamentary representation in the EU can emerge, but to uncover them, we need to unbundle the seemingly ‘settled’ questions of who is represented how by national parliaments in EU politics. The constructivist approach to representation allows us to zoom into the act of representing and to scrutinize taken-for-granted understandings of those who can be made present and how they can be made present. It unsettles the ‘whom’ and ‘how’ questions of representation that are unquestioned in the standard account. Empirical research has generated a rich body of literature on the Europeanization of national polity, politics, and policies, but has so far largely neglected the Europeanization of national parliamentary representation itself . The starting point of this study’s concept is that national parliaments remain key representative institutions in European democracies despite the aforementioned challenges from above and below. This study acknowledges that there are two channels of representation and legitimacy in European Union governance (Art. 10 TEU). That is the indirect intergovernmental channel from national citizens to national parliaments that oversee their national governments’ negotiations at the EU level, and the direct supranational channel flowing from European citizens via the European Parliament. In this setup, “the lower, national tier retains in crucial respects a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the overarching, supranational tier” (Crum 2016, p. 3). Much of the EU’s legitimacy still rests on national parliaments and national demoi. This study assumes further that national parliaments change the way they fulfill their representative function in response to the challenges. They are understood as flexible representative institutions whose members may play new representative roles that go beyond the standard account of national interest representation. Thereby, this study proposes a fundamentally different, more open way to conceive of national parliaments’ representative role in the EU. It leaves the binary thinking of national parliaments occupying one representative mode and the EP monopolizing the other. To uncover these alternative modes of representation, this study does not look at the macro-level of formal national parliamentary representation in the EU. Instead, it zooms into the actual practice of representation. Representation is then defined at the actor level as a relationship

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between national MPs and those they represent. From a rational neoinstitutional perspective, these MPs are goal-driven actors embedded in (parliamentary) institutions as their “strategic operating environment” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, p. 7). Within the opportunities and constraints provided by the institutional context, national MPs use their representative roles in EU politics as strategies to realize their preferences. Crucially, MPs can use representative claims to construct their represented and the kind of relationship that they have with them as such strategies (Strøm 1997, 2012). At first glance, it may seem unorthodox, even impossible, to try to combine a rational choice approach with representation as a constructed process. Yet, Saward, too, conceptualizes representatives as “purposeful” actors (2010, p. 48) that explore “structural options” and “activate the agentic opportunities available to them” (2014, p. 728) by using “representative types or roles as resources ” (2010, p. 57, emphasis added; see also 2014, p. 726). Representation as claims-making in fact shares the view of representative roles as strategic tools. It considers institutional conditions and actors’ political motivations. “It is not simply that representatives may play a particular role; it is that certain contextual constraints and strategic opportunities and choices may lead to that ‘role’ being played in the context of positioning and patterning behavior” (Saward 2014, p. 729). At the same time, the constructivist take on representation is problematizing a number of key concerns that rationalists take for granted (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). While representatives and represented are exogenous to the act of representation in rational choice approaches, they become endogenous in constructivist accounts. This study sees national MPs as strategic actors in an EU context, but allows for their focus and style of representation in EU politics to be more flexible than state-centric, electoral, or partisan conceptions of representation have us believe. MPs have fixed preferences, but the constituencies they represent are at least partially created in the process. This study assumes the dynamic roles that “do not map at all neatly either onto a series of discrete dyads or a single clearly bounded conception of a system of representation” (Saward 2014, p. 732) to aggregate to patterns of representation that “shape in turn the character and boundaries of the larger representative system” (Saward 2014, p. 732). Whom and how MPs represent in EU politics thereby shapes the character and boundaries of the overall system of representation, “a pattern of dyads

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that becomes in effect a patterned system” (Saward 2014, p. 732). These patterns of representative focus (whom) and style (how) are understood as both behavioral (representative roles) and conceptual patterns (representative role orientations). The former are the roles MPs strategically play in parliament, the latter are the deeper attitudes they hold on these roles. This study defines national parliamentary representation in EU affairs as behavioral representative roles and conceptual representative role orientations by individual strategic MPs that aggregate to patterns of representation along the focus and style dimension of representation. “Such patterns and patterning of representation are crucial to our efforts to gain robust theoretical and empirical understanding of political representation” (Saward 2014, p. 728). This is particularly true in the EU’s representative system. The following section now spells out the core tenants of both focus and style of representation by national MPs in EU politics.

2.3

Whom and How to Represent in EU Politics?

This study combines a rational neo-institutional approach to representative roles (Strøm 1997, 2012) with a constructivist understanding of representation as claims-making (Saward 2006, 2010, 2014). Crucially, it takes the classic principal–agent account of parliamentary representation based on formal chains of authorization and accountability (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993; Strøm 2000) as a starting point and describes national MPs as rational vote-, office-, and policy-seeking actors (Strøm and Müller 1999) who are constrained by their institutional and political environment (Jenny and Müller 2012). From a constructivist perspective, however, they do not simply refer to a pre-existing focus and style of representation in EU affairs, but create them through the performative act of claims-making. So far, this study has argued that the standard formal model of representation as a relationship of delegation and accountability is ultimately inadequate and insufficient to capture the workings of national parliamentary representation in the EU (Piattoni 2013). It nonetheless makes use of this parsimonious approach as a starting point. The reason is that, despite all the challenges, national parliaments remain key representative institutions, and formal electoral channels of representation continue to matter. Thus, we have to consider these formal channels, when conceptualizing representative patterns of national MPs in EU affairs.

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At the same time, we need to move beyond narrow conceptions of electoral authorization and accountability and develop new tools to make sense of the full representative potential national MPs have in the EU. The challenges they face from above and below (the transnationalization of politics and societies and the diversification of representation) cannot be solved merely transferring simple models of national parliamentary representation from the national context to the EU level. This study argues that national MPs are confronted with two sets of pressures potentially pulling them in separate representative directions: economic and political interdependence on the one hand, and politicization of EU affairs on the other hand. This in turn creates the need for MPs to reconcile responsiveness to their electorate with responsibility emanating from the wider EU system (Mair 2009). Political parties are responsive, when they “sympathetically respond to the short-term demands of voters (…)” (Bardi et al. 2014, p. 237). Responsible political parties in turn have a twofold obligation: some form of trusteeship of their electorates’ needs—that may even go against said electorates’ specific demands, and an obligation to honor international commitments as well as to ensure credibility and reliability as an international partner. Thus, political parties have to reconcile short-term demands of their electorates with (1) long-term needs of the electorate and (2) demands directed at them by international principals (Bardi et al. 2014, p. 237). On this basis, Mair has argued that parties today face a kind of cumulative dilemma. Parties have always struggled with trying to reconcile responsiveness with responsibility. Yet, Mair warned that, due to the progressive denationalization of politics in the EU, and the many commitments this entails, the gap is ever-widening. At the same time, parties face many competitors to representation. Mair fears that the gap is not only becoming larger, but parties also increasingly lose the means to fill it (Bardi et al. 2014; Mair 2009). Thus, Mair assumes responsibility and responsiveness to be fundamentally incompatible. Responding to the electorates’ wishes makes MPs responsive, caring for their long-term needs and maintaining the system makes them responsible. This study questions this neat division and asks, what happens, if we consider that there may be certain voters who want their representatives to cater to their long-term needs, and who also want them to make sure the EU system of governance remains up and running? Do we then not have representatives who can in fact be both responsible and responsive at the same time? Simply put, responsibility may be in

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voters’ interest. Thereby, it may become an (electoral) incentive for MPs, rather than a mere systemic constraint in all circumstances. In the EU, not only national MPs find themselves in an environment of economic and political interdependence, but also citizens across Europe. Policy problems and their solutions cut across national borders, but, especially in the EU, so do social connections. Member state societies are mutually interconnected through open borders and the free movement of people (Barnard 2016). Across the EU, mutual connectedness is ubiquitous. What this mutual connectivity essentially does, is to create pressures on national MPs and voters to be responsible for the wider EU system. At the same time, not only national MPs may realize that they lose their monopoly on representation. In fact, the growing politicization of EU issues we witness may signal that citizens across Europe become aware of these developments, too. Simply put, politicization of EU affairs means that EU issues become more salient among a wide variety of actors who have clear, polarized positions on them (Kriesi and Grande 2015; Rauh and Zürn 2014; Statham and Trenz 2013, 2015). Politicization of EU affairs surely is differentiated (e.g., contributions in de Wilde et al. 2016a), but, what can be said, is that it increases pressures for responsiveness to voters’ concerns. In such an environment, where interdependence and politicization coexist, Mair assumes them to go against each other: politicization induces responsiveness to voters, while interdependence creates systemic pressures for international responsibility. Having introduced the idea that voters themselves may want such responsibility, allows us to move past the dilemma to some extent. MPs can use their representative roles as strategies to mitigate this dilemma. They may alter whom and how they represent depending on what they believe to be in their voters’ interest. Thereby, MPs can be both responsive and responsible. These efforts of reconciliation lead to distinctive patterns of representation in EU affairs along a focus and style dimension. With regard to whom they represent, national MPs can claim an exclusively national representative focus or they can Europeanize their representative portfolio to include trans- or supranational representation. Put differently, they can speak for national citizens only or they can also and even exclusively refer to citizens from fellow EU member states or a European citizenry as a whole. With regard to how they represent these citizens in EU affairs, that is their representative style, they can conjure up a republican vision of common

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good and public interest or they can opt for a pluralist-liberal conception claiming to represent particular interests. This view of representation as strategic claims-making is only part of the story, however. As argued above, to understand the dynamics and mechanisms behind national MPs’ representative patterns, we have to include their conceptual patterns, too. “An interesting and crucial question is then how the representatives themselves perceive their role and task. The best way to assess that is by asking them” (Deschouwer et al. 2014, p. 6). Therefore, we need to conceptualize the connection between MPs’ public claims behavior and their representative role orientations and self-perception. From a rational neo-institutional perspective on representative roles, MPs use their representative focus and style as strategies to reach their goals (Strøm 1997, 2012). In that sense, representative roles become “regularized patterns of behavior” (2012, p. 85, emphasis added). As far as an MP’s goals are concerned, we can assume a hierarchy of goals with re-authorization seeking as the primary goal to allow for policy influence, not only, but also through holding offices (e.g., Auel 2009; Müller and Strøm 1999). According to the principal–agent model of representation, the representative relationship in parliamentary democracies is conceptualized as two parallel chains: one of delegation and one of accountability (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2003). In the national context, this means that national representatives have a national electoral connection to national voters. They are authorized and held accountable by these national citizens. “As a result, representation understood in these terms tends to focus on the interests (…) of the voters ” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 66, emphasis added). In EU politics, this study argues that the interests of the voters do remain central for an MP’s strategic representative role choice because she continues to be re-authorization-seeking. In that sense, formal electoral connections continue to matter. Yet, this simple framework captures only part of the story. Rather, this study argues that EU integration, while it has not changed the general goals MPs pursue, it has altered the strategies they use to reach them. Crucially, national MPs remain vote-, policy-, and office-seekers. At the same time, however, they adapt their representative roles as endogenous strategies to reach their goals. In fact, there is every reason to expect that they alter their focus and style of representation in response to challenges

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they face in the EU multi-level system. While the ‘whom’ and ‘how’ are settled questions for most rational approaches (national voters in formal chains of delegation and accountability), they become unbundled again, when we take a constructivist look at them. That is we question this narrow understanding of representation by national MPs in EU affairs. The key virtue of coupling both approaches is that we can retain the special representative relationship national MPs have with their territorially defined electorates, while we are at the same time able to go beyond these narrow representative confines. To that end, we do not have to ‘deroot’ the national MP from the national anchorage, just open up new ways for them to claim representation beyond unitary national interests. As far as the focus of representation is concerned, this study distinguishes between two broad types of representative focus, a national and a European(-ized) one (see Wessels 1999 for MEPs). The former refers to national constituencies/interests only and is the ‘default option’ for national MPs according to classic models of national parliamentary representation in EU affairs. National MPs exclusively represent their national voters. The European(-ized) representative focus is different from the purely national one in that it has a European dimension of representation. Here, we can again distinguish two sub-types: In Europeanized representation, national MPs refer to a national object of representation and a European object. Their representative focus is ‘national plus European,’ because they do not anymore focus exclusively on national representation, but expand their representative portfolio to include citizens beyond national borders, be they foreign EU nationals or a European people. This type of representation is considered Europeanized, because it already contains an element that transcends national representation. The difference to European representation, then, is that the latter does not include any such national anchorage anymore. The national MP focuses exclusively on non-national citizens; it is a European only representation. Simply put, Europeanized representation still has a national object of representation alongside a European one, while European representation completely leaves the classic representative role of a national MP behind. Such a conceptualization allows national MPs dealing with EU affairs to not only represent “nationals of a member state” but also “citizens of a Union of peoples” or even “members of a putative European people” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013, p. 207). European(-ized) representation

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can refer to both horizontal and vertical Europeanization (Koopmans 2007). It can contain references to citizens from other EU member states as transnational representation and/or references to a Pan-European citizenry as a whole as supranational representation (for a similar distinction, see Walter 2017). Put differently, the distinction between Europeanized and European representation denotes to what extent there still is a national object of representation. Let us take the example of an Austrian MP. She may represent: • Austrian citizens [exclusively national representation] • Austrian citizens plus German citizens (transnational) and/or European citizens (supranational) [Europeanized representation] • German citizens (transnational) and/or European citizens as a whole (supranational) [European representation]. The style of representation, or how MPs represent in EU politics, is conceptualized as the degree of representative universality or how MPs solve conflicts of interests in EU politics. It distinguishes between a republican and a pluralist style of representation (Rehfeld 2009, 2016). The former promotes the common good/wider public interest, whereas the latter aims at furthering particular group interests. Republicans tend to view the common interest as an organic whole that is to guide representatives in making good public policy. The common good denotes “those goods that serve all members of a given community and its institutions, and, as such, includes both goods that serve no identifiable particular group, as well as those that serve members of generations not yet born” (Etzioni 2015, p. 1). Pluralists on the contrary are concerned with public policy that furthers independently legitimate, particular interests that together constitute the ‘common good.’ In this view, an MP is to aggregate group preferences and “champion faithfully her constituents’ interests” (Getman and Karlan 2008, p. 58). There are three reasons to conceptualize MPs’ representative style in EU affairs in such a way: First, the diversification of representative agents and the wider politicization of EU issues among these actors create representative rivals for national MPs. This increasing representative competition makes it especially interesting to investigate the degree of universality in MPs’ representative style in the EU context. Because national MPs are formally authorized to represent by their voters, they

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have a kind of “head start” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 166) over representatives who are not formally elected. It is an open question, whether national MPs play out that advantage, and represent the public good, or whether they enter the representative competition and become champions of particular interests with regard to EU issues. Second, republican and pluralist elements of representative democracy are out of balance in the EU system (Scharpf 2009). At the supranational level, a republican community is clearly underdeveloped. As a regulative polity, the EU affects particular societal groups, whose interests need to be championed in EU decision-making. Again, national MPs can do both: conjure up some wider responsibility for collective welfare or show themselves responsive to more specific concerns. Finally, pluralist and republican representative styles, of course, directly relate to the focus of representation in that the common good can either be understood in national or European(-ized) terms. National MPs can represent the national or the European public interest. By the same token, they can represent particular interests of a nationally organized grouping or a European one (for a similar point in more general terms, see Rehfeld 2016). Let us look at an Irish MP with a national focus of representation. He may represent: • the interest of Irish farmers or his local constituency [Pluralist representation] • the interest of Ireland, the Irish people/citizens as a whole [Republican representation]. The same Irish MP with a fully European focus of representation would represent: • the interest of European farmers or all farming regions in Europe [Pluralist representation] • the interest of Europe, the European people(s) [Republican representation]. Table 2.1 couples these styles of representation with the foci of representation and depicts all ideal-typical combinations along the two dimensions.

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Table 2.1 Focus and style of representation in EU politics

National

European(-ized)

Europeanized (national plus)

European (European only)

Common interest (Republican)

Specific interest (Pluralist)

own national citizens, interest (as a whole) (British MP: the British national interest) own national citizens, interest (as a whole) plus other citizens, interest (transnational and supranational) (German MP: the German people and the Greek citizens; Austrian MP: Austrian interest and the European interest other member state’s citizens/interest (transnational) and/or European citizens/interest (supranational) only (Irish MP: the British interest; the European citizenry)

own national functional/partisan/regional groups (Austrian MP: the Austrian unemployed; my party voters; my constituency/region) own national plus European functional/partisan/regional groups (Irish MP: the farmers in my constituency and anywhere in the EU; the socially disadvantaged in Ireland and other ‘debtor countries’)

European functional/partisan/regional groups (British MP: business owners anywhere in the EU; young people in Spain and Portugal; conservative voters in Europe)

Note Illustrative examples in italics

There are two main causal mechanisms behind the Europeanization of the representative focus. The first mechanism is located at the level of the agent, the national MP. Interdependence creates pressures on them to Europeanize their representation. Here, both foreign national (governmental) representatives and the long-term needs of national constituencies are the reference point. Through their responsibility toward their constituencies and their representative peers, there is an indirect responsibility “also to those peers’ constituents or to emerging ‘global [here rather European] publics’” (Savage and Weale 2009, p. 78). A policyseeking MP will Europeanize her representative focus to include other

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than national citizens, if she thinks mutual connectivity to require this— be it for the long-term benefit of her own voters or because of wider system maintenance concerns. It becomes rational for national MPs to leave the ‘nation-state box’ and consider a wider European constituency as they have to take the existing externalities and interdependencies in the EU multi-level system into account, when wanting to exhibit policy influence. Akin to what Mayhew termed “institutional maintenance” (1974, p. 141), national parliamentarians face a Europeanized collective action problem. Even, if one were to argue that national MPs had no direct electoral reason to care about any of the effects on anyone other than their national constituencies, they cannot generate these effects blindly, either. If they narrowly focused on representing their national constituency only, they might end up jeopardizing system stability. In that sense, they may become externality managers who are co-responsible for system maintenance. The second mechanism is situated at the level of the principal and primarily hinges on national MPs seeking re-authorization. National MPs’ re-authorizing principals (national voters and national parties) want them to include other EU citizens’ grievances into domestic will-formation and decision-making on EU affairs. MPs would then act as responsive agents of their formal constituents. Hence, responsiveness toward national constituents does not automatically mean national interest representation only. Being responsive to these kinds of principals means acting responsibly, because the principals are the ones who want their agents to act in solidarity with “strangers” (Risse 2014a, p. 1). The national MP does not have a formal electoral relationship with these other EU citizens, but she does have one with her national electorate. In this view, national MPs may realize interdependencies, blurred boundaries and the corresponding need to consider others, but so may national constituencies. “Domestic constituents will have to think not only about the reasonableness of the burdens that they are expected to bear but also about the burdens that the protection of their interests imposes on others, given the feasible set of international options” (Savage and Weale 2009, p. 75). These national constituencies, so the argument in the second mechanism, would induce national MPs to choose a Europeanized focus of representation. It is rational for MPs who seek re-authorization to conform to this demand. The remaining question is why would such

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voters emerge “in the face of the seeming indifference national European electorates display to the idea that they are all in this together” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 173)? Indeed, at first glance, the chances for the emergence of such a body of voters seem slim. Empirical research has shown that the politicization of EU issues very much runs along national lines, whereas interdependence cuts across national borders in Europe (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016, p. 49). Many observers agree that “the politicisation of European governance proceeds mainly in nationally segmented publics instead of transnationally integrated settings” (de Wilde et al. 2016b, pp. 7f.; see also Risse 2010). In line with this, Schimmelfennig et al. (2015) argue that interdependence creates pressures for European integration, while politicization may hinder it. With regard to European(-ized) representation, this study objects here. Interdependence clearly generates pressures to Europeanize representation, yet so may politicization of EU issues. The reason is that it does not only refer to Euroscepticism and anti-EU tendencies, but also cosmopolitan and pro-EU sentiments. Voters increasingly realize the mutual interconnectedness and “national constituencies are beginning to doubt that all problems would go away if only national governmental representatives pulled back” to “measures on their own” (Piattoni 2013, p. 238). In both the agent- and principal-driven variant, national MPs become ‘surrogate representatives’ (Mansbridge 2003) in that they also represent constituencies with which they do not have a direct electoral connection. In the first case, national MPs become surrogates in response to other national representatives and their domestic constituencies (institutional incentive). In the second, their voters/parties induce this surrogacy (electoral incentive). Regarding the style of representation, there are again two mechanisms behind an MP’s choice in EU politics, which relate to responsibility and responsiveness. National MPs can represent specific interests in national/European societies, and consider how these groups win/lose from European integration (pluralist style). Alternatively, they can refer to the common interest of national communities/a European community (republican style). Simply put, national MPs can depict EU affairs in the interest of all or to the benefit of some. According to the first mechanism, it may again be the re-authorizing principals that induce a national MP to either champion particular interests or consider the wider public interest.

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From a principal–agent perspective, voters want their specific interest to be represented. Going beyond this narrow view, scholars have argued, however, that voters do want their representatives to act in the wider general interest, not least because this ensures their specific interests have a chance to be at minimum partially represented. This may be better than having an MP who represents the interest of another, competing group (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008). In that view, MPs who are responsible for the common good can be responsive to their (s)electorates, although they may deviate from their immediate interest. The second mechanism holds that other agents again become the reference point of MPs’ representative behavior in EU politics. National MPs may have two ways to react to the representative competition they face by informal and unelected representatives in EU affairs. They may ‘indulge’ in this direct competition as pluralists and accept the challenge “by rival claims of different representatives who can give the group’s interests a separate (and, they think, more satisfactory) presence” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 101). Here, they have a clear advantage over non-elected rivals: “Representatives who have to stand for election are usually more constrained than those who don’t. But the fact that they are constrained also makes it much easier for them to refuse to back down” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 187). What these MPs may also do, however, is play out their electoral advantage over rival representatives precisely by evoking the common good. An elected MP can credibly represent the entire political community because she is in a privileged position to act “on the explicit authorization of the represented, or at least of a majority amongst them (…)” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 166). In sum, the style of representation determines how representation takes place, i.e., how conflicts of interests are resolved, directly aiming at everybody’s welfare or a diverse representation of particular group interests. The focus of representation then determines how ‘everybody’ and ‘the particular group’ are understood in geographic terms. Are we only talking about everybody in the national community, in multiple European communities or a single European community? The combinations of focus and style result in four patterns of representation by national MPs in EU politics (Table 2.2). National MPs can be National Republicans in EU politics (upper left): As purely national representatives, they represent national citizens only and do not consider other EU citizens. They construct their represented

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Table 2.2 Patterns of representation by national MPs in EU politics Focus Style

National

European(-ized)

Public interest

The National Republican

Particular interests

The National Pluralist

The European(-ized) Republican The European(-ized) Pluralist

in terms of a common national interest or the general interest of their country’s people/citizens in a republican understanding. For example, this is a British MP representing the British national interest/the interest of the British people in EU affairs. As a National Pluralist (lower left), the national MP still stays within her classic role of representing national concerns in EU affairs, but she does so as a representative of particular groups in society rather than appealing to a wider national public interest. For instance, this could be an Irish MP protecting Irish turf-cutters from competition in the European single market. Once national MPs Europeanize their representative focus, they leave the ‘nation-state box’ and the classic representative role assigned to them. As European(-ized) Republicans (upper right), they are taking the concerns of other EU citizens—be they from other member states or Europe as a whole—into consideration. They may either exclusively refer to them or include national citizens as well. As Republicans, they again appeal to a wider general interest, just this time one that has a European dimension. An Austrian MP may represent citizens in Austria and all across the EU or all Europeans in general, for example. Finally, the European(-ized) Pluralist (lower right) represents particular groups, but now including—or even exclusively focusing on—European constituencies/a European constituency. Here, we can think of a German MP speaking for the workers in Germany as well as Greece, Portugal or Spain. He could also stand for all employees in the European Union as a whole.

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2.4

Summarizing the Theoretical Approach

National MPs operate in an EU environment characterized by economic, political, and societal transnationalization and interdependence as well as a politicization of EU issues and diversification of representative competitors. Within the classic principal–agent model, re-authorization-seeking national MPs are connected to their national electorates in a formal delegation-accountability chain. At the same time, they are policy-seeking actors who are embedded in institutional contexts at the national and European level. These MPs face a potential trade-off between being responsive to their electorate’s short-term demands and responsible for their long-term needs as well as for obligations emanating from the wider European system. They can use representative roles (defined here as behavioral patterns of representation along a focus and style dimension) as strategies to mitigate this potential dilemma. They may consider citizens from other EU member states or European citizens as a community because (a) their voters want them to, because (b) they see it in those voters’ long-term interest or because of (c) system maintenance concerns. Conversely, they purely focus on national concerns, if (a) their voters do not want them to consider other EU citizens, if (b) they think exclusive national representation fosters their electorates’ long-term welfare or because (c) they are in an (institutional) position to ignore systemic pressures and demands by other national representatives. The pressures of transnationalization and interdependencies are at work at both the principal and the agent level. It is argued here that through these mechanisms at both levels, national MPs create an indirect representative relationship with constituencies from other member states and even a hypothetical European constituency. In other words, they may become their surrogate representatives across borders even though they are not formally obliged to (see also Angevine 2017). In that sense, both voters and MPs deviate from a traditional static principal-agent model of representative democracy, where delegation and accountability are considered stable, structured by formal constitutions. Relationships of delegation and accountability are not fixed, but rather in flux and open to the interpretation and manipulation of both citizens and their representatives. (de Wilde 2010, p. 17, emphasis added)

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At the same time, these national MPs are confronted with a growing politicization and contestation of formerly uncontested and largely ignored EU politics. Many groups increasingly take an interest in EU affairs and MPs face ever more representative rivals claiming to take up those interests. National MPs can respond to this diversification of principals and agents by directly entering the pluralist game of particular interest representation or by positioning themselves as arbiters of a republican public interest. It may again be their (s)electorate who induces them to either fight for their particular interest or consider the well-being of the broader collective. According to this study, there are four ideal-typical representative roles MPs can choose from: National Republican, National Pluralist, European(-ized) Republican, European(-ized) Pluralist. These representative roles are strategies national MPs employ to reach their goals of reauthorization and policy influence amidst potentially conflicting pressures. These “[s]trategies are not directly observable, but instead we infer them from the patterned behavior that parliamentarians display” (Strøm 2012, p. 88, emphasis added). For this study, the behavioral representative patterns we observe are representative claims made by national parliamentarians (see Chapter 3). MPs use these claims intentionally as “basic building blocks” (de Wilde 2010, p. 119) of political debate. MPs can claim to act in any of the four basic roles and it is “the status of each of these roles as roles that even more significantly makes them resources. (…) In practice, the would-be representatives shift among (…) such roles in a strategic way” (Saward 2010, p. 72, emphasis added). Looking at strategic behavioral patterns of representation via representative claims-making helps us to move beyond entrenched formal representative modes. It allows us to explore representation beneath and in between elections, not as a given fact, but as a dynamic relationship (Saward 2006). In their representative claims-making, national MPs “can operate across society (including making claims intended to carry beyond a polity’s borders )” (Saward 2014, p. 734, emphasis added), they can make claims to represent “a particular group” or to “pursue a view of the common good” (Saward 2014, p. 730). The flexible and constructive process of such symbolic representation allows for behavioral representative patterns beyond formal expectations. Thereby, it suits the complex web of responsiveness and responsibility mechanisms in the EU system.

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Yet, behavioral representative patterns as representative claims-making are only part of the story of representation by national MPs in EU affairs. Such symbolic representation in the national policy-making arena allows us to go beyond the ‘beaten paths’ of parliamentary representation in EU affairs, and can be considered a first step toward substantive representation (Wängnerud 2009). It does not, however, enable us to know something about the other two elements of substantive representation, namely the representatives’ attitudes and their policy-making behavior. Representative claims-making is the observable implication of representative roles MPs strategically play in parliament, when dealing with EU affairs. We cannot, however, make any assessment of how deeply rooted these strategies are in a kind of representative self-conception of national MPs in EU politics. Therefore, this study has a twofold understanding of representative patterns that does not only look at behavioral patterns, but tries to also uncover their conceptual counterpart through qualitative interviews (see Chapters 3 and 6). Observable and situational representative speech behavior is complemented by MPs’ underlying intentions to create a well-rounded picture of representative patterns in EU politics. In the end, we may not only see a strategic representative reaction of national MPs to the challenges of European integration, but “[c]ompetitive representative claims-making has the power to alter the mental map of delegation and accountability (…)” (de Wilde 2010, p. 17, emphasis added) as well. Therefore, a comprehensive account of national parliamentary patterns of representation in EU affairs has to include both behavioral representative roles and conceptual representative role orientations of individual national MPs along the representative focus and style dimension. Against this theoretical background, the study asks the following overarching research questions: RQ1: Focus of Representation: Whom do national MPs represent in EU affairs? RQ2: Style of Representation: How do national MPs represent in EU affairs? Representative patterns have been defined as both behavioral (roles) and conceptual (role orientations). Further, they contain a focus (Whom?)

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and style (How?) dimension of representation. From the prevalent macroperspective, national parliaments seem to “remain rather centred on their respective domestic political logics and so far there are little to no signs of parliaments genuinely internalising a pan-European perspective (…)” (Crum 2016, p. 17). Neither do we have any empirical indication of whether this representative focus is actually true at the micro-level, nor whether national MPs have a pluralist or republican style of representation in EU affairs. Therefore, the first two sub-questions are descriptive and empirically explore existing patterns of representation: RQ1.1: Do national MPs have a national or European(-ized) focus of representation? RQ2.1: Do national MPs have a republican or pluralist style of representation (public vs. particular interest representation)? If we accept that these representative patterns of national MPs are essential not only for our understanding of national parliaments’ representative potential, but also for the democratic legitimacy of the EU, it is not sufficient to investigate the kinds of patterns we see. Instead, we also need to uncover the factors that influence and explain the emergence of these patterns. Therefore, the explanatory part of this study wants to provide answers to the following questions: RQ1.2: How can potential differences in the focus of representation be explained and what are the factors that explain a national or European(-ized) focus of representation? RQ2.2: How can potential differences in the style of representation be explained and what are the factors that explain a republican or pluralist style of representation? It is important to close this gap in both European and legislative studies for three main reasons: First, theoretically conceptualizing and empirically investigating broader representative roles may open our eyes to national MPs acting ‘outside the nation-state box.’ They may already be alleviating the representation deficits in the European Union by complementing the formal intergovernmental and supranational channels with innovative and flexible avenues of representation at the micro-level

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that the pre-dominant macro-perspectives on national parliaments cloud from our view. National MPs may already establish new representative links across borders and with European citizens. They may already reconcile particular with public interests in the EU. At the macro-level, the representative system may be biased toward pluralist rather than republican democratic elements (Scharpf 2009), yet maybe we find a (different) balance at the individual level. National MPs may be able to reconcile seemingly contradictory representative elements, national demoi with a European one, transnational group interests with a European community. They may ultimately be quite flexible ‘shape-shifters’ (Saward 2014). European(-ized) representation would be a first step in reducing the input and output incongruences in the EU multi-level system because it incorporates those who cannot formally partake in a decision, but are affected by it. What is more, this can be done without having to institutionally re-design the entire EU system of decision-making, and by keeping the important national representative relationship of formally elected MPs intact. Further, a balance between public and pluralist interest representation could be struck which would be healthy for multilevel democracy in the EU. This could ultimately be a first step toward reducing the gap between the represented and their representatives. Second, identifying the factors that influence the patterns of representation in general, and foster a Europeanization/balance between pluralist and republican elements in particular (see Chapter 5), puts scholars in a position to systematically understand the drivers of such innovative representative patterns. Put differently, we can identify possible conditions under which the seemingly unbridgeable gap between responsiveness and responsibility may not be entirely unbridgeable at the end of the day. Under certain circumstances, the gap may become smaller in the speech and mind of national MPs. This again may be a small, but remarkable step toward mitigating representative shortcomings in the EU. Of course, the tension identified by Peter Mair would remain, but maybe MPs are not inevitably trapped in it. Finally, conceptualizing, exploring, and explaining these patterns may not only help with tackling the ‘representative part’ of representative democracy in the EU, but also the democratic one. The democratic deficit is a dual deficit. National parliaments lose legislative competencies to the EU level, which challenges them as central representative institutions leading to “national ‘politics without policy’” (Schmidt 2010, p. 24,

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emphasis in original, see also Schmidt 2006). Discussions take place in the national arena, but decisions are made elsewhere. At the same time, this cannot be compensated for by the European Parliament which is still weak on partisan politics and is not the prime locus of political legitimacy in the EU, consisting of “‘policy without politics ’” (Schmidt 2010, p. 24, emphasis in original). Alternative modes of representation in national parliaments have the potential to counteract to some degree the resulting “citizen demobilization on the one hand or radicalization on the other” (Schmidt 2010, p. 24). In any case, the representative part national MPs are willing and able to play is crucial for both representation and democracy in the EU. The next chapter discusses the data and methodology of this study. Hypotheses on the institutional and party-political factors that may explain different patterns of representation in EU politics will be deduced from the aforementioned theoretical framework in the explanatory Chapter 5 right before the analyses.

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CHAPTER 3

Data and Methodology

The chapter provides information on the data and methodology of this study. It starts with a brief justification of the study’s comparative perspective on countries, topics, and empirical material (Sect. 3.1) and continues with a description of the two methods of data collection, the Representative Claims Analysis (RCA) and the semi-structured qualitative interviews (Sect. 3.2). It spells out how the quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed (Sect. 3.3) before it concludes with a presentation of the study’s main dependent variables and an evaluation of the reliability and validity of the data (Sect. 3.4).

3.1 Selection of Countries, Topics, Parliamentary Debates and Interview Partners This study focuses on four EU member states (at the time of investigation): Austria, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. While they are the ‘usual suspects’ in research on MPs’ representative behavior in the

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_3

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national context (e.g., Gallagher and Komito 2010; Müller et al. 2001), there is so far little inquiry into those same MPs’ European representative patterns (e.g., Kinski 2018; Kinski and Crum 2020 for the Eurozone crisis). The analysis focuses on the lower houses of parliament (Nationalrat , Bundestag , Dáil , House of Commons) because it is interested in representatives that have a direct electoral connection. The study relies on two distinct data sources: parliamentary plenary debates and interviews with members of the European Affairs and Budget/ Finance Committees to capture representative behavior and attitudes in EU politics. The sample includes plenary debates from 2005 to 2011 on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), the Treaty of Lisbon (LT), and the first Eurozone bailout mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 3.1.1

Comparison Across Countries and Topics

As Western European democracies, the countries are similar in key features of representative parliamentary democracy with comparably stable party systems (Poguntke et al. 2007). In their parliamentary systems without a history of minority governments, the dividing line runs between governing majority and opposition (Lijphart 2012). Compared to Eastern European member states, party system volatility is low (Ibenskas and Sikk 2017). This allows us to hold constant basic configurations of parliamentary and party competition as potential confounding factors. At the same time, the countries differ with regard to key institutional conditions for (European) representation in national parliaments, i.e., type of democracy, politicization and economic and political interdependence in the EU and institutional involvement in EU affairs. Furthermore, there is sufficient variation on the study’s independent variables, especially the presence, strength, and positions of political parties on the left–right and pro-anti EU dimension (Chapter 5). From such typical and diverse cases (Gerring 2007), we can generalize to a certain extent, while also recognizing case-specific properties. The two Anglo-Saxon majoritarian democracies (Ireland, UK)1 and the two continental consensus democracies (Austria, Germany) (Lijphart 1 Even though Ireland and UK have moved toward greater consensus style in recent years, they are still the prime real world examples of Westminster democracies (Bulsara and Kissane 2009; Green and Prosser 2016).

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2012) provide different institutional opportunity structures for MPs and their representative patterns in EU politics. Ireland and the UK are unitary states, the former centralized; the latter (after devolution in 1998) decentralized. Austria and Germany are both federal states, the former centralized, the latter decentralized (Lijphart 2012, p. 178). In Ireland and the UK, we have pluralist, free interest group competition, while in Austria and Germany, the system of interest group representation is (neo)corporatist, i.e., co-ordinated and compromise-oriented (Lijphart 2012, pp. 165f.). Additionally, the countries cover a wider range of electoral and party systems: two countries with proportional representation, open list in Austria and single transferable vote in Ireland, Germany with a mixed member proportional system and the first-past-the-post system in the UK as pure majority voting. The sample covers two neighboring party systems as indicated by their fragmentation and polarization, multi-party systems with two-party dominance and pluralist multi-party systems. These differences in power concentration and diffusion make majoritarian democracy more ‘adversary’ (Mansbridge 1983) than consensus democracy, which tends to have “the kinder, gentler qualities” such as “a strong community orientation” (Lijphart 2012, p. 287). For representation, this means that consensus democracies tend to be “better at representing (…), representing everyone more accurately, and (…) more inclusively” (Lijphart 2012, p. 274). Turning to the EU context, the four countries differ with regard to their importance for and involvement in European integration. The population size of a member state is a first indication for a country’s weight in the decision-making process and therefore for how important it is for maintaining European integration. Here, we have Germany and the UK as ‘big,’ and Austria and Ireland as ‘small’ member states. When we look at the importance for European integration in financial terms, for example measured as the absolute and relative contributions to the EU budget in the period under investigation (European Commission 2012, p. 102), we see a similar divide. During the Eurozone crisis, we have Germany and Austria as ‘creditor states’ and Ireland as a recipient country that requested financial assistance by the EFSF on November 28, 2010. As a non-member of the Eurozone, the UK was less important for

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maintaining the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) as it did not contribute to the European rescue mechanisms.2 When we look at the intra-EU trade dependence for the period of investigation (Eurostat 2016), the UK is the least economically interdependent in the EU, while Germany’s export-led growth clearly benefits from duty-free access to the single market (e.g., Hall 2012). Countries also differ when it comes to their political interdependence, i.e., the depth of EU integration, given opt outs from the Schengen Area (Ireland, UK) or the Monetary Union (UK) at the time of the investigation. Overall, Germany and the UK are particularly relevant for system maintenance given their contributions to the overall EU budget and their weight in EU decision-making processes. While Germany is deeply interdependent politically and economically, the UK is less affected by political (depth of integration) and economic interdependence (trade). Austria and Ireland are interconnected within the EU, yet less important for its maintenance. Not only do the sampled countries differ with regard to their general involvement in European integration, but also in terms of their parliaments’ involvement in EU primary and secondary law. How parliament is involved in ratification of primary law changes and what its oversight institutions and actual activities are in the EU policy-making process, provide the background against which MPs develop their representative patterns in EU affairs. The German Bundestag is institutionally strong and among the most active in using its oversight rights. The Austrian Nationalrat is also among the stronger parliaments, it even has a binding mandate, which it rarely employs, however. Rankings usually see the UK House of Commons “in between” stronger and weaker parliaments in terms of institutional strength (Auel and Neuhold 2018, p. 6). The Irish Dáil is among the weaker parliaments in terms of both institutional strength and activity (Barrett 2018). When it comes to EU activities, the British lower house is among the less active parliaments, while the Bundestag and Nationalrat are comparably active (Auel et al. 2015a, p. 79). With regard to parliamentary involvement during the Eurozone crisis, especially the Bundestag has seen its participation rights increased through rulings

2 The UK contributed to Irish recovery with bilateral loans through the Loans to Ireland Act 2010 (Treasury of the United Kingdom 2010).

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of the Constitutional Court (Höing 2015), while Ireland as a recipient country had limited room to maneuver (Coutts 2017). Regarding EU treaty ratification, countries range from exclusive ratification by parliament (Germany) to optional (UK—when (new) competencies are conferred or extended; Austria—obligatory only when full change to Austrian Constitution) and obligatory referendums (Ireland) (Thurner and Stoiber 2000, pp. 37f.). Besides such institutional conditions at the national and EU level, party political factors may shape MPs’ representative patterns in EU politics. In the period of investigation, the sampled countries differ sufficiently with regard to the presence and strength of parties along the economic and social left–right ideological scale as well as the pro-anti EU integration scale (Bakker et al. 2015; see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 3.1 for details). While British mainstream parties differ most noticeably in their position on European integration, German mainstream parties are unified by a pro-European consensus. Austrian and Irish mainstream parties range in the middle with relatively small differences. In the period under investigation, Eurosceptic challenger parties in parliament criticize EU integration from the far-left in Germany and Ireland, whereas they oppose it from the populist right in Austria. During the time of investigation, Eurosceptic challengers are absent in the UK, yet the Tories are Eurosceptic. Furthermore, there is substantial variation with regard to these parties’ governing responsibility across countries and topics under investigation ranging from social-democratic-Green coalitions to conservative-social democratic Grand Coalitions, conservative-liberal and even conservativepopulist right alliances (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 3.1 for details). This will allow us not only to compare the effect of party ideological factors, but also of government-opposition dynamics on MPs’ representative patterns in EU politics (Chapter 5). The selected topics—EU Treaty reforms and Eurozone crisis management—are “critical decision cases” (Steiner et al. 2004, p. 104) in which “[n]ational parliaments have become the most important and visible arena for public political debate about the state and future of European integration” (Wendler 2016, p. 1). Far-reaching political (institutional) and economic (re-distributive) decisions are made that deeply affect various groups across the EU and European citizens more generally. It is in such ‘high profile’ debates that we can expect MPs to articulate whom and how they represent in EU politics most explicitly. The selected debates

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are ideal to investigate the full range of representative patterns because they are moments of change and crises with much at stake. At such times of failed referendums and a “state of emergency” (Kreuder-Sonnen 2019, p. 8), representatives “have an incentive to try to produce a compelling vision of what it is, and who it is, they are ultimately for” (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, p. 175). The Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty and the European Financial Stability Facility are all highly salient, polarized issues in national parliaments (Wendler 2016), the media and citizen public. Yet, Austria, Germany, Ireland, and the UK differ with regard to the degree and kind of politicization we observe (e.g., Grande and Hutter 2016; Kriesi and Grande 2016). In domestic newspaper debates, there is lower public politicization of Constitutional and Lisbon Treaty debates in Germany compared to the UK and especially Austria (Grande and Hutter 2016, p. 71), yet exceptionally high levels of politicization with regard to Eurozone crisis management (Kriesi and Grande 2016, pp. 255–257). In the UK, we see the opposite: Consistently politicized debates during the treaty reforms and comparatively little politicization of the Eurozone crisis (Kriesi and Grande 2016, p. 257). In Austria, the treaty debates show the highest politicization compared to Germany and the UK, while Austrian debates on the Eurozone crisis are less politicized than in Germany, but more than in the UK (Kriesi and Grande 2016, pp. 255–257). For Ireland, we lack comparable data on the politicization of the treaty reform debates. We do find a rather positive and diverse legitimation debate in media discourse (Hurrelmann et al. 2013). The fact that Ireland had to vote twice in a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty indicates a comparably high degree of politicization (for an in-depth discussion of events and debates in Ireland, see Girvin 2010). During the Eurozone crisis, we find a moderate politicization in Ireland in the news media and citizen arena (Gora 2018). The study does not include debates on EU legislation and policymaking because of the potential bias a necessary limitation to certain policy areas could induce for findings on whom and how national MPs represent in EU politics. Future research could study these representative patterns of day-to-day EU policy-making across all policy areas. Limiting the empirical analyses to certain debates is somewhat mitigated by combining this parliamentary speech with interview data. The former tells us something about MPs’ representative behavior at certain times and under certain conditions, while the latter gives us insights into their

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underlying representative attitudes and “experience under perhaps very different conditions” (Jenny and Müller 2012, p. 160). 3.1.2

Parliamentary Debates and Interview Partners

To observe representative speech behavior in the parliamentary arena, this study relies on plenary debates because representation has to be seen, and therefore it has to be made in public. The plenary is the public arena in the policy-making process in general and EU politics in particular (e.g., Auel and Raunio 2014, p. 4; Maatsch 2012, pp. 194f.). In the parliamentary plenary, the patterns of representation become publicly visible. Representatives do not only state their policy positions, but also elaborate whom these policies are good for and whom their opponents’ policies harm, when speaking on the floor of the house (Martin and Vanberg 2008, p. 507). They voice their constituencies’ concerns, elaborate on broader responsibilities and show themselves accountable. In their speeches, members of parliament establish visible representative linkages with their represented (Proksch and Slapin 2015, p. 2). Plenary debates are favored over European Affairs Committee (EAC) meetings because the latter do not meet in public by default for all the four countries. These differences in accessibility would not allow us to obtain all literal transcripts, which we would need to conduct the Representative Claims Analysis (de Wilde 2010, pp. 23f.). Additionally, MPs may make fewer such claims to begin with given their aim is to reach policy solutions rather than speak to an audience of citizens and establish representative linkages with their constituencies. Some might object that the mass media is the much more decisive public arena and crucial for establishing the representative relationship in modern democracies (Michailidou and Trenz 2012). This study, however, is not interested in the representative claims that reach the media sphere because only a (biased) subset of MPs’ claims may reach that arena in the first place. The fact remains that the news media reports well on plenary debates, and MPs’ “speeches target a very large, often even a transnational, audience” (Maatsch 2012, p. 194, emphasis added). Scholars have also used parliamentary questions to investigate the focus and style of representation in the national context (e.g., Erzeel 2012; Martin 2011; Russo 2011). Parliamentary questions are a good fit for these studies because they have a narrower research interest, in that they investigate certain constituencies, i.e., MPs’ electoral district focus

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or representation of women. The present study investigates the whole range of representative patterns in EU politics. Hence, plenary debates give more room to develop these patterns. Finally, plenary debates are a great data source to investigate representative claims-making behavior in the four countries because we have two working parliaments (Austria and Germany) and two debating parliaments (Ireland, UK). The former have a comparably resourceful administrative infrastructure in general and with regard to EU affairs in particular (Höing 2015; Miklin 2015). In working parliaments, representatives concentrate on compromises on policy in committees, parliamentary debate is less confrontational than in debating parliaments. In addition, statements are highly prepared and access to the floor is restricted in working parliaments compared to debating parliaments (Proksch and Slapin 2015, pp. 61–65). For this study, the individual plenary debate is the sampling unit. Every reading /debate stage is counted as a separate debate. All obligatory ratification debates on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), the Lisbon Treaty and the EFSF are included, and, where applicable, debates on constitutional amendments and referendum debates (see Appendix A 3.1 for a detailed overview of all sampled debates). For Ireland, there are no debates on the TCE as the bill had been lapsed after the French and Dutch referendums had rejected the treaty. This is to some degree ‘compensated’ by a very extensive examination of the Lisbon Treaty (with a negative referendum in 2008 and an approval by popular vote in 2009). For the UK, comparable debates were chosen for the Eurozone crisis. These debates either dealt with the Eurozone bailouts directly and /or they took place around key EFSF decisions at the EU level, i.e., its installation in May 2010 as well as its expansions (March and July 2011) and leveraging (October 2011). For Austria, Germany, and Ireland, only the debates on the EFSF architecture were included, leaving out debates on individual country programs or memoranda of understanding. This is done for comparability reasons as some countries such as Germany debated about these operative issues, while others did not. When government declarations were connected to the selected EFSF debates, they were also sampled. In total, this amounts to 35 plenary debates (Table 3.1). Turning to the second data source, the qualitative interviews to uncover representative attitudes were conducted from 2014–15 with

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Table 3.1 Number of plenary debates (instances) across countries and topics

Austria Germany Ireland United Kingdom Total

TCE

LT

EFSF

Total

2 2 0 1 5

2 4 6 (18) 2 14 (26)

3 4 4 (7) 5 16 (19)

7 10 10 (25) 8 35 (50)

In Ireland, there are multiple resumptions of the same debating stage (for Dáil procedures, see Caffrey 2010). Debates were counted toward the same debate, if they continued on the same day, and were a new debate, if resumed on another day. The numbers in brackets indicate all debate instances

Table 3.2 Party membership of interviewees 2005–2011 Austria Germany Ireland UK

Left 2 IND 4

Greens 4 Greens 1 SF 0 SNP 0

SPÖ 3 SPD 5 LAB 3 LAB 7

ÖVP 4 CDU 5 FG 6 LIBDEM 0

FPÖ 3 FDP 5 FF 3 CON 7

BZÖ 2 CSU 2

Total 16 20 [36] 16 [52] 14 [66]

FC = Finance Committee, ESC = European Scrutiny Committee, IND = Independent MPs. MPs were members during (substantial) parts of the investigation period. Response rates: AUT = 31 per cent, GER = 35 per cent, IRL = 32 per cent, UK = 25 per cent

66 members of the European Affairs and Budget / Finance Committees (FC) of the four countries (Table 3.2).3 The interviewees were sampled as elite experts (Littig 2009; Pfadenhauer 2009). They have privileged access to and specific internal knowledge of parliamentary E(M)U politics. As “information-rich cases” (Patton 2002, p. 230) they are sampled as heterogenous, yet typical cases (Patton 2002, pp. 234–236). This means the sample has to include MPs from all four countries, but also aims to 3 39.4 per cent from the EACs, 37.8 per cent from the Budget (Finance) Committees,

9 per cent were members of both and 13.6 per cent members of other committees such as the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC). Including MPs from other committees’ accounts for the different debating cultures in that they had a prominent role in debates in Ireland and the UK, while speakers in Austria and Germany strictly came from the abovementioned committees.

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cover the range of parliamentary parties as comprehensively as possible. This is to minimize (self-)selection bias, i.e., accessible MPs differing systematically in certain characteristics from non-accessible MPs (Goldstein 2002, pp. 669f.). To dig deeper into the fabric of representative attitudes in EU politics, we focus on the aforementioned committees. This purposeful sampling does not aim at representativeness (Mason 2002, p. 124), but at capturing the relevant range of representative attitudes among those most involved in E(M)U politics. What these E(M)U experts think on representation in EU politics supplements what they say in parliament. The overall response rate was 31 per cent which clearly meets accepted standards and is in line with other research projects that conduct parliamentary surveys or interviews (average response rate of European parliaments between 21 and 41 per cent, see Bailer 2014, pp. 178–186). While this study is fortunate to draw on that many interviews and the overall distribution of interview partners is very satisfactory, there were some accessibility issues. In the UK, only Tory and Labour MPs were interviewed. This may be because interviews were conducted around the General Election 2015 (with no systematic differences in pre- and postelection interviews). In Ireland, MPs from the left-wing Eurosceptic Sinn Féin (SF) party did not agree to an interview, but far-left independent MPs did.

3.2 Data Collection: Representative Claims Analysis and Qualitative Interviews The mixed-method design combines two methods of data collection: the quantitative Representative Claims Analysis of plenary debates with the qualitative MP interviews. The two sets of data ideally complement each other. Data on parliamentary behavior provides precise information on parliamentary claims-making behavior that can be linked to institutional conditions and party political incentives. Interviews in turn generate a more in-depth picture beyond what is observable in a certain time period. They let us know, how durable representative attitudes are and what motivates them (Jenny and Müller 2012).

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Representative Claims Analysis

RCA is a quantitative content analysis method introduced by Pieter de Wilde (2012, 2013; de Wilde et al. 2014) that fruitfully combines Saward’s theory of representative claims-making (2006, 2010) with the empirical approach of political claims analysis (PCA, e.g., Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2010). As a “theoretically informed and empirically viable methodological approach” (de Wilde 2013, p. 278, emphasis added), it is ideal to uncover national MPs’ representative claims-making behavior in EU politics. This study follows de Wilde et al. (2014) by defining claims based on necessary core elements. This approach avoids entire speeches to be considered a single claim even when different issues and representative objects are addressed—something that had been left open in the original political claims analysis. In Saward’s original formulation, representative claims have the following form (2010, p. 36, italic emphasis in original): A maker of representation (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audience (‘A’). Saward differentiates between those who make the representative claim (makers or claimants) and those who do the representing (subject). He also distinguishes the constituencies that are represented (object) from the actually existing constituencies (referent). Representation happens in front of a particular audience. For instance, a social democratic MP (maker) offers herself or her party (subject) as speaking for the interests of the unemployed (object /referent) to fellow MPs and the media (audiences) (for examples, see Saward 2010, p. 37). As suggested by de Wilde (2013), this study ‘relieves’ Saward’s representative claims of all elements that are external to the claim. The empirical analysis concentrates on what we can observe from the textual claim itself and from the status of the claimant. Also following de Wilde (2013), we drop the distinction between claimant and subject as well as object and referent as they are empirically less important and hard to distinguish. This approach offers a reliable coding method because we only code what it explicitly stated in the claims. This study deviates from de Wilde, however, with regard to the core elements that distinguish one representative claim from the other. While his approach is a crucial step forward in measuring representative claims,

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it does not fully capture the representative relationship for our purposes here. Agreeing with him that “the core of a representative claim remains the linkage between the claimant and the object” (2013, p. 287), we make the object of representation a core element in our approach. Hence, the present study places a stronger emphasis on this object of representation, i.e., its focus and style dimension, when conducting the RCA. It thereby centers on the representative in representative claimsmaking rather than on political or positional claims-making (see also Kinski 2018; Kinski and Crum 2020). A representative claim, then, has to encompass the following two elements to be considered representative: 1. Claimant: By definition the individual MP making the claim as the only core element ‘external’ to the representative claim. 2. Representative Object: Who (focus) is claimed to be represented how (style)? For this representation to be political, the claim must also contain a political issue, be it policy or polity-related. Hence, there needs to be a third core element: 3. Policy and/or Polity Issue: On what issue is the representative claim staged? A representative claim then has the following core structure: How (style) does who (claimant) claim to represent whom (focus) on what (issue)? A claimant establishes the representative link by speaking for or about a constituency (Saward 2006, p. 305). Speaking for a group, the representative directly claims to represent their interests (“I represent /stand for the interests of European farmers.”). Speaking about their constituencies, claimants refer to their needs and problems or discuss costs and benefits a political measure has on them (“The proposed bill harms employees in Austria.”). Representative claims may be single sentences or extend over a few paragraphs. A new representative claim is coded, whenever at least one of the three core elements (claimant, object, issue) changes. An exception are claims that enumerate several representative objects: “I support the bailout package because it is in the interest of the German taxpayers as

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Table 3.3 Representative claims analysis in this study Setting

Type

Claimant

Issue

Object

Parliament*

Speech Act (speech vs. interjection) Mode (direct vs. indirect)

MP* (Name)

Topic*

Focus* (national vs. European(-ized)

MP Party

Position

Style (public vs. particular interest)

(Topic) Plenary Debate* Date* Year

GovR I (Executive vs. Legislative) GovR II (Governing majority vs. opposition) Committee European experience Socio-demographics

Core elements in bold GovR = Governing responsibility *marks elements that delineate representative claims from one another

well as the Greek citizens ” is the same substantial claim. In this case, the German MP has a Europeanized (German and Greek) focus and refers to both particular (taxpayers) and public interest (citizens). Identical claims during an MP’s speech are not coded twice because how strongly an MP represents certain constituencies is better captured by how she represents the same group of people on different issues. Repeatedly talking about the same group’s interests concerning the same policy rather tells us something about how strongly she might feel about that policy. In addition to the three core elements, representative claims can contain several optional elements (see also de Wilde et al. 2014, pp. 7f.). They make for different kinds of, more or less ‘sophisticated’ representative claims. Table 3.3 summarizes these core and optional elements. Parliament and Debate-Level Variables Setting records four variables external to the representative claim: The parliament, the sampled debate as well as the exact date and year it took place.

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Core Variables Claimant (who?): The individual MP giving a speech or interjecting in another’s speech. We also code party affiliation, governing responsibility, committee membership, European experience and socio-demographics (see Appendix A 3.2 for the full codebook, A 3.3 for coding examples of core elements). Issue (on what?): There are three different kinds of topic categories (similarly Wendler 2012, 2013, 2014): (1) general statements on European integration and the Eurozone crisis (i.e., reasons, causes), (2) polity and (3) policy issues. Again, when an MP enumerates several policy topics in the interest of the same constituency, multiple issues were coded instead of splitting the claims (see Appendix A 3.2 for the detailed list of topics). An optional Position variable captures the positive, negative, or ambivalent assessment of the (main) topic. The Representative Object is the core of the representative claim and constitutes this study’s dependent variables. Representative Focus (whom?): (1) A national focus is coded when MPs exclusively refer to their own national citizens and/or to particular national groups. MPs have (2) a Europeanized focus (national plus European) when they represent their own nationals plus other EU nationals (transnational/horizontal) and/or European citizens (vertical/supranational). They have (3) a European focus, when they exclusively refer to other than national representative objects. Representative Style (how?): Republican claims (public interest) are distinguished from pluralist claims (particular interest) (see Appendix A 3.2 for coding details). The republican representative style is captured by references to the whole body politic, e.g., references to citizens, people, the political community. The pluralist representative style is coded as all references to party, functional and regional groups similar to extant research into traditional and core constituencies of political parties (e.g., Nyhuis et al. 2016). Besides such purely (1) republican and (2) pluralist representative claims, this study also distinguishes (3) mixed representative claims that include both a republican and a pluralist dimension (so-called politico claims). When a claim with the same topic refers to ‘German interest’ and ‘German citizens’, this is coded as one republican claim (the same goes for pluralist references).

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Types of Representative Claims Type of Speech Act: Claims as part of an MP’s own speaking time are distinguished from claims interjected during another MP’s speech. Mode of Representation: This variable differentiates between direct and indirect representative claims. Empirically, MPs do not only claim to speak for or about a constituency directly, but they may accuse another representative of not being able or willing to represent this constituency properly (de Wilde 2013, p. 284). They thereby indirectly signal that they are the ones who actually represent this group. Overall, the individual representative claims are the coding unit and unit of analysis. The coding process has two steps: First, individual claims are identified and distinguished from each other based on the core elements. Second, the codebook is applied to the identified claims. This manual approach allows for an in-depth analysis of diverse representative patterns. 3.2.2

Qualitative Interviews

Latent representative patterns in EU politics manifest themselves in MPs’ representative claims-making behavior in parliamentary speech. Interviews provide valuable nuances on these patterns that we cannot observe from behavior. “In the end, MPs’ opinions about their job remain central to the study of roles (…)” (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012, p. 215). The quantitative analyses uncover the conditions under which MPs claim certain representative roles in public, while the interviews allow us to find out what their underlying representative conceptions are. We choose qualitative interviews over standardized surveys because we want to get an in-depth sense of how national MPs develop, elaborate and justify their representative focus and style in EU politics. We want them to have the space for their “articulated narratives for making sense of their representative choices” rather than “forcing artificial antagonism between principals” (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012, p. 214). This does not only put the quantitative data based on speech behavior into perspective, but also enriches our analysis with vital information on legislators’ views and ideas about their representative patterns in EU politics. Because we get such first-hand insights into what representatives think, interviews have always been a valuable tool in legislative studies, especially in earlier research on representative roles and typologies of MPs (Bailer 2014, p. 169). Similar to existing research (Jenny and Müller 2012), the typology developed here is put to a test in the interview material, while

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that material is also used to identify potentially more nuanced ‘real-world’ role orientations (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012, p. 215). Of course, we never know, whether interviewees really tell us what is in their hearts and minds as various measurement effects are a potential source of bias. Besides social desirability, it is age, gender and professional seniority on both sides that may shape the interview situation (Desmond 2004; McDowell 1998; Rice 2010). To minimize these biases, we carefully design the interview questionnaire. To do this, this study relies on semi-structured, guided interviews (on the interview guide approach, see Patton 2002, pp. 343f.). They are ideal to uncover representative patterns in a comparative setting. On the one hand, the semi-structured interview guide contains a common set of questions which allows for systematic comparison. On the other hand, the interviews are open and flexible enough to stimulate an active interview situation. There are pre-defined core questions that make sure “the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person interviewed” (Patton 2002, p. 343). Their order, however, is variable and so is the use of additional questions or encouragements of longer anwers to allow for a natural conversation flow. This creates enough structure and guidance on the part of the interviewer, while leaving space for nuances and unexpected answers by the interviewee. The author conducted all interviews in the respective MP’s native language (English or German) to minimize loss of information and maximize accuracy and authenticity (Welch and Piekkari 2006). They were transcribed in the original language. Quotes from German-speaking MPs used in Chapter 6 are translated into English by the author. Of the 66 interviews, 60 were face-to-face interviews and six were conducted by phone. Researchers prefer the former for their personal contact and higher control of the interview situation (e.g., Vogl 2013), but studies comparing the two modes find no significant differences in the data (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004) and comparable data quality (Carr and Worth 2001). Interviews with political elites make different demands on the interviewer than interviews with ‘ordinary citizens’. Legislators are used to talking in public and being questioned critically. In such “interviewing up” (Bailer 2014, p. 171), power rather lies with the interviewee and this may result in dominant or evasive respondent behavior. In such a setup, “more subtle and more insistent questions” (Bailer 2014, p. 171) are considered legitimate.

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Turning to the questionnaire (see Appendix A 3.4 for the English questionnaire and the Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 3.2 for the German questionnaire), it contains both open and closed questions—the former to encourage elaborate answers, the latter to generate (dis–)approval. Further, it includes both experience/behavior questions and opinion/value questions (Patton 2002, pp. 348–350). The latter directly ask for conceptual patterns, the former do so indirectly through behavioral patterns. Retrospective questions were reduced to a minimum because of well-known problems with recall and distortion (Lewis 2003, p. 54). Precise, time- or event-specific data is not so much the goal (Jenny and Müller 2012), but insights into MPs’ overall representative understanding. Instead, MPs are encouraged to give their own examples, which illustrate broader role orientations. After the same introductory statement and a ‘warm-up’ question, the questionnaire contains two sets of questions grouped into two blocks. Block I deals with the general EU environment and key elements of the theoretical framework. Block II inquires an MP’s representative focus and style in EU politics. Each interview ends with the same general questions about the EU’s institutional architecture the interviewee would prefer and about the role national parliaments would play in this hypothetical setup. Block I includes questions on potential pressures of interdependence, co-responsibility for system maintenance and the tension between responsibility and responsiveness. Specifically, for instance, MPs are asked about whether politicians should take into account the views of other European governments with reference to data from the European Social Survey that had asked citizens the same question (ESS round 6 2012). Block II captures this study’s key dependent variables based on the typology developed in Chapter 2. It directly and openly asks whom they represent in EU politics as well as whether and why they (do not) consider the consequences of their decision on other EU citizens. This distinguishes those who immediately mention European constituents in the open question, from those who do upon re-consideration, and those who refuse such European(-ized) representation. Another set of questions then probes the style of representation asking, for instance, for particular groups the MP represents or whether MPs should have a common good orientation in EU politics.

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3.3 Data Evaluation: Regression Analyses and Typology of MPs Multivariate regression analyses are used to uncover factors that affect representative speech behavior in EU politics (Chapter 5). In doing so, there are some key methodological decisions to make. A first issue concerns the data structure. The data collected via the Representative Claims Analysis has a multi-level structure: Claims are nested within national MPs who are nested within parties in a given country. Furthermore, some MPs reappear in some debates concerning the three topics over time, although this ‘panel structure’ is very ‘patchy’ as it does not refer to all MPs in the sample being consistently surveyed over the same time periods. Also, the limited number of cases at the country level (N = 4, Constitutional Treaty: N = 3) renders valid statistical inference and precise estimation of coefficients at the system’s level very difficult (for approaches on how to model clustered data, see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). There is an ongoing debate on the acceptable minimum number of cases for the contextual unit (countries in this case) (Hox 1998, p. 151; see also Hox and Wijngaards-de Meij 2015), but even the most ‘liberal’ suggestions propose ten cases at minimum (Snijders 2004, p. 676). Commonly, it is said that sample sizes with less than 20 cases only allow for limited inference (Schuck et al. 2011, pp. 48f.; see also Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). Additionally, the number of cases at the contextual level (country level) is more important than that at the lower levels: “For accuracy and high power a large number of groups appears more important than a large number of individuals per group” (Hox 1998, p. 150). Given these precautions, this study does not use a multi-level analysis, but instead includes country and topic dummies to capture variance across countries and topics in addition to the independent variables. More specifically, to account for autocorrelation in the data, binary logistic regressions at the claims-level with robust clustered standard errors where claimants are the clustering variable are used to estimate the likelihood of a claim being European(-ized) and republican/pluralist, respectively. This model estimation takes into account the clustered structure of the data. Clustering the standard errors around the individual MP accounts for the fact that we cannot assume representative claims made by the same MP, albeit on different topics and at different points in time, to

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be statistically independent of each other. Put differently, the representative claims the same MP makes on whom and how she represents are connected to each other because they are made by the same MP who utters them as strategic roles in parliamentary debate (and potentially also holds deeper representative role orientations, Chapter 6). Assuming independence across clusters, but correlation within clusters (MPs) ensures that unobserved differences between and similarities ‘within’ an MP do not drive the results. Moreover, as aforementioned, plenary debates vary in number and length per country and topic (see Appendix A 3.1 for details). For the regression analyses, the data is not weighted according to debate length. This ‘unweighted’ approach to representative claims as the basic elements of parliamentary speech is customary in studies employing the same content analysis method (e.g., de Wilde et al. 2014). While the general propensity to make any representative claim in the first place is of course related to the speaking time an MP has, it does not tell us much about her likelihood to make a European(-ized) or republican claim, for instance. Overall, the full universe of representative claims was coded in the selected debates in the four parliaments. Inferential statistics are needed nonetheless because of possible measurement error and the stochastic element in all social processes (see discussions by Behnke 2005 and Broscheid and Gschwend 2005). Also, the text generation process is stochastic, in that not every MP has the same chance to enter the sample, i.e., speak in the plenary, and there are cross-country differences (Proksch and Slapin 2015, pp. 62f.). Furthermore, there is only limited potential for a longitudinal research design, i.e., to compare behavioral patterns of representation over time because the data contains five points in time (2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) and developments between these observations do not need to be linear. Difference may well be due to differences in debate topic rather than changes over time. Thus, this study opts for a comparison across topics instead. A statement such as ‘European(-ized) representation has decreased from 2005 to 2009 and increased again until 2011’ is not possible. Yet, conclusions such as ‘Europeanization was higher during Constitutional Treaty debates than during Lisbon Treaty debates’ are justified given the data structure. Finally, focus and style of representation are both ‘observably’ categorical and relate to a latent construct (Karlson et al. 2012, p. 289; Kröger and Skopek 2017, p. 9). On the one hand, an MP may either claim

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to represent a European(-ized) constituency in a representative claim or she claims to speak for national concerns only. Her colleague during his parliamentary speech may make a claim to represent particular interests in EU affairs rather than general ones. These are the observable behavioral patterns. On the other hand, these strategic roles do relate to an underlying continuous construct, namely that of a Europeanization of the representative focus, and a style of representation with Republicans and Pluralists at the ends of the continuum. The interview data can get at these underlying continuums, i.e., the deeper representative role orientations (Chapter 6). We approach the interview material with the ideal types in mind that were identified in Chapter 2. The interviewed MPs as the unit of analysis are empirical examples that fit these ideal types more or less well (Kluge 2000). For the focus of representation, the interview questionnaire allows us to distinguish four different types of national MPs on a continuum from purely national to fully European representation along four key features: • attitude of MPs toward taking other governments’ position in EU affairs into account [Other governments’ position] • attitude toward taking into account the consequences of MPs’ EU decisions on other EU citizens [Consequences on EU citizens] • the extent to which MPs see a tension between responsiveness toward national citizens and wider European responsibility [Tension] • MPs’ representative object in EU affairs [Representative Object]. The four types are the National Representative (N1), the National Representative in a European Context (N2), the Europeanized Representative (E1), and the European Representative (E2) (Table 3.4). While the two national types (N1—National Representative, and N2—National Representative in a European Context) share their exclusively national focus of representation, the Europeanized Representative (E1) claims to speak for both national and European citizens (horizontally/vertically). The fully European Representative (E2) does not refer to national citizens, but conceptualizes her representative object purely in European terms. The two national types do not take into account the consequences of their decisions on other citizens, while European(-ized) Representatives (E1 and E2) do. N1 and N2 share their classic, ‘standard account’ of

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Table 3.4 Conceptual focus of representation: Typology of MPs Type

N1 The National Representative

N2 The National Representative in a European Context

E1 The Europeanized Representative

E2 The European Representative

Other governments’ position Consequences on EU citizens R &R-Tension Representative Object

NO

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO N

YES N

YES N + EU

NO EU

N = national, N + EU = national and European/other MS, EU = European

national representation in EU affairs. They are elected by citizens based on national territory and they see themselves as making EU decisions in their national citizens’ best interest without consideration for other EU citizens. What distinguishes the two is that the National Representative in a European Context is closer to E1 and E2, when taking account of the European environment she operates in. N2—albeit not having a European(-ized) focus of representation—has a European outlook in the sense that she regards the EU layer as relevant, when furthering her national constituency’s concerns and therefore takes account of other governments’ positions. The purely National Representative—N1—on the contrary does not consider the EU context or other government positions as relevant to successfully fulfill his national representative task. In line with this, National Representatives do not feel a tension between European responsibility and national responsiveness simply because they are purely nationally oriented and do not think they should assume a wider responsibility in the first place. They can easily solve the responsibility-responsiveness dilemma: Not feeling co-responsible for other EU citizens completely relieves them of this potential conflict. The National Representative in a European Context and the Europeanized Representative do feel a tension because they either claim to represent national and European citizens (in the case of the latter), or they at least consider other government positions which makes a potential tension arise

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(in the case of the former). The European Representative again does not feel a tension because she does not conceive of her representative object as having a national element at all. For her, representing interests of national and other EU citizens is not inherently incompatible as interests are the same and are subsumed under an overarching European citizenry. The National Representative (N1)—Purely national (representative) outlook, EU context irrelevant for decision-making National Representatives (N1) are exclusively oriented toward national concerns and contexts and their (representative) focus is completely national. They do not tend to consider the wider EU environment they are part of, when making EU decisions. The National Representative in a European Context (N2)—EU context relevant for decision-making National Representatives in a European Context (N2) also see themselves as representing national concerns, but do so acknowledging that they operate within a wider EU system. They have a national representative focus and do not see themselves representing other EU citizens’ concerns. The Europeanized Representative (E1)—Representing national and fellow EU citizens Europeanized Representatives (E1) consider the EU context and see themselves as representing national and European concerns, in various balances. They still remain nationally anchored MPs, but broaden their representative portfolio to include fellow EU citizens. The European Representative (E2)—Representing European citizens European Representatives (E2) see themselves as representing European concerns only. To them, national and EU citizens’ interests are identical as citizens have the same wants and needs across Europe. For the style of representation in EU politics, the interview questionnaire allows us to distinguish three different types of national MPs on a continuum from pluralist to republican representation along four key features: • MPs who refer to either particular groups or the ‘common good’ and do not consider the respective other option or explicitly negate the alternative are classified as Pluralists or Republicans, respectively.

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• Whenever MPs mention both types, but explicitly decide for one as the overriding style, they are classified as Pluralists or Republicans, respectively. • Whenever they mention both types, either equally or in an issuedependent way, they are assigned into the Politico category. • The above classification is made based on the communitarian public good definition (representing all members of the political community). In a second step, those MPs that explicitly mention marginalized groups in society (Difference Principle) (Rawls 1999; see also Altham 1973, p. 75) are alternatively classified into the Republican category. The Pluralist (P)—Representing particular interests Pluralists (P) represent particular interests such as functional groups in society (e.g., farmers, employees) or geographic constituencies. Some of these MPs describe themselves as representatives of a particular interest refusing either the existence of a common good or seriously doubting that something like a general interest can be identified a priori. Yet, others will acknowledge that there may indeed be some form of common good, but will argue that the common good is only attained through pluralist competition of diverging interests. Therefore, the common good is reached a posteriori. The Republican (R)—Representing the common good R1: General interest representation in communitarian terms: The (Communitarian) Republican sees her role in representing a form of common good or collective interest, when it comes to EU affairs. Some of them will describe themselves as purely republican viewing particular interest representation as potentially dangerous and parochial. Some will accept that there are indeed particular interests in society, but will opt for representing all citizens because it is their understanding of how representation becomes and remains democratic. For them, the common good exists prior to and independent of pluralist interest competition.

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R2: Common good in Rawlsian terms: In contrast to R1, the Rawlsian sees her role in alleviating the conditions of the least well-off in society, thus representing the disenfranchised and marginalized. The Politico (Po)—Representing both particular and general interests The Politico sees her role in both particular and common interest representation, when it comes to EU affairs. They will be somewhere on the Pluralist-Republican continuum, in that they either equally refer to both styles of representation or say that it very much depends on the circumstances they are in, and on the specific decision at hand. In that sense, they are more pragmatic than dogmatic in their representative style. Using the ‘categorical indexing’ method (Mason 2002, pp. 150-165) the interview material is assigned to the four different dimensions (other governments’ position, tension, consequences, representative object ) to allow for systematic comparison. The categories are then grouped into the different types of representatives (e.g., N1, N2, E1, and E2). Overall, there were no outliers in the sense that an MP’s answers would contradict each other. The different dimensions seem to measure the underlying conceptual constructs well. Even though most MPs did, they do not need to possess all the characteristics to qualify as a certain representative type, instead it is “a matter of degree” with some MPs being “’better’” and others being “’worse’” members of their class (Schwartz et al. 1989, pp. 2f.). The method aims to systematically extract, reduce and structure information by assigning interview responses (‘raw data’) to the different representative types and corresponding categories. It follows a mechanism-oriented, configurational logic rather than a variable-oriented, relational approach. Thereby, it is an excellent complement to the statistical analysis of the claims data because it is especially well suited to uncover causal mechanisms in three distinct steps and at three different levels of abstraction (Gläser and Laudel 2013).

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1. Identifying and extracting raw data (causal mechanisms as reported by the interviewee): Relevant passages on MPs’ conceptual focus and style of representation in EU politics are extracted in their verbatim form. They are then assigned to the different categories of each representative type in an extraction matrix. These direct quotations represent individual views of interviewees; causal mechanisms are most likely incomplete, possibly inconsistent, and surely subjective. 2. Paraphrasing, structuring, and summarizing data (causal mechanisms at the level of individual representative types): The same extraction matrix is used to paraphrase key lines of argumentation in the direct quotes. For each category, common lines of reasoning are clustered and summarized. These summaries are then checked for contradictions at the level of each individual representative type. 3. Interpreting data and identifying patterns (causal mechanisms across all representative types): In this final step, similarities and differences across the class of cases are investigated. We can identify different possible paths that lead to a national as opposed to a European representative focus, for instance. Uncovering such necessary and sufficient, or at least enabling and constraining conditions, eventually allows for “contingent generalizations” (Blatter and Blume 2008, p. 334) from the interview data. It fills the “black boxes between causes and effects” (Gläser and Laudel 2013, n.p.). The next section summarizes the dependent variables of this study, discusses reliability and validity as well as the basic data structure.

3.4

Dependent Variables and Data Structure

Behavioral Representative Patterns This study has two sets of dependent variables that measure the focus and style of representation in MPs’ speech-making behavior. The focus of representation is measured by two binary dependent variables at the representative claim-level: DV1 measures European(-ized) representation (national plus European and European only combined), and DV2 measures European representation (European only). For DV1 , Europeanization of a claim starts as soon as it transcends purely national interest representation. Naturally, this also includes claims with a purely European focus. DV2 exclusively includes this European focus and

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National

Focus of Representation

National plus EU

EU only

European(-ized) Representation (DV1)

European Representation (DV2)

Fig. 3.1 Dependent variables: Behavioral focus of representation

does not simultaneously establish a national representative relationship. Figure 3.1 illustrates this operationalization. The style of representation is measured by two binary dependent variables at the representative claim-level: DV3 measures a republican representative style via public interest representation and DV4 measures a pluralist representative style via particular interest representation. Here, public interest representation refers to the communitarian view of a political community (see Appendix A 3.2 for details). Figure 3.2 illustrates this operationalization.

Republican

Public Interest (DV3)

Pluralist

Particular Interest (DV4)

Style of Representation

Fig. 3.2 Dependent variables: Behavioral style of representation

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Conceptual Representative Patterns At the behavioral level, we cannot take a closer look at the national representative, because we can ‘only’ code the representative object. Yet, the interview data allows us to distinguish National Representatives who represent national interests and whose frame of reference is the national context only (N1) from those who also speak for national concerns only, but think the European context is relevant to further these interests (N2). Europeanized Representatives (national plus European) (E1) are differentiated from purely European Representatives (E2). Therefore, we capture a continuum from purely national to fully European representation (Fig. 3.3). For the conceptual style of representation, we distinguish the Pluralist (particular interest representation) from the Republican (public interest representation) at the two endpoints of a continuum. While the Politico (Po) ranges in between the two types and combines both common and particular interest representation, we can now also separate the two different common good definitions discussed above (communitarian vs. difference principle, R1, R2, respectively) (Fig. 3.4). Before we turn to the descriptive analysis of focus and style of representation in EU politics (Chapter 4), we need to discuss the reliability and validity of the data as well as its general properties. To warrant the reliability of the Representative Claims Analysis, both an intra-coder and an inter-coder reliability test were conducted. Based on a random sample of three plenary speeches by Austrian MPs on the Lisbon Treaty, the unitizing reliability (claim identification) and, in a second step, the coding reliability of the claim-level variables were assessed (Krippendorff 2013). For the unitizing reliability, the percentage agreement (Holsti coefficient) and correlation of concurrent decisions out of all decisions were calculated. These correspond to 91 per cent, and .95 and 84 per cent and .92, respectively which clearly meets accepted standards (Lombard et al. 2002, p. 593). The individual coding reliability for all variables used in N1

N2

National

E1

Europeanized

E2

European

Fig. 3.3 Dependent variables: Conceptual focus of representation

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Particular Interest

Pluralist (P)

General Interest

Politico (Po)

Republican (R1 R2)

Fig. 3.4 Dependent variables: Conceptual style of representation

the analysis is at or above a Holsti coefficient of 85 per cent and a correlation of .92 in both tests. Krippendorff’s alpha at or above .77 in both tests meets accepted standards (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 324f.) (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 3.3 for detailed results by variable). The inter-coder reliability test also served as a test-standard reliability test, a first measure of the internal validity of the data (Krippendorff 2013, pp. 271f.). The coding categories were distinct, exclusive, and exhaustive, residual categories were seldom used, which indicates construct validity (Neuendorf 2017). For the attitudinal data, more than one interviewee from a certain country, party, or committee allowed us to cross-check findings on conceptual patterns in terms of consistency and plausibility (Bailer 2014, p. 176). Overall, the study has a multi-method approach that captures the same theoretical construct with different data collection methods which is to cross-validate findings and which increases inferential validity. In that sense, behavioral and conceptual patterns do not have to be identical, but should not contradict each other, either. Looking at the representative claims-making behavior, MPs made 2099 representative claims (325 in Germany, 483 in Austria, 777 in Ireland and 514 in the UK). Since coded debates vary in number and length across countries, it is instructive to look at the average number of claims per MPs’ debate appearance and debate hour. The former ranges from an average of 2.7 representative claims per debate appearance in Germany to 4.2 in Ireland. The average amount of representative claims per debate hour goes from 18.2 in Germany to 24.5 in the UK; Irish MPs make 19.9 claims to representation per hour. Hence, there do not seem to be marked differences in the overall propensity to make a representative claim between the countries. We also see no differences for representative claims per hour between topics.

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Hence, while we do expect differences in the claimed focus and style of representation across countries and topics, national MPs’ general claimsmaking behavior in EU affairs is very similar and consistent across settings. This is a strong indication that empirically, representative claims are not just ‘random noise’ but basic elements of parliamentary speech that MPs from different countries speaking on different EU issues use consistently and purposefully. Looking at the 66 interviews, we also see similarities rather than differences with regard to the general properties of the data. Their average duration was 38 minutes (from 10 to 67 minutes) and did not vary substantially across countries or parties. All core questions were asked in all interviews. In 10 per cent of the interviews, a member of staff was present, but they rarely intervened in the interviews. Chapter 4 now turns to the descriptive analysis of whom and how MPs represent in EU politics in what they say and think.

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CHAPTER 4

Focus and Style of Representation in EU Politics

4.1

The Purpose of This Chapter

This chapter describes whom and how national members of parliament (MPs) represent in EU politics. It shows empirical patterns of representation in terms of MPs’ speech behavior (representative claims) and attitudes (interview typology). To this end, the chapter first separately maps the distribution of representative focus (national vs. European(-ized)) (4.2) and representative style (republican vs. pluralist) (4.3). It then presents the combination of empirical focus and style (4.4). In doing so, it highlights similarities and differences between countries, topics, parties, and data sources. The conclusion summarizes the main descriptive findings and puts them into perspective (4.5).

4.2 Focus of Representation: Whom to Represent in EU Politics? In EU politics, national MPs make exclusively national, national plus European and fully European claims to representation. According to Robert Lugar, former member of the populist right-wing Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), this difference in representative focus is the underlying dividing line among MPs in the Austrian parliament: © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_4

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(T)here is a difference of opinion about which people deserves our attention. There are parties in this House who believe that we are the people’s representatives in the Austrian Parliament and are therefore obliged to the Austrian people. And there are other MPs here who are spanning this a bit further and who also hold the European people dear to their heart. (…) It may very well be legitimate if you think about Greece and Portugal and the peoples of these countries and if you do not want them to be hit by adversities. (…) Someone asked me yesterday: What are you discussing in parliament – it cannot be so hard to simply do the best! The question is: What is the best in this situation? And then the question follows: The best for whom? (…) wanting the best for Greek, Portuguese, Italian citizens and only in the very last consequence having the Austrian interest in mind. Robert Lugar, independent MP (former BZÖ), European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) debate, Austria, 30 September 2011, Plenary Protocol of the 120th Plenary Session of the Austrian Nationalrat , p. 65 (emphasis in original, translated by the author).

The MP divides the Austrian parliament into two types of representatives—one group of exclusively national representatives and another that (also) represents other EU citizens. He clearly belongs to the former in that he represents “the interest of the Austrians because we are in the Austrian parliament, we are elected by Austrians and that is why we represent Austrian interests!” (120th Plenary Protocol, p. 67). According to this standard account of representation, foreign interests merely function as constraints to such national interest representation. In the example below, foreign interests limit the British room to manoeuver in a bargaining process between national interests. In this view, representation is a zero-sum game in which foreign interests cannot be taken into account in domestic will-formation. On double majority voting, I understand that the Spanish and the Poles did not want that because they had the artificial advantage of a weighting in their favour under the previous system, but I cannot see why it is in the British national interest that the Poles and the Spaniards should have that advantage. Quentin Davies, Conservative Party (CON), Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) debate, UK, 9 February 2005, House of Commons Plenary Protocol Vol. No. 430, part No. 37, Column 1594 (emphasis added).

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This is by far not the only type of representation we see, however. MPs make Europeanized claims to representation in that they judge EU measures based on the effects they have on their national constituencies and citizens in other member states/European citizens as a whole. The Lisbon treaty will ensure that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding within the EU. This is a very positive move as it will strengthen the protection rights for citizens of Ireland and other member states. Damien English, Fine Gael (FG), Lisbon Treaty debate, Ireland, 23 April 2008, Dáil Éireann Plenary Protocol Vol. 652, No. 3, p. 791 (emphasis added).

Here, MPs do not pit national interests against each other, but reconcile national and European interests in their speech-making behavior. MPs who Europeanize their representative focus very explicitly elaborate that their policy decisions in EU politics do not only depend on national concerns, but that they instead consider the grievances of other EU citizens as well. I quite frankly admit that this decision to agree to this rescue package is not easy, but we should briefly consider how the people in Greece are doing. There, too, are employees who have worked for many years, paid into the pension system and are now confronted with the fact that 20 per cent of the pensions are to be reduced. There are civil servants who have always remained in their country and who have been there for the people and are now being confronted with the idea that 30,000 to 40,000 jobs are to be cut (…). Michael Schickhofer, Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), Austria, EFSF Expansion, 30 September 2011, Plenary Protocol of the 120th Plenary Session of the Austrian Nationalrat, p. 70 (emphasis added, translated by the author).

Based on these considerations, the MP asserts that this decision “cannot be just about our own interests” (120th Plenary Session, p. 71, emphasis in original) and eventually concludes: “I stand by the Austrian interests, but we must also think in terms of Europe and the people of Greece” (120th Plenary Session, p. 72, emphasis added).

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In such Europeanized representative claims, MPs combine national representation with both transnational and supranational European representation: “the ratification of the treaty (…) is fundamental, not only for the 4.2 million people living in the country but also for the 500 million people living throughout the continent of Europe who are part of the EU 27 member states ” (Lucinda Creighton, Fine Gael, Lisbon Treaty debate, Ireland, 8 July 2009, Dáil Éireann Plenary Protocol Vol. 687 No. 4, p. 792, emphasis added). In fully European representative claims, MPs do not refer to a national constituency. They exclusively refer to citizens from other member states (transnational) or all Europeans (supranational): I reject the expansion and strengthening of the so-called EU- rescue mechanism. The law is bad news for the people in Europe. It is bad news for the employees in Greece. (…) It is bad news for the Greek retirees. (…) The employees in the public sector are now threatened by unemployment. And the people in Greece who rely on public service are the ones suffering from this unjust crisis management. (…) Inge Höger, Left Party, EFSF Expansion, Germany, 29 September 2011, Plenary Protocol of the 130th Plenary Session of the German Bundestag (17/130), 15240 C (emphasis added, translated by the author).

When we turn to the overall distribution of the representative focus, we see that quite a remarkable 34 per cent of the 2099 representative claims by 420 MPs are at minimum European(-ized), that is contain a reference to a national plus European object or a European object of representation only (DV1 ). Even for the fully European claims that exclusively refer to a European representative object without any national linkage (DV2 ), we still count 17 per cent of all representative claims coded. Put differently, approximately every third representative claim made by a national MP in the sample has a European representative dimension, be it together with a national representative object or alone. One in six representative claims exclusively refers to a European object of representation. Of the 34 per cent European(-ized) claims, 50 per cent are national plus European, and 50 per cent are purely European. Thus, Europeanization of national parliamentary representation is anchored in national representation, and fully transcends it in equal terms.

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The majority of representative claims remains purely national. This is not surprising because nationally elected MPs have a privileged representative relationship with their national electorate. They do, however, expand their representative portfolio to European citizens to quite a remarkable degree. They thereby remain nationally grounded, while at the same time inserting non-national citizens’ grievances into their domestic decision calculus on EU politics. This share of Europeanized claims-making is in line with indications from existing empirical research. For example, investigating representative pluralism in national parliamentary debate, de Wilde (2012) shows that national EU budget debates in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands feature representative references to other EU member states (9.4 per cent) and claims to supranational representation of the European Union (9.0 per cent). Kinski (2018) finds that 39 per cent of representative claims in parliamentary debates on the Eurozone crisis in three member states have a European dimension. This Europeanization is, however, by no means uniform. We see quite striking differences between countries (Fig. 4.1) and topics (Fig. 4.2). Germany has the largest share of European(-ized) claims with a remarkable half of the claims referring to a national plus European object of representation or a fully European object (DV1 ), and about a third of all representative claims even fully European (DV2 ). Austria and Ireland are rather similar with regard to their share of European(-ized) representation (38 per cent and 35 per cent respectively), while the former ranks higher on fully European claims (20 per cent and 13 per cent respectively). The UK is at the other side of the extreme with comparatively few European(-ized) claims. Still, even here, 18 per cent of claims are European(-ized), while 8 per cent are fully European. The chi-squared is significant at the 0.001 level and Cramer’s V of 0.22 for European(-ized) claims and 0.21 for European claims shows a moderate relationship between country and the two dependent variables. Turning to the Europeanization across topics (Fig. 4.2), we see that it is lowest in Lisbon Treaty debates (31 per cent European(-ized) and 13 per cent European representative claims). Debates on the Constitutional Treaty are most European(-ized) (41 per cent and 24 per cent respectively), while EFSF debates range in the middle (34 per cent and 19 per cent respectively).

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Fig. 4.1 European(-ized)/European focus of representation across countries (N = 2099)

Not controlling for any other factor, the differences between topics are significant at the 0.001 level for DV1 , but the association between topic and focus is weak.1 Interestingly, representative claims in creditor countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland pre-bailout) are much more Europeanized than in Ireland post-bailout and the UK as a non-Eurozone member. When we look at Ireland pre- and post-bailout specifically, we see a striking ‘effect’ of the country entering the bailout. In 2010, Irish Teachta Dála (TDs) were about as European(-ized) in their claims-making as their Austrian and German colleagues. Yet, when crisis hit, they started protecting their national constituencies and focused significantly less on other EU citizens becoming more like the UK with its limited amount of

1 We have to be a bit cautious given that there are no Irish TCE debates. The association becomes more pronounced, when we exclude Ireland from the sample.

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Fig. 4.2 European(-ized)/European focus of representation across topics (N = 2099)

Europeanization in claims-making. Austria and Germany remained consistently European(-ized) throughout the early crisis years of 2010 and 2011 (see also Kinski 2018). Finally, we can see a clear pattern across political parties in terms of their ideological position on the left–right scale (data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2006 and 2010; Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe et al. 2010). For both European(-ized) (DV1 ) and European (DV2 ) representative claims, on average, the more to the left of the political spectrum a party from any of the four countries, the more considerate of other EU citizens’ interests its MPs are in their parliamentary speeches on the EU treaty reforms and Eurozone crisis management under investigation (Fig. 4.3). Representative claims made by MPs from far-right parties are

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Fig. 4.3 European(-ized)/European focus of representation across parties (N = 2099)

significantly less likely to be European(-ized) or fully European than those made by their colleagues from the far-left.2 Europhile MPs from the Green and Social Democratic parties Europeanize a substantial amount of their representative claims, while, on average, their colleagues from center-right Europhile parties make less Europeanized claims. Three Eurosceptic parties on the far-left and the far-right are noteworthy. The German Left Party (prior to 2007 Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS) has the highest share of European(-ized) and European representative claims (disregarding the Irish Greens due to their small number of overall claims). What is even more surprising, the Austrian right-wing Eurosceptic parties, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), are quite European(-ized) as well. The effects of a party’s position on the left–right 2 There are relatively few cases for some of the parties especially on DV (e.g., the Irish 2 Green Party, the Irish Socialist Party [SP] and the Scottish National Party [SNP]) Thus, positions of these parties may be treated with caution.

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scale and its EU position will be investigated further in the multivariate analyses in Chapter 5. For now, three main findings stand out: First, we do in fact see quite a striking Europeanization of MPs’ representation in national parliamentary speech-making. They do not only mediate between national and European constituencies, but also make exclusive claims to European representation. They are anchored in national representative relationships and simultaneously transcend them. As nationally elected representatives, they do not automatically play national interests off against each other, but, under certain conditions, seem to take European(-ized) interests into account. Second, the degree of Europeanization differs across countries and topics. Germany and the UK are at opposing poles of that Europeanization spectrum among the countries in the sample. Debates on the Constitutional Treaty are especially Europeanized, while Eurozone crisis debates in Austria and Germany are much more Europeanized than Irish debates post-bailout. Finally, we see a left–right pattern in European(-ized) representative claims-making, but based on the descriptive analysis alone, we cannot yet say how it relates to a party’s position on European integration. What we can do, however, to substantiate these first descriptive findings on speech behavior is have a look at the interview data to see in how far MPs’ representative attitudes are European(-ized). If we recall, four types of representatives are distinguished: The two national types (N1— National Representative and N2—National Representative in a European Context) who share their exclusively national focus of representation and the two European(-ized) representatives. The latter are the Europeanized Representative (E1), who claims to speak for both national and European citizens, and the European Representative (E2), who only refers to European citizens. E1 and E2 together constitute DV1 [European(-ized) conceptual focus], DV2 is equal to E2 only [European conceptual focus]. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of the four types across countries among the 66 interviews. Again, three patterns are noteworthy. First, of all four countries in the sample, we only find all four types among Irish TDs. There were no fully European Representatives (DV2 ) in Austria, Germany or the UK. Irish MPs are not only the most heterogeneous in their representative role orientation in EU politics, they are also the most polarized with 50 per cent of interviewees having a national (N1 or N2) and 50 per cent a European(-ized) focus of representation

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Fig. 4.4 Conceptual focus of representation across countries (N = 66)

(DV1 ). The second insightful finding is that all British MPs in the sample have a national focus of representation in EU politics. 71 per cent of them do, however, have a European outlook when representing their national concerns (N2). Still, with 29 per cent, the share of purely National Representatives (N1) without consideration of the EU context is clearly highest as compared to the other three countries. Among the interviewees, we do not find a single British MP who sees him- or herself as (also) representing other EU citizens. British MPs entirely remain within the classic national mode of representation. Finally, for Austria and especially Germany, the picture is very different. Here, the majority of MPs (56 per cent and even 60 per cent respectively) actually feels they represent European citizens alongside their national population (DV1 ) in EU politics. The majority of MPs with a national representative focus are N2 (i.e., consider the EU environment), even though Austrian MPs are twice as likely to be N1 (19 per cent as compared to 10 per cent in Germany). Overall, the Europeanized Representative (E1) is the most prevalent single type. The share of DV1 (E1 and E2 combined) is at or even above 50 per cent for Germany, Austria and Ireland, and a striking zero per cent for British MPs. DV2 only exists in Irish MPs’ self-perception.

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While we cannot directly compare the two data sources (because of differences in sampling and unit of analysis), we see that both behavioral and conceptual patterns of representation point into the same direction. National MPs do not only speak about representing other EU citizens’ interests in parliament, but they also seem to hold deeper European(-ized) role orientations. Ranking the countries on a ‘Europeanization scale’ for both behavioral and conceptual patterns, the order from highest to lowest is Germany, Austria, Ireland and the UK. When we look at the distribution across parties in the four countries for the conceptual patterns, we also see traces of a left–right pattern emerging in Austria, Germany and Ireland. Generally speaking, the more to the right of the political spectrum a party, the more likely its MPs have a national focus of representation rather than a European(-ized) one. These observations are broadly in line with what the Representative Claims Analysis (RCA) revealed of MPs’ representative behavior in parliamentary speech. At the same time, there are fascinating nuances in the interview data that were impossible to uncover in the behavioral data. Interestingly, MPs view themselves more often as Europeanized representatives than they make Europeanized claims in their parliamentary speeches. Especially in Eurozone crisis debates post-bailout, Irish TDs are not particularly European in their representative claims-making, yet in the interviews, the only fully European Representatives come from Ireland. Finally, the RCA could not discriminate between N1 and N2, but the interviews bring out an interesting detail. Out of all national representatives in the sample, more than two-thirds actually have a European outlook (N2). They consider other EU governments’ positions even though they ultimately represent national concerns (see Chapter 6 for more qualitative details).

4.3 Style of Representation: How to Represent in EU Politics? As we have seen from the examples on the foci of representation in the previous section, MPs represent both common and particular interests in EU politics. “Lawmakers are likely to care (and perhaps ought to care) about the justice of a law for both the whole and the parts thereof, in some cases, more the one than the other” (Rehfeld 2016, p. 35). In a republican style of representation, MPs refer to the common good, be it national or European in focus:

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This House, this Parliament, which was elected by the Austrians, is kindly requested to assume its responsibility. (…) We will therefore assume this responsibility today – for the well-being of Austria, for the well-being of Austrians – together with the fact that it is about the future of Austria that we are ready to face. Josef Cap, Social Democratic Party of Austria, Lisbon Treaty debate, Austria, 9 April 2008, Plenary Protocol of the 55th Plenary Session of the Austrian Nationalrat , p. 85 (emphasis added, translated by the author).

Josef Cap clearly claims responsibility for the well-being of all Austrians. In this claim, he is a National Republican who does not speak for particular groups, but represents the general Austrian interest. MPs do not only represent this general interest by reference to citizens, people(s) and population(s), but also by claiming to speak for abstract interests: Our next principle objection to the treaty is that it damages the British national interest and weakens democracy by setting up a process of continuing integration beyond the control of the electorate. William Hague, Conservative Party, Lisbon Treaty debate, UK, 21 January 2008, House of Commons Plenary Protocol Vol. No. 470, part No. 34, Column 1261 (emphasis added).

Notably, these common good references are by no means exclusively national, but MPs act as European(-ized) Republicans, for instance speaking about the well-being of all European citizens: Almost a decade’s work at the Convention on the Future of Europe on the constitutional treaty and subsequently on the Lisbon treaty looked as if it could be lost. That would have been a catastrophic loss to Europe and to each of its almost 500 million citizens. (…) It was an issue that was going to affect the lives, the well-being and livelihood of hundreds of millions of fellow Europeans. Dick Roche, Fianna Fáil (FF), Lisbon Treaty debate, Ireland, 8 July 2009, Dáil Éireann Plenary Protocol Vol. 687 No. 4, p. 788 (emphasis added).

On the other side of the continuum, we have a pure pluralist style of representation, when MPs exclusively refer to particular social or functional groups in society. For example, during the Eurozone crisis debates, (far-)/left-wing MPs deplore the crisis ramifications on vulnerable groups in society.

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All the while the ordinary people of Greece, Ireland and Portugal are paying a very real human price as endless rounds of austerity push hundreds of thousands if not millions of families further into poverty and financial hardship. Pearse Doherty, Sinn Féin (SF), Ireland, EFSF debate, Ireland, 20 September 2011, Dáil Éireann Plenary Protocol Vol. 740 No. 3, p. 815 (emphasis added). But seriously, you [the government] do not really want to suggest that the security guard who stands at Mrs. Merkel’s door every morning lived beyond his means with his 1,200 Euro income a month. The same applies to the saleswoman in the bakery or the butcher shop that we go to, or at Schlecker, Lidl or Aldi. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), EFSF debate, Germany, 19 May 2010, Plenary Protocol of the 42nd Plenary Session of the German Bundestag (17/42), 4133 C (emphasis added, translated by the author).

In the EU context, MPs also frequently refer to groups such as farmers, rural communities or the taxpayers, for instance. Finally, there are Politico claims that include both common and particular interest representation. Such a mixed representative claim is the one by German Left Party MP, Inge Höger, cited above, in which she simultaneously speaks for “the people in Europe” (public interest) and “the employees in Greece” (particular interest). Overall, we coded 2221 representative claims (by 423 MPs) that refer to common and/or particular interests. This includes generic representative claims that speak about ‘citizens’ or ‘farmers,’ for example, without specifying their geographic scope as national or European. In the sample, a remarkable 64.9 per cent are republican claims, i.e., make pure common good references, 22.4 per cent are pluralist claims, i.e., refer to particular interests only, and 12.7 per cent of claims contain a reference to both common and specific interest (politico claims). Consequently, even 77.6 per cent of all representative claims contain a republican reference (pure republican plus mixed politico claims). Two out of three representative claims exclusively summon all members of a community, be it national, trans- or supranational. Of the more than three-quarters that are republican or politico claims, 84 per cent are purely republican in style.

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At the claims-level, we therefore see a clear tendency for MPs to claim to speak for the general interest of citizens, people(s) and ‘the collective’ rather than presenting themselves as champions of particular group interests in EU politics. This finding is in line with existing comparative research on the quality of parliamentary discourse on domestic issues that finds common good references to be more prevalent than particular interest ones (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004; Steiner et al. 2004). Again, we see notable differences between countries and topics at the claims-level. In the two majoritarian democracies with their more conflictual style of politics, Ireland and the UK, we see more particular interest representation than in Austria and Germany as examples of consensus democracies (Fig. 4.5, left graph, n = 1940; right graph, N = 2221). Yet, even British and Irish MPs with their strong constituency orientation are overall much more republican than pluralist in their representative claims-making. The chi-squared is significant at the 0.001 level and Cramer’s V of 0.13 shows a weak to moderate relationship between representative style and country.

Fig. 4.5 Behavioral styles of representation across countries (in per cent)

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Turning to the differences between topics (Fig. 4.6), we see a clear ranking with EFSF debates featuring the highest share of pluralist claims, followed by Lisbon Treaty debates and, at the other end of the extreme, the TCE with a stunning amount of republican representation. The observed differences are significant at the 0.001 level and, not considering any other influencing factor, Cramer’s V of 0.17 shows a moderate relationship between debate topic and style of representation. So far, there are two main results: First, MPs refer to both styles of representation, although there is a clear tendency to represent common interests rather than particular ones. Second, we see quite differentiated patterns across countries and topics, with consensus democracies leaning more toward the republican style of representation in EU affairs, and majoritarian democracies more toward the pluralist style. While the Constitutional Treaty discussion was almost exclusively framed in terms of the general interest, costs and benefits to specific groups as winners and losers of the crisis measures were more prevalent in Eurozone crisis debates. This is a first indication that (re-)distributive issues like the

Fig. 4.6 Behavioral styles of representation across topics (in per cent)

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EFSF seem to induce a pluralist style of representation, while institutional reforms generate republican representation (for similar results on domestic issues, see Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004; Steiner et al. 2004). When we aggregate the data to the MP-level, we observe that MPs clearly lean toward republican representation, but the majority tends to be Politicos in EU politics. Approximately every third MP in the sample exclusively refers to the general interest and does not at all represent particular groups. Only 7.1 per cent of MPs are pure Pluralists and only speak for particular groups in all their debate contributions. The remaining majority (59.8 per cent) range somewhere between pure Republicans and pure Pluralists, thus make both common good and particular interest claims in varying balances.3 We see both similar and different conceptual patterns in the interview data. 37.9 per cent of interviewees are Pluralists, only 15.2 are Republicans, while the vast majority of 46.9 per cent are Politicos. The share of Republicans and Pluralists has basically reversed. For one, this could be due to a certain “publicity” effect (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004, p. 18) of plenary debates that—as compared to ‘private’ interviews—induces MPs to adopt republican representative speech. Yet, we also observe interesting country patterns (Fig. 4.7). 100% 80%

7

6

9

9

60% 40% 20% 0%

2 5

4 AUT

3 8

8

GER Pluralist

IRL Republican

5

UK

Polico

Fig. 4.7 Conceptual styles of representation across countries (N = 66) 3 These patterns remain robust, when we only include MPs that make at least two and three claims in the sample.

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Fifty per cent of Irish MPs see themselves as pure Pluralists and only 12.5 per cent as pure Republicans. All British MPs are either pure Pluralists (35.7 per cent) or Politicos (64.3 per cent). To some extent, this is due to the strong constituency orientation in these two countries. German MPs are rather reluctant to identify as Republicans, while Austrians have rather diverse conceptual styles of representation. When we take the alternative Rawlsian common good definition, 37.9 per cent of all MPs understand themselves as representatives of the vulnerable or marginalized groups in society—be it alone or together with a utilitarian common good. Overall, when assessing their representative style in EU politics, MPs identify with both republican and pluralist orientations. While this is in line with their behavior, the dominant republican style in claimed representation is not present to the same extent in MPs’ attitudes. While this may to some degree be due to differences in sampling, it will be investigated further in the explanatory Chapter 6.

4.4 Focus and Style of Representation: Whom and How to Represent in EU Politics? The many qualitative examples in this chapter illustrate that national MPs do indeed mix and match different foci and styles of representation. Table 4.1 shows the relative distribution of our four ideal types at the claims-level—The National Republican, the European(-ized) Republican, the National Pluralist or the European(-ized) Pluralist.4 The National Republican is the most prevalent representative type with 45.7 per cent of the claims followed by European(-ized) Republican (28.1 per cent), National Pluralist (20.2 per cent) and European(-ized) Pluralist (5.9 per cent). In the plenary debates, MPs primarily represent the general national interest or the national citizenry as a whole. While this ‘classic’ type of representation is the one expected by the standard account of representation, it does not even cover half of the representative claims MPs make. The absolute majority of representative claims belongs to one of the other representative types. Almost three in ten representative claims are European(-ized)-republican and almost half of these claims have an exclusively European focus. One-fifth of

4 We exclude generic representative claims that do not specify a focus, and drop Politico claims as they contain both republican and pluralist references.

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Table 4.1 Behavioral patterns of representation (n = 1823) Focus European(-ized)

National

Style Public Interest (DV3) (Row %) (Col %) (Cell %) Particular Interests (DV4) (Row %) (Col %) (Cell %) Total (Row %) (Col %)

Total

(DV1)

(DV2)

834

513

249

1,347

(61.9) (69.4) (45.7)

(38.1) (82.6) (28.1)

(18.5) (78.1) (13.7)

(100.0) (73.9)

368

108

70

476

(77.3) (30.6) (20.2) 1,202 (65.9) (100.0)

(22.7) (17.4) (5.9) 621 (34.1) (100.0)

(14.7) (21.9) (3.8) 319 (17.5) (100.0)

(100.0) (26.1) 1,823 (100.0)

claims is national-pluralist, but national MPs only very marginally refer to European(-ized) specific interests, like farmers from other EU member states, for example. Table 4.2 ranks the four patterns by frequency across countries, and reveals some interesting nuances. First, Austria and Ireland show the same order as we saw in the overall dataset with national-republican Table 4.2 Behavioral patterns of representation across countries (in per cent) #

Austria

Germany

Ireland

UK

1.

National Republican (47.9) European(-ized) Republican (34.5) National Pluralist (12.6)

European(-ized) Republican (41.7) National Republican (37.3) National Pluralist (11.6)

National Republican (39.5) European(-ized) Republican (28.9) National Pluralist (25.4)

European(-ized) Pluralist (5.0)

European(-ized) Pluralist (9.4)

European(-ized) Pluralist (6.1)

National Republican (58.2) National Pluralist (24.0) European(-ized) Republican (13.5) European(-ized) Pluralist (4.3)

2.

3.

4.

European(-ized) is DV1 , deviations from the general pattern in bold

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claims dominating the debates, although more strongly so in the Austrian Nationalrat . National-pluralist claims are more common among Irish TDs than Austrian MPs. This may be due to the constituency orientation of Irish members of parliament and applies to the British case as well (24 per cent of claims are national-pluralist). Second, German and British MPs are special in that they do not follow the general pattern, but deviate in different directions (highlighted in bold). Notably, for MPs from Germany, European(-ized)-republican claims are the most common pattern of representation in EU affairs closely followed by national-republican ones. Put differently, more often than not German MPs speak about a European(-ized) general interest than they do about an exclusively national interest. For British members of the lower house, the picture is completely different. Their purely national representation comes both in the republican and pluralist guise and completely dominates national parliamentary debate. European(ized)-republican claims, the preferred variant in the other three countries, only come in third among UK parliamentarians. The European(-ized) Pluralist is a negligible pattern in all four parliaments. MPs do not tend to establish a representative relationship that goes beyond the national border and refers to specific societal groups. In TCE debates, MPs evoke a European or national plus European common good in a striking 37.4 per cent of all representative claims. In EFSF debates, MPs talk more about particular national constituencies that are (adversely) affected by the crisis. The amount of references to these particular groups from other member states or across the entire Table 4.3 Behavioral patterns of representation across topics (in per cent) #

TCE

LT

EFSF

1.

National Republican (48.3) European(-ized) Republican (37.4) National Pluralist (9.1)

National Republican (48.2) European(-ized) Republican (27.8) National Pluralist (20.0)

National Republican (40.1) National Pluralist (25.8)

European(-ized) Pluralist (5.3)

European(-ized) Pluralist (4.0)

2.

3.

4.

European(-ized) is DV1 , deviations from the general pattern in bold

European(-ized) Republican (24.4) European(-ized) Pluralist (9.7)

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EU (European(-ized) Pluralist) is also highest during the Eurozone crisis debates (Table 4.3). In sum, national MPs show remarkably diverse representative patterns in their speech-making behavior. What is more, they also show such diversity, when it comes to their representative attitudes (Table 4.4). Interviewed MPs are most likely to be National Politicos in an EU Context. This means they represent general and particular national interests, but have a European outlook in the advancement of these national concerns (15 MPs or 22.7 per cent). This group is quite closely followed by the Europeanized Politicos (10 MPs or 15.1 per cent) who take into consideration national and European concerns, be they of common or specific nature. The National Pluralists in an EU Context share the third rank with the Europeanized Republicans and the Europeanized Pluralists (8 MPs or 12.1 per cent respectively). Table 4.4 Conceptual patterns of representation in EU politics (N = 66) Style Republican (Public Interest) (Row %) (Col %) (Cell %) Pluralist (Particular Interest) (Row %) (Col %) (Cell %) Politico (mixed) (Row %) (Col %) (Cell %) Total (Row %) (Col %)

Focus Europeanized

European

Total

0

10

National

National (in EU)

0

2

8

(20.0) (8.0) (3.0)

(80.0) (30.8) (12.1)

6

8

8

3

25

(24.0) (50.0) (9.1) 6

(32.0) (32.0) (12.1) 15

(32.0) (30.8) (12.1) 10

(12.0) (100.0) (4.5) 0

(100.0) (37.8)

(19.4) (50.0) (9.1) 12 (18.2) (100.0)

(48.4) (60.0) (22.7) 25 (37.9) (100.0)

(32.3) (38.5) (15.1) 26 (39.4) (100.0)

Three most prevalent types in gray

(100.0) (15.2)

31 (100.0) (47.0)

3 (4.5)

66 (100.0)

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While the national focus of representation dominates MPs’ role conceptions in EU affairs (as it does their claims-making), it is a national focus that acknowledges the EU environment. When it appears, it is not in the guise of ‘the national interest’ only, but considers both specific and general national concerns at the same time. More strikingly, MPs tend to have quite mixed representative role orientations with the Europeanized focus (national plus EU) and the Politico (general and particular interest) being the most ‘popular’ representative patterns. MPs are quite the ‘chameleons’ of representation in EU politics. In practice, they transcend scholarly categories and establish multiple representative links simultaneously. Quite some ‘pure forms,’ the National and European Republican, for instance, do not exist among interviewed MPs. When we rank the conceptual patterns by country (Table 4.5), we see quite a bit of variation concerning the role orientations MPs hold across the four countries. First, Irish TDs have the most diverse conceptual portfolio: Of the 12 possible combinations, only three types do not exist among Irish parliamentarians. At the other end are British MPs who we can only classify into four of the 12 types empirically. Austria and Germany rank in between with four and five missing types, respectively. Second, MPs in Austria, Germany and Ireland are rather ‘spread’ along the focus and style continuum, whereas 50 per cent of British MPs see themselves as National Politicos in an EU Context when representing in EU affairs. Put differently, British MPs are less flexible in their representative role orientations than MPs from the other three countries. Finally, in Ireland the European Pluralist is in fact among the most prevalent types in the sample, while it does not exist in any of the other countries. We will analyze these patterns in greater depth in Chapter 6.

Europeanized Republican/Europeanized Politico (25.0) National Politico/National Pluralist in EU (12.5) National Pluralist/National Republican in EU/National Politico in EU/Europeanized Pluralist (6.3)

1.

5.

4.

3.

2.

Austria

National Pluralist/Europeanized Pluralist/Politico (12.5) National Politico/National Republican in EU/National Pluralist in EU/Europeanized Republican (6.3)

National Politico in EU/Europeanized Politico (20.0) Europeanized Republican (15.0)

National Pluralist in EU (10.0) National Pluralist/National Politico (5.0)

National Politico in EU/European Pluralist (18.8)

Ireland

Europeanized Pluralist (25.0)

Germany

Conceptual patterns of representation across countries (in per cent)

#

Table 4.5

National Pluralist/Politico (14.3)

National Pluralist in EU (21.4)

National Politico in EU (50.0)

UK

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139

Conclusions

Chapter 4 has provided a descriptive overview of the behavioral and conceptual patterns of representation among Austrian, British, German and Irish MPs in EU politics. It has considered both the focus and style of representation individually and their respective combinations into representative patterns. So, then, what do we know about whom and how national MPs represent in EU affairs so far? First, we do find diverse patterns of representation in EU politics that go very well beyond an MP’s standard role of a National Republican. The degree of Europeanization in MPs’ representation is striking for behavioral and conceptual patterns. MPs do not only talk about representing other than national citizens in Europe during their plenary speeches, but this also translates into deeper conceptions about their representative role in EU politics. Second, the behavioral and conceptual representation the study uncovers are not erratic, but follow distinct empirical patterns. For instance, German MPs are very inclined to Europeanize their representation, while their British colleagues are reluctant to do so across all data sources. When playing their representative roles in public speech behavior, MPs act as Republicans, whereas their role orientations point more toward a pluralist conception of representative democracy. Third, the empirical patterns are complementary in the sense that MPs combine different representative foci and styles. They do not have to forgo certain representative duties at the expense of others. In that sense, representation does not have to be a zero-sum game, but MPs can include multiple concerns in their representative portfolio. What is more, most MPs who have an exclusively national focus of representation do consider the European level as an important playing field to further their national concerns. Therefore, not even these MPs believe the nation-state is the ‘be-all and end-all,’ when fulfilling their representative tasks. Chapter 5 now explains the behavioral patterns. How can we explain differences in the focus and style of representation in parliamentary speeches in EU politics?

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References Bächtiger, A., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2004). The real world of deliberation: A comparative study of its favorable conditions in legislatures (EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/17). http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/ 2634/sps2004-17.pdf. Accessed 9 Apr 2020. Bakker, R., de Vries, C., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Marks, G., et al. (2015). Measuring party positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics, 21(1), 143–152. de Wilde, P. (2012). The plural representative space: How mass media and national parliaments stimulate pluralism through competition. In S. Kröger & D. Friedrich (Eds.), The challenge of democratic representation in the European Union (pp. 117–134). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hooghe, L., Bakker, R., Brigevich, A., de Vries, C., Edwards, E., Marks, G., et al. (2010). Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning. European Journal of Political Research, 49(5), 687–703. Kinski, L. (2018). Whom to represent? National parliamentary representation during the Eurozone crisis. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(3), 346– 368. Rehfeld, A. (2016). Beyond trustees and delegates. In M. Bühlmann & J. Fivaz (Eds.), Political Representation: Roles, representatives and the represented (pp. 29–47). Abingdon: Routledge. Steiner, A., Bächtiger, A., Spörndli, M., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2004). Deliberative politics in action: Analyzing parliamentary discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 5

Explaining MPs’ Representative Behavior in EU Politics

5.1

The Purpose of This Chapter

After the previous chapter has mapped whom and how members of parliament (MPs) represent in EU politics, the main aim of this chapter is to explain their representative claims-making behavior in parliamentary plenary debates. Under which conditions do national legislators engage in European(-ized) representative claims-making when talking about EU affairs? What makes them opt for republican, what for pluralist representative claims? To help us understand the drivers behind these representative foci and styles of parliamentary claims-making behavior, this chapter presents the quantitative regression analyses. Chapter 6 then turns to the explanation of MPs’ representative conceptions based on qualitative interview data. Chapter 4 has revealed a surprisingly high degree of European(-ized) representation in the plenary debates as well as considerable diversity in representative style. As puzzling as this may seem from the venture point of the standard account of democratic representation (Castiglione and

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_5

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Warren 2006), the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 enables us to deduce hypotheses on the institutional and party strategic factors that may explain these behavioral patterns. The next Sect. 5.2, first deduces determinants of the claimed representative focus and then turns to those most likely explaining MPs’ representative style. To understand what makes national MPs Europeanize their focus of representation, we consider ideological differences in terms of left–right and pro-anti EU party positions alongside government– opposition dynamics and MPs’ individual experiences with European governance. Whether MPs claim to represent particular groups (pluralist style) or a unitary common good (republican style), is thought to depend less on their ideological persuasion. Rather, the specific issue at hand and the position the MP has toward it are likely to be important as well as the type of party she is a member of (catch-all vs. issue-parties). ‘Where the MP sits’ (Miles 1978) is argued to matter when it comes to the government–opposition divide and committee membership. Since we only look at four countries and three debate topics (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [TCE], Lisbon Treaty [LT], European Financial Stability Facility [EFSF]) we are unable to systematically test explanatory factors at the country and debate level. What we can do in the result section, however, is discuss observable differences and link them to the types of democracy as well as patterns of interdependence and politicization. The chapter then goes on to operationalize the dependent and independent variables (Sect. 5.3) before presenting the regression results for representative focus (Sect. 5.4) and style (Sect. 5.5). As the chapter will show, institutional, party, individual and claim-level factors help us understand the Europeanization of representative focus and differences between a republican and pluralist style of representation in MPs’ claims-making behavior. Three noteworthy findings stand out. First, and contrary to what is hypothesized, we do not observe proEU mainstream parties as the drivers behind Europeanized representative claims-making behavior in parliamentary speech. Instead, Eurosceptic MPs from the far-left are the ones who are most inclusive of other EU citizens and their interests into domestic will-formation. In other words, pro-EU positions do not help us explain Europeanized representation, but we witness a Eurosceptic Europeanization of national parliamentary representation. This may seem counter-intuitive at first, yet MPs can very well be in favor of European integration, but argue for its benefits to

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national constituencies only. At the same time, MPs who are more critical toward the EU and its current state may voice their criticism in the name of other European citizens as well. It is plausible that far-left MPs drive such a Eurosceptic Europeanization because left-wing Euroscepticism usually comes in the guise of opposition toward the EU’s neoliberal policies (de Vries and Edwards 2009). In contrast, Eurosceptic MPs from the radical right tend to engage in national representation, something they share with Europhile MPs from conservative mainstream parties. The more to the right an MP’s party, the less her claims are Europeanized. This result is striking as it decouples Europeanized representation from support of the European integration project or the EU’s policies. This challenges an implicit assumption in EU studies: It is far from clear that those in favor of the EU are always the drivers of Europeanization processes (for a similar finding for international politics more broadly, see de Wilde 2020). Having many pro-EU parties in parliament is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for Europeanized representation, while a certain amount of left-wing Eurosceptic forces in parliament seems to be conducive to it. Second, when it comes to the style of representation, this study finds a clear divide between consensus and majoritarian democracies. MPs from the former claim to be Republicans rather than Pluralists, while MPs from the latter do the opposite. Third, the MPs’ style of representation in EU politics does not only depend on the type of democracy, but also on the issues at stake. When MPs talk about institutional issues, as was the case especially in Treaty debates, they tend to speak for all citizens, be they national or European. When they position themselves on specific policy measures that produce winners and losers, as was the case especially in Eurozone crisis debates, they represent specific groups rather than all citizens as a whole. The third observation is notable for two reasons. First, the mechanisms behind the style of representation with which MPs claim to represent in EU politics are similar to what we know from representative role research in the national context (Dudzinska ´ et al. 2014; Önnudóttir 2016). Second, they clearly have an issue-specific character that this national research has so far rather neglected (Andeweg 2012). Overall, party strategic factors are key to understanding whom MPs claim to represent in EU politics, while institutional factors explain how they do so. The chapter concludes (Sect. 5.6) by contextualizing the main

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empirical findings, and discusses their broader implications for EU studies and representation research at large.

5.2

Institutional and Party Strategic Factors

Which factors help us explain Europeanized claims-making? Recalling from Chapter 2, we have distinguished two mechanisms behind MPs’ Europeanized focus. (1) They may represent whom their voters or party want (national responsiveness) and/or (2) whom international interdependencies beyond the nation-state suggest (international responsibility). On the one hand, they claim to represent Europeanized constituencies, if their national electorate/the party selectorate want them to. The “wish for (re-)election seems to impel office holders to conform to role expectations that are articulated by the (s)electorates attached to the respective electoral office” (Best and Vogel 2012, p. 61f.). In that sense, they respond to and to some extent retrace developments that already exist at the principal level. Europeanized representation becomes a ‘principal-driven process.’ On the other hand, MPs may consider the concerns of foreign EU nationals and European citizens as part of their responsibility for the EU as an interdependent political system. Here, MPs act as externality managers and system maintainers, Europeanized representation becomes an ‘agent-driven process.’ Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the standard account of representation, then, national MPs have strategic and institutional incentives for Europeanized claims-making—both from a domestic vote-seeking (or electoral responsiveness) and an international policy-seeking (or nonelectoral responsibility) perspective. 5.2.1

Left–Right and EU Party Positions

From a domestic vote-seeking or electoral responsiveness perspective, left–right and EU party positions become decisive. So far, there has not been much empirical research into “the effects of party on parliamentary role perceptions and the style and focus of representation” (Gauja 2012, p. 121f.), not in a domestic representative context and let alone in a multi-level European one. First, this study expects Europeanized representative claims-making to depend on party positions on the left–right scale. This concerns both the

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economic and the societal/cultural dimension. While the former determines “left/right conflict over policy outputs (‘who gets what’)”, the latter refers to the “more combustible issue of the boundaries of the political community (‘who is one of us’)” (Hooghe and Marks 2009, p. 16; see also Van der Brug and Mughan 2007). Voters and parties that are more to the right of the societal/cultural dimension view the national community as the basis of rights and privileges, seeking to protect its interests (McDonald et al. 2007, p. 63f.; Zürn 2014). Conversely, parties more to the left “see less need to grant privilege for any reason, other than by virtue of one’s humanity” (McDonald et al. 2007, p. 64). They therefore favor a non-national conception of political community. With regard to the second dimension of a party’s left–right orientation, namely its stance on economic issues, the underlying question is whether and if so, by whom public goods should be (re-)distributed. Parties to the left favor more government involvement in the economy including an expansive welfare state than their colleagues from the right side of the political spectrum (McDonald et al. 2007, p. 64). For the focus of representation in EU politics, this means that voters of right-wing parties want their MPs to consider fellow nationals, while they are likely to be indifferent or even hostile to include fellow EU citizens. From research on welfare state chauvinism and transnational solidarity in the EU, we know that for nationally oriented voters solidarity stops at the national border (Kuhn et al. 2018, p. 1762; see also Mewes and Mau 2013; Van der Waal et al. 2013). Cosmopolitan voters, that is those more to the left on the societal dimension, are generally more aware of interdependencies across nations. Their solidarity extends beyond national borders (Kuhn et al. 2018, p. 1762). Consequently, they are likely to want their MPs to speak for other EU citizens as well. They consider them ‘worth representing’ because they are fellow citizens in an interdependent Europe, and not because of their nationality. There are some indications that political parties respond to these electoral incentives. For Eurozone crisis debates in national parliaments, for instance, Closa and Maatsch (2014) find that both conservative supporters and right-wing opponents of the EFSF justify their position with reference to national interests and benefits. Conversely, “‘antiausterians’” (p. 834) on the (far) left of the political spectrum assume their electorate is against the neoliberal austerity measures in the name of solidarity with other EU citizens. They therefore claim to represent

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these other EU citizens as well. “They believed that the EFSF would (…) impose draconian austerity measures that contradicted the basic understanding of solidarity among states and among people” (Closa and Maatsch 2014, p. 839). Hence, we can expect that the more to the right of the political spectrum (economic and societal/cultural left–right) an MP’s party, the less likely her representative claim is European(-ized). Hypothesis 1: A representative claim by an MP is less likely to be European(-ized), the more to the right of the political spectrum her party is. Second, a party’s position toward European integration is expected to influence the claimed representative focus. Europhile parties and their voters subscribe to the basic idea of an integrated European continent. Their support for European integration ranges from positive attitudes toward an integrated Single Market in purely economic terms to a deeper understanding of political integration based on pooled sovereignty at the supranational level. Oftentimes, but not necessarily, these economic and political elements go hand in hand (Kopecký and Mudde 2002, p. 301). Voters and parties with such pro-European positions maintain a systemic, institutional or “diffuse” polity support (Easton 1965, p. 124) “regardless of how European integration is defined and realized in detail” (Kopecký and Mudde 2002, p. 301). Additionally, research findings suggest that such supportive voters commonly also hold stronger European identities (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Wessels 2007). These voters disapprove of nationalism that stands in the way of cross-border cooperation. Regardless of whether they want integration to move toward a federalist vision of Europe or see it as a purely economic endeavor, they can be expected to support benefits of the project to reach beyond their national borders. For the focus of representation in EU politics, this means that these voters are likely to want their MPs also to represent the interests of fellow EU citizens. MPs from Europhile mainstream parties will therefore not claim to push through exclusively national interests. Instead, in an effort of electoral responsiveness, they are likely to take the interests of other EU citizens into account because they expect their supporters to want them to.

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Hypothesis 2: A representative claim by an MP is more likely to be European(-ized), the more supportive of European integration her party is.

5.2.2

Governing Responsibility and European Experience

A second set of hypotheses deals with institutional determinants of a Europeanized focus from an international policy-seeking or non-electoral responsibility perspective. The tension between responsibility and responsiveness is not equally acute for all national representatives. In the European multi-level context, those that have governing responsibility are particularly exposed to the pressures of interdependence compared to their counterparts in the opposition (Bardi et al. 2014, p. 243; Rose 2014, p. 263). “Legislators of a governing party cannot duck their responsibility for public policy as the opposition can” (Deschouwer et al. 2014, p. 14). The EU’s interconnected policy-making with cross-border externalities creates “new principals to whom governments must act responsibly (…) many of whom are not located within the domestic realm (…)” (Mair 2009, p. 14). This is especially true for treaty reforms and intergovernmental Eurozone crisis measures, the topics analyzed in this study. In these cases, Heads of State and Government are the ones who ultimately make the decisions that affect other than national EU citizens and governing majorities in national parliaments carry them through ratification. Hence, it can be argued that representatives with governing responsibility are particularly responsible for other than national EU citizens and EU system maintenance. In contrast, opposition MPs are generally less exposed to this tension between national responsiveness and trans- or supranational EU responsibility because their no-vote does not endanger system stability to the same extent (at least under majority governments). Hence, it is easier for them to ignore EU-wide implications and consequences on other EU citizens to some extent. Were the opposition parties to take on governing responsibilities after the next election, they would “become vulnerable to the same constraints of interdependence” (Rose 2014, p. 263) which would “entail a necessary change in their responsiveness appeal” (Bardi et al. 2014, p. 243). Hence, this study argues that representatives with governing responsibility—especially so members of government, but also MPs from the

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governing majority—are more exposed to interdependence. They therefore need to show themselves responsible for the externalities they produce on other EU citizens as well as for system maintenance more generally qua their decision-making position within the EU. As a result, their claims are more likely to include references to other EU citizens than those made by their colleagues from the opposition. Hypothesis 3: A representative claim is more likely to be European(ized), if it is made by an MP who has governing responsibility. Finally, at the individual legislator level, an MP’s prior and current experience with supra- and transnational governance in a European context can help us explain Europeanized claims-making. Experience with European governance is commonly used as a predictor for positive attitudes toward European integration in national and European legislators (e.g., Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Katz and Wessels 1999; Scully et al. 2012), in national government officials in the Council of the EU (e.g., Beyers 2005) or within the European Commission (e.g., Egeberg 1999; Hooghe 2005, 2012; Kassim et al. 2013). Most of these studies assume socialization through cross-border interactions to lead to transfers of loyalty to the EU level based on the theories of neofunctionalism and supranationalism (e.g., Haas 1958; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). This study also assumes that European experience positively affects MPs’ Europeanized representation. Within its rational-choice approach, however, it does not primarily assume MPs to Europeanize their claimsmaking because the exposure to the EU level has promoted “a sense of ‘we-ness’” in the “interest of a common, European good” (Beyers 2005, p. 899). Rather, these MPs are particularly exposed to and aware of existing interdependencies and externalities on other than national EU citizens. They are likely not only recognizing the need to co-operate to solve common cross-border problems for their own national citizens, but also more prone to evaluate the policy decisions and their consequences for other EU citizens as well. MPs who act within a transnational European context are more aware of the need for collective responsibility. They are therefore more likely to take the consequences on other EU citizens into account in their domestic EU decisions as well. There is no need to restrict European experience to EU institutions. In fact, it should also include other transnational European institutions, such as the Council of Europe because any exposure to European governance beyond the nation-state may shift an MP’s focus

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toward European responsibility. Thus, she considers not only internal (national), but also external (European) constituencies. Hypothesis 4: A representative claim is more likely to be European(-ized), if it is made by an MP who has (held) a position at the European level. In the following, we turn to possible determinants of an MP’s style of representation. According to this study’s theoretical framework, MPs can have a republican or a pluralist representative style that is they can claim to represent the general interest or particular ones. As we have seen, particular interests may include functional groups such as farmers, workers, and taxpayers, but also sub-territories such as voters, constituencies, or certain regions. MPs claim to be Republicans, whenever they refer to citizens, people, human beings or interests of a country/Europe in general. MPs can show responsibility for the whole or responsiveness toward certain parts. This distinction between common and particular interest representation is one of three elements underlying the original trustee-delegate style of representation (Wahlke et al. 1962). It refers to the aim of the policy decision, rather than the source of decision-making (mandateindependence) or their responsiveness to sanctions (Rehfeld 2016, p. 29). Because empirical representation research in the national context usually does not differentiate between the three elements, this study can only to a limited extent draw on existing research to formulate hypotheses on the factors that are expected to explain republican vs. pluralist claimsmaking behavior of national MPs in EU politics. Fortunately, we can additionally resort to literature on particular interest representation (e.g., Piattoni 2001a) and research on the quality of political debate dealing with general interest representation (e.g., Steenbergen et al. 2003; Steiner et al. 2004). At first glance, it seems intuitive to assume that, in public speeches, strategic MPs will always favor general interest claims over particular interest representation that may be linked to clientelism and patronage. As Piattoni (2001b, p. 193, references omitted) argues, however, this is a very one-sided way to see representation in modern democracies. Instead, voters may also demand particular interest representation. [In r]eal democracies, as opposed to idealized ones, (…) [t]he interests which are worthy of being represented and supported are not necessarily only those broad enough to claim to represent ‘the general interest’ of

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society (…). Citizens often do not ask from their representatives the elaboration and implementation of political programs for the improvement of the whole society, but rather quite specific policies for the improvement of their personal lot.

Against this background, we can distinguish hypotheses at the issue level from those at the party and institutional level. 5.2.3

Topic and Position in Claims-Making

According to Saward, “representatives sometimes claim as trustees, sometimes as delegates, and sometimes as something variable and in-between (‘politicos’). Sometimes they hint at two or three of these types in one speech, or claim” (2010, p. 72). The factors that make MPs refer to republican or pluralist representation may therefore be located at the claims-level. As Miller and Stokes (1963, p. 56) argued early on, MPs’ styles of representation may depend on the kind of issue they are talking about (see also Andeweg 1997, 2012, p. 81f.). This issue-dependence may translate to EU politics as well. Here, we can distinguish between representative claims referring to a polity issue and those made on a policy issue (Vowe 2008). In EU politics, we can expect MPs that make general statements on European (economic and monetary) integration and/or the institutional setup of the E(M)U, its democratic quality and division of competencies, to claim to represent the polis, or citizenry as a whole—be this community conceptualized as the national or European one. Conversely, when MPs refer to specific policy issues in their representative claims, we can expect them to speak for those particular groups who are affected by such policies. For example, an MP is likely to discuss policies that tackle the Eurozone crisis in the name of taxpayers or employees and socially disadvantaged groups. MPs are likely to emphasize the interests of farmers, when they debate changes to the Common Agricultural Policy. MPs may also be more likely to refer to (specific consequences for) certain regions and/or their constituencies, when they talk about the implications of concrete EU policy measures. Hypothesis 1a: MPs are more likely to claim to represent the common interest (republican style), when they make a statement about polity issues in EU affairs.

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Hypothesis 1b: MPs are more likely to claim to represent particular interests (pluralist style), when they make a statement about policy issues in EU affairs. Additionally, the position MPs take toward the topics may influence their representative style. Parliamentarians can either be in favor of a certain policy decision and its implications on their represented, ambivalent about it or downright against it. They can equally take a positive, negative, or ambivalent stance toward broader polity-related issues. Put differently, legislators can be supportive of, opposed to or conflicted about both policy and polity issues (Cohen and Noll 1991). When MPs are in favor of a certain policy or polity issue, we can expect them to stress its advantages for all citizens. This helps them broaden their electoral appeal. They stage themselves as being for political issues, which benefit everyone, that is further the common good. Put differently, when MPs want to ‘sell’ a certain policy or institutional arrangement as desirable, they can be expected to justify it with regard to the general interest it serves rather than unnecessarily ‘narrowing’ the positive implications to just a few selected groups. MPs who want to emphasize the positive outcome of their representative work have no incentive to be seen as ‘patrons’ working for the interest of a very specific clientele who neglect “economic and political externalities which may accumulate with devastating effects” (Piattoni 2001b, p. 205) on fellow citizens, be they national or European. Rather, they express their support of European integration or the EFSF, for example, in universalistic terms. Hence, they speak for the interest of the Germans, the Greeks or all Eurozone members. Conversely, MPs are likely to act as guardians of particular groups who are harmed by a certain policy or whose rights are compromised by a certain institutional setup. Hence, an MP who is opposed to a certain issue will most likely rather claim to represent the particular groups that suffer rather than trying to make the case that the respective issue goes to the detriment of all citizens. Hypothesis 2a: MPs are more likely to claim to represent the common interest (republican style), when they make a positive statement about EU affairs. Hypothesis 2b: MPs are more likely to claim to represent particular interests (pluralist style), when they make a negative statement about EU affairs.

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5.2.4

Committee Membership and Governing Responsibility

Additionally, an MP’s committee membership is expected to matter for the styles of representation she expresses. More precisely, members of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) and Foreign Affairs Committees (FAC) are expected to be more likely to represent the general interest than members of other committees. Conversely, they are less likely to speak as representatives of particular interests. The causal mechanism behind this expectation is that members of EACs are generally also more involved in the polity aspects of European integration compared to members of other committees. The EAC in the German Bundestag , for example, takes “a leading role” when it comes to “changes to EU primary law, the accession of new member states, the use of simplified treaty revision procedures or infringements of the subsidiarity principle” (Höing 2015, p. 195, similarly for Ireland: Barrett 2015, p. 295). For Austria, Miklin (2015, p. 392) adds “[i]n fact, the Main Committee (…) has kept only those issues dealt with by the European Council and the Eurozone summits within its own competence, and it has delegated all ‘day-to-day’ decision-making in the Council of Ministers to the sub-committee”. Even in the case of the UK, where the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) is at the heart of the process of examining EU documents, those issues that the ESC recommends for debate on the Floor of the House are usually the more important overarching questions (Huff and Smith 2015, p. 315f.). Thereby, we can assume members of the EACs to be more aware of the ‘bigger picture’ and therefore more inclined to speak for the political community’s general welfare in universalistic terms. Additionally, we witness a trend toward “‘mainstreaming’ EU affairs scrutiny” in national parliaments (Gattermann et al. 2016, p. 89), that—among other things—includes the growing involvement of sectoral committees and non-EU specialists in the scrutiny process of day-to-day secondary law matters. These developments may even more so stress the role of EAC members for the general questions of European integration. Furthermore, members of the EACs commonly have a distinct European portfolio. This does not necessarily mean that they are all Europhile, but rather that they are, like their colleagues in other committees, experts for their specific policy area, namely EU affairs (Hubé and Verzichelli 2012; for a general overview of the role of parliamentary committees in Western democracies see Mattson and Strøm 1995). EAC members are therefore

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less likely to speak for specific group interests than their colleagues on the Agriculture Committee, for example, whose area of expertise is farming. Foreign policy is commonly associated with classic diplomacy between nation-states. What is more, this is usually linked to a more unitary and consensus style of decision-making with “politics stopping at the water’s edge” (Raunio and Wagner 2017, p. 3).1 Members of Foreign Affairs Committees are therefore expected to be more likely to claim to speak for the general interest of nation-states, be it their own, another EU member state, or a wider EU interest. Members of specialized sectoral committees, be it on economic, social or agricultural affairs, are more likely to speak for specific groups that are affected by certain EU policy measures, for example. Hypothesis 3a: MPs are more likely to claim to represent the common interest (republican style), when they are members of the country’s European and/or Foreign Affairs Committee. Hypothesis 3b: MPs are less likely to claim to represent particular interests (pluralist style), when they are members of the country’s European and/or Foreign Affairs Committee. Moreover, we expect a positive relationship between an MP’s governing responsibility and her representation of the general interest, while opposition MPs may be more prone to speak for particular groups. Looking at national election candidates, Önnudóttir (2016, p. 735) finds a party’s governing experience and its willingness to seek governing responsibility to exert a positive influence on the proportion of trustees within this party. Specifically, she argues that “[p]arties who are frequently represented in government where they have to implement collectively binding decisions might be more used to justifying their decisions as being for the greater good” (Önnudóttir 2016, p. 735). As they seek governing responsibility, election candidates from such parties claim a republican style signaling decision-making competence not just to their own clientele. The present study makes a similar argument for national MPs’ representative claims-making in EU politics. Heads of State and Government define the broad political guidelines in the European Council. Ministers 1 Raunio and Wagner (2017) and Wagner et al. (2017) highlight that consensus is important, but so is party political contestation.

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decide in the Council of the European Union. Thus, we can expect these actors to justify their actions in the name of the greater good. They have an incentive to stay in government, and therefore appear responsible for the decisions that benefit all citizens and not just cater to specific groups. The same argument can be made for the majority supporting those government actors in parliament. Regarding European treaties and intergovernmental Eurozone crisis measures, these governing MPs ultimately ratify the agreements or justify them in a referendum. They have to mobilize broad electoral support beyond certain groups in order to uphold popular support. Opposition MPs on the contrary do not have immediate governing responsibility and do not have to claim to speak for the welfare of society as a whole. In fact, they may have the ‘luxury’ to show themselves responsive to particular interests as they are not ultimately responsible for making collectively binding decisions, and to a lesser extent for potentially divisive effects of particular interest representation. In contrast to governing party MPs, they may build their support precisely on the representation of specific groups. Hypothesis 4a: MPs are more likely to claim to represent the common interest (republican style), when they have governing responsibility. Hypothesis 4b: MPs are more likely to claim to represent particular interests (pluralist style), when they are in opposition.

5.2.5

Catch-All Parties vs. Single-Issue Parties

A final, strategic factor relates to the type of party an MP belongs to, more precisely the difference between catch-all and single-issue parties. Kirchheimer’s original thesis of the ‘catch-all people’s parties’ (Kirchheimer 1966; for an in-depth discussion, see Krouwel 2003) relates to a weaker link to social groups who used to constitute parties’ traditional electoral bases along clearly defined cleavages. In response to this and other developments, parties from center-left and center-right transformed to organizations whose “overriding (if not sole) purpose (…) is to maximize votes, win elections and govern. To do so, they seek to aggregate as wide a variety of social interests as possible” (Gunther and Diamond 2003, p. 185f.). To broaden their electoral appeal, these parties tend to have a more comprehensive, yet also more ambiguous policy program (Bräuninger and Giger 2018; Meguid 2005; see also Wolinetz 1991).

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Hence, MPs from these parties will not try to refer to as many particular interests as possible in their limited parliamentary speech, but rather claim to speak for an overarching common interest at the aggregate level that subsumes all these different social groups. Single-issue parties on the contrary, get their voting base precisely through focusing on a smaller set of particular issues and the respective groups who support these. Their electoral appeal hinges on claiming to represent their particular clientele. Even when these parties have de facto broadened their policy portfolio over time, they continue to be seen as single-issue parties by their supporters (Meguid 2005, p. 348). As Best and Vogel (2012, p. 50f.) describe, it is therefore reasonable to expect single-issue parties to claim to represent their supporting groups, while catch-all parties aim at representing as many people as possible: In particular, parties with a sharp ideological profile and/or a clearly demarcated electorate – typically one-issue parties—are expected to represent foremost the interests of their supporting social or political groups. In contrast, catch-all parties tend to represent a rather fuzzy profile to their heterogeneous electorates in order to address the interests of as many voters as possible.

We argue this logic to spill over to EU politics. When talking about EU affairs, MPs from catch-all parties chose their ‘representative advantage’ over non-elected representative competitors and will tend to use a republican style of representation, MPs from single-issue parties will opt for a pluralist style. Hypothesis 5a: MPs are more likely to claim to represent the common interest (republican style), when they are from catch-all parties. Hypothesis 5b: MPs are more likely to claim to represent particular interests (pluralist style), when they are from single-issue parties.

5.3 5.3.1

Operationalization Dependent Variables

Focus of Representation: Two binary dependent variables are used to measure the European(-ized) focus of representation (Chapter 3). The first dependent variable (DV1 ) is a binary variable coded 1, if a representative claim refers to a ‘national plus European’ or ‘European only’ object

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of representation. Europeanized representation already starts the moment a claim transcends purely national representation. The second dependent variable (DV2 ) measures the exclusively European focus of representation as a binary variable coded 1, if a representative claim only refers to a European object of representation without reference to national citizens. Here, the representative claim establishes a purely European representative relationship lacking national anchorage. Style of Representation: Two reverse binary dependent variables are created (Chapter 3). A republican style (DV3 ) is coded 1, when a representative claim exclusively refers to the general interest, a pluralist style (DV4 ) is coded 1, when a claim exclusively refers to particular interests. Claims that refer to both common and specific interest were coded as 1 for politico style and 0 for both republican and pluralist style. 5.3.2

Independent Variables

Regression of Focus of Representation Governing Responsibility I refers to representatives with a government position (Minister or Secretary of State), whereas Governing Responsibility II includes members of the governing majority.2 European Experience captures whether the representative has previously held or is currently holding a position within the EU (EP, Committee of the Regions, COSAC) or the wider transnational European governance structure (Council of Europe, OSCE) (see Appendix A 3.2 for complete list). The party level variables are from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2006 and 2010 respectively (Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe et al. 2010).3 For lack of data for some of the independent Irish Teachta Dála (TDs) in the sample, they were assigned the Socialist Party score as they have all previously been members (of a sub-group) thereof.4 To capture the different nuances in a party’s left–right position, the Left –Right Party Position is operationalized in three ways: the 2 Non-elected government members (one in Germany) excluded from the analysis. 3 Studies on the reliability and validity of Chapel Hill expert party placement show a

high correlation with other expert surveys (e.g., Whitefield et al. 2007) and alternative data sources such as the Manifesto Project (Bakker et al. 2015). 4 Results remain robust, when they are dropped and when they are assigned the more ‘conservative’ Labour party scores.

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overall ideological position of the party on a general left –right scale (0 extreme left to 10 extreme right) is taken as a starting point. To disentangle economic and societal/cultural left–right, we take the party’s position on economic issues (from 0 left, active government involvement to 10 right, low government market intervention) as well as its position on the Green/Alternative/LibertarianTraditional/Authoritarian/ National (GAL-TAN) divide (Hooghe and Marks 2009) (from 0 left, cosmopolitan to 10 right, communitarian). The different variables are added in turn. The EU integration position is measured as the party’s stance on EU integration (0 strongly opposed to 7 strongly in favor). To capture differences between countries and topics, Country and Topic Dummies are added, respectively. Gender (female), Age and Education (minimum Bachelor of Arts or equivalent) are added to control for possible effects on European(-ized) claims-making. Whether or not there has been or will be a National Election in the same year is included as an additional control variable. This is to control for the fact that looming national elections or just having been re-elected may lead to less European(-ized) claims-making. Finally, a party’s Vote Share in the last national elections in per cent is added to control for the size of the parties and potential differences between party types with regard to European(-ized) claims-making. Regression of Style of Representation Polity Topic: This variable is coded 1, if a claim exclusively refers to a polity topic, and 0, if it refers to a policy topic only or both a polity and policy topic. Policy Topic: This variable is coded 1, if a claim exclusively refers to a policy topic, and 0, if it refers to a polity topic only or both a polity and policy topic. Positive Position: This variable is coded 1, if a claim contains a positive position toward the Polity/Policy Topic, and 0, if it contains a negative or ambivalent one. Negative Position: This variable is coded 1, if a claim contains a negative position toward the Polity/Policy Topic, and 0, if it contains a positive or ambivalent one. EAC and FAC Membership: The variable is coded 1 for members of the EAC and/or FAC and 0 for all other committee members and members of the executive.

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Governing Responsibility: Governing Responsibility I is coded 1 for Executive actors; Governing Responsibility II is coded 1 for member of the Governing Majority. Catch-all vs. Single-issue Party: is measured in Vote Share (in per cent) at the previous election. Country and Topic Dummies are added to capture differences between the four countries and three topics under study. Control variables include Gender (female) and Age (in years). Table 5.1 summarizes the operationalization of the dependent, independent and control variables used in this chapter for the explanatory analyses of focus and style. Table 5.1 Overview of dependent, independent, and control variables Dependent variables

Description

European(-ized) Focus (DV1 )

1 if a representative claim has a European(-ized) representative focus (national + European or European only), 0 otherwise 1 if a representative claim has an exclusively European focus, 0 otherwise 1 if a representative claim exclusively refers to general interests, 0 otherwise 1 if a representative claim exclusively refers to particular interests, 0 otherwise

European Focus (DV2 ) Republican Style (DV3 ) Pluralist Style (DV4 ) Independent variables

Description

Governing Responsibility I (executive) Governing Responsibility II (Gov. Maj.) European Experience

1 if government actor, 0 otherwise

Left–right Party Position

1 if governing majority, 0 otherwise 1 if MP has or has previously had a European position, 0 otherwise Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2006 and 2010 on (1) overall ideological left-right party position/(2) economic position/(3) GAL-TAN position (0 extreme left to 10 extreme right)

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Independent variables

Description

EU Integration Position

Austria Germany Ireland UK (reference category) TCE (reference category) LT EFSF

Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2006 and 2010 on party position on EU integration (0 strongly opposed to 7 strongly in favor) 1 if exclusive polity topic, 0 otherwise (reverse) 1 if positive position towards topic, 0 otherwise (reverse) 1 if EAC or FAC member, 0 otherwise Vote share (in per cent) at previous national election 1 for Austrian MPs, 0 otherwise 1 for German MPs, 0 otherwise 1 for Irish MPs, 0 otherwise 1 for British MPs, 0 otherwise 1 TCE debates, 0 otherwise 1 Lisbon Treaty debates, 0 otherwise 1 EFSF debates, 0 otherwise

Control variables

Description

Gender (female) Education (min BA)

1 if female, 0 if male 1 if minimum BA or equivalent university degree, 0 otherwise Age in years 1 election that year, 0 otherwise Vote share (in per cent) at previous national election

Polity Position (Policy Position) Positive Position (Negative Position) EAC/FAC Membership Catch-all vs- Single-issue Parties

Age (in years) National Election Vote Share

The following section presents, discusses, and contextualizes the results of the multivariate regression analyses of the focus and style of representation in national MPs’ representative claims-making in EU affairs. It seeks to uncover the conditions under which MPs claim to Europeanize their representative focus. Section 5.5 then subsequently analyzes those factors that influence whether they do so as Republicans or Pluralists.

5.4

Behavioral Representative Focus Explained

Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables. 2036 claims made by 406 MPs are included in the analysis, as there is some missing data for some of the MPs on some of

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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

European(-ized) Focus European Focus

2099 2099

0.3373035 0.1653168

0.4729021 0.3715548

0 0

1 1

Governing Responsibility I Governing Responsibility II European Experience Left–right Party Position Economic Left–right Party Position GAL-TAN Party Position EU Integration Position Austria Germany Ireland UK EFSF Lisbon Treaty TCE

2099 2099 2099 2062 2062

0.1805622 0.5007146 0.224869 5.768147 5.54354

0.3847467 0.5001186 0.4175955 2.155878 2.1574

0 0 0 1.25 0.91

1 1 1 9.67 8.64

2062 2062 2099 2099 2099 2099 2099 2099 2099

5.668043 4.955461 0.2301096 0.1548356 0.3701763 0.2448785 0.319676 0.5454979 0.1348261

1.866108 1.743579 0.4210031 0.3618341 0.4829668 0.4301176 0.4664621 0.4980443 0.3416191

0.83 1.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

9.67 6.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Gender Education Age National Election Vote Share

2099 2099 2096 2099 2066

0.1434016 0.7846594 51.33826 0.2529776 27.06733

0.3505655 0.4111564 10.04499 0.4348218 12.34989

0 0 24 0 0.6

1 1 81 1 42.3

the independent variables. For a few, their age could not be determined and some party positions were unfortunately not included in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (on the British Democratic Unionist Party, DUP, or the independent MPs from Germany and Austria, for instance). We estimate multiple models with different model specifications. First, the full models including all countries and topics for both dependent variables, European(-ized) Focus (DV1 ) and European Focus (DV2 ), are discussed. One set of models is run with Governing Responsibility I (Models 1 and 2), the others (Models 3 and 4) with Governing Responsibility II . We cannot add both to the same model because all members of the executive are also members of the governing majority. In the first four models, we include the general left–right position. This is followed

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by analyses that test which kind of left–right position (economic vs. GAL-TAN) is important. In Table 5.3, we can see that Governing Responsibility I , i.e., whether a representative is a member of the executive, has a positive and significant impact on the chance of a claim being European(-ized), while there is no significant effect for the fully European focus. Governing Responsibility II , i.e., membership of the governing majority, does not have a significant effect on DV2 , when controlling for all other factors in the model. Being responsible for policy decisions does play a role for European(ized) claims-making, but only for members of the executive. Claims by members of the governing majority are not significantly more likely to be European(-ized). Currently holding or previously having held a European position is positive and significant in all models. Hence, when a representative has held and/or currently holds a European position, the chance of her claim being European(-ized) or even fully European is higher. The general left–right position has a highly significant negative impact in all models. Everything else being equal, the further to the right of the political spectrum a party, the lower the probability of its MPs’ representative claims to have a European(-ized) or fully European focus of representation. Interestingly, controlling for other factors, a party’s position on EU integration has no significant impact on either of the dependent variables. Even though it may sound like a paradox at first, there seems to be something like a Eurosceptic Europeanization in that representative claims can have a critical stance toward EU policy measures, but the claimants air their critique in the name of a European(-ized) representative object. The party-level factors will be examined more closely in the second set of models below. Turning to the country-level differences reveals that in Austria, Germany, and Ireland, the chance of a claim having a European(-ized) or fully European focus of representation is significantly higher than in the UK as the reference category. Finally, while claims in Lisbon Treaty debates are less likely to be European(-ized) and European than claims on the Constitutional Treaty, there is only a significant difference between EFSF and TCE debates for DV1 . The observed differences between topics and all other relationships with both dependent variables remain robust, if Ireland is excluded from the analysis because there is no data for Ireland during the Constitutional Treaty debates (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.1). Topic differences are therefore not driven by (the lack of) Irish claims. Linking these differences across countries and topics

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Table 5.3 Logistic regressions of European(-ized)/European focus (1) European(-ized) focus (DV1 ) Gov. Resp. I (Executive) Gov. Resp. II (Gov. Maj.) Eur. Experience Left–right Pos. EU Position Austria Germany Ireland EFSF Lisbon Treaty Gender (female) Education (min. BA) Age (in years) Nat. Election Vote Share

Observations Clusters (MP) AIC Log Likelihood Nagelkerke’s R2

(2) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

1.528*** (0.191)

(3) European focus (DV2 )

(4) European focus (DV2 )

1.133 (0.193)

1.409** (0.172) 0.802*** (0.0281) 1.001 (0.0483) 3.517*** (0.735) 3.939*** (0.852) 3.179*** (0.631) 0.668* (0.128) 0.544*** (0.0932) 0.956 (0.143) 0.956 (0.134) 1.000 (0.00491) 0.663** (0.0838) 1.013* (0.00674)

1.098 (0.166) 1.399** (0.169) 0.804*** (0.0284) 0.990 (0.0481) 3.690*** (0.793) 4.215*** (0.918) 3.508*** (0.684) 0.671* (0.134) 0.551*** (0.0969) 0.958 (0.138) 1.030 (0.143) 1.000 (0.00475) 0.653** (0.0862) 1.017* (0.00851)

1.626*** (0.237) 0.807*** (0.0321) 1.043 (0.0658) 2.801*** (0.693) 3.658*** (1.066) 1.936* (0.527) 0.715 (0.153) 0.586** (0.116) 0.938 (0.163) 0.900 (0.154) 1.007 (0.00703) 0.631** (0.104) 1.005 (0.00798)

1.178 (0.225) 1.624*** (0.236) 0.806*** (0.0318) 1.038 (0.0665) 2.758*** (0.695) 3.612*** (1.070) 1.993* (0.543) (0.153) 0.699 0.579** (0.114) 0.941 (0.163) 0.925 (0.154) 1.007 (0.00697) 0.618** (0.102) 1.002 (0.00976)

2036 406 2436.6 −1203.3 0.138

2036 406 2445.4 −1207.7 0.132

2036 406 1705.3 −837.7 0.131

2036 406 1704.9 −837.5 0.131

Odds ratios displayed, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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to the dynamics of interdependence and politicization, we see no clear pattern emerging, yet, given the limited number of countries/debate topics. We observe a clear dividing line between the UK as the least interdependent in the sample at the time, and the other countries that are more interconnected within the EU. Also it does not unequivocally have to be the case that the more politicized a debate, the less European(-ized) representative claims-making. Instead, this may depend on the kind rather than mere degree of politicization (salience, polarization, actor configuration) in each individual country discourse (de Wilde et al. 2016a). Future research is needed to disentangle this further. The MP-level control variables do not exert an independent influence. The national election dummy is significant across all models with claims being less likely to be European(-ized) and European, if made in an election year. Additionally, the higher the vote share of a party, the more likely claims by MPs are European(-ized), but there is no significant effect for DV2 . Regarding the prediction of DV1 , Model 1 displays the better goodness of fit measures when compared to Model 2. For the two model specifications predicting DV2 , the differences are less pronounced. The common regression diagnostics (i.e., tests for multicollinearity and model specification error) show no problems. The independent variables are uncorrelated and there are no signs of omitted variable bias or misspecification (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.2). If we estimate the original Models 1 and 3 without the vote share to reduce the number of missing cases (Irish independent TDs), the effect of the general left– right position indeed remains the same, while all other relationships also remain unchanged (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.3). What is the substantive effect of these significant relationships, however? When we look at Models 1 and 3 through the odds ratios of the significant binary predictors, we see that for executive actors the odds of their claim being European(-ized) are about 1.5 times higher than for an MP without a government position. A claim by an MP who has (had) European governance experience is 1.4 times as likely to be European(-ized) and 62.6 per cent more likely to be fully European. The odds of a representative claim by an Austrian, German or Irish MP to be European(-ized) are 3.5, 3.9, and 3.2 times higher, respectively, than those claims to representation made by their average British colleague. Representative claims are 2.8, 3.6, 1.9 times more likely to be fully European for Austrian, German, and Irish MPs, respectively, than

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for MPs speaking on the floor of the House of Commons. Representative claims made during EFSF debates are 33.2 per cent less likely to be European(-ized), while for those made during the Lisbon Treaty debates there is a 45.6 per cent (41.4 per cent) smaller chance to be European(-ized)/fully European. Put differently, a claim uttered during Lisbon Treaty debates is almost half as likely to have a European dimension than one spoken during the debates on the European Constitutional Treaty. Finally, having (had) a national election in the same year decreases the probability of a representative claim being European(-ized) by 33.7 per cent, of being European by 36.9 per cent. Average marginal effects plots for the significant binary predictors (Fig. 5.1) based on Models 1 and 3 indicate that, on average, having a government position increases the chance of a representative’s claim being European(-ized) by 8.9 percentage points. Having (had) European experience increases the probability of a representative’s claim being European(-ized) by 7.1 percentage points on average, while an election year decreases it by 8.1 percentage points. The average marginal effects of

Fig. 5.1 AME plots: binary predictors of European(-ized)/European focus

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the country dummies are larger and range from 23.4 to 27.7 percentage points. Claims during EFSF debates are 8.2 percentage points less likely to be European(-ized) than claims made during Constitutional Treaty debates. For claims made during Lisbon Treaty debates, Europeanization is 12.3 percentage points less likely compared to TCE debates. The marginal effects of the significant binary predictors on DV2 are overall similar, yet smaller in terms of their substantive effect on a claim’s propensity to exclusively refer to a European object of representation. Figure 5.2 shows the substantive effect of left–right party position on the predicted probability of a claim being European(-ized) or fully European. If an MP were to change her ideological position from radical left to radical right, the predicted probability of a claim being European(-ized) would decrease by 37.8 percentage points on average, that of a representative claim having an exclusively European focus by 24.2 percentage points.

Fig. 5.2 Predicted probability: left–right position on European(-ized)/ European focus

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Put differently, an MP’s ideological position on the general left–right scale has a stronger effect on their propensity to make claims that at minimum contain a European representative dimension than on those that are exclusively European. Interestingly, claims by a right-wing MP are less likely to be European(-ized) than they are to be European. Overall, both types of representative Europeanization, the European(ized) (DV1 ) and fully European focus (DV2 ), are driven by the same explanatory factors and likely to occur under similar conditions. Whether or not MPs’ representative claims have a European(-ized) or an exclusively European representative focus therefore crucially depends on their party’s position on the general left–right ideological scale (H1 confirmed) as well as their own trans- and supranational experience in Europe (H4 confirmed). While claims to represent by members of the executive are more likely (also) to refer to citizens from other EU countries or a European citizenry (DV1 ) (H3 partially confirmed), their party’s stance on EU integration does not have an impact on either of the two dependent variables (H2 not confirmed). Instead, Europeanization in representative claims-making seems largely driven by Eurosceptic parties from the left. While the findings will be put into the theoretical context at the end of this section, one non-finding actually stands out: a positive party stance toward European integration does in fact not lead to a Europeanization of national parliamentary representation. MPs that claim to represent other EU citizens do not need to do so in a pro-EU fashion. Europeanized national parliamentary representation does not mean pro-EU representation. Neither does it follow that MPs who claim to speak for their national citizens only do so with a Eurosceptic attitude. The results show that we cannot per se equate a positive attitude toward European integration with the representation of other EU citizens. Put differently, whether a party is for or against European integration does not tell us whom their MPs claim to represent in EU politics. In order to disentangle these dynamics a bit further, the following zooms into the left–right and the pro-anti EU dimension. We look at which groups of parties drive the observed Europeanization of national parliamentary representation. Previous research has repeatedly shown that there is an inverted u-curve, i.e., a strong link between extremism on both sides of the left–right scale and anti-EU positions (e.g., de Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe et al. 2002; McElroy and Benoit 2007).

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The question is, how this relates to the Europeanization of representative claims-making in general and the phenomenon of Eurosceptic Europeanization in particular. If there were no Eurosceptic Europeanization, we would see a nonlinearity in the relationship in that mainstream (pro) EU parties drive Europeanization, while extremism on either side hampers Europeanization, i.e., the link would be quadratic. We follow three approaches to test this for both dependent variables (Table 5.4). In Models 1 and 2, a squared left–right position is added along with the non-squared left–right position to test a possible inverted u-curve relationship. Models 3 and 4 introduce an interaction term between the general left–right position and the EU integration variable. Finally, in Models 5 and 6, the general left– right positioning is used to construct a categorical variable separating the parties into far-left (below 2.5 on Chapel Hill scale), center-left (below 5), center-right (below 7.5) and far-right (above 7.5) to see which group(s) precisely drive(s) Europeanization (reference category: far-right). Models 1 and 2 show that there is no quadratic relationship between a party’s left–right position and its MPs’ claims-making behavior while the effect of the general left–right position remains significant and all other effects unchanged. In addition, the Box-Tidwell model that tests for non-linear deviation in predictor variables (here: left–right position) is not significant. Hence, no transformation is suggested (Box and Tidwell 1962). Put differently, Europhile mainstream parties do not drive Europeanization of representation. As Models 3 and 4 demonstrate, when adding the interaction term between left–right and EU position, the general left–right position loses its explanatory power, but the interaction term between the two is also not significant. Categorizing the different parties then reveals that left and center-left parties drive European(-ized) claims-making behavior (DV1 , Model 5), while exclusively European representation (DV2 , Model 6) is driven by far-left parties only. Crucially, there seems to be a nuanced Eurosceptic Europeanization mostly driven by MPs from far-left, and center-left parties. Interestingly, the ‘more demanding’ full Europeanization comes from far-left MPs, while MPs from center-left parties do not significantly foster the exclusive representation of European citizens, but they do represent more than just national constituencies. So far, we have tested the effect of a party’s general left–right placement on the propensity of a claim being European(-ized) or fully European. As expected, we found a strong negative correlation. What

Germany

2.816*** (0.767) 3.231*** (0.806)

2.054* (0.618) 2.743** (0.882)

1.156 (0.105)

1.117 (0.192) 1.642*** (0.236) 0.498* (0.167) 1.049 (0.0345)

1.515*** (0.189) 1.415** (0.173) 0.567* (0.154) 1.035 (0.0278)

1.070 (0.0730)

(2) European focus (DV2 )

(1) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

1.091 (0.135) 0.985 (0.0185) 3.494*** (0.734) 4.104*** (0.876)

1.530*** (0.191) 1.419** (0.173) 0.851 (0.0747)

(3) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

1.136 (0.174) 0.984 (0.0227) 2.793*** (0.692) 3.841*** (1.103)

1.137 (0.192) 1.638*** (0.238) 0.860 (0.0907)

(4) European focus (DV2 )

A closer look at party-level predictors: the general left–right position

Left-right Pos. # EU Position Austria

EU Position

Center-Right

Center-Left

Gov. Resp. I (Executive) European Experience Left–right Position Left–right Position2 Far-Left

Table 5.4

2.686** (0.828) 4.125*** (1.288)

3.513** (1.541) 1.995 (1.107) 0.987 (0.558) 1.074 (0.102)

4.731*** (1.819) 3.795** (1.790) 1.809 (0.816) 0.953 (0.0682)

4.285*** (1.253) 5.185*** (1.270)

1.133 (0.200) 1.662*** (0.246)

(6) European focus (DV2 )

1.535*** (0.190) 1.411** (0.178)

(5) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

168 L. KINSKI

2036 406 2436.2 −1202.1 0.139

2036 406 1703.9 −836.0 0.133

1.401 (0.507) 0.740 (0.159) 0.599** (0.119) 0.901 (0.167) 0.900 (0.150) 1.007 (0.00701) 0.649** (0.104) 1.006 (0.00834)

2.527*** (0.704) 0.683* (0.131) 0.553*** (0.0947) 0.939 (0.143) 0.961 (0.131) 1.000 (0.00495) 0.672** (0.0838) 1.014* (0.00687)

Odds ratios displayed, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Observations Clusters (MPs) AIC Log Likelihood Nagelkerke’s R2

Vote Share

Nat. Election

Gender (female) Education (min. BA) Age (in years)

Lisbon

EFSF

Ireland

(2) European focus (DV2 )

(1) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

2036 406 2437.9 −1202.9 0.138

3.418*** (0.709) 0.680* (0.134) 0.550*** (0.0951) 0.958 (0.142) 0.952 (0.132) 1.000 (0.00490) 0.667** (0.0845) 1.015* (0.00704)

(3) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

2036 406 1706.8 −837.4 0.131

2.104* (0.612) 0.730 (0.158) 0.595** (0.118) 0.944 (0.163) 0.897 (0.153) 1.008 (0.00704) 0.630** (0.104) 1.006 (0.00791)

(4) European focus (DV2 )

2036 406 2442.2 −1204.1 0.137

3.673*** (0.925) 0.682 (0.136) 0.554*** (0.0964) 0.974 (0.145) 0.965 (0.136) 1.000 (0.00490) 0.670** (0.0842) 1.013 (0.00704)

(5) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

2036 406 1709.9 −838.0 0.130

1.872 (0.607) 0.770 (0.172) 0.614* (0.124) 0.945 (0.169) 0.916 (0.158) 1.008 (0.00714) 0.643** (0.105) 1.008 (0.00912)

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kind of left–right position are we talking about, however? Is it the societal/cultural dimension of ‘who belongs to us’ or the economic one of ‘who gets what’? Table 5.5 uses the original model specifications of Models 1 (DV1 ) and 3 (DV2 ) from Table 5.3, once with a party’s economic left–right and once with its GAL-TAN position. Everything else being equal, the further to the right of the political spectrum a party, the lower the probability of its MPs’ representative claims to have a European(-ized)/European focus of representation. This result remains robust, when we look at the economic and identity-based position separately. Both are significantly related to the Europeanization of representative claims-making. While generally speaking, the substantive effect of the coefficients cannot be compared directly across models in a logistic regression, we used the same specification except for the operationalization of the party’s left–right placement. The effect of a party’s placement on the cosmopolitan—communitarian divide is stronger than that of its economic position. Therefore, the questions of where the political community ends (national—European), and who eventually belongs to it, can better explain an MP’s choice of representative focus in EU affairs. In other words, the cosmopolitan attitude of a party drives Europeanization more than its stance on economic redistribution. This is seconded by the predicted effect of both variables on the probability of a representative claim being European(-ized): Were an MP to shift his stance from extreme left to extreme right on economic issues, the likelihood of his claims being European(-ized) would drop by 34.9 percentage points. The same MP turning from cosmopolitan to communitarian would result in a decreased likelihood by a remarkable 46.1 percentage points. A claim by an MP whose party favors openness of borders and a collective identity that goes beyond national borders is more than twice as likely to at least contain a European object of representation alongside a national one. For the fully European representative claims, the effect of the GAL-TAN position is also stronger than that of the party’s economic stance. Finally, to ensure that all of these results are not driven by any one country or debate topic, and as a further robustness check, each country/topic is dropped in turn, but results remain stable (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.4). In sum, party-ideological factors are driving Europeanization of representative claims-making behavior in national MPs. We find a European(ized) or European representative focus especially in parliamentarians from (far) left Eurosceptic parties and Europhile left-center parties, while ‘left’

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Table 5.5 A closer look at party-level predictors: economic and GAL-TAN position

Gov. Resp. I (Executive) Eur. Experience Econ. Left–right Position GAL-TAN Position EU Position Austria Germany Ireland EFSF Lisbon Gender (female) Education (min. BA) Age (in years) Nat. Election Vote Share

Observations Clusters (MPs) AIC Log Likelihood Nagelkerke’s R2

(1) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

(2) European focus (DV2 )

(3) European(-ized) focus (DV1 )

(4) European focus (DV2 )

1.551*** (0.201) 1.422** (0.174) 0.806*** (0.0270)

1.163 (0.204) 1.637*** (0.236) 0.806*** (0.0305)

1.481** (0.187) 1.461** (0.180)

1.071 (0.174) 1.687*** (0.250)

0.766*** (0.0406) 0.887 (0.0616) 4.244*** (1.168) 6.722*** (2.193) 3.267*** (1.025) 0.748 (0.163) 0.611* (0.128) 1.024 (0.178) 0.877 (0.149) 1.010 (0.00731) 0.608** (0.102) 1.020* (0.00977) 2036 406 1713.4 −841.7 0.124

1.080 (0.0479) 2.426*** (0.474) 3.303*** (0.705) 2.592*** (0.485) 0.701 (0.134) 0.554*** (0.0955) 0.972 (0.143) 0.982 (0.133) 0.999 (0.00495) 0.676** (0.0866) 1.010 (0.00646)

1.125 (0.0703) 2.000** (0.485) 3.086*** (0.872) 1.613 (0.424) 0.734 (0.154) 0.590** (0.116) 0.956 (0.163) 0.917 (0.157) 1.007 (0.00699) 0.643** (0.106) 1.001 (0.00776)

0.769*** (0.0350) 0.880* (0.0491) 5.049*** (1.249) 6.724*** (1.657) 4.926*** (1.145) 0.677* (0.131) 0.556*** (0.0987) 1.036 (0.160) 0.924 (0.127) 1.002 (0.00514) 0.649*** (0.0840) 1.026** (0.00860)

2036 406 2439.6 −1204.8 0.136

2036 406 1706.1 −838.0 0.130

2036 406 2453.4 −1211.7 0.127

Odds ratios displayed, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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refers more to the party’s stance on the cosmopolitan—communitarian than the economic re-distributive cleavage. Individual experience with European transnational governance also fosters European(-ized) claimsmaking. Having governing responsibility—be it as a minister or as part of the governing majority in parliament—has less of a consistent effect. Members of government are more prone to European(-ized) claimsmaking than the rest, but this does not unequivocally extend to MPs belonging to the governing party/parties.

5.5

Behavioral Representative Style Explained

2221 representative claims (517 in Austria, 376 in Germany, 790 in Ireland and 530 in the UK) by 423 MPs were coded. For the multivariate analysis, we estimated separate logistic regressions for DV3 Republican and DV4 Pluralist. The first set of models includes pure Republican (DV3 ), pure Pluralist (DV4 ) and the mixed Politico claims. The latter are coded 0 for both Pluralist and Republican style of representation. A second set of models estimates the same regressions for the purely Republican and Pluralist claims only, dropping all mixed Politico claims. That results in an n of 1940 representative claims by 408 MPs. Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables for all representative claims, Table 5.7 for the dataset containing the pure claims only. Again, binary logistic regressions at the claims-level with robust clustered standard errors with claimants as the clustering variable are used to estimate the likelihood of a claim being either a republican (public interest) or a pluralist claim (particular interest). Regressions are fitted separately for the two dependent variables to test the different sets of hypotheses for each representative style. Both ways to operationalize Governing Responsibility (executive/governing majority) are added in turn. Again, because the independent variable Vote Share contains a comparably large number of missing cases that would lead us to drop the Irish independent TDs from the sample, the regressions are also estimated without the variable Vote Share, but results remain stable (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.5). Looking at the full dataset in Table 5.8 (Models 1 to 4), we see that, based on the data, the hypotheses at the claims-level are supported (H1a– H2b). The odds of a claim being a republican claim are about 2.4 times higher, when the claim exclusively contains polity issues. They are 2.4

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Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics, all claims Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Republican Pluralist Politico

2221 2221 2221

0.6492571 0.2242233 0.1265196

0.4773101 0.4171637 0.3325089

0 0 0

1 1 1

Polity Topic Policy Topic Positive Position Negative Position EAC/FAC Membership Governing Responsibility I (Executive) Governing Responsibility II (Governing majority) Vote Share Austria Germany Ireland UK EFSF Lisbon Treaty TCE Gender Age

2221 2221 2221 2221 2221

0.518235 0.3435389 0.5231878 0.2516884 0.3322828

0.4997799 0.4749963 0.4995745 0.4340809 0.4711378

0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1

2221

0.1800991

0.3843565

0

1

2221

0.5074291

0.5000574

0

1

2187 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 2221 2218

26.98642 0.232778 0.1692931 0.3592976 0.2386312 0.3138226 0.5484016 0.1377758 0.1485817 51.21641

12.39062 0.4226971 0.3750951 0.4799026 0.4263428 0.4641497 0.4977638 0.3447421 0.3557558 10.07478

0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24

42.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 81

times more likely to be pluralist claims, when they exclusively refer to policy issues. While a positive attitude toward an issue in a claim increases its chance to be a republican claim, a negative attitude increases the chance of a claim purely referring to particular interests. Overall, the claims-level factors fare comparatively well in explaining an MP’s choice between common and particular interest representation. Surprisingly, the individual and party-level factors have less consistent effects. Only an MP’s membership in the EAC and/or FAC exhibits a consistently significant effect. As hypothesized, the odds of a claim being a republican claim increase, when MPs are members of these committees, while they decrease for pluralist claims (H3a-b supported). Both

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Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics, pure claims Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Republican Pluralist

1940 1940

0.743299 0.256701

0.4369256 0.4369256

0 0

1 1

Polity Topic Policy Topic Positive Position Negative Position EAC/FAC Membership Governing Responsibility I (Executive) Governing Responsibility II (Governing majority) Vote Share Austria Germany Ireland UK EFSF Lisbon Treaty TCE Gender Age

1940 1940 1940 1940 1940

0.5396907 0.3319588 0.5278351 0.2381443 0.3314433

0.4985507 0.4710377 0.4993533 0.4260577 0.4708534

0 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 1

1940

0.1819588

0.38591

0

1

1940

0.5108247

0.5000117

0

1

1908 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1937

27.13464 0.221134 0.1680412 0.3634021 0.2474227 0.3010309 0.5515464 0.1474227 0.1505155 51.23232

12.41135 0.4151176 0.3739993 0.4811032 0.4316257 0.4588244 0.4974641 0.3546182 0.3576681 10.091

0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24

42.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 81

measurements of Governing Responsibility and the party size do not have significant effects. To put it bluntly, what MPs talk about in their claims seems to matter for the styles of representation they choose in EU affairs rather than where they sit. Common and particular interest representation is indeed issue-driven (Andeweg 2012, p. 81f.). Additionally, there are interesting cross-country differences (Ireland as reference category with lowest level of republican/highest level of pluralist claims) and topic differences (EFSF with lowest level of republican and highest level of pluralist claims as reference category). We see claims by MPs from the consensus democracies, Austria and Germany, to have a consistently higher chance to be republican claims (ranging from 1.5 for Austria to 2 times more likely for Germany) and a consistently

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lower chance to be pluralist claims (ranging from 60 per cent less likely for Austria to 66 per cent decreased likelihood for Germany). There are no statistically significant differences between the UK and Ireland as the two majoritarian democracies with a constituency-based electoral connection as far as the propensity of a claim referring to common or particular interest is concerned. As has already been indicated by the descriptive analysis above, we observe claims made during Lisbon Treaty debates and even more so those uttered during debates on the Constitutional Treaty to have a lower chance to be pluralist claims, and a higher chance to be republican claims than claims stated in the course of the EFSF debates. Table 5.8 Logistic regressions of representative styles (full dataset)

Polity Topic

(1) Republican style (DV3 )

(2) Republican style (DV3 )

2.459*** (0.258)

2.431*** (0.254)

Policy Topic Positive Position

1.500** (0.185)

Austria Germany

1.395** (0.174) 1.381 (0.236)

(4) Pluralist style (DV4 )

2.457*** (0.299)

2.436*** (0.296)

1.723*** (0.230) 0.694* (0.104) 0.770 (0.136)

1.787*** (0.251) 0.749* (0.107)

1.521*** (0.187)

Negative Position Committee (EAC/FAC) Gov. Responsibility I (Executive) Gov. Responsibility II (Gov. Maj.) Vote Share

(3) Pluralist style (DV4 )

1.287* (0.153)

1.072 (0.156) 1.004 (0.00522) 1.538** (0.219) 2.026*** (0.373)

1.005 (0.00641) 1.516** (0.227) 1.988*** (0.369)

1.099 (0.184) 0.991 (0.00582) 0.396*** (0.0691) 0.337*** (0.0656)

0.986* (0.00657) 0.386*** (0.0695) 0.328*** (0.0635)

(continued)

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Table 5.8 (continued)

UK Lisbon TCE Gender (female) Age (in years) Constant

Observations Clusters (MP) AIC Log Likelihood Nagelkerke’s R2

(1) Republican style (DV3 )

(2) Republican style (DV3 )

(3) Pluralist style (DV4 )

(4) Pluralist style (DV4 )

1.286 (0.209) 1.302* (0.175) 2.322*** (0.487) 0.819 (0.107) 0.991 (0.00515) 0.720 (0.217)

1.230 (0.201) 1.315* (0.177) 2.302*** (0.488) 0.807 (0.102) 0.991 (0.00520) 0.731 (0.227)

0.853 (0.147) 0.697* (0.0978) 0.465*** (0.0925) 1.423* (0.202) 1.011 (0.00567) 0.270*** (0.104)

0.885 (0.150) 0.704* (0.0999) 0.482*** (0.0984) 1.454** (0.203) 1.011 (0.00568) 0.275*** (0.106)

2184 413 2648.8 −1311.4 0.124

2184 413 2653.5 −1313.7 0.121

2184 413 2136.6 −1055.3 0.137

2184 413 2138.6 −1056.3 0.136

Odds ratios displayed, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

When we fit the models again excluding the politico claims (Models 5 to 8 in Table 5.9), we see robust results. Overall, Models 5 and 7 display the better goodness of fit measures when compared to other specifications. There are again no specification errors or problems with multicollinearity (see Electronic Supplementary Material ESM 5.6). The average marginal effects plot (Fig. 5.3, left side) shows the substantive effects of the significant binary predictors (based on Model 5 from Table 5.9). On average, referring to a polity topic increases the probability of a representative’s claim being a republican claim by 16 percentage points, while a positive position increases it by 9 percentage points. The average marginal effect of an MP’s EAC/FAC membership is smaller (increase of the likelihood by 6 percentage points). An MP being female lowers the chance of a claim being in the name of common interests by 6 percentage points. The average marginal effects of the country dummies are larger and range from 13 to 16 percentage points. Claims

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Table 5.9 Logistic regressions of representative styles, w/o politico claims

Polity Topic

(5) Republican style (DV3 )

(6) Republican style (DV3 )

2.501*** (0.312)

2.478*** (0.308)

Policy Topic Positive Position

1.652*** (0.242)

Austria Germany UK Lisbon TCE Gender (female) Age (in years) Constant

Observations Clusters (MP)

1.462* (0.216)

(8) Pluralist style (DV4 )

2.719*** (0.344)

2.695*** (0.341)

2.016*** (0.274) 0.676* (0.105)

2.082*** (0.291) 0.732* (0.108)

1.702*** (0.254)

Negative Position Committee Membership (EAC/FAC) Governing Responsibility I (Executive) Governing Responsibility II (Gov. Maj.) Vote Share

(7) Pluralist style (DV4 )

1.343* (0.188)

1.366 (0.255)

0.759 (0.147) 0.975 (0.158)

1.061 (0.185)

1.008 (0.00612) 2.407*** (0.428) 2.971*** (0.621) 1.336 (0.254) 1.346 (0.215) 2.038*** (0.431) 0.709* (0.106) 0.991 (0.00582) 0.853 (0.309)

1.013 (0.00699) 2.450*** (0.451) 3.004*** (0.632) 1.285 (0.242) 1.337 (0.214) 1.980** (0.429) 0.693* (0.101) 0.991 (0.00591) 0.825 (0.303)

0.993 (0.00589) 0.430*** (0.0752) 0.334*** (0.0687) 0.774 (0.139) 0.668** (0.101) 0.420*** (0.0876) 1.407* (0.205) 1.011 (0.00591) 0.309** (0.122)

0.988 (0.00675) 0.420*** (0.0756) 0.328*** (0.0670) 0.805 (0.143) 0.673** (0.103) 0.432*** (0.0924) 1.439* (0.206) 1.011 (0.00597) 0.315** (0.124)

1905 398

1905 398

1905 398

1905 398

(continued)

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Table 5.9 (continued) AIC Log Likelihood Nagelkerke’s R2

1996.5 −985.3 0.142

1999.8 −986.9 0.140

1959.8 −966.9 0.167

1962.2 −968.1 0.166

Odds ratios displayed, standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

during the TCE debates are 11 percentage points more likely to be republican claims than claims made during EFSF debates. Average marginal effects plots for the significant binary predictors based on Model 7 (Fig. 5.3, right side) show a similar magnitude in terms of substantive effects of the predictor variables on the propensity of claims to be particular interest claims. Referring to a policy topic increases the probability of a representative’s claim being pluralist by 18 percentage points on average. Assuming a negative position in a claim increases this likelihood by 13 percentage points. Claims made by members of the EAC

Fig. 5.3 AME plots: binary predictors republican/pluralist style

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or FAC are 6 percentage points less likely to be pluralist than those made by members of other parliamentary committees. Country and topic effects are similar in magnitude to those for the republican style of representation, yet the relationship runs in the opposite direction. Representative claims by Austrian and German MPs are 13 and 15 percentage points less likely to be pluralist than claims made by their Irish colleagues. Claims made during Lisbon Treaty debates are 7 percentage points less likely to be pluralist than those made during EFSF debates. In sum, claims-level factors are driving the styles of representation national MPs use in their claims-making behavior in EU affairs. Whether MPs speak as Republicans or Pluralists crucially depends on what they talk about and how they talk about it. The kind of issue and an MP’s position toward that issue are decisive in explaining their claimed representative style. Surprisingly, party-level factors play less of a role in determining the style of representation, while the previous section has shown that they are the key to understanding MPs’ focus of representation in EU politics.

5.6

Conclusions

This chapter set out to explain national MPs’ behavioral patterns of representation in European Union affairs as observed in their parliamentary speech. The aim was to uncover the determinants of MPs’ focus and style of representation at the representative claims-level by formulating and systematically testing hypotheses at the claims, individual and party level, also taking into account possible institutional as well as country and topic effects. Based on the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, explanatory factors that were tested include strategic political (dis-)incentives as well as institutional opportunities and constraints. As one of the main empirical chapters in this book, it thereby provides answers to research questions RQ1.2 and RQ2.2. After having established whom and how MPs claim to represent in EU affairs in Chapter 4, this chapter explained why national MPs make claims to representation the way they do. Under which conditions do national MPs insert the grievances of European citizens into domestic parliamentary will-formation? What are the factors that foster such European(-ized) representation in national parliamentary debate? Why do they go beyond their classic role as national representatives? In addition to the analysis of the favorable conditions for a Europeanization of national MPs’ representative focus, this chapter also investigated the causes behind how MPs

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represent their representative objects, be they national or European(ized). What determines an MP’s choice between a republican and a pluralist style of representing these objects? When does she speak for the public interest, when does she refer to particular concerns in debates about EU politics? The multivariate regression analyses clearly and consistently show that whether or not an MP Europeanizes her representative claims, be they fully or partially European in focus, crucially depends on the party’s left– right placement. The more to the left an MP, her representative claims are significantly and substantially more likely to at least have a European dimension or even be fully European, when compared to her colleagues right of center. Notably, MPs from the far, rather than the center-left parties are the driving forces behind this. When taking a closer look at the kind of left –right position, the analysis paints an even more nuanced picture. Europeanization of representative claims-making is driven by MPs from parties on the left of the GAL-TAN scale rather than their position on economic redistribution. This means that members of the Austrian Green Party, for instance, with its decidedly cosmopolitan position, are more prone to claim to speak for foreign EU citizens than their colleagues from the far-right Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) with its clear communitarian stance. German Liberal Democrats are, however, also more likely to speak for other EU citizens due to their cosmopolitan position, while they are clearly right of center in economic terms. Related to this is the second noteworthy (non-)finding. In the regression analyses, we consistently do neither find an independent influence of the party’s pro-anti EU placement nor an interaction effect with the party’s left–right position. Claims made by MPs from Europhile parties are not significantly more likely to be European(-ized). A reason could be that there are Eurosceptic parties on both extremes of the left–right scale, of course. Indeed, we observe MPs from the far-left to foster a Eurosceptic Europeanization in national parliamentary debate. Europhile mainstream parties do not promote the Europeanization of national parliamentary representation as strongly. This has very interesting implications: Actually, having voices in parliament that are directed against the EU from the left, which tends to manifest itself in less fundamental opposition to EU integration as such and more as criticism of (neoliberal) EU policies (de Vries and Edwards 2009), may in fact foster a European focus of representation. Conversely,

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a broad Europhile consensus in parliament can also lead to surprisingly nationally focused MPs at least as far as whom they consider to represent. In their representative claims-making on EU topics, the former (also) focus on how the EU is bad for European constituencies, while the latter may as well speak about how it is good for national constituencies. So far, the label ‘Transnational and Pan-European Euroscepticism’ (see contributions in Leruth et al. 2017, pp. 369–424) has been applied to Eurosceptic actors connecting to each other across Europe. It seems that this phenomenon may also exist in national MPs with regard to whom they represent in EU politics. It is, however, not only the party position that matters for European(ized) and European representation, but an MP’s individual European experience also makes for a Europeanization of her representative focus. Representative claims made by MPs with experience of transnational interdependencies in a European context are more prone to consider transand pan-European constituencies as well. Even when party affiliation and differences across countries and topics are taken into account, this effect remains stable: Claims to representation by MPs with experiences such as a previous career in the European Parliament, for example, are more likely inclusive of European constituencies than those by MPs without such experience. The number of MPs in the sample with such dual career trajectories is, however, rather small and it would have been interesting to test whether a ‘weaker’ form of European experience would have already been sufficient to foster European(-ized) representation. Unfortunately, data was not available for the MPs under study, but Hubé and Verzichelli (2012), for example, define European experience of national MPs in terms of the frequency of their contacts with both EU and non-EU institutions and actors. We expected governing responsibility to be one of the key variables to help us make sense of the Europeanization of national parliamentary representation. It tied very nicely into the responsibility—responsiveness literature by Mair (2009) and others, yet its effects are not so consistent. Both the kind of governing responsibility and Europeanization we look at make a difference. In EU affairs, being a member of the governing majority in parliament does not entail ‘enough’ governing responsibility to trigger a European(-ized) or European focus of representation in parliamentary claims-making. While prime ministers and (junior) ministers are the representatives who make European(-ized) claims (DV1 ) in

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parliament, they are not more inclined to make fully European claims (DV2 ) than members of parliament without such governing office. The fact that MPs who belong to the governing majority do not make claims that are significantly more likely to be European(-ized) or European may to some extent be related to the topic selection of this study. The EU debates in the sample are instances of EU primary law/treaty changes or intergovernmental treaties in the case of the crisis mechanism. It may be the case that with regard to the day-to-day policies of the EU’s secondary law, ‘ordinary’ members of the governing majority who discuss the directives and regulations in the respective committees have more of a governing (or rather transposition) responsibility. They may therefore claim these measures to be in the interest of other EU citizens as well. We would need further research including debates on ordinary EU legislation to test this. Another noteworthy finding here is that representative claims by executive actors are not more likely to be exclusively European than those by the other MPs, but they are more likely to be European(-ized) that is at least contain a European representative reference alongside a national one. As representatives of the member states within the EU’s intergovernmental institutions, the (prime) ministers tend to retain their national representative anchorage and do not forgo their privileged representative relationship with their national constituencies when making representative claims in parliament. After all, they are not pure transor supranational representatives, but national representatives who have EU-wide responsibility in terms of externality management and system maintenance. Finally, the country and topic differences we observe are in line with what the theoretical framework had suggested and the case selection tried to vary. European(-ized) representation is certainly not equally common among all national parliamentarians. Among the four national parliaments under study, and everything else being equal, claims made during Austrian, German, and Irish debates are more prone to be European(-ized) or exclusively European than those made by British MPs, whereupon the difference between German and British MPs’ claimsmaking behavior is strongest also in substantive terms. Even before Brexit was imminent, British MPs were least inclined to leave their standard role as national representatives when making representative claims on EU affairs. German MPs, arguably especially responsible for system maintenance in the EU and very dependent on political and especially economic

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interconnectedness within the EU’s Single Market and Eurozone, are on the other side of the spectrum. With four cases, it is not immediately evident whether interdependence accounts for this variation. An alternative explanation could be the strength of national parliaments in EU affairs. Here, the expectation would be that the stronger a parliament’s institutional oversight and control rights vis-à-vis its government, the more likely parliamentarians are to Europeanize their representation as they can ‘afford’ to consider other citizens’ concerns. At face value, the patterns in the data fit with the Austrian Nationalrat and the German Bundestag as institutionally strong parliaments and the Irish Dáil and British House of Commons as comparably weak in EU affairs, although the former has expanded its oversight rights in June 2011 (Auel et al. 2015a, p. 78f.). The multivariate analyses also show that there are consistent differences in Europeanization across the different debates. While the TCE fostered European(-ized) claims-making in parliament, claims made during the debates on the EFSF and especially the Lisbon Treaty were consistently more national. Again, we cannot say for certain what it is exactly about these topics that triggers these representative patterns. As discussed, it might be the kind rather than the degree of politicization we see in each of the four country’s debates. Alternatively, one might also consider the degree of supra- and transnationalism envisaged in those treaties under discussion. The TCE was the archetype of increased political integration, a Constitution for Europe with state-like symbols. The Lisbon Treaty was similar in substance, but national in framing. As an intergovernmental treaty, the EFSF illustrated both, the high degree of trans-European interdependence and member states’ reluctance to give up their national autonomy. When we turn to the behavioral style of representation in EU affairs, the factors that help us make sense of an MP’s choice between republican and pluralist claims-making lie at the claims-level more than at the individual MP or party level. Indeed, the representative style tends to be very much issue-specific. As the multivariate analyses show, MPs speak for the interest of the entire community, be it the national or European one, when they speak about issues related to the E(M)U institutional design. Conversely, whenever they talk about concrete policy issues, they tend to speak for the particular constituencies that are affected by these decisions. When highlighting positive implications of the EU, they want to demonstrate that these are in the interest of all citizens and not just some

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privileged groups. When moaning the negative consequences of certain EU measures, they opt for particular interest representation instead. In EU politics, MPs seem to avoid publicly supporting something that only benefits a certain clientele, but claim to be guardians of such particular groups, when their interests are harmed. Quite surprisingly, among the other explanatory factors that were tested, only an MP’s committee membership makes a difference with regard to which style of representation she chooses in her claims-making, although the substantive effect this has is rather weak. MPs involved with ‘the big European picture’ in the EACs and FACs claim to represent the public rather than the particular interest. The governing position of an MP and her belonging to a catch-all or single-issue party does not help us predict whether her claims will be republican or pluralist. In EU affairs, governing actors are not more common good oriented and neither are MPs more concerned about specific interests when they come from single-issue parties. MPs with or without governing responsibility and from different types of parties make their decision on how to represent in EU affairs based on what they talk about and how they talk about it rather than one group being consistently more republican or pluralist than the other. For EU politics, we can confirm what Andeweg assumes for legislators’ representative style more generally. “In different situations, or with regard to different types of issues, (…) different role orientations become salient” (Andeweg 2012, p. 81). Again, there are substantial differences between countries, but this time the dividing line seems to run between majoritarian and consensus democracies. Crucially, the type of national democracy seems to drive the style of representation MPs choose in EU affairs. German and Austrian MPs have a more republican style, British and Irish MPs a more pluralist way to solve conflicts of interest in EU affairs. Again, we would need more country cases to see whether these differences are in fact due to the divide between majoritarian and consensus democracies and if so, which causal mechanisms are precisely underlying the patterns. One would also need to test the mediating effect of the electoral system in general and the strong constituency orientation in Ireland and the UK in particular. Finally, there is a difference between economic, (re-)distributive issues as mainly discussed during EFSF debates and topics related to the EU as a political project at stake during TCE and Lisbon Treaty debates. The former debates induce a more pluralist style of representative claimsmaking, the latter a republican one centered on the common interest (for

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similar results on type of policy and common good orientation in EU negotiations, see Elgström and Jönsson 2000). Thus, the topic does not only seem to matter at the level of the individual claim, but also at the debate level. Overall, national MPs have to make two choices when making representative claims in EU plenary debates: Whom do I claim to represent and how do I do so? We assumed that these choices are driven by an MP’s goal to be re-authorized as a representative in the future and to make good public policy for the constituencies she chooses to represent. She chooses to Europeanize her representative claims-making, if she thinks her voters and party appreciate her to do so, and if she is aware of and/or responsible for managing European interdependencies. It seems that the more her country is embedded within the multi-level system, the more her claims will consider other EU citizens and their needs. This Europeanization of representation is, however, not constant across EU debate topics, but varies with the issue at stake. Her second decision on the style of representation is driven by the kind of issue she talks about and the stance she takes toward this issue. Electorally speaking, it is more opportune for her to refer to the common good when she can claim credit for the big achievements of European integration and its institutional embodiment within the EU, while she will claim to be the guardian of certain groups that are vulnerable to the negative ramifications of certain EU policies. Further, where she sits, influences where she stands in representative terms, yet it is neither her seat on the governing bench, or her party affiliation, but the committee she belongs to. Which type of national democracy she is from seems to tell us a lot about her choice between public and particular interest representation in EU politics. Ultimately, however, representative claims-making behavior in parliament is symbolic and we can only consider the patterns a first, albeit very important step toward substantive representation. Through voicing their constituencies’ interests in parliamentary debate on EU politics, national MPs make them present in the domestic will-formation process. Knowing the reasons behind such representative speech behavior is essential, but tells us little about two other elements of substantive representation, namely the representatives’ role orientations, and in how far they promote policies for the groups they represent (Wängnerud 2009). This book does not do the latter, but the subsequent Chapter 6 does analyze MPs’

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underlying attitudes on whom and how to represent in EU affairs in the interview data.

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CHAPTER 6

Explaining MPs’ Representative Conception in EU Politics

6.1

The Purpose of This Chapter

This chapter examines members’ of national parliaments (MPs) conceptual patterns of representation based on the interview data. Tracing focus and style at the ideational level (i.e., what they think) (Sects. 6.2 and 6.3) enables us to understand nuances that would have remained undiscovered had the analysis solely focused on the behavioral level (i.e., on what they say). One of the chapter’s main purposes is to uncover the causal mechanisms behind both focus and style of representation by taking an in-depth look at lines of argumentation and MPs’ reflections in the interviews (Sect. 6.4). We relate these insights back to the quantitative analysis at the behavioral level, identify similar explanatory factors, but go much beyond that, too. Specifically, the analysis goes deeper to flesh out empirically MPs’ representative role orientations in the EU multi-level system. How do MPs justify their national representative focus, why do they feel they have a European(-ized) one? Why do some find it legitimate to champion particular interests in EU politics, while others feel obliged to act for a broader public interest? Thereby, the chapter uncovers a more finegrained reasoning based on MPs’ attitudes toward a European demos and public sphere as well as toward the finality of European integration. We show how their constitutional preferences vis-à-vis the EU and their © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_6

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general understanding of what it means to be a parliamentarian relate to their representative role orientations in EU politics. Overall, we conclude by tying the conceptual representative patterns to these bigger questions of a European identity and demos (Sect. 6.5). The subsequent quotes serve as empirical illustrations of the overall arguments. They flesh out the typology empirically and help validate the qualitative analysis (Corden and Sainsbury 2006). The quotes stand for a class of quotes and for a class of national MPs that share specific features of their representative role orientation. Specifically, we will use two types of quotes. Those that present MPs that are typical examples of their representative types and those that illustrate the empirical variance within each type. For readability reasons, the main text will only include reasonably short quotes. Quotes are anonymized, the interview information including country and party affiliation can be found in Appendix A 6.1.

6.2

Conceptual Representative Focus Explained

For the conceptual focus of representation, we differentiated four types along four categories (other governments’ positions, responsibility– responsiveness tension, consequences on other EU citizens, representative object, see also Sect. 3.3): National Representative (N1) (18.2 per cent, n = 12), National Representative in a European Context (N2) (37.9 per cent, n = 25), Europeanized Representative (E1) (39.4 per cent, n = 26), and European Representative (E2) (4.5 per cent, n = 3). N1s and N2s both exclusively represent national concerns. Both do not take into account the consequences of their decisions in EU affairs on other EU citizens [Commonality: Representative object and consequences on EU citizens]. While N1s do neither consider other governments’ positions nor feel a tension between national responsiveness and European responsibility, N2s typically do so on both dimensions [Difference: Other governments’ positions and tension]. E1s and E2s share their taking account of other governments’ positions and the consequences on EU citizens [Commonality: Other governments’ positions and consequences on EU citizens]. While the former (E1s) feel a trade-off between responsibility and responsiveness and typically represent European alongside national concerns, the latter (E2s) do not feel such a tension between national and European representative obligations because they understand their representative task to be fully European [Difference: Representative object and tension].

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The following proceeds in three steps: It starts from tracing the differences between the two kinds of national representatives (N1s /N2s). Then, their commonalities are illustrated and contrasted with the attitudes of Europeanized and European Representatives (E1s /E2s). Finally, we highlight the differences between E1s and E2s. 6.2.1

The National Representatives (in a European Context) (N1s and N2s)

Explaining Differences I: Other Governments’ Positions—National vs. European Context While N1s do not take into account other governments’ positions, N2s do consider this European context to advance their national constituencies’ interests. In justifying this, N1s use four core arguments that we can group into principled and procedural opposition to taking account of other governments’ positions. The former is more normative in that it refers to what a national MP should (not) do (desirability argument); the latter more ‘empirical’ in that it considers what an MP can(not) do (feasibility argument). The desirability argument/principled opposition takes two forms: MPs argue that it is simply not in their job description as a national legislator to take account of other governments’ positions and/or that doing so would be an undue interference with their own or other governments’ representative task in EU politics. In the former line of reasoning, they maintain that they should not be concerned with what other EU governments think when deciding on EU issues precisely because they are elected nationally. Oftentimes, they instantaneously understand ‘taking account of other governments’ positions’ as not being able to represent their national voters in a zero-sum logic of representation. For those tabling the interference argument ‘taking account of’ does not mean ‘consideration of,’ but illegitimately disputing the legitimate representative role of nationally elected officials. They argue that foreign governments should not interfere with their national concerns and vice versa. The task of a national MP (…) is to represent the electorates’ will and its interests, and it is precisely not to let other governments’ requests, wishes and desires interfere with those of ones’ own electorate – I64, Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Austria – National Representative (N1).

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I do not think it is within my remit, I am elected to the Irish parliament, it is not my job to dictate how Spain and Germany should run their countries – I7, Labour Party (LAB_IRL), Ireland – National Representative (N1).

Some N1s explain that when it comes down to actual policies rather than the more general abstract question, ‘taking account of’ always becomes an illegitimate influence that most national MPs would oppose. [I]f you put to them [national MPs] this kind of question “Should German MPs review Ireland’s budget before Irish TDs?” and they would not say to take them [other governments’/parliaments’ positions] into account – I4, Fine Gael (FG), Ireland – National Representative (N1).

According to these N1s, national MPs have a national representative role in EU politics that precludes them from informing themselves about the goals of other member states to reach an optimal outcome for their own national constituencies. In that view, representing one’s own national interests automatically prohibits including in that process the goals of other governments representing theirs. The second line of reasoning revolves around the feasibility rather than the desirability of taking other governments’ positions into account. According to this argument, the real world of EU politics hinders MPs to consider other governments’ positions rather than a principled aversion to doing so. Here, we again have two kinds of argumentation. The first builds on a reciprocity or retaliation logic. The MPs feel that other member states’ representatives do not take account of their concerns, thus they do not consider theirs, either. The decisions by other governments… no. Let me turn this around, I do not think the French, the Spanish or the Portuguese do that. When I make a decision that affects Germany [in an EU context], I cannot consider what Cyprus, Malta or one of the Baltic States may have to say. I can take note of this, but I attach much more importance to my voters’ opinion. (…) First and foremost, every state is responsible for itself – I34, Free Democratic Party (FDP), Germany – National Representative (N1).

While, here, the argument is ‘we do not’ because ‘others do not, either,’ the second argument brought forward is that ‘we do not’ because ‘others have already done so’ in a kind of two-level logic. Proponents of

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this view find that, at least when it comes to secondary law, other governments’ positions have already sufficiently been taken into account once national MPs deal with them. I think that, generally speaking, this is not our task. (…) In practice, it is not the case that the European Commission talks to us asking whether their idea may have negative consequences on Ireland or whoever. Rather, something comes down and we assume that this has already been negotiated with everyone. And then we look at the consequences this has on our own country. But to wrack ones’ brain about others… that is not really the case – I66, Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), Austria – National Representative (N1).

In a sense, these MPs are sympathetic to the idea that other governments’ views should be taken into account by someone, just not by them. Similarly, some MPs argue that it is the role of their national governments to consider other countries’ negotiation positions because they are bargaining at the EU level. In their view, the role of national MPs is to influence the government in formulating the national point of view in the first place. This is compatible with the classic, intergovernmental role for national parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs. So, I think the national parliament will have to be strong and vocal in setting out what is in the best interest of the Irish people, it is then for the respective minister to go to the EU level and listen to everybody. (…) If all of us here became just totally focused on everybody else’s concerns, who protects our national interests? – I11, Fianna Fáil (FF), Ireland – National Representative (N1).

These N1s—and very legitimately so—stress their national electoral connection and their privileged relationship with their national constituencies. For N1s, being a (good) national representative means also having a national horizon. In contrast, the National Representatives in a European Context (N2s) feel that considering the wider EU context including what other member states’ governments think is essential as it helps them advance their national voters’ concerns. N2s invoke three interrelated, yet distinct reasons for this: (1) a bargaining/negotiation view, (2) a system maintenance view, and (3) a ‘good-neighborliness ’ view. Proponents of the bargaining/negotiation view see the virtue of ‘taking account of other governments’ positions’ in knowing red lines and

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avenues for potential compromise in order to achieve what is in the national interest in an interdependent world. I indeed consider it [taking account of other governments’ positions] important simply because that way we can correctly estimate our own room to maneuver. We have to know where we have allies and where the people are that see things differently, and how we can accomplish as much as possible of our own interest – I25, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany – National Representative in a European Context (N2).

The system maintenance view goes beyond this purely strategic reasoning and incorporates some sense of responsibility for the wider EU system. N2s clearly have an intergovernmental understanding of EU decision-making, yet they also acknowledge that, for a multi-level system such as the EU to work, national MPs cannot blindly push through national concerns without considering the overall EU polity. But, when representing Austrian interests or evaluating if something is in the Austrian interest, I also have to consider the consequences my national position will have on the bigger entity, if I were to push it through 1:1. Then a compromise can also be in the Austrian interest because the functioning of the entire system and consensus are necessary and important – I54, Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), Austria – National Representative in a European Context (N2).

Finally, some N2s see taking into account the positions of other member states as ‘good neighborliness.’ That is, they do not only consider it to be strategically advantageous for them individually and the EU collectively, but also have a sense of this being the appropriate and reasonable form of behavior (Savage and Weale 2009, p. 75). That is good neighborliness. Imagine you are an agent and you are empowered by as it were your democratic institutions. That does not give you the right to boss anyone else around. And it does impose an obligation on you to consider how your actions impact others (…). So, it really affects your national interest if your national representation will try to find common ground with other entities. And it will respect their search of their national interest – I48, Conservative Party (CON), UK – National Representative in a European Context (N2).

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Crucially, while N1s, if at all, see the responsibility to take into account other governments’ positions with the national governments only, N2s extend this responsibility to legislators and parliamentary assemblies as well, yet they make a clear distinction between this incorporation and representation of the interests of other European countries. N2s, as much as N1s, do not represent other than national concerns. N2s’ representative role orientation is again firmly rooted in the belief that national MPs have to represent national interests exclusively, but that they do so within a wider European context. Explaining Differences II: Tension Between National Responsiveness and European Responsibility N1s do not feel a tension between national responsiveness and European responsibility because either they are not aware of any European responsibility in the first place or because they acknowledge the potential conflict, but always solve it toward national responsiveness. For the first group, having European responsibility is not at all part of their representative mindset. They again think in a zero-sum logic in which European responsibility means prioritizing ‘the EU interest’ over national concerns. I am very interested, when you speak to Austrian politicians do they say ‘Oh yes, we are very concerned about the entire EU’? (…) That is very interesting for me. To be honest, I haven’t even thought about these things before you have asked me. It had not even occurred to me that anyone would think that I should put the EU interest first. I am absolutely fascinated – I47, Conservative Party, UK – National Representative (N1).

The second group of N1s is not completely surprised by the notion of European responsibility, but believes it to be irreconcilable with national responsiveness under any condition. For them, national responsiveness always trumps European responsibility and therefore, they do not feel a tension. No. I do not see myself in this tension. (…) In the face of existing constraints because of the international legal order, the question can only be, in how far we can push through our own interests – I64, Freedom Party of Austria, Austria – National Representative (N1).

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In contrast, N2s do feel a tension and acknowledge that there are situations in which the best outcome for their voters clashes with a wider European interest. When their national vote-seeking incentives conflict with their European policy-seeking ones in such a way, they tend to abide by the former. Yes, there is a tension. I think all MPs wrestle with this and how they position themselves may well be determined by the nature of their engagement with their local electors because at the end of the day, we all have to survive – I37, Labour Party (LAB_UK), UK – National Representative in a European Context (N2). That is a very difficult question to answer because of course there is a European wider interest, which does not always encapsulate the national interest. You can find yourself in a position where the European interest demands one thing, but the British national interest demands another. But I would suggest that primarily for British parliamentarians whose highest calling is to represent the national interest that they should continue to do that. (…) For example, our parliament is (…) united in the determination to support the Euro area in its quest for greater integration leading toward greater stability and growth on the basis that that will be good for Britain without worrying too much whether it is good for them or Europe – I38, Labour Party, UK – National Representative in a European Context (N2).

Crucially, we again see clear differences between N1s and N2s. The former do not have an active sense of a tension between national responsiveness and European responsibility, or they neglect European responsibility because they view this to go against their duty as national representatives. The latter do see the potential for a tension because demands of their national constituencies may clash with the need for European responsibility. Both representative types, however, remain in the mindset of the classic national representative in EU politics, as the discussion of commonalities on the two other dimensions—consequences on other EU citizens and representative object—will now go to demonstrate. Explaining Commonalities I: Consequences on Other EU Citizens To recall, the difference between taking into account other governments ’ positions and considering consequences on other EU citizens, is that the former may still coincide with a national representative orientation, while

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in case of the latter, MPs Europeanize their representative role orientation. Here, N1s and N2s share the same representative pattern in that they, in contrast to E1s and E2s, do not take consequences on other EU citizens into consideration, when making decisions in EU politics. Not only the N1s who showed principled opposition to taking into account other governments’ positions, but also those N1s with a procedural view are now using principled arguments against the very idea of considering consequences on other EU citizens. According to them, nationally elected representatives should only consider consequences their decisions have on national citizens. They justify this view with the formal electoral chains of authorization and accountability. These views are consistent among N1s and show that they completely subscribe to the classic account of national representation in EU politics, and see an exclusive representative relationship with their national voters. No, not at all [consequences on other EU citizens]. I am elected for Germany and primarily for our citizens. (…) The main task, in my opinion, and that is the way it should be, is to represent the interests of the Germans, so our people, those that voted for me. (…) I am not elected for Greece, I am elected for Germany – I32, Free Democratic Party, Germany – National Representative (N1).

What is more, N1s explicitly assume their national citizens do not want them to represent other EU citizens. Hence, they have no vote-seeking incentives to do so: If I say that my overriding guidance is how the other people of Europe will be affected by a particular measure, then my constituents would be less than pleased. (…) Every country is selfish, right? – I11, Fianna Fáil , Ireland – National Representative (N1).

N2s tend to be a bit ‘milder’ in their neglect of consequences on other EU citizens. Now, they are the ones who maintain that these effects should ideally be taken into account by someone in the EU, most likely members of the European Parliament (MEPs), but do not see themselves responsible for doing so. Even though these N2s acknowledge interdependence and externalities within the EU system, they remain classic national representatives and do not consider other than national citizens for their decision-making.

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No [consequences on other EU citizens] because basically we are looking at our own citizens here. The EU should be good for all its citizens. It has to look at a bigger picture as well. (…) And we look at it from the point of view of national parliaments, (…) national parliaments should look after the things that reflect on their own citizens – I1, Fine Gael , Ireland – National Representative in a European Context (N2).

Both N1s and N2s ultimately do not tend to consider the consequences their decisions in EU affairs have on other EU citizens, albeit for very different reasons. N1s focus on why they should not consider them, while N2s emphasize that they should be considered, but by supranational institutions in the EU. Explaining Commonalities II: Focus of Representation in EU Affairs When asked directly whom they represent in EU politics, N1s and N2s clearly have an exclusively national focus of representation “because national parliaments reflect national attitudes, of course” (I66, BZÖ, Austria—National Representative (N1)). While both reason that this formal representative role is vital for the proper democratic functioning of the EU, they differ somewhat with regard to how ‘fiercely’ they formulate this national representative role, and, as we have seen, in terms of their consideration of the wider EU context. Crucially, N1s and N2s link their representative role orientation in EU politics to their constitutional preferences vis-à-vis the EU and their feelings toward a European demos and identity. N1s tend to see the EU as a confederation and explicitly not as a federal state. Especially N1s from right-wing populist parties relate their national focus of representation to the question of national sovereignty. The Austrian interest, absolutely. I would not understand a member of parliament who does not say ‘Austria first’. And this precisely is the core of my policies, the policies my party advocates with regard to the EU, a confederation of countries, not a federal state – I63, Freedom Party of Austria, Austria – National Representative (N1). The Austrian parliamentarian must, not should, but must exclusively represent the interests of his electorate, his constituency, his province and eventually also that of the entire Austrian Republic. (…) But what he [the Austrian MP] surely must not do, is to promote developments, to support

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and favor decisions that lead to a disempowerment of his voters and therefore to dismantling or at least retreat of democracy and to a transfer of power to institutions that are beyond the influence of the electorate. The starting point can never be the interest of the EU, its deepening, its growth or the like, but only the question in how far the Union and the transfer of competencies still makes sense in the interest of your own people – I64, Freedom Party of Austria, Austria – National Representative (N1).

N2s recognize their interdependence with the EU, but still see themselves as national representatives only. They argue more for a joint federation of countries that combines both intergovernmental and supranational elements. “In Europe, I represent the British national interest, but in common cause with others, I mean if you have a common issue like global warming, for instance” ( I39, Labour Party, UK – National Representative in a European Context (N2)). Notably, both N1s and N2s explain their national focus of representation with reference to the non-existence of a European demos and common European identity. They argue that because there is no such thing as a single European community, their national electorate would not want them to represent other EU citizens. They pose that as long as these prerequisites for European democracy do not exist, they see no need to represent anyone but their national citizens. As vote-seekers, they therefore have no incentive to represent any other citizens than their national citizens. For these MPs, the lack of a European identity is what makes European(-ized) representation by national MPs not only impossible, but also unnecessary. The EU is an International Organization which the UK belongs to because of the British national interest. (…) I think that one reason why the EU is so clearly not a country is that, if it were, we would simply not tolerate these impositions being put on our fellow citizens, but we do simply not think of them as our fellow citizens and that is why the Germans do not want to pay for the Greeks as they do not see themselves as being part of a common country, not really. (…) [I]t shows you that there is not this commonality of feeling – I47, Conservative Party, UK – National Representative (N1).

What is more, N1s and N2s suspect all other MPs to have a national representative understanding when it comes down to it.

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I am strategically better off, if the rest of Europe is well off. And if the rest of Europe is doing badly, then I am doing badly and especially so Germany. This is all in there, but this is all national interest – I26, Christian Democratic Union, Germany – National Representative in a European Context (N2). I do not know anyone [in the Austrian parliament] who advocates the expansion of fishing quotes at the Spanish coast because he believes the national fishers there to be endangered. This is simply not done – I66, Alliance of the Future of Austria, Austria – National Representative (N1).

Overall, both types of national representatives do not conceive of themselves as European(-ized) representatives, and what is more, they do not believe that their fellow national parliamentarians ‘truly’ have such a representative outlook, either. While we cannot know for certain, if their assessment is correct and all European(-ized) representation is eventually driven by a national interest, their assessment of their colleagues goes to show their own understanding of representation in EU politics. The following first compares the Europeanized Representatives (E1s) to the National Representatives in a European Context (N2s) to make clear where the representative role orientations of the two types coincide [other governments’ positions and tension], but especially where they diverge sharply [consequences on other EU citizens and representative object]. In a final step, the Europeanized Representatives (E1s) are compared and contrasted with the European Representatives (E2). 6.2.2

The Europeanized Representatives (E1s Compared to N2)

Explaining Commonalities: Other Governments’ Positions and Tension – N2s and E1s Both N2s and E1s unambiguously take account of other governments’ positions and highlight that this is a task for both governments and parliaments in EU politics. Most E1s deplore, however, that many of their colleagues do not ‘actually’ and systematically take into account these positions in a manner that they consider sufficient. They also argue that parliament would have to organize very differently for this systematic incorporation to happen on a larger scale.

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I think this is rather a wish that we try not to do EU politics in our own world, but to take into account how other countries discuss certain topics. (…) Although currently, I would of course say that it would be desirable, if the German Bundestag were to pay a bit more attention to what the wishes of the Greek government are – I29, Left Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1). What are the interests of the individual member states? And then we try to weigh that up. But it would probably overwhelm us in our workflows. We would have to organize ourselves completely differently, if we were to build such a level of communication with other parliamentarians – I21, Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

E1s also use a slightly different justification for taking other governments’ positions into account than their N2-colleagues. While we do again find the system maintenance and good neighborliness views, we do not find MPs who exclusively focus on the negotiation view. On the contrary, this ‘purely selfish’ bargaining view is more often than not substituted for an argumentation based on reasonableness. More than among N2s, among E1s, other governments’ positions are not considered to have a strategic bargaining advantage or to maximize ones’ national gain, but for the sake of reaching an agreement that fits for everyone. E1s simultaneously ask “whether the expectations that they have under an agreement are reasonable given the expectations of others under that agreement” (Savage and Weale 2009, p. 63). How do I get along with my neighbors? Is there a common hedge or is there a fence that one of us built? (…) Let’s say I cut his trees because the branches hang into my yard, I can formally do that, but maybe it is better for me to ask him whether this is ok. Then we have a different relation and maybe live together peacefully – I53, Austrian People’s Party, Austria – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Similar to their colleagues with a pure national focus of representation, some E1s immediately relate the reason for incorporating the views of other member states in their decision-making to their representative role as a national parliamentarian, but in a very different way: “Yes. So, of course, I always have to look at that [other governments’ positions]. I am not just a national parliamentarian, but I am, of course, also a European

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parliamentarian to some extent” (I21, Social Democratic Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1)). The second dimension N2s and E1s have in common is their view of the responsibility–responsiveness tension. Like their N2 peers, E1s see less of an antagonism in their daily work, but tend to locate the dilemma at the level of the voters. They argue that, as parliamentary representatives, they know that they have to frequently make decisions that may be “at odds” (Pitkin 1967, p. 209) with short-term national gains to the benefit of the long-term functioning of the European Union. These MPs are well aware that they may not do so “without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest” (Pitkin 1967, p. 209f.). The tension does not exist in economic reality or our reality as such, if you ask me, but the tension exists in terms of translating and explaining this to the voters, the sovereign who is entitled to receive an explanation – I35, Free Democratic Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

When reflecting about this tension, E1s immediately consider not only the consequences their decisions have on their national electorate, but also include European citizens in their calculus, which is one of the dimensions that clearly makes them different from the N2s: This is quite objectively a tension, because our taxpayers also want to know what is done with their money. (…) But then, of course, (…) to put it bluntly, the European thought cannot and must not mean the creation of equal injustice for all in Europe. Because this goes to the detriment of Europe, to the detriment of all the vulnerable people and their social standards – I30, Left Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Explaining Differences: Consequences on Other EU Citizens and Representative Object—N2s And E1s In contrast to N2s, all E1s consider consequences on other EU citizens and have a national and a European focus, but the balance between the two foci differs. Specifically, there are those E1s who are (1) national first and European second, those who are (2) equally national and European, and MPs who refer to themselves as (3) first European and national second. The second group is the most prevalent among the Europeanized Representatives. E1s that are national first and European second care about the consequences their decisions have on other EU citizens: “[W]e consider all

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of the consequences, including those on our neighboring citizens, I find that self-evident”—I31, Free Democratic Party, Germany—Europeanized Representative (E1). At the same time, they lean more toward national representation and highlight their privileged representative relationship with their national constituencies. They explain that this national orientation is legitimate and that it does not preclude them from additionally assuming a Europeanized representative role. For them, Europeanized representation means that European citizens matter in their work as representatives. They do not play national interests off against other national interests, but when forced to decide, their national citizens clearly have priority: [W]e observe that in Greece many people are doing very badly. We do not only have these people at the back of our minds (…), but in fact, they play an essential role. (…) But when push comes to shove, (…) then most colleagues - and I am sure all other parliamentarians from all other member states see this in the same way - would decide in the interest of their own country – I24, Christian Democratic Union, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

The second group of E2s see themselves as representatives of both national and European citizens in equal terms. We have to be accountable towards our people, but I equally look to the European peoples – I59, Green Party, Austria – Europeanized Representative (E1). So, I am equally concerned about the employee in Portugal who also wants to feed her family, who wants to have a decent life, as much as about the one in Ireland or ‘my own’ in Germany – I17, Social Democratic Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

While this group has a ‘national and European’ representative role orientation, the last group of E1s leans more toward representing other EU citizens than national ones. Commonly, however, this ‘more European’ role orientation is issue-specific. In policy areas with a very high degree of interdependence, these E1s tend to put European interests first and national ones second. “From a macroeconomic perspective, I think it is easiest to answer this question, then it is the interests of the European citizens, no doubt. Then the European clearly comes before the national”

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(I58, Green Party, Austria –Europeanized Representative (E1)). An Irish TD seconds this view in the case of free movement in the EU Single Market. The TD ends with a plea to put the overarching interest of all European citizens first. So, I had no direct interest and certainly in my constituency there was no particular clamor for the lifting of free movement and labor restrictions on foreign workers, but I believe that this was the right thing to do because I believe that all EU citizens are entitled to the same treatment, the same rights, the four freedoms and that should not be distinguishable between member states. So, that is just one example where I think I demonstrated that the overall EU interest, the overall interest of all EU citizens is the overarching and should be. The European Union will be doomed ultimately to failure if we do not look at the big picture and if we do not look at the overriding interests of the whole European Union and its people – I3, Fine Gael , Ireland – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Interestingly, they acknowledge their voters’ commonalities with citizens from similar (social and functional) backgrounds in other countries. In other words, they argue to be Europeanized ‘surrogate representatives’ that represent people based on a common cause and not so much because of their belonging to a nationally defined electorate (Mansbridge 2003). I am an urban person, I think I have more in common with someone from London or Warsaw, someone who lives in a city, who has similar attitudes as I have, than with someone who lives in a rural area – I56, Social Democratic Party, Austria – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Yet other E1s do explicitly refer to a common European identity or demos that makes them conceive of their relevant political community as a Europe-wide one. A fellow MP asked me ‘Will you vote ‘yes’ on Portugal [bailout during Eurozone crisis] again, what is all this good for? (…) Everything is going down the drain and I just hope we will be the last ones’. Then I tell him, who do you think, who is ‘we’? And he says ‘Well, we, Germany.’ Well, I think it is ‘We Europe’, that is the decisive difference. (…) For them, the community we belong to is the national community and not the community of Europeans. (…) So, I believe this is the real dividing line that is in the background for many – I36, Green Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

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Similar to the representative claim in the Austrian plenary debate by Robert Lugar (see Sect. 4.2), this MP again stresses an underlying cleavage between national and European(-ized) representation for the German parliament. The question of who belongs to the political community and whether this political community transcends national borders is decisive. E1s frequently use the image of a family rather than the neighborhood and include system maintenance arguments as well: I can see Europe as a neighborhood: different countries live along the street. Then you sometimes help your neighbor with the famous pound of sugar. (…) But if it is rather the picture that I have, and that is we are a big family because we share fundamental commonalities. (…) And that is why, yes, as a national MP the primary obligation is to represent national citizens, but always, as a member of a family, a family of common values, to see that family members are doing well, that the entire thing is sustained – I35, Free Democratic Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Overall, Europeanized Representatives (E1) are similar to National Representatives in a European Context (N2) in terms of taking account of other governments’ positions and the feeling of tension, albeit with different kinds of justifications. In contrast to both National Representatives (N1s and N2s), E1s consider consequences on other EU citizens and represent a national plus European representative object. The key difference between N1s and N2s on the one hand, and E1s and E2s on the other, is their representative role orientation. The former stay within the classic, national representative conception, while the latter broaden their representative portfolio to include other EU citizens. 6.2.3

The European Representative (E2 Compared to E1)

Finally, the difference, between E1s and E2 is ‘how far’ they go in their Europeanization. While E1s represent national concerns plus grievances of citizens from other member states and/or all European citizens, E2s even go as far as an entirely European focus without any specific national anchoring. European Representatives (E2s) are similar to E1s in their acknowledgement of other governments’ positions and consequences on EU citizens, but do not feel a tension between national responsiveness and European responsibility simply because they do not have a national, but an entirely European representative focus.

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There are only three E2s in the sample. All of them are Irish TDs, one from Fine Gael and two are far-left independent TDs. Depending on party affiliation, the way they argue for a fully European representative role orientation differs quite substantially. With regard to taking account of other governments’ positions, the center-right E2 justifies the regard for foreign member states’ positions by reference to system maintenance for the European project as well as potential externalities on individual member states. (I)f you are committed to the European project, how, then, can you be involved in a European-wide project, if you do not have regard for the views of the other governments in the European Union and have regard for their needs? (…) [K]nowing that not to do so would create serious problems not only for the European project, but for the individual member states as well – I2, Fine Gael , Ireland – European Representative (E2).

The two far-left E2s on the contrary do not argue with system responsibility, but immediately talk about their responsibility for the working people across Europe and beyond. They rather neglect responsibility for a system like the EU with its neo-liberal policies that, according to them, function to the detriment of the ordinary citizens, especially those socially disenfranchized and in need. Ultimately, they even assume an internationalist perspective. I do not know about a responsibility for the wider system, but I certainly have a keen interest in what is happening in the rest of Europe (…) what other European people are doing in the face of the EU policy. (…) I am internationalist and a socialist, so for me there is no real borders. I see the interests of working people, the unemployed, the young people as extending way beyond national boundaries. So, I am very interested in solidarity, not only across Europe, but across the world – I13, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2).

Crucially, these E2s clearly distinguish their fully European focus of representation from the national one of the N2s whom they situate within the mainstream parties: We, as socialists, would be more internationalist than maybe the mainstream parties in that the mainstream parties would still tend to frame issues in terms of the national interest, whereas we would not tend to

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put it that way, but more in terms of the interests of workers, the unemployed, ordinary people, small farmers. But in fairness to the whole Irish political system, I think they are quite cosmopolitan in their outlook – I13, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2).

Nevertheless, E2s deplore that some TDs from the ‘established parties’ do not take into account the consequences on other EU citizens, but tend to view the EU in national cost–benefit terms. They identify themselves as Eurosceptic Europeans because they represent European citizens even though they are critical toward the EU in many respects. They view many of their colleagues as Europhile Nationals in that they are pro-EU, but have a national representative focus. This ties in very well with the notion of Eurosceptic Europeanization that we uncovered in MPs’ parliamentary speech behavior. I do not think they take other than national citizens into account. (…) it is all about who can go and get the most money for us from Europe, like that is the conception of being a good European, (…) that is how most politicians conceive of it. (…) In fact, the Left is more European, that is the ironic thing. (…) [F]rom the point of the Left, a view of a very different type of Europe, a Europe of ordinary Germans or ordinary Greeks. In the Left certainly there is a higher European consciousness while also a higher awareness of all the problems with the European Union – I15, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2).

In stark contrast to the E1s, who retain a national representative relationship alongside their European one, the two socialist E2s do not think their constituency is restricted to the territory of the nation-state. They refer to common interests among working class and ordinary citizens across Europe and see themselves as their advocates detached from any formal representative relationship. [We represent] working class people and 99 per cent of ordinary citizens all across Europe. And that was always the way we posed it. We do not think that the interest of the 99 per cent in Ireland is fundamentally any different than the 99 per cent in Greece or Germany or anywhere else in Europe – I15, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2).

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In the context of the Eurozone crisis, they clearly portray themselves as the far-left (populist) alternative to other, mainstream and right-wing (populist) parties. The way we would pose it is ‘We bailed out banks as did Greek people, as did German people, as did workers across Europe.’ Whereas the sentiment that is propagated by right populists (…) is ‘We bailed out Europe and Europe should now give us our money back’ without any sort of class conception, (…) it is posed in national terms as opposed to building a different Europe, solidarity of working people across Europe – I15, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2). I know German people have suffered as well the consequences of the economic crisis and they have paid a price for the crimes of bankers and financers and politicians. (…) [F]or me it was more like the people against the big institutions, the banks and the big corporations – I13, Independent TD, Ireland – European Representative (E2).

The E2 from Fine Gael also has a fully European representative role orientation, but one that focuses on all Europeans as a common people. This E2 assumes that most other national MPs will not share such a fully European focus, in fact not even a national plus European one favored by E1s. [The question is] on whose behalf do you vote, when you give instructions to your minister as to the position he should take at Council meetings? I vote for all Europeans (…). So, I came to my own conclusion that they [MPs from other countries] voted locally, they did not think European, they thought nationally – I2, Fine Gael , Ireland – European Representative (E2).

Given this purely European representation, E2s, as opposed to E1s, do not feel a tension between national responsiveness and European responsibility because, for them, the two automatically coincide. They are simultaneously responsive to and responsible for their constituencies across Europe, be it the working class or all European citizens. For them, there is no trade-off between national and European groups because national differences are subsumed under an overarching European constituency.

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The two should coincide, they should converge. The interests of the European citizen and the national citizen must converge (…). You see, do we represent European people, or do we wish to represent a particular locality in the European Union to the exclusion of others? (…) I believe that people wherever they live on the continent of Europe have the same fears, concerns, worries, to a greater or lesser extent, I believe we should take those things into account. (…) And I think that I certainly have always tried to do that. (…). In other words, instead of me looking at it from an Irish perspective, I need to look at the European institutions from a European perspective – I2, Fine Gael , Ireland – European Representative (E2).

Overall, N1s and N2s see representation in EU politics as a zero-sum game, E1s and E2s as a positive-sum game.

6.3

Conceptual Representative Style Explained

There are three basic styles of representation in EU politics—the Pluralist (P), Republican (R) [Communitarian Republican (R1) /Rawlsian Republican (R2)], and Politico (Po) (see also Sect. 3.3). They differ with regard to their common good definition and the degree of representative universality. The Republicans and the Pluralists are pure types with a fixed representative style and the Politico is a flexible type with a contingent representative style. The majority of all interviewees are Politicos (Po, general and particular interest) (46.9 per cent, n = 31), while 37.9 per cent are pure Pluralists (P, particular interest) (n = 25) and only 15.2 per cent are pure Republicans (R1, general interest) (n = 10). What is more, 25 MPs (37.9 per cent) have a Rawlsian common good definition representing the disadvantaged (R2, least well off). In this alternative classification, ten of the Pluralists become Rawlsian Republicans (exclusive focus on the disadvantaged). Two of the Republicans also refer to the socially disadvantaged, but explicitly state that their overriding style of representation is the common good in republican terms. Thirteen Politicos are also concerned with the vulnerable. The following does two things: It presents the main lines of argumentation of each type by highlighting differences between them, and discussing nuances in justification within them. Again, for readability reasons only shorter illustrative quotes are used in the text.

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Pluralists, Republicans, and Politicos in EU Affairs—Similarities, Differences, and the Common Good The Pluralists (Ps) MPs who have an exclusively pluralist style of representation in EU affairs (P) believe that open competition and conflict between diverging interests of various societal groups is both desirable and legitimate. For them, this constant struggle of organized group interests is the prerequisite to find the best possible solutions to policy problems in EU matters. Pluralists consider “openly carrying out differences of opinion that are inevitable in a free state and the compromises that settle these conflicts (…) the only way to find a viable solution to problems (…)” (Fraenkel 1964, p. 301, translated by the author). As far as their role as representatives is concerned, they clearly acknowledge that MPs represent certain specific interests and that this is precisely how they fulfill their representative tasks well, be it in EU or other matters. Every parliamentarian here, not only with regard to EU issues, strives to do a good job, and to do so he always represents certain group interests, and legitimately so – I27, Christian Democratic Union, Germany – Pluralist (P).

Such particular interest representation is not seen as parochial or one-sided and MPs stress their responsibility for facilitating compromise between diverging interests. A Politico, who has a partially pluralist representative style, describes this line of argumentation best. People do represent constituencies and even when you look at parliaments where they are not elected on the basis of an electoral constituency, but a list system, they are still there representing a certain interest, it might be a certain sector, it might be a particular industry, it might be a particular philosophy or viewpoint in their own party but everybody is there representing something, nobody comes there without any baggage. So, I think that in the real world we have to acknowledge that and we do have to realize that people do come with certain interests, but it is about striking a balance – I3, Fine Gael , Ireland – Politico (Po).

As we can see, Pluralists immediately relate their aim of representing particular interests to the two other elements that Rehfeld (2016) identified behind the delegate orientation: responsiveness to the prospect of

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re-election and reliance on constituency’s/party’s view. In the Pluralists’ minds, these dimensions almost automatically go together. Crucially, while it makes sense to distinguish these different dimensions analytically, MPs do not tend to do so, when reflecting on their style of representation in EU affairs. Pluralist MPs do “not deny that there are broad areas of public and social life on which a consensus omnium exists” (Fraenkel 1964, p. 300f., translated by the author). In fact, they very much emphasize that, in a representative democracy, the rules of the game are indispensable for pluralist competition as they define the boundaries in which this conflict of interest can orderly take place. Interestingly, the rule of the game they mention the most in justifying their pluralist style of representation is the electoral system, specifically the formal chain of delegation and accountability. Pluralists who are elected for a specific constituency emphasize their being delegates of their constituents and electorate, when asked whether they represent any particular interests in making decisions on EU matters: I suppose the title that we have is Teachta Dála, which is ‘messenger of the people’ that is the definition if you like, so that is what we are. We are messengers of our electorate. So, they come to us with their concerns, we relay those back to government, as backbenchers we relay them back to ministers who act at EU level, in the opposition parties, they relay them to their leaders who bring them to the floor of the Dáil or committees – I6, Fine Gael , Ireland – Pluralist (P). So, like any politician, but it is particularly acute in Ireland, people are concerned about getting re-elected and the main concern for being reelected is: ‘Are your constituents satisfied and what are the issues that matter to your constituents?’ Whether this is EU fishing or the CAP reform or turf cutting. Those issues (…) matter to their constituents and therefore they matter to the public representatives, it is as simple and straightforward as that, I think the link is direct – I3, Fine Gael , Ireland – Politico (Po).

Pluralists criticize the republican definition of a single public interest that exists a priori and that is identified by the representatives. Instead, pluralists argue that “the common good [can] only be achieved a posteriori as the result of a delicate process of divergent ideas and interests by groups and parties (…)” (Fraenkel 1964, p. 300, translated by the author, emphasis added). According to Ps, in a differentiated society, “the

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fundamental questions of every political decision, which can be seen as the bonum commune” (Fraenkel 1964, p. 324, translated by the author, emphasis added) can only be determined as a result of contention between particular interests in society. They consider it neither desirable nor possible for national MPs to identify one single uniform public interest that is able to absorb the plurality of divergent interests entirely within itself. Interestingly, we can find such views on both the right and left side of the political spectrum. The Tory MP below couples the pluralist conception of the common good with a rather harsh criticism of EU elites that, according to the MP, claim to speak for a public good. The Pluralist from the German Left Party focuses more on a possible contradiction between the public German interest as identified by the government and what the MP believes to be the interests of plural groups across Europe. The greater European good, which is constantly claimed, is by putting aside the interests of specific people, but it actually turns out that all the specific people have their interest put second to a class of European officials. The greatest virtue I think you can ever do in a representative democracy, the single greatest virtue is to unashamedly represent your constituency interests. And if everyone did that, the sum total would be the genuine European interest. (…) You know, when people claim to elevate a general good above that of actual people, we should always be very cautious. Who decides the public interest? Who is the public? – I50, Conservative Party, UK – Pluralist (P). There is no such thing as the German interest in EU matters, because there is not the single German citizen, who represents 100 per cent of Germany. Rather, in each country, there are very many groups, which represent plural interests, including those completely different from the current government. (…) And there are similar groups in many other European countries. So, I believe that in all countries there are always fellow partners in crime with a common interest. (…) The question of what the German interest is, is, of course, an exciting question which addresses the democratic principle you believe in – I29, Left Party, Germany – Pluralist (P).

The Republicans (R1s) In the speech data, the majority of representative claims are republican. When MPs speak about EU affairs in parliament, a substantial number

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exclusively makes common good references. Yet, among the interviewees, we only find very few MPs with a purely republican representative style in EU affairs. These R1s explicitly point to the danger of particular interest representation which they do not link to a pluralist understanding of democracy, but to clientelism, lobbying, and corruption: “I do not represent specific group interests, this always sounds like you are the ‘extended arm’ of some lobby group”—I33, Free Democratic Party, Germany—Republican (R1). In contrast to Pluralists, Republicans aim at identifying the overall public interest. They ‘accuse’ pluralist representatives of being narrowminded delegates of particular groups. In this case, they talk not so much about elected parliamentarians, but particularly about non-parliamentary representatives from the second and third sector. Thereby, they clearly play out their advantage as elected parliamentarians with a representative responsibility for the wider common good rather than entering the representative competition and becoming champions of particular interests with regard to EU issues. I see representation, not just in EU affairs, but in general as a holistic task, and that is what is best for the whole society. (…) I mean, of course, there are other political groups, and other representatives, also elected, whose sole concern is to represent only a particular group, regardless of the impact this has on other groups. They are clearly lobbying and perhaps even know what impact this has on the other groups – but they do not care because they are only representatives of this group. They do not have the same moral concerns I would have as a representative. So, I see it as my job, when I am a national representative to say ‘Okay, I have to look at what is best for everyone’ – I53, Austrian People’s Party, Austria – Republican (R1).

They clearly know that this common good tends to be hard to identify and that there will always be winners and losers. For them, the prospect of maximizing collective welfare, however, justifies their role in determining what is in the public interest and what is not. [Y]ou are trying to act for the welfare of everyone, and that eventually means your decisions will always be too little for someone. Individually, it is never everything for all, but collectively it is of course the best for all – I53, Austrian People’s Party, Austria – Republican (R1).

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Republicans also do not distinguish between different trustee dimensions (Rehfeld 2016). In their view, representation of the common good goes along with less responsiveness to sanctions and being guided by their own conscience. Representatives are elected to do the best for and in the name of everyone. In our Constitution, there is the free mandate. That means the deputy is bound by no one except his conscience. Formally, he is not even bound by the electorate. And, therefore, he has to do everything to fulfill his task as a responsible representative. (…) In the complex reality that we live in today, already at the national level, and even more so in this twodimensional matrix with the European level (…) Is the average citizen in a position (…) to make such decisions, and to do so politically responsibly that is not only with his specific, but everyone’s interest in mind? This is where we come in – I52, Austrian People’s Party, Austria – Republican (R1).

Finally, especially Irish R1s deplore that most of their colleagues in the Dáil are allegedly driven solely by re-election motives and their constituency orientation. For them, the “electoral system (…) really feeds the clientelist nature of politics that we have until voters start rewarding people who prioritize their real role as a national parliamentarian, that trend is going to continue” (I10, Fianna Fáil , Ireland – Republican (R1)). By ‘real role,’ they mean some form of representing the public interest: I am not wearing a constituency hat, when I am dealing with European issues, it is broader than that. I suppose I am dealing with them as a member of the Irish parliament. (…) I see my role as representing the opinions of the Irish people. I have the public interest in mind – I10, Fianna Fáil , Ireland – Republican (R1).

Overall, both Pluralists and Republicans are ‘representative purists’ out of principle and/or regardless of the issue at stake. What is more, this role orientation is not only confined to EU matters, but seems to be their general style of representation. Politicos on the contrary, have a more differentiated and flexible style of representation in EU politics.

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The Politicos (Pos) Politicos do not favor one representative style over the other, but acknowledge that both particular and public interest representation matter for their representative role. Interestingly, clientelism does not carry a negative connotation for them, but is simply one side of their representative understanding. I think there are two sides, what you might call clientelism and what is parliamentary representation. One is that you may have representatives in parliament who are very exclusively based on a kind of constituencyclientelist basis and you may have other parliamentarians who just deal with what concerns the public interest. I think that this ‘either-or-view’ is incorrect and mistaken. It is simply both, the interest of some and of all – I8, Labour Party, Ireland – Politico (Po).

Politicos do not by definition view these styles to be mutually exclusive or incompatible. They acknowledge the problems with reconciling the two, but argue that they may well complement one another. “In EU affairs and overall, I feel responsible for all German citizens in general, and those in the middle class in particular” ( I34, Free Democratic Party, Germany – Politico (Po)). Again, Politicos relate their mixed style of representation to the source of judgment that guides their decision. They believe “the representative has an obligation both to the wishes of his constituents and to the best policy as he sees it (…)” (Pitkin 1967, p. 148). In making these decisions, they act as both ‘enlightened statesmen’ and ‘obedient agents’ of their voters. Unlike Pluralists, they do not tend to view the common good as the result of a competitive process, but are more like Republicans who believe it to be given. It is their task to identify the general will. Yes, of course, as a deputy, you are a representative of the citizens of your constituency, but that does not release you from making your own judgment on certain difficult questions, and in the interest of making a responsible decision, which may then be difficult to explain to the citizens. But precisely regarding such existential questions of Europe, one cannot only go along with the current opinion or even a temporary mood of the electorate, but one must of course very much weigh up what is the whole? And what is in the interest of the whole and a good future? (…) the question is how far you can go, you have to go in the interest of the whole without, however, losing sight of the particular demands of the citizens – I23, Christian Social Union (CSU), Germany – Politico (Po).

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What is noteworthy here, and Politicos share this type of argumentation with the Republicans, is that they believe to be obligated to justify and explain their deviation from constituency interests to these constituents. This is essentially their way of reconciling their electorate’s demands with what they believe to be in the wider interest (Pitkin 1967, p. 209f.). Overall, Politicos are probably the ‘most realistic’ and adaptable representatives, yet they do not tend to problematize their two representative roles as much as their exclusively pluralist or republican colleagues do. They do neither discuss the dangers of clientelism and differences in power among organized interest groups as the Republicans do. Nor do they grapple with the questions of whether an overall common good can be identified or of the danger of some deciding what benefits all like Pluralists do. The Rawlsian Republicans (R2s) The Rawlsian Republicans (R2s) are not so much concerned with the general will of the people, but rather represent those who do not have a voice. This again seems to be a general representative understanding rather than one that is specific to EU matters. “For me, representation is speaking for those who cannot speak for themselves, the powerless” ( I42, Labour Party, UK). The Rawlsian Republican’s goal is “making sure that no one is left behind” ( I7, Labour Party, Ireland) and “to bring the voices of ordinary people, the working people and particularly the disenfranchised into the parliament” ( I13, Independent TD, Ireland). Rawlsian Republicans do not want the greatest good for the greatest number of people, but want the least well-off in society to improve their position. Interestingly, R2s explicitly argue against equality of outcomes for everyone. They rather think of aiding the marginalized groups in society to achieve equality of opportunities. [I]n simple terms, society must not drift further apart and all people must be equal in terms of opportunities, although we know they will not achieve equal results – I18, Social Democratic Party, Germany – Rawlsian Republican (R2). But I came into politics because I am on the side of people who never had the chance to be connected, to be privileged, to get the best education and health care, the best everything that is represented by David Cameron and

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his ministers who went to the most exclusive private schools and so on. I came into politics because I am on the side of the people who should have the opportunity to fulfil their potential – I39, Labour Party, UK – Rawlsian Republican (R2).

While many R2s speak in general terms, they also make explicit references to what their Rawlsian orientation means in relation to EU matters. Using examples from the Greek debt crisis a German Social Democrat asks “How should Europe continue to function, if the strongest grow stronger and the weakest get weaker?” (I20, Social Democratic Party, Germany).

6.4 Causal Mechanisms Behind Representative Focus and Style Interviewees name all four main factors identified in Chapter 5 (governing responsibility, European experience, party left–right placement, Eurosceptic Europeanization) as drivers of their Europeanized representative role orientations. At the same time, they elaborate the causal mechanisms behind them, e.g., how certain groups of voters want them to represent other EU citizens. E1s explicitly argue that their focus of representation is motivated by vote-seeking incentives. They highlight that their voters also want them to represent other EU citizens. Thereby, they identify their voters as one of the driving forces behind their Europeanized representative role orientation. In response to this, they span their constituency beyond their national borders. They conceive of their constituency not only in (national) geographic terms, but also as a political constituency across Europe. You see, in many ways I have a constituency that is a geographic constituency, but then I have a political constituency. And my political constituency, I would be left of center, (…) goes beyond these shores if that makes some sense. National borders are not relevant in that sense, I think we have to think broader than that (…). I think it is in the interest of the people who elected me to act in solidarity with people of like mind across the European Union. I think we can actually achieve something better for the people we represent geographically here, but also those in Europe. At the same time, the ones here have to be to the forefront of your mind because

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I am not here because someone in France elected me – I14, Independent, Ireland – Europeanized Representative (E1).

These MPs clearly remain nationally anchored, but to be re-authorized by their voters, they include other European citizens in their representative focus. They are acting responsibly for these other EU citizens, while at the same time being responsive to their national voters’ demands. The E1s highlight that whether or not their voters want them to consider these citizens in their representation crucially “depends on party affiliation” ( I31, Free Democratic Party, Germany – E1). Those to the left “would romanticize a bit and say they are cosmopolitan European” ( I31, Free Democratic Party, Germany – E1), while “[i]t gets a bit more national-egoistic the further we go to the right” (I21, Social Democratic Party, Germany – E1). E1s from the left of the political spectrum find that their colleagues from the right are driven by their voters’ national outlook and see this as the main reason for why these MPs have a national focus of representation. When I look at the members of the CSU [Christian Social Union], I see that they have a very strong responsibility towards their voters to guard the national well-being. I believe that this is the crucial difference between us and them. We see urgent social problems in Greece that we have repeatedly brought up in the Bundestag . Turns out, the others knew this as well, but did not publicly talk about it – I30, Left Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Ultimately, “I mean of course, democracy works that way. You ponder ‘What do my voters actually say to this?’” ( I31, FDP , Germany—E1). E1s are convinced that they have a ‘true’ Europeanized focus of representation, while they believe “the average national MP” will merely claim to have one “in the debate, but not in their decision” (I65, BZÖ, Austria— E1). This line of argumentation is prevalent among those members of conservative/center-right parties who see themselves as ‘outliers’ among their party peers because they have a Europeanized representative focus. Even left of center E1s see themselves more as the exception than the rule. They argue that, on average, the national MP lacks the electoral incentive to focus on other EU citizens, because most voters favor a national representative outlook.

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I’d say 90% of the TDs at least have a straightforward Irish focus. I have a broader focus. (…) I think we are still very much insular in that respect. What we do is we see how the EU benefits Ireland rather than the benefits of the EU in relation to the other 27 members and their people. We do generalize from time to time, but it is not something that engages the public hardly at all – I9, Labour Party, Ireland – Europeanized Representative (E1). A situation [the Eurozone crisis] (…) where people in Greece are eating out of dustbins and people in Portugal are going hungry or we [Irish people] do not have a health system any longer. (…) And you would like to think that there would be solidarity between the citizens of the member states (…) I think that would have benefitted the citizens across Europe – I14, Independent, Ireland – Europeanized Representative (E1).

An MP from the Austrian Green party stresses the primacy of this vote-seeking incentive by drawing an analogy between the Austrian and EU political system. The MP describes what the Austrian political system would look like, if it were functioning according to the EU model. The MP attests that heads of state and government (and consequently also their supporting majorities in parliament), on average, do not have much of a rational political motivation to care for EU citizens because they are not formally authorized by and accountable to these citizens. There would be an Austrian Council including the nine regional governors. And there may be one governor who really wants to represent Austrian interests, those interest of the entire country. The problem arises when, let’s say this is the governor of Salzburg. He has to be re-elected in Salzburg and only there. That means, to survive he would have to prioritize the regional interest. He has a clear incentive to emphasize the regional interest, but very few to emphasize the common Austrian national interest. That would be the structure of the EU. (…) There is something European after all, some deeper substance, but the political incentives go into the other direction – I60, Green Party, Austria – Europeanized Representative (E1).

Moreover, E1s explicate that being pro-EU does not automatically lead an MP to have a Europeanized focus of representation. Instead, they clearly depict the mechanisms behind a Eurosceptic Europeanization driven by MPs from the left of the political spectrum, and especially those

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critical toward the European integration process or at least its neoliberal policy manifestations. Conservatives tend to say: ‘What is good for Germany and do we have to take on still more responsibility in Europe?’ And they are not antiEuropean at all, on the contrary, they just say: ‘First and foremost, my own shirt is closer than their [other EU citizens’] skirt and therefore Germany first has to care for itself.’ (…) I want to find consensus with the Greeks so that Greece can survive and (…) the people can find a job there – I20, Social Democratic Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1). I think this [representative focus] is a matter of definition. We are sometimes portrayed as anti-European with regard to our positions, although I think the things we demand are very European. So, for instance, we have criticized crisis politics and were marked as anti-European, when in fact it is the crisis politics that is deeply against the European people. (…). And in the EU context, it is not the national borders anymore, but a strong Germany has to help the poor Cyprus, and this is in fact something very pro-European, but a completely different logic from what the CDU has pushed through at the EU level. Therefore, actually, what they have done is anti-European because what it actually does is it gives primacy to your own interests or the interests of rich countries – I29, The Left Party, Germany – Europeanized Representative (E1).

MPs also identify governing responsibility to be decisive for a Europeanized representative role orientation. Here, MPs tend to refer to members of government rather than MPs that belong to the governing majority, which is in line with our findings from the Representative Claims Analysis (RCA). “Yes, of course there is a tension, and this is even greater, if one has a leadership position, at least it feels like it is greater” (I26, Christian Democratic Union, Germany—N2). Finally, MPs refer to their supra- and transnational European experiences, when they justify their Europeanized role orientation. These do not only include work experience at the EU level, but mostly their contacts with other national parliamentarians through the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) or other informal meetings: “The reason is simple, we work together more closely, and that also means we talk to each other more often” ( I53, ÖVP , Austria—E1).

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Next, we turn to the causal mechanisms behind the different styles of representation in EU politics among the interviewees. Committee membership makes a difference not only in MPs’ speeches, but also in their minds. Members of the Budget Committee see themselves as “representatives of the taxpayer.” Members of the European Affairs Committees (EACs) in turn “speak more for the general interest in Europe” (I27, CDU , Germany—P). Surprisingly, in the statistical analysis we did not find significant differences between MPs with and without governing responsibility. In their conceptual role orientation, however, this latter factor seems to play a role. Republicans describe governing responsibility to be decisive in their decision to represent the common good. For example, an Irish Fianna Fáil TD uses the party’s agreement to the European bailout package for Ireland to highlight that public and particular interest representation are polar opposites in his/her view. The TD argues that what his/her party did, was putting its own electoral fortune on the line to ensure longterm recovery for Ireland, while others, according to him/her, chose “the easy alternative” by responding to short-term demands of the electorate, which this representative equates with populism. So whilst there are times when the tendency might be to take the populist route rather than what is in the best interest of the country, sometimes it is not as acute as it was then, but the decisions taken in 2009 and 2010 were of such importance that the politicians that occupied offices at the time, put their own and the party’s electoral situation completely aside and I think that was the right thing to do – I12, Fianna Fáil , Ireland – Republican (R1).

Pluralists also argue that opposition MPs represent “the alternative way,” while government parties are assumed to represent “the common good (…) because the interests of the state should normally be represented by the government” (I66, BZÖ, Austria—N1). Politicos switch between the two representative styles in EU affairs depending on the kind of issue involved. They differentiate issues according to their scale. None of the interviewees explicitly refers to the distinction between concrete policy and more general, large-scale polity issues that we found to be decisive in explaining MPs’ behavioral style of representation in EU affairs in Chapter 5. The examples they give, however, revolve around a similar distinction. Essentially, Politicos base

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their decision on the question of (1) who they believe to be affected by a certain measure, and (2) their assessment of its long-term consequences. If one makes the right decisions at the right time, even if they are drastic and not very popular decisions, the common good is reached in the long term. It is often the case that citizens focus more on short-term successes and measures, and do not recognize the whole context. Some then only see ‘We have to pay for the lazy people in Greece or elsewhere’. But then it is your task as a representative to make the case that our common currency is the Euro and that it can also be attacked in Greece or elsewhere, and then we must defend the stability of our currency there as well. (…) But when you have say European infrastructure projects, the Trans-European Networks, then you would focus on the specific interests of your electorates, your constituency, for instance. It depends on the size of the issue – I22, Christian Social Union, Germany – Politico (Po).

Finally, for Rawlsian Republicans, we see a clear left–right pattern among the interviewees. MPs from the left of the political spectrum are more likely to follow the Difference Principle than their colleagues from the right. For left of center MPs, workers, employees, and those in precarious social conditions are their core constituencies. “Of course, it is clear that the SPD must always represent the interests of employees—that is self-evident” (I18, Social Democratic Party, Germany—R2). A prominent exception are members of the two populist right-wing parties in Austria, BZÖ and FPÖ. They also see it as their role to speak for the disadvantaged in society, but for them these are the ‘ordinary people’ or ‘the small man on the street.’ I can tell you which groups are not dear to my heart, not particularly dear to my heart. These are the ones who are doing very well financially. I am not here to defend their interests, but the interests of ordinary people – I63, Freedom Party of Austria, Austria (R2).

In connection to the focus of representation, Rawlsians from the left tend to have a Europeanized conception of the marginalized groups they represent. They speak for those left behind not only in their country, but also across the EU. I see myself as representing working people, people who struggle for a living all their lives. I would see myself as representing people who

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have been marginalized economically, socially within Irish society. And I certainly would not see myself as representing the business classes or the wealthy. I do try to have a wider understanding of this, I think particularly European policy is impacting on marginalized people in our country, but also across the EU as well. They [EU policies] are harmful for ordinary citizens who are not wealthy and who are not corporations. If you look at the TTIP negotiations, I mean that is only to benefit corporations and the easier movement of capital and profits and will undermine wages and employment for ordinary citizens – I16, Independent, Ireland – Rawlsian Republican (R2).

Overall, Rawlsians from both the far-left and far-right make more populist anti-establishment references (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013) pitting the ‘hard working men and women’ against the European political elites at the national and EU level.

6.5

Conclusions

This chapter had the goal to gain deeper insights into the lines of argumentation for and causal mechanisms behind national MPs’ conceptual patterns of representation in EU politics. Its aim was to provide knowledge about MPs’ deep-seated attitudes toward whom and how they represent, when making decisions on EU matters. In Chapter 4, the general distribution of types among the interviewees was discussed, now we focused on the picture behind these types. This conclusion highlights the more general findings and puts them into context. On the focus of representation, three crucial insights stand out. First, MPs have a clear understanding of their representative focus in EU affairs. This is not something the researcher put to them, but something that they have thought through and juggled with conceptually. This may sound trivial, but is an indication that national MPs have a distinct representative role orientation in EU politics. Their foci, be they national or Europeanized, are internally consistent and clearly distinguishable. We see plausible lines of argumentation that are related to the MPs’ overall understanding of national representation and the EU multi-level system. For one, this coherence and depth is an indicator of the quality of the questions and the dimensions that form the typology behind them. MPs tend to form very homogenous types, even though there is variation in terms of their individual reasoning, of course. However, what is even more important is that this type of respondent behavior goes to show

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that what we observe is not just something they say in parliament, but also something they have weighed in their minds. The representative role they play in the parliamentary plenary, when talking about the Eurozone crisis or EU treaty reforms is rooted in deeper role orientations. These role orientations, and this is the second noteworthy finding, are more diverse than what we were able to observe in MPs’ parliamentary speech. In the RCA, national representation manifested itself in the exclusive reference to national citizens and their concerns. The interviews allowed us to gain a more fine-grained understanding of these national representatives. On the one hand, there are those national representatives who completely shut themselves off from any non-national stimuli. For them, the European level and other EU member states are not relevant, not even to gain a negotiation advantage. In their thinking, they stay in the nation-state box, so, naturally, they would not represent anyone, but the interests of their national electorate. Yet, in the interview sample, there are in fact very few such MPs. On the other hand, the much more common type of national representation is one that does have a concern for what is going on beyond the nation-state. Even in the UK, where we only find national representatives, most of them do take the positions of other governments into account and are aware of interdependencies in the EU context. They opt for national representation, but in doing so, they are very well aware of their EU environment. The national representatives we encounter may not be European(-ized) with regard to whom they represent, but they are very much European as far as their horizon is concerned. Considering the European level may be a first step toward taking consequences on EU citizens into consideration as well. Third, whom MPs believe to represent in EU affairs crucially depends not only on party-strategic and institutional factors, but is also related to their conception of the European Union as a representative democracy and its future development. MPs who see themselves as representing the interests of other EU citizens as well, also believe in the gradual emergence of the social and cultural prerequisites to make democracy in Europe work. They are more optimistic about the ‘no-demos thesis’ (Grimm 1995; for a recent empirical discussion, see also Risse 2014b): “There is something European after all, some deeper substance” (I60, Green Party, Austria). They see a sense of European community and identity emerge among their voters. They themselves are operating in a

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transnational public sphere, well aware not only of what other EU governments are doing, but also of how citizens in other member states are affected. What is more, when asked the final question on how they would institutionally re-design the European Union, MPs with a European(-ized) focus were more likely to take a more federalist perspective on European integration: “national sovereignty (…) is an illusion today. (…) [It] can only exist, if it is pooled and that means transferred to Brussels” (I60, Green Party, Austria). Some of them even explicitly speak out for a United States of Europe: If anything was possible, I’d have a very simple constitution, I’d get rid of all the treaties as we were supposed to do with the constitutional treaty, I would have an EP that has pan-European constituencies, I would have a directly elected president of the European Commission and I would have (…) a Commission that acts like a kind of executive and a parliament that has the power to hold them to account. (…) For national parliaments, the yellow card system is quite a good one, influencing and engaging in the pre-legislative stage – I3, Fine Gael , Ireland.

Overall, simply looking at an MP’s attitude toward European integration/the EU does not tell us much about their likelihood to have a European focus of representation. It is in fact Irish Eurosceptic MPs from the left who argue most strongly for the existence of European commonalities among ordinary citizens and a transnational European public sphere. They are also the only ones in the sample with a purely European focus of representation. Regarding MPs’ conceptual style of representation, we first see that on the one hand, there are very principled Republicans and Pluralists. They think the opposite style is undesirable and illegitimate, while their own style is static and very persistent. On the other hand, the majority of interviewed MPs are Politicos who have an exceptionally dynamic and fluid style of representation. They clearly know what it means to represent the public interest or particular concerns, but explicitly decide to include both into their representative portfolio in EU politics. While pure Republicans and Pluralists stick to their representative style, be it in EU, domestic, or international politics, Politicos adapt to the circumstances depending on the scope of the issue at stake. They can be anything from common good defenders to representatives of very specific

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interests. Politicos are true ‘shape-shifters’ (Saward 2014), not only in terms of what they say in parliament, but also with regard to their selfperception as representatives. Overall, compared to the behavioral style, we see that fewer interviewees are pure Republicans. Publicity compared to more private interview settings may have a kind of “‘civilizing effect’ on the participants in the sense that explicitly selfish [particular] interests can rarely be justified in the public sphere” (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004, p. 8). Second, Republicans and Pluralists closely link their style of representation to their understanding of how democracy should work and how the common good can be achieved. The latter view democracy as a constant competition among different organized interests. They find it natural and necessary that they, too, represent certain concerns, all the while knowing that, as representatives, they have to ensure a balance. For the Republicans on the contrary, democracy is only legitimate, when it ensures the public interest over ‘self-interested’ particular groups. These MPs perceive themselves as representing this general will. Politicos are again more pragmatic here: They view democracy in Europe as containing both republican and pluralist elements. They make their representative style decision by constantly weighing particular and public interest. Third, the distinction between a republican and a pluralist style of representation is not purely academic, but MPs also make that distinction. Even the Politicos clearly discern the two, arguing for both to be part of their representative style. At the same time, MPs do not distinguish between different elements of the trustee-delegate typology. Pluralists represent particular interests and see themselves as rather dependent on their constituencies by whom they hope to be re-elected. Republicans represent the common good, make decisions based on what they believe is the wider public interest and portray themselves as statespersons who are willing to risk electoral fortunes for the greater good. For Politicos, these trustee-delegate dimensions also go together, they simply embody both. In a nutshell, the “crucial question (…) whether or not there is a connection between role conceptions and how representatives behave” (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012c, p. 14), can be answered with a cautious ‘yes’ for EU affairs. This chapter has demonstrated that the behavioral patterns of representation we observe in parliamentary speech on EU politics do translate to profounder conceptual patterns. At the

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same time, it has also revealed that these representative role orientations and especially their justifications go beyond the repertoire that parliamentarians (are able to) show in their speeches.

References Bächtiger, A., & Steenbergen, M. R. (2004). The real world of deliberation: A comparative study of its favorable conditions in legislatures (EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/17). http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/ 2634/sps2004-17.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2020. Blomgren, M., & Rozenberg, O. (2012c). Legislative roles and legislative studies: The neo-institutionalist turning point? In M. Blomgren & O. Rozenberg (Eds.), Parliamentary roles in modern legislatures (pp. 8–36). Abingdon: Routledge. Corden, A., & Sainsbury, R. (2006). Using verbatim quotations in reporting qualitative social research: Researchers’ views. University of York Social Policy Research Unit. https://www.york.ac.uk/inst/spru/pubs/pdf/verbquotrese arch.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2020. Fraenkel, E. (1964). Der Pluralismus als Strukturelement der freiheitlichrechtsstaatlichen Demokratie. In A. von Brünneck (Ed.), Ernst Fraenkel— Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien (pp. 297–325). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Grimm, D. (1995). Does Europe need a constitution? European Law Journal, 1(3), 282–302. Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking representation. American Political Science Review, 97 (4), 515–528. Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. Government & Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America. Government & Opposition, 48(2), 147–174. Pitkin, H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Berkeley, LA: University of California Press. Rehfeld, A. (2016). Beyond trustees and delegates. In M. Bühlmann & J. Fivaz (Eds.), Political representation: Roles, representatives and the represented (pp. 29–47). Abingdon: Routledge. Risse, T. (2014b). No demos? Identities and public spheres in the Euro crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(6), 1207–1215. Savage, D., & Weale, A. (2009). Political representation and the normative logic of two-level games. European Political Science Review, 1(1), 63–81. Saward, M. (2014). Shape-shifting representation. American Political Science Review, 108(4), 723–736.

CHAPTER 7

Discussion and Conclusion

This study examined whom and how members of national parliaments (MPs) represent in European Union politics. The collected evidence suggests that national MPs do not only adapt their parliamentary activities, but their entire representative portfolio to the multi-level realities in the EU. We do not only witness a Europeanization of parliamentary procedures, but ultimately of parliamentary representation itself . Thereby, the study generates theoretical, empirical, and normative insights that are of considerable value for EU studies and international relations literature as well as comparative legislative and party research. The concluding chapter discusses these insights and their implications in three distinct ways: First, it elaborates on how the theoretical model developed in this study advances the wider theoretical debate on crossborder representation in an interdependent world (Sect. 7.1). Second, on the basis of the main empirical findings, Sect. 7.2 makes the case for the Europeanization of parliaments rather than (or alongside) the parliamentarization of Europe (Koenig-Archibugi 2019). It ties this proposal to the theoretical discussions of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in EU politics and global governance. Finally, Sect. 7.3 weighs in on how transnational representation in national parliaments may foster transnational democracy.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7_7

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Overall, the concluding chapter assesses the democratic quality of the observed patterns of representation. This includes a critical assessment of their potentials and perils for sustaining the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, but also international politics and global governance more broadly. It thereby re-connects the analysis to the democratic properties of the EU as a system of collective representative institutions that operate on the basis of liberal democracy. The EU may be a ‘most likely’ case for cross-border representation within national institutions because it provides a unique institutional framework for the ‘all-affected’ and ‘allsubjected principle’ to coincide (Fraser 2008, pp. 64–65). Nonetheless, these patterns of political representation beyond borders may to some degree extend to other transnational structures governing the global economy, climate and environmental regulations, migration policy, or public health, for instance.

7.1

Cross-Border Representation in an Interdependent World

National parliaments remain the central representative institutions in modern parliamentary democracies in Europe and beyond. Citizens’ identification and processes of collective will-formation are still rooted in the national context. At the same time, this so-called ‘standard account’ of representation based on territorially elected agents of a nationally defined political community has become inadequate to describe the reality of an interconnected European Union in a globalized world. This interdependence of politics and societies leads to a mismatch between boundaries of (EU member) states and the effects their decisions have on other citizens (in the EU), i.e., a mismatch between the authorizing and affected constituencies (Montanaro 2018). In such an environment, we need to look beyond representation as a principal–agent relationship based on formal channels of delegation and accountability. This study advances theoretical scholarship on the European Union and international politics in that it updated the ‘standard account’ of representation to these interdependent realities. Combining rationalchoice with constructivist approaches to representation, we can conceptualize what happens inside of national parliamentary representation (in EU politics) rather than just its outward institutional manifestations. This individual actor-centered approach allowed spotlighting alternative modes of representation within formal chains of delegation and accountability

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that would have otherwise gone unnoticed. This has consequences for the way we view political representation in interconnected settings. Given the importance of national institutions and political processes for democratic self-determination, we need to acknowledge that national representatives remain nationally elected and are first and foremost responsive to their national electorates. At the same time, there are affected interests beyond borders and, acting within formal chains of representation, national representatives may include these interests into the domestic political process. They thereby become ‘surrogate representatives’ (Mansbridge 2003) of non-national citizens without having to forgo their national representative linkage. This new theoretical approach (see Chapter 2) opens our eyes to diverse patterns of representation that already exist within national institutions, but that the ‘standard account’ of representation would consider irrelevant or impossible. It would have us believe that MPs are either irrational or insincere when representing any other interests than the ones they depend on for re-election. This study has shown, however, that this is too simplistic of a view. Rather, national parliamentary representation in the EU is not an inevitable zero-sum game, in which MPs pit national interests against each other in “the mindset that for some to win others must lose” (Juncker 2017). This leaves us with the following theoretical innovations for the study of political representation in the EU and international politics more broadly: Responsiveness to national constituencies and responsibility for other EU citizens are not mutually exclusive per se. In this more optimistic view than the one Peter Mair originally formulated (2006, 2013), responsibility can be both agent- and principal-driven (see Sect. 2.3). Both national representatives and national constituencies can see the need for taking into account the consequences a decision has on other than national citizens. Where problems and solutions transcend national borders, MPs may no longer answer the question of who is in- and excluded in the processes of political decision-making by reference to a national citizenry alone. Instead, they may transcend the national boundaries to include other affected EU citizens in the coming about of that decision. This insight on the reconcilability of responsiveness and responsibility advances research on parliaments and representational politics because it suggests a new avenue to close the representational void in modern democracies: Voters may feel sympathies for the fates and fortunes of other EU citizens and prefer their representatives to represent them, too.

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MPs who are accountable to such voters do not so much face an inevitable trade-off between responsibility and responsiveness. Being responsible and representing those other EU citizens is precisely what makes them responsive to their national voters. To uncover the factors that foster such Europeanization, the agent-driven mechanism induces us to look at the kind of MPs and the institutional context they operate in. The principaldriven mechanism has us ask about the kind of party and voter that favor such representation. Future comparative public opinion surveys could investigate more systematically this demand side of representative roles (e.g., Werner 2019a, b; also Dassonneville et al. 2020). This would help us understand in how far voters are really an impediment to cross-border representation. The final theoretical innovation concerns the style of representation (see Sect. 2.3). In modern national democracies, representation is democratic because of a delicate balance between pluralist and republican elements of democracy. This balance is enshrined in the constitutional protection of rights, liberties, and the rule of law on the one hand, and through elections that ensure political equality on the other hand. In the EU, this pluralist-republican balance is much more volatile. Pluralist and liberal democratic elements are strong, while the republican, structural dimension is underdeveloped (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013; Scharpf 2009). The diversification of (unelected) representative actors at both the national and the EU level, leaves two choices for national MPs and their style of representation in EU politics: Either, they join the competitive game and represent particular groups, when making their decisions in EU politics. Or they may represent the wider public interest from the privileged position of being electorally legitimized representatives. This study makes the more general point that especially in transnational governance settings, political actors’ and voters’ conceptions of democracy and the common good may be more important than the question how strongly the former are bound by instructions of the latter. Hence, this study suggests that scholars should leave behind the mandate-independence controversy for good and turn to legislators’ pluralist and republican conceptions of democracy instead. Overall, with these theoretical insights, the study sharpens our theoretical lens for the diversity of representative patterns within national institutions that may already accommodate transnational politics better than the theoretical toolkit on representation from the age of nationstates has us see. This also allows for a fresh perspective on the role

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national parliaments play beyond their formal place in EU politics and global governance.

7.2

The Virtue of Europeanized Parliaments

The empirical evidence on national MPs’ representative behavior and conceptions in EU politics compiled in this study suggests that, rather than an “immutable constraint” (Koenig-Archibugi 2019, p. 16) national parliaments are in fact vital building blocks of European representation, be it of foreign EU nationals or an overarching EU citizenry. The specific empirical findings (Chapters 4–6) warrant some broader conclusions. National MPs stay true to their national representative link. The majority of claims to representation is national-republican. This is important because, after all, the formal national chain of delegation and accountability remains vital to legitimize EU governance. At the same time, MPs go well beyond this standard national representation (as demonstrated in Chapter 4). They insert grievances of other EU citizens into the domestic decision-making process on EU politics. In the majority of these representative claims beyond national borders, they even exclusively speak about European concerns. Ultimately, they are both national and European representatives. In their speeches, MPs do not simply take a national or European side. They simultaneously recognize multiple interests and thereby actively reconcile them with one another. MPs are Republicans rather than Pluralists, when they speak publicly about EU affairs. They stage themselves not as representatives of specific group interests, but as guardians of a greater public good. In promoting the general welfare of the political community, they play out their ‘legitimacy advantage’ as elected actors. This is great news for scholars working on representation within the EU as national MPs seem to produce coherent rather than colliding claims to representation and thereby potentially raise the overall quality of representation in the EU (Lord and Pollak 2010). If we agree that such European patterns of representation in national parliaments are desirable (see also Sect. 7.3), the question is how we can foster them. The empirical analysis has shown that left-wing parties play a key role (see Sect. 5.4). When we look at who it is among ‘the left’ that drives this Europeanization and what kind of left–right placement we are talking about, we observe two things. First, a cosmopolitan party stance drives Europeanization more than a left position on economic redistribution. The underlying question here is ‘who belongs to the

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political community?’ rather than ‘who wins and who loses within a political community?’ Second, especially MPs from Eurosceptic far-left parties insert the grievances of other EU citizens into domestic parliamentary debate. These findings second recent research on the emergence of a distinct cosmopolitan—communitarian cleavage (e.g., de Wilde et al. 2016b). The results signal that MPs base their representative behavior on the fundamental question of the boundaries of the political community in a global world. Therefore, this study uncovers traces of a Eurosceptic Europeanization from the left that has interesting implications for our view of soft (left-wing) Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008): A Europhile consensus in parliament carried by mainstream parties does not automatically lead to Europeanized representation. This insight cautions against the assumption often implicitly made in EU research that pro-EU policy stances are equal to favoring transnational solidarity or representation. Eurosceptics from the left criticize the EU’s neoliberal policies and ensuing social inequalities rather than fundamentally opposing integration as such based on nationalist sentiments like their far-right Eurosceptic colleagues (de Vries and Edwards 2009). The former are more conducive to a European focus of representation in national parliaments than some Europhile center parties. Political parties seem to provide the structures that determine whether Europeanized representation emerges. They are the venues within which responsiveness and responsibility may be either compatible or fundamentally irreconcilable. Yet, not only party ideology helps us explain Europeanization of representative claims-making (see Sect. 5.4). While experience with European governance structures matters at the individual level, governing responsibility only makes a difference for heads of states and government, but not for members of the governing majority. This confirms that we also need to look at individual characteristics of legislators, when explaining their representative behavior, and that government-opposition dynamics are more complex. For EU politics, there does not simply seem to be “a growing bifurcation in European party systems between parties which claim to represent but don’t govern and those which govern but no longer represent” (Mair 2009, p. 17). While the low number of country and debate cases does not permit us to draw definite conclusions on which factors at the systems’ level precisely explain the observed patterns, they offer some insights on the larger dynamics of interdependence and politicization in the EU. First,

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it is not the case that representation during the temporally more distant treaty debates (Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty) is more European(-ized) than representation during the Eurozone crisis debates. It does not seem to be the degree of politicization that matters for Europeanization of representative claims-making, but the kind of politicization we see. EU salience may in fact foster such claims-making across national borders, whereas polarization may hinder it. Second, while a country’s degree of interdependence within the EU may explain to some extent the differences between the UK as consistently ‘the most national’ and the other three countries, additional factors such as the strength of national parliaments in EU politics or the country’s power position in the EU may also play a role. It seems to be the case that interdependence does not hamper the responsive relationship between MPs and their voters per se, but that it rather intervenes in the relationship (see also Ezrow and Hellwig 2014). To verify this and find out how these patterns travel to other EU member states, research should examine more national parliaments including Eastern and Southern European member states. This would need to include a more careful investigation of how patterns evolve over time and across a wider range of EU day-to-day legislation. What this study has clearly shown is the particularity of the UK case when it comes to patterns of representation in EU politics (see especially Chapter 6). The findings offer a new, representational perspective on Brexit that nuances the common explanations of nationalist and Eurosceptic attitudes: For British MPs, representation is exclusively based on citizenship and nationality, not on interdependence and externalities. Consequently, their goal is to ‘regain control’ for national, not European citizens. While the behavioral focus of representation seems to be driven by factors outside of parliamentary speech that make certain types of MPs and parties more prone to Europeanization of representation, the behavioral style of representation rather depends on factors within parliamentary speech (see Sect. 5.5). Hence, for the style of representation, what an MP talks about and how she talks about it matter rather than where she sits or which party she belongs to. Additionally, there seems to be a split along the majoritarian—consensus democracy divide, with the former showing more pluralist, and the latter more republican claims-making. This is a first indication that the electoral (constituency-/majority-based

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vs. proportional) and parliamentary system (working vs. debating parliaments (in EU politics)) play as much a role for the style of representation in EU politics as do differences in the type of domestic interest group representation (pluralist vs. (neo-)corporatist). Overall, the patterns of representation we observe when EU politics are debated in national parliaments are by no means invariable and homogenous. Instead, they are versatile and dynamic. Regarding the conceptual patterns of representation, this study offers an even more nuanced picture (see Chapter 6). National MPs do not only talk about other EU citizens’ concerns, when speaking in public, but we find a deeper Europeanization of representative role orientations as well. It is not just ‘cheap talk,’ but MPs have well thought-out representative foci, which go beyond the national citizenry in a remarkable 44 per cent of our interview partners. MPs are even more Europeanized in their self-perception than they are, when speaking in parliament. On average, purely national representatives do not ignore the EU context, while Europeanized representatives do not cut the national link, either. These findings have important implications for the kind of conceptual Europeanization we observe: Europeanized representatives do not perceive of their representative choice as an ‘either-or-decision’. In a sense, they embody a new role for national parliaments in EU affairs, one that understands parliaments as national representative institutions that are simultaneously trans- and supranational. Even the MPs with an exclusively national representative focus tend not to be inward-looking, but concern themselves with the EU environment. This set of findings directly speaks to research on the emergence of a European public sphere (Koopmans and Statham 2010) and especially the role of EU citizens within it (Walter 2017). It gives reason for optimism in that even those MPs who exclusively represent domestic constituencies are aware of what happens in other EU member states and at the EU level. Those who also represent other EU nationals or an overarching EU citizenry may even more actively contribute to a European public sphere. They help establish a multi-level representative field (Crum and Fossum 2009) through forging trans- and supranational representation networks that incorporate their national constituencies. National MPs have made up their minds about whom they (should) represent in an interconnected EU. Their styles of representation signal that they balance pluralist and republican elements, but have a different emphasis in speech behavior as compared to self-conception. While in

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their speeches, they are Republicans, they are more likely to be Pluralists, when asked about their role orientation. This does not only indicate that it may be fruitful to look at how public settings shape representation more broadly (see Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004). It also suggests that national MPs can assume an integrative function in EU democracy by reconciling the interests of the whole and the parts. In EU politics, they mainly see their role as Politicos in “resolving the conflicting claims of the parts, on the basis of their common interest in the welfare of the whole” (Pitkin 1967, p. 217). The question that they truly care about is who constitutes ‘the part’ and ‘the whole,’ i.e., their focus of representation in EU politics. Overall, behavioral and conceptual representation are inherently connected. To a certain extent, they both relate to rational explanations including re-election motives, party strategic, and institutional factors (see Chapter 5). At the same time, European representation in national parliaments goes deeper than such interest-based explanations. It is connected to constructivist explanations that is a specific understanding of what it means to be an MP—more particularly, to be an MP in a highly interdependent world. As we have seen, MPs’ understanding of what representation and democracy are, of European identity and demos as well as the EU’s future shape their role expectations and ultimately behavior in EU politics (see Chapter 6). What does all of this mean, then, for national parliaments and representation in the EU? The tempestuous crises challenging the European Union in recent years including the electoral success of nationalist and Eurosceptic forces have shown the limits of both the intergovernmental and supranational models of representation. All too often, we believe there is only this ‘either-or-decision’. In his speech on the State of the Union 2017, then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has said “We only had two choices. Either come together around a positive European agenda or each retreat to our own corners”. In this view, for representation to work democratically in the EU, it is either reverting back to national sovereignty or strengthening the Community Method. We know, however, that especially supranational representation may not be desired by many citizens. Eurosceptic tendencies are on the rise and Brexit has been the most prominent, but by far not the only sign of citizens feeling the need to ‘regain control’. The fact that we do find these alternative modes of representation in national parliaments, and

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that they are not isolated and erratic, but quite noticeable and systematic, may be a way forward that is precisely not the institutionalization of a European super-state. Instead, it keeps the national anchorage of national representatives and simultaneously opens up the possibility of inserting grievances of other EU citizens and an overall European good into domestic decision-making. Therefore, this study suggests that national parliaments can play a vital role as a third way between the supranational channel which “seeks to represent the common good of a European people” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013, p. 206) and the intergovernmental channel which encapsulates “the mutual self-interest of the single member states” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013, p. 206). This third way is European(ized) representation within national parliaments, which combines the intergovernmental, trans- and supranational logics in domestic willformation on EU politics. Its key virtue is that it simultaneously goes beyond national borders and remains within formal national chains of electoral authorization and accountability. Thereby, it may be conducive to “a European ‘demoi-cracy’” based on “shared policies that treat the different demoi with equal concern and respect” (Bellamy and Castiglione 2013, p. 206, emphasis in original). The virtue of European representation in EU national parliaments is that it does not need a cumbersome re-designing of the EU institutional setup. As Juncker (2017) has put it: “When we talk about our own future, experience tells me new Treaties and new institutions are not the answer people are looking for. They are merely a means to an end, nothing more, nothing less”. Instead, to some extent we can rely on the actors within such institutions. Therefore, this study goes beyond existing proposals for a third way, e.g., early proposals on a system of veto rights (Abromeit 1998) or on interparliamentary co-operation (Crum and Fossum 2012), in that it does not call for institutional innovations to insert the interests of those affected in interconnected settings into the domestic decision-making process. In essence, it suggests a refocusing of theoretical and empirical research: MPs already do define their representative mandate more broadly than we as scholars tend to expect. They do have a multilayered conception of the relevant political community, possibly consisting of different national demoi and a European demos they feel simultaneously responsible for. Rather than (only) parliamentarizing Europe, i.e., strengthening the supranational channel, the findings of this study suggest Europeanizing parliaments (the intergovernmental channel)

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instead (Koenig-Archibugi 2019). Another virtue of such a refocusing for representation research is that the underlying mechanisms of crossborder representation may travel to other international settings as well (see also Sect. 7.3). While this is beyond the scope of this study and ultimately an empirical question, the study has confirmed the theoretical and empirical virtue of the representative claims-making approach (de Wilde 2013; Saward 2006, 2010) to uncover such patterns in the first place. We can extend the analysis to other international and non-state forms of governance. This may include representative patterns in international assemblies such as the United Nations (UN) (e.g., de Wilde et al. 2016b), in international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) in international organizations (IOs) around the globe or among non-state actors that influence transnational policy issues such as Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for Future movement. Ultimately, empirical representation research can use the modified version of the Representative Claims Analysis introduced in this study for any kind of representative object, not just for detecting cross-border representative patterns. This may include representative relationships in regional assemblies or questions of party-voter dealignment, for example (e.g., Nyhuis et al. 2016).

7.3

From Transnational Representation to Transnational Democracy

Now that we have argued that Europeanized parliaments can be an antidote to the EU’s democratic deficit, the fundamental normative question arises whether or not they should be. Should national representatives deviate from their classic role based on formal electoral accountability and expand their representative appeal in the first place? Given that national voters elect them, and other EU citizens do not possess the formal sanctions to decline these self-proclaimed representatives, is European representation desirable from a democratic perspective? How can we ensure this kind of representation to guarantee public control, political equality, and public justification (Lord and Pollak 2013, p. 526)? That is essentially, how do these patterns of representation remain democratic? The study highlights three reasons why the observed patterns can be considered normatively desirable and democratically legitimate. First, and this relates to public control, national MPs remain exactly this, nationally elected representatives. Their national institutional anchoring and electoral relationship remain intact and there is no need to loosen these chains of

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authorization and accountability. This formal context helps render their representative claims legitimate. At the same time, classic national interest representation still plays a major role in what MPs say and think. Many are National Republicans, and the standard account of representation remains vital, yet other forms of representation also gain momentum in response to EU realities. This calls for caution toward the “idea that we can have democracy without boundaries means that the intimate link between democracy and the state can be severed” (Dryzek 1999, p. 44). On the contrary, this study indicates that this national link is vital for democracy without boundaries to be possible (see also Bellamy 2019 on republican intergovernmentalism in the EU). Second, and this relates to political equality, the patterns are not only agent-, but also principal-driven. Not only MPs themselves start broadening their representative portfolio. This may very well be initiated by the wishes of their voters. Scholars commonly ascribe awareness of responsibilities beyond the nation-state to the political elite rather than the voters. This study has raised attention to the fact that a sense of cross-border responsibility may also be located at the voter-level. Research has in fact found traits of even more far-reaching solidarity among some European citizens (e.g., Kuhn et al. 2018; Risse 2014b). Some may interpose that this mechanism will not apply to the majority of voters and even those that do show cross-border solidarity, for example, discriminate against foreigners (e.g., Kuhn and Kamm 2019). Even if this only applies to a limited number of voters, in an increasingly interdependent world, some responsibility toward non-national citizens is better than none. Ultimately, the question is whether the Left Party represents the ‘working poor’ in Greece in the German Bundestag not only because the MPs think it is the morally upright thing to do, but because their voters also feel the fate of these Greek citizens should be taken into account by their German MPs. This latter one should be the more ‘durable variant’. It reconciles responsibility with responsiveness and can therefore increase trust in and legitimacy of representation in the EU. Even if the majority of voters were not to drive European representation in national parliaments, the normative potential of these alternative representative patterns unfolds regardless of whether their inclusion in domestic will-formation on EU matters is driven by the agents or the principals. The same holds true for the “sincerity, authenticity, truthfulness” (Saward 2017, p. 85) of such representation. The analysis of MPs’ self-perception in this study does indicate a certain sincerity, but even if MPs were not at all sincere in their

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representative claims beyond borders, their publicly uttering them might produce policy outcomes that reflect transnational interests better than had they not been mentioned at all. This resonates with the importance of transnational discourse for evolving transnational democracy (Dryzek 1999). The third reason why we can consider such broader representative debate and mindset among national MPs in EU politics normatively desirable relates to the importance of justification in the process of such representation. The burden is on the MPs to provide justification for why they are legitimate representatives of certain constituencies, and why they construct them the way they do. Even for constituencies who do not agree with an MP’s representative choice in EU politics, it may become more legitimate, when the MP adheres to every citizen’s “individual right to receive justifications” (Lord 2013, p. 249) for decisions that affect them. All three reasons show that there are important normative implications of distinguishing between the authorizing and the affected constituency who do not tend to match in a globalized world (Montanaro 2018). While the national electorate as the authorizing constituency may judge the effectiveness of representation, only the affected constituency can judge its legitimacy (Disch 2015). The problem is that an affected constituency that goes beyond national borders does not have the institutional means to relay that judgment to the national representatives. This can lead to claims of misrepresentation (Guasti and Rezende de Almeida 2019), in a worst-case scenario even to paternalistic forms of surrogate representation like in the context of colonialism, for instance (Kinski and Crum 2020, p. 385). One might then conclude that speaking for European constituencies can certainly be a matter of advocacy, but never truly one of representation. This study would argue that the difference between Europeanized constituencies and say, future generations, for example (Whiteside 2019) is that the former are actual flesh and blood constituents who inhabit a fixed territory and have an ascertainable will. Therefore, they can in principle become objects of trans- and supranational representation. Nevertheless, the point remains that they have no institutional channels to validate the claimant’s assertion of representativeness. Here, we could argue that the affected constituencies still receive some form of access that they would not have had, had representation been purely national and their interests been seen as irrelevant among national MPs. As we have seen, many national MPs open up the domestic debate on EU politics

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to these constituencies and sincerely believe this to be the appropriate thing to do. Ultimately, it may be easier for affected constituencies to contest representation on their behalf by such elected than by unelected representatives. If transnational representation in national parliaments can be democratic, can we then conclude that it is a stepping stone to transnational democracy? The answer is: it may be. The European Union as the overall institutional framework, in which these representative patterns emerge, clearly has some virtues that may make the observed patterns especially successful there. First, member states co-operate within the framework of the European treaties based on shared values. This ensures equality and permanence to a degree that we do not see in international politics and global governance more broadly. Those most affected by EU decisions are also those jointly subjected to the EU as a “structure of governance that sets the ground rules that govern their interaction” (Fraser 2008, p. 65). Possibly this makes members of EU national parliaments and their voters especially aware of their responsibilities for more than just the national interest. Second, as we have seen, national parliaments as institutions are very much involved in EU politics. In the EU, they are ‘multi-arena players’ (Auel and Neuhold 2017) in a ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum 2009). Again, this is something that does not necessarily hold true for international relations more broadly. What we can say is that parliaments remain key representative institutions in a globalized world, and there is much to say in favor of bringing international affected interests into these institutions. Ultimately, whether the patterns we observe travel to other international settings and transnational policy issues, is something future empirical research has to investigate. Do debates on migration revolve around the interests of those seeking sanctuary or around the protection of national citizens? Are representative patterns during the global COVID-19 pandemic national or cross-national? The all-affected principle (see Goodin 2007; Held 1995) as a normative yardstick for global governance and transnational democracy (KoenigArchibugi 2017) suggests that all those affected by a decision should be able to give their input into that decision. To make that work, scholars have proposed the creation of various formal mechanisms of authorization and accountability for all those affected by a political decision (Koenig-Archibugi 2012; Rehfeld 2005; see also contributions in Blatter and Bauböck 2019). For national parliaments in the EU, such

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proposals include extending EU citizens’ election rights from local to national level, or introducing a ‘Green Card’ for national parliaments as a proactive rather than protective way to put proposals on the EU agenda (Fasone and Fromage 2015). This would mean that national parliaments have to consider not only subsidiarity and proportionality, but ultimately also shared responsibility across borders. This study enriches these discussions on institutional responses that foster transnational democracy by highlighting that alongside these, we need the corresponding representative practice and actor behavior. Such alternative patterns of representation in national parliaments can contribute to a more responsive and responsible representation in the EU. They may also fulfill the requirements of democratic representation, although some properties of the EU as a political system may make it special in this regard. Looking at both representative speech behavior and conceptions, this study shed light on what MPs say and think. It provided empirical evidence that what MPs say in parliament is not ‘mere talk,’ but that there seems to be something going on below simple strategic rhetoric. While MPs remain strategic actors responding to electoral and party-political incentives, they have a deeper opinion on whom and how to represent in EU politics. Whether this translates into substantively different policy decisions, and whether parties “walk like they talk” (Bischof 2018, p. 310) remains up to future research to investigate. A starting point could be to look at the congruence between MPs’ understanding of representation in transnational contexts and that of their voters (e.g., for the national context Bengtsson and Wass 2010; Méndez-Lago and Martínez 2002). What we have seen is that national parliamentary representation continues to adjust to modern realities, and it seems, “[t]here is no alternative in sight to parliamentary representation when it comes to combining responsiveness and leadership in a democratically responsible way” (Schüttemeyer 2009, p. 11).

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Appendix

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7

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LT

Topic

Country

22nd Legislative Period/109th Session 23nd Legislative Period/55th Session 24th Legislative Period/73rd Session

11.05.2005

19.05.2010

08.07.2010

24th Legislative Period/66th Session

22nd Legislative Period/96th Session

02.03.2005

09.04.2008

Code/number

Date Bundesverfassungsgesetz über den Abschluss des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa (Constitutional Amendment) Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa samt Protokolle, Anhänge und Schlussakte (Ratification) Vertrag von Lissabon zur Änderung des Vertrags über die Europäische Union (Lisbon I) Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem zur Durchführung des Vertrags von Lissabon das Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und das Bundesverfassungsgesetz, mit dem besondere Bestimmungen für die Neuermittlung der Verteilung von nach der Wahl der Mitglieder des Europäischen Parlaments 2009 zu vergebenden Mandaten durch die Bundeswahlbehörde erlassen werden, geändert werden (Lissabon-Begleitgesetznovelle) (Lisbon I) Erklärung des Bundeskanzlers und des Vizekanzlers gemäß § 74b GOG-NR zur Erörterung der Frage der Stabilisierung der gemeinsamen europäischen Währung und den Lehren aus der Griechenland-Krise

Title

A 3.1 Overview of coded debates per country and topic

Gov. Declaration Length: 2 hrs 50 min

2nd/3rd Length: 1 hr, 34 min

2nd/3rd Length: 7 hrs, 7 min

2nd/3rd Length: 3 hrs, 14 min

2nd/3rd Length: 58 min

Readings/instances/duration

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Topic

TCE

Country

GER BT

24th Legislative Period/66th Session

24th Legislative Period/120th Session Plenary Protocol 15/160

19.05.2010

30.09.2011

24.02.2005

Code/number

Date Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz zur Teilnahme an internationaler Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierung (Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz – ZaBiStaG) geändert wird Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Zahlungsbilanzstabilisierungsgesetz geändert wird Erste Beratung des von der Bundesregierung eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 29. Oktober 2004 über eine Verfassung für Europa/Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Deutschen Bundestages (und des Bundesrates) in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union

Title

(continued)

1st Length: 2 Berlin hours

2nd/3rd Length: 3 hrs, 50 min

2nd/3rd Length: 1 hr 14 min

Readings/instances/duration

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Country

LT

Topic

A 3.1 (continued) Code/number Plenary Protocol 15/175

Plenary Protocol 16/151

Date

12.05.2005

13.03.2008

Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers zur Ratifizierung der europäischen Verfassung: Für ein starkes und soziales Europa/Zweite Beratung und Schlussabstimmung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zu dem Vertrag vom 29. Oktober 2004 über eine Verfassung für Europa/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zum Vertrag von Lissabon/Erste Beratung des Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Erste Beratung des Entwurfes eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Art. 23, 45 und 93) (Lisbon I)

Title

1st Length: 1 ½ Berlin hours

Gov. Declaration 2nd/3rd Length: 2 ½ Berlin hours (excl. Gov. Dec.)

Readings/instances/duration

256 APPENDIX

Country

Topic

Code/number Plenary Protocol 16/157

Plenary Protocol 16/232

Date

24.04.2008

26.08.2009

Zweite Beratung und Schlussabstimmung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zum Vertrag von Lissabon/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfes eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Art. 23, 45 und 93) (Lisbon I) Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Grundgesetzänderungen für die Ratifizierung des Vertrags von Lissabon/Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Erste Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 23, 45 und 93) (Lisbon II)

Title

(continued)

1st Length: 1 ½ Berlin hours

2nd/3rd Length: 2 Berlin hours

Readings/instances/duration

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Country

EFSF

Topic

A 3.1 (continued) Code/number Plenary Protocol 16/232

Plenary Protocol 17/42

Date

08.09.2009

19.05.2010

Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung der Grundgesetzänderungen für die Ratifizierung des Vertrags von Lissabon/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundes-tages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union/Zweite und Dritte Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 23, 45 und 93) (Lisbon II) Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch die Bundeskanzlerin: zu den Maßnahmen zur Stabilisierung des Euro in Verbindung mit Erste Beratung des von den Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und der FDP eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus (StabMechG)

Title

Gov. Declaration/ 1st Length: 2 Berlin hours (excl. Gov. Dec.)

2nd/3rd Length: ¾ Berlin hours

Readings/instances/duration

258 APPENDIX

Country

Topic

Code/number Plenary Protocol 17/44

Plenary Protocol 17/124

Date

21.05.2010

08.09.2011

Zweite und dritte Beratung des von den Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und der FDP eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus (StabMechG) Erste Beratung des von den Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus in Verbindung mit Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP: Parlamentsrechte im Rahmen zukünftiger europäischer Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen sichern und stärken (StabMechG neu)

Title

(continued)

1st Length: 2 Berlin hours

2nd/3rd Length: 2 Berlin hours

Readings/instances/duration

APPENDIX

259

Topic

TCE LT

Country

IRL DE

A 3.1 (continued) Code/number Plenary Protocol 17/130

xxx Vol. 650, No. 3 Vol. 651, No. 1 Vol. 651, No. 2 Vol. 651, No. 3 Vol. 651, No. 4 Vol. 652, No. 1 Vol. 652, No. 2

Date

29.09.2011

none 02.04.2008

03.04.2008

08.04.2008

09.04.2008

10.04.2008

17.04.2008

22.04.2008

Zweite und dritte Beratung des von den Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP eingebrachten Entwurfs eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus; Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Haushaltsausschusses zu dem Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP: Parlamentsrechte im Rahmen zukünftiger europäischer Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen sichern und stärken (StabMechG neu) xxx Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I) Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I)

Title

xxx 2nd Length: 1 hr, 36 min 2nd (resumed) Length: 2 hrs, 31 min 2nd (resumed) Length: 1 hr, 20 min 2nd (resumed) Length: 3 hrs, 20 min 2nd (resumed) Length 1 hr, 42 min 2nd (resumed) Length: 50 min 2nd (resumed) Length: 1 hr, 50 min

2nd/3rd Length: 2 Berlin hours

Readings/instances/duration

260 APPENDIX

Country

EFSF

Topic

Code/number Vol. 652, No. 3

Vol. 653, No. 2

Vol. 687, No. 4

Vol. 687, No. 4

Vol. 692, No. 3 Vol. 692, No. 3

Vol. 713, No. 3 Vol. 713, No. 3

Vol. 740, No. 3

Vol. 741, No. 1

Date

23.04.2008

29.04.2008

08.07.2009

08.07.2009

21.10.2009

21.10.2009

24.06.2010

24.06.2010

20.09.2011

21.09.2011

European Financial Bill and Euro Area (Amendment) Bill European Financial Bill and Euro Area (Amendment) Bill

Stability Facility Loan Facility

Stability Facility Loan Facility

European Financial Stability Facility Bill European Financial Stability Facility Bill

European Union Bill

European Union Bill

Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2009 (Lisbon II)

Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2009 (Lisbon II)

Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I)

Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 (Lisbon I)

Title

(continued)

2nd (resumed, debated twice) Length: 3 hrs, 50 min

Committee + Remaining Stages Length: 3 hrs, 28 min (with 2nd) 2nd (debated twice) Length: 1 hr, 21 min

2nd (resumed, debated thrice) Length: 5 hrs, 40 min Committee + Remaining stages (debated twice) Length: 1 hr, 40 min 2nd (resumed, debated twice) Length: see below Committee + Remaining Stages Length: 4 hrs, 52 min (with 2nd) nd (debated twice) Length: see below Committee + Remaining Stages Length: 4 hrs (with 2nd) 2nd (see below)

Readings/instances/duration

APPENDIX

261

15.11.2011

03.11.2011

27.10.2011

24.05.2011

21.06.2010

Vol. 535, part No. Eurozone Crisis 225

Especially in Ireland, a reading of the bill/stage of debate could be spread out over several days or debate instances

EFSF

21.01.2008

LT

11.03.2008

09.02.2005

TCE

UK HC

Vol. 741, No. 1

21.09.2011

Title

European Financial Stability Facility Bill and Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Bill Vol. 430, part No. European Union Bill 37 Vol. 470, part No. European Union (Amendment) Bill 34 Vol. 473, part No. European Union (Amendment) Bill 64 Vol. 512, part No. European Council 18 Vol. 528, part No. Eurozone Financial Assistance 163 Vol. 534, part No. Eurozone Crisis 215 Vol. 534, part No. Eurozone Crisis 219

Code/number

Date

Topic

Country

A 3.1 (continued)

Committee + Remaining Stages Length 1 hr 2nd and final Length: 5 hrs, 5 min 2nd Length: 4 hrs, 48 min 3rd Length: 5 hrs, 59 min ex post statement + debate Length: 44 min Backbench Business Length: 59 min ex post statement + debate Length 1 hr, 9 min Chancellor of the Exchequer statement Eurozone crisis + implications for UK Length: 44 min Westminster Hall Debate Length: 1 hr, 30 min

Readings/instances/duration

262 APPENDIX

Claimant Representative Claim

DATE YEAR CLAIMANT CLAIMANT PARTY TYPE OF CLAIMANT I (Executive actor)

V3c V3d V4

V4a

V4b

V3b

V3a

TOPIC PLENARY DEBATE PLENARY DEBATE

CLAIM NUMBER PARLIAMENT

V1

Plenary Debate

V2

Variable name

Variable number

Elements

A 3.2 Codebook representative claims analysis

Is it an executive actor or an MP?

Which party does the claimant belong to?

Date of plenary debate Year only Who is the claimant?

Plenary debate topic

What is the specific topic of the plenary debate?

Name of the chamber?

Variable question/description

Categorical

String

Numerical Numerical String

Categorical

String

Categorical

Numerical

Variable type

AT NR DEU BT IRL DÉ UK HC

(continued)

Text (CDU etc.) (automatically recoded into categorical variable) 0 = Executive 1 = Legislative

1 = EFSF 2 = LT 3 = TCE DD.MM.YYYY 20xx Name of Executive actor/MP

1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = Text

1 - ∞

Coding scheme/categories

APPENDIX

263

Elements

A 3.2 (continued)

TYPE OF CLAIMANT II (Governing majority) CLAIMANT GENDER CLAIMANT AGE

V4c

CLAIMANT EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE CLAIMANT COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP TYPE OF SPEECH ACT

MODE OF CLAIM (direct/indirect)

V4g

V4h

V4j

V4i

CLAIMANT EDUCATION

V4f

V4e

V4d

Variable name

Variable number

Categorical

Categorical

Categorical

Which committee is the MP a member of? Is the claim within an ordered MP speech or interjected into another MP’s speech? Direct: ‘I represent x’; indirect: ‘You do not represent x’

Categorical

Categorical

Has the claimant (had) experience at the European level?

What is the claimant’s highest level of education?

Numerical

Categorical

Categorical

Is it member of governing majority or opposition?

Is the claimant male or female? How old is the claimant?

Variable type

Variable question/description

1 = direct 2 = indirect 3 = both

0 = ordered speech 1 = interjection

0 = male 1 = female Difference between date of birth and date of plenary debate in years 0 = below BA or equivalent 1 = minimum BA or equivalent 0 = no 1 = yes see List of European Experience 0 = all other committees 1= EAC/FAC

0 = Governing majority 1 = Opposition

Coding scheme/categories

264 APPENDIX

Elements

Variable name TOPIC STRING MAIN TOPIC

ADDITIONAL TOPICS POSITION

REP FOCUS

REP STYLE

Variable number

V5

V5a

V5b

V6

V7

V8

Categorical

Categorical

What is the style of representation?

Categorical

0 = no evaluation 1 = positive evaluation 2 = negative evaluation 3 = ambivalent evaluation 1 = National 2 = National and European (Europeanized) 3 = Only European (European) 1 = general interest (Republican) 2 = particular interest (Pluralist) 3 = both (Politico) see List of particular vs. general interest

Categories see List of Topics 0 no additional topics

Categories see List of Topics

Categorical

Categorical

Text

Coding scheme/categories

String

Variable type

What is the object of representation?

What is the topic of the claim? What is the main polity and/or policy topic referred to by the claimant in the representative claim? What are the additional polity and/or policy topics referred to in the claim? Which position regarding the main topic is taken in the claim?

Variable question/description

APPENDIX

265

266

APPENDIX

A 3.2 List of topics Treaty reforms 1 = polity related 1000 1100 1200 1300

= = = =

EU integration process and European Union in general Treaty reform Democratic quality of EU affairs EU institutions and decision-making procedures

2 = specific policy tools 2000 = Financial transfers in the EU (financial endowment of the EU/transfers in the EU (CAP, structural funds, budget/MFF) or national governmental actions toward financial endowment of the EU/transfers in the EU) 2100 = EMU (policies regarding single market, monetary union, its social/ecological regulation) 2200 = Justice and Home Affairs (migration, asylum, police and justice issues, Charter of fundamental rights) 2300 = Foreign Policy and Enlargement (GASP, CFSP, Neighborhood Policy, Global World Trade, and climate policy) 3 = other Eurozone crisis management 1 = polity-related 100 = Economic and Monetary Union/EU Economic Governance in general 101 = EMU/EU Economic Governance reform and crisis management 102 = Democratic quality of EMU affairs 2 = specific policy tools 200 = GRC rescue packages/measures 201 = European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 202 = European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

APPENDIX

203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

267

Fiscal Compact Financial Transaction Tax/Tobin Tax and similar Specific National Austerity Policies in crisis context Debt Break Packages on Capital Market Regulation Stability and Growth Pact Bank Levy European Semester Euro Bonds EU Measures against (youth) unemployment Bank Rescue Packages Six Pack European System for Bank Insolvencies Measures for Co-ordination of Economic Policy at EU level European Citizen Initiative Europe 2020 national income tax (in crisis context)

3 = General 300 301 302 303

= = = =

primacy of politics over markets Sovereign debt as cause of crisis Financial market as cause of crisis EU integration general

4 = Other A 3.2 List European experience EP COSAC Euro-Mediterranean Group Committee of Regions Western European Union European Investment Bank European Movement (incl. European League of Economic Cooperation)

268

APPENDIX

(Vice-) president, leader of European parties and/or their youth organizations Members of Convention for constitutional treaty Council of Europe OSCE For Germany Europa Union A 3.2 List particular vs. general interest representation Style of representation

Coding

Republican (General Interest)

People/‘the people’ Population Citizens Humans National/European/ country interest Next generation ‘hard-working’ (taxpayers, employees, savers, civil servants, nurse, nanny, craftsman, freelancers, baker, seasonal workers, etc.) ‘in need/the weak’/‘exploited’ (students, low income people/unemployed, pensioners/retirees, migrants, disabled, disenfranchised/social disadvantaged, mortgage holders) employers/business (Small and medium sized enterprises, large companies, [export] industry, entrepreneurs) youth/young generation/children old generation ‘anti-EU’ (angry man on the street, etc.) families ‘the ordinary citizen’ consumers farmers fishers party, (party voters) region/constituency Christians women other

Pluralist (Particular Interest)

APPENDIX

269

A 3.3 Coding examples (1) Harald Vilimsky (FPÖ), EFSF ZaBiStG 1, 19.05.2010 “Why not hold the banks accountable? They went into the financial gambling house, my honourable members. That was the usual way. (…). That, precisely, is the problem, to find an alternative in the interest of Austrian taxpayers, and to not only act in the interest of the banks – ‘your’ banks are in many ÖVP-committees! – but to adequately represent the Austrian taxpayers.” Topic: 302 Whom: National (Austrian taxpayers) How: Pluralist (2) Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin (Sinn Féin), EFSF Installation, 24.06.2010 “I have to object not only to the imposition of a guillotine in regard to this Bill, but I also oppose the Bill entirely. A hugely significant measure is contained within the Bill, yet it is being forced through the House. It will have implications for people across Europe and not only in Ireland. If we look at what has been said about the measures involved, we can take the Greek situation. It is not about the ordinary citizens of Greece. They are being held to pay for the bailout of those who were holding Greek government debt. This is not the way we believe it should be addressed and we will oppose the legislation. Our spokesperson will explain the reasons in detail. We will neither endorse the approach contained in it nor the guillotine being sought.” Topic: 201 Whom: National plus European (people across Europe and Ireland; ordinary citizens in Greece) How: Politico (3) Inge Höger (Die Linke), EFSF StabMechG new 2/3, 29.09.2011 “I reject the expansion and strengthening of the so-called EU- rescue mechanism. The law is bad news for the people in Europe. It is bad news for the employees in Greece. Thanks to EU regulations, they will have even less money in their pockets in the future, but work longer hours – how absurd! It is bad news for the Greek retirees. They are also supposed to pay for a crisis they did not cause. The employees in the public sector are now threatened by unemployment. And the people in

270

APPENDIX

Greece who rely on public service are the ones suffering from this unjust crisis management. For instance, I am thinking of sick people who cannot afford the high costs in privatized hospitals. The rescue mechanism is envisaging further privatizations. This is also bad news for students who cannot afford tuition fees. Two-tier education, two-tier medicine, two-tier Europe!” Topic: 101 Whom: European (people in Europe, Greek retirees, public service employees, those reliant on Greek public service) How: Politico (4) Quentin Davies (Conservative Party), TCE debate, UK, 09.02.2005 “On double majority voting, I understand that the Spanish and the Poles did not want that because they had the artificial advantage of a weighting in their favour under the previous system, but I cannot see why it is in the British national interest that the Poles and the Spaniards should have that advantage.” Topic: 1300 Whom: National (British national interest) How: Republican (5) Damien English (Fine Gael), Lisbon Treaty debate, 23.04.2008 “The Lisbon treaty will ensure that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding within the EU. This is a very positive move as it will strengthen the protection of rights for citizens of Ireland and other member states.” Topic: 2200 Whom: National plus European (citizens of Ireland and other member states) How: Republican (6) Peter Altmaier, (CDU), TCE debate, 24.02.2005 “Especially the fact that the European Constitution does precisely not represent the wishes and ideas of a single country has contributed to the fact that Europe as a whole has won and thus all European citizens.” Topic: 1100 Whom: European (all European citizens) How: Republican Notes: Dependent variables and topic only.

APPENDIX

271

A 3.4 Interview Questionnaire (English) Brief description of research interest (Note: Parts in bold are asked out loud, interviewer instructions are not bold. The order of questions may be adjusted depending on the conversation flow. Must-ask questions are underlined.) Ice-breaker question:Generally speaking, how have EU affairs affected your work as an MP/TD? First of all, I would like to ask you a few general questions about the EU political environment. BLOCK I: POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: INTERDEPENDENCE, SYSTEM MAINTENANCE, RESPONSIBILITY/RESPONSIVENESS Question 1:Recent data from the European Social Survey has revealed that [EU/country value]% of the [EU/country] respondents who answered this question find it important for democracy in general that national politicians take into account the views of other European governments as well. How do you feel about this? (follow-up question) Do you take these into account in your daily work? Question 2:Do you feel co-responsible for the European Union? Why (not)? Question 3:Sometimes this responsibility for the wider system can go against being responsive to the interests of the British/Irish citizens, do you experience this tension, and if so, how? (follow-up question) Can you give examples from your work? Question 4:How did you experience this tension during the Eurozone crisis? (for those who do not perceive tension) Has the Eurozone crisis changed something in your perception? BLOCK II: REPRESENTATIVE FOCUS AND STYLE Now I would like to turn to the people you represent in the British House of Commons/Irish Dáil and on whose behalf you make decisions in parliament. Question 5:As a parliamentarian, who do represent in EU affairs? (follow-up questions) And what does that mean in practice? Can you give examples?

272

APPENDIX

Question 5a:Has the Eurozone crisis changed something in that respect? Question 6 (if not already included in 5/5a): When making EUdecisions in parliament, do you take into account the consequences of your decisions on other EU member states/other EU citizens? (follow-up question, if yes) Why? (follow-up question, if no) Why not? Question 7:If you think of the other members of the House of Commons/Dáil, who do you think they represent in EU matters? Question 8:(If MP/TD has been in parliament for at least the past two legislative terms): You have been in the House of Commons/Dáil for a while now. Would you say that members of the House of Commons/Dáil have generally become more national or European in their representation? (follow-up) What do you base this on? Question 9:If you think about various groups in society, do you represent the interests of a certain group in the British/Irish parliament when it comes to EU affairs? Question 9a:Has the Eurozone crisis changed this? Question 10:Whose well-being do you have in mind/who do you feel responsible for when you make EU decisions? Question 11:Do you think a member of parliament should represent particular interests or the common good in EU affairs? (deliberately asked without national versus European). Question 11a:Has the Eurozone crisis changed this? Wrap-up Questions:If you could institutionally design a European Union, what would it look like? What role would national parliaments play in it?

APPENDIX

273

A 6.1 Anonymized interviewees Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

Country

Party

Interviewee

IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL IRL GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER GER UK UK

FG FG FG FG FG FG LAB_IRL LAB_IRL LAB_IRL FF FF FF IND_IRL IND_IRL IND_IRL IND_IRL SPD SPD SPD SPD SPD CSU CSU CDU CDU CDU CDU CDU Left_GER Left_GER FDP FDP FDP FDP FDP Green_GER LAB_UK LAB_UK

Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee

Duration 1 (l1) 2 (l2) 3 (l3) 4 (l4) 5 (l5) 6 (l6) 7 (l7) 8 (l8) 9 (l9) 10 (l10) 11 (l11) 12 (l12) 13 (l13) 14 (l14) 15 (l15) 16 (l16) 17 (l17) 18 (l18) 19 (l19) 20 (l20) 21 (l21) 22 (l22) 23 (l23) 24 (l24) 25 (l25) 26 (l26) 27 (l27) 28 (l28) 29 (l29) 30 (l30) 31 (l31) 32 (l32) 33 (l33) 34 (l34) 35 (l35) 36 (l36) 37 (l37) 38 (l38)

52 39 37 46 10 43 41 39 45 31 67 37 25 44 32 34 25 27 58 56 33 35 31 55 24 61 41 33 38 37 38 20 43 59 51 22 32 38

min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min

(continued)

274

APPENDIX

A 6.1 (continued) Case 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Country

Party

Interviewee

UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT

LAB_UK LAB_UK LAB_UK LAB_UK LAB_UK CON CON CON CON CON CON CON ÖVP ÖVP ÖVP ÖVP SPÖ SPÖ SPÖ Green_AUT Green_AUT Green_AUT Green_AUT FPÖ FPÖ FPÖ BZÖ BZÖ

Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee Interviewee

Duration 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

(l39) (l40) (l41) (l42) (l43) (l44) (l45) (l46) (l47) (l48) (l49) (l50) (l51) (l52) (l53) (l54) (l55) (l56) (l57) (l58) (l59) (l60) (l61) (l62) (l63) (l64) (l65) (l66)

52 25 40 30 28 31 35 38 35 26 24 34 14 66 50 35 37 30 30 57 29 48 36 30 27 32 41 37

min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min min

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Index

A Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), 117, 118, 124, 180, 202, 204, 222, 225, 226 Aristotle, 30 Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), 198, 205, 217, 218, 224

Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), 198, 204, 207, 214, 224, 225 Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria, 219, 222, 226 Common Agricultural Policy, 150 Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), 39

B Bagehot, Walter, 31 Brexit, 182, 239, 241 Budget Committee, 6, 89, 225 Bundestag, 5, 82, 84, 120, 129, 152, 183, 205, 222, 244 Burke, Edmund, 31, 33, 34

Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), 26, 27, 156, 224 Conservative Party (CON), UK, 118, 128, 198, 199, 203, 216 Constructivism, 4, 8, 30, 34, 44–46, 50, 59, 234, 241

C Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 123, 156, 160 Charter of Fundamental Rights, 119

Council of the European Union/Council of Ministers, 23, 26, 152, 154 COVID-19, 2, 246

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 L. Kinski, European Representation in EU National Parliaments, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53313-7

305

306

INDEX

D Dáil (Éireann), 5, 82, 84, 119, 120, 128, 129, 183, 215, 218 Denationalization, 29 Die Linke (German Left Party), 124, 129, 216 E Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), 9, 25, 26 Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU), 84 Election Day, 8 Electoral connection/linkage, 3, 8, 32–35, 49, 55, 82, 175, 197 European Affairs Committee (EAC), 6, 24, 87, 152, 173, 176, 178, 225 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), 28 European Commission, 25, 148, 197, 229 European Election Candidate Study, 42 European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 82, 83, 86, 88, 118, 120, 121, 129, 131, 132, 135, 142, 145, 151, 161, 164, 165, 174, 175, 178, 179, 183, 184 Europeanization Eurosceptic, 124, 142, 143, 161, 166, 167, 170, 180, 181, 211, 221, 223, 238 national parliaments, 4, 5, 9, 43, 44, 120, 125, 142, 166, 179–181, 233, 237, 240 representation, 5, 9, 41, 43, 44, 50, 53–55, 62, 99–101, 105, 120, 121, 125, 127, 139, 141–144, 148, 156, 161, 166, 167, 179–181, 185, 223, 233, 237–239

European Member of Parliament Study, 41 European Parliament (EP), 7, 23, 26, 27, 42, 44, 63, 90, 156, 181, 229 European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), 152 European Social Survey, 97 European Union (EU) democracy, 6, 7, 27, 43, 52, 62, 63, 82, 143, 184, 185, 203, 217, 228, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 244, 246, 247 demoi-cracy, 242 demos, 193, 194, 202, 203, 208, 241, 242 legitimacy, 6, 9, 12, 23, 28, 29, 44, 61, 63, 234, 237, 244 Externality manager, 54, 144

F Fianna Fáil (FF), 128, 197, 201, 218, 225 Finance Committee (FC), 6, 82, 89 Fine Gael (FG), 119, 120, 196, 202, 208, 210, 212–215, 229 Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), 89, 152, 153, 157, 173, 176, 179 Fraenkel, Ernst, 214–216 Free Democratic Party (FDP), Germany, 196, 201, 206, 207, 209, 217, 219, 222 Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 124, 195, 199, 202, 203, 226

G Green/Alternative/LibertarianTraditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (GAL-TAN), 157, 161, 170, 171, 180

INDEX

H Hobbes, Thomas, 30 House of Commons, 5, 82, 84, 118, 128, 164, 183

I Input incongruence, 22 Interdependence, 23, 47, 48, 53, 55, 58, 82, 84, 97, 142, 147, 148, 163, 183, 201, 203, 207, 234, 238, 239 International organizations (IOs), 203, 243 International parliamentary institutions (IPIs), 243

L Labour Party (LAB_IRL), Ireland, 196, 219, 220, 223 Labour Party (LAB_UK), UK, 200, 203, 220, 221 Liberal Democrats (UK) (LibDem), 89 Locke, John, 30 Logistic regression, 98, 170, 172, 177

M Maastricht Treaty, 23 Madison, James, 31 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 41–43, 50, 201 Mill, John Stuart, 31 Montesquieu, Charles de, 30 Multi-arena players, 27, 246 Multi-level parliamentary field (MLPF), 27, 246 Multi-method research design, 5

307

N Nationalrat, 5, 82, 84, 118, 128, 135, 183

O Output incongruence, 22, 62

P PartiRep Project, 39 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Germany, 124 Permissive consensus, 23 Plenary debates, 5, 25, 82, 87–90, 99, 132, 133, 141, 185, 209 Political Claims Analysis (PCA), 91 Political parties challenger, 85 Eurosceptic, 85, 90, 124, 166, 170, 180, 238 mainstream, 85, 142, 143, 146, 167, 180, 210, 212, 238 populist, 202, 212, 226 responsible, 47 single-issue, 154, 155, 158, 184 Politicization, 1, 4, 47, 48, 51, 55, 58, 59, 82, 86, 142, 163, 183, 238, 239

Q Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), 7, 23 Qualitative interviews, 60, 81, 88, 95, 141 Quantitative content analysis, 91

R Rational neo-institutional approach, 4, 38, 45, 46, 49 Rawls, John, 103

308

INDEX

Representative Claims Analysis (RCA), 5, 81, 87, 90–93, 98, 107, 127, 224, 228, 243 Responsibility, 12, 20, 21, 26, 28, 32, 33, 40, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 59, 62, 85, 87, 94, 97, 100, 101, 128, 144, 147–149, 152–154, 156, 172, 174, 181, 182, 184, 194, 198–200, 206, 209, 210, 212, 214, 217, 221, 222, 224, 225, 235, 236, 238, 244, 246, 247 Responsiveness, 12, 20, 21, 30, 32, 36, 37, 47, 48, 54, 55, 59, 62, 97, 100, 101, 144, 146, 147, 149, 181, 194, 199, 200, 206, 209, 212, 214, 218, 235, 236, 238, 244, 247 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 30 S Schengen Area, 84 Scottish National Party (SNP), 124 Single European Act (SEA), 23 Single Market, 1, 57, 84, 146, 183, 208 Sinn Féin (SF), 90, 129 Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), 119, 128 Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 129, 205, 226

Surrogate representation, 245 System maintenance, 54, 58, 84, 97, 147, 148, 182, 197, 198, 205, 209, 210

T Teachta Dála (TDs), Irish MP, 122, 156, 208, 210–212, 215, 220, 225 Transnationalization of politics, 4, 22, 43, 47 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), 82, 88, 118, 122, 131, 135, 142, 161, 165, 178, 183, 184 Treaty of Lisbon (LT), 7, 8, 25, 27, 82, 86, 88, 99, 107, 119–121, 128, 131, 142, 161, 164, 165, 175, 179, 183, 184, 239 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 7, 25, 26, 44 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 7

U United Nations (UN), 243

V Virtual third chamber, 26