Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case 9780773593480

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EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA THE TANZANIAN CASE

by DAVID R. MORRISON

MONTREAL

McGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS

First published in the United Kingdom by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London © 1976 by David Morrison ISBN 0-7735-0258-0 Legal Deposit 4th Quarter Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

PREFACE This study explores the circular relationship between formal education and politics in the mainland sector of the United Republic of Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). The politics of education are examined in terms of policies related to social structure, occupational integration and political integration, factors which have in turn influenced the country's structure of political conflict and strategy for development. Parts I and II, focussed on the colonial era and the first half decade of independence, portray a politics-education relationship closely paralleling that found in other underdeveloped African countries, especially the former British dependencies. However, it is hoped that the themes examined illuminate President Julius Nyerere's decision in 1967 to embark upon a major programme of educational reform. His guidelines for Tanzania's "educational revolution", Education for Self-Reliance, their impact on educational policy and practice, and their prospects for implementation are analyzed in some detail in Part III. The book is based largely on field work conducted in Tanzania from October 1965 to December 1966, supplemented by two shorter visits in 1973. Most of the material is drawn from published and unpublished government documents, newspapers, and well over four hundred interviews with politicians, civil servants, teachers, and others. In undertaking research and preparing the book for publication, I received assistance from a number of people and institutions. I am particularly indebted to Professor Colin Leys, now of Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, under whose supervision I worked at the University of Sussex; his intellectual guidance and knowledge of East African affairs I found to be of unquestionably great value. I should also like to thank for their generous support, advice, and criticism: Professor Cranford Pratt, Chairman of the International Studies Programme at the University of Toronto; Dr. E. A. Brett and Professor Bruce Graham of the University of Sussex; Professor Anthony Low, formerly Dean of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex and now of the Australian National University; Mr. Griffiths Cunningham, formerly Principal of Kivukoni College in Dar es Salaam and now of Atkinson College, York University, Toronto; and Dr. James Coleman, author and editor of Education and Political Development and now the regional representative of the Rockefeller Foundation in Kinshasa, Zaire. 5

PREFACE

6

I am grateful to the University College, Dar es Salaam (now the University of Dar es Salaam), and in particular the former Institute of Public Administration, for inviting me to become a Research Associate during 1965-6. The then Director of the Institute, Dr. David Kimble (now Professor of Government at the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), was especially helpful in assisting me to overcome several problems, both academic and nonacademic. I wish to express a general word of thanks to others who were associated with the Institute as well as to members of the Departments of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam and Makerere University in Kampala. I should like to acknowledge my heavy debt to the Tanzanian Ministry of Education (now the Ministry of National Education) for permitting me to undertake interviews with educational administrators and teachers, for giving me access to several Ministry files and documents, and generally for providing a friendly and helpful atmosphere for my research. I am particularly grateful to the late Mr. Solomon Eliufoo, Minister of Education from 1962 to 1968; Mr. Francis Burengelo, a former Principal Secretary; Mr. Augustine Mwingira, formerly Assistant Chief Education Officer (Planning Section), Chief Education Officer, Principal Secretary, and Chief Administrative Officer of the University of Dar es Salaam who is now Principal Secretary in the Ministry of National Service and Defence; and Mr. Joseph Sawe, the first Tanzanian Chief Education Officer. Civil Servants in other ministries, especially in the former Ministry of Regional Administration, were also of great assistance, as were several Ministers, members of Parliament, local authority personnel and officials of the Tanganyika African National Union and the National Union of Tanganyika Workers. In addition I should like to thank the Education Secretaries General and other personnel of the five national educational voluntary agencies that were operating in 1965-6: the Christian Council of Tanganyika; the Education Department of His Highness the Aga Khan; the East African Muslim Welfare Society; the Tanganyika African Parents Association; and the Tanganyika Episcopal Conference. I cannot thank individually the many people who granted me time for interviews, but their contribution to this study cannot be overemphasized. I was provided with excellent facilities and services by libraries and their staffs at the following institutions: The University of Sussex, Brighton; The University College, Dar es Salaam; The University of Dar es Salaam; Makerere College (now Makerere University), Kampala; The University of Zambia, Lusaka; Trent University, Peterborough, Canada; The University of Toronto; The University of London Institute of Education; The Royal

7

PREFACE

Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London; and the British Museum, London. Jacqueline Adams of Peterborough and Veronica Malambo of Lusaka deserve votes of thanks for typing the manuscript and providing secretarial assistance. Arlene Davis, Gloria Holmes, Mavis Prior, Patricia Strode, and Carol Sherman, all of Peterborough, also helped with typing and proofreading. Thanks also to Thomas Mkude, a former student at the University College, Dar es Saalam, who translated several documents for me from Swahili to English. I am grateful for financial and other assistance I received as a Commonwealth Scholar from the United Kingdom Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and the British Council. I should also like to thank the University of Sussex for a generous grant to defray some of the costs entailed in completing the study. Both Trent University and The University of Zambia provided secretarial assistance and duplicating facilities. Finally, it must be noted that I alone am responsible for any errors or deficiencies in the study. The book is dedicated with a special thank you to Gail.

D.R.M. August 1974 Peterborough, Canada

CONTENTS Page 5 14

Preface Abbreviations Chapters 1. Introduction

.

.

.

..

17

PART I: THE COLONIAL AND NATIONALIST LEGACIES 2. Education and Colonial Society .. 3. The Impact of Nationalism ..

.. ..

44 70

PART II: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 4. The Framework for Policy-making and Administration .. .. .. .. .. 95 5. Growth in Educational Provision .. .. 110 128 6. The Politics of Primary School Expansion .. 7. Education and Social Structure .. .. 163 8. The Primary School Leavers Crisis . 195 9. Education and Political Socialization .. .. 215 .. 237 10. The National Service Dispute PART III : A NEW APPROACH 11. Education for Self-Reliance.. .. 12. Conclusion: a Theoretical Overview

..

.. 255 • 307

Appendices I. A Note on Survey Data .. .. .. .. 316 II. Government Expenditures (Current and Capital) on Education as Percentages of Total Government Expenditures and of Gross Domestic Product, Selected African Countries, 1962, 1968 and 1971 .. 318 III. Statistics and Statistical Assumptions relating to Regional and District Disparities in Primary School Provision .. .. .. 320 Select Bibliography Index ..

.

. ..

.. .

326 340

TABLES Table

Page

2.1 Enrolment in African Schools by Level at Five Year .. Intervals, 1926-1956 .. 45 .. .. 2.2 Enrolment in Asian Schools by Level at Five Year Intervals, 1926-1956 .. .. .. .. 46 2.3 Enrolment in European Schools by Level at Five Year Intervals, 1926-1956 .. .. .. .. 46 2.4 Enrolments of Tanganyikan Africans by Educational .. Level, 1956 .. .. .. .. .. 52 2.5 Enrolments of Africans in Standards I-VI by Province, .. .. .. 1948 .. .. .. 54 2.6 Percentage Targets for Enrolment of Children Aged Seven to Eleven and Percentage Enrolment by .. Province, 1953 .. .. .. .. 55 3.1 Enrolment in Aided African Schools by Level, 1956 and 1961, and Percentage Increase, 1956-1961 .. 76 3.2 Enrolment at Entry and Promotion Points in African Aided Schools, 1956 and 1961, and Percentage .. Increase, 1956-1961 .. .. .. .. 76 5.1 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Standards I, V, and VII and in Total Primary School Enrolment, 1956-1961 and 1961-1966 .. 113 5.2 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Forms I and V and in Total Secondary Enrolment, 19561961 and 1961-1966 .. .. .. 114 5.3 Students Enrolled in Teacher Training Courses, 1961 .. .. and 1964 .. .. .. .. 115 5.4 Growth in Higher Educational Provision for Mainland Tanzanian Students, 1961-62-1966-67 117 5.5 Central Government Current Expenditures on Education, by Category, 1962, 1964, and 1966 .. 118 5.6 Central Government Expenditures on Primary and Secondary Education per Pupil, 1962, 1964, and .. .. .. .. 1966 .. .. .. 119 5.7 Primary School Enrolments as Percentages of Estimated Total Populations, Selected African Countries, 1960, 1965, and 1970 .. .. .. 121 5.8 Secondary School Enrolments as Percentages of Estimated Total Populations, Selected African Countries, 1960, 1965, and 1970 .. .. .. 122

TABLES

Table 5.9 Government Expenditures (Current and Capital) on Education as Percentages of Total Government Expenditures and of Gross Domestic Product, Selected African Countries, 1965 .. .. 6.1 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Standards I, V, and VII and in Aided Primary Schools, 1956-1960 and 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 .. 6.2 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Registered Standards I, V, and VII and in Total Enrolment, Kilimanjaro District, 1961-1963 .. .. .. 6.3 Percentage Increases in Educational Expenditures and in Educational Expenditures as Percentages of Total Expenditures, Kilimanjaro District Council, 1961-1963 .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.4 Enrolment in Aided Standards I to VIII, 1963 .. 6.5 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Standards I and VII and in Aided Primary Schools, First Five Years of Independence (1961-1966), First Five Year Plan Period (1964-1969), and Annually from 1965 to 1969 .. .. .. 6.6 Projections of the Five Year Plan and Requests of Kilimanjaro, Iringa, and All Local Authorities for .. Primary School Development, 1964 .. 6.7 A Comparison of Primary School Development Offers of the Ministry of Education to Kilimanjaro District Council and Other Selected LEAs for 1965 6.8 Percentage Increases in Educational Expenditures and in Educational Expenditures as Percentages of Total Expenditures, Kilimanjaro District Council, .. .. .. 1964-1966 .. .. .. 6.9 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Registered Standards I, V, and VII and in Total Enrolment, Kilimanjaro District, 1964-1966 .. .. .. 6.10 Growth in Primary School Enrolment Aided by Central and Local Governments, Kilimanjaro .. .. and Tanzania, 1964-1966 .. .. 7.1 Approximate Enrolments by Race in Selected .. Secondary Schools, 1966 .. .. .. 7.2 Approximate Percentage of School-Age Population Enrolled in Aided and Registered Primary Schools .. .. .. .. .. by Region, 1965

12 Page

124 130 137

138 141

146 148 150

152 152 153 168 173

13 Table

TABLES

Page

7.3 Some Comparisons of Primary School Enrolments in Registered Schools, Five Rural Districts, 1961 and 1966 .. .. .. 174 .. .. .. 7.4 Approximate Percentage of Primary School-Age Children Enrolled in Registered Primary Schools, Four Rural Districts, 1961 and 1966 .. .. 175 7.5 A Comparision of Enrolment in Registered Standards IV and V, Six Rural Districts, 1966 I76 .. .. 7.6 Secondary School Selection by Region, 1966 .. 178 7.7 Number of Assisted Form I Places per Thousand of Population Allocated to Each Region, 1966 .. 179 7.8 Approximate Percentages of Primary School-Age Children Enrolled in Registered Primary Schools, Moshi Town, Iringa Town, and Dar es Salaam, 1961 and 1966 .. .. 187 .. .. .. 7.9 A Comparison of Enrolment in Registered Standards IV and V, Three Urban and Three Rural LEAs, .. 1966 .. .. .. .. .. .. 188 8.1 Percentage of Primary School Leavers Not Obtaining Secondary School Places, 1960-1966 .. .. 196 11.1 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Standards I and VII and in Aided Primary Schools, 1961-1966 and 1966-1971 .. .. .. .. 271 11.2 Percentage Increases in Enrolment in Aided Forms I and V and in Aided Secondary Schools, 1961-1966 .. and 1966-1971 .. .. .. 272 .. 11.3 Annual Percentage Increases in Aided Primary School Enrolment, 1969-1973 .. 272 .. .. .. 11.4 Approximate Percentage of School-Age Population Enrolled in Aided Primary Schools by Region, 1965 .. .. and 1969 .. .. .. 275 .. 11.5 Number of Assisted Form I Places per Thousand of 1967 Population Allocated to Each Region, 1966 and 1971 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 277

ABBREVIATIONS A.

In text and notes Assistant Chief Education Officer ACED Afro-Shirazi Party ASP Christian Council of Tanganyika CCT Chief Education Officer CEO District Education Officer DEO EAMWS East African Muslim Welfare Society General Entrance Examinations GEE Local Education Authority LEA NAUTS National Union of Tanzanian Students NUTA National Union of Tanganyika Workers Provincial Education Officer PEO Primary School Inspector PSI Regional Education Officer REO Tanganyika African National Union TANU Tanganyika African Parents Association TAPA Tanganyika Episcopal Conference TEC Tanganyika National Union of Teachers TNUT Tanganyika Unofficial Members Organization TUMO TANU Youth League TYL United Tanganyika Party UTP Unified Teaching Service UTS

B.

In notes DE DSM EACSO GP HMSO LC ME Min. NA Pad. Sec. Min. PS

Department of Education Dar es Salaam East African Common Services Organization Government Printer His (Her) Majesty's Stationary Office Legislative Council Ministry of Education Minister for Education National Assembly Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Education Principal Secretary, Ministry of Education 14

15 C.

ABBREVIATIONS

In references to files of the Ministry of Educations Coast Coast Regional Education Office, Dar es Salaam DSM Headquarters of the Ministry of Education, Dar es Salaam Iringa Iringa Regional Education Office, Iringa Mbeya Regional Education Office, Mbeya Mbeya Moshi Kilimanjaro Regional Education Office, Moshi Mtwara Regional Education Office, Mtwara Mtwara Songea Ruvuma Regional Education Office, Songea

One Tanzanian Shilling (Sh.) is worth approximately l4¢ (U.S.).

1The

references to files in the notes include reference numbers and locations. The full titles are cited in the bibliography.

1 INTRODUCTION An eminent educationist commented in 1964: "One of the most important insights of the new African nations is their clear recognition that education is the greatest instrument man has devised for his own progress."' His statement reflected a popular perspective of the early 1960s that saw education as the key to "modernization" and rapid economic growth throughout the underdeveloped world, and especially in tropical Africa where John Kenneth Galbraith identified the absence of "a minimum cultural base" as the primary obstacle to development.2 However, while no one would deny that formal education is important in inculcating the skills and attitudes needed for a social and economic transformation, it has become evident that this role, far from being as straightforward as many optimists had thought, is complicated by a number of factors, of which those generally understood to be "political" are of great importance. Education and politics are related in circular fashion: on the one hand, schooling influences the formation of political norms and values and provides one of several qualifications for political officeholding; on the other, a political process is involved in educational policy-making and in public controversies over certain policies.3 Although this relationship prevails in both "underdeveloped" and "developed" countries, it tends to be closer and more pervasive in the former for a number of reasons. Competition over scarce opportunities for school places is intense because formal education is a key factor in differentiating those who can command the material and social rewards of high income employment from those who cannot. It is true that in many parts of Asia and the Middle East the output of post-primary educational institutions is much greater than the demand for people with this level of education; in these cases other factors also determine access to social and economic privileges. However, throughout most of tropical Africa, a secondary education still ensures much greater rewards than society can offer the masses. Thus, the distribution of educational opportunities heavily influences class formation and also reinforces or mitigates other social cleavages that affect politics such as those based on race, religion, geographical location, and ethnicity. Another factor that reinforces the political saliency of education, particularly in African states, is the shortage of well-educated local 17

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

18

manpower with the administrative and technical skills needed to staff public services and productive enterprises. At the same time there are not enough job opportunities in underdeveloped economies to meet the desires for paid employment of people with a minimal level of education. The development and maintenance of political capacity depend heavily on the extent to which this imbalance can be overcome. Finally, because formal education was imported by colonialists, newly independent governments tend to increase the already heavy load on educational systems by attempting to change structures and curricula in ways that will support post-colonial policies and goals. The close identification of education with politics, particularly in the countries of Africa and Asia, is of interest to the student of politics in a number of ways. As James Coleman notes, "there is now a vastly broadened basis for fruitful dialogue regarding the educationpolity relationship on such questions as the role of education in the formation of attitudes, values, and personality; in the recruitment of elites; and in socio-political change."` In fact, since the publication of his book of readings on Education and Political Development in 1965, many political scientists have embarked on research projects focussed primarily on the function of formal education in political socialization5 and the recruitment of elites.6 Yet others, still interested in the education-politics relationship, have examined educational policy-making in case studies of political interaction.7 My own perspective in looking at the Tanzanian experience in one sense falls between these two approaches, yet in another attempts to combine them by examining an aspect of the circular cause-andeffect relationship involved in the "politics of development" and the "development of politics." In other words, the focus is on educational decision-making within the context of general political change, while the educational policies under study are those that in turn affect the structure of political conflict and authority and, more broadly, strategies for economic and social development. The use of formal education to promote the creation of national identity and, more narrowly, to foster attitudes of political and social commitment is of obvious interest in these respects. But so too are questions concerning social stratification and occupational recruitment because, as we have noted, these are highly charged issues that also strongly influence politics, all the more so in Tanzania where the government gradually if hesitantly became more and more committed to a strategy of socialist transformation. Politics in Tanzanian In many new states of Africa and Asia, the mass enthusiasm mobilized at the time of independence has been dissipated. Expectations

19

INTRODUCTION

about the dawn of a new era of prosperity have been replaced by the grim realization that the masses will continue to live at the edge of poverty, exploited or ignored by the few who dominate government and commerce. The fact that the upper strata of society are now dominated by nationals rather than colonial overlords has undoubtedly been a source of some satisfaction; however, as the gap between rich and poor widens, the likelihood of eventual violent social disruption increases. The structures of international aid, trade and politics tend to reinforce this cleavage, and do little to close the gap between the "developed" and the "underdeveloped" worlds.° Nevertheless, in a few new states a search has been undertaken to find means of overcoming stagnation and promoting a more decent and humane life for the people. Tanzania has been one of these, although until 1967 it was by no means certain that it would differ much from most other underdeveloped countries. Even now, its future is almost too heavily dependent upon one man, President Julius Kambarage Nyerere.'° Tanganyika, the mainland sector of the United Republic of Tanzania, achieved independence on December 9, 1961. For leaders of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the struggle for independence had been a relatively easy, but nonetheless exhilarating experience.11 However, once they were in authority, they found it difficult to maintain and use the widespread support they had mobilized behind the cause of freedom. As in other new states, politics were vulnerable to international pressures imposed by the Pan-Africanist movement, the Afro-Asian campaign against colonialism, the Cold War, and, above all, the structures of international capitalism and the world commodity market. In addition, Tanganyika, partly because it had for long an uncertain international status and partly because it lacked lucrative, exploitable resources, had been much more economically neglected than other former British territories such as Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia. The people suffered widely from endemic diseases and were overwhelmingly rural, illiterate and rooted in parochial beliefs and practices; and, while the economy contained a small commercial sector based on the export of cash crops, productive forces remained heavily engaged in near-subsistence agriculture. It is true that political strains based on the strength of "traditional authorities" and tribal distinctions were less severe than elsewhere (largely because the limited capitalist penetration had yet to produce marked material disparities among the regions), but the overall prospects for development appeared bleak indeed. (As things turned out, the low level of capitalist development was a mixed blessing: on the one hand, there was no significant indigenous property-owning class to block socialist reconstruction; on the other, in the relative absence

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

20

of exploitative relations in the countryside, the potential for developing a politically-conscious peasantry was minimal.) Immediately before and after independence, political leaders were inundated with demands for rapid government action that could not possibly be satisfied by the limited stock of available human and material resources.. At the most general level, people wanted more schools, more medical facilities, better roads, higher prices for produce, etc. These pressures were reinforced by the development of what can be termed an "uhuru complex" ; when independence (uhuru) was achieved, many individuals began to assume that the things they had once done for themselves should now be done by the "people's government". Moreover, "uhuru," the Swahili equivalent of "freedom", gave rise to the notion that people were free to behave as they wished and to disregard elements of established authority, especially those associated with the former colonial regime. Political harmony was also threatened by conflicting demands that stemmed from the relative advantages enjoyed by Asian and European minorities over the African majority, the educated over the uneducated, town-dwellers over the rural population, certain regions over others, and Christians over Muslims. Finally, and more specifically, strains arose from the claims of many middle- and lower-level TANU activists who had helped to achieve independence and who expected rewards that were simply not available, the growth of labour unrest, and the vocal, if largely ineffectual, opposition of small splinter parties established to challenge the authority of TANU.I 2 In January 1962, less than two months after independence, the cumulative impact of these political problems was such that Nyerere decided to step down from the office of Prime Minister to devote himself to remoulding TANU as an effective instrument for changed circumstances, and to overcome what he thought were widely-held misconceptions about the meaning of independence. While he was out of office, measures were taken to involve TANU more fully in government work, and a republican constitution was framed under his guidance. Nevertheless, even after Nyerere defeated his only opponent by a margin of almost fifty to one in a November election to fill the new office of President, TANU leaders remained uneasy about the effectiveness of their party. The turnout of eligible voters was rather low and, as Henry Bienen points out, "the election revealed that TANU could win any contest but that it had not organized the population to support it overwhelmingly at the polls."19 A new sense of direction was obviously needed. Having given considerable thought to ways and means of generating effective political participation, Nyerere was able to present to the Annual Conference of TANU in January 1963 a strong case for

21

INTRODUCTION

the creation in law of a one-party state. His speech, later prepared as a pamphlet for public circulation, was the first of several political interventions to deflect the course of development that earned him the sobriquet Mwalimu—the teacher. Elaborating on an earlier defence of the notion that party competition was not essential to democracy,14 Nyerere postulated that in pre-colonial Africa there had been no fundamental cleavages based on wealth or social status, and that institutionalized opposition had been unknown. He claimed that the contemporary situation was somewhat similar: the removal of the old regime destroyed the rationale for intense political conflict because TANU had been formed not to oppose an indigenous group in Tanganyika but rather "to rid ourselves of colonialism". Democracy, instead of a specific set of institutional arrangements, was much more an attitude of mind that depended on guarantees of free discussion.15 Although opposition to the one-party state declaration was expressed only by tiny if vocal minorities, no action was taken on it in 1963, a year during which political leaders were largely preoccupied with an abortive attempt to establish an East African Federation and during which unresolved tensions (especially in labour relations) continued to mount. Then came the most taxing and dramatic strain yet imposed on the political system. In January 1964, within ten days of the armed overthrow of the Sultan and government of neighbouring Zanzibar, noncommissioned officers of two battalions of the Tanganyika Rifles led a mutiny, disarmed their British and Tanganyikan superiors, and confronted the Cabinet with an ultimatum. Although uncertainty (especially pronounced because of events in Zanzibar) was widespread at the time, the mutineers had no intention of securing political power; rather, their action was taken in support of claims for higher pay, better working conditions, and complete Africanization of the commissioned ranks. The government acceded to these demands at first, but later obtained help from United Kingdom forces to arrest the ringleaders and disband the army.16 Although the initial disturbance was quickly contained, the political significance of the event was much wider. Many people suspected of conspiring against the government (notably trade unionists) were detained, most only briefly, and some major political decisions taken earlier were now prosecuted quickly. The President appointed a commission to make recommendations for the constitutional amendments necessary to establish a one-party state; TANU membership was opened to civil servants; and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and its affiliated unions were dissolved and replaced by the National Union of Tanganyika Workers

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

22

(NUTA), a unified organization closely bound to TANU and largely controlled by the Ministry of Labour. Just three months later, Nyerere and the late President Abeid Karume of Zanzibar announced the formation of a union of the two countries,l" which placed yet a further great strain on the resources of the mainland. Although given a constitutional relationship within the United Republic of Tanzania similar to the one then prevailing between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Zanzibari Cabinet continued to exercise powers (particularly in the spheres of foreign relations and defence) that legally fell within the preserve of the Union government. Moreover, the regime on the islands pursued domestic policies that were inspired by a revolutionary socialist's and authoritarian ethos more than those followed by Nyerere and his associates on the mainland. Finally, leaders of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) refused to give up their separate identity to merge with TANU. Hoping (in vain) for an early solution to such problems, Nyerere decided to proceed with a provisional remoulding of political structures on the mainland. After the publication of the report of the One-Party State Commission in 1965, a revised interim constitution forged formal links between TANU and the state." Under its provisions, a presidential plebiscite was held and balloting took place to select members of Parliament for mainland constituencies from twocandidate slates consisting of party members nominated and approved by TANU machinery. The results of the elections were widely acclaimed as proof that a measure of political choice could be permitted within a one-party system and a largely pre-literate society without sacrificing political momentum or suffering severely from the exploitation of racial, religious, tribal or economic cleavages.EO While Nyerere received an overwhelming vote of confidence, over half of the incumbent members were defeated, among them two Ministers and four Parliamentary Secretaries. After the elections, the National Assembly was less of a "rubber stamp" institution and members became conscious of the need to remain in close contact with their constituents in order to retain their seats. Moreover, even though some leaders had been defeated, the elections not only permitted an increase in popular control but also strengthened the collective authority of the government and decreased the likelihood of extraparliamentary opposition by providing an outlet for local grievances. While the experiment in one-party democracy proved remarkably successful in many respects, it depended heavily on Nyerere's efforts. Many men in higher government and party posts showed by their speeches and actions that they did not fully share the President's

23

INTRODUCTION

concern to promote constructive debate and widespread popular participation, and, among middle and lower level leaders, there were even more marked authoritarian and paternalistic tendencies." However, ultimately, in Tanzania as elsewhere, the achievement of commitment among political activists and the maintenance of legitimacy depend heavily on the extent to which an approach to social and economic development can be implemented successfully. Until the end of 1966 the results were not encouraging. When TANU assumed power, it inherited a Three Year Development Plan for 1961 to 1964, which "was largely concerned with outlining projects rather than analyzing the economy and providing for structural change" 22 Scant attention had been paid even to the integration of departmental projects. In short, it was a plan without an ideological rationale that could be communicated to the people, and without means of stimulating a sense of mass involvement. A new slogan—uhuru na kazi, freedom and work—was coined to replace that of the independence struggle—uhuru na umoja, freedom and unity. But undirected appeals to work hard were in themselves ineffective means of promoting change. The rate of growth during the Three Year Plan period was insufficient to raise the real income per capita much above the desperately low level of Q0 per annum; in fact, after a fall in 1961, the 1960 level was not reattained until 196322 The plan's lack of direction and purpose stimulated the government, and the President in particular, to define an approach to development. In publishing Ujamaa—The Basis of African. Socialism in 1962,E4 Nyerere committed himself to the goal of a socialist society. Defining socialism as "an attitude of mind" which "is needed to ensure that people care for each other's welfare," he rebuked modern tendencies towards acquisitiveness, exploitation, idleness, and the acceptance of wide differentials in living standards as permanent. To overcome them it was necessary to return to the traditional spirit of ujamaa—"familyhood". "In tribal society, the individuals or the families within a tribe were `rich' or `poor' according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor." He explicitly rejected the notion that socialism and a classless society must emerge from a conflict between a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, claiming instead that Tanganyika already supported a social structure devoid of class cleavages; while it was true that some people had access to political and economic privileges, these were to be used for the benefit of the underprivileged. However, Nyerere did not offer a strategy for inculcating the values of ujamaa; his prime tactic appeared to be exhortation. The only references to structures in his pamphlet claimed that "rigid adherence to a standard political pattern" could not yield socialist

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

24

behaviour, and admitted that he did not intend "to define the institutions which may be required to embody the socialist attitude of mind in a modern society." Instead, the primary emphasis of the government was on economic growth per se. An ad hoc approach was developed that linked together emphases on centralized planning to maximize the use of scarce resources, on exhortation to mobilize the people towards greater collective and individual efforts, and on the use of the party, the civil service and the cooperative movement as specific instruments for change. In addition, political leaders accepted the orthodox notion that substantial technical and financial assistance from abroad were needed if progress was to be made.26 Nyerere's reluctance to commit himself to far-reaching structural changes stemmed in part from his empiricism; he was willing to see if the basic approach of Western economists would work. Moreover, he stressed consistently that politics inevitably involve a conflict of principles, and that there is "no sacred book.. .which can tell future generations how to attain the ideal."26 His flexibility also arose from the fact that, unlike men such as Lenin and Mao, he had difficulty in winning subservience to his beliefs from his fellow political leaders. We have noted differences of style and opinion on the question of political participation; during the first half decade of independence, views on the strategy for development varied even more widely. While all leaders paid lip service to socialist ends, some saw a flexible policy orientation as essential if aid and investment were to be attracted from developed countries in both Eastern and Western blocs, and others adopted an approach more closely attuned to that of Marxism-Leninism; despite the President's strong views on equality and non-racialism, a few responded favourably to racialist appeals, especially when directed against the Asian business community; and, although Nyerere stressed the importance of close identification between leaders and the people and the necessity of preventing the emergence of a visible gap between them, some Ministers indulged heavily in conspicuous consumption and private investment. 27 Partly as a result of the tendency of members of the political elite to place unity of party and state above unity of purpose, the first major attempt at development planning during the post-independence era ended in failure. The Five Year Plan for 1964 to 1969, clearly more impressive on paper than the earlier Three Year Plan, was conceived as the first of three plans designed to integrate public and private investment in order to achieve by 1980 an increase in per capita income from L20 to ,E45, self-sufficiency in trained manpower, and an improvement in the average life expectancy from thirty-five to fifty years.E8 Although the task of the planners was hampered by a

25

INTRODUCTION

series of administrative and political obstacles, which made their work far less coherent and integrated than they had hoped,88 the plan was ready for submission to Parliament before the beginning of the 1964-5 fiscal year. Once approved it was given wide publicity through the press, the radio, and the party machinery; each citizen was urged to familiarize himself with its contents and to work with others to assist in the realization of its objectives. However, while representing a step towards rationalizing the use of scarce resources and reconciling conflicting goals, the plan did not successfully wed ideology and technology in terms that were comprehensible to TANU functionaries and the masses. In addition, the document did not make allowance for problems that later arose from external responses to policies followed by the Tanzanian government or from shifts in the pattern of demand for the country's exports; nor did it suggest the need for greater state control over the private sector of the economy to stimulate development on an egalitarian basis. The initial two and one half years of the planning period proved disappointing to political leaders and technical experts alike. Besides the difficulty of securing the services of sufficient personnel for implementation, the government faced severe problems in obtaining the financial resources necessary for projected capital and recurrent expenditures: foreign policy disputes with West Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom90 curtailed aid from these countries; business uncertainty about the implications of the formal commitment to socialism and greater incentives to locate enterprises in Kenya created a shortfall in anticipated private investment; and sharp declines in world prices of some of Tanzania's export commodities, notably sisal, reduced foreign trade earnings despite overall increases in agricultural production. The preoccupation of political leaders with securing unity, with remoulding institutions in which dissidence was apparent, with strengthening the union with Zanzibar and with conducting foreign relations distracted their attention from plan implementation. Moreover, although provision was made for periodic progress reviews, no machinery was effectively established to make alterations in programmes as circumstances changed. Gross domestic product actually fell in the first year of the Five Year Plans'. and, of all government departments, only the Ministry of Education remained on schedule at the end of 1966.38 By that year it was also becoming evident that disparities in the distribution of wealth and privilege were continuing to grow. Constant warnings about behaviour that was detrimental to egalitarianism did little to close the economic and cultural gaps between the privileged minority and the underprivileged majority. In fact the

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26

cleavage was growing wider, not just because Africans had taken over jobs formerly held by Europeans, but also because of the tendency among people with newly-acquired riches and influence to further augment these assets. There were indications as well that many members of the public were becoming disillusioned, particularly with political leaders who preached the virtues of hard work and sacrifice while displaying obvious signs of affluence. When Parliament reassembled after the 1965 elections, several newlyelected members embarked on a campaign against Ministers and Regional Commissioners who used expensive chauffeur-driven, publicly-owned cars; allegations were made that some leaders had deserted the people for the "wabenzi," a Swahili term derived from "Mercedes-Benz" and used widely as an abusive description of the rich. Yet another manifestation of dissatisfaction over the pattern of class formation was apparent in mounting unrest among parents and youths about the inability of growing numbers of primary school leavers to obtain either the places in secondary schools that would ensure good paying jobs or any sort of employment outside of the agricultural sector.33 Everybody aspired to the fruits of independence, but only a few were getting them. This whole problem was closely linked with the failure to develop a satisfactory strategy for rural development. The masses were told their future lay on the land, but a life based on near-traditional agriculture was hardly an attractive prospect. By 1966 the three cornerstones of existing agricultural policy were being questioned more strenuously than ever before. Producers' cooperatives were investigated after strong criticisms about inefficiencies in marketing and unsatisfactory profit-sharing arrangements among members.S4 An extensive programme to develop village resettlement schemes was curtailed in scope when it became apparent that individual projects were too heavily capitalized and too paternalistic in organization to create economically independent and viable communities. And doubts increased about the Ministry of Agriculture's "improvement approach," which was directed towards the creation of a virtual class of efficient peasant producers who were expected to stimulate others by their example. By the time Nyerere wrote the introduction to a collection of his speeches and writings in 1966, his views on ujamaa had undergone a change that undoubtedly reflected his concern about these and other obstacles to socialist development. His treatment of the traditional family was less romanticized and idealized, and he disclaimed any "special virtue in `African Socialism' ".35 Later that year he dropped references to socialism as an inherited attitude of mind and began

27

INTRODUCTION

to emphasize the structural change required within the social and economic systems to develop modern Tanzania along socialist lines. While still expressing a willingness to receive external assistance, he started to argue that economic development must receive most of its impetus from internal resources and labour; "self-reliance" was the new key. Finally, he accepted the view that industrialization would have to wait until a new and vigorous approach to agricultural modernization had achieved results.98 To what extent the President originally intended to follow these ideological shifts with concrete action cannot now be determined because matters came to a head in October 1966, setting off a chain of events that culminated in far-reaching changes. The catalyst was a demonstration of some four hundred post-secondary students against the government's terms for compulsory National Service; it came after months of increasingly bitter and arrogant criticism of political leaders by student activists who claimed that they should not have to make sacrifices while the "wabenzi" continued to grow richer and more privileged.S7 Nyerere sent the demonstrators down from their educational institutions, and, taking steps he had urged for some time, cut his own salary and the salaries of all political leaders and civil servants earning more than £660 per annum. In administering these "shock treatments," the President indicated that they were just the beginningofeffortsto check the growing imbalance between the elite and the masses. Towards the end of the year, it was rumoured that some leaders were urging the government to demonstrate decisively a full commitment to the implications of socialism and self-reliance. Early in January 1967 Nyerere toured upcountry areas on what the party newspaper, The Nationalist, labelled "the long march"; later he met with Regional Commissioners and the National Executive Committee of TANU. Stories in the press speculated that he would soon issue a policy declaration, but many observers thought that it would merely amount to another rhetorical statement for propaganda purposes. They were wrong. On February 5, 1967 Nyerere spoke to a mass rally in Dar es Salaam, a custom usually observed only on national holidays, and introduced a "Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance" adopted a few days earlier at the meeting of the TANU National Executive in Arusha. Explaining the "Arusha Declaration," as it became known, he stated that the "time had come to define and make each person understand what socialism was. The time had come to fulfil [the] policy of ujamaa and what the nation should do."38 The document contained several specific proposals for reorganizing the economy and altering government and party structures.

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28

Although other leaders may have influenced its contents, the principal points reflected the evolution of Nyerere's own thought :39 1. The way to build and maintain Socialism is to ensure that the major means of production are under the control of the farmers and the workers themselves through their Government and their cooperatives. 2. We have made a mistake to choose money... to be our major instrument of development. We are mistaken when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries....From now on we shall stand upright and walk on our feet....Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is the people and their hard work, especially in agriculture ....Our emphasis should therefore be on...self-reliance. 3. TANU is a party of farmers and workers....Every TANU and Government leader must be either a farmer or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism. The significant departure of the Arusha Declaration was not so much that the ideas represented a radical and sudden shift in Nyerere's philosophy, which they did not, but rather that its publication signified the beginning of an attempt to make them operational. Within a week of releasing the document, the government nationalized the banks, the major flour milling and import-export companies, and the insurance trade, and announced its intention of acquiring controlling interests in several manufacturing firms and sisal plantations.40 The suddenness of these moves and later nationalization measures (including the expropriation of houses and buildings in 1971) created considerable financial and manpower problems for the government and the firms involved, and it will take some time for compensation difficulties to be resolved. Moreover, for decades some capital that might have been put to alternative uses will be drained into compensation payments and new investment in the nationalized enterprises. Nevertheless, the costs have to be weighed against the benefits: much greater public control over salary and wage structures, an assurance that profits (when they are made) will be available for reinvestment in Tanzania, and an opportunity (albeit not yet effectively taken up) of devising an industrial strategy geared to local needs rather than external profitability.41 Also, the nationalization programme demonstrated that the TANU government was not content just to preach a socialist doctrine that, without implementation, would have appeared more and more cynical as time passed. Policies emanating from the Arusha Declaration imposed on the relatively privileged a life that is more austere than in most other tropical African countries. In the period after February 1967 the government affirmed its intention of curbing urban wage and salary

29

INTRODUCTION

increases until the standard of living in the rural areas improves, and successive budgets introduced higher taxes on luxuries and, more generally, made the system of taxation more progressive and equitable. As John Saul concludes, while It would be difficult to argue that the leadership, broadly defined, is operating at austerity levels or that the luxury consumption-syndrome has been entirely displaced...compared with developments elsewhere in Africa the cumulative impact of salary cuts, taxation, and the like has had some significance in controlling self-indulgent waste and the grosser misuse of the surplus. It is thus the fact that such elements have yielded relatively graciously to the first steps in socialist reconstruction which must be considered atypical when viewed in continental perspective....42 Of course, a major test of the Arusha strategy is whether these sacrifices contribute to transforming the lives of the masses. Nyerere followed up the Declaration by issuing two major position papers that contained some long-run guidelines for the necessary transformation. One, Education for Self-Reliance,43 called for a revolution in the system of formal education and is discussed in detail in Chapter Eleven; the other, Socialism and Rural Development, created a vision of a nation of self-reliant "ujamaa villages"." In the shorter run, the Second Five Year Plan for 1969-74 was geared to rural development and the satisfaction of basic needs for improved nutrition and better clothing and housing; the new plan also made provision for regular reviews of progress and for the amendment of programmes in the light of changing circumstances." A favourable political climate and an effective administration are additional prime requisites for change along socialist and self-reliant lines. In the years following the Arusha Declaration, the President has continually demonstrated his determination to strengthen party and government machinery, and to make the strategy for development less dependent upon initiatives from State House. Early ad hoc measures included recruiting more able personnel for the central office of TANU, transferring skilled people from civil service jobs in Dar es Salaam to those in the field, streamlining the Cabinet in order to improve administrative efficiency, and reshuffling portfolios in order to make better use of the talents of respective political leaders. For a time it appeared that the new sense of direction might be undermined by Nyerere's leading rival, Oscar Kambona, following the latter's resignation in June 1967 from the Cabinet and his post as Secretary General of TANU; however, his potential as a focal point for dissidence rapidly declined when, after his voluntary selfexile, he was implicated in some questionable financial dealings and

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30

some of his closest associates were detained. Late in 1969 others among his followers were allegedly involved in a conspiracy to stage a coup, and, after a trial that lasted several months, were convicted of treasonable offences. The downfall of Kambona and the purge of many of his followers enabled the government to underline its intention of remoulding TANU as a party of workers and farmers, led by people who dissociated themselves from the practices of capitalism and feudalism. At the party's National Conference in October 1967 it was decided to give leaders (a large group as defined in the Arusha Declaration) one year in which to give up any shares or directorships in private companies, domestic accommodation facilities rented to others, and additional salaries of any sort; those who did not comply were to abandon their political and administrative positions. A year later nine party leaders, including seven members of Parliament, were expelled from TANU on the grounds that they had violated the spirit of the Arusha Declaration or the terms of the leadership requirements. Although the reasons for some of the expulsions were obvious, suspicion developed that others had been carried out more because of opposition to particular government policies and practices than because of anti-socialist misdemeanors. However, while the regulations were later relaxed a little, enforcement procedures have been tightened and expulsions have continued to take place, most often with firm evidence of behaviour contrary to the spirit of Arusha. The reserve of popular legitimacy bestowed by the relatively successful operation of the one-party state constitution was clearly strengthened by the implementation of the Leadership Code and the imposition of broader controls on the privileged, and it was reinforced again in the elections of 1970. However, the problem remained of how to harness to that legitimacy the political capacity needed to ensure that antagonistic class formation would be reversed, not merely retarded, and, above all, to stimulate increasing levels of production among the workers and peasants in whose name the Arusha Declaration was proclaimed. The National Executive Committee of TANU undertooka major initiative aimed at resolving this problem early in 1971 when, spurred on by the lessons of the Uganda coup, it issued the TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo). They defined a leading role for the party in guarding against imperialist and counter-revolutionary forces within and outside the country, and in guiding "all activities of the masses." The Government, parastatals, national organizations, etc., are instruments for implementing the Party's policies. Our short history of independence

31

INTRODUCTION

reveals problems that may arise when a Party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for the Party to take the reins and lead.... Ways must be found to ensure that the Party actively supervises the activities and running of its implementing agencies. Leadership also entails reviewing the results of implementation46 Moreover, in charging TANU with responsibility for ensuring that "people participate in devising solutions to their problems in offices, institutions, the army, villages, industries, etc.,"47 Mwongozo recognized that politically-conscious pressure from below and meaningful participation by workers and peasants are essential ingredients of a socialist transformation, and ultimately the only guarantees of sustained progressive change. The reality is still far removed from the rhetoric of the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo, and the obstacles to closing the gap are immense.98 Nevertheless, advances have been made in political education69 and workers' participation, a people's militia has been formed, and steps have been taken to develop an effective training programme for party and rural development cadres. In addition, a promising beginning has been made in implementing a major reorganization of the machinery of government, which, following extensive planning and party approval, was unveiled in 1972 in a major presidential position paper, Decentralisation.b0 Aimed at overcoming some of the barriers to rural mobilization posed by the compartmentalism, incrementalism, and hierarchy of the classical bureaucratic model, the programme has involved dismantling the structure of local government inherited from the British and devolving greater responsibility for decision-making from the centre to the regions and districts. District Development Councils have replaced the old District and Municipal councils, the previously separate bureaucracies of the central and local governments have been integrated in a single development administration, and many of the ablest political leaders and civil servants have been reposted from Dar es Salaam to the regions. Functional officers are now grouped in district and regional "development teams", which are supervised both centrally and locally and work closely with the party, members of Parliament, and local councillors. It is hoped by moving away from departmental structures in this way that it will be possible to maintain control and direction from the centre, to induce a more developmental (innovative rather than adaptive) ethos in the public service, and to make it more responsive to local needs and demands. To succeed the measures require strong ideological commitment among government employees, close cooperation between them and politicians, and radical changes in the prevailing system of rewards

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32

and sanctions used to influence the behaviour of civil servants. It remains to be seen whether these requisites can be met, and, more broadly, whether decentralizing decision-making within the public service is as compatible as the President argues with stimulating greater popular participation in the formulation and implementation of development plans. In the context of all of these changes, some observers may question the wisdom of the recent decision to move the capital from Dar es Salaam, the heart of the old colonial export enclave, to Dodoma, more centrally located but in the midst of one of the poorest regions in the country. Will it not involve a wasteful diversion of energy and resources when there is so little to spread around ? Perhaps, but the symbolic importance of the move may release new energies. As Nyerere has simply but eloquently declared, "to plan is to choose."bl In contrast to many of their counterparts elsewhere in the "third world", Tanzania's leaders are at least attempting to make choices that challenge the contradictions of underdevelopment, rather than enjoying personally the material benefits that would accrue from letting outsiders choose for them a path of increasing dependency offering little hope for the vast majority of the people. Education and Politics in Tanzania Even though Tanzania began after 1966 to diverge more noticeably from the patterns and strategies of development found throughout most of tropical Africa, the relationship between education and politics in the first half decade of independence did not differ much from that in other new states. The chapters that follow are devoted primarily to an examination of that period, and serve to show that, within any ex-colonial underdeveloped country, there are strong constraints upon the use of formal education to promote social and political goals. One important series of obstacles stemmed from the structure and content of educational systems inherited from former colonial overlords. In the East African context, schools were introduced by missionaries, whose educational activities were later supplemented and brought under control by colonial administrators. The result of their endeavours in Tanganyika was the creation of an educational system that was inegalitarian in that it provided opportunities only for the fortunate few, and favoured Europeans and Asians over Africans, Christians over non-Christians, and certain regions and tribal groups over others. Independent Tanganyika was also bequeathed the characteristic imbalance between the output of the educational system and the

33

INTRODUCTION

requirements of the occupational structure: there was a severe shortage of local people equipped to tackle the tasks of development, and a surplus of poorly educated youths seeking paid employment. The former aspect of the problem, more serious in Tanganyika than in most other former colonies in Africa, was due to the lack of preparation by educational authorities for the rapid constitutional advances that occurred after the formation of TANU in 1954. The latter aspect, less pronounced at the time of independence than in many places elsewhere, arose from the fact that in the early colonial days school leavers with six or more years of education were virtually ensured some form of employment in the modern occupational structure. Gradually parents and pupils began to regard Western schooling as a means of improving the welfare of the extended family and of escaping the poverty of rural life. An appreciation of the potential rewards of education grew rapidly even though the level of education required by employers steadily rose, and job opportunities increased at a much slower rate than the output of primary schools. The social content of syllabuses quite naturally reflected the norms of colonial rulers, and promoted neither a sense of Tanganyikan nationality nor a respect for indigenous cultures. The scarcity of opportunities for education and characteristics of the teaching and learning processes strongly promoted competition and individualism, traits which were reinforced in pupils who attended boarding schools where they were removed from active contact with their communities and provided with better living conditions than they had previously enjoyed. As a result, educated Africans were estranged from the problems of their society, their wish to obtain the privileges and comforts of salaried employment was strengthened, and they tended to adopt narrowly elitist attitudes. Overtly political constraints also made it difficult to harness education to development efforts. One problem was that the basic goals of political leaders were not easily brought into harmony. They espoused a desire to work simultaneously towards rapid economic development and the creation of an egalitarian society, and towards the establishment of national unity and democracy. As elsewhere, they had to find a balance between a situation in which the gap between people who perform modern and highly remunerative roles and the masses would become too wide to bridge, and one in which economic stagnation would result from a deficiency of skilled manpower to serve as social levers. They also had to make decisions on how much political freedom could be tolerated so that popular participation neither disrupted nor dampened develop. ment efforts, yet was secured for the political activities that were

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34

necessary. These questions were crucial for education: in deciding whether scarce resources should be used to provide a modicum of education for all children, or extensive education and training for a small number; and in planning how school courses and activities should be designed to promote political support for the regime and its goals. These problems were in turn heightened by the difficulty of obtaining agreement among political leaders on practical means of reconciling and fostering their goals. Politicians have to rely heavily on professional administrators for technical advice and sympathetic understanding in educational policy-making. However, many senior administrators tended to view formal education as something apart and, except for economic development, only tenuously related to broader social and political processes. Moreover, many of these people had great respect for the traditions of the colonial educational system and were apprehensive about initiatives that appeared to debase professional standards or involve the schools in "politics". These difficulties were compounded by all the problems of a bureaucracy that lacked sufficient skills and suitable structures. Through their behaviour within and outside the classroom, teachers are expected to act as the main agents of change. Yet most of them, like educational administrators and even political leaders, were products of the colonial educational system; those who were not were expatriates, usually serving only a two or three year tour in the country. Some teachers were admirably equipped to perform broad social and political tasks, but many were not. Educational administrators, teachers, and even pupils and students exerted specific demands as well. So, too, did officials of the Christian churches (successors to the missionaries) and of other voluntary agencies, and councillors, and executive personnel involved in local authorities (which were given some responsibilities for primary school education). The pattern of political interaction also included politicians and members of the political community who acted as representatives of specific interests. Parents, like their counterparts the world over, wanted something better for their children than they had themselves, but, as we have seen, their motivation was strongly economic as well because education was seen as the key to relative affluence for the extended family. As a result, they tended to be suspicious of attempts to tamper with the existing system, for fear of a decrease in educational opportunities and the rewards these would bring. As independence approached it did become possible for the TANU government to abolish formal racial discrimination in education and to increase markedly the opportunities for Africans.

35

INTRODUCTION

However, a mere increase in contact between Africans and nonAfricans was no guarantee of greater racial harmony, all the more so in the Tanzanian case because an Asian minority lost its privileged position and suffered an absolute decrease in the educational opportunities offered its children. It was possible to use the educational system to soften the social cleavage based on religion, but disparities in educational opportunities among regions and tribes and between urban and rural areas became more pronounced as time passed. In the meantime, as we have seen, the question of class formation developed overriding significance in socialist Tanzania; education was the prime determinant, but the government was slow to take strong corrective measures. Towards the end of the colonial era, concerted efforts were initiated to overcome the shortage of skilled manpower needed for development purposes. Nevertheless, after independence the government had to rely heavily on the services of expatriates, entailing high political and financial costs. While many of the foreign personnel understood the country's problems and sympathized with the aims of political leaders, many did not; in any case, Tanzania did not enjoy the advantages and disadvantages of developing in relative national isolation as did revolutionary socialist societies such as China and Cuba. Of course, local public servants themselves did not always have a strong commitment to social transformation; shortly after independence, considerable success was achieved in the integration of manpower and educational planning, but for some time concern tended to centre on the quantity of "educational outputs" not their quality. In response to the rising discontent of parents and primary school leavers about unemployment among the latter, political leaders had to choose among the following alternatives to alleviate pressure: curtailing expansion at lower levels of the educational system, thereby sacrificing the goal of egalitarian development and heightening dissatisfaction among those denied educational opportunities; increasing facilities at secondary and higher levels faster than dictated by forecasts of manpower needs in order to absorb more primary school leavers, thereby diverting resources from other government programmes and running the risk that tensions among unemployed school leavers would emerge at these levels as well; or using schools and other means of manipulation to shift the aspirations of parents and pupils from an urban and paid job orientation to a rural and agrarian one. By and large attempts to control primary school expansion proved disastrous, but, for both educational and political reasons, Tanzanian authorities were reluctant to countenance the rapid proliferation of private secondary schools.

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36

While the first two alternatives were not totally abandoned, official thinking moved increasingly towards the third approach. Politically and economically the most attractive, a policy of linking education to rural life had been abandoned by the colonial regime largely because of opposition from nationalist leaders who viewed it as a means of perpetuating the inferiority of Africans. However, in the absence of marked economic growth and in the context of a mounting population drift to urban areas, it was revived and given political backing by these same leaders. Even then risks were involved because of the strength of ingrained attitudes, the psychological and technical unsuitability of teachers, and, above all, the continuing discrepancy between the amenities and material rewards of the town and the countryside. Little was done to change the social and political contents of curricula or the nature of the school experience during the first half decade of independence. For the most part political leaders relied on calls to educational administrators and teachers to stress to pupils the importance of the successful nationalist struggle, of loyalty and unity, and of the aims and programmes of the government. Syllabuses were revised to include more African materials, but the perspective remained largely an alien one. Then in 1965, after the apparent growth of opposition among students to the government's one-party state proposals and to other measures, a decision was made to use schools and colleges as more positive instruments of political socialization. One approach involved a more thoroughgoing programme of curricular change, particularly in history, civics, and geography courses. Nevertheless, efforts were impeded by a lack of textbooks and materials that presented the values espoused by the government, by the academic limitations of many teachers at the primary level, and by a shortage of citizen teachers at higher levels. Another means was the establishment of TANU Youth League branches in schools; in addition, school leavers and graduates with more than twelve years of formal education were required to spend two years in the National Service, a paramilitary and nation-building corps. Besides attempting to increase the identification of young people with the party and its goals, these programmes were designed to heighten comprehension of the problems of underdevelopment and to stimulate greater affinity among educated and uneducated youths. Both schemes encountered problems owing to poor administrative arrangements, weak communications between politicians and schools, and, most important, a conflict between the attitudes the educational system had traditionally fostered and those which the government wished to develop. Moreover, political leaders

37

INTRODUCTION

themselves often did not behave according to the norms and values they espoused. We have mentioned that the primary school leavers' problem and a demonstration of students against the terms of compulsory National Service were important among factors leading to the Arusha Declaration. In its wake the President issued a pamphlet analyzing the shortcomings of the educational system and offering detailed recommendations to transform it; previous curricular and institutional changes paled into insignificance by contrast with these proposals. Whether they can be implemented, and, even if implemented, whether they are sufficient to overcome the pattern of constraints education has imposed on political and socio-economic development, are questions left to the final chapters of the book.

NOTES I. John W. Hanson, "The Nation's Education Purpose", in Okechukwu Ikejiani, ed., Nigerian Education, Ikeja, Longmans of Nigeria, 1964, p. 20. 2. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Underdeveloped Country, Toronto, C.B.C. Publications, 1965, pp. 22-5. 3. Although many studies—such as histories of educational policy, accounts of educational policy-making and administration, and analyses of the role of schools in political socialization and recruitment—explore specific aspects of the relationship between educational and political systems, few render an overview of its reciprocal nature. Insofar as underdeveloped countries are concerned, the following anthologies contain some material on the subject: James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965; D.C. Piper and Taylor Cole, eds., Post-Primary Education and Political and Economic Development, Durham (N.C.), Duke University Press, 1964; L. G. Cowan, et al., eds., Education and Nation-Building in Africa, New York, Praeger, 1965; J. W. Hanson and Cole S. Brembeck, eds., Education and the Development of Nations, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966; and Richard Jolly, ed., Education in Africa: Research and Action, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969. See also the titles of books and articles in the select bibliography below. 4. James S. Coleman, "Introduction", in Coleman, cd., Education and Political Development, p. 10. 5. Two general surveys that carry the discussion of the political socialization function of developing educational systems somewhat beyond the tentative conclusions offered in Coleman's book are Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969 and Penelope Roach, Political Socialization in the New Nations of Africa, New York, Teachers' College Press, 1967. A major survey research project aimed at exploring processes of political socialization in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda was undertaken in 1966 by Kenneth Prewitt,

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38

George Von der Muhll, and others. Some of the findings are published in Kenneth Prewitt, ed., Education and Political Values: an East African Case Study, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971. The book contains a rather uneven collection of articles that, overall, fails to meet the original promise of the project. 6. Most of the good published works on the recruitment of political elites have thus far come from sociologists rather than political scientists or political sociologists. However, see W. H. Morris Jones, "Political Recruitment and Political Development", in Colin Leys, ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 113-34. A particularly good, if now somewhat dated collection of articles is found in P. C. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966. 7. See David Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: an African Case, Stanford University Press, 1969, and L. Gray Cowan, The Cost of Learning: the Politics of Primary Education in Kenya, New York, Teachers' College Press, 1970. Both Abernethy and Cowan are also concerned with the circularity of the education-politics relationship. 8. This section provides only an overview of Tanzanian politics designed to place in broader perspective the developments examined in later chapters. An especially useful (if somewhat uneven) collection of papers and articles on the political economy of Tanzania is Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, vol. I, 1972, and vol. II, 1973. Standard earlier works on Tanzanian politics are Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970; and William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967. 9. The best known work that counteracts the euphoria about Africa of the late 1950s and early 1960s is Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa, London, Andre Deutsch, 1966. Franz Fanon's, The Wretched of the Earth (New York, Grove Press, 1968), written in 1961, accurately anticipated much that was to happen in sub-Saharan Africa. 10. In contrast to some journalists, I would not want to assert that Nyerere is the political system in Tanzania; his control is hardly that extensive. Nevertheless, his charismatic authority and political skills have been the dominant influences on the strategy for social and political change, which would likely have been radically different in his absence and, despite recents efforts to institutionalize it, it could well be altered drastically by his departure. 11. The history of nationalism and the independence movement in Tanganyika is sufficiently well-documented that it does not have to be recounted here. See Bienen, Party Transformation, pp. 19-71; J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963; B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, London, Oxford University Press, 1961; Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London, Chatto and Windus, 1965; and Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika", in Gwendolen M. Carter, cd.,

39

INTRODUCTION

African One-Party States, Ithaca (N.Y.), Cornell University Press, 1964, pp. 395-477. 12. The most authoritative account of many of the political problems that arose after independence is Bienen, Party Transformation, especially pp. 158-202. Tordoff's chapter on labour and politics is also useful (Government and Politics, pp. 137-58). 13. Bienen, Party Transformation, p. 58 (sec also pp. 56-7). Nyerere received 1,127,978 votes and Zuberi Mtemvu, leader of the African National Congress, 21,276; however, "the little over 1 . 1 million votes cast were less than one-fourth of the potential electorate" (ibid., p. 57). 14. See Julius K. Nyerere, "The African and Democracy" (written in 1960), in his Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 103-6. 15. Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," in ibid, pp. 195-206. 16. For details see the British and East African press reports in the ten days following January 20, 1964; Listowel, Making of Tanganyika, pp. 430Ø; and Bienen, Party Transformation, pp. 366-81. 17. The government of Zanzibar had experienced economic difficulties and international pressures of some magnitude since the overthrow of the Arab minority government by African nationalists in January. For an account of the revolution and its immediate aftermath, see Michael Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965. 18. While the rhetoric of the Zanzibari regime has been revolutionary and socialist, government policies have often been more inspired by hatred of the Arab former ruling class and Asian middlemen. 19. See The Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party Slate, DSM, GP, 1965; and The Interim Constitution of Tanzania, Laws of Tanzania, No. 43 of 1965. 20. An excellent collection of essays on the elections is Lionel Cliffe, ed., One Party Democracy, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967. Cliffe's analysis in Chapters I0-14 is particularly good. See also Belle Harris, "The Tanzanian Elections", Mbioni, vol. II (no. 5, 1965); Bienen, Party Transformation, pp. 382Ø5; and Tordoff, Government and Politics, pp. 31-54. 21. Based on my experience in Tanzania and a perusal of newspaper reports of speeches and statements. One member of Parliament remarked to the author in 1966, "I wouldn't last long if Nyerere wasn't on top. He's the one who gives me my licence to criticize." Some Regional and Area Commissioners became notorious for abuses of authority, particularly in using their powers to jail people for forty-eight or twentyfour hours without having to state cause. Reprimands or dismissals followed in most cases of this sort. 22. Bienen, Party Transformation, p. 276. See Tanganyika, Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961-62/1963-64, DSM, GP, 1962. 23. See Tanzania, Background to the Budget, 1966-67, DSM, GP, 1966, p. 10. 24. Freedom and Unity, pp. 162-71. 25. See Address by the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere on the Tanganyika

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

40

Five Year Plan and Review of the Plan, DSM, Tanganyika Information Services, 1964, pp. 1-10. This speech, delivered to the National Assembly on May 12, 1964, contained the core of Nyerere's views on development as they had evolved to that time. 26. Nyerere, "Introduction", Freedom and Unity, p. 16. 27. For perspectives on these differences among leaders see Bienen, Party Transformation, pp. 203-11, 216-17, and 221-6; and R. Cranford Pratt, "The Administration of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: the Tanzanian Experience, 1963-66", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. V (March 1967), pp. 38-59 (reprinted in Cliffe and Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, vol. II, pp. 11-24). 28. See Tanganyika Five-Years Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1 July 1964-30 June 1969, 2 vols., DSM, GP, 1964. 29. These problems are well outlined by Pratt (albeit from within a rather bureaucratic model) in "Economic Planning". See also Bienen, Party Transformation, pp. 281-306; and B. van Arkadie, "Planning in Tanzania", in Cliffe and Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, vol. II, pp. 25-39. 30. Over West Germany's insistence on applying the Hallstein Doctrine to Tanzania, the expulsion of American diplomats from Zanzibar and the alleged complicity of the United States in a Portuguese plot to overthrow the Tanzanian government, and Britains failure to overthrow the Smith regime in Rhodesia. 31. From £ 240,257,000 to £ 239,249,000 (Tanzania, Background to the Budget, 1966-67 DSM, GP, 1966, p. 10). 32. See Tanzania, First Year Progress Report on the Implementation of the Five-Year Development Plan, DSM, GP, 1966. 33. See Chapter 8. 34. Parliamentary protest led to the appointment of a special presidential commission to investigate the cooperative movement. See Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, DSM, GP, 1966. 35. "Introduction," Freedom and Unity, p. 17. 36. See Nyerere, Our Economy, 1965-67, DSM, GP, 1966 (reprinted as "The Tanzanian Economy", in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism: Uhurna na Ujamaa, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 157-74). 37. Sec Chapter 10. 38. The Standard, February 6, 1967. The entire Arusha Declaration was reproduced in this issue, and has since been published in several places, including Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 231-50; and Nyerere, Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism, DSM, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 13-37. For more detailed accounts and analyses of the Arusha Declaration and its aftermath, see Cliffe and Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, passim; Knud E. Svendsen and Merete Teisen, eds., Self-Reliant Tanzania, DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1969; and J. F. Rweyemamu et al, eds., Towards Socialist Planning, DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972. See also Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. VI (no. 2, 1968),

41

INTRODUCTION

pp. 141-69 (reprinted in Arrighi and Saul, eds., Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp. 11-43); and Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania," in ibid., pp. 237-335. For other perspectives, see R. Cranford Pratt, "Tanzania Finds Its Own Way", Round Table, vol. 58 (October 1968), pp. 379-91; All Mazrui, "Anti-militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XII (September 1968), pp. 269-84; and Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa", Foreign Affairs, vol. 47 (April 1969), pp. 545-59. 39. The words are taken directly from the Arusha Declaration, but the numbers and editing are mine. 40. See The Nationalist and The Standard, February 6-11, 1967, and The Sunday News, February 12, 1967. 41. For a good analysis of the Arusha strategy and its potential, written in comparative East African perspective, see Ann Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1972. 42. John S. Saul, "Planning for Socialism in Tanzania: the Socio-political Context", in Rweyemamu et al, eds., Towards Socialist Planning, p. 6. 43. Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance, DSM, GP, 1967 (reprinted in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 267-90; and Nyerere, Essays on Socialism, pp. 44-75). 44. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, DSM, GP, 1967 (reprinted in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 337-66; and Nyerere, Essays on Socialism, pp. 106-44). For a discussion of the strategy for rural development, see below, pp. 291-3. 45. See Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969-30th June, 1974 DSM, GP, 1969. See also Rweyemamu et al, eds., Towards Socialist Planning, passim; and A. J. M. van de Laar, "Tanzania's Second Five-Year Plan", in Cliffe and Saul eds. Socialism in Tanzania, vol. II, pp. 71-81. 46. See TANU Guidelines 1971, DSM, TANU, 1971, clauses 11 and 14. 47. Ibid., clause 14. See also clause 15. 48. See Cliffe and Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, passim, but esp. vol II, part VIII, pp. 304-58, in which essays by I. G. Shivji, T. Szentes, W. Rodney, and J. S. Saul explore some of the major internal and (particularly) external contradictions confronting the building of socialism. 49. See below, pp. 278-9. 50. Nyerere, Decentralisation, DSM, GP, 1972 (excerpted in Nyerere, Freedom and Development: Uhuru na Maendeleo, DSM, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 344-50). Some of the analysis that follows draws upon B. B. Schaffer, "The Deadlock in Development Administration", in Leys, ed., Politics and Change, pp. 177-212. 51. This was the theme of the President's address to the Bienniel Conference of TANU in 1969 when he introduced the Second Five Year Plan. See Nyerere, "To Plan Is to Choose", in Nyerere, Freedom and Development, pp. 80-104.

Part I THE COLONIAL AND NATIONALIST LEGACIES

2 EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY Representatives of mission societies, heeding the call of David Livingstone to uplift the moral and material standards of Africans by giving them the "true religion" and "civilization", introduced Western formal education to what became Tanganyika.' More than a decade before the German colonization of the area, the French Roman Catholic Order of the Holy Ghost had established a school at Bagamoyo on the Indian Ocean, and shortly thereafter the Universities Mission to Central Africa, the Church Missionary Society, the Lutheran Mission of Berlin and several Roman Catholic orders founded schools to promote proselytization.2 At first, the missionaries acted autonomously and authoritatively in isolated communities; after German East Africa was founded, they had to submit to the rule of colonial administrators, but they continued to operate their schools independently.3 Meanwhile, the need for inexpensive manpower to fill low-level civil service jobs and the desire to spread German culture induced the colonial regime itself to provide educational facilities.4 African parents did not accept formal education eagerly. For centuries their children had been taught about social mores, the supernatural, food production, and other matters by elders of the family, clan, or tribe.5 The people were naturally suspicious of the European missionaries who denounced traditional ways and beliefs and preached a new religion; thus the initial recruits for schools came primarily from families of freed slaves and social outcasts.6 Later, however, other parents, some out of curiosity and some out of deference to Europeans, sent their children forward. Gradually, as commercialization developed, more and more Africans realized that schools opened the door to paid employment with the colonial administration, the missions, and businesses. By 1914 government and mission schools had enrolments of approximately 6,200 and 110,000 respectively, but then the war suddenly shattered the system of education. Government schools were closed, pupils and teachers in war zones dispersed, and German missionaries were expelled; as a consequence, educational provision in Tanganyika fell considerably behind that in the British territories in the north and south. The Growth of Educational Provision, 1918-1956 When peace returned the German empire was partitioned into Mandates of the League of Nations, each entrusted to a victorious 44

45

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

allied power. Tanganyika Territory, approximately ninety-five per cent of the area of former German East Africa, became (at least de facto) a dependency of the United Kingdom. British authorities and mission societies had virtually to begin afresh to rebuild an educational system. In doing so, not only the African population but also European and Asian minorities had to be considered: as elsewhere in British East Africa, it was decided to provide separate facilities for each of the three groups.9 With a warning that statistics published before 1945 are unreliable, Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 illustrate the growth of enrolment in the three systems from the 1920s to 1956. Table 2.1 ENROLMENT IN AFRICAN SCHOOLS BY LEVEL AT FIVE YEAR INTERVALS, 1926-1956 Years 1-6a (Assisted) 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956

5,843 22,693 30,570 c 115,516 194,251 345,014

Years 7-12a (Assisted) — — 26 c 1,446 4,869 13,857

Total" (Assisted)

Unassisted Years 1-4b

5,843 22,693 30,596 39,869 116,962 199,120 358,871

162,806 144,917 191,061 c c c 84,300

Source: D.E., Annual Reports. are for schools assisted by the colonial government. The figures for 1926-36 inclusive include pupils enrolled in teacher training and vocational courses. By 1951 the seventh and eighth years had been transferred from the secondary to the primary programme. b Statistics for unassisted schools are given in precise figures in early Annual Reports, but their reliability is highly suspect. r Not available. a Totals

African education. As Table 2.1 shows, the growth in African educational facilities assisted by the government was by no means rapid before the Second World War. During the 1920s and 1930s most African children who obtained access to schools attended for only one to three years; a very few were able to complete six years and proceed to teacher training, clerical and other vocational courses. The depression forced the closure of many schools staffed by European teachers with the consequence that the expansion of post-primary courses (beyond the level of Standard VI) was delayed. By 1940 a

46

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Table 2.2 ENROLMENT IN ASIAN SCHOOLS BY LEVEL AT FIVE YEAR INTERVALS, 1926-1956

1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956

Years 1-6

Years 7-12

Total

1,360 2,844 3,742

— — 293

1,360 2,844 4,035 5,800 8,824 13,517 20,047

a

a

7,277 10,687 14,461

1,547 2,830 5,586

Source: D. E., Annual Reports. Not available.

a

Table 2.3 ENROLMENT IN EUROPEAN SCHOOLS BY LEVEL AT FIVE YEAR INTERVALS, 1926-1956 Years 1-6 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956

580 438 725 539 599 1,508 1,929

Years 7-12a — — — — — 147 464

Total 580 438 725 539 599 1,655 2,393

Source: D. E., Annual Reports. Most European children attended secondary schools in Kenya and Europe. a

mere five schools were offering the full secondary course (Standards VII-X), and only a few additional students were able to enrol in Makerere College in Uganda (opened in 1923) for advanced secondary and vocational courses." During the Second World War educational administrators reported that popular demand for school places for the first time greatly

47

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

exceeded the supply in many areas,11 and by 1947 European staff in the government and teaching services had returned to a level sufficient to permit the launching of a Ten Year Plan for African Education. The objectives were to increase the number of pupils attending the first four years of the primary school course by a factor of two and a half, and to develop district day and boarding schools to give an additional two years of pre-secondary instruction to one out of every five Standard IV leavers." In 1950 enrolment targets for Standards I to IV were further increased and boarding middle schools were introduced to provide a new four year course replacing the two year one previously given at district schools.13 By the end of the ten year period, the goal for primary school enrolment had been slightly exceeded, but the ratio of places in Standard IV to those in Standard V had grown to 7:1 rather than 5:1 as planned.la The Ten Year Plan envisaged only a modest expansion at higher levels because it was thought desirable to widen the base of the system first. However, in 1949 senior secondary streams offering Standards XI and XII were opened in a few territorial schools, enabling students to pursue courses at this level in Tanganyika rather than at Makerere College. From 1946 to 1956 the number of pupils enrolled in Standards IX to XII increased from 917 to 2,409.15 In addition, a small but increasing number of students received scholarships for university and professional courses in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. A larger number took higher studies at Makerere, which became a degree-granting institution affiliated to the University of London in 1949. .Non-African education. From the late 1920s onwards, six-year primary courses were provided at public expense for Europeans and Asians in racially segregated, co-educational day schools. A few European boarding institutions were also established. There were no secondary facilities for European children until shortly before independence, but the colonial government bore most of the costs of sending students to Kenya and Europe. Post-primary education for Asians, although slow in starting (largely because of parental apathy), developed rapidly after the end of the Second World War. There were no colleges providing university or technical education for nonAfricans; however, once again, many students were given public assistance to study outside Tanganyika. The Framework for Policy- Making and Administration For African education. By and large the institutional framework for the formulation and implementation of policies for African education closely paralleled that of other British colonial territories, and involved the joint participation of Government officials, missionaries,

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

48

and native authorities.16 A Director of Education was among the department heads created in 1920; responsible to the Governor, he was assisted in administrative and inspectorial duties by a small group of European officers stationed in Dar es Salaam. At first, the supervision and inspection of African schools outside the capital was undertaken by heads of government secondary schools. However, the rapid post-War growth in educational provision necessitated an expansion of the Department's administrative establishment: Provincial Education Officers and Assistant Provincial Education Officers were appointed to perform full-time administrative roles; beneath these posts, filled by Europeans, a cadre of African Schools Supervisors was established to assist the heads of primary schools. Influenced by German records concerning the low standards of mission schools and the constant rivalry among religious groups, the first British Governor wished to make education solely a government responsibility. However, under circumstances in which the missions provided education for over one hundred thousand children and the goverment for only a few hundred, meagre finances made such a policy unworkable. Moreover, the Permanent Mandates Commission and the head offices of mission societies in Europe and North America strongly urged the Colonial Secretary to establish a relationship between government and private agencies similar to that prevailing in the United Kingdom and most British dependencies. In 1925, on the recommendation of authorities in London, the Director of Education convened a conference of educationists and mission representatives in Dar es Salaam. From their deliberations guidelines emerged for the Education Ordinance of 1927, which brought mission schools under government control and recognized the societies as voluntary agencies eligible for grants-in-aid. The Ordinance also established a Central Advisory Committee on African Education consisting of Department and voluntary agency representatives (and of one or two African teachers).17 Although their schools were placed under government control, the agencies remained responsible for some administrative matters. These were initially overseen by European teachers and clergymen, but by the 1940s the Christian Council of Tanganyika (an association of Protestant churches) and the Catholic Welfare Society had established education departments to co-ordinate the work of various mission societies and to act in day to day liaison with the government. Three categories of field personnel were developed : Education Secretaries (for administration), Educational Assistants (for inspection), and Schools Supervisors. After 1949 the two organizations received grants-in-aid to pay the salaries and expenses of Education Secretaries General, the heads of their education departments.

49

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

During Sir Donald Cameron's tenure as Governor of Tanganyika from 1925 to 1931, African native authorities were given a measure of responsibility for education.i8 Under the impression that education ranked highly among the demands of chiefs, the Governor approved a suggestion that they should be permitted to establish special boarding schools.19 The government agreed to supply and pay teachers on the understanding that capital costs would be met by the native authorities and boarding expenses by parents. After a period of experimentation, during which a number of these schools proved successful in stimulating African interest in education and in reducing the financial burden of the central government, they were permanently incorporated into the educational system with the expectation that native authorities would cover a rising proportion of recurrent costs. Long before the post-1945 development of new local government institutions throughout British Africa, educational administrators in Tanganyika sought to establish decentralized education authorities on the English pattern. Two attempts to lay the groundwork were thwarted by missionaries who feared that their authority would be undermined.20 However, the government finally prevailed in the early 1950s when District Education Committees were set up to represent the interests of the government, the voluntary agencies, and the native authorities. At first responsible only for advising the Department of Education on the requirements for schools at the local level, these Committees were assigned executive responsibilities in 1953 for such minor matters as remission of middle school fees. While institutions in Tanganyika had detailed responsibility for educational policy-making and administration, external agencies played important roles in prescribing and recommending general guidelines for policy. The most important was the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies, later styled the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies; with a membership drawn from public and private educational agencies in the United Kingdom, it was set up in 1923 to advise the Colonial Secretary and the Departments of Education in African territories. In addition, as a Mandatory Power under the League of Nations and an Administering Authority under the United Nations, Britain was subject to supervision by first the Permanent Mandates Commission and later the Trusteeship Council. Both of these bodies expressed keen interest in African education.21 For non-African education. The Director of Education exercised responsibility for the development of European and Asian education until 1949 when, with the introduction of an education tax for non-

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

50

Africans, European and Asian Education Authorities were constituted. Consisting of boards of appointed members chaired by the Director, these Authorities assumed responsibility for policy-making and budgeting for the education of their respective racial communities, subject to the approval of the Legislative Council." The Department of Education continued to provide administrative and inspectoral personnel. Meanwhile, several European and Asian parents' committees that managed schools were given the status of voluntary agencies. In addition, the Ismaili community (with assistance from the Aga Khan) actively developed educational facilities after 1930, and eventually established the Aga Khan's Department of Education in 1951. The Policy-Making Process Broadly speaking, policy for African education was devised by colonial administrators in London and Dar es Salaam who were virtually free of constraints save those they placed upon one another. The mission societies differed with the colonial regime on a number of matters, but the government's financial control almost invariably settled issues in its favour.E3 Until after the Second World War, international pressures were little heeded and African opinion was rarely articulated or valued. In contrast, both before and after the establishment of Education Authorities, policy for Europeans and, to a lesser extent, Asians was made largely in response to pressures exerted by members of the two communities. Educational Policies and Their Significance Social structure. In any society, consciousness of differences among people influences the way in which individuals and groups define goals and the means of achieving them. In other words, social structure is an important determinant of political behaviour, especially in economically underdeveloped countries that have experienced only a brief period of national political institutionalization. Because, in turn, education is inextricably linked in the underdeveloped world to social and economic mobility, the historical distribution of educational opportunities is an important key to understanding social stratification and differentiation. In Tanganyika, as elsewhere, these opportunities were not equally attainable; as a result, existing social cleavages became more pronounced and new ones were created and reinforced. In looking at the relationship between education and social structure, we shall examine the dimensions of race, religion, region, tribe, and class. Growth in the provision of educational facilities for Africans was

51

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

closely geared to the aims of the colonial government and the missions, the strength of popular demand, and the availability of human and financial resources. By 1956, co-educational day primary schools were offering a four year course designed to give pupils permanent literacy and elementary general knowledge. On the basis and girls' of competitive examinations, some children were selected for boys' middle schools, which were mostly boarding institutions. Middle school leavers who performed well in written and oral examinations were promoted to academic secondary schools, trade schools, and teacher training centres. Most secondary schools offered only two years of instruction but a Standard X territorial examination was used to select a few students for advanced academic studies (leading to the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate) or vocational training in teaching, medicine, clerical work, and agriculture. The Cambridge examination in Standard XII was in turn employed to determine entry to Makerere College in Uganda, Royal Technical College in Kenya, and advanced teacher training courses in Tanganyika.2" At Makerere, students took a course (equivalent to Form VI in Britain) that determined entry to professional and degree studies both there and outside East Africa. As Table 2.4 shows, the educational opportunity for the average African child in 1956 was slight. Even at the lowest level, where expansion had roughly followed growth in public demand (but had been curtailed by the two world wars and the great depression), only a minority of children attended school: the enrolment in Standards I to IV of 336,000—a threefold increase over the previous decade—represented a mere thirty-nine per cent of children in the age-group from seven to eleven years. Of the pupils in Standard IV, one in seven entered Standard V; of those in Standard VII, one in four was placed in Standard IX. In 1952, 548 students had entered the first year of secondary school; only forty reached Makerere College in 1956. In contrast, European and Asian children, drawn from relatively small and urbanized minorities, had extensive educational facilities for their numbers; broadly speaking, it can be said that throughout the colonial period the number of places (in Tanganyika and elsewhere) corresponded roughly to the school-age population in the European community and to the demand for them in the Asian community. In both cases, secondary school entrance was nonselective, that is, any child who was not too old obtained access and remained as long as he maintained a minimum academic standard. The relative advantage of non-Africans is strikingly illustrated in the

52

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Table 2.4 ENROLMENT OF TANGANYIKAN AFRICANS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1956 Level Primary (I-IV) Middle (V-VIII) Secondary (IX-X) (XI-XII) Higher Advanced secondary Non-degree professional courses Degree courses Othere Teacher training courses Post Standard VII Post Standard X and XII Vocational Courses

Institutions 2,589 357a 24 4 lb

Enrolment 336,079 32,845 2,1191 290 f 80 59 20 8

26 4 2d

2,409

167

l 2,254

2,072 182 f 832

Source: D. E., Annual Report, 1956. aIncludes 90 "district schools" giving only Standards V and VI and 10 secondary schools giving Standards VII and VIII. bThe Royal Technical College did not open until 1957. Statistics for students studying at the higher level outside East Africa were not published. clncludes students doing post-graduate diploma, School of Art, and special entry general courses. dlfunda Trade School and Tengeru Natural Resources School. Private agencies and some government departments ran other institutions. fact that more Asians than Africans were enrolled in Standards IX to XII in 1956 despite a population ratio of Asians to Africans of less than 1:100.25 By the mid-1950s, despite earlier inequities, students who had completed twelve or fourteen years of education had about equal chances of obtaining access to more advanced courses, regardless of race. However, this comparison is misleading because Africans had to overcome many more barriers to reach that level, and those who did represented a much smaller fraction of their age-group than their European and Asian counterparts. Although variations in access to education developed among Africans of various Christian churches, a more significant distinction evolved between Christians and Muslims. The early missionaries, encountered considerable hostility from the population of

53

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

the predominantly Muslim coastal belt; with few exceptions, they concentrated their operations inland among people who held traditional African religious beliefs. Consequently, since most educational facilities were provided by Christian voluntary agencies, the formal instruction of Muslims was relatively neglected. German and British government educators took special interest in Muslim education, but sheikhs (the spiritual leaders of the community) and many parents viewed Western-inspired schools, even when government-run, as threats to their authority and propagators of false Christian doctrines. Instead, most sheikhs sought to restrict the children under their charge to Koranic schools that taught religion and Arabic.48 Nevertheless, many Muslims did attend government and native authority schools, and a few, often under assumed Christian names, obtained admission to mission institutions. In 1936 the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS) was founded in Kenya by a group of Asians and Africans educated in secular institutions. With a promise of assistance from the Aga Khan, the EAMWS undertook the coordination of religious activities and the promotion of secular education among Muslim Africans in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. In time, a few of the stronger branches built schools and sought grants-in-aid on the same basis as mission agencies. 27 Complete comparative statistics on the religion of African schoolchildren are not available, but some idea of the disparities is obtained from an examination of enrolment in government and mission primary schools. In 1956, 711 government and native authority and twenty-seven Muslim agency institutions catered for97,917 children; 1,846 mission schools provided 237,669 places.28 Even by assuming (rather generously) that Muslims comprised 75 per cent of the first figure and 20 per cent of the second,29 we can conclude that they were outnumbered by a factor of almost three to one. Making the further assumption that most mission-educated school leavers were nominal Christians, one can see that this group had proportionally greater chances of advancing to higher levels of education. As Muslims outnumbered Christians by a ratio of 3:2,Ø one can easily see that religion was reinforced by education as a clearly visible social cleavage. In geographical and ethnic terms, the growth of educational provision among Africans was markedly uneven. Before the Second World War, educational administrators permitted primary school expansion at a rate determined in part by the demands of communities, and, because some social systems were more receptive than others to Western education, substantial differences appeared. Some

54

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

of these were reinforced and yet others were created by missionaries who chose to work where they deemed the prospects for proselytization most satisfactory. In a few districts, where two or more mission societies competed directly, educational facilities developed much more rapidly than the demand for them. Consequently, when a recognition of the rewards of education became widespread in the 1950s and 1960s, these areas already had schools; others had to struggle vigorously to obtain them. Table 2.5 shows provincial variations in 1948. A year before, educational administrators, in framing the Ten Year Plan, decided to promote the equalization of opportunities by giving special assistance to "backward areas."31 In each province a target was Table 2.5 ENROLMENT OF AFRICANS IN STANDARDS I-VI BY PROVINCE, 1948

Province"

Tanga (8) Southern (4) Eastern (3) Northern (7) Lake (1) Southern Highlands (5) Western (2) Central (6)

Enrolment

25,711 24,068 21,699 19,066 18,818 13,534 10,668 8,077

School-age Populationb 68,286 110,585 112,450 72,365 228,252 105,610 117,100 101,917

Percentage of School-age Population Enrolled 38 22 19 26 8 13 9 8

Source: D.E., Annual Report, 1948, p. 11. "The figures in parentheses represent the ranking of provinces by population according to the 1948 census. bComputed as 12i per cent of total population, these figures represent a six year age-group. set for a certain percentage enrolment of the primary school (Standards I to IV) age group; unfortunately, no statistics were provided at the end of the planning period, but in 1953, as Table 2.6 illustrates, variations were still marked. (The figures in Table 2.5 are for Standards I-VI, those in Table 2.6 for Standards I-IV. However, while not strictly comparable, they do illustrate the extent and growth of provincial disparities.) Within the provinces

55

EDUCATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY

there were even greater differences: in the Northern Province, for example, the percentage of children aged seven to eleven enrolled in Kilimanjaro District in 1953 was seventy-nine and in Masai only seven sa Although regional disparities were not as great at higher levels, children from districts with large primary systems had proportionately more opportunities to go to senior secondary schools and Makerere College. Table 2.6 PERCENTAGE TARGETS FOR ENROLMENT OF CHILDREN AGED SEVEN TO ELEVEN AND PERCENTAGE ENROLMENT BY PROVINCE, 1953 Province

Tanga Northern Southern Eastern Southern Highlands Lake Western Central

Percentage Percentage Target for 1956 Enrolled in 1953 50 50 40 40 30 30 30 30

53 46 39 29 23 20 20 18

Source: D. E., Annual Report, 1953, p. 16. Thereafter, provincial breakdowns on this basis were not published (perhaps to escape possible political embarrassment).

Most notable among the tribes" which demanded and received preferential treatment were the Chagga of Kilimanjaro and the Haya of Bukoba. The Pare and other inland tribes of Tanga Province and the Nyakusa of Rungwe were to a lesser extent similarly privileged. Perhaps fortunately in terms of the prospects for political integration, the largest tribes—the Sukuma and the Nyamwezi of Lake and Western provinces respectively—did not secure many educational facilities in relation to their populations; neither emerged in the position of privilege occupied to the north by the Ganda of Uganda and the Kikuyu of Kenya. In 1951 the United Nations Visiting Mission received complaints from representatives of the Chagga, Haya, and Pare peoples; in turn, it criticized the colonial administration for retarding the educational advance of areas where interest was displayed, while

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promoting that of regions where apathy might prevent the effective use of new facilities. The Colonial Office replied: The policy is—and this point must be stressed—that if any district can go beyond [its] present target [it] will be given every possible encouragement to do so.... There are those who argue, and with some justification, that the present more advanced areas owe their progress to their good fortune .... these areas in the early days received priority of attention from the Administration and were chosen as the fields for more intensive activities on the part of missionary bodies.... had such favours been more evenly distributed from the beginning, the present stage of development would have been more uniform. Be that as it may, the marked differences in parts of the Territory...constitute a problem. While it is desirable to dispel any fears on the part of the more progressive tribes that they are being held back ...it is equally important that the people in the less favoured areas should not be given cause to feel that they are doomed to an indefinite period of inferiority.S4

The problem was passed on, unresolved, to the independence regime. It would be a misnomer to apply the term "class" to East African society before the colonial period. Within a tribe or clan, there were strata based on political and religious roles, age, etc., but life styles and values were cohesive, and relations to the means of production relatively undifferentiated. However, the advent of Western formal education, together with the establishment of a new occupational structure and the linked processes of labour migration and urbanization, tended to foster a class structure cutting across traditional divisions and strata.35 Administrators in Britain's African territories at first gave deliberate preference to children and close relatives of those recognized as traditional political authorities. In Tanganyika A. Travers Lacey started a government school in Tabora in 1925 to cater for the sons of chiefs, and designed a curriculum that stressed theoretical and practical training in the arts of leadership. Meanwhile, the native authority schools established after 1927 began to provide education for the sons of lesser notables. Even though the purpose of Tabora School was originally defined by an educator, educational administrators became increasingly worried about the possible creation of an unbridgeable gap between leaders and the masses. Despite the fact that many general administrators saw specialized education of chiefs and headmen as essential in the development of native authorities, the policy was gradually altered: native authority schools were opened to all children in 1933, and, after 1935, competitive examinations determined entrance to Tabora Se A type of elite-mass gap, though not necessarily based on

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neo-traditional distinctions, was inevitable. Africans who became teachers, medical assistants, and clerks were not as privileged as members of the European- elite or many Asians, but they had many more social and material advantages than people who lived at the level of near-subsistence. As the educated moved from their home areas to towns or to unfamiliar rural locations, ties with the extended family, the clan, and the tribe gradually weakened. Moreover, access to economic and political influence assured their own children a much better chance than most of securing school places. As independence approached, the traditional bonds that cut across new social cleavages were still strong, but the development of a relatively homogeneous and predominantly urban class based largely on the fruits of education was becoming apparent. Economic structure and cultural change. While the quantitative distribution of educational opportunities left its mark on postcolonial society, there were important qualitative legacies as well. During the German era, the curricula in African schools were patterned on those used in the home countries of European missionaries and teachers. An attempt to implant basic skills in literacy and numeracy was accompanied by religious studies in mission institutions and a measure of vocational instruction in government ones.37 No basic changes were made in the early years of British rule, but after 1925 the climate of opinion changed. Largely responsible was a team of educationists that conducted two surveys in 1921 and 1924 under the sponsorship of the Foreign Missions of North America and an American philanthropic trust fund; the "Phelps-Stokes Reports" sought to develop the "right sort" of education for African children, and initiated a process of experimentation aimed at placing African education within the context of African economic and cultural change.ss The Phelps-Stokes proposals, together with mounting pressures in the United Kingdom, led the Colonial Secretary to ask the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the Tropical African Dependencies to produce detailed guidelines. The Committee concluded that education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various peoples....Its aim should be to render the individual more efficient in his or her condition of life...and to promote the advancement of the community as a whole through the improvement of agriculture, the development of native industries, the improvement of health.. .. Education should strengthen the feeling of responsibility to the tribal community ....39

While reaffirming the aims of colonial administrators and missionaries to produce manpower and to spread Western religious values,

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the Committee thus stressed in addition the importance of adapting education to African life and of raising general economic standards. Throughout British Africa, educational administrators and teachers were urged to undertake experiments to implement the recommendations of the Phelps-Stokes reports and the Advisory Committee.'0 In Tanganyika, the most comprehensive scheme of adaptation was devised by Lewis Mumford, the first headmaster of Malangali School in the old Southern Highlands Province. On taking up his post in 1927, he attempted "to develop a native educational system based upon native customs, but which introduces such modifications as will fit the individual for social and economic changes which are bound to follow increasing contact with Europeans." Far more ambitious in scope than Travers Lacey's project at Tabora, Mumford's entailed the construction of buildings described as "an improved type of native dwelling." Having recruited pupils from nearby areas, the headmaster sought the services of African elders to give advice on "how to educate the boys in the traditions of their respective tribes." A curriculum was designed to combine instruction in tribal law and customs with training in agriculture, carpentry, tailoring, and masonry. Literary education of a Western type was kept to a minimum. However, after five years, Mumford's departure brought the experiment to an end. One of his successors as headmaster noted that while good "in theory," the system did not work "in practice" because "neither pupils nor natives wanted the half-and-half education.... Those who came to school wanted European education. Those who wanted the old native education could get it in their homes."" Similar results, discouraging to educators, were experienced elsewhere." Difficulties were also encountered in implementing the less ambitious policy of using formal education to promote rural-development. In most British colonies in Africa, the teaching of agriculture was given an important place in the curricula of African schools of all levels in the hope that a majority of school leavers would be induced to play a role in improving the productivity and living standards of the countryside. However, after each of several attempts to stress the importance of an agricultural bias, there was a gradual drift away from that special emphasis towards greater concentration on literary subjects.°S Educational administrators continually berated Africans for their propensity to demand a comfortable urban life rather than a life of "noble toil" on the land. The first Director of Education in Tanganyika noted disapprovingly in 1926, "A census of African children at the present time will probably reveal that... the vast majority look upon school as a means to become a clerk or teacher or to enter some other sedentary employment.... "°4 Three decades later, a

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successor wrote, "The attitude of many pupils towards education remains unsatisfactory and there is a need ... for corrective propaganda to the impression that literacy means a well-paid job."45 As late as 1954, Governor Sir Edward Twining unblushingly complained of Africans who "... have lost their sense of values and appear never to have heard of such a phrase as `dignity of labour,' and who seem to expect themselves to be regarded as fully educated and entitled to well-paid employment for which they are inadequately equipped. "64 There were several reasons for the failure of these experiments in Tanganyika and almost everywhere else in colonial Africa where they were tried. First, educational administrators had neither sufficient information nor adequate skills and equipment. Secondly, many teachers, especially Africans, were themselves refugees from rural life, and thus ineffective agents of programmes designed to persuade youths that their destiny lay in working the land. And, finally, parents and pupils exerted strong pressures on teachers to concentrate on the academic material on which examinations were based. The first two of these are readily understandable, but the third requires further comment. Although many Africans consistently rejected Western educational forms, it did not take others long to perceive that education was the means of entry to a new occupational structure established by the Europeans. Until shortly before independence, the places for children beyond the third or fourth years of the primary system were so few that anyone with six years of education was virtually assured of a paid job. Since tradition decreed that material wealth was shared among all members of the extended family, an educated person could raise the living standards of several people. To the pupil himself; education meant an escape from the poverty of the near-subsistence farm to better housing, food, and other amenities enjoyed by school leavers of earlier generations.47 Although many occupations were created by the Europeans, those most coveted by Africans were clerical and other `whitecollar' ones. This phenomenon was analyzed in the Gold Coast by Philip Foster; it is his thesis that the British colonialists, in supplanting traditional political authorities as the dominant elite, became a reference group which young Africans sought to emulate. He notes that three characteristics of this elite were significant in the type of education parents and pupils demanded: it had a virtual monopoly over formal education of a particular type; it confined itself primarily to a narrow range of occupations of an administrative variety; and it was internally stratified on the bases of occupational and formal educational criteria. As a result, Africans, in

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aspiring to jobs like those held by the Europeans, sought an education similar to that enjoyed by members of the elite.46 Because of these factors, attempts to gear the educational system to the traditional and/or rural environments appeared to many perceptive Africans as a means of perpetuating the inferior status of their race. Even among those who accepted the introduction of Western agricultural methods and rural amenities, the pace of these developments was much too slow to make farming seem an attractive occupation, all the more so because few Europeans were seen using their hands and bodies in vigorous manual labour. Although educational administrators in Tanganyika spent considerable time and effort on programmes to adapt Western educational forms to their conception of African needs, they paid little overt attention to the integration of Africans into the new occupational structure except as adjuncts to positions held by Europeans. In the 1920s Governor Cameron had expressed a wish "to furnish the means of obtaining a good secondary education in order that the boys...may be able...to proceed to such postsecondary education as may be available...and so qualify for... posts such as Medical Assistants, Civil and Mechanical Engineers, Secondary School Teachers, and so on, thus attaining to higher positions in their own country in gradual displacement of the Europeans and other `foreigners' whom the Government is now forced to supply because there is no internal supply".49 However, few colonial administrators sympathized with this aim. Until the pace of political development increased markedly in the mid-1950s, authorities tended to restrict the output of post-primary institutions to the immediate and visible needs for middle and low level manpower. The priority for educational expansion, such as it was, was on the spread of mass primary education. Important political consequences stemmed from the way in which educational policies and practices were linked to economic and cultural changes in Tanganyika and other tropical African territories. While it is true that traditional societies differed somewhat in their degree of exposure and receptivity to Western educational forms, most of them gradually came to appreciate the relationship between education and the closely-linked factors of occupational recruitment, social status, and material well-being. Demands for educational expansion were among the most keenly expressed during the transition from colonial to independent rule. These demands increased with the rapid growth in the number and importance of opportunities for Africans within the occupational structure. As independence approached, nationalist governments faced serious problems.

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First, in the short run, the greatest difficulty concerned how to meet demands for more places in schools and colleges at a time when resources were in extremely short supply. Mass pressure was directed towards the expansion and extension of primary facilities, but, among the well-educated minority, secondary and higher education were regarded as higher priorities. It was important to compromise between these two alternatives in a way that would not create disaffection among either the masses or the elite, or divert resources away from other public responsibilities. Overt political considerations were not the sole criteria impinging upon decision-making: educational policies had to consider the realities of economic underdevelopment. Overproduction at the primary level threatend to create serious dislocations because the non-agricultural occupational structure was incapable of absorbing a great influx of semi-educated youths. However, there were difficulties involved in choosing either to curtail primary expansion or to permit rapid growth: the former involved the risk of alienating parents and young people who after independence thought that education was a matter of right, and the latter, the risk of creating a pool of disgruntled urban unemployables. Finally, colonial educational systems failed to produce not only the number of people required to localize the occupational structures after independence, but also the administrative and technical skills needed to consolidate the transfer of authority and embark upon expanded public programmes. If effective locally-controlled and staffed public (and private) sectors were to be developed, it was necessary to concentrate on the expansion and diversification of post-primary educational facilities; how could this need be reconciled with demands for primary school expansion? These three problems—related respectively to political demand, economic underdevelopment, and bureaucratic viability—relate directly to the capacity of political regimes to legitimate themselves and of political systems to cope with the difficulties confronting them. Manipulation of the educational system alone could not have prevented them, nor could one have expected the colonial regime to act; nevertheless, in Tanganyika (as elsewhere) one must conclude that the process of educational planning or lack of it did fail to equip Africans adequately for their changing environment. Political socialization. Although the British Advisory Committee had recommended the use of education to train "the people in the management of their own affairs, and the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service,"b0 few colonial administrators in Tanganyika expressed much concern about this sort of role. Again, Governor

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Cameron was an exception. In interpreting the Covenant of the League of Nations and the mandate principles, he argued that the guardianship is not a permanent and absolute one and is to be exercised only until the people `can stand by themselves.' That being so, it is clearly, I submit, the duty of the Mandatory Power to train the people so that they may stand by themselves...however long that training may take, and to make its dispositions in such a manner that, when the time arrives, a full place in the political structure shall be found for the native population." As Lady Listowel noted in her history of Tanganyika, Cameron "intended to make education the keystone for his state edifice. In his view Indirect Rule, preparation for self-rule and eventual independence were all conditioned by education."S2 Instead, however, overt political education was limited to the teaching of British conceptions of native administration, colonial rule, and constitutional development. Nevertheless, whether intended or not, educational policies and practices did profoundly influence politics within the colonial territories, acting as a catalyst in the growth of resistance to foreign domination and, more particularly, in the recruitment of an elite committed to the achievement of independence. This relationship is too obvious to require further comment. However, in the Tanganyikan context, special note should be taken of the importance of language policy in fostering nationalism. Confronted with the problem of communicating with people who spoke over one hundred languages and dialects, the German regime discovered that there was one potential lingua franca: Swahili, spoken by most of the coastal population and a few upcountry inhabitants. Officials, in attempting to establish an efficient subordinate civil service, decided to use Swahili as the medium of instruction in the lower levels of their schools and German in the upper; 53 missionaries, however, opted to conduct their teaching in tribal vernaculars because they were concerned with winning confidence within the scattered communities from which they sought converts. When Britain assumed the mandate, general and educational administrators alike favoured further promotion of Swahili, primarily because of its practical advantages, and the government decided to use Swahili and English as the languages of instruction in elementary and advanced institutions respectively. Through the leverage of grants-in-aid, the Department of Education gradually induced missionaries to supplant the usage of tribal vernaculars, although not without considerable conflict." Later, both educational administrators and educationists questioned the pedagogical soundness of the policy, but did not succeed in changing it."

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The promotion of Swahili gave Tanganyika an advantage not shared by the majority of African colonial territories: an indigenous language that could become a symbol of "national" pride and could be used as a means of spreading the nationalist message before and after independence. While the promotion of Swahili helped, the school experience of the African child did little to foster the growth of a Tanganyikan identity. Special textbooks and syllabuses for East Africa gradually came into use, but in many primary level courses emphasis was heavily placed on knowledge about alien matters remote from local problems. At higher levels pupils were taught the history of the Territory and surrounding areas; however, the focus was upon events and dates important to the European colonialists. Moreover, it was necessery to prepare for examinations that were set and marked in Britain. Often during the colonial era, the Department of Education issued stirring policy declarations calling on educators to inculcate values of sacrifice and civic duty among the African children who were fortunate enough to hold places in schools and colleges.56 However, the limited opportunities made available beyond the circumscribed base of the educational system and the instrumental attitude of parents and pupils towards education combined to make the school in colonial Tanganyika the scene of intense competition and individualism. Success in examinations, the chief criterion for access to the best occupational positions available to Africans, came to be viewed popularly as the dominant purpose of education. Not unnaturally, many individuals who managed to overcome difficult selection barriers began to show signs of superiority and expect privileges in recognition of their achievement. Aspects of the curriculum, the learning process, and the school environment further strengthed the impact of educational structure on the promotion of competitive and selfish, rather than cooperative and communal orientations. Much of the material presented to African children in schools contradicted their previous experience and seemed unrelated to their immediate environment. Some subjects such as hygiene and science, through condemnation of traditional practices, served to create antipathy towards illiterate elders and to bolster a desire to escape from the poverty and disease of rural life. The process of learning tended to widen the gap between school life and the outside world: although there were many gifted individuals in the teaching profession, the majority of primary school teachers had rather limited intellectual resources; most had at best eight years of academic education and two years' teaching training in a "tramline" course. In the classroom their approach was teacher— rather than pupil-centred, and stress was laid upon memorizing,

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a practice strengthened by the widespread realization that examinations were the gateway to success. At higher levels, skilled teachers who sought to discourage rote learning and stimulate thought found their task a difficult one. Finally, beyond the level of Standard IV, most schools and training centres founded for Africans were boarding institutions, which removed children from active participation in the life of their families and communities for the major part of every year. Pupils found food and living conditions much better than those they had previously enjoyed. Thus, however, sound for purely pedagogical purposes, these institutions also served to enstrange educated Africans from the problems of their society. Summary and Conclusions Throughout the period examined in this chapter, education did not become an important political issue. Educational policy for Tanganyikan Africans was determined within a relatively closed system largely excluding people directly affected by it; in contrast, policy for Asians and Europeans was established in consultation with the two communities and more or less satisfied their demands. However, the effects of educational policies and practices were significant for political and social change. First, differences in educational provision among races, regions, tribes, and religious communities made social cleavages more obvious and heightened the potential for political conflict based on social structure. Moreover, a widening gap and gradually solidifying differences between educated and uneducated Africans led to the emergence of yet another dimension of political interaction centred on class. Secondly, the educational system evolved so that an imbalance developed between the requirements of the occupational structure on the one hand, and the aspirations and skills of African school leavers on the other. This imbalance contained seeds of difficulties both in the failure of those with a low level of education to obtain paid employment and in the meagre production of highly qualified African personnel needed to staff an effective public service. Thirdly, the educational system fostered aloofness rather than social obligation among the elite. Nevertheless, schools and colleges, although hardly designed as instruments of nationalism, contributed markedly to increased resistance to colonialism and a growth in national consciousness. The emergence of articulate spokesmen for African interests and, later, of organized action to secure independence forced an opening of the process of educational policy-making. In turn, some of the policies we have been discussing underwent changes: we shall complete the setting for the post-independence era by examining the impact of nationalism.

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NOTES 1. See Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London, Longmans, 1952. David G. Scanlon reviews the educational role of missions in Africa and cites several lengthy sources in his "Introduction" to David G. Scanlon ed., Church, State, and Education in Africa, New York, Teachers College Press, 1966, pp. 3-32. Other contributors deal with particular territories in greater detail. 2. G. F. Sayers, ed., The Handbook of Tanganyika, DSM, GP, 1930, pp. 384-5. 3. See A. R. Thompson, Partnership in Education in Tanganyika, 19191961, unpublished M. A. thesis, University of London, 1965, pp. 41-3. 4. For a discussion of German educational policy in Africa, see Martin Schlunk, "German Educational Policy; The Schools System in the German Colonies", in David G. Scanlon, ed., Traditions of African Education, New York, Teachers College Press, 1964, pp. 27-50. The selection is an abridged translation of Schlunk, Das Schulwesen in den deutschen Schutzgebeiten, Hamburg, L. Friederichsen & Co., 1914. See also J. Cameron and W. A. Dodd, Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1970, pp. 47-57. 5. For accounts of traditional informal education in East Africa, see O. F. Raum, Chagga Childhood, Oxford University Press, 1940; E. B. Castle, Growing up in East Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 39-45; and C. M. Varkevisser, "Growing up in Sukumaland" in Centre for the Study of Education in Changing Societies, Primary Education in Sukumaland (Tanzania), Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969, pp. 42-82, especially pp. 69-77. 6. Thompson, Partnership, p. 41. 7. See Sayers, Handbook, pp. 376-7 and 386. 8. Based except where noted on D.E., Annual Report, 1923-1956. See especially 1949, pp. 4-6 (for a history of African education), pp. 42-3 (for a history of European education), and pp. 51-2 (for a history of Asian education). See also Tanganyika, Report of the Central Education Committee, DSM, GP, 1943; and Cameron and Dodd, Schools and Progress, pp. 58-78 and 101-16. 9. See Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: the Case of Kenya and Uganda, New York, Teachers College Press, 1967, pp. 1-9 for a brief history of colonial educational development in the other two British East African territories. See also Ronald Hindmarsh, "Uganda", in Scanlon, ed., Church, State and Education, pp. 137-63, especially pp. 140-5. 10. The first Tanganyikan students were admitted to Makerere College in 1934. See J. E. Goldthorpe, An African Elite: Makerere College Students, 1922-1960, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 9-14 for a history of Makerere College. 11. D. E., Annual Report, 1941, p. 3. 12. D. E., A Ten rear Plan for the Development of African Eduction, 1947.

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13. D. E., Revised Ten Tear Plan for African Education, 1950. 14. D. E., Triennial Survey of the Department of Education for the Tears 1955-57, p. 8. 15. D. E., Annual Report, 1946 and 1956. The 1946 figure included students studying in Standards XI and XII at Makerere College. Table 2. 1 is misleading on post-primary education because of the introduction of the middle school course in 1950. 16. See R. J. Mason, British Education in Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, especially pp. 37-64; and J. Roger Carter, The Legal Framework of Educational Planning and Administration in East Africa, Paris, UNESCO, 1966. 17. In addition to Annual Reports, see Thompson, Partnership, pp. 93-6. 18. Cameron was a strong advocate of the policy of indirect rule developed earlier in Uganda and Nigeria by Lord Lugard. For accounts of efforts to establish a system of native administration in Tanganyika, see Kenneth Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931," in V. Harlow and E. M. Chilver, eds., History of East Africa, vol. II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, especially pp. 550-2 and 566-76; Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, London, HMSO, vol. I, 1950, pp. 211-358; and Cameron's own account in My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria, London, Allen & Unwin, 1939. 19. Cameron, Tanganyika Service, p. 129; and Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London, Chatto and Windus, 1965, p. 95. 20. See Anthony Smith, The Contribution of the Missions to Educational Structure and Administrative Policy in Tanganyika, 1918-1961, unpublished M.A. thesis, Sheffield University, 1962, pp. 112-13 and 117-9. 21. For a description of the provisions for League of Nations and United Nations supervision, see B.T.G. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 23-5. 22. That same year, a small additional racial system was established for Goans and other miscellaneous non-Africans when leaders of the Goan and Indo-Pakistani communities decided they could not coordinate their educational activities; it was placed under the control of the Director and a special advisory council. 23. Thompson, Partnership, and Smith, Mission Contribution, examine these mission-government conflicts in great detail. To compare the Tanganyikan case with essentially similar developments elsewhere in colonial Africa, see Scanlon, ed., Church, State, and Education. 24. In the sphere of teacher training, two year courses were given to Standard VIII leavers who taught at the primary level, ex-Standard X students who were used in middle schools, and holders of the Cambridge School Certificate who were recruited for middle schools and the lower levels of secondary schools. The Royal Technical College in Nairobi, opened in 1957, provided advanced training in engineering and technology.

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25. 2,604 Asian and 2,409 African students (D.E., Annual Report, 1956, pp. v and xvi). The 1957 census revealed a total population of 8,788,466, of whom all but 123,130 were Africans. The racial breakdown of others was: Asians, 75,536; Europeans, 20,598; and Arabs, 19,000 (East African Statistical Department, Tanganyika: Population Census, 1957, Nairobi, GP, Table I). 26. Muslim leaders were further disgruntled by the persistent refusal of the colonial government to extend grants-in-aid to Koranic Schools (see Cameron and Dodd, Schools and Progress, pp. 68-9). 27. Based on interviews with officials of the EAMWS in Dar es Salaam in 1966. 28. D.E., Annual Report, 1956, p. v. 29. The Colonial Office assumed in 1951 that a majority of children in government and native authority primary schools were Muslims, but no census was undertaken. (See United Nations Trusteeship Council,

United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1951: Report on Tanganyika together with Related Documents—hereafter cited as Visiting Mission—New York, 1952 p. 62.) In 1961 the Catholic Welfare Society (by then renamed the Tanganyika Episcopal Conference) and the Ministry of Education undertook a joint survey of the religious composition of pupils in Roman Catholic Primary and middle schools. It revealed that twenty-two per cent of the enrolment at the lower level was Muslim in composition: in all likelihood this was a much higher proportion than that of five years before (see Smith, Mission Contribution, p. 280). 30. Figures drawn from the 1957 census show that 24.9 per cent of the African population were Christians, 30.9 per cent Muslims, 43.2 per cent "pagans", and 1.0 per cent unknown (Tanganyika, African Census Report, DSM, GP, 1963, p. 61). 31. D. E., Ten Year Plan. 32. D. E., Annual Report, 1953. 33. For short but excellent discussion of the use of "tribal" and "ethnic" as concepts, see Lionel Cliffe, "Factors and Issues", in Lionel Cliffe, ed., One Party Democracy, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, pp. 306-9. 34. Visiting Mission, 1951, pp. 41-2. 35. See P. C. Lloyd, "Introduction", in P. C. Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 49-62 for a good discussion of the applicability of the concept "class" in the pre-independence African context. 36. See Thompson, Partnership, pp. 210-11; and Listowel, Making of Tanganyika, p. 93. 37. See Schlunk, "German Education Policy". 38. See Thomas Jesse Jones, ed., Education in Africa and Education in East Africa, New York, Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1922 and 1925. 39. Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies, Education Policy in British Tropical Africa, 1925,

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40.

41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

68

reprinted in L. G. Cowan, et al., eds., Education and Nation-Building in Africa, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 46-7. See also the later memoranda which basically reemphasized the proposals of 1925: Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, The Education of African Communities and Mass Education in African Society, London, HMSO, 1935 and 1943. For general discussions of the recommendations and various attempts to follow them, see Philip Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965, especially pp. 148-71; L. J. Lewis, Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Areas, London, Thomas Nelson, 1954: John Wilson, Education and Changing West African Culture, New York, Columbia Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1963, pp. 27-71; Mason, Education in Africa, pp. 37-64; and Thompson, Partnership. C. Whyland, `Malangali Station Book', typescript, no pagination, located at Malangali Secondary School, Mufindi District. Cameron and Dodd (Schools and Progress, pp. 64-5) report that the Malangali experiment also met "deep missionary hostility on the grounds that tribal elders, brought to educate pupils in traditional ways, were inculcating pagan, non-Christian beliefs". See especially Foster, Education and Social Change, pp. 148-71; and Wilson, Changing West African Culture, pp. 40-50. Year after year in their annual reports, Directors of Education commented on the need to emphasize agriculture in the schools and teacher training institutions. Special reports on means to implement the objective were prepared by R. J. Mason in 1938 and R. J. N. Swynnerton in 1949. The nationalist response to the latter report is examined in Chapter 3. D. E., Annual Report, 1926, p. 21. Ibid., 1953, p. 36. L. C., Debates, 1954, p. 28. For an African's view of the changes wrought by formal education on traditional life, see James Ngugi's novel, The River Between, London, Heinemann Educational Books, 1965. Foster, Education and Social Change, especially pp. 1-9. Cameron, Tanganyika Service, p. 129. Advisory Committee on Native Education, Education Policy, Cowan, Education and Nation-Building, p. 46. Cameron, Tanganyika Service, p. 76. Listowel, Making of Tanganyika, p. 48. See Schlunk, "German Educational Policy", p. 39. See Thompson, Partnership, p. 112. See, for example, the comments of the Director of Education in D. E., Annual Report, 1928, p. 8; and Nuffield Foundation and Colonial Office,

African Education: a Study of Education Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 79-83. 56. The analysis in this section is based primarily on interview data. However, see Father Jos Elstgeest, "Primary Education: Revolution

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for Self-Reliance", in Idrian N. Resnick, ed., Tanzania: Revolution by Education, Arusha, Longmans of Tanzania, 1968, especially pp. 229-32; and (Mrs.) A. C. Grol-Overling, "The School", in The Primary School in Sukumaland (Tanzania), pp. 106-34. For a comparison with a similar situation in Nigeria, see Ayo Ogunsheye, "Nigeria", in James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, especially pp. 129-34.

3 THE IMPACT OF NATIONALISM To African supporters of TANU, independence promised the end of humiliating inferiority and the beginning of new economic, social, and political opportunities. From the time of the movement's inception, its leaders had recognized that a lack of educational opportunities for Africans at all levels was a major factor in retarding the general advance of the people; in fact some of them appeared to accept the rather facile notion that education was the panacea for most of the problems of underdevelopment. Although TANU did not initiate many novel proposals for educational development before independence, it did articulate demands and use tactics that could not be ignored in the context of rapid constitutional evolution. As a result, changes of political significance were made in educational policies and practices. In the meantime, the policy-making process became more sensitive to African opinion and changes took place in the formal structures for educational administration and decision-making. Changes in the Policy-Making and Administrative Framework The lines followed in altering the policy-making and administrative framework tended to conform closely to those laid down by expatriates in other British colonial territories at similar stages of evolution.' A new Education Ordinance passed on the eve of independence authorized a number of departures from colonial institutional arrangements: an elected Minister for Education replaced an appointed Minister for Social Services; the Director of Education was removed from the Legislative Council and the office was renamed "Chief Education Officer"; the semi-autonomous non-African Education Authorities were abolished; and the Department of Education, which had been organized to cater for separate racial groups, was upgraded in status to a Ministry and reorganized on functional lines. In addition, the Advisory Committee on Native (by then African) Education was replaced by an Advisory Council on Education, set up to proffer advice on the education of all children irrespective of race. Shortly before independence, arrangements were also made to develop an agency outside of the Ministry— the Teacher Training Advisory Board—which had responsibilities for advising the Minister on syllabuses, training courses, and other professional matters.

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Meanwhile, the Christian mission societies began in the 1950s to transfer their functions to local churches and hierarchies. No significant changes were made by any of the voluntary agencies in their structures for educational administration, but funds for educational purposes were increasingly expected to come from local rather than foreign sources. It will be remembered that District Education Committees had been set up as advisory bodies after the Second World War, and that they had assumed limited executive responsibilities in 1953. Although many colonial administrators had doubts about the administrative capacity of local authorities, the Education Ordinance of 1961 reconstituted these Education Committees as adjuncts of rural district councils, which in turn were given oversight of all presecondary institutions except girls' boarding schools. (A similar transfer of responsibility to urban councils was not made at that time.) Financial arrangements were changed so that council treasuries began to make all payments to meet the costs of primary education; the guideline for local government contributions (established in 1956) remained 50 per cent, but monies were now transferred from the centre rather than to it. Local educational authorities were charged with planning expansion (subject to Ministry approval), advising the Chief Education Officer on the registration of schools, paying teachers' salaries in accordance with a national scale, collecting fees and supplying books and materials from the proceeds, administering a system of fees remission, and maintaining school buildings.2 These responsibilities implied a heavy administrative burden even though the voluntary agencies continued to share many of them. However, the councils were accorded little room for manoeuvre in decisionmaking. Curricula and the terms of employment of teachers remained firmly under central control, and, to ensure compliant behaviour, the Minister was given considerable discretion over subventions arrangements and empowered to remove any or all schools from the jurisdiction of a local authority that "made a default."3 The new Advisory Council on Education was established to represent a broad range of public interests, not merely those of the government and the voluntary agencies. In addition, the 1961 legislation provided for the creation of advisory boards of governors for secondary schools and teachers' colleges, and of school committees (many of which already existed) for lower level institutions.' Each of these innovations was designed to involve a greater number of people (if not, with the exception of the last, a representative cross-section of Tanganyikans) in educational decisionrnaking.

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Finally, many more teams and commissions with interests in educational matters visited Tanganyika as the tempo of constitutional development increased. Of particular importance were the Visiting Missions of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which came at three year intervals beginning in 1948. These structural changes, although clearly based on British models, diverged from the colonial pattern in a number of ways : final decisions became the prerogative of politicians rather than civil servants; separate organizations for the formulation and implementation of educational policies for various racial communities were integrated; rural local authorities were assigned larger roles in the finance and administration of primary schools; representatives of the public were given more opportunities to advise on policy development; and the colonial links were themselves finally cut. However, even before the new Education Ordinance was passed, policy-making had begun to undergo a transformation. Changes in the Policy-Making Process As the pace of political change quickened and as African opinion on education became more clearly articulated through teachers' associations,5 tribal unions, and TANU, the Europeans who had dominated policy-making gradually began to heed African demands. Official responsiveness also increased because of pressure exerted on the United Kingdom by supporters of the African cause in the United Nations. Actual Africanization of the policy-making process was impeded by the short supply of skilled Africans and by the unwillingness of colonial authorities to move quickly. Nevertheless, throughout the 1950s, and particularly after TANU's sweeping victories in the territorial elections of 1958-9, more and more Africans assumed posts formerly occupied by Europeans and Asians. Within the Department (later Ministry) of Education, increasing emphasis was placed on the recruitment of African District Education Officers from the ranks of Schools Supervisors and middle and secondary school teachers. Meanwhile, Europeans in the service of voluntary agencies gradually transferred responsibilities to African clergymen and teachers, and African "unofficial" members of the Legislative Council and the district councils began to replace or supplement non-African and traditional authorities. Then in 1960 Oscar Kambona, the Secretary General of TANU, became Minister for Education. Although the more or less complete assumption of educational policy-making roles by Africans still lay in the future, the balance of influence and power had tipped heavily in their favour by the time of independence.

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Changes in Educational Policies and Practices The nationalist assault on the colonial educational system and its policy-makers was dominated by demands for: more opportunities for Africans at all levels; the abolition of racial discrimination and the preference for non-Africans in educational provision; and a uniform curriculum in all schools irrespective of racial composition or rural-urban location. All were logical corollaries of a desire for an independent Tanganyika in which Africans would experience human dignity in place of colonial servitude. Provision for African education. In his annual report for 1950 the Director of Education noted that the proposals of the Ten Year Plan of 1947 and the revisions of 1950 had been widely approved in the Advisory Committee on African Education, the Legislative Council, and the annual conference of Provincial Education Officers. However, he was disturbed that Africans generally opposed the development of middle schools and the extension of the primary course from six to eight years. Many articulate Africans feared that these changes (also made in Kenya but not in Uganda) would perpetuate a bottleneck at the end of Standard IV; instead they preferred to see any additional financial resources used for secondary school expansion and a full six-year course for all children who entered Standard I.8 This opposition, which was ignored, was symptomatic of growing dissatisfaction among Africans. Complaints about a shortage of school places were common among demands voiced to the United Nations Visiting Missions of 1948, 1951, and 1954.7 In its brief to the 1954 Mission, the newly-formed and as yet poorly organized TANU recounted its bold demands on the colonial administration to adopt the aim of six years compulsory education for all children, to construct new secondary schools, and to establish a separate university college in Tanganyika.8 (The last of these had been voiced by the Mission of 1948, and all three visiting teams emphasized the importance of post-primary educational development in laying the groundwork for economic and political advance.)ø Gradually the changing political climate influenced a shift in priorities. When planning for the years from 1956 to 1961, educational administrators were determined to reconcile competing demands in a programme that they considered educationally and politically acceptable. They produced a plan that recognized the need for substantially increased facilities at the secondary level; specifically, they proposed to curtail the rate of expansion in Standards I and IV, to increase the number of middle school places by more than fifty per cent, to expand secondary enrolment (especially

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in Standards XI to XII), and to replace the advanced secondary course at Makerere College with a Higher School Certificate programme in three Tanganyikan schools. The Department• realized that the decision to restrict expansion in the lower standards would be unpopular, but hoped to win support by stressing the desirability of improving the quality of primary school education and of increasing opportunities at higher levels." When the details of the plan were announced, educational administrators were reasonably confident of African approval; however, they failed to make equally sure of Treasury backing. The Department of Education had produced, in the words of the (then) Member for Social Services, "... a Plan which reflectsrepresents—the view of local authorities and educational experts as to what is the minimum requirement for the next stage of African education,"u but the capital expenditure required for its implementation was more than twice the amount set aside for education in the government's overall five year development plan. Moreover, faced at that time with falling revenues, Treasury officials were unable even to commit the finances necessary for projected increases in recurrent expenditures." Because the details of the educational plan had become common knowledge, the Executive Council decided not to insist on proposals of a more limited scope. Instead, it took the equally embarrassing step of accepting the existing recommendations as directives for policies "to be implemented as and when the necessary financial provision can be made available."13 Unofficial members of the Legislative Council were bitterly critical of the government's refusal to accept outright a plan prepared by its own civil servants. Paul Bomani, the only TANU member of the Council at that time, echoed only slightly more strongly the views of many other unofficials of all races when he said, ...we have so many different kinds of taxation, we have local rates, cattle tax, produce cess and all of these have been introduced by Government by telling the people that in return they will get social services. Now we are told that there is no money to implement the five-year development plan. I do not think I will be able to tell my constituents why Government has collected all this money to pay for education. I think it is absolutely wrong.I" The attack on the government was so strong that Governor Twining decided to deliver a special address to the Council. He declared that, Despite a warning by Government that the financial position would not permit the Plan to be implemented fully at the present time, Government

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was pressed to pursue a policy in connection with African education which could only lead to bankruptcy.... It would be utterly irresponsible... to go ahead recklessly with expenditure on services which ...cannot be financed without distorting the balanced structure of Government activities.... The development of economic resources must be given first priority.15 His speech, as well as the remarks of other high-ranking colonial administrators, reflected the view that education was purely a social service; not many years later, it was regarded as one of the most important economic investments open to government. At any rate, the Governor did make a concession by appointing a committee (of official and unofficial members) to review the proposals for education in the light of the broader plan. Although the Committee's recommendations did lead to a substantial increase in projected capital expenditure, especially in education,16 the target date for final implementation was set back two to three years." In the meantime, the administration took a positive step towards the creation of a university college. In 1955 proceeds from the sale of German lands expropriated during the Second World War became available, and a portion of this money was allocated to start a Higher Education Trust Fund. A British working party visited East Africa later that year, and, after lengthy deliberations, the colonial governments of Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika issued a joint White Paper early in 1958 committing themselves to support a federal University of East Africa with constituent colleges in each of the three largest territories." When a second working party suggested that a University College of Tanganyika be opened in 1965-6,12 TANU urged the administration to act more quickly." British authorities agreed to advance the initial intake of students to 1964, but party leaders were still not satisfied: soon after the attainment of responsible government late in 1960, the new Council of Ministers announced that the University College would open in temporary quarters in 1961.41 Although other changes in educational provision also awaited the nationalist assumption of power, TANU leaders were consulted before coming into office on a Three Year Development Plan for the period I961-64. Published shortly after elected ministers had assumed responsibility for most portfolios, this plan included a section on education that superseded the controversial programme of 1956. Expansion of secondary facilities emerged as the dominant feature: several new streams were to be added in Standard IX; the Standard X territorial examination was to be abolished to permit all secondary school students to proceed through the full four year programme; and higher school certificate studies were to be increased.

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At lower levels, day primary schools were to be extended to provide a six year course and middle schools were to be converted into double stream institutions offering Standards VII and VIII.22 As can be seen by a comparison of data in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, much of the educational growth between 1956 and 1961 occurred because of earlier development: enrolments did not increase at the basic entry and promotion points of Standards I, V, and IX as rapidly as in the overall four-year levels. However, the new plan and the assumption of policy-making roles by African politicians combined late in the planning period to stimulate greater increases Table 3.1 ENROLMENTS IN AIDED AFRICAN SCHOOLS BY LEVEL, 1956 AND 1961, AND PERCENTAGE INCREASE, 1956-61 1956

Standards I-IV Standards V-VIII Standards IX-XII Total

329,832 31,434 2,388 363,736°

1961

409,918 52,500 5,672 468,387b

Percentage Increase 24 67 140 29

Source: D. E., Annual Report, 1956; M. E., Annual Report, 1961. aIndudes 82 students enrolled in the higher school certificate course at Makerere College. bIncludes 297 students enrolled in Forms V and VI. Table 3.2 ENROLMENTS AT ENTRY AND PROMOTION POINTS IN AFRICAN AIDED SCHOOLS, 1956 AND 1961, AND PERCENTAGE INCREASE, 1956-61

Standard I Standard V Standard VII Standard IX Standard XI

1956

1961

107,971 10,859 6,164 1,287 157

117,759 16,576 11,974 2,127 1,095

Source: D. E., Annual Report, 1956; M. E., Annual Report, 1961

Percentage Increase 9 53 94 65 600

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than those projected in the revised five year plan of 1956. In fact, the targets for post-primary expansion in the original draft were almost reached in Standard IX and greatly exceeded in Standard XI.23 Growth in Standards I to VIII, particularly in the first four standards, was considerably greater than educational administrators had foreseen or desired 24 To digress briefly, it should be noted that TANU itself began to provide educational facilities for children in 1955;25 in doing so, the nationalist movement was following the example of missionaries who for years had run "bush schools" staffed by untrained teachers. In a campaign to demonstrate that the colonial regime had not provided sufficient educational opportunities for Africans, TANU recruited retired and dismissed teachers and unemployed Standard VI and VIII leavers to conduct classes at the primary and middle levels. Children who did not succeed in gaining admission to regular schools gathered together in mud and wattle or brick houses that often doubled as TANU offices, or under the shade of a mango tree, to attend lessons most often given without the aid of textbooks or proper materials. Some of these institutions were closed by the government in accordance with a law that required the registration of all sub-grade schools and forbade them to give instruction beyond Standard II. Moreover, as a political organization, TANU was not allowed to operate schools. However, noting that many European and Asian educational institutions were run by parental voluntary agencies, the party managed to surmount this latter difficulty by forming the Tanganyika African Parents Association (TAPA) ; in a few cases where qualified teachers could be found, TANU schools were registered under the name of TAPA and permitted to teach up to Standard IV. Meanwhile, the number of unregistered institutions continued to grow despite sanctions imposed by the colonial regime. In the wake of independence, TAPA assumed responsibility for all TANU schools, but most of them were still technically illegal and all were desperately deficient in trained staff, physical facilities, and educational materials. Responsible for their creation, the new government faced the problem of how to integrate them into the approved structure without alienating parents and supporters. Racial integration of education. A "colour bar" was prevalent in many aspects of life in colonial Tanganyika, and was most obvious in hotels, cafes, and public houses. As the European elite began to accept the inevitability of African self-rule, restrictions were broken down. One of the last elements of racial segregation to disappear, at least in legal terms, was the system of separate educational development for Africans, Asians, Europeans, and Goans and others.

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Although a few institutions (notably St. Joseph's Convent School in Dar es Salaam) had a long history of multi-racial enrolment, the idea of general integration was not seriously broached until 1948 when the United Nations Visiting Mission recommended the creation of common facilities in Dar es Salaam and other major urban centres.26 In 1951 Makerere College in Uganda (previously restricted to Africans) was opened to students of all races, a step that had been urged intermittently by British educationists since 1937.27 The U.N. Mission of 1951 took note of the decision at Makerere, and then considered the argument against change voiced by colonial and educational administrators:As far as primary schools were concerned the question of language alone would make inter-racial education impracticable at the present time.... Children must be taught in the language through which they could assimilate knowledge with a minimum of mental strain....

At the time, although all post-primary instruction was given in English, Swahili was used in African elementary schools and Urdu and Gujarati in Asian ones. The visiting team agreed that "... the approach to the problem of establishing education in Tanganyika on a non-communal basis must be a gradual one, but it expresses doubt that a basis as gradual as that envisaged by the Administering Authority represents a sufficiently positive approach .... " Having observed a high standard of English among African and Asian students, members of the team recommended the immediate establishment of one senior secondary school for children of all races. The Colonial Office in turn replied that no further steps towards integration would be undertaken until sufficient time had elapsed to assess the experiment at Makerere." Neither side at this time admitted that the most important obstacle lay in the opposition of European parents who feared that the quality of instruction given to their children would suffer.8° School integration was one of several matters concerning racial disparity that TANU began to exploit in 1954. The visit of the third U. N. Mission in that year provided the party with an excellent opportunity to publicize abroad its claim that the education system was "merely preparing the African for being used as cheap labour for the immigrant races."" A delegation from Tanganyika African Government Servants' Association, which later cooperated closely with TANU, r a vicious circle in the operation of colonial policy:

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Everything boils down to that one word: discrimination. We Africans want more opportunities; the Administering Authority tells us that we have not the necessary education qualifications. But who holds the key to our proper education? The Administering Authority itself.... It is always the African who occupies the bottom rung in the Civil Service, and the Government's argument is always that the African educational standard is below that of the European or-Asian.81

Leaders of the Asian Association, a cultural organization that formed a political pact with TANU for the elections in 1958 and 1959, also pleaded for integrated secondary schools, stating that children in the existing"...system grow up with set notions of watertight compartments, some with superiority, others with inferiority, and still others with hatred and ridicule."32 The report of the 1954 Mission made many recommendations more radical than TANU leaders had expected: among them was a request to the colonial government "to recognize the principle [of integration] immediately as the basis of the educational system. [The Mission] certainly sees no real difficulty in declaring all secondary schools open to pupils of all races who have the desire and the qualifications to enter them." It conceded that the language barrier was a problem at the primary level, but "the time must be near when increasing numbers of children of all races will be brought up in their homes with a knowledge of the English language learned from educated parents; and for these it will be impossible to justify any arbitrary separation of schools." In reply, the colonial administration criticized the overall report as "an unbalanced and misleading picture of conditions in the Territory", and claimed that "gradual development towards unification in education from the top down is less likely to impede the advance of African education.... "33 By 1954 the "top down" approach included not only Makerere College but also two projected schemes: the Royal Technical College in Kenya, also an institution serving all of East Africa, and a lower level technical institute in Dar es Salaam. The next year, a two-man commission was sent to Tanganyika from the United Kingdom to examine the state of non-African education. It supported local administrators in their opposition to rapid integration, but proposed establishing institutions that would give two year senior secondary courses to students of all races." (At the time, Africans had to go to Makerere College to study at this level; Asians had facilities in two of their secondary schools.) In a White Paper, the government commented : The... [European and Asian] Education Authorities, while they favour in principle that some steps should be taken towards inter-racial education,

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have commented that they have some doubts on the specific proposal of experiments with post-School Certificate courses .... While fully appreciating these views, Government is of the opinion that further consideration might perhaps be given...to an experiment...in one school, possibly the Indian Secondary School in Dar es Salaam.35 "Gradualism" was evidently being stretched past the limits of plausibility, and this concession understandably failed to satisfy critics who wanted a categorical commitment to complete integration as the eventual goal. Meanwhile, TANU leaders were given further cause for complaint when the government announced early in 1955 the disposition of funds obtained from the sale of German property. Governor Twining announced to the Legislative Council (just recently reconstituted on the unofficial side on the basis of racial parity) that all but a tiny fraction of the sum would be allocated to education. However, the amount, £2,844,000, was to be divided into four equal portions: one, as already mentioned, for the establishment of a trust fund for interracial higher education; and three for capital development projects in the European, Asian and African educational systems. Of these three shares, the European one was earmarked for one project—a boarding secondary school in Iringa—while the African and Asian ones were to be spread out among various schemes.3° The thirty members of the Tanganyika Unofficial Members Organization (TUMO) made few comments in Council about the apportionment of the funds, although a European member said he thought that a more sensible allocation of the money would have channelled it into price stabilization. Only Paul Bomani of TANU attacked the distribution as unfair. In response to his criticism, the Member for Finance and Economics stated that he did not make comparisons about expenditures on, or contributions to revenue by various races "...because I do not think that comparisons in either case are helpful towards our goal of building up a single Tanganyika society."37 A few days later, Julius Nyerere wrote to the Chairman of TUMO imploring him to use his influence to change the decision : Government could not have chosen a worthier cause on which to spend money than education. But the decision to distribute the funds on a parity basis must have come to many people as a shock.... Disparity of educational expenditure per head of population in each racial group is always there..., [but] this particular disparity is aggravated to the point of absurdity by this application of parity! ... even if the whole population had accepted the proposition...that quality makes members of the minority groups deserve more money per head for the education of their children, one would at least have expected the Authorities concerned to have considered NEED.

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For lack of education is one thing in which the African can claim undisputable superiority over the other racial groups.

Nyerere concluded with an attack on racial parity in politics, and asked the Chairman to propose that the funds be used instead for the provision of higher education facilities for the country as a whole.98 TANU failed to change the Governor's decision, but gained an excellent example to use in popular agitation against racial parity. In 1956 a majority of TUMO members, on the urging of the Governor, formed the United Tanganyika Party to support the prevailing official conception of multi-racialism and to undermine the strength of TANU. To win mass support in the elections scheduled for 1958 and 1959, the UTP had to match many of TANU's demands, while building up a comparable organizational base in the countryside. It failed in its political objectives. However, the Visiting Mission of 1957, uncertain as to which of the two organizations commanded greater popular backing, was able to report that both firmly supported educational integration, although they differed over emphasis and timing. Once more, the representatives of the United Nations called for common secondary facilities and a unification of the procedures for policy-making and administration; again their demands were rejected.39 Then the results of the September 1958 elections suddenly altered relationships within the political system. TANU had obliterated all opposition, and, although half of the seats were yet to be contested in 1959, there was no doubt as to which group would win. Once in the Legislative Council, TANU and its supporters organized a concerted attack on all aspects of government policy. Racial discrimination in education was deplored by several speakers during the annual budget debate, and, after some hesitancy, the government finally acquiesced.60 Clearly the new political climate made continued legal recognition of segregation untenable. A Committee on the Integration of Education was appointed in December 1958; it was chaired by the Director and comprised, among others, TANU members and supporters of all races. Confronted by separate systems that had evolved along disparate lines with differing modes of financing, the Committee had no easy task. However, political necessity compelled it to produce far-reaching recommendations in its report of October 1959. The main proposals were that post-primary institutions should be opened to all pupils on the basis of competitive examinations, that tuition and boarding fees in all secondary schools should be uniform with a system of remissions for necessitous cases, that the non-native education tax

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should be abolished, and that the various authorities and advisory committees should be replaced by a single Advisory Council on Education.41 Although these recommendations posed problems for decisionmakers, not the least of which was that non-Africans would lose their privilege of automatic entry to secondary school, the most serious difficulties concerned primary schools: there were marked differences in the languages of instruction, the content of curricula, the length of course, the educational qualifications of teachers, the physical standards of buildings, and rates of fees charged. Recognizing that it would be a long time before all African children would have access to Standards I-IV (let alone Standards V-VIII), the Committee suggested as a first step towards integration the adoption of a uniform eight-year curriculum (except for language). Other practical difficulties precluded an unqualified recommendation to permit unrestricted and open enrolment. Instead, it was proposed that "any child should be eligible for admission to any school in the Territory, provided his knowledge of the language of instruction is such that he would be able to maintain his place in the school, and provided that in the case of a primary school priority in admission should be given to the children of the community for whom the school was established." Languages of instruction were to remain as they were.42 The colonial administration decided to defer action on the report until the establishment of responsible government after new elections in 1960. In December of that year, some six weeks after Julius Nyerere and nine of his colleagues formed a majority on the Council of Ministers, a White Paper was published, committing the government to most of the Committee's recommendations and accepting January 1, 1962 as the date for bringing them into force. One significant change was made: the enrolment and linguistic preferences given to children of a particular racial group in primary schools provided originally for that group were to last only three years.03 The debate on the White Paper was highlighted by a problem that was to confront TANU for quite some time. The party now formed the government, and, in just over a year, would be free from any formal control by the United Kingdom. A large number of the movement's supporters expected their leaders to alter suddenly the facts of economic and social life merely by the exercise of political power; some wanted immediate measures to deprive the racial minorities of all special privileges. Julius Nyerere, as Chief Minister, opened the debate with an explanation of why it would take longer to effect integration at the primary level than at higher levels. Defending the decision to permit preferential treatment for three

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years, he said, "We are proposing a radical change in our education system and I think it is fair that we shall allow for a period of adjustment to changed conditions."44 One by one, TANU members took the floor to attack the Council of Ministers for a policy of timidity and excessive moderation, outnumbering those who spoke in the government's favour. Jeremiah Kasambala, later a cabinet minister (until his defeat in the elections of 1965), complained that during the period of transition only the leftover places would be given to African children who most needed education. Along with several others, he advocated the introduction of Swahili as the medium of instruction in all primary schools, thereby permitting immediate integration. His speech ended with a phrase that became popular with succeeding speakers: "I think this integration cannot wait for evolution. In this backward country... we need revolutionary methods."" Another member, who later became a Parliamentary Secretary and an Ambassador, said: "I find it difficult... to believe that integration is really going to succeed because some of our fellow members still have this imperialistic mind that an African child is supposed to serve a European or Asian child.48 The government's most bitter critic in the Legislative Council was C.S.K. Tumbo, a trade unionist who later broke with TANU : proclaiming that "I am pro-systematic revolution", he called for complete and unconditional integration to rectify the situation in which being a European or an Asian gave one a passport to prosperity, while being an African meant that one was downtrodden and treated as sub-human.47 In reply, Nyerere stated that the tenor of some of the criticisms might damage the image of a non-racial Tanganyika which he was then promoting in order to stimulate foreign investment. He commented that an outsider listening to the debate would almost think that the government was creating rather than abolishing racial institutions. Affirming that the past could not suddenly be obliterated, he questioned the concept of revolution held by some of the members. To be blind to facts which we inherit may be termed revolutionary but it is very blind revolution. True revolution must have its eyes wide open and know the situation as it is... that our children speak different languages... What some of my hon. friends are recommending is not revolution but explosion. He concluded by stressing that his government would do nothing to satisfy the irresponsible.4s A vote on the White Paper was then passed without formal dissent, and, shortly before independence,

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the proposals for educational integration were embodied in legislation. A uniform curriculum. Another victory for African nationalism was the recommendation of the Committee on Integration, later approved by the Legislative Council, to work towards a uniform primary school curriculum for children of all races. This marked the end of the colonial policy of differentiating among racial groups with respect to educational content; it also meant the rejection of the latest experiment to adapt formal instruction to the supposed needs of the rural and agrarian sector.49 In 1948 a new Director of Education had expressed interest in revitalizing the idea of using schools to promote rural development and to integrate the majority of school leavers into their home communities. It will be remembered that earlier experiments to bias African education towards agriculture had failed largely because of practical obstacles and resistance from parents and pupils; however, spurred on by the enthusiasm of an important chief, the Director was determined to make a fresh attempt s0 He wrote of the old district schools, which gave instruction in Standards V and VI, that there is considerable ground for believing that their period of usefulness has come to an end ....Of the pupils who pass out of the District schools, approximately four-fifths proceed no further with their education.... The Standard VI qualification is becoming more and more insufficient to enable a boy to obtain any very much better employment than he could have obtained after passing Standard IV. . . . These boys are likely to become unemployed, unemployable, and unsettled. 5' The new middle schools established in accordance with the revised Ten Year Plan were intended to alleviate this problem by providing a course "designed to be complete in itself so that those who pass it, whether they proceed further or not, will have received an education which will assist them to follow in a more intelligent and capable manner whatever pursuits they take up and, generally, to play a more useful part in the development of the locality to which they belong."52 Woodworking and other manual skills were to be taught in urban schools, but agriculture was viewed as the key in rural areas. Assisted by agricultural officials, the Department of Education introduced new agricultural syllabuses in rural primary and middle schools in 1952.63 A year earlier, a team of British educationists touring East Africa (commonly known as the Binns Study Group) had voiced strong approval of the programme.54 However, dissent was expressed by some of the African delegates to a special conference held in Britain to discuss the Binns report. One speaker asked

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whether English educationists would be prepared to introduce coal mining and textile work in their own schools; another insisted that the agricultural bias was doomed to failure because of parental antipathy.55 In Tanganyika popular discontent did indeed develop when it was generally realized that children were being required to spend several hours of school time outdoors doing practical gardening and farm work. In one place, villagers became so irate that they set fire to a middle school only months after it had opened.50 To many Africans the new programme symbolized what they believed to be a deliberate European effort to retard the social and economic advance of their race. This feeling was reinforced by the fact that a similar scheme was introduced in Kenya, while no such programme was introduced in Uganda, which had smaller European and Asian minorities than either Kenya or Tanganyika.57 The Department of Education undertook an extensive propaganda campaign to convince the public of the value of agricultural instruction, but its impact on people who had grown accustomed to regarding education as a means of escaping rural life was limited. At the same time, practical implementation at the school level was hampered by a lack of sympathetic and skilled teachers. Nevertheless, educational administrators spoke optimistically of a prospective change in attitudes among parents, pupils, and teachers once initial difficulties had been overcome.58 In 1955 an Agricultural Officer, appointed to survey progress, recommended a number of changes to improve teacher training, supervision, and syllabuses.5' It is doubtful that his proposals would have done much to overcome the central problem—which lay outside the schools—but in any case the advent of TANU soon made them irrelevant. TANU leaders were by no means opposed to the expansion of general technical and vocational educational facilities, which, in fact, they strongly supported; however, they did object to the teaching of agriculture in primary and middle schools, and they sought to exploit for political advantage popular discontent about the programme. Abolition of the scheme was one of the demands TANU voiced to the United Nations Visiting Mission in 1954.80 Later, even some of the chiefs, on whom the government could generally rely for support, began expressing reservations.81 Fanned by TANU, unrest grew and in 1957 the government agreed to comply with a request of the Visiting Mission to reduce the agricultural emphasis."S After the elections of 1958, TANU used the Legislative Council as a forum in which to attack agricultural education. Solomon Eliufoo, who became Minister for Education after independence, claimed that thinking Africans had been suspicious of the policy

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from the outset because it was "something devised for Africans only, and... suspicion has continued because of poor results." A colleague declared that preparation for life in the community was properly the function of the villagers, not the school; and a European with considerable experience in education condemned "the fruitless idea to try to make the agricultural revolution needed in Tanganyika through schoolboys in our middle schools instead of through adults."63 The Director of Education, a recent appointee not personally associated with the experiment, defended the concepts underlying agricultural education, but indicated that he agreed with many of the specific criticisms of the programme.8° Thereafter, the Department (which in any case was preoccupied with the introduction of the English language in Standards III and IV) gradually dropped its emphasis on agriculture.86 By 1960, the year that TANU leaders entered the Council of Ministers, gardening and farm work had become merely extracurricular activities supervised by a few enthusiastic teachers in a small number of schools. Summary and Conclusions As educational policy-making became more open to African influence and control, three changes with significance for political development took place. First, educational opportunities for Africans grew more rapidly, and the emphasis on expansion was shifted from the primary to secondary and higher levels; secondly, racial segregation and, to a more limited extent, preference in educational provision came to an end; and, finally, the predominantly rural and agrarian bias in African elementary schools was dropped. An additional, if less important, step was taken with the passage of the Education Ordinance: educational discrimination on religious grounds was declared illegal.66 The emphasis on post-primary provision after 1956 was both insufficient and too late to produce enough qualified Africans to assume high level positions in the structures of government and the economy at independence. The new government of Tanganyika, like its counterparts elsewhere in newly independent black Africa, faced a hard choice in compromising between two courses of action. On the one hand, it could continue to employ large numbers of expatriates in key posts, thereby alienating supporters who desired immediate Africanization of jobs irrespective of qualifications and diverting public funds from development programmes into the payment of high salaries and travel expenses. On the other, it could promote inexperienced and unskilled Africans to important positions, thereby weakening bureaucratic efficiency and running the risk of a loss in legitimacy owing to a failure to provide effective public services.

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Meanwhile, the rapid growth of primary school places and the failure of schemes to inculcate an appreciation of a rural agricultural life brought closer the political dangers inherent in the imbalance between low level educational output and the absorptive capacity of the modern occupational structure. The integration of education by race and religion, though important as first steps to make social cleavages based on these factors less visible and pronounced, did not by any means make it possible to close the gaps in educational provision immediately. Disparities centred on class, region, and tribe continued to grow. As far as political integration, commitment, and mobilization were concerned, no changes occurred to stem the drift towards an increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant socialization process in the schools and colleges of Tanganyika. NOTES I. This section is based primarily on D.E. and M.E.,Annual Report, 1955-61; and The Education Ordinance, Laws of Tanganyika, no. 37 of 1961. For a brief account of parallel changes in neighbouring territories, see J. Roger Carter, The Legal Framework of Educational Planning and Administration in East Africa, Paris, UNESCO, 1966. 2. Based on Education Ordinance, s. 8; interviews; and minutes of the Dar es Salaam, Iringa Town, Iringa District, Njombe District, Moshi Town, and Kilimanjaro District Councils. 3. See Education Ordinance, ss. 7, 10, and 38. 4. Ibid., ss. 11-20. 5. The Tanganyika African Teachers' Association (TATA) was formed at the instigation of the Director of Education in 1944 (D. E., Annual Report, 1944, p. 16). It remained in existence as a small and quite uninfluential organization until 1958 when it was replaced by the Tanganyika Union of African Teachers (TUAT), a stronger but hardly militant affiliate of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour. TATA and TUAT spoke out in support of some general demands for changes in African education, but for the most part restricted themselves to trade union matters such as improved salaries and working conditions. Broadly speaking, they were not particularly successful in achieving their goal before independence. The memberships of TATA and TUAT were largely restricted to teachers employed in government and native (later local) authority schools because the Christian voluntary agencies refused to permit their teachers to join. However, the Catholic Welfare Society sponsored the formation of the Tanganyika African Catholic Teachers' Union (TACTU) in 1956 and many Protestant sects established smaller organizations; in doing so, the voluntary agencies hoped that teachers' unions would assist their campaign for the establishment of a unified teaching service. This aim arose from the fact that considerable

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dissatisfaction existed among mission teachers because government grants-in-aid were not sufficient to provide working conditions comparable with those in government and native authority schools. As a result, many teachers left agency schools to seek employment elsewhere. Because such opportunities were so few, however, the mission administrators reasoned that it would be to everyone's advantage to wage a coordinated campaign for equal conditions. Little progress was made before independence, in part because of quarrels among the various teachers' associations. In 1960 several of the Protestant unions joined forces in the African Teachers' Union of the Christian Council of Tanganyika. (Based on interviews. See also Anthony Smith, "The Contribution of the Missions to Educational Structure and Administrative Policy in Tanganyika, 1918-1961", unpublished M.A. thesis, Sheffield University, 1962, p. 225.) 6. D. E., Annual Report, 1950, p. 12. Kenya Africans also voiced suspicions that the changes were designed to maintain their educational inferiority to Europeans and Asians (see Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: the Case of Uganda and Kenya, New York, Teachers College Press, 1967, pp. 3-8). 7. Visiting Mission, 1948, pp. 144, 153-4; 1951, p. 41; and 1954, pp. 11-14, 18-20, 31, 41-4, and 62-3. 8. Ibid., 1954, pp. 12, 13, 20, 44, and 62. 9. Ibid., 1948, p. 156; 1951, pp. 40-4; and 1954, pp. 103-4. 10. D. E., Draft Five rear Plan for African Education, 1957-61, 1956. See also L. C., Debates, 1956-7, pp. 568-9 and 593. 11. L. C., Debates, 1956-7, p. 593. 12. Ibid., pp. 588-9. 13. Tanganyika, The Five rear Plan for African Education, Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1956, DSM, GP, 1956. 14. L. C., Debates, 1956-7, p. 578. 15. Ibid., pp. 647-8 and 652. 16. Ibid., pp. 648-9 (the decision to appoint the Committee emerged from a petition of unofficial representatives); see also Visiting Mission, 1957, pp. 53 and 103. 17. Director of Education to Provincial Education Officers, October 10, 1956 and Director of Education to Education Secretaries General, June 25, 1957, File PL/200, Songea Regional Education Office. The two letters present details of retrenchment in planned development. 18. Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, Higher Education in East Africa, Entebbe, GP, 1958, p. 74. The report of the 1955 working party is in Appendix I. 19. Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July-August, 1958, Nairobi, GP, 1959, p. 13. 20. Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, 1960, Nairobi, GP, 1960, pp. 4 and 15. 21. The decision was announced in November 1960 (See L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. III, col. 89). The new TANU headquarters building was turned over to the University for use until a new out-of-town campus

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was ready. After the move to the campus in 1965, the office building became the university's adult education centre. 22. Tanganyika, Development Committee of the Council of Ministers, Three Year Development Plan for Education, mimeo, 1960. See also, Tanganyika, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/ 2-1963/ 4, DSM, GP, 1962. 23. The draft five year plan called for an increase in the number of streams in Standards IX and XI of 22 and 20 to make totals of 66 and 25 respectively. By 1961 there were 65 and 33 streams in Standards IX and XI respectively. 24. See Chapter 6 for an examination of the reasons for the rapid growth in primary school places from 1959 onwards. 25. Most of this materials is based on interviews. (However, see TAPA, Sauti ya Wazazi, No. I, mimeo in Swahili, January 1966.) TANU was also active in the sphere of adult education. Its most noteworthy project was the establishment of Kivukoni College, an institution patterned after Ruskin College in Oxford and designed to give a residential course in the humanities and social sciences to activists in TANU and the trade union and cooperative movements. The initial costs required to open the College were met in large measure by private donations to a trust fund established by the party. 26. Visiting Mission, 1948, p. 157. It would appear that none of the people interviewed by the Mission at that time actually requested integration; the Director of Education in his annual report merely mentioned the demand without comment (D. E., Annual Report, 1948, p. 1). 27. See J. E. Goldthorpe, African Elite: Makerere College Students, 1922-1960, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 13. 28. Visiting Mission, 1951, pp. 44-5 and 63. 29. This point was made by a later Visiting Mission, 1957, p. 62. 30. Ibid., 1954, p. 44. 31. Ibid., p. 14. 32. Ibid., p. 21. 33. Ibid., pp. 103 and 134. 34. Tanganyika, Non-African Education, report prepared by Donald Riddy and Leslie Tait, DSM, GP, 1955, pp. 79-80. 35. Tanganyika, Development of Non-African Education, Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1956, DSM, GP, p. 7. 36. L. C., Debates, 1955, p. 27. 37. Ibid., pp. 196, 239, and 309. 38. Cited in Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London, Chatto and Windus, 1965, p. 260. 39. Visiting Mission, 1957, pp. 63 and 108-9. 40. L. C., Debates, 1958-9, vol. I, pp. 42, 44, 46, 56, 72-4, 84, and 172. 41. Tanganyika, Report of the Committee on the Integration of Education, DSM, GP, 1959, pp. 9-11, 19 and 21. 42. Ibid., p. 10. Another serious obstacle was posed by the existence of the European secondary school (St. Michael's and St. George's) built from the funds released by the Custodian of Enemy Property. Clearly an

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anachronism because of its superior physical and teaching facilities, the school was eventually closed in 1963 and reopened as Mkwawa Senior Secondary School. 43. Tanganyika, The Basis for an Integrated System of Education, Government Paper No. 1 of 1960, DSM, GP, 1960. 44. L. C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. II, cols. 47-51. 45. Ibid., cols. 54-6. 46. Richard Wambura, ibid., col. 111. 47. Ibid., col. 97. 48. Ibid., cols. 115-25. 49. For a review of this experiment written from the vantage point of an educationist, see William A. Dodd, "Education for Self-Reliance" in Tanzania: a Study of its Vocational Aspects, New York, Teachers College Press, 1969, pp. 5-18. 50. D. E., Annual Report, 1948, p. 32. The chief was Adam Sapi of the Hehe, later Speaker of the National Assembly. The last time the colonial regime had devoted special attention to agricultural education was in 1937 when an educational administrator was commissioned to undertake a survey of rural schools and to recommend steps to reinforce an agrarian bias. His report was accepted by a special Central Education Committee established the following year to advise the Director on the Territory's needs in the post-depression era. Because this Committee's proposals-including those for rural educationrequired the services of many more European officers and teachers than became available during the Second World War, they were deferred (see Tanganyika, Report of the Central Education Committee, DSM, GP, 1943, especially pp. 23-31). 51. D. E., Revised Ten Tear Plan, 1950, pp. 7-8. 52. D. E., Provisional Syllabus of Instruction for Middle Schools, 1952, p. 1. 53. R. J. N. Swynnerton, an Agricultural Officer, better known for his agricultural plan adopted for the African areas of Kenya during the Emergency, conducted a study for the Department of Education in 1948, which formed the basis of the new experiment. An instructor at the training institute run by the Department of Agriculture at Ukirigurudrafted the agricultural syllabuses. The timetable for Standards I-IV prescribed five hours a week of farming and handiwork. That for Standards V to VIII prescribed about two hours a day for agriculture during the three months of planting and harvesting and about an hour a day during the remaining six months of the academic year. See D. E., Syllabus of Instruction for Primary Schools, 1953, and D.E., Provisional Syllabus of Instruction for Middle Schools, 1952. 54. Nuffield Foundation and Colonial Office, African Education: a Study of Education Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 72-3. 55. Ibid., p. 175. 56. The school was near Mwanza. Based on an interview with an Education Officer in 1966. 57. See Weeks, Educational Divergence, pp. 6-7.

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58. See D.E., Annual Report, 1951-5, passim. 59. See Tanganyika, Department of Agriculture, Report on an Inquiry into Agricultural Education at Primary and Middle Schools, DSM, GP, 1956. 60. Visiting Mission, I954, p. 20. 61. See L.C., Debates, 1955, pp. 259-61, 272; and 1957-8, pp. 920-1. 62. Visiting Mission, 1957, pp. 67 and 110-11. 63. L. C., Debates, 1958-9, vol. IV, pp. 75, 85, and 89. The last two speakers were John Keto and Barbro Johannson. 64. Ibid., p. 93. 65. M. E., Triennial Survey of Education in The rears 1958-1960, pp. 6-7. 66. Education Ordinance, ss. 5, 29, and 30.

Part II

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

4 THE FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION Institutional Changes Despite the transfer of formal sovereignty from London to Dar es Salaam and the gradual evolution of a mobilizational strategy for development, authorities responsible for education in Tanzania (as it became) tended until 1967 to accept an essentially British conception of their needs and roles. As a result, they retained the basic institutional framework set up under the Education Ordinance of 1961. Certain changes did take place when circumstances made them necessary or desirable, but most of these were merely piecemeal adjustments. Even the union with Zanzibar had little impact: formal education on the islands—except at the post-secondary levellremained the responsibility of the Zanzibari government, and few channels of communication were developed between mainland and Zanzibari educational officials. The establishment of the Ministry of Education was much increased, but the only major organizational innovation was the creation of a Planning Section, a step that reflected the common commitment of governments in newly-independent African states to develop coordinated procedures for economic and educational planning.s In addition, the responsibilities of the Teacher Training Advisory Board for advising the Minister on professional matters such as syllabus revision and training courses were gradually transferred to an Institute of Education associated with the University College. Voluntary agencies. During the transition to independence in African colonial territories, nationalist leaders began to question the wisdom of leaving some responsibility for schools in private hands at a time when systems of formal education were expected to play a key role in development programmes. While only the government of Guinea went as far as nationalizing all schools and excluding churches from education at independence, most other tropical African governments acted quickly to diminish the role of voluntary agencies.3 In Tanganyika, even if the Cabinet had agreed with some of the more outspoken critics of the missions, the extent of church involvement in education would have precluded an immediate takeover of all schools. Instead, the government took a number of measures that 95

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paralleled earlier developments in Ghana, and, at least in terms of their effect, conformed to a pattern that became typical of most former British colonies.4 Secondary schools and teachers' colleges managed by the voluntary agencies continued to receive grants-inaid for teachers' salaries and general expenses, but the Ministry of Education took direct control over such important matters as the selection of students and the maintenance of discipline. The essentially public nature of these institutions was further reflected in the composition of boards of governors set up to advise heads and principals: the government appointed more members than the agencies and had the final say on all nominations. At the primary level the voluntary agencies had traditionally played a role that extended beyond administrative and financial responsibilities to classroom supervision. However, in 1962, while the government welcomed the continued involvement of Education Secretaries (administrative personnel whose salaries were paid from agency funds), it withdrew grants-in-aid for Education Assistants and Schools Supervisors whose direct participation in the teaching process was considered to be incompatible with the overriding responsibility of the state. Officials of the Christian Council of Tanganyika (CCT) and the Tanganyika Episcopal Conference (TEC—the former Catholic Welfare Society) argued that the move was premature, but to no avail.5 The two corps (and the government's own Schools Supervisors) were replaced by a new primary school inspectorate, employed directly by the Ministry and responsible for both formal inspection and the continued education of serving teachers. Primary School Inspectors were given the same rank as District Education Officers (who were chiefly responsible for administrative and financial matters) and assigned to the staffs of Regional Education Officers. In another move in 1962 to establish greater government control, the National Assembly passed legislation in 1962 that created a Unified Teaching Service (UTS) to act as the legal employer of teachers at all levels.° Although the voluntary agencies continued to pay the salaries of teachers from grants-in-aid, they lost their independent control over salaries and working conditions and the recruitment and posting of teachers. Shortly after these changes took place, the number of voluntary agencies of national status grew from two to five. Grants-in-aid for Education Secretaries General, already given to the CCT and TEC, were extended to the Tanganyika African Parents Association (TAPA), the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), and the Education Department of His Highness the Aga Khan. Meanwhile, small organizations such as parents' associations and

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commercial enterprises continued to receive grants-in-aid for educational institutions, although not for administrative purposes. Although the government severely curtailed the scope for independent action available to the national voluntary agencies, it did accord them formal representation in educational advisory structures. Education Secretaries General were made members of the Advisory Council for Education and the Central Board of the UTS, and most Education Secretaries were appointed to serve on District Education Committees and Regional Committees of the UTS. The conversion of the CCT and TEC into little more than administrative adjuncts of the Ministry of Education and the elevation of TAPA and the Muslim agencies effectively stemmed most of the demands of middle level TANU leaders and others for the outright withdrawal of voluntary agencies from educational responsibilities. Many people interviewed by the author in 1966 pointed out the advantages to the government of maintaining the status quo in its relationship with the agencies: the Ministry of Education was spared much administrative work that it would have had to undertake if all schools were owned and run by the state; and pressure on public expenditure was relieved by agency contributions to the operating and capital costs of the educational system. Nevertheless, it had become apparent that there were also drawbacks to the continued participation of voluntary agencies in public education: first, because their manpower and financial capabilities varied considerably, it was difficult to achieve equality in the academic and physical standards of schools; secondly, the additional administrative structures tended to erect a barrier to effective communications between administrators and teachers; and, thirdly, given the association of most agencies with religious groups, it was hard to eliminate competition and friction based on evangelical fervour. Finally, and most important of all, the older Christian agencies, while no longer influential in national policymaking, did retain considerable initiative in primary school development at the local level. When authority was given to grant-aid new streams, their Education Secretaries, who were local people or long-resident expatriate missionaries, had much greater access than transitory Regional and District Education Officers to information about how the population was distributed and where there were concentrations of children without schools. Moreover, CCT and TEC officials almost invariably administered several unassisted bush schools and were well placed to help their parishioners in obtaining government aid for those existing institutions in preference to new local authority projects.7 As we shall see,

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these problems and the imperatives of post-Arusha socialist development did eventually lead to the nationalization of all schools.8 Local authorities. In 1964 municipal councils were given responsibilities for primary school education similar to those assigned rural district councils at independence. However, in contrast to the rapid strides towards decentralization in the period from 1956 to 1961, the following years were characterized by a virtual holding operation. In fact, by the mid-1960s local authorities found their autonomy curtailed because the centre had increasingly intervened in the processes of fee collection, financial audit, and development planning. Similar developments occurred in other former British colonies. s The Tanganyika Education Ordinance was rather vague on the subject of fees: nothing was specified about the determination of rates, but it did at least imply that fees were to be levied and collected by local education authorities (LEAs).10 Some councils, under heavy pressure from their elected members, had instituted free tuition in Standards I-IV (and in some cases higher levels) before the formal constitution of LEAs in 1961, and several others proceeded to do so afterwards. Although many educational administrators doubted the wisdom of fee abolition at a time when few districts came even close to contributing fifty per cent of the operating costs of primary schools, the Ministry did not formally object as long as local rates were increased to subsume lost income." By and large, the results proved disastrous. It is true that fees provided only about ten per cent of the revenues required to run primary schools, but they were directly tied to the purchase of materials and equipment. Because few local authorities were prepared to raise taxes, required books and other teaching essentials were not provided in sufficient quantities. The problem was exacerbated by the tendency of LEAs to devote what limited funds were available to their own schools to the exclusion of those managed by voluntary agencies; as a result, some agencies threatened to close their educational facilities.'$ The resulting frustration placed senior Ministry officials in an awkward position: at one level, they were caught between the demands of local politicians and the grievances of teachers and field officers; at another, they had to compromise between their wish to see autonomous LEAs work effectively and their desire to maintain acceptable educational standards. Late in 1960 Mr. Nyerere had told the Legislative Council that he opposed abolition: There is an assumption somewhere if we were to abolish school fees just like that, that fact somehow would come as a miracle, and enable this

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Government to give education to every child in the country....I have a feeling that if we gave free education in this country it would be a retrograde step. Those who can pay should pay and only those who cannot pay should be assisted by the Government.13 However, like many verbal admonitions from the centre at that time, this directive had little impact.I4 The situation continued until 1963 when the Ministry issued regulations requiring LEAs to impose uniform fees at each primary level that were not to fall below minima prescribed by the Minister." Threatened with a reduction in their subventions if they did not comply, recalcitrant LEAs were soon brought to heel, although two districts were exempted for political reasons and an administrative breakdown delayed reintroduction in a third until 1966.16 Even after fees were reintroduced, parents in some areas refused to pay them. For example, with just weeks to go until the end of the 1966 academic year, one Education Secretary reported to the author that he had collected only Shs. 7000 from a potential revenue base of Shs. 25,000. Often, as in this case, voluntary agencies had particular difficulty because they lacked sanctions to enforce payment. Largely as a result, some local councils took over complete responsibility for fee collection and the distribution of books and materials, but this solution proved unsatisfactory in many cases because of administrative incapacity and conflicts over favouritism. No matter which system was used, parental resistance was often reinforced by local politicians, who, according to one educational administrator, "feel that it is best to leave parents to pay fees as they like". Bitter clashes frequently arose between headteachers and TANU activists after children were sent home because of unpaid fees» In one interesting case, a divisional executive officer who was responsible for fee collection attempted to broaden his political base by telling parents that payment was optional; needless to say, not many people paid until the Area Commissioner intervened. These difficulties eventually led to yet another curtailment in the freedom of manoeuvre accorded to LEAs: in 1967 the government centralized ordering procedures for books and materials in the Tanzania Publishing House and required local treasuries to meet the costs. Obliged to purchase materials even if people refused to pay fees, LEAs became motivated both to collect as much as they could and to operate a system of fees remission geared more to genuine financial need than to political influence. Meanwhile, financial mismanagement of a more general nature

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became a problem in some local authorities. One Regional Educadon Officer (REO) wrote headquarters in 1963 to request the removal of "educational functions" from two LEAs (Tabora and Ufipa) because they had been "very slack" in supplying schools with essential materials, maintaining buildings, and paying grantsin-aid to voluntary agencies." Another district council (Pare) went bankrupt in 1965 and had to be salvaged by the central government: during an investigation of the insolvency, a local government official admitted that several sums specifically earmarked for educational purposes had been "misused on other expenditure heads"; moreover, teachers went without their salaries for two months." These cases were not typical—after an understandably difficult start everywhere, several local authorities did establish effective administrative and financial organizations. Nevertheless, the difficulties were sufficiently widespread to convince the Ministry that DEOs should be assigned direct oversight of the educational accounts of rural district councils.Y0 Finally, a lack of coordination in development planning between the central and local governments led to an expansion of primary school facilities far greater than that foreseen or desired at the time by political leaders and educational administrators. Chapter Six examines the politics involved in several attempts by the centre to control this situation. In his budget speech of June 1964 the Minister for Education, Solomon Eliufoo, regretted that local education authorities "have not lived up to their responsibilities."21 Talk of further decentralization of educational responsibilities, once quite common, dwindled, and representatives of the Ministries of Education and Local Government decided in 1964 not to take any major steps until the 1970s. When changes did come at that time, they were radically different from what had been originally envisaged.22 Teachers' organizations. At the time of independence, there were small teachers' association fragmented on the bases of race and religion; they had been notably uninfluential during the colonial period. The first African Minister for Education, Oscar Kambona, criticized the internal disunity of the profession and strongly urged the formation of a single union.23 In January 1962 the leaders of the various organizations settled their differences and announced the formation of the Tanganyika National Union of Teachers (TNUT).24 Mr. Eliufoo, who by then had replaced Kambona, welcomed the move and exhorted TNUT leaders to make their organization not just a trade union struggling to obtain benefits but a professional association dedicated to improving educational

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standards and meeting "the challenge of fighting against ignorance. "25 The Minister's plea appeared puzzling when labour legislation was passed in June 1962 precluding from trade union membership anyone who earned more than £660 per annum; TNUT, as an affiliate of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, was included. The organization's leaders protested this provision because it effectively debarred most secondary school teachers,E6 but the government refused to compromise. Instead, Mr. Eliufoo suggested the establishment of a separate, purely professional body for all teachers that would be concerned basically with matters other than salaries and working conditions.27 His recommendation was not pursued. Ironically, the realization of a goal long sought by teachers' organizations further weakened TNUT's position. The establishment of the Unified Teaching Service in 1962 ensured that salaries and working conditions would be equal for all teachers of a given rank and provided procedures for appeals concerning dismissals, transfers, and promotions.28 However, while these provisions greatly improved the lot of the teacher, they erected a buffer organization between the government and TNUT that not only performed some of the tasks that the union might have undertaken but also worked to co-opt and overcome any widespread teacher discontent. Meanwhile, relations between TNUT leaders and the Ministry continued to deteriorate, and, in the wake of the army mutiny in 1964 and the subsequent reorganization of the labour movement, the association was disbanded. Apparently on the insistence of Michael Kamaliza, then Minister for Labour, the Cabinet decided that teachers would be enrolled in one of the "industrial" sections of NUTA rather than being permitted to form a new organization.28 The Teachers' Section of NUTA became the sole agent for teachers in negotiations over salaries and working conditions. However, even though all teachers (irrespective of salary) were invited to join, in the eyes of many members, it did not develop into a satisfactory vehicle for the promotion of professional interests. In a survey of 277 school teachers (conducted by the author in 1966), 62 per cent of the citizen respondents were members.90 However, among the members, three-quarters of those who had some secondary school education (Grade B teachers and above) and two-fifths of the lower level teachers cited "force" as their basic reason for joining.3' Of members who were prepared to evaluate the Teachers' Section (128 out of 141), almost three-fifths thought that it was not

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a good organization for teachers.S2 The dominant reason for rejecting NUTA was that it was too closely tied to the government to serve the interests of the profession effectively. A small minority complained that "teachers are not workers," while yet others criticized the lack of teacher representation in NUTA:33 the Assistant Secretary General of the Teachers' Section was a former teacher, but all matters in the field were handled by Regional and Branch Secretaries, few of whom had had teaching experience. Available evidence suggests that teachers had little influence on educational policy-making. It is true that they were represented on Regional Committees of the UTS, but these bodies dealt with individual cases and seldom became involved in policy questions. At the time of independence, primary school teachers were permitted to sit on District Education Committees, and those not employed by the government or the local authorities could hold office as district councillors. However, these privileges were effectively revoked in 1963 after a group of Catholic teachers successfully opposed TANU candidates in elections for the Bukoba District Council ;34 teachers were told to stay out of politics and devote themselves fully to their profession 35 When asked, "Do you think that teachers have any voice (or say or influence) with the Ministry of Education in making educational policy?" 21 per cent (57) of the teachers interviewed in our survey said "yes", a further 5 per cent (13) gave a qualified "yes", and 59 per cent (163) said "no".S6 As one might expect, a higher proportion of secondary than primary school teachers thought that teachers were influential, but the appraisal was still largely negative.37 An overwhelming percentage (over 85) of both groups (if one excludes European expatriates) expressed a desire for a much greater voice for the profession, 98 and in both cases a substantial number wanted to see a new teachers' association established. The Public. No basic institutional changes involving public participation in educational matters took place in the early years of independence. However, it is worth examining briefly the three structures set up by the Education Ordinance to provide some measure of public consultation: the Advisory Council on Education, boards of governors, and school committees. In his address to the first meeting of the Advisory Council in 1962, Mr. Eliufoo stated that "purely professional considerations are not the only ones affecting educational policy. It is desirable that the Minister should have available to him a source of advice of a more general nature." He pointed out that the membership was "as representative as possible of the special interests throughout the country", but neither he nor anyone else stated clearly just what

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the role of the Council would be. Years later, no one was much clearer because the Advisory Council had become only marginally involved in the policy-making process. Although many important questions came before it, they generally fell within two categories: matters that happened to be under consideration at the time of annual meetings, and issues that involved unpopular decisions for which the Minister wanted some support. Initiatives by lay members were rare, and debate was monopolized by Ministry and voluntary agency members; as a result, considerable time that could have been used for a review of policy was taken up in discussions of administrative details. By and large, the main beneficiaries of the Advisory Council were Ministry officials who used it as a forum in which to float "trial balloons." It had the additional advantage of making some people who were not intimately involved in educational planning and administration aware of some of the problems faced by political leaders and educational administrators.39 By 1965 boards of governors had been appointed for almost all secondary and teacher training institutions. Representing government, voluntary agency, and "public" interests, many of them soon became dormant largely because they were not assigned clearcut responsibilities. Some authority for staffing and finance was given to the governors of a few voluntary agency schools, but, in most institutions, boards played only an advisory role in such questions as discipline and physical planning. Although a few heads interviewed by the author thought that their boards might become effective pressure groups in obtaining more facilities, others discounted this possibility at a time when all schools had to compete for exceedingly limited public resources. Several heads wanted to see a greater delegation of financial control to boards along the lines of developments in Uganda and Kenya; however, the Ministry claimed that such a move would be premature, especially because many board members had demonstrated a lack of understanding of educational matters and some had tended to regard boards as "political structures" in which they could enhance their power and prestige.40 Parents (as such) did not usually become involved in any formal way in the affairs of secondary and teacher training institutions, most of which were designed to serve wide geographical areas. However, the parents' or school committee did develop as an established institution at the primary school level. School committees were assigned only advisory functions, but, unlike boards ofgovernors, their role became clear and fairly well understood. Their most important task involved participation in the selection process for Standard I, which, earlier, had often been characterized by

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misunderstandings and accusations of favouritism that undermined harmonious school-community relations. In addition, the committees accepted some measure of responsibility for the collection of school fees, the enforcement of school disciplinary policies, the organization and financing of mid-day meals, and the supervision of self-help building projects. Some committees, but clearly a minority, also developed into vehicles for the transmission of local educational demands to development committees and officials of the Ministry and the voluntary agencies. Educational administrators agreed that from their perspective the success or failure of school committees depended largely on the enthusiasm and ability of headteachers. Of forty-one primary schools visited by the author in 1966, thirty-seven had functioning committees, although it was apparent in comparing information supplied by the heads and other teachers that many of these were relatively inactive.° In twenty-six cases, the headteachers were satisfied with their committees. Understandably, their evaluation tended to focus on the extent to which the behaviour of committee members was compliant and/or supportive. While the author discovered some evidence of school committees acting independently on staff matters (in one case succeeding in having an unpopular headteacher removed), policy initiatives by parents were rare. In a study of the politics of education in Kilimanjaro District, Joel Samoff concluded that " . . . the headteacher plays a dominant role in the school committee and uses his committee to back his demands. . . parents are so afraid that their children will suffer if they challenge the headteacher that the committee approves whatever the headteacher recommends."48 L.F.B. Dubbeldam found a similar pattern prevailing in most of the school committees he examined in Mwanza District." In summary, the institutional changes that took place in the first half decade of independence resulted in a greater commitment to the integration of educational and economic planning, in a diminution in the national role of the voluntary agencies, in closer control by the centre over local authorities, and in moderately greater participation by parents in the affairs of primary schools. The policy to involve more people not directly concerned with education decision-making at the centre and in secondary schools and teachers' colleges was not implemented effectively. Moreover, teachers' organizations did not develop into bodies with influence in educational matters. Basically, the account of these changes sheds light on the consolidation of power by the central government; however, while it tells us something about administration, when it

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comes to national policy-making, we have said more about who was not involved than who was. The Policy-Making Process After independence, the broad outlines of educational policy were determined, although not necessarily formulated, by the President and the Minister for Education acting alone, together, or with members of the Cabinet or its Committee on Higher Education and Training. The National Assembly and the National Executive Committee of TANU served as forums for discussion, and they had the formal authority to ratify, amend, or reject policy initiatives. However, at least in the educational sphere, government leaders and senior administrators possessed the sanctions and technical resources necessary to dominate these institutions, all the more so because political activists tended to accept the myth that questions apart from expansion were the preserve of "professional experts." A key group developed within the Ministry of Education to advise the Minister on major policy questions, and to deal with day-to-day decision-making on minor matters. It comprised the Principal Secretary, the Principal Assistant Secretaries for Higher Education and for Finance and Establishments, the Chief Education Officer (CEO), six Assistant Chief Education Officers (ACEOs), and the Registrar of Students. At the time of independence, all but two of the eleven positions were held by British expatriates.44 However, rapid Africanization of senior posts took place in all ministries; in Education, only the Principal Assistant Secretary (Finance and Establishments) and ACEO (Inspectorate Section) remained in European hands at the end of 1963. By the time the Africanization process was virtually complete in 1965, the eleven men in the senior posts had begun to work effectively as a team (at least in bureaucratic terms). By 1966 it was common practice for them to meet around a table in the Principal Secretary's office once or twice a week for policy sessions, while, on lesser administrative questions, they were in daily contact with one another. According to accounts given by some of them, ideas were exchanged informally and openly. Full Africanization at lower levels of the Ministry resulted, if anything, in a reinforcement of the British bureaucratic norms of hierarchy and discipline: for example, great care was taken to follow the formal channels of communication established by colonial administrators (but often circumvented by them in practice). As a result, junior educational administrators came to play only a minimal role in policy-making, contributing suggestions only when specifically requested to do so. Generally poor communications

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facilities throughout the country reinforced the exclusion of field officers. (Conversely though, because of this problem, Regional Education Officers in particular continued to make decisions on many matters that fell between the formulation and the straightforward implementation of policies; and, as noted above, Education Secretaries of the Christian voluntary agencies remained influential in the sphere of primary school development.) Nevertheless, the policy process did become much more open than it had been in colonial days when administrators and missionaries made decisions about African education with only the slightest concern about consulting Africans. Just how open will become apparent in the chapters that follow.

NOTES 1. The Union government was assigned responsibility for the higher education of Zanzibaris in 1967 (see The Standard, July 6, 1967). 2. The change followed a recommendation of UNESCO, Report of the UNESCO Planning Mission for Tanganyika, Paris, limited mimeo edition, 1963. 3. See David G. Scanlon, "Introduction", in Scanlon, ed., Church, State, and Education in Africa, New York, Teachers College Press, 1966, especially pp. 18-22. 4. See Nicholas O. Anim, "Ghana", in ibid., especially pp. 188-90. In Uganda the government formally nationalized all grant-aided schools, but permitted voluntary agencies to share in their management (see J, Roger Carter, The Legal Framework of Educational Planning and Administration in East Africa, Paris, UNESCO, 1966,p.15). Although voluntary agencies in Tanzania continued to act as formal managers of schools, government action reduced the capability of agencies to act independently to about the same level as in Uganda. 5. See Minutes of Advisory Council on Education (hereafter cited as Advisory Council), DSM, mimeo, 1962. 6. The Unified Teaching Service Act, Laws of Tanganyika, no. 6 of 1962. See below, n. 28 for a description of the organization of the UTS. 7. For an excellent analysis of how the Christian voluntary agencies dominated decision-making about primary school expansion in Kilimanjaro District, see Joel Samoff "Politics, Politicians, and Party: Moshi, Tanzania 1968-9", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971, Chap. 3, especially pp. 65-94. (The study was published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1974 as Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power.) 8. See below, p. 283. 9. See, for example, Carter, Legal Framework, pp. 19-20. In Kenya the difficulties were so great that the central government finally decided in

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FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION

1969 to abolish local education authorities and transfer their functions. directly to the Ministry of Education ( The Reporter, November 28, 1969). 10. See Education Ordinance, s. 8. 11. M.E., Annual Report, 1960, p. 3; and 1961, p. 3. 12. See, for example, Provincial Education Officer, Eastern Province, to Secretary, Bagamoyo Local Authority, December 29, 1961, File EDP/ P2/2/4, DSM. 13. L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. II, cols. 122-3. 14. For example, fees were abolished in Bagamoyo and Rufiji in 1961 and Morogoro and Kisarawe in 1962. 15. See "Primary School Fees and Remissions of Fees," Ministry of Education Circular (EDC/304/A/16), November 20, 1963. 16. The Minister decided that it would be unwise to impose fees in Masailand because of the continuing strong opposition of the Masai to Western education. H.E. Sarwatt, M.P., persuaded Mr. Eliufoo not to introduce fees in Mbulu on the grounds that Barabaig and Iraqw would complain vigorously if they realized that they were being assessed a levy while their neighbours, the Masai, were not. The Minister agreed to postpone the introduction. In Rufiji the policy was not enforced until an educational field officer was assigned to area headquarters in 1966. Before then no one assumed any particular responsibility for the implementation of the regulations. 17. Cases of this sort seemed to be most common in Kilimanjaro and Rungwe where schools are relatively plentiful and there appears to be a strong feeling that education is a right. However, instances elsewhere, including Dar es Salaam, also came to the author's attention. The means used to put pressure on parents varied from simply sending pupils home to a rather curious use of compulsory attendance regulations issued by the Ministry on behalf of most LEAs. The compulsory attendance order gave local authorities the right to prosecute the parents of children who were removed from any level of the educational system (or who were truant) after they had been enrolled. In at least two districts (Mbinga and Mpwapwa), educational officials devised a rather clever scheme: they advised headteachers to send home any pupils whose fees had not been paid; parents were then prosecuted for contravening the compulsory attendance order! 18. REO, Tabora, to Headquarters, July 4, 1963, File 4/24/1, DSM. He reported that many teachers wanted to move to other districts as a result of the shortages of materials. 19. Interviews and File 214, Moshi. 20. For details, see Advisory Council, 1966, Appendix `C'. Some DEOs reported in 1966 that the new system was not working well; instances were cited of Executive Officers and District Treasurers who guarded the accounts rather too carefully. 21. N.A., Debates, 1st Parliament, 13th meeting (hereafter cited in the fashion "1, 13th"), 1964, cols. 566-7. 22. See File EDP 2/1, DSM, and below p. 283. 23. L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. V, col. 200.

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The Sunday News, January 7, 1962. N.A., Debates, 1, 2nd, 1962, cols. 546-57. The Sunday News, June 17, 1962. N.A., Debates, 1, 4th, 1962, cols. 105-6. A Central Board of the Unified Teaching Service was set up to ensure uniform working conditions and to act as a final appeal board. It was composed of the Secretary of the UTS (a full-time executive officer) and fifteen members appointed by the Minister: the Education Secretaries General of the five national voluntary agencies; five representatives of teachers; and five representatives of the Ministry, the central government, and the Local Government Service Commission. Most decisions on promotions, terms of service, and discipline are made by Regional Committees of the UTS, whose membership also reflects the interests of teachers and employers. 29. According to a senior educational administrator. 30. 135/217. Six out of 60 non-citizens were also members. Despite descriptions of the Teachers' Section as all-inclusive, it would appear that recruitment was geared largely to the primary level (only 4 out of the 22 citizen secondary school teachers in the sample were members.) 31. 45/61 (74 per cent) and 32/80 (40 per cent) respectively. In most cases, "forced to join" meant that TNUT members automatically became NUTA members, subject to automatic check-off of dues, without easy recourse to withdrawal from membership; however, a few respondents indicated that they had been subjected to more direct forms of coercion. 32. 75/128 (59 per cent) gave a negative response, 47/128 (36 per cent) a positive response, and 6/128 (5 per cent) a positive response qualified by criticism. 33. Of 130 (124 negative and 6 qualified positive) negative assessments of NUTA, 105 (81 per cent) gave close ties with the government as their primary reason and 9 (7 per cent) and 16 (12 per cent) cited identification as workers and lack of teacher representation respectively. The latter two were common as second or third responses as well. It is interesting that all respondents had at least one reason to offer. In contrast, of those who gave a positive assessment, over 10 per cent offered no justification (8 out of 63 positive and qualified positive responses). 34. See Gt3ran Hyden: "Buhaya: Selection and Election Processes in Bukoba and Karagwe Districts", in Lionel Cliffe, ed., One Party Democracy, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, pp. 59-60. According to one of the educational administrators interviewed by the author, a somewhat similar case developed in Kilimanjaro District. 35. U. T. S. Circular No. 1 of 1963, "Election of Teachers to Local Councils (UTS/16/2/1). Actually the circular only forbade participation in local councils, and did permit up to two teachers to serve on any District Education Committee; however, it was generally interpreted to mean exclusion from the latter as well. 36. Of the 277 teachers in the sample, 44 (16 per cent) did not know or did not offer an answer. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

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37. The breakdown for primary school teachers was: yes, 20 per cent (42); qualified yes, 5 per cent (10) ; no, 64 per cent (133) ; and don't know, 11 per cent (22). For secondary school teachers it was: yes, 21 per cent (15) ; qualified yes, 5 per cent (3) ; no, 43 per cent (30) ; and don't know, 31 per cent (22). Over half of the European expatriates teaching secondary school (20/31) did not venture an answer, in many cases because they had been in the country for only a short period and because, in any case, they regarded their roles as essentially technical and avoided "political" matters. If one looks only at the Africans and Asians in the secondary teacher sample (39), the breakdown was: yes and qualified yes, 39 per cent (15) ; no, 56 per cent (22) ; and don't know 6 per cent (2). Surprisingly in the light of the fact that many Asian teachers were generally dissatisfied with their prospects in Tanzania, there were no substantial differences between their views and those of Africans at either level; perhaps many Asians thought that teachers in general had some influence even if they themselves did not. 38. 179 out of 207 (86 per cent) primary, and 34 out of 39 (87 per cent) African and Asian secondary school teachers. 39. Although hardly representative of the rural masses, the Advisory Council included members from such politically influential groups and organizations as TANU headquarters, the National Assembly, NUTA, the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, the University College of Dar es Salaam, and the Tanganyika Association of Chambers of Commerce. 40. The problems of boards were discussed in the Advisory Council in 1966, but the ensuring recommendations skirted the main issues (see Advisory Council, 1966, Appendix 'A'). 41. Three of the four schools without committees were in Dar es Salaam and the other was in the neighbouring rural district of Kisarawe. Generally speaking committees were weakest in urban areas where, as headteachers explained, it was usually more difficult to generate interest among parents and guardians who experienced many competing demands on their time. An alternative explanation for some cases (not offered but equally plausible) is that urban parents were more articulate and less intimidated by headteachers, and were therefore discouraged by heads from participating actively in school affairs. (In all, fourteen of the primary schools visited were in urban areas, nine of them in Dar es Salaam.) 42. Samoff, "Politicians and Party", p. 82. 43. L.F.B. Dubbeldam, The Primary School and the Community in Mwanza District, Tanzania, Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1970, pp. 139-45. 44. The exceptions were Joseph Sawe, who served as Chief Education Officer from 1962 to 1967, and R.H. Saidi, who later became Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. At that time, there was no Planning Section. Its first head, A.C. Mwingira, was appointed in 1964 and held the rank of Senior Education Officer until his promotion to ACED in 1966; he was promoted to CEO in 1967.

5 GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION We noted earlier that governments in the new states of tropical Africa inherited several problems relating to education: political tensions that flowed from marked disparities in educational provision among "traditional" and "modern" social groups, economic and political strains that stemmed from a poor fit between the output of the educational system and the requirements of the occupational structure, and cultural and political difficulties that arose from a school experience bore little relation to the realities of African life. The second of these problem areas was the one most closely related to aggregate growth in educational provision. Decisions were needed to reconcile conflicting demands for mass primary education on the one hand, and relatively elitist secondary, technical, and higher facilities on the other; weighing in the balance were economic and political dangers inherent in failing to meet the developmental imperative of highly skilled manpower and in providing either too many or too few primary school opportunities. In Tanganyika the Three Year Development Plan for 1961-4 set the guidelines initially accepted by the TANU government. As noted in Chapter Three, highest priority was placed on secondary and higher education because of the "obvious economic benefits" that would accrue. Because it was assumed that "no direct economic benefits" flowed from primary school development, the plan stated that there would "not be an increase in the number of places available for children entering Standard I." Decisions to undertake a gradual extension of the basic course from four to six years and to increase the number of places in Standards VII and VIII were explained in terms of the social advantages of permanent literacy, but they certainly reflected an awareness of political pressures as well.1 Mr. Kambona, as Minister for Education, strongly affirmed the Cabinet's commitments to these priorities shortly after the TANU government was sworn in. Compulsory universal primary school education—a demand often articulated during the , struggle for independence—would have to await the closure of the manpower gap and the production of sufficient wealth to pay for the necessary buildings, materials, and teachers.2 In making this choice, Tanganyikan leaders were not necessarily taking a courageous, 110

IlI

GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

unpopular stand in the face of strong pressures: the pool of skilled manpower was so small and the financial capacity of the public sector so limited that any other ranking of priorities would have been tantamount to a rejection of basic goals for development. Moreover, . the government faced criticism from some of its own followers who demanded immediate Africanization of the public and private sectors. Mr. Nyerere and his colleagues certainly wanted to comply as quickly as possible, but, as Mr. Kambona cautioned, Africanization would fail if it meant merely going out in the streets and picking someone for a job just because he was an African. In the short-run, the services of many expatriates would have to be retained. In the long-run, the solution lay in the rapid expansion of general and technical post-primary facilities ;3 some countries appeared to have sufficient resources to concentrate on mass primary education as well, but at the time there was general agreement that Tanganyika was not one of them. This commitment to the production of high level manpower was soon reinforced by two further developments. First, the government decided to adopt the manpower planning techniques pioneered by American economists, notably Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers.' In 1962, at the Cabinet's request, the Ford Foundation seconded Mr. George Tobias to conduct a detailed study of the country's middle and high level manpower requirements and ways and means of meeting them.5 Secondly, just before independence, UNESCO was invited to provide an educational planning mission to make recommendations in relation to the existing Three Year Plan and the goals established at UNESCO's conference of African states on the future of education on the continent.6 The Tobias Report urged that "all possible emphasis should be given to the development of secondary [and technical] education for more students as fast as teachers and facilities become available."7 Implicit in this study, but explicit in the operating principles of the Manpower Planning Unit (set up at Tobias' suggestion),8 was the view that elementary eduction was essentially nonproductive except as a base for the recruitment of students to higher level institutions. To manpower planners, some development was necessary at the lower level in order to maintain a satisfactory pool from which to select pupils for promotion; beyond that point, severe restrictions were necessary to ensure productive use of scarce resources.° The UNESCO Conference on African Education had adopted 1980 as the target for achieving compulsory universal primary school education for the entire continent; however, the UNESCO Mission rejected this goal for Tanganyika.

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As in many other countries... there is a popular demand for an increase in the provision of school places. This pressure from parents manifests itself in the setting up, ...of private illegal primary schools, thus forcing a horizontal extension of the base of the educational pyramid that the country cannot afford at a time when the most urgent priority is the strengthening and expansion of the upper levels of the system.... Secondary education should continue to have first call on all resources.... The Mission recommended an annual level of capital expenditure

on secondary education almost equal to that spent in the previous two or three years on all educational development." Both reports strongly influenced educational sections of the Five Year Development Plan for 1964-9. Targets for secondary, technical and higher education were set (often after considerable conflict between manpower and educational planners11) in conjunction with Tobias' projections, which by then had been updated by a new survey geared to the general goal of self-sufficiency in manpower by 1980.12 Again there was a strong justification for existing priorities: "Whereas there is a satisfactory percentage of young people benefiting from primary education..., the percentage of young people benefiting from secondary or technical education is woefully inadequate for running the administrative and economic machinery of the country efficiently in the near future."19 Ambitious targets, set in all post-primary spheres,14 were defended by President Nyerere in his major speech on the Five Year Plan: One of the major long term objectives of our planning is to be self-sufficient in trained manpower by 1980. This means a carefully planned expansion of education. This expansion is an economic function: the purpose of Government expenditure on education...must be to equip Tanganyika with the skills and the knowledge...needed if the Development of this country is to be achieved.'s

This order of priorities remained virtually unchallenged until after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 when the President began to sound a rather different note. Primary Provision Table 5.1 compares percentage increases in enrolment in the periods 1956-61 and 1961-6. If the reader thinks that the figures represent developments considerably out of phase with the official policy of restraint, he is certainly correct. Total enrolment grew almost three times more rapidly in the latter period than in the former, and the rates of increase at the levels of entry to each stage of the educational pyramid were even greater. As we shall see

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GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

in Chapter 6, the causes of this great discrepancy between planned and actual expansion were primarily political. Table 5.1 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED STANDARDS I, V, AND VII AND IN TOTAL PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT, 1956-61 AND 1961-66 19560

19610

1966

Standard I.

111,514

121,386

154,512

9

27

Standard V

13,368

19,721

58,653

47

200

Standard VII

8,084

14,649

46,816

69

225

All Standards

382,141

482,121

740,991

26

54

% Increase % Increase 1956-61 1961-66

D.E. and M.E., Annual Report, 1956 and 1961; and M.E., Statistics for 1966, mimeo. aThese figures are sums of all racial systems (and hence differ from those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

Source:

Secondary Provision Rates of growth at the secondary level were lower in 1961-66 thait in 1956-61 (see Table 5.2), but the absolute expansion in the later period was considerably greater. Although physical facilities were often opened late because of shortfalls in external aid and construction delays, enrolment increases were remarkably close to the targets projected in the Three and Five Year Plans. As student numbers rose from 5,288 in 1956 to almost 24,000 in 1966, a number of existing schools were enlarged and some new ones were built. In addition, unaided enrolment (not shown in the table) grew from a mere 21 in 1956 to 3,819 in 1966, again reflecting substantial capital development. Technical and Vocational Provision Technical education had always been the weak sister during colonial times, largely because it was invariably difficult to find competent teachers and administrators with the relevant interests and skills. This situation did not change quickly after independence: a report on technical education by a member of the UNESCO Planning Mission was rejected as "inaccurate" and "out of step with main report,"18 and only in 1966 was someone with considerable

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114

experience in technical education hired to oversee developments in this sphere. At independence the Ministry of Education ran three institutions concerned solely with technical education—the Dar es Salaam Technical Institute and the trade schools at Moshi and Ifunda; five years later, only the Technical Institute remained. Against the better judgment of many educational administrators, the Ministry had phased out the craft-training programmes at Moshi and Table 5.2 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED FORMS I AND V AND IN TOTAL SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT, 1956-61 AND 1961-66 1956a Form I Form V All Forms

2,491 51 5,288

1961a 4,196 236 11,832

1966

% Increase % Increase 1956-61 1961-66 6,377 68 52 250 826 360 23,836 125 100

Source: D.E., Annual Report 1956: and United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1972-73, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 44. a These figures are sums of all racial systems (and hence differ from those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Until 1962 Form I was called Standard IX.

Ifunda because the Tobias Report (echoing the views of people in commerce and industry) had declared that the skills these schools imparted were essentially irrelevant for modern needs." A later report by the Manpower Planning Unit strongly emphasized that "the prime responsibility for training skilled manual workers is that of industry and not that of the educational system"; in any case, employers "have not in fact looked to the Trade Schools for any important portion of their skilled labour."18 A new policy sought instead to supplement regular academic instruction with courses of a vocational and technical bent. To this end, Moshi and Ifunda were converted into secondary technical schools and two new institutions, Galanos and Kibaha, were opened with an agricultural bias. Commercial streams were introduced in other schools. The Technical College itself made considerable progress in the half decade after independence: full-time students only increased from 420 to 700, but the number doing higher level courses of longer duration grew markedly; in 1961 virtually all students were primary school leavers, while in 1966 most were Form IV

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leavers or graduates of the three-year trade school programme." Besides the Technical College, which was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, there were institutions for technical and vocational education overseen by other ministries: two agricultural training schools were maintained from colonial days and a new higher level Agricultural College (eventually incorporated in the University) was established; and a new medical school (Muhimbili) was opened in Dar es Salaam to provide training initially for nurses and rural medical assistants and later for doctors as well. Quite naturally, one other sphere of vocational training continued to depend on the public system of formal education—the preparation of teachers. It became apparent soon after independence that teacher training was not keeping pace with the demands created by primary school expansion. At the secondary level so many highly qualified African teachers moved to civil service jobs that only nine graduates remained in service in 1963, and the government thus had to rely on expatriates much more heavily than it wished. During the Three Year Plan period from 1961 to 1964 (as Table 5.3 indicates), expansion in enrolment was slight Table 5.3 STUDENTS ENROLLED IN TEACHER TRAINING COURSES, 1961 AND 1964 Number of Institutions 1964 1961

Enrolment 1961

1964

Increase

Type A B

5

5

461a 472) 50)

13

Type C

21

21 1,261 1,566

24

Source: M.E., Annual Report, 1961 and 1964. a Unfortunately, the figures for 1961 are not broken down into Types A and B; however, most would almost certainly have been B at this time.

in the three basic two-year teacher training courses: A for Form IV leavers, B for Form II (Standard X) leavers, and C for StandardVIII leavers. Average annual growth rates in the A/B and C programmes were 6 per cent and 8 per cent respectively compared to 10 per cent in primary school enrolment 2° and a much higher rate in secondary enrolment. The number of students obtaining

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116

university or other advanced qualification in education did increase from 36 in 1961 to 180 in 1964, but output still fell far short of requirements. 21 Planners made two important decisions for the period from 1964 to 1969: to expand teacher training opportunities and to proceed with a proposal of the UNESCO Planning Mission to upgrade the primary school teaching service by phasing out the Grade C programme. 22 (This latter step also made possible economies of scale through the consolidation of a number of small and expensive colleges.) Specifically, the objective was to provide 2,700 places for Grade A trainees by 1969, some 700 more than had existed in all programmes in 1964; meanwhile, the last 120 Grade C teachers were to graduate at the end of l968. 23 Unfortunately these plans were closely tied to American and British funds, which were cut off after the U.S. Congress withdrew USAID support from all but a few projects and Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over Rhodesia. As a result, the number of places opened in teachers' colleges fell behind targets set in the Five Year Plan. 24 To complete the picture note should be made of a new two year teacher training course for Form VI leavers launched in 1965, 25 and a programme initiated in the same year that tied university bursaries and places to a commitment to teach for five years. 26 By 1967 over 500 students with a formal education at least equivalent to Form VI were enrolled in graduate or diploma teaching courses. 27 Provision for Higher Education There were only 87 Tanganyikans enrolled in degree or diploma courses at Makerere College in 1956-57, and five years later only 205 in the three Colleges of the University of East Africa. The number of students overseas had grown markedly, but in terms of projected manpower needs, totals were far below requirements.2B Nevertheess, in the short-run, it was not possible to do much to increase opportunities at this level because of the low secondary output; a programme of rapid expansion was thus set aside until the end of the Three Year Plan period of concentration at the secondary level. Capital expenditures, though, were unprecedented as work progressed on a new campus for the University College, Dar es Salaam, which opened in 1964. Table 5.4 summarizes the growth in university enrolment during the first five years of independence. In relative terms, the growth of Tanganyikan students in the University of East Africa was quite encouraging as was the virtual doubling of total enrolment

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GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

there and overseas; however, the absolute totals were miniscule when compared to those at lower levels. The Five Year Plan envisaged a continuing heavy capital commitment to the University College and a steady increase in the number of Tanganyikans studying towards degrees at the University of East Africa and abroad. Table 5.4 GROWTH IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL PROVISION FOR MAINLAND TANZANIAN STUDENTS, 1961-62 AND 1966-67 1961-62

1966-67

o0

Increase A. Intake University of East Africa Foreign Universities Total

102 348 450

511 190 701

400 —45 56

Output University of East Africa Foreign Universities Total

45 150 195

1 74 330 504

290 120 160

Total Enrolment All degree courses

926

2,026

120

B.

C.

Source: United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1972-73, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 44. Public Spending on Education An examination of government expenditures on various levels of education will serve to draw together data on the growth of educational facilities. Table 5.5 compares spending at two year intervals from 1962 to 1966. (Unfortunately comparable data are unavailable for 1961, the last year of colonial rule, because published expenditures were classified racially rather than functionally.) Over this period, total expenditures increased at an accelerating rate, while those on higher, secondary-technical and teacher training programmes grew even more quickly, and took larger proportions of the total budget. 29 The growth at the higher level from 1964 to 1966 was considerable. The wild fluctuations apparent in primary spending reflect two factors: local education authorities spent proportionately more from their own resources in 1964 than in 1962—total expenditures by the two levels of government actually increased by 17 per cent

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EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Table 5.5 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION, BY CATEGORY, 1962, 1964, AND 1966 Expenditures (million Shs.)

% Inc.

% Total Expenditures

Higher

1962 1964 1966

7.70 9.06 17.24

18 90

8.6 8.9 11.7

Secondary and Technical

1962 1964 1966

22.26 33.70 45.08

52 34

24.9 33.1 30.6

Teacher Training

1962 1964 1966

5.24 8.00 12.52

53 57

5.8 7.9 8.5

Primary

1962 1964 1966

47.82 41.56 60.70

-14 46

53.5 40.9 41.2

1962 1964 1966

6.42 9.36 11.78

46 26

7.2 9.2 8.0

1962 1964 1966

89.44 101.68 147.34

31 46

100.0 100.0 100.0

General Administration Total

Source: M.E., Annual Report, 1962 and 1964: The Standard, June 28, 1966.

(The 1966 figures are estimates and thus not strictly comparable. Unfortunately the Ministry did not publish reports after 1964, and the author was unable to locate an alternative source breaking down expenditures in this way.) from Sits. 83.2 million to Shs. 97.1 million; and central contributions were especially high in 1966, the first year of a project to shorten the primary school curriculum from eight to seven years. Nevertheless, even as a percentage of all public spending on education, the primary school share fell from 64 in 1962 to 60 in 1964;3° if one excluded the expenses involved in the conversion programme in 1966, a similar decline would emerge. Some idea of the per capita costs at various educational levels can be obtained from Table 5.6. The central government estimates in 1966 provided for twenty-three times as great an expenditure

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GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

on a secondary school student as on a primary school pupil; even if local government spending is taken into account (the parenthetical figures), total per capita public investment in 1964 was eleven times higher at the secondary level. The difference reflects the facts that in the primary schools salaries and maintenance expenses were lower, materials were less costly, and, not to be forgotten, burdens were placed on teachers and school plants that were far in excess of what was thought to be educationally sound. A similarly Table 5.6 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION PER PUPIL, 1962, 1964, AND 1966

Enrolment

Expenditures (million Shs.)

Secondary

1962 1964 1966

14,175 19,891 23,836

22.26 33.70 45.08

Primary

1962 1964 1966

518,663 633,678 740,991

47.82 41.56 60.70

Expenditure per Pupil (Shs.) 1570 1694 1892 92(160)" 66(152)b 82

Source: Table 5.7; M.E., Annual Report, 1962 and 1964; and M.E„ Statistics for 1966. "The amount spent by central and local governments (including expenses met from fee revenue) was Shs. 82. 3 million, yielding a per pupil expenditure of Shs. 160. bThe amount spent by central and local governments (including expenses met from fee revenue) was Shs. 90 .1 million, yielding a per pupil expenditure of Shs. 152. marked disparity existed between the secondary and higher levels; the cost per student to the central government of a year of university education was about Shs. 22,000 at the University of East Africa and Shs. 17,000 overseas.3' Capital costs were also indicative of these variations. The following expenditures were projected in the Five Year Plan: primary, Shs. 53.9 million; secondary, Shs. 58.8 million; and higher, Shs. 97 million.32 These yielded ratios 1:34:3440 in the amounts spent per pupil or student. 33 A Comparative .Note on Educational Provision and Expenditure Given the similarities in the post-colonial situations of tropical African states, it is not surprising that policies for educational

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

120

expansion in Tanzania closely resembled those adopted elsewhere. Few governments had sufficient financial and manpower resources to commit themselves to universal primary school education; the major exceptions were Ghana and the Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria, which had begun to work towards this goal in the late 1950s, and Zambia, where it was adopted in 1966.94 Almost everywhere highest priority was in any case placed on developing secondary and higher education, and, in this respect, Tanzania went further than most other countries in integrating educational and manpower planning.95 Tanzania lagged behind many other colonies and ex-colonies in the provision of mass primary school education. Table 5.7 provides an approximate measure of this disparity by relating primary level enrolment to total population in selected African countries. If, as census data indicate, the primary school age-group constitutes between seventeen and twenty per cent of the population in these countries, it can be seen that only about a quarter of this age-group was enrolled in Tanganyika in 1960 compared to close to 40 per cent or more elsewhere. Even Malawi (Nyasaland), the only territory in the table with a per capita income lower than that of Tanganyika, had a much higher percentage enrolment. In the period between 1960 and 1965, Ghana virtually achieved its target of universal primary school education, while the other countries either encouraged or permitted smaller rates of growth. By 1965 over a third of the primary school-age population of mainland Tanzania was enrolled in government-assisted schools, a marked increase that occurred despite an official policy of restraint; however, the disparity still existed (and in many cases was greater) in relation to the other countries. To look beyond the period presently under discussion, it can be seen that Tanzania's primary school enrolment as a percentage of population increased only marginally from 1965 to 1970 and remained well behind the others, even Malawi, the only country among those listed in which new primary school places failed to keep pace with population growth. Meanwhile, Zambia had moved rapidly towards universal primary schooling, and Kenya and Togo had made educational provision for well over half of their primary school-age children. At the secondary level the growth in enrolment in Tanzania between 1960 and 1965 was impressive, but, measured as a proportion of total population, it was the lowest increase of all countries compared in Table 5.8 Moreover, there were considerable disparities at this level as well: if, as seems likely the secondary school age-group constitutes roughly twelve per cent of the population, then in 1965 just under 20 per cent of the age-group was enrolled

121

GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

Table 5.7 PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS AS PERCENTAGES OF ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATIONS, SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES" 1960, 1965, AND 1970

Countryb

Primary School Estimated % Population Year Enrolment Population in Primary Increase (thousands) (millions) Schools,'

Ghana (1957)

1960 1965 1970

664 1,414 1,390

6.78 7.74 8.64

9.8 18.4 16.1

6.3

Kenya (1963)

1960 1965 1970

781 1,102 1,428

8.12 9.60 11.25

9.5 11.5 12.7

3.2

Malawi (1964)

1960 1965 1968d

285 331 334

3.49 3.91 4.22

8.2 8.5 7.9

- 0.3

Tanzania (mainland) (1961)

1960 1965 1970

448 710 828

9.98 11.33 12.90

4.5 6.3 6.4

1.9

Togo (1960)

1960 1965 1970

103 156 229

1.44 1.64 1.97

7.2 9.5 11.6

4.4

Zambia (1964)

1960 1965 1970

288 410 695

3.21 3.71 4.15

8.9 11.1 16.7

7.8

Source: UNESCO, Statistical Year book 1971, Paris, 1972, Table 2.11; and United Nations, Demographic Year Book 1970 and 1971, New York, 1971 and 1972, Table 4. "These countries were chosen because they are the only sub-Saharan African countries for which data are available for Tables 5.7 and 5.9. Enrolment data for Uganda appear unreliable, but it is included in Table 5.9 to provide a comparative perspective on educational finance for all three East African countries. bThe dates of independence are shown in parentheses. cEven if the school-age population comprised approximately the same proportion of total population in each country, these percentages would not be strictly comparable because school programmes varied in length and in the number of promotion barriers within them. However, the figures do provide a rough standard for comparison. dStatistics of enrolment in 1970 are not available.

122

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

in Ghana, about 6 per cent in Togo, and less than 2 per cent in Tanzania. Only in Malawi was the percentage as low. During the period from 1965 to 1970, the proportion of the secondary school age-group provided with places was just maintained in Tanzania and Malawi; elsewhere it continued to rise, most notably in Zambia and Kenya. Table 5.8 SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS AS PERCENTAGES OF ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATIONS, SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES,° 1960, 1965 AND 1970 Secondary School Enrolment (thousands)

Estimated % Population Population in Increase (millions) Secondary Schoolsb

Country

Year

Ghana

1960 1965 1967c

83.8 162.4 179.0

6.78 7.74 8.14

1.2 2.1 2.2

1.0

1960 1965 1970

19.4 49.2 126.9

8.12 9.60 11.25

0.2 0.5 1.1

0.9

1960 1965 1968c

1.5 8.3 9.3

3.49 3.91 4.22

0.04 0.2 0.2

0.1

Tanzania (mainland)

1960 1965 1970

9.8 21.9 31.2

9.98 11.33 12.90

0.1 0.2 0.2

0.1

Togo

1960 1965 1969c

4.9 11.3 16.7

1.44 1.64 1.82

0.3 0.7 0.9

0.6

1960 1965 1970

2.6 17.2 52.5

3.21 3.71 4.15

0.1 0.5 1.3

1.2

Kenya

Malawi

Zambia

UNESCO, Statistical Year Book 1971, Paris, 1972, Table 2.12; and United Nations, Demographic Tear Book 1970 and 1971, New York, 1971 and 1972, Table 4. a See Table 5.7, note a. b See Table 5.7, note c. c 1970 enrolment figures not available.

Source:

123

GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

Educational development cannot be compared without examining economic factors. The Five Year Plan would have made greater provision for expansion at the secondary level if manpower planners had not been concerned about the economic and social costs of increasing educational output more rapidly than it could be absorbed by the economy. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 5.9, Tanzania in 1965 was already contributing as great a proportion of public funds to education as the other countries to which it is compared. Ghana, by making roughly the same relative contributions, was sufficiently wealthy to undertake educational commitments that were inconceivable in the Tanzanian context, and Zambia had considerable potential to do so as well. Educational expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product in Tanzania were about average for the countries compared, but rapid expansion during the 1960's left behind a legacy of high recurrent costs: by 1971 government spending on education accounted for over 4 per cent of GDP in Tanzania, as well as in Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia. (In the last case, the figure had reached 5.9 per cent, greater than that of some industrialized countries.36 Comparative data for 1962, 1968, and 1971 are presented in Appendix II.)

18 l0d 13 17 15 15 16

1,608 357 179 6,140 43,500 5,863e 650

369.5 67.4 41.7 980 5,361 951 180.8

814 138 28.8

Kwacha Shillings

Francs Shillings Kwacha

oA

1.9 2.4 4.4

Educational Expenditures: GDP 4.1 1.9d 3.1 2.7

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, Table 179; and 1971, New York, 1972, Tables 178 and 194. a See Table 5.7, note a. b See Appendix II for comparative statistics for 1962, 1968, and 1971. c All of these figures are at purchasers' values, except those for Uganda which have been adjusted to factor cost. d Because of differences in accounting techniques and generally unreliable statistics, this table provides only a rough measure of comparison. The Kenyan percentages would probably be somewhat higher if monies transferred from the central government to local authorities for educational purposes had been reported as educational rather than (as seems likely) local government expenditures. e GDP at factor cost.

Cedis

Ghana Kenya Malawi Tanzania (mainland) Togo Uganda Zambia

GDPe (millions)

66.0 6.8 5.5 168

Currency

Country

Total Expenditures (millions)

Educational Expenditures (millions)

Educational Expenditures: Total Expenditures

oA0

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CURRENT AND CAPITAL) ON EDUCATION AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (AT CURRENT PURCHASERS' VALUES), SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES,e1965b

Table 5.9

tJ 41.

125

GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

NOTES 1. See Development Committee of the Council of Ministers, "Three Year Development Plan for Education", mimeo, 1960. 2. L.C. Debates, 1960-1, vol. I, cols. 316-17. 3. Ibid., cols. 315-16. 4. See F. Harbison and C. A. Myers, Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth: Strategies of Human Resources Development, New York, McGrawHill, 1964; and Harbison and Myers, eds., Manpower and Education, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. For discussions of manpower planning techniques and practices in Tanzania, see George Skorov, Integration of Educational and Economic Planning in Tanzania, Paris, UNESCO, 1966; R.L. Thomas, "Implementing of Manpower Programmes in a Developing Country", paper prepared for the International Institute of Educational Planning, mimeo, 1966; and Thomas, "Manpower Development for Industrialization, Country Case Study: United Republic of Tanzania", paper prepared for the Centre for Industrial Development, mimeo, 1966. For critiques of manpower planning approaches in Tanzania, see Idrian N. Resnick, The Economics of Manpower Development: the Tanzanian Case, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1966; Resnick, "Educational Barriers to Tanzania's Development", in Idrian N. Resnick, Tanzania: Revolution by Education, Arusha, Longmans of Tanzania, 1968, pp. 123-34; John Saul, "High Level Manpower for Socialism", in ibid., pp. 93-105; and M.A. Bienefeld, "Planning People", in J. F. Rweyemamu et al, eds., Towards Socialist Planning, DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1972, pp. 166-99. 5. Tanganyika Government Paper No. 2 of 1963, High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Tanganyika, 1962-67, prepared by George Tobias, DSM, GP, 1963. 6. UNESCO, "Report of the UNESCO Educational Planning Mission for Tanganyika", Paris, limited mimeo edition, 1963. The conference had been held in Addis Ababa in May 1961. 7. High-Level Manpower, pp. 8-12. 8. Ibid., pp. 4-5. Tobias' "Human Resources Secretariat" was established as the Manpower Planning Unit and was placed within the Directorate (later Ministry) of Development and Planning. For a description of the institutional machinery for manpower planning, see Skorov, Integration, pp. 56-8. 9. The following statement typifies the views of manpower planners towards primary development: Tanganyika cannot adhere "to many attractive but abstract education goals which have been set by many international bodies....If the line can be held on primary expansion... it will be a major achievement. Any substantial educational resources which primary take [sic] beyond minimal levels will mean the diversion of resources vital to secondary, technical and higher education and as a consequence a reduction in the essential skill development on which the nation's economic development depends." Ministry of Development Planning, "Development of Planning related to the Needs of Children

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

126

in Tanganyika", mimeo, no date (probably 1964), pp. 6 and 9. See also Skorov, Integration, pp. 43-5. 10. UNESCO, Planning Mission, pp. 9. 19, 22, and 39. 11. Compare the suggested growth rate of secondary education in UNESCO, Planning Mission, p. 19 with that eventually adopted in Tanganyika, Tanganyika Five-Tear Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1964-30th June, 1969, DSM, GP, 1964, vol. I, p. 64. The number of new streams to be opened each year was reduced from twenty to eight or nine partly because of financial constraints but also because the projections of manpower planners prevailed over those of the educational planners. For a discussion of the differences in approach towards post-primary planning between manpower and educational officials, see A.C. Mwingira and Simon Pratt, The Process of Educational Planning in Tanzania, DSM, 1965, mimeo, .pp. 58-73. (The references to Mwingira and Pratt in this book are to the original paper rather than the edition published in Paris by UNESCO in 1966.) 12. Tobias' projections were updated in the process of planning and later replaced by fresh data collected in 1964. See United Republic of Tanzania, Directorate of Development and Planning, Survey of the High-

Level Manpower Requirements and Resources for the Five-Year Development Plan, 1964-65 to 1968-69, DSM, GP, 1965. 13. Five Year Plan, vol. I, p. 12. 14. See ibid., pp. 63-8 and vol. II, pp. 102-11. 15. Address by the President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere on the Tanganyika Five Tear Plan and Review of the Plan, DSM, Tanganyika Information Services, 1964, p. 5 (my italics). 16. See Minutes of the Technical Education Committee, Advisory Council, 1963. 17. High-Level Manpower, pp. 10-12. 18. Manpower Requirements, 1964-65 to 1968-69, p. 15. 19. M.E. Annual Report, 1961; and Statistics for 1965. 20. See Table 6.1. The growth rate figures are based on averages of the yearly rates of increase calculated from statistics in M.E., Annual Report, 1961-4. 21. M.E., Annual Report, 1961 and 1964. 22. See Five Tear Plan, vol. II, pp. 115-17; see also UNESCO, Planning Mission, pp. 64-5. 23. Five Tear Plan, vol. II, p. 116. 24. See the report of Mr. Eliufoo's budget address to the National Assembly in 1967 in The Standard, July 1, 1967. 25. Five Tear Plan, vol. II, p. 116. 26. The programme was announced by Mr. Eliufoo in N.A., Debates, 1, 7th, 1963, cols, 726-7. 27. S.N. Eliufoo, "Education: a New Era Begins", The Standard (Republic Day Supplement No. 1), December 6, 1967. 28. While annual reports provide data on Tanganyikan students in East African institutions of higher education, not even approximate figures are available on students who went abroad before independence.

127

GROWTH IN EDUCATIONAL PROVISION

29. The apparent slowdown in the expansion of secondary expenses merely reflects a decreased enrolment growth rate. 30. Total expenditures by both levels of government were Shs. 129.8 million and Shs. 161.1 million in 1962 and 1964 respectively. 31. Mwingira and Pratt, Educational Planning, p. 95. The higher cost of facilities at the University of East Africa reflected a high level of expenditure needed to support a relatively small number of students in small departments with plants and equipment not yet fully utilized. To send a student abroad, it was necessary to meet only travel, tuition, and maintenance costs. 32. Five Year Plan, vol. II, pp. 108, 111, and 115. 33. Based on 1964 enrolment figures (Table 5.6) for primary and secondary schools and the total Tanzanian enrolment in the University of East Africa in that year-328. If the total number of students there and abroad (1,132) is used, the ratios are 1:34:997. 34. See Philip Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 179-219; David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education (Nigeria), Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969, especially Part II; and J.M. Mwanakatwe, The Growth of Education in Zambia since Independence, Lusaka, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 44-57. 35. See Skorov, Integration. 36. Some comparative percentages for 1960 were: the Soviet Union, 7.0; the United States, 6.2; Canada, 5.9; Japan, 5.3; the United Kingdom, 4.4; and, The Federal Republic of Germany, 3.8. In Latin America and Asia: Brazil, 2.7; Ecuador, 2.3, an'd India, 1.9 (F. Edding, "Expenditure on Education: Statistics and Comments," in E.A.G. Robinson and J.E. Vaizey, eds., The Economics of Education, London, Macmillan, 1966, p. 41.)

6 THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION Although the Three and Five Year Plans sought to restrain primary school development for both social and economic reasons, an unprecedented expansion in enrolment took place in the first half decade of independence. A glance at the people with an interest in this sphere of policy-making and their inclinations on the question of increasing primary school opportunities gives some indications of why it was difficult to control expansion. At the centre, we find a Cabinet formally committed to restraint but wary of dampening mass aspirations for education largely because these were easier to accommodate than many other demands; a Minister for Education torn between the conflicting aims of his political colleagues and his technical advisers; a group of expatriate officers anxious to use the strengthened legitimacy of an African government to pursue an unpopular course of action; and a group of recentlypromoted African educational administrators largely in sympathy with the desires of their compatriates, but uncertain about how to placate political authorities and maintain what they believed were sound educational principles. At the periphery, we see parents prepared to make great sacrifices to ensure educational opportunities for their children; politicians within party and local government structures eager to strengthen their legitimacy but mindful of the rewards and punishments at the disposal of their leaders; employees of central and local governments (including teachers) owing mixed allegiance to authorities often in conflict; and representatives of voluntary agencies anxious (in the case of Christian denominations) to overcome their identification with colonialism, yet finding it difficult to reconcile the demands of the government with those of their own superiors. Moreover, one must remember that communications between Dar es Salaam and upcountry areas were rather tenuous, that bureaucratic structures were weak and ill-defined, and that civil servants were inexperienced, especially during the first two or three years of independence. The Trend Towards Uncontrolled Expansion, 196o-63 Table 6.1 illustrates the tremendous expansion of the primary school system from 1960 to 1964, and makes revealing comparisons with the previous four year period. The overall growth rate of 128

129

THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

enrolment rose from 17 per cent in the years from 1956 to 1960 to 42 per cent in the later period, and growth rates were even higher at the entry and promotion points. As a result, the stage was set for an even larger increase in total enrolment in the years that followed. Annual growth rates fluctuated markedly, reaching astounding levels in 1963 in all Standards except VII; even the more moderate expansion in 1964 outstripped the annual average of the earlier period, except at the Standard V level. It should be noted that Table 6.1 does not include data on unassisted schools. There were no reliable statistics before 1964, but some idea of the extent of their proliferation may be obtained from what scanty evidence is available: from 1956 to 1960 the number of pupils in institutions registered or seeking permission to teach up to Standard II increased by approximately 34 per cent, more than three times the growth rate in aided African Standards I and II (10 per cent).1 Even between 1960 and 1961, when publicly supported Standard I places increased by 4 per cent, the number of pupils in unassisted schools probably grew by more than 7 per cent. 2 In addition to these recognized but unaided schools run in most cases by Christian voluntary agencies, the Tanganyika African Parents Association was operating about two thousand unrecognized and technically illegal schools shortly after independence. Probably catering for as many as 150,000 children,$ TAPA schools usually were staffed by unqualified teachers, had virtually no essential equipment and materials, and often attempted to offer all levels of the primary programme. Underlying this expansion was unbridled mass enthusiasm for education and its anticipated rewards. It is true that in many outlying areas it was still necessary for teachers and headmen to go out to the villages to recruit pupils and there was continuing resistance to Western educational forms among such tribes as the Masai, the Barabaig (of Mbulu), and the Ha (of Kasulu). But by the early 1960s demand for schools places had far outstripped supply in urban centres and in a growing number of rural areas influenced by the commercial economy and the "modern" way of life. Also symptomatic of growing pressure were increases in influencepeddling and bribery as means of obtaining entry and promotion in primary schools.4 Educational demand was reinforced by politicians who began to criticize the restrictive policy towards primary school development immediately after the formation of the TANU-dominated Council of Ministers. Just ten days after the Council was sworn in, Timothy Samjela, the Secretary-General of TAPA, urged the government to take rapid steps to introduce free and compulsory primary school

116,574

121,386

125,521

136,541

140,34I

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

20

3

9

3

4

5

% Increase

43,610

40,508

26,803

19,721

17,919

13,368

Enrolment Std. V

145

8

51

36

10

34

% Increase

24,657

18,444

15,730

14,649

11,263

8,084

Enrolment Std. VII

120

34

17

7

30

39

% Increase

633,678

592,104

518,663

484,121

447,692

382,141

Enrolment All Stds.

42

7

14

8

8

17

Increase

Source: D.E. and M.E., Annual Reports, 1956-64. "These standards were chosen to illustrate growth because promotions from Standards IV to V and VI to VII respectively were not automatic and depended upon examinations and other means of selection. bThe figures for 1956, 1960, and 1961 are sums of totals in the four racial systems. Although the non-African primary courses were of six years' duration and the African ones of eight, the enrolments in the first eight years of all systems are included.

1960-64

111,514

1956

Enrolment Std. I

PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED STANDARDS I, Va, AND VII AND IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOLS, 1956-60b AND 1961b, 1962, 1963, 1964

Table 6.1

y

5

ø o

8

P o

d

131

THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

education in all parts of the territory.6 Members of the new Legislative Council took up the cry the following month; although few called openly for universal primary school education, their cumulative demands far exceeded the capacity of the government to respond favourably. Their chief arguments were: that a policy of extending the basic course from four to six years should be implemented simultaneously in all areas of the country rather than only in certain ones as planned ; that fees for primary school education should be abolished ; and that "bush schools" should be officially recognized and permitted to extend their programmes from Standard II to at least Standard IV. In addition, several members made strong pleas for special consideration for their own "underprivileged" constituencies and districts.6 At the local level, pressure for expansion was strengthened by TANU's own involvement in educational development before independence. In urging parents to build schools which it agreed to staff, the party had already created a range of vested interests. `Self-help' schools did not initially use central or local government capital resources, but once they were established a cry soon arose for local education authorities to assume financial responsibility for them. Meanwhile, in some areas, zealous TANU and TAPA leaders directly strained limited finances and manpower by encouraging people to open schools near ones already run by voluntary agencies; they also launched often successful appeals to parents to abandon the institutions of the "imperialists" for those of the "people".7 Political leaders at the centre found it difficult to punish stalwart party supporters for this sort of behaviour. There were other forces at work as well. One arose from the behaviour of the Christian voluntary agencies, which, although they had long before agreed on their respective spheres of interest in many areas, were still in fierce competition in others. Agency representatives claimed mass support as an excuse to push developments that could not be satisfactorily financed or staffed or often, for that matter, sufficiently well patronized to make them viable.8 Nevertheless, once bush schools were established, Education Secretaries, priests, and clergymen reinforced local demands for government registration and aid. Moreover, while the East African Muslim Welfare Society had occupied only a marginal position in the educational system of post-War colonial Tanganyika, a new government formally committed to religious freedom and heavily influenced by the Muslim community accorded the EAMWS much more favourable treatment. Although all schools were declared open irrespective of religion, the glaring imbalance in educational opportunities between Christians and Muslims provided the rationale for

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

132

establishing many new EAMWS primary schools even where no need could be demonstrated. Finally, the school had tended to become an important status symbol for a community because of the growing prestige of education. Talk of building a new school or extending an existing one often led to conflicts over siting among leaders of nearby villages. Districts councillors, members of Parliament, and other TANU activists who depended on local power bases also intervened because of the importance of educational expansion to their political careers. Many times disputes of this sort were settled by a decision to proceed with two or more projects rather than one.9 An attempt to impose controls. While it is obvious that tacit compliance from the central government was partly responsible for the large growth in enrolment that did take place, the issue of imposing controls gradually became more salient in official circles. Immediately after the attainment of responsible government in 1960, educational administrators and politicians both wanted to dampen public expectations about an increased central government commitment to primary development; meagre finances had to be channelled heavily into secondary school expansion. However, the two groups initially parted company on the question of using resources other than those of the central government to increase educational opportunities at the primary level. The administrators (particularly the expatriates among them) favoured holding the line, but the politicians were prepared to condone limited growth beyond the targets of the Three Year Plan, provided that development costs were met locally.10 In this way, the centre was able to make convenient use of the decentralization of responsibilities for primary school education by diverting pressure for expansion to the local authorities. Nevertheless, Oscar Kambona, then Minister for Education, cautioned district councils against overcommitting themselves and reminded them of their obligation to meet fifty per cent of the operating budgets for primary facilities in their areas. In addition, Chief Minister Nyerere warned the Legislative Council that local authorities had many calls on their resources and that school buildings in themselves were useless unless teachers could be recruited and paid; he strongly emphasized the importance of consulting Ministry officials before any primary school project was undertaken." It soon became apparent that declarations of this sort made in Dar es Salaam and unsupported by sanctions were not taken seriously. Moreover, the Minister for Education took a somewhat different approach in speeches delivered in his home constituency of Morogoro and in other parts of the country, notably Pare.'2 Long an arena for intense competition among four mission societies, Pare

133

THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

had a history of successful unaided schools. Popular pressure for universal primary education was particularly strong after the elections of 1958, and the voluntary agencies were quite prepared to open new classes as quickly as demand arose. As a result, officials in the Ministry of Education decided late in 1960 to check unplanned expansion by placing a ban on any new Standard I development whether aided or not. As soon as the directive became common knowledge, local people began to lodge complaints with TANU officials who promptly organized a deputation to Dar es Salaam. Is Mr. Kambona toured Pare in December 1960. At one public meeting he heard speeches by several local notables who pressed for more Standard I streams and more places for Standard IV leavers who "proved too young and too immature to work for the country as a whole and their parents in particular." In response the Minister outlined the government's difficulties, but promised that a full eight-year course would be established as soon as possible; in the meantime, if the people wanted schools, it was up to them to contribute the necessary labour and money. Heartened by the Minister's invitation, district and village TANU leaders organized selp-help building programmes and increased their pressures for more assistance from the voluntary agencies. These efforts happened to coincide with the opening of a new academic year. In February 1961 the (expatriate) District Education Officer reported that "local people have jumped at the opportunity to extend existing lower primary schools after the Minister's tour" and that several new Standard I classes had been opened as well. His warning that such activities contravened the regulations and were punishable went largely unheeded; and, in fact, the District Council recommended registration of most of the new schools and agreed to cover the operational expenses of some of them.14 Although more pronounced in Pare than in many other areas, this sort of development was common throughout upcountry Tanganyika. Nyerere and his colleagues were pleased at first about the positive response to appeals for self-help, but they quickly realized that an awkward situation was developing. On the one hand, educational administrators were disturbed because the unplanned expansion involved hiring unqualified teachers; moreover, after five years of attempting to improve the quality of instruction by instituting full-day teaching in Standards III and IV, more and more schools were reverting to half day attendance in order to free classrooms and teachers for expansion. On the other hand, many local leaders and parents were frustrated on learning that teachers and teaching materials were not forthcoming for schools they had built at the urging of TANU spokesmen; as a result, demands for a

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

134

clear-cut government commitment to universal primary school education became even more strident.15 During the February 1961 session of the Legislative Council, Mr. Kambona (probably beginning to regret his own catalytic effect on the situation) affirmed the government's pledge to stand by the priorities of the Three Year Plan. He stressed that he would consider for approval only those local authority requests which had been "properly worked out" and were "suited to the needs of an area and approved by local inhabitants." Moreover, classrooms, teachers, and materials had to be available and districts councils would have to meet initial and continuing costs.te In May the Council of Ministers extended their efforts with an extensive propaganda campaign that made use of the English and Swahili press, radio, and the party. Ministry figures were publicized purporting to show that 75,000 out of 500,000 primary school places were vacant, and local leaders everywhere were urged to direct their attention to reducing wastage rather than promoting expansion.17 However, by January 1962 it was apparent that the campaign had failed (see Table 6.1). Aided enrolment had grown by as much as it had in the previous year (8 per cent) ; and the expansion of Standard I places was almost as great as in 1961 (over 3 per cent compared to 4 per cent). The experience demonstrated clearly the futility of propaganda unaccompanied by strong sanctions. The first serious initiative to introduce controls came from the bureaucracy: the Chief Education Officer (a European finishing his tour of service) resolved early in 1962 to persuade the Cabinet to take decisive action to bring local leaders and educational authorities under more effective central scrutiny. Although he alone was legally answerable for the registration and closure of schools, the CEO did not want to act without the support of political leaders, partly because he was an expatriate, but largely because primary expansion and self-help programmes were exceedingly sensitive issues at the grassroots level. Europeans were seen to have withheld opportunities for Africans to obtain the social and economic rewards of education; effective implementation of the policy of restraint, whether by expatriates or citizens, would be widely interpreted as a return to colonial practice. In a lengthy memorandum to the Permanent Secretary (who was also from Britain), the Chief Education Officer expressed personal approval of the Ministry's emphasis on secondary development and of the policy of devolving responsibility for primary education onto the local education authorities.1ß Nevertheless, the current tendency of LEAs to succumb to pressure made difficult the reconciliation of the two policies. He commented that rapid primary expansion not

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

only diverted resources from secondary development but placed it upon "an increasingly insecure foundation. ...On reflection, I think that I have been wrong in being prepared to yield to popular pressures and to agree to proposals which are educationally unsound." He recommended the threat and, if necessary, the use of strong sanctions already authorized by the Education Ordinance: informing LEAs that no central subventions would be paid to them after December 31, 1962 unless their development plans were submitted by September 30 and then approved; and warning all unauthorized schools that they would be closed on September 1 if they failed to meet the Ministry's registration requirements. He suggested as well that any LEA should be forbidden to open new classes at any level unless all schools under its jurisdiction ran fullday sessions for Standards III to VIII with a full complement of qualified teachers. The memorandum was forwarded to Al Noor Kassum, the Parliamentary Secretary, who commented that the proposals were "very sound ... professionally. [However], politically I know from experience, it is going to be extremely difficult to put into practice the full recommendations. We shall have to draw the line somewhere but I am not sure it is going to be that easy to define."19 No action was taken at that time, but the Chief Education Officer was determined to keep the issue alive. He finally persuaded the Minister—now Solomon Eliufoo—to submit the proposals to Cabinet in May.20 However, Mr. Eliufoo, at Kassum's instigation, began a process of brokerage by substituting "may" for "will" in a statement about "action will be taken" to close unauthorized schools; and by inserting "normally" before an assertion that "no new school place will receive the approval of the Minister" without guarantees about fullday teaching and staffing.81 While the CEO regretted these changes, the weakening of his proposals had only just begun. To what extent the Minister defended the recommendations before Cabinet cannot be determined, but quite naturally his colleagues were less concerned about the educational than the short-run political implications of unabated primary expansion. Cognizant of the threat to their fragile legitimacy, they realized that few popular expectations could be realized immediately; to deny increased educational opportunities would further disenchant a people already showing signs of dissatisfaction with the meagre material rewards of independence. As a result, the Cabinet amended the recommendations in a way that negated the intention of enforcing controls. It did agree to threaten a reduction in subventions if development plans were not approved by the Minister, but the deadline for submission was put back from

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September 1 to October 31, just two months before the commencement of the 1963 academic year. Even more significant was the rejection of the suggestion that expansion should be forbidden until all Standards III and IV within a district operated on a full-day basis; instead, the Cabinet decided to permit new development if existing provisions for full-time teaching were maintained. With respect to unregistered schools, the deadline was extended to October 31 and all references to closure and legal action against managers were deleted. In addition, the Cabinet moved a vote of thank to TAPA for its efforts in promoting education, and strongly recommended that the Ministry show its appreciation by opening training programmes for unqualified TAPA teachers.22 In effect, educational administrators were back where they started, with only the instrument of moral suasion at their disposal. However, the amended Cabinet Paper did at least enable them to draft regulations for vetting the development plans of local authorities. It was deciddd to accept as a fail accompli the expansion that had occurred in 1961 and 1962, but executive officers of councils were requested to submit plans before October 31 indicating the number of new classrooms at each level they intended to open in 1963. Insofar as unauthorized development was concerned, field officers were advised to take all steps short of legal action to obtain compliance with Ministry regulations.23 Implementing the new approach. Kilimanjaro is neither a typical nor an average district ;24 however, the experience there in implementing the new regulations illustrates many of the basic difficulties confronted by the Ministry elsewhere in the country. Already the tribe best provided with educational facilities, the Chagga of Kilimanjaro had responded avidly to Mr. Kambona's invitation in 1960 to construct self-help schools. By the time that the newlyconstituted District Education Committee held its first meeting in March 1962, the most pressing task before members was to consider petitions for the approval of primary streams that had already been opened, in some cases as many as fifteen months earlier. Despite warnings from the District Education Officer that expansion required qualified teachers as well as classrooms, the Committee approved all of the requests; Council, in turn, formally notified the schools involved of their official registration.25 The Assistant Chief Education Officer (Primary) lauded the Committee and the Council for their enthusiasm, but cautioned against opening schools that had not been officially registered by the Ministry. He reminded the local education authority that its role in capital development was purely advisory: only the Ministry could approve plans for expansion and extension. Considerable semantic confusion dominated the ensuring

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THE POLrrICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

exchange of correspondence about registration procedures. Meanwhile, the schools and streams in question remained open and operated without interference.26 Shortly thereafter, the new regulations aimed at controlling expansion were introduced, but to little effect. Table 6.2 shows a rapid growth of places in 1962 and 1963. The relative increase in Standard I almost matched that in total enrolment, while the Table 6.2 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN REGISTERED" STANDARDS I, V, AND VII AND IN TOTAL ENROLMENT, KILIMANJARO DISTRICT, 1961-3 1961

1963

Standard I

7,535

9,409

25

Standard V

1,674

5,331

220

Standard VII

1,234

1,424

15

All Standards

34,684

46,391

34

0'

Increase

Source: Regional Education Office, Moshi. aIn Table 6.1, the statistics are for schools aided by central and/or local governments; in this table, all registered schools—aided or not—are included. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain data for 1962 or statistics breaking down aided and unaided enrolments in 1961 and 1963.

number of pupils in Standard V increased in the two year period by a phenomenal rate. Table 6.3 illustrates the accompanying marked increases in local authority funds spent on education in absolute and relative terms and as a proportion of total Council expenditures. It is true that the increase in 1963 was not as great as in the previous year; nevertheless, the percentage of Council funds allocated to education continued to rise. Like so many other local authorities, Kilimanjaro found the financial burden particularly high because fees had been abolished for Standards I to IV and a high proportion of tuition revenue from upper standards was being used for fees remission. What then had happened to the development plan for 1963, which was to have been submitted by October 31, 1962? Kilimanjaro was one of forty-four LEAs (out of a total of fifty-seven at the time) that did not submit one.27 As late as July 1963 the Regional Education Officer reported that the plan for the school year already half over was still not forthcoming "apparently because Council has

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Table 6.3 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES AND IN EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES, KILIMANJARO DISTRICT COUNCIL, 1961-3

Year

Educational Expenditures" (Thousand Shs.)

1961 1962 1963

1,571.1 3,686.8 5,206.0

% Increase

% Educational Expenditures: Total Expenditures" Total (Thousand Shs.) Expenditures

135 41

5,758.0 7,383.2 8,674.2

27 50 60

Source: Kilimanjaro District Council Office. "Includes central government subventions.

found it difficult to complete" the designated forms. Rather understating the case, he noted that development had "tended" to get out of hand because of self-help building projects and that Council was somewhat reluctant to commit its own funds because of "its already overburdened position". He reported that there were 49 unaided schools and 136 unaided streams in assisted schools. "In pressing for new development....parents are blind to the possible implications of staff and finance. They do not consider whether teachers are going to be found or whether they (the parents) will be able to bear the recurrent costs indefinitely.28 The Kilimanjaro situation could no longer be ignored as it had been before this report was received. After considerable discussion, the ACEO (Primary) instructed the REO to accept the unapproved development of 1963 as afait accompli (a step that it had been hoped to avoid a year earlier), to introduce strict controls for 1964 (but no explicit means were outlined), and to persuade the Council to forestall further expansion. Any new educational expenditures were to be channelled towards incorporating as many unassisted streams as possible into the grant-aided system.29 It was obvious that the new approach to primary expansion in 1963 had failed in Kilimanjaro, and that controls were needed if the directives for 1964 were to produce any positive results. Although increases elsewhere were generally less dramatic than in Kilimanjaro, expansion throughout the country was considerably greater in 1963 than in any preceding year (see Table 6.1) : in assisted schools alone, total enrolment rose by 14 per cent, Standard

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

V by 51 per cent, and Standard I by 9 per cent. Clearly contravening official policy was the absolute increase in Standard I (11,020), almost as high as that for Standard V (13,705). Meanwhile, unassisted development continued virtually unchecked almost everywhere. Early in 1963 the Permanent Secretary had sent a circular to Regional Commissioners and Regional Education Officers asking them to adhere to three principles in overseeing self-help projects: that parents should be required to guarantee recurrent financial support for new schools; that any project should be submitted to the local authority for thorough consideration of its costs and educational viability; and that efforts should be redirected towards improving existing buildings and facilities.30 Later that year the Advisory Council endorsed this "improvement approach" and, in a rare instance of policy initiation, recommended placing highest priority on the construction of teachers' quarters. It also approved proposals to integrate TAPA more fully in the public system of education, and urged TAPA and other agencies to close institutions that did not meet prescribed educational and physical standards 31 Without sanctions these guidelines became a dead letter as well. The improvement approach failed largely because local leaders responsible for mobilizing workers regarded with suspicion projects such as teachers' quarters, dining halls, and kitchens that yielded no obvious material returns. Moreover, basic building materials promised by local authorities and district development committees were not provided on schedule. Again we see the interplay of weak mobilizational and bureaucratic capacities. Even as late as 1966, only marginal advances had been made in integrating TAPA. In 1962, 54 of the Association's 2,017 schools known to the Ministry were registered.32 Four years later a mere 244 had been approved, and, of these, only 198 were receiving assistance from central and local governments. Meanwhile, between 1,000 and 1,300 technically illegal schools were still functioning,33 and, despite serious financial limitations, educational standards that shocked Ministry representatives, and weak leadership in most regions, there were no signs of an imminent collapse. In fact, even though TAPA was somewhat of an embarrassment to them, TANU leaders continued to speak optimistically about developing a more positive role for the organization, and, on occasion, they intervened covertly when TAPA's interests were threatened by education officials. In addition, some middle level leaders directly flouted Cabinet and Ministry warnings about unapproved TAPA projects by encouraging their initiation. Raiding and in some cases actual takeovers of voluntary agency schools continued.

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Although these problems with respect to self-help development and TAPA were not effectively overcome for several years, the Ministry did have an excellent opportunity of bringing at least the local authorities under closer control when the Five Year Plan for 1964-69 was drafted. It was hoped that a dramatization of the importance of the plan within the party and among the people would permit the government to defend many policy changes in the name of overall development. Primary School Expansion and the First Five Year Plan Plan formulation. We have noted that the Five Year Plan continued to place high priority on the rapid development of secondary and higher education, and that targets for growth were geared closely to the projections of manpower planners. By and large, the programme for primary expansion was tied to the use of resources not required by other commitments. However, the final draft did not conform to the wishes of educational administrators who, in negotiations with the Ministry of Development Planning, were forced to make compromises that had serious implications for the control of local education authorities and primary school development. Demonstrating that they were more in tune with political reality than the authors of the Three Year Plan had been, Ministry officials assumed at the outset that local authorities could be held in check only if demands for primary level expansion were to some extent placated. In a detailed account of the formulation of .the education section of the Five Year Plan, Augustine Mwingira (then head of the Planning Section) and Simon Pratt (a planning officer seconded by UNESCO) described their attitudes: If it seems that undue attention has been devoted to the determination of manpower demands on the educational system, it should be remembered that this is due partly to the novelty of the procedures and, indeed, to the current fashion for employing them. Projects to cope with the other type of educational demand, which might be termed "popular" rather than "economic", must also feature in a plan if the plan is itself to be popular.34

They followed three guidelines in drafting the primary school plan : the requirement "to fulfill all obligations implied by Government approval of developments already carried out"; the estimation "by political judgment" of a "desirable rate of expansion of the primary school system, beating in mind that the manpower development programme in post-primary education must have economic priority" ; and the wish "to transform the existing primary school system into one of higher quality which will be a more useful instrument of development."35

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

By interpreting the figures in Table 6.4, one can see that the guideline of fulfilling existing obligations implied a heavy financial commitment if the standards in which promotion was automatic (II to IV, VI, and VIII) were to expand to offer the same number of places as the entry and promotion points (Standards I, V, and VII). Ignoring "wastage" (a rapidly decreasing phenomenon), it was necessary to finance increases in places between Standards I to IV, V to VI, and VII to VIII of 28 per cent, 40 per cent, and 11 per cent respectively. While the first guideline merely reflected the results of unplanned expansion from 1960 to 1963, the second implied that there would be moderate enrolment increases at the entry and promotion points. The President himself, apparently resolved to reverse the flexible approach adopted by the Cabinet in 1962, defined a "desirable growth rate" at the Standard I level as one that would give places to a relatively fixed proportion of the relevant age groups on a year to year basis. His directive was interpreted as allowing an increase of 2 per cent per annum, the overall rate of population growth Table 6.4 ENROLMENT IN AIDED STANDARDS I TO VIII, 1963 Standard I II III IV

Enrolment 136,541 125,889 177,989 106,768

Standard V VI VII VIII

Enrolment 40,508 28,968 18,444 16,633

Source: M. E., Annual Report, 1963

estimated (conservatively and inaccurately) by government demographers. At first personnel in the Primary Section of the Ministry requested a higher rate, but the two per cent recommendation was accepted on the insistance of the Planning Section.36 Although greater than the average increase in Standard I enrolment from 1956 to 1960 and obviously more realistic than the intention set forth in the Three Year Plan of holding the line, the new prescribed rate was substantially lower than the average annual growth of over 5 per cent from 1960 to 1963 (see Table 6.1). At the upper primary level, the draft plan envisaged an increased enrolment of about 10 per cent a year with differential rates in each standard to allow the last two years of the system to absorb an increasing proportion of children leaving Standard VI. Moreover, it was planned to keep the increase in Standard V places quite low

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in 1964 in order to permit the development of sufficient financial and manpower resources to accommodate the expansion of 105 per cent in the period from 1961 to 1963.87 It was hoped that this relatively greater emphasis on development in the senior years would reduce enrolment ratio between Standards IV and V from 2.6:1 in 1963 to 2:1 in 1969. The third guideline, concerning quality, was also related to the question of expansion. In order to reduce half-day attendance and to restore teacher-pupil ratios to levels existing before 1962, it was necessary not only to increase the supply of teachers but also to ensure that primary school growth was carefully controlled. In addition, it was decided to proceed with a UNESCO proposal to upgrade the teaching corps by intensifying in-service courses and by phasing out the Grade C training programme for primary school leavers. It was hoped that all of these measures would make it possible to shorten the primary course from eight to seven years by 1971, a step that would lead eventually to substantial reductions in both capital and recurrent expenditures."H Once the draft plan for education had been prepared and costed, negotiations began with the Ministry of Development Planning. The gross cost of the plan (for all educational levels) was calculated to be Shs. 1,056 million and Shs. 500 million in recurrent and capital expenditures respectively. Mwingira and Pratt note that it "was designed to meet... manpower targets ...with modifications only to allow for upgrading of educational qualifications for entry to the teaching profession... and to meet what were politically minimal requirements for the expansion of the primary school system". However, the Ministry of Development Planning had allocated only Shs. 670 million for recurrent expenditures on education. The reaction of the Ministry of Development Planning, represented...by its Manpower Planning Unit, was twofold; first it was suggested that the planned expansion of primary education was not in accordance with the manpower requirements of the country.... and, secondly, it was contended that the financial implications of the plan...did not recognize the "realities" of the financial situation S9 Hard bargaining then ensued. As a first step towards closing the Shs. 400 million gap, Mwingira and Pratt agreed to reduce the projected rates of growth at the upper primary level, in particular those planned for Standards VII and VIII. This measure represented a potential saving of Shs. 50 million, which, together with recosting the proposals on a net basis, reduced the estimate for recurrent expenditures to Shs. 928 million 60 Still, however, Shs. 258 million separated the two sides.

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

When the Ministry of Development Planning insisted on adhering to its initial estimate, the Ministry of Education reacted sharply by claiming that Shs. 760 million would be required just "to maintain existing services with expansion limited to that which had already been approved in principle."41 The Cabinet ordered a re-examination of unit cost estimates, an accounting procedure that led to a further cut of Shs. 50 million, but which also implied a weakening of teacher-pupil ratios at the primary level. Later technical assumptions "saved" an additional 90 million shillings, but the two groups failed to achieve further compromises, leaving a gap of almost Shs. 120 million between them.4E Decisive Cabinet intervention was required to break the deadlock. However, reference to the subcommittee "set up for the purpose did not ...produce a financial reconciliation ....The cuts to which the subcommittee agreed...amounted to only L1,197,000" (Shs. 24 million). Among these were yet further decreases in the number of places planned for Standards VII and VIII and reductions in the teacher training programme "arising partly from the primary school cut but mainly from the excision of a proposal to train untrained teachers serving in schools outside the publicly financed educational system."'" This latter proposal had been included originally to meet the Cabinet's wish to assist TAPA. Disappointed at the inability of the politicians to reach a compromise, the educational planners decided reluctantly that primary education would again have to bear the brunt of amendments. They made two decisions which greately increased the administrative and financial burdens upon local education authorities. First, it was decided to reduce the primary school course to seven years much earlier than originally planned by beginning to phase out Standard VIII in 1965 rather than in 1971. The anticipated saving for the immediate planning period was only Shs. 8 million (an overly optimistic estimate in any case), but the saving proposed for the next period was considerable because the capital costs of conversion in a smaller system would be lower and because recurrent expenditures would not rise as quickly in the absence of further commitments to Standard VIII development.44 Although there was concern about an adverse effect on manpower requirements because standards of attainment might fall, the change had the immediate political advantage of channelling all development funds for the expansion of the seventh and eighth years into the growth of places in Standard VII, thereby making possible the elimination of the selection barrier at Standard VI by the time the conversion was implemented. However, a more serious problem was posed for the slightly longer run: the proportion of unsuccessful to successful

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144

candidates for entry to secondary institutions would grow more quickly than originally planned. Secondly, it was agreed that the financial contribution expected of local authorities would be increased by Shs. 52 million to Shs. 207 million, 35 per cent more than the Ministry of Local Government estimated to be the maximum capacity of district and municipal councils.°b This decision not only placed unrealistic demands on some of the poorer local authorities but also (as we shall see in Chapter Seven) made it difficult for the government to decrease regional disparities in educational opportunity. These two changes narrowed the financial gap sufficiently for the Cabinet to accept a net recurrent cost to the central government for the educational plan of 710.1 million shillings. The accompanying reductions in proposed capital expenditures were also accepted." The revised targets for primary school expansion were not geared to the estimated population growth rate of two per cent per annum. Only 75 new classes a year at each of the entry and promotion points were to be permitted; in terms of enrolment, the increase in each case was to fall within a range of 3,000 to 3,400. Thus, although it was anticipated that Standard VII development might increase more rapidly in order to keep pace with that of Standard VI, the absolute shortfall of places between Standards IV and V was to remain frozen throughout the planning period. One educational administrator commented that it cannot be over-emphasized that the net result of the reductions and alterations of the Development Plan originally submitted by this Ministry is that, while Higher Education, Secondary, Technical, and Teacher Training sectors still adhere to a recognizable plan, the primary sector has been reduced to an ad hoc solution fitted to a drastically restricted residual sum of money. This is not planning. It is short-run administrative and financial expediency, the adverse consequences of which, both educationally and socially, are difficult to foresee.

He added, however, that all officers of the Ministry would of necessity assist in explaining the primary programme "in the face of adverse criticism" and would maintain the priorities as strictly as possible.47 Plan implementation. Manpower planners had won an initial victory: primary school development was to be sacrificed to increases in output at the secondary, technical, and higher levels. However, even though the Five Year Plan was more firmly geared to enrolment projections and more fully costed than the earlier Three Year Plan, was it realistic to expect that controls could be imposed more effectively after 1964 than previously? The guidelines adopted for the Five Year Plan were in fact introduced to control expansion in

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

1964—several months before the plan was published and approved. In that year growth in aided places in Standards I and V was almost contained within the prescribed range of 3,000 to 3,400 (see Table 6.1), but in the following year there were increases of about 9,000 in each.d8 Moreover, as can be seen by comparing figures in Tables 6.1 and 6.5, the growth rates of Standard I and in total enrolment in 1965 were surpassed only by those of 1963, and the relative increase in Standard VII was the highest ever. But thereafter there was a sharp deceleration: in 1966 the number of pupils in primary schools climbed only 4 per cent, and, in the last three years of the planning period, growth rates were lower than in the late colonial period. Overall, between 1965 and 1969, the absolute increases in Standard I and total enrolment were only slightly higher than in 1956-60. The eventual containment of primary school expansion reflected improved techniques for central control, supported by political resolve and a slackening of parental demand. However, it was not certain until well into the planning period that the necessary political will would be exerted. Two factors were largely responsible for the seventeen per cent increase in enrolment between 1964 and 1966, which compares unfavourably in terms of planning priorities with the mere five per cent rise between 1966 and 1969. One was the high priority assigned by politicians and educational administrators alike to rapid progress towards universal primary education in urban areas. This resulted in a decision to assist the opening of several new streams, especially at the upper primary level. Because it would have been politically (and, for some people, morally) untenable to penalize rural districts even further by making drastic reductions in their plans for expansion, the urban developments required an overall increase above the projected 75 streams at each of the entry and promotion points in 1965 and 1966.48 However, the more important factor was the inability of the centre to prevent earlier uncontrolled expansion from producing an escalation of enrolment greater than had been foreseen. This problem was most apparent in a small number of districts (notably Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, and Rungwe) which by and large had the best educational facilities and in which it was still most difficult to control expansion. The case of Kilimanjaro is particularly instructive in this context. It will be recalled that the Kilimanjaro District Council failed to produce plans for primary school development for 1962 and 1963. During that time, the number of places in registered schools increased by 34 per cent. A large proportion of this growth (much greater than in any other district) was unauthorized by either the central or the local government and initially received no public

149,341 154,512 157,196 155,802 157,986

140-158 (000s)

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

1964-69

13

6 3 2 —1 1

27

% Increase

25-61 (000s)

33,892 46,886 51,460 55,381 60,790

15-46 (000s)

Enrolment Standard VII

145

38 38 10 8 10

225

% Increase

634-776 (000s)

710,200 740,991 753,114 765,169 776,109

484-741 (000s)

Enrolment All Stds.

Source: Table 6.1; United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1972-73, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 44

121-154 (000s)

1961-66

Enrolment Standard I

22

21

12 4 2

54

% Increase

PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED STANDARDS I AND VII AND IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOLS, FIRST FIVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE (1961-66), FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN PERIOD (1964-69), AND ANNUALLY FROM 1965 TO 1969

Table 6.5

rn

P

w

5

ro 0

ö z

ö

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

financial assistance:60 in 1963 alone, 63 unaided streams were opened in Standards I and V on the initiative of parents and voluntary agencies.S" During the latter half of 1963, a planning committee of Ministry and local representatives was established to consider priorities and the problems of unplanned development in Kilimanjaro. It decided to require notice before new streams were opened and to reject requests for expansion until it was shown that existing schools were well-staffed and operating efficiently. The committee also agreed that the burden on parents who had undertaken to finance expansion privately was too great; as a result, it suggested that Council meet the operating expenses of existing unaided streams (but no more in future) at an initial total cost of Shs. 2,020,000 in 1964. To raise the necessary funds, it recommended charging annual fees of Shs. 10 in Standards I to IV, reducing existing costs by closing most boarding upper primary schools, and asking the central government for more assistance.62 Council accepted these recommendations and agreed to aid several of the unassisted schools within its jurisdiction in 1964.53 Largely as a result, its expenditures on education rose by Shs. 2.4 million, a 46 per cent increase over 1963 (see Tables 6.3 and 6.8). The closure of some boarding schools permitted a reallocation of funds, fees of Shs. 30 rather than Shs. 10 were levied for Standards I and IV, and fees for upper primary schools were also increased." However, while these measures offset some of the new expenditures, Council faced a major financial crisis, unless the Ministry of Education substantially increased subventions. Meanwhile, at ministerial headquarters an effort was being made to limit the increases in aided classes at each of the entry and promotion points to the projected 75. Local education authorities were advised to request a bare minimum of new streams in Standards I and V, and to concentrate their efforts on the construction of extra classrooms to accommodate full-day teaching in Standards III and IV. In line with earlier policy, no threats were made about closing schools or reducing subventions, but the Ministry stated unequivocally that unapproved projects would not receive central government assistance at a later date.55 Again many local authorities were tardy in meeting the deadline for submission of plans—October 1—even though all of them were much better staffed and equipped than they had been in the first two years of independence. By mid-December the rural councils in only four of the seventeen regions and a mere six town councils had forwarded development programmes. This time a much tougher warning was issued: "Failure to have plans here [in Dar es

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EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Salaam] by 15/1/64 will affect the payment of subventions."se All plans were submitted by early in February. Table 6.6 shows the disparities between the requests of LEAs for new developments in 1964 and the Ministry's Five Year Plan projections, which had been made final by February 1964. Although it was too late by then to close any streams that had opened a month earlier, Ministry officials set about making reductions for subventions purposes, thereby requiring some developments to continue with support only from local government or private sources. The Kilimanjaro District Council was one of the LEAs that submitted its development plan to headquarters after the beginning of the academic year. Even though the demands of councillors and voluntary agencies had been pared considerably, the requests were staggering in terms of the Ministry's guidelines for expansion. Kilimanjaro was only one of 73 local education authorities, yet its demands accounted for 55 of 270 (20 per cent) of total LEA requests for new streams. The original plan is compared with that of Iringa, a typical LEA, in Table 6.6. (The Iringa programme was approved without change.) Table 6.6 PROJECTIONS OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN AND REQUESTS OF KILIMANJARO, IRINGA, AND ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT, 1964 New Aided Streams Standard I Standard V Standard VII Totals

Projections

Requests Kilimanjaro

75 75 75

1 16 38

225

55

-

Requests Iringa

Requests All LEAs

1 2 2

45 109 116

5

270

Source: P.S. to Min., February 13, 1964, File EDP 2/1, DSM; File 100, Moshi; and File EDP P2/4/2, DSM. The Planning Section of the Ministry referred the Kilimanjaro draft to the Chief Education Officer, J. A. Sawe. As a Chagga himself, Mr. Sawe undoubtedly realized how difficult it would be to persuade the District Council to restrain development in the face of extreme popular pressure. Without making specific proposals, he forwarded the programme to the Principal Secretary with the comment that "in view of the general overall plan for the country, it would be impossible to approve the Kilmanjaro District one and

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

obtain the necessary staff in one year." The Principal Secretary suggested making some reductions, but, because the school year had already commenced, he recommended accepting most of the requests and emphasized again the need to maintain guidelines in the future: "We shall tell them that any new development will not ever rank for subvention and [that we] may have to consider a reduction in the subvention" if greater cooperation is not forthcoming. Mr. Eliufoo, also a Chagga, agreed about the necessity of control, but refused to consider a threat to reduce the subvention.57 The matter was referred back to the Planning Section, which recommended a freeze on Standard I development and a reduction in the number of streams in Standards V and VII to 14 and 20 respectively. These latter offers depended on a plan that would not substantially increase enrolment in Standard V but would permit a growth of about 1,400 places in Standard VII. 58 The District Council was now in an awkward situation. It had already started aiding several more previously unassisted streams than the 55 for which it requested central assistance, but the Ministry in any case was prepared to support only 34. As a result, the increased subvention from the centre covered only Shs. 536 thousand,69 a mere 22 'per cent of the 1964 increase in educational expenditures (rather than the normal 50 per cent). This time Council was "baled out" by the Ministry of Local Government, which provided a special grant that maintained educational outlay as a proportion of' total expenditures at 60 per cent (see Tables 6.3 and 6.8) ; however, officials at the centre were alarmed about Council's financial plight80 and worried as well because too few qualified teachers were available to staff the new LEA-assisted streams. Amidst the concern about overspending and the teacher shortage, enrolment statistics for 1964 in Kilimanjaro might have given cause for satisfaction. The number of pupils in Standard I actually declined, the increase in Standard V was just over four per cent, and overall primary level enrolment grew by less than one per cent, well below the national average of 7 per cent.81 However, the figures merely reflected a decision not to register any new streams that year. They masked the opening of several unauthorized classrooms and the continuation unabated of self-help building projects.0a It was clear that the success in restraining expansion was only apparent—existing commitments to extend schools and build new ones, together with pressure from parents and voluntary agencies for recognition and assistance, ensured the rapid rise in enrolment that did in fact ensue over the next two years. In preparing for 1965 the Ministry introduced a new procedure to curtail expansion that effectively removed the initiative for

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educational development from local authorities. Instead of asking LEAs for requests, the centre made offers to assist a designated number of new streams. These were made months before the beginning of the school year and were binding unless a council could justify an additional allocation. In principle local authorities were free to underwrite further expansion from their own resources, but, because the central government's subvention structure provided most of the capital costs and fifty per cent of the operating expenditures of new approved developments, local politicians and bureaucrats in most areas came to realize that the promotion of unauthorized projects created an unbearable financial burden if LEAs covered total expenses themselves and political problems if they did not.es The offers. for 1965 again accorded favourable provision to Kilimanjaro, partly because of the magnitude of earlier non-aided development. (The offers to Kilimanjaro and some other LEAs are compared in Table 6.7. It should be noted that the projections for Table 6.7 A COMPARISON OF PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT OFFERS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO KILIMANJARO DISTRICT COUNCIL AND OTHER SELECTED LEASa FOR 1965

New Streams Standard I New Streams Standard V New Streams Standard VII New classrooms Standards III & IVe

Kilimanjaro

Iringa

Newalab

Kisarawe

0

3

0

2

10

1

2

0

19

0

0

5

16

4

3

0

Source: File EDP/A2/4/6/2, DSM; File 1/1, Iringa; File 201, Mtwara; and File LEA/33, Coast. aThe pattern of offers to the three LEAs selected reflects that of about twenty for which data were obtained by the author. bMtwara Region. cFor full-day teaching in Standards III and IV. Standard VII in Kilimanjaro and in Kisarawe reflected earlier reorganization in those districts for conversion to the seven year primary programme.) However, by the time a plan based on these

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

offers was drafted by the District Education Committee and approved by the Ministry, it was apparent that Kilimanjaro would be in serious trouble again in 1965. A month before the new school year began, the Regional Education Officer reported that the teacher shortage was so acute that it was necessary to close some schools or to revert widely to the practice of half-day teaching in Standards III and IV. He noted that political pressures made the first alternative untenable and thought that the second would be unfortunate "on professional grounds."" Submissions on the question were made to Mr. Eliufoo by educational administrators, district councillors, and other local politicians; the Minister was in an awkward dilemma, all the more so because his political base was among the Chagga. The school year opened with teachers stretched thinly pending a decision by the Minister," who personally attended a special meeting of the District Education Committee late in January. He gave permission to several schools to revert to half-day teaching as a temporary expedient. The Principal Secretary later confirmed this decision on condition that teachers freed would not be used in classrooms opened in 1965 and that full-day teaching would be reinstituted once the conversion to the seven year primary programme had been completed in 1966.88 Although the extent of the ensuing reversion to half-time schooling was "not as serious as feared"," official concern mounted about the financial status of Council after it became apparent that educational expenditures had increased by 25 per cent in 1965 (see Table 6.8). The increase did not match that in each of the three previous years, but the rise from 60 to 70 per cent of total expenditures necessitated cutbacks in other services provided by the local authority. Meanwhile, the frequency of complaints by teachers, field officers, and parents about teacher shortages and unsatisfactory distribution of materials was increasing. No new developments or central assistance to existing schools were authorized for 1966 apart from grants required to complete the conversion to the seven year course." Nevertheless, many district councillors were adamant in demanding that the local authority assume responsibility for all remaining unassisted streams; as a result, thirty-four unaided schools were approved for LEA assistance in January 1966. Despite the strongest warning ever issued by the centre, Council refused to reverse its decision.89 Once again, the centre acquiesced to a fait accompli. Table 6.9 shows the extent to which the attempt to restrain primary school development in 1965 and 1966 failed in Kilimanjaro. It is true that the growth rates in Standards I and V were lower than in the period from 1961 to 1963, and that the absolute increases were

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Table 6.8 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES AND IN EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES, KILIMANJARO DISTRICT COUNCIL, 1964-1966 Total Educational % Expenditures" Increase Expenditures" Educational Expenditures (Thousand Shs.) (Thousand Shs.) Total Expenditures 1964 1965 1966b

46 25 I

7,612.5 9,504.6 9,606.2

12,657.6 13,556.8 14,500.7

60 70 66

Source: Kilimanjaro District Council Office. "Includes central government subventions. bEstimates only. The actual educational expenditures were undoubtedly much higher because of the unanticipated takeovers of unassisted schools by the District Council in 1966.

Table 6.9 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN REGISTERED STANDARDS I, V, AND VII AND IN TOTAL ENROLMENT, KILIMANJARO DISTRICT, 1964-66

Standard I Standard V Standard VII All Standards

1964

1966

% Increase"

8,903 5,566 2,769 46,764

10,527 8,736 6,795 62,69 lb

18 (25) 57(220) 145 (15) 35 (34)

Source: Regional Education Office, Moshi. "Percentage increases for the period 1961-63 are in parentheses (see Table 6.2). bIncludes only Standards I to VII. In accordance with the Five Year Plan, Standard VIII was phased out in Kilimanjaro Region in 1965.

slightly less as well. Nevertheless, overall enrolment increased more rapidly in both relative and absolute terms, clearly reflecting the extent of earlier commitments and the creation of many more places in Standard VII. While the number of children in primary schools grew by 34 per cent, the District Council's decision to assume

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

financial responsibility for all registered schools led to an even greater expansion in assisted enrolment-42 per cent, more than two and a half times the overall growth rate of 17 per cent for mainland Tanzania (see Table 6.10). One can also see in Table 6.10 that Table 6.10 GROWTH IN PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT AIDED BY CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, KILIMANJARO AND TANZANIA, 1964-66 Kilimanjaro

0

Tanzania

Increase 1964

44,172°

Increase 633,678

42 1966

62,691

17 740,991

Source: Regional Education Office, Moshi; M.E., Annual Report, 1964; and M.E., Statistics for 1966, mimeo. aThis figure differs from that in Table 6.9 because the enrolment in unaided streams has been subtracted from total enrolment. the 18,519 additional places aided in Kilimanjaro in 1965 and 1966 accounted for 17 per cent of total primary school expansion in all 73 municipalities and rural districts. Similar increases in a few other areas also contributed to the failure to stay within the projections of the Five Year Plan up to the end of 1966.70 That planners were still under strong pressure to expand primary facilities as late as 1966 is further revealed in data from our survey of educational administrators and teachers in that year. When asked, "Do you think that it is better to build and extend more primary schools or more secondary schools?" One-third of the administrators and 47 per cent of the secondary school teachers interviewed favoured primary school development,71 high proportions indeed when one remembers that official policy at the time clearly sought to expand secondary education and curtail primary school growth. Although European expatriates were much more inclined to advocate primary expansion than Africans and Asians, 26 per cent of a largely African sample of primary school teachers also gave this as their preference.72 However, with a sudden rise in the number of unemployed primary school leavers in that year, some parents were beginning to doubt the value of' an investment in their children's education. For the first time since independence, it was becoming difficult to fill school places in many parts of the country; the focus of pressure for expansion was clearly shifting from the primary to the secondary level.7S

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154

Still, even though the new central controls were at last containing increases in aided primary school enrolment within prescribed limits, parental demand for more educational opportunities did not everywhere diminish. The number of unassisted places throughout the country rose from 59,000 in 1965 to 72,000 in 196774 (a 22 per cent increase in contrast to the modest 6 per cent growth in aided enrolment over this two-year period). Again, those LEAs where expansion had been difficult to control were largely responsible. For example, while aided enrolment in Kilimanjaro remained roughly constant at about 62,000 between 1966 and 1969, 113 new unassisted schools (probably catering for fifteen to twenty thousand children) were functioning in the latter year.75 Pressure for government recognition and assistance was mounting, and the stage was set for another struggle with the centre aimed at diverting resources away from other development priorities and other parts of the country. As Joel Samoff concluded after studying local politics in Moshi, "... the politics of education in Kilimanjaro are ... the politics of subverting national educational planning."78 Summary and Conclusions During the final phase of British colonial rule in Africa, the emphasis underlying educational policy-making shifted from the spread of mass literacy to the preparation of an elite capable of assuming political, administrative, and technical roles after independence. In Tanganyika, this elitist bias was firmly incorporated in development plans; as a result, it was deemed necessary to restrict the growth of expenditures and hence enrolment at the primary school level. Although political and educational authorities accepted a formal commitment to control primary school growth in face of widespread public demand for more educational opportunities, various attempts to do so initially resulted in failure. Why? Certainly institutional incapacity was an important factor. Throughout the period from 1960 to 1966, communications channels were weak, the relationship between central and local governments was continually redefined, politicians and bureaucrats were uncertain of their roles, and mechanisms for the resolution and rationalization of political conflict underwent several alterations. Neither the party nor the civil service was an effective instrument of mobilization and control. Politicians, parents, and the voluntary agencies were more than willing to capitalize upon these weaknesses. While certain political and administrative structures must be developed if programmes to use political institutions as agents of social change are to succeed, the skills and attitudes of actors, and their abilities and wills to pursue a policy line vigorously, comprise another important dimension of decision-making. Some central and

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

local government personnel were insufficiently trained and experienced, and some political and educational authorities had ambivalent feelings about primary school expansion. Even after President Nyerere had finally decided that greater restraint was essential, the question of will was important. It is true that the large increase of primary school places in the three years before his decision made difficult an immediate deceleration in the rate of expansion; nevertheless, he did not intervene to stem new growth when strong pressures were brought to bear or when it seemed politically advantageous to ignore rather than check popular enthusiasm. Decision-making with respect to primary school development illustrates a situation in which political and administrative authorities respond to demands that cannot be fulfilled without some cost in terms of competing priorities. That is not to say, in the language of games theory, that it is a zero-sum contest: despite the manpower planners' view that high priority for post-primary development precluded more than a modest expansion of elementary facilities, it did prove possible to use self-help and local authority resources to support growth greatly exceeding planned rates without sacrificing commitments to secondary, technical, and higher education. However, there were costs. Inevitably, there was a decline in the quality of instruction at the primary level, which for years to come will affect the recruitment of high level manpower. But more important politically, the distribution of places resulting from the expansion reinforced social cleavages, while the growth itself created tension because increasingly occupational aspirations could not be satisfied.

NOTES 1. Any statistics collected before 1964 are open to serious doubt, especially those for enrolment in unaided schools. The estimate of 34 per cent is based on rough data in D.E., Annual Report, 1956 and 1960 that show the enrolment in these institutions growing from 82,000 to 110,000. In this same period, the number of African pupils in aided places in Standards I and II increased from 194,265 to 212,743. 2. No data for schools permitted to teach up to Standard II are given in the 1961 Annual Report, but the number of these institutions grew from 1,979 to 2,106. If, as in 1960, the number of children in each school averaged 52, the total enrolment increased from 110,000 to 118,000. 3. According to information provided by educational field officers, TAPA opened 1,963 illegal and 54 recognized schools at the beginning of the 1962 academic year (see File EDP 2/1, DSM). It is probable that these institutions had an average enrolment of 75 to 80.

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156

4. Understandably, most headteachers when asked about criteria used to select pupils for Standard I claimed that the process was based strictly on a "first-come, first-served" basis. However, 11 out of 41 interviewed complained of interference by "politicians" and 3 admitted that they had occasionally accepted small bribes. Two District Education Officers criticized these practices. Six years after independence, a member of the National Assembly "stood up and said amid laughter" from members: "I am going to speak the whole truth, as an adult who has children. We can be pleased these days that our people value education so much that they bribe in order to get their children to school!" (The Standard, April 14, 1967). 5. The Tanganyika Standard, September 13, 1960. 6. L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. I, cob. 128, 150, 155, 177, 186, 195, 207, 235, 270-1, 348; and vol. II, col. 72. 7. The eagerness of TAPA officials and teachers to recruit pupils was not solely ideological. TAPA schools depended largely upon fees to finance their operations; thus, the salaries to teachers were linked to the size of the fee-paying enrolment. 8. One of the most intense areas of competition was Masasi, which was the scene of particularly aggressive raiding of pupils well into the late 1950s. In village after village the established Roman Catholic or Protestant school found itself having to compete with a new one set up by the rival agency. Usually local demand was such that neither school could be operated at full capacity. In 1960 the Department of Education decided to use the situation in Masasi to conduct an experiment on the viability of one-teacher schools, a step that gave voluntary agencies greater impetus to expand their operations but that reduced the extent of raiding. Two years later the Ministry accepted a recommendation of the visiting UNESCO Mission to end the experiment in Masasi in favour of establishing a smaller controlled programme run in Morogoro is conjunction with the teachers' college there. (Based on interviews and Minutes of the Conference of Regional Education Officers [hereafter cited as REOs Conference], 1962.) For the local response to this decision, see n. 9 below. 9. The author learned that this practice was particularly prevalent in Kilimanjaro and Pare districts. The policy to close and consolidate many formerly one-teacher schools in Masasi (see n. 8 above) was hampered considerably by resistance from local politicians in villages scheduled to lose schools. Although the policy was adopted in 1962, effective measures to implement it were not taken until 1966. According to government and agency field officers, many of the closure decisions eventually taken were based on political rather than enrolment considerations. 10. See the statements of Messrs. Nyerere and Kambona in L.C., Debates, 1960-61, vol. I, cob. 316-17; and vol. II, col. 51. Nyerere urged people who wanted primary schools to "begin to look nearer home, to the local authorities". 11. Ibid., vol. I, col. 317; and vol. II, col. 52.

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

12. Pare was the most privileged district in terms of primary school enrolment in the old Tanga Province. It was later' merged with the even more privileged Kilimanjaro District to form Kilimanjaro Region. Several people interviewed claimed that tension over the educational disparity between Pare and other districts in Tanga was the prime reason for the separation. 13. See File 54, Moshi, especially Provincial Education Officer, Tanga, to CEO, September 7, 1960. 14. A summary of Kambona's remarks and behaviour, and the ensuing difficulties is contained in File 54, Moshi. 15. See L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. III, passim but especially cols. 40-4, 100, and 109-11. 16. Ibid., cols. 48-9. 17. See John Cameron, "Wastage in Tanganyika with Special Reference to Primary Schools", Teacher Education, vol. VI (November 1965), pp. 105-6: see also The Tanganyika Standard issues of May 1961, especially May 5. In fact, the 15 per cent estimate was much too high because the Ministry wanted the situation to look as alarming as possible. 18. CEO to P.S., February 5, 1962, File EDP 2/1, DSM. 19. Parl. Sec. to Min., April 25, 1962, File EDP 2/I, DSM. 20. See CEO to P.S., April 27, 1962 and P.S. to CEO, May 4, 1962, File EDP 2/1, DSM. 21. "Let us by all means get tough, but this policy may lead to a state of affairs from which we may find it difficult to withdraw." Parl. Sec. to Min., May 5, 1962. Eliufoo replied the same day that he would tone the wording down. The changes were inked in and initialled by the Minister. File EDP 2/1, DSM. 22. Extract from Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, June 25, 1962, File EDP 2/1, DSM. 23. Based on interviews and information in File EDP 2/1, DSM, and in files in Iringa, Moshi, and other regional centres. 24. Kilimanjaro, on the southern slope of Africa's highest mountain, is small geographically; however, in its arable portion, it has one of the highest population densities in Tanzania. Inhabited by approximately 400,000 Chagga and a few thousand people of other tribes, it was particularly favoured by British officials who encouraged the growth of a cash economy based upon native-grown and cooperatively-marketed coffee. The Chagga were one of the tribes of East Africa (such as the Ganda, Kikuyu, Haya, and Nyakusa) which, despite differences in political and social structures, had value systems conducive to the rapid assimilation of Western socio-economic forms and practices. As a result of these and other factors (such as strong competition in educational development between Roman Catholic and Lutheran missions), the tribe emerged at independence as the wealthiest and most highlyeducated in the country. It is noteworthy that Kilimanjaro stands out from other districts not only because of its relatively high degree of socio-economic modernization, but also because of the relatively

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158

greater reluctance of the Chagga to accept the hegemony of TANU and Tanganyika. For a detailed examination of the Chagga, see K. Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro, The Hague, Mouton, 1964. For excellent studies of their recent politics, see Basil P. Mramba, "Kilimanjaro; Localism and Nationalism," in Lionel Cliffe, ed., One Party Democracy, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, pp. 105-27; and Joel Samoff, "Politics, Politicians, and Party: Moshi, Tanzania 1968-9", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971 (published by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1974 as Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power). For historical accounts of educational development in Kilimanjaro, see G.N. Shann, "The Early Development of Education among the Chagga", Tanganyika Notes and Records, vol. 45 (December 1956), pp. 31-2; and Shann, "The Educational Development of the Chagga Tribe", Oversea Education, vol. XXVI (July 1954). 25. Minutes of Kilimanjaro District Education Committee, March 16, 1962 and pencilled marginal note, File 58/62, Moshi. 26. ACED (Primary) to REO, Kilimanjaro, May 8, 1962, and succeeding correspondence, File 58/62, Moshi. 27. P.S. to Regional Commissioners, December 12, 1962, File EDP 2/1, DSM. 28. REO, Kilimanjaro, to ACED (Primary), July 9, 1963, File EDP 22/6/2, DSM. 29. See File EDP/22/6/2, DSM, especially ACED (Primary) to REO Kilimanjaro, July 19, 1963. 30. P.S., "Training for Rural Development", January 1, 1963, File 4/206/ III, Mbeya. 31. Advisory Council, 1963. 32. Of the 54, 31 were authorized to offer only Standards I and II. File EDP 2/1, DSM. 33. The lower figure is contained in TAPA, Sauti ya Wazazi, No. 1, mimeo (in Swahili), January 1966, and the higher one was given to the author by Timothy Samjela, then Education Secretary General, in May 1966. 34. A. C. Mwingira and Simon Pratt, The Process of Educational Planning in Tanzania, DSM, mimeo, 1965, p. 73. 35. Ibid., p. 74. See also P.S. to Min., December 30, 1963, File EDP 2/I, DSM. 36. Education Officer (Planning) to ACED (Administration and General), December 28, 1963 and P.S. to Min., December 30, 1963, File EDP 2/1, DSM. 37. See Table 6. 1 for the statistics. The material is based on File 2/1, DSM and interviews. 38. See File EDP 2/1; DSM: and Mwingira and Pratt, Educational Planning, pp. 42-50 and 96-7. 39. See Mwingira and Pratt, Educational Planning, pp. 88-9 and 91. 40. Ibid., pp. 87 and 89-91. 41. Ibid., pp. 91-2. 42. Ibid., pp. 88 and 92-4, and an interview with a senior educational administrator.

159 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61.

62.

THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

Mwingira and Pratt, Educational Planning, p. 94. Ibid., pp. 96-7. Ibid., p. 98. Ibid., pp. 87-8 and 98-9. "Memorandum on the Development Plan of the Ministry ofEducation", 1964, File EDP/214, DSM. 8,973 and 9,873 in Standards I and V respectively (see Tables 6.1 and 6.5); the total for Standard Vin 1965 was 53,483. Based on interviews. The author was unable to ascertain the extent to which this commitment to urban expansion contributed to overall growth above the projections in 1965. However, in Dar es Salaam alone, seven new streams were introduced in each of Standards I and V and fourteen in Standard VII. ("Summary of 5 Year Development Plan of Education—DSM City", 1965, File 211/2, Coast.) Unfortunately, data are not available for 1963 breaking down figures according to the number of school places receiving financial assistance from both levels of government or just the LEA. However, in 1964, 64 per cent (29,801 out of 46,784) of all primary school places were assisted by both central and local government (data provided by the Regional Education Office, Moshi). It is likely that this proportion was slightly lower in 1963. "Annual Report of the REO for 1963—Kilimanjaro Region", File 100 Moshi. Minutes of the Kilimanjaro LEA Subcommittee on Finance and Expansion, July 8 and 25, 1963 File 58/62, Moshi. "Monthly Report", REO, Kilimanjaro, September 1963, File 100, Moshi; and Executive Officer, Kilimanjaro District Council, to REO, Kilimanjaro, February 3, 1964, File 58/62, Moshi. File 100, Moshi. P.S. to Executive Officers of Councils, March 27, 1963, File EDP 2/1, DSM. ACED (Primary) to REOs, December 14, 1963, File EDP 2/1, DSM. CEO to P.S., January 1, 1964; P.S. to Min., January 8, 1964; and Min. to P.S., January 9, 1964, File EDP 2/1, DSM. The fourteen streams would merely replace and equal number closed in order to permit the use of physical facilities for Standard VII. Consequently, 34 rather than 20 streams were to be opened in Standard VII; an average enrolment of 40 would yield 1,360 places. File EDP/A2/4/6/2, DSM. P.S., Ministry of Local Government, to Regional Commissioner, Kilimanjaro, February 27, 1964, File 100, Moshi. Standard V enrolment increased from 5,331 to 5,566 and total enrolment from 46,391 to 46,764. Standard I fell from 9,409 to 8,903. Only at the Standard VII promotion point did Kilimanjaro enrolment grow more quickly than the national average-1,424 to 2,769, 95 per cent compared to 34 per cent. (The data are in Tables 6.2 and 6.9.) One educational administrator reported in 1966 that he knew of forty classrooms either built or under construction that were not approved by the District Council, let alone the central government.

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160

63. When visiting regional and district education offices, the author questioned Regional and District Education Officers about the responses of LEAs to Ministry development offers. Most field officers claimed that by 1966 the district and municipal councils had come to accept Ministry guidelines as binding. One DEO called his council a "pure rubber stamp" and an REO said with a chuckle that the planning function of the LEAs was performed in line with the principle of "guided freedom". In some cases in which the LEAs initially sought to authorize expansion greater than that implied by Ministry offers, educational administrators effectively used threats of sanctions to force compliance. For example, the Kisarawe (Coast Region) Council wished to obtain central government assistance for seven new Standard I streams in 1965. After being informed that the Ministry would assist only one or two, the Executive Officer wrote the REO stating that the LEA would in any case finance the developments. The REO then sought the advice of the Primary Section at headquarters, which told him to stress that unapproved developments would never receive central assistance and that the annual recurrent cost of seven schools would be /4,200 by 1968. Meanwhile, at the urging of educational administrators, the Regional Local Government Officer reminded the Executive Officer of the weak financial position of his treasury. Finally, after three months of negotiations, headquarters wrote directly to the Council Office approving the district plan in all respects except the Standard I requests. Two streams were offered with the following warning: "It should be noted that, if any additional classes are opened which have not been approved by the Minister, the whole position of your subvention will be reconsidered, and legal or administrative action may be taken". A few days later, the Executive Officer replied and, noting that only two streams would be opened, warmly thanked the Minister for his "generous decision". (Based on correspondence of September to December, 1964, File LEA/ 33, Coast.) 64. "Monthly Report", REO, Kilimanjaro, November 1964, File 100, Moshi. 65. Minutes of the Kilimanjaro Education Committee, January 25, 1965, File 58/62, Moshi. 66. P.S. to Executive Officer, Kilimanjaro District Council, February 20, 1965, File EDP/22/6/2, DSM. 67. Education Officer (Primary Section) to P.S., April 22, 1965, File EDP 22/6/2, DSM. 68. See File EDP 22/6/2, DSM. 69. Late in 1965 (on November 1 1 ), the REO wrote his Principal Secretary complaining of the Council decision to take over all remaining unassisted schools "when it cannot be said that Council has made 100 per cent provision" for the existing schools aided either by both levels of government or the LEA alone. "Please, if you have any advice, give it to council before it is too late". Deliberations within the Primary Secdon led to the conclusion that Kilimanjaro should be warned that its subvention would be reduced by an amount equal to the teaching and

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THE POLITICS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL EXPANSION

materials shortfalls in the schools that were assisted by the centre. The Principal Secretary agreed and this time Mr. Eliufoo concurred. A letter was drafted by the Primary Section and approved by the Minister (P.S. to Executive Officer, Kilimanjaro District Council, December 18, 1965). It stated that the Ministry insisted on full provision for the efficient running of all schools assisted by the central government. "If it appears at any stage that you are starving these either of funds or of staff in order to run additional... schools [financed only by Council] then this Ministry will reluctantly have to take the major step of reducing your subvention by the amount which your contribution to the costs of these schools falls short of the minimum requirements." The Ministry of Regional Development also strongly urged Council not to expand its commitments because of extreme financial stringency bordering on bankruptcy (Assistant P.S., Regional Administration, to Executive Officer, Kilimanjaro District Council, January 17, 1966). However, Council proceeded and, by December 1966, no central action had been taken (File EDP 22/6/2, DSM). Meanwhile, the author had discovered that the teaching establishments in several schools were below the required minima prescribed by the Ministry; it was obvious that the Principal Secretary's conditions for the reversion to half-day teaching had not been fulfilled. 70. The author was unable to obtain statistics of growth in all of the districts concerned, but it appeared from interviews that difficulties in controlling expansion were most pronounced in Bukoba and Rungwe. While not as great as in Kilimanjaro, the problem in these districts is well illustrated in the following case drawn from the Rungwe experience. In 1963 local leaders in Ibutu village, after deciding to extend the existing lower primary school to Standard V, mobilized villagers to construct a self-help classroom. The DEO informed them that the extended stream would not be permitted to open because neither finance nor teaching staff could be provided. The villagers appealed unsuccessfully to the Regional Commissioner and then sent a delegation to Dar es Salaam to see Mr. Eliufoo and Mr. Kasambala (the Minister for Cooperatives who then represented Rungwe in the National Assembly). The petitioners succeeded in obtaining permission to run the upper primary classes entirely on their own. Nevertheless, by late 1965 the financial situation and the standard of educational provision in the school had become so untenable in local eyes that the District Council was forced to assume responsibility. Ten other communities built unauthorized classrooms in 1965 hoping that they too would eventually be able to obtain public assistance. Meanwhile, the councillors, like their counterparts in Kilimanjaro, vigorously pursued a policy to bring unapproved developments under LEA financing even though central funds were not available for the programme. In 1966 Mr. Eliufoo visited the district and threatened a reduction in Ministry subventions, but no action was taken. (Based on interviews with field officers and File 4/206/III, Mbeya.) 71. Of the 81 educational administrators in our sample, 27 (33 per cent)

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

72.

73. 74. 75.

76.

162

favoured primary school expansion, 41 (51 per cent) secondary school expansion, 2 (3 per cent) expansion at both levels, and 7 (9 per cent) at neither level. Among 70 secondary school teachers, 33 (47 per cent) expressed a preference for further primary school development, 32 (46 per cent) for secondary, 1 for both, and 4 (6 per cent) for neither. Women and more highly-educated respondents from all racial groups tended to be more in favour of primary school development than men or lesser-educated respondents. Of the 207 primary school teachers in our sample, 53 (26 per cent) favoured primary school development, 144 (70 per cent secondary school expansion, 8 (4 per cent) expansion at both levels and 2 (1 per cent) at neither level. The differences between Africans and Asians, on the one hand, and Europeans, on the other, stand out most clearly among the secondary school teachers, of whom the following percentages favoured primary school development: Africans, 35 per cent (8/23); Asians 38 per cent (6/16); and Europeans 61 per cent (19/31). Among administrators, the percentages were: Africans, 30 per cent (23/71); Asians, 67 per cent (2/3); and Europeans, 14 per cent (1/7). Of the 207 primary school teachers, 180 were Africans, 24 Asians, and 3 Europeans; as at the secondary level, there was virtually no difference between the proportions of Africans (25 per cent: 45/180) and Asians (29 per cent: 7/24) favouring primary school expansion. The Europeans' preference for primary school development (51 per cent: 21/41 overall) over Africans and Asians (29 per cent: 92/317 overall) can be explained in part by the fact that Europeans did not have to worry about finding secondary school places for their children. See Chapters 8 and 11. United Republic of Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract 1966, DSM, GP, 1968, p. 176; and S.N. Eliufoo, "Education: a New Era Begins", The Standard, December 6, 1967. See Samoff, Politicians and Party, pp. 54 and 61. Since all registered schools functioning in 1966 were brought within the aided system, we can assume that these 113 unassisted schools were all established and/or registered after that time. Most were authorized to teach only up to Standard II, but Samoff reports that many were teaching higher grades as well. Samoff, Politicians and Party, p. 65.

7 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE We examined earlier the way in which the allocation of educational opportunities during the colonial era influenced social stratification and differentiation. Inequalities in educational provision, strengthened in some cases by a self-conscious policy of segregation, reinforced social cleavages based on race, religion, region, tribe, and class. As independence approached the new TANU government voiced a strong commitment to social harmony and political unity, but it lacked the resources necessary to achieve immediate equality of opportunity and treatment, let alone to overcome inherited imbalances and abuses. Moreover, in education (as in other policy spheres) these objectives were not always pursued as vigorously as the rhetoric of political leaders suggested. Education and Race Parliamentary approval of the 1960 White Paper on education and of the 1961 Education Ordinance provided a legal framework for the abolition of racial segregation and preference in the Tanganyikan educational system. However, despite their symbolic importance, these measures left a host of problems unsolved. It was easy enough to standardize the length of primary and secondary school programmes, to prescribe a common syllabus for all children, and to open post-primary schools and colleges to all racial groups. But it was much more difficult to integrate elementary schools using different languages, charging different fees, and providing very different standards of instruction. It was more difficult as well to convince the underprivileged majority that rapid advances were being made to narrow the gap in opportunities, and to placate the previously favoured minority (particularly Asian parents) whose children were no longer assured of a post-primary education. Racial integration. When TANU backbenchers in the National Assembly strongly criticized the government for not moving quickly enough towards effective racial integration, especially at the primary level, official spokesmen replied that the source of the problem was not the three year preference given to children of the racial community for whom each school was built. The basic barrier was linguistic diversity.' A move towards a solution of this problem came early in 1963 when, despite some protests from Asians, the Ministry of Education made Swahili and English the only media of instruction 163

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

164

in the primary schools. In a further effort to discourage cultrual separation, Urdu, Gujarati, and other Indo-Pakistani languages were removed from curricula, even as optional fields of study. (Of course, these provisions also served to assuage African politicians who had voiced a strong anti-Asian line.) English remained the basic language of instruction in post-primary schools and colleges, but Swahili was made a compulsory subject of study up to the School Certificate level.3 Left open was the question of how to standardize the use of Swahili and English at the primary level. By 1954 former African schools were using Swahili as the language of instruction from Standards I to VI and English (studied from Standard III) in Standards VII and VIII. Most schools previously reserved for non-Africans introduced Swahili as a subject in Standard III, but taught in English throughout the eight year programme. Thus, although linguistic practices converged, genuine integration at the base of the educational system had still not been attained. A few politicians and many educational administrators (Africans and Europeans alike) favoured closing the gap by greater emphasis on the study of English in Swahili schools.3 However, the government's policy of promoting Swahili as the national language led logically to a decision to eliminate English as a medium of instruction at the lower levels. In 1965 the Cabinet adopted a two-year target for achieving linguistic integration, and confidential consultations were undertaken in the Advisory Council: some Asian members expressed concern about the possible adverse effects on the quality of secondary school education and on children from English-speaking families, but there was general concurrence (provided that changes were made in consultation with managers).4 Early in 1966 a committee appointed by the Minister urged the government to undertake research aimed at securing "the foundations of the intellectual respectability of Swahili." The committee recommended converting most English-language schools to Swahili medium, beginning with Standard I in 1968 and phasing through to Standard V in 1972; the adoption of English as the language of instruction for some subjects in Standard V and for all in Standard VI (rather than Standard VII); and the introduction of English as an oral language in Standard I (instead of Standard III). Private schools were exempted as were a small number of state-run schools specifically earmarked for children of expatriates.5 Although the recommendations were approved without amendment by the Advisory Council in April 1966, they were not made public until March 1967. Then, in the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration, they were justified as part of an overall programme of educational

165

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

reform when, in fact, they had been developed quite separately. However, by that time the government was even more firmly committed to the promotion of Swahili, and the Ministry dropped one of the proposals to improve the competence of Africans in English.' Another barrier to racial integration was the differential fee structure. The extent of the disparity is illustrated in the fact that just before independence European and Asian parents of children in Standard IV had to pay (respectively) upwards of thirty and ten times the tuition charged African pupils.' Beginning in 1962 all schools were formally open to Africans, but only a tiny minority of African families could afford to send children to English-medium institutions; the three year preference and language were certainly factors, but the principal obstacle was financial inability. Moreover, former Asian and European schools were concentrated in towns and trading settlements, making them accessible only to urban dwellers and their relatives. Because almost no Asians or Europeans enrolled their children in schools other than those previously reserved for them, the outcome was marginal integration at the primary level: a few privileged Africans attended classes with children of other races, but only in predominantly European or Asian cultural environments. In 1963 educational administrators recommended closing the gap by raising the tuition in Swahili-medium schools and lowering fees in some English-medium institutions. However, in the face of widespread pressure for "free" primary education, the Cabinet rejected a fee schedule proposed by the Ministry in favour of one that imposed relatively low fees in former African schools and maintained wide differentials.' This decision satisfied neither members of the Advisory Council on Education, who objected to the continuing disparity between English- and Swahili-medium schools, nor senior administrators, who complained as well that revenue from former African schools was insufficient to meet rising expenses.° The Minister appointed a committee to reconsider the question. It proposed charging identical rates in schools formerly reserved for Africans and Asians (involving, respectively, a levelling upwards and downwards), and reducing the level of fees in former European institutions so that at least a few African children (supported by relatively wealthy families or scholarships) could attend.10 Although the Advisory Council supported these changes, political leaders did not. Iri refusing to follow the advice of the committee, the Cabinet displayed a greater awareness of likely mass response to fee increases in Swahili-medium schools than the Advisory Council, which,

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166

with its wealthy urban membership, was hardly representative of Tanzanian society. However, because demands for further racial integration and greater revenue could not be ignored, the centre "passed the buck" to local authorities in rather classic fashion: the Education Ordinance was amended to enable municipal and district councils to regulate fees according to costs prevailing in each area.11 In effect, formal responsibility for fee increases and for any disparities in fee structures was shifted from the central government to the local authorities, but actual control was not relinquished because of the key roles played by field officers of the Ministry at the local level. Meanwhile, the specific issue concerning fees and racial integration had been settled effectively by the decision to convert former Asian schools into Swahili-medium institutions. A third obstacle to integration lay in the teaching profession. Pending full-scale integration of primary school teaching staffs in 1965, the Ministry decided in 1962 to undertake immediate token interchanges of Africans and Asians. Not surprisingly, friction ensued of the sort that is invariably generated by placing within a single institution people who have learned different ideas and followed different procedures; similar difficulties arose at the secondary level. In addition, cross-posting led to criticism from middle level TANU leaders that the process was too slow,'2 and to complaints from African teachers that they were relegated solely to teaching Swahili, from Asians (particularly women) who refused to accept positions away from their homes, and from school managers who claimed that there had been a lowering of teaching standards.I3 Some of these problems were mitigated after the pace of teacher integration increased in 1965. However, it was much more difficult to overcome ingrained attitudes towards race. Many teachers in racially-mixed schools interviewed by the author in 1966 did express optimism about the role of the school in promoting racial harmony, but a few made racialist comments of a paternalistic or spiteful nature. Some Africans complained about arrogance, incivility, and similar traits among Asian children; and, of 40 teachers of Indo-Pakistani descent interviewed, 12 (30 per cent) claimed that Africans differed from others in innate ability, one noted that they were "slow learners" because of their environment and two complained that they had "no manners."14 We need not labour the obvious conclusion that such views, however much in a minority, obstruct effective integration. Although several petty conflicts between African educational administrators and teachers in former Asian schools continued to have racial overtones, open discrimination had largely been eliminated at the end of the first half decade of independence. The

167

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

author encountered only one case in which school authorities were disciplined by the Ministry for racialist behaviour: a warning was issued when it was discovered that seating arrangements had been deliberately segregated in an ex-Asian primary school.15 Nevertheless, such subtle manifestations of racial prejudice illustrate that qualitative integration by race is not a goal that can be achieved simply by structural changes in entrance requirements, fees, etc., or by alterations in the curriculum. A transformation in attitudes is both necessary and much more difficult to achieve, all the more so because the school is only one socializing medium and the home and the peer group are even less likely to promote racial harmony. The racial distribution of educational opportunities. Although considerable progress was made during the last few years of colonial rule in providing more educational opportunities at all levels for Africans, at the time of independence they were still severely deprived in contrast to Asians and Europeans. Not much was said by authorities afterwards, but all concerned with education recognized the necessity of taking measures to redress the imbalance. The government was confronted with an awkward situation in the primary school system: the supply of places for Asian children almost met demand, while less than half of all African children had even a chance to enter school, let alone pass through the eight year programme. The disparity was particularly obvious in urban areas where most Asian children lived. Largely as a consequence, the Ministry of Education placed high priority on development in the towns, both to increase the number of places for Africans and to ensure that almost all pupils could proceed unimpeded from Standard I to Standard VIII. Although the primary school curriculum was not shortened to seven years specifically to promote racial equality, as it had been in Kenya,16 the conversion facilitated the achievement of these goals. At the secondary school level, the absence of linguistic and financial barriers enabled the government to achieve formal integration and corrective justice for Africans more quickly. Asians, previously granted almost automatic entrance, were required to compete for entrance on an equal basis with Africans, thus creating many more opportunities for the latter. Year by year, African enrolment in former Asian day schools approached and often surpassed fifty per cent, while the places available for Asians in former African boarding institutions did not increase beyond a token number. Although full comparative data are not available, Table 7.1 gives some indication of the degree of relative African advantage obtained through integration.

4 96

Source: Offices of the schools concerned. QB= Boarding; D=Day. •bSt. Michael's and St. George's School for Europeans was formally closed at the end of 1963 and reopened as a senior secondary school in 1964. No European children were enrolled there (or in other schools listed in this table) in 1966.

16

384

Europeanb

Iringa

B-boys

Mkwawa

1 99 3

399

African

Moshi

B-boys

Old Moshi

—

100

0

280

African

Moshi

B-girls

Assumpta

39 61

37

% Asians

208

322

Asian

Moshi

D-coed

% Africans 63

Enrolment Asians 103

Mawenzi

175

Iringa

D-coed

Aga Khan

Asian

Place

Typed

Name

Enrolment Africans

Community Established for

APPROXIMATE ENROLMENTS BY RACE IN SELECTED SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1966

Table 7.1

n co z a .71 n a

6 ö

Y

p

c

cy

169

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

To what extent it became the practice to give special preference to Africans cannot be determined because marks in the General Entrance Examinations (GEE) were not published and selection was conducted behind closed doors. However, one headmistress of a girls' boarding school (formerly reserved for Africans) informed the author that she had been rebuffed in several attempts to admit a handful of Asian and European children; even more revealing was the estimate of the headmaster of a highly regarded boys' secondary school that six to seven times as many Asians would have been admitted to his institution if performance in the GEE had been the sole criterion for entrance. Another way in which the government ensured a special preference for Africans was by imposing an admissions quota based on citizenship: beginning in 1965, a minimum of two per cent of post-primary places were reserved for non-citizens,' and it became evident that this "minimum" was also interpreted as a "maximum." Because most children of European expatriates already studied outside the country, the decision largely affected Asians, perhaps as many as, or more than fifty per cent of whom did not hold Tanzanian citizenship. Of all the policies concerning racial integration and preference, this one most provoked non-Africans; as an illustration, of seventeen non-citizen Asian teachers who indicated in interviews that they planned to leave Tanzania, five gave insufficient educational opportunities for their children as the main reason.18 Religion The Education Ordinance also made religious integration obligatory. Although problems arose from relations among the Christian voluntary agencies, the most severe difficulties came from Christian antipathy toward Muslims and the historical imbalance in educational provision between Christians and Muslims. The issues of discrimination and inequality both require brief examination. In colonial days each post-primary school admitted its own pupils on the bases of written examinations and interviews; as a result, religion was often an important criterion. At independence, despite the fact that all schools were formally integrated, regional selection boards were established both to introduce effective government control over admissions and to overcome continuing religious discrimination. Under this new procedure parental preferences were still considered, but only children who performed exceptionally well in examinations or in the eyes of headteachers were guaranteed places in the schools requested; at least some pupils were distributed in a way that ensured a degree of religious integration.'Ø Because primary schools served the areas immediately

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

170

surrounding them, which in most cases were monopolized by a single voluntary agency, it was not possible to do much at this level. However, a policy of enforcing attendance at the nearest institution was adopted, thus encouraging some religious mixture where more than one religious agency operated. By and large, arrangements at both levels worked satisfactorily; although religion undoubtedly continued to influence some decisions on admission, only a few cases of blatant discrimination resulted in open political disputes.20 Other minor difficulties still arose in certain schools because of subtle harassment of children of religious minorities and a failure to provide open access to various religious instructors. However, the political saliency of such issues gradually diminished. Meanwhile, the disparity in educational opportunities between Christians and Muslims was not combated as effectively as Muslims spokesmen had hoped. In 1963 Chief Fundikira, a leader of articulate Muslims and at the time an opponent of TANU, strongly criticized the government for not giving preferential treatment to Muslims until the achievement of relative parity. Vice-President Kawawa, himself a Muslim, blamed the colonialists for the situation and praised his administration for opening all schools to all children, irrespective of creed.2' He sidestepped the question of whether integration of schools as such would eventually lead to parity. Other politicians also expressed concern, but the government continued to deflect attention to its record in promoting religious integration.22 There are no statistics enabling us to draw conclusions about the extent to which the gap was bridged. At the Advisory Council meeting of 1964, the Ministry announced that it was undertaking a religious census, which would be published in the Annual Report. However, the Chief Education Officer prudently reported a year later that it was not the Ministry's policy to place any major emphasis on religious, tribal or racial differences. For this reason, statistics issued to the general public would not be broken down in these ways." Although realizing the danger of speculation, the author suspects that the publication of religious census data would have generated political discontent from two sources: from Muslims, dissatisfied with the size of the gap still separating them from Christians; and from others, alarmed at the relative gains made by Muslims as a result of pressure from influential members of their community and the expanded activities of the East African Muslim Welfare Society. Region and Tribe Equality rather than integration was the central issue in establishing guidelines for the geographical and ethnic distribution of school

171

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

places, but there was considerable disagreement over priorities stemming largely from incompatible, if often implicit, definitions of equality. Although it may involve over-intellectualization, it is helpful to understand the debate in terms of the ideological conflict between liberalism and socialism. The liberal "is oriented to the present and seeks to ensure that there is parity of treatment within existing socio-economic structures"; the socialist "looks to the future and says there can be no real equality until such time as obstacles to individual advancement are rendered only by ability and personal motivation, not by the additional factors of wealth, status, and cultural privilege."24 There is an obvious conflict between equal treatment of all regions and districts (or tribes) and preferential consideration of those that are underprivileged: the former neglects historical disparities, the latter attempts to narrow them. In terms of the individual, the former preserves inequality in the name of equity, while the latter seeks equality through preferential means. Two other choices are also open: no planning at all or special privileges for the already well-provided. Opportunities for primary school education (by region). In relating regionalism to the primary schools, the key factor is the geographical distribution of facilities because children almost invariably attend schools within the district or municipality in which they live. In Chapter Six, we observed that primary school development was marked more by ex post facto rationalization than by planning. Nevertheless, before examining the patterns of regional distribution, it is worth glancing at relevant policy guidelines. Post-War colonial policy had given special preference to the underprivileged regions, although the aim of the Ten Year Plan of 1947 was to narrow rather than close the gap between these and the better-provided areas.25 By and large TANU leaders were less concerned about the need to overcome disparities than colonial administrators; to be sure, many politicians preached the rhetoric of long-run equality but few were prepared to restrain unplanned development springing from local initiative. The Development Plan for 1964-9 actually abandoned the formal commitment to parity by emphasizing the need for consolidation of earlier expansion and by placing the onus for further development on local authorities; both provisions favoured the richer, more well-endowed areas. Although this order of priorities arose as a pragmatic response to the need for financial stringency, its effect was similar to what would have happened if a conscious choice had been made to entrench existing inequalities. However, it should be noted that decisions taken after 1964 on new centrallysponsored expansion in Standard I did extend moderately preferential treatment to the historically deprived areas.

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172

Some idea of the magnitude of inter-regional disparities can be obtained from Table 7.2, which provides a rough measure of the proportion of school-age children enrolled in each of the regions in 1965.28 As can be seen, the already skewed distribution in the percentages of children in aided schools (the second last column) is even further skewed when total registered enrolments are considered (the last column) ; the latter reflect substantial unaided enrolments in areas where popular demand and self-help participation were highest. Not surprisingly Kilimanjaro Region (Moshi, Kilimanjaro District, and Pare) led all other regions in the percentage of schoolage children enrolled: only three of the other sixteen regions had a proportion even two-thirds as great, and five had less than half. Such scanty statistical evidence as we have suggests that regional inequalities decreased somewhat between 1948, the first year of the Ten Year Plan for African Education, and 1965. It would appear that the rates of enrolment growth in that period in the two old administrative provinces that were best provided at the outset (Tanga and Northern) were exceeded everywhere except in Southern Highlands Province.27 However, while we have no complete data with which to plot a trend in the intervening years, it is likely that inequalities generally increased after independence because of the period of laissez-faire growth between 1961 and 1964 and the subsequent decision to place a heavier financial burden for development on the local authorities during the period of the Five Year Plan. For example, as can be seen in Table 7.3, Kilimanjaro District far exceeded four sample districts in the old Eastern and Southern Highlands provinces in enrolment growth rates at almost every level in the period between 1961 and 1966. Even more striking are the data in Table 7.4, which relate enrolment figures to estimates of the primary school-age population in four of the districts in these two years. In contrast to relatively insignificant changes in the districts that already had considerably lower percentage enrolments in 1961, Kilimanjaro experienced by 1966 an increase in the number of children in schools from two-fifths of the age-group to three-fifths. It is true that Kilimanjaro was an exceptional case: it comprised just over 4 per cent of the total mainland population, yet between 1964 and 1966 it accounted for 17 per cent of the entire increase in aided enrolment in the country.28 Nevertheless, impressionistic evidence suggests that a few other districts such as Bukoba and Rungwe also experienced disproportionately high gains after independence. Moreover, the fact that the growth in percentage enrolment in Njombe was about five times as much in 1961-6 as in neighbouring Iringa-Mufindi (Table 7.4)

44,268

30,353 65,718 44,263 36,232 59,626 34,954 28,473 36,544 57,855 22,497 33,689

32,849 769,348

1,781

nil 10,455 545 484 2,097 3,914 355 380 9,534

155 1,934

1,352 59,148

42,487

30,353 55,263 43,718 35,748 57,529 31,040 28,118 36,164

48,321

22,342 31,755 31,497

710,200

5. Coast

13. Mbeya

15. Kigoma 16. Iringa 17. Shinyanga

Total

39

35

34 32 32 30 26 24

31

34 31 27 29 24 23 36

67 58 52 46 44 43 42 40 36 35

% School-Age Population Registered Schools

60 49 46 45 42 43 36 39 35 34

% SchoolAge Pop. Aided Schools

"The age-group 9-16 inclusive in 1967, which closely approximates the age-group 7-14 inclusive in 1965.

Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract 1966, DSM, GP, 1968, p. 176; United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 3, 1971, Table 201.

6. Singida 7. Mtwara 8. Morogoro 9. Mara 10. Mwanza 10. Arusha 12. Tabora 13. Dodoma

1,958,603

130,338 108,864 122,044 62,815 100,906 70,037 155,005 111,013 101,694 171,220 99,269 83,030 115,954 182,633 75,947 130,658 138,653

87,100 62,659 63,249 29,019

8,655 9,718 6,889 900

78,445 52,941 56,360 28,119

Region

1. Kilimanjaro 2. West Lake 3. Tanga 4. Ruvuma

Estimated School-Age Population"

Unaided Enrolment

Aided Enrolment

Total Registered Enrolment

Table 7.2 APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION ENROLLED IN AIDED AND REGISTERED PRIMARY SCHOOLS BY REGION, 1965.

28 24

3,410 4,210 886 1,095 2,250 2,880 945 1,170

1961 1966 1961 1966 1961 1966 1961 1966

Iringa (S. Highlands)

Coast (Eastern)

Iringa (S. Highlands)

Coast (Eastern)

Njombe

Kisarawe

Iringa-Mufindi

Rufiji

Source: Regional Education Offices, Moshi, Iringa, and Dar es Salaam.

24

24

43

7,535 10,527

1961 1966

Kilimanjard (Northern)

Kilimanjaro

90 315

723 2,082

209 480

360 1,495

1,674 8,736

250

50

130

315

90 225

315 541

61 245

320 775

275 1,234 6,795

150

72

300

140

160

2,944 3,681

10,881 13,809

3,289 4,443

13,313 18,500

62,691

34,684

25

27

35

39

68

Std. % Std. % Std. % All % I Inc. V Inc. VII Inc. Stds. Inc.

Year

District

Region (Old Province)

SOME COMPARISONS OF PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS IN REGISTERED SCHOOLS, FIVE RURAL DISTRICTS, 1961 AND 1966

Table 7.3

EDUCATION ANDPOLITICS INAFRICA

175

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Table 7.4 APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF PRIMARY SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN ENROLLED IN REGISTERED PRIMARY SCHOOLS, FOUR RURAL DISTRICTS, 1961 AND 1966

District

Estimated Enrolment School- % School% Year Standards Age Age Increase I-VIII Population Children (OOOs) Enrolled

Kilimanjaro

1961 34,684 85.0 41 1966 62,691° 106.3 59

18

Njombe

1961 13,313 59.3 22 1966 18,500 68.4 27

5

Rufiji

1961 1966

16 20

4

Iringa-Mufindi

1961 10,881 61.2 18 1966 13,809 84.2 19

1

2,944 3,681°

18.0 18.1

Source: Regional Education Offices, Moshi, Iringa, and Dar es Salaam: Appendix III, Table III. 4. Kisarawe, included in Table 7.3, is omitted here because boundary changes between 1957 and 1967 make it impossible to estimate school-age population:The assumptions on which these estimates were made and the basic data are in Table III. 4. °Standards I to VII only (Standard VIII was phased out in these districts in 1965). This means that the percentage enrolment figures for these districts would be higher in 1966 if one took as the school-age population the group aged

7-13 inclusive rather than 7-14 (on which these estimates are made). indicates the likelihood of other similar increases in inequalities among what were thought to be typical local education authorities. Because of the close link between the level of educational attainment and socio-economic mobility, another important factor in the regional distribution of educational opportunities is the extent to which children are able to pass unimpeded from Standard I to Standard VII or VIII. A comparison in Table 7.5 of enrolment ratios of Standards IV to V in 1966 in six essentially rural districts indicates that there were substantial disparities in this respect as well."

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

176

Table 7.5 A COMPARISON OF ENROLMENT IN REGISTERED STANDARDS IV AND V, SIX RURAL DISTRICTS, 1966 District

Region

Kilimanjaro Kisarawe Pare Iringab Njombe Rufiji

Kilimanjaro Coast Kilimanjaro Iringa Iringa Coast

Index of Enrolment Enrolment Enrolment Std. IV Std. V Std. V: Std. IVa 9,781 953 3,742 2,612 3,871 945

8,736 600 2,295 1,082 1,495 356

.89 .63 .61 .41 .39 .38

Source: Regional Education Offices, Moshi, Iringa, and Dar es Salaam. aTaking enrolment in Standard IV as the base 1.00. bIncludes Mufindi. Finally, there were also geographical disparities that cannot be documented quantitatively, but which were important in the eyes of many people who were involved in the politics of education. For example, Pare had a history of conflict over the relative extent of primary provision in the north and south of the district. Regional differences in the availability of places at various levels of the primary school system provided middle level politicians with a sense of justification when they requested more facilities for a particular "underprivileged" community, district, or region. Debates and questions in the National Assembly abounded with such demands, and the Minister for Education and his senior civil servants were continually receiving petitions and visitors seeking favours. However, in the years following independence, the most intense conflicts centred on the distribution of post-primary opportunities. Opportunities for secondary school education (by region). Historically regional disparities in secondary education were as great and as haphazard as at the elementary level. Some provinces had more schools than others (in numbers bearing little relation to primary school output), and recruitment was such that local children tended to obtain places most easily. Tabora, St. Andrew's Minaki, and St. Francis' Pugu were the principal exceptions; these were territorial schools that offered studies at a higher level and in better facilities than the average school. Although there was some opposition to abandoning the concept of the territorial school, the TANU

177

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

government decided shortly before independence to make all secondary institutions zonal, each serving a group of regions.S0 Selection rather than the geographical distribution of schools thus became the significant variable at the secondary level. By and large the liberal conception of equality governed regional selection: out of the total number of places available in a given year, each region was entitled to a quota based primarily on the number of competitors from centrally-aided primary schools.3' In 1966, the only year for which we have data, there were places for 15 per cent of the children enrolled in aided institutions who wrote the General Entrance Examinations; this proportion was lower than ever before because the competition included children in Standards VII and VIII from five regions that were involved in the conversion to the seven year primary programme. As can be seen in Table 7.6 the percentages of successful pupils varied from 12 in Singida and West Lake to 21 in Mtwara. Although the explanation for these differences is unknown, they certainly do not reflect a concerted attempt to equalize historical disparities. Table 7.7 ranks the regions according to the number of Form I places allocated per thousand of population in 1966. If the equalization principle had been strictly employed, this ranking would have varied inversely with that of Table 7.6; however, there is no such correlation, and there are glaring inconsistencies in the cases of Coast, Ruvuma, Mwanza, Mara, and Shinyanga regions. Although the regional allocation of secondary school places depended on variations in Standards VII and VIII provision without particular regard for population differences, there were two ways in which individual children from the relatively deprived regions received preferential treatment. First, because quotas were determined according to the number of primary school leavers from centrally-financed schools, competition was more intense in regions containing comparatively wealthy districts that were able to support a number of primary schools financed solely by local authorities and/or parents. As can be seen in the second last column of Table 7.6, the percentage of places available for candidates from all schools was lower than everywhere else (except Mara) in Kilimanjaro, West Lake, and Mbeya regions; Kilimanjaro and Pare districts were responsible in the first case, Bukoba and Rungwe in the latter two respectively. Secondly, because of regional variations in such matters as primary school teaching standards and the intensity of the competition for Form I places, it was easier for children from areas that were less well provided to meet the minimum requirements for inclusion in the regional quota. For example, of the students (all from the region) entering one secondary school in Kilimanjaro in

46,666

6. Mwanza 10. Shinyanga 10. Tangas 10. Arushas 13. Morogoros 13. Kilimanjaros 13. Mara 16. Singida 16. West Lake

Totals

39,487

1,167 908 837 5,947 487 827 1,453 1,260 2,763 980 4,958 2,577 3,352 8,465 1,186 1,193 2,127

Candidates 'A' Schools" % Places

20

20 17 18 17 16 11 15 14 13 13 12 13 8 11 12 10 13

184 154 1,052 84 136 235 196 427 135 682 354 435 1,071 150 143 247 5,925'

% Places

20 18 18 17 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 13 13 13 12 12 15

21

All Candidates `A' Candidates

240

Places Offered (Assisted Schools)

Source: M.E., Statistics for 1966. °Schools approved for central government subventions. sThese regions had approximately double their shares of candidates and places because Standard VIII was phased out at the end of 1965. `An additional 980 places were offered by unassisted schools.

6. Dodoma

5. Kigoma 6. Tabora 6. Mbeya

3. Coasts

1,199 920 900 5,972 507 827 2,167 1,293 3,169 1,011 5,446 2,951 3,352 11,904 1,275 1,193 2,580

1. Mtwara 2. Iringa 3. Ruvuma

Region

Candidates All Schools

SECONDARY SCHOOL SELECTION BY REGION, 1966

Table 7.6

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Table 7.7 NUMBER OF ASSISTED FORM I PLACES PER THOUSAND OF POPULATION ALLOCATED TO EACH REGION, 1966 Region

1. Kilimanjaro 2. Coast 3. Tanga 4. Mwanza 5. Ruvuma 6. West Lake 7. Morogoro 8. Singida 9. Arusha 10. Dodoma 10. Mara 12. Iringa 13. Mbeya 13. Tabora 15. Mtwara 16. Kigoma 17. Shinyanga

Rank Places % Places Offered `A' Candidates" 13 3 10 6 3 16 13 16 10 6 13 2 6 6 1 5 10

536b 5261' 341b 427 154 247 2181' 143 1771' 196 150 184 235 136 240 84 135

Popula- No. Places tion (000s) per 1967 Thousand Population 652.7 784.3 771.1 1,055.9 393.0 658.7 685.1 457.9 610.5 709.4 544.1 689.9 969.1 562.9 1,041.1 473.4 899.5

82 67 44 40 39 38 32 31 29 28 28 27 24 24 23 18 15

Source: M.E., Statistics for 1966; and United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 1, 1969, Summary Statistics.

"See Table 7.6. make the statistics comparable, the number of places is halved in each of the regions in which Standard VII and VIII children competed for them.

1'To

1966, none had achieved less than 214 out of a possible 300 marks in the GEE, yet in a school in another region children were admitted with as few as 130 marks 32 After the abolition of territorial schools, there was little political controversy over the principle of zonal selection. However, the question of introducing preferences for the less privileged regions was often the subject of debate. Several members of Parliament voiced claims that certain regions had been neglected, and on one occasion a member called for a system of "reserved places" for "backward areas," a suggestion that was deftly rejected by Mr. Eliufoo on the grounds that all regions were relatively deprived.33 Suspicions that some districts within a region were more favoured than others often led to pressure for more openness in the

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selection procedure.34 However, Ministry spokesmen consistently turned down requests to involve representatives of the public and to publish the results of the GEE, thus avoiding embarrassing comparisons of wide disparities in standards of attainment and potential misunderstanding over the difference between a "passing" mark and one sufficient to secure secondary school admission.33 Another common type of conflict stemmed from demands for new post-primary development within particular districts or regions. Mr. Eliufoo and others frequently talked about the ease of simultaneously ensuring relative geographical equality and securing the advantages of scale by using zonal selection and expanding existing schools.96 However, the economic benefits of a new school and the prestige of being associated with an institution of advanced learning made strong local demands for schools understandable and, in the eyes of petitioners, quite legitimate. As a result, when a decision was reached to embark on a new project, a dispute over siting often arose between central officials and conflicting local interests. A case involving the planning of a new teachers' college in Iringa will serve to illustrate how this sort of dispute can become further complicated by ecclesiastical competition and the politics of foreign aid.3r In phasing out training programmes for Grade B and C teachers, the Ministry of Education had to reach a decision in 1964 on the number of Grade A colleges needed at the end of the transitional period in 1969. The Planning Section initially settled on nine, a total that would have placed three each under the management of the government, the Christian Council of Tanganyika, and the Tanganyika Episcopal Conference. However, under pressure from these voluntary agencies, the number was increased to eleven: the three then under government management, two already run by the CCT and the TEC respectively, and six others (three new and three upgraded) to be divided equally between the agencies. One of the new colleges provisionally allocated to the CCT was to be located "at Iringa."38 Because "Iringa" referred to a town, a district, and a region, it was not surprising that some people took up the cause for a site outside of Iringa town. The first to do so were members of the Njombe Education Committee in September 1965: on being told by the Iringa Regional Education Officer that the College was to be built at an undetermined location, they passed a unanimous resolution in favour of Njombe minor settlement. The Anglican Bishop of South-West Tanganyika, an expatriate whose headquarters were in Njombe, strongly supported the request, and in November a meeting of the Southern Highlands Churches Education Council (set up to manage the college) added

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its endorsation. Of the church groups involved, only the Anglican Diocese of Dodoma favoured Iringa town (because of its relative proximity to Dodoma). In the meantime the government had secured a promise of financial assistance for the college from USAID. Representatives of the American agency refused to consider Njombe; at first they argued that Dar es Salaam was the best site, but, in view of the fact that there was already a government-managed Grade A teachers' college in the capital, they eventually agreed to a site in Iringa town. Because USAID was prepared to make a much higher contribution to capital costs than the churches, the Regional Education Officer was instructed to tell the Churches Education Council and the Njombe Education Committee that the decision to locate in Iringa town was final. However, the people committed to Njombe were not prepared to let the matter drop: churchmen were determined to save face and local politicians were upset because of the blow to their pride and because they believed that justice demanded better treatment for their district. Even though the Education Secretary General of the CCT visited Iringa town in January 1966 and selected a site, members of the Njombe District Development Committee went to Dar es Salaam to petition the Minister directly. They were unsuccessful, but, as late as June, the Regional Education Officer had to face bitter criticism within the District Education Committee. Then came the final irony: during 1966 the American Congress cut back the USAID commitment to Tanzania, and the government was forced to defer the project until the Second Five Year Plan period.39 The link between locale and ethnicity. By and large, it is fair to say (as have many commentators) that ethnicity is not as politically important in Tanzania as it is in most tropical African countries. As noted elsewhere, the great number of tribal communities and generally decentralized political traditions were significant factors. However, this legacy could easily have been lost; it was not, largely because Nyerere and a few other TANU leaders managed to institutionalize a taboo on inter-tribal political conflict, even more successful than that on the politics of race. Nevertheless, despite the effectiveness of deliberately underplaying ethnicity, many middle level leaders close to the masses tended to view questions in tribal terms, and because regions and districts in many cases subsumed the territorial frontiers of tribes, some politicians used regional comparisons as a guise for the expression of ethnic grievances. When the distribution of educational opportunities did become

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an open political issue, it was almost always linked with regionalism. However, one could often read "tribe" for "area" in pleas for the underprivileged. In addition, there were complaints about regional advantages that were obviously aimed at favoured tribes; most common were criticisms of Mr. Eliufoo, a Chagga from Kilimanjaro, on the grounds that his region was especially privileged 40 (Of course it was, but, as we have seen, for reasons for which the Minister was not directly responsible.) 1966 was a particularly difficult year for Mr. Eliufoo in this respect because his region was involved in the conversion to the seven year primary programme: Kilimanjaro was entitled to so many Form I places for Standard VII and VIII leavers that not all of the children could be accommodated within the zone; as a result, several headmasters elsewhere in the country received hostile complaints about places going to children of outsiders, especially Chagga 41 Class While education reinforced or mitigated differences arising from race, religion, region, and ethnicity, it also acted as a prime determinant of new cleavages based on "horizontal" social differences. Concepts such as "class" and "elite" are elusive abstractions based on a sense of collective identity experienced by a group of people, or on a cluster of "objective" variables ascribed by an observer. This lack of obvious visibility is complicated by semantic conflicts over how such terms should be used. Nevertheless, social stratification is more important than other forms of social differentiation in determining long-run patterns of economic development and social change. With some justification, much of the social analysis of contemporary Africa has been cast within an elite-mass framework. However, this mode of thinking can be simplistic, and, if accompanied by the view that "class" is inappropriate in the African context, a historical as well.42 To use the term "elite" for all who live on capital and depend upon salary or wage employment, except those on the fringe of the money economy, stretches considerably the notion that significant privilege, wealth, and/or power usually accompany elite status. Alternatively, to use "elite" in this latter sense blurs important distinctions if we lump together in the "masses" such divergent people as small businessmen, office and industrial workers, and near-subsistence peasants. The applicability of class has been questioned on the grounds that social consciousness and linkages are structured largely along vertical rather than horizontal lines of cleavage, that social mobility is high, that privileges have not been entrenched along inter-generational lines, and that the social

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relations of production are fluid. However, it is unrealistic to assume that these characteristics of the immediate post-colonial situation will not change, or indeed have remained unaltered, since the achievement of independence. We shall use the language of the elite-mass framework in characterizing the relationship between education and social stratification, while bearing in mind that the terms merely denote levels of privilege in post-colonial society. Underlying and continually altering the basis of these privileges are processes of class formation. We reserve "elite" and "elites" to describe the local groups who command the status and living standards of colonial expatriates— senior politicians and civil servants, managers, professionals, and "emergent" businessmen and commercial farmers. We do so because these people are not a coherent class in the sense of having a specific relationship to the means of production; all of them, even the last two categories, share privileges largely derived from access to scarce educational opportunities and their subsequent relations with state and multinational corporate power. However, these relations offer potential for the development of a property-owning class, and in many African countries they have facilitated a movement by leading politicians and bureaucrats into business, land-holding, and commercial farming. Moreover, given low levels of class consciousness and—where consciousness is apparent—of organizational and leadership capacity among other local strata, it is conflict and competition within the elite and between it and expatriate and foreign interests that is central in determining state policies that influence changes in levels of production, the use or loss of surplus, and patterns of stratification. While the concept "elite" is most appropriately reserved for those who clearly enjoy incomes and amenities of a standard denied to Africans during colonial days, there are other local groups who are less privileged but nonetheless better off than the vast majority of the people—clerical employees, non-graduate teachers and medical assistants, skilled and semi-skilled workers, petty shopkeepers, semi-commercial peasant farmers, etc. These people we shall designate as sub-elites. In class terms they span the lower reaches of the petty bourgeoisie and what Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul call the "labour aristocracy of tropical Africa": workers who make three or more times the wages of unskilled labourers "together with the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and expatriate concerns," who exercise "discretionary consumption ...which absorbs a significant proportion of the surplus produced in the money economy."" Education and the elite. High material standards, the strong likelihood

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of an urban and literate environment, and the bookish and Westernoriented nature of the educational experience give elite children (already favoured in Standard I selection) a strong cultural advantage in competitive examinations. Moreover, many of them attend high fee-paying (former European) primary schools where the materials and equipment and the level of teaching are considerably superior to those in Swahili-medium institutions. None of these advantages. is particularly surprising; all tend to solidify educational privilege and its rewards on an inter-generational basis. Even if entry to elite groups in Tanzania remains quite open, comparative evidence from elsewhere in tropical Africa confirms that the preferential educational opportunities of elite children give them a much better chance of achieving elite status in adulthood than children from other strata 44 The cultural advantages of elite children have been further reinforced by the political influence of their parents, although, even before the Arusha Declaration, not to the same extent in Tanzania as in many other sub-Saharan African countries. Impressionistic evidence suggests that members of elite groups were in the forefront of efforts to keep open a limited number of superior former European schools for the benefit of their own children, not just those of expatriates as official policy proclaimed. However, decisions relating to secondary school fees and admissions illustrate only modest success by privileged elements in currying special educational favours. On June 13, 1963, Mr. Eliufoo announced the abolition ofsecondary school fees effective January 1, 1964; his formal justification was that the manpower needs of the country were too great to deny any capable child a place because of an inability to pay fees 4s However, it is revealing that just two years earlier the government had declared that a new system of secondary school fees remission would eliminate financial incapacity as a factor in selection.46 One reason for the policy change in 1963 was the administrative impracticability of this remission scheme in the context of parental antipathy towards paying fees; during 1962 a Regional Education Officer had written that fees remission is becoming one of the big rackets in the new Tanganyika. The frequent pronouncements by people in authority that no child should be kept out of a Secondary School through inability to pay fees has led many boys and parents to think that "inability" means "unwillingness." It is now almost a matter of personal prestige to get as much remission as possible.47 It was claimed that almost one-third of potential revenue from fees was lost in 1962 as a result of this factor and the generosity of remis-

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sion committees. Moreover, it was suspected that people had only just begun to find means of obtaining remissions greater than their entitlement under the regulations.48 Although these difficulties might have been overcome, influence-peddling and pressure from high places made such hopes illusory. Some members of the political elite were particularly intractable, and, in fact, one cabinet minister even refused to pay his child's fees.49 As a result, outright abolition was the easiest decision (although a rather costly one) and may in the circumstances have been the most equitable. Year after year regional secondary school selection boards were subject to complaints and pressures from parents who ranged from the illiterate farmer to the well-educated cabinet minister or senior civil servant.60 Demands did not stop there, but filtered upwards to the Ministry and downwards to individual schools. Most persistent were parents who thought themselves capable of wielding political influence: one head of a secondary school reported receiving twenty to thirty letters and phone calls a week from such people. While pressure of this sort was to be expected, the relevant question is whether or not it was successful. From time to time, middle level politicians voiced publicly complaints that were common-place in political gossip—that "big men" obtained special privileges for their families and friends in secondary school admission .m Educational authorities were understandably reluctant to discuss particular cases or even the general problem, but such scanty evidence as we have suggests that most of these petitioners were rebuffed. For example, when pressure for places was particularly acute in Kilimanjaro in 1966, Mr. Eliufoo was the target of considerable abuse because it was widely felt that he had neglected his Chagga people; however, his prestige rose somewhat when it became known that his brother's daughter had not obtained a place in Form I. In that same year the oldest son of a very senior civil servant failed to qualify for a place in the GEE. While the boy was eventually accepted by a private school, the Ministry did not succumb to pressure by finding him a place in a public institution. If the author is mistaken and influence-peddling has been more pronounced than suggested, it is still remarkable that even before the Arusha Declaration one did not encounter in Tanzania open statements of the notion that "I am entitled to special consideration for my children because I am a big man." There were several people who privately subscribed to this view, but the fact that Nyerere had managed to impose publicly an ideological imperative in support of equity ensured that discretion governed attempts to exert influence; this factor in turn probably decreased the actual incidence of such attempts. However, it should be noted that success in the GEE

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was not the sole criterion used in the secondary school selection process. The recommendations of headteachers were also considered, and one does not need evidence of open influence-peddling to suspect that these often favoured the children of "presentable" and influential parents. Education and class privilege. Many of the socio-cultural advantages of elite children are enjoyed by children in the other privileged strata, although there are great relative differences. Urban children in particular are advantaged even if they do not come from literate families because they live in an environment that yields a comparatively better comprehension of what is taught in schools. As individuals, members of the sub-elites possess few levers that can be used to exact special privileges for their children, but as a group they fare better than the masses, largely because of greater educational development in the urban areas. While this advantage stemmed from a policy to achieve racial equality in primary school opportunities, it also reflected the political strength of urban dwellers. Just how fully class has affected the distribution of educational facilities is not known; only an extensive survey could provide the data necessary for even a rough analysis. However, some indication is available from statistics on the rural-urban distribution of places, a distinction that is closely related to class and which is itself a significant and highly visible social cleavage. Table 7.8 estimates the percentages of the primary school-age group enrolled in Moshi and Iringa towns and in Dar es Salaam in 1961 and 1966. In each case the percentage increase was dramatic, especially in contrast to the much slower rates of growth in the rural areas. Comparing the figures in Tables 7.4 and 7.8, we see that, while the percentage of school-age children enrolled in Iringa Rural barely inched towards 20 during the five-year period, the proportion in Iringa Urban rose from one-quarter to two-thirds. The percentage increase in Dar es Salaam was ten times greater than in the nearby district of Rufiji, and, even in atypical Kilimanjaro, the increase in Moshi was more than double that in the surrounding rural district. Complete statistics are unavailable, but we can infer from those presented that children in most major urban areas had by 1966 proportionately better opportunities for primary schooling than children in even the most advantaged rural areas. Overall the ratio between town and country in the percentage of the school-age group enrolled was probably approaching 2:1.52 More evidence of the relative advantage of urban over rural children is presented in Table 7.9, which compares enrolments in Standards IV and V in 1966 in three pairs of contiguous urban and rural local authorities. In each case, urban children were virtually

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assured of passing through primary school without facing selection barriers, while rural pupils had a nearly comparable opportunity only in Kilimanjaro." An urban bias was also incorporated into the secondary selection procedure because there were relatively more day schools available for town children than there were boarding institutions for children from upcountry." Moreover, the elimination of the selection barriers in Standards IV and VI in urban primary schools inflated the quota of Form I places allocated to each urban education authority.55 Table 7.8 APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES OF PRIMARY SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN ENROLLED IN REGISTERED PRIMARY SCHOOLS, MOSHI TOWN, IRINGA TOWN, AND DAR ES SALAAM, 1961 AND 1966

LEA

Moshi Town Iringa Town Dar es Salaam

Enrolment Estimated % School- Increase Year Standards School- Age ChilI-VIII Age Popu- dren lationa Enrolled 1961 937 2,600 1966 3,176k 3,926 1961 625 2,600 1966 2,580 3,958 6,352 1961 23,500 1966 22,552b 34,293

36 81 24 65 27 66

45 41 39

Source: Regional Education Offices, Moshi, Iringa, and Dar es Salaam: and Appendix III, Table III.5. "The assumptions on which these estimates were made and the basic data are in Table III.5. bStandards I to VII only (Standard VIII was phased out in these LEAs in 1965).

Summary and Conclusions A verdict on the political effects of racial integration in the schools will have to await the passage of several years. Certainly the policy was implemented beyond merely formal stages, but it would be facile to expect that greater contact will necessarily increase the degree of harmony among racial groups. In addition, although the gradual closure of the gap between underprivileged Africans and more privileged Asians may contribute to a lessening of resentment among Africans, one can hardly expect Asians to be universally magnanimous, especially in view of the absolute decline in the number of post-primary school places available for their community.

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Table 7.9 A COMPARISON OF ENROLMENT IN REGISTERED STANDARDS IV AND V, THREE URBAN AND THREE RURAL LEAS, 1966

Enrolment Standard V

Index of Enrolment Std. V ; Std. IVa

LEA

Enrolment Standard IV

Dar es Salaam (U) Kisarawe (R)

3,123 953

3,018 600

.97 .63

Iringa (U) Iringa-Mufindi (R)

359 2,612

345 1,084

.96 (.62) .41 (.32)

Moshi (U) Kilimanjaro (R)

390b 9,781

409b 8,736

1.05 (.18) .89 (.23)

Source : Regional Education Offices, Moshi, Iringa and Dar es Salaam. aTaking enrolment in Standard IV as the base 1.00. 1961 figures, where available, are in parentheses. bThere were equal numbers of streams in Standards IV and V, but enrolment was higher in the upper year.

In other words, the educational system can help to increase understanding among people separated by culture, but it can also provide a focal point for continuing or even increasing hostility. Formal religious integration, recognition of the East African Muslim Welfare Society on the same basis as the CCT and the TEC, and considerable sensitivity towards the danger of open religious conflict reduced tensions between Muslims and Christians. Meanwhile, educational competition among Christian denominations was harnessed more effectively. In short, although problems remained, educational policy and practice contributed to a lessening of the potential divisiveness of colonial religious legacies. In contrast, disparities in educational provision based on region and tribe grew, largely because of the unevenness of uncontrolled primary school expansion but also because of a conflict of goals in formal policies. Moreover, the readily available data on geographical distribution are likely to attract even more attention as time passes, especially because the issue is related to ethnicity, and it is common knowledge that the few tribes particularly favoured by the British colonialists still enjoy special advantages. However, given the pattern of political evolution since independence and especially the ideological climate the President has attempted to foster, the most important social cleavages influenced by

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education were those based on differences in wealth and status. Whether economic development and political legitimacy can be stimulated most effectively through dependence on particular groups or on the society at large is a moot question. In any case, the logic of Nyerere's egalitarian socialism certainly placed reliance on the latter: privilege implied a responsibility and a willingness to work for the community and was not to be used primarily for personal, family, or group profit. The colonial educational system had promoted inegalitarian and narrowly elitist values, and after independence educational and occupational structures continued to set a rapidly growing group of privileged people apart from the masses. In the absence of countervailing forces, there was a danger that privilege would tend to generate and reinforce privilege. We shall turn to an examination of the response to these problems shortly. First, however, we shall look at another aspect of the issue of class advantage: the lack of opportunities available for primary school leavers to enjoy what their parents and classroom experiences taught them to expect from their education.

NOTES I. See, for example, the remarks of Al Noor Kassum, Parl. Sec., in N.A., Debates, 1, 7th, 1963, col. 78. 2. See M.E., Annual Report, 1963, p. 2. 3. Several teachers and educational administrators interviewed by the author in 1966 supported the promotion of Swahili, but were concerned about an apparent decline in the standard of written and spoken English. Many wanted to introduce English in Standard I and to raise the level of proficiency in English among primary school teachers. 4. Advisory Council, 1965. 5. See "Minutes of the Language Policy Revision Committee, 27th January, 1966," Appendix E, Advisory Council, 1966. 6. The Standard, March 18, 1967. Swahili was henceforward to be the medium of instruction throughout primary school, not just in Standards I to V. 7. See Tanganyika, Report of the Committee for the Integration of Education, DSM, GP, 1959, Appendix C, p. 25. It will be remembered that many districts at this time did not charge any fees in Standards I to IV of African schools. 8. The minimum fees for former African day schools were eventually set at Shs. 10, 25, and 40 rather than the recommended levels of Shs. 30, 60, and 90 for Standards I-IV, V-VI, and VII-VIII respectively. Fees in former Asian Schools were set at Shs. 120 for all standards as proposed, but those for former European schools were increased to Shs. 420 from the recommended rate of Shs. 300 (compare the schedules adopted by the REOs Conference, 1963 and by the Cabinet in File 3/101, Iringa).

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9. See Advisory Council and REOs Conference, 1964. 10. The Committee recommended common minimum fees in former African and Asian schools of Shs. 24, 48, and 72 in Standards I-II, III-I V, and V-VIII respectively (the minima then existing are in n.8), and minimum fees of Shs. 250 in former European schools (see Appendix F, Advisory Council, 1966). 11. The Standard, April 13 and 14, 1967. 12. See, for example, the comments of Messrs. Mtaki and Kapilima in N.A., Debates, 1, 13th, 1964, cols. 586-7; and 15th, 1964, col. 45. 13. See REOs Conference, 1963 and 1964. 14. The proportions were roughly the same between primary (24) and secondary (16) teachers. Racialist comments were more common among non-citizens (11/26=42%) than among citizens (4/14=29%). 15. File 2009, Coast. 16. See Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: the Case of Kenya and Uganda, New York, Teachers College Press, 1967, p. 14. 17. Speech by Mr. Eliufoo broadcast on August 11, 1964, mimeo copy in File 200/1, Coast. He justified the policy by reference to the high per capita costs of secondary education and to uncertainty about non-citizen children staying to use their education for the good of the country. Quite understandably, the quota was difficult to administer; in one region in 1966, eight children were selected as citizens only to be rejected as non-citizens a few weeks later. 18. Of the 26 non-citizen Asians asked about their intentions, 17 indicated a desire to leave the country, 5 were uncertain, and only 4 expressed a wish to remain as long as their permits and contracts were renewed. 19. Sec REOs Conference, 1962. 20. The following cases illustrate the principal types of dispute: 1. Concerning religious discrimination in admissions An EAMWS school in Shinyanga Region was being run "as the private preserve of Muslims"; it was opened to non-muslims after the managers were strongly warned by field officers of the Ministry. In a similar situation a European Roman Catholic priest in Iringa was deported in 1964 for refusing to register a Muslim child. 2. Concerning attempts to circumvent the rule about registration in the nearest primary school Most of the cases of which the author is aware occurred not between Muslims and Christians but between Christians of different denominations and orders. The problem was particularly acute in Njombe and Songea where there was intense competition between the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA—"high church" Anglican) and the Order of St. Benedictine (OSB—Roman Catholic). One rather bizarre confrontation is worth recounting in detail. At the first meeting of the newly-constituted Njombe District Education Committee in 1962, discussion centred on a report of the sub-chief of Mawenzi, who complained of his inability to fill places in the local UMCA school because of strong opposition from parents. A committee travelled to Mawenzi, a predominantly Catholic area, to study

191

21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

the problem. When questioned by committee members, several parents said that they preferred their children to walk several miles to the OSB schools at Madunda and Lahanji because the UMCA institution gave "bad schooling". However, further investigation revealed that a European Roman Catholic priest had intimidated parents by warning them of evils that would result if their children attended the "heathen" UMCA school. Moreover, the bush school in Lahanji did not even exist; on the advice of the priest, parents had been telling the sub-chief that their children were enrolled there as an excuse for not patronizing the Mawenzi school. The committee concluded that the priest wanted to force the closure of the UMCA institution at Mawenzi and then apply for registration of a new Catholic school nearby. Eventually, after heated conflict between representatives of the two agencies, the Mawenzi school was placed under "joint-board management." The arrangement involved continued registration under the UMCA, which was to select the headteacher, but the appointment of other teachers by the OSB (see Minutes of the Njombe LEA and related reports and correspondence, File 2/69, Iringa). The joint-board management solution was applied in four other cases in Njombe and in several in Songea. Nevertheless, Ministry of Education and voluntary agency field officers interviewed in 1966 reported that there were still tensions in many of the communities involved. N.A., Debates, 1, 7th, 1963, cols. 761-5. Ibid., 1, 10th, 1964, col. 166; and 13th, col. 588. Advisory Council, 1964 and 1965. A rough idea of the extent of the gap and of changes over time can be obtained from the data in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. The two districts that were least well-provided were Rufiji and Kisarawe, both largely Muslim. Although their relative growth in enrolment between 1961 and 1966 kept pace with that of Iringa (an upcountry and largely Christian district), the absolute increases were much smaller. David R. Morrison, "Technology and Democracy: Compatible Bedfellows?" journal of Canadian Studies, vol. IV (May, 1969), p. 61, n.6. Targets were set for each province for the percentage enrolment of children aged seven to eleven. It was hoped that by 1956 the range would run from 30 per cent to 80 per cent; however, just three years earlier the spread was 18 per cent to 53 per cent (sec above, Table 2.6). Given the fact that enrolment fell short of the number of places available in some areas and exceeded recommended capacity in others, this proportion is not strictly an indicator of relative educational privilege; however, in the absence of accurate statistics on school places, it is the best indicator that is available. The Ministry of Education had figures on primary school places, but these were based on statistical assumptions (which were not well-founded) rather than on an actual census. The statistical data are presented in Appendix III. Unfortunately, comparisons had to be made in relation to both Tanga and Northern provinces because Pare and Kilimanjaro districts, which formed the

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new Kilimanjaro Region after independence, were previously contained within Tanga and Northern provinces respectively and no data are available for 1948 for either of these districts. 28. See above, p. 153. If one includes Moshi Town, a separate local educational authority, the district as a whole accounted for 18 per cent of increased enrolment in these years. (The aided enrolment in the rural district rose from 44,172 to 62,691, and, in the town, from 2,541 to 3,176.) 29. A more relevant measure would compare Standard IV enrolment in 1965 and Standard V enrolment in 1966. Unfortunately, complete data for 1965 are lacking. Nevertheless, the ratios in Table 7.5 are significant as relative measures. 30. A few members of the Legislative Council expressed regrets about downgrading territorial schools (L.C., Debates, 1960-61, vol. II, cols. 56, 57, and 92). One member, Chief Ivor Mhaiki (later an official of the Ministry of Education), made the issue one of integration: to his mind, the task of building "one strong nation" required geographical as much as racial integration; he urged the government not to worry about the increased expenses (travel warrants, etc.) that would be involved in creating more territorial schools (col. 57). Mr. Nyerere replied that a measure of tribal integration would be ensured in regional schools, but that financial limitations precluded a more sweeping programme (col. 119). 31. Although this was the basic criterion, it was determined in three separate categories: places for boys in boarding schools, places for girls in boarding schools, and places in day schools for children of both sexes. The size of the categories depended on the number of schools of each type within a given zone. 32. Interviews with headmasters. 33. N.A., Debates, 2, 2nd, 1965, col. 55. 34. See, for example, the remarks of Mr. Mageni in the National Assembly, reported in The Standard, February 7, 1967. He "said that whenever selection of students for secondary schools was undertaken, districts should be invited to send observers so that fears that more students from one than another were being chosen... would be removed." 35. See Mr. Eliufoo's comments in N.A., Debates, 1, 10th, 1964, col. 164 and in The Standard, February 7, 1967. Late in 1960 Mr. Nyerere had explained to the Legislative Council in great detail that the G.E.E. were designed not to produce passes and failures but to ensure that places were filled by the best candidates (L.C., Debates, 1960-61, vol. II, col. 7). Nevertheless, demands for publication of results and confusion over the purpose of the G.E.E. continued to arise. See, for example, N.A., Debates, 1, 1st, 1962, col. 278; 3rd, 1962, col. 56; 5th, 1963, cols. 101-02: 12th, 1964, col. 49. 36. See transcript of "Radio Broadcast by the Minister for Education on Selection into Form I," January, 1964, File 3/101, Iringa; and his remarks in N.A., Debates, 1, 13th, 1964, col. 242.

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37. Except where noted, based on interviews and Files 1/1, 2/69, and 8/7/8, Iringa. 38. Tanganyika, Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1 st July, 1964-30th June, 1969, DSM, GP, 1964, vol. II, p. 116. 39. See United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969-30th June, 1974, DSM, GP, 1969, vol. II, p. 68. The College was finally built with Danish assistance and was opened on the original site in Iringa town in 1971. Meanwhile, the lobbying on behalf of Njombe eventually yielded results. The district was awarded a secondary school in the Second Five Year Plan (ibid., p. 65), and this institution (built in Njombe minor settlement) was opened in 1972. 40. See, for example, N. A., Debates, 2, 4th, 1966, col. 138; and reports of debates in The Standard, July 16, 1966 and April 14, 1967. 41. Three headmasters mentioned this problem in interviews. 42. P.C. Lloyd questions the relevance of class analysis in his "Introduction" to Lloyd, ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 55-62, but concedes that it may become more useful in the future. Much more simplistic rejections of class analysis are found in ideological statements offered by African leaders, including Nyerere. ("Simplistic" is used here in the sense of serious social analysis; claims of a "classless society" are certainly not simplistic if viewed in the light of political strategy.) 43. Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1968), p. 149. 44. See Remi P. Clignet and Philip Foster, "Potential Elites in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: a Preliminary Comparison," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 70 (1964), pp. 349-62; Barbara B. Lloyd, "Education and Family Life in the Development of Class Identification among the Yoruba," in P.C. Lloyd, ed., Elites in Africa, pp. 163-81, especially pp. 169-73; Gaynor Cohen, "Recruitment to the Professional Class in Sierra Leone," paper presented to a conference on Social Change in Sierra Leone, The University of Western Ontario, May 1971; and Jerry B. Olson, "Secondary Schools and Elites in Kenya: a Comparative Study of Students in 1961 and 1968," Comparative Education Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (February 1972), pp. 44-53. Clignet and Foster found that the children of Ghanaian professional men had over four times as great a chance of entering secondary school as those of clerks and teachers, fourteen times as those of farmers, and 140 times as those of semi- and unskilled workers. Their findings for Ghana were strongly supported by evidence adduced by G.E. Hurd and T. J. Johnson, "Education and Social Mobility in Ghana", Sociology of Education, vol. 40 (Winter 1967), pp. 55-79. 45. N.A., Debates, 1, 7th, 1963, col. 127. 46. The Tanganyika Standard, November 24, 1961. See also the statement of Parl. Sec. and the sceptical comments of MPs in N.A., Debates, 1, 3rd, 1962, cols. 12-13.

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47. REO, Tabora, to ACEO (Primary), August 21, 1962, File 4/24/1, DSM. 48. For example, it was alleged that a husband would transfer his assets to his wife, and then, on the basis of penury, apply for remission. See REOs Conference, 1962. 49. According to a senior educational administrator interviewed in 1966. 50. Except where noted, this section is based on information obtained in interviews. 51. See, for example, the allegations of Messrs. Kasella Bantu and Mageni in N.A., Debates, 2, 3rd, 1966, col. 138; and the report of debates in The standard, July 2, 1967. 52. In 1965 just under 40 per cent of children aged 7 to 14 were enrolled in primary schools throughout the country (Table 7.2). The rural and urban percentages were likely about 35 and 65 respectively. It should be noted that the urban percentages in Table 7.8 may be inflated inasmuch as several pupils enrolled in urban schools were from the rural areas and living temporarily with relations in towns. However, the 1967 census from which we derived our estimates of school-age enrolment was conducted in August, during the school year, and therefore presumably counts such children as urban-dwellers. 53. Between 1961 and 1966 the opportunities of getting beyond Standard IV grew much more in the urban than in the rural areas. The indices for 1961 in Iringa and Kilimanjaro are in parentheses in Table 7.9. 54. Day and boarding places were largely allocated to urban and rural pupils respectively. The government is building dormitories at some day schools in order to redress this imbalance. 55. Because the quota for each LEA, like that for each region, was linked to enrolment in the final year of centrally-aided primary schools, not to total population or total enrolment in primary schools.

8 THE PRIMARY SCHOOL LEAVERS CRISIS Late in 1965, 46,700 children wrote the General Entrance Examinations in competition for places in secondary schools; yet, even though all had spent seven or eight years in a course basically designed to prepare them for further studies, only 7,000 were admitted to Form I. Most of the unsuccessful candidates faced what for them was a bleak future: there were few jobs open in the urban commercial economy requiring even unskilled manual labour, and fewer still opportunities for vocational training. Amidst a shattering of the hopes of children about an escape from poverty and of parents about a higher standard of living, mounting discontent was focussed on the TANU government. Political leaders did not ease the tension with their standard retort, "go back to the land!" Stripped to its bare essentials, this problem reflected a level of occupational expectations far in excess of the actual number of opportunities available. While some observers have claimed that this imbalance resulted not from education but from economic underdevelopment, this view is an over-simplification because (in the language of economists) it looks only at the supply of jobs and omits consideration of the demand for them. A balanced perspective would agree that only substantial economic development can provide a long-run solution to the problem ;1 in the short-run, however, it is reasonable to accept the proposition that the supply of jobs will remain relatively inelastic2 and to concentrate instead on changing the pattern and intensity of demand. In this respect education is an important variable. There is no need to repeat the analysis of how formal education came to be valued highly in African eyes, or how the school system itself reinforced the notion that education was basically a means of ensuring upward social and economic mobility for the individual and his extended family. The explanation for the sudden growth of discontent about the failure of primary leavers to obtain access to secondary school lies partly in the maintenance of basically colonial approaches to education after independence, but largely in the extent of uncontrolled primary school expansion. As can be seen in Table 8.1, the number of unsuccessful pupils rose from 6,120 in 1961 to 13,948 in 1965; in the meantime, despite the heavy emphasis on secondary development, the rate of growth in Form I places was not as great. Then suddenly the prospects for promotion became 195

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much worse: of the 46,666 children who wrote the General Entrance Examinations in 1965, only 6,903 were given places in aided and unaided secondary schools. This dramatic change occurred in part because pupils of five regions in both Standards VII and VIII competed for admission in the first phase of the conversion to the seven year primary school programme. However, even if one looks only at Standard VIII competitors (as we have done in Table 8.1 in the row of figures in parentheses), one clearly sees the results of earlier rapid expansion in Standards V to VII in a larger increase in the number of unsuccessful Standard VIII leavers than in any previous year. TABLE 8.1 PERCENTAGE OF PRIMARY SCHOOL LEAVERS NOT OBTAINING SECONDARY SCHOOL PLACES, 1960-1966 (AIDED AND UNAIDED SCHOOLS)

Year

1960-1 1961-2 1962-3 1963-4 1964-5 1965-6 (1965-6 Special Case)/

Standard VIII Enrolment Year 1

Form I Enrolment Year 2

Unsuccessful Students Year 2

Percentage Unsuccessful Students

10,316" 11,912" 13,730 16,633 20,348 46,666d

4,196" 4,810 5,013b 5,302 6,400e 6,903e

6,120 7,102 8,717 11,331 13,948 39,763

59 60 64 68 69 85

(23,6101)

(6,9031)

(21,7071)

(761)

Sources: D. E. and M. E., Annual Report, 1960-1964; and M.E., Statistics for 1965 and 1966, mimeo. "These figures are totals for the four racial systems, which count the second and third years of the Asian, European, and "other" secondary programme as the equivalents of Standard VIII and Form I respectively in the African programme. bIncludes 41 children in Form I at St. Michael's and St. George's, the former European Secondary School. elncludes 458 pupils in unassisted secondary schools. dlncludes children in Standard VII in the five regions converting to the seven year primary curriculum. *Includes 980 pupils in unassisted secondary schools. fA hypothetical case based only on Standard VIII leavers, omitting the 18,056 Standard VII leavers who wrote the General Entrance Examinations in the five regions that converted to the seven year primary programme.

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The situation that developed in Tanzania in 1966 closely paralleled what had already happened in Ghana, Eastern and Western Nigeria, Kenya, and a few other tropical African countries.3 In these other cases governments had not responded effectively despite their concern about the social and political implications of growing numbers of unemployed youths. A few job training and vocational guidance programmes were undertaken, but, in large measure, reliance was placed on exhortations to "lazy layabouts" to work with their hands or return to the land, without much thought about what could be done to create urban job opportunities requiring manual labour or to make the prospects of rural employment more attractive.; In addition, many governments were prepared to condone the establishment of private secondary schools to relieve the pressure for places in state-supported institutions. For example, even though educational authorities in Kenya viewed unaided schools as a threat to planned development because they absorbed capital and manpower and tended to offer a qualitatively inferior education, the government found that it was difficult to limit their growth. Sheldon Weeks notes that, beginning in 1964, just shortly after Kenyan independence, politicians, Members of Parliament, and Ministers became active in opening new unaided senior secondary schools. These schools were ...called Harambee schools after the national motto meaning, "Let's all pull together." The government, attempting to require communities to have at least £2000 before they started a Harambee school, was attacked as "acting in an imperialist manner." By the spring of 1965, over 150 Harambee schools had been opened in Kenya, and new ones were beginning to open.5 Just a year later, there were 203 Harambee schools compared to only 198 aided institutions.° While this sort of development may help to keep a proportion of youths off the job market for three or four years, the earlier experiences with unaided secondary schooling in Nigeria and Uganda clearly show that the long-run effect is merely the creation of a pool of more highly-educated unemployable young people.? Thus, when the school leavers' problem confronted Tanzanian authorities, they did not find the solutions of other countries particularly helpful. However, with their knowledge of the situation elsewhere, they could have taken advantage of the time available to them before 1966 to plan a more creative response. They did not. The School Leavers' Problem, 196o-65 Almost immediately after the TANU Council of Ministers took office in 1960, politicians began to criticize the government for not

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increasing the job opportunities of school leavers by expanding secondary enrolment and vocational training programmes.8 Meanwhile, wealthy parents whose children were denied places in Tanganyikan secondary schools started to look towards private, high-tuition institutions in Kenya and Uganda. At that time the government was largely able to allay concern by emphasizing its intentions of eliminating selection barriers within the primary school programme and of enlarging the secondary system. However, as more and more children were denied post-primary opportunities from one year to the next, it became increasingly difficult for the Cabinet and the Ministry of Education to argue plausibly that the situation would improve. An indication that assurances about future prospects were becoming less effective came in the National Assembly in February 1962. During a question period, a lively exchange of views was sparked when a government spokesman noted that no further trade school development would be undertaken to absorb school leavers; when pressed, he stated that nothing else would be done to ease the problem apart from continuing secondary school expansion and placing more emphasis on evening extension classes.9 Later one member rather fancifully suggested that a helpful solution would be to send Standard VIII leavers overseas on scholarships to learn trades, while others urged the authorities to do more than just increase secondary opportunities.10 In 1963 the government did found the Tanganyika National Service, a paramilitary and nationbuilding corps, largely as a means of training lesser educated youths for productive work; however, the number of places made available catered for only a tiny minority of school leavers. About this time some educational administrators started to work at the problem in another way, hoping that it would be possible to slow down the growth rate of children leaving school by instituting controls on primary school expansion. As we have seen, that approach was notably unsuccessful, and unfortunately no one appeared to have an alternative solution. Members of Parliament kept calling on the government "to do something,"11 but specific suggestions (such as even more rapid secondary expansion) tended to be financially impracticable and undesirable on other grounds. Moreover, fearing the development of problems that had been experienced elsewhere, the Ministry steadfastly refused to consider a rapid expansion in unaided secondary schooling. A few private schools were registered between 1963 and 1966, mostly under the management of Asian parents' associations, but they were closely supervised to ensure racial integration and the maintenance of high educational standards.12 Until 1964 government spokesmen invariably answered criticisms

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by pointing out that there had been steady increases in educational opportunities at all levels, and that there were financial barriers to more rapid development. People who lodged complaints in narrow regional terms were reminded that the school leavers' problem was national in scope and equally serious everywhere in the country.l3 Then a new emphasis began to emerge. Al Noor Kassum, Mr. Eliufoo's Parliamentary Secretary, was among the first to give it expression when he told the National Assembly in 1964 that the only realistic destination for most children was a "return to the land to take up farming."14 Shortly afterwards, President Nyerere said in a speech: For too long we in this country have suffered from the results of a colonial attitude of mind ....There has been an assumption that educated boys and girls would be `wasted' if they returned to their homes to work as farmers. The implication was that trained intelligence was unnecessary to agriculture ....Nothing could be further from the truth. ... 15 By this time, having committed the government to a policy of stricter control over primary school expansion, the President was beginning to realize that the school leavers' problem might be attacked by qualitative as well as quantitative measures. At his initiative, the annual Conference of Regional Commissioners in October 1964 passed a resolution stating that there was something wrong in our education system. In 'the past, agriculture was not given its proper place in the school syllabus. As a result, many school leavers despised farming in favour of white-collar jobs. Although this mistake had been discovered for some time; yet not enough propaganda had been made to change the pupils' ideas. The Ministry of Education should, therefore, be asked to stress the importance of agriculture and farming in schools.16

Many of the people in attendance had been in the forefront of TANU's campaign against the agricultural bias in African schools just a few years earlier. The resolution did not generate an immediate response from educational administrators; most of them were skeptical about the merits of agricultural instruction because of the unfavourable experience in colonial days and the doubts expressed by educationists elsewhere. In addition, the Kenya Education Commission had just rejected such a change 17 However, renewed agitation among parents and school leavers in December 1964 and January 1965 kept the issue alive. Finally, under continuing pressure from political leaders, officials of the Ministry of Education decided to proceed

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cautiously: at the annual meeting of Regional Education Officers in August 1965, field officers were asked to submit opinions and suggestions concerning the possible reintroduction of a modified agricultural bias in primary schools. Although no particular urgency was stressed, circumstances forced action much sooner than most administrators had foreseen. The "Crisis" of 1966 When the results of the General Entrance Examinations were announced in December 1965, public response differed significantly from that in earlier years. Government and TANU officials had come to expect a few petitions from disgruntled people, but this time parents descended upon most regional and district offices in droves. Almost three times as many pupils as ever before had failed to obtain places; and, in contrast to about 14,000 unsuccessful children in the entire country a year earlier, Kilimanjaro Region alone accounted for almost 11,000.18 The situation grew particularly tense because the public had not been forewarned of a change of this magnitude, and civil servants and politicians were simply not emotionally or technically prepared to withstand the rising chorus of protest.I" Field officers in Moshi had to face an especially exhausting and frightening experience.20 Day after day during December, January, and February, queues formed outside the Regional Education Office, sometimes a hundred or more people long. One by one, parents filed in to see the Regional Education Officer; dissatisfied with his inability to meet their requests, they would turn to the District Education Officer, Primary School Inspectors, and even clerks. In addition, the office of the District Council's Administrative Assistant for Education was inundated despite the fact that he had no jurisdiction over secondary placement. Some petitioners merely sought information on schools in Uganda and Kenya, but many others were fully prepared to plead, threaten, cajole, or bribe to obtain places for their children; a few even threatened to injure or kill the Regional and District Education Officers. On one occasion several school leavers showed up at the Office, and, although refraining from any activities other than shouting loud complaints, they thoroughly terrified Ministry employees. The police were called for assistance a few times, but, apart from controlling crowds, there was little they could do. Out in the villages on Mount Kilimanjaro, relations became so strained between teachers and parents that in a few cases teachers had to be transferred to schools some miles distant. Moshi was certainly the scene of the greatest protest, partly

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because there were more unsuccessful school leavers in Kilimanjaro Region than elsewhere, and partly because the Chagga were so enthusiastic about education and its rewards. However, similar situations developed on a smaller scale in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Bukoba, and a few other regional centres. About all that educational administrators could do was provide lists of private schools in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. A Ministry order had virtually denied them a favourite option of years past: allowing pupils to repeat their final year of primary school.E1 Parental frustration led to a different sort of response in some areas. Two Regional Education Officers reported in January 1966 that a few schools had been unable to fill all places in Standard I and V for the first time since independence, apparently because some parents saw no point in paying primary school fees when they had such a small chance of obtaining a satisfactory return on their investments. Educational administrators in Eastern Nigeria had also witnessed similar signs of disenchantment among parents less than ten years after the introduction of universal primary school education.42 Meanwhile, President Nyerere faced one of the most hostile meetings of his political career at Arnautoglu Hall in Dar es Salaam on January 8, 1966. He had summoned all party cell (kumi-kumi) leaders in the city area to discuss the school leavers' problem in the hope of easing tension. Answering allegations and complaints about the selection process and the number of children who failed to secure secondary school places, he stated that it was the government's intention to provide a basic seven-year education to all citizens not solely so that they could obtain jobs but primarily "so that they can help themselves in life." In one sense, the school leavers' problem represented progress because so many more children than ever before had the opportunity to obtain a full primary school education; the President also reminded his audience that Standard VII leavers were much more fortunate than children who had no chance to go to school at all. He admitted that there was no easy solution to their plight but asked the cell leaders for help in explaining the problem to the people.23 The President's speech was given wide publicity over radio and by the party, and, if it did not allay parents' disappointment, it did at least ease the pressure on government and party spokesmen by enabling them to.admit the existence of a serious problem. The Chief Education Officer sent a circular to field staff asking them to participate in a propaganda campaign; he said that it was important that Regional and District Education Officers "should not hide from the public on this issue, but that they must take an aggressive

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role in publicizing the very real advances made by the Ministry since independence in 1961." He asked each REO to prepare a report for public circulation pointing out the large enrolment increases at the upper primary level in his region and stressing that the main aim of primary school education was permanent literacy not preparation for secondary school. The reports were to mention as well the success of racial integration, the abolition of secondary school fees, the fairness of the Form I selection procedure, and the financial limitations upon further educational development.Y4 However, the degree of discontent was too great to be dispelled by propaganda alone. One sign of this came from the English-language press, particularly in the letters to the editor column of The Standard; letters appeared almost daily in January and February complaining about the situation and offering palliatives. Just before the President's speech one parent wrote that I have an obligation of knowing my country's education system. But owing to lack of a quick grasping and sometimes owing to not being told the truth, I fail to understand it.... The system is said to be coping with the country's progress. Does progress mean decreasing our children's opportunities? Encouragement to parents to send children to schools turns to frustration when so many children are checked off at an early stage....25 Another correspondent later claimed that the President's speech...afforded no more than momentary relief to the anxieties and problems of parents and their unplaced Standard VII and VIII children ....If my two sons had never gone to school at all or were dull in class, then I would not shout too much, but when they are bright boys and the problem of their future is thrust on me so suddenly, I feel I have every right to protest in the strongest terms 26 Yet another asked, "How useful is this unlucky chap who has exhausted the home economically? Useless. The education he has been receiving has made him worse."E7 Other letter-writers criticized the conversion to the seven year primary programme, accused the government of nepotism in selection, and attacked the "return to the land" doctrine of the Ministry and political leaders.28 The author was denied permission to peruse unpublished letters, but was informed by a spokesman of The Standard that statements and allegations made in many of them were libellous or too extreme to print. While the English-language press played only a peripheral role in mass politics, it was important as a source of information and opinion among the politically-articulate. Consequently, the letters column

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may have had as great an impact on the government as the long queues outside Ministry of Education offices. In any case, the Ministry of Information (with assistance from educational administrators) prepared a long reply to critics, which was published in The Standard. It defended the conversion to the seven year programme, praised the "astronomical" expansion in secondary enrolment since independence, and asked parents to stop now regarding primary education as a licence to run away from the labouring village life. Instead they should help Government to orientate the youth to the land where they will find gainful existence.

At this point, TANU's own English-language newspaper, The Nationalist, entered the debate. Although it did not print many letters about the school leaven' problem, its editor expressed strong dissatisfaction with the government's statement. He agreed that the problem boils down to the fact that our economy cannot yet support universal secondary education ....No sane parent...believes that all his children can and should receive academic instruction right up to university; neither have parents demanded that the government immediately find jobs for all the...12-year olds who fail to get places in secondary school every year.

However, the government did have some obligation to help both individuals and the country by creating more useful opportunities for school leavers. "What the people would like to hear is the sort of plans the government has for this vast reservoir of manpower and potential riff-raff. The Director of Information's long reply has carefully avoided this question," Discounting a return to the "threeacre-and-a-hoe economy," the editor called for imaginative schemes for vocational training.29 Shortly thereafter members of Parliament arrived in Dar es Salaam for the February meeting of the National Assembly; many were determined to keep the issue alive and to force government action. A week before the session began, Adam Kaombwe, a former teacher representing Tabora East, gave notice of a motion that read: Because of the increase of students completing primary school and thus the increase of those who miss chances of entering secondary schools, this Parliament requests the Government to find suitable ways of eradicating this problem.3o

Kaombwe led off a three-day debate, mixing praise for the accomplishments of the government with concern about the need to meet

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the problem more satisfactorily. He himself offered several suggestions such as a rapid expansion of trade training and technical education facilities, and a heavy emphasis on agricultural and other vocational courses in the primary school curriculum. Also, so that students would be older and more prepared to face the world, he .recommended raising the age of entry for Standard I from six or seven to eight, and extending the primary school programme from seven to ten years.S1 Other backbenchers followed, reinforcing these suggestions and adding demands for better conditions in the teaching profession, larger secondary school streams, more private schools, low-cost secondary institutions run by local authorities, a complete cessation of primary development, and special agricultural training courses or state farms for school leavers. Several members urged the appointment of a special commission (similar to the one then studying the co-operative movement) to investigate the problem and make detailed recommendations.32 Mr. Kawawa, the Second Vice-President, was the first government spokesman to reply. He based his remarks partly on a prepared statement that had been circulated to members and sent out to other party leaders. In it, he offered statistics on educational growth at all levels and emphasized that unplaced school leavers were much more fortunate than "those 800,000 who have failed to even learn the first alphabet." Leaders were urged to tell the people to rejoice in the progress we have made, that our children have failed to continue with further education, but they have been educated ....A farmer who, due to his great effort reaps more than he can store, has kindly feeling for the food he cannot store. He does not get exasperated and stop farming the next year. It is better for him to have more than to be without. Hence it is your duty to encourage parents to send their children to school.33

In his speech he discounted demands for more technical institutions (because trade school leavers had experienced great difficulty in obtaining jobs), for state farms (because the children were too young), and for agricultural training courses and more secondary schools (because of financial limitations). Only two proposals received some measure of approval: the government would permit the operation of more private secondary schools and would consider the introduction of an agricultural bias in the curriculum.34 The Minister for Education was no more accommodating. He defended the government's record at great length and rejected more of the members' suggestions such as those for an extended primary school course, larger streams, and half-day teaching. Particularly noteworthy (in the light of later thinking) was Mr. Eliufoo's criticism of the proposal to raise the age of Standard I

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entrance to eight years: if implemented, he said, this would decrease a person's working life by two years. He did not comment on proposals to alter the primary school curriculum.ss Although many backbenchers were pleased that the government had permitted an open airing of the question, a few privately expressed reservations about the defensive attitude of the government and its apparent unwillingness to innovate.S6 In fairness to the Minister and his technical advisers, it should be pointed out that conservatism was not the only factor responsible: in the absence of a panacea, the government did not want to rush into any policy decision that might raise expectations without satisfying them. Nevertheless, Mr. Eliufoo became determined to proceed quickly with some measures after he visited his Kilimanjaro constituency for a few days in March; he had won re-election easily in 1965, but it was obvious from his reception that the school leavers' problem had started to erode his once secure base among the Chagga.s' Unemployed youths were beginning to refer to themselves as "Thank You Eliufoo"; the educational system had expanded greatly at the primary level but this soubriquet was not a compliment. Policy Responses Private schools and "school leavers' schemes." By and large the government was prepared to support any serious private initiative to ease the school leavers' problem. Official wariness about private secondary schools began to dissipate as soon as the magnitude of popular discontent became apparent. By April 1966, when the Advisory Council convened for its annual meeting, official policy was to encourage "the opening of Private Secondary Schools, but insisting on such schools' maintaining reasonably high standards of education comparable to those in Public Secondary Schools." It was agreed that it was most undesirable to permit the development of institutions similar to the Harambee schools in Kenya; however, given the budgetary and physical limitations of most private schools and the shortage of well-qualified teachers, it was likely that any rapid expansion would lead to a drop in standards. More serious from the vantage point of the President's concern about class privilege was the likelihood of a further provision of opportunities for elite and upper class children whose parents could afford to pay high fees. By the end of 1966 twenty-seven unaided institutions were on the register, twenty more than in 1965.33 Several more opened in 1967. The government also encouraged schemes to provide employment or training opportunities for school leavers that were set up

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by TANU, the TANU Youth League, and other interested groups. Communal farms, apprenticeship programmes, workshops, etc. abounded early in 1966. However, most failed for want of technical expertise and/or capital. Moreover, there was no effective central organization responsible for coordinating them and offering assistance. A few survived, such as a farm school run by Williamson Diamond Mines in Mwadui and a workshop started by the District Education Officer and other civil servants in Pare, but the number of young people catered for was minute in relation to the total population of school leavers." Even then, these operations and youth club programmes (dating back to the 1950s) were at best partial solutions because they could not give a guarantee of economically worthwhile employment to those who enrolled in them. Agriculture in the primary schools. It quickly became apparent within the Cabinet that the only financially viable means of easing the pressure of the school leavers' problem were those that would reinforce the claim that the destiny of most Tanzanians lay on the land; realistic measures were needed to make it possible and potentially profitable for school leavers to take up farming. The Ministry of Education was urged to hasten its survey of agricultural studies, and in April 1966 members of the Advisory Council examined several of the proposals that had been advocated in the National Assembly. At about this time, when it was becoming obvious that a public commitment would soon be made to a new agricultural programme in the schools, the author was attempting to discover the views of the people who would be responsible for its detailed formulation and implementation. Among senior and junior administrators in Dar es Salaam and in the field, only one person interviewed was flatly opposed, stating that "I am against the idea completely—we would be right back where we were in colonial days." Supporters ranged from unreserved enthusiasts to doubtful pessimists. The anxieties of the latter concerned the unsuitability of teachers, the lack of land available for school farms, and the unsatisfactory arrangement of academic terms and vacations for the most effective agricultural use of seasonal changes. There was also the nagging question of whether parents and local politicians would accept a programme similar to the one TANU leaders had urged them to fight in colonial days. Above all, educational administrators seriously doubted that thirteen or fourteen year-old school leavers could become useful workers or effective agents for changing the farming practices of their parents and elders. Mr. Eliufoo announced on June 26 that active planning was underway to devise a satisfactory curriculum for agriculture. Before

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that date the author had interviewed 93 out of a sample of 207 primary school teachers. To the question, "Do you think that there should be greater emphasis in school curricula on agriculture and other vocational subjects like handicrafts?" sixty-two (67 per cent) replied "yes", and a further seven (8 per cent) supported such changes with qualifications. Almost one-quarter (twenty-three) of these teachers opposed vocational biases. In contrast, only ten out of 114 (9 per cent) interviewed after the Minister's announcement expressed opposition. To what extent this reflected a genuine change of opinion is difficult to say. However, a question to rural teachers about their preferences for urban or rural schools evoked similar patterns of replies among those interviewed before and after June 26. The fact that antipathy to rural life was roughly constant does show that the change in opinion was likely not as great as the difference in responses to the question about vocational programmes would appear to indicate. Moreover, the group interviewed earlier included the entire sample from Dar es Salaam, and, under any circumstances, one might well expect teachers in the capital city to be less enthusiastic. Among teachers elsewhere, the percentage of opposition was only 9 (8 per cent and 9 per cent before and after June 26 respectively) •40 The question about rural-urban preferences probably reflected the disposition of rural teachers towards agricultural instruction more accurately than the direct one about vocational programmes. The fact that 20 per cent of the rural teachers wanted urban jobs certainly indicates that a lack of relevant qualifications was not the only barrier to the successful introduction of agricultural studies posed by the teaching profession.41 Still, although less directly related, it is interesting that 36 per cent of the urban teachers interviewed were prepared to serve in rural areas.42 Despite the reservations and the signs of mild antipathy among educational administrators and teachers, it was to a generally sympathetic audience that Mr. Eliufoo addressed his open letter of June 26.43 He began by offering four reasons why "we have reached the stage when all schools must prepare pupils for work on the land." The first one is... getting enough food... for a young nation like Tanzania. Food comes first before all other needs....The second reason is that ours is an agricultural country.

Then came the fundamental explanation: The third reason is this: today annual enrolment at Standard I level is about 160,000 and those who get a secondary education and other post-

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primary education number 7,000 which is only four per cent of the children who enrol in Standard I. These [the 96 per cent] will have to go back to the land because they have no vocational training of any sort.

Finally, he noted that it was not possible to increase the rate of educational growth because "the Central Government is at present using about 20 per cent of its recurrent expenditure on education." After offering a brief account of the "white-collar" bias inculcated by the educational system, the Minister concluded that it "is seen therefore that if education and the schools lead children to dislike agriculture then schools arc endangering proper development of this country." Although no palliative was offered apart from the usual exhortation to help pupils develop a "love and respect for land and agriculture," he reported that a Ministry committee would soon make detailed recommendations for curriculum changes. Moreover, and here one sees the first formulation of a fundamental change in the government's philosophy of education, We want teachers to realize... that 96 per cent of the children we admit into schools will become peasant farmers and, therefore, all teaching and all school activities should be directed to suit these children. The practice of teaching pupils as if they will all proceed to secondary schools must stop. It is of no use to us and it is dangerous. It is significant in this respect that one-quarter of all the primary school teachers (and over half of the Asian respondents) interviewed in 1966 did claim that preparation for advanced education was an important purpose of the primary school system." Only a few days elapsed before the Primary Schools Panel of the Institute of Education began a series of lengthy meetings to consider the implications of the Minister's announcement. The members decided that every subject in the curriculum from mathematics through to Swahili and English had to be geared "to motivate pupils to a healthy attitude towards the land as a livelihood"; they agreed to increase the content of agricultural theory in general science courses and to bring practical farming back into the timetable.95 However, throughout their deliberations, agriculturalists and educationalists alike emphasized that the difficulties would be immense and the dividends limited. In a paper on educational policy written late in 1966, this author summarized what appeared at that time to be the scope of the approach and the problems facing it: Fortunately, the people involved in planning the changes are under no illusions.... Their main aim is to raise the status of agriculture as an

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occupation in order to induce as many children as possible to accept willingly the fact that they have no viable,alternative. The planners realize that it is neither desirable nor possible for primary schools to train farmers as such; they know that the drudgery of the heavy agricultural syllabus of the 1950s succeeded more in alienating young people from the land than in attracting them to it. There will be difficulties in acquiring land for schools, devising for them several practical courses suitable to local conditions and ....providing them with teachers who have both technical expertise and sensitivity towards children.... [Moreover], a child between the age of ten and fifteen, physically and psychologically immature and equipped with only rudimentary concepts of good agricultural techniques, cannot acquire land for himself let alone clear it for cultivation .... Still, the whole exercise will be futile unless a revolution in agriculture is accelerated to the level at which children can really believe that farming, on a collective or individual basis, is as satisfying in its social and economic rewards as life and work in the towns. There is little room for optimism on this point, apart from the negative aspect that numbers of school leavers are growing so rapidly that perhaps people will begin to realize that poverty on the shamba is better than unemployment in an urban slum. 48

The main danger, however, was that people would come to regard an agricultural curriculum as the panacea for the school leavers' problem and even some of the basic obstacles to development. Perhaps Mr. Eliufoo realized this when he made only scant mention of the policy change in his budget address to the National Assembly only a day after his letter had been posted to primary school teachers.47 In any case a bandwagon effect was soon apparent among middle level politicians who expected immediate and extensive implementation of curriculum changes, particularly those involving practical farming. Educational administrators kept emphasizing to the Minister and his Cabinet colleagues that it was more important politically to do the job well: a large-scale programme with untrained teachers and inadequate materials and implements would merely regenerate the parental hostility of the 1950s and produce demoralizing confusion among teachers. Despite some reluctance among political leaders, it was agreed to introduce an experimental programme by slow stages, beginning in 1967 with a Standard V course in agricultural theory and only fifteen full-scale pilot school farms.48 Summary and Conclusions Although Tanzania increasingly experienced the dislocations of educational overproduction in an underdeveloped economy common throughout tropical Africa, it was not until 1966 that the effects of unplanned primary expansion became so pronounced that

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the issue assumed major political importance. Most people— educational administrators, teachers, parents, pupils, politicians alike—were caught unprepared. Moreover, the standard rejoinder to school leavers "to return to the land" was beginning to irritate people, especially because it was obvious that the schools themselves tended to reinforce children's motivations for an urban, "whitecollar" life. At first the Ministry of Education responded to growing criticism by the rather defensive argument that the school leavers' problem merely reflected the government's success in promoting educational expansion. However, it became apparent that neither this stance nor the encouragement of local initiatives to start private secondary institutions and school leavers' schemes was sufficient; party leaders at all levels wanted a more positive policy. Easily the most frequently mentioned was the reintroduction of agriculture, which was already being considered but in a fairly limited context. The government wanted a dramatic counter-measure in the face of a crisis: this policy was particularly well-suited because it gave the appearance of decisive action yet required a sufficiently long period for implementation that it was possible to dampen popular discontent in the short-run. There was a danger that expectations would become too rapidly inflated as a bandwagon effect developed; as a result, educational administrators were able to persuade political leaders that a cautious and well-planned initiative might succeed where a full-scale programme would almost certainly fail. This tentative approach did not last. It was soon replaced by a presidential policy declaration more sweeping than anyone in the Ministry of Education had anticipated. The school leavers' problem was partly responsible, but another educational crisis acted as the principal catalyst; we shall discuss this latter development after examining attempts to use the educational system as an instrument of political socialization.

NOTES I. For analyses of the relationship of education to employment with particular reference to East Africa, see Guy Hunter, "Education, Employment and Rural Development: the Problem in East Africa", and Frederick H. Harbison, "The Generation of Employment in Newly Developing Countries", in James R. Sheffield, ed., Education, Employment and Rural Development, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, pp. 35-53 and 173-93.

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2. Manpower planners estimated that the absolute increase in nonagricultural employment during the Five Year Plan period "will not be such that it will potentially provide jobs for much more than the present number of Standard VIII leavers each year. But a heavily increasing share of... this employment will require secondary school graduates and technicians" (Ministry of Development Planning, "Development Planning related to the Needs of Children in Tanganyika," mimeo, n.d., probably late 1964). 3. See Philip Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 201-9; David Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 196-212; A. C. Calloway, "School Leavers in Nigeria: No. 3," West Africa, April 8, 1962; Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: the Case of Kenya and Uganda, New York, Teachers College Press, 1967, pp. 12-14; and Susan Elkan, "Primary School Leavers in Uganda," Comparative Education Review, vol. IV (October, 1960), pp. 102-9. 4. Foster found that, while there was considerable truth in the assumption that the educational system cultivated "white-collar" biases, school children were quite prepared to consider occupations to which they could realistically aspire (Education and Social Change, pp. 207-8). A later survey confirmed this finding in Kenya (see David R. Koff, "Education and Employment: Perspectives of Kenya Primary Pupils", in Sheffield, ed., Education and Rural Development, pp. 390-412. 5. Weeks, Educational Divergence, p. 12. 6. Kyale Mwendwa, "Constraint and Strategy in Educational Planning", in Sheffield, ed., Education and Rural Development, p. 278. 7. Weeks gives an excellent short account of these cases in Educational Divergence, pp. 12-14. 8. See L.C., Debates, 1960-I, vol. II, cols. 7, 88, and 93. 9. N. A., Debates, 1, 1st, 1962, cols. 28-30. 10. See ibid., 2nd, 1962, cols. 560, 568, 603, and 606; 3rd, 1962, cols. 56-7. 11. See, for example, ibid., 1, 5th, 1963, cols. 79, 94-5, 101-2; 6th, 1963, col. 12; 7th, 1963, cols. 756, 766-7; and 10th, 1964, cols. 78-9. 12. For details, see M.E., Annual Report, 1964, 1965, and 1966. For a discussion of policy on private schools, see Advisory Council, 1963; and N.A., Debates, 2, 2nd, 1965, cols. 152 and 309. 13. See, for example, N. A., Debates, 1, 5th, 1963, cols. 79, 95; and 7th, 1963, col. 767. 14. Ibid., 10th, 1964, col. 79. 15. J. K. Nyerere, "Speech Opening Mahiwa Young People's Training Centre," Freedom and Unity, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 316. 16. Cited in George Skorov, Integration of Education and Economic Planning in Tanzania, Paris, UNESCO, 1966, p. 60. 17. Simon Ominde, "The Structure of Education in Kenya and some Planning Problems", paper prepared for the Conference on Education, Employment and Rural Development, Kericho, Kenya, September,

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1966, p. 15. (A revised version of Ominde's paper, which treats the question of agricultural education somewhat differently is in Sheffield, ed., Education and Rural Development, pp. 288-96.) Callaway in "Primary School-Leavers in Nigeria: No. 3" had expressed strong doubts in 1961 about an agricultural bias in primary schools, which was then being discussed as a solution to the school leavers' problem in southern Nigeria: "The truth is that school-leavers' attitudes toward employment are determined almost exclusively by what is happening outside the schools, in the society and economy. No amount of instruction by itself—whether in primary or post-primary. schools—can make modern farmers." Later, Philip Foster wrote extensively on this theme: see Education and Social Change, passim, and "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning", in C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, eds., Education and Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine, 1965, pp. 142-66. 18. See Tables 7.6 and 8.1. 19. Several field officers were rather bitter because political leaders had not used the radio and the party to explain just how serious the problem would be. 20. According to information supplied to the author in interviews with several field officers. 21. REOs were warned not to permit excessive repetition at their Conference of August 1965. A circular laying down precise guidelines was delayed until after the elections of that year because of the hostility that it might have generated towards the government (REOs Conference, 1966). Another increasingly common practice involved falsification of records by head teachers in order to have certain pupils preselected from their schools before the General Entrance Examinations. 22. Report of the Conference on the Review of the Education System in Eastern Nigeria, GP, Enugu, 1964, p. 1, cited in Weeks, Educational Divergence, p. 11. 23. Interviews; The Sunday News, January 9, 1966; and The Nationalist, January 10, 1966. 24. CEO to REOs, January 28, 1966, File 4/206/III, Mbeya. 25. The Standard, January 7, 1966. 26. Ibid., January 21, 1966. 27. The Nationalist, January 27, 1966. 28. The Standard, January 21 and 27; and February 2 and 16, 1966. 29. Ibid., January 25, 1966. 30. Ibid., February 22, 1966. 31. See N.A., Debates, 2, 3rd, 1966, cols. 115-23; and The Standard, February 24, 1966. Kaombwe had sent these suggestions to the Minister in a letter dated January 27, 1966; also included in it were recommendations about overcoming the shortage of teachers (by higher salaries, better working conditions, and half-day attendance) and nationalizing the curriculum. Mr. Eliufoo did not send a reply until July 26. See File EDP/214, DSM.

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32. N. A., Debates, 2, 3rd, 1966, cols. 124-38 and 163-227. 33. R. M. Kawawa, "To Educate the Nation," mimeo, February 21, 1966. 34. N.A., Debates, 2, 3rd, 1966, cols. 228-31. 35. Ibid., cols. 231-48. 36. In interviews with the author. 37. See reports of his visit in The Standard, March 30, 1966; and The Nationalist, March 31, 1966. These reports, however, do not convey the extent of the anxiety and even hostility which Mr. Eliufoo faced according to educational administrators and teachers interviewed by the author later that year. Several people thought that Mr. Eliufoo would have lost his seat if the elections had been held after the announcement of the results of the General Entrance Examinations; one field officer in the Ministry claimed that the Minister's visit had been postponed for a month to allow time for disgruntled parents "to cool down." 38. M.E., Statistics for 1966, mimeo. According to people interviewed in 1966, several middle level politicians were actively involved in the promotion of private secondary schools. 39. Based on interviews. The sort of problems faced by the managers of such schemes is illustrated by the Pare tinsmithing workshop. Everything was going quite well until suddenly the instructor (a local fundi) was offered a technical course in China. He accepted and took most of the proceeds of the operation with him, thus setting back progress by several months. 40. Although teachers from the capital city comprised only 27 per cent (50 out of 207) of the primary school sample, 60 per cent (20 out of 33) of the teachers who opposed vocational biases were from Dar es Salaam. Only 3 out of the 37 other teachers interviewed before June 26 opposed vocational biases, compared to 10 out of 114 after that date. 41. 25 out of 126. Of these 25, 16 thought they could improve their educational qualifications, and hence salaries and benefits, more easily if they lived in a town or city, 7 mentioned other urban amenities and 2 gave as their prime reason a positive distaste for rural life. Among the majority, the reasons given for wanting to remain in rural schools are instructive: lower cost of living, 34 per cent; dislike of urban life, 26 per cent; children easier to handle, 23 per cent; higher status in rural areas, 3 per cent; and enjoyment of farming, 3 per cent. 42. 17 out of 81 (21 per cent) said they would have preferred a rural posting and another 12 (15 per cent) said that they would be happy no matter where they were posted. The cost of living in towns and dislike of urban life were the chief reasons offered by those who wanted rural posts. 43. Published in full in The Standard, June 29, 1966 (my italics). 44. Asked what were the purposes of primary school education, 44 per cent replied preparation for life, 34 per cent for basic literacy, and 24 per cent for secondary and further education (N=207). Other responses included to prepare citizens (15 per cent), to impart moral values (l per cent), to teach children how to think (6 per cent). (Percentages add up to more than 100 because some respondents gave two or more

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answers.) Among the respondents, 20 per cent (36/180) of the Africans and 54 per cent (13/24) of the Asians listed preparation for advanced education as an important purpose. The Institute of Education, "The Re-Introduction of Agriculture in the Primary School Curriculum", mimeo, 1966. David R. Morrison, "Educating Citizens for Tanzania", paper prepared for the annual conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, December 1966. See The Standard, June 28, 1966. An equally plausible alternative is that the two statements were drafted by different people who were not in direct contact. Based on interviews.

9 EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION Little was done in Tanzania during the first half decade of independence to use the educational system explicitly for purposes of political socialization. R. P. Dore notes that few underdeveloped countries have shown much concern even in principle with the political content of popular education, and even those which do have done little that is effective in practice.... Most governments of the new nations do not dispose of the talent and resources to create a new educational style. Many still, rely heavily on foreign teachers; unlike China they just do not have a coherent ideology to propagate, and even if they did they could not trust their teachers to do the job.' In terms of Dore's description, Tanzania until 1967 stood between less developed countries with revolutionary Marxist-Leninist regimes such as China, North Korea, and Cuba—which undertook sweeping changes in inherited educational systems2—and the majority of underdeveloped countries: there was some concern about the political implications of education, but effective action was largely limited to the promotion of nationalist objectives; and a coherent ideology, though emerging, had not yet been linked to a concrete strategy for development.

Educational Policies and National Integration Promoting Swahili as a national language. Swahili had become the language of anti-colonialism and nationalism during the struggle for independence, and there were obvious advantages in continuing its promotion as a national language: it was closer to being a lingua franca than English, it made possible effective communications among people of diverse traditional backgrounds, and it was indigenous to Africa rather than the homeland of the European imperialists. As noted in Chapter Seven, Swahili was made a compulsory subject for all secondary school students in 1964, and plans were laid shortly thereafter to use it as the basic medium of instruction for Africans and non-Africans alike at the primary school level. Comments of long-serving secondary school teachers indicated that this growing emphasis was successful in raising the status of the language: often somewhat disapprovingly, they readily admitted in interviews that many students had come to 215

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regard English studies as drudgery and that, unlike students of earlier generations, most tended to converse informally in Swahili. 3 Although many educators tended to equate a drop in the level of proficiency in English with falling educational standards,4 the most serious obstacles to the greater use of Swahili by the mid-1960s were technical ones such as a lack of research facilities and books and, most important, a shortage of teachers competent in the language. Politically, the positive commitment of politicians and some educational administrators ensured that any opposition would be overridden. Africanizing the curriculum. At independence, apart from the successful campaign to remove the agricultural bias of African primary schools, the curriculum was generally neglected in the midst of concern about the racial integration of schools and the contribution of education to the rapid Africanization of the occupational structure. Nevertheless, in the major debates on educational policy in the Legislative Council and the National Assembly at that time, a few backbenchers did call for sweeping changes in the content of educational programmes at all levels. Their major criticism of the existing curricula concerned the lack of attention paid to Africa and Tanganyika :6 one member decried the prevailing "English" and "bookish" approach of teachers and proclaimed that "we don't want a nation of half-Westernized Tanganyikans"; another complained that the existing system of education ensured that children had no pride in their culture.6 Shortly after independence, Richard Wambura (later a Parliamentary Secretary) made a particularly strong plea for change: During the colonial era very little African culture was taught in schools. Now I think that it is time to teach the African culture, history, and way of life at great length. Ouryoung men must be told that education does not mean a separation from life in the villages. With the colonial type of education one grew to despise his own home and his fellow villagers so that African culture came to be regarded as backward and uncivilized. This situation must change. Our pupils must learn African history and about the African way of life before all else.?

Earlier Mr. Nyerere had agreed that curriculum revisions were necessary but was rather non-committal about their scope or timing: Very often we tend to think that all we need to do is turn out numbers so that at the next election we can produce the figures of what an elected Government has been able to do and what the Colonial Government was unable to do.... But as a school teacher myself I must support .. . the notion that we must, at the same time, be thinking in terms of what kind of education we are giving our children.°

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Much work was required. Syllabuses and textbooks in subjects ranging from general science through to geography and history had to be revised to reflect an African perspective and to include material on local conditions and problems. One can appreciate the magnitude of the task when one examines one of the few textbooks on Tanganyika then studied by primary school pupils, a history prepared by an expatriate teacher.9 It contained all the "right ideas" about racial toleration, African self-rule, etc., but was clearly paternalistic in tone and European-centred in perspective: one chapter was devoted to a study of European missionaries and explorers, another to the Anglo-German conflict of 1914-18, and yet another to the progress brought by the colonial system after the Second World War; among the illustrations was a drawing of Princess Margaret's visit to Tabora School in 1956. Early in 1963 the Inspectorate of the Ministry and the Teacher Training Advisory Board completed four years of preparatory work on new syllabuses for primary schools.10 These were specifically designed and orientated to: (1) provide a local approach to teaching the child's background; (2) enable the teacher with a relatively limited academic background to provide an adequate education for his charges; (3) and provide a reasonable basis for secondary education.

The authors strongly recommended against making any further changes until 1969 in order to give teachers an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with new programmes and "to maintain and raise standards."n A year later several curriculum changes were introduced at the secondary school level; the most significant ones were in Forms I and II, which were directly under the control of Tanzanian officials. (Courses of study for Forms III to VI were less flexible because they had to be worked out in conjunction with the Ministries of Education in Uganda and Kenya and geared to the requirements of the Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate.) Again it was recommended that a fairly extended period should elapse before further revisions were considered. However, the new syllabuses had been in use for only two years at the primary level and a shorter time at the secondary level when the Ministry decided to make even more extensive changes. The impetus came partly from the need to design a primary programme of seven years' duration, partly from a desire among educationists to define an active role in curriculum development for the new Institute of Education, but largely from widespread discontent among parents and politicians about the school leavers' problem.

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In addition, many teachers, educational administrators, and politicians were concerned about the fact that the African materials in use did not necessarily reflect an African point of view. (For example, the history book described above was still the basic text in Standards VII and VIII.) The task was undertaken by subject panels set up late in 1965 by the Institute; they consisted of educational administrators, educationists from the University College and teachers' colleges, and teachers from primary and secondary schools. A subcommittee of one of the panels wrote a critique of the 1963 history syllabus for primary schools: Std. V

The history section... is Tribe-centred. This approach could have most harmful effects in a newly-independent nation. There is nothing in it to indicate to the pupil that he is a member of a nation... and not to this or that tribe.... [Worse still], about half the pupils in Std. IV do not continue on into Std. V, and, therefore receive no teaching at all on their nation's history or present aims.... Std. VI

From the tribe, and without any prior study of the history of his nation and continent, the pupil is required to switch his attention to world civilizations and explorations.... Std. VII and Std. VIII

The history of East Africa and Tanzania... is largely a history of Africans being acted upon rather than a history of the inhabitants of this area.. . It is not a history which is likely to awaken in primary pupils national pride or even pride in the achievements of Africans outside his [sic] own country. [Basically], the current syllabus shows signs of a desire to impart knowledge for the sake of knowledge and not nearly enough interest in creating attitudes.12 The School Certificate (Forms III and IV) history syllabus was equally unsatisfactory. Students had a choice of three papers: one on European expansionism, "British institutions and their application to her dependencies in the 19th and 20th centuries," and a general history of tropical Africa; another on modern European history with special emphasis on Britain and a concluding section on Africa; and the last on the history of the British Empire and Commonwealth with particular reference to Africa.18 The European-centred perspective of each is obvious. Similar deficiencies were found in the geography syllabuses and, to a lesser extent, in others.ta By late in 1966 most of the revisions had been completed. In geography, a primary school course was designed to concentrate on the problems of social and economic development, and the

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important roles played by people in all walks of life in solving them.I" At the secondary level, options on Britain and the Empire were dropped, and the new syllabus extended the emphasis introduced at the primary level by attempting to promote "a constructive attitude towards, and an understanding of, the problems and possibilities of ... development"; material was heavily based on Tanzania and East Africa and included "detailed studies on schemes for hydro-electricity, resettlement, irrigation, dams, commercial farming, etc."16 The new primary school history programme sought to replace a formal narrative of facts and dates with illustrations through the lives of famous people of the attitudes and characteristics it was thought that Tanzanians should exhibit: the stories were drawn primarily from Tanzania and Africa but also from other continents and were designed for study in Standards IV to VI; in Standard VII the emphasis was on civics. Among the aims of the new approach were "to encourage pupils to think of the people of Tanzania, PAST as well as present, as Tanzanians, rather than as members of this or that tribe ...; to awaken a proper sense of national pride by ensuring that pupils are aware of the struggles and achievements of past generations of Tanzanians ...; and to create an awareness of Africa's long and proud history."I7 Some of the specific ideas advanced were criticized by professional historians;" however, while liberties were taken in historical interpretation to present a political point of view, this practice (whether or not explicitly conceived) is common to all countries and had certainly prevailed in colonial Tanganyika.18 At the secondary level, negotiations with Uganda, Kenya, and the Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate resulted in a new School Certificate syllabus, replacing the previous choices with courses leading to papers on the history of East Africa and other regions of the continent.20 Plans were also made to introduce a Higher School Certificate syllabus on "African Affairs since 1945." It will require several years to assess the impact of these changes. Even then if attitude changes are detected, it will be difficult to isolate the effect of the school curriculum as such; however, at least the substance of what is taught does not contradict official views on nationalism, tribalism, and African unity. Of course, as is the case with all curriculum changes, successful implementation is being impeded by deficiencies in the capabilities of some teachers and by a lack of sympathy among others.2' Moreover, the general shortage of satisfactory textbooks and teaching guides is most serious in subjects that educational authorities wish to see taught from a local point of view. Despite encouragement to teachers and others to submit manuscripts, it will take a long time

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and a substantial financial investment to produce materials of the sort needed. Localizing the teaching service. Closely related to these problems, particularly as they affected history and geography, was the continued heavy reliance on expatriate teachers after independence. Middle level politicians had long been demanding total Africanization and the exclusion of teachers of specific nationalities.22 (The Peace Corps was a major target of criticism.") Some of the critics seemed to be motivated by a straightforward desire to create more job opportunities for Tanzanians, but most were concerned about the broader implications of foreign influences on Tanzanian youths. A few expressed the rather simple-minded notion that foreigners were at the root of all evil in the educational system, not realizing or admitting that many Tanzanian teachers were "more British than the British" and that a few recent graduates of universities in the United States were "more American than the Americans." As early as 1960, Mr. Nyerere had pointed out the impossibility of Africanizing the teaching service and simultaneously expanding the secondary school system; more, not fewer expatriates were needed.24 This dependence was further reinforced as more and more citizen teachers took advantage of growing opportunities for employment in the civil service. By 1963 the number of African university graduates teaching in secondary schools had fallen to nine, and there were far fewer Tanganyikan teachers with teaching diplomas or certificates than there had been before independence.25 Only after that time did an increased emphasis on teacher training and rapidly decreasing employment opportunities in business, industry, and the public service begin to change the balance: by June 1964, 287 out of 919 secondary school teachers were citizens, and, of the latter, 33 held university degrees.26 The figures were much the same for 1965, but the number of prospective citizen teachers enrolled in educational and training programmes ensured rapid growth in the proportion thereafter. Meanwhile, high priority was placed on Africanizing the headships of secondary schools and teachers' colleges: at the end of 1966, fifty per cent of the former and 4 out of 17 of the latter were held by citizens.27 By then it had also been decided to phase out Peace Corps assistance, beginning at the end of 1967 with teachers in primary schools (who with a few British volunteers were among the few Europeans in the primary system). The Schools and Social and Civic Responsibility Although the conversion of a former colonial educational system into a nationalist instrument is a much easier task than its trans-

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formation into a socialist one, some political leaders and educational administrators increasingly sought to graft the second aim to the first. Moreover, there was a natural concern to foster among pupils and students a positive identification with the country's evolving political institutions and, more particularly, with the goals and policies of the government. The views of political leaders. The President was the only political leader who developed publicly a coherent political philosophy of education that involved more than the mere reinforcement of territorial and cultural nationalism. From the outset, his main concern was to prevent education from undermining the growth of an egalitarian socialist society. Although accepting the notion that equality had to be sacrificed drastically in order to produce the high level manpower necessary for development,28 he worried about the danger of creating an arrogant and acquisitive elite. As early as 1946, he wrote of his concern over the amount of money spent on his own education at a time when most children had no chance to attend school and many schemes for social improvement were so badly needed. Why, he asked, "did the community spend all that money, run all those risks and miss all those chances of schooling?" Surely not to build "a magnificent but useless apex of a stagnant pyramid," but rather because it wants us as lifting levers, and as such we must remain below and bear the whole weight of the masses to be lifted, and we must facilitate that task of lifting ....The educated man is not important in himself; his importance lies in what he can do for the community of which he is a member.E° Years later, after he had become Chief Minister, Nyerere addressed members of the graduating class of Tabora Boys' School, and reminded them how fortunate they had been in overcoming the many hurdles involved in school entrance and promotion. Now they had an obligation to return to their villages to assist those who had not had such opportunities but who had nonetheless made great sacrifices to support others through fees and taxes.S° This theme reappeared several times in requests to politicians, civil servants, and teachers to assume a special responsibility in persuading educated youths of their debt to society.$' Similar pleas were often echoed by other leaders, but they tended to give it a rhetorical overtone that was usually absent in Nyerere's addresses.32 The President frequently stressed as well the importance of preventing "the present position from solidifying into a class structure .... We must not allow the present income differentials

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to become sacrosanct." Although (as we have seen in Chapter Seven) the structure of the educational system reinforced elitism and class privilege, Nyerere suggested that propaganda on the concept of advanced education as a trust held by the few for the benefit of all could help to counteract these tendencies, provided that effort was directed as well towards "improving wages and conditions at the bottom of the economic scale" and "increasing education and training opportunities, so that the `scarcity value' of those now on top is reduced."" In addition to this specific concern, Mr. Nyerere wrote that the basic principles of ujamaa and one-party democracy must underlie all the things taught in schools, all the things broadcast on the radio, all the things written in the press. And if they are to form the basis on which society operates, then no advocacy of opposition to these principles can be allowed.34

Besides stressing these and more straightforward nationalist themes," other political leaders emphasized the importance of identification with TANU and even submission to it 86 However, despite their willingness to expound principles, political leaders did not offer much guidance to educators on how to wed ideology with practice until the end of 1966. Before that time only a few, often tentative educational policies were introduced that were directly related to political commitment and civic obligation. Civics courses. When curricula were revised after independence, provision was made for civics instruction in Standard VIII and Form II; however, in both cases, the approach and the details were devised by teachers and educational administrators who did not consult politicians other than the Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary. The 1963 Standard VIII syllabus bore the stamp of British expatriates who thought it improper to use the schools for political propaganda, partly because they were reluctant to become involved in the affairs of a country other than their own, and partly because they accepted Western myths about the possibility of a politically neutral study of government. As a result, the course was exceedingly dry and institutional s' Teachers were urged to devote lessons to "current affairs only when events of outstanding and exceptional importance occur" and, above all, to treat "topics factually. The opinions of the teacher have no place whatsoever in the teaching of such matters." Even though the syllabus included a section on "What the Government does," these strictures made it difficult to go beyond a description of institutions to a discussion of processes. The syllabus for Form II explained that

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the theme for this year's study—a combination of History and Civics—has been chosen because it is considered that no pupil should leave secondary school without some knowledge of how his country is governed, how its judicial system operates, and how its social institutions are organized.... A cardinal aim... should be to help in preparing pupils to be as reasonable and well-informed citizens and voters as possible. The outline was similar to that for Standard VIII although there were greater emphases on patterns of historical evolution, comparisons with other systems, and processes of nation-building and development. Teachers were advised to stress "the obligation of the citizen, whatever his political beliefs, to be loyal to his Government, and to express opposition, if he feels any, by constitutional means." Raised again was "the question of whether a teacher should express his opinions on the merits or demerits of any political system ... ," a problem which is best left to the individual ... to answer for himself. Whatever he decides, he should be sure ... that the pros and cons of any point at issue are always presented objectively and fairly and ... that any opinion ... is always clearly 'labelled' as an opinion .... However, on reading the syllabus, the intelligent teacher must surely have wondered about the definition offered of democracy— "a country, whose government whatever its form has a democratic character and behaves in a democratic way."Ø8 Although one can see the intent of this statement, one is still entitled to ask whether it is fact, opinion, or tautology. Many civics teachers at both levels expressed strong reservations to the author about their courses. The most common complaints concerned the absence of textbooks published after independence and, for that matter, the lack of any satisfactory materials for the pupils. It was apparent that primary school teachers relied heavily, and even exclusively in some cases, on the Five Year Plan and the Interim Constitution of 1965, both of which were difficult to understand and assimilate for teachers and pupils with a limited grasp of English. Secondary school teachers used a broader range of resources but they, too, found the available material unsatisfactory and insufficient. A civics text was published in 1966 bearing the claim, "an officially accepted course book for Secondary Forms 2 and for Teacher Training Colleges in Tanzania." However, it soon became apparent that educational administrators, in hurriedly approving Father Meienberg's Tanzanian Citizen,ss had not consulted political leaders. On orders from the President himself, the Ministry had

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to inform schools and booksellers that it had been decided to withdraw approval of the text. The reasons, though not publicly disclosed, were its rather crude anti-communist and anti-socialist biases and its strong emphasis on religion (reflecting the Roman Catholic values of its author).90 The search for a satisfactory textbook had to begin afresh. An additional difficulty in the secondary schools was the tendency to thrust the Form II course on expatriates who may have had the best of intentions but who had limited knowledge of the country. Most foreign teachers conceived their role as essentially a technical one of disseminating knowledge in order to prepare students for examinations ;41 only a small minority arrived in Tanzania with a mission to convert Tanzanians to their way of thinking, and those that did soon realized the futility of that task. However, it was difficult to gauge the extent to which moral attitudes, political preferences, and social prejudices were transmitted and absorbed. Moreover, no matter how they acted, expatriates found that they had to be extremely careful not to offend African students who resented outsiders telling them what was best for their own country, even if what was said was fully in accord with government policy. Partly because of thin reliance of foreign teachers but largely because of increasing evidence of student antipathy towards the government, the Cabinet urged the Ministry to step up efforts to promote the teaching of civics and current affairs from a Tanzanian (i.e. TANU) perspective.42 Although the President was worrying more and more about signs of arrogance and individualism among educated youth, the main catalyst was the grumbling and even overt opposition to the one-party state proposals encountered by Vice-President Kawawa and his fellow Commission members in their travels to secondary schools and teachers' colleges in 1964 and 1965. A particularly tense situation developed at one teachers' college: after arguing the basic case for a one-party constitution, the Vice-President called for a vote on the proposal, whereupon an unidentified student apparently retorted, "why bother since you have made the decision already." Only Nyerere's intervention prevented the incident from developing into an open conflict.42 As a result of this sort of difficulty, it was realized that many students were questioning the government's legitimacy, and that teacher transfers or even threats to close educational institutions were not satisfactory as counter-measures. A more viable approach required greater use of the educational system itself for political purposes. In August 1964 Mr. Eliufoo addressed a letter to all heads of secondary schools and teachers' colleges, regretting that some of them "seem to be forgetting to instill in the minds of pupils and

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staff ... the spirit of building the nation." While it was desirable that students should develop inquiring minds, some of them "are proving embarrassing to the government." According to the Minister the basic problem stemmed from a lack of information about "all the Government is doing for the nation"; the solution lay in an intensification of lessons in current affairs and civics. The issues in this important task are the emphasis on portraying the United Republic Nationhood, the desirability of having a one-party system for national solidarity and quick progressive action, and the role the pupils are to play in building the Nation at the end of their school careers . .. However, it is important to remember that Schools teach citizenship and not politics." No concrete plans were announced until more than a year later, after the elections of 1965. Then the Chief Education Officer sent a circular to the heads of post-primary institutions, in which he reminded them of their particular responsibility ... to see that pupils are given the maximum opportunity ... to develop a sound knowledge and understanding of current affairs, particularly those of direct concern to Tanzania and to Africa .... Much of this responsibility must devolve upon the History Staff of schools, whose special concern must always be to relate their teaching of the past to the present .... In the special circumstances of a young developing nation this is not enough. A more direct and dynamic approach is needed to ensure that secondary school leavers shall have gained an insight into, and a truly African outlook on, the major issues of the day. In this statement there was an obvious shift from concern solely with institutions to a broader study including policy questions and processes. The CEO proposed a new programme of weekly current affairs periods for students in Form IV and the second year of teacher training courses. Because "it is imperative that current affairs should be approached and taught from a Tanzanian point of view," he made it clear that responsibility for these sessions would rest with heads who were citizens, or with "the most suitable" Tanzanian teachers in schools that were administered by expatriates." The model for the new programme was Tabora Girls' School where Barbro Johannson, a European but a citizen and a former member of Parliament, had experienced great success in the current affairs classes that she introduced early in 1965. Many other teachers approached the task with vigour, although in a few schools visited by the author in 1966 the heads had taken no initiative despite explicit instructions to begin sessions in January of that year.

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Most satisfied were the few who made special efforts to develop integrated courses that examined events of current interest in relation to broader political questions and strategies for development. Several teachers in charge of the Form IV programme reported considerable progress in developing a faculty of intelligent criticism among their students, despite the fact that many students proved less interested in developmental problems than in topics amenable to superficial political analysis: particularly popular were guessing games about Zanzibar somewhat akin to crude Kremlinology. One headmaster reported that the big problem is that the boys are used to the British system and have been taught that it is best. At the time of Nkrumah's overthrow the Form V and VI boys wouldn't even agree that he had done anything worthwhile. It is easier with the younger boys who haven't got this background of experience with expatriate teachers. Others agreed that expressions of outright opposition were diminishing. Nevertheless, the assessment of another head was shrewd and, as events were to show, accurate: "The idea of a Tanzanian nation is developing well, but ideas about socialism are not coming well at all." The school environment and student activities.46 The formal contents of curricula and the way in which they are taught are not the only significant determinants of the role of schools in political socialization. Also important but much more difficult to document and analyze is the culture of a school community as expressed in the norms and values that guide behaviour within it. Given the subtle nature of this factor, it is not surprising that it was paid scant attention by educational authorities during the first five years of independence. As a result, there were great differences among schools in such matters as organization and discipline, student associations and activities, and relations with the community. In almost all the primary schools visited by the author in 1966 it was apparent that a stern code of discipline was preached and practised by headteachers. Some recent graduates from teachers' colleges expressed shock and dismay at the frequent use of corporal punishment, and at the lack of opportunity for discussion of school problems by teachers and pupils. These were greater variations at the secondary level where the personalities and perspectives of heads largely determined the atmosphere. Many schools under the tutelage of expatriates and Tanzanians alike retained strong authoritarian and paternalistic strains imported from British grammar schools and perhaps reinforced by the mores of African family life. Others clearly maintained discipline but were much

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freer and more open. Some headmasters regarded the cane as the only answer to unacceptable behaviour, yet to others it was anathema. In addition, some institutions were strongly permeated by a religious ethos, while others were avowedly secular.47 There was a wide range of school activities among the forty-one primary institutions visited, but there were elected pupils' councils in only two of them; in most, if children took any responsibilities at all, their roles were those of the prefect or the monitor appointed by the headteacher (sometimes in consultation with other teachers). Again there were marked differences among the secondary schools. Patterns of student government lay along a broad spectrum between a prefecture system rigidly controlled by teachers, and an elected students' council acting in conformity with a constitution based on the national one.48 The modes of organization for other associations and activities were equally varied, while money-raising projects ranged from ones that stimulated the individual profit motive through those based on cooperative principles to those that contributed directly to the welfare of the house, dormitory, or school. Until the end of 1966, only two policy initiatives were taken in this general sphere; both were aimed at breaking down the elitist and individualist attitudes fostered in colonial schools and at involving pupils and students more heavily in the work of the community. The first encouraged schools to take on development projects, notably adult literacy and self-help schemes; gone were the days when a school, particularly a boarding institution, could act as if it were a fortress defending itself from the society encircling it. Unfortunately, some of the attempts to place schools in touch with the problems of the people misfired because a few politicians regarded schoolchildren as a good source of free labour, and because the underlying purposes of community development work were not adequately explained; as a result, enthusiasm was dampened and hostility generated 49 However, other cases showed that such projects, adequately explained and in competent hands, could foster a sense of social responsibility and improve the image of the school in the community. The other innovation, prompted by the further goal of promoting closer identification of school children with TANU, involved the establishment of TANU Youth League (TYL) branches in all schools. Mr. Kawawa made a plea for such a programme in April 1965,50 and it is clear that student reactions to the one-party state proposals were in large measure responsible. The Vice-President appointed a committee to make specific recommendations and encouraged interested headmasters to introduce branches on their own initiative. At their annual conference in August 1965, Regional

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Education Officers were informed of the plans and cautioned to proceed slowly: It was realized that in some regions the matter had been taken up enthusiastically and prematurely. Regional Education Officers were to exercise tact in this matter and not to damp the enthusiasm, although they were to watch carefully to see that these projects do not interfere unduly with the normal work of the schools ....61 Just a week later Mr. Kawawa broached the subject again in a

speech to the second annual conference of the National Union of Tanzanian Students (NAUTS). Decrying past "official encouragement for students to remain separate from the society in which they live" and the tendency among educated youths to hold unrealistic job aspirations, he urged NAUTS to join TYL in a fight against such attitudes. The Vice-President regretted that the Youth League had been deprecated by educated youth in the past, and hoped that friction would not develop with NAUTS as TYL activities were expanded in the schools.52 The explanation for this apparent friction over the policy lies partly in the traditional attitudes of some educational administrators towards involving the schools in politics, and partly in the genuine concern among others that implementation would fail without proper planning. There is strong evidence to suggest that this anxiety was well placed. Eleven of the twenty-nine secondary schools visited by the author in 1966 had TYL branches. In each case, teachers reported that students had been enthusiastic when the branches were opened, but only in two schools had the experiment proven a success. In each of these, steps had been taken to integrate TYL and other school activities, and teachers had spent long hours off duty providing advice and encouragement. In the other schools several problems had arisen: in one, TYL was in strong competition with other organizations (including NAUTS), thus splitting the student body into contending factions; in another, Youth League members organized a strike over the quality of food; in yet another, teachers and politicians clashed over whether membership was to be compulsory; and, in many, the branches had become dormant through a failure to define a role beyond that of a forum for ideological debate. Late in 1966 Mr. Kawawa's office reactivated the committee on TYL in the schools, and responded to the obvious need for more coherent planning by developing a model programme. This gave school branches definite responsibilities for self-help and literacy schemes, traditional dancing and singing activities, and local history projects. It provided as well for vacation work camps to

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bring together all League members irrespective of educational attainment.b3 While it would be naive to claim that this new approach was sufficient either to bind students to the party or to eliminate the mutual antipathy of educated and uneducated youths, it certainly put the programme on a sufficiently firm foundation to make possible a concerted effort to achieve these ends. To digress briefly, it should be noted that the concern of many educational administrators and teachers about the introduction of TYL in schools was magnified by their previous difficulties with politicians. We have already noted the practice of forcing school children to participate in self-help schemes. Other problems included intimidation in tenders for books, materials, and food, and threats to teachers stemming from rulings on entrance, promotion, attendance, and the payment of fees. Most vexing of all, however, was the practice of using pupils at all levels as ready-made audiences for political speeches, marchers in pro-government demonstrations, performers at celebrations, and flag-wavers in receptions for visiting dignitaries. Complaints by teachers and field officers (including one strong appeal by a District Education Officer) led Mr. Kawawa to send a circular to party leaders and government officials urging them to exercise restraint in such activities. It had some effect but the practices continued. Field officers were advised that their only course of action lay in the use of tact and in keeping the Ministry informed.5° Summary and Conclusions It was much easier to use the system of formal education to promote Tanzanian nationalism than to foster commitments to socialism or, more narrowly, to the regime. This problem stemmed only marginally from educational policy and practice; much more important was the fact that being a nationalist did not impose burdens or restrictions on the individual that were comparable to those implied in being a socialist. Nevertheless, the growing emphasis on Swahili and African culture undoubtedly did contribute to the development of a sense of national identity among the educated minority that was more African, or at least less distinctively Western, than that among the educated of' Kenya or Uganda.55 Still, even though the educational system could not have contributed effectively to the creation of a socialist society without farreaching changes in other socio-economic and political structures, not much was done before 1967 to make educational efforts conform to the mobilizational and socialist ethos of political leaders. In common with the majority of new states, Tanzania appeared to lack both the material and human resources necessary to change

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radically the social and political orientation of formal education. Moreover, as elsewhere, educational authorities were loathe to abandon the security of the internationally (i.e. British) recognized norms by which they had been schooled for the sake of uncertain innovations that would "lower standards" and "adulterate" the educational process. They were particularly hesitant about involving schools in what many of them thought were political activities, an attitude which reflected a blindness to the facts that any system of education propagates political values, and that many of the practices and courses of study in Tanzanian schools continued to reinforce what the British had thought best to emphasize. It is interesting that a survey undertaken in 1966 showed that there were few significant differences in political attitudes between school children in socialist and non-aligned Tanzania and those in Kenya where the political elite was much more favourably disposed to a capitalist and Western-oriented strategy for developments° The gradual introduction of civics programmes and nation-building schemes came in response to a realization among some educators and politicians that the schools were not fulfilling the social and political responsibilities expected of them by the government. However, compared with measures in China and Cuba, those taken in Tanzania appeared cautious, uncertain, and ill-planned. Their insufficiency was clearly demonstrated in October 1966.

NOTES 1. R. P. Dore, "Schools and States in Asia and Africa", Pacific Affairs, vol. 38 (Fall and Winter 1965-6), p. 349. 2. It should be noted that even these countries (with the exception of Cuba) were slow to reshape education to conform to ideological perspectives. 3. This transition reflects in part an accurate assessment of the changing demands of the occupational structure. Year by year, more and more informal communications within the public and private sectors were conducted in Swahili. Finally in 1967 there were indications that rigid adherence to the use of English in formal, written communications within the civil service was breaking down. Early in that year, Mr. Kawawa announced that Swahili would become the working language of the government and that regulations requiring the use of English would be dropped (see The Standard, January 5, 1967). 4. This sort of evaluation reflected the culture-bound perspective of many expatriates and Africans alike. However, until there is more scholarly endeavour in Swahili studies and more wide-ranging translation of works in English and other languages, such reservations are likely to be widespread.

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5. See, for example, L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. I, col. 250; vol. II, col. 59; vol. V, cols. 183 and 195; and N.A., Debates, 1, 2nd, 1962, cols. 612-13 and 623-5. 6. L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. V, cols. 176-8. 7. N.A., Debates, 1, 2nd, 1962, cols. 562-5. A paraphrasing of a translation from the original Swahili. 8. L.C., Debates, 1960-1, vol. II, col. 120. 9. P.H.C. Clarke, A Short History of Tanganyika, London, Longmans, 1960. 10. Wizara ya Elimu (M.E.), Muhtasari ya Schule za Primary-,Zenye Mafunzo kwa Kiswahili (general outline of the syllabus), DSM, GP, 1963. See also specific subject syllabuses, especially Muhtasari ya .7iographia and Muhtasari ya Mafundisho ya Historia. 11. Advisory Council, 1963. 12. The Institute of Education, "The History Sub-Panel's Views on the Present Syllabus," mimeo, July 1966. Each subject panel set up a sub-panel on the primary school syllabus; a majority of the members of each sub-panel were primary school teachers. The criticisms in these excerpts typify complaints that the author also encountered in interviews. 13. M.E., "Syllabus for History in Secondary Forms 1 to 4", mimeo, 1964. 14. See "Memorandum from Central Inspectorate", REOs Conference, 1966. 15. See "Minutes of Meetings of the Institute of Education Sub-Panel for Primary School Geography", mimeo, 1966. 16. "Memorandum from Central Inspectorate." 17. The Institute of Education, "An Outline of the History Sub-Panel's Proposals", mimeo, July 1966. 18. Such as statements by the sub-panel that "the City State civilization of the 10th-15th centuries should be looked upon as a Tanzanian achievement rather than as something to do with the coast which is of no concern to the people of the interior," and that "Ancient Egypt would then be properly seen as an African civilization and Africa would be seen as a source of ideas and methods which the later European civilizations of Greece and Rome drew upon for their development." 19. Several recent studies of political socialization cited elsewhere in this study have examined the value biases in curricula and how these are mediated by experiences outside of and within the classroom. Of particular interest on the question of biases are analyses of history and civics courses in Canada, which show that the French Canadian child in Quebec is given an interpretation of Canadian history that differs radically from the interpretation given to the English-speaking child in that province and elsewhere in the country. See A. B. Hodgetts, What Culture? What Heritage? A Study of Civic Education in Canada, Toronto, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1968; and Marcel Trudel and Genevieve Jain, L'Histoire du Canada: Enqutte sur les manuels (Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism), Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970.

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20. M.E., "The New 0 Level (School Certificate) History Syllabus for Centres in East Africa", mimeo, October 1966. 21. For example, one expatriate headmaster stated in an interview that "I am afraid that too much emphasis is being placed of Africa. Some pupils now feel that Tanzania is the hub of the Empire. They lose sight of broader things." 22. See, for example, the demands of TUAT in The Tanganyika Standard, November 10, 1960 and July 6, 1961; and the comments of members of Parliament in N.A., Debates, 1, 2nd, 1962, cols. 279-80, 558-9, 566-7, 629-30 and 638; and 1, 10th, 1964, cols. 76-7. See also the revealing debate on the Adu Commission report in L.C., Debates, 1960-61, vol. V, cols. 41-98. 23. TAPA and TNUT representatives attacked the Peace Corps strongly in Advisory Council, 1963, echoing earlier criticisms by the East African Teachers' Council (The East African Standard, November 15, 1962) ; Mr. Samjela of TAPA maintained his opposition (see Advisory Council, 1964 and 1965). Among members of Parliament, Messrs. Mtaki and Mbogo were particularly outspoken critics of the Peace Corps. See their comments and those of others in N.A., Debates, 1, 17th, 1963, col. 754; 1, 13th, 1964, cols. 110, 585, 589, 594; and 1, 16th, 1965, col. 194. 24. L.C., Debates, 1960-61, vol. I, cols. 378-9. 25. S. N. Eliufoo, "Education Near Teacher Target", The Standard, December 9, 1965. 26. A. Mwingira and S. Pratt, The Process of Educational Planning, DSM, mimeo, 1965, Table 3.3, p. 33. 27. Advisory Council, 1966, Appendix C. 28. At the official opening of the new campus of the University College, Dar es Salaam, in 1964, the President said that "it can be reasonably argued that the principle of equality demands that some education should be provided for all our children before advanced training is given to a few. At the same time, the need to secure our nation and develop its economy demands that at least some should be prepared for advanced service to the community" (J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 312-13). 29. These thoughts were expressed by Nyerere in an open letter printed in the student journal Makerere, and cited in Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, Chatto and Windus, London, 1965, pp. 206-7. 30. Tape recording in a private collection. Set. also Address by the President

Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere on the Tanganyika Five rear Plan and Review of the Plan, DSM, Tanganyika Information Services, 1964, p. 6; "Opening of the University College Campus", Freedom and Unity, esp. p. 307; and the President's speech to a World University Service Conference in Dar es Salaam printed in full in The Standard, June 28, 1966. 31. See, for example, the President's speech to students of Morogoro Teachers' College reported in The Sunday News, August 28, 1966; and Mr. Eliufoo's address to teachers of Ilboru and Arusha Secondary Schools, reported in The Sunday News, November 17, 1966.

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32. Compare Nyerere's speeches and writings (cited in notes 29 to 31) with the comments of Mr. Kawawa at the opening of an upper primary school (The Sunday News, September 19, 1966) and of Mr. Karume in addresses to youth (The Nationalist, August 17 and September 21, 1966 and The Sunday News, September 21, 1966). See also the remarks of Messrs. Babu (The Nationalist, August 13, 1966), Anangisye, then Secretary-General of the TANU Youth League (Sunday News, August 14, 1966), and Wambura (The Nationalist, January 21, 1966). 33. "Relations with Private Capital Investment", Freedom and Unity, p. 311. 34. "Introduction", ibid., p. 14. 35. Such as the obligations of young people to honour and praise their great "national" traditions (see the remarks of Mr. Kawawa, The Nationalist, August 24, 1966) and to guard against the intrigues of imperialists and neo-colonialists (see statements of Mr. Kawawa, ibid.; Mr. Kambona, ibid., August 2, 1966; Mr. Karume, ibid., August 17, 1966; and Mr. Lawi Sijaona, then Minister for Home Affairs, The Standard, October 15, 1966). 36. See reports of speeches by Messrs. Kambona and Kawawa in The Nationalist, August 2 and 24, 1966. 37. Wizara ya Elimu (M.E.), Muhtasari ra Mafundisho Ta Historia, DSM, GP, 1963, p. 9. 38. "Syllabus for History in Secondary Forms 1 to 4," pp. 3-5. 39. Hildebrand Meienberg, Tanzanian Citizen, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1966. The claim about official approval is printed on the back cover. 40. According to one source, the President was furious when he read the book. As the following quotations illustrate, the concern was certainly understandable: "The advantages of the [capitalist] system are that men are more ready to be enterprising in businesses which they own themselves.. .. Though they are working for their own interests, the developments which they bring about in industry can benefit the country as a whole" (p. 149). "Neither of [the common] . .. charges against the capitalist system is in every case true. There have been many instances of capitalists who have taken a lead in establishing fair wage rates and better conditions for factory-workers.. . .Nor have monopolists always abused their power. Sometimes they have used it for the common good" (p. 150, italics in original). "Socialists believe in allowing some room for private enterprise and competition ..They accept that a man takes more interest in an enterprise which he owns himself, and which bears the family name" (p. 152). "Socialists ... accept the principle of political opposition.... A different point of view is held in communist countries....The citizen of a communist country is hardly allowed to read or hear anything which his government does not wish him to read or hear" (pp. 153-54). "A community is only the individuals who form it" (p. 157, my italics). "Christians, Moslems and others believe that all power, including political power, comes from God. On this view even the President and the Ministers are responsible

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to a higher authority, that is, God Almighty. A President should be able to give

an account of his decisions to God" (p. 46, italics in original). "The most important human right is that of freely worshipping God" (p. 93). "Family life means to have children" (p. 95).

In addition, the book contains some errors of fact such as in the number of district councils (p. 123). 41. Of 34 European non-citizen teachers in our interview sample, 30 (88 per cent) cited this role, although 11 (32 per cent) added that they hoped that they would contribute something to the development of the students they taught; 4 talked of moulding character, and attitudes towards life and citizenship. Among 26 Asian non-citizens the last of these was the dominant response: it was offered by 16 (61 per cent), compared to 10 (39 per cent) who gave the straightforward technical definition. The question asked was: "What are your aims as a teacher in Tanzania?" It is interesting to compare the responses of 213 citizens: to mould the character of children, 71 (33 per cent); self-improvement or self-advancement, 59 (28 per cent); to create good citizens, 41 (19 per cent); to develop the nation, 34 (16 per cent); to maintain or raise educational standards, 22 (10 per cent) ; to prepare children for examinations, 18 (8 per cent); other, 8 (4 per cent). 31 (15 per cent) defined no specific aims apart from "Just to teach," "to be a good teacher," etc. (Multiple responses were recorded.) 42. According to an interview with a senior educational administrator. 43. Based on interviews with educational administrators and teachers who had been at the institution in question. Some Cabinet ministers wanted to dose the school but the President succeeded in mollifying them. Several teachers were reposted before the matter was dropped. 44. M.E., "A Message by the Minister for Education to all Headmasters and Principals of Secondary Schools and Colleges", mimeo, 20 August, 1964. 45. M.E., "Current Affairs (and Civics)", mimeo, 16th November, 1965. 46. Based largely on interviews and impressions. For other descriptive accounts of school environments in Tanzania, see George Von der Muhll, "Education, Citizenship, and Social Revolution in Tanzania", in Kenneth Prewitt, ed., Education and Political Values: an East African case Study, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971, pp. 23-52, esp. pp. 46-50; and Lionel Cliffe, "Socialist Education in Tanzania", ibid., pp. 53-67, esp. pp. 61-4. The Prewitt volume contains a number of essays that analyze data collected in an extensive survey of schoolchildren in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in 1966. Prewitt, Von der Muhll, and David Court use these data to argue that the school environment may well be a highly significant variable in the process of political socialization in "School Experiences and Political Socialization; a Study of Tanzania Secondary School Students," Comparative Political Studies, vol. III (July 1970), pp. 203-25. 47. Data from the 1966 survey of East African schoolchildren (see n. 46 above) suggest that the religious environment and social composition of

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49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

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Tanzanian schools is related to political attitudes. Prewitt et al discovered that students in secondary schools managed by the Christian voluntary agencies tended to be more critical than their counterparts in government institutions in answering the questions relating to what they were most and least proud of in Tanzania. Moreover, the highest proportion of critical responses came from students whose educational experience was "reinforcing", i.e., who attended Protestant primary and secondary schools or Catholic primary and secondary schools ("School Experiences and Political Socialization", pp. 213-16). David Court found that the percentages of students who favour the idea of community service and who rank high on measures of self-reliance were appreciably higher in schools where the social composition by religion was heterogeneous than in those where Catholics or Protestants predominated. ("The Social Function of Formal Schooling in Tanzania", paper prepared for the Annual Social Sciences Conference of the Universities of East Africa, December 1971.) Headmasters and headmistresses of schools in which there was considerable student participation justified their approach on the basis of making a contribution to the development of democratic values, and one admitted that the students' council was a useful "political safety valve." Teachers who adhered to the old prefecture system tended to be paternalistic. ("if we had elections the pupils would elect naughty fellows") and afraid of disruption ("the boys would go on strikes"). One headmaster (a Tanzanian) stated quite frankly, "I don't believe in democracy in schools." See REOs Conference, 1963 to 1966 for discussions of attempts by politicians to use schools as pools of "forced labour". Each year cases were reported and each year field officers were assured that the Minister would intervene to support them if overzealous local leaders persisted in these activities. The East African Standard, April 23, 1965. REOs Conference, 1965 (my italics). "Kawawa Opens NAUTS Conference," Ministry of Information press release, August 13, 1965. Based on interviews. See also Advisory Council, 1966 for earlier plans and discussions. Interviews; REOs Conference, 1965 and 1966; and correspondence in File 4/24/1, DSM. In analyzing a survey of Kenyan and Tanzanian school children conducted in 1966, David Koff and George Von der Muhll report that Tanzanian students expressed more interest in the preservation of African traditions than their Kenyan counterparts ("Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania—a Comparative Analysis", The journal of Modern African Studies, vol. V, no. 1 [1967], pp. 47-8. The survey was taken in conjunction with the broader study of political socialization in East Africa mentioned in n. 46). It is the opinion of this author that this finding reflects the much greater emphasis placed in the worth of African culture in Tanzania, both in the classroom and in political

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discourse, rather than (as one might suggest at first glance) a higher degree of tribal nationalism or neo-traditionalism. For a comparative study of measures taken to nationalize and Africanize curricula (with special reference to France's former colonial territories), and an appeal for greater efforts, see Abdou Moumouni, Education in Africa, London, Andre Deutsch, 1968. 56. See Koff and Von der Muhll, "Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania", pp. 13-51. In their analysis of survey data, the authors report only one difference between Tanzanian and Kenyan secondary students that is crucial in terms of the approaches to development taken by the governments of the two countries: the Tanzanians tended to be slightly more egalitarian and less elitist than their Kenyan conterparts. However, it should be noted that the difference was not statistically significant in the case of one of the two indicators used, and that it did not hold in the case of primary school pupils (p. 35).

io THE NATIONAL SERVICE DISPUTE Despite growing concern among Tanzanian leaders about the lack of dedication of educated youths to TANU and its goals, the process of politically-inspired educational reform might well have remained a haphazard one had not a conflict developed between students and the government over the conditions of compulsory national service. While it is likely that the Arusha Declaration of 1967 would have necessitated a reassessment of the role of formal education in creating a "self-reliant" Tanzania, this dispute was itself a key factor in President Nyerere's decision to stem the drift away from his vision of a socialist society.l The Background During the 1960s more students than at any previous time began to question authority and the values of their elders; student dissent had had a much longer history, but its scale and breadth clearly changed with a worldwide expansion of facilities for higher education and a rapid increase in international communications. Partly as a result, students within underdeveloped countries, whose small numbers and cultural and economic advantages already gave them the aspirations of prospective elites, became even more convinced that they could control their destinies by influencing affairs of state. Although there were exceptions, activists tended to be more radical and reformist than their governments, not just because of the sense of injustice shared by the young everywhere, but also because many of them had no opportunity of obtaining the jobs and privileges to which they thought themselves entitled. Even in tropical Africa, where social mobility and needs for indigenous high level manpower were high, students and young graduates realized that they had little chance of acquiring the rewards secured by an older generation during the transition from colonial to independent rule. This sort of frustration, together with confidence in the extent of their potential power, led several students in Tanzania into an open confrontation with political authorities. It proved to be one of the exceptional cases: at least the leaders of the protest movement demonstrated that they were more motivated by narrowly elitist considerations than by the socialist sentiments so many of them espoused.2 The focus of the dispute, the Tanganyika National Service, had 237

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been formed in 1963 as a voluntary nation-building and paramilitary corps separate from the armed forces. It was conceived at first as a vehicle for giving disciplined training to a growing number of TANU Youth Leaguers and other young people with little formal education so that they could make positive contributions to development through participation in construction, roadbuilding, and similar projects.° The Service assumed a new importance after the abortive army mutiny in January 1964 when it became the principal route for entry into the reconstituted Tanzania People's Defence Force.4 Young people of both sexes were recruited for a period of two years which began with a three-month training programme involving military instruction and short courses in politics, history, bookkeeping, Swahili, and physical education. They then served for twenty months in nation-building schemes, youth camps, the armed forces, the prison service, or the police until returning to National Service camps for a final month-long course and passing out ceremonies. During their two years, recruits received free board and lodgings, free uniforms, and a pocket money allowance of twenty shillings a month. Because of these perquisites and the excellent prospects of permanent employment, the scheme was an attractive one for those who did not possess post primary educational qualifications; competition was intense for the 3,300 places available during the Five Year Plan period from 1964 to 1969. However, although the government continued to emphasize that the National Service was open to all young people on a voluntary basis,° graduates of secondary schools, professional institutions, and universities did not heed the call. Early in 1965, largely because of the hostility of some youths towards the one-party state proposals and the apparent unwillingness of many to make sacrifices in the interests of the community, the government intensified efforts to recruit post-primary leavers to the National Service and began to consider the possibility of limited conscription. The President announced in May that the National Service programme would be altered in order to attract educated youths; they were to have the opportunity of repaying the state's investment in their education, and were to be encouraged to mix more freely with less fortunate young people in the common cause of service to society.° Tentative details of a voluntary scheme were presented to the Conference of Regional Education Officers in August of 1965: post-secondary recruits would spend three months in National Service camps and then take positions in teaching, the civil service, or the private sector. However, for the next twentyone months, they would draw only forty per cent of their salaries, the remaining sixty per cent being used to cover the costs of their

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training. Meanwhile, throughout this period they would wear National Service uniforms during working hours. The government gave no indication of how volunteers would be attracted, apart from offering them special preference for jobs in the public service. Earlier in August, Vice-President Kawawa (in his speech to NAUTS on the introduction of TYL in educational institutions) had strong words for those among the educated minority who shunned the National Service: No man or woman is worthy of being called an educated person if he or she fails to respect both the work and the worker upon whom they and all of us depend. We ourselves have to be willing to serve without large personal returns in the way of high wages or comfortable living.

A few weeks later he attacked students for their lack of enthusiasm, and warned them that steps might be taken to force them to enrol.° Then, shortly after the general elections of October, he announced that National Service would in future become compulsory for university graduates, Form VI leavers, and the graduates of most professional colleges. The terms were basically those of the earlier voluntary programme approved by the Regional Education Officers, except for provisions about the length and type of service: each Serviceman was to spend three months in basic training, two in nation-building work of some sort, eighteen on his designated job, and one back in camp at the end of the two year period.° Students immediately began to voice their displeasure at the prospect. Particularly vocal were the Tanzanians enrolled at the University College, Dar es Salaam. At the time, they were already irked by existing government control over their choice of studies and careers through tied bursaries and placement schemes,l° flushed with a new sense of group importance because of the attention they had aroused by a demonstration against the United Kingdom over Rhodesia's U.D.I.,I' and, more than ever, aware of their importance as the "high level manpower" of the future. However, they found it difficult to attract outside support for a campaign against compulsory National Service: the magnificent physical plant of the University College, luxurious by British or even North American standards, evoked awe, pride, but also anxiety among the people;'2 the mood of anti-intellectualism in TANU, always strong among low and middle level activists who had little formal education, had been strengthened by student opposition to the one-party state proposals; and, finally, there was growing public resentment not just of the educated but also of all behaviour that smacked of a "wabenzi" mentality. Students launched their compaign at two levels. Representatives

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of NAUTS and the Tanzania University Students Organisation, Dar Unit (commonly known as the "Dar Unit") met privately with officials of the Vice-President's Office and attempted to negotiate changes in the terms and conditions of service. In the process they had sessions with Mr. Kawawa and even the President. Also active were student leaders from Muhimbili Medical School, Chang'ombe Teachers' College, the Dar es Salaam College of Business Education, and a few of the local secondary schools. However, while the president of NAUTS later charged that the government had been unbending in these negotiations,19 the development of a climate for reasonable talks was largely forestalled because other students insisted on a public confrontation. Most prominent was Boniface M. Kimulson, a law student who was President of the Students' Union at the University College 14 In a strongly worded letter published in The Standard in December 1965, he grudgingly accepted compulsory service but attacked the length of the training course and the ensuing nation-building programme. He also stated that the conditions and regulations governing National Service for student graduates should reflect and march with some of their basic educational and social standards, for example decent uniforms, respectable meals, and sensible discipline. [Moreover], after the course these trainees should proceed to their vocational calling without having to wear uniforms.

Worst of all were the salary provisions. Forty per cent would be totally inadequate to enable graduates to meet "our social requirements" or obligations to parents and other dependents. He concluded with a warning: "Do not forget that education makes people easy to govern but difficult to drive."" The letter stimulated replies : most of them condemned Kimulson's arguments and others expressed basic agreement.1° The issue was also prominent in the pages of the students' newspaper, University Echo. There is no doubt that the debate hardened the resolve of political leaders and reinforced some of their worst fears about students. Their displeasure must have been particularly pronounced when Kimulson published another letter regretting the false image people were developing of students, but claiming that "university students forming the intelligentsia class of the nation can in a way be said to constitute a special category of reasoning and approaches to social problems."" Another student declared that "professionals demand certain standards of social etiquettes [sic]."18 The image of students became more tarnished in April and May of 1966 when a series of strikes and walkouts took place at Muhimbili

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Medical School in Dar es Salaam. The disturbances arose after Form VI leavers complained about unsatisfactory quarters, poor food and dining facilities, and excessive noise and rowdiness among lower level school leavers who were enrolled in medical assistant and nursing courses. While these grievances were to some extent justified, it was apparent that the trouble stemmed partly from attempts by the Form VI leavers to obtain exclusive dormitories and cafeterias for themselves so that they would not have to associate with their educational inferiors.te President Nyerere made his position on the obligations of students eminently clear in an address to the general assembly of the World University Service held at the University College in June. Every time I come to this campus.. . I think again about our decision to build here, and our decision about the type of buildings.... Anyone who walks off this campus into the nearby villages, or who travels upcountry. . will observe the contrast in conditions here and the conditions in which the mass of our people live....The purpose of establishing the university is to make it possible for us to change these poverty-stricken lives. To those who "demand that they should be treated separately from others when questions of National Service arise," he replied categorically: We do not build sky-scrapers here so that a very few fortunate individuals can develop their own minds and then live in comfort.... We tax the people to build these places only so that young men and women may become efficient servants to them. There is no other justification for this heavy call being made on poor peasants. He rebuked those who "compare themselves ... with graduates of universities in the wealthy countries of the world" when "the masses continue to live on an annual income of about £20 per head per year." Such arrogance had no place in Tanzania where so much work remained to be done for the community.20 The President's speech was delivered during the early stages of an extensive campaign to explain the aims and terms of National Service to students. A recently-appointed Chief Education Officer for the Service visited several secondary schools and teachers' colleges in June and July, and encouraged a full and frank exchange of views on the issue. He reported to the author that he had been able to overcome many fears that had been based on incorrect or misunderstood information. Several teachers concurred in this positive assessment, and expressed their own satisfaction at having had certain questions clarified.

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On July 19 Mr. Kawawa announced that a White Paper recommending compulsory enlistment would be brought before the next session of Parliament.21 Shortly thereafter, when NAUTS held its third annual conference, the National Service and the relationship of students to the government were discussed at length. S. J. Sitta, the outgoing President, expressed a hope that mutually satisfactory negotiations would take place before the White Paper was introduced. He also called on political leaders to stop making defamatory remarks about the arrogance of students and their unsatisfactory contribution to nation-building. Almost predictably, the two guest speakers from TANU, Eli Anangisye (the Secretary-General of TYL and an MP) and A. M. Babu (the Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives) condemned students who disdained contact with the masses and expressed narrowly elitist views.22 When the terms of National Service for graduates were finally announced late in September, it was apparent that the government had made one concession to students' demands (or at least had clarified an earlier proposal more effectively) : during the time recruits worked at their regular jobs, they would receive Shs. 180 a month plus forty per cent of their salary in excess of Shs. 180; all emoluments would be tax free.23 As Vice-President Kawawa pointed out, these provisions meant that a university graduate would receive a take-home income only twenty-three per cent below his net salary; the effective reduction for a Form VI leaver would be only thirteen per cent.24 On other questions—the length of service, the type of programme, and the wearing of uniforms— the government had remained firm. The NAUTS executive urged the National Assembly to reject the White Paper: "History has proved that discipline and a sense of responsibility cannot be obtained from forced labour."25 Student leaders were now all agreed that their last hope lay in direct, open confrontation. During a two day debate, several members of Parliament criticized aspects of the proposed programme. However, if the officers of NAUTS really expected their plea to generate widespread support for their cause, they were mistaken; much more common were complaints about the students and their attitudes towards National Service. Only F. K. Chogga voted against the White Paper, but, as a man with a rapidly developing reputation as a perpetual oppositionist, he could hardly have been considered an influential ally.28 Although NAUTS and the Dar Unit cancelled plans to stage a demonstration at the Parliament Building, O. Chawe, the new President of NAUTS, issued a statement to the press containing the

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strongest criticisms of the government to date. He claimed that all student views had been disregarded and that the "fact-finding act was a pure bluff." Moreover, The determination with which the Government steamrolled the White Paper through Parliament justifies students' fears that the Government's ulterior motive is to punish students for their so-called arrogance and isolation from the masses. If this is the way the final legislation will be handled . , the legislation will receive no cooperation at al1.27

The Dar Unit executive added that the White Paper was "a jumble of mess in substance" and that the "anti-democratic" way in which it was considered had made "the whole idea of the National Service repugnant and unacceptable ti. etudents."Y8 Needless to say a rather tense situation developed. An unidentified "Socialist Student" published a letter in The Nationalist condemning university students as "reactionary", "anti-progressive", "antisocialist", and "counterrevolutionaries." "They do not understand that Tanzania is poor, that Tanzania has enemies all around it, that Tanzania needs all the efforts of all its citizens to fight with hands and brain to thwart the imperialist machinations against progress and socialism."28 Mr. Kawawa addressed National Servicemen and remarked pointedly that youths "must know that life did not mean comfort but meant difficulties."30 A few days later, the TANU Club on campus entered the fray. Although not an official branch of the party, the Club consisted of students who regarded themselves as party militants. The members unanimously approved a statement attacking Parliament for rushed passage of the White Paper and pointing out that students were being asked to make sacrifices while the "big men" in the party and the civil service continued to enjoy their "huge houses" and "magnificent cars" 31 NAUTS followed with a sequel, perhaps realizing at this late hour that there was a chink in the armour of political leaders: "Who is nearer to the people, a Benz-driven individual living in Oyster Bay and working in Azania Front or a pedestrian student living in the centre of Chang'ombe at the periphery of Karikoo area ?"32 The October 22 Demonstration33 Convinced that they now had a powerful leaverage over the politicians, student leaders planned the most serious open confrontation with the government since the army mutiny of 1964: a march to the Vice-President's Office to present him with a petition on Saturday, October 22, 1966. Police permission was obtained and about four hundred students, mostly from the University College, were recruit-

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ed. Carrying signs with messages such as "KAWAWA MUST QUIT" and NATIONAL SERVICE TO HELL", the demonstrators proceeded according to plan until they reached Mr. Kawawa's office; there they were diverted by police to State House, farther down the road. In the words of a press report, "they entered the gates and walked up the drive, flanked by armed steel-helmeted riot police. They were then ordered to sit on the terrace in front of the building."s' The President, the Vice-President, and fourteen Cabinet Ministers sat silently while a spokesman for the students read their petition. It contained arguments that had by then become familiar, but concluded with a statement tantamount to an ultimatum: Unless these terms of reference and the attitude of our leaders towards students change we shall not accept the National Service in spirit, let our bodies go but our souls will remain outside the scheme. And the battle between the political elite and the educated elite will perpetually continue.35

The President replied at length, beginning calmly but becoming more angry as time passed. From a review of the purposes of compulsory National Service and the provisions of the White Paper, he turned to the students' campaign and their petition. First he considered the complaints about the life styles of "big men"; however, he did not respond in the manner in which the organizers of the demonstration had hoped. They were startled when Nyerere rebuked their analysis of conflict between the political and educated elites by saying, "you and I are members of the same class—the exploiting class. The man who gets the minimum wage and the poor peasant, they are the ones who have to pay these wages. Everybody in this country is paid too much except the poor peasant." With that the President announced an immediate cut of twenty per cent in his own salary of £3,000. Continuing, he declared that "the meaning of National Service is that the nation is asking its youths for its services. The youth does not turn to the nation and say `how much' and then sit down to bargain!" Nevertheless, he was willing to meet their ultimatum, but on his terms: It is not forced labour for a teacher to be in a classroom and earning £ 380 a year .... I am not going to spend public money to educate anyone who says ... that National Service is a prison camp. ... I am not going to accept anyone whose spirit is not in it. The demonstrators would be exempted from the National Service. However, they would have their studies terminated as well—all of

them were to return immediately to their homes. Four hundred and

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twelve students stood indicted: 338 from the University College, two-thirds of the Tanzanians then enrolled; 45 from the Muhimbili Medical School; 4 from Chang'ombe Teachers' College; 3 from the Dar es Salaam College of Business Education; and 2 from Kurasini International School, a private secondary institution Se Immediate Outcomes Having gone that far, the President was not prepared to let the matter drop. Even as the students were being escorted to the police station for fingerprinting and later to their educational institutions for travel warrants to cover their journeys home, a directive went out from party headquarters to TANU and TYL branches, the national women's association, and the National Service to organize massive counter-demonstrations for the following day in support of the government's stand and Nyerere's action. On October 23 the President delivered a two hour speech at a rally in Dar es Salaam, broadcast live to the country by Radio Tanzania. He repeated many of the things he had said the day before, and concentrated in particular on the implications of two of the signs the students had carried: one read "REMEMBER INDONESIA," a clear reference to the success of recent student demonstrations there, and the other, "TERMS HARSH—COLONIALISM WAS BETTER"; appalled by both of these, Nyerere asked, "Can these ideas originate with our youth or are they coming from elsewhere ?"37 For days reports kept coming to Dar es Salaam of marches, rallies, and demonstrations in Zanzibar and upcountry. The author was in Moshi at the time and was able to witness reactions outside the capital at first hand. Everywhere he went during the week after the students' demonstration, people talked of little else. Among elders the dominant attitude was one of remorse at the way the youths had behaved, and of hope that the president would be lenient now that they had been put in their places. Younger educated people tended to be less sympathetic towards the President's action: one recent graduate who was teaching in a secondary school voiced his complete agreement with the students' position; and a tense situation developed in two of the local secondary schools when a few of the students refused to participate in the pro-government demonstration ordered by the Regional Commissioner. Nevertheless, that this sort of response was not universal was indicated in the dramatic, if shrewd decision of students at the Morogoro Teachers' College to assert their loyalty to the President by enrolling voluntarily in the National Service before the legislation enacting conscription was passed.S" Among some party activists the episode provided an opportunity for rather crude anti-intellectualism; to others it offered yet more

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proof of "neo-colonial exploitation."39 Another sort of reaction was typified by this statement from an editorial in The Nationalist: The memorandum of the students... must give the government the occasion to review extensively the educational system in the country. When students who have so openly benefited from the reclamation of our political birthright of independence, so earnestly tell the world that they would rather live under colonialism, there must be something wrong with their educational institutions and methods. When students almost totally educated from the taxes of the poor common man in this country, turn round in body only and not in spirit, there is something the matter with their educational institutions and methods. They were not, in a word being educated! ! 4° The idea of a presidential commission on education (similar to earlier investigations of the one-party state proposals and the cooperative and labour movements) was prominent among suggestions in the days that followed.4t However, the President's action in cutting his salary indicated that he was thinking along broader lines. In his speech the day after the demonstration he had said that "the meaning of socialism is that people live together and work together for the benefit of all and not that the majority work in order to be exploited by the few. If everyone of us is going to put money before the nation, then the nation will not be built."42 The students were not the only ones who had strayed from the path of socialist development. Within a few weeks the salaries of Cabinet Ministers had been cut, and detailed provisions had been announced for reductions in the salaries of civil servants and employees of public corporations. In the meantime, the President had embarked on the first phase of his "long march" to Arusha. The ensuing Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance in February 1967 continued and intensified the attack on privilege: leadership conditions promised to undercut the material privileges of party activists, nationalization measures brought under direct government control the salaries and wages of many employees hitherto in the private sector, and strong emphases on rural development and price and wage controls gave notice to urban workers that they, too, had to exercise restraint in the interests of the masses. In the shorter run, there was the question of how to treat the students who had been rusticated. Among the politically articulate and the parents of those sent down, there appeared to be a majority opinion in favour of clemency, provided that the demonstrators apologized and accepted the government's terms for National Service. However, many people took a "hard line" approach. The Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Youth League issued a statement praising

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the President for "sacking the students being used by imperialism and their [sic] stooges," calling for a ban on NAUTS, and urging that "the reactionary students shall never be admitted to schools or be given employment anywhere in Tanzania."" Although one cannot place much credence in rumours, it was widely claimed that the Cabinet was badly split on the question of whether or not to permit the demonstrators to resume their studies. At the University College, most members of faculty and senior administrators had remained aloof from the students as the dispute gained momentum. Now, with only a handful of Tanzanians left attending classes (especially in the Faculties of Law and Arts and Social Sciences") and with suggestions coming even from the President that the students had been influenced by outside interests, the senior staff became heavily embroiled in the issue. Expatriates (at the time in a large majority) and citizens alike found themselves on both sides of the question of whether or not the President had acted in the right way. To some Nyerere's action was a denial of free speech, while to others it had nothing to do with this issue; rather, it was a just and correct response to the obvious rejection by students of the social and political obligations morally imposed on them by the conditions of underdevelopment and the high public investment in their education. Almost all wanted to see the students returned for a variety of reasons—the government had interfered improperly in the life of the university, only the ringleaders had known of the ultimatum, the students were merely victims of an unsuitable educational system, etc. However, only a few diehard conservatives thought that no changes were necessary within the University College. The majority favoured more courses and programmes to involve students fully in the problems of Tanzania and in the life of the people; of these, a small minority sought a thoroughgoing programme of "socialist reconstruction." The question was not immediately resolved. Government offices were inundated with correspondence both pleading on behalf of the students and condemning them, a few letters to the editor were published in the newspapers " and the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce resolved to employ only graduates who had completed National Service (thus effectively barring the demonstrators)." Student groups in Kenya and Uganda did not help the cause of their departed colleagues by launching hostile attacks on the Tanzanian government 47 Nor did the Vice-President of NAUTS when, in the absence of the rusticated President, he published a letter in The Standard claiming that students were proud of the government for the National Service scheme, and that they were prepared to serve willingly provided the minor points of dispute ("which have

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been exaggerated") were resolved. He made matters worse by saying that students might oppose TANU, the Afro-Shirazi Party, or the President but they would never oppose the nation and the people.4S In response to this, TANU headquarters immediately attacked NAUTS for trying to set the people against the party and its leaders.48 The Vice-President of NAUTS later backed down and apologized, but his statement had a ring of insincerity." Despite a letter from Tanzanian students still enrolled at the University College dissociating themselves from his comments, NAUTS was banned on November 21 and its assets were turned over to the TYL.b3 The government also disbanded the TANU Club on campus and welcomed the establishment of a TYL branch.52 A few days later the President spoke at the passing out parade of a group of National Servicemen. He raised the subject of the students who had been sent down and said, "It seems that we all agree that we should forgive them, and I say let us forgive them." A tumultuous cheer rose from the audience, forcing Nyerere to stop for a moment. When he resumed he disappointed many people who had thought that the students would be permitted to return to their educational institutions immediately; instead, they would have to remain at home for two years and would be permitted to resume their studies only if the President received letters of apology from the students and of support from their parents.ss Shortly thereafter the National Assembly passed legislation implementing the original proposals of the White Paper.b4 From the official point of view the matter appeared to be closed,55 but it was soon reopened. The National Service dispute, together with earlier signs of student hostility towards the government and its goals and programmes, convinced President Nyerere that formal education was in need of drastic reform. The school leavers' crisis added to the urgency and appeared to require equally sweeping changes. NOTES 1. That is not to say that the President had a premeditated plan already to put into action at the first opportunity. Rather, his response to the students' opposition to National Service triggered off a series of reactions that culminated in the policies to transform socialist promises into socialist practices. 2. On the basis of a survey of students enrolled at all three campuses of the University of East Africa in the mid-1960s, Joel Barkan argues. that they tended to be much ".. . more concerned with the trappings of elite status rather than being elite in the functional and behavioural

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senses of the term. Rather than wanting to exercise power by making decisions which will affect the lives of their countrymen, most East African University students... are content to carve out a secure niche for themselves and their families." (Joel D. Barkan, "African University Students: Presumptive Elite or Upper-Middle Class," in Kenneth Prewitt, ed., Education and Political Values: an East African Case Study, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971, p. 177.) The tenor of the campaign of Dar students against National Service effectively supported his thesis. 3. See The East African Standard, October 4, 1963. 4. See William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967, p. 164. 5. See, for example, The East African Standard, March 13 and April 19, 1964. 6. Ibid., May 21, 1965. 7. "Kawawa Opens Nauts Conference," Ministry of Information press release, August 13, 1965. 8. The Nationalist, September 21, 1965. 9. The Standard, November 16, 1965. 10. For details, see Advisory Council, 1965 and 1966; REOs Conference, 1964-6; and N.A., Debates, 1, 5th, 1963, cols. 720-1. Most schemes obliged students to teach or accept government employment for a five year period. Government direction was much stricter in this respect than in Kenya and Uganda, a fact that further annoyed Tanzanian students. (For comparative details, see Sheldon Weeks, Divergence in Educational Development: the Case of Kenya and Uganda, New York, Teachers College Press, 1967, p. 20.) 11. The students conducted the demonstration on Saturday, November 13, just two days after the declaration of U.D.I. What began as a peaceful march suddenly erupted as a more violent exercise when a few students, inflamed by Britain's indecisiveness, broke some windows at the offices of the British High Commission and the British Information Service. They found the High Commissioner's car and smashed its windows and body with clubs. Eventually riot police dispersed them with tear gas and the leaders were taken to State House to see the President. He admonished them for their behaviour and sent them to the High Commissioner to apologize. No charges were laid (see The Sunday News, November 14, 1965 and The Nationalist, November 15, 1965). Although rebuked for their violence (but not their cause), many students realised just how effective group action could be. 12. One Area Commissioner who toured the campus in company with the author expressed amazement and even wonderment at what "our poor Tanzania has done". However, he thought that facilities were too good for "those lazy students." 13. The Standard, October 7, 1966. 14. As in other universities the Students' Union was open to all undergraduates. It was distinct from the Dar Unit, an organization solely for Tanzanian students.

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15. The Standard, December 17, 1965. 16. See, for example, The Nationalist, December 21, 1965; and The Standard, December 24, January 6, 14, and 19, and February 10 and 14, 1966. 17. The Standard, January 31, 1966. 18. Ibid., January 14, 1966. 19. Interviews; The Standard, April 7 and 28, and May 17, 1966; and The Nationalist, May 5, 1966. 20. The Standard, June 28, 1966 (the speech is reproduced there in full. The italics are mine). 21. Ibid., July 19, 1966. 22. Ibid., and The Nationalist, August 13 and 14, 1966. 23. See The Standard, September 28, 1966. 24. Ibid., October 5, 1966. 25. Ibid., September 30, 1966. 26. Ibid., October 4 and 5, 1966. Chogga had walked out earlier in the debate when he had been denied permission to speak by the Speaker. Mr. Kawawa had pointed out that Chogga was free to confer with him privately or to debate the provisions of the National Service Bill when it came before the Assembly. 27. The Standard, October 7, 1966 (my italics). 28. Ibid., October 12, 1966. 29. The Nationalist, October 15, 1966. 30. Ibid., October 18, 1966. 31. The Standard, October 20, 1966. 32. Ibid., October 21, 1966. 33. The following account is based on interviews; The Sunday News, October 23, 1966; The Standard and The Nationalist, October 24, 1966. 34. The Sunday News, October 23, 1966. 35. The petition is reproduced in full in ibid. 36. The Standard, June 21, 1967. 393 students participated in the demonstration and 19 others not in attendance were implicated as "ringleaders" in the campaign against National Service. 37. The Nationalist, October 24, 1966. 38. Ibid., October 31, 1966. 39. See the statement of Mr. Karume in ibid., October 24, 1966. It is an excellent example of both tendencies. 40. The Nationalist, October 24, 1966. 41. Among those who sought the appointment of a commission was a Kenya African lecturer at the University College. In a letter to The Nationalist (October 29, 1966) he said that the aim of such a commission should be to design a truly socialist educational system. The demonstrators themselves had been merely "victims of the system." 42. The Nationalist, October 24, 1966. 43. Ibid. (my italics). 44. About 80 per cent of the Tanzanian students in these faculties were implicated in the demonstration, but a substantial minority in the Faculty of Science were sent down as well.

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45. See The Nationalist, November 3 and 22, 19661 and The Standard, November 4, 11, and 14, 1966. 46. The Standard, October 25 and 28, 1966. 47. The Tanzania University Students Organisation, Nairobi Unit attacked the government for its "undemocratic dismissal of innocent student demonstrators" (The Standard, October 25, 1966). Six students from the Makerere Guild and the University College, Nairobi Students' Union met government leaders a little later, but were rather blunt in their request for the reinstatement of the student demonstrators (see The Nationalist, November 17, 1966). A week later the Makerere Guild called for a "more democratic policy" towards the students (The Standard, November 24, 1966). 48. The Standard, October 27, 1966. 49. The Nationalist, October 29, 1966. 50. He talked of a "misunderstanding" much like that between a father and an errant son, but did not mention at all a change in attitudes towards the National Service (see The Nationalist, November 5, 1966). 51. The Nationalist, November 8 and 21, 1966. 52. The Standard, March 19, 1967. 53. The author was in attendance; the direct quotation is taken from a translation of the President's remarks in The Standard, November 26, 1966. 54. See The Standard and The Nationalist, December 15, 16, and 18. Mr. Chogga was again the lone dissenter. 55. However, university officials, wary in the first month after the demonstration, opened negotiations with the government on the details of the students' reinstatement. It was agreed that they would be permitted to resume their studies after two academic years in July 1968. The President himself visited the College on December 16 to hold a closed session with faculty members and administrators. According to one lecturer, Nyerere charmed all in attendance with the exception of one or two diehard expatriate opponents of the government's position.

Part III A NEW APPROACH

11 EDUCATION FOR SELF-RELIANCE The Arusha Declaration was made public on February 5, 1967. Before the excitement surrounding it and the nationalization measures had waned, President Nyerere issued on March 9 yet another dramatic manifesto, Education for Self-Reliance. Like the Declaration on Socialism and Self-Reliance, the contents did not reveal any profoundly original ideas, but the goals defined, together with the proposals for implementing them, amounted to a call for a revolution in the country's system of formal education. The Programme) The President introduced Education for Self-Reliance with the proposition that "we have never really stopped to consider why we want education.... Individually and collectively we have in practice thought of education as a training for the skills required to earn high salaries...." Yet the basic purposes of education everywhere must be "to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society, and to prepare young people for their future membership of a society and their active participation in its maintenance or development." Implying that the educational system in Tanzania had somehow failed in these respects, Nyerere offered a critique of the educational legacy at independence. Colonial schools had introduced and reinforced certain undesirable attitudes: a pronounced emphasis on subservient attitudes and white-collar skills; a capitalist orientation towards the individualistic instincts of mankind that "led to the possession of individual material wealth as being the major criterion for social merit and work"; and a sense of inequality among humans that in practice was underpinned by the domination of the weak by the strong, of the poor by the rich, and of the African by the non-African. In effect, colonial education was "part of a deliberate attempt to effect a revolution" by seeking "a colonial society which accepted its status and which was an efficient adjunct to the governing power". Despite the fact (according to Nyerere) that the "most glaring faults of the educational system have been tackled",2 there were "four basic elements in the present system" which tended to undermine attempts to develop Tanzania along socialist lines. These were: 255

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(I) The education we are at present providing is... basically an elitist education designed to meet the interests and needs of a very small proportion of those who enter the school system. [By providing education for the intellectually strong, the existing system] ... induces among those who succeed a feeling of superiority and leaves the majority hankering after something they will never obtain ....It induces the growth of a class structure in our country. (2) Education is such as to divorce its participants from the society it is supposed to be preparing them for.... The school is always separate; it is not part of society. It is a place children go to and which they and their parents hope will make it unnecessary for them to become farmers and continue living in the villages. (3) Our present system encourages school pupils in the idea that all knowledge which is worthwhile is acquired from books or from `educated people' .... Everything we do... underestimates the value to our society of traditional knowledge and the wisdom which is often acquired by intelligent men and women as they experience life. (4) Our young and poor nation is taking out of productive work some of its healthiest and strongest young men and women. Not only do they fail to contribute to that increase in output which is so urgent for our nation; they themselves consume the output of the older and often weaker people....Even during the holidays we assume that these young men and women should be protected from rough work.

Asking, "Can these faults be corrected?" Nyerere stated that the economic limitations of the country precluded an increase in the proportion of public expenditure devoted to education. Therefore, the only choice before us is how we allocate the [existing] educational opportunities, and whether we emphasize the individual interests of the few or whether we design our educational system to serve the community as a whole. And for a socialist state only the latter is really possible.

Clearly reinforcing a proposition somewhat tentatively implied in Mr. Eliufoo's earlier call for the reintroduction of an agricultural bias in the primary schools, he called for a seven year primary course that is "complete ...in itself," and made available as quickly as possible to all Tanzanian children. For the majority of our people the thing which matters is that they should be able to read and write fluently in Swahili, that they should have an ability to do arithmetic, and that they know something of the history, values, and workings of their country and their Government, and that they should acquire the skills necessary to earn their living. (It is important to stress that ...most people will earn their living by working on their own or on a communal shamba, and only a few will do so by working for wages which they have to spend on buying the things the farmer produces for himself.)

Similarly, secondary schools " ... must not be simply a selection process for the university, teachers' colleges, and so on," but must

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make students aware that their educational advantages vis-a-vis the majority are given only so that they will be able to serve the community effectively. In addition, the President stated that syllabuses had to be altered more fully to "prepare young people for the realities and needs of Tanzania," and examinations had to be downgraded in Government and public esteem.... As a general rule they assess a person's ability to learn facts and present them on demand ....They do not always succeed in assessing a power to reason, and they do not assess character or willingness to serve. Nyerere talked of combining examinations with pupil and teacher assessments of work done for the school and the community, and emphasized that, in any case, examinations "should be designed to fit the education which has been provided" rather than the reverse. Although these suggestions implied radical departures from past practices in Tanzania, they did not reflect policies that differed much from those of a great many other educational systems in the world: other governments have instituted syllabus changes in an attempt to alter prevailing social values, and in many countries in the West and elsewhere there has been a trend away from heavy reliance on written examinations as means of selection and promotion. However, Nyerere did not stop at these recommendations; rather he regarded them as only the first steps necessary to transform the total environment of educational institutions. He envisaged schools and colleges developing as self-reliant and selfsufficient social units: There must be the same kind of relationship between pupils and teachers within the school community as there is between children and parents in the village. And the former community must realize, just as the latter do, that their life and well-being depend upon the production of wealth—by farming or other activities.... Each school should have, as an integral part of it, a farm or workshop which provides the food eaten by the community and makes some contribution to the total national income.

He emphasized that this is not a suggestion that a school farm or workshop should be attached to every school merely for training purposes. It is a suggestion that every school should also be a farm; that the school community should consist of people who are both teachers and farmers, and pupils and farmers. The President thought that the greatest potential for this sort of

reorganization lay in secondary schools and teachers' colleges. "But, although primary schools cannot accept the same responsibility for

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their own well-being as secondary schools, it is absolutely vital that they, and their pupils, should be thoroughly integrated into .. . village life." Children had to be given responsibilities to the community, and the community had to become involved in school activities. In order to enable the vast majority of primary pupils who cannot proceed to advanced studies to attain relative maturity before leaving their schools, it was necessary to raise the age of entry to Standard I from five to six years to seven or eight 3 Nyerere claimed that a full programme relating education to agriculture, simulating community life in boarding schools, and integrating day institutions with society could accomplish much more than formal classroom work alone in moulding a citizenry dedicated to "socialism" and "self-reliance". Moreover, insofar as economic integration was concerned, it was possible not only to raise the status of agriculture in popular esteem but also to contribute to a revolution in farming techniques. But, while the encouragement of a closer proximity between vocational aspirations and realities was important for the best use of human resources and for the prevention of social and political upheaval, broader questions were even more crucial (1) The school farms must be created by the school community.... They must be used with no more capital assistance than is available to an ordinary, established co-operative farm.... By such means, the students can learn the advantages of co-operative endeavours.... They will learn the meaning of living together and working together for the good of all and...the nonschool community. (2) [School members should learn] that their living standards depend on the farm.... If they farm well they can eat well and have better facilities.... If they work badly, then they themselves will suffer .... Pupils should be encouraged to make many of the decisions necessary... only then can the participants practice — and learn to value — direct democracy. [Although some guidance and discipline are necessary,] this sort of planning can be part of the teaching of socialism. (3) Many ... activities now undertaken for pupils ... should be undertaken by the pupils themselves ....Even at university, medical school or other post-secondary levels, there is no reason why students should continue to have their washing up and cleaning done for them. Nor is there any reason why students at such institutions should not be required as part of their degree or professional training, to spend at least part of their vacations contributing to the society in a manner related to their studies. [In short, much can be done to counteract narrow elitism and intellectual arrogance.]

The President concluded by emphasizing that the proposals were not designed to punish pupils or teachers; rather, they recog-

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nized "that we in Tanzania have to work our way out of poverty, and that we are all members of one society, depending on one another." After noting and dismissing several practical obstacles, he conceded that the programme in itself could not work a revolution: "Social values are formed by the family, school, and society—by the total environment in which a child develops." Nevertheless, Education for Self-Reliance had to be implemented because "it is no use our educational system stressing values and knowledge appropriate to the past or to the citizens of other countries; it is wrong if it even contributes to the continuation of those inequalities and privileges which still exist in our society...." Theoretical Implications Education for Setf-Reliance suggested that classroom work and extracurricular activities should be linked through a transformation in teaching and learning methods that emphasized experimentation and actual experience. In so doing it confronted in an integrated fashion many of the political and social problems that education was creating or reinforcing in the post-colonial period. First, the primary school curriculum was to be geared to the needs and realities of rural, agrarian life in the hope that Standard VII leavers would become psychologically and technically prepared to accept that life. Secondly, in order to discourage narrow individualism and to foster an understanding of economic underdevelopment, children at all levels were to experience the problems and rewards of undertaking cooperative endeavour on behalf of the community and of planning in the context of severe economic restraints. Thirdly, a renewed dedication to a Tanzanian approach to education was to produce a sense of national identity based not just on an appreciation of African culture but also on socialist values and pride in an indigenous effort to develop the country through hard work and austerity. Finally, social cleavages were to be softened by the closer integration of schools and communities within the broader context of the proposals and implications of the Arusha Declaration. Even disparities in educational opportunities among regions and tribes were to diminish with the gradual fulfilment of the commitment to provide a primary education for all Tanzanian children. However, a declaration of policy—the formal commitment of resources—by no means ensures that the resources needed for policy implementation can be located and used effectively. Many obstacles were apparent before the publication of Education for Self-Reliance, and, as we shall see, developments since then have further illustrated the problems. First, however, let us examine the experiences of some other countries that have attempted similar innovations.

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The Experiences of Other Countries Although President Nyerere did not acknowledge any indebtedness to educational experiments elsewhere for the proposals of Education for Self-Reliance, and indeed many of his prescriptions followed logically from his ideological perspectives, he was undoubtedly influenced by some knowledge of similar programmes in other countries that have incorporated sweeping educational reforms in strategies for radical change. If an external model did affect his thinking, it was certainly not one imported from other countries of Africa,° or from North America or Western Europe; rather it must have come from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia and from Cuba.° However, even if these latter countries were only marginally influential, it is still worth glancing briefly at some of their experiences in order to gain further insight into the problems confronting the implementation of Nyerere's programme. The central theme of Education for Self-Reliance is that Tanzanian educational institutions cannot be isolated, elitist enclaves for the dissemination of literary knowledge, but must become centres where teachers and pupils can learn to understand and experience the aspirations and problems of society at large. Therefore, school communities themselves must become integrally involved in the strategy for mass, egalitarian development by undertaking productive enterprises on a communal basis and by becoming more effectively integrated within the larger community. There is in this approach a striking similarity to the Marxist philosophy of education, which posits that once a socialist revolution has occurred schools must be transformed to provide knowledge of the class struggle and the struggle for production. As part of its overall strategy of political education, the dictatorship of the proletariat is urged to combat antagonistic class contradictions and to hasten proletarianization by combining formal education with productive labour and by ensuring that schools and the productive units of society (factories, communal farms, etc.) are closely related.? The theoretical objectives are close to those of Nyerere's programme: to promote a proletarian consciousness that is sufficiently strong to overcome the tendency among members of political, managerial, and technocratic elites to divorce themselves from the masses and begin a new process of antagonistic class formation, and to maximize productivity by developing socially useful skills while children are at an early age. Although Lenin was a strong advocate of this sort of polytechnical education and introduced a number of experiments shortly after the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union has not been notably successful in combining education with productive labour. Most of the reforms were dropped during Stalin's rule, and attempts to use

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the educational system to create "Soviet Man" were largely limited to overt political indoctrination.° By the time that Khrushchev embarked on his programme of "de-Stalinization" in 1956, it was apparent that, although the Soviet educational system had accomplished several remarkable feats, it was failing to meet some of the theoretical tasks set for it. There were signs that education was reinforcing factors that were retarding social mobility and inducing social stratification, and was not effectively combating growing political disaffection and disdain for manual labour. The "Khrushchev school reform" of 1958 was aimed at overcoming these deficiencies by making more educational opportunities available to children of lower strata, by placing greater emphasis on initiative in the classroom and extra curricular activities, and by increasing substantially the amount of time devoted to shop courses and agriculture in primary and secondary schools and to "on-the-job" training in higher level institutions. In addition, the great majority of secondary school graduates were compelled to enter the labour force for at least two years as a result of a regulation reserving 80 per cent of all places in institutions of higher education for people with two or more years work experience.° However, in the face of strong opposition from many quarters, much of the "reform" was repealed after Khrushchev's ouster from power in 1964. Some of the problems that, according to Jeremy Azrael,1° influenced the repeal are suggestive in terms of the implementation of Education for Self-Reliance in Tanzania. First, the returns from productive training were minimal compared to the costs of outfitting schools and of disturbing regular work routines in factories. Secondly, secondary school students were insufficiently equipped upon graduation to take up jobs as skilled workers. Thirdly, the quality of higher education dropped because of the two year interruption in the schooling of most students; furthermore, many who had their studies interrupted became frustrated both as a result of the two year delay in their graduation and because "if anything, closer contact with `real life' heightened awareness of the gap between ideology and actuality and turned credulous schoolboys into critical realists and cynics." Nevertheless, in comparing the Soviet and Tanzanian cases, it should be borne in mind that the Khrushchev reform was introduced at a time when the Soviet Union was already industrialized and that it was intended to generate substantial economic returns. In Tanzania, the level of capitalization required to outfit schools as farms and workshops is much lower because the country is underdeveloped and agricultural, and because the aim is not primarily to produce skilled workers but

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rather to involve school children in simple and cooperative productive labour. In China, where Mao Tse-tung's goals of creating the "New Socialist Man" and of achieving a revolutionary classless society have overridden the aim of taking the shortest route to industrialization and rapid economic growth, efforts to synthesize formal education and productive labour have been much more thorough than in the Soviet Union." Not much was done during the consolidation of the "New Democracy" from 1949 to 1953, and, according to the former head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, a proposal to add productive labour to curricula "encountered obstruction [in 1954] and was not carried through at that time."i2 Indeed, as Franz Shurmann notes, the educational system had its origins, not in schools copied from the Soviet Union, but in Westerntype schools introduced into China three-quarters of a century ago. As in contemporary Hong Kong, these schools were attended mostly by children of the growing urban bourgeoisie of the coastal cities. Their values derive from Western doctrines of "liberalism," which stressed competition, individualism, and technical proficiency. Soviet educational influence of the early 1950's contributed to strengthening these values.Is However, Chinese leaders became more worried about the continuing entrenchment of class privileges, increasing urban unemployment, and endemic rural underemployment. Given these problems and the difficulty of combining the values of "red" and "expert" in one individual in a situation in which revolutionary cadres were indoctrinated by means of informal educational mechanisms and professional and technical personnel were schooled in an essentially bourgeois educational system,14 the party's Central Committee decided that formal education had to be transformed as part of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958." An official spokesman stated that Education must serve politics, must be combined with productive labour, and must be led by the Party. These three things are interrelated. Education divorced from productive labour is bound to lead, to a degree, to the neglect of politics and of Party leadership in educational work, thus divorcing education from the realities of our country and eventually cawing right deviationist and doctrinaire mistakes.16

Factories and communes were therefore urged to establish "sparetime schools" to elevate "the cultural level and technical competence of the masses" and "half-work, half-study schools" to offer a programme for children in which education and production would

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receive equal attention.17 Larger factories and industrial complexes were even encouraged to establish universities,1s while existing full-time educational institutions at all levels were enjoined to incorporate productive labour as an integral part of their curricula.lø Agricultural middle schools, of which several thousand were established in accordance with the 1958 policy, were closest to the model suggested by Nyerere for Tanzanian primary and secondary schools.YO These "half-work, half-study" institutions made it possible for hundreds of thousands of children to proceed beyond the compulsory six year primary course to an additional three years of schooling; they were organized as farming communities in which pupils spent half of their time on formal studies and half on farm work (either on a split-day or split-week basis). The proceeds from the sale of what was produced were used to finance the operations of the schools. In terms of the perspectives of the Chinese leadership these schools combined a number of theoretical advantages: not only were they inexpensive because they functioned with fewer teachers than regular schools and were potentially self-supporting, but also they were designed to induce large numbers of youths to stay and work on the communes and, above all, to inculcate the highest form of education—a synthesis of theory and practice. However, in their formative years, agricultural middle schools were confronted by a number of serious problems, some technical— such as shortages of competent teachers and required materials and equipment and a poor division of time between study and labour— and some political—such as hostility among pupils and skepticism among parents and party cadres. The political difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that graduates of regular middle schools had an opportunity to continue their education, while those of the agricultural middle schools, with only a rudimentary grounding in the Chinese language, arithmetic, politics, and agriculture, did not. With the exception of this last problem (which is manifested more in regional and rural-urban disparities), the other difficulties are certainly apparent in Tanzania. The problems encountered during the Great Leap Forward temporarily weakened Mao's position, and led to a reversion to earlier, largely Soviet-inspired policies in many spheres of public life. After a high public official argued in 1961 "that it was wrong for students in ordinary schools to spend so much time on political studies and labor that their academic studies suffered," the emphasis placed on productive labour in educational institutions gradually declined and many of the half-work, half-study schools were closed.Y' The tide was reversed in 1964 as part of a general campaign

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against "revisionism" and "economism": a new policy declaration decreed that many more half-half schools were to be established, and that much more vigorous efforts were to be directed towards incorporating productive labour in full-time institutions in order to convert all schools and colleges to the half-work, half-study model over a period of ten years. In curtailing the amount of academic material to be covered within a given period of time, it was also decided that passive learning based on rote memorization and "cramming large amounts of spoon-fed information" should be superseded by the much more active involvement of students in the learning process." Again trouble developed, and, as Donald Munro notes on the basis of reports published in 1964 and 1965, the fault lay with bourgeois-teacher oppositionists and high-level educators favoring the Soviet model for schools.... Many teachers and cadres were accused of holding that students of working class and peasant origin were "stupid" and "low class" ... [and] of continuing to characterize themselves as "ultimate authorities" and "specialists".... [Moreover, many] opponents of Mao's educational policies ... simply redefined approved guidelines or slogans to suit their own purposes.23

Largely as a result, the implementation of new policy floundered. One effect of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," during which all Chinese educational institutions were closed for several months, was the virtual elimination of overt opposition to the combination of education with productive labour. When the schools were reopened, they were all expected to conform to the half-work, half-study model quickly and to make extensive use of part-time teachers who continued to experience practical problems in the army or in productive labour. In addition, it was announced that the system of examinations would be revamped in order to dampen individualistic motivation and prevent discrimination against students from peasant and worker backgrounds. As Nyerere later advocated in Tanzania, an assessment of a student's contribution to the community was to form a part of his overall evaluation. These measures were substantially implemented soon afterwards,E" and, as further steps to equalize opportunities, age restrictions were relaxed and fees were reduced or, in some cases, abolished. Greater emphasis than ever before was placed on integrating schools with factories and communes, and the pace of decentralizing educational responsibility was accelerated.25 Although it is difficult to assess new developments in China until considerable documentary evidence is available (and even then the task is a hazardous one), it would appear that the problems

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experienced earlier concerning the level and commitment of teachers, educational administrators, and party cadres are still making it hard for Mao and his associates to proceed as quickly as they would wish. According to Marianne Bastid, the full-time teachers' ranks have been so well "purified" that some schools are very short staffed. The remaining teachers are so much afraid of being accused by the students that they dare not enforce any kind of discipline; in order to keep safe, they mumble some excerpts from Mao Tse-tung's works all day long. They beg to be given another job.Qs Moreover, even though Chinese leaders earnestly want "to make revolution" in the schools, the mood of anti-intellectualism induced during the Cultural Revolution led to the widespread notion that "to study is of no use."27 While opportunities for further education and training will be progressively equalized as full-time and halfhalf schools become more alike and as promotion becomes less dependent on the advantages and disadvantages of class background, one must question as well whether or not trimming academic material in order to make more time available for physical labour and political activities (on a scale far exceeding what Nyerere envisaged for Tanzania) will produce enough middle and higher level graduates with the specialized skills needed to meet the increasingly complex demands of industrialization and economic development. Munro raises the further possibility that "the reduction in the amount of theoretical work taught in the arts and sciences could be detrimental to the training of people capable of making the imaginative innovations on which future progress depends."28 In both respects, the outcome will be contingent upon the continued success of Chinese leaders in maintaining a dialectical tension between the socio-political and economic goals of the revolution, and upon the extent to which the basically authoritarian structure of the educational system is moderated by the declared intention of encouraging initiative and experimentation. Other socialist countries that have been heavily influenced by the thought of Mao and the Chinese experience have also become committed to the "half-work, half-study" educational model;29 Cuba appears to have been markedly successful in this respect S0 However, there are no detailed case studies from which to draw firm conclusions. It should be emphasized that, in noting the similarities in intent and in content of Education for Self-Reliance and attempts by communist countries to implement the Marxist doctrine of praxis in their educational programmes, we are not suggesting that President Nyerere's overall strategy to use education for social and political

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ends conforms to that of Marxist-Leninists. Nyerere has neither the will nor the necessary resources to impose totalitarian controls on Tanzanian society; his socialism is strongly tinged with liberal humanitarianism; and Tanzania is relatively open to foreign influences. For all of these reasons, the President has to be content with implementing Education for Self-Reliance with techniques of moral suasion that are more subtle and less powerful than those implied by "thought reform" or "subservience to the mass line." The Implementation of Education for Self-Reliance The immediate aftermath. Surprise and confusion were the initial reactions among most people concerned with education to the publication of Education for Self-Reliance. Although the Minister for Education and his Principal Secretary were undoubtedly aware of the details, officials in the Education Division of the Ministry apparently had not been consulted. They, along with several other people, had been expecting the announcement of a special presidential commission on educational A day after the President released his pamphlet, The Standard conducted an interview with a "Ministry spokesman,"88 who revealed that "a special committee made up of experts...has been set up to make recommendations for the implementation of the country's new education policy which lays emphasis on agriculture." However, he was referring not to a new institution but to a subpanel of the Institute of Education that had already been at work for some months. The spokesman said that the committee would study the President's proposals carefully before making any recommendations to the Minister, and cautioned that "the implementation of the policy, just like any other educational policy, would be carried out gradually." Although accurate in one sense, his description of Nyerere's programme was hardly in keeping with the President's desire to stimulate dramatic and rapid changes: It is not entirely new—it is just a question of a new emphasis and a change in duties, and an extension of what we have been doing in the past. We have some schools which are producing their own food and cutting down maintenance costs. The pilot agricultural programme in fifteen upper primary schools and the "small experimental farms" of the two secondary schools with agricultural biases were offered as evidence. The spokesman emphasized strongly that there would be no diminution in academic standards, nor would deserving students "be deprived of academic advancement and a subsequent higher school education." Although he must have been briefed about the President's proposals, even Mr. Eliufoo seemed to be caught somewhat off

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guard; in a major speech delivered on March 11 (two days after Education for Self-Reliance was published), he did not mention the President's pamphlet. Moreover, in outlining the purposes of higher education, his remarks appeared out of phase with Nyerere's views; repeating the narrow technocratic emphasis of earlier policy, he said that higher education should provide ...an adequate number of people to fill the high-level manpower requirements of the country. It should prepare graduates for entry to specific careers. It should provide the institutional arrangements which are necessary to keep the high-level manpower force up to date and thus prevent obsolescence. His final point, and only reference to broader social and political objectives, was particularly curious: "It should, as it already does, assist in the development of the content of educational courses so that people who are highly educated are also well suited to undertake the tasks which are most important in development." On another point he echoed the fears of his advisers by noting that syllabus revision "is of necessity a slow process and any scrimping of the preliminary work or lack of care in drawing up the detailed schemes would be disastrous." He offered not a word about socialism or self-reliance." The speech had obviously been written by an adviser who had no foreknowledge of Education for Self-Reliance, but it is surprising that Mr. Eliufoo did not make at least some minor changes to effect a reconciliation. Perhaps because educational administrators thought themselves under attack, they began to issue a series of press releases defending the Ministry's record (particularly in educational expansion) and making what appeared to be policy statements in conformity with Education for Self-Reliance. One announced a decision made much earlier to convert former Asian schools to the Swahili medium, but added a significant change by proposing Swahili as the language of instruction for the entire primary school programme 34 Another revealed that there would be enough citizen teachers for the primary schools by the end of the year and that 150 Peace Corps teachers at that level would be phased out (a decision that had been made in December of the previous year35). Yet another statement, which did reveal an acceleration of earlier plans, announced that the headships of all teachers' colleges and boys' secondary schools would be Africanized by the end of April. Finally, the Minister called a conference of headquarters personnel, Regional Education Officers, heads of post-primary institutions, and other senior administrators "to brief them on the necessary steps to be taken to implement the new policies."36 The week-long conference was rather inconclusive. Vice-

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President Kawawa delivered the opening address, in which he issued a warning about the need to act quickly. "Unless we succeed in transforming our education now, we may find in ten or even five years' time that our united society is no longer united and our people are frustrated ...."3' Other political leaders also spoke on strongly ideological terms, and not unexpectedly Education for Self-Reliance and its general guidelines were endorsed "wholeheartedly". However, few participants offered many practical suggestions;98 in fact, the Director of Agriculture, who had the most specific comments to offer, was rather pessimistic about some of the claims by then being made on behalf of an agricultural curriculum. Besides pointing out the lack of realism in expecting twelve to fourteen year-olds to farm their own or their fathers' land, he noted that progress would be slow because "experience has shown that the key to better teaching of agriculture lies in the better training of teachers rather than in the manipulation of curriculum."39 In the meantime, others had seen more quickly the opportunity afforded for educational change by the Arusha Declaration. The Institute of Adult Education of the University College had planned a conference on "The Role of the University College, Dar es Salaam in a Socialist Tanzania" before Education for Self-Reliance was published. It was held just afterwards, on March 12 to 14, and brought together representatives of the College, TANU, TANU's affiliated organizations, the National Service, and the Tanzania People's Defence Force. Particularly prominent was "the group of nine lecturers" (as it came to be known), comprised primarily of expatriates who accepted a basically Marxist view of development in Tanzania.40 These people spearheaded the adoption of many far-reaching proposals such as those for a new compulsory interdisciplinary common course linked to Tanzania's "socialist aspirations," decreased reliance on foreign agencies for the recruitment of academic staff, greater insistence on sympathy to Tanzanian socialism as a criterion for appointments in the social sciences, and more involvement of faculty and students in university government. In addition, the conference adopted recommendations for the Africanization of "sensitive posts" held at the time by expatriates, more thoroughgoing integration of the university and the city of Dar es Salaam, and a much wider programme of nation-building activities for the students.4' A few days later, the Principal of the College (a Tanzanian who certainly had never identified himself as a radical42) issued a public statement, describing the conference as "successful" but "unofficial." All the recommendations would have to be studied in

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detail by various university bodies before steps could be taken.4S Again a split developed within the College, this time over the pace of reform. The "group of nine" obviously wanted to move more quickly than either College or educational authorities would permit, and hoped to reinforce a climate of opinion in which merely token change would be seen as insufficient.44 However, the only immediate measure of any significance was the President's decision to permit the students sent down in October to return to their studies in July 1967, rather than 1968, an action that came at the unanimous request of the National Assembly to forgive the demonstrators in the "spirit of Arusha."45 Another group that attempted to push policy changes along particular lines was comprised of a few TANU activists who have served since Arusha as a left-wing intellectual ginger group within the party. Among the suggestions of the TANU Study Group were outright nationalization of all voluntary agency schools, closure of all private institutions and immediate universal primary school education.40 Mr. Eliufoo advised worried and cautious members of Parliament not to take the proposals seriously because they did not have the official sanction of TANU.47 Ironically, the member of Parliament who had initiated the debate on the school leavers' problem the year before, Adam Kaombwe, even went so far as to suggest that too much emphasis was already being placed on localization and agriculture, to the detriment of pupils who proceeded to secondary schools.48 Although a few schools took immediate steps to move towards the guidelines of Education for Self-Reliance,49 the most common responses were largely symbolic. Thousands of school children participated in mass rallies and marathon walks in support of the Arusha Declaration and related policies,b0 and the President himself undertook a walk of 135 miles from Butiama, his home village, to Mwanza, where the National Conference of TANU met in October 1967. However, the mobilization of mass enthusiasm was hardly a substitute for concrete action. On the first anniversary of the Arusha Declaration, the President conceded that "this might be a more difficult year. The first year was for preparation and dedication but this year is for realistic support of the Declaration: the year of work."51 Policy outcomes. The challenge of Education for Self-Reliance has been reflected in a number of policy initiatives since 1967, although they have hardly been as sweeping as the prescriptions of the presidential manifesto. The modest programme designed in 1966 to reintroduce agriculture in primary schools was cast aside; in 1968 all primary, secondary, and teacher training institutions embarked on farming

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and other "self-reliance" activities, and a new agriculturallybiased science syllabus was incorporated in the primary school curriculum. Between 1967 and 1973 the number of secondary schools specializing in agriculture was increased from two to thirty-two.52 An explicitly socialist programme of "political education" replaced "civics" at all levels of the educational system (with an especially heavy emphasis in teachers' colleges) in 1968, and TYL branches were established in primary schools and revitalized in secondary schools and teachers' colleges. The University College (reincorporated as the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970) followed suit in 1969 by establishing a compulsory common course in development studies focussed on the problems of underdevelopment in East Africa and rooted in the principles of Tanzanian socialism. In that same year Tanzania's vulnerability to hostilewhite ruled southern Africa and to counter-revolutionary pressures from elsewhere was recognized in the initiation of para-military training ("nwØmcØ") in all educational institutions. In terms of educational expansion, Education for Self-Reliance clearly called for an abandonment of the policy of containing primary school growth in favour of rapid development. However, as we saw in Chapter Six, the First Five Year Plan's objective of checking expansion finally met with some success in 1966, and growth was minimal in the period from 1967 to 1969 (see Table 6.5) . As a result, primary level enrolment began to lag considerably behind population growth (which, as the 1967 census revealed, had been grossly underestimated). Applying reasonably valid assumptions to census data, we calculate that the proportion of the eight year age-group seven to fourteen enrolled in Standards I to VIII in 1965 was 36 per cent, while only 32 per cent of the seven year age-group seven to thirteen was in schools in 1969 (see Table 11.4). The decline in the number of pupils in Standard I as a percentage of all seven year-old children was even more drastic. Between 1965 and 1969 Standard I enrolment grew by a mere seven per cent; in contrast, we estimate that the number of children aged seven years increased by almost forty per centsa This means (leaving aside the fact that the age of school entry varied from five to nine or ten) that there were occupied Standard I places for 49 per cent of Tanzanian seven year-olds in 1965, yet for only 38 per cent in 1969!" Although a breakdown of the 1967 census by age was not yet available when the Second Five Year Plan for 1969-74 was drafted, planners did realize by then that primary school expansion had fallen far short of population increases during the earlier planning period. Accordingly, in keeping with the principles of Education for

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Self-Reliance, the new plan placed great emphasis on primary school development, and, although not explicitly stated, on closing the gap between urban and rural areas. The Standard IV examination (virtually eliminated in the towns and cities by 1966) was to be phased out by 1973, meaning that all children who entered primary school in 1970 would have the opportunity of passing through the full seven year programme.b5 The overall increase in Standard I places was to provide for a percentage increase in the age-group able to enter school only from forty-seven (an overestimate) to fifty-two, but a firm commitment was made to universal primary schooling and 1989 was set as the target date for achieving it.58 Moreover, for the first time since independence, some measure of corrective justice was built into plans for the regional allocation of new primary school places: preference in the distribution of capital funds was to be given to regions with a low intake in Standards I and V "to enable them to catch up to the National Average." Within districts, a special political incentive was provided by the promise that "priority will be given to communities in which the spirit of Ujamaa is active."b7 The consequent demands for teachers led to plans for a more rapid expansion of training programmes, but growth in other post-primary institutions was to be limited (as before) to levels sufficient to satisfy manpower needs and the objective of self-sufficiency in manpower by 1980.b8 These priorities have served to guide policies of educational expansion throughout the Second Five Year Plan period, which has now been extended until 1975 to allow more time for the new decentralized machinery for state planning to produce the Third Plan. Tables 11.1 and 11.2 compare growth in primary and secondary school enrolment in the first and second half-decades of Table 11.1 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED STANDARDS I AND VII AND IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOLS, 1961-66 AND 1966-71 1961 Standard I Standard VII All Standards

1966

1971

% Increase 1961-66

% Increase 1966-71

121,386 154,512 190,091

27

23

46,816

70,502

225

51

482,121 740,991 902,609

54

22

14,649

Source: Table 5.1 and United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1972-73 , DSM, GP, 1972, p. 44.

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Table 11.2 PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN ENROLMENT IN AIDED FORMS I AND V IN AIDED SECONDARY SCHOOLS, 1961-66 AND 1966-71

Form I Form V All Forms

1961

1966

1971

% Increase 1961-66

% Increase 1966-71

4,196

6,377

7,570

52

19

236

826

1,608

250

95

11,832

23,836

32,603

101

37

Source: Table 5.2 and United Republic of Tanzania, The Annual Plan for 1972-78, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 44.

independence, and Table 11.3 illustrates aggregate expansion at the primary level in 1969 and the first four years of the Second Plan. Primary school enrolment is again growing rapidly, although, as we shall see, not as quickly as capital development permits. The goal of eliminating the Standard IV examination was not achieved everywhere by 1973, but overall, throughout the country, there were by that year enough places in Standard V to accommodate all Standard IV leavers.69 The deceleration at the secondary level in turn reflects the continued use of strict manpower planning criteria in controlling the expansion of places.80 In this respect, it should be noted that of the 44,117 high and middle level personnel required over the First Plan period, educational statistics showed that 44,102 had been Table 11.3 ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT, 1969-73 1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

Enrolment (000s)

776.1

828.0

902.6

982.0

1,192.5

% Increase

1

7

9

9

21

Source: Table 6.5: United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey 197172, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 130; and The Daily News, September 26, 1973.

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produced by 1969, suggesting an almost perfect estimate. However, as the Second Plan points out, "one reason for the closeness of these !`estimates' is that they are not really forecasts of what `may' happen, as would be the case in an unplanned economy. They are in fact targets and much of the machinery of Government is geared to the achievement of these targets."81 Thus, comments M. A. Bienefeld, "if the fit does not vindicate the forecasters, it suggests that plan implementation was largely successful." Bienefeld produces evidence indicating that a modest secondary leaver problem is in fact developing, while at the same time noting that there are continuing shortfalls in the production of people qualified in science and technology. Yet, he says, it remains substantially true that Tanzania has been able to build up an educational system that is meeting its manpower needs consistently with the nation's policy to achieve self-sufficiency in high and middle level manpower by 1980 and without creating future over capacity in institutions of higher education or producing large numbers with expensive skills who will find themselves unable to use such skills. Although this is a major accomplishment it represents success only at a narrow, mechanical and quantitative level."S Strict control over growth at post-primary levels means that secondary schooling remains elitist at least in terms of the structure of the educational system and its occupational rewards. However, the Second Plan did recognize that the decision to use Swahili as the sole medium of instruction in primary schools, while retaining English at higher levels, was creating an even greater "linguistic gulf" than had previously existed. Moreover, English instruction continued to lend an "alien atmosphere" to post-primary education, "remote from the problems of the masses." It was hoped that complete localization of the secondary school teaching force, anticipated by 1977, would permit a gradual transition- to the use of Swahili as the basic teaching language at that level; however, the lack of suitable materials presented a formidable obstacle.83 Political education classes are now (1974) given in Swahili, and there are plans to make the switch in the teaching of history.86 However, one disadvantage of this piecemeal approach, especially in regard to political education, is that material that ought to be integrated with the entire learning experience may be digested in isolation. One of the key ways in which Nyerere hopes to combat competitive individualism and elitist attitudes is through reform of the system of examinations and academic promotion, but in this sphere his vision has yet to extend to policy. The General Entrance Examinations were restyled "Primary School Leaving Examinations" in 1967.

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Although symbolically important in emphasizing that the primary school course is supposed to be "complete in itself", this change had no real significance in altering the mode of selection for secondary school. Nor did the constitution the following year of Regional Selection Committees consisting of Ministry personnel, heads of secondary schools, and representatives of TANU, TAPA, the women's movement, and local authorities." These Committees undoubtedly serve to allay suspicions of favouritism towards particular children, but they have not seriously begun to use an assessment of pupils' "self-reliant" behaviour as a factor in the selection process; the traditional criteria—performance in written theory papers, tempered by often class-biased evaluations of academic ability and conduct by headteachers—continue to dominate. The story is largely the same at post-primary levels. Chediel Mgonja (who replaced Mr. Eliufoo as Minister for Education after the latter suffered a crippling stroke in 1968) strongly attacked the traditional formal examination as an outmoded colonial hangover in a major policy speech in 1971,86 but not much action accompanied the rhetoric. It is true that later that year Tanzania withdrew from the East African partnership with the Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate, and established national examinations for Forms IV and VI.B7 However, although this measure was significant in breaking a relationship of dependency and in increasing local control over curriculum development, it did not lead to a departure from the historically-entrenched examinations syndrome. A Tanzanian university lecturer, Marjorie Mbilinyi, writing in 1973 notes that Examination devices remain the sole [sic) selective mechanism (in spite of the...call for alternate forms of selection) at all levels of education, especially the strategic Standard VII, Form IV and Form VI. Although the Form IV and VI examinations have been nationalized, they are basically the same in form as the former Cambridge Certificate Examinations. Rote memory is relied upon..., or at best convergent thinking, which then determines the nature of teaching methods in practice in primary and secondary schools (and, of course, other higher levels of education culminating with the University).68

President Nyerere has also recently expressed regret about the slow pace of reform.88 A National Examinations Council was established in 1973 and given a mandate to formulate examinations policy in accordance with the principles of Education for Self-Reliance;70 however, it has yet to move in the direction of the sort of radical changes the Chinese have now implemented. In the absence of recent published statistics breaking down

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primary school enrolment on a regional basis, it is difficult to assess efforts during the Second Plan period aimed at equalizing educational opportunities throughout the country.71 The earlier neglect of regional disparities is apparent in Table 11.4, which compares Table 11.4 APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION ENROLLED IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOLS BY REGION, 1965 AND 1969

Region°

1. Kilimanjaro (1) 2. West Lake (2) 3. Coast (6) 3. Ruvuma (4)

5. Mara (9) 5. Singida (5) 7. Tanga (3)

8. Morogoro (7) 9. Tabora (10) 10. Mtwara (8) 11. Dodoma (12) 12. Arusha (12) 13. Mwanza (10) 14. Mbeya (15) 15. Kigoma (14) 16. Iringa (16) 17. Shinyanga (17) Total

Estimated School-Age % % Enrolment Population Enrolled Enrolled Change 1969 1969b I965 1969 1965-69 81,367 56,023 50,340

147,203 126,257 126,887

60 49 42

55 44 40

-5 -5 -2

31,685 43,793

79,798 111,452

45 35

40 39

-5 +4

33,489 56,201

86,248 151,685

43 46

39 37

-4 -9

44,493 32,222 57,716 41,903 34,759 58,073 54,192 23,742 38,953 37,025

130,367 103,519 191,069 146,657 123,999 212,269 210,279 93,806 159,335 187,356

39 34 36 31 31 34 27 29 24 23

34 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 20

-5 -3 -6 -2 -3 -7 -1 -4 0 -3

776,109 2,388,168

36

32

-4

Source: Table 7.2: United Republic of Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 1970, DSM, GP, pp. 203-4: and United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 3, 1971, Table 201. °The ranks of regions in 1965 in terms of aided enrolment are in parentheses. The ranking in Table 7.2 is in terms of total registered enrolment. bThe seven year age-group 5 to 11 inclusive in 1967, which closely approxi-

mates the age-group 7 to 13 in 1969. The 1965 percentages are based on an eight year age-group as the primary school programme then was of eight rather than seven years' duration.

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estimates of the percentage of school-age children enrolled in 1965 and 1969. Effective implementation of the policy of containing growth did prevent relative inequalities from widening—in fact all but two regions, Mara and Iringa, failed to keep up with population growth, while separate statistics for Dar es Salaam would show that enrolment in the capital also increased as rapidly as the schoolage group; however, with these exceptions, disparities remained almost frozen. Now that primary school development is again rapid, it is likely that regional inequalities are also growing, notwithstanding the high priority given to less well-endowed areas, because it is in regions where percentage enrolments are highest that popular demand and a willingness to commit local resources to education are greatest. No matter how strong the desire of decision-makers to promote equalization, the goal of universal primary education dictates that enrolment must grow quickly and that targets must be met. Ultimately the achievement of compulsory primary schooling will overcome the problem. In the meantime, however, since regional quotas for Form I selection are determined largely by Standard VII output, inequalities at the secondary level will probably continue to increase. They did grow during the period from 1966 to 1971 as data in Table 11 .5 reveal. While a comparison of allocations of Form I places in these two years in terms of 1967 population figures inflates the numbers for 1971, relative advantages in secondary school selection clearly increased in regions with comparatively greater primary level opportunities. The data mask even greater disparities in district allocations. Concern about this question within Regional Selection Committees led to a Ministry decision in 1972 to distribute places on a district basis.72 An example of the magnitude of differences emerged later that year when it was revealed that less than two per cent (1 O out of 503) of Standard VII leavers in Masai qualified for Form I entrance in 1973, compared to the national average of about nine per cent.73 In response to strong concern expressed by the Masai District Executive Committee of TANU, the government promised "to improve the state of education" in the district,74 Although more teachers were posted there the following year and efforts were made to overcome chronic shortages of materials, the Ministry's solution was basically political. Masai was given fifty Form I places in 1974,75 seemingly portending an overall increase in inter-district conflict over the allocation of secondary school opportunities. Meanwhile, although there has been some success in overcoming the historical disadvantage of females in securing school places, rural-urban and class inequalities have widened. The preferred position of Dar es Salaam (with its more abundant secondary

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Table 11.5 NUMBER OF ASSISTED FORM I PLACES PER THOUSAND OF 1967 POPULATION ALLOCATED TO EACH REGION, 1966 AND 1971

Regiona

I. Coast (2) 2. Kilimanjaro (1) 3. Tanga (3) 4. West Lake (6) 5. Ruvuma (5) 6. Singida (8) 7. Mara (10) 8. Morogoro (7) 8. Tabora (13) 10. Arusha (9) 11. Mwanza (4) 12. Dodoma (10) 13. Mbeya (13) 13. Kigoma (16) 15. Iringa (12) 15. Mtwara (15) 17. Shinyanga (17)

Places Population No. No. Offered (000s) Places Places Increase per per thousand thousand Popu- Population lation 1971 1967 1966 1971 1,071 884 591 446 265 296 323 381 313 332 557 352 448 219 305 462 186

784.3 652.7 771.1 658.7 393.0 457.9 544.1 685.1 562.9 610.5 1,055.9 709.4 969.1 473.4 689.9 1,041.1 899.5

67 82 44 38 39 31 28 32 24 29 40 28 24 18 27 23 15

137 135 77 68 67 65 59 56 56 54 53 50 46 46 44 44 32

70 53 33 30 28 34 31 24 32 25 13 22 22 28 17 21 17

Source: Table 7.7 and The Nationalist, April 24, 1971. "The ranks of regions in 1966 are in parentheses. facilities) can be seen in the fact that 21 per cent of Standard VII leavers in Coast Region obtained places in Form I in 1971, in contrast to a range of only 10 to 13 percent in other regions.76 The differential was less in 1972, when the "promotion rate" in Coast was 18 per cent compared to nine to 13 per cent elsewhere,77 but the advantage of the capital city was still greater than these figures suggest because other districts in Coast Region conformed closely to the national average. A rural-urban breakdown in other regions would undoubtedly also illustrate relatively more opportunities for the children of town-dwellers. The arguments we advanced in Chapter Seven suggest that children from privileged classes are

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continuing to enjoy special educational advantages of a sort that the Arusha Declaration and the Leadership Code are powerless to prevent. We have no firm evidence to support the hypothesis that class is an important factor in selection for publicly-assisted secondary schools. However, the number of private institutions has steadily grown, and high fees (standardized at Shs. 1000 for tuition and Shs. 500 for boarding78) place entrance to these schools out of reach for most Tanzanian children. Some idea of the extent of this aspect of class privilege is apparent in statistics for 1969, which showed that 21 per cent of all secondary students were enrolled in private schools (8,092 out of 38,000).78 Nevertheless, while social disparities in educational opportunities continued to grow, great strides have been made in the sphere of mass adult education, which had earlier been given short shrift in comparison with child-centered educational development.BO In accordance with the President's wish to integrate schools and communities, the Second Five Year Plan announced that concerted efforts would be directed towards making primary schools "community educational centres" and focal points for total educational needs "rather than ... somewhat detached institutions for the education of children."81 The logic of this policy in turn led to the creation in 1969 of a new Ministry of National Education responsible for adult education and cultural development as well as formal education.82 Since that time even greater energy has been channelled into adult education than had been envisaged in the Second .Plan. Working on the assumption that literacy is a crucial requisite for communicating needed development-oriented attitudes and skills throughout the populace and for stimulating political consciousness supportive of socialism, President Nyerere declared 1970 "The Year of Adult Education".83 During that year Adult Education Officers were trained and posted to every district to plan extensive literacy campaigns and assist headteachers and others in the process of implementation. In his New Year's address the following January the President said that he was encouraged by the progress that had been made, and asked for special efforts to eradicate illiteracy in Dar es Salaam and five rural districts.84 These pilot projects were largely successful, but the scope of the literacy drive was further accelerated in 1971 when the Biennial Conference of TANU adopted a resolution calling for universal adult literacy by the end of 1975.86 Special attention was given to ujamaa villagers in 1972 and 1973, and by June of the latter year almost three million adults were enrolled in literacy classes.86 Materials used in literacy campaigns have become increasingly political and developmental in content. Meanwhile, the intensity of

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adult political education programmes has increased: TANU has played an active role in these, and in 1973 compulsory adult and political education classes were introduced in all places of work 87 In addition, TANU's Kivukoni College has been expanded into a high-level ideological institute for the training of party and rural development cadres; at the time of writing (1974), it is preparing teacher-trainees for seven new zonal TANU colleges."" The prospects. Some elements of Education for Self-Reliance have not yet been translated into concrete policy and practice, and it will take several years before the impact of the programme can be fully assessed. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions can be drawn about the prospects for implementation. There are three levels of analysis that must be considered. First, has the government the resources and capabilities that are necessary? Secondly, are the innovations in policy winning sufficiently wide acceptance to clear the way for their implementation? And, finally, even if the President's proposals are fully carried out, will they fulfil the expectations of political leaders, and hence reduce the constraints that education has placed on political and socio-economic development? On the question of capabilities and resources, one can find little scope for optimism. We have noted elsewhere that shortages of suitable textbooks, materials, and equipment have retarded the process of curriculum revision. The problem cannot be overcome overnight, nor is it one that financial resources alone (even if available) could solve. Geography, history, and civics/political education have been particularly ill-served; moreover, the lack of detailed knowledge about soils, climate, etc., together with a shortage of farm implements and machinery, were largely responsible for the original decision to limit the scope of agricultural instruction and farming in the schools in 1967. As we have seen, despite rather obvious attempts by the Ministry of Education to curtail the immediate rate of change in response to Education for Self-Reliance, the urgency of the President's appeal forced action more rapidly than had been planned. Moreover, several teachers and pupils quickly took up his challenge and initiated curricular and extracurricular changes on their own initiative. Because of shortages in relevant materials and equipment, considerable confusion ensued in many schools." Another obstacle stems from the intellectual limitations of primary school teachers and the tendency of teachers at all levels to accept Western values rather uncritically. Education for Self-Reliance demands new skills, some ideological and some practical, and the 1967 Ministry of Education Conference on the President's proposals recognized that teachers must shoulder the heaviest burden in the

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280

process of implementation.8° However, teachers (at all levels but especially the primary) had had great problems in adapting themselves to the rather straightforward syllabus revisions of 1963 and 1964," and have understandably had even more difficulty adjusting to the much more sweeping changes now taking place. A senior educational administrator, writing in 1968 of the first year's experience, reported: To a few of our teachers, Education for Self-Reliance initially meant little more than a return to school farming, with the optimum credit likely to be given to the school with the largest acreage and heaviest crop. Many more teachers responded to the call by urgent staff meetings at which they decided what the school effort should be and proceeded to organize the pupils accordingly. Some, in true capitalist fashion, drew up grandiose plans for carpentry workshops, irrigation schemes, chicken batteries, or tractors, and sought financial support that they should have known would not be available. Only a minority of teachers involved the local elders and officials in discussion..., and integrated the effort of the school with that of the community.... Our immediate problem is to persuade the experienced teacher of the new political and sociological significance of what he does and says in school. 93

However, despite a new teachers' college course in "National Education", "which centres upon the role of the teacher in a socialist self-reliant Tanzania",93 there are problems in equipping new teachers as well, especially Standard VII leavers. Instead of proceeding with the aim of the First Five Year Plan to upgrade the teaching service by phasing out the Grade C training programmes, the Second Plan announced decisions to expand it and establish as well a one year course for "Grade D" teachers who have completed Standard VII and two years of National Service.s4 Our survey data suggest that additional problems are posed by the teaching force. Thirty per cent of the African and Asian respondents, when asked why they had become teachers, claimed that they had had virtually no choice, either because other opportunities were completely closed to them or financially unavailable, or because they were pushed into teacher training courses by parents, teachers, or missionaries." While this response in itself says little about the degree of discontent within the profession, over one-fifth (13 out of 62) of the Tanzanians who offered it said that they intended to leave teaching. Only five per 'cent (8 out of 151) of the citizen teachers who gave other reasons for their occupational choice indicated a desire to resign, although seventeen per cent of all citizen respondents expressed some uncertainty about their intentions." It is a moot point whether one can take as a measure of widespread

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dissatisfaction the fact that over one-quarter of the Tanzanian teachers interviewed in 1966 wished to leave, or (in many cases reflecting a realistic appraisal of limited alternatives) had given some thought to leaving the profession;87 however, other responses,98 together with a subjective evaluation of the mood of those interviewed, indicated that antipathy among many teachers towards their jobs and the government was pronounced. Moreover, one must wonder how teachers can act as effective agents of change within schools and, more significantly in this regard, within their communities when a good many of them clearly believe that they have suffered a reversal in status. Asked whether teachers were more or less respected by parents and others in the community than at the time of independence, 45 per cent of the sample perceived a decline in respect and only 34 per cent an increase.99 Respondents living in Dar es Salaam and relatively well-developed regions and, more generally, teachers at the rank of Grade B or higher were particularly prominent among those who offered the former opinion.100 In explaining their answer, those who thought that teachers were less well respected singled out three factors: political (the primary school leavers' crisis and diminished popular respect for people in authority), material (the relative decline in teachers' standards of living), and social (the substantial increase in the number of teachers in the country) 101 The postArusha years have not brought any substantial improvement in the lot of teachers. In fact, they now have to work a good deal harder, undertaking additional responsibilities for agriculture, political education, and adult literacy classes. Meanwhile, primary school teachers have remained among the lowest paid of public employees. Provoked by a number of letters in the press in 1972 and 1973 decrying falling standards at the primary level, several teachers wrote replies in which they complained of overwork and poor pay.102 After a number of members of Parliament voiced support for teachers' demands, Simon Chiwanga (who replaced Mr. Mgonja as Minister for National Education in the wake of the 1972 decentralization reshuffle) promised that the government would undertake a serious review of the salary scales.'°s Turning to the educational administrators, we see that most posts within the Ministry were held by citizen Africans when Education for Self-Reliance was published. However, just shortly before that time, the author had heard recurring criticisms from politicians, teachers and others that educational administrators were too British in orientation,10a too conservative in outlook, and too concerned with trivial matter?" to provide the sort of technical and inspirational leadership necessary for adapting the educational system effectively

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to meet the needs of Tanzania. The image was applicable only to some education officers but, like any stereotype of this sort, it certainly influenced the attitudes of others. The author also discovered that many educational administrators tended to display certain attitudes that were inimical to the spirit of Education for Self-Reliance: a belief that matters concerning the quality (as opposed to the quantity) of education were the preserve of experts not politicians; an acceptance of the distinction between nonpartisan civics and politics ;1°6 and a strong attachment to the efficacy of public examinations and formal standards in determining occupational qualifications. In the broader sphere of socialist commitment and understanding, one of the recommendations of the 1967 Ministerial conference was revealing of the attitudes of many senior administrators. Dealing with the integration of schools and communities, it proposed open days and farmers' days but then concluded, "the days and times when members of the public come into the school campus must be known, and proper arrangements made, and school property will have to be carefully watched."r°7 It would be unfortunate to create the impression that all educational administrators constitute an obstacle to the successful implementation of the new policy. The author found that several of them were more in sympathy with the need to respond creatively to the school leavers' problem than many politicians perhaps thought. Moreover, while some senior administrators first interviewed early in 1966 and reinterviewed after the students' demonstration in October spoke defensively about the role of the educational system, others indicated that they were more prepared than ever to undertake radical reform measures. One field officer declared that We need Tanzanians with an original mentality ...real Tanzanians not artificial ones. If we are too influenced by the outside we will lose our balance and things will fall to pieces. Only a revolution in education will do. Nevertheless, while these latter people were certainly psychologically prepared for change, the initial official reaction of the Ministry to Education for Self-Reliance and the subsequent timidity in some policy spheres have indicated a lack of boldness and initiative. The prospects in this respect improved in September 1967 when many personnel changes were made abruptly within the Education Division of the Ministry: some officers "retired" or returned to teaching; others were sent from headquarters to the field; and yet others were brought from upcountry posts to Dar es Salaam. Joseph Sawe, the Chief Education Officer, left the service for a post with an international agency in Geneva, and was replaced by Augustine

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Mwingira,108 one of the most capable and dynamic senior educational administrators in the Ministry and an active participant in seminars sponsored by TANU to produce a more effective interchange of ideas between politicians and civil servants. More personnel changes were made in 1968 and again in 1969 when the new Ministry of National Education was created."' When the government's decentralization measures were implemented in 1972, several able, young teachers were promoted to posts in the expanded educational field administration,"° thereby strengthening greatly the potential for effective supervision of primary schools (although unfortunately removing some of the best talent from the primary and secondary teaching forces). Of course, good will and commitment are hardly the only criteria for effective decision-making. Efficient structures are needed as well. While the picture is brighter in this respect than in the early years of independence, there is still considerable room for improvement. One change that created some technical difficulties at first, but which should prove worthwhile in the long-run, involved abolishing the dual structure of educational administration and transferring the ownership and management of all publiclysupported voluntary agency schools to the central government and the local authorities. Enabling legislation was passed in 1969 and the takeover was virtually completed by mid-1970; somewhat surprisingly considering the sensitivity surrounding this question even after the Arusha Declaration, the political obstacles to nationalization were minimal." At the same time the central government assumed responsibility for paying all teachers' salaries (removing a source of grievance among teachers working in local authorities that were lax in meeting payroll commitments). In 1972 the new regional development administrations, in conjunction with District Development Councils, took over primary school education from the local authorities, which were abolished."' As far as the question of winning public approval is concerned, the key issue is the integration of education and rural life for it is on this foundation that the proposals concerning cooperative endeavour, democratic planning, and participation in nation-building rest. There has certainly been marked success in stimulating enthusiasm among the people for the rhetoric of socialism and self-reliance; actions to implement the Leadership Code have in particular strengthened this effort and retarded the growth of cynicism. More specifically, in the relative absence of overt discontent such as that expressed during the school leavers' crisis of 1966, it would appear that there has been a fairly widespread recognition that the new case for agriculture in the schools has greater merit than the colonial

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one. In large measure this response can be attributed to the ideological climate fostered after the Arusha Declaration; it is indeed doubtful that the educational proposals would have won favour outside the context of the broader ones emphasizing more effective rural development and greater social equality. However, despite the absence of articulate opposition to Education for Self-Reliance and the enthusiasm with which adults have embraced the mass literacy campaign, there is evidence that many parents have come to regard educating their children as a futile endeavour. With a steady diminution in the relative opportunities of Standard VI I leavers to obtain secondary school places and hence in prospects of secure paid employment, people in many parts of the country have opted to keep their young ones at home to tend animals or perform other domestic chores. By 1973 it was estimated that there were enough places in Standard I to accommodate seven per cent more of the seven year-old age-group than was then enrolled ;113 these vacancies, together with "wastage" in higher standards (which began to increase in 1966 after a previously steady decline through the late 1950s and early 1960s) meant that primary schools were operating at ten to twenty per cent below capacity.'" Concern about this problem and the question of what socialism implied in regard to the financing of' social services raised again the issue of abolishing primary school fees. Ronald Ngalai, MP for Rombo, spearheaded a vigorous parliamentary debate in April 1971 on a private member's motion calling on the government to consider introducing free primary level education. He and some of his fellow backbenchers argued that inability to pay fees was a major obstacle confronting many parents who might otherwise send their children to school, and an excuse for others. In response Vice-President Kawawa expressed his agreement in principle, but noted that development efforts in other spheres might be hindered as a result of the consequent reallocation of resources; in any case, it was parents' not valuing education rather than fees that was at the root of the problem. Nevertheless, the Minister for National Education did agree to direct field officers and local authorities not to expel any child from school because of non-payment.'" The debate sparked off an extensive exchange of views in the press over the next few months, and in August 1971 the Minister appointed a committee to consider the feasibility of abolishing fees and ways and means of stimulating more rapid progress towards universal primary education.'16 Several Regional Education Officers advocated eliminating fees at their annual conference the following January, arguing (rather bureaucratically if understandably) that collection was a greater headache than ever now that the leverage

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of expulsion was denied to them."" The special committee reported in July 1972 and, apparently against the Minister's wishes, it made its recommendations—outright abolition of fees and an advance in the target date for achieving universal schooling from 1989 to 1979. Mr. Ngalai urged the government to implement the report immediately, but Mr. Chiwanga replied that the time for instituting free tuition was still not ripe.11e However, the question was no longer whether to abolish fees but when. It was answered in June 1973 when they were eliminated (in all but the few English-medium primary schools119) along with several other "nuisance taxes" that had proven costly to collect in relation to the revenue generated.1E0 In his opening address to the Bienniel Conference of TANU that September, President Nyerere reported that the decision had been taken in order to combat wastage, but doubted that it was the "whole answer." He charged the party and its affiliates with a special responsibility to encourage parents to send their children to school and keep them there for the full seven years; unless greater effort was made, it would take sixty not fifteen years to achieve universal primary education.12' TAPA, which is still operating several hundred unassisted schools, is now to play a particularly important mobilizing role in combating wastage; to that end, it has been given a larger subsidy, enabling it to employ a number of teachers and education officers (seconded by the Ministry) as regional secretaries.122 Propaganda and greater participation by parents in educational affairs (not much has yet been accomplished in this sphere "23) may help to rebuild popular enthusiasm for education, but, as we shall argue, neither solution gets to the heart of the problem. One of the difficulties in opening the educational system to more widespread participation in decision-making and in converting schools into "community educational centres" stems from the historically-entrenched reluctance of educational administrators and teachers to permit an active role for others in influencing the nature of the formal educational process. This reluctance extends to school children, who have always been expected "to behave themselves" and be passive receptors of knowledge. However, Education for Self-Reliance sees pupils and students as active participants in the school community, sharing responsibility with teachers for determining and meeting its needs. In addition, the TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo) of 1971 define a leading role for the party in a number of areas previously the preserve of bureaucrats and technocrats, including the provision of guidance and leadership in the creation of socialist, participatory democracy in all places of work; and, although a huge gap remains between precept and

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practice, President Nyerere has clearly moved from a position of regarding increased popular participation as desirable in itself to one of seeing it as essential for development. None of this sits well in the hierarchical and authoritarian social structure of Tanzanian schools and colleges. Partly as a result, there have been several confrontations recently between staff and students that have ended in harsh disciplinary measures being imposed on students.124 In the context of these disputes, teachers and many members of the public have accused students of disrespecting authority and exploiting Mwongozo ;125 students in turn have criticized teachers of being colonially-minded and negligent.126 As in any polarized situation, the truth lies buried somewhere in between. However, while youthful exuberance and arrogance have been ingredients in many of the incidents, the failure of teachers to attempt participatory experiments has often been the basis of students' antics—students are seen as irresponsible and they behave accordingly. In some of the cases, the provocation has come directly from seemingly unreasoned and authoritarian acts of school heads such as in the following scenario reconstructed by a reporter for the government newspaper. On June 24, 1972 the Headmaster of Mkwawa Secondary School ordered his students to wear shorts rather than trousers when lining the streets of Iringa to greet Mr. Kawawa who was on an official visit. Several students refused, arguing that trousers were optional in the school uniform and that it was too cold at that time of year to stand about for hours in shorts. The Headmaster then decided to punish all of the students—until further notice they were to dress in shorts at all times and wear neither jackets nor pullovers over their short-sleeved shirts. In addition, town leave was cancelled except for attending church and all social and sporting activities were suspended. However, at least the Head learned that the days of splendid isolation and absolute prerogatives were over. The Regional Commissioner intervened at the request of a student delegation and reversed the disciplinary strictures; he also pointedly refuted the Headmaster's claim that the TANU Guidelines were inoperative in schools. The confrontation then shifted to one between the teaching staff and the party. After some teachers allegedly threatened to resign in protest over the Regional Commissioner's intercession, the Headmaster telephoned Ministerial headquarters, and on advice closed the school on July 1, several days before a school vacation was to have commenced. Nevertheless, the punishments were no longer in effect when Mkwawa was reopened.1" Although the picture is brighter in many educational institutions, the University of Dar es Salaam has also experienced a period of

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strained relations between students (supported by some lecturers) and the administration. It came after Symonds Akivaga, the President of the Dar es Salaam University Students' Organisation (DUSO, the successor to the old Students' Union) was rusticated in July 1971 for using inflammatory language in an open letter to the Vice-Chancellor, which complained of inadequate student representation on committees, a breakdown in communications with the administration, and slow progress in adapting the University to the needs of socialist development. Students boycotted classes for five days, returning only when President Nyerere promised a thorough investigation.128 However, amidst a volley of charges and countercharges and then in fighting among student leaders, it was not until October 1972 that DUSO began to function effectively again and student leaders agreed to participate once more in University decision-making bodies.129 Whatever the "rights and wrongs" of such incidents, they do havea demoralizing impact upon administrators, teachers, and students alike and undercut as well the possibility of developing the sort of environment Nyerere wishes to see in institutions of learning. Mr. Chiwanga, while chastising some students for misinterpreting Mwongozo, declared in November 1972 that his Ministry and TANU remained fully committed to student participation and cooperative decision-making in schools and colleges,130 but several school closures and student expulsions since then suggest that much remains to be done. President Nyerere has called for a virtual revolution in educational policy and practice. We have seen that the attitudes and behaviour of several people involved in formal education reveal at least tacit opposition to aspects of his programme and that there are immense financial and technical problems as well. However, if teachers, educational administrators, parents, and students could be convinced of the validity of Education for Self-Reliance, and if other problems could be overcome, would it be realistic to expect the educational system to promote the goals defined by the President? One danger is that even those purposes of educational reform that are broadly acceptable in principle may be unwittingly distorted or subverted in the translation of policy to practice. The failure thus far to integrate agricultural and political education effectively into the broader curriculum has meant that these subjects, while given great emphasis, have been taught in an isolated and fragmented way. Moreover, as Dr. Mbilinyi reports, "Although the school was meant to be a productive unit, a farm or crafts workshop in and of itself, and all, teachers and students alike, were to be productive members of the productive unit, instead, `self-reliance' activities are treated as something separate from the rest of school work, as extra-

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curricular."131 This tendency is well-illustrated by the headmaster who told another university lecturer who had come to observe his students in teaching practice, "If you want to watch your students' lessons, do not come on Wednesday afternoon, because that is the time we have education for self-reliance."'" This compartmentalization is further reinforced by demands made uponschooland college heads to account for the amount of money "saved" by "self-reliance activities." This is in line with the objective of encouraging some measure of financial self-sufficiency in educational institutions, but the emphasis placed upon the one aspect of performance that can be quantified (if only crudely) tends to give it undue prominence in comparison with broader goals and to substitute bureaucratic for creative behaviour.'Ø The divorce of politics, agriculture, and productive labour from the rest of the school experience and often from the wider political and economic context, certainly lessens the potential for cultivating the socialist and self-reliant attitudes desired by the Tanzanian leadership. Moreover, there is a serious risk that a mere grafting of these subjects and activities to the old curriculum may be counterproductive. One commentator notes (with particular reference to agricultural education) that, As an isolated art, participation in agricultural labour by a non-agriculturalist (and by those clearly destined to earn their living by mental labour) is at best a questionable symbol of solidarity and at worst a piece of arrogance—no different from a titled aristocrat descending into a coal mine for once in his life, wearing a worker's cloth cap.134

In the absence of a transformation in the curriculum, cynicism, breeding direct opposition or alienation, could result in a miserable failure. The unfortunate "overlap .. , found between punitive, disciplinary measures taken against students and ...self-reliance activities'"35 reinforces this prospect. However, educational policymakers have not been unaware of some of the deficiences in postArusha curricular reform. Considerable planning and research have gone into a new experimental primary school syllabus that does attempt to wed academic, technological, and political education in a total programme suited to national and local needs. It was introduced in 1973 in eight pilot projects instituted in ujamaa village schools.t3s Limited manpower and financial resources preclude its adoption in more than a few schools at any one time (and, of course, the experiments may not yield the desired results), but at least a promising start has been made in trying to meet one of the central commitments of Education for Self-Reliance.

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Military training offers another example of how an acceptable policy can be distorted in practice. While some teachers initially expressed concern about the propriety of introducing mchakamchaka to educational institutions, the military coup in Uganda in 1971 and the ensuing period of hostility between General Amin's regime and Tanzanian authorities were sufficient to convince almost everyone that it was not empty rhetoric to talk about defending the nation and the present development strategy from internal and external threats. Nevertheless, there has been a feeling among some young people that "defending the nation" is more glamourous and exciting than "building the nation", and the President has thought it necessary on occasion to remind youth that the former should not take priority to the exclusion of the latter.137 There has also been a tendency to see the "spit and polish" of military drill as an end in itself rather than in its broader context. One young secondary student, in a letter to The Standard in 1970, complained of students having "shamefully lost class time" by parading with guns to welcome President Nyerere to Iringa Region; would it not have been sufficient, he asked, to march past the President "in salutation ?"1S8 Some observers and university lecturers have complained of what they see as a similar problem at the University of Dar es Salaam— that a growing number of students have begun to approach their studies from within a rigid ideological framework.'3s One notable instance that has been cited of this tendency occurred in 1969 when members of the "Students' Revolutionary Front" (later banned) and the TYL campus branch called for the dismissal of a "reactionary" American political scientist140 who had criticized Franz Fanon, the philosopher of the Algerian Revolution. We have noted that students of education in China perceive this phenomenon as a major problem there, and clearly, if it became pronounced in Tanzania, it could well reduce the capacity of educated people to generate solutions to the problems of underdevelopment that the country so desperately needs. However, in the author's opinion, the danger of the educated substituting socialist and militant rhetoric for action has been exaggerated. At a conference held at the University in December 1973, a few student participants did couch their contributions in crude and dogmatic Marxist language that displayed a rather blinkered perspective on reality (although an expatriate lecturer was the main offender). But many more demonstrated that their studies in Marxist and socialist analysis had given them a level of critical awareness of the contradictions of underdevelopment that is rare in English-speaking African universities.141

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The students who attended the conference were in any case atypical. They represented the most articulate representatives of the left on campus, not the majority whose interests and attitudes are much closer to their predecessors who demonstrated in 1966.142 Shortly before his inauguration as Vice-Chancellor of the University, Pius Msekwa142 had said, "The task of this institution is not merely to produce graduates but to produce graduates who are well equipped and oriented to bring meaningful progress to the masses who educate them."144 However, careerism and elitism remain as powerful motive forces among most students in the University and other institutions of higher education. An incident took place at the Nyegezi Training Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 1970 that was reminiscent of the old National Service dispute: forty-six students were sent down by their Principal after they had refused to move into a dormitory which they claimed lacked proper washing facilities and partitions 146 Other illustrations also abound; as Jane and Idrian Resnick note, recent graduates "dislike working in occupations not of their choosing (secondary school science failures jumped from 40 to 58.7 per cent from 1966 to 1969), and being prevented from taking jobs with ...organizations" other than the government.146 To some extent, and with some justification, younger educated people still think that they are undergoing hardships that their elders—despite austerity measures— do not have to endure.147 All of this lends weight to Bienefeld's succinct conclusion that Attempts to eliminate the pervasive elitism of the highly educated are all but hopeless in the face of the social exclusiveness of life in present boarding schools and the university, the general social attitude to education, the students' exposure to the competitive selectiveness of the educational process and to the authoritarianism of the institutions, and the fact that education still is the gateway to high incomes, status and power. 148

Dr. Mbilinyi argues that what is needed is an alternative to the present hierarchical and competitive structure of the educational system,'" but ultimately changes in the structure of formal education will not suffice any more than curricular reform in producing the changes desired by President Nyerere. The crucial issue is whether there is any likelihood of a lasting transformation in attitudes towards the instrumental value of education. Idrian Resnick has suggested that it would be unrealistic to expect such a development unless middle and high level occupations are freed from rigid ties to formal educational qualifications.10 Worthwhile as this suggestion may be, it would prove difficult to implement because of the traditional dependence on educational criteria in

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definitions of merit, and the ease with which any other criteria can be used as a screen for nepotism and tribalism; nevertheless, it is obvious that proposals of this sort, involving the manipulation of non-educational variables, must be combined with educational policies if the latter are to be effective. More narrowly, on the question of the relationship of education to rural change, the government's paper, The Daily News, lamented editorially in 1973 that "Education for Self-Reliance is not working"; school leavers were continuing to flock to towns in large numbers. Primary school teachers were enjoined to make a more serious effort,Iat but the simple truth of the matter is that "security of income and life is still most visibly obtained by job-acquisition, not by remaining a rural agricultural producer." 52 Even looking towards the future, Albert Meister's pessimism is well-founded when he says, If we can occasionally detect a direction in history, the continual repetition of the phenomenon of rural exodus is a good example of it. The desire to make young educated Africans remain on the land runs exactly counter to history....Unwilling or unable to become a peasant, could the young African become a farmer? ... The chances of creating a modern agricultural sector...are slim because of the lack of capital for investments and for recruiting men who will be leaders. 153 However, while one can hardly expect Tanzanian authorities, to stem the drift to towns, Education for Self-Reliance is part of a broader programme that offers at least some hope for rural development. Walter Rodney, for long a leading member of the left on the University teaching staff, suggests that, As part of an educational system for youths and a political programme for adults, agriculture can be an integrative force in the life of the country and a means towards the solidarity of the working classes.... The purpose of agricultural theory and practice must be to act as a ligature which holds together a socialist society numerically dominated by peasants."4 Although these words offer a prescription that would be regarded as undesirable by some observers and overly optimistic by others, they do express the central notion that educational changes aimed at influencing economic, social, or political life cannot produce desired results in the absence of measures in other spheres as well. To be specific, the programme outlined in Education for SelfReliance cannot achieve the objectives set for it unless the overall strategy for rural development can be implemented. This requires not only a steady improvement in the standard of living in the rural

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areas, but also a continuing determination to keep the wage and salary levels of urban workers and professional people from rising much above their present levels until such time as the gap in living standards is seen to be closing. Although the Arusha Declaration reinforced the legitimacy of the government in the countryside, and gave the political leadership a base of support with which to counter-balance pressures from the privileged classes (an advantage also shared by the governments of China and Cuba), urban interests remain the most politically articulate. Unless they are placated to some extent, the government runs the risk of inducing apathy or dissidence among them, thereby endangering the forward momentum of development efforts. In the rural areas themselves, the pace of change was slow until 1970, but has been more encouraging recently. At first much of the activity that followed the publication of Nyerere's Socialism and Rural Development in 1967 was largely symbolic. Some of the old village settlement schemes, with their paternalistic and capitalintensive modes of organization, were merely renamed "ujamaa villages" without any fundamental transformation taking place. Several of the new settlement schemes were also plagued by difficulties stemming from weak leadership, uncertain organization, and excessive dictation from above by TANU officials. Moreover, a number of obstacles based on pre-colonial and colonial social and economic patterns have stood in the way of inducing people to participate in cooperative villages and, once in them, to stay; it has been particularly difficult to persuade better-off farmers to abandon their family-run capitalist operations to undertake leadership roles in the ujamaa villages.'55 While these problems remain, there has been a considerable re-allocation of resources towards the rural areas during the period of the Second Five Year Plan. In addition to the intensification of adult education, the agricultural extension corps has been enlarged (although still not sufficiently) and reoriented towards work in ujamaa villages, a three-stage programme has been devised for the evolution of villages into full producers' cooperatives, and rural credit facilities have been expanded considerably. In 1971 ujamaa development was accelerated through the adoption of a "frontal approach" —whole districts were enrolled in villages in major campaigns, which succeeded in increasing the number of these communities from 1,600 to 4,400 over the course of that year.1b6 The pace was stepped up again in 1973 when the President decreed that all peasants should move to ujamaa villages within a period of three years.'57 Still, although the concentration of scattered agricultural pro-

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ducers in villages is a prerequisite for equalizing access to services between the urban and rural areas, in itself it does not ensure the development of democratically-organized and self-reliant communal villages. Moreover, to the extent that the programme involves bureaucratization and coercion, it runs counter to Nyerere's broader goals.'S8 In the final analysis, however, its test must be whether rising levels of productivity can be generated in the absence of antagonistic class formation. (In the latter respect, doubts have been expressed about the wisdom of placing higher priority on villagization than on the collectivization.159) TANU issued a major policy statement in 1972 defining a leading role for the party in stimulating greater agricultural production,180 but it remains to be seen if the present training scheme for rural cadres can produce leaders who will work with, rather than talk down to peasants. Nevertheless, the ujamaa experiment in Tanzania is bold and imaginative, and, whatever its shortcomings, it is trying,to confront rural underdevelopment in the interests of the people rather than the privileged few, a phenomenon that is all too rare elsewhere in Africa. Conclusion What then do we conclude about the prospects for Education for Self-Reliance? Is the programme merely wasting scarce resources unless a revolution occurs in the countryside and other contradictions impeding a socialist transformation are resolved? Do we agree with Philip Foster that the school is a prisoner of society and cannot be used to initiate changes in attitudes and behaviour ?181 Or conversely with Ivan Illich, the prophet of deschooling, that the very structure of formal education inherently impedes radical change ?'82 The theses of Foster and Illich are logically consistent and wellsupported by evidence, yet their conflicting assumptions lead to virtually opposite conclusions (albeit offering equally bleak prognoses for Education for Self-Reliance). Moreover, both simplify social reality in an understandable search for universal validity. While not denying that each approach has its strengths in trying to unravel the relationship between formal education and social change, on balance we would agree with a third, essentially Marxist position—that a transformation in the material base of society must precede lasting changes in the institutional and ideological superstructure, but that the dialectical relationship between the two requires political struggle at both levels. Although it is true that Tanzania's "educational revolution" may be ill-planned, lacking in the resources necessary to see it through,

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and heavily dependent upon changes in the social relations and forces of production that may not take place, the new approach at least is aimed at overcoming the incongruity between the path of development chosen by the country's leaders and the effects of an educational system inherited from former colonial overlords. Before the potential detractor criticizes the programme too severely, he should ask himself, "Is there an alternative?" Authorities in Tanzania may not have all the answers. But it would have been foolish of them to have sat by idly in the knowledge that their educational system was inappropriate for the sort of society they seek to create.133

NOTES 1. Julius K. Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance, DSM, GP, 1967. It has

2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

been reprinted in several volumes including Nyerere, Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism, DSM, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 44-75; Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 267-90; and Idrian N. Resnick, ed., Tanzania :Revolution by Education, Arusha, Longmans of Tanzania, 1968, pp. 49-70. "First, the racial distinctions within education were abolished.... Secondly, there has been a very big expansion of educational facilities available, especially at the secondary school and post-secondary school levels.... [Thirdly], the education provided in all our schools is much more Tanzanian in content." A proposal earlier rejected by the Minister for Education (see above, pp. 204-5). The italics and the numbers are mine. Even at the height of attempts to establish mobilizational political systems in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, the governments of these countries did not introduce sweeping changes in formal education in order to achieve their radical social and political goals. Their efforts were largely limited to curriculum revisions and youth policies to facilitate political indoctrination of a rather narrow scope. However, given the high level of Israeli participation in youth programmes (particularly in the National Service) prior to 1967, it is at least plausible to argue that the Israeli kibbutz served as a model for Nyerere's vision of the school as a self-sufficient and self-reliant social unit. It is also evident that the President was strongly influenced by Rene Dumont's False Start in Africa (London, Andre Deutsch, 1966); see especially pp. 195-210. Marx and Engels made frequent references to this proposition and included it in their original call for revolutionary action in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (see the Progress Publishers, Moscow edition of 1952, p. 75). For a clear expression of the contemporary Chinese interpretation of this aspect of Marxist educational philosophy, see

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Lu Ting-yi, "Education Must Be Combined with Productive Labor," in Stewart Fraser, ed., Chinese Communist Education, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1965, pp. 283-300. 8. See Jeremy R. Azrael, "Soviet Union", in James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 233-57; and "New Deal for Russian Schools", The Economist, vol. 221, December 3, 1966, p. 1018. For a fuller examination of Soviet education and politics, see Nigel Grant, Soviet Education, London, Penguin, 1964; George Z. F. Bereday et al. eds., The Changing Soviet School, London, Constable, 1960; and George Z. F. Bereday and Jaan Pennar, eds., The Politics of Soviet Education, London, Stevens, 1960. 9. Azrael, "Soviet Union", pp. 247-65. 10. See Jeremy R. Azrael, "Bringing up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress", Problems of Communism, vol. XVII (May June 1968), pp. 24-25. 11. An extensive bibliography on Chinese education (before and after the revolution) is contained in Stewart Fraser, ed., Chinese Communist Education, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1965. Fraser's book is a useful compilation of documents, as is the shorter Chang-tu Hu, Chinese Education under Communism, New York, Teachers College Press, 1962. For overviews of education and politics, see R. F. Price, Education in Communist China, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970; Robert D. Barendsen, "Education in China: a Survey", Problems of Communism, vol. XIII (July-August 1964), pp. 19-27; C.T.Hu,"Communist Education: Theory and Practice", in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., China under Mao: Politics Takes Command, Cambridge (Mass.), M.I.T. Press, 1966; C. T. Hu, ed., "Symposium on Aspects of Chinese Education", Comparative Education Review, vol. XIII (February 1969), pp. 1-95; and John N. Hawkins, "The Educational Revolution in China," Social Theory and Practice, vol. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 58-66. 12. Lu Ting-yi, "Education and Productive Labor," p. 294 (see n. 7). 13. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966, p. 52. 14. Sec ibid., esp. Chapter 1, for an excellent discussion of the concepts of "red" and "expert" in Chinese ideology. 15. None of the secondary sources on Soviet and Chinese education consulted by the author points out that the Chinese initiative in 1958 coincided with the Khrushchev educational reform in the U.S.S.R. As a result, it cannot be determined whether or not the changes were influenced by one another. However, it is interesting that the Chinese policy, introduced at a time when Soviet influence was waning and shortly before the open breach between the two powers, was aimed at combating what were seen as dangers to the revolution in adhering to the Soviet strategy for rapid industrialization and growth. 16. Lu Ting-yi, "Education and Productive Labor," p. 295. 17. Hu, "Communist Education," p. 250. 18. Fraser, Chinese Communist Education, p. 301. 19. See Hu, "Communist Education," p. 251; and Theodore Hsi-en Chen,

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"The New Socialist Man," in Hu, ed., "Symposium on Chinese Education," p. 92. 20. This section is based on Robert D. Barendsen, "The Agricultural Middle School in Communist China", in MacFarquhar, ed., China under Mao, pp. 304-32. 21. Donald J. Munro, "Maxims and Realities in China's Educational Policy: the Half-Work, Half-Study Model," Asian Survey, vol. VII (April 1967), pp. 256-7. The section that follows is based largely on ibid., pp. 254-72; see also Chen, "New Socialist Man", especially pp. 92-3, and "China: Half-Study", The Economist, vol. 220, July 23, 1966, p. 347. 22. Munro, "Maxims and Realities," p. 263. 23. Ibid., pp. 264-5. 24. See S. Garrett McDowell, "Educational Reform in China as a Readjusting Country", Asian Survey, vol. XI (March 1971), p. 265; and Reg Hunt, "Beyond the Cultural Revolution", Times Educational Supplement, August 20, 1971. 25. See Munro, "Maxims and Realities," pp. 267-8; and especially Marianne Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution", The China Quarterly (AprilJune 1970), pp. 1645. 26. Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals", p. 43. 27. Ibid., p. 42. 28. Munro, "Maxims and Realities", p. 264. See also pp. 269-70. 29. See, for example, Hyung-chan Kim, "Ideology and Indoctrination in the Development of North Korean Education", Asian Survey, vol. IX (November 1969), pp. 831-41. 30. As well as (as is more widely known) in the sphere of gearing informal adult education to the achievement of universal literacy and a high degree of mass mobilization. See Mervyn Jones, "Crash Programme for Cuba's Schools", The New Statesman, vol. 75, February 2, 1968, pp. 134-5; and "Cuba: the Three Rs—and Something More", The Economist, vol. 299, October 26, 1968, p.42. For an overview of Cuban education (written from the standpoint of an economist and which unfortunately does not deal with attempts to combine education and productive labour), see Richard Jolly, "Education", in Dudley Seers, ed., Cuba: the Economic and Social Revolution, Chapel Hill (N.C.), The University of North Carolina Press, 1964, pp. 161-180. In Appendix A of Part II of the appendices (pp. 346-70), Jolly includes some materials on the political content of Cuban education in 1962. Some more recent general thoughts are contained in Rolland G. Paulston, "Cultural Revitalization and Educational Change in Cuba", Comparative Education Review, vol. 16 (October 1972), pp. 474-85. 31. According to a former educational administrator interviewed by the author (in Canada) in 1968. 32. See The Standard, March 11, 1967. 33. The Sunday News, March 12, 1967 (my italics). The omission is all the more striking because the address was made at the opening of a conference planned after the Arusha Declaration but before the public-

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ation of Education for Self-Reliance on "The Role of the University College, Dar es Salaam in a Socialist Tanzania." The other government and party spokesmen at the conference (Messrs. Kawawa, Anangisye, and Babu) concentrated specifically on themes based on interpretations of the Arusha Declaration (see The Sunday News, March 12, 1967 and The Standard, March 13, 1967). 34. The Standard, March 18, 1967. See above, pp. 164-5. Suspicion continued to linger that the (former European) English-medium schools, ostensibly kept open to provide for the children of expatriates, were being used by "big men" to secure educational advantages for their own children (see the critical comments voiced in the National Assembly in The Standard, July 14, 1969). 35. According to Peace Corps personnel interviewed by the author at that time. The announcement was made in The Standard, March 9, 1967. 36. The Standard, March 15, 1967. 37. Ibid., April 11, 1967. 38. See press reports and J. Cameron and W. A. Dodd, Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, Oxford, Pergamon, 1970, pp. 225-6. 39. The Standard, April 13, 1967. 40. Their approach is outlined in John S. Saul, "High Level Manpower Socialism," in Resnick, ed., Revolution by Education, pp. 93-105. 41. A full report of recommendations passed by the conference and its subcommittees was published in The Standard, March 15, 1967. With respect to this last suggestion, it was proposed to make students' contributions to the community a criterion for their graduation. 42. Dr. Wilbert Chagula. In time he became more closely associated with the leadership and was appointed to the Cabinet in 1970. At the time of writing (1974) he holds the key portfolio of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. 43. The Standard, March 20, 1967. 44. Based on conversations with two of the participants. 45. See The Standard, April 19, 21, and 22, 1967. The President accepted the Assembly resolution (proposed by Mr. A. Kaneno, M P for Karagwe)on two conditions: that the ringleaders would not be reinstated, and that parents would be obliged to write or make statements to Regional Commissioners describing the behaviour of their children during the time since October 22. On June 21 it was announced that all but 20 of the 412 would be permitted to resume their studies (see The Standard). Pleas from three M Ps to pardon these 20 students were rejected (ibid., June 24 and July 7, 1967). 46. The Nationalist, June 19, 1967. 47. The Standard, July 4, 1967; see also the issue of July 2. 48. Ibid., July 1, 1967. 49. See, for example, reports in ibid., April 20 and 30, 1967; May 21, 1967; January 18 and 26, 1968. 50. The Standard and especially The Nationalist carried scores of stories about such activities throughout 1967.

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51. The Standard, February 6, 1968. 52. The Daily News, July 14, 1972. 53. The number of nine year-old children in 1967 (roughly the number who would have been seven in 1965) was 304, 449. The number of five year-old children in 1967 (roughly the number who would be seven by 1969) was 419, 242. If we assume that there were 304.5 thousand seven year-olds in 1965 and 419.2 thousand in 1969, this represents an increase of 38 per cent. Meanwhile, Standard I enrolment increased from 149, 341 to 157, 986 (see Table 6.5. For the census data, see United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 3, 1971, Table 201). 54. Using the data in n. 53, we see that a Standard I enrolment of 149, 341 in 1965 represented 49 per cent of nine year-olds in 1967, while 157, 986 pupils in 1969 represented 38 per cent of five year-olds in 1967. The enrolment in 1967 was 157, 196, representing 42 per cent of the actual population of seven year-old children in that year. See 1967 Census, vol. 3, Table 201. 55. United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1969-80th June 1979, 1969, vol. I, p. 149. 56. Ibid., p. 148. 57. Ibid., vol. II, p. 63. 58. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 149 and 153-4. 59. See President Nyerere's speech to the Bienniel Conference of TANU, The Daily News, September 26, 1973. 60. The average annual growth rate in Form I dropped from 6 per cent during the planning period 1964-9 to 3 per cent during the period 1969-72. The comparative rates for Form V intake fell from 22 per cent in 1964-9 to 9 per cent in 1969-72. (Calculated from basic data in United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey 1971-72, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 130.) 61. Second Five rear Plan, vol. IV, p. 16. Italics in the original. 62. M. A. Bienefeld, "Planning People", in J. F. Rweyemamu et al, eds., Towards Socialist Planning, DSM, Tanzania Publishing House 1972, pp. 174-5. 63. Second Five rear Plan, vol. I, pp. 152-3. 64. Edmund O'Connor, "Contrasts in Educational Development in Kenya and Tanzania", African Affairs, vol. 73 (January 1974), p. 82. 65. See The Nationalist, August 13, 1968. 66. The Standard, April 2, 1971. 67. The Nationalist, June 11, 1971. While the measure was generally received positively, there was not unexpectedly some concern among the privileged and literate about the implications. See, for example, a letter in The Standard, June 24, 1971, predicting that the move would increase influence-peddling, and another in ibid., July 15, 1971, forecasting a lowering of standards. 68. Marjorie Mbilinyi, "Education for Rural Life or Education for Socialist Transformation," paper prepared for the Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1973, p. 4.

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69. The Daily News, June 1, 1973. 70. Ibid., November 14, 1973. 71. In any case reliable estimates of the percentage of school-age children enrolled in the 1970s will now have to await the 1977 census. 72. The Daily News, June 15, 1972. 73. Ibid., December 22, 1972. 74. Ibid., December 23, 1972. 75. Ibid., November 5, 1973. 76. Calculated from basic data in The Nationalist, April 24, 1971. 77. Calculated from basic data in ibid. and The Standard, issues of October and November, 1971. The Coast figures are in The Standard, October 20, 1971. 78. The Nationalist, May 5, 1971. Private schools had been charging as much as Shs. 1800 for tuition. The decision to impose maximum fees (in practice they are minimum as well) came after mounting criticism about profiteering, and a public rebuke of the managers of some private schools by the Minister for Education (see The Standard, February 2, 1971). 79. United Republic of Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 1970, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 206. 80. See the criticism of earlier neglect of adult education in Cameron and Dodd, Schools and Progress, p. 211. 81. Second Five rear Plan, vol. I, p. 157. 82. The Department of Culture was transferred to a restyled Ministry of Education and Culture in 1968 (see The Nationalist, September 12, 1968), and the Ministry of National Education, incorporating responsibility for adult education, was formed early the following year (ibid., February 4, 1969). 83. The Standard, January 1, 1970. 84. Ibid., January I, 1971. 85. The Nationalist, September 27, 1971. 86. See press reports throughout the period; The Daily News, June 28, 1973; and President Nyerere's speech to the Biennial Conference of TANU ibid., September 26, 1973. 87. See The Daily News, July 13, 1973. For an earlier discussion of political education programmes, see Lionel Cliffe, "Socialist Education in Tanzania," in Kenneth Prewitt, ed., Education and Political Values: an East African Case Study, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1971, p. 57. 88. See The Sunday News, February 25, 1973. 89. According to press reports and informal interviews (albeit mostly with former expatriate volunteer teachers). For a good, if understandably optimistic account of the difficulties of implementing the school agricultural policy, see A. C. Mwingira, "Education for Self-Reliance: the Problems of Implementation", in Richard Jolly, ed., Education in Africa: Research and Action, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969, pp. 65-80, esp. pp. 68-9. Mwingira was Chief Education Officer when his chapter was prepared as a conference paper in 1968.

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90. Cameron and Dodd, Schools and Progress, p. 226. 91. Many teachers complained to the author in 1966 about their difficulties in understanding and interpreting the syllabuses. Moreover, several Primary School Inspectors noted their disappointment about the inability of many teachers to adapt; not surprisingly older ones had particular trouble. 92. Mwingira, "Problems of Implementation," p. 68. Italics in the original. 93. Ibid., p. 69. 94. Second Five Year Plan, vol. I, pp. 153-4. Growing primary school enrolment made both measures necessary, but they were criticized as retrograde steps by some Members of Parliament (see The Standard, July 14 and 15, 1969). 95. The question was not put to Europeans, who were asked instead why they had come to Tanzania to teach. 61 (30 per cent) of the 203 African and Asian primary and 11 (30 per cent) of the secondary school teachers gave "no choice" as their response. Other reasons offered were (N=241): general responses such as "I liked it", "I wanted to", "It was my decision", "It was a calling", "I was a born teacher", 23 per cent; liked dealing with children, 19 per cent; wanted to help build the nation, 16 per cent: wanted the opportunity to continue learning, 8 per cent; wanted to help tribe or village, 3 per cent; others, 1 per cent. As one would expect, more older teachers and educational administrators who were former teachers (42 per cent of 132 who were 35 or over) claimed that they had had no choice than younger ones (20 per cent of 226 under 35); and women (N=62) tended to offer "liked dealing with children" (45 per cent) more than "no choice" (18 per cent). The responses of primary and secondary school teachers correlate remarkably well, and there were no other major differences, surprisingly not either in race or in father's occupation. It is interesting that 37 out of 79 (47 per cent) educational administrators who were former teachers gave "no choice" as their basic reason for becoming teachers; of course, these people tended to be older than the teachers and therefore had had proportionately fewer occupational alternatives when they entered and completed teacher training courses. 96. 36 out of 213. For primary school teachers (N=191) the breakdown to the question, "Do you intend to remain in teaching?" was: "yes", 74 per cent; "no", 10 per cent; "maybe" or "don't know", 16 per cent. The breakdown for secondary school teachers was: "yes", 64 per cent; "no", 9 per cent; "maybe" or "don't know", 27 per cent. As one would expect, the extent of "no" and "don't know" responses was highest among respondents under 35. The proportions. of "no" responses were fairly evenly distributed among teachers of all grades and educational levels, but the percentage of "don't know" respondents for Education Officers and Grade A teachers (N=47) was higher (28 per cent) than for lower grade teachers (14 per cent of 165) who had fewer occupational alternatives. Among primary school teachers, those in Dar es Salaam (N=45) were more negative or uncertain

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about their intentions (40 per cent) than those in other local education authorities (21 per cent of 144). (The numbers do not add up correctly to 213 and 191 because of computing or coding mistakes.) 97. Twenty-seven per cent (21 "no" and 36 "don't know" out of 213). Of these 57, 93 per cent gave as their reason for intending to leave (or thinking about it) dissatisfaction with working conditions (especially salaries, opportunities for promotion and upgrading, and the policy of transferring teachers anywhere in the country). 5 per cent said that they had lost interest in their jobs, and one Grade A primary school teacher claimed that he was fed up with the lack of freedom given to teachers in the classroom. Of the eighteen primary school teachers from Dar es Salaam (with its high cost of living and greater relative disparities in income and life styles), eleven (61 per cent) cited low salaries as their reason. 98. Asked an open-ended question about what they thought of teachers' salaries, only 18 per cent of the African and Asian respondents (N=242) said that salaries were high enough. Another 28 per cent said that they were insufficient to cover expenses, but high enough considering the economic situation of Tanzania, while 52 per cent said that they were too low (2 per cent did not offer opinions). In answering the question "Would you say that the prospects of promotion for teachers are good, not so good (fair), or poor?" 11 per cent said "good", 25 per cent, "fair", and 54 per cent, "poor". (10 per cent did not know.) Africans tended to be more discontented about salaries, and Asians about promotion prospects: urban teachers were marginally more dissatisfied than rural ones; and secondary school teachers were a little happier with salaries than those working at the primary level. 99. The question was: "Do you think that the amount of respect that parents and other people have for teachers has risen or fallen since independence (or uhuru) ?" The breakdown of responses (N=243) was: risen, 82; fallen, 109; the same, 11 (5 per cent); don't know for certain—may haue (or has) risen for Africans but has fallen (or stayed the same) for Asians, 16 (7 per cent); don't know, 25 (10 per cent). The response involving racial comparisons was only given by Asians (N=40) and was the dominant one offered by them (40 per cent). The breakdown for all African teachers (N=203) was: risen, 38 per cent; fallen, 49 per cent; the same, 4 per cent; don't know, 9 per cent. 100. Among primary school teachers, 61 per cent of those in Dar es Salaam (N=56) and 54 per cent of those in Moshi Town and Kilimanjaro District (N=63) thought that respect for teachers had fallen, compared to only 18 and 35 per cent respectively who said that it had risen. In contrast, 51 per cent of those in Iringa Town, Iringa District and Kisarawe (N= 84) answered "risen" and only 34 per cent "fallen". (The largest variation among these three LEAs in either response was only 8 per cent.) There were no substantial differences between primary and secondary teachers (apart from more "don't know" responses among the latter), but, looking at the combined totals, we see that 45 per cent of Grade C teachers (N=117) and only 25 per cent of those at other ranks (N=126) claimed that respect for

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teachers had increased. Older and more experienced teachers (especially those 40 or over and those serving for fifteen or more years) were strongly of the opinion that respect for teachers had risen, a probable reflection both of the deference accorded to elders in Tanzania and of some recollections of unpleasant teaching experiences in the years before the rise of nationalism. 101. Among the 109, the breakdown was: political factors, 31 per cent (12 per cent and 19 per cent, the primary school leavers' crisis and diminished respect for authority respectively); material factors, 29 per cent; social factors, 28 per cent; "bad behaviour" of some teachers, 5 per cent; and don't know, 7 per cent. There were no significant differences among groups within the sample. Among the 82 who thought that popular respect for teachers had risen, the reasons offered for this were: people value education more highly now, 82 per cent; teachers now participate more fully in the community, 7 per cent; teachers are now better educated and trained, 6 per cent; people know that teachers' working conditions have improved, 4 per cent; don't know, 1 per cent. 102. For some of that period it was not uncommon to find a letter or so a week complaining about falling standards. For examples of rejoinders by teachers, see The Daily News, September 9, 1972 and February 21 and 28, 1973; and The Sunday News, December 3, 1972. 103. The Daily News, June 29, 1973. 104. The author attended the Conference of Regional Education Officers in August 1966. Mr. Eliufoo opened the Conference with an address in Swahili. After he departed, the Chairman said, "Now gentlemen, let's carry on in English. That [the Swahili speech] was only a political concession." Moreover, in 1966 it was a standing joke in Dar es Salaam that one could tell an African educational administrator by his mode of dress—white shirt, shorts, and knee socks, the basic "uniform" of the "old colonial type". 105. With respect to concern over trivia, many teachers of all racial groups referred to a Ministry circular of May 1966 forbidding women teachers from wearing sundresses or skirts above their knees on the grounds that such apparel was indecent. One teacher pointed out not only that the circular was pointless in a tropical climate but also that it was inconsistent—no mention was made of traditional Asian dress which, although covering the knees, leaves gaps elsewhere, nor was there any mention of the shorts worn by many male teachers. However, it is interesting that this very question of female attire later became an important one in a campaign launched by the TYL "green guards" against "decadent" Western standards of dress (see The Nationalist and The Standard, issues of December 1968 and January 1969), and in another undertaken by TANU in 1973 (see The Daily News, September 8, 1973). 106. See above, pp. 222-3. It is revealing that only eight out of eighty-one educational administrators in an interview sample offered "the training of good citizens" in response to a question about the purposes

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of education. When questioned further about what they meant by "good citizens", six of the eight stressed the concept of service to the nation, four the necessity for a general understanding of how government institutions work, and three the desirability of fostering democratic values. None mentioned "socialism" or "ujamaa" explicitly. 107. Cited in Cliffe, "Socialist Education," p. 60. The italics are Cliffe's. 108. Mwingira had been Assistant Chief Education Officer, Planning Section. He became Principal Secretary in 1968, and then moved to the University of Dar es Salaam as Chief Administrative Officer in 1970. In 1973 he was transferred back to the civil service as Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and National Service. For details of the 1967 personnel changes, see The Standard, September 9 and 25, 1967. 109. The Nationalist, July 10, 1968 and February 4, 1969. 110. The Daily News, June 29 and August 17, 1972. More personnel changes were made at the centre the following year (see ibid., December 15, 1973). 111. The takeover followed passage of a new National Education Act, which provoked little debate in the National Assembly. (See The Standard, November 24 and December 17 and 18, 1969. For reports of progress and problems, see ibid., issues of January to May, August 15, and August 24, 1970.) Earlier, in 1968, the East African Muslim Welfare Society had been banned amidst a growing conflict within its ranks; its educational responsibilities were transferred to the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, a new organization supported by several African Muslims prominent in TANU. 112. See Julius K. Nyerere, Decentralisation, DSM, GP, 1972; and The Daily News, July 1, 1972. 113. See President Nyerere's speech to the Bienniel Conference of TANU in 1973 (printed in full in The Daily News, September 26, 1973). 114. Judging from official estimates and scattered statistics (see The Standard, January 21, 1971; The Nationalist, July 3, August 8, and September 4, 1971; and President Nyerere's speech cited inn. 113). 115. The Nationalist, April 28, 1971. 116. The Standard, August 9, 1971. 117. Ibid., January 5, 1972. 118. For the report, see The Daily News, July 12, 1972; for the Minister's criticism of the committee for releasing its report and for the nature of its recommendations, see ibid., July 17, 1972. 119. Ibid., September 18, 1973. This decision clearly discriminated against those members of the "wabenzi" who had chosen to send their children to the English-medium schools. Whether it will be possible to ensure continuing fees collection in these schools is another matter—a year earlier the District Education Officer for Dar es Salaam had publicly complained about parents not paying fees in several city schools, including Bunge Primary School, one of the former European institutions (The Daily News, June 15, 1972). 120. The Daily News, June 15, 1972.

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121. The President predicted that universal primary education would not be achieved until 2034 unless the rate of expansion were greatly accelerated (The Daily News, September 26, 1973). 122. See The Standard, April 12, 1971; and The Sunday News, September 23, 1973 and January 27, 1974. TAPA had turned over all of its assisted schools to the central and local governments in 1970, but it was still running 537 unassisted schools in 1973—one at the secondary level and 536 at the primary (The Sunday News, May 6, 1973). 123. See David Court, "The Social Function of Schooling in Tanzania," paper prepared for the Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1971, p. 6. 124. See press reports of the most prominent incidents, which involved the following secondary schools: Pugu (The Standard, August 14 and 16, 1971) ; Musoma (The Daily News, May 17, 1972 and The Sunday News, May 28, 1972); Mkwawa (The Sunday News, July 2, 1972 and The Daily News, July 5, 10, 17, and 21, 1972); Mzumbe (The Daily News, July 9, 1973); Bwiru (ibid., September 5, 1973); Kisongera (ibid., September 7, 1973); and Tumaini (ibid., September 14, 1973). Each of these involved school closures or expulsions of students, except the Bwiru case, in which six students were hospitalized and another seventeen required medical attention after being "disciplined" by the Headmaster. 125. See, for example, letters published in The Daily News, March 30 and April 24, 1973; and in The Sunday News, January 20, 1974. See also the statement of G. A. Semiti, MP, in ibid., July 16, 1972. 126. See, for example, letters published in The Daily News, July 20, 21 and 29, 1972, and July 21 and October 15, 1973. 127. See J. Ulimwengu, "Chiwanga Should Tell Us about Mkwawa," The Sunday News, July 21, 1972; and reports in The Daily News, July 5, 10, 17, and 21, 1972. TANU officials also intervened in the Musoma dispute, ordering the reinstatement of 370 students who had been suspended (The Sunday News, May 28, 1972). 128. See reports in The Nationalist and The Standard, July, August, and September 1971, especially July 10-15. 129. The University Council appointed an investigatory committee under the chairmanship of J. Mungai, MP. It reported in November, but its recommendations were denounced as a bureaucratic whitewash by the campus TYL branch (see The Standard, November 29, 1971), and they provoked a heated exchange of letters in the press in December. In the meantime, the University disciplinary authorities rejected Akivaga's appeal for reinstatement, and the "Cabinet" of DUSO resigned in protest, leaving the student body formally leaderless (The Nationalist, August 20, 1971 and The Standard, August 25, 1971). He was reinstated the following year, but his new Cabinet still refused to appoint student representatives to University committees. However, Akivaga's image as a campus hero was soon tarnished—his Cabinet was overthrown in a "bloodless coup" in September 1972 (following allegations of corruption and dictatorial behaviour), and a provisional "Revolutionary Council" organized fresh DUSO elections. A new Cabinet took office

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in October and it soon reestablished a working relationship with the administration (see The Daily News, September 1 and October 28, 1972; and The Sunday News, October 22, 1972). 130. The Sunday News, November 19, 1972. 131. Mbilinyi, "Education for Rural Life," p. 4. Italics in the original. 132. Cited in S. Ndunguru, "'Education for Self-Reliance' and the Curriculum," East Africa Journal, vol. VIII (February 1971), p. 13. 133. Several reports of "money saved" through self-reliance activities have been published in the press. E.g. The Daily News, June 7, 1972. 134. Walter Rodney, "Education and Tanzanian Socialism," in Resnick, ed., Revolution by Education, p. 78. 135. Mbilinyi, "Education for Rural Life," p. 4. 136. The Daily News, June 28, 1973. 137. E.g. the President's speech reported in The Standard, February 6, 1968. 138. The Standard, August 22, 1970. 139. Based on informal conversations. 140. Dr. F. S. Singleton. See The Standard, August 7, 1969. 141. Some members of the student left at the University have also made significant theoretical contributions to the debate over the prospects for socialism in Tanzania. Particularly notable was the essay, "Tanzania: the Silent Class Struggle," written by Issa G. Shivji (then in his graduating year and now a lecturer) and published in a local student magazine in 1970. It provoked a number of responses by socialist academics at the University, which have now been collected with the original essay in The Silent Class Struggle, DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1973. (Most of these have also been reproduced in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, vol. II, 1973, pp. 304-58.) For an assessment of the student left (written before the 1971 crisis), see John S. Saul "Radicalism and the Hill," in Cliffe and Saul, Socialism in Tanzania, vol. II, pp. 289-92. 142. A point underscored by Saul in "Radicalism and the Hill". 143. Msekwa had been Executive Secretary General of TANU, 1967-70. 144. The Standard, August 29, 1970. 145. Jane and Idrian Resnick, "Tanzania Educates for a New Society", Africa Report, vol. 16 (January 1971), p. 29. 146. The Standard, December 3, 1970. The Nyegezi Centre has been particularly beset by this sort of trouble-it was closed for a month in 1972 after students had demonstrated against a decision to issue them with certificates rather than diplomas (The Sunday News, June 11, 1972). 147. Jane and Idrian Resnick, "Tanzania Educates for a New Society," Africa Report, vol. 16 (January 1971), p.29. The Resnicks write (ibid.) : "They see the modification of The Arusha Declaration, which allows leaders to put their property in trust for their children, as a loophole entrenching the politically powerful and sheltering them from the sacrificial knife of socialism. Graduates resent having to pay 30 per cent of their salaries for private housing when senior officials are provided with government houses for only 10 per cent of their incomes. They conclude that `equality is only for the

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lower ranks of the civil service'." 148. Bienefeld, "Planning People," p. 180. 149. Mbilinyi, "Education for Rural Life," esp. pp. 17-26. 150. Idrian N. Resnick, "Educational Barriers to Tanzania's Development," in Resnick, ed., Revolution by Education, pp. 123-34. The Resnicks also stress this point in "Tanzania Educates", p. 29. 151. The Daily News, February 13, 1973. 152. Mbilinyi, "Education for Rural Life", p. 3. 153. Albert Meister, East Africa: the Past in Chains, the Future in Pawn, New York, Walker & Co., 1968, pp. 232 and 234. 154. Rodney, "Education and Tanzanian Socialism," p. 78. 155. See Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," Foreign Affairs, vol. 47 (April 1969), pp. 552-54. For a wide-ranging selection of papers on rural development policy, see Cliffe and Saul, eds., Socialism in Tanzania, vol. II, pp. 122-211. 156. The United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey 1971-72, DSM, GP, 1972, pp. 60-63. 157. The Daily News, November 7, 1973. 158. For a good analysis of these problems, see P. Raikes, "Ujamaa Vilgmi and Rural Socialist Development," paper prepared for the Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, Dec. 1973. 159. See ibid. 160. The Daily News, May 20, 1972. 161. See Philip J. Foster, "The Vocational School Fallacy in Development Planning," in C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, eds., Education and Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine, 1963; and, dealing specifically with Tanzania, his "Education for Self Reliance: a Critical Evaluation," in Jolly, ed., Education in Africa, pp. 81-101. 162. See Ivan Illich, "Education without School: How It Can Be Done," The New York Review of Books, vol. XV (January 7, 1971), pp. 25-31; and Illich. "The Alternative to Schooling," Saturday Review, vol. 54 (June 19, 1971), pp. 44-48. Court examines Education for Self-Reliance in the light of the Foster and Illich thesis in "The Social Function of Formal Schooling in Tanzania." 163. After this book went to press, the National Executive Committee of TANU committed the government to a crash programme of primary school expansion aimed achieving universal primary education by November 1977. The NEC decided as well that all Form VI leavers would now spend time living and working in the community, and that university admission would be based in part on the recommendations of party branches. In addition, the Ministry of National Education was urged to find other means of bringing examination policy and practice into closer accord with the precepts of Education for SelfReliance. (See "Tanzania: Education and Leadership", Africa, No. 42 [February 1975], p. 33.)

12 CONCLUSION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW In this study of Tanzania, we have examined the politics of education in relation to social structure, occupational integration, and political socialization. These are factors that have in turn influenced the country's structure of political conflict and authority and, more specifically, the programme for national development gradually defined after independence. A few theoretical propositions can now be suggested about the relationship between politics and education in underdeveloped countries, and the role educational reforms can play in strategies for development. We have seen that the interplay of education and politics can create or reinforce as many problems as it can overcome. First, although it is true that schooling can be a great equalizer by heightening social and economic mobility and hastening effective integration of disparate groups and strata, the distribution of educational opportunities can also be such that vertical social cleavages are widened and sharpened, and that the gulf separating the privileged few from the underprivileged many is deepened. The resulting social and political conflict may contribute to either a strengthening or a weakening of political legitimacy and developmental momentum. Secondly, it is difficult to integrate education and occupational structures in a way that produces maximum economic and political benefits. It is possible to project the requirements of the public and private sectors of the economy for middle and high level manpower and to design programmes for the expansion of secondary and higher educational institutions to meet these requirements; however, it is folly to think that this economistic approach (so prevalent in Western thinking about developments) will ensure that an educational system has the qualitative potential to produce graduates with the motivation and the technical competence to fulfil expectations set for them. Moreover, although there is a high correlation between the extent of mass literacy and per capita income,2 a rapid rise in the output of elementary schools may well contribute, at least in the short-run, to increases in urban unemployment and rural underemployment and to social and political tensions that can divert the allocation of resources away from their most productive use. Finally, in attempting to foster political integration and to inculcate certain social and political values, political and educational authorities may be able to increase 307

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

308

support for the government and its policies. Nevertheless, they also run the risk of inducing apathy and/or dissidence among youth to such an extent that the legitimacy of a regime is weakened and a potentially valuable asset in terms of manpower for development is devalued or even lost. In order to understand how these contradictory tendencies arise, education and politics must be studied as mutually dependent variables within the context of underdevelopment. For the purposes of analytical clarity, we shall approach this task by reviewing, first, the non-political constraints on the politics of education which set limitations on the range of policy alternatives that can be considered; next, the explicitly political pressures that further constrain freedom of manoeuvre because they cannot easily be reconciled; and, thirdly, the extent to which formal eduction can be manipulated so as to maximize its positive contribution to strategies for development. Although Tanzania is a special case among non-communist underdeveloped countries in the sense that it has become one of the few to have undertaken more than a rhetorical commitment to a socialist transformation, its historical development and its social and economic structures are sufficiently typical of the ex-colonial territories of tropical Africa that its experience is suggestive of generalizations concerning each of these questions. The non-political constraints on educational policy-making stem largely from the structure of colonialism and the nature of underdevelopment. Political and educational authorities have to adjust themselves to systems of formal education which provide only limited opportunities for schooling at the elementary level and markedly fewer opportunities at higher levels, which reinforce and highlight horizontal and vertical social cleavages, and which to some extent estrange children from their society and their culture. Moreover, limited capital and scarce skilled manpower dictate that programmes for expanding educational facilities, especially at post-primary levels, must fall well short of popular demands unless there are such drastic reductions in other public commitments that development efforts are undermined and employment opportunities for school leavers and graduates even further reduced. Attempts to introduce qualitative changes are also constrained by these factors, especially by the shortage of competent and adaptable administrators and teachers. The political forces operating within this context can be characterized as a series of crosscutting ideological perspectives. First, there is a conflict between elitism and populism that dates back to colonial days when general administrators favoured limited educa-

309

CONCLUSION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

tional development geared essentially to the production of low level manpower, and missionaries and many lay educators advocated mass education for Christian proselytization and the presumed "civilizing" effects of literacy. As a result, the limited resources available were channelled in a way that provided a modicum of education for a substantial minority of African children and that singled out a select few for post-primary education and its rewards. Post-independence political leaders view literacy as an important symbol of modernity and realize that mass expectations can be satisfied more easily in the educational sphere than in many others. As a result, they have tended to favour a more populist approach, often committing themselves to universal primary schooling immediately or on a phased basis. However, they are also aware of the need for highly educated and skilled indigenous manpower to replace expatriates and to provide the expertise for expanded development programmes. They are under pressure as well from African parents, both within and outside the more privileged strata, to create more opportunities for children to proceed beyond a primary school education that no longer provides the jobs it had once virtually guaranteed. Moreover, manpower planners and many educational advisers have cautioned that the short- and long-run expenditures required to finance primary level expansion involve a largely wasteful diversion of public monies into unproductive consumption at a time when it is essential to maximize investment by undertaking a carefully planned programme for the expansion of higher level facilities. Secondly, opinions differ on the related question of how to deal with the uneven distribution of educational opportunities among religious, regional, and ethnic groups that developed haphazardly during the colonial era.3 The problem is further complicated by the fact that a few Africans have achieved elite status largely as a result of educational selection, and want to maintain that status for their families. Politicians, religious and traditional leaders, educators, parents, and other spokesmen for groups and interests that are relatively privileged may not request continuing special preferences; however, they tend to couch their arguments about educational opportunities in terms of a basically liberal conception of equality, which accepts existing disparities as given and asks that equal treatment be given to all groups in the future. Those who claim to represent groups or interests that are (or appear to be) underprivileged tend to voice their demands on the basis of an essentially socialist conception of equality, which sees the need to extend special preferences to the less privileged in order to achieve long-run parity of treatment. Claiming to represent all the people,

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

310

but mindful of the fact that their legitimacy depends more on some groups than others, political leaders find it most expedient to decry past injustices and, by and large, to uphold the liberal conception of equality. Thirdly, cutting across the quantitative dimension of educational policy-making, there are competing views about whether the structure and content of education should be patterned on models imported from former metropolitan powers or adapted to indigenous conditions. While colonial administrators conceived of schooling rather narrowly in terms of its supportive function for the regime, many religious and lay educators were concerned about the appropriateness of the educational experience within the African context. However, several attempts to adapt schools to indigenous traditions and to agrarian life failed, in part because they were illconceived and patronizingly paternalistic, but largely because Africans demanded a literary education that would open the door to paid employment in the colonial occupational structure. Passive rote learning of "factual" material, often largely irrelevant in local circumstances, provided the key to open the door because promotion from one educational level to the next depended heavily on rigid examination structures. At the same time, African teachers, many of whom later became educational administrators, felt secure in this system, which they had passed through themselves and which seemed to guarantee standards of educational attainment equal to those of the metropolitan powers. As a result, while post-independence plans to Africanize syllabuses have met little opposition as long as they have not appeared to threaten occupational mobility or debase formal standards, more far-reaching proposals for radical changes in the teaching and learning processes, in methods for evaluation, and in the agricultural and vocational contents of curricula must contend with strong conservative pressures from parents, pupils, and teachers and a good many educational administrators and politicians. Fourthly, there is a related question about the extent to which state schooling should serve society or the individual. Although the colonial conception of social and civic obligation was taught in the schools prior to independence, the dominant values imparted (albeit in a paternalistic and authoritarian manner) were those of Western liberal individualism, and prospective teachers in training were instructed that their primary task was to ensure the healthy development of individual children. But, above all, the most significant factor contributing to this basically individualistic conception of education was and is the intense competition for educational and occupational advancement. Politicians, educational administrators,

311

CONCLUSION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

teachers, and pupils may well point with pride to the contribution of schools in developing a sense of national identity and solidarity, in achieving mass literacy, and in producing skilled manpower for development. However, as the Tanzanian case demonstrates, it is exceedingly difficult to overcome the individualist and materialist biases that permeate African educational systems so that values of self-sacrifice and service can be inculcated and reinforced, an accomplishment that even many political leaders not formally committed to socialism would welcome. Finally, influencing each of the others, there is conflict about whether the primary responsibility for educational policy-making should rest with politicians or professional experts and, more generally, about the extent to which the policy-making process should be open. During the colonial era, within limits set by budgetary constraints and indigenous responses to schooling, governments and mission societies had a fairly free hand in determining the pace of educational expansion, while professional educators, both teachers and administrators, had a virtual monopoly over the contents of curricula and the nature of the learning experience. After independence, religious authorities assumed a clearly subordinate position (although they did retain considerable influence at the local level); however, often to the chagrin of educators, manpower planners began to play an increasingly important role in setting quantitative guidelines for development. In addition, political activists at all levels began to exert growing influence over the rate of educational expansion and the siting of schools and colleges. However, while conceding that government leaders have the right to set objectives for educational systems, educators have clung to the view that the details of policy concerning programmes of studies and the maintenance of educational standards properly remain within their preserve. Because their perspectives tend to be conservative and based on principles introduced by former metropolitan powers, they constitute an obstacle to any radical changes that political leaders or others might wish to introduce. While it is true that the- context of educational policy-making makes it difficult to alter policies and practices radically and that forces for change are countered by strongly entrenched conservative interests, the Tanzanian case does show that it is nevertheless possible to evolve a strategy for overcoming some of the problems imposed or reinforced by formal education. The last question we must consider is whether educational reforms, if attempted, can accomplish the social and political tasks set for them. Education can produce some desired changes in social structure, but not others. Although the extent to which educational opportu-

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

312

nities can be redistributed among social groups is limited by a lack of resources and by political pressures, as long as educational attain-. ment remains the prime determinant of socio-economic mobility and privilege, it is possible to close the gap in these respects between groups that are differentiated vertically by race, religion, location, and ethnic affiliation. However, the nature of underdevelopment implies that the range of opportunities to enjoy an advanced level of social and material amenities does not expand rapidly. As a result, the division between the more privileged and less privileged segments of society can easily harden into a rigid class structure in which those who already possess advantages can take steps to secure continuing social and economic opportunities for their children. This sort of development cannot be forestalled by manipulating an educational system: policing selection and promotion procedures to ensure some degree of equity (elite children start off with a cultural advantage in any case) and emphasizing egalitarian values in the curriculum may help, but, to be effective, these measures require a broader political programme aimed at containing the privileges of the upper strata and closing the gap between them and the masses. Of the three factors of social structure, occupational integration, and political socialization, education can most easily be manipulated to achieve one aspect of a politically satisfactory fit between an educational system and an occupational structure. While it takes considerable capital and some time to establish higher level institutions that are appropriate for the production of skilled local manpower, there are no major political obstacles to doing so (although there may well be conflict over definitions of what is appropriate and how to proceed). However, the usefulness of specifically educational policies to overcome the tensions arising from underemployment among primary school leavers is much more questionable; this problem can only be overcome when the pace of economic development is sufficient to sustain a high level of employment. Many Western observers think that the only viable counteractive educational measure involves curtailing or even halting the expansion of primary school facilities, but the difficulty with this prescription is that its implementation tends to reinforce an existing pattern of privilege. The other alternative, making use of the socializing potential of schools to reorient attitudes towards rural life and to give youths the incentive to undertake modern farming, can be effective only in the context of more far-reaching policies for stimulating agricultural production and improving living conditions in the countryside. The question of using curricula and the school experience to inculcate values related not just to vocational preferences but also

313

CONCLUSION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

to the generation of support for a political system, its regime, and the goals of its leaders is equally complex. While an effective programme of political education depends in part on the skilful preparation of syllabuses, textbooks, and teaching aids, it must rely largely on factors that cannot be controlled easily, such as the capabilities and attitudes of teachers, the way in which classroom and extra-curricular activities are undertaken, and the degree to which what the child learns at school is congruent with what he observes in society at large. Even if all of these variables could be controlled, a hard task when there is a wide gap between aspirations and realities, formal education is only one of several competing agents of socialization. The family, the peer group, the church, and, underlying these and other structures, the social relations of production influence the development of values and behavioural traits. Several scholars have adduced evidence suggesting that the school, and especially the primary school, is a particularly formative agent of political socialization: Robert Hess and Judith Torney draw this conclusion about American children ;4 Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt note that, whereas the parent interacts with the child in a variety of ways and is seen to play many conflicting roles, the teacher appears basically as "an authoritative spokesman of society";s and David Koff and George Von der Muhll found that East African children claimed to have learned more about being "good citizens" from their teachers than from parents or politicians.6 However, one should not attach undue significance to these findings. For one thing, they are based on survey research undertaken in schools, and this environment may distort responses to questionnaires (especially when children are asked to assess such matters as the relative importance of teachers and other authority figures). Moreover, the data lend themselves easily to categorization by school type, experience, etc., and may therefore mask the importance of other explanatory variables. In any case an educational system is the product of historical forces; it is not at all surprising that the school, as much in Africa as in the United States, both reflects and reinforces those forces. From our vantage point, the key issue is not the effectiveness of formal education in transmitting values from one generation to another, but whether it can be used to alter attitudes and behaviour. It is clear that schools in isolation cannot accomplish much in this respect; however, the Chinese and Cuban experiences demonstrate the possibilities of a radical socializing role provided that educational policies and practices are well integrated with broader strategies for development. The relationship between education and politics is not the central contradiction of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, as this study has

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

314

hopefully shown, the relationship is significant in understanding some of the dilemmas confronting societies that are poverty-stricken, disease-ridden, exploited both economically and culturally. We have seen that educational systems inherited from a colonial situation were inappropriate for the new tasks of development, especially in a context such as that of Tanzania where an attempt is being made to build socialism. Several obstacles block the way to redirecting educational policies and practices so that they will not further constrain the achievement of political goals. However, while formal education is only one instrument for change, and it is dangerous to overestimate its usefulness if other instruments are neglected, it is essential that no effort be spared to ensure that its positive potential is maximized.

NOTES 1. For an excellent critique of this dominant characteristic of Western literature on development, see J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies, New York, Basic Books, 1968, especially pp. 17-38. 2. Which may well mean that literacy is influenced by high per capita income rather than the latter by the former. A study by Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson suggests that per capita income levels can more accurately be used to predict literacy levels than vice. versa ("Concerning the Role of Education in Development", in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States, New York, The Free Press, 1963, pp. 263-5). 3. The imbalance in educational facilities between Africans and Europeans and other non-indigenous people in areas such as East Africa where nonAfricans were encouraged to take up permanent settlement and undertake agricultural and commercial activities obviously presented fewer difficulties; although minority communities attempted to preserve some of their privileges, African governments moved quickly to remove these advantages, especially those enjoyed by non-citizens. 4. Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Chicago, Aldine, 1967, especially pp. 213-20. 5. Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969, p. 158. 6. David Koff and George Von der Muhll, "Political Socialization in Kenya and Tanzania—a Comparative Analysis", The journal of Modern African Shudipr, vol. 5, no. 1 (1967), p. 24. However, they also note that Kenyan and Tanzanian children trust politicians less well than teachers, fathers, and religious leaders (p. 23), a finding that reemphasizes the importance of ensuring that there is a high degree of congruence between what is learned in schools and what is observed in society.

APPENDICES

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA APPENDIX

316

I

A NOTE ON SURVEY DATA In undertaking field research for this study, the author conducted 358 structured interviews with educational administrators and primary and secondary school teachers to obtain data on attitudes relating to the philosophy of education, priorities for educational development, professional status, and the relationship of education to politics. The interview schedule also included questions about the demographic, educational, and career backgrounds of respondents. Although the survey yielded considerable information of interest, it has not been used as a major source because materials obtained from documentary sources and unstructured interviews (with respondents both within and outside the survey sample) were more useful in illustrating the basic themes of the book. Nevertheless, the programme of interviews, involving visits to several upcountry education offices and a variety of urban and rural schools, considerably enhanced the author's appreciation of some of the more subtle features of the educational process in Tanzania, and deepened his understanding of the problems confronting the formulation and implementation of policies for educational reform. Interviews were conducted with personnel in the headquarters of the Ministry of Education and the national voluntary agencies in Dar es Salaam, and with educational administrators and teachers in three regions that were selected so as to obtain a rough cross-section of conditions and experiences: the Coast, which contains the capital city and a number of rural districts that are characterized by marked economic and educational underdevelopment; Kilimanjaro, which is the most well-endowed region of the country in terms of economic and educational development; and Iringa, which is an average region according to several socio-economic indicators. The sample of educational administrators included: (a) all professional officers at Ministry headquarters below the rank of section head (20); (b) all Regional Education Officers (17); (c) all District Education Officers in the three selected regions (8) and all District Education Officers in other regional centres (15) ; (d) all Primary School Inspectors in the three selected regions (11); (e) all Education Secretaries General (5) ; and (f) all Education Secretaries in the three selected regions (14).

317

APPENDICES

Of these 90 people, all but nine were interviewed. (The author was unable to arrange interviews with two of the headquarters personnel, three Regional Education Officers, two District Education Officers, and two Education Secretaries.) The sample of secondary school teachers was drawn from twelve schools (within the three regions), chosen so as to achieve a representative selection of institutions in terms of rural/urban location, boarding/day attendance, and managing agency. It included the heads of these schools and 58 other randomly selected teachers. The sample of primary school teachers was drawn from 41 schools in Dar es Salaam and Kisarawe (Coast Region), Iringa Town and Iringa District (Iringa Region), and Moshi and Kilimanjaro District (Kilimanjaro Region). The schools were selected randomly from lists that ensured a representative breakdown by type of institution (day extended and full primary schools, day lower primary schools, and boarding upper primary schools), by managing agency, and, in the case of rural districts, by relative proximity to urban areas. The 207 respondents included the heads or acting heads of these schools almost all teachers in the smaller one-stream institutions, and four to six teachers in the larger ones (selected fairly randomly from among those who had spare periods on the day of the author's visit).

318

EDUCATION AND POLITICS IN AFRICA APPENDIX II

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES (CURRENT AND TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND OF PURCHASERS' VALUES), SELECTED AFRICAN

Country (Currency)

Year

Educational Expenditures (millions)

Ghana (Cedis)

1962 1968 1971

44.5 72.1 98.1

Kenya (,E)

1962 1968 1971

8.3 9.8 27.6

Malawi (Kwacha)

1962 1968 1971

3.2 8.9 10.8

Tanzaniab (Shillings)

1962 1968 1971

116 195 380

Togo (Francs)

1962 1968 1971

595 914 1,437

Uganda (Shillings)

1962 1968 1971

124 187 381

Zambia (Kwacha)

1962 19671 1971

8.0 48.5 68.9

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1970, New York, 1971, Tables 179 and 193; 1971, New York, 1972, Tables 178 and 194; United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, Statistical Yearbook 1972 Addis Ababa, 1972-3, Part 2, p: 9/3, Part 4, pp. 31/34-5,34/32-3, and 40/3. United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey 1971-72, DSM, GP, 1972, p. 5; and Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1972, Lusaka, GP, 1973, pp. 56, 117, and 119.

319

APPENDICES

CAPITAL) ON EDUCATION AS PERCENTAGES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (AT CURRENT COUNTRIES, 1962, 1968, AND 1971a %

Total Expenditures (millions)

GDP (millions)

Educational Expenditures Total Expenditures

°/0 Educational Expenditures GDP

325.7 370.5 502.4

1,094 2,067 2,726

14 19 19

4.1 3.5 3.6

51.5 98.9 156.9

244 477 630

16 10 17

3.4 2.1 4.4

20.2 54.3 81.8

102 244 319

16 16 13

3.1 3.6 3.4

4,169 7,897 8,704c

18 14 15

2.8 2.5 4.4c

16 15 14

1.9 1.5 d

3,133e 6,626e 9,316e

21 16 19

4.0 2.8 4.1

401 891 1,152

14 15 11

2.0 5.4 5.9

641 1,409 2,541 3,846 6,292 10,000 599 1,143 2,052 55.4 330.2 642.9

32,000 61,000 d

a Statistics for 1965 are in Table 5.9 above. Mainland only. c This figure is for GDP at factor cost, and would be somewhat higher if calculated in terms of current purchasers' values. The percentage of educational expenditures as a percentage of GDP at purchasers' values would therefore be lower. d Not available. e These figures are at factor cost. 1 1968 figures are not available. b

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320

APPENDIX III

STATISTICS AND STATISTICAL ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO REGIONAL AND DISTRICT DISPARITIES IN PRIMARY SCHOOL PROVISION A. A Comparison of Regional Disparities, 1948 and 1965 As noted on p. 172 above, incomplete statistical evidence suggests that the relative disparities among the old provinces in terms of the percentage of primary school-age children enrolled in aided schools decreased somewhat between 1948 and 1965. Table III.1 records absolute and percentage increases in enrolment in the first six standards in this period, and, as the provinces are listed in ascending order on the basis of the assumed percentage enrolment of children aged seven to twelve, it can be seen that the growth rates were much more rapid in the less well-endowed regions. However, the low enrolments in many provinces in 1948 make this sort of comparison somewhat misleading, a proposition that is supported by a glance at the absolute increases. Table III.2 projects a more accurate picture of the relative changes. It corrects some of the statistical distortions of Table III .1, and relates the increases in enrolment in Standards I to VI to increases in the school-age population. Using Tanga and Northern as the basis for a comparative index of relative growth rates in the approximate percentage of school-age children enrolled, it can be seen that inter-provincial expansion was more evenly distributed between 1948 and 1965 than it had been before the Second World War, and that the relative gap between Tanga and Northern provinces and the others was closed everywhere except in the Southern Highlands area. (Table III.3 estimates the size of the group aged seven to twelve in each of the old provinces in 1948 and 1965.)

321

APPENDICES

TABLE III.1 GROWTH IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT, STANDARDS I TO VI,a BY PROVINCEb 1948 TO 1965 Provinces

Central Lake Western Southern Highlands Eastern Southern Northern-Tangad Tanganyika

Enrolment 1948

Enrolment 1965

8,077 18,818 10,668 13,534 21,699 24,068 44,777

61,369 161,909a 47,525f 74,618g 76,903 78,624 146,747

53,292 143,0916 36,857f 61,084g 55,204 54,556 101,970

660 7606 350f } 560h 450g J 250 230 230

141,641

647,695

560,054

400

Increase

Percentage Increase

Source: Table 2.5; and M.E., Statistics for 1965. The only breakdown by province available for 1948 was for Standards I-VI (which then constituted the full primary school programme); figures for 1965 have been adjusted to make them comparable in this respect. However, the data are still misleading because the 1948 figures are for Africans only and those for 1965 are for children of all races; as a result, the increases are exaggerated, particularly in Tanga and Eastern provinces where one finds the largest concentration of non-Africans. Table I11.2 attempts to correct this distortion. b The 1948 breakdown was based on the old provincial boundaries; regional figures for 1965 have been regrouped on this basis. 6 Listed in ascending order on the basis of percentage enrolment of the group aged 7 to 12 in 1948; see Table 2.5. d Unfortunately, Tanga and Northern figures have to be combined because the districts of Pare and Kilimanjaro (now Kilimanjaro Region) were divided in the two old provinces. 1965 enrolment data for these two districts would have made the separation possible, but were not available at the Regional Educational Office in Moshi. 6 These figures are slightly inflated because Kahama, a part of the Western Province in 1948, was attached to Shinyanga Region in 1965. Unfortunately, separate district statistics are unavailable. f These figures are somewhat deflated because two districts of the old Western Province were in 1965 attached to regions included in the totals of other provinces—Kahama in Shinyanga (Lake) and Ufipa in Mbeya (Southern Highlands). g These figures are slightly inflated because Ufipa, a part of the Western Province in 1948, was attached to Mbeya Region in 1965. h Because of boundary changes, this figure is given to show the overall percentage increase in the three provinces. a

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322

TABLE III.2 AN INDEX OF RELATIVE GROWTH IN THE APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES OF SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION ENROLLED IN AIDED PRIMARY SCHOOLS (STANDARDS I TO VI) BY PROVINCE, 1948 TO 1965, USING TANGA AND NORTHERN PROVINCES AS THE STANDARD

Province

Approximate % School-Age Children Enrolled 1948a 1965b

Increase in Percentage Enrolled

Index of Relative Growths

1.00 1.34 1.21 1.61 1.49 1.37 0.82

Tanga-Northern Eastern Southern Central Lake Western Southern Highlands

31.8 19.3 21.8 7.9 8.3 9.1 12.9

53.0 47.8 47.5 42.0 39.9 38.2 30.2

21.2 28.5 25.7 34.1 31.6 29.1 17.3

Tanganyika

15.5

42.4

26.9

Source: Tables 2.5, III.1, and III.3. a Africans only (see Table 2.5). b Children of all races. Calculated by taking the number of children enrolled in Standards Ito VI as a percentage of the estimated school-age population. The data on enrolment are in Table II1.1 and on estimated school-age population in Table III.3. a Calculated by taking the percentage increase in Tanga-Northern from 1948 to 1965 as the base 1.00 and comparing percentage increases in the other provinces in relation to this base. The figures for Lake, Southern Highlands, and Western provinces may be slightly misleading because of boundary changes (see d, e, f below) ; however, these changes have been taken into consideration in the calculations (see Table III.3). Moreover, since both sets of figures (for enrolment and school-age population) are for Africans only in 1957 and all races in 1967, the slight distortion apparent in Table III.1 is largely corrected. d Based on Lake Province plus Kahama District (see Table .1II.3, n. c.). a Based on Southern Highlands plus Ufipa District (see Table III.3, n. d.). I Based on Western Province minus Kahama and Ufipa Districts (see Table 1II.3, n. e.).

323

APPENDICES

TABLE III.3 ESTIMATES OF INCREASES IN SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION (STANDARDS I TO VI) BY PROVINCE, 1948 TO 1965

Province

Estimated School-Age Estimated School-Age Population, 1948 Population, 1965 (Africans)" (all races)"

Tanga-Northern Eastern Southern Central Lake" Westernd Southern Highlands"

140,651 112,450 110,585 101,917 228,252 117,100 105,610

276,745 160,945 165,537 146,154 405,616 124,400 246,848

Tanganyika

916,565

1,526,265

Source: Table 2.5; United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 3, 1971, Table 201. a See Table 2.5. b The age group 9-14 in 1967, which would roughly correspond with the age group 7-12 in 1965. e Kahama District is included in the 1965 enrolment and 1967 census figures for Lake Province even though it was part of the old Western Province. (It is now in Shinyanga Region, which was predominantly in the old Lake Province, and unfortunately separate district data are not available.) Thus, the estimate of school-age population is inflated. Nevertheless, the data are fairly accurate for Lake plus Kahama and are therefore valid for the comparative purposes in which they are used in Table III.2. d Ufipa District is included in the 1965 enrolment and 1967 census figures for Southern Highlands Province even though it was a part of the old Western Province. See c above. Kahama and Ufipa districts are excluded from the 1965 enrolment and 1967 census figures for Western Province (see c and d above). Nevertheless the data are reasonably valid for Western Province minus Ufipa and Kahama.

B. A Note of the Calculation of the Population of School-Age Children within the Jurisdiction of Seven Local Education Authorities, 1961 and 1966. In Table 7.4 and 7.8, we made comparisons among a number of local education authorities in terms of the percentage of primary school-age children enrolled in registered primary schools within their jurisdictions in 1961 and 1966. The basic data and method of calculating age-group figures are presented in Tables III .4and III .5.

TABLE III.4 ESTIMATES OF INCREASES IN SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION (FOR STANDARDS I-VIII), FOUR RURAL DISTRICTS, 1961 AND 1966 District

Regional% Est. School-Age Populationd Population Population Average Annual Estimated Population" School-Age 1961 1966 Children Growth Rate 1961 1966 1957a 1967 1967 (000s) (%) (000s) 462.1

23

85.0 106.3

Kilimanjaro

351,000 476,223

3.1

396.7

Njombe

240,500 318,811

2.9

269.6 311.0 22

Rufiji

119,000

121,024

0.2

119.9

120.9

15

18.0

18.1

Iringa-Mufindi

239,000

349,348

3.9

278.5

337.2

22

61.2

74.2

td C Fy'

59.3 68.4 z

Source: Tanganyika, African Census Report, DSM, GP, 1963, Table 11; Tanganyika, Report of the Census of the Non-African Population taken on the Night of 20th/21st February, 1957, DSM, GP, 1958, Tables 5 and 8; and United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 1, 1969, Summary Statistics; vol. 3, 1971, Table 201. a Each total represents a sum of the rural African population and a rough estimate of the non-African population, which was not fully broken down on a district basis. b The population estimates for 1961 and 1966 are interpolations based on the assumption that annual growth rates were reasonably constant over the ten year period. c The age-group 7 to 14 inclusive as a percentage of total population in the region of which each district is a part. Separate figures breaking down age by one-year groups are not available on a district basis. d Calculated by applying the 1967 regional figure for percentage school-age children to the 1961 and 1966 interpolations. Since birth-rates have been rising, the number of school-age children as a percentage of total population was probably lower in each district in 1961 than in 1967. This means that the estimates of school population for 1961 are likely on the high side.

c) 5 m >

p

w 4..

13,726 9,587 128,742

26,864 21,746 272,821

7.0 8.5 7.8

18.0 25.2 13.3 20.0 173.8 253.1

(000s)

Estimated Population" 1961 1966

14.4 19.8 13.5

% School-Age Children 1966"

2,600 2,600 23,500

3,926 3,958 34,293

Est. School-Age Population 1961c 1966d

Source: Tanganyika, Report of the Census of Non-African Population taken on the Night of 20th/ 21st February, 1957, DSM, GP, 1958, Table 5; United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, DSM, GP, vol. 2, 1970, Tables la and 106. a The population estimates for 1961 and 1966 are interpolations based on the assumption that annual growth rates were reasonably constant over the ten year period. b The age-group 8-15 inclusive in 1967 (therefore closely approximating the age-group 7-14 inclusive in 1966) as a percentage of the estimated population in 1966. c Calculated by applying the 1966 figure for percentage school-age children to the 1961 interpolation. d The actual age-group 8-15 inclusive in 1967, which closely approximates the age-group 7-14 inclusive in 1966.

Moshi Iringa Dar es Salaam

Population Population Average Annual 1957 Growth Rate 1967 (%)

ESTIMATES OF INCREASES IN SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION (FOR STANDARDS I-VIII), MOSHI TOWN, IRINGA TOWN, AND DAR ES SALAAM, 1961 AND 1966

TABLE III.5

H

6

b ro

-

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS A. Government of TanganyikalThe United Republic of Tanzania African Census Report, 1963. Agriculture, Department of, Report on an Inquiry into Agricultural Education at Primary and Middle Schools, 1956. The Annual Plan for 1972-73, 1972. The Basis for an Integrated System of Education, Government Paper No. 1, 1960. Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract 1966, 1968. Development and Planning, Directorate of, Survey of High-Level Manpower

Requirements and Resources for the Five-Tear Development Plan, 1964-65 to 1968-69, 1965. Development of Non-African Education, Sessional Paper No. 6, 1956. Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961 / 62-1963/ 64, 1962. The Economic Survey 1971-72, 1972. Education, Department of, Annual Report, 1923-1959. , Provisional Syllabus of Instruction for Middle Schools, 1952. , Revised Ten Tear Plan for African Education, 1950. , Syllabus of Instruction for Primary Schools, 1953. A Ten Tear Plan for the Development of African Education, 1947. Triennial Survey of Education in the Tears 1955-57, 1958. , Triennial Survy of Education in the Tears 1958-60, 1961. Education, Ministry of, Annual Report, 1960-1965. , (Elimu, Wizara ya), Muhtasari ya Jiographia, 1963. , (Elimu, Wizara ya), Muhtasari ya Nafundisho ya Historia, 1963. (Elimu, Wizara ya), Muhtasari ya Schule za Primary-Zenye Mafunzo kwa Kiswahili, 1963. , Unified Teaching Service, Circular Nos. 3 and 4, 1964. The Education Ordinance, 1961. Five Tear Plan for African Education, Sessional Paper No. 5, 1956. First Tear Progress Report on the Impelmentation of the Five-Tear Development Plan, 1966. Higher Education in East Africa, Government Paper No. 1, 1958. High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Tanganyika, 1962-67, Government Paper No. 2, 1963, prepared by George Tobias.

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Organization of Services to be Administered by Local Authorities in Tanganyika and Consequential Financial Arrangements, Government Paper No. 1, 1963. 326

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Proposals of the Tanzania Government on Local Government Councils, Government Paper No. 1, 1966.

Report of the Central Education Committee, 1943. Report of the Census of the Non-African Population taken on the Night of 20th/21st February, 1957, 1958. Report of the Committee on the Integration of Education, 1959. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic OneParty State, 1965. Report on the Services to be Administered by Local Authorities in Tanganyika and the Consequential Financial Arrangements, prepared by A. W. Kent, 1962. Sayers, G. F., ed., The Handbook of Tanganyika, 1930. Tanganyika Five-Tear Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 196430th June, 1969, 2 vols., 1964. Tanzania Second Five-Tear Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969-30th June, 1974, 4 vols., 1969. The Unified Teaching Service Act, 1962.

B. Others East African Statistical Department, Tanganyika: Population Census, 1957, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1958. Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, Higher Education in East Africa, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1958. Report of the Quinquennial Advisory Committee, 1960, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1960.

, Report of the Working Party on Higher Education in East Africa, July-August, 1958, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1959. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Tanganyika, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. UNESCO, Final Report, Conference of African States oh the Development of Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, 15- 25 May, 1961, Paris, 1961. , Report of the UNESCO Planrang Missionfor Tanganyika, Paris, limited mimeo edition, 1963.

, Statistical Yearbook 1971, Paris, 1972. United Kingdom, Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, The Education of African Communities, London, HMSO, 1935. , Mass Education in African Society, London, HMSO, 1943. , Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies, Education Policy in British Tropical Areas, London, HMSO, 1925. , Report of the East African Royal Commission, 1953-5S, London, HMSO, 1955. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1970, 1971; and Demographic Yearbook 1971, 1972. , Economic Commission for Africa, Statistical Yearbook 1972, Addis Ababa, 4 vols:, 1972-73. , Trusteeship Council, United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1948: Report on Tanganyika together with Related Documents, New York, 1949.

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BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS Abernethy, David D., The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: an African Case, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969. Adams, D. and Bjork, R. M., Education in Developing Areas, New York, David McKay, 1969. Anderson, C. Arnold and Bowman, Mary Jean, eds., Education and Economic Development, Chicago, Aldine, 1965. Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. Burke, F. G., Tanganyika: Preplanning, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1965. Burns, D. C., African Education, London, Oxford University Press, 1965. Busia, K. A., Purposeful Education for Africa, The Hague, Mouton, 1969. Cameron, Sir Donald, My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria, London, Allen & Unwin, 1939. Cameron J. and Dodd, W. A., Society, Schools & Progress in Tanzania, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1970. Carter, J. Roger, The Legal Framework of Educational Planning and Administration in East Africa, Paris, UNESCO, 1966. Castle, E. B., Growing up in East Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966. Centre for Study of Education in Changing Societies, Primary Education in Sukumaland (Tanzania), Groningen, Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969. Chesswas, J. D., Educational Planning and Development in Uganda, Paris, UNESCO, 1966. Chidzero, B.T.G., Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, London, Oxford University Press, 1961. Clarke, P.H.C., A'Short History of Tanganyika, London, Longmans, 1960. Cliffe, Lionel, ed., One Party Democracy, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967. Cliffe, Lionel and Saul, John S., eds., Socialism in Tanzania, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, vol. 1, 1972, vol. 2, 1973. Clignet, Remi, and Foster, Philip, The Fortunate Few: a Study of Secondary

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UNESCO, Paris, 1966. Huq, M.S., Education and Development Strategy in South and Southeast Asia, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1965. Ikejiani, Okechukwu, ed., Nigerian Education, Ikeja, Longmans of Nigeria, 1964. Jolly, Richard, ed., Education in Africa: Research and Action, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969. , Planning Education for African Development, Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969.

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Jones, Thomas Jesse, ed., Education in Africa, New York, Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1922. , ed., Education in East Africa, New York, Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1925. Kitchen, Helen, ed., The Educated African, New York, Praeger, 1962. Knight, J.B., The Costing and Financing of Educational Development in Tanzania, Paris, UNESCO, 1966. Lewis, L.J., Education and Political Independence in Africa, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962. , Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Areas, London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1954. Lipset, Martin Seymour, ed., Student Politics, New York, Basic Books, 1967. Listowel, Judith, The Making of Tanganyika, London, Chatto and Windus, 1965. Lloyd, P.C., Africa in Social Change, London, Penguin, 1967. , ed., The New Elites of Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1966. Lowe, J., Grant, N., and Williams, T.J., eds., Education and NationBuilding in the Third World, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1971. Mason, R.J., British Education in Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1959. Meienberg, Hildebrand, Tanzanian Citizen, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1966. Meister, Albert, East Africa: The Past in Chains, The Future in Pawn, New York, Walker & Co., 1966. Moumouni, Abdou, Education in Africa, London, Andre Deutsch, 1968. Mwanakatwe, J.M., The Growth of Education in Zambia. since Independence, Lusaka, Oxford University Press, 1968. Mwingira, A.C. and Pratt, Simon, The Process of Educational Planning in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, mimeo, 1965, and rev. ed., Paris, UNESCO, 1967. Nuffield Foundation and Colonial Office, African Education: a Study of Education Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa, London, Oxford University Press, 1953. Nyerere, Julius K., Address by the President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere on the Tanganyika Five Tear Plan and Review of the Plan, Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika Information Services, 1964. , Education for Self-Reliance, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967. , Freedom and Development: Uhuru na Maendeleo, Dar es Salaam, Oxford Press, 1973. , Freedom and Socialism: Uhuru na Ujamaa, London, Oxford University Press, 1968. , Freedom and Unity: Uhuru na Umoja, London, Oxford University Press, 1967. , Ujamaa—Essays on Socialism, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968. Oliver, Roland, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London, Longmans, 1952.

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Planning and Development, Coast Region: Mafia District, EDP/P2/2/6. Planning and Development, Coast Region: Mzizima District, EDP/P2/2/3. Planning and Development, Iringa Region: Iringa District, EDP/P2/4/2. Planning and Development, Iringa Region: Iringa Town Council, EDP/P2/4/4. Planning and Development, Iringa Region: Njombe District, EDP/P2/4/3. Planning and Development, Kilimanjaro Region: General, EDP/P2/6/ 1. Planning and Development, Kilimanjaro Region: Moshi District, EDP/22/6/2. Planning and Development, Kilimanjaro Region: Moshi Town Council, EDP/P2/6/4. Planning and Development, Kilimanjaro Region: Pare District, EDP/P2/6/3. Planning and Development: Primary Education, EDP 2/1. REOs Conference, 1962-64, 4/24/1. Subventions to Local Authorities, Kilimanjaro Region: Kilimanjaro District, EDP/A2/4/6/2. Subventions to Local Authorities, Kilimanjaro Region: Moshi Town Council, EDP/314/3/62-63. Subventions to Local Authorities, Iringa Region: Iringa District, EDP/A2/4/4/2. Subventions to Local Authorities, Iringa Region: Iringa Town Council, 317/3/62 and EDP/A2/4/4/4. Coast Regional Education Office, Dar es Salaam Education Committee of [Dar es Salaam] City Council, EL/61, 2 vols. Education Plans and Capital Development—Dar es Salaam City, 211/2. Education Plans and Capital Development—Kisarawe, LEA/33. Education Plans and Capital Development—Rufiji, LEA/73. Five Year Development Plan (Education), 200/1. Monthly Reports, 2009. Iringa Regional Education Office, Iringa Annual Report, District Education Officer, Iringa, A/1. Circular Letters from the Ministry, 3/101, 2 vols. Educational Development Policy and Planning, 1/1. Iringa—School Farms and Plantations, 10/938. Local Education Committee: Minutes and Correspondence of Uhehe Local Authority—Iringa Rural Local Authority, 2/65. Local Education Committee, Njombe: Minutes and Correspondence, 2/69. Minutes and Correspondence Local Education Committee: Iringa Town Council, 2/96. Monthly Report, 8/7/8.

337

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kilimanjaro Regional Education Office, Moshi Annual Report: Letters, Written Reports, and Statistics, 100. Chagga LEA Education Committee, 58/62. Moshi Town Council Education Committee, 87. Pare Local Education Committee, 54. Primary School Development Plans: Kilimanjaro, 213. Three Year Plan : Pare District, 214. Mbeya Regional Education Office, Mbeya Educational Plans General, 4/206, vol. III. Educational Policy General, 4/200/II. Mtwara Regional Education Office, Mtwara Five Year Development Plan, 201, Ruvuma Regional Education Office, Songea Five Year Plan: General, PL/200. Education, Ministry of, "Five Year Development Plan", mimeo, May 29, 1964. , "A Message by the Minister for Education to all Headmasters and Principals of Secondary Schools and Colleges", mimeo, August 20, 1964. , Minutes of the Conference of Regional Education Officers, 1962-6. , "The New 0 Level (School Certificate) History Syllabus for Centres in East Africa", mimeo, October 5, 1966. , "Progress in Education in Iringa Region since, 1961", typescript (Iringa Regional Education Office), 1966. , Statistics on Enrolment and Educational Expenditures, Coast, Iringa, and Kilimanjaro regions, 1961-6, provided by Regional Education Offices, Dar es Salaam, Iringa, Moshi. , Statistics on Enrolment in Mainland Tanzania, 1965-6. , "Syllabus for Grade A Teacher Training", mimeo, December 31, 1963. , "Syllabus for History in Secondary Forms I to 4", mimeo, May 4, 1964. Information, Ministry of, "Kawawa Opens NAUTS Conference", press release, August 13, 1965. Manpower Planning Unit, "Annual Manpower Report to the President (1964 Calendar Year) ", mimeo, 1965. , "Annual Manpower Report to the President (1965 Calendar Year)", mimeo, 1966. , "Report to the President: Manpower Problems and Programs for Solving Them", mimeo, 1964.

B. Theses and Papers Court, David, "The Social Function of Formal Schooling in Tanzania", paper prepared for Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1971. Kawawa, Rashidi M., "To Educate the Nation", mimeo, 1966. Mbilinyi, Marjorie J., "Education for Rural Life or Education for Socialist Transformation", paper prepared for Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1973.

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Mbilinyi, Marjorie J., "The Problem of Unequal Access to Primary Education in Tanzania", paper prepared for Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1973. Morris, Jon R., "The Impact of Secondary Education Upon Student Attitudes towards Agriculture: Some Preliminary Considerations", paper prepared for the annual conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, January 1965. Morrison, David R., "Educating Citizens for Tanzania", paper prepared for the annual conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, December 1966. , "Education and Political Development: the Tanzanian Case", D. Phil. thesis, University of Sussex, 1970. Mwingira, A.C., "Education Policy and Development Policy in Tanzania", paper prepared for the East African Staff College Seminar, Dar es Salaam, February 21, 1966. , "High Level Manpower Needs of East Africa and the University of East Africa", paper prepared for a seminar of the East African Academy and the East African Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, July-August 1965. Ominde, Simon, "The Structure of Education in Kenya and some Planning Problems", paper prepared for the Conference on Education, Employment and Rural Development, Kericho, Kenya, 1966. Papers prepared for a seminar on School Leaver Problems in Tanzania, University College, Dar es Salaam, March 14, 1966. Phipps, B., "The Teaching Profession in Uganda: Some Preliminary Thoughts", paper prepared for the annual conference of the East African Institute of Social Research, January 1963. Raikes, P., "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development", paper prepared for Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, December 1973. Samoff, Joel, "Politics, Politicians, and Party: Moshi, Tanzania 1968-69, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971. Smith, Anthony, "The Contribution of the Missions to Educational Structure and Administrative Policy in Tanganyika, 1918-1961, M.A. thesis, Sheffield University, 1962. Thomas, Robert L., "Implementing a Manpower Programme in a Developing Country", paper prepared for the International Institute of Educational Planning, 1966. , "Manpower Development for Industrialization, Country Case Study: United Republic of Tanzania", paper prepared for the Centre for Industrial Development, 1966. Thompson, A.R., "Partnership in Education in Tanganyika, 1919-1961," M.A. thesis, University of London, 1965. Whyland, C., Malangali Station Book, typescript, c. 1940.

339

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, AND JOURNALS The Daily News (Dar es Salaam, from 1972). East Africa journal (Nairobi). The East African Standard (Nairobi). Mbioni (Dar es Salaam, the monthly newsletter of Kivukoni College). The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam, to 1972). The Reporter (Nairobi). Sauti ya Wazazi (Dar es Salaam). The Standard (Dar es Salaam, from 1965 to 1972). The Sunday News (Dar es Salaam). The Tanganyika Standard (Dar es Salaam, to 1965). The Tanzania Education journal (Dar es Salaam).

INDEX ABERNETHY, David, 38n Adult education, 278-9, 284, 292, 299n; see also Political education Advisory Committee on African (Native) Education, 48, 70, 73, 82 Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 49 Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies, 49; guidelines on colonial education, 57-8; see also Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies Advisory Council on (National) Education, 82, 139, 164-6, 170, 205-6; established, 70; composition, 71, 97, 109n; role, 71, 102-3 African Teachers' Union of the Christian Council of Tanganyika, 88n Afro-Shirazi Party, 22, 248; see also Zanzibar Afro-Shirazi Youth League, 246-7 Aga Khan, His Highness the: and education in Tanganyika, 50 Aga Khan Secondary School, Iringa, 168 Agriculture, Department of, 90n; Director of, 268; (and Co-operatives), Ministry of, 26, 290 Agricultural education (education for rural life) : colonial policy and practice, 57-61, 68n, 84-6, 90n, 310; offered in selected secondary schools, 114; as response to postcolonial school leavers' problem, 199-200, 203-4, 206-9, 210, 212n; attitudes of educational administrators and teachers towards, 206-7, 213n; and Education for Self-Reliance, 256-9, 266, 268, 269-70, 279-80, 283-4, 287-8, 291, 299n, 305n; see also education and occupational integration, Education for Self-Reliance, primary school leavers, rural development Akivaga, Symonds, 287, 304.n

Amin, Idi, 289 Anangisye, Eli, 233n, 242, 297n Anderson, C. Arnold, 314n Arusha Declaration, 37, 40n, 41n, 112, 164, 184-5, 237, 246, 255, 268-9, 278, 281, 283-4, 287, 292, 296n-7n, 305n-6n; introduced, 27; major principles, 28; major changes following, 28-31 Arusha Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Arusha Secondary School, 232n Asian Association, 79 Assumpta Girls' Secondary School, 168 BABU, A. M., 233n, 242, 297n Bagamoyo District, 107n Barabaig, 107n, 129; see also Mbulu District Barkan, Joel, 249n Bastid, Marianne, 265 Bienefeld, M. A., 273, 290 Bienen, Henry, 20 Binns Study Group, 84-5 Boards of Governors: see Secondary schools, Teachers' colleges Bomani, Paul, 74, 80 Bowman, Mary Jean, 314n Bukoba (town), 201 Bukoba District, 55, 102, 145, 161n, 172, 177 Bunge Primary School, 303n Butiama, 269 Bwiru Secondary School, 304n CABINET, 21, 29, 297n; and education, 95, 101, 105, 128, 134-6, 139, 141, 143-4, 164-5, 176-7, 189n, 198, 206, 209, 224, 234n, 244, 246-7; Committee on Higher Education and Training, 105 Calloway, A. C., 212n Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate, 217, 219, 274 Cameron, Sir Donald, 49, 61-2, 66n Cameron, J., 68n Canada, 127n, 231n

340

341

INDEX

Catholic Welfare Society, 48, 67n, 88n, 96; see also Tanganyika Episcopal Conference Central Advisory Committee on African Education, 48, 90n Central Province, 54-5, 321-3 Chagga, 55, 136, 157n-8n, 182, 185, 200, 205; see also Kilimanjaro District Chagula, Wilbert, 268, 297n Chang'ombe Teachers' College, 240, 245 Chawe, 0., 243 Chief Education Officer, 70, 71, 105, 134-5, 170, 201, 225, 282-3; see also Mwingira, Augustine C.; Sawe, Joseph China, People's Republic of, 35, 213n, 292; education in, 215, 230, 262-6, 274, 289, 294n, 313 Chiwanga, Simon: Minister for National Education (1972), 281, 285, 287, 303n Christian Council of Tanganyika (CCT), 48, 88n, 96-7, 180-1, 188; see also Universities Mission to Central Africa Chogga, F. K., 242, 250n, 251n Church Missionary Society, 44 Civics: see political education Class: see Social class; and education, see Education and social structure Cliffe, Lionel, 39n Clignet, Remi, 193n Coast Region, 160n, 173, 178-9, 276-7, 316-7 Coleman, James S., 18 Committee on the Integration of Education, 81-2, 84 Constitution: of Republic of Tanganyika, 20; Interim, of United Republic of Tanzania, 22, 223 Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, 109n Council of Ministers,,75, 82, 83, 86, 129, 134, 197; see also Cabinet Court, David, 234n-5n, 306n Cowan, L. Gray, 38n Cuba, 35, 215, 230, 260, 266, 292, 296n, 313 Culture, Department of, 299n Curriculum: general policies and changes, 33, 36, 56-64, 73, 82, 84, 216-20, 231n-2n; and Education

for Self-Reliance, 270, 279-80, 287-8; see also Agricultural education, Examinations policy and practice, Higher education, Language policy, Political education, Primary schools, Secondary schools, Teachers' colleges, Teacher Training Advisory Board, Technical education, University College, Dar es Salaam (Institute of Education) DAILY' NEWS, 291 Dar es Salaam: education in, 107n, 109n, 159n, 181, 186-7, 201, 207, 213n, 275, 276-7, 278, 281, 300n-In, 303n, 317, 325 Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, 247 Dar es Salaam College of Business Education, 240, 245 Dar es Salaam Technical College, 79, 114-5 Dar es Salaam University Students' Organisation (DUSO), 287, 304n-5n Dar Unit: see Tanzania University Students Organisation, Dar Unit Dawson, Richard, 313 Declaration on Socialism and SelfReliance: see Arusha Declaration Development and Planning, Directorate of, I25n; Ministry of, 140, 142-3; Manpo''er Planning Unit, 111, 114, 142 Development plans and planning, 23-5, 29, 32, 292-3; see also Development and Planning, Educational plans and planning, First Five Year Plan, Manpower planning, Second Five Year Plan, Three Year Development Plan District Councils: see Local education authorities, Local government District Development Councils, 283 District Education Committees: see Local Education Authorities District Education Officers, 72, 96-7, 100, 133, 156, 160, 161n,201, 205, 229, 303n, 316-7; DEO, Kilimanjaro, 136, 200 Dodd, W. A., 68n Dodoma (town), 32, 181 Dodoma Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8

INDEX

Dore, R. P., 215 Dubbeldam, L. F. B., 104 Dumont, Rene, 294n EAST AFRICAN Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), 96-7, 131-2, 170, 188, 190n; established, 53; banned, 303n Eastern Province, 54-5, 172, 321-3 Education adult: see Adult education and Culture, Ministry of, 299n Department of, 48, 49, 50, 63, 72, 74, 84, 85, 86, 90n, 156n; replaced by Ministry, 70 Department of His Highness the Aga Khan, 50, 96-7 for self-reliance: see Education for

Self-Reliance Director of, 48, 49, 50, 58-9, 66n, 68n, 73, 81, 84, 86, 87n, 89n, 90n; post abolished, 70 Minister for, 71, 95, 105, 128, 176, 275; post created, 70; see also Eliufoo, Solomon; Kambona, Oscar; Mgonja, Chediel; National Education, Minister for Ministry of, 25, 67n, 229, 235n, 302n, 316; established, 70; changes after independence, 72, 95-7, 105-6; relations with voluntary agencies, 95-7, 283; relations with local education authorities, 98-100; and Advisory Council on Education, 103; and Boards of Governors, 103; and School Committees, 104; and technical education, 114; and teacher training, 114-5; and educational spending, 118; and politics of primary school expansion, 128, 132-55, 156n, 157n, 160n, 161n; and racial integration of schools, 163-7; and religious integration of schools, 170, 191n; and regional disparities, 180-1, 191n; and secondary school admissions policy, 185; and primary school leavers' problem, 198-210, 212n-3n; and curriculum policy, 217-20, 222-5; response to Education for Self-Reliance, 266-7, 274,

342

275, 279, 281-3; incorporates Department of Culture, 299n; replaced by Ministry of National Education, 278, 299n; Planning Section of, 95, 140-1, 148-9, 180, 303n; see also National Education Ministry of and occupational integration, 17-8, 24, 32-3, 35, 59-61, 64, 86, 110-2, 155, 189, 195-7, 210n-1n, 256-9, 260, 271, 272-3, 290-1, 307-10, 312; see also Agricultural education; China, People's Republic of; Manpower planning; Primary school leavers; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Ordinance (1927), 48; (1961), 70-2, 86, 95, 98, 102, 135, 163, 166; see also National Education Act Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of, 135, 193n, 222; see also Kassum, Al Noor political: see Political education and political integration, 18, 33, 62-3, 64, 87, 215-20, 229, 230n-2n, 235n-6n, 259, 294n, 307-8, 310-1; see also Language policy, Education and social structure and political recruitment, 17-8, 37n-8n and political socialization, 17-8, 33, 36-7, 37n-8n, 61-4, 87, 189, 215, 220-30, 231n, 233n-6n, 258-9, 260, 285-91, 307-8, 310-1, 312; see also China, People's Republic of; Education for Self-Reliance; Political education; Tanganyika National Service; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and politics: general relationships, 17-8, 38n, 293, 307-14; politics of education: see Cabinet; Council of Ministers; Education, Minister of; Education, Ministry of; Educational administrators; Educational Legislative policy-making; Council; Local education authorities; National Assembly; National Education; Nyerere, Julius K.; Parents; Politicians;

343

INDEX

Press; Primary schools; Students; Tanganyika African National Union; Teachers; Voluntary agencies Principal (Permanent) Secretary to Ministry of, 105, 134, 139, 148-9, 151, 160n-ln, 266 Secretaries: see Voluntary agencies Secretaries General: see Voluntary agencies and social structure, 17-8, 32, 50, 57, 64, 155, 163, 259, 307-8, 311; race, 32, 34-5, 45, 49-52, 64, 66n, 67n, 70, 72, 73, 77-84, 86-7, 89n-90n, 163-9, 186, 187-8, 189n, 190n, 294n, 312, 314n; religion, 32, 35, 52-3, 67n, 68n, 86-7, 131-2, 156n, 157n, 169-70, 182, 188, 190n-1n 234n-5n, 309, 312; regional disparities and ethnicity, 32, 35, 53-6, 64, 87, 144, 170-82, 188, 191n, 192n-3n, 259, 271, 275-6, 309, 312, 321-5; ruralurban disparities, 35, 145, 159n, 167, 186-7, 194n, 271, 276-7, 323-5; social class, 32-3, 35, 56-7, 64, 87, 182-6, 188-9, 193n, 205, 256, 258-9, 260, 273-4, 276-8, 290-1, 297n, 303n, 307, 309, 312; see also China, People's Republic of; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics universal primary: see Primary schools Education for Self-Reliance, 29, 37; critique of colonial and postcolonial education, 255-6; programme, 256-9; theoretical objectives, 259; comparisons with other countries, 260-6, 294n-6n; immediate aftermath, 266-9, 296n-7n; policy outcomes, 269-79, 298n-9n; prospects for implementation, 279-94, 299n-306n Educational administration: colonial era, 47-50, 70-2; post-colonial era, 95-106, 278, 281-3; see also Advisory Council on (National) Education; Chief Education Officer; District Education

Officers; Education, Department of, Director of, Minister for, Ministry of, Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of, Principal (Permanent) Secretary to Ministry of; Educational administrators; Local education authorities; National Education, Minister for, Ministry of; Primary School Inspectors; Regional Education Officers; Schools Supervisors; Voluntary agencies administrators: and politics of education, 34, 35-6, 50, 64, 70-2, 86, 105-6, 164-5, 171, 218, 307-9, 310, 311; and primary school expansion, 128, 132-55; and primary school leavers, 198, 199, 200, 206, 208-10, 212n; as agents for change, 34, 36, 58, 222-3, 228, 230, 281-3, 285, 308, 310-1; see also Survey of educational administrators and teachers enrolment: German era, 44; British Tanganyika, 45-7, 51-5, 67n, 76-7; post-colonial era, see Higher Education, Primary schools, Secondary schools, Teachers' colleges, Technical education expenditure and finance, 71, 96-100, 117-9, 123-4, 127n, 144, 147-8, 150, 318-9; in Kilimanjaro District, 137-8, 147, 151-2 plans and planning, 45-7, 54-6, 73-7, 86-7, 89n, 95, 104, 110-7, 119, 120, 126n, 140-4, 154, 171-2, 270-3; see also Education and occupational integration, Education for Self-Reliance, First Five Year Plan, Five Year Plan for African Education, Manpower planning, Second Five Year Plan, Ten Year Plan for African Education, Three Year Development Plan policies: see Agricultural education, Curriculum, Education for Self-Reliance, Education and occupational integration, Education and political integration, Education and political socialization, Education and social

INDEX

structure, Educational planning, Examinations policy and practice, German East Africa, Higher education, Language policy, Manpower planning, Political education, Primary schools, Primary school leavers, Secondary schools, Teachers' colleges, Technical education policy-making: colonial era, 47-50, 64, 70-2, 106; postcolonial era, 97, 102, 103-4, 105-6; conflicts among policy goals, 33-4, 35, 60-1, 308-11; see also Education and politics Elections: Legislative Council, of 1958-9, 72, 79, 81, 85, 133; Presidential, of 1962, 20, 29n; Presidential and Parliamentary, of 1965, 22, 83, 205, 239; Presidential and Parliamentary, of 1970, 30 Eliufoo, Solomon, 85; Minister for Education (1962-8), 107n, 126n, 182, 184, 185, 190n, 192n, 199, 205, 212n, 213n, 232n, 256, 274; on local education authorities, 100; on teachers' organizations, 100-1; on role of Advisory Council, 102; and primary school development, 135, 149, 151, 157n, 161n; on regional educational disparities, 179-80; on primary school leavers, 204-5, 294n; on agricultural education, 206-7; on civics programme, 224-5; and Education for Self-Reliance, 266-7, 296n-7n Enrolment: see Educational enrolment, Higher education, Primary schools, Secondary schools, Teachers' colleges, Technical education Ethnicity: and education, see Education and social structure Examinations policy and practice, 51, 56, 63-4, 169, 177, 179-80, 184-7, 192n, 196, 201, 212n, 217, 257, 264, 271, 273-4, 282, 294n, 298n, 310, 312 FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, Member for, 80 First Five Year Plan (1964-9), 24-5, 223, 238; and education, 112-3,

344

116-7, 119, 123, 128, 140-5, 148, 153, 171-2, 211n, 270, 272-3, 280 Five Year Plan for African Education (1956-61), 73-5, 89n Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development: see First Five Year Plan, Second Five Year Plan Ford Foundation, 111 Foreign Missions of North America, 57 Foster, Philip, 59, 193n, 211n, 212n, 293, 306n Fundikira, Chief A., 170 GALANOS SECONDARY School, 114 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 17 German East Africa, 44-5; education in, 44, 48, 53, 57, 62 Germany, Federal Republic of, 25, 40n, 127n; see also German East Africa Ghana, 19, 96, 120-4, 197, 294n, 318 Gold Coast, 59; see also Ghana Guinea, 95, 294n HA, 129; see also Kasulu District Harbison, Frederick, 111 Haya, 55, 157n; see also Bukoba District Hehe, 90; see also Iringa District Hess, Robert, 313 Higher education: campaign for university college, 73, 75; policy, 116-7, 267, 290; and Education for Self-Reliance, 258, 268-9, 270, 286-7, 289-90, 294n, 297n, 304n-5n; government expenditures on, 117-9; see also Higher Education Trust Fund, Makerere College, Students, Tanganyika National Service, University College, Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, University of East Africa Higher Education Trust Fund, 75 Holy Ghost, Order of the, 44 IFUNDA TRADE (later Secondary Technical) School, 52, 114 Ilboru Secondary School, 232n Illich, Ivan, 293, 306n Indian Secondary School, Dar es Salaam, 80

345

INDEX

Information, Ministry of, 203 Institute of Education: see University College, Dar es Salaam Iraqw, 107n; see also Mbulu District Iringa (town), 180-1, 186-7, 193n, 286, 301n, 317, 325 Iringa-Mufindi District, 148, 150, 172, 174-6, 180, 186, 190n, 191n, 194n, 301n, 317, 324 Iringa Region, 173, 178-9, 180-1, 275, 277-8, 289, 316-7 Israel, 294n JOHANNSON, Barbro, 91n, 225 Jolly, Richard, 296n

191n-2n, 194n, 200, 205, 301n, 317, 321, 324 Kilimanjaro Region, 152, 157n, 172-3, 177-9, 191n, 200-1, 277-8, 316-7, 321; see also Kilimanjaro District, Moshi, Pare District Kimulson, Boniface M., 240 Kisarawe District, 109n, 150, 160n, 174-6, 19In, 301n, 317 Kisongera Secondary School, 304n Kivukoni College, 89n, 279 Koff, David, 235n-6n, 313, 314n Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 215 Kurasini International School, 245

KAHAMA DISTRICT, 321-3 Kamaliza, Michael, 101 Kambona, Oscar, 29-30, 233n; Minister for Education (1960-1), 72, 100, 110-1, 132-4, 136, 156n, 157n Kaneno, A., 297n Kaombwe, Adam, 203, 212n, 269 Kapilima, C. M., 190n Karume, Abeid: First VicePresident (1964-72), 22, 233n Kasambala, Jeremiah, 83, 161n Kasella Bantu, Joseph, 194n Kassum, Al Noor, 135, 189n, 199 Kasulu District, 129 Kawawa, Rashidi M.: VicePresident of Tanganyika (1962-4), 170; Second Vice-President of Tanzania (1964- ), 204, 224, 227-9, 230n, 233n, 239-40, 242-4, 268, 284, 286, 297n Kenya, 19, 25, 55; education in, 75, 85, 103, 106n-7n, 120-2, 124, 167, 197, 199, 205, 229-30, 235n-6n, 249n, 318; private schools in, used by Tanzanians, 198, 200, 201; joint curriculum planning with Tanzania, 217, 219; students in, and the National Service dispute, 247, 251n Keto, John, 91n Khrushchev, N., 261 Kibaha Secondary School, 114 Kigoma Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Kilimanjaro District, 157n-8n; education in, 55, 104, 107n, 108n, 136-9, 145-54, 156n, 157n, 159n, 160n-ln, 172, 174-7, 182, 185-7,

LABOUR, Ministry of, 22 Lacey, A. Travers, 56, 58 Lake Province, 54-5, 321-3 Language policy: and education, 62-3, 78, 79, 82-3, 86, 163-6, 189n, 215-6, 229, 230n, 267, 273 League of Nations: mandate over Tanganyika Territory, 44-5; Permanent Mandates Commission, and Tanganyika, 48, 49; see also United Nations Legislative Council, 72., 80; actions and debates on education, 50, 73, 74-5, 80-1, 82-3, 85-6, 131-2, 133, 192n, 216 Lenin, V. I., 24, 261 Listowel, Lady Judith, 62 Livingstone, David, 44 Lloyd, P. C., 193n Local education authorities, 97, 102, 108n; origins, 48-9; established, 71; role, 71, 72, 104, 107n; expenditures on finance, 71, 98-100, 107n, 117-9, 144, 147-8, 150, 154-5, 160n, 161n, 171-2, 177; and primary school fees, 71, 98-9, 166, 189n-90n; and primary school expansion, 100, 132-40, 143-4, 147-50; abolished, 283; see also Kilimanjaro District Local Government, Ministry of, 100, 144, 149 Local Government: and politics of education, see Local education authorities, Kilimanjaro District, Native Authorities; decentralization measures, 31, 283 Lugard, F. J. D., Baron, 66n Lutheran Mission of Berlin, 44

INDEX

MAGENI, M., 192n, 194n Makerere (University) College, 46-7 51, 55, 65n, 66n, 74, 78, 79, 116, 251n Malangali Boys' (later Secondary) School, 58, 68n Malawi, 120-2, 124, 318 Mali, 294n Manpower planning, 35, 111-23, 125n, 126n, 140, 142, 154-5, 210n-ln, 271-3, 290-1, 307-9, 311, 312; see also Development and planning, Education and occupational integration, Educational planning Manpower Planning Unit: see Development and Planning Mao Tse-tung, 24, 262-5 Mara Region, 173, 177-9, 275, 277-8 Marx, Karl, 294n; Marxist philosophy of education, 260, 265-6, 294n; see also China, People's Republic of, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Masai (people), 107n, 129; see also Masai District Masai District, 55, 107n Masasi District, 156n, 275 Mason, R. J., 68n Mawenzi Secondary School, 168 Mbeya Region, 173, 177-9, 277-8, 327 Mbilinyi, Marjorie, 274, 287, 290 Mbinga District, 107n Mbogo, P., 232n Mbulu District, 107n, 129 Meienberg, Hildebrand, 223-4 Meister, Albert, 291 Mgonja, Chediel: Minister for Education (1968-9), 274; Minister for National Education (1969-72) 274, 281, 284 Mhaiki, Chief Ivor, 192n Mission societies: and education in Tanganyika, 32, 44-5, 47-8, 52-4, 57, 62, 65n, 66n, 77, 309, 311; responsibilities transferred to local voluntary agencies, 71-2; see also Catholic Welfare Society, Christian Conference of Tanganyika, Voluntary agencies Mkwawa Secondary School, 90n, 168, 286, 304n Morogoro Agricultural College, 115

346

Morogoro District, 132 Morogoro Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Morogoro Teachers' College, 156n, 232n, 245 Moshi, 172, 186-7, 192n, 200, 245, 301n, 317, 325 Moshi Trade (later Secondary Technical) School, 114 Mpwapwa District, 107n Msekwa, Pius, 290, 305n Mtaki, A. S., 190n, 232n Mtemvu, Zuberi, 39n Mtwara Region, 150, 173, 177-9, 277-8 Mufindi District: see Iringa-Mufindi District Muhimbili Medical College, 115, 240-1,245 Mumford, Lewis, 58 Mungai, J., 304n Munro, Donald, 264-5 Musoma Secondary School, 304n Mwadui, 206 Mwanza (town), 90n, 201, 269 Mwanza Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Mwingira, Augustine C., 109n, 140, 142, 282-3, 299n, 303n Mwongozo: see TANU Guidelines Myers, Charles A., 1 I 1 Mzumbe Secondary School, 304n NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 22, 25, 26, 105, 109n, 126n, 16In, actions and debates on education, 96, 156n, 163, 170, 176, 179, I92n, 193n, 198-9, 203-6, 209, 216, 232n, 281, 297n, 300n, 303n; and National Service dispute, 242-3, 248, 250n, 269, 297n; and Education for Self-Reliance, 269 National Education Act (1969), 303n Minister for, 299n; see also Chiwanga, Simon; Education, Minister for; Mgonja, Chediel Ministry of, 285, 286, 287, 288, 303n; replaces Ministry of Education, 278, 283, 299n National Executive Committee of TANU: see Tanganyika African National Union National integration: and education, see Education and political integration, Education and social structure, Language policy

347

INDEX

National Muslim Council of Tanzania, 303n National Service: see Tanganyika National Service National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), 21-2, 109n; Teachers' Section and attitudes of teachers towards, 101-2, 108n National Union of Tanzanian Students (NAUTS), 228, 239; and National Service dispute, 240, 242-3, 247-8, 251n; banned, 248 Nationalist, 27, 203, 243, 246, 297n Native Authorities: and education, 48, 49, 53, 56 Newala District, 150 Ngalai, Ronald, 284-5 Nkrumah, Kwame, 226 Nigeria, 19, 66n, 120, 197, 201 Njombe District, 172, 174-6, 180-1, 190n-ln, 193n, 324 Northern Province, 54-5, 172, 191n2n, 320-3 NUTA: see National Union of Tanganyika Workers Nyakusa, 55, 157n; see also Rungwe District Nyamwezi, 55 Nyegezi Training Institute 290, 305n Nyerere, Julius K.: Chief Minister (1960-1), 82, 111, 133; Prime Minister (1961-2), 20; President (1962- ), 19, 20, 22, 38n, 39n, 181, 185, 188-9, 205, 289, 298n, 299n, 305n; on one-party democracy, 21, 222; and creation of one-party state, 21-2; on socialism, 23-4, 26-8, 221-2, 255-9; and Arusha Declaration, 27-9, 37, 237, 269, on development and planning, 32, 40n, 41n; on First Five Year Plan and education, 112; and rural development, 29, 292-3; on rural development and education, 199, 256-8; philosophy of education, 216, 221-2, 232n-3n .241, 255-9, 289; and Education for SelfReliance, 29, 37, 255-9, 260, 263, 264, 265, 266-7, 273-4, 278, 279, 287, 290, 294n; on racial disparities in education, 80-1, on racial integration and education, 83; on regional integration and education, 192n; on abolition of

primary school fees, 98-9, 285; and primary school development, 132, 141, 155, 156n; on primary school leavers' problem, 201; on Africanization of teaching service, 220; and Father Meienberg's Tanzanian Citizen, 223-4, 233n; on adult education, 278; and National Service dispute, 27, 37, 237, 238, 240, 244-8, 249n-51n, 269, 297n; and other student demonstrations, 224, 234n, 287 OCCUPATIONAL INTEGRATION: and education, see Agricultural education, Education and occupational integration, Manpower planning, Primary school leavers Old Moshi Boys' Secondary School, 168 Orrinde, Simon, 212n Order of St. Benedict (OSB), 190nln PARE (people), 55; see also Pare District Pare District, 55, 101, 132-3, 156n, 157n, 172, 176-7, 191n, 206, 213n, 321 Parents: and politics of education, 34, 35, 103-4, 112, I28, 145, 149 151, 154, 163, 199, 200, 201, 309-10; attitudes towards education, 33, 34, 59-61, 78, 99, 128, 129, 133, 153, 184-5, 190n-ln, 201, 202, 209, 210, 245-6, 283-4 Parliament: see National Assembly Parliament, members of, 26, 30, 31, 39n, 132; and education, see National Assembly Peace Corps, 220, 232n, 267, 297n Permanent Mandates Commission: see League of Nations Phelps-Stokes reports, 57-8 Political education: civics, 36, 62, 219, 222-6, 230, 233n-4n, 270, 279, 282; in schools (after Arusha Declaration), 270, 273, 279, 287-8 299n; military training in schools, 270, 289; for adults, 31, 278-9, 293; see also Education and political socialization, Education for Self-Reliance, Tanganyika National Service, TANU Youth League

INDEX

Political integration: and education, see Education and political integration, Language policy; see also Education and social structure Political socialization: and • education, see Education and political socialization, political education, Tanganyika National Service Politicians: and politics of education, 33-4, 307-10, 311; see Cabinet, Eliufoo, Solomon; Kambona, Oscar; Kawawa, Rashidi; Legislative Council ;National Assembly; Nyerere, Julius K.; Tanganyika African National Union Politics of education: see Education and politics Pratt, R. Cranford, 40n Pratt, Simon, 140, 142 President: see Nyerere, Julius K. Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State, 21-2; opposition of students to proposals of, 224, 227, 238 Press: and politics of education, 134, 202-3, 281, 284, 291, 302n, 304n; and National Service dispute, 240, 246-8; see also Daily News, Nationalist, and Standard Prewitt, Kenneth, 37n, 234n-5n, 313 Primary schools: colonial policy and development, 45-7, 51-2, 53-6, 60, 73-4; early post-colonial policy, 75-6, 110-3, 120; and Education for Self-Reliance, 256-8, 269-72, 275, 288; campaign for universal primary education (in Tanzania), 73, 110, 129, 131, 132-3, 269, 284-5, 305n; (elsewhere), 120, 309; goal of universal primary education, at first rejected, 111-2; set for 1989, 271, 275; set for 1977, 294n; politics of primary school expansion, 77, 110, 112-3, 120, 128-55, 155n-62n 196, 198-9; campaign for free primary school education, 98-9, 129, 131, 165, 284-5; fees abolished, 285; School Committees, 71, 102-4, 109n; conversion to seven year programme, 118, 142, 143, 151, 167, 196, 202-3, 217; enrolment, 112-3, 120-1,

348

128-30, 134, 137-9, 141, 145-6, 149, 151-4, 155n, 159n, 172-6, 187-8, 192n, 194n, 195-6, 207-8, 270-2, 275-6, 284, 298n, 299n, 321-5; government expenditures on, 117-9; and racial integration, 78, 82, 163-7; and regional disparities, 171-6, 19In, 275-6, 321-5; environment of, and political socialization, 33, 63-4, 226-7, 235n; see also Agricultural education, Curriculum, Language policy, Local education authorities, Political education, Primary school leavers, Teachers Primary School Inspectors, 96, 200, 300n, 316 Primary School Leavers: problem, 33, 35-6, 53, 61, 64, 84, 87, 110, 143-4, 195-200, 209-10, 284, 291, 307, 309, 312; crisis of 1966, 26, 153, 200-5, 209-10, 217, 269, 281, 282; agricultural education as policy response, see Agricultural education; private secondary schools as outlet, 35, 197, 198, 200-1, 204-6, 210, 213n, 278, 299n; school leavers' schemes, 205-6, 210; see also Education and occupational integration, Education for Self-Reliance, Primary schools Provincial Education Officers, 48, 73 RACE: and politics, 20, 24, 77; and education: see Education and social structure Regional Commissioners, 139, 161n, 199, 245, 286, 297n Regional Development, Ministry of 161n Regional Education Officers, 96-7, 100, 106, 139, 160, 184, 201-2, 212n, 267, 316-7; Conference of 189n, 200, 227-8, 238-9, 284-5, 302n; REO, Coast, 160n; REO, Iringa, 180-1; REO, Kilimanjaro, 137-8, 151, 160n, 200 Regions: educational disparities among, see Education and social structure Religion: and politics, 20; and education: see Education and social structure Resnick, ,Jane, 290, 305n, 306n

349

INDEX

Resnick, Idrian, 290, 305n, 306n Rhodesia, 40n, 116, 239, 249n Rodney, Walter, 291 Royal Technical College, Nairobi, 51, 52, 67, 79; see also University College, Nairobi Rufiji District, 107n, 174-6, 186, 191n, 324 Rungwe District, 55, 107n, 145, 161n, 172, 177 Rural development, 26, 27, 29, 284, 291-3, 306n; education for rural life, see Agricultural education,

Education for Self-Reliance Ruvuma Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 SAIDI, R. H., 109n St. Andrew's Minaki School, 176 St. Francis Pugu (later Pugu) School, 176, 304n St. Joseph's Convent School, 78 St. Michael's and St. George's School, 80, 89n-90n, 168; see also Mkwawa Secondary School Samjela, Timothy, 129, 158n, 232n Samofl, Joel, 104; 154, 162n Sapi, Chief Adam, 90n Sarwatt, H. E., 107n Saul, John S., 29, 305n Sawe, Joseph, 109n, 148, 282 Scanlon, David G., 65n School Committees: see Primary schools Schools Supervisors, 48, 72, 96 Schurmann, Franz, 262 Second Five Year Plan (1969-74), 29, 292; and education, 181, 193n, 270-3, 278, 280 Secondary schools: colonial policy and development, 45-7, 51-2, 60, 73-4; early post-colonial policy, 75-7, 111-2, 113, 120, 122, 123, 126n; and Education for SelfReliance, 256-8, 269-70, 272-3; abolition of fees, 184-5, 190n; selection procedures, see Examinations policy and practice; Boards of Governors, 71, 96, 102-3; enrolment, 113-4, 120-2, 168, 178-9, 195-6, 205, 272-3, 275-8, 298n; government expenditures on, 117-9; and racial integration, 167-9; and religious integration, 169-70; and regional disparities, 176-80, 275-7; environment of,

and political socialization, 33, 63-4, 226-7, 235n, 286, 304n; private, and the school leavers' problem, see Primary school leavers; see also Agricultural education, Curriculum, Language policy, Manpower planning, Political education, Students, Teachers Semiti, G. A., 304n Shinyanga Region, 173, 178-9, 190n, 277-8, 321, 323 Shivji, I. G., 305n Singida Region, 173, 177-9, 277-8 Singleton, F. S., 305n Sitta, S. J., 242 Social class: and politics, 25-6, 2831, 67n, 182-3, 193n, 292-3; and education: see Education and social structure Social Services, Minister (Member) for, 70, 74 Social structure: and education, see Education and social structure Songea District, 190n-ln Southern Highlands Churches Education Council, 180-1 Southern Highlands Province, 54-5, 58, 172, 320-3 Southern Province, 54-5, 321-3 Stalin, J., 260-1 Standard, 202-3, 240, 247, 266, 289 Students: and politics of education, 34, 35, 237, 310; attitudes towards education, 58-61, 289-90, 306n; and school leavers' problem, 199200; opposition to one-party state, 34, 224, 227, 238; and National Service dispute, see Tanganyika National Service; and TANU Guidelines and participation, 285-7, 305n-6n; organizations, see Dar es Salaam University Students Organisation, National Union of Tanzanian Students, Students Revolutionary Front, Tanganyika African National Union (University TANU Club), Tanganyika University Students Organisation, TANU Youth League, University College, Dar es Salaam (Students' Union) Students Revolutionary Front, 289 Sukuma, 55

INDEX

Survey of educational administrators and teachers: scope, 3167; attitudes towards National Union of Tanganyika Workers, 101-2, 108n; views on political influence of teachers, 102, 109n; preferences for primary or secondary school expansion, 152, 161n-2n; head teachers on criteria for Standard I selection, 156n; attitudes towards race, 166, 190n; career intentions of non-citizen Asians, 169, 190n; views on language policy, 189n; views on agricultural and vocational education, 206-7, 213n; preferences for rural or urban jobs, 207, 213n; views on purposes of primary schools, 208, 213n-4n; aims as teachers of non-citizens, 224, 234n; aims as teachers of citizens, 234n; explanations of career choice, 280, 300n; career intentions of citizens, 280, 300nln; perceptions of teachers' status, 281, 301n-2n; views on sufficiency of teachers' salaries, 301n; views on purposes of education, 302n-3n Swahili: and educational policy and practice, see Language policy Swynnerton, R. J. N., 68n, 90n TABORA (Boys' Secondary) School, 56, 58, 176, 217, 221 Tabora District, 100, 203 Tabora Girls' Secondary School, 225 Tabora Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Tanga Province, 54-5, 157n, 172, 191n-2n, 320-3 Tanga Region, 173, 178-9, 277-8 Tanganyika African Catholic Teachers' Union, 87n Tanganyika African National Congress, 39n Tanganyika African National Union, 19-23, 25, 29, 33, 34, 41n, 70, 86, 102, 109n, 110, 158n, 163, 170, 195,197,224,237,283, 298n, 299n, 302n, 303n, 305n; and Arusha Declaration, 27, 28, 30, 269; TANU Guidelines, 30-1, 285-7, 304n; TANU Study Group, 269; and rural development, 292-3; and political education, 89n, 279, 293; and adult education, 278-9;

350

and education in colonial era, 70, 72, 73-5, 77, 78-83, 84-6, 89n, 131, 199, 206; National Executive Committee and educational policy-making, 105; and National Service dispute, 239, 242, 245-6, 248; University TANU Club, 243, 248; and secondary school selection, 274-5; and Education for Self-Reliance, 268-9; leadership and primary school expansion, 128, 132, 133, 143, 145, 154-5; leadership and regional educational disparities, 171, 177; leadership on political role of education, 221-2; activists and school nationalization, 97;' activists and primary school fees, 98-9, 284-5; activists and primary school expansion, 128-9, 131-4, 139, 151, 154, I56n, 161n; activists and racial integration, 163, 164, 166; activists and regional educational disparities, 176, 180; activists and primary school leavers' problem, 197-8, 201, 203, 206, 209, 210, 213n, 217; activists and curriculum policy, 164, 216; activists and Africanization of teaching corps, 220; activists and political role of school children, 227, 229, 235n; see also Cabinet; Kawawa, Rashidi; Legislative Council; National Assembly; Nyerere, Julius K.; Tanganyika African Parents Association Tanganyika African Parents Association, 77, 128, 131, 136, 139-40, 143, 155n, 156n, 232n, 274, 304n; established, 77; recognized as national voluntary agency, 96-7; new role under Education for SelfReliance, 285 Tanganyika African Servants' Association, 78 Tanganyika African Teachers' Association, 87n Tanganyika Association of Chambers of Commerce, 109n Tanganyika Episcopal Conference, 67n, 96-7, 180, 188; see also Catholic Welfare Society, Order of St. Benedictine Tanganyika Federation of Labour

351

INDEX

(TFL), 20-1, 87n, 101; tee also National Union of Tanganyika Workers Tanganyika National Service, 36, 198, 268, 280; programme, 237-9; dispute between government and students, 27, 37, 237-48, 249n51n, 269, 290, 297n Tanganyika National Union of Teachers, 100-1, 108n, 232n Tanganyika Rifles: mutiny of 1964, 21, 101, 238, 243 Tanganyika Union of African Teachers (TUAT), 87n, 232n Tanganyika Unofficial Members Organization, 80-1; see also United Tanganyika Party TANU: see Tanganyika African National Union TANU Guidelines, 30-1, 285-7 TANU Youth League, 206, 233n, 238, 242, 245, 248, 302n; in schools and colleges, 36, 227-9, 239, 248, 270, 289, 304n Tanzania People's Defence Force, 238, 268 Tanzania Publishing House, 99 Tanzania University Students Organisation, Dar Unit, 240, 242-3, 250n; Nairobi Unit, 251n TAPA: see Tanganyika African Parents Association Teacher Training Advisory Board, 70, 95, 217 Teachers: and politics of education, 34, 98-9, 102, 128, 151, 229, 283, 302n, 310, 311; as agents for change, 34, 36, 58, 63-4, 166-7, 207, 209, 219, 222-8, 279-81, 285-6, 287-8, 300n, 308, 310, 313, 314n; organizations, 72, 87n-8n, 100-2, 104; Africanization of teaching corps, 220, 232n, 267, 273; see also National Union of 'Tanganyika Workers, Survey of educational administrators and teachers, Tanganyika National Union of Teachers Teachers' colleges (and teacher education): colonial policy and development, 51-2, 66n-7n; early post-colonial policy and development, 115-6, 142, 220; and Educalion for Self-Reliance, 256-8, 269-70, 271, 280, 300n; politics of siting

Iringa Teachers' College, 180-1, 193n; Boards of Governors, 71, 96, 102-3; enrolment, I15-6; government expenditures on, 117-8; see also Curriculum, Political education, Students, Teacher Training Advisory Board, Teachers, University College, Dar es Salaam (Institute of Education) Technical education, 51-2, 67n, 111-2, 113-5, 117-8, 204; see also Agricultural education, Dar es Salaam Technical College, Manpower planning Ten Year Plan for African Education (1947-56), 47, 54, 73, 84, 171-2, 191n Tengeru Natural Resources School, 52 Three Year Development Plan (1961-4), 23; and education, 75-6, 110-1, 113, 115-6, 128, 132, 134, 140-1, 144 Tobias, George, 111, 125n, 126n Tobias Report (High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources in Tanganyika), 111-2, 114 Togo, 120-2, 124, 318 Tordoff, William, 39n , Torney, Judith, 313 Trusteeship Council: see United Nations Tumaini Secondary School, 304n Tumbo, C. S. K., 83 Twining, Sir Edward, 59, 74-5, 80 UFIPA DISTRICT, 100, 321-3 Uganda, 30, 46, 55, 66n, 90n, 289; education in, 75, 85, 88n, 103, 106n, 121, 123-4, 229, 249n, 318; private schools in, used by Tanzanians, 198, 200, 201; joint curriculum planning with Tanzania, 217, 219; students in, and the National Service dispute, 247, 251n Ujamaa, 23-4, 26-8, 222, 303n; see also Arusha Declaration, Nyerere, Julius K. Ujamaa villages, 29, 278, 288,292-3 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 140; Conference on African Education, 111; educational planning mission in Tanganyika, 111-3, 116, 142, 156n

352

INDEX

Unified Teaching Service, 97, 101, 102; campaign for, 88n; established, 96; organization of, 97, 108n Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 263; education in, 127n, 260-2, 294n United Kingdom, 21, 22, 25, 40n, 45, 47, 82, 116, 127n, 218, 239, 249n; and colonial education in Africa, 48, 49, 57, 63, 72, 78-9; British influence on education in Tanzania, passim, esp. 32-3, 48-9, 56-64, 72, 84-6, 95, 105, 154, 217-27, 230, 281; see also Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British Tropical African Dependencies United Nations: trusteeship over Tanganyika, 45, 66n; Trusteeship Council and Tanganyika, 49, 72; Visiting Missions to Tanganyika, 72; of 1948, 73, 78; of 1951, 55-6, 73, 78; of 1954, 73, 78-9, 85; of 1957, 81, 85 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 181 United States of America, 25, 40n, 116, 127n, 181, 200, 313; see also Peace Corps, United States for Agency International Development United Tanganyika Party, 81 Universities Mission to Central Africa, 44, 190n-1n University College, Dar es Salaam, 75, 88n-9n, 109n, 116-7, 218, 232n, 291, 303n; Institute of Education, 95, 208, 217-8, 266; Students' Union, 240, 250n, 287; and National Service dispute, 239-45, 247-8, 250n-ln, 269; and Education for Self-Reliance, 268-9; becomes University of Dar es Salaam, 270; see also Higher education, Tanganyika African National Union (University TANU Club), Tanganyika University Students Organisation, University of Dar es Salaam University College, Nairobi, 251n University Echo, 240 University of Dar es Salaam, 291,

303n; established, 270; and Education for Self-Reliance, 270, 286-7, 289, 297n, 304n-5n; see also Dar es Salaam University Students Organisation, University College, Dar es Salaam University of East Africa, 75, 116-7, 119, 127n, 249n; see also Makerere College; University College, Nairobi; University College, Dar es Salaam University of London, 47 VISITING MISSIONS to Tanganyika: see United Nations Voluntary agencies: relationship to colonial government, 48; relations with central government and Ministry of Education, 34, 95-8, 103, 104, 106n, 128, 311; relations with local government and education authorities, 49, 98-100, 106n; organization, 48, 71, 96-7; Education Secretaries General of, 48, 96-7, 108n, 181, 316; Education Secretaries of, 48, 96-7, 99, 106, 131, 316-7; and primary school expansion, 97, 128-9, 131-3, 149, 154, 156n, 157n, 190n-ln; schools nationalized, 98, 269, 283; see also Mission societies, Christian Council of Tanganyika, Catholic Welfare Society, East African Muslim Welfare Society, Education Department of His Highness the Aga Khan, Tanganyika Episcopal Conference, Tanganyika African Parents Association Von der Muhll, George, 38n, 234n-6n, 313, 314n WAMBURA, Richard, 216, 233n Weeks, Sheldon, 197, 211n West Lake Region, 173, 177-9, 277-8 Western Province, 54-5, 321-3 White Paper on racial integration of education, 82-3, 163 Williamson Diamond Mines, 206 ZAMBIA, 19, 120-4, 318 Zanzibar, 25, 40n, 75, 226, 245; revolution, 21; union with Tanganyika, 22, 39n; education in, 95, 106n