Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282-1422 (Warfare in History) 9781783270316

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SOLDIERS IN THE

LATER MIDDLE AGES 1282–1422

“Not only the leaders but the entire nation are trained in war. Sound the trumpet for battle and the peasant will rush from his plough to pick up his weapons as quickly as the courtier from the court.” So wrote Gerald of Wales at the end of the twelfth century; and war continued to define the experiences of Welshmen in the succeeding years.

ADAM CHAPMAN is Editor and Training Coordinator with the Victoria County History of the Counties of England at the Institute of Historical Research, London. Cover illustration: A Welsh soldier of the fourteenth century. The effigy depicts Gruffudd ap Llywelyn ap Ynyr (d. c. 1320) wearing mail and a padded surcoat. It can be found in the church of St Garmon (St Germanus of Auxerre) in Llanarmon-yn-Iâl, Denbighshire. Photograph courtesy of and copyright Martin Crampin.

GENERAL EDITORS: Matthew

Bennett, Anne Curry, Stephen Morillo

an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620–2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com

1282–1422

CHAPMAN

Warfare in History

IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

This book explores the role of the Welsh in England’s armies and in England’s wars between Edward I’s conquest of Wales in the 1280s, through the wars in Scotland and France and the revolt led by Owain Glyndŵr, concluding with Henry V’s conquest of Normandy following his victory at Agincourt in 1415. It examines the structure and composition of armies and the social networks and hierarchies which underpinned them: what sort of Welshmen became soldiers? How was Welsh society organised for war? What impact did wider political considerations have upon Welshmen in England’s armies? These questions are answered using both well-known sources, such as the financial records of the English crown, and others less familiar, including the records of local administration and the large surviving corpus of Welsh-language poetry.

WELSH SOLDIERS

WELSH

WELSH SOLDIERS IN THE

LATER MIDDLE AGES 1282–1422

A

D A M

C

H A P M A N

warfare in history

Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282–1422

warfare in history issn 1358-779x Series editors Matthew Bennett, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK Anne Curry, University of Southampton, UK Stephen Morillo, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA This series aims to provide a wide-ranging and scholarly approach to military history, offering both individual studies of topics or wars, and volumes giving a selection of contemporary and later accounts of particular battles; its scope ranges from the early medieval to the early modern period. New proposals for the series are welcomed; they should be sent to the publisher at the address below. Boydell and Brewer Limited, PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF Previously published volumes in this series are listed at the back of this volume

Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages

Adam Chapman

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© Adam Chapman 2015 All rights reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of Adam Chapman to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

First published 2015 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge ISBN 978-1-78327-031-6 The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620-2731, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate This publication is printed on acid-free paper

Typeset by Frances Hackeson Freelance Publishing Services, Brinscall, Lancs

Contents List of Tables Acknowledgements Abbreviations A Note on the Welsh Language Map Introduction

vi vii ix xiv xv 1

Part I 1   The Reign of Edward I

11

2   Edward of Caernarfon

36

3   The Wars of Edward III: Scotland and France 1327–1360

57

4   Before Glyndŵr: 1360–1400

78

5  Henry IV and Henry V: Rebellion and Aftermath                   109 Part II 6 War and Welsh Society: Military Obligation and Organisation          153 7 Going to War: Recruitment and Deployment                       171 8 The Distinctiveness of the Welsh Soldier: Equipment                 194     and Organisation Conclusion                                                    218 Appendix 1: The Size of English Armies and Their Welsh Constituents       227 Appendix 2: Important Welsh Figures                                231 Glossary                                                       233 Bibliography                                                   239 Index                                                           254

Tables Table 1: English garrisons and standing forces in Wales and the Welsh March under Henry IV Table 2: English garrisons in Wales and the Welsh March for which musters survive, 1400–1409 Table 3: Garrison Strengths in Wales in 1415 Table 4: Select examples of the size of English armies and their Welsh constituents, temp. Edward I and Edward II Table 5: Select examples of the size of English armies and their Welsh constituents, temp. Edward III

114 118 133 228 229

Acknowledgements The research that initially informed this book was the result of an AHRC doctoral award, part of a much larger project, ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England, 1369–1453’. To be part of such a valuable contribution to medieval military history was extremely rewarding; so it is to my supervisor Anne Curry, and the rest of the project team, Adrian Bell, David Simpkin and Andy King, that I owe a significant debt. Without them, their feedback, friendly interest and helpful criticism, this book would not have reached publication. Their efforts were supplemented by the enthusiasm of those behind another AHRC project based at the University of Wales Centre for Advanced Welsh and Celtic Studies, Aberystwyth. Without Ann Parry Owen, whose excitable email in Welsh began a journey into the cultural context in which ‘my’ soldiers lived, this would have been a rather different book. Her interest and that of Dylan Foster Evans, Barry Lewis, Jenny Day and Eurig Salisbury helped my research evolve and shaped something of its current and future direction. Others who were with the process from the start also deserve special thanks. Leonie Hicks and Rachel Evans have probably listened to my witterings on this subject over enormous quantities of tea for longer than anyone else and with far greater patience than was warranted. Others who shared parts of this process included the various denizens of room 2241, most notably Jaime Ashworth, whose alternative title, ‘Dying for a Leek’, requires no further comment here. Mike Lally, Ally Moore, Mark Rose, Jennie Thorne, together with Hannah Ewence, Jan Lanicek and Stephen Robinson, all contributed valuable moral and intellectual support when it was needed. To all those who have lent their support in answering questions and generally providing prods in the right direction, especially Simon Payling, Ben Bankhurst, Gordon McKelvie and Linsey Hunter, thank you. At Southampton I was fortunate enough to benefit from the kindness of archaeologists Gareth and Nicole Beale, Sandy Budden, Christina Karlsson, Chris Lewis, Kris Strutt, Pina Franco, Dave Underhill, Sarah Inskip, Pete Girdwood, Lief Ishaksen, Ellie Williams, and others from yet more diverse disciplines, particularly Beth Carroll, Adam Dunn and Mary Orr, Eleanor Quince and Mary Stubbington. I have been lucky enough to have received support and advice from Professor Ralph Griffiths, Deborah Youngs, Dan Power of Swansea University, Louise Barker and Richard Suggett of the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales and Jeremy Ashbee of English Heritage, all of whom have been encouraging at key moments. Sara Elin Roberts deserves special praise for her

viii

acknowledgements

thorough and direct approach to copy-editing, late-in-the-day reference checking and guidance in matters of medieval Welsh law. I am also grateful to those I was fortunate enough to work with at the University of Southampton, the University of Kent and Manchester Metropolitan University, and my current colleagues at the Institute of Historical Research. Special gratitude must be reserved for the staff of the Victoria County History, Elizabeth Williamson, Matt Bristow, Jessica Davies, Alan Thacker and Rebecca Read. As with all historians, I am in the debt of the staff of the National Archives, the British Library and the National Library of Wales and all the various institutional libraries, notably those of the University of Southampton and Cardiff University whose assistance was so invaluable. This process has been speeded by the good offices of Caroline Palmer of Boydell and Brewer and the mobile office space afforded by South West Trains, and leavened by my reintroduction to the cricket field. All those who have played for the Cavaliers Cricket Club will be aware that this has resulted in no compromise to their standards. Finally, I should like to thank my family, who have looked on without obvious bemusement for all this time, and Louise and those who introduced me to the study of medieval history at the University of East Anglia: Rob Liddiard, Stephen Church, Christopher Harper-Bill and Tom Williamson. Finally, I dedicate this book to the memory of the grandfather I knew, Marcus Chapman, and the one I did not, Norman Womack, both veterans of the RAF in the Second World War.

Abbreviations Annales Monastici

Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard, 5 vols (London 1864–69) Ayton, Knights and Warhorses A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994, 2nd edn, 1999) BBCS Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies Bell et al., The Soldier in Later A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England 1369–1453 Medieval England (Oxford, 2013) BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research BL British Library BnF Bibliotheque nationale Français Book of Prests The Book of Prests of the King’s Wardrobe for 1294–5 presented to John Goronwy Edwards, ed. E.B. Fryde (Oxford, 1962) Byerly and Byerly (eds), Records Records of the Wardrobe and Household, 1286– of the Wardrobe and Household 1289, ed. B.F. Byerly and C.R. Byerly (London, 1986) Calendar of Ancient Correspondence concerning Cal. Anc. Corr Wales, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1935) Calendar of Ancient Petitions relating to Wales: Cal. Anc. Pet. Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries, ed. W. Rees (Cardiff, 1975) Cal. Chancery Warrants Calendar of Chancery Warrants Preserved in the Public Record Office (London, 1927) Cal. Ch. Rolls Calendar of Charter Rolls, 1257–1417, 5 vols (London, 1903–16) Cal. Docs. Scot. Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland (ed. J. Bain, 5 vols (London, 1881–88) Calendar of Various Chancery Rolls, 1277–1326: Cal. Var. Chanc. Rolls Supplementary Close Rolls, Welsh Rolls, Scutage Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office (London, 1912) Cal. Inq. Misc. Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous, Chancery, Preserved in the Public Record Office, 8 vols (London, 1916–)

x

abbreviations

Carr, ‘An Aristocracy in Decline’ A.D. Carr, ‘An Aristocracy in Decline: The Native Welsh Lords after the Edwardian Conquest’, WHR 5 (1970), pp. 103–29 A.D. Carr, Owen of Wales: The End of the House Carr, Owen of Wales of Gwynedd (Cardiff, 1991) Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in A.D. Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred the Hundred Years War’ Years War: Sir Gregory Sais’, THSC (1977), pp. 40–53 Calendar of Close Rolls, 1272–1422, 35 vols CCR (London, 1900–32) Calendar of Fine Rolls, 1272–1422, 14 vols CFR (London, 1911–34) Chapman, ‘He took me to A. Chapman, ‘“He took me to the Duke of the Duke of York’ York”: Henry Griffith, “A Man of War”’, in B.J. Lewis, A. Parry Owen and D.F. Evans (eds), ‘Gwalch Cywyddau Gwŷr’: Essays on Guto’r Glyn and Fifteenth Century Wales (Aberystwyth, 2013), pp. 103–34 Chapman, ‘The King’s A. Chapman, ‘The King’s Welshmen: Welsh Welshmen’ Involvement in the Expeditionary Army of 1415’, JMMH 9 (2011), pp. 41–64 A. Chapman, ‘Rebels, Uchelwyr and Parvenus: Chapman, ‘Rebels, Uchelwyr and Parvenus’ Welsh Knights in the Fourteenth Century’, in A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (eds), The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 145–56 Th. M. Chotzen, Recherches sur la poésie de Chotzen, Recherches Dafydd ap Gwilym, barde gallois du XIVe siècle (Amsterdam, 1928) CIPM Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem, 1272–1422, 20 vols (London, 1904–2002) CPR Calendar of Patent Rolls, 1272–1422, 43 vols (London, 1901–71) Curry, Agincourt: A New History A. Curry, Agincourt: A New History (Stroud, 2004) A. Curry, The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Curry, Agincourt: Sources Interpretations (Woodbridge, 2000, second edn, and Interpretations 2008) R.R. Davies, The Age of Conquest: Wales Davies, The Age of Conquest 1063–1415 (Oxford, 1991). First published 1987 as Conquest, Coexistence and Change: Wales, 1063–1415

abbreviations

Davies, Lordship and Society Davies, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’ Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr Davies, Welsh Military Institutions DKR

xi

R.R. Davies, Lordship and Society in the March of Wales 1282–1400 (Oxford, 1978) R.R. Davies, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’, THSC (1968), pp. 150–69

R.R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr (Oxford, 1995) S. Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, 633–1283 (Cardiff, 2004). Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, 36, 41, 42, 44, 48 (London, 1875–83) DL Duchy of Lancaster Dunn, Politics of Magnate Power A. Dunn, The Politics of Magnate Power, England and Wales 1389–1413 (Oxford, 2003) Littere Wallie, preserved in Liber A in the Public Edwards, Littere Wallie Record Office, ed. J.G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1940) EHR English Historical Review Evans, ‘Some Notes on D.L. Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality the Principality of Wales’ of Wales in the time of the Black Prince (1343– 76)’, THSC (1925–26), pp. 25–110 H.T. Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses Evans, Wales and the Wars (Oxford, 1915, repr. Stroud, 2005) of the Roses Foedera Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae etc., ed. T. Rymer, A. Clarke, F. Holbrooke and J. Caley, 4 vols (London, 1816–69) Jean Froissart, Chronicles, ed. G. Brereton Froissart, Chronicles (London, 1978) Oeuvres de Froissart, ed. K. de Lettenhove, 28 Froissart, Oeuvres vols (Brussels, 1867–77) N. Fryde, The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II Fryde, Tyranny and Fall (Cambridge, 1979) List of Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls 1282–1343, ed. N. Fryde (Cardiff, 1974) Gerald of Wales: The Journey through Wales/The Gerald of Wales Description of Wales, ed. and trans. L. Thorpe (London, 1978) The Chronicle of Adam Usk 1377–1421, ed. C. Given-Wilson, Adam Usk Given-Wilson (Oxford, 1997) Chronicles of the Revolution, 1399–1400: The Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution Reign of Richard II, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Manchester, 1993) Glamorgan County History, volume III: The Glam. C.H. III Middle Ages (Cardiff, 1971)

xii

Gough, Scotland in 1298

abbreviations

H. Gough (ed.), Scotland in 1298: Documents Relating to the Campaign of King Edward the First in that Year, and especially to the Battle of Falkirk (London, 1888) R.A. Griffiths, The Principality of Wales in the Griffiths, Principality of Wales Later Middle Ages: The Structure and Personnel of Government, volume I: South Wales, 1277–1536 (Cardiff, 1972) Griffiths, ‘Revolt of Rhys R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Revolt of Rhys ap ap Maredudd’ Maredudd, 1287–8’, WHR 3 (1966), pp. 121–43 JMH Journal of Medieval History JMMH Journal of Medieval Military History Jones, ‘Anglesey Court Rolls’ ‘Anglesey Court Rolls, 1346’, ed. G. Peredur Jones, Transactions of the Anglesey Antiquarian Society & Field Club (1930), pp. 33–49 Lanercost Chronicon de Lanercost. The Chronicle of Lanercost: 1272–1346, translated, with notes by Sir H. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1913) J.E. Lloyd, Owen Glendower (Oxford, 1930) Lloyd, Owen Glendower J.E. Morris, Welsh Wars (Oxford, 1901, 2nd edn, Morris, Welsh Wars Stroud, 2006) NLW National Library of Wales NLWJ National Library of Wales Journal Oxford DNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, www.oxforddnb.com Parl. Writs The Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, etc., collected by Francis Palgrave, 5 vols (London, 1827–34) E. Powell, Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Powell, Kingship, Law and Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Oxford, 1989) Society Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council, PPC ed. N.H. Nicholas, 7 vols (London, 1834–87) M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Prestwich, War, Politics Edward I (London, 1972) and Finance PROME The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England 1275–1504, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., 16 vols (Woodbridge, 2005) Record of Caernarvon Registrum vulgariter nuncupatum ‘The Record of Caernarvon’, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1838) Rees, South Wales and the March W. Rees, South Wales and the March, 1282–1415: A Social and Agrarian Study (Oxford, 1924)

abbreviations

Reg. B. P. Rishanger

Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp Rot. Parl. Rot. Scotiae Saul, Richard II Scrope v. Grosvenor Siddons, Heraldic Badges Skeat (ed.), The Bruce Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’ Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow THSC TNA TRHS VCH Vita Edwardi Secundi

WBO WHR

xiii

Register of Edward the Black Prince, ed. M.C.B. Dawes, 4 vols (London, 1930–33) Willelmi Rishanger, quondam monachi S. Albani, et quorundam anonymorum, chronica et annales, regnantibus Henrico Tertio et Edwardo Primo, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series, London, 1865) C. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2000) Rotuli Parliamentorum: ut et petitiones, et placita in parliamento temp Edward I–temp Henry V, 4 vols (London, 1767–77) Rotuli Scotiae in turri Londinensi et capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservati, ed. D. Macpherson et al., 2 vols (Record Commission, 1814–19) N.E. Saul, Richard II (London, 1997) The Scrope and Grosvenor Controversy, ed. N.H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1832) M.P. Siddons, Heraldic Badges in England and Wales, 3 vols (Woodbridge, 2009) W.W. Skeat (ed.), The Bruce, or the Book of Robert de Broyss, King of Scots (1286–1332), 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1894) J. Beverley Smith, ‘Edward II and the Allegiance of Wales’, WHR 8 (1976), pp. 139–71 J. Beverley Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Prince of Wales (Cardiff, 2005) M. Strickland and R. Hardy, From Hastings to the Mary Rose, The Great Warbow (Stroud, 2005) Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion The National Archives Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Victoria County History W. Childs (ed.), The Life of Edward the Second, re-edited text with new introduction, new historical notes, and revised translation based on that of N. Denholm-Young (Oxford, 2005) Welsh Biography Online: http://wbo.llgc.org. uk/en/index.html Welsh History Review

A Note on the Welsh Language The majority of people in Wales in the Middle Ages would have spoken Welsh, with some knowledge of Latin and English and, among the higher ranks of society, Anglo-Norman and French. Knowledge of English could not be taken for granted among Welshmen and it was usual for Marcher lords and English officials to employ interpreters. Indeed in the first half of the fourteenth century, interpreters and Welsh-speaking criers and priests were all employed by the English kings alongside Welshmen paid as soldiers. During the period covered by this work, the form would have been middle Welsh. Welsh had a long written history, including prose and poetry, and was the main language of the country until the Industrial Revolution. Welsh is a phonetic language, and despite the early origins of Welsh, the language has continued to develop. The grammar is standardised and has much in common with major modern European languages. The morphology of Welsh includes the unusual grammatical structure of initial consonant mutations, something which is shared with other Celtic languages: the initial consonant of some words will change to a softened form in certain grammatical situations, and so the nickname ‘coch’ will appear as ‘goch’ due to its grammatical relationship to the preceding word. In this work, modern standardised spelling will be used except for the purposes of direct quotations from unedited works or in cases where the original meaning is disputed or not discernible. For definitions of Welsh and other terms which may be unfamiliar, see the Glossary at the end of the book.

The shires and Marcher lordships of Wales in the fourteenth century

Introduction

This book seeks to explore the role of the Welsh in England’s armies and in England’s wars between Edward I’s conquest of Wales and Henry V’s conquest of Normandy. It concerns the structure and composition of armies, the group dynamics within them, and the social networks and hierarchies which underpinned them. What sort of Welshmen became soldiers? How was Welsh society organised for war? What impact did wider political considerations have upon Welsh service in England’s armies? War in English service inevitably had a colonial flavour in the years after the conquest of Gwynedd, and war played its part in the process of resettlement. The employment of Welshmen in England’s wars in Scotland, Flanders and later, the wars pursuing the English claim to the throne of France, now called the Hundred Years War, played a key part in shaping later medieval Wales. It has often been stated, and is still widely believed, that the Welsh archer in his ‘knitted Monmouth cap’ was a key part of every English victory in the Hundred Years War.1 A possible origin may lie in Shakespeare’s Henry V (1599). In the play, the garrulous captain Fluellen reminds the king not of the number or importance of Welshmen in his army, but of those in the army of his great-uncle, Edward the Black Prince, at Crécy. It is also an article of faith in some quarters that the longbow was a curiously Welsh weapon whose secret was imparted to the English through Edward I’s wars of conquest. This is an assertion that it is difficult for the evidence to sustain, but is nonetheless one of the key elements of Welsh popular history. What follows is a study in two parts. Part I offers a chronological account of the involvement of Welshmen in English armies between the conquest of Gwynedd in 1282–83 and the end of the reign of Henry V in 1422. In doing so, it considers the continuation of Edward I’s attempts to master the British Isles, addressing the wars

  William Shakespeare, Henry V, act V, scene vii; K. Buckland, ‘The Monmouth Cap’, Costume 13 (1979), pp. 2–16.  1

2

introduction

in Scotland that dominated English military affairs from the 1290s to the 1340s. Edward I’s reign also contained wars against France, the first after the conquest of Wales being in Gascony, the second, in the winter of 1297–98, in Flanders. It was here that Welshmen were first exploited as subjects of the English realm, but it was in the reign of Edward II, the first English prince of Wales, that Welshmen assumed political as well as military importance. Edward I created the military machine that Edward II and Edward III developed. Paid, Welsh infantry were a substantial part of this machine. The Welsh elite who abandoned Llywelyn ap Gruffudd were bound to Edward I and more so to his son. Many of the most tumultuous periods of Edward II’s reign were shaped by events in Wales and Welshmen fought on all sides; Chapter 2 emphasises this. This book’s treatment of Edward III’s reign is divided. The first part encompasses the period between 1327 and 1360. This reflects a political divide, from the deposition of Edward II, the establishment of Edward III’s personal regime in 1330 and his formal assumption of the title of king of France in 1340 and ends with the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360. This also reflects a historiographical divide in terms of the military experience of the English realm. During this period, the nature of the wars fought by English kings changed and with it, the nature of English armies. From levies of men drawn from English and Welsh communities with the king’s own military household at its head recruited by mechanisms honed in Edward I’s day, by 1369, England’s armies were almost universally recruited by indentured contracts with individual captains. Chapters 4 and 5 abandon strict regnal divisions. The first considers Welsh attitudes to the wars between England, France and their proxies in Iberia and of the English in Ireland in the second half of the fourteenth century. As the work of ‘The Soldier in Late Medieval England’ project has shown, this period was essential to the development of the profession of soldiering in England.2 This is also an important period for Welsh historiography. After a spell of relative stability and the repositioning of the Welsh elite as servants to the English Crown, there is a marked sense of the re-establishment of a Welsh ‘national’ identity. In military terms this has two key manifestations. The first was the threat presented by support for Owain ap Tomas ap Rhodri, otherwise Owain Lawgoch, descendant of one of the brothers of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the self-proclaimed and French-supported prince of Wales. The support he gathered from Welshmen in both France and Wales led to his assassination by an English agent in 1378 and foreshadowed the revolt of Owain Glyndŵr.3 This revolt and its aftermath form the focus of the remaining chapter of this part of the study (Chapter 5). This chapter examines the role of Welshmen opposing the rebellion and the place of reconciliation in

  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England.   For example: Carr, Owen of Wales; Davies ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’; idem, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr; Lloyd, Owen Glendower.

 2  3

introduction

3

the careers of repentant rebels. It goes on to show how Henry V absorbed the ­remilitarised Welsh ­population into his wars in France. Part II of this book examines what might be termed the military society and communities of Wales. Chapter 6 examines the mechanism of obligation that compelled Welshmen to join England’s armies. In the absence of traditional feudal structures, Welsh law was adapted for this purpose and military tenures of other sorts instituted in both royal shires and Marcher lordships. Chapter 7 explores the way in which Welsh soldiers were recruited, arrayed and paid. It investigates how the mechanisms of royal and Marcher government were used to gather soldiers from Wales and the way in which they performed, or were meant to perform, in battle. The final chapter of Part II considers the ‘distinctiveness’ of the Welsh soldier. To what extent were Welsh soldiers different from their English counterparts? How would their contemporaries have recognised these differences and how were the differences between Welsh and English societies manifested in war? Wales and the Welsh between 1282 and 1422 Military historians are occasionally guilty of neglecting the context from which armies and individual soldiers emerge. Wales was not one country and was not treated as a single polity until the Acts of Union of the 1536 and lacked even an idea of a clear set of geographical boundaries until the years of the Glyndŵr rebellion in the first decade of the fifteenth century. The constituent parts of what was considered ‘Wales’ in the later Middle Ages were many and varied. For the English, pre-Conquest Wales was divided into ‘pura-Wallia’, the independent areas of Wales still ruled by native princes, and the ‘Marchia Wallie’, the Marchland which had been conquered by Anglo-Norman lords; and after the Edwardian Conquest this contrast was largely perpetuated in the distinction drawn between the Principality (the five counties of Anglesey, Merioneth, Caernarvon, Carmarthen and Cardigan) and the March (the rest of Wales, with the exception of Flintshire).4

The shires of Wales formed the principality of Wales, with Flintshire part of the earldom of Chester. The label ‘principality’ was inherited from the princes of Gwynedd who, in the thirteenth century, had styled themselves ‘prince of Wales’. Hence the label applied even when there was no prince of Wales, as was the case for significant periods (1307–43, 1376–99 and 1413–22). The March consisted of forty or so independent lordships, with rights and privileges taken by right of conquest from Welsh princes or granted by English kings and jealously guarded by their lords. There was a tendency over time, however, for the lands in the March of Wales to be collected in the hands of the dominant English magnates, a trend exaggerated by the Lancastrian usurpation in 1399 which brought the estates of the

  Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 6.

 4

4

introduction

duchy of Lancaster into the royal demesne. For the purposes of this book, Wales shall be taken to refer to the totality of the shires and March, but not the ‘marcher’ counties of England on the borders of Wales. This reflects a contemporary formulation, coined by Lewys Glyn Cothi, a Welsh poet active in the middle years of the fifteenth century, who, in an elegy to Thomas ap Rhydderch, a gentleman of Carmarthenshire, termed the different parts of Wales ‘siroedd a’ r mars’, literally, the shires and March.5 The Welsh as a people, however, by virtue of their language and history, were rightly regarded as different and remain so. It is possibly for this reason that the period between the fall of Pura Wallia in 1283 and the victory of a Welshman of sorts at Bosworth in 1485 has, with a brief and notable interlude in the early years of the fifteenth century, been relatively neglected until the latter part of the twentieth century. Powell’s Historie of Cambria, now called Wales (1584) was only expanded to include material after 1282, with material derived from the papers of the antiquarian Robert Vaughan of Hengwrt, by William Wynne of Garthewin in Denbighshire, published in 1697. Both were regularly reprinted well into the nineteenth century. The period after the Edwardian conquest remained neglected however. J.E. Lloyd’s pioneering two-volume study of medieval Wales, published in 1911, ended altogether in 1282.6 As Rees Davies noted, ‘It is perhaps inevitable that the history of what is “pure” should occupy pride of place in the studies of Welsh historians.’7 This study is not concerned with that pursuit, but with the settlement made by Edward I, the way in which military matters were affected by it and the ways in which Welsh society responded to it. Within a society that had a distinct ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity which was retained after the conquest, wars fought on behalf of a different country inevitably assumed a colonial character. Sources Much of the work on medieval English armies has drawn upon the first example of systematic study of royal administrative and financial documents, J.E. Morris’s The Welsh Wars of Edward I.8 The work Morris published was not without its faults: there were a number of documents, both printed and in manuscript, of which Morris was unaware, while at the time he was compiling his work the Welsh context of the wars described was relatively little studied. Work on the nature of England’s armies between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries has been extensive. Michael Prestwich’s analysis of Edward I’s personal administration, the king’s

  D.R. Johnston (ed.), Gwaith Lewys Glyn Cothi (Cardiff, 1995), pp. 133–4, line 2 on p. 133.   D. Powel (ed.), trans. H. Lhoyd, The Historie of Cambria, now called Wales (1584); J.E. Lloyd, A History of Wales from the earliest times to the Edwardian Conquest (London, 1912).  7   Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 6.  8   Morris, Welsh Wars.  5

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Wardrobe, in the organisation of Edward I’s military machine – essentially that used until the middle years of his grandson’s reign – built upon the foundations laid by Morris and has, in turn, set a pattern for much later work on the subject.9 Prestwich’s work consolidated the case for a great change in the nature of English armies during the reign of Edward I but, more recently, he has argued that developments were not sustained and that armies in the reigns of Edward II and Edward III were hampered by ‘a striking failure to innovate’.10 This assessment echoes Clifford Rogers’s arguments concerning an ‘infantry revolution’ in the practice of war in fourteenth-century Europe. Rogers, citing much chronicle evidence, notes a marked change in English tactics between Bannockburn in 1314, when cavalry were bested by Scottish foot soldiers, and Haildon Hill (1333) and Crécy (1346), when men-at-arms and archers were combined and fought on foot. This, he suggested in a highly influential article, was the basis of English success and the trigger for major change.11 The fundamental question, perhaps, is whether the kind of army available to a commander was a result of or led by the strategy employed. The reign of Edward III saw a number of changes occur together. The key changes in military organisation were relatively simple though their impact has been disputed. Whence these developments emerged and what they meant are at the heart of the debate. For Rogers, Edward III’s change in fortunes in France in the years after 1346 resulted from the skilful use of the longbow and defensive tactics involving the use of dismounted men-at-arms and archers. The ‘adoption’, development, and use of the longbow is key to this argument and Rogers suggests that later gunpowder artillery had a similarly important effect.12 This technological determinism is countered, to an extent, by the administrative innovations relating to war in the same period. Until the Reims campaign of 1359–60, foot soldiers raised by commissions of array played a significant part in wars beyond England’s shores. Andrew Ayton’s work on military organisation in the first half of Edward III’s reign has greatly expanded the understanding of the formalisation of the ‘mixed retinue’ of menat-arms and archers led by members of the aristocracy which first supplemented

  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance; M. Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, JMH 37:3 (2011), pp. 233–44. 10   M. Prestwich, ‘Was There a Military Revolution in Medieval England?’ in C. Richmond and I. Harvey (eds), Recognitions: Essays Presented to Edmund Fryde (Aberystwyth, 1996), pp. 19–38. 11   C. Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, Journal of Military History 57:2 (1993), pp. 241–78; Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 243–4. Military revolutions have a tendency to be found wherever one looks, as is noted with reference to composition of armies and gunpowder artillery in Lancastrian Normandy by A. Curry, ‘Guns and Goddams: Was There a Military Revolution in Lancastrian Normandy 1415–50?’ JMMH 8 (2010), pp. 171–88 and soldiers fighting purely for pay in the Anglo-Norman realm: S.D. Church, ‘The 1210 Campaign in Ireland: Evidence for a Military Revolution?’ Anglo-Norman Studies 20 (1998), pp. 45–57. 12   Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp.  9

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arrayed county levies and later replaced them.13 H.J. Hewitt also provided an invaluable overview of developments in this important period though some of his conclusions have been modified in light of later research.14 After the resumption of the war with France in 1369, armies were generally smaller and wholly mounted and were recruited by indentured contract. Military indentures in themselves were not a new development but after 1369 the Crown entered into contracts with its magnates and, increasingly, with individual captains to supply a specified number of men-at-arms and archers for set periods for defined rates of pay. In effect, the process of military recruitment was privatised and, through the documents presented to the Exchequer for audit, a greatly increased range of documents, notably payrolls and muster rolls, are available for analysis by the historian. These documents, together with particulars of account presented by captains and the issue rolls and warrants for issue from the Exchequer, survive in abundance, an abundance that has, until recently, been a barrier to systematic study.15 The changes in the composition and documentary record of the resulting armies were first addressed in the work of A.E. Prince and later by James Sherborne, whose efforts traced developments in the composition and organisation of English armies from the 1340s to c. 1380.16 Individual expeditions have also attracted attention and have added to the wider picture: Ayton’s work on the Crécy campaign, Hewitt’s volume on the Black Prince’s expedition of 1355–56 and Anne Curry’s work on Agincourt have all made contributions to military history which are greater than narrative accounts of battles or discussion of tactical practice and strategic ambitions.17 Sources for Wales Searching for Welshmen among the military records of the English Crown was where this study began and where other scholars, indeed, had been before. Studies specifically seeking references to Welshmen fighting in English service in the later Middle Ages have been relatively limited, however. There have been a number of biographical studies, notably J.G. Edwards’s work on Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, and Tony Carr’s biographies of Sir Gregory Sais and Owain of Wales, together with his   Ayton, Knights and Warhorses.   H.J. Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III (Manchester, 1966). 15   Most are part of TNA Exchequer series E 101, E 403 and E 404 respectively. 16   A.E. Prince, ‘The Indenture System under Edward III’, in J.G. Edwards (ed.), Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait (Manchester, 1933), pp. 283–97; idem, ‘The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III’, EHR 46 (1931), pp. 353–71; J.W. Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369–80’, in A. Tuck (ed.), War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England (London and Rio Grande, 1994), pp. 1–28. 17   A. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, in A. Ayton and P. Preston (eds), The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 159–251; H.J. Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition of 1355–7 (Manchester, 1958); Curry, Agincourt: A New History. 13

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seminal article ‘Welshmen in the Hundred Years War’, are the most comprehensive and commonly cited works on the subject.18 Carr’s overview was unusual in its use of the large body of Welsh-language literature to illustrate his subject, in addition to the records of English government. In this, he drew upon the work of Theodor Chotzen who attempted to place the work of the fourteenth-century poet, Dafydd ap Gwilym, in its historical context and Howell T. Evans, whose Wales and the Wars of the Roses made the case for the use of poetry to explore the complicated web of allegiances in fifteenth-century Wales.19 The nature of this poetry, composed for a courtly setting and likely set to music, is one reason that it has been greeted with suspicion. Most of the Welsh poetry of the later Middle Ages is praise-poetry, and it was composed for the property-owning section of Welsh society, the so-called uchelwyr (literally ‘high men’).20 The social pressures of Welsh society were put into words by a class of professional poets, who travelled from house to house, praising the uchelwyr for upholding the values of the aristocratic status and, occasionally, attacking them when they did not. Indeed, at least by the fifteenth century, it seems to have been all but a social requirement for uchelwyr to welcome poets into their houses. It is their beholdenness to the praise of poets, rather than any difference in values, which distinguishes the Welsh uchelwyr from the equivalent social groups in England. At the latest estimate, some fifty-nine poets who worked during the fourteenth century have left us samples of their work.21 As to the fifteenth century, no estimate has yet been made, but there will probably be around a hundred poets, ranging from those with only one or two surviving poems to Guto’r Glyn, with more than 120, and Lewys Glyn Cothi, with around 238. The task of editing this material has been going on for over a century. A milestone was reached in 1952 with the publication of Thomas Parry’s Gwaith Dafydd ap Gwilym.22 This work set the pattern, and over the years a number of high-quality editions have appeared, the most significant being Dafydd Johnston’s Gwaith Iolo Goch and Gwaith Lewys Glyn Cothi.23 In the 1990s the University of Wales Centre for Advanced Welsh and Celtic Studies, having completed a seven-volume edition of the poetry of the Welsh princes (c. 1100–c. 1282), turned to a systematic programme of editing later medieval poetry. The resulting series Beirdd yr Uchelwyr, or ‘Poets of the Nobility’,

  J.G. Edwards, ‘Sir Gruffydd Llwyd’, EHR 30 (1915), pp. 589–601; A.D. Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years War’, WHR 4 (1968), pp. 21–46; Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’; Carr, Owen of Wales.. 19   Chotzen, Recherches; Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses. 20   B.J. Lewis, ‘Opening up the Archives of Welsh Poetry: Welshness and Englishness during the Hundred Years War’: online at www.wales.ac.uk/Resources/Documents/Research/ OpeningArchivesWelshPoetry.pdf, accessed 20 April 2014. 21   See B.J. Lewis and T. Morys (eds), Gwaith Madog Benfras ac Eraill o Feirdd y Bedwaredd Ganrif ar Ddeg (Aberystwyth, 2007), pp. 1–7, for a complete list. 22   T. Parry, Gwaith Dafydd ap Gwilym (Cardiff, 1952). 23   D.R. Johnston, Gwaith Iolo Goch (Cardiff, 1988); Gwaith Lewys Glyn Cothi (Cardiff, 1995). 18

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at the time of writing, contains some forty-one volumes, over eighty poets and some 50,000 lines of verse from the period between about 1300 and about 1550. This material has been deployed in a limited fashion in this book but it remains a valuable resource which deserves greater attention from historians.24 If the military history of England in the later Middle Ages has come to be dominated by documents originating in central government, the role of war in local administrations has often been overlooked. This book draws heavily upon administrative documents from the principality of Wales, and the earldom of Chester particularly the accounts of their chamberlains which survive in a more or less complete series for the fourteenth century. While those examining the royal castles have made extensive and effective use of such documents, the picture of routine military activity can be greatly expanded by use of these documents. Examination of these records of local government has done much to broaden the base of this study and to establish how mechanisms of military organisation meshed with the day-to-day administration of the lands of Wales. The careers of officials, in the southern shires of the principality, at least, are known through the extremely detailed prosopographical work of Ralph Griffiths and this resource has done much to illuminate how military service was integrated into the wider public careers of many soldier recorded in the records of the Exchequer.25 Use has also been made of the surviving documentary evidence for Marcher government. In many cases, the detail these documents provide is similar, but with the addition of detail relating to landholding and its military components, and their debts to Welsh practice is made clearer through the succession of estate surveys made at various points in the fourteenth century. All these sources and others go a long way towards integrating the affairs of Wales into more general sources, such as the calendars of patent and close rolls. The intention of this book is to establish the importance of the Welsh soldier in the period between the Edwardian conquest of Gwynedd and the death Henry V, in the aftermath of the most sustained Welsh revolt against English rule, the rebellion of Owain Glyndŵr. In doing so it addresses the importance of war to the development of Welsh society in the same period and it is hoped that it provides a wider appreciation of the Welsh soldier as a member of England’s armies and in the military landscape of the English realm.

  I hope to return to this poetry and its treatment of England’s wars in more detail at a later date.   Griffiths, Principality of Wales.

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part i

1

The Reign of Edward I

In the British Isles, the reign of Edward I saw the reach of the English Crown expand. The last areas of native-ruled Wales were eventually brought under English control and attempts, ultimately unsuccessful, were made to repeat the process in Scotland. This chapter will summarise the final decades of these wars before considering their consequences for the Welsh and for Edward I’s military machine.1 The process of settlement after Edward’s conquest in 1282–83 was met, in some quarters, by hostility and rebellion. The character of these rebellions was not national in the modern sense but a reaction to repressive government by the invader, and personal grievance. It is remarkable, however, that there was significant Welsh involvement in the suppression of these rebellions and both the reasons for this and its scale will be analysed. Finally, it is necessary to consider the effects of the conquest of Wales on Edward I’s military capabilities. What was the scale of Welsh participation in wars beyond Wales? How did this compare to the contributions from other parts of the English realm? How did Welshmen adapt to being soldiers of a distant and powerful king rather than subjects of an ambitious native prince? There are a number of other questions addressed in this chapter that will recur later in this book. Was there a notable ‘Welsh’ effect on the way in which the king’s wars were fought after 1282? How did Welshmen adapt themselves to the conditions of English service? First, it is necessary to provide a brief outline of the conflict that brought about Edward I’s victory over the Welsh. The struggle for independence or supremacy of Pura Wallia (Wales under native rule) was conducted as much between the princes themselves as between Welshmen and Anglo-Normans or Englishmen. Unlike Scotland, there was no nation or state that bound the peoples of Wales

  For a fuller narrative of the wars in the second half of the thirteenth century, see Morris, Welsh Wars; Davies, The Age of Conquest, particularly ch. 7; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.  1

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together. Such hegemony as was achieved by an individual prince such as Lord Rhys of Deheubarth (d. 1197) or Llywelyn ab Iorwerth (Llywelyn Fawr) (d. 1240) was transitory and personal. In the thirteenth century Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and his grandson, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, came not only to dominate Wales but also to seek to expand the bounds of their influence. Edward I’s involvement with Wales began in 1254 with the grant of the earldom of Chester on the occasion of his marriage to Eleanor of Castile. Part of the earldom included the area of north-east Wales between the rivers Conwy and Dee called the Four Cantrefs (Perfeddwlad). Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s victory over his brothers at Bryn Derwin in June 1255 and the oppression of Edward’s officials triggered rebellion in the Four Cantrefs a year later, to Llywelyn’s profit. In 1257, Edward’s forces were defeated in the Tywi valley (Carmarthenshire) and a royal expedition reached Deganwy but was forced to withdraw. Llywelyn’s influence came to spread across the north, and into mid- and west Wales and his dominance was confirmed in 1267 when Henry III, weakened by baronial opposition supported by Llywelyn (who married a daughter of Simon de Montfort), recognised Llywelyn’s claim to be prince of Wales, as overlord to his fellow Welsh princes, in the Treaty of Montgomery, in exchange for homage. One of the factors in Edward’s eventual victory over Llywelyn was that not all Welshmen supported his cause. Llywelyn’s fellow princes, notably those in Powys and in West Wales, had reason to fear his motives, while those subject to Marcher lords were bound by other ties. Despite Llywelyn’s success against Henry III in the 1260s, the treaty agreed at Montgomery in 1267 promised more than it could deliver and committed Llywelyn to payments of cash that were beyond his means. Certainly one of the complaints made by the communities of Gwynedd, probably in the summer of 1283, was of Llywelyn’s demands for military service. It is a frequent comment about his last years that the prince exceeded his financial and military resources.2 These financial pressures drove Llywelyn’s expansive tendencies and, inevitably, infringed on the position of others, such as his own brothers or the princes of Powys. Llywelyn’s acknowledgement of Henry III’s superior lordship over Wales at Montgomery in 1267 was problematic in a way comparable to the 1259 Treaty of Paris, sealed between Henry III and Louis IX, and later settlements between the English and French crowns. Each gave an opportunity for the superior lord to interfere with the affairs of his inferior on a feudal basis. This reflected wider European trends in the dignity of the prince and the codification of law and governance. David Stephenson has analysed the extent to which the princes of Gwynedd in the thirteenth century exploited these. Through gradual developments in land tenure and the administration of their court, they attempted to construct a Welsh version of what might be termed a feudal elite on a recognisably European model. Stephenson   Ll. Beverley Smith, ‘The Gravamina of the Community of Gwynedd against Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’, BBCS 31 (1984–85), pp. 162, 174. Clause 8 of the gravamina is the one in question.  2

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has identified similar currents in Powys.3 Partible inheritance, established in Welsh law, had resulted in conflict among princely families who had to provide for the maintenance of multiple heirs. After the death of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Gwynedd was nearly destroyed by family conflict. To counter this problem, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd variously sent his brothers into exile or prison to maintain his position while Welsh princes either acting against Anglo Normans lords or in their own interests looked to England for support. After 1267 opposition to Llywelyn came primarily from his youngest brother, Dafydd, both in his own right and in his role as Edward I’s agent provocateur. Others, however, acted against the oppression of their prince and the situation immediately before Llywelyn’s death was bleak. A surviving copy of a gravamina, a schedule of complaints against Llywelyn, shows that tolerance even among Llywelyn’s own men was stretched. There was a conspiracy against the prince, hatched in the tower of Bangor cathedral, and the heirs of Ednyfed Fychan, by now hereditary officers of the prince’s court and lords of much of Anglesey, undoubtedly colluded with Edward’s invasion. In fact, it could be said that it was the English that intervened in a civil war in which the princes of Gwynedd sought dominance over their fellow Welsh rulers. The result was that, for many Welshmen, war was a familiar experience and war in the service of the English Crown for pay was usual, even before the Edwardian conquest. Edward I’s Welsh Wars The two wars fought by Edward I against Llywelyn ap Gruffudd were different in intent if not in character. The Treaty of Montgomery, negotiated in Llywelyn’s favour in 1267, had at the same time placed Llywelyn in a feudal relationship with the English Crown and with it imposed an extraordinary financial burden. He had obliged himself to pay 25,000 marks within eight years, and most commentators have taken the view that, in doing this, he over-reached Gwynedd’s means. Keith Williams Jones criticised Llywelyn’s ‘over-weaning ambition and ill-conceived policies’; the prince had ‘grossly over-estimated his fiscal resources’.4 This trenchant critique has been followed by other scholars, albeit in more muted terms. Stephenson takes a sunnier view, noting that Llywelyn’s lands in mid-Wales in the 1260s, Gwethrynion, Builth, Brecon, Cedewain and part of Ceri and Elfael, together with his incursions into the Shropshire March, gave him resources sufficient for the task. When these resources were added to the lands of southern Powys, confiscated from Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn at the end of

 3   D. Stephenson, The Governance of Gwynedd (Cardiff, 1984); idem, ‘From Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to Edward I: Expansionist Rulers and Welsh Society in Thirteenth-Century Gwynedd’, in D.M. Williams and J.R. Kenyon (eds), The Impact of the Edwardian Castles in Wales: The Proceedings of a Conference held at Bangor University, 7–9 September 2007 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 9–15.  4   Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, 1292–3, ed. K. Williams-Jones (Cardiff, 1976), pp. xvii–xix.

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1274, these resources seem less strained.5 Despite this, the terms of the treaty were abused by both sides. Although Llywelyn was in arrears by 5,000 marks at the end of 1272, he had already paid 15,000 of the 25,000 he had initially agreed. In negotiations with Edward I in 1274, Llywelyn made it clear that he would honour his arrears in full and immediately if the English honoured their commitments. How serious this offer was has been widely discussed. It is evident that his resources were stretched and that matters of feudal justice strained the relationship between king and prince too far. Llywelyn was proclaimed a rebel on 12 November 1276 and the Marcher lords, with royal licence, began the war, retaking lands lost to Llywelyn since 1267. The earl of Hereford recovered most of Brecon, Ralph Tony, Elfael, and Peter Corbet the western half of Caus on the borders of Shropshire. In Glamorgan, the earl of Gloucester’s officials refused the Welsh a truce and imposed a trade embargo. Military commands were established under the earl of Warwick and Roger Mortimer at Montgomery and Payn de Chaworth at Carmarthen. Warwick and Mortimer’s forces caused Llywelyn’s newly built castle of Dolforwyn to surrender after an eight-day siege on 8 April 1277; Builth was taken and a new castle begun there by May; the spectacularly sited castle of Dinas Brân was burnt by its own Welsh garrison. Chaworth’s army compelled Llywelyn’s allies in Deheubarth to surrender and by 25 July the king’s brother, Edmund of Lancaster, who had taken command in South Wales, had taken Ceredigion and had begun a castle at Aberystwyth. The army which Edward led into North Wales in July 1277 to end Llywelyn’s resistance was strikingly large, numbering around 15,000, of whom 9,000 were from South Wales and the March. Llywelyn’s enemies included the lords of Powys and Rhys ap Maredudd of Dinefwr, together with many Welshmen subject to Anglo-Norman lords.6 Anglesey was invaded by sea and the harvest gathered to deprive Llywelyn’s forces of supplies and to starve the people of Gwynedd who, despite Llywelyn’s territorial expansion into southern Powys, were dependent on the fields of the island for their wheat. The war devised by Edward was not intended to be one of conquest but rather a means of destroying Llywelyn’s authority by stripping Llywelyn of his gains and dividing Gwynedd. This was ostensibly to provide for the prince’s brothers Dafydd and Owain who – as Edward perceived it – had been unjustly deprived. The effect was to punish an insubordinate vassal and to deprive him of the ability to unite the Welsh for any purpose. By the settlement made in 1277, Dafydd was granted the Four Cantrefs but under the aegis of the earldom of Chester, and this was one of the key difficulties. Once again legal grievances and a lack of what might be termed ‘good faith’ between the parties were important factors. Edward I, as in England   Stephenson, ‘From Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to Edward I’, pp. 13–14.   M. Prestwich, ‘Edward I and Wales’, in Williams and Kenyon (eds), The Impact of the Edwardian Castles in Wales, pp. 1–2.  5

 6

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15

and in Gascony, was eager to determine his rights and, once these were established, to enforce them. Modern commentators have treated the outbreak of rebellion as a miscalculation on Edward’s part. The king’s imposition of high-handed English officials who exercised their powers harshly, rather than placing trust in those Welshmen who had lent him their support, repeated the error made by Henry III. Edward’s failure to reward Llywelyn’s brother Dafydd adequately following his support in 1277 did nothing to help the situation and eventually goaded Dafydd into revolt. Though Llywelyn claimed that he had no advance knowledge of the outburst of revolt initiated by Dafydd at the end of March 1282, he had little option but to join it and to assume leadership of it. As Davies described it, ‘The war of 1277 had been fought in pursuit of the personal quarrel of the native prince of Wales with Edward I; the war of 1282 was truly a war of national liberation under the leadership of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd.’7 The revolt of 1282 was not confined to Gwynedd. Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Maelor of northern Powys raided Oswestry and the princelings of Deheubarth captured the castles of Aberystwyth, Llandovery and Carreg Cennen. Nevertheless, Welshmen of the south-east or south-west participated in the revolt and many from these areas served for pay in Edward’s armies.8 Edward’s response was tactically similar to 1276–77. Within four days of the outbreak of the revolt, he established three military commands under Reginald Grey at Chester, Roger Mortimer in mid-Wales and Robert Tibetot in the west. His intention was to submit native Wales beyond Gwynedd to his will, before moving on Gwynedd. This was accomplished despite a defeat of the earl of Gloucester in an engagement in the Tywi valley on 16 June. In 1282, as in 1277, the final assault on the mountains of Gwynedd was preceded by taking Anglesey, isolating Gwynedd from its chief source of grain. More than forty ships were requisitioned from the Cinque Ports to carry supplies and troops to assault Anglesey. The defection of men like Hywel ap Gruffudd ab Ednyfed Fychan and his brother Rhys, who had been associated with the Gwynedd dynasty and whose estates were centred on Anglesey, must have aided Edward’s efforts there. Hywel died at the disaster of the Bridge of Boats on St Leonard’s Day, 1282. This disaster occurred when an army formed of both Englishmen and Welshmen, led by Luke de Tany and containing Edward I’s friend and later justiciar of North Wales, the Savoyard Otto de Grandison, fell victim to the retreating tide and attack by Welsh forces.9

 Davies, The Age of Conquest, p. 348.   Ibid., p. 349.  9   G. Roberts, Aspects of Welsh History: Selected Papers of the Late Glyn Roberts (Cardiff, 1969), pp. 302–3; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, pp. 538–42.  7  8

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The death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd at Cilmeri, near Builth, on 11 December 1282 did not end the conflict.10 Gwynedd was not finally conquered until the death, capture and brutal execution of Dafydd ap Gruffudd in the summer of 1283. The settlement that followed, proclaimed at Rhuddlan in 1284, divided Gwynedd into three shires on an English model, placed under the government of Otto de Grandison.11 New Marcher lordships were created from the Four Cantrefs between the rivers Conwy and Dee, and Edward’s famous stone castles were erected as symbols and military bulwarks of his conquest. This mirrored the codification of the governance of royal lands in south-west Wales that had taken place in 1277. Llywelyn suffered at the hands of those who had been established as a new ministerial and military elite in the thirteenth century. This is revealed partly by the plotting of Bishop Anian of Bangor and members of the prince’s court against his rule in 1282 but also in the names of those rewarded after 1284. Gruffudd ap Tudur, son of one of Llywelyn’s most prominent courtiers in the 1240s and 1250s, was made constable of Dolwyddelan after 1284; his brother Tudur Fychan received the township of Nantmawr for life in 1284 and had an additional grant of £20 for good service to the English Crown in 1290.12 It was the descendants of Ednyfed Fychan (d. 1246), Llywelyn ab Iorwerth’s distain (Latin, senescallus), who gained the greatest rewards, however. Their names will be encountered frequently in this study, but in 1284 even the most ambitious among them could not have foreseen that one of their number, Henry Tudor, would one day claim the English Crown. Many of this family appear to have defected to Edward’s cause by 1282. Hywel ap Gruffudd ab Ednyfed Fychan died at the battle of the Bridge of Boats but his nephew, Gruffudd ap Rhys, had his inheritance in Rhos, Anglesey, confirmed to him in 1284. By the time he performed homage to Prince Edward, the future Edward II, at Flint in 1301 he was knighted and was generally known by the name Sir Gruffudd Llwyd.13 More than a decade after his death, he was remembered as ‘a man of the court’.14 His career demonstrates the benefits available to those who defected to the English cause at the right time. There were a number of anomalies in this picture, occasioned by Welsh lords who had accommodated themselves with Edward but had previously fought against Llywelyn. Most significant of these were the lords of Powys Wenwynwyn whose lands became, over time, a Marcher lordship. The others included the barons of Edeirnion styled ‘Welsh barons’. The label bridged the conquest. They 10   The precise circumstances of Llywelyn’s death were cloudy at the time and remain so. For analysis of the sources, see Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, pp. 561–81; Ll. Beverley Smith, ‘The Death of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd: The Narratives Reconsidered’, WHR 11 (1983), pp. 200–19. 11   The administrative elements of this settlement are analysed in W.H. Waters, The Edwardian Settlement of North Wales in its Administrative and Legal Aspects (1284–1343) (Cardiff, 1935). 12   Cal. Var. Chanc. Rolls, 1277–1326, pp. 288–9, 324–5. 13   J.G. Edwards, ‘Sir Gruffydd Llwyd’, EHR 30 (1915), pp. 589–91. 14   Cal. Var. Chanc. Rolls, 1277–1326, p. 293; Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 248.

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were descended from princely dynasties whose status as princes or lords had been reduced under the princes of Gwynedd during the thirteenth century. The princes of Gwynedd called them all baron (barwn) and had their feudal overlordship over them recognised in the Treaty of Montgomery in 1267. After Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s defeat in 1277, the lords of Edeirnion on Gwynedd’s southern borders transferred their loyalty to the English Crown. After 1282 it was this which preserved their lands and their status as tenants-in-chief.15 The Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd, 1287 The last of the Welsh barons to emerge in the post-conquest settlement was Rhys ap Maredudd of Ystrad Tywi. He, like Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn in Powys, had deserted Llywelyn’s cause. Though he was rewarded by Edward after 1282, like Llywelyn he began to feel the oppression of Edward’s rule. Dinefwr, the royal seat of Deheubarth, remained in Edward’s hands. Rhys’s expectation of independent lordship under nominal suzerainty had not been fulfilled, and he was obliged to present his suit and at the county court of Carmarthen under the authority of the justiciar of West Wales. These tensions had been felt by Rhys’s fellow lords in 1282. In 1287, Rhys himself revolted.16 The disillusionment and repeated humiliations that pushed Rhys into rebellion, having suffered for his loyalty to the English cause during the wars against Llywelyn, may have brought him sympathy. The chronicler Thomas Wykes claimed that Gloucester and other Marcher lords had urged Earl Edmund to grant Rhys a truce. They may have sympathised with Rhys’s resistance to royal encroachment on his liberties, encroachments that they felt themselves, and may also have been swayed by the fact that Rhys’s mother, Isabel, daughter of William (II) Marshal, earl of Pembroke, was related to several of them.17 Rhys had his strongholds at Dryslwyn and Newcastle Emlyn, but he also captured the castles of Llandovery, Carreg Cennen and Dinefwr. The military response to Rhys’s revolt was the first major test of the military resources made available to Edward by his conquest. With the king in Gascony, it was his cousin, Edmund of Cornwall, who raised forces to contain the rebellion. On 2 July the justiciar of West Wales was ordered to seize Rhys’s possessions.18 The justiciar, Robert Tiptoft, led a local response using Welshmen from the immediate area, but supported by small forces led by men whose presence in Cardiganshire owed much

  Carr, ‘An Aristocracy in Decline’, pp. 104–8.   Ibid., p. 109. 17   Annales Monastici IV, pp. 310–11. Isabel’s mother was Isabel de Clare (d. 1220); R.F. Walker, ‘Marshal, William (II), fifth earl of Pembroke (c.1190–1231)’, M.T. Flanagan, ‘Clare, Isabel de suo jure countess of Pembrroke (1171 x 6–1220)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 14 December 2013. 18   The Wardrobe accounts for this campaign, TNA E 101/4/16–19, have been published in Byerly and Byerly (eds), Records of the Wardrobe and Household, pp. 423–41. 15

16

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to their service to Edward in the wars against Llywelyn.19 This force eventually numbered around 2,000 men.20 A council held at Gloucester on 15 July resolved to assemble an enormous army to converge on Carmarthen at the western end of the Tywi valley in the first week of August. At its largest the army numbered almost 22,000 men and assembled in four groups. Around two-thirds of the troops were recruited from the shires and March of Wales with the remainder coming from English counties. Many were specialist troops, including ninety crossbowmen from London and Bristol, while 280 foot soldiers were recruited from Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Derbyshire. The army assembled gradually; 2,412 men from the middle March and the English borders under Earl Edmund marched from Monmouth on 30 July, arriving at Carmarthen about 8 August. Tiptoft’s men from the shires under his control were joined at Carmarthen by 450 reinforcements from Cemais in northern Pembrokeshire. By 12 August, 4,640 men from the northern shires of Wales and its neighbouring March and 400 from northern Cardiganshire, and also including men from the earldom of Chester, Staffordshire and Shropshire, assembled at Llanbadarn Fawr under John de Havering. The largest single contribution to this army was 1,000 men from Powys under their lord, Owain de la Pole (d. 1293), eldest son of Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn (d. 1286). Twice that number had been gathered from the shires of Merioneth, Caernarfon and Anglesey by Robert de Staundon, sheriff of Merioneth. The combined strength of this army was 6,660 men. On their march south they were accompanied by twenty foresters who widened the roads traversed by the soldiers and also assisted in the siege operations at Rhys’s stronghold at Dryslwyn where they arrived by 15 August, two days after the main army.21 The largest force, however, was that assembled under Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester, at Brecon. By the time it reached Llandovery on 3 August it numbered 5,600, growing to 7,500 four days later. In contrast, the rather more potent threat posed by Dafydd ap Gruffudd in the winter of 1282–83 was met in West Wales, from Carmarthen as far north as Merioneth, by William de Valence, earl of Pembroke. Although Pembroke’s army numbered over 8,000 for short periods, it seldom contained more than 3,000 men. The foot soldiers in that force were almost exclusively Welsh and included Rhys ap Maredudd and many of those who rebelled with him.22

  Griffiths, ‘The Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd’, p. 129; the Englishmen included Roger, Llywelyn and Hugh Mortimer who held estates in Genau’r Glyn (Cardiganshire), with thirty-six men assisted by three Welshmen. 20  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 215. 21   Byerly and Byerly (eds), Records of the Wardrobe and Household, pp. 423–41. 22   R.F. Walker, ‘William de Valence and the Army of West Wales, 1283–3’, WHR 18 (1996–97), pp. 407–29. 19

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This massive army was quickly reduced to a more manageable size; a substantial number of men were retained under Gloucester at Llandovery until 13 September. The strategic purpose of this force was to isolate and localise the rebellion, though in truth the rebellion Rhys initiated was a personal dispute with relatively limited support rather than a true communal uprising and was thus more or less self-contained. Hindsight suggests that assembling such an impressive force was an over-reaction and that it was ineffective; Rhys escaped the sieges of both Dryslwyn and Newcastle Emlyn, probably before his opponents arrived at either. He was captured in April 1292.23 Despite this, the logistical challenge of assembling, let alone paying, such an enormous army in a period of under two months was extraordinary. That it was successful on this front illustrates the effectiveness with which the military resources of Wales were harnessed, only four years after the completion of the conquest. Such a response was expensive and required loans from Italian banks. According to Morris, the total expenditure on the war against Rhys exceeded £10,606.24 The rebellion disturbed the peace of Cardiganshire and Carmarthenshire and also that of the neighbouring lordship of Gower. There Rhys’s intervention took advantage of existing discontent directed against the lord of Gower, William de Briouze (d. 1291).25 William Crach and Trahaearn ap Hywel attacked Oystermouth Castle during Rhys’s revolt and were hanged for their rebellion outside Swansea in November 1290. William miraculously lived to tell the tale, allegedly through supplication to the late bishop of Hereford, Thomas de Cantilupe (d. 1282), and was able to relate the story at an inquiry into the sanctity of Thomas in 1307.26 Nothing in the evidence relating to that case, however, points to the involvement of Rhys. The uprising in Gower at the same date caused Swansea to be burnt and appears to have been supported by the leading Welsh freemen of the lordship.27 Despite this, de Briouze was able to send his son and a number of soldiers to assist the army in late December 1287 and carpenters from Swansea were sent to assist with the siege works.28 Five years after the revolt had ended, Rhys was captured. He was either taken or betrayed by sons of Madoc ab Arawdr: Madoc Fychan, Trafarn, Hywel and Rhys Gethin. Madoc had taken Llywelyn’s side and had fought against Rhys for a   Griffiths, ‘Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd’, pp. 139–43; J. Beverley Smith, ‘The Origins of the Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd’, BBCS 21 (1965), pp. 161–2. 24  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 219. 25   J. Beverley Smith and T.B. Pugh, ‘The Lordship of Gower and Kilvey in the Middle Ages’, in Glam. C. H. III, pp. 229–31; R. Bartlett, The Hanged Man (Princeton and Woodstock, 2006), ch. 7, pp. 68–79. 26  Bartlett, The Hanged Man, pp. 75–9. See also the ‘City Witness’ project; www.medievalswansea. ac.uk/ accessed 12 February 2014. 27   Glam C. H. III, pp. 231–2. 28   Byerly and Byerly (eds), Records of the Wardrobe and Household, pp. 486, 491. 23

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second time, but in English service, in 1287. While this act might be seen as settling a score, it also reveals something of the ambivalence about those who came to accommodations with the English Crown in the years after 1283.29 From the perspective of the English Crown, however, there was no difference; these men were leaders of their communities and could be called upon to raise and lead soldiers against any enemy, and, by buying into English patronage, for whatever reason and however unwillingly, to ensure that further rebellions were less likely. The Rebellions of 1294–95 If the process of accommodation of the native elite with Edward I’s new order led to disappointment among some who felt they should have gained from it through their support for Edward, those who had come to peace and suffered the depredations of royal officials were even less content.30 The rebellions launched in 1294, continuing into the following year, were the result of the imposition of the structures of English government on the royal shires of Wales. While the revolts originating in North and West Wales seem to have had a genuine aim of self-determination, the third focus of revolt, in Glamorgan, was geographically discrete and founded on longer-standing disaffection between the Welsh community and the dispossessed Welsh lords of Glamorgan and Gilbert de Clare.31 The cause of the revolt was not, as was suggested by Morris, Edward I’s demands for soldiers from his shires to serve in the war in Gascony.32 In large part this war was a conflict fought between Gascons and the French Crown; only relatively small numbers of English troops were recruited even before the rebellion in Wales ignited. Even allowing for the disruption caused to Edward’s plans by the rebellions in Wales, over the four years the Gascon war lasted, £137,595 was spent in wages for Gascons, and only £17,928 of that total was spent on soldiers from elsewhere in Edward’s realm.33 Put simply, the demand for troops from England and Wales was relatively limited. Keith Williams Jones established that the burden of the lay subsidy levied on England and Wales in 1292–93, and still being paid in 1294, was grossly disproportionate relative to the wealth of the country. The thinly populated shire of Merioneth was assessed at £566, more than a third of the sum levied on the

29   Griffiths, ‘The Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd’, p. 138; Beverley Smith, ‘The Origins of the Revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd’, p. 162. 30   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, pp. xxiv–xxxiv. 31   The war was later referred to by the people of Glamorgan (English and Welsh) as a ‘war against the earl [Gilbert de Clare]’; Cal. Anc. Pet., p. 217; M. Althschul, ‘Glamorgan and Morgannwg under the rule of the De Clare Family’, in Glam. C. H. III, pp. 59–60; J. Conway Davies (ed.), The Welsh Assize Roll 1277–1284 (Cardiff, 1940), pp. 176–7, 215, 268, 273, 282, 288–9, 291, 293–4. 32  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 251. 33   Account of John Sandale and Thomas de Cambridge; TNA, E 372/160.

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larger and wealthier county of Essex, £1,604, ten years later.34 The third instalment, paid in April 1294, yielded £2,026 7s. 10d; the fourth, due at the beginning of October, eventually yielded £29 15s. 6d. The weight of this burden was a significant factor in the revolt. It is no accident that many of those who joined the rebellion, and lost their lives or forfeited their property, had been heavily assessed as individuals. When Llywelyn ap Gruffudd had demanded financial tribute – in effect, a novel grant of direct taxation – in 1272 and 1275, he sowed some of the seeds of his eventual defeat. Among the most significant grievances expressed by the uchelwyr of Gwynedd against Llywelyn after his death in 1283 had been the prince’s financial demands.35 After the Edwardian conquest, discontent at a heavy burden of tax was compounded by territorial resettlement in the vicinity of the new castle boroughs, most notably around Denbigh. The privileges of the burgesses of these boroughs added to the excessive zeal of English officials, in both the financial and judicial spheres.36 Edward’s demands for soldiers from Wales may well have proved decisive. The result was, in Davies’s words, ‘a classic anti-colonial revolt’.37 It began on 30 September, the day that Welsh levies from North Wales were meant to assemble at Shrewsbury, whereupon the leader of the revolt in North Wales, Madoc ap Llywelyn, declared himself prince of Wales. One of the first victims was actually one of the designated captains of the levies from West Wales, Geoffrey Clement, deputy justiciar of West Wales, who had been murdered in Cardiganshire four days earlier.38 Another official who fell victim to the rebellion, Roger de Pulesdon, sheriff of Anglesey, had been responsible for the collection of the subsidy; he was lynched at Caernarfon.39 Despite this, it is evident that a great number of troops from West Wales had already been recruited and had journeyed as far as Winchester under Walter de Pederton, another deputy of the justiciar of West Wales, before they were halted on 8 October. The numbers were clearly significant; Pederton’s expenses amounted to £160, equating to the wages of perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 men.40 The three armies mustered under the king at Chester, the earl of Warwick at Montgomery and the earls of Pembroke and Norfolk at various points in the south.41 Fryde’s assessment provides much needed evidence of Welsh involvement

  Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, pp. xxiv–xxxv.   Ll. Beverley Smith, ‘Gravamina’, pp. 158–76. 36  Davies, The Age of Conquest, pp. 379, 382–4. 37   Ibid., p. 383. 38  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 91–2. 39   CPR 1292–1301, p. 165. 40   The rate of pay was likely to have been 2d. per day and the march from West Wales perhaps ten days in duration. 41  Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 260–2; Book of Prests. Details of their size and progress were compiled from the extant accounts of the king’s personal finance department, the Wardrobe, by Morris and by E.B. Fryde from further accounts of which Morris was unaware. 34 35

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on the king’s side; it must be emphasised that those men who had taken Edward’s side in the last war against Llywelyn generally remained loyal to his cause. For some, this campaign provides the first clear evidence of careers in English service that were to span the next three decades. Edward’s response to this rebellion, an existential threat to English rule in Wales in a way that Rhys ap Maredudd’s revolt was not, was to meet it with overwhelming force. In many cases, the threat of military action was sufficient. The chronicle composed at Hagnaby Priory, Lincolnshire, stated that 10,000 Welshmen surrendered to Edward before Christmas 1294 and were pardoned on condition of military service in Gascony. Over 200 hostages were taken and distributed around the castles of England.42 The enrolled accounts of the war in Gascony show that nothing like the 10,000 who allegedly sought pardon actually served overseas. The Welsh owed military service to their lord in any case, but the chronicler’s comment illustrates Edward’s perceived ambitions for Wales as a military resource.43 The king’s army was 16,000 strong when it was assembled at Chester. It was predominately formed from men from English counties bordering the March that had frequently provided soldiers for Edward’s earlier wars in Wales. The ease with which the army was raised says much for the efficiency of Edward’s military machine; the king had little difficulty in getting the men he needed.44 Edward’s campaign across North Wales met most resistance. Divisions were evident among the Welsh community however; 600 of Edward’s soldiers were drawn from Anglesey. It was Warwick’s army operating in the central March around Montgomery that had the greatest Welsh contribution among its 14,500 men: 400 from Powys, 100 from the Mortimer lordship of Cedewain and 300–400 from Clun.45 As the king’s army advanced and it became apparent that the threat in mid-Wales was smaller than anticipated, Warwick’s army was reduced in scale. On 6 March 1295, when Warwick’s forces defeated the army of Madog ap Llywelyn at Maes Moydog to the west of La Pole (Welshpool) in the parish of Castell Caereinion,46 the majority of Warwick’s 2,500 men were from Shropshire, with a handful of crossbowmen and men from Warwick’s own household. Morris identified the tactics employed by Warwick at Maes Moydog as an important precursor to those of mixed retinues of men-at-arms and archers employed by Edward III against France. As Prestwich notes, the evidence available does not support this assertion; Warwick’s foot soldiers may have been equipped

  Book of Prests, p. xiv.   M. Prestwich, ‘A New Account of the Welsh Campaign of 1294–5’, WHR 6 (1972–73), p. 90. 44   M. Prestwich, Edward I, King of England (New Haven, CT, and London, 1997), pp. 224–5. 45   Book of Prests, pp. xxxvii, xli–xlii. 46   OS grid reference SJ 170077. There are still three farms named ‘Moydog’ in the vicinity and the name was clearly in use in the thirteenth century: J.G. Edwards, ‘The Site of the Battle of “Meismadoc”, 1295’, EHR 46 (1931), pp. 262–5. 42 43

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with bows but this was not recorded in the Wardrobe accounts. The best account of the battle, in the Hagnaby chronicle, simply says that the Welsh held their ground and waited for Warwick’s forces to attack.47 In any event, the payrolls show that only thirteen crossbowmen and archers were with the army at the time so Morris’s conclusion is dubious.48 Madoc escaped from the battle but was captured somewhere in Merioneth in late July 1295. Rather than being executed, he remained in a variety of royal prisons, while his son was installed in the royal household and attained a measure of forgiveness through service to both Edward I and his son, Edward II.49 The revolt in West Wales was led by Maelgwn ap Rhys, a man of only local importance. The army led against Maelgwn’s forces by Pembroke and Norfolk appears to have been drawn mainly from the west of England and was only around 4,200 strong. Relatively little is known about its actions but it is probable that its operations were confined to the south and west of Wales between Pembroke’s estates and Norfolk’s lordship of Brecon. An anecdote referring to the Welsh rebels in this region being tricked into defeat on 10 March 1295 by a Welsh spy in English service may well refer to the actions of this army.50 The geographically limited actions of the rebels in Glamorgan, however, suggest that the ‘national’ character of the rebellion may have been overplayed. There are indications that both Welsh and English communities were involved and that many tenants of the lordship, the largest and wealthiest in the March, transferred their allegiance from their lord, Gilbert de Clare, earl of Suffolk, to the king; indeed, the revolt was later described in petitions lodged by both Welsh and English communities in 1297 as ‘the war against the earl’.51 The origins of the grievances expressed by the rebels, who captured the major castles of the lordship including the mighty fortress of Caerphilly, appear to have been common to many Marcher tenants. At around the same time, the tenants of Gower petitioned their lord for justice by English law rather than Welsh and against the arbitrary nature of Marcher rule. It is probable that these sentiments were shared by the Welsh men of Glamorgan. The motives of their leader, Morgan ap Maredudd, are easier to trace. A scion of the native lords of Caerleon in Clare’s lordship of Gwynllŵg, his father, Maredudd, had been deprived of his lands twenty years earlier and the grievance held by Morgan was, in these terms, just; attempts to pursue it through Edward I’s assize into Welsh law had been blocked by de Clare’s failure to co-operate and Morgan,   Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, p. 242; Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 256–8.  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 99; Prestwich, ‘A New Account of the Welsh Campaign, 1294–5’, p. 91; Prestwich, Edward I, p. 223. 49   A.D. Carr, Medieval Anglesey (2nd ed., Llangefni, 2011), pp. 34–5. 50   J.G. Edwards, ‘The Battle of Maes Moydog and the Welsh Campaign of 1294–5’, EHR 39 (1924), p. 10. 51   Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 207–8; Cal. Anc. Pet., pp. 217–19; Altschul, ‘Glamorgan and Morgannwg under the Rule of the De Clare Family’, pp. 59–61. 47

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possibly as a result, adhered to Dafydd ap Gruffudd as late as May 1283.52 How he escaped Dafydd’s fate is unclear, but his conscious choice, having deprived de Clare of his lordship and against the earl’s wishes, was to come into the king’s peace in person.53 Through this he received favour as well as pardon. His career in royal service continued into the reign of Edward II, being knighted at the Feast of Swans in 1306.54 Wars Abroad: Scotland, Flanders and Gascony, 1296–98 The ongoing conflict between the dukes of Gascony (also the kings of England) and the kings of France had no direct impact on the military response to the rebellions in Wales, but the latter distracted Edward I from plans to relieve pressure on Gascony by mounting an invasion on the northern borders of France.55 After the death of Alexander II in 1286, the vacant Scottish throne provided another serious distraction and eventually attracted French interest into the British Isles. In appealing to Edward to resolve the issue of royal succession in Scotland, the Scots had, as Llywelyn had before them, invited Edward to expand his influence beyond England’s borders. The installation of Edward’s preferred candidate, John Balliol, allowed Edward to demonstrate his claims to superior lordship over Scotland, a situation which mirrored not only Edward’s own relationship with the French Crown, but also the relationship which Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd had attempted to engineer with regard to Wales. As the wars in both Wales and Gascony demonstrated, such an arrangement was inherently unstable. Conflict in some form was inevitable. In the case of Scotland the trigger came in the form of Edward’s unprecedented demands for feudal military service from Balliol and his magnates for the war in France.56 By February 1296, Balliol had been deprived of power and a council of twelve had sealed an alliance with the French. This alliance occasioned the outbreak of war with Scotland. The connection between Scotland and France shaped international relations in northern Europe for centuries and the service of Welshmen in war for the remainder of the period of this study. The armies assembled by Edward I to serve in Scotland were remarkable for the scale of the contribution of the Welsh. While this was commented upon by

52   His name appears on a witness list on a letter from Dafydd ap Gruffudd concerning land in Penweddig (Cardiganshire) and an associated charter of Gruffudd ap Maredudd ab Owain to Rhys Fychan on 2 May 1283 dated at Llanberis (Merioneth); Edwards, Littere Wallie, pp. 74–5, 133; H. Pryce (ed.), The Acts of the Welsh Rulers 1120–1283 (Cardiff, 2005), nos 78, 457, pp. 213–14, 656–7. 53   The well-informed chronicler of Worcester provides this detail; Annales Monastici, IV, p. 526. 54   Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, p. 142. 55  Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 386–92. 56   Ibid., p. 372.

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Morris and has been remarked upon since, there is no clear overview of the significance of their involvement. This is partly because of the the erratic survival of the appropriate records. In 1296, for example, relatively little is known with certainty about Edward’s army that invaded Scotland and which for a time, appeared to have succeeded in conquest. The money spent on infantry, £21,443, was sufficient to fund an army of approximately 25,000, less than half the 60,000 Edward had asked the exchequer to arrange on 23 January.57 The scale of the Welsh contribution to this army is unknown but was reasonably substantial, probably on a par with the 2,500 soldiers from Ireland but fewer than the 5,000 men drawn from Yorkshire.58 The little that is known comes from a partially extant plea roll and safe conducts granted to 320 Welshmen. Of these, twenty were from Gower, with their constable Byrol Turberville, and the remainder from the earl of Hereford’s lordship of Brecon.59 Others, summoned from Glamorgan, appear to have deserted and were imprisoned for the offence. They were still detained by Gilbert de Clare’s widow in May or June of 1297, despite payment of a fine of 100 marks by the community of the commote of Meisgyn, effectively blackmailing the community for their good behaviour.60 The partial plea roll is an especially interesting and unique survival. It names twenty-three Welsh participants, with John de la Rey, constable of Walter de Beauchamp’s Welshmen, and Sir William de la Pole, son of Gruffudd ap Gwenynwyn, leading a contingent from Powys.61 One Welshman, Dafydd ap Cynwrig, was accused of stealing a horse; he stated that he had bought the animal at Carlisle, ‘at the time the Welshmen came to Scotland’. The majority of the Welshmen named in the roll were actually bringing cases to the court. One, Llywelyn ab Ithel, accused an Englishman, Ralph de Toggeden, of stealing a sword worth 4s. and a cloak worth 2s. 8d. Two more Welshmen, almost certainly from Gower, actually stood as sureties for their constable, Byrol de Turberville, in the week beginning 17 May 1296 in a case connected with supplies.62 The implication of this fragmentary evidence is that Welsh involvement in the army was significant and well integrated into the whole. It is impossible to gauge their effectiveness. The Scots were far from strong enough to engage Edward’s army in open battle and

 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 93–4; idem, Edward I, p. 470, n. 4.   J.F. Lydon, ‘An Irish Army in Scotland, 1296’, The Irish Sword 5 (1962), pp. 184–9; M. Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, in R.A. Griffiths and P.R. Schofield (eds), Wales and the Welsh in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to J. Beverley Smith (Cardiff, 2011), p. 57. 59  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 273; Cal. Docs. Scot. II, no. 839, pp. 220–1; C.J. Neville (ed.), ‘A Plea Roll of Edward I’s Army in Scotland, 1296’, in Miscellany of the Scottish History Society XI (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 7–133, nos. 108, 109, 111, 113, 119, 132, 150, 151. 60   Cal. Anc. Pet., pp. 218–19. 61   Neville, ‘Plea Roll’, pp. 63–5; CPR 1292–1301, p. 223. 62   Neville, ‘Plea Roll’, pp. 81–3. 57

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were defeated, final surrender and humiliation of Balliol being achieved in early July 1296, and Scotland was, briefly, conquered. Payments made by the Wardrobe clerk, Roger de Cottingham, in February 1297 are a reminder that Edward’s focus remained on Gascony. One hundred and thirty foot soldiers were despatched to serve with the king’s lieutenant there, the earl of Lincoln. Of these, ninety were Welshmen from royal lands in West Wales, including the lordships of Cydweli and Haverford as well as the county of Carmarthen, the men of Carmarthenshire being under the leadership of William Martyn of Cemais (Pembrokeshire).63 The remainder were drawn from Ireland, with a handful of Englishmen. A further sixty men, led by Ieuan ap Llywelyn, Henry de Rue and Ralph de Lisle, departed from Exeter on 5 April.64 Edward’s demands at parliament in Salisbury that more troops be sent to Gascony met with outright hostility from magnates and commons alike. The opposition was led by the earls of Norfolk and Hereford who refused to fulfil their hereditary roles as marshal and constable at a muster in July.65 Edward’s decision to campaign in Flanders and to place the burden of military service and supplies on the people of England exacerbated the troubles he was then having with his barons. This has led Prestwich to suggest that Edward’s decision to recruit infantry from Wales for the army he raised to support his ally, the count of Flanders, was, at root, political.66 In recruiting from Wales, and attempting to summon the lords of Scotland to serve in Flanders, the burden upon his English subjects and dependence upon truculent English magnates were reduced.67 The preparations for the campaign of 1297 – its destination was not disclosed publicly – began with a summons issued on 14 July, a week after the accompanying summons to the feudal muster. The work of recruitment had probably already been completed. Credences had been issued to officials, including the justiciar of North Wales and the constable of Conwy Castle, on certain matters on 17 May. On 14 and 15 July, orders were issued to muster the men selected at Llandaff, Oswestry, Brecon and Usk.68 The efficiency of the process, despite the king’s political difficulties, is illustrated by Edward’s departure from Winchelsea with 670 cavalry and 6,300 infantry on 22 August. The Welsh troops entered royal pay on either the

  TNA C 47/4/6 fol. 3; Martyn was lord of Cemais in northern Pembrokeshire and later served as justiciar of Wales 1315–16, Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 98. 64   BL Add. MS 7965 fols. 13, 54. 65   The discussion of the Flanders campaign and the events surrounding it is informed by M. Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, pp. 56–69; Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 418–25. 66   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, pp. 56–7. 67   N.B. Lewis, ‘The English Forces in Flanders, August–November 1297’, in R.N. Hunt, W.H. Pantin and R.W. Southern (eds), Studies in Medieval History Presented to F.M. Powicke (Oxford, 1948), pp. 310–18. 68   CPR 1292–1301, pp. 248–250; CCR 1296–1302, p. 44. 63

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last day of July or on 1 August.69 Although the processes of recruitment were well honed by 1297, there was scope for variation. Earlier campaigns had seen officers appointed as deputy justiciars in West and North Wales with responsibility for recruitment. Morgan ap Maredudd and Walter Hakelut were issued with letters of credence to do the king’s recruiting in Glamorgan as others were elsewhere. Therefore, although the practical effect was the same, there remained fluidity in the terminology.70 The recruiters in South Wales did not lead the troops in person but served in the king’s household. The men of Glamorgan were led by David Graunt and Robert le Veel. The dominance of Welshmen among the infantry recruited for the campaign was not without its own problems. The principal leaders of the baronial opposition to Edward and his arbitrary demands for men, money and food in 1297 were both Marcher lords themselves. The earl of Hereford was lord of the important liberty of Brecon, and the earl of Norfolk was lord of Chepstow. Resistance might have been expected elsewhere too. Elfael had fallen into royal hands in 1293. In May 1297, Edward had encouraged the men of Edmund Mortimer’s lordship of Maelienydd to complain about their lord, and there are suggestions that he engaged in similar tactics in Brecon.71 Morgan ap Maredudd was sent to Wales from the king’s court – at a knight’s wage of 2s. per day – ‘for certain secret matters of the king’. It is probable that these ‘secret matters’ were to enquire into the situation in Brecon. Morgan, styling himself the king’s valettus, wrote to the king noting the provisioning of the castle of that lordship and his understanding that the earl of Hereford was declaring himself against the king’s peace.72 Davies suggests that Morgan was acting as an agent provocateur; Hereford’s response through his steward, Philip ap Hywel, was to confirm the rights and tenure of his tenants in Brecon, an action repeated in Glamorgan.73 Despite the political unease in the relationship between the king and his barons, it was only in Brecon that no troops were recruited. It is surprising therefore that Brecon was given as a muster point. That said, it lay on the most direct road from West Wales to a suitable fording point on the Severn and the pay accounts suggest that this was the route travelled.74 The same accounts show that six boats were employed to transport the 900 men recruited from Glamorgan

  Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 60.   CPR 1292–1301, pp. 293–4. For Hakelut, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 95–6. 71   Edmund Mortimer of Wigmore was also lord of Ceri and Cedewain in addition to Maelienydd. 72   BL Add. MS 7965 fol. 15; Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 101; the editor dates this letter to c. 1321 and cites the mention of Philip ap Hywel as seneschal of Brecon as reason for this. Morgan was knighted in 1306, however, and would have been unlikely to have styled himself valettus subsequently; Philip ap Hywel was also steward of Brecon in 1297. The earlier date is also suggested in Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, p. 142, n. 16 citing TNA, C 266/4 no. 11. 73  Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 268–70; Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, p. 143. 74   BL Add. MS 7965 fol. 81 shows that three bailiffs were paid to lead men from Brecon to Hereford. 69

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across the Severn estuary, an expensive measure which suggests Edward’s desire for haste.75 What of the Welshmen who actually served in Flanders? Much has been made of the writings of the Brabantine chronicler, Lodewyck van Veltham, whose account of Welshmen outside Ghent offers much of interest not only for this study, but in assessing the general quality of Edward I’s infantry. ‘Their weapons’, van Veltham wrote, ‘were bows, arrows and swords. They also had javelins.’ He also noted that they wore no armour, but were clad in linen tunics, with red cloaks, and went bare-legged even in winter.76 Edward’s household had routinely contained Welshmen even before the conquest of Wales, when members of the Welsh elite had been present as hostages or on diplomatic missions. By the winter of 1297–98, a dozen Welshmen, with six pages, served in the household on a permanent basis. They received 3d. per day and had robes specially made for them in London. They were referred to in the accounts as the Wallenses Regis, the King’s Welshmen. Their role is unclear but Prestwich suggested that they supplemented the king’s personal bodyguard. Their continuous presence gives this idea some credence, as does the later reference to them as archers.77 In the king’s absence, William Wallace led Scotland into rebellion. This required a second English expedition in the winter of 1297–98, following a long period of indecision. Scottish raiding on Northumberland finally forced action and writs of array were issued on 23 October.78 This campaign was as dismal a failure as Edward’s efforts in Flanders but is remarkable for the size of the army assembled. In all, 29,000 infantry were summoned from Wales, Chester and the English shires. As had been the case in 1296, such numbers cannot be considered a realistic expectation. Even allowing for optimism among royal officials, a significant shortfall must have been expected. The initial muster was held at Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 6 December, but the inertia of recruitment and the distances involved meant that the army did not reach its maximum size of approximately 18,500 until late February 1298. The army was assembled too late to mount an effective campaign but this nonetheless impressive total – all the more so considering that a further 7,300 infantry were with the king in Flanders – was rapidly reduced by desertion. The scale of the Welsh contribution is difficult to gauge but we know that 3,000 men were raised from the royal shires of North Wales and its neighbouring March with a further 300 led by Sir William de la Pole from Powys.79 The majority of the   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 60.   Lodewyk van Velthem, Spiegel historiaal of rym-Spiegel: zynde de Nederlandsche rym-chronym., ed. I. le Long (Amsterdam, 1727), pp. 215–16; a convenient translation of this passage is given in Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, p. 166. 77   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, pp. 61–2. 78  Prestwich, Edward I, p. 478. 79  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 286; Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 284–6; Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 55–66. 75

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infantry recruited, however, appear to have been turned back when the campaign was abandoned. Thus an effective response to Wallace’s insurrection only came in the following summer. The response under Edward, despite the tribulations of the winter, followed the same policy that he had pursued in raising soldiers to serve in Flanders. The summonses issued for the campaign to Scotland on 8 April reveal that his intention was that Welshmen from the shires and March of Wales should make up the bulk of his infantry. The total derived from the patent rolls, 11,200, is slightly greater than those recorded in the parliamentary writs, 10,500.80 The recruitment effort in South Wales, including the March, was co-ordinated by Warin Martyn, who was appointed deputy justiciar during April and May.81 His was a short appointment, possibly with limited powers. His efforts were supported by Morgan ap Maredudd, by this time attached to the royal household, and William de Camvill, probably the son of Geoffrey de Camvill, lord of Llanstephan. The three were ordered to cause men from the area under their jurisdiction to be at Carlisle by 30 June.82 The efforts of Martyn and his fellow officers were clearly effective since 10,900 men were mustered at the start of the campaign. Of this number, all but 400 were still serving two months later. These losses, the battle of Falkirk notwithstanding, seem disproportionately small and some at least were not inflicted by the enemy. Considering that the population of Wales is unlikely to have exceeded 200,000– 300,000 in the late thirteenth century, the service of 10,000 men from a population of this size is an impressive logistical achievement. It must have had a substantial social impact since perhaps one in eight or one in ten Welsh men alive in 1298 was at Falkirk.83 The horse inventory, a document compiled to value horses so that compensation could be paid for any lost or killed in the course of this campaign, reveals how unbalanced the Welsh contribution to English armies in this period was. Mounted men were confined to the constables of the Welsh infantry and the small retinues of those who commanded them.84 In 1298, for example, these included Sir William de la Pole of Powys and his brother, Gruffudd. John de Havering, the

80   CPR 1292–1301, pp. 342–3; Parl. Writs I, p. 312; the breakdown of Edward’s demands shows that around half were intended to come from his own lands: 2,000 from North Wales with 500 from Anglesey, 2,300 from West Wales with 500 from Builth, a total of 5,300. 81  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 94. 82   Morgan ap Maredudd may actually have been in the household of Prince Edward by this date; he was in the pay of the prince, with eight others at Linlithgow at the end of November 1298, BL Add. MS7966a fol. 101v; Geoffrey de Camvill also held lands in Staffordshire and in Ireland: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 91. 83   The estimation of medieval populations is highly problematic and such figures should be approached with extreme caution. See for example, J.C. Russell, British Medieval Population (Alberquerque, 1948), pp. 319–63; G. Rex Smith, ‘The 1284 Extent of Anglesey Revisited: Some Facts and Figures’, Studia Celtica 45:1 (2011), p. 97. 84  Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 228–9

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justiciar of North Wales had a retinue of twenty-five mounted men, consisting of four knights, twenty esquires – including three Welshmen, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, Einion ab Ieuan and Meurig ‘Atteben’ – and the master of the Hospitallers of Halston (Shropshire), Brother Ednyfed.85 The latter’s presence is explained by his earlier military service in 1294–95 and his responsibility for his order’s estates in North Wales. His military enthusiasm does not seem to have been shared by his successors and no later reference to military service by Welsh Hospitallers has been found.86 Three other Welshmen were present in the royal household: Morgan ap Maredudd, who had also been in Flanders, Geoffrey or Gruffudd Makarewy and Rhys ap Trahairan. The value of Welsh soldiers was sufficient for Edward to lend them to his allies. In 1298 he lent a number of Welsh troops to Albert, duke of Austria, to assist him against the emperor, Adolf of Nassau. Despite Edward’s trust, they failed to make a good impression: one apparently leapt onto the back of the emperor’s horse and attempted to slit his throat, hardly a chivalric action.87 By 1300, Edward’s domestic pressures had eased somewhat. Perhaps because of this, or perhaps because of the trouble encountered with Welsh soldiers in 1297 and 1298, none were recruited to go to Scotland with the king in that summer. The reason given by Edward himself, ‘because of all the great work which they have done in our service in the past’, may be taken at face value.88 Welsh levies had been the only means by which Edward had been able to raise an army at all for his Flanders expedition. They had certainly greatly increased the scale of the forces he had been able to field in both 1296 and 1298. Many Welshmen must have been on campaign somewhere or other for an equivalent of two of the previous four years. More recent commentators have generally taken the view, based on the accounts of chroniclers, that the Welsh had simply proved too much trouble.89 Yet without Edward’s Welsh resources, the size of army he was able to assemble was greatly reduced. Even at its maximum size, a little over 9,200 in mid-July 1300, the infantry component of the army was only 58 per cent of the size originally requested and less than half as large as that fielded in the previous summer. Nevertheless it was still a substantial army.90 Welsh absence at the aftermath of the siege of Caerlaverock was noted as an unfortunate omission by Rishanger who suggested that the purposes of the campaign suffered for their absence; ‘Sed pro dolor! Defecerunt nobs pedites de

85   Brother Ednyfed is otherwise recorded as ‘Odo de Nevet/Neneth’ whose responsibilities as master of the preceptory of Halston included administering the Hospitaller lands in North Wales; VCH Shropshire II, pp. 87–8; CPR 1292–1301, p. 549. 86   Book of Prests, p. xxx. 87   Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years War’, p. 23, citing Chotzen, Recherches, p. 126, n. 88  Gough, Scotland in 1298, p. 199; TNA E 159/73 m. 16. 89   Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, p. 240. 90   C. Candy, ‘An Exercise in Frustration: The Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1300’ (unpublished MA dissertation, Durham University, 1999), p. 22.

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Wallia. Si enim tales habuissemus.’91 This situation was exacerbated by large-scale desertion among the Yorkshire levies. There were almost 3,500 Yorkshire infantry in the army when it mustered at the end of June 1300. A month later the number was down to 1,483. Edward was understandably furious, and wrote to the keeper of the Wardrobe: We are sending you under our seal the names of the footmen from the county of York who have left our service and our host without our leave. These people have maliciously deceived us and have traitorously failed us in our business.92 While Edward had no large body of Welsh infantry with him, there were Welshmen among his household in the form of a small company, called the Wallenses Regis by the clerks maintaining the Wardrobe account. Nine were present with the king at Caerlaverock in July under the command of William le Wylde.93 The Welsh contribution in 1300 was financial. On 1 April, John de Havering, justiciar of North Wales, was ordered to collect a subsidy for the war from his bailiwick. Such a subsidy was also imposed throughout the shires of West Wales and the March.94 Evidence for the expedition mounted in 1301 demonstrates the growing familiarity and efficiency of the processes of military recruitment in Wales and the March, as well as the importance of Welshmen to this process. Two sons of Sir Hywel ap Meurig, who had served the earls of Hereford through the Welsh wars, were employed as commissioners of array. Philip ap Hywel, steward of the lordship of Brecon, and his brother, Master Rhys, were appointed to act with the justiciar of West Wales, Walter de Pederton. The division of labour is not explicit, but it is probable that Pederton was responsible for recruiting from the royal territories and the two sons of Sir Hywel ap Meurig for co-ordinating recruitment in the lands of the March to the east. In North Wales and the neighbouring March the task was placed in the hands of, among others, Richard Mascy, justiciar of Chester, and the king’s esquire, Gruffudd Llwyd.95 The campaigns of the last years of Edward I’s reign, in 1303–4, 1306 and 1307, were smaller than those of earlier years.96 This may have been an indication of increasing financial and political strain or the effects of old age on the king. It is also possible that tactical lessons had been learned from the earlier campaigns about the value of foot soldiers. The Welsh contribution to these infantry forces remained disproportionately large.

  Rishanger, p. 442.   Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 238–9, citing idem, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 95–6; TNA SC 1/61/63, 68. 93   BL Add. MS 35291 fol. 47; Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, pp. 61–2. 94   CPR 1292–1301, pp. 302, 534. 95   CPR 1292–1301, p. 598; Parl. Writs I, p. 602. For the career of Master Rhys ap Hywel, see Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 205, 291; Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, pp. 142–3. 96   See Appendix 1, table 4. 91

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The army assembled in 1303, for example, provides some interesting comparisons across Edward I’s dominions. The Welsh contribution was almost entirely composed of foot soldiers led by men with significant local status but, in rank at least, there were no more than three knights; the remainder were not even described as esquires. Forces recruited in Ireland, and paid largely from its own revenues, acted as a more or less independent army serving in the west of Scotland between May 1303 and February 1304. The 2,600 foot soldiers from Ireland were led by the earl of Ulster and contained no fewer than 300 cavalry including eleven knights banneret. While the comparison is probably unfair – much of Ireland had been under some form of Anglo-Norman rule for a century and a half – it is nonetheless revealing of the political significance of the two territories, both part of the English realm.97 Not as many foot soldiers served in this army as had previously been the case, but at the beginning of June 1304, when the army was at its largest, Edward had 7,500 foot soldiers taking his wages even though the Scots had clearly decided to avoid pitched battle.98 Nonetheless, Edward was successful in subduing Scotland. By the summer of 1304 it looked as though his conquest might have been successful, after a decade of recruiting and paying for enormous armies to fight in Scotland with only extremely limited political reward. The campaign launched in the summer of 1306 appears to have confirmed a change in Edward’s strategic thinking. In part this was because of changed circumstances in Scotland and the enthronement of Robert Bruce as king of Scots, but it was also because Edward himself was too ill to lead the army in person; the main army despatched north that summer was commanded by the prince of Wales. This was not an invasion force. In fact several armies operated under different commanders in different parts of Scotland and, perhaps because the Scots were faced with a different challenge, the English forces met with greater success.99 The force with which Aymer de Valence surprised and routed Bruce and his men at Methven, near Perth, on 19 June was small and contained no more than 1,500 infantry (the battle was won by the cavalry). It is unclear exactly how many foot soldiers accompanied the prince of Wales. The total spent on infantry by him was £1,142, a comparatively small sum, but sufficient to secure several meaningful victories, at the castles of Lochmaben and Kildrummy, and then at Perth.100 In the absence of detailed accounts, the Welsh contribution is difficult to assess. On 27 May, Gruffudd Llwyd was granted safe conduct to lead 300 Welshmen from North Wales through England to Scotland. Until they joined the army these men

 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 97–8; J.F. Lydon, ‘Edward I, Ireland and the War in Scotland, 1304–1304’, in J.F. Lydon (ed.), England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven (Blackrock, 1981), pp. 43–6. 98  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 80, 97–8. 99  Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 507–11. 100  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 71; idem, Edward I, p. 508. 97

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were paid from the revenues of the chamberlain of North Wales; the chamberlain, Thomas Esthall, claimed their wages as part of £6,169 4s. 4½d. allowed against his account.101 The Last Campaign The recruitment for Edward I’s last campaign shows something remarkable. The pattern of the campaign of the previous year was repeated; only 2,700 foot soldiers were deemed necessary to support Edward’s household forces. The interest of this army is not found in how many soldiers were recruited, but where they were recruited from. At the end of July, after Edward’s death but when the army was at its largest, 2,915 infantry were receiving pay. Of these, 2,818 were Welsh. The remainder were recruited from the liberties of the bishop of Carlisle.102 The intention seems to have been to recruit men who knew the area and soldiers that the king could trust. This trust is illustrated in the men that he appointed to manage the recruitment and lead the soldiers north. Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, who arrayed and led 500 men from North Wales, was a member of the pre-eminent uchelwyr family of Tregarnedd in Anglesey. He had been raised in Edward’s court and had served the king in arms since at least 1294. Sir Morgan ap Maredudd, the one-time leader of a rebellion in Glamorgan, had been knighted with Edward of Caernarfon in 1306 and in 1307 arrayed 500 men from South Wales. By 1307, the king’s resources were augmented by the largest of the Marcher lordships, Glamorgan, which was then in the king’s hands. This yielded a further 500 men who mustered at Cardiff on 3 July and at Usk a day later. Their names are preserved on what is the earliest surviving muster for any part of a royal army raised in Wales.103 The roll shows that all the soldiers were Welsh. This is only to be expected, since the English tenants of the lordship were exempted from the summons and they are listed according to commote.104 The arrayers were the sheriff of Glamorgan (a title equivalent to that of steward of the lordship), Robert Greyndor and Walter de Gloucester while Stephen de la More was appointed to lead them to Carlisle. The survival of this roll is presumably related to the fact that the wages it records were audited with the revenues of Glamorgan and therefore treated separately from those of the royal household or of the chamberlain of the royal shires. Inevitably, few if any of the Welsh contingents reached their

  CPR 1301–7, p. 435; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, p. 80; Esthall was chamberlain from 1302 until 1312. 102   TNA E 101/373/15 fols. 13–19; M. Prestwich, ‘“Tam infra libertates quam extra”: Liberties and Military Recruitment’, in idem (ed.), Liberties and Identities in Later Medieval Britain (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 111–19. 103   TNA E 101/13/23. 104   CPR 1301–7, p. 529; Parl. Writs I, pp. 379–80. 101

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­ estination before Edward’s death. None of the men of Glamorgan had pay from d the Wardrobe before 23 July, though most appear to have remained until the point the campaign was abandoned in early September.105 Conclusions It is quite clear that Edward I’s Welsh wars were a vital element in the development of a military machine in which Welshmen, as allies of the English Crown and, after 1283, as its subjects were a key component. Even in the mid-thirteenth century Welshmen in English service were far from novel. The process of conquest had begun centuries earlier, while wars between Welshmen as well as the expansionist policies pursued by the two Llywelyns invited English influence into Welsh affairs. Many of Edward I’s barons possessed lordships in the March of Wales. The military value of these to their lords has long been understood, but Prestwich has suggested that Edward I’s initial motivation for recruiting Welshmen as the majority of his infantry to serve in Flanders in 1297 was driven partly by political considerations.106 He could not raise troops by feudal summons of his barons, and heavy taxation to support wars in Gascony and to suppress rebellion in Wales made willing recruits from England hard to find. There is a suggestion that he had a genuine concern for the welfare of his subjects and that this, despite the mistrust of the Welsh amongst the English elite, motivated his decision. The scale of Edward’s personal resources in Wales should not be underestimated. Around half the Welsh infantry present at Falkirk in 1298 were drawn from the king’s own lordships.107 The disproportionate number of Welshmen in Edward I’s armies was more than a political sop to English concerns. It is arguable that Edward was only able to raise such enormous armies because of the recruiting grounds in the shires and March of Wales. A heavily pastoral economy that was able to support a relatively large surplus population was invaluable in Edward I’s military schemes. He was aided by finding Welshmen whom he could trust, drawn from native elites. The leaders of the king’s Welshmen owed their place in society and their careers, and in Morgan’s case quite possibly his life, to the king’s favour. Edward, in return, had representatives among the Welsh elite without whose influence and acquiescence the effective governance of Wales would have proved impossible. The three Welsh knights active in the latter years of Edward’s reign present interesting contrasts. Sir William de la Pole managed the feat of consolidating the work of his father and grandfather, transforming southern Powys into a Marcher lordship under its native princely dynasty. Sir Morgan ap Maredudd had, perhaps by good fortune, deserted Dafydd ap Gruffudd at the last possible moment. By claiming to have transferred his allegiance from the Clare   TNA E 101/373/15 fols 13, 19.   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 60. 107  Davies, The Age of Conquest, p. 399. 105

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lords of Glamorgan and Newport to the king, he gained favour in the form of a place in the royal household. Sir Gruffudd Llwyd was far more than ‘practically the king’s resident commissioner of array’ in North Wales.108 His place in Edward’s household as a young man and his descent from Llywelyn ab Iorwerth’s famous distain or steward, Ednyfed Fychan, meant that he bridged the divide between the Crown and the elite of Anglesey. The defection of key members of the Welsh elite to Edward eased the king’s path in 1282–83 and, through the person of Gruffudd Llwyd, allowed the descendants of Ednyfed Fychan to take the place of the princes they had served at the head of Welsh society.

  J.G. Edwards, ‘Sir Gruffydd Llwyd’, EHR 30 (1915), p. 591.

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2

Edward of Caernarfon

Of all England’s fourteenth-century kings, Edward II was the most dependent upon his Welsh subjects. As the first English prince of Wales he had been lord of the shires of both North and West Wales. Aside from being born in the midst of the building site that was Caernarfon Castle, he had maintained a number of Welshmen in his household as prince. Nevertheless it is likely that the connection with the uchelwyr, the class of the native elite that had deserted Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, was acquired on campaign. The loyalty displayed towards Edward II by this group right until the end of his reign is remarkable and the importance of this support has been underappreciated by many historians.1 Edward II’s military machine was very much the same as that developed by Edward I but was extended above and beyond sustainable levels, and the number of Welshmen employed by Edward II in his campaigns to Scotland was larger even than those deployed by his father in the 1290s. The machine was found wanting most tellingly at Bannockburn in 1314 and again in 1322, but Edward did little to change the nature of his armies and few of his campaigns enjoyed conspicuous success.2 Enormous levies of Welshmen, generally led by their fellow countrymen, were essential to Edward’s ability to wage war and also for the ability of his barons to oppose him. Most of Edward’s opponents held substantial Marcher lordships so it was natural that, in their struggles with their king, Edward’s barons deployed their Welsh tenants to buttress their causes. In the dispute over the ordinances intended to limit Edward’s power in 1312, in the war fought against Hugh Despenser the younger in 1321 and in support of Thomas of Lancaster during the winter of 1321–22, the power of the lords of the March was measured in the numbers of men their estates could supply.

 1   The best account of the connection is Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’. For an assessment of the importance of the uchelwyr in efforts to free Edward following his deposition: T.F. Tout, ‘The Captivity and Death of Edward of Caernarvon’, in idem, The Collected Papers of Thomas Frederick Tout. With a Memoir and Bibliography, vol. 3 (Manchester, 1934), pp. 145–90.  2   The most recent assessment is Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 233–44.

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This chapter will consider the role of Welsh military resources in the political narrative of Edward II’s early reign before turning its attention to the continuation of the wars against the Scots as far as Bannockburn. Next, it will discuss the political fallout from this cataclysmic defeat as it related to Wales: the revolt in Glamorgan led by Llywelyn Bren in 1316 through to the campaigns that led to the defeat of the king’s enemies at Boroughbridge in 1322. Finally, it will consider the importance of Welsh support in the time of Edward’s tyranny and the king’s military dependence on his Welsh subjects. It is no accident that, when invasion came in the summer of 1326, it was to Wales that Edward fled in search of support. The Road to Bannockburn Although the manner in which Edward II organised his armies was essentially that devised by his father, Edward’s strategy against the Scots departed in some respects from that employed in the later years of Edward I’s reign. After 1301 the number of foot soldiers in English armies had gradually decreased. The army that accompanied Edward on his last campaign in 1307 had fewer than 3,000 infantry, almost all of whom were Welsh. The armies raised in 1308, 1309 and 1310 were far larger and the Welsh contribution to the arrayed infantry was correspondingly significant.3 In 1308, 2,150 Welsh infantry were recruited from North Wales and £678 19s. 2d. paid to them in advance was allowed against the account of Thomas Esthall, chamberlain of North Wales (1302–12).4 In 1309, Walter Hakelut was ordered to array 2,000 men from West Wales for service in Scotland, and Esthall’s accounts for the same year record that 200 marks were paid to 950 foot soldiers from North Wales in October. The same account records similar payments to 2,000 foot soldiers made in August 1310. These sums form a substantial proportion of the £6,169 4s. 4½d. allowed against these accounts in the Exchequer’s memoranda rolls.5 In 1310 pay accounts show that around 2,600 Welsh soldiers joined Edward’s army at Berwick from mid-September: 838 under Sir Gruffudd Llywd from the shires of North Wales and 883 from West Wales under Rhys ap Gruffudd. The balance was drawn from the Marcher lordships and these men formed a substantial majority of the 3,000 infantry on this campaign. Unusually, the chaplain who accompanied the Welsh soldiers, Gervase, was named in the pay account; he was paid the handsome sum of £11 3s. for his sixty days with the army.6

  See Appendix 1.  Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 377, p. 46.  5   Foedera I, iv, p. 146; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, nos. 377, 681, pp. 46, 80.  6   BL MS Cotton Nero C viii, fols 6r–6v. This Gervase may well be the ‘Gervase le Persone de Lanmais’ (Llanfaes, Anglesey) who went to Flanders with Welsh soldiers in 1297; BL Add. MS 7965 fol. 82d.  3

 4

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Why Edward felt the need greatly to increase the size of his armies relatively early in his reign is far from clear. The armies recruited were far too large to draw the forces of Robert Bruce into battle, the chances of defeating such enormous forces were too small. Even contemporaries suggested that these armies were raised with little clear idea about how the enemy was to be defeated by them. The author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi was disparaging about the motivation for the 1310 campaign – he ascribed it, probably quite reasonably, to Edward’s unwillingness to perform homage to the French king – and dismissive of the quality of Edward’s infantry. They were, he wrote, ‘intent on gain’ (qui animum ad questum habebant intentum), and the Welsh in particular, were ‘always ready for plunder’ (qui parati sunt ad predam).7 In consequence, they suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Scots whilst engaged in raiding away from the army. With such indiscipline it is no surprise that the substantial costs incurred by the Crown were out of all proportion to the results achieved. The army defeated at Bannockburn is estimated to have numbered between 13,000 and 25,000 strong. That fielded in 1322 on a campaign almost as disastrous is known to have numbered around 22,000. Despite these failures, Welsh soldiers played a prominent, and evidently valued, part of Edward II’s military schemes. In the disputes between the king and his barons, the Welsh March became a point of friction. Much of the opposition to Edward II was concentrated in, or impacted upon, the shires and March of Wales. The actions of the Ordainers, intent on restricting the power of the king in 1311, were backed by muscle from the Marches. The earl of Hereford, for example, had Welshmen in his retinue in his confrontation with the king in 1312. The author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi called them ‘a crowd of Welsh, wild men from the woodlands’ (turba Wallensium vallata, silvestris et fera).8 Just as the woods of Wales had proved to be a dark and dangerous obstacle to Edward I, so the Welsh were a threatening, uncivilised presence in England, backing political confrontation with the threat of physical force. It is no accident, regardless of what may have happened, that one account of the murder of Piers Gaveston suggests that he was killed by two Welshmen from the estates of the earl of Warwick.9 Bannockburn The defining test of Edward I’s military machine came seven years after his death on 24 June 1314. It is evident that, even in the planning stages, Edward II intended to attempt to crush the Scots with extravagant numbers of infantry. Morris, using   Vita Edwardi Secundi, pp. 11–12.   Ibid., pp. 56–7.  9   J.S. Hamilton, Piers Gaveston, Earl of Cornwall, 1307–1312: Politics and Patronage in the Reign of Edward II (Detroit and London, 1988), p. 99.  7  8

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the writs of array, calculated that 21,540 foot soldiers were summoned to serve. McNamee, using the same sources, has suggested a slightly larger total of 22,140.10 The number of men summoned, however, provides only a limit to Edward’s aspirations and clear evidence of the number of soldiers serving at any given point of the campaign is weak. This is a consequence of the scale of the defeat inflicted by Bruce’s forces, since many of Edward’s household records were lost in the flight from the field. The Welsh contribution to the army can be accurately assessed by reference to the accounts of officials in local administrations and allowances against these accounts recorded in the memoranda rolls. These show that £194 13s. was paid to Roger Mortimer of Chirk, John Cromwell and John Charlton, lord of Powys, for leading 2,133 Welsh infantry from North Wales, and possibly the neighbouring Marcher lordships, to Scotland in 1314. The same rolls record that £91 14s. 6d. was paid to Roger Mortimer of Chirk and other leaders of Welsh troops going to Newcastle by the chamberlain of South Wales, Robert, prior of Carmarthen.11 The latter amount equates to approximately ten days’ wages for 1,000 men at a rate of 2d. per day, the exact number that Walter Hakelut had been ordered to array and cause to join the king at Newcastle-upon-Tyne by 28 April 1314.12 These men may have been supplemented by other soldiers recruited in the Welsh March. Several Marcher lords, the earls of Arundel, Warrenne, Lancaster and Warwick, refused to serve in person but each sent knights to fulfil their feudal obligations. It is not certain, however, that they allowed the Crown to recruit from their Welsh estates so the full extent of Welsh involvement in Edward’s army must remain obscure. Despite the fact that the king’s army was assembled by tried and trusted methods, its sheer size must have resulted in a great many inexperienced foot soldiers of poor quality drawn from the English counties; Edward’s Welsh troops would have been by far the most experienced and, theoretically at least, the most effective. What role English and Welsh foot soldiers actually played in the outcome of the battle is all but impossible to establish. The author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi remarked upon the role that Scottish foot soldiers played, noting that only at the battle of the Golden Spurs at Courtrai (1302) had a mounted army been scattered by infantry, as happened at Bannockburn. The author of the Vita attributes this to the arrogance and pride of the English nobility rather than to the discipline of Scottish foot soldiers arranged in schiltroms – impenetrable circles of foot soldiers armed with long spears – but even in the rout, much of the English army managed to

  J.E. Morris, Bannockburn (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 40–41; C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–1328 (East Linton, 1997), pp. 61–2.  11   Robert, prior of Carmarthen was chamberlain between 25 August 1311 and Michaelmas 1314; Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 168; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, nos. 304–5, pp. 37–8.  12   Cal. Anc. Pet., p. 349.  10

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retreat to Berwick.13 The Lanercost chronicler, however, stated that the Welsh, with Aymer de Valence, earl of Pembroke, instead headed west to Carlisle.14 Barbour, in his later Scots prose chronicle, suggests that heavy casualties were inflicted upon those Welshmen who did not flee, describing their ‘naked’ bodies, presumably unarmoured, dressed in linen cloth, scattered around the battlefield: ‘Walismen, Quhair-euir thai held, men mycht tham ken; For thai wuill near all naked war, Or lynyng clothis had, but mair.’15 Whatever the consequences for Welshmen serving at the battle, however, a contemporary Welsh annal recorded what was important from a Welsh perspective, the death of Earl Gilbert de Clare, lord of Glamorgan: ‘y bu llafa y season yn ystriflen yn y goggled ac y llas Jarll Clar/the Englishmen fought in the north and there was killed Earl Clare.’16 The suicidal charge that resulted in the young earl’s death brought Glamorgan into the hands of the king, as guardian of the three sisters of the deceased earl, his heiresses. Ultimately, the earl’s death brought the largest and wealthiest of the Marcher lordships into the hands of the most grasping of the king’s favourites, Hugh Despenser the younger, an action that created significant political instability throughout the South Wales March. In the short term the Bannockburn defeat was followed by an increased threat of Scottish incursions into the north of England. In 1315 Aymer de Valence and Bartholomew Badlesmere were sent to secure the Scottish Marches, accompanied by a large infantry force, many of whom were Welsh. In that year, allowances of £202 10s. were made against the account of Robert Mustlewyck, chamberlain of West Wales. This sum had been paid to Robert Multon, assigned to lead 2,500 men from Mustlewyck’s bailiwick to serve in Scotland.17 Scottish incursions were not confined to the north of England. In Ireland, the English Crown was faced with a campaign led by Edward Bruce. Anxieties were expressed that there might be an attack launched on Wales by sea, from either Scotland or Ireland. In a bid to pacify the local population, an inquiry was commissioned into alleged oppression by royal officials.18 The fear of full-scale rebellion in support of the Bruces has possibly been exaggerated by some historians who overestimate the unity of purpose among the Welsh, but there was suspicion of the Welsh on the part of royal officials.19 Their fears were far from groundless; a Scottish fleet under Thomas Dun had raided Holyhead on the coast of Anglesey in November 1315, and 13 Vita Edwardi Secundi, pp. 54–7. 14   Lanercost, pp. 228–9. 15   Skeat (ed.), The Bruce, p. 419. 16   NLW Llanstephan MS 148 fol. 98d. s.a. 1314, cited by J. Conway Davies, ‘The Despenser War in Glamorgan’, TRHS third series 9 (1915), p. 22. 17  Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, n. 383, p. 47. 18   J. Beverley Smith, ‘Gruffydd Llwyd and the Celtic Alliance, 1315–18’, BBCS 26 (1976), pp. 463–4. 19   For example, J.R. Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, 1307–22: A Study in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1970), p. 184.

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a garrison of eight mounted men-at-arms and twelve crossbowmen was installed in Beaumaris Castle for much of the same year.20 Edward’s concern at this small raid is evident: ‘If this riot be not hastily quenched much greater evil may come in other parts of Wales.’21 At the end of November the king met with Einion Sais, bishop of Bangor (1309–28), Sir Gruffudd Llwyd and Sir Morgan ap Maredudd at Clipston (Nottinghamshire) for negotiations concerning the state of Wales (pro negociis statum terre Wallie tangentibus).22 It was in 1316, however, that the Welsh March became central to the struggle between the king, his proxy in Wales, the younger Despenser, and the latter’s opponents. The first expression of the problem was the revolt in Glamorgan led by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd ap Rhys, generally known as Llywelyn Bren (Llywelyn of the wood), the native lord of Senghenydd and Meisgyn. Llywelyn’s father had supported Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in the 1260s, but his rebellion seems to have been the culmination of disaffection between some of the Welsh community and their lords, manifested in the earlier revolt under Morgan ap Maredudd in 1294–95. The initial hostility to royal custody was soothed by the appointment of Bartholomew Badlesmere as keeper of the lordship in September 1314. He granted offices in the lordship to Llywelyn and other Welshmen. Badlesmere’s replacement, Payn de Turberville, of Coity in the Vale of Glamorgan, in July 1315, displaced Llywelyn and installed his friends who acted in a high-handed fashion. Llywelyn denounced Turberville who, in turn, denounced Llywelyn, accusing him of sedition. Edward’s insensitive handling of the personal animosity at his court almost certainly triggered Llywelyn’s rebellion. Like the earlier revolt, this uprising was founded in local issues and personal grievance rather than ‘national’ ill-feeling.23 Support was significant enough for the rebels to launch an assault on Caerphilly Castle, to capture or damage several other castles, and for external military intervention to be deemed necessary. The army raised to put down the rebellion was necessarily large and expensive but mainly drawn from neighbouring lordships. It was led by Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford, whose lordship of Brecon bordered Glamorgan to the north. Under him served Roger Mortimer of Chirk, Bartholomew Badlesmere, Henry de Lancaster, William Montague and John Giffard of Brimpesfield and the husbands of two of the three Clare heiresses, Hugh Audley and Roger Damory. By 18 March their army of 150 men-at-arms and 2,000 infantry compelled Llywelyn and his sons to surrender to Hereford at Ystradfellte. The initial treatment of the rebels was   For these and other precautions in the same period; A.D. Carr, ‘Anglesey and War in the Later Middle Ages’, Transactions of the Anglesey Antiquarian Society and Field Club (1984), pp. 16–17. 21   Cal. Chancery Warrants. 1244–1326, pp. 436–7. 22   Smith, ‘Gruffudd Llwyd and the Celtic Alliance’, p. 465. 23   This was the view of T.F. Tout in the Dictionary of National Biography, volume XXXIV (1893), pp. 21–2. More recent analysis of this rebellion can be found in R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Revolt of Llywelyn Bren’, in idem, Conquerors and Conquered in Medieval Wales (Stroud and New York, 1994), pp. 84–91 and J. Beverley Smith, ‘The Rebellion of Llywelyn Bren’, in Glam. C. H. III, pp. 72–86. 20

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conciliatory; many were taken into the king’s peace by Turberville’s replacement, John Giffard (his appointment was itself a concession), though Llywelyn himself was lodged in the Tower of London. The accounts presented by Giffard for his term as custodian of Glamorgan reveal how quickly the rebels were readmitted to peace. £199 15s. 9d. was spent on garrisons, provisions and materiel for the castles of the lordship in the course of the rebellion, but the same account records payments made to 1,000 infantry from the lordship assembled at Cardiff and sent to Carlisle to serve in Scotland in the following summer.24 This apparent reconciliation ended when Hugh Despenser the younger, husband to the third of the Clare heiresses, secured Glamorgan for himself in November 1317. Llywelyn was placed at Hugh’s mercy. He was taken to Cardiff Castle, summarily tried and subjected to the full horrors of a traitor’s death early in 1318. Furthermore, his estates were denied to his sons and granted to a Welshman loyal to Despenser, Runus Bwl. Llywelyn’s sons had accepted the protection of Hereford and were in his service in 1321–22 against Despenser and the king. The unjust treatment of Llywelyn Bren was a source of lasting grievance: it was among the charges levelled at the Despensers in 1321.25 Llywelyn Bren’s revolt was not the only disturbance in the March of Wales in 1316. In Powys, the relationship between its lord, John Charlton, and Gruffudd de la Pole deteriorated to such an extent that the king was forced to intervene, despatching John Cromwell as his representative to impose peace. The root of the dispute between Charlton and de la Pole lay in the conversion of Powys from a principality to a Marcher lordship governed by English laws of inheritance. Gruffudd de la Pole was the youngest and last surviving son of the last independent prince of southern Powys, Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn (d. 1286). Charlton’s wife, Hawise de la Pole, daughter of Gruffudd ab Owain ap Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn, as daughter of Gruffudd’s elder brother, left Gruffudd only the lordship of Mawddwy in his own right and the minor lordships of Dinas and Mechain Is-Coed. The dispute had started in law in 1311 and had taken the form of a siege of La Pole (Welshpool) Castle by 1312.26 Since Charlton owed his position to his place in Edward’s court where he had been chamberlain (1310–18), Gruffudd was compelled to turn to Thomas of Lancaster for aid. This first attempt at royal intervention in 1316 was unsuccessful; this phase of conflict between the two men and their tenants was only concluded, after a summer of fighting, in October 1316 when Gruffudd surrendered his lands and received a pardon. This outbreak was the first flaring of a long feud which only ended with Gruffudd’s death in 1332.27 Like the revolt of Llywelyn

 Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 430, p. 52; Rot. Scot. I, p. 156.   Cal. Chancery Warrants, 1244–1326, p. 440. 26   J.F.A. Mason, ‘Charlton, John, First Lord Charlton of Powys (d. 1353)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 26 June 2012. 27   CPR 1313–17, pp. 54, 548. A full account of the convoluted dispute is in R. Morgan, ‘The Barony of Powys, 1275–1360’, WHR 10 (1980–1), pp. 1–37. 24 25

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Bren, this conflict became enmeshed in wider political struggles between the king and Thomas, earl of Lancaster. Though these revolts were serious, requiring royal diplomatic and military intervention, they were representative of the escalation of local confrontation throughout an increasingly troubled English realm which, in addition to prolonged weakness in government, was also subject to famine.28 Recruitment for the campaign proposed for Scotland in the summer of 1316 was disrupted by signs of instability in North Wales. While 1,500 troops were recruited in July, by the time they reached Chester on 4 August they were met with orders to return whence they came ex certa causa – presumably a specific invasion threat to North Wales from Ireland – acting on information originating from the community of North Wales which had been supplied to the king.29 The nature of this information was not spelt out but it can be no coincidence that letters were exchanged between Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, undisputed leader of the Welsh elite, and Edward Bruce who had been crowned ‘king of Ireland’ in May 1316. Bruce offered the prospect of invasion. Sir Gruffudd’s reply, extraordinary for a man who owed his position and status to the English Crown, but presumably speaking for his community, was that if Bruce were to come to Wales, the nobiles of Wales would join him. Whatever the reality of Bruce’s sentiments or the prospects of invasion, that Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, of all people, should make such an offer indicates how low Edward II’s stock had sunk.30 The discovery of these wavering loyalties seems to have been the cause of the recall of Welsh troops and was certainly the reason that Sir Gruffudd was imprisoned in Rhuddlan Castle late in 1316 by the justiciars of North Wales, Roger Mortimer and Roger de Grey of Ruthin. The existence of the letters between Bruce and Sir Gruffudd Llwyd demonstrates the independence of thought of the uchelwyr a generation after the conquest. Gruffudd Llywd and his contemporaries had, in their minds at least, taken on the mantle of the princes and felt able to reconsider the settlement imposed by Edward I with independent action. This turned out to be dangerous as well as implausible, but it shows that contemporary suspicion of the loyalty of the Welsh by the English was fully justified. This theme is worth exploring in more detail. For the sake of this study it is sufficient to note that some difficulties in the accommodation the uchelwyr had reached with the English Crown are reflected in contemporary poetry. The poets, as barometers of the society in which they operated, expressed ambivalence to those who prospered in military service of the English Crown. Sir Gruffudd Llwyd had been rewarded with knighthood in 1301, but his years of greatest influence came during the reign of Edward II. He is most obviously prominent as a soldier

 McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces, p. 149.   Rot. Scot. I, p. 159. 30   For the text of the documents in question, Smith, ‘Gruffydd Llwyd and the Celtic Alliance’, pp. 476–8. 28

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in the records, but this is not the focus of two surviving awdlau (odes) composed by Gwilym Ddu of Arfon. These poems date to the period of Gruffudd Llwyd’s imprisonment in 1317 and lament at this state of affairs is their principal theme. Sir Gruffudd’s qualities as a warrior and as a leader are noted, but Gwilym’s references are thin on specific detail. The closest he comes to praising Sir Gruffudd’s leadership in war is in describing Sir Gruffudd as ‘Llew diymryson o Fôn Forudd/The lion of strife from Anglesey to the English Channel’.31 Gruffudd was dominant in his native Anglesey and had fought in Flanders in 1297 but this is hardly fulsome praise of his military leadership or of his loyalty to English kings. As Morgan Thomas Davies notes, such reticence would be very unusual by the standards of the later fourteenth century: Iolo Goch was commissioned to compose praise to Edward III and even Dafydd ap Gwilym was able to include positive references to that king’s victories.32 The well-known praise poems composed for Owain Glyndŵr by the poet Gruffudd Llywd (fl. c. 1380–c. 1410) and by Iolo Goch make very specific mention of Owain’s service in Scotland and the rewards available from the Crown, most notably knighthood.33 By the second quarter of the fifteenth century, these were commonplace themes of the poetic lexicon. In the works of the poets of the princes, specific references to war had also been the norm. The poets of the princes, in their marwnadau (death odes or elegies) for administrators and members of the teuluoedd (military households), tended to refer to their loyalty to their prince and their service in war, or to provide specific detail relating to the careers of the departed.34 By contrast, the rather generic praise employed by Gwilym Ddu could be read as reflecting underlying resentment towards English rule or, implicitly, be a comment on the effectiveness of Edward II’s regime. It might also be that 1317 was simply too early, in the post-conquest history of Gwynedd, to praise service in the cause of an English king. It should be noted, however, that Gwilym Ddu’s bitterness at his patron’s imprisonment was not directed against the malice of the English but against God. This must reflect the realisation that it was the English that held the power and that only the Almighty could influence this. Thomas of Lancaster Beyond the problems apparent in Wales, Edward II faced other challenges. The Scots recaptured Berwick in 1317; the concern for its loss in England added to the

  M.T. Davies, ‘The Rhetoric of Gwilym Ddu’s Awdlau to Sir Gruffudd Llwyd’, Studia Celtica 40 (2006), p. 167. 32   Ibid., p. 172. 33   D.R. Johnston (ed. and trans.), Iolo Goch: Poems (Llandysul, 1993): ‘To King Edward III’, pp. 2–5; praise to Owain Glyndŵr, see texts 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and notes in M. Livingston and J.K. Bollard, Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook (Liverpool, 2013), pp. 12–27, 28–31, 261–91, 292–6. 34   Davies, ‘The Rhetoric of Gwilym Ddu’s Awdlau’, pp. 168–9. 31

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increasing political strain between the king and Thomas, earl of Lancaster. In 1317 tensions in the Welsh March were centred on Denbigh. Lancaster had acquired the lordship by marriage to Alice de Lacy in 1311. Six years later, in May 1317, John, Earl Warrenne, abducted Alice, possibly at the king’s instigation.35 Lancaster extracted his wife and his revenge by the application of armed force on Warrenne’s estates in both Yorkshire and the March, where he held the lordships of Bromfield and Yale. The conclusion of what was, in effect, a private war between magnates was among the factors that brought Lancaster and Edward together and persuaded the former to accept terms in the Treaty of Leek in August 1318. By this treaty, a new standing council was to be established, but on it, Lancaster was represented only by a banneret. The ordinances intended to effect reform in the royal household, first proposed in 1311, were to be maintained. The guarantors included some of the leading courtiers but nothing was said about the removal of evil counsellors or the resumption of their grants. Part of the price of Lancaster’s acceptance was for the hapless Warenne to forfeit both his Yorkshire estates and the Marcher lordships that Lancaster had ravaged during the previous year. The estates taken by Lancaster bolstered his powerbase and military resources in the March. A placated Lancaster was present at the parliament held at York in May 1319, one of the outcomes of which was a plan to recapture Berwick. The king’s strategy was, once again, based on overwhelming force. Edward summoned an extravagant and hopelessly unrealistic number of foot soldiers. Fewer than half of the 23,596 summoned actually appeared and it is questionable whether there was ever any expectation that they would.36 Of those requested, only around 3,000 were called from Wales and it was intended that the March would provide the majority of these: only 700 were summoned from the royal shires. The arrayers were experienced men, led in North Wales by Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, by now released from his captivity, and by his cousin Rhys ap Gruffudd in the south.37 The 2,500 Welshmen who joined Edward II at Gosforth in early August were the largest single contribution to Edward’s infantry, followed by 1,740 from Yorkshire, together with other northerners, some Scots and Irish.38 It should be noted that the Welsh were managed, and served, as a group. Their pay passed through the hands of only one or two individuals, their leaders, though they did not travel to Scotland as single force. Those from Anglesey, Merioneth and Caernarfonshire mustered at   S.L. Waugh, ‘Warenne, John de, Seventh Earl of Surrey [earl of Surrey and Sussex, Earl Warenne] (1286–1347)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 14 October 2012. 36   Parl. Writs II, ii, pp. 517–20. 37   The other named arrayers were: Goronwy ap Tudur and Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Geruarth (North); Dafydd ap Llywelyn Foel and Llywelyn Ddu (South): Parl. Writs II, ii, p. 519. All barring Dafydd ap Llywelyn Foel are recorded in the Wardrobe account, TNA, E 101/378/4, as having served on the campaign. 38   Cal. Docs. Scot. no. 668, pp. 125–6; Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, pp. 245–6. Information here and elsewhere about the army is taken from the Wardrobe book: TNA, E 101/378/4, fols 33–38d. 35

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Conwy on 19 July and appear to have arrived at Gosforth nineteen days later. The earl of Arundel’s men from his estates of Oswestry and Clun marched north with John Charlton’s men from neighbouring Powys on 29 July and took only eleven days over their journey.39 The growing influence of Hugh Despenser in southern Wales can also be observed: 301 men were drawn from Cantref Mawr (Carmarthenshire), where Despenser was steward, with a further 500 from his own lordship of Glamorgan. The king, in contrast, could only find 141 foot soldiers from Cardiganshire and the earl of Hereford, from Brecon, 161. While Glamorgan was the largest and wealthiest lordship in the March, it seems that Despenser’s officials took pains to maximise his military resources. Despite the information given in the Wardrobe book, the total size of the army is uncertain since it only recorded those who received royal pay. The complications caused by multiple payments also results in different counts being made by different historians. In this instance, Bain suggested that 8,080 men were in pay at the siege between 1 August and 24 September; Morris, 7,048.40 A further 2,000 men were said to have served at Lancaster’s own expense. The siege was unsuccessful: at Berwick, the commanders of the army almost immediately fell to quarrelling and Lancaster withdrew his troops once it became clear that the Scots had slipped past the besiegers and were devastating Yorkshire. This gave rise to the accusation that Lancaster was acting in collusion with the enemy. A truce was made at the beginning of December, leaving the town in Scottish hands and relations between Lancaster and Edward at a new low. At Berwick, the stability of the army had also been compromised by the king’s promise of further patronage to the younger Hugh Despenser. Mistrust of Hugh had been a destabilising influence in the March following his mistreatment of Llywelyn Bren. Loyalty towards their new lord among the tenants of Glamorgan seems to have been limited. Whether the ‘Welshmen hated the rule of Hugh’, as the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi claimed, is open to question, however.41 The author may have been John Walwayn, a servant of Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford and lord of Brecon.42 Since the Walwayn family was from Herefordshire and Walwayn’s business must often have taken him to the March, he was a well-informed observer but one who was far from impartial. Even so, his is a view which   TNA, E 101/378/4 fol. 33r. It may be that the Welsh only entered royal pay when all had arrived at Gosforth. See also Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 84. His source was TNA, E 101/15/20. 40   Bain’s count appears to be accurate: Cal. Docs. Scot. no. 668, pp. 125–6; Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry’, p. 84. 41   Vita Edwardi Secundi, p. 110. 42   This suggestion was first made in N. Denholm-Young, ‘The Authorship of the Vita Edwardi Secundi’, EHR 71 (1956), pp. 189–211. For a reassessment of the claims made for Walwayn as author of the Vita, see W. Childs, ‘Resistance and Treason in the Vita Edwardi Secundi’, in M.C. Prestwich, R.H. Britnell and R. Frame (eds), Thirteenth Century England VI, Proceedings of the Durham Conference 1995 (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 177–91, at p. 178, n. 6. 39

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Despenser himself may have suspected. Early in the summer of 1321, Despenser urged his sheriff, John Inge, to prevent secret assemblies among the Welsh in Glamorgan, and he was troubled by the activities of another Bohun servant, Master Rhys ap Hywel. Master Rhys had earlier played a part in preventing the king seizing the lordship of Gower (and thus placing it in the hands of Despenser) in 1320. A year later Master Rhys was alleged to be making alliances and ‘leading a great rout of people with him’.43 The rapid accumulation of estates and offices in southern Wales by the younger Despenser, the largest and richest of which was Glamorgan, combined with his avarice and, not least, his treatment of those who stood in his way regardless of their status and position, made armed conflict in Wales all but inevitable. The war waged against the younger Despenser by his Marcher neighbours in May 1321 was triggered by the dispute over the lordship of Gower and Despenser’s interference in the affairs of the Briouze lords of Gower. This was not the only factor noted in chronicles of the period, nor was it necessarily the most important.44 Inevitably, it was the military resources of the March that were employed. Generally, this was a war fought among Welshmen but it was the conflicts between lords rather than rebellion that fomented this short, vicious and bloody war. On Monday, 4 May 1321, an army led by Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford, supported by both Roger Mortimer of Chirk and his uncle and namesake of Wigmore and High Audley, tacitly supported by Thomas of Lancaster, rode towards Newport carrying a royal standard; the campaign against Despenser was conducted in the king’s name. The army was substantial. The close rolls suggest 800 men-at-arms, 500 hobelars and 10,000 foot soldiers, but these numbers are very likely to have been a significant overestimate. There is no doubt that the Marcher lordships, if effectively mobilised, could have produced an army of this scale, but reports of this kind are likely to have been exaggerated.45 Bohun’s army was supported by those who had risen with Llywelyn Bren and, by the end of March, had taken all of Despenser’s castles and caused damage to the lordship assessed at £38,000.46 The pardons granted later indicate that the barons’ army was led by experienced soldiers who had organised, arrayed and led royal armies.47 Despenser temporarily lost Glamorgan, and the defeat gave the victors the power to banish both him and his father. Their banishment, however, was brief. The reversal of the barons’ fortunes, when it came, was every bit as dependent on the military resources of Wales as had been the defeat of Despenser in the first place.   Smith ‘Allegiance of Wales’, pp. 157–8.   Conway Davies, ‘The Despenser War in Glamorgan’, pp. 42–50. 45   CCR 1318–23, p. 541. 46   Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, pp. 158–9. 47   For some of those pardoned, CPR 1317–21, pp. 15–20. For example, Roger Trumwyn, a servant of the earl of Hereford, was later deputy justiciar of North Wales: ibid., p. 18; Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 246–8. Another was Edmund Hakelut, who held various offices in South Wales and led Welsh troops on numerous occasions: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 243–4. 43

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The Royal Response On 15 November 1321, Sir Gruffudd Llwyd and Rhys ap Gruffudd were ordered to raise forces from both halves of the principality and to lead attacks on the possessions of the king’s Marcher opponents. Principally, these attacks were concentrated on the estates of the Mortimers and their allies and those who had sided with Lancaster. Lancaster’s lordship of Denbigh was assaulted, as was the former Warrenne holding of Bromfield and Yale. John Charlton, no longer a recipient of royal favour, had his caput at La Pole (Welshpool) taken, Chirk was captured and Clun was also attacked. This last, though an Arundel lordship (Arundel had sided with the king), had fallen into the hands of Mortimer of Wigmore in the previous year.48 These actions were part of a concerted royal campaign against the king’s enemies and were essential to his survival. Edward’s own army, marching northwards, only succeeded in fording the Severn on 14 January 1322 before heading to Hereford and Shrewsbury, compelling the surrender of the Mortimers and their allies by the end of the month. It is significant that the continuation of the Brut y Tywysogion described this army as ‘the hosts of Gwynedd’. Nearly two generations after the conquest, Gwynedd was synonymous with North Wales, a fact that adds further political resonance to the events of early 1322.49 Success in compelling Mortimer and his allies to surrender was only the first phase. On St Valentine’s Day, the king ordered Sir Gruffudd Llwyd and Giles Beauchamp to array 2,000 men from Anglesey, Caernarfon and Merioneth, ostensibly for service against the Scots. A further 7,750 were requested from the March, including those lordships, Brecon and Powys, whose lords were supporters of Lancaster.50 No fewer than 3,000 men were summoned from Glamorgan. They were specifically requested as 2,000 Welsh and 1,000 English. None, however, were called from Lancaster’s own lordship of Denbigh which, with Bromfield and Yale, were committed to the keeping of Sir Gruffudd and Beauchamp on 26 February. It seems that Sir Gruffudd Llwyd used this opportunity to settle scores, launching an attack on the lordship of Dyffryn Clwyd, adjacent to Denbigh. The lord, John de Grey, one of the king’s allies, was more than likely responsible for uncovering Sir Gruffudd’s dalliance with Edward Bruce, therefore occasioning his imprisonment in 1316. Using royal resources to attend to a personal quarrel seems to have had no immediate repercussions – presumably the loyalty of Sir Gruffudd and his forces was considered more important – and the Welsh forces continued their journey   As noted by the Wigmore Chronicle, printed in Monasticon Anglicanum: A History of the Abbies and Other Monasteries, etc., originally published in Latin by Sir William Dugdale, 6 vols in 8 parts (London, 1817–30), volume VI, i. p. 352. 49   T. Jones (ed.), Brut y Tywysogion, or The Chronicle of the Princes, Peniarth MS. 20 Version (Cardiff, 1952), p. 124. 50   The earl of Hereford (lord of Brecon) died at Boroughbridge with Lancaster; John Charlton (Powys) surrendered with the Mortimers. 48

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to meet with the king at Burton-on-Trent.51 Similar efforts were made in southern Wales against Lancaster’s adherents. Rhys ap Gruffudd received £171 6s. 8d. as payment for forty men-at-arms and 3,000 foot soldiers to seize into the king’s hands the lands of Cantref Mawr, Cantref Bychan (both being placed in the stewardship of the younger Despenser), the lordships of Gower, Narberth (Pembrokeshire) and the royal lordship of Builth (let to Mortimer of Chirk), together with the Mortimer estates in mid-Wales.52 All of Wales was placed under direct royal control or under that of the king’s closest allies. The success was sealed by the victory of royalist forces at Boroughbridge, which led to the deaths of Lancaster and Hereford. Edward’s gratitude to his Welsh supporters was unprecedented, including a summons (one of only two in the Middle Ages) for the communities of the Welsh principality to send representatives to the parliament held at York in April 1322. In return, specific grievances were aired. It is interesting to note that the concerns of the uchelwyr were not primarily with political or military matters. The principal demand (not acceded to) was that Welsh law should give way to English common law for matters of inheritance and land transactions.53 Equally revealing is that the communities of Mortimer’s estates – though not represented in parliament themselves – threatened to leave their lands if their lords were reinstated.54 Edward’s vastly improved domestic position enabled him to launch another campaign against the Scots. Most unusually, the writs of array issued on 10 June 1322 stressed the good service and effectiveness of Welsh troops and their leaders earlier in the year.55 This friendly tone was in contrast to the less conciliatory summons to the men of Cornwall. They were threatened with dire penalties for non-co-operation, freighted with a reminder that they had not previously – entirely unsurprisingly – contributed to Edward’s Scottish wars. The expansion of the demand for military service supposedly came out of the York parliament of 1322: each vill in the realm was to supply one foot soldier to serve for forty days in the king’s armies, as had been tried before in 1316 and 1318.56 In the Welsh shires and lordships this provision seems not to have applied, a matter which had caused hardship in the recent past. The bondmen of Penrhosllugwy, Anglesey, had petitioned the king for respite on the grounds of poverty caused by his repeated demands for military service and by losses cause by murrain on their cattle. The aftermath of Edward’s victory was a good time to further a pre-existing dispute about the unjust assessment of labour

  Smith, ‘Gruffudd Llwyd and the Celtic Alliance’, pp. 472–3.  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 280; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 467, p. 56. 53   A similar demand had been made by the tenants of Gower following the rebellion of 1287. 54   Rot. Parl. I, pp. 387, 390. 55   The details of Welsh service on this important campaign are taken from N. Fryde, ‘Welsh Troops in the Scottish Campaign of 1322’, BBCS 26 (1974), pp. 82–9 using BL Stowe MS. 5353. 56   PROME Edward II: May 1322, n. 6; J.R.S. Philips, Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, 1307–24: Baronial Politics in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1972), pp. 227–8. 51

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services and other grievances; it shows the extent to which those at all levels of society were compelled to contribute to Edward’s wars.57 Following the parliament, a new campaign was launched against the Scots. The Welsh contribution to Edward’s army was certainly significant: 6,490 men, including contingents from the confiscated Marcher lordships of Lancaster’s supporters and, in all likelihood, Welshmen from Flintshire among the 633 men recruited from the king’s earldom of Chester. These men, together with 3,500 levied from the northern counties and 200 Gascon crossbowmen, formed the nucleus of Edward’s army and were likely to have been his best and certainly most experienced troops. Nevertheless, they formed only half of the overall strength of his foot soldiers who numbered 21,700, in addition to over 300 household troops. It is significant in this light that Edward’s Welsh soldiers, though they amounted to only about one-third of the strength of the army, took nearly half the pay: £3,675 10s. 7d. of the £7,418 15s. 11d. disbursed on infantry in the course of the campaign went to these Welsh soldiers, with at least part of this sum being provided from the revenues of the chamberlain of North Wales.58 It would be unfair to ascribe the dismal near-disaster (Edward was extremely fortunate to evade capture by the Scots) to his Welsh infantry. Although the Welsh contingent lost 115 men from North Wales before the army left Newcastle, only fifteen men were lost from the South Wales levy by the end of the campaign.59 While the Wardrobe accounts record these losses, they also note marks of special favour. Whilst in Scotland, Edward granted Sir Gruffudd Llwyd a new standard from royal funds and contributed £2 towards the burial expenses of his son, also Gruffudd, at the church of the Friars Preachers at Newcastle-upon-Tyne around 9 October 1322 after the escape of his army into England. These examples were a very practical demonstration of the value Edward placed on his support from Wales: despite the abject failure of the campaign, Fryde emphasised that the removal of opposition to Edward’s rule and the military resources he was able to mobilise from his Welsh estates foreshadowed their importance to the tyranny of the final years of his rule. Edward’s own support from the Welsh leaders, combined with Despenser’s authority in South Wales and the March threatened to create a powerful and dangerous military grouping with which no opposition would be able to deal. Under Edward I, the March had been the centre of opposition to royal authoritarianism. Under Edward II, it looked like becoming the bastion of royal support. The military power of Edward and the Despensers was the more terrifying since it was accompanied by formidable financial means.60

 Carr, Medieval Anglesey, p. 238.   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 176 59   Fryde, ‘Welsh Troops in the Scottish Campaign of 1322’, pp. 83–4. We should be careful not to ascribe these losses purely to desertion: brawls, murders, disease and even soldiers buying themselves out of their service could account for losses outside battle. 60  Fryde, Tyranny and Fall, p. 6 57

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The means, of course, included the revenues of the Marcher lordships confiscated from his enemies, including the younger Roger Mortimer who had fled to France with Edward’s estranged wife and son in 1325. It was in this context that Edward II looked to Wales to mobilise large forces to bolster his authority in Gascony during the war of St Sardos in 1324–25. The conflict had been settled by negotiation by the time these Welsh forces arrived. That it was Welsh foot soldiers that Edward selected from his realm to be despatched to southern France, when his authority in Gascony was challenged by the French king, is another demonstration of the value of Edward’s Welsh estates at this point in his reign. Primarily this was secured by Edward’s patronage of the Welsh elite, particularly Sir Gruffudd Llwyd and his cousin, Rhys ap Gruffudd. It is no accident that it was to these men, and their fellow uchelwyr, that Edward turned in 1326 during the final crisis of his reign. So certain was Edward of their support that, when threats of Mortimer and Isabella’s invasion were first detected, plans for the royal response noted that ‘our lord king himself will make his way towards the March of Wales to rouse the loyal men of that land and will punish the traitors’.61 When the invasion actually came, this is what Edward did, but his preparations show signs of confusion. Summonses for an impossible number, no fewer than 43,640 foot soldiers and archers, were made from the English counties, while in Wales similar summonses realistically asked for as many troops of whatever type that could be raised. Despite the earlier plans, Edward’s first appeal to his Welsh supporters came two days after Mortimer and Isabella’s forces had landed on the Suffolk coast, a recognition that attempts at repelling invasion had failed.62 There is also the possibility that Mortimer still had supporters in Wales. Sir Gruffudd Llwyd appears to have been prevented from providing assistance: Fryde points to a reward granted to the chamberlain of North Wales for his help ‘at the time of the pursuit of Despenser’ as support for this suggestion.63 In light of Sir Gruffudd’s earlier loyalty and later events this is likely. Rhys ap Gruffudd, however, was assiduous in his commission. Notes in the memoranda rolls suggest that the enormous sum of £259 2s. 8d. was set against the chamberlain of South Wales’s account for eight days’ wages for men-at-arms and foot soldiers that he led towards Brecon.64 While the king was travelling towards the March, on 10 October, a commission was made to Richard Wroth, keeper of Archenfield (the Welsh-speaking area of south-west Herefordshire), and John Sutton to raise ‘all able-bodied men’ and to commit those unwilling to fight to the castle of St Briavels. Similar commissions

  Parliamentary and council proceedings, TNA, C 47/5/17 quoted by Fryde, Tyranny and Fall, p. 184. 62   CPR 1324–7, pp. 325, 331. 63  Fryde, Tyranny and Fall, pp. 189–90. 64   This order was dated at Gloucester on 11 October 1326; it is unknown whether this debt was subsequently honoured; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 593, p. 70. 61

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were made to the lordships of Brecon, Talgarth, Hay, Elfael (where a Welshman, William ap Rhys was named as keeper), Radnor, Pembroke and Maelienydd (where two more Welshmen, Cadwgan ap Hywel and Dafydd Fychan were named as keepers of the lordship).65 An Exchequer official, John Langton, accompanied Edward during his flight with at least £29,000 in ready money. Troops could have been paid, therefore, and these orders had some effect.66 Ten days later, the younger Despenser, Edmund Hakelut and Bogo de Knovill were appointed to lead the troops. They were ordered to take the lands of Henry de Lancaster in the March into royal hands. Rhys ap Gruffudd was active in West Wales, receiving the castle of Llanbadarn Fawr into his hands on 21 October.67 Unsure of support elsewhere, and in accordance with his plans, Edward made efforts to mobilise the southern March. On 27 October, further writs of array were issued, mostly to Welshmen, in Kilvey (part of Gower), in Glamorgan, and to Usk, Tregrug, Edlogan and Abergavenny.68 On the following day, Adam le Walsh was commissioned to raise 400 foot soldiers to defend Cardiff against enemies of the king and Despenser. The speed with which resistance to the invasion collapsed in Wales and elsewhere, however, indicates that many of those pressed into serving were far from committed to the cause. That said, the frantic granting of pardons to those who had come out against the king in the early weeks of November suggests that Edward had not been without support.69 In the midst of this, Rhys ap Gruffudd was commissioned with others to meet Isabella on the king’s behalf. Just six days later, the Bohun servant, Master Rhys ap Hywel, and Henry of Lancaster located Edward in upland Glamorgan near Llantrisant. The war, such as it was, reached its end.70 This war had only a single significant engagement; the remarkable defence of Caerphilly Castle which lasted until the feast of St Gregory (12 March). We are fortunate that the names of the garrison and the besieging army have been recorded. The castle, an enormous edifice, was held by just thirty-eight men, captained by Sir William de Felton and Sir Thomas Lovel, de facto guardians to the son and heir of the younger Despenser.71 The besieging army was led by Alan la Zouche, indentured to provide thirty men-at-arms and a large infantry force necessary to take the castle. He was assisted in this by the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, Robert Northburgh (1322–58), and Caerphilly’s

  All these lordships were either royal or in royal hands (Maelienydd, Brecon), owing to confiscations following 1322 or the exile of Mortimer. 66  Fryde, Tyranny and Fall, p. 189. 67   CPR 1324–7, p. 332; CFR 1319–27, p. 414. 68   CPR 1324–7, p. 336; these orders were reiterated on 29 October. 69   CPR 1324–7, pp. 334–6. 70   Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, p. 165. 71   The strength of the garrison is determined from the pardon issued to them on 20 February 1327: CPR 1327–30, p. 13. A general pardon was issued to all the men present with Edward, except Hugh Despenser the younger, on 15 February; ibid., p. 13. 65

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newly designated constable, Robert Chandos. with 400 Welshmen.72 The payroll for these men shows that they were probably recruited locally, though there are few toponyms recorded. One, Ieuan de Segenhith (Senghenydd), hints that these men were recruited from within the commote in which the castle lay.73 The advent of Edward III’s reign, under the tutelage of his mother and Roger Mortimer, one of the Marcher lords who had suffered following Thomas of Lancaster’s defeat, was unlikely to be beneficial to those who had been conspicuously loyal to Edward II. It was probably Mortimer’s insight that had resulted in Sir Gruffudd Llwyd being unable to respond to Edward II’s summons. In the new regime, Mortimer’s dominance over Wales was a direct threat to the native uchelwyr. The extent of Mortimer’s control was greater even than Despenser’s. He secured the valuable lordship of Denbigh following the forfeiture of the elder Despenser (15 December 1326); he gained Glamorgan from the younger Despenser’s widow, Elizabeth de Clare (12 June 1327), and the lordships of Oswestry and Clun with the FitzAlan estates in Shropshire (13 September 1327). He also obtained a reversion of the royal Marcher lordships of Montgomery and Builth (2 September 1329) from Isabella, and later gained the lordship of Montgomery in fee (April 1330). Most brazen of all, he appropriated the Marcher estates of his own uncle, Roger Mortimer of Chirk, who had died in the Tower in 1326, even though Roger had a legitimate son of full age. In addition, Mortimer also gained control of Cemais and Cantref Bychan as custodian of the young James Audley, Pembroke, Abergavenny and Cigerran from the wardship of Laurence Hastings and, with the wardship of the heir to the earldom of Warwick, he also held Elfael. To this he added the key offices of the principality (though Edward III had been invested as earl of Chester, he was never, formally, prince of Wales). Mortimer was appointed justiciar of the whole principality on 22 February 1327, this being converted to a life grant on 8 June 1328, and he was made justiciar of the bishoprics of Llandaff and St Davids.74 Those upon whom Edward II had depended were inevitably most vulnerable. Whatever Sir Gruffudd Llwyd’s intentions in responding to Edward Bruce’s letter, it was under Mortimer’s aegis he had been imprisoned in 1316, and it was Mortimer’s officials who had prevented Sir Gruffudd from coming to Edward II’s aid.75 It seems understandable that someone more powerful than many princes of   The indenture is recorded several times in the patent rolls: CPR 1327–30, pp. 12, 18. Alan la Zouche’s account gives the strength and names of his forces: TNA, E 101/18/1, printed in H.J. Randall and W. Rees (eds), South Wales and Monmouth Record Society Publications 4, pp. 38–41. 73   The bishop was only allowed to set the ‘expenses incurred in seizing the castle of Caerphilly into the king’s hands’ against his account in 1331; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, nos. 685, 777, pp. 81, 90. 74   R.R. Davies, ‘Mortimer, Roger (V), First Earl of March (1287–1330)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 17 July 2013. 75   Edwards, ‘Sir Gruffudd Llwyd’, Appendices I–III, pp. 600–1; Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, pp. 475–6. 72

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Gwynedd would be seen as a threat by a man who sought to dominate all Wales. Despite this, Sir Gruffudd and his cousin, Rhys ap Gruffudd, equally dominant in West Wales, seem to have been given the benefit of the doubt in the short term. Sir Gruffudd was given a commission to inquire into the state of the lordship of Dyffryn Clwyd, and a grant to Rhys ap Gruffudd of the manor of Penathlen (probably Penllyn, Glamorgan) made by Edward II was confirmed.76 Their authority was acknowledged by the new regime, though neither party was fully reconciled to it. This impression is reinforced by the refusal of Sir Gruffudd or Rhys – or any of their fellows – to answer the summons made to the parliament which deposed Edward II in 1327. Should there have been any doubt about their unhappiness, then the involvement of both men in an audacious plot to spring Edward II from his captivity in Berkeley Castle (Gloucestershire) later in that year dispelled it. The plot, however, was betrayed and, perhaps as a result, Edward may have been murdered.77 Following the failure of this plot, Rhys ap Gruffudd fled to Scotland while Sir Gruffudd and thirteen others were imprisoned. Of the thirteen, each had served with Sir Gruffudd on earlier campaigns and four had been included in the summons to parliament in 1327.78 Rhys seems to have made his peace quickly and was pardoned on 28 February, though his lands and offices were not restored until two months later. If this was an attempt to buy his loyalty it was notably unsuccessful. He was implicated in another plot to free Edward II, in the belief that he was still alive, led by Edmund, earl of Kent, in 1330. It may be that Rhys was the near-victim of deception: it emerged at Mortimer’s trial that Mortimer had acted to encourage the belief that Edward II was living.79 Following the failure of this plot, Rhys escaped again with other Welshmen and his estates were seized. With the fall of the regime of Mortimer and Isabella in October 1330, Rhys enjoyed a swift and comprehensive change of fortune. His estates were restored by parliament and, by the end of the year, he was a knight of the royal household.80 His rehabilitation and   CPR 1327–30, p. 238; CFR 1319–27, p. 422. The grant to Rhys ap Gruffudd must have been reversed later since Penllyn was held by John de Norreys in 1349; CIPM IX, no. 428, p. 337 77   Tout, ‘Captivity and Death’, pp. 165–7 and Appendices I and II, pp. 182–9. The debate about the fate of Edward II continues: for example; I. Mortimer, ‘The Death of Edward II at Berkeley Castle’, EHR 120 (2005), pp. 1175–214. 78   Their identities are taken from the pardon granted to them shortly afterwards; CPR 1327–30, pp. 272–3. Those included were: Morgan Llwyd ap Rhys Gethin; Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Hywel; Herbert de Ferrers; Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd ap Goronwy; Dafydd Fychan ap Dafydd ab Ieuan; Gwilym Hir. The four imprisoned with Gruffudd Llwyd also included in the parliamentary summons were: Iorwerth ap Gruffudd; Gruffudd ap Hywel; Hywel ap Gruffudd; Dafydd ab Adda. Herbert de Ferrers and Gwilym Hir had served with Rhys in Scotland in 1322. For a full account of Rhys’s Scottish connections, see Smith, ‘Allegiance of Wales’, pp. 167–70; for the conspiracy and summons to Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, ibid., pp. 166–7. See also Tout, ‘Captivity and Death’, Appendices I and II, pp. 182–9. 79   S.L. Waugh, ‘Edmund, First Earl of Kent (1301–1330)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 17 July 2013. 80  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 99–102. 76

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that of his knightly cousin Sir Gruffudd Llwyd also extended to the communities they represented. Edward III’s government rewarded their loyalty and recognised that their support was essential for peace and effective governance in Wales. Conclusions Edward II’s Welsh subjects were arguably more important to his military endeavours and his political struggles than they had been to those of his father. Service in war in Scotland, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, defined the lives and experience of two generations of Welshmen. Examination of Edward II’s military misadventures has, rightly, demonstrated the strategic narrowness and tactical limitations of the machine assembled by Edward I.81 Edward I had developed methods capable of assembling and funding enormous infantry forces which could be maintained in the field for considerable periods of time and which could stifle and frustrate his enemies. This was shown by their effectiveness in Gwynedd and early successes in Scotland. The limitations of this approach seem to have been clear to Edward after 1300. The armies raised in the later years of his reign were much smaller and more care seems to have been taken in the selection of troops. Edward II’s armies were significantly larger and substantially less successful in Scotland than those of his father. It may be revealing, however, that it was the most experienced soldiers and commanders that included the Welsh under their native leaders and men from the northern counties led by men like Andrew Harclay. They were also most effective against Edward II’s domestic enemies. The usual reason given for the ineffectiveness of Edward’s armies is the troubled relations he had with his barons and the favour displayed towards Gaveston and Despenser. Arguably more important, however, were the limitations in the armies he chose to assemble. Edward II persisted with a strategy based on the idea of overwhelming force composed of enormous infantry armies, despite the obvious deficiencies exposed at Bannockburn and emphasised in the winter of 1322. Edward recognised that his Welsh subjects were indispensable in such a strategy and that stability in Wales was essential to fight wars elsewhere effectively. Edward’s choice of a Clare heiress – and with her Glamorgan – as a wife for the younger Despenser was as much strategic as a mark of personal favour. Wales became a bulwark against insurrection rather than its source. It must be acknowledged that Edward II’s best soldiers – and certainly the best led – came from the shires and the March of Wales. Both opponents and allies of the king took pains to recruit, or to bring to heel, the Welsh March and the leaders of its native community. The leaders of the Welsh elite were far more significant than their modest wealth suggests. The few Welshmen who became knights before

  Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 243–4.

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1330 formed bridges between the king and his Welsh subjects and were among his most loyal supporters, as the treatment of Sir Gruffudd Llwyd by Mortimer makes only too apparent. Before 1322 the concentration of Welsh estates in the hands of Edward’s most powerful enemies was a problem. After 1322 their passing into hands sympathetic to the king provided the source of his power and the basis of that power was, by turns, financial and in strength of arms.

3

The Wars of Edward III Scotland and France 1327–1360

The reign of Edward III was, in military terms, a period of transition. At the beginning of his reign, the military systems inherited from Edward I were largely unchanged and their failures, obvious by the time of Bannockburn in 1314, had not been addressed.1 In 1327 the armies recruited in the young king’s name for service in Scotland were dominated by foot soldiers levied on counties and liberties by commissions of array. The men-at-arms accompanying them were drawn primarily from the royal household and the households of the king’s barons. By the time the first phase of the French war was concluded by the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360, English armies had started to assume a different character. The foot soldier had almost wholly given way to the mounted archer serving in mixed retinues with mounted men-at-arms. Although mounted, and thus able to travel swiftly on horseback, both men-at-arms and mounted archers generally fought on foot. The means by which they were recruited also changed: commissions of array gradually gave way to recruitment by military indenture, and paid service was the norm. Effectively, this privatised military recruitment: captains were responsible for gathering both men-at-arms and archers, usually in approximately equal numbers, for fixed periods in a clearly defined contractual arrangement. This change was gradual; although indentures had been known in the reign of Edward I, they were then only for garrison service, but the effects on the military participation of men from the shires and March of Wales were marked.2 The ill-equipped foot soldier was obsolescent by the 1340s and, whether they were levied from Welsh shires, Marcher lordships or English counties, their decline was a result of their inflexibility. Although foot soldiers were recruited after 1360, they were generally employed, as we shall see, in specialist roles.

  Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 238–9, 243.  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 94–5, 112.

 1

 2

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Wales was subject to other changes. The generation which had witnessed Edward I’s conquest, that had bolstered Edward II’s authority, and that had led armies far greater than those ever assembled by any Welsh prince, came to the end of their careers and their lives. By the 1340s there was an identifiable change in attitude among the Welsh elite toward fighting in English wars. The leaders of Welsh society had always defined their position by military leadership. By the second third of the fourteenth century this tied Welshmen, militarily, to their lords. It is in this period that we can begin to discern a distinctively ‘Welsh’ perspective of war in English service. This is visible in the development of new strands of Welsh-language poetry at about this time, which moved away from the sense of loss and desolation occasioned by the conquest. The importance of warfare to the uchelwyr can be found in the poetry dedicated to them. From Edward III’s reign, the ambivalence towards English service that is apparent in earlier decades was, if not wholly absent, greatly reduced. By about 1350, Iolo Goch (fl. c. 1345–c. 1400), a poet from north-east Wales, felt able to compose praise for the king in Welsh, for a Welsh audience. Cefaist gost, cefaist gysteg Yn nechrau d’oes yn wychr deg Yn estwng pobl anystwyth Lloegr a Ffrainc, lle gorau ffrwyth: Cof cyfeddliw heddiw hyn, Bob ail brwydr, gan hobl Brydyn, A wnaethost, ni buost bŵl, Ar ael Iorc, arial Ercwl, Dyludo’r llu lle bu’r baich, Daly’r brenin, duliwr Brynaich, Dolurio rhai, daly ereill, Llusgo’r ieirll oll, llosgi’r lleill, Curo â blif, ddylif ddelw, Cerrig Caer Ferwig furwelw; Rhoist ar gythlwng, rhwystr gwythlawn, Ar Fôr Udd aerfa fawr iawn. You had trouble, you had hardship At the beginning of your life right fiercely Subduing the stubborn people Of England and France, place of finest fruit; A shameful memory today Among the people of Scotland What you did in every other battle, you weren’t sluggish, Above York, ferocity of Hercules, Attacking the host where it was strongest, Capturing the king hammerer of the Scots, Wounding some, capturing others, Dragging off all the earls, burning the rest, Battering with a catapult – image of a web – The stones of pale-walled Berwick;

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You starved – angry hindrance – A very great army on the North Sea.3

Iolo Goch was glorifying the military achievements of Edward III in Scotland and France and, more directly, elevating the achievements of the Welshmen, his patrons, who served the king. In contrast, Dafydd ap Gwilym, the best known of the fourteenth-century cywyddwyr, considered, in a playful fashion, the brutalising effect of war on society. As the poet saw it, his audience, the warriors themselves, needed reminding that their duties as noblemen extended beyond the battlefield. Rhinwyllt fydd a rhy anwar. Rhyfel ac oerfel a gâr. O chlyw fod, catorfod tyn, Brwydr yng ngwlad Ffrainc neu Brydyn, Antur gwrdd, hwnt ar gerdded Yn ŵr rhif yno y rhed. O daw, perhôn a diainc, Odd yno, medr ffrwyno Ffrainc, Creithiog fydd, saethydd a’i sathr, A chreulon, ddyn wych rylathr. A chreulon, ddyn wych rylathr. Mwy y câr ei drymbar draw A mael dur a mul darian A march o lu no merch lân. Ni’th gêl pan ddêl poen ddolef, Ni’th gais eithr i drais o’r dref. He will be wild-natured and too savage. He will love war and conflict. That there is battle in France or Scotland, a challenge for a mighty man, he’ll head straight off there to enlist in the ranks. Should he escape and come back he’ll be scarred, an archer will leave his mark on him, and bloody, you fine bright girl. He’ll have more affection for his heavy spear And his sword (woe who puts faith in him) and mail coat and dark shield and war horse than for a pretty girl. He won’t protect you when cry of anguish comes, He won’t take you from your home except by force.4

These changes, and the relatively positive perspective on the wars of England, would have seemed improbable at the start of the young King Edward III’s reign. At

  Johnston (ed.), Iolo Goch: Poems: ‘I’r Brenin Edward y Trydydd/To King Edward III’, lines 21–36, pp. 2–3.  4   ‘Merch yn Edliw ei Lyfrdra/A girl taunts him for his cowardice’: http://dafyddapgwilym.net, poem 72, lines 27–42.  3

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that time, the immediate impact of the overthrow of Edward II by Mortimer and Isabella was their suspicion of the established Welsh leadership. Rhys ap Gruffudd, only recently pardoned for consorting with the Scots, and Sir Gruffudd Llwyd were commissioned to raise forty men-at-arms each from South Wales and North Wales respectively. Neither man actually led the troops that they were commissioned to levy. By the time that the army marched, both men had been implicated in rebellion. Sir Gruffudd was among those who were imprisoned in Caernarfon Castle on account of his support for Edward II; he had led a plot to rescue the deposed king from Berkeley Castle, the discovery of which led to the decision of the Mortimer regime to incarcerate him.5 Rhys ap Gruffudd was also implicated. No official payrolls exist for the disastrous campaign to Scotland in the summer of 1327, though Jean de Bel, who served on it, stated that the army consisted of some 30,000 troops of various kinds.6 If this is true, which is improbable, then this army would have been one of the most substantial of the period, and certainly the largest ever despatched to Scotland. It is notable for some changes in approach; this was the first campaign where ‘men-at-arms’ are specifically requested from Welsh lordships for a Scottish campaign and not charged with the leadership of Welsh levies.7 Thus the men from South Wales were led by John de Hardreshall, then constable of St Briavels Castle and custodian of the Forest of Dean, and Roger Swynerton who was owed an unspecified sum for soldiers for the Scottish war of this year.8 It might be suggested that, without effective leadership, the Welsh levies ordered for this campaign may have contributed to its failure. This is not to say that the Mortimer regime possessed a blanket distrust of all Welshmen, for Mortimer himself still held a substantial powerbase in the March. In the period of Mortimer’s regency (1327–30) the military resources of the royal lands of Wales and the March were employed in political disturbances as well as in acts of war. When a coup was attempted in 1329, Mortimer looked to his own estates in the March and the lands of the Crown in North Wales and the earldom of Cheshire to nip the attempt in the bud. In this, his ally, the Norfolk knight Sir Oliver Ingham, then justiciar of Chester, was responsible for gathering the men of North Wales and Chester. Mortimer seems to have made his own arrangements

  This plot, and the subsequent case brought before the king’s bench in 1331 accusing William de Shaldeford of having exposed the plot and caused the king’s death, is discussed in Tout, ‘Captivity and Death’, pp. 175–88. For the Anglesey men implicated, Carr, Medieval Anglesey, p. 161.  6   A.E. Prince, ‘The Importance of the Campaign of 1327’, EHR 50 (1935), p. 300, n. 4.  7   Rot. Scot., I, p. 206.  8   For his career, see M. Jones, ‘Edward III’s Captains in Brittany’, in W.M. Ormrod (ed.), England in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 1986), pp. 99–118; Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 602, p. 71.  5

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too. Men from his lordship of Cedewain can be found in attendance upon him in the period immediately before Mortimer’s deposition in 1329–30.9 These preparations were unsuccessful and, following Edward’s coup against Mortimer and Isabella, the king’s activities in Scotland in the early 1330s reveal few deviations from the pattern established for the Scottish wars of his father and grandfather. In 1334–35, men from North Wales were sent to support Edward Balliol, albeit in a rather piecemeal fashion. When Edward began his march to Roxburgh from Newcastle on 14 November 1334, the infantry contribution consisted only of 241 Welshmen from Radnor and Merioneth led by Roger Corbet with John de Leyburn and Gruffudd ap Madoc of Glyndyfrdwy.10 The levies of Caernarfon and Anglesey, 319 men, were not arrayed at Conwy until 27 November.11 In South Wales the recruitment seems to have been better organised. Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, described as the ‘chief leader of the elected men of South Wales’ (Capitali ductori hominum electorum in Suth Wall) left Builth on 4 November. He was accompanied by an unnamed subductoris (a deputy leader), though both were paid at a rate of 2s. per day, suggesting that he was a man of equivalent status. Serving under them and drawn from South and West Wales were eight men-at-arms and four centenars, each receiving 12d. per day. Of the 444 troops, twenty-three were listed as hobelars (6d.) and the remainder as foot (2d.). Included in their train were ten standard bearers, twenty vintenars, a beadle, and a doctor (all 4d.). Despite their late start, they served until the end of the campaign in February. Though the size of Edward’s army can only be estimated, the Welsh contribution to the foot soldiers was around a quarter, and their overall contribution to the army approximately a sixth. Other infantry consisted of a levy from Yorkshire and 143 foot soldiers from the Forest of Dean, in an army of around 4,000 men.12 This was a pattern recognisable from the campaigns of Edward I and Edward II. The subsequent campaign in the summer of 1335, however, was a taste of things to come. English offensives in Scotland became dependent on speed and mobility rather than force of numbers. Perhaps reflecting this, seventy-six men, including the leaders and constables of the Welsh foot soldiers, were arrayed and paid as menat-arms and were mounted. Fifty of these were drawn from the estates of the earl of Arundel in north-east Wales.13 Although a total of 2,668 Welsh foot soldiers served in the summer of 1335, Scottish refusal to engage with any army of more than a few  9   TNA SC 6/1206/1 (receiver’s accounts for Cedewain, Montgomery and Dolforwyn, 3–4 Edw III); CPR 1327–1330, p. 347. Ingham had been appointed on 28 February 1328; CPR 1327–1330, p. 242. 10  Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 82–3, n. 33. 11   R.G. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327–35 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 180–2. Nicholson and Rogers, directly or otherwise, refer to BL MS Nero C. VIII fols 254–254v. 12   C.A. Candy, ‘The Scottish Wars of Edward III, 1327–38’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2004), pp. 162–4. 13   See above, particularly with reference to the 1322 campaign.

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hundred, not to mention the financial strain of these enormous numbers, made such forces a burden rather than a benefit.14 The majority of the Welsh foot soldiers were retained for almost two months longer than the English shire levies. Only levies from English towns were retained for almost as long, probably because they were better equipped; the last of these, ten mounted archers from Gloucester, were paid off by 28 September. The last of the Welsh contingent, the men of the shires of North and South Wales, remained until October.15 Coincidentally, Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, arguably the chief beneficiary of the English conquest of Gwynedd, was among twelve prominent uchelwyr who were excused from serving on the campaign.16 Sir Gruffudd was dead by the end of July.17 The conflict in Scotland persisted throughout the next decade. The connections between the Scots and the French, formalised in 1295 and later styled the ‘Auld Alliance’, were one of the factors that, together with the problematic status of Gascony and Edward III’s requirement to pay homage for the duchy, drove the English and the French to war. Though the first stages of the French wars in 1337 and 1338 were conducted in Flanders, the methods employed by English armies and military organisation took time to change. Because of the formidable cost of securing continental alliances, Edward III initially made use of cheaper Welsh soldiers as he had in the wars in Scotland. On 25 February 1338, John de Langton, William Brown, John de Avene, the Welsh lord of Afan in Glamorgan and Hywel ap Hywel of Brecon, all described, probably erroneously, as knights, were commissioned, with Gruffudd Dwn of Cydweli and John de Norreys of Penllyn, Glamorgan, to array 600 men from the royal lands of South Wales and a further 1,290 from the Marcher lordships in southern Wales. Similarly, Fulk Fitzwarin, John Charlton, the son of Lord Charlton of Powys, Robert Harley and Gruffudd Crach of Flintshire were appointed as commissioners of array for an accompanying levy of 200 men from North Wales and a further 500 from the lordships of the northern March. The men arrayed were to assemble at Ipswich on or before Easter Sunday 1338.  Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, Appendix VII, pp. 253–4, citing BL MS Nero C. VIII fol. 258v, gives seventy-six men-at-arms, thirty standard bearers, 144 vintenars, eighty-seven mounted men, 2,668 foot soldiers, three chaplains, three doctors and two proclamators, in all 3,013 men. Those from North Wales were led by John de Vyene, named in a memorandum against the account of the chamberlain of North Wales: Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 837, p. 96. 15  Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, Appendices II, III, IV, V, VI and VII – all are drawn from BL MS Nero C. VIII. 16   Rot. Scot., I, pp. 311–12, 333–4. The twelve concerned were Gruffudd ap Rhys (Sir Gruffudd Llwyd), Gruffudd ap Madoc (his identity is uncertain; he is possibly to be identified with the man of that name among those attainted for the murder of William de Shaldeford in 1345, but may be Gruffudd ap Madoc of Glyndyfrydwy, the grandfather of Owain Glyndŵr, who came of age in 1324), Gwilym ap Gruffudd, Iorwerth ap Gruffudd, Hywel ap Gruffudd, Dafydd ab Adda, Tudur ap Goronwy, Gruffudd ab Ednyfed, Hywel ap Tudur, Ieuan ap Hywel, Tudur ap Hywel and Iorwerth ap Tudur. 17   CIPM VII, p. 453. 14

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Few of these men would actually fight in Flanders. As the campaigns continued, the use of infantry was restricted by Edward III’s shortage of money. More Welsh infantry were levied late in 1338 but substantial numbers went no further than the east coast of England. Six hundred and forty Welshmen from South Wales, led by Ieuan ap Morgan, were granted letters of protection for their return home from Colchester on 10 July, while forty-six more from North Wales, under John Godenogh, received letters of protection to return from Ipswich seven days later.18 The St Albans chronicler noted the unruliness of Welsh foot soldiers while waiting to embark for France in the winter of 1337–38. They lit fires around Bury St Edmunds where the king held his council, and, while in the service of Walter Mauny in Flanders, they set light to a church.19 Further writs of array for North Wales, South Wales and the March were issued on 7 November 1338, specifying that half the soldiers were to be archers and half armed with spears.20 Since Edward’s finances limited the number of infantry he could pay, selections had to be made from among the soldiers he had assembled. A letter from Sir John de Molyns requested that only eighty Welshmen from a levy of 200 drawn from North Wales, led by John Turberville and waiting to embark at Tilbury, be chosen. The letter appears to be a request for a warrant to allow the chamberlain of North Wales, John de Ellerker, the expenses incurred by the remainder of this levy.21 Those selected were to be paid one month’s wages in advance while those returning were to receive a ‘gift’ totalling £8 for their expenses. Turberville’s share of these wages equated to 6d. per day (14s. for the month), the rate paid to the vintenars and standard bearers of South Wales.22 John Ellerker, chamberlain of North Wales, however, was granted allowances against his accounts for the pay of all those troops sent to an unspecified destination on 28 August 1339, so the savings must have been limited.23 In the event, only around 800 Welshmen sailed with Edward III: fifty-one from Flintshire, 424 from North Wales, and between 374 and 463 from South Wales.24 Most of the men who sailed with Edward in May 1338 returned from Flanders by the end of February 1339. While the campaign was generally inconclusive, a campaign diary, apparently written by a soldier in the English army, provides an unusual record of the tactical use of Welsh soldiers; spearmen were used as protection for

  CPR 1338–1340, pp. 113, 118.   E.M. Thompson (ed.), Chronicon Angliae ab Anno Domini 1328 usque ad Annum 1388 auctore monacho quodam Sancti Albani (London, 1874), p. 7. 20   Treaty Rolls, nos. 892–896, pp. 317–20. 21   CCR 1339–41, p. 186. For the undated letter, see Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 192–3: the editor assigns it to 1338–43, coinciding with the terms during which John de Elleker held the office of chamberlain of North Wales. The entry in the close rolls clearly refers to the same occasion. Thus this letter should be dated to late August or early September 1339. 22   The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, ed. M. Lyon, B. Lyon, H.S. Lucas and J. de Sturler (Brussels, 1983), p. 361. 23  Fryde, Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls, no. 993, p. 111. 24  Lyon et al. (eds), The Wardrobe Book, pp. 360–1. 18

19

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the flanks of the archers. At Clairfontaine on 23 October 1339, ‘le roy … myst ses gents en arraie, les archiers a l’encoste des gentes d’armes, et les Galoys ove lour lances encoste eux’.25 From the survival of the pay accounts it can be shown that the two companies can have been no more than forty strong; only eighty Welshmen, possibly those selected at Tilbury, were in pay at the time. What this suggests is that Welsh skills with the spear were important to their commanders and that this was a skill not found amongst English county levies. A proposal for a campaign to Flanders in 1341 reveals details of Edward III’s military thinking and the value of different types of soldier. Although the campaign did not take place, the parlous state of English royal finances meant that the proposal was carefully budgeted.26 Its primary interest concerns the use of contracts and magnate retinues, but the army was intended to incorporate a number of novel ideas, including the use of heavily armed footmen, without any mounted archers. Two thousand of these, from a total army of 12,500, were to be Welshmen with lances, and these Welshmen, for forty days’ service, would cost £1,000, giving a rate of 3d. per day, the same as that proposed for the other archers in this army. This was the standard rate for archers serving overseas in 1338–40; archers still in England were paid 2d. per day.27 The experimental nature of these proposals hints at lessons learnt from the winter of 1338–39 in both financial planning and the value of Welsh spearmen in protecting the flanks of archers on the battlefield. By 1342 Edward III’s shortage of money was felt even in his own Welsh shires. Carmarthen and Cardigan had been farmed to Henry, earl of Derby, and the issues from the same counties granted to another member of Edward’s household, Sir Nigel de Loring. These grants left little money for the chamberlain, Thomas de Castle Goodrich, to pay levies recruited from South Wales for Edward’s campaign to Brittany in 1342. The writ ordering Thomas to pay 1,650 Welshmen and their leaders until their arrival at Winchelsea was answered by a letter requesting funds. The situation appears to have been resolved by a direct grant from the king, details of which are recorded in some detail in the chamberlain’s subsequent account.28 The array yielded only 819 archers with five constables and was supervised by Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain and Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd. Owain had, with Sir Philip Clanvowe, collected the subsidy of £321 8s. 5d. from the Wardrobe at Westminster, but, like Sir Rhys, he does not appear to have served on the expedition itself. The   ‘1339 Campaign Diary’, in Froissart, Oeuvres, volume XVIII, pp. 90–2, cited in Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 169–70. 26   M. Prestwich, ‘English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341’, BIHR 54 (1983), pp. 102–13. 27   This applied to English and Welsh alike; see the archers of John de Vere, earl of Oxford, serving between 25 March and 14 April 1340: Lyon et al.(eds), The Wardrobe Book, p. 362; and Welshmen under Gruffudd ap Madoc and Cynwrig ab Iorwerth, between 12 November and 27 November 1338: ibid., p. 361. 28   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 191; TNA SC 6/1221/4 m. 4. 25

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troops were led by Edmund Hakelut and Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Philip. The chamberlain’s account also includes the wages of the masters of five ships and 121 sailors, as part of the preparations for the campaign, presumably drawn from Welsh ports. This suggests that the men recruited from South Wales were, unusually, intended to complete much if not all of their journey by ship.29 Six hundred Welshmen under Hakelut were first wrecked by winter storms and then stranded for twenty days ‘for want of wind’ on the Scilly Isles. Hakelut can be found drawing pay for himself and his men in September. It seems likely this misfortune occurred on their return journey, possibly involving the same ships. This may not be a complete picture, as sixty-five archers who served under Madoc ap Hywel were finally paid for their service in Brittany in 1343.30 While men were also raised for the same campaign from North Wales, it seems that those from Anglesey and Merioneth never actually left England. They were not, as Ayton suggests, among the men stranded on the Scilly Isles since they are recorded separately in the Vadia Guerre account. Additional detail to that included in the main account, compiled by William de Farley, can be found in a separate account, compiled by John de Kermond, which covers the period 5–25 November.31 The men noted by Kermond almost certainly left royal pay at Plymouth. A third Vadia Guerre account records Cynwrig Ddu with three constables, a doctor, chaplain and proclamator leading 376 foot archers between 1 September and 17 December.32 This agrees with Kermond’s account which records Cynwrig Ddu of Anglesey with Gruffudd ab Iorwerth of Merioneth leading 180 archers and spearmen from each of the two counties. In addition to the usual provision of chaplains, standard bearers (vexillifer) and doctors provided by each county is an unusual figure explicitly called an interpreter (interperatore), apparently from Anglesey. This emphasises the need for reliable communication, and the interpreter’s importance is obvious, for he was paid 6d. per day, the same as the Welsh chaplains, presumably for the same reason, 2d. per day more than the vintenars, doctors and standard bearers.33 Crécy and Calais On 11 July 1346, the largest army ever to sail from England in the Middle Ages departed from Portsmouth. The unusual size of the army resulted from the

29   TNA SC 6/1221/4 m. 4. Dafydd also served as rhingyll of Caeo (Cantref Mawr, Carmarthenshire), 1332–3, Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 366. 30   In their time on the Scilly Isles they were alleged to have caused over £500 worth of damage. Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 101; CIPM II, p. 489; CPR 1343–45, p. 494; TNA E 403/326 m. 30; Madoc ap Hywel, etc., Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 260. 31  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 259–60; Kermond’s account is TNA E 101/23/22. 32   Edington’s account is TNA E 36/204. 33   TNA E 101/23/22 no. 1 m. 2.

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strategic aims of the campaign. The army had to be large enough to challenge Philip de Valois in the field without having to draw on expensively maintained and inconstant continental allies and mercenaries. Its exact size is, through the loss of the original pay accounts, a matter of some debate, most recently examined by Andrew Ayton and Clifford Rogers.34 The payroll for the campaign drawn up by Walter Wetwang survives only in a number of copies of various later dates which are not consistent with each other. Moreover, the parts which concern the Welsh infantry are, unsurprisingly, the very parts which have been reduced and simplified most severely in the copying. This brevity is compounded by the fact that the size and nature of the army changed significantly over the length of the campaign. Rogers suggests a larger figure, 15,250, of which 2,300 were Welsh (he describes them as spearmen). In the most recent estimate, Ayton suggests that there were no more than 9,000 arrayed troops, that is, infantry drawn from Wales and the English counties, with the king in July 1346. The quality of these troops cannot be determined as the demands were sufficiently great that a number of unsuitable men were selected; Henry of Lancaster was commissioned to pick out the ‘ailing and feeble’ from among the Welsh troops before they embarked.35 The writs of array intended that approximately 7,000 of a proposed total of 13,000 infantry were to be Welshmen, half archers and half armed with spears or lances.36 Of these, 3,550 were to be drawn from the lands of the prince of Wales – the royal shires and their dependent lordships – while the remainder were to be recruited from the March.37 Rogers suggests that the transcribed portions of Wetwang’s roll describe the size of forces at the start of the campaign, which gives a figure of 4,572 Welshmen. The amounts issued from the exchequer to the chamberlains of North and South Wales, £349 and £230 respectively, indicate that around 5,000 men, or around two-thirds of those initially sought, were recruited and set off from Wales towards Portsmouth.38 Some are known to have left the army without leave, an easier task when marching to the south coast of England than to the borders of Scotland. But the exact number of Welshmen who fought at Crécy alongside both the prince of Wales and, as Froissart recorded, the men of the prince’s duchy of Cornwall, is unknown. The figure suggested in Wetwang’s account is, if not wholly reliable, then certainly plausible.39

34  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 13–14, Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 217–72 and Appendix 1. A. Ayton and P. Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005). 35   TNA C 76/22 m. 22, cited by Hewitt, The Organisation of War, p. 37. 36  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 13. 37   Ayton and Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346, p. 181, n. 105. 38   Ibid., p. 181, and also Ayton, ‘The English Army and the Normandy Campaign of 1346’, in A. Curry and D. Bates (eds), England and Normandy in the Middle Ages (London, 1994), pp. 253–68. 39  Desertion: Reg. B.P. I, pp. 8–9. Froissart’s description, Froissart, Oeuvres, volume V, pp. 65–6; a translation can be found in Froissart, Chronicles, p. 93.

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Assuming that their dating is reliable, two anonymous letters go some way to explaining the shortfall. The troubles of Edward III’s finances had been overtaken by the inadequacies of the young prince’s administration which lent heavily on the uchelwyr. The first of these two letters, which can be dated to late April or early May 1346, relates to a commission for an unstated number of archers from parts of South Wales. This letter suggests that arrayed men had been waiting fifteen days for their payment. The second, referring to an unspecified number of men levied from ‘the addressees lordship of South Wales’ (the implication is that this letter was directed at the prince) and arrayed by Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain, Einion Fychan and Rhys Fychan, expresses concern, not just with payment, but also with leadership. In each case, it is likely that the unnamed author was Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd. It is certain that Sir Rhys served on the campaign – while in Normandy in 1346 he received a courser from the Black Prince as reward for his services and Iolo Goch mentions his skill at Crécy in an elegy following his death in 1356:40 Syrthio, anghlod swrth anghlaer, Syr Rhys aur yng ngwregys aer, Gwae a’I gweles yng Nghresi, Gŵr diwael mewn trafael tri, Dorgwn gyd, dau gyngyd Gai, Dewr loywfryd mewn dur lifrai The fall, heavy dark shame, Of golden Sir Rhys in his war belt. Woe to those who saw him in Crécy, A fine man like three in the fray, A pack of watchdogs, of the same spirit of Kay, Brave clear mind in steel livery.41

The role of the Welsh at the battle can be determined with surprising accuracy since Froissart included it in his chronicle. The Welsh and Cornish formed part of the Black Prince’s division, the prince was duke of Cornwall as well as prince of Wales and contributed to the rout of the French. Et lá entre ces Englés avoit et ribaus les gallois et cornillois, qui poursieuvoient gens d’armes et arciers, qui portient grandes coutilles, et venoient entre leurs gens d’armes et leurs arciers qui leur faisoient voie, et trouvoient ces gens d’armes en ce dangier, comtes, barons, chevaliers et escuires: si les occioient sans merci, commes grans sires qu’il fust. However, among the English there were pillagers and irregulars. Welsh and Cornishmen, armed with long knives, who went out after the French (their own men-at-arms and archers making way for them) and, when they found any in difficulty, whether they were counts, barons, knights of esquires, they killed them without mercy.42

  Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 236–7; Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 101.   From ‘Marwnad Syr Rhys ap Gruffudd o Lansadwrn/Elegy for Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd of Llansadwrn’, in Johnston, Iolo Goch: Poems, lines 5–10, pp. 26–7. 42  Froissart, Oeuvres, volume V, pp. 65–6; translation in Froissart, Chronicles, p. 93.

40 41

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The Siege of Calais The needs of Edward’s army changed over the course of the campaign. Following the victory at Crécy the requirement for troops became very different. The type of infantry that Wales could provide was entirely suited to siege operations in the vicinity of Calais.43 From the commencement of the campaign on 11 July 1346, to the capture of Caen on 26 July, the battle of Crécy on 26 August, and the eleven-month siege of Calais between 3 September 1346 and 4 August 1347, a total of 32,000 men were engaged at various times.44 Lambert’s analysis suggests that Edward’s army at Calais numbered no more than 5,000–6,000 over the winter of 1346–47. Disease played a part as an outbreak of dysentery during the winter caused a major loss of life among the English army.45 This presented a challenge to the English commanders even if the French were in a poor position to recruit an army to lift the siege. Urgent summonses were issued by the Black Prince and these included all the lands of Wales.46 The earl of Arundel summoned fifty-five mounted archers and forty-six foot archers to be arrayed at Oswestry prior to embarking at Dover for Calais. It is interesting to note that Arundel’s lordships had provided eighty-seven mounted archers to serve in Scotland in 1335. Whether this is a reflection of horse-breeding within the lordship or of the relative affluence of Chirk is impossible to gauge. If, however, this was in answer to the summons issued 6 March 1347, it was woefully short of the 240 requested from his lordships.47 Elsewhere in Wales, large numbers of reinforcements were summoned for the siege, including 200 raised from Flintshire under Gruffudd ab Iorwerth ap Meilyr and 100 under Rhys ap Roppert. As ever, it is unclear how many actually answered the summons or served at the siege, although Welshmen often feature among the pardons granted subsequently.48 In September 1346 – a month after Crécy – in the commotes of Twrcelyn and Talybolion, Anglesey, thirty of the thirty-five townships were indicted and fined a shilling each at the great tourn of the sheriff for non-payment of ‘army money’. One, Bodeon in Malltraeth, was fined 2s. for not appearing at the muster held at Conwy.49 The communal element of the resulting army is apparent. While the implication is that each township should send an individual to

  For the massive logistical operation involved, see C.L. Lambert, ‘Edward III’s Siege of Calais: A Reappraisal’, JMH 37 (2011), pp. 245–56. 44   Ayton and Preston, The Battle of Crécy, 1346, Appendix 1, pp. 230–51. 45   Lambert, ‘Edward III’s Siege of Calais’, pp. 252–6. 46   Reg. B.P. II, p. 49. 47   NLW Chirk Castle Collection, D.9–D.14. cited in Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 82; Reg. B.P. I, p. 56. 48   Reg. B.P. I, pp. 14, 49. For other reinforcements summoned from the principality, ibid., pp. 7, 13–14, 32, 49–53, 55–6, 63, 78. For Rhys ap Roppert, see A.D. Carr, ‘Rees ap Roppert’, Transactions of the Denbighshire Historical Society 25 (1976), pp. 155–70. 49   Jones, ‘Anglesey Court Rolls’, pp. 33–49. 43

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the muster (the resulting army being selected from those who appeared), it seems that this was the minimum requirement. The surrender of Calais on 1 August 1347 was arguably a greater victory than Crécy and the scale of the achievement was appreciated in Wales. Iolo Goch, itemising Edward III’s achievements, recorded the capture of the Scottish king at Neville’s Cross, but gave precedence to events in France in the same period. Gelyn fuost i’r Galais O gael y dref, golau drais; Grasus dy hynt i’r Gresi, Gras teg i gan Grist i ti; Llithio dy fyddin, lin lem Frain byw, ar frenin Böem; Pergyl fu i byrth Paris Trwst y gad lle trewaist giis; Ehedy, mor hy ydwyd, Hyd y nef, ehedyn wyd. You were an enemy to Calais By taking the town, splendid force; Gracious was your progress towards Crécy, You have fair grace from Christ; You fed your army, cruel battle line, Human crows, on the king of Bohemia; A danger to the gates of Paris Was the noise of battle where you struck a blow; You will fly, you are so bold, As far as heaven, you are a bird.50

The significance of the siege and the value of the town can also be seen in the poetry of Dafydd ap Gwilym, who used the strength of walls of Calais as a metaphor in his love poetry. Although the solid strength of castle walls – and French ones too – are not unknown in later Welsh verse, the mention of Calais is significant.51 Ef a roes Duw, nawddfoes nawd, Gaer i’m cadw, gwiwrym ceudawd, Cystal, rhag ofn dial dyn, Â’r Galais rhag ei elyn. God, whose way is to protect, has granted a fortress to defend me – the heart’s fine power,

 Johnston, Iolo Goch: Poems, ‘I’r Brenin Edward y Trydydd/To King Edward III’, lines 37–46, pp. 2–5. 51   For poetic references to castles within Wales, D. Foster Evans, ‘Twr Dewr Gwyncwerwr (A Brave Conqueror’s Tower): Welsh Poetic Responses to the Edwardian Castles’, in D. Williams and J. Kenyon (eds), The Impact of the Edwardian Castles in Wales: Proceedings of a Conference held in Bangor 7–9 September 2007 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 121–8. 50

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The Black Prince’s Chevauchée and the Battle of Poitiers, 1355–56 Prompted by internal political tension in France between Jean II and Charles of Navarre, the Black Prince’s expedition to Gascony, begun in 1355, was intended to bolster the English position in Gascony by mounting a chevauchée through central France. A second force under Henry, duke of Lancaster, acting in concert with Charles of Navarre in Normandy, was disrupted by the latter changing his mind, while a third, in Picardy, under the king himself, was abandoned after the adoption of a scorched-earth policy by Jean II in Picardy and the capture of Berwick by the Scots. Berwick’s capture necessitated a campaign which drew upon Welsh resources, albeit in relatively small numbers. On 26 November, the chamberlain of North Wales was ordered to array 160 spearmen also armed with swords to be at Newcastle by Christmas Day, with a further 460 spearmen (ad lanceas) from the Marcher liberties.53 In 1355, Prince Edward drew archers from Cheshire, Flintshire and the prince’s shires of North Wales, all part of his own demesne.54 All his archers, English and Welsh, were provided with a green and white uniform as the prince’s archers had been in earlier campaigns. The whole force was meant to arrive in Plymouth by mid-July. The array was for 300 archers from Cheshire, 100 from Flintshire and 140 from North Wales. The men of North Wales were paid from the revenues of the chamberlain of North Wales, as was the newly dubbed knight, Sir Hywel ap Gruffudd. The men of North Wales were led by Goronwy ap Gruffudd, those of Flint by Dafydd ap Bleddyn Fychan and each was paid 1s. per day, while their seven vintenars and their chaplain were paid 6d. per day.55 The Black Prince’s Welsh archers, expected to serve on foot, were paid only half this amount. Here can be seen an interesting discrepancy; the mounted men of Flint and Cheshire were paid for twenty-one days in advance to cover their journey to the south coast, but the men of North Wales were allowed only ten days for a longer journey on foot.56 On arrival at Plymouth, thirty-four of the Welsh archers were found to have deserted, fourteen from North Wales, a tenth of those mustered, and  ‘Caer Rhag Cenfigen/A Fortress against Envy’, www.dafyddapgwilym.net, poem 122, lines 17–20.   Reg. B.P. III, p. 491, Rot. Scotiae, I, pp. 784–6. 54  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, Appendix C, provides a useful gazetteer of those named individuals known to have served between 1355 and 1357. This amounts to some 890 individuals, 140 or so from Cheshire. In contrast, only seven men in this list can be positively identified as Welsh, though Hewitt notes that this list is incomplete. 55   Both appear to have been esquires, paid an annuity of £5 in addition to their wages, see Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, p. 62. 56   Reg. B.P. III, p. 224. 52 53

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twenty, a fifth of their contribution, from Flint, while a further nine men were found to be too ill for further service and were sent home. The total that actually sailed for France, therefore, was just under 200. The deserters are listed by name, with their origin, whether North Wales, Flint or Cheshire.57 Rather than giving an indistinct injunction to the sheriff or justiciar to pursue deserters, as found in earlier campaigns, these men were to be pursued and punished individually, a reflection of the greatly reduced numbers and tighter administration from the armies of Edward I’s day. Their names are revealing of both English influence and settlement in the north of Wales. The majority are typically and recognisably ‘pure’ Welsh in origin. Others, such as Bleddyn Arow, reveal English influence, while John Steel appears to be something of a rarity, an Englishman serving in a Welsh levy. While Englishmen had often led Welsh soldiers, this is a rare instance of one serving with his Welsh neighbours.58 Traces of this campaign may be found in the verse of Dafydd ap Gwilym, who at first weeps crocodile tears at not going with Rhys, his kinsman but, with Rhys more pertinently, was the husband of a woman he professed to love, on a ‘Gascon mare’ (a Gascon ship). Since the deployment of Welshmen – or even English infantry in any quantity – to Gascony was relatively unusual, we can discount the suggestion of Ifor Williams that this poem referred to 1346 or that of Theodore Chotzen that it was simply metaphorical. The campaign of 1355 seems by far the most likely option.59 Od â â’i enaid, baid banw, I’r lwydlong wyllt ar lidlanw, Llonydd ni hir gydfydd hi, Llun ei hwyl yn llawn heli. Gwisg ei phen fo’r ffrwd wen wawl, Gwasgwynes y gwaisg ganawl. Ni cherdda, ni hwylia hi, Trychwanddyn, a’r trwch ynddi. If he, a woman’s hindrance, Gets into the wild grey ship alive on a vicious tide, She won’t stay calm for long, [with] the shape of her sail filled with brine. May her head-dress be the gleaming white current, Gascon mare of the fair channel She will not travel, she will not sail, Hole-riddled girl, whilst that scoundrel is inside her.60

  An order was sent out to John de Delves, lieutenant of the justiciar of North Wales, naming them and ordering the seizure of their lands, Reg. B.P. III, p. 215. Of those invalided home, five were from North Wales and the remainder from Flintshire: ibid., p. 216. 58   Reg. B.P. III, pp. 215–16. 59   I. Williams, Detholion o Gwyddau Dafydd ap Gwilym, p. 156, cited by Chotzen, Recherches, p. 127 60   ‘I Ddymuno Lladd y Gŵr Eiddig/To wish the jealous husband killed’, www.dafyddapgwilym. net, poem 116, lines 23–30.

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Edward’s army of 2,200 arrived in Bordeaux in September 1355 and conducted a low-risk, and extremely profitable, chevauchée along the foothills of the Pyrenees almost as far as the Mediterranean. Once in France, the Welsh archers were supplied with horses – there are payments made for shoeing in Bordeaux on their return from the prince’s first raid. Since these archers would only have been able to provide relatively poor-quality horses from their own resources, it was deemed more prudent to procure suitable mounts in Gascony and to save money on the costs of shipping. It also shows that foot soldiers had no place on a chevauchée.61 It appears that many of the Welshmen who arrived at Plymouth either never made the crossing or were detached from the army shortly after its arrival. Goronwy ap Gruffudd drew pay for only sixty men, and the leader of the men of Flint, David ap Bleddyn Fychan, thirty men. The chaplain of the men of North Wales is not accounted for, though a chaplain from Flint was. Evans suggests that the remaining Welshmen may have been allocated as personal retinues of the Welsh knights, though he presents no evidence for this.62 Once abroad, we hear little of the service of the Welsh, but something of their drinking, which caused the Black Prince’s controller to pay £11 5s. to the townspeople of Castets-en-Dorthe in Gironde ‘in recompense for damage done to the same by various Welshmen and other retainers of the prince’.63 This payment was made in addition to the cost of 78s. 6d. for the four pipes of wine which occasioned the damage. Despite this behaviour, many of the Welsh soldiers received favour in the form of pardons for felonies, including robbery and murder. Dafydd ap Bleddyn Fychan received rewards in kind, in the form of legal assistance and three oaks from the prince’s woods at Ewloe for the rebuilding of his houses which, in his absence, had been destroyed by fire.64 On 18 June 1356, Lancaster landed at Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue in the Cotentin peninsula to join with Charles of Navarre’s brother, Philip, and Breton forces. Their chevauchée through lower Normandy was successful in terms of pillage, but failed to join with the army of the Black Prince which had overwintered in Bordeaux. Consequently, the prince’s English and Welsh army, reinforced by nearly 5,000 Gascons, left Bordeaux on 8 July and had launched a second chevauchée as far north as Tours on the Loire. The path of the prince’s retreat, however, was blocked by Jean II with an army of 10,000 men. The resulting battle at Poitiers on 19 September was one of the great chivalric episodes of the entire Hundred Years War. Its conclusion, the capture of Jean II, was the most significant military coup

  Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, p. 62.   Ibid., pp. 63–4. 63   This must have occurred on the night of 6 October 1355 as they arrived on that day and the payment is dated 7 October. Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 62–5. 64   Reg. B P. III, p. 259. This was one of four recorded gifts in 1356. All but one (to the town of Flint for repair of its church) were to men who had served the Prince in the Gascon campaign: ibid., pp. 279, 308, 426. 61

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of Edward III’s reign and of the Black Prince’s career. The influence of the prince’s Welsh soldiers at Poitiers is impossible to trace since the narrative accounts have relatively little regard for the role of archers at all, never mind Welsh ones. While little is known about the archers, the most notable Welshmen to serve with the Black Prince in 1355–36 were both descendants of the line of Ednyfed Fychan; Sir Hywel ap Gruffudd, Syr Hywel Y Fwyall’ (‘Sir Hywel of the Axe’) of Chwilog, Eifionydd (Merioneth) and Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II, son of the Cardiganshire potentate of the same name. The latter’s rewards were handsome. He was knighted on his return from France and acquired a valuable prisoner at Poitiers, Florimond de Sully.65 This was certainly the finest achievement of his career. It is Sir Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Hywel who became identified with the battle, however and his battleaxe later assumed quasi-mythic status. According to a note in BL Add. MS 14866, in the hand of David Johns (1586–87), it was apparently granted a place at Windsor and a portion of food daily which was distributed to the poor. The story should be treated with some caution since it does not, for example, occur in the elegies composed shortly after Sir Hywel’s death by Gruffudd ap Maredudd and Rhisierdyn. It is also absent in the praise Sir Hywel received, late in life, when constable of Cricieth Castle, by Iolo Goch. It was a version of this poem that David Johns’s manuscript records.66 In fact, among this praise, only Iolo Goch actually mentioned Poitiers at all – ‘Pan rodded, twsged rhwysgainc, Y ffrwyn ym mhen brenin Ffrainc’ (When the bridle, harsh gift on a binding rope, was put on the French king’s head).67 Sir Hywel’s axe and its place at Windsor appears to have been well known by the fifteenth century however. A poem by Guto’r Glyn to Sieffrai (Geoffrey) Cyffin of Oswestry and his wife Siân uses it as a device to praise the lavishness of a feast they provided. Fal Hywel yn rhyfelu, Felly ’dd wyf, â’r fwyall ddu, A gâi unsaig o Winsawr Ac arall i’r fwyall fawr.

65  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition of 1355–1357 (Manchester, 1958), pp. 15–18, also Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, p. 62. They were each paid different amounts, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, 40 marks, and Sir Hywel ap Gruffudd, £20. For the knighting of Rhys ap Gruffudd II: CCR 1354–60, p. 529; for further details of his lands and career: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 262–3. 66   My thanks to Jenny Day for this detail. A. Parry Owen (ed.), Gwaith Gruffudd ap Maredudd, volume III (Aberystwyth, 2007), p. 136; Johnston (ed.), Gwaith Iolo Goch, p. 185, idem, Iolo Goch: Poems, pp. 158–9, Nerys Ann Jones and Erwain Haf Rheinallt (eds), Gwaith Sefnyn, Rhisierdyn, Gruffudd Fychan ab Gruffudd ab Ednyfed a Llywarch Bentwarch (Aberystwyth, 1995), ‘Marwnad Hywel ap Gruffudd o Eifionydd’, pp. 69–73, 99. See also Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years War’, pp. 29–30. 67  Johnston, Iolo Goch: Poems, ‘I Syr Hywel y Fwyall, Cwnstabl Castell Cricieth/To Sir Hywel of the Axe, Constable of Cricieth Castle’, lines 61–2, pp. 8–9.

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the wars of edward iii Like Hywel waging war with the black axe, so am I, who received one dish from Windsor and another dish for the great axe.68

The Reims Expedition 1359 Whether or not Edward III had intended to claim the throne of France before 1356, the capture of Jean II at Poitiers gave Edward an opportunity for negotiation over the state of Gascony and other English holdings in France. When these negotiations failed, he launched another invasion. The army Edward assembled was brought together with the specific aim of taking the Crown of France at Reims. The composition of this powerful army, intent on symbolic conquest, reflected the declining role of the foot soldier. The initial recruitment target for the Welsh shires was just 2,600, later falling to 1,000. Another 9,000 men were raised from the English counties, alongside 4,000 men-at-arms and 5,000 mounted archers. Although many of the Welsh and English foot soldiers arrived in France, most left royal pay and presumably returned home within a few days of the start of the expedition. Sir Hywel ap Gruffudd was commissioned to attend the prince of Wales, commanding fifty ‘of the best archers in North Wales’ to join the prince at Sandwich.69 The force, of whom forty were to be spearmen, was to be led by Gruffudd ap Madoc Gloddaith (d. c. 1400).70 They were ordered to be at Northbourne, near Deal, Kent, by 30 May.71 In addition to these men recruited from the royal shires, the retinue of Henry, duke of Lancaster, contained 100 Welsh foot soldiers, presumably from his Marcher lordships of Kidwelly or Iscennen in south-west Wales. The pay accounts surviving for the prince of Wales, however, make no mention of any Welsh soldiers.

68   ‘Moliant i Sieffrai Cyffin ap Morus o Groesoswallt a’i wraig, Siân ferch Lawrence Stanstry/Praise to Geoffrey Cyffin ap Morus of Oswestry and his wife, Siân daughter of Lawrence Stanstry’, http:// gutorglyn.net, poem 97, lines 41–4; Johnston, Iolo Goch: Poems, ‘I Syr Hywel y Fwyall, Cwnstabl Castell Cricieth/To Sir Sir Hywel of the Axe, Constable of the Castle of Cricieth’, pp. 6–9; Parry Owen (ed.), Gwaith Gruffudd ap Maredudd, III, ‘Marwnad Syr Hywel y Fwyall o Eifionydd/Elegy to Sir Hwel of the Axe of Eifionydd’, pp. 76–81 and Jones and Rheinallt (eds), Gwaith Sefnyn et al., ‘Marwnad Hywel ap Gruffudd o Eifionydd/Elegy to Hywel ap Gruffudd of Eifionydd’, pp. 65–73, by Rhisierdyn. Other, later, references to Sir Hywel’s axe are found in poems by Lewys Glyn Cothi and Syr Dafydd Trefor (fl. c.1460–c.1528): Johnston (ed.), Gwaith Lewys Glyn Cothi, ‘Moliant Siôn ap Tomas/Praise to Siôn ap Tomas’, lines 31–2 on p. 66 and R. Ifans (ed.), Gwaith Syr Dafydd Trefor (Aberystwyth, 2005), poem 16, ‘I Ddangos Fyrred Oes Dyn/To Show the Brevity of Man’s Life’, lines 31–2 on p. 84. Fulll range for the poem, pp. 84–96. 69   Reg. B.P. III, pp. 347. 70   Madoc Gloddaith (d. c. 1358) was a son-in-law of Sir Gruffudd Llwyd. For Gruffudd’s administrative career, see A.D. Carr, ‘The Mostyn Family and Estate, 1200–1642’ (unpublished PhD, University of Wales Bangor, 1976), pp. 126–30. This appears to be the only reference to his military service. 71   Reg. B.P. III, pp. 347, 349–51, 355.

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Though such a levy was raised for this campaign, their service was very short.72 For example, 920 Welsh foot soldiers served under Owen Charlton from 23 September to 9 November when more than half left royal pay. The 420 who remained served only until 27 January 1360. This reflects a wider pattern, since men of the English shire levies also stayed with the army for only a short period; most were released from service relatively quickly. That said, the Welsh foot were paid only 2d. per day while members of the levies from the English counties received 6d. The differential in pay presumably reflected better equipment and possibly the provision of horses. These men appear to have left pay earlier than those of North Wales.73 That the men were recruited in the first place suggests some indecision on Edward’s part, or perhaps the expectation of greater opposition in the initial stages of the campaign. The number of Welsh soldiers raised was minimal and reduced still further by the fact that the earl of Arundel’s retinue, which might have been expected to include men from his substantial Marcher estates, does not appear to have left England at all.74 Some of the Marcher lords took financial advantage of the situation and twenty-nine men paid fines in order to be excused service in the army of the lord of Dyffryn Clwyd (Grey of Ruthin), yielding £12 8s. 4d.75 A rare account of Welshmen serving on campaign is provided by Sir Thomas Gray, a member of the prince of Wales’s retinue, in his Scalacronica. It provides a remarkably detailed account of Welsh archers from Glamorgan in the latter stages of the 1359 campaign. Some men-at-arms, knights and squires with eight Welsh archers, of the Lord Despenser’s retinue had a fine fight in the Beauce, when the king’s army was quartered in villages. They were away from the army, near to Bonneval, guarding the millers in a mill to get some grain milled; they were spotted by the French garrisons round about, who came to attack them with twenty-six billmen and twelve archers, French Bretons. Both sides dismounted on foot and fought each other boldly; the French were defeated, three of their men-at-arms killed and twenty taken prisoner, and everyone on both sides was wounded near to death. Some of the English were put on their faith to the enemy during the mêlée, and were rescued by the Welsh, who did very well there.76

The nationality of the archers concerned is an incidental detail, but in the context of this campaign, an important one. These archers, almost certainly drawn

 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 10–11.   TNA E 101/393/11, fol. 116r. 74  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, p. 10 n. 4. 75   TNA SC 2/218/7, m. 30. 76   Scalacronica 1272–1363, ed. A. King, Surtees Society 209 (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 185. In this instance, the English who were ‘put on their faith’ had surrendered and allowed themselves to be taken for ransom, despite being rescued; the rules of chivalry obliged them to pay their captors. I would like to thank Andy King for these references in the Scalacronica: these are the only mentions of Welsh involvement in this text. 72 73

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from Despenser’s lordship of Glamorgan, were part of his regular retinue serving as mounted archers rather than part of a royal levy of foot soldiers. In other words, the Welshmen described in the Scalacronica were archers who happened to be Welsh and nothing more. The mention that these Welshmen were attached to a seigneurial retinue underlines an important point. Too often there is an assumption, which is implicit in the original documents only to a limited degree, that the only Welshmen present on the campaigns of this period were those summoned by commission of array. This notion has been perpetuated to a great extent by much of the secondary literature, as if the Welsh only provided a specific type of soldier. In part this is a function of the lack of information available on the make-up of many of the retinues which would, like Despenser’s, have included Welshmen from amongst their tenants. Conclusions Edward’s campaign of 1359–60 failed in its primary objective: Reims was not captured and Edward’s army suffered a long, hungry winter. By the time Edward and the representatives of the Dauphin came to negotiate terms at Brétigny in the summer of 1360, the English were in no position to fight. That said, English armies had changed substantially since Edward III had become king. English troops were routinely mounted, and the ‘mixed retinue’, which combined archers and men-at-arms, was becoming the norm. The ability of traditional mechanisms of recruitment and organisation to provide this sort of army was limited, as was the capacity of the Welsh economy to provide these better-equipped soldiers in quantity. Conducting wars overseas required English forces to be mounted. Although the relative strategies of English and French kings in the first phase of the Anglo-French conflict in the fourteenth century have been extensively debated, the differences between the army that fought at Crécy and that which invaded in 1359 are as striking to us now as they were to contemporaries. Edward’s army in 1346 could find a place for Welsh archers and spearmen fighting and travelling on foot. This was both a strategic decision – to draw the French on the battle – and a sensible tactical choice: these Welsh foot soldiers were among Edward’s most experienced and reliable soldiers. In 1359, Edward III’s intention was to capture, and be crowned at, Reims; any chance of success would be hampered by large numbers of slow-moving foot soldiers. This may have been a lesson taught by the long chevauchée of 1346. No matter how useful foot soldiers might have been in a siege, such as that at Reims, they presented commanders with the difficulty of getting them there in the first place. The chevauchée, the mounted raid, became the defining English tactic in France, but, as we shall see in the next chapter, it was not universal. While the role of the foot soldier, and mass Welsh participation in English armies, were in decline, the importance of English wars for the self-­ perception and social importance of the Welsh uchelwyr increased. The changing

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attitudes emerged in the poetry praising them and their activity (it is impossible to imagine a Welsh poet writing praise for an English king before Edward III). Unlike the Scottish wars of Edward I and Edward II, in the French wars of Edward III it is possible to gauge some sense of collective belonging within the English realm and military organisation from surviving literary evidence. Though there were challenges to this in later decades, the value of this praise poetry to the historian in understanding attitudes to England’s wars among the Welsh secular elite should not be underestimated. The prevalence of military metaphors and specific references to Calais, Gascony or even Gwladoedd Ddolfin (the Dauphin’s lands), in relation to France following the capture of Jean II, reflect a clear understanding not only of English, but also French politics.77

  Jones and Rheinallt (eds), Gwaith Sefnyn et al., ‘Marwnad Hywel ap Gruffudd o Eifionydd’ by Rhisierdyn, line 78, p. 73; the notes, p. 104, provide further references to this phrase and the Dauphin in the works of other poets.

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4

Before Glyndŵr: 1360–1400

Welsh historians have tended to view the second half of the fourteenth century in the context of two attempts at Welsh self-determination. These were the claims of the last descendant of the princes of Gwynedd, Owain Lawgoch (d. 1378), to be prince of Wales and then later, the rebellion led by Owain Glyndŵr in pursuit of the same title during the first decade of the fifteenth century. The one was concentrated in France and attracted a sympathetic response in Wales and from Welshmen seeking service against the English in France. The other was a revolt fomented among men who had made their careers as soldiers and administrators of the English Crown. War determined the pattern of relationships between Welsh and English because, between 1360 and 1400, there was scarcely a year that did not witness some military engagement or defensive activity. That said, foreign expeditions led by the king in person were relatively unusual. There were none, for example, between 1359 and 1385. There was a further gap then to 1394 and no more before Richard II’s fateful campaign to Ireland in 1399. The Irish campaigns marked a return of war to the lands of Wales in that they offered a departure point. Richard II was the first English king to visit Ireland since John campaigned there in 1210. This chapter begins in the years after the Anglo-French peace settlement in 1360. English soldiers continued to have a presence in France and the first fruits of the ideas of national self-determination that bloomed under Owain Glyndŵr were harvested under the leadership of the last descendant, in the male line, of the princes of Gwynedd. The leadership of Owain Lawgoch (Owain of the Red Hand) meant that Welshmen served on both sides after the failure of the Brétigny settlement. The records available to us also reveal that Welshmen played their part in conflict at sea and in Iberia, Scotland and Ireland. In this period, the military aspect of Marcher lordship expressed itself as forcefully as before, but, in common with the scale of armies after 1359, the scale of Welsh involvement was much reduced. The general experience of those living in the principality of Wales and the March was a peaceful one, although significant tensions

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lay beneath the surface. Peace and stability, combined with proactive management, meant that Marcher revenues greatly increased in the second half of the fourteenth century. Marcher lords, however, became rarer visitors to their lordships and several of the great Marcher estates, notably the earldom of March, were blighted by minorities. Welshmen served in relatively small numbers in the retinues of English lords, alongside the latters’ English tenants and generally under English captains. There were few prominent Welsh soldiers before 1399, though a great many more emerged in the course of the rebellion and its aftermath. Inevitably, the character of these men tends to be viewed through the prism of the Glyndŵr rebellion, making the routine activities of the generation of Welsh soldiers which preceded it the most neglected of the period discussed in this book. The death of Edward, prince of Wales, in 1376 and the youth of Richard II on his accession, coupled with the loss of many of the records relating to military activity in Gascony, mean that we know relatively little about the military careers of important Welshmen. The fine alabaster tomb made for Goronwy ap Tudur of Penmynydd, Anglesey (d. 1382) and his wife speaks of a man of wealth and influence. The elegies composed immediately after Goronwy’s death by drowning in Kent on his return from Iberia describe a martial reputation which might be taken for hyperbole had Goronwy not been granted the rare honour, for a Welshman, of the office of constable of Beaumaris on 18 March 1382, four days before his death. The administrative records of war can shed almost no light on how Goronwy, his brothers and sons, risked their lives for the English Crown.1 Where muster records do exist it is possible to analyse Welsh involvement in any given army on a microscopic level and to follow the career of individuals or families minutely. The Resumption of the War in France The collapse of the settlement agreed at Brétigny came swiftly in the early months of 1369. A French army invaded Gascony from the east, compelling the Rouergue and much of Quercy to submit by mid-March. On 29 April, French forces entered Abbeville on the Somme, the capital of Edward III’s county of Ponthieu, and overran the remainder of the county within a week. On 9 May, Charles V, addressing the Paris Parlement, formally renewed the war against England. Two days later, Edward III restored the arms of France to those of England on his great seal and the peace was forgotten.2

  Much of the information regarding the careers of individual soldiers and campaigns deriving from muster and retinue rolls as well as that from enrolled letters of protection in the treaty rolls, and the Gascon and Scottish rolls from the period after 1369 is taken from the AHRC funded ‘Soldier in Later Medieval England’ project.   2   J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War, volume 2: Trial by Fire (London, 1992), pp. 581–5.   1

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The English military response was swift. The first major expedition to France following the resumption of the war was led by John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, who indentured to serve for six months with 499 men-at-arms, 1,000 archers and 300 lances, and bowmen from Wales. These must have been drawn from his Marcher lordships: Monmouth and Three Castles, Iscennen and Cydweli. Landing at Calais at the beginning of August, Gaunt led a chevauchée through Artois and Picardy but gained little of substance. Gaunt was accompanied by the earl of Hereford who received prests (payments) for 300 men-at-arms and 600 archers, bringing the total size of the army to over 3,000 men. If the evidence of Hereford’s retinues for the naval expedition of 1371 and 1372 are to provide any guide, some of Hereford’s archers would have been drawn from his estates in south-east Wales.3 In early September, a second army of around 2,000 men landed at Calais under the earls of Warwick, March, Salisbury and Oxford. No musters survive for this force, though the experienced commanders, Warwick who held Gower, and Salisbury who held Denbigh, Hawarden and Moldsdale, are more likely to have recruited from their Welsh estates than the seventeen-year-old earl of March who had yet to gain control of his estates. Lord Grey of Ruthin, veteran of Crécy, served with this army accompanied by a retinue of twenty-nine men-at-arms, sixty archers and 100 Welshmen from his lordship of Dyffryn Clwyd.4 Stafford also participated in the chevauchée: it is likely that he recruited from his lordship of Gwynllŵg as he had done earlier in the decade. Gaunt’s chevauchée succeeded in postponing any possibility of a French attack on England in the summer of 1369 but by December a fleet and an army commanded by Owain Lawgoch had been assembled on the Seine between Rouen and Harfleur. Owain, active as a routier in the 1360s, had been an adherent of the French since 1369.5 As last surviving male heir to the princely line of Gwynedd, and with the support of Charles V, Owain sailed from Harfleur just before Christmas 1369 with the apparent objective of making a landing in Wales.6 After only ten or twelve days at sea, he was defeated by the weather. His abortive invasion plans must have been well known in England; orders to the prince of Wales, John of Gaunt, and other Marcher lords to arrange for the defence of their lands in Wales were made on 10

  The fullest account of this campaign is J.W. Sherborne, ‘John of Gaunt, Edward III’s Retinue and the French Campaign of 1369’, in Kings and Nobles in the Later Middle Ages: A Tribute to Charles Ross, ed. R.A. Griffiths and J.W. Sherborne (Gloucester, 1986), pp. 41–61. See also Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France’, p. 3.   4   Sherborne, ‘John of Gaunt’, pp. 48–9.   5   Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, or Owain Lawgoch, despite his claims, had the upbringing of a Surrey squire and the career of a routier before the resumption of the war. He attracted a significant number of Welshmen to serve with him in France: M.P. Siddons, ‘Welshmen in the Service of France’, BBCS 36 (1989), pp. 161–84; Carr, Owen of Wales.   6   A.D. Carr, ‘Owen of Wales [Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri] (d. 1378)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 21 October 2014.   3

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November and again on 24 December.7 Threats of invasion were nothing new in Wales, but Owain’s claim to the title and dignity of prince of Wales posed a serious symbolic threat, the more so since it was exploited keenly by Charles V. Moreover, judicial records suggest that a successful landing on the Welsh coast might have elicited substantial support. In the same year, for example, an Anglesey man was declared a ‘traitor and enemy of the lord prince’ for his support of Owain.8 Owain returned to France following the failure of this expedition and was among the French forces who defeated the English expedition to France that departed in the summer of 1370. The commander of this expedition was the Cheshire knight, Sir Robert Knolles, a man who had gained his experience as a routier and who had, with Sir Hugh Calverley, participated in the celebrated Combat des Trente, when thirty English and Breton knights had fought and lost a set-piece combat against thirty French and Breton knights near Ploërmel, Brittany, in 1351. In 1370, the original intention seems to have been to give Knolles sole charge of a force to invade Normandy with the support of Charles II of Navarre. By 20 June, when indentures were eventually sealed, Knolles was joined by three associate commanders, Sir Alan Buxhill, Sir Thomas Grandison and Sir Thomas Bourchier. The appointment of a commander who had risen by his ability rather than by noble birth caused difficulties from the start, and despite some initial success, the chevauchée was a fiasco. The campaign ended in open dissent with Knolles unable to enforce his will. Knolles’s indenture specified a force of 2,000 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers and while an incomplete retinue list survives, this details only 1,416 men-at-arms and 1,512 archers. None of those named in these lists appear to be Welsh, although the enrolled protections reveal that Knolles’s Cheshire connections extended into Flintshire, since six of the seven Welshmen known to have participated appear to have originated there. The seventh, Dafydd ap Meuric, served among the powerful retinue of 199 men-at-arms and 300 archers of the Gloucestershire knight, Sir John Minsterworth. We do not have a muster roll for Minsterworth’s company, but it is likely that more Welshmen served under him since he held land in the lordship of Usk. Minsterworth was among those who led the rebellion against Knolles’s command and he too later entered French service and was eventually executed as a supporter of Owain Lawgoch.9 Knolles’s army landed at Calais and proceeded   CCR 1369–74, pp. 61–2, 158.   Record of Caernarvon, p. 133; Carr, Owen of Wales, p. 25.   9   Of the 978 letters of protections enrolled in the treaty rolls for this year, 755 appear to relate to Knolles’s expedition. For Minsterworth’s lands in Usk, CFR 1369–77, p. 232; CIPM III 1348–77, no. 885. By the fifteenth century, Minsterworth was part of the Duchy of Lancaster: VCH Gloucestershire XIII (draft): www.victoriacountyhistory.ac.uk/counties/gloucestershire/work-in-progress/minsterworth, accessed 12 June 2014. Bleddyn ap Daffydd of Northhope, Flintshire; Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Fychan; Edward ap Bleddyn of Wepre, Flintshire; Dafydd ap Meuric; Dafydd ap Llywelyn of ‘Merton’ (possibly Mostyn) and Ieuan ab Ieuan ‘Waspur’, probably also of Wepre, Flintshire: TNA   7   8

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through Artois and Vermandoais to Laon and Reims, pursued by Charles V’s newly appointed constable, Bertrand du Guesclin. Knolles also received support from the prince of Wales. The Flintshire knight, Sir Gregory Sais, was among the company of Sir John Chandos who reinforced Knolles’s army. Both Knolles and Chandos were subsequently recalled by the prince to campaign in Anjou and the Touraine.10 Owain Lawgoch was involved in Knolles’s defeat: Du Guesclin left Owain and his lieutenant, Ieuan Wyn, to defend the French gains at Saumur on the Loire.11 After two years of inconclusive naval action, the next major land campaign to France was launched in the summer of 1372. This was the last occasion on which Edward III intended to lead an expeditionary army in person and preparations began early in the year. Numerous indentures of service were entered into on 24 and 25 February and, by the end of March, instalments of wages had been paid for one year to approximately 4,000 soldiers. Indecision on the part of the king resulted in men assembled at Southampton in May receiving instructions to remain there until the end of June. By 10 July, the plans were hurriedly changed in response to threats of French landings on the south coast and news of the defeat of John Hastings, earl of Pembroke, by a Castilian fleet off La Rochelle on 22 June. The capture of the unfortunate earl led to a meeting with Owain Lawgoch at Santander. Froissart’s chronicle suggests that at this meeting, Owain demanded homage for the earl’s Welsh lands.12 Eventually, over 6,000 troops converged on Sandwich and Winchelsea, but the expedition achieved nothing since it never left England.13 Among the lords who had contracted to serve with the king were several with Welsh estates: Edmund Mortimer, the earl of March, John Charlton III, lord of Powys, and Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford. Retinue lists survive for the latter two. Charlton’s is of special interest as he was only an occasional soldier, unlike his warlike grandfather. His retinue, unlike that of the earl of Hereford, contains a substantial number drawn from his Welsh tenants, Welshmen from within his own household and many from his Shropshire estates.14 At the very time Edward III had planned to launch this expedition, a distraction with more significant and dangerous Welsh connections was at hand. On 10 May, 1372, Owain Lawgoch issued a proclamation in which he declared his claim to Wales in grandiloquent style: ‘which country is and should be mine by

C 76/53 mm. 19–20. Dafydd ap Meuric took out a letter of protection to serve with Minsterworth: TNA C 76/53 m. 18.  10   Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’, p. 44.  11  Carr, Owen of Wales, pp. 25–7, 49–51.  12   Ibid., pp. 32–3.  13   Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions’, p. 8  14  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 47; TNA, E 101/31/37, m. 1.

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right’.15 On the strength of this, Owain raised an army, numbering between 600 and 800, substantially larger than that he had in 1369.16 Owain and his men landed on Guernsey but failed to defeat even its small garrison and from there he seems to have been ordered to seek ships from Castile for the blockade of La Rochelle.17 What is certain is that Owain’s army contained a great number of Welshmen, some of whom had certainly served in English armies before siding with a man who claimed to be prince of Wales. The extent of Owain’s support in Wales is difficult to gauge, though Carr’s research suggests it was significant enough to be a cause of concern for the effective government of the principality.18 The only army actually to land in France in 1372 finally sailed on 16 October and was led by John, Lord Neville, steward of the king’s household, in support of John de Montfort, duke of Brittany. As neither Neville, nor any of the captains accompanying him, held any lands in Wales it is improbable that this army of 480 men-at arms and 480 archers contained any Welshmen, though the available documentation fails to provide any names to confirm or deny this.19 Similarly, neither the musters of naval forces led by Sir Philip Courtenay launched at the same time, nor those of the army led by the earl of Salisbury in 1373, show any evidence of Welshmen.20 Gaunt’s Grande Chevauchée of 1373 was intended to ride across France from Calais to Bordeaux, with an army of 6,000 men, of whom a quarter served in Lancaster’s own retinue. As in 1369, Gaunt’s retinue was the largest in the army, though the exiled duke of Brittany and Edward, Lord Despenser, both brought significant contributions. Contingents were also led by captains from Aquitaine and from the Low Countries, with a number of individuals, at least, from Spain.21 The muster roll of Edward, Lord Despenser, constable of the army, is especially important since he was lord of the largest of the Marcher liberties, Glamorgan. Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, also had a presence in the March in the form of the lordship of Gower, and clearly brought men from that lordship.22 Edward, Lord Despenser was a prominent soldier and his will suggests that his death in

 Carr, Owen of Wales, p. 26.   Carr, ‘Owen of Wales’, in Oxford DNB, accessed 21 October 2014.  17  Carr, Owen of Wales, pp. 26–31.  18   Ibid., pp. 44–5 cites the results of an inquisition taken at Flint on 25 September 1374, naming thirty-seven Welshmen not only from Flintshire but from other parts of North Wales, South Wales and the March, alleged to be in the service of Owain in France. Ten of these can be shown to have been with Owain in 1376.  19   Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France’, p. 9.  20   TNA E 101/31/31 and TNA E 101/32/36 respectively.  21   Sherborne, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France’, pp. 10–12  22   Despenser’s muster roll is TNA E 101/32/26 and Warwick’s TNA E 101/32/39. The third surviving muster from Gaunt’s chevauchée, TNA E 101/32/38, is that of Ralph, Lord Basset, who held no lands in Wales, and contains no obviously Welsh names.  15

 16

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November 1375 was a result of the hardships of campaigning.23 It is highly likely therefore that the two surviving muster rolls examined below, from 1373 and 1375, offer only a snapshot of those he employed in his service in the course of his career. The remarkable continuity of personnel shown between these two muster rolls compensates, to some extent, for the lack of further evidence. The second of these rolls refers to the expedition led by the earl of Cambridge and duke of Brittany in 1375, when Despenser was again constable. In 1373, Despenser’s retinue was second in size only to that of Gaunt. The list of men-at-arms in Despenser’s muster roll is effectively a gazetteer of the gentry of both lowland Glamorgan and Despenser’s estates in the west of England. Among those from Glamorgan were Sir Laurence Berkerolles of Coity, Sir Oliver St John and John St John, sheriff of Glamorgan in 1397, William Stradling of St Donats, and John and Laurence Norreys of Penllyn. In addition, and unusually, there were office holders from Glamorgan. John ap Rhys, farmer of the moveables of the lordship, and Thomas Broun, constable of Cardiff Castle and receiver of the lordship in 1376, served as esquires as did William Daventry, constable of the castle of Llantrissant. Such men were the backbone of an elite that straddled the Severn. The Despensers were primarily Gloucestershire lords who drew much of their income from and spent much of their patronage in Glamorgan, and many offices were granted to strangers to the lordship. The cross-Severn influence of the lords of Glamorgan is clear in Despenser’s military connections: Stephen Bawdrip of Penmark, who served in 1375, was a member of a family whose origins were in Somerset, but who were well on the way to accepting the manners and habits of their Welsh neighbours at Penmark.24 Another of those with extensive interests in Somerset and Glamorgan was Sir Walter Bluet, who was appointed as sheriff of Glamorgan in 1377. Bluet was also lord of the manor of Raglan in the lordship of Usk and held other estates in Glamorgan where the family had been long established. Ralph Bluet, a vassal of Gilbert de Clare, was with his earl at Bannockburn in 1314.25 Native Welshmen were in a minority in Despenser’s retinues in both 1373 and 1375. In 1373 only three esquires, including John ap Rhys, and forty-nine archers from a total retinue of 599 have unambiguously Welsh names. One of the esquires, Leisan de Avene, was descended from Morgan Gam, the pre-conquest lord of Afan. He had surrendered his rights to the lordship of Afan with the borough of   T.B. Pugh, ‘The Marcher Lords of Glamorgan, 1317–1485’, in Glam. C. H. III, p. 179 n. 88.   C.W. Lewis, ‘The Literary Tradition of Morgannwg down to the Middle of the Sixteenth Century’, in Glam. C. H. III, pp. 495, 512. Stephen Bawdrip and Henry Bawdrip both served as menat-arms with Sir William de Windsor in France in 1380–81: TNA E 101/39/7. The family no doubt originated from the village of Bawdrip near Bridgewater, Somerset, and, in common with many Somerset families, held lands in Glamorgan.  25   Pugh, ‘The Marcher Lords of Glamorgan’, pp. 178–181; Sir Walter Bluet: TNA E 101/34/3 m. 1, E 101/34/5 m. 2; Ralph Bluet, Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 77.  23

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Aberafan in exchange for a life annuity of 10 marks some time before 1373.26 His military service was, therefore, an extension of his dependence on his lord, and he received a war payment of £100 jointly with John Maryn for service at Calais in 1376.27 Repeated military service within one family can be observed among the few Welsh archers in this retinue; Madoc ap Gruffudd Hagr (English: ugly), served in 1375. His brother Gruffudd Fychan had served in 1373.28 Unusually, the precise origins within a lordship of three more archers are recorded. Ieuan ap Hywel ab Ieuan was from Senghenydd, north-west of Cardiff, Grono ab Ieuan from Tiriarll and Ednyfed ap Madoc from Neath, both territories being in the far west of the lordship.29 Other archers bore suggestive toponymics, but despite names which appear straightforwardly English, confidently asserting the ‘ethnic’ status of the likes of Stephen Penmark or Philip Chepstowe is all but impossible. The Reign of Richard II Wars in France By June 1377, England was vulnerable, following the death of Edward III and his succession by the young Richard II. Despite this, it was the capture of the comparatively obscure Gloucestershire knight Sir John Minsterworth (who had been in French service since 1373) that may have initiated the military preparations made in Wales that summer. Minsterworth, who had been captured by the French and then recaptured, confessed to associating with Owain Lawgoch and to assisting him in plans for a third invasion attempt with the support of the Welsh. Certainly, the precautions taken around Minsterworth’s custody at Bristol in March and, following his execution, the dispersal of his remains suggest that a landing in southern Wales was strongly suspected. Quarters of Minsterworth’s body were despatched to Dover and Newcastle. The remaining quarters were despatched to places where Minsterworth was familiar. One was sent to Bristol, near Misterworth’s estates30

  R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Boroughs of the Lordship of Glamorgan’, in Glam. C. H. III, p. 359. The process of consolidation of seignorial authority this represents is well described by Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 86–92; see also J. Beverley Smith, ‘The Lordship of Glamorgan’, Morgannwg 2 (1958), pp. 9–38. The third, Gruffudd ap Llywelyn Fychan, is at present unidentifiable; given the Glamorgan connections of the Welshmen known from this retinue, he is unlikely to be identified with the man of this name of Cellen (Cardiganshire) who served as joint beadle of Cantref Mawr in 1380–81: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 297.  27   TNA E 101/403/460 m. 19. Maryn himself was from Northamptonshire and can be found in Calais for over twenty years though he may not have served continuously: TNA E 403/459 m. 4 (1375); TNA E 403/569 m. 14 (1399). The clerk who recorded this payment rendered Leisan as ‘Ludevyc’.  28   Madoc, TNA E 101/34/5 m. 2d; Gruffudd Fychan, TNA E 101/32/26 m. 1d.  29   TNA E 101/34/3 m. 3d.  30  VCH Gloucestershire XIII, ‘Minsterworth’ (forthcoming), www.victoriacountyhistory.ac.uk (accessed 23 October 2014).  26

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and also the port that controlled trade up and down the Bristol Channel and as far as Dublin, and one, most unusually, to Carmarthen, the administrative centre of the shires of South Wales. Parts of dismembered traitors usually remained in England, so to send part of Minsterworth’s corpse to Wales was a brutal message to potential supporters of Owain Lawgoch in South Wales.31 With the threat of an invasion led by Owain in mind, preparations against a landing were made along the Welsh coast. There preparations were led by Sir Gregory Sais, with special attention being paid to Pembrokeshire and the coast of western Wales. The Pembrokeshire coast was rightly considered vulnerable. Later, a French army landed on the shores of Milford Haven in 1405 in support of Owain Glyndŵr and in 1485 this was the landing-place of Henry Tudor.32 Because of the capture and imprisonment of the earl of Pembroke off La Rochelle in 1372, the lordship was in royal hands, so these preparations were, unusually, a royal responsibility. Sir Gregory had returned to England following the loss of his lands in Poitou in 1375 and was commissioned to repair and fortify the castles of Pembroke and Cilgerran as well as the town of Tenby, reinforcing an earlier commission made to several of the leading men of the locality.33 Local lords were compelled to repair their own castles – Carew, Manorbier, Pilton and Newport (Cemais, Pembrokeshire), were named – and to array the local community.34 Something of the seriousness of their task, and the suspicion of the Welsh population, can be gauged from the payroll. This records some men as leaving and travelling overnight, presumably to conceal their movements.35 The impression given by those named on the payroll is of a local militia reinforced by professional soldiers, with Sir John Joce of Prendergast acting as Sir Gregory Sais’s local agent. In addition to Sir Gregory’s retinue of nineteen men-atarms and twenty archers, an additional force of 100 men, comprising two knights (Sir John Joce and Sir Henry Wogan), forty-eight esquires and fifty archers, was recruited locally. The local men served en bloc from 21 July to 20 October when all remaining soldiers left royal pay. Pembrokeshire society remained delineated

 Carr, Owen of Wales, pp. 50–1.   The preparations in 1377 formed part of R.K. Turvey’s study of the Pembrokeshire gentry. His reconstruction of the links between the men involved have proved invaluable. R.K. Turvey, ‘The Perrot Family and Their Circle in South-West Wales during the Later Middle Ages’, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Wales, Swansea, 1988).  33   CPR 1374–77, p. 501. A commission ordering the arrest of William Wyriot was made out to Sir Henry Wogan, Matthew Wogan, Peter Perrot, William Mallenfaunt, Laurence Brounhill, Richard Huscard, John Scurlag, Richard Wyriot, Peter Jordan, John Wydlok and Philip Sutton. Both William and Richard Wyriot are named as men-at-arms under Gregory Sais later that year, serving alongside several of those named in this commission: TNA E 101/34/29 m. 10. Wyriot was in trouble again in April 1380 for ‘maintaining a band of malefactors’, CPR 1377–81, pp. 509, 511. See Appendix 1.  34   Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’, pp. 46–7; CPR 1374–77, p. 495.  35   TNA E 101/34/29.  31

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between English and Welsh. Welshmen are rare in this company, particularly as Sir Gregory’s retinue was composed almost entirely of Cheshire men.36 Between 9 August and 18 September, Sir Gregory’s efforts were supplemented by a separate force of forty-nine men-at-arms and fifty archers under Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II. Sir Rhys had local connections, including an estate at Martletwy, north of Milford Haven. As the son of Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, he inherited a standing in South and West Wales that quite outweighed his own more modest achievements, even as a veteran of the Black Prince’s victory at Poitiers. Sir Rhys’s retinue included four members of the Vernon family, related to Sir Rhys through his sister’s marriage, and a number of local lords including Robert de Penres of Llanstephan and William Martyn of Cemais in Pembrokeshire. The issue rolls suggest that money was paid out in the year in question but the surviving particulars of account relate to Sir Rhys’s son, Thomas Griffith (b. 1378).37 Thomas seems to have been pursuing the account long after his father’s death (25 May 1380), probably c. 1400 since Richard II was described as ‘recently king of England’. The fact that this account was at least twenty-three years in arrears cannot be readily explained.38 No landing was attempted in 1377, however, and in the following year Owain Lawgoch was assassinated in France by John Lamb, an agent of the English Crown. His exceptional end, far more than the military preparations made against him in Wales, is testament to the threat that Owain was thought to pose. In Wales, Owain’s death ended the immediate external threat. By 1380, English military interests had spread as far as Iberia through John of Gaunt’s claim to the throne of Castile, which had been initiated by his marriage to Constance of Castile, agreed in 1371. Gaunt’s brother, Edmund of Langley, earl of Cambridge, led the first military action in support of Gaunt’s claim, sailing with 1,000 menat-arms and 1,000 archers from Plymouth in late June 1381. Though the alliance that launched the campaign was agreed on 15 July 1380, the need for parliament to agree funding for this army stalled preparations for its departure while the outbreak of the Peasant’s Revolt may have drawn out the process yet further.39 No musters are known to survive for this expedition, though letters of protections and attorney enrolled in treaty rolls reveal the names of 169 of those who intended to be involved. With the exception of David Jordan of Pembroke, just seven men with Welsh names can be found, and all were in the retinue of Sir William Beauchamp,   No fewer than seven representatives of the Massy family were present, for example. As for Welshmen we find the archers Morgan L’archer and Adam Sais and the esquires Ieuan ab Einion and Hywel ap Lewis, but their origins are obscure. For the nature of the divisions in Pembrokeshire, see B.S. John ‘The Linguistic Significance of the Pembrokeshire Landsker’, Pembrokeshire Historian 4 (1972), pp. 7–29.  37   For Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 262–3. The abandonment of the usual patronymic style of naming in this fashion is extremely unusual: E 403/463 m. 3.  38   The particulars of account are TNA E 101/37/5. See also Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 239, E 101/398/8 m. 2.  39  Saul, Richard II, pp. 96–7.  36

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brother of the earl of Warwick.40 Jordan may have been one of a reasonably substantial – and troublesome – contingent from Pembrokeshire. A commission in Pembrokeshire was required to arrest ‘certain persons’ who were among those who mutinied against the earl and his Portuguese hosts while encamped, underemployed and dissatisfied, around Lisbon.41 The only men named, however, were Henry Wilwehous and Robert Lylye, though others must have been implicated.42 The most prominent Welshman in Beauchamp’s retinue, however, was Goronwy ap Tudur of Penmynydd, Anglesey, who died on his return to England.43 The grant by Richard II of the constableship of Beaumaris to Goronwy ap Tudur immediately prior to Goronwy’s death was a striking mark of personal favour, reward for his service for the Black Prince and for Richard. At the time of his death Goronwy was forester of Snowdon and steward of the Bishop of Bangor’s Anglesey manors. His brother Ednyfed (of Trecastell, also in Anglesey) seems to have died around the same time and it is probable that Goronwy and Ednyfed both fought in Portugal and were accompanied by other men from Anglesey or North Wales.44 Elegies composed to the brothers by the poets Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Dafydd, Iolo Goch, Llywelyn Goch ap Meurig Hen (fl. c. 1330–c. 1390, himself a soldier in his youth) and Rhisierdyn attest to his substantial standing.45 Iolo Goch believed that the brothers’ deaths cast a cloud over all of Anglesey. Two of Goronwy and Ednyfed’s remaining brothers, Rhys and Gwilym ap Tudur, may well have served with them in Iberia. If so, they must be regarded as the most likely informants for the poets and, since their elegies were public declarations of grief, the detail they contain is, in all likelihood, accurate. The military careers of the brothers were extensive and varied. Rhys certainly served in Ireland in 1394; it is probable that both he and his brother were also with Richard in Ireland in 1399 and both died in the rebellion of Owain Glyndŵr, their cousin.

  All TNA C 76/65 m. 16. The other principal retinues appear to have been led by Sir Matthew Gournay (forty-seven enrolled letters) and the earl of Cambridge himself (forty-eight).  41   T.V. de Faria, ‘Tracing the ‘chemyn de Portugale’: English Service and Servicemen in FourteenthCentury Portugal’, JMH 37 (2011), pp. 259–61.  42   Calendar of Public Records Relating to Pembrokeshire, ed. H. Owen, 3 vols, Cymmrodorion Record Series, no. 7 (1911–18), volume I, p. 19.  43   The others were Matthew ap Dafydd, Einion ap Hywel, Ieuan ap Hywel ap Gwyn, Cynwrig ab Ieuan ap Llywelyn, Ithel ap Llywelyn ap Dafydd and Gruffudd ap Madoc; C 76/65 m. 16.  44   CPR 1381–5, pp. 100, 104, 442. Both archive and poetic sources confirm the date of his death as Sunday, 23 March 1382; Iolo Goch, in his elegy to the two brothers, suggests that Goronwy died by drowning in Kent; G. Roberts, ‘Wyrion Eden’, in idem, Aspects of Welsh History: Selected Papers of the Late Glyn Roberts (Cardiff, 1969), pp. 199–200; Johnston (ed.), Iolo Goch: Poems, ‘Marwnad Meibion Tudur Fychan/Elegy for Tudur Fychan’s Sons’, lines 79–88, pp. 26–7.  45   For Llywelyn Goch’s elegy, see D.R. Johnston (ed.), Gwaith Llywelyn Goch ap Meurig Hen (Aberystwyth, 1998), ‘Marwnad i Gronwy ap Tudur o Benmynydd/Elegy to Goronwy ap Tudur of Penmynydd’, pp. 30–5. Rhisierdyn also composed an elegy to Sir Hywel y Fwyall; Jones and Rheinallt (eds), Gwaith Sefnyn et al., pp. 65–8.  40

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Goronwy’s distant kinsman, Sir Gregory Sais, was made captain of the town of Berwick in December 1383, recognition of his military skill and experience. Berwick was one of the most prominent military appointments in the English realm.46 The muster taken on 1 March 1384 shows a retinue of 322 men – including Owain Glyndŵr and his brother Tudur –seemingly wholly drawn from the north of Wales, centred on Flintshire, the surrounding March and Cheshire.47 Sir Gregory, for all his time abroad, a French wife and extensive military career, was a Flintshire man whose father and brother had served as sheriffs of the county, therefore this recruitment in and around Flintshire is not surprising.48 On 20 March, in anticipation of a short expedition led to the Scottish March by John of Gaunt, Sir Gregory was commissioned to investigate the dilapidations and damage to Berwick. Gaunt had led an expedition to the Scottish March in April 1384 which was ‘strongly northern in character’, a judgement borne out by the surviving documents.49 While a large contribution from Lancashire is likely, it is far from clear what, if anything was offered by Gaunt’s Welsh estates. Sir Gregory was still at Berwick in the following August when the corporation of the town asked, unsuccessfully, for him to be reappointed and for the fortifications to be repaired.50 In the following year, the first royal expedition to Scotland since 1359 was triggered by the arrival in Scotland of the admiral of France, Jean de Vienne, who had been despatched from France with 2,000 men. While the military objective of Richard’s expedition in 1385 was to check the threat of invasion of northern England, for the king, it provided a platform from which to establish a martial reputation, while pacifying domestic opposition. On 4 and 13 June 1385 the last writs of summons of the general feudal levy of the English kingdom were issued. Since those who served were bound by obligation rather than wages. We have fewer of the financial records that illuminate the nature of other armies in this period.51 At least two Welshmen – Llywelyn ap Llywelyn and Llywelyn ab Ithel ap Llywelyn – took out letters of protection to serve with Sir Henry Coneway among his retinue of eleven men-at-arms and twenty archers. Other individuals; William ap Rhys ap Hywel (probably of Carmarthenshire) and Sir Roger Lestrange

  Rot. Scot. II, p. 58.   TNA E 101/39/39.  48   TNA E 101/42/14 m. 2.  49   A. Goodman, John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe (Harlow, 1992), pp. 224–5; The surviving muster roll details the retinue of the earl of Northumberland, 476 men, with a further 600 from Yorkshire, with Sir Robert Hilton, sheriff of that county with a retinue of 16 men-at-arms and 100 archers of his own; Percy’s retinue, TNA E 101/40/5.  50   Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’, p. 50.  51   N.B. Lewis, ‘The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385’, EHR 72 (1958), pp. 1–26, with a reply by J.J.N. Palmer ‘The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in England (1385)’, EHR 82 (1968), pp. 771–5; N.B. Lewis with reply by J.J.N. Palmer, ‘The Feudal Summons of 1385’, EHR 100 (1985), pp. 729–46.  46  47

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of Knockin were men with Welsh backgrounds, but the best known Welsh participant was Owain Glyndŵr.52 In his deposition in the Scrope–Grosvenor case in the court of chivalry, Owain stated that he had served in Scotland in 1385.53 Owain, his brother Tudur and his brothers-in-law, John Hanmer and Robert Puleston, bore witness that they had seen Robert Grosvenor bear the arms he claimed on this occasion. It is probable that all three served in the retinues of either Sir Gregory Sais, whom Froissart suggests was at Carlisle 1385, or Glyndŵr’s other military patron, Richard FitzAlan, earl of Arundel.54 Glyndŵr and his family were not the only Welshmen to testify. Morgan Yonge, later sheriff of Flintshire and a rebel in Owain’s cause, testified on behalf of the Yorkshireman, Richard Scrope of Bolton.55 The size of the army in 1385 can only be assessed through the issue rolls which provide only the names of the leaders of contingents.56 Despite the unusual nature of recruitment in 1385, the number of Welshmen actually serving on this important campaign was small. No more than 500 or so foot archers, a knight and fewer than seventy (itself a generous estimate) esquires were included in an army that numbered well over 7,700 archers and over 4,000 men-at-arms. Some useful information regarding Welsh involvement can be extracted from the issue rolls and some interesting detail can be added to the debate regarding the feudal summons from other sources. Despite the historiographical attention given to this campaign because of the use of a feudal levy, the contribution of the Welsh shires has not been accurately assessed. Some 200 archers were raised from Anglesey and a further 100 from Merioneth. These were listed in the issue roll as being paid for twenty days. Both contingents were led by Richard Massy of Cheshire, Ieuan ab Ieuan and Rhys ap Tudur of Anglesey. Forty archers were raised

  Llywelyn ap Llywelyn, Llywelyn ab Ithel ap Llywelyn with Sir Henry Coneway; DKR 36, pp. 121, 302. Five other Flintshire Welshmen also received letters of protection: Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Bleddyn, Cynwrig ap Cynwrig ap Bleddyn, Bleddyn ap William ap Gruffudd, Siancyn ap Madoc Llwyd and Iorwerth ap Hywel ap Madoc, ibid., pp. 40, 209, 302, 314. From South Wales, William ap Rhys ap Hywel was granted a protection for this campaign on 15 July 1385 and was stated to be serving in the company of ‘David ap Pounteyn’, C 71/65 m. 8. Roger Lestrange of Knockin was distantly related to Owain Glyndŵr through Owain’s grandmother.  53   Scrope v. Grosvenor, volume I, p. 254.  54   A.R. Bell, War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 175–9; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, pp. 23–4; for recent comments on Glyndŵr and his Scottish service, A. Breeze, ‘Owen Glendower’s crest and the Scottish campaign of 1384–1385’, Medium Aevum, 73:1 (2004), pp. 99–102; Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’, p. 50 and A. Chapman, A.R. Bell and D. Simpkin, ‘Owain Glyn Dŵr’, www.medievalsoldier.org/SoM/December2007.php: accessed 23 March 2012. vThe depositions of Owain and his circle are well known; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, pp. 22–4. For Morgan Yonge, his lineage, subsequent career and estates, A.D.M. Barrell and R.R. Davies, ‘Land, Lineage and Revolt in North-East Wales, 1243–1441: A Case Study’, Cambrian Medieval Celtic Studies 29 (1995), pp. 46–9.  56   Lewis, ‘The Last Medieval Summons’, Appendix II, pp. 17–23.  52

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from the county of Flint and paid for a similar period. They were led by Ieuan ap Hywel, David Kellow, William Meredith and Benedict ap William.57 In his study of the army, Lewis did not realise that men were also recruited from South Wales, as no payments were recorded to them in the issue rolls.58 The chamberlain’s account for South Wales, however, reveals that 255 foot archers paid 2d. per day were recruited from Carmarthenshire and Cardiganshire for the ten days of their march from Builth to York which began on 5 July. They were accompanied by a chaplain, a doctor, a standard bearer, two centenars and thirteen vintenars and led by Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Pontan.59 The recruitment from Richard’s principality of what was, for the time, a sizeable company of foot archers paid at rates not seen for a generation was an obvious anachronism, levies of foot soldiers having all but ceased. The nature of the service of the men from South Wales, paid from the point at which they left their territory, has the air of obligation about it, though this is not explicit. Similar conditions of service were recorded in the March at around the same time.60 In the context of the feudal summons issued by Richard, it would be unwise to overlook relict systems of recruitment and obligation which existed at a lower level. The feudal summons, therefore, may have reached further than has previously been thought. It was not the last time Richard II recruited companies of Welsh foot archers; similar companies were recruited from each of the counties of the principality of Wales to serve in Ireland in 139461 and Henry V recruited companies of archers from his personal estates in southern Wales in 1415. There is no evidence that a similar company of Welsh foot archers was recruited for Henry IV’s expedition to Scotland in 1400.62 Richard’s military excursion to Scotland preceded some of the greatest challenges to the young king’s regime. A French fleet had been gathered at Sluys during July 1385 and an invasion had only been prevented by a surprise attack on Damme by the men of Ghent, at that time English allies. The peace negotiations that followed foundered, however, over Gaunt’s planned expedition to Castile. John of Gaunt’s

  TNA E 403/508 mm. 23–4.   His other figures appear correct: Lewis, ‘The Last Medieval Summons’, Appendix II, p. 21 and ‘The Feudal Summons of 1385’, p. 737, n.  59  Rees, South Wales and the March, p. 264 n. 2 citing TNA SC 6/1221/16. Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Pontan was the Walstottus (the literal translation is ‘interpreter’, but here it means ‘steward’) of the commote of Widigada and Elfed in Cardiganshire: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 410.  60   In the lordship of Three Castles, for example; see Rees, South Wales and the March, p. 147, citing TNA DL 43/13/8.  61   TNA E 101/402/20 fol. 39v.  62   A.L. Brown, ‘The English Campaign in Scotland, 1400’, in H. Hearder and H. Loyn (eds), British Government and Administration: Studies Presented to S.B. Chrimes (Cardiff, 1974), pp. 40–54 and A. Curry, A.R. Bell, D. Simpkin and A. King, ‘New Regime, New Army? Henry IV’s Scottish Expedition of 1400’, EHR 125 (2010), pp. 1382–413.  57  58

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expedition in pursuit of his claim to its throne was partly inspired by the defeat of a Castilian army by the Portuguese at Aljubarotta in August 1385, and was by far the largest English military enterprise of 1386. The army that sailed from Plymouth on 7 July landing at La Coruña eighteen days later was around 3,000 strong. Despite initial success, conquering Galicia, Compostela and La Coruña by the end of 1386, Gaunt found these gains impossible to sustain, and throughout the following year his army was reduced by a combination of lack of funds, disease and desertion. The expeditionary army eventually withdrew to Bayonne by the end of September 1387. Among those who seem to have deserted Gaunt’s expedition were the Llanstephan esquires, John and Thomas Fort. This must be the most plausible explanation for the presence of a Castilian, John d’Ispaine, who was deemed an enemy alien, in their household in south-west Wales at Easter 1387.63 The absence of Gaunt had far wider and more significant consequences in the summer and autumn of 1386 since it created a political vacuum at the heart of government. The immediate result was a revival in French plans for a major attack on England’s south coast, in part because of the demands on English shipping incurred by the needs of Gaunt’s army. In common with much of the southern coast of England, from Lynn in Norfolk as far as South Wales, measures for defence were put into place: on the coast of South Wales orders were made to repair the king’s castles. In August, precautions were even taken in Flintshire, where Sir Henry Coneway, veteran of decades of service in Ireland, was commissioned with his family to garrison the castle of Rhuddlan.64 Other Welshmen were employed in the wider defence of English interests. In 1386 Sir Gregory Sais was in the garrison of Calais with a retinue of thirty-one men-at-arms, twenty-three archers and nine crossbowmen. His muster list shows sixty-three names, nine of whom had served with Sir Gregory two years earlier at Berwick among a rather smaller retinue. These included David Birchore of Flint and John Birchore, presumably a brother. Both had been granted protection to serve with Sir Gregory in 1378 as well as serving at Berwick in 1384.65 We also find under Sir Gregory, Thomas Salusbury, who served as an archer at Berwick and Calais, and was presumably a relative of the Henry Salusbury who was involved in a conveyance of Sir Gregory’s lands after his death in 1390.66

  For further details of the lives, lands and administrative careers of John and Thomas Fort. see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 320–1; R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Cartulary and Muniments of the Fort Family of Llanstephan’, BBCS 24 (1971), pp. 311–84. For a full account of John Fort’s career and references to others in his family: A. Chapman, ‘John Fort Esquire of Llanstephan’: www.medievalsoldier.org/Fort.php, accessed 1 April 2014.  64   CPR 1385–89, p. 160.  65   The musters are TNA E 101/40/25 and E 101/42/14, the details are taken from the latter. John de Birchore of Flint, protection in 1378: C 76/32 m. 12.  66   Thomas Salusbury: (1384) TNA E101/39/25; (1386) TNA E101/40/25; Carr ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’, p. 51, Knighton’s Chronicle 1337–1396, ed. and trans. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 1995), pp. 346–7, also attests to Sir Gregory’s presence in the garrison of Calais in 1386.  63

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In later July 1386, Jean de Vienne, admiral of France, was ordered to collect all shipping appropriate for a crossing to England. A substantial army, estimated variously between about 10,000 and, with the precision of the fevered imagination of Thomas Walsingham, 103,600, was assembled by late October when Charles VI arrived at Sluys.67 Preparations against invasion also included orders to North Wales and the Duchy of Lancaster estates on 12 September, while the French fleet was gathering, to provide 200 and 400 archers respectively to aid the defence of London. It is probable that the result was 360 archers from the counties of Merioneth, Caernarfon, ‘the Marches’ and ‘Wales’ who received payment of £146 8s., equating to approximately a fortnight’s service. Eighty of the archers, with three men-atarms led by Einion ap Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and Einion ab Ithel ap Gurgennu, originated from Merioneth and were paid for twenty-one days. Of these, eight days were financed from the revenues of the principality and the remainder from the Crown.68 In addition to the men of Merioneth noted above were 120 archers under Rhys ap Tudur and his brother Gwilym from Carnarfonshire, and also from Merioneth, Einion ap Gruffudd ap Llywelyn and two others with forty archers. The largest force was from ‘the marches’, probably meaning Flintshire: Ithel ap Bleddyn ab Ithel, Hywel ap Tudur ab Ithel, William ap Maredudd ap Gruffudd, Dafydd Fychan ap Dafydd Llwyd, Ithel Moel ap Dafydd, each with twenty archers, and Hywel ab Iorwerth with three esquires and sixty archers. To put this in perspective, forty-three esquires and 818 archers were raised from Cheshire and were paid six days’ wages from the revenues of chamberlain there. They, together with seventy archers from Herefordshire, were among the lucky ones. Archers summoned from Devon, Derbyshire and Staffordshire were sent home unmustered and unpaid on 11 October and the finances of government were ill equipped to meet the challenge.69 Knighton noted that unpaid soldiers, not only the easily identifiable Welsh, but also those from Lancashire and other distant parts, plagued the areas they travelled through on their return from London. Furthermore, relying on the experience of his locality, he reported damage by the men of Cheshire in Leicestershire.70 What this evidence suggests is that the men of Wales were treated no differently from the men of the English counties, though, probably by luck rather than policy, they at least received pay for their endeavours. In the event, the French invasion was  Saul, Richard II, pp. 152–4; J.W. Sherborne, ‘The Defence of the Realm and the Impeachment of Michael de la Pole in 1386’, in Tuck (ed.), War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, pp. 99–118, pp. 110–13.  68   TNA SC 6/1214/12 m. 5 and CPR 1385–89, p. 217. Further details can be found in the issue roll printed in Issues of the Exchequer: Being a Collection of Payments out of His Majesty’s Revenue, from King Henry III to King Henry VI Inclusive, ed. F. Devon (London, 1837), pp. 231–2.  69   Sherborne, ‘The Defence of the Realm and the Impeachment of Michael de la Pol’; idem, ‘Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France’, p. 111. See also TNA E 403/515 for 16, 19, 27 October 1386; see also CPR 1385–89, p. 217.  70   Knighton’s Chronicle, pp. 350–1.  67

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aborted on or soon after 16 November. The effort, not to say expense, of both sides had been wasted. The upheavals of 1386 resulted in the appointment of a continual council, in effect a regency led by the king’s opponents, by parliament on 19 November 1386.71 Thomas of Woodstock, duke of Gloucester, and Richard Fitz Alan, earl of Arundel, lost little time in preparing a more militant policy towards France, the result of which interconnected military and domestic affairs for the succeeding two years. The earl of Arundel, in particular, seems to have driven military policy, embarking on naval raids in 1387 and 1388. Bell shows that the English estates of the earl of Arundel were a significant military resource in their own right. His Welsh estates were no less significant. The lordships of Bromfield and Yale, Chirk and Shrawardine, the Shropshire Hundred of Oswestry, and Ruyton-of-theEleven-Towns, the castle of Dawley and its dependent fees, with the reversion of the lordship of Clun, formed a large and contiguous unit in the north-east of Wales and the county of Shropshire.72 Arundel’s tenants played a large part in his retinues but the gentry of Shropshire, Herefordshire and the neighbouring March were also well represented. Since one of these men was Owain Glyndŵr, who served with his brother Tudur and others who were later associated with them in their rebellion, the Arundel connection has been fully explored by previous writers.73 Beyond the Marcher gentry, men such as Fulk Fitzwarin of Ellesmere and Richard Talbot of Whittington, Blackmere and (eventually) Castle Goodrich, we find more obscure figures, at least two of whom gave their lives to Owain’s rebellion. Grono ap Tudur was with Owain at its beginning at Sycarth, when Glyndŵr declared himself prince of Wales, and joined the attack on Ruthin where Grono was captured and executed. A later adherent of Glyndŵr who served in Arundel’s retinue in 1387 was the Herefordshire Lollard, Walter Brut. Walter seems to have joined the rebellion later, perhaps following his lord, Edmund Mortimer, and was possibly executed after being captured at the battle of Bryn Glas in June 1402.74 Between Arundel’s naval campaigns of 1387 and 1388, attempts were made by the king, with the aid of Richard de Vere, duke of Ireland, to re-establish the king’s

  Sherborne, ‘The Defence of the Realm and the Impeachment of Michael de la Pole’, pp. 113–14.   R.R. Davies, ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397–9’, in F.R.H. Du Boulay and C. Barron (eds), The Reign of Richard II: Essays in Honour of May McKissack (London, 1971), pp. 257–8; J.L. Gillespie, ‘Thomas Mortimer and Thomas Molineux: Radcot Bridge and the Appeal of 1397’, Albion 7 (1975), p. 170. See also TNA Chester 2/70 m. 7v.; 2/73 m. 6; Bell, War and the Soldier, pp. 175–80.  73   A. Goodman, ‘Owain Glyn Dŵr before 1400’, WHR 5 (1970–71), pp. 67–70; R.I. Jack, ‘New Light on the Early Years of Owain Glyndŵr’, BBCS 21 (1964–66), pp. 163–6.  74   All TNA E 101/40/33. For Grono ap Tudur, see Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyndŵr, p. 103; for Walter Brut, W.W. Capes (ed.), Registrum Johannis Trefnant Episcopi Herefordensis, Canterbury and York Society 20 (1916), pp. 278–365, Lloyd, Owen Glendower, pp. 109–10 and Maureen Jurkowski, ‘Who Was Walter Brut?’, EHR 127 (2012), pp. 285–302.  71

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control of government by military force. Troops were raised from Cheshire by de Vere to march on London but were met by Henry, earl of Derby, at Radcot Bridge, west of Oxford, on 20 December 1387 where the duke was defeated. While Myres collated the narrative of the battle from the surviving chronicles, the details of the armies has not been considered.75 Contemporary chronicles cannot be said to be helpful in this regard: their concern is with the leaders of what were effectively private armies. Knighton’s chronicle describes de Vere’s army, defeated and stripped of their possessions and clothing, as being drawn from Wales and Cheshire.76 If this were the case, the Cheshire contribution seems to have been more highly valued. In December 1398, 4,000 marks were deposited at Chester Abbey in two instalments for distribution among those who had suffered in the debacle. It is unclear how much of this money, if any, was disbursed outside Cheshire. No similar sums appear in the chamberlain’s accounts of the Welsh shires.77 Given what we know of Richard’s infamous Cheshire archers, it is likely that the majority of the troops were drawn from Cheshire and possibly Flintshire, with relatively few, if any, from the shires of North Wales. Of the armies that opposed and defeated de Vere, even less is known. As proprietorial concerns, drawn from the households and estates of the magnates involved, they did not receive royal pay. Some detail of the response to de Vere’s army in the March can be found in the account of Alan de Thorp, receiver of the Arundel lordship of Bromfield and Yale, from 1387. This reveals that Roger Glover was paid 20s. in December by order of the earl’s council to report on the movements of the duke while the castle of Holt was garrisoned for six weeks ‘in the time of the commotion of the duke of Ireland in the March’ (tempore commocionis ducis Hibernie in marchia). The 100s. paid to the constable, David de Eyton, for the use of radmanni – men drawn from among the ranks of Holt’s burgesses – suggests that, if they were paid rather than serving on account of obligation, only a handful of men were employed.78 If the normal rate of military pay in this period – 6d. per day for archers – had been given, 100s. would only provide five men for a six-week period. Even at a lower rate – and 3d. would seem a plausible minimum – the garrison would be unlikely to consist of more than ten men. Other expenses in the same account rather suggest that the castle itself was not used to such occupation:

  J.N.L. Myres, ‘The Campaign of Radcot Bridge in December 1387’, EHR 42 (1927), pp. 20–33.

 75

76 Knighton’s Chronicle, pp. 420–3.

  Davies, ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397–9’, p. 261.  78   ‘David de Eyton’ was Dafydd de Eyton ap Llywelyn who Pratt, despite the above, described as constable of Holt ‘since at least 1388’, citing BL Add. Ch. 8633 and 8635. Dafydd was replaced by Sir William Bagot in 1398: D. Pratt, ‘Bromfield and Yale in English Politics, 1387–99’, Denbighshire Historical Society Transactions 30 (1981), p. 121, n. 58.  77

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‘decayed stonework was hastily made good, defective lead and timber roofing repaired, drains and sluices cleaned out and the malt-kiln repaired.’79 Ireland Temporary cessation of the war with France led English military attention elsewhere throughout the period. We have seen evidence of this in relation to France’s allies, the Scots, and to the dynastic ambitions of John of Gaunt, but after the sealing of treaties at Brétigny and Calais in 1360, providing military support for the government of Ireland became a priority. While the war with France was in abeyance, the policy of Edward III was the pacification of the country to a sufficient degree that it could make an effective contribution to England’s finances. Between 1361 and 1376 English policy towards Ireland changed. Before 1361, English practice had been to employ chief governors, both English and Anglo-Irish, who had, like John Charlton I, lord of Powys, in the late 1330s, maintained small retinues at the cost of the Irish exchequer.80 The peace of 1360 presented the English authorities with an opportunity and between 1361 and 1376 there were five military expeditions to Ireland. The first manifestation of this new interest in Ireland was the campaign led by Lionel of Antwerp, third son of Edward III, earl of Ulster, and later duke of Clarence, in an attempt to restore English lordship in Ireland.81 Lionel led two expeditions, the first from 1361 to 1364 and the second from 1365 to 1366. When first appointed in 1361, he was provided with a force of approximately fifty knights, 300 men-at-arms, and 540 mounted archers, and was given ample financial resources to raise additional troops within Ireland. The army that eventually accompanied him, however, had fewer men-at-arms (197) and more mounted archers (670) than originally envisaged.82 Almost as soon as he landed, Lionel made a foray into Wicklow against the Gaelic forces that were harassing English settlements around Dublin. But containment and warding were what principally occupied the duke and his army with varying degrees of success until the duke’s departure in 1366. The duke was followed as lieutenant by a series of experienced professional captains. Because they secured English governance, but not Irish revenues, records of their armies were preserved in the Exchequer. The core of Lionel’s army in 1361 was indentured, though additional archers were found by commissions of array. The archers from English counties were

  Pratt, ‘Bromfield and Yale in English Politics, 1387–99’, pp. 110–11, citing TNA SC 6/1234/5.   P. Connolly, ‘The Financing of English Expeditions to Ireland, 1361–1376’, in J. Lydon (ed.), England and Ireland in the Later Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Jocelyn Otway-Ruthven (Blackrock, 1981), p. 104.  81   TNA E 101/28/13–15.  82   W.M. Ormrod, ‘Lionel, Duke of Clarence (1338–1368)’, Oxford DNB, accessd 6 March 2009; Connolly ‘The Financing of English Expeditions’, pp. 105–6, citing TNA E 101/28/21.  79  80

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predominately mounted, and archers from the Welsh Marcher estates were almost exclusively on foot. This army was, therefore, a mixture of old and new. Lionel’s marriage to Elizabeth de Burgh secured parts of the Clare inheritance in the form of the Marcher lordships of Carleon and Usk and at least twenty archers in his personal retinue came from those lordships.83 Lionel was supported by Ralph, earl of Stafford, who was accompanied by his younger son and eventual heir, Hugh (d. 1386). Stafford’s retinue, in common with others involved in this force, made extensive use of the military community of Cheshire and Flintshire. The Welshmen in both Clarence’s and Stafford’s retinues, while apparently drawn from their lord’s own lands, were intermingled with men of ‘English’ origins from their wider estates. Musters survive for the retinues of Lionel and Stafford, and though there are also detailed particulars of account available for the retinues of Ralph de Ferrers and William de Windsor, these furnish few details regarding the origins of their men.84 Stafford, like Clarence, was a Marcher lord holding Caus (Shropshire) and Glynllŵg. Stafford’s own retinue contained twenty-six archers from Glynllŵg and at least one, Ithel de Caus, from the lordship of that name in Shropshire. Several others bear toponyms from southern Wales. These included Cowbridge, Glamorgan and Castle Martyn in the Pembrokeshire lordship of Cemais. In addition to the large county levies of both mounted and foot archers were companies of Welsh foot archers arranged in twenties. It is notable that rates of absence and desertion seem lower amongst the Welsh contingents than amongst the county levies, though this was not for want of pay since, unlike later campaigns in Ireland, supplies of money were generally sufficient.85 The presence of so many foot archers is evidence of royal penny-pinching: all the foot archers, both English and Welsh, were paid 3d. per day, the mounted archers, 6d. Stafford’s retinue also contained 113 Welsh foot archers from Brecon, Gower and Glamorgan entering pay on 1 August 1362, when the rolls end.86 Since Stafford had no direct connection with these lordships, some explanation of their presence is necessary. The men of Glamorgan appear to have served in the place of their lord, Edward Despenser, who had been summoned to serve in Ireland in person on account of his lands there. Brecon was in royal hands following the death of its lord, Humphrey de Bohun, in February 1362. The wording of the writ directed at Stafford and Despenser suggests some form of semi-feudal obligation. Each man was ordered

  Among the block of Welsh names was one ‘Geoffrey de Usk’. These Welshmen served for five quarters from August 1362 April 1366; TNA E 101/28/18 mm. 6–11.  84   TNA E 101/28/15–23.  85   Connolly, ‘The Financing of English Expeditions’, pp. 106–7.  86   TNA E 101/28/15 mm 3d–1d. There were twenty men from Glamorgan, fifty-two from Brecon and forty-one from Gower.  83

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before glyndŵr upon his allegiance and under pain of forfeiture, to make ready and array himself and his men with all his power according to his estate to cross to Ireland to Lionel, earl of Ulster, the king’s son, there to abide with him and other lieges for the safety thereof.87

In each of these armies, in addition to Welsh archers levied from Marcher estates, Welsh involvement was supplemented by the Marcher squirearchy. One of these men, Owain Puleston, served in Ireland with his brothers Roger and John, but by 1386 was in the retinue of the French seneschal of Saintonge, Guillaume de Naillac. With him, among a crowd of Welshmen – presumably one-time supporters of Owain Lawgoch – was another representative of the ‘English’ Marcher gentry, Geoffrey Bluet, whose family held Raglan in the lordship of Usk.88 The Puleston family had settled at Emral in Flintshire in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and Owain Puleston’s allegiance to France is more significant because a relative, Robert, was married to a sister of Owain Glyndŵr. Another Flintshire soldier was Henry Coneway, who either originated from, or settled in, Rhuddlan. Coneway was not only a man-at-arms in the retinue of the duke of Clarence but made a career in Ireland, subsequently serving with both Sir William Windsor and Sir Robert Ashton between 1371 and 1376.89 By the time he became a knight, perhaps in 1382, he had been in arms for over twenty years.90 By this time, he had been retained for life by Edmund Mortimer III, earl of March (d. 1381), initially as an esquire, and subsequently as a knight bachelor. His income was derived from two of Mortimer’s estates, £40 from the issues of the lordship of Cedewain and a similar amount from the revenues of the lordship of Denbigh. Coneway even witnessed the earl’s will, which was made at Denbigh on 1 May 1380.91 John Stackboll or Stakpole (possibly of Stackpole, Pembrokeshire) seems to have remained in Ireland serving with Windsor into Windsor’s second term as lieutenant in 1376. In 1380 he received letters of protection to serve in France with Ralph, lord Basset of

  CCR 1360–64, p. 384. The order, dated 10 February, was directed widely: to Thomas de Furnivall, Despenser, Thomas, earl of Oxford, David de Strathbogie, earl of Athol and twenty-two others. Several religious were included in the summons together with Mary, countess of Norfolk, Eleanor, countess of Ormond, five other countesses, Anne le Despenser and two other ladies, most of whom had estates in Ireland.  88   BN, Nouvelles acquisitions françaises 8604, nos. 76, 84 cited in Siddons, ‘Welshmen in the Service of France’, pp. 166, 78, 80; his eventual fate is unknown. A Robert Puleston testified in the Scrope–Grosvenor case in the court of chivalry and was married to Lowri, a sister of Owain Glyndŵr. The Bluet family had extensive interests both in Gloucestershire and in south-east Wales, notably including Raglan in the lordship of Monmouth.  89   J.E. Messham, ‘Henry Conewey, Knight, Constable of the Castle of Rhuddlan, 1390–1407’, Flintshire Historical Society Journal 35 (1999), p. 15.  90   CPR 1381–85, p. 119.  91   The will, in French, names him as ‘Henry de Cornwaille’. At this date, he was still an esquire; his knighting appears, therefore, to have occurred on the campaign itself, a detail Messham fails to note: Messham, ‘Henry Conewey, Knight’, p. 15.  87

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Drayton, and a year later in the company of Sir Richard Poynings for service in Brittany.92 Sir Robert Ashton, of Long Ashton, near Bristol, replaced Windsor as lieutenant, in 1372. He was another who had previous military and administrative experience in Ireland and his indenture specified that he maintain two forces there.93 The first, of 60 men-at-arms and 100 mounted archers, is that to which the surviving muster roll refers. It was to be paid from English revenues for one year. Ashton’s second force was to consist of eighty hobelars and 200 foot soldiers recruited in Ireland and paid for from its revenues.94 Walter Somery, who served as an esquire with Ashton, was probably of the family which held Dinas Powys, Glamorgan, while it is likely that Hugh Yale had some association with the lordship of that name in north-east Wales. John Burghill came from Llanfilo in the lordship of Brecon, and John and Robert Craddock from Pembrokeshire.95 Ashton’s was a remarkably heterogeneous force in terms of its geographical origins and Windsor’s retinues follow a similar pattern. The musters relating to the army that accompanied Sir John Stanley to Ireland in 1387 reveal that Welshmen remained active there, albeit in small numbers. The few present in Stanley’s force can be found on a single membrane of his surviving musters, though several other men seem to have been described as, rather than named, ‘Walsh’, although the muster roll in question is otherwise composed of Irishmen.96 These armies brought limited stability to Ireland while royal attention was elsewhere but, following the Anglo-French truce agreed at Leulinghem in 1389, Richard II turned his gaze away from the English Channel and towards the Irish Sea. The two campaigns he led to Ireland in person in 1394 and 1399 departed from the ports of West Wales and are therefore of particular interest. The surviving documentation for these important campaigns, however, is far from complete. Though a Wardrobe book survives and can provide some useful information about the royal household in the 1394 campaign, no muster rolls survive for this campaign. Saul   William Sais: TNA E 101/28/18 and TNA E 101/32/25 m. 2; John Stackpole: TNA E 101/31/25 m. 2, TNA E 101/33/35 m. 1, TNA E 101/33/34, TNA E 101/33/38. Protections: 1380; C 76/64 m. 5, 1382; C 76/65 m. 17. Stackpole’s origins must remain uncertain, but the distribution of the name suggests that the family were among the early Anglo-Flemish settlers in Pembroke with interests in Ireland. A Philip de Stakpole held four fees in the county of Pembroke (where Stackpole itself is situated) in 1366; CPR 1364–7, p. 264, though a Robert Stakboll was resident in Dublin by 1391, CPR 1389–92, p. 406.  93   M. Jones, ‘Ashton, Sir Robert (d. 1384)’, Oxford DNB, accessed 6 March 2009.  94   Windsor’s force: TNA E 101/31/25 – sixty ‘armed archers’ and fifty men-at-arms; Ashton’s ‘English’ troops: TNA E 101/32/25; Connolly, ‘The Financing of English Expeditions’, pp. 114–15.  95   TNA E 101/33/35. These men are not to be confused with the Craddock family of Cheshire, though the surname undoubtedly reveals Welsh ancestry in each case.  96   Cynwrig ap Davy (‘Kenewrek ap Davi’), for example, appears initially as an archer, but also served as a man-at-arms: TNA E 101/41/18 m. 19 and m. 25 respectively. The muster roll including the Irishmen is TNA E 101/41/18 m. 27ii.  92

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estimated that the king’s household in 1394–95 consisted of between 4,000 and 5,000 men from a total of c. 7,000. From the information contained in enrolled letters of protection and attorney, Bell found 293 named individuals serving on this campaign. While this number can be extended by use of the Wardrobe book, including the names of contingents of infantry, for example, it is still only a snapshot of the full army.97 While several named Welshmen and Welsh residents feature serving as esquires or granted protections, the most interesting evidence for 1394 concerns two forces of Welsh troops. The most direct analogy from Richard’s reign was his liveried Cheshire archers, but these men were of an altogether different rank and status, albeit drawn from the royal demesne. The first force, of sixty foot archers with nine mounted archers, a beadle, a chaplain and a ‘baneour’ (possibly Welsh Banewr – standard bearer) was led by four named esquires.98 Of the named leaders only one can be securely identified; Henry Don of Cydweli, whose son Maredudd Don served on the campaign. A second, Roger Mortimer, had no connection to the earls of March and was probably a burgess of Cardigan. His family had been in military service in South Wales since the thirteenth century. The remaining two are problematic and altogether more anonymous.99 Because of damage to the manuscript, the third can only be identified as ‘ap Hywel’, while the identity of the fourth, Owain ap Gruffudd, has been suggested to be Owain Glyndŵr. This is unlikely since these archers probably originated in South Wales: Owain ap Gruffudd ab Einion of Iscoed Hirwaun in Cardiganshire is a far more plausible candidate.100 Eighty foot archers, probably from the northern shires of Wales, were led by Rhys ap Tudur of Anglesey with two companions and were accompanied by twelve mounted archers with two beadles, and three ‘gubernators’; presumably serving as vintenars. Both companies entered royal pay on 7 September 1394 and were released by 21 April the following year. Such a complement recalls the usual arrangement of Welsh troops serving in the armies of the three Edwards, but by this time it appears anachronistic, at least in terms of military organisation. The exact period of service for the men led by Rhys ap Tudur is uncertain but it is clear that they were not always with the army. His foot archers were not present for fifty-seven days of the campaign, while two of the mounted archers were absent for

 Saul, Richard II, p. 279; Bell, War and the Soldier, pp. 188–9.   TNA E 101/402/20 fol. 39v.  99   For Henry Don and his family, see Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyndŵr, pp. 305, 307. This Roger Mortimer is almost certainly the burgess of Cardigan of that name (d. 1424–25) who served as mayor/ escheator of the borough of Cardigan in 1418–19. His son Owain was recruited to serve in France in 1415. See Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 218, 428. 100   Owain was beadle of that commote between 1388 and 1390 and collector of the subsidy in 1398. His son Maredudd was among those who held Aberystwyth for Owain Glyndŵr in 1407 and was sheriff of Cardigan in 1424: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 273, 524.  97  98

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fifteen days.101 Few other Welshmen are named in the Wardrobe book. Maredudd ap Henry Dwnn has been noted and he, like the two Cardiganshire men, Rhys ap Thomas ap Dafydd – an esquire of Richard’s household – and Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain, served with a small personal retinues of two archers.102 Further information is thinner still. It is likely that Thomas Gower, burgess of Haverford, taking a letter of protection to go to Ireland with Roger Mortimer, earl of March, was among the earl’s following but Gower’s role is unknown, as is the size of the earl’s retinue.103 The musters for the standing army maintained in Ireland following Richard’s departure, under its deputy governor, Stephen le Scrope, between 1395 and 1397, reveal no Welshmen whatsoever.104 Since these musters reveal some continuity with the army that accompanied Sir John Stanley in 1387, which contained a mere handful of Welshmen, this is unsurprising but it seems that many of the men in Scrope’s retinue forged military careers in Ireland over a long period.105 Stephen le Scrope himself may have played his part in the suppression of Glyndŵr’s rebellion. Camden, writing in the seventeenth century, suggested that in 1405, an army from Ireland raised and led by Scrope mounted a highly successful raid on Anglesey, recapturing Beaumaris Castle and returning to Ireland with one of the most valuable ecclesiastical relics on that island, which was apparently given to Christ Church Cathedral, Dublin.106 Richard’s victory over his political opponents in 1397 and the execution of their leaders greatly extended royal authority in the March of Wales. On 25 September 1397, Richard took into his hands the lands of the executed earl of Arundel and formed them, along with the county palatine of Cheshire and the county of Flintshire, into a second principality, that of Chester. Following the banishment of Henry, earl of Derby, in 1398, his Marcher estates were also left at the king’s disposal and were distributed among Richard’s supporters, although Richard reserved the rights of the earl’s heirs. With this large block of lands in   It is probable that one of his companions was his brother Gwilym, and entirely plausible that the third was another brother, Maredudd, father of Owen Tudor. 102   TNA E 101/402/20 fol. 38v. Rhys ap Thomas ap Dafydd also received a protection for half a year, at the same time and in the same place (Haverford) as Henry Don and William ap Rhys ap Hywel: CPR 1391–96, p. 483. He was among the most significant men in the southern principality of his generation and served not only Richard II but each of his Lancastrian successors. See Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 143–4 and references. Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain is probably the man of this name who served as steward of Cemais throughout the later rebellion: R.K. Turvey, ‘The Marcher Shire of Pembroke and the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, WHR 15 (1991), p. 167, n. 87. 103   CPR 1391–6, p. 481. 104   TNA E 101/41/39. 105   Robert Dullard who served as an archer in this force and a man-at-arms in the later army is just one example. 106  Carr, Medieval Anglesey, pp. 320–1; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, p. 99 n. 4, cites Henry of Marlborough, printed in the 1607 edition of Camden’s Britannia (pp. 832–6). 101

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north-east Wales under royal control, in addition to the lands of the principality of Wales, significant Welsh involvement in Richard’s subsequent military endeavours might be expected.107 That this was not the case derives from the use to which these lands were put. Arundel’s officers – some of them Welsh – were dismissed in favour of outsiders, many from Cheshire, and the revenues of the lands were distributed among Richard’s supporters. Welshmen were all but excluded. Similar exclusion of Welshmen from the governance of Flintshire may explain the substantial disaffection revealed in the recognisance rolls of the county in the 1390s. There had been violent demonstrations in the Flint county court in 1394, and in 1398 many prominent Welshmen of the county were bound over to keep the peace.108 Richard’s territorial aggrandisement seems to have been at the expense of the ambition of some of his Welsh subjects. In the six months from October 1398, for example, Robert Parys, chamberlain of Chester, who had been placed in charge of the finances of the former Arundel lordships, disbursed £2,576 to 758 of Richards’s Cheshire retainers. John ap Gwilym of Chirk was an all but unique example of a Welshman who negotiated the transition. He was appointed a ‘yeoman of the livery of the Crown’ on 23 March 1398. This attachment to Richard’s regime allowed him to confirm his title to land in the town of Oswestry. He had previously served Richard, earl of Arundel, in many offices in the lordship of Chirk and remained in place after 1397. His appointment as one of Richard’s yeomen of the Crown, however, is the only military role he is known to have performed.109 He continued to be prominent after the restoration of the Arundel estates after 1400. A ‘Jakke ap Gwilym’ held the office of chief forester in Chirk between 1407 and at least 1417 and served with Thomas, earl of Arundel, in France in 1415. It is probable that this was the same man; if so, his was a truly remarkable career.110 Given Richard’s policy towards the Arundel estates, it is unsurprising that the few sources we have for Richard’s second campaign to Ireland in 1399 show very few Welshmen in spite of the king’s use of Pembroke as the launching point for the expedition. This army appears to have been significantly smaller than that deployed in 1394. The Cheshire contingent was undoubtedly large, but is unlikely

  Davies, ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397–9’, pp. 256–79.   TNA E 403/562 m. 10, m. 16, cited by Davies ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397–9’, p. 278. Davies, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’, p. 157. 109   At the same time he was confirmed as ‘Pengreor and Keys’ (Pengreawr and Cais, chief herdsman/ studman and serjeant) of Chirk lordship: CPR 1396–99, p. 323; NLW Chirk Castle D 42–5. For the dues relating to the office in Chirk, see G.P. Jones (ed.), The Extent of Chirkland, 1391–1393 (Liverpool, 1933), pp. xxiii–iv. His petition names him as Jankyn ap Gwilym: TNA SC 8/251/12505; the grant confirms his identity; CPR 1396–99, p. 318. ‘Jakke ap Gwilym’ in the office of chief forester in Chirk between 1407–8 and 1417: NLW Chirk Castle D nos. 56–8, and for the service of the same in France in 1415, TNA E 101/47/1 m. 1. 110   See Dunn, Politics of Magnate Power, pp. 162–8 and Davies, ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester, 1397–99’, pp. 277–8. 107 108

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to have contained Flintshire men, still less any from the Arundel estates. Ten knights, 110 men-at-arms and 900 archers were drawn from Richard’s principality of Chester, along with his bodyguard. Frustratingly, the 1399 campaign is very poorly served in terms of documentary evidence; the historian is compelled to rely on enrolled letters of protection for evidence of those who served. Inevitably such limited sources can only offer a small sample of the personnel involved in these campaigns, though Bell has identified striking continuity in service among English knights and esquires between these campaigns and those led by the earl of Arundel in 1387–88. None of the men he noted was Welsh and a more general impression of the role of Welshmen in either of these campaigns is all but impossible to establish.111 Welshmen, predominately from the southern shires of the principality, can be found among the 309 persons named among the letters of protection for the campaign. Among the few sure examples of men who served on both of Richard’s Irish campaigns were the brothers John and Thomas Fort of Llanstephan, but letters of protection were granted to others from southern Wales.112 The most prominent of these was Rhys ab Adda Fychan, who received protection to serve in the retinue of the duke of Aumâle. A native of the commote of Creuddyn, he had held a variety of offices, and was sheriff of Cardiganshire in 1396. A more surprising participant in the 1399 expedition was the parson of Llandysul, Cardiganshire, Llywelyn ap Philip, who had letters of attorney enrolled at Westminster on 14 April.113 For Thomas ap Rhys ap Gruffudd, generally known as Thomas Griffith, service in this expedition continued a family tradition. His grandfather, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd served at Crécy, his father, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II at Poitiers. Their success, however, meant that Thomas was a Staffordshire man, settled on estates that had come through his mother. His military career bears scant comparison with his noble antecedents.114 More interesting is the role of the relatively small number of Flintshire men, and the still smaller number, drawn from the Arundel lordships included in Richard’s principality of Chester, found among Richard’s bodyguard and household. One, Morgan Fylkin, served in the retinue of Richard de Cholmundeley as part of the king’s bodyguard in 1398 and was sufficiently close to Richard’s regime to be specifically exempted from the general pardon issued to the men of Cheshire in May 1400. Some form of accommodation was clearly reached later: he served as an archer in the retinue of Thomas, earl of Arundel,  Bell, War and the Soldier, pp. 188–9   Both were granted letters of protection for service: Thomas, CPR 1396–99, p. 538; John, CPR 1396–99, p. 546. 113   CPR 1396–99, p. 520. 114   Thomas ap Rhys ap Gruffudd; CPR 1396–99, p. 546. If this identification is correct he would have been a young man (b. 1378), who later served Henry IV and Henry V both as prince of Wales and as king, see Appendix 1. His letter of protection was issued on 19 May at Haverford; see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 263. 111

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for the French campaign of 1415 and with Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, for the invasion of Normandy two years later.115 Revolution Having heard of the landing of Henry, duke of Lancaster, at Ravenspur, Richard returned to Pembroke from Ireland around 4 July 1399. The debate surrounding Richard’s actions has been a long one that need not be delved into here, but some consideration of the political – and thus military – geography of the lands of Wales on Richard’s return is relevant. The preparations made for Henry’s return throughout his duchy of Lancaster estates were extensive although their effects, Dunn suggests, may have been inflated by hindsight.116 What is indisputable is the speed and efficiency of the preparations made by Lancastrian officials. Richard departed from Milford Haven – and felt sufficiently secure to leave his personal baggage, jewels and plate deposited in the castles of Pembroke and Haverford117 – so the efforts made by these officials in Bolingbroke’s South Wales estates, and by the men of these lordships, can be said to be especially important. At Cydweli, where Richard himself had stayed on his way to Ireland in May, the gates of the castle were stopped against his return with stone and mortar while Robert Butterby, the porter of the castle, made urgent purchases of ‘oil and stones’ for the better defence of the castle against King Richard.118 At the castles of Hay and Brecon the moats were scoured and at Brecon the drawbridge was renewed. In the subsequent receiver’s account, these efforts were explicitly described as ‘to resist the malice of King Richard returning from Ireland against these parts’.119 Men were also despatched to garrison the castles of Carreg Cennen and Cydweli. At Monmouth, the castle was heavily guarded – at a cost of £54 6s. 7d. – ‘to resist the enemies of the lord’ (ad resistendum inimicos domini), while at Skenfrith, the drawbridge was repaired for the more modest sum of 15s.120 The military importance of these efforts is difficult to quantify. It is noteworthy that, when Richard returned from Ireland, he made no efforts to recruit from the gentry and tenants of the southern royal shires of Wales, instead relying on his supporters in the north and in his principality of Chester.

  Morgan Fylkin: 1398, TNA E 101/42/10 m. 3; exemption from pardon, CPR 1399–1401, pp. 285–6; 1415: TNA E 101/47/1 m. 2d; 1417, TNA E 101/51/2 m. 3. 116  Dunn, Politics of Magnate Power, pp. 168–77. 117   J.W. Sherborne, ‘Richard II’s Return to Wales, July 1399’ and ‘Perjury and the Lancastrian Revolution of 1399’, in Tuck (ed.), War, Politics and Culture in Fourteenth-Century England, p. 122, n. 17 and pp. 141–5; John ap Harry, a Lancastrian servant and sheriff of Herefordshire in 1399, was ordered to arrange the transfer of these jewels to London after Richard’s capture. 118   TNA DL 29/584/9240, m. 2 119   TNA SC 6/1157/4 m. 4 120   TNA DL 29/584/9240, m. 2 (Cydweli) and DL 29/615/9840 (Monmouth). 115

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Where the Lancastrian preparations may have had an effect is in the failure of Thomas, Lord Despenser’s mission to raise support in his lordship of Glamorgan. Adam Usk suggests that the men of Glamorgan refused to assist their lord.121 They had ample reason to be wary. On Glamorgan’s borders to the north and east lay lordships held by Bolingbroke’s men. To the north lay Brecon with Hay and Huntington, Monmouth and Three Castles that, with the surrender of Bristol by late July, effectively blockaded the Severn. To the west of Glamorgan lay Cydweli, and Iscennen with the lordship of Ogmore within Glamorgan itself. As already noted, the officials of these lordships had shown, in Davies’s polite understatement, ‘exemplary zeal’ in their preparations. The population of Glamorgan may have been wary of the consequences, visited not by Bolingbroke himself, but by his tenants. When Henry reached Gloucester he was joined by an army of his tenants from Cantrefsylef, Brecon and Llywel, ‘pledged to defend him against his enemies’.122 Glamorgan therefore must have been an unpromising recruiting ground. This fear was far from groundless: Adam Usk, accompanying Thomas Arundel, the returning archbishop of Canterbury, suggests that the Mortimer lordship of Usk was saved from Bolingbroke’s wrath by Adam’s own intervention.123 I, through favour, made peace between the duke and the lordship of Usk, the place of my birth, which he had intended to harry, on account of the resistance of the lady of that place, the king’s niece, there ordered; and I also got Sir Edward de Charlton, then husband of that lady, to be taken into the duke’s following; and I caused all the people of Usk, who for the said resistance, had gathered at Montstarri, to their great joy to return to their own homes.124

Usk’s account is the only direct evidence for even attempted opposition to Bolingbroke’s progress in the Welsh March. Other Marcher lords found it prudent to join Bolingbroke when the opportunity presented itself rather than rushing to his side. Edmund Mortimer, uncle to the heir of the earldom of March, and John Trefnant, bishop of Hereford, met Bolingbroke at Hereford while John Charlton, lord of Powys (1374–1401), joined Bolingbroke at Leominster (Herefordshire) on Sunday 3 August.125 In Wales, Jean Creton, who had accompanied the king from Ireland, tells us that the earl of Salisbury was despatched to the north of the principality with   ‘He [Richard II] sent Lord Despenser to raise his people of Glamorgan for his cause, but they refused to follow him’ (dominum de Spenser ad sussitandumsuos de Glanmorgane, licet sibi nequaquam parentes, in sui destinans succursum): Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, pp. 58–9. 122  Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 85, citing TNA SC 6/1157/4 m. 4 (Brecon Receivers Account). 123   It is entirely possible, however, that the other lordships held by the countess of March in 1399 (Builth, Ceri and Cedewain) were so mustered. 124   Sir Edward Charlton (d. 1421) had just married (in June 1399) Eleanor, daughter of Thomas Holand, earl of Kent (d. 1397), Richard II’s half-brother: Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, pp. 157–8. 125   Charlton (d. 18 or 19 October 1401 at Usk – PPC I, p. 174, n.) was married to Alice, daughter of the late earl of Arundel: Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, p. 128. 121

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a view to recruiting support there.126 Within four days of his landing at Conwy, the earl had gathered a very large force from North Wales and Cheshire. While the figure of 40,000 men Creton offers is an obvious exaggeration, the idea that significant support was available there is far from unlikely. Had Rhys and Gwilym ap Tudur, king’s esquires and leading uchelwyr in Anglesey, been in the company of Salisbury, their gathering support from the locality of Conwy would, in light of their role in the later rebellion and as leaders of the squirearchy of North Wales, have easily been achieved. Though elevated for his loyalty to the king, Salisbury was lord of Hawarden and Moldsdale and was appointed to the unprecedented office of ‘governor of the principality of Chester and of the parts of North Wales’ on 19 July 1399. Other preparations had been put in hand. William Eggerton was appointed keeper of Harlech Castle and ordered to provide it with supplies and men on 30 July.127 What became of the army so frantically assembled by Salisbury is another of those questions which cannot be satisfactorily answered. Creton’s suggestion that a rumour of the king’s death caused widespread desertion after a fortnight is perhaps less likely than the pragmatic acceptance of Bolingbroke’s victory. In this, the Welsh were no more or less fickle than the men of Cheshire who had surrendered without a fight by 9 August.128 In Wales, the aftermath of Richard’s capture and deposition came to be overshadowed by Owain Glyndŵr’s rebellion. In the northern shires, many of Richard’s apparent supporters joined Glyndŵr. Owain’s cousins, Rhys and Gwilym ap Tudur, were granted pensions of £10 annually to serve Richard in person in July 1398 and were, in all probability, with Richard in Ireland in 1399. Their loyalty to their former master may have been one of the factors that influenced their support or, as some have suggested, instigation, of Glyndŵr’s revolt in 1400.129 In the southern counties of the principality many of those who had benefited from Richard’s favour passed into Lancastrian service with barely a flutter. Many, perhaps most, of such men, some of whom are identified above, were conspicuous by their loyalty in the face of Glyndŵr’s rebellion in the following decade. Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Gruffudd

126   Jean Creton, ‘A Metrical History of Richard, King of England, with Particular Reference to the Rebellion of His Subjects and of His Seizure: written by a distinguished French gentleman, who, with the permission of the king of France, followed the said king’, ed. J. Webb, Archaeologia 20 (1824), pp. 13–423. 127   TNA CHES 2/73 m. 1. For the Montague connection to Mold and Moldsdale, see Davies, The Age of Conquest, p. 471. 128   Creton, ‘Metrical History’, pp. 322–4; Davies ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester 1397–9’, pp. 275–7. 129   CPR 1396–99, p. 400.

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Sais130 and Llywelyn Fychan ap Llywelyn Goch131 reached swift and lasting accommodation with the new regime. Their sensitivity to political matters may be one reason why Richard found support on his return so difficult to obtain in Wales. Richard II is generally believed to have enjoyed good relations with the Welsh, though such a statement suggests a sense of ‘national’ feeling or identity that is undoubtedly misplaced. This does not mean that the lands of Wales were entirely peaceful or wholly supportive during any particular phase of Richard’s reign. It is true that many of the rebels of 1400 were drawn from among Richard’s supporters, as was the case in Cheshire, but equally revealing is that many had served the king’s opponents at various times in their careers, a category to which Owain Glyndŵr himself belonged through his attachment to the earl of Arundel. Moreover, a substantial number of men continued in office and took patronage from both Richard II and Henry IV without a murmur, exactly as was the case in much of England. Richard’s sway, particularly over North Wales, was extremely significant, and in it may be discerned something of the origins of the rebellion begun there under Owain Glyndŵr. Conclusions In a period of near constant conflict, it is unsurprising that Welshmen featured in every theatre of war. The changes in the organisation and conduct of war were felt in Wales particularly strongly. Prior to 1360, war was a mass participation exercise organised communally and with a strong participatory element. The Welsh tenants of the principality and the March were obliged to serve their lords in war and the exercise of lordship in like manner was a frequent demand of the English Crown. This led some men, like Sir Gregory Sais and Owain Lawgoch, into careers as routiers. Their influence, in the case of Sir Gregory as a focus for recruitment, and in the case of Owain as a focus for Welsh opposition, had direct effect on the military service of Welshmen. Owain Lawgoch’s importance also had an obvious political effect but his threat was primarily a military one. Like Gaunt’s claim to the Castilian throne, Owain Lawgoch’s claim to be prince of Wales was used to undermine the stability of the enemy and its allies and there is good evidence to suggest that Owain enjoyed the support of men whose military experience in 130   CPR 1396–99, p. 281. He was probably from Cantref Mawr and another whose service bridged the change of regime and whose loyalty seems to have been constant during the period of rebellion. He was named as a king’s esquire by 30 January 1398 (CPR 1396–99, p. 281), and continued in royal service until at least 1417. See Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 320, 326, 359, 360, 363, 381. 131   CPR 1396–99, p. 285. For Llywelyn Fychan ap Llywelyn Goch, probably of Anhuniog, Cardiganshire, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 114, 125, 128, 272, 285, 309, 325, 481, 531, 532, 534, 536, 545. He was described as a king’s esquire in 1397 (TNA SC 6/1159/14 m. 8); he clearly transferred his loyalty to the new regime, and appears to have remained loyal throughout the rebellion. He was a dominant figure in Cardiganshire society for upward of thirty years.

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English service could be put to good use. No invasion came, however, but Owain had sufficient pull to draw Welshmen and even Englishmen living in the March into French service. His influence was deemed sufficiently ‘national’ and disruptive to see him spied on and assassinated. The importance of direct lordship in the shires and March of Wales remained. Although the Welsh squirearchy were increasingly drawn into the mainstream of the military community of the English realm, their service was still tied to connections of lordship and locality. Owain Glyndŵr, merely a prominent Welsh squire at this stage of his career, served Gregory Sais and the earl of Arundel. Their influence was focused on the north-east of Wales and was, so far as Owain was concerned, personal. The ability of Marcher lords to draw upon their Welsh tenants when required is most clearly shown in the revolution on 1399. Henry Bolingbroke’s dominance of southern Wales outside the principality deprived Richard of an easy way into England and bolstered his own military resources. Personal lordship translated easily into armed force and this can be seen most clearly in Ireland where Welshmen served at their lord’s behest. Those capable of serving as men-atarms had an ability to choose which captain to serve to a degree; this choice was not available to those serving as archers and there is little evidence that such men served anyone beyond their immediate lords. The Crown also attempted to draw on its resources in Wales. The recruitment of companies of Welsh archers partially paid from household resources in 1385, 1394 and probably in 1399, suggests that, for Richard II at least, the theory of military obligation on a communal basis was no dead letter. His appointment of key individuals as king’s esquires also echoes the policies of Edward I and Edward II, who concentrated power and largesse in the hands of trusted Welsh lieutenants. As an attempt at direct influence this was unsuccessful but may have had significant consequences in the longer term. It was the native squirearchy, trained in the ways of war, that fomented a decade of rebellion.

5

Henry IV and Henry V Rebellion and Aftermath

The role of Welshmen in the affairs of England in the fifteenth century was shaped, above all else, by the events of its first decade. Henry IV had leant on his Welsh estates to secure his path to the throne and as king had added them to the royal demesne. The shires of the principality were granted to his son, Henry of Monmouth, but the effect was to place approximately two-thirds of Wales under royal control. The apparently secure hold over the royal demesne in Wales was soon challenged. Owain Glyndŵr, esquire and a Welsh baron of princely descent, began a rebellion that lasted about ten years and defined Anglo-Welsh relationships for the remainder of the century. The military experience won in the course of the rebellion by both the prince and the Welsh leaders was an important factor in the manner in which England fought its wars in France and the shape of Welsh society. The first part of this chapter considers the military response to the rebellion within Wales and by Welshmen as well as Englishmen. It goes on to address the process of reconciliation between the end of the rebellion and the end of Henry V’s reign in 1422. All Welshmen were touched by the rebellion and most would have had some sort of military involvement with it: as a result, Wales was remilitarised. As in the period after the Edwardian conquest, Welshmen could be treated as a military resource but a resource that was difficult to trust. The second part of this chapter examines the way in which the English government went about using the experience of the rebellion. After the rebellion, military service was part of a wider process of reconciliation and accommodation. Former rebels served in England’s armies alongside those who had remained loyal to Henry IV and his son, the prince of Wales. The reconciliation of former rebels is an important theme in the second part of this chapter and is discussed in relation to the earl of Arundel’s expedition to France in 1411 and Henry V’s expedition in 1415. Finally, there is a consideration of how Welshmen made military careers after the rebellion in the invasion of France. This chapter is therefore, a study of rebellion, resistance and reconciliation.

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The Reign of Henry IV: The Glyndŵr Rebellion, 1400–10 Owain Glyndŵr’s motives in declaring himself prince of Wales have been examined inconclusively over six centuries, but a few facts are significant. From the perspective of the society in which he lived he had a claim to the title. He was descended from the princely families of northern Powys and Deheubarth and related by marriage to the descendants of Ednyfed Fychan who had all but taken the place of the princely dynasties in post-conquest Wales. This was clearly widely understood and Owain used these facts to his advantage. We must also consider the nature of his proclamation of his right to the title of prince of Wales. If we are to believe some very scant evidence, Owain’s declaration was a reaction to his neighbour, Reginald Grey of Ruthin, failing to pass on a summons for service with Henry IV in Scotland. As a royal tenant-in-chief, a Welsh baron, Owain might have expected to receive one, as might Grey, whose Marcher lordship gave him similar status. Grey had definite connections to the Ricardian regime, however, and such summonses were generally issued to royal annuitants, possibly to ensure the loyalty of those who had deserted Richard.1 While there is no record of Glyndŵr being in receipt of such an annuity, or of a specific association with Richard, he and his father had been servants of the earls of Arundel and other Welsh associates of the executed earl of Arundel were crown annuitants.2 Whatever the facts of the matter, a dispute between neighbours would be poor justification for the declaration of open rebellion against the Crown and usurpation of a royal title. Other facts suggest that Owain’s motives must have been more complex. Glyndŵr’s first raid was against Ruthin on 18 September; the subsequent attacks over the following five days on Flint, Rhuddlan, Holt, Oswestry (where the rebels wrought such destruction that the earl of Arundel was compelled to grant the burgesses a new charter) and Welshpool suggest that any dispute with Grey was a pretext for something longer in planning.3 An inquisition held at Oswestry on 6 October 1400 stated the declaration of rebellion had been made at Glyndyfrdwy on 16 September 1400. It names Glyndŵr’s accomplices together with 147 individuals involved in the initial raids on the towns.4 However, William de Venables, constable of Chester Castle, made efforts to reinforce his garrison ‘because of the insurrection in North Wales’ two days earlier, on 14 September.5 It is

  Bell et al., ‘New Regime, New Army?’ pp. 1396–400.   For example, John ap Gwilym of Chirk, above, p. 103; Bell, War and the Soldier, pp. 175–80; Goodman, ‘Owain Glyn Dŵr before 1400’, pp. 167–70.   3   Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p. 102.   4   G.C.G. Roberts, ‘Oswestry 1400: Owain Glyndŵr’s Supporters on Trial’, Studia Celtica, 40 (2006), pp. 117–26. The gist of the conclusions of this jury, with further specific details relating to John Kynaston, steward of Ellesmere, are recited in a case brought before the King’s Bench; Coram Rege Rolls, 2 Henry IV, Easter, rex m. 18, Salop; printed in G.O. Sayles (ed.), Select Cases in the Court of the King’s Bench under Richard II, Henry IV and Henry V, Selden Society 87 (London, 1971), pp. 116–17.   5   TNA SC 6/774/11.   1

  2

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not certain whether Venables was reacting to violence or to rumour but the reason for this difference might well have been symbolic. Owain had chosen 16 September because it was the birthday of Henry of Monmouth, the young prince of Wales. There is an indication that the value of a significant date was recognised by Owain and his supporters. One of the named participants of the assembly at Glyndyfrdwy was Crach Ffinnant (Scab of Ffinnant), described as eorum propheta (their prophet), and from other sources, Y Crach is known to have been a poet, skilled in the prophetic tradition. Later in Owain’s rebellion he was said to have consulted Tomas ap Hopkin ab Einion, a master of that art.6 Glyndŵr’s declaration was also a semi-public event: the time, place and names of the participants were well known. These included Owain’s cousins, Rhys and Gwilym ap Tudur of Anglesey, king’s esquires of Richard II, who were in Ireland with Richard in both 1394 and 1399.7 The possibility that the rebellion was part of a wider reaction against the Lancastrian regime with a strong pro-Ricardian element cannot be dismissed. If this is the case, then the first flash of rebellion could be said to have had much in common with the failed revolt in Cheshire and the Epiphany Plot early in 1400.8 The national ambitions of the second phase of the Welsh rebellion at its height may not have been what the rebels intended at the outset but were part of the exuberance of success. Whatever triggered the rebellion, its effects on Wales and the March were dramatic. A society that, with only minor disturbances, had been relatively peaceful for around a century – a length of time unprecedented in Welsh history – plunged into widespread, sustained and divisive conflict. The reach of royal and Marcher government was, for a time, severely limited but not destroyed. Governance clearly survived in one form or another and, after the rebellion subsided, its financial elements, at least, recovered relatively quickly. The national character of this conflict, originating in the north and east of Wales, but, like the wars of the thirteenth century, gradually encompassing the whole of Wales and its March, is remarkable. Glyndŵr and those around him gradually developed a programme for an independent Welsh state which included a parliament and universities as well as exploitation of the divisions which Henry IV’s usurpation had brought to the surface   TNA SC 6/774/11 and G. Aled Williams, ‘Gwrthryfel Glyndŵr: Dau Nodyn’, Llên Cymru 33 (2010), pp. 180–7. Both Lloyd, Owen Glendower, p. 31 and Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p. 102 make note of the date of the declaration, but neither attaches any significance to it. Davies does discuss Owain’s use of prophecy however (Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, pp. 55, 159–61), and there has been a great deal of interest in the subject, including J.A. Doig, ‘The Prophecy of the “Six Kings to Follow John” and Owain Glyndŵr’, Studia Celtica 39 (1995), pp. 257–67 and H. Fulton, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Uses of Prophecy’, Studia Celtica 39 (2005), pp. 105–21.   7   See above and K. Williams-Jones, ‘The Taking of Conwy Castle, 1401’, Caernarvonshire Historical Society Transactions 39 (1978), pp. 6–43.   8   Given-Wilson (ed.), Adam Usk, pp. 86–92.   6

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in England. Whether these aspirations – even with French assistance or help from rebels in England – were achievable is beyond the scope of this study, as are most of its long-term effects. The aim of this chapter is to examine the militarisation of Welsh society that the rebellion brought about, its effects and its aftermath. There have been several attempts at constructing a narrative of the rebellion, but relatively little attention has been paid to the organisation of the English military response on a ‘national’ scale. Several local studies have examined the effects on particular towns, counties and lordships. Rhidian Griffiths and Rees Davies built upon Lloyd’s account of the military affairs of the revolt and illustrated the Crown’s defence of its interests. Though the government of the principality was theoretically in the hands of the young prince of Wales throughout the period, his influence is difficult to quantify. In part this is because of Henry of Monmouth’s youth and the limited survival of the records of his household. More important perhaps is that the military action directed against Glyndŵr was very much a Lancastrian family affair. Henry IV, as son of the duke of Lancaster and as earl of Derby, must have been brought up with a keen awareness of the role of the Marcher lord. The king was, as we have seen, lord of a significant part of the south-east March and through the minorities of other Marcher lords, responsible for the custody of much more. The estates of the FitzAlans, the Despensers and the Mortimers were all in the king’s hands and several of the other Marcher liberties, notably Denbigh, were subject to royal custodians in this period. Finally, the revolt was expressed as a challenge to royal and not merely princely authority. Henry of Monmouth was the first English prince of Wales to be compelled to fight for his principality and, by usurping the title of prince, Glyndŵr and his followers were rejecting the authority of the Crown. The initial response to the rebellion in September 1400 was led by the officials of the English counties bordering the March in much the same way as their predecessors had done in the thirteenth century. The follow-up, a lightning raid on northern Wales led by the king himself following his return from Scotland at the beginning of October 1400, was seemingly decisive but our knowledge of the military response to later phases of the rebellion is limited. Large armies were relatively rare and almost invariably unsuccessful. The accounts of Prince Henry’s household, coupled with even a cursory examination of the preparations made by the English Crown against the impact of the rebellion, reveal a heavy reliance on the border counties of England and the co-ordination of the March, its lords and officials.9 In the absence of the scale of resources brought to bear by Edward I, local men were relied upon to look after their own interests for only limited rewards. Between the incursion made by the king on his return from Scotland in 1400 and the army led by the prince that besieged Aberystwyth in 1407, only three major expeditions – in 1401, 1402 and 1403 – were sent against Glyndŵr and his forces.   W.R.M. Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry’s War: Armies, Garrisons and Supply during the Glyndŵr Rising’, BBCS 34 (1987), pp. 165–73.

  9

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113

This was a consequence of the state of royal finances, which were inadequate, and those expeditions that were despatched were therefore ineffective. In August 1401, for example, Prince Henry was ordered to lead the men of Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire assembled by a commission of array. Under the terms of this commission, service was unpaid and inevitably unpopular. On 31 July 1402, in an echo of Edward I’s wars in Wales, writs were issued for the array of no fewer than seventeen counties, the duchy of Lancaster and Bristol.10 The soldiers recruited were part of a three-pronged expedition under the king, his son, and the earls of Warwick and Stafford. This expedition failed to make much of an impression. In the following year, Prince Henry’s efforts as lieutenant in Wales collapsed for lack of money. Large and expensive expeditions were abandoned and Henry IV’s policy was built around the maintenance of strategic castles. At various times, as many as sixty castles were garrisoned in the shires and March of Wales. This was more successful: although several castles were overrun at various times, the rebels succeeded in capturing and holding only two major royal castles, Aberystwyth and Harlech. The garrisons staffing the castles were often severely pressed, however. Added to the garrison strategy, regional commanders – almost all gentry of the border counties and Marcher liberties – attempted to maintain an economic blockade. The success of this is impossible to gauge. It may have had some effect, but was clearly regularly breached by land and sea. Scottish and French ships were active off the Welsh coast and in North Wales. Furthermore, it is clear that an important official, the chamberlain, Thomas Barneby, made significant profits from breaching it!11 Tables 1 and 2 summarise the scale of garrison forces employed by the Crown and in lordships under royal control during the rebellion. It is known that many other castles were garrisoned, most by Marcher lords acting at their own expense, so these figures show only some of the picture. Table 1 uses financial records which may only give the type and number of soldiers employed for a particular period. It shows that the greatest number of soldiers were employed during 1401 after the first flush of rebellion had been suppressed. The aim, no doubt was to secure a centre of English authority and to prevent the rebellion coming back to life. When this was unsuccessful it can be seen that large concentrations of troops were unusual. Castle garrisons seldom numbered more than thirty men and the larger numbers reflect either royal expeditions operating from regional centres such as Carmarthen or standing forces intended to control a large area. The latter also had a much lower ratio of men-at-arms to archers, reflecting their wider role.

  CPR 1401–5, pp. 137–8.   Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, particularly ch. 9, ‘Guerrillas and Garrisons’. For the double dealing and self-serving chamberlain, Thomas Barneby, see R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Glyndŵr Rebellion in North Wales Through the Eyes of an Englishman’, in Griffiths, Conquerors and Conquered, pp. 123–38.

  10  11

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Table 1: English garrisons and standing forces in Wales and the Welsh March under Henry IV† Garrison/standing force

Date (start)

Men-atarms

Archers

Total

Denbigh

1401

30

120

Rhuddlan

1401

9

40

Conwy

1401

15

Beaumaris

1401

15

Caernarfon

1401

20

Cricieth

1401

6

1401

Harlech

Ratio

Reference (TNA, except where stated)

150

1:4

E 101/36/1

49

1:4.4

E 101/36/1

60

75

1:4

E 101/36/1

140

155

1:9.3

E 101/36/1

80

100

1:4

E 101/36/1

50

56

1:8.3

E 101/36/1

10

30

40

1:3

E 101/36/1

Cydweli Castle

17.5.1401

0

12

12

–

DL 29/584/9241 m. 2

Swansea

0.9.1401

3

18

21

1:3

SC 6/1202/16 m. 2

Denbigh

29.9.1401

7

3

10

1:0.43

E 101/43/9 m. 2

Carmarthen town and Castle

9.10.1401

20

80

100

1:5

E 403/571, m. 2

Cardigan Castle

21.10.1401

50

250

300

1:5

E 403/571, m. 9

Aberystwyth

21.10.1401

30

80

110

1:2.7

E 403/571, m. 9

Aberystwyth

24.11.1401

30

80

110

1:2.7

E 403/571, m. 27

Swansea

6.7.1402

2

6

8

1:3

SC 6/1202/17 m. 2

Denbigh

8.7.1402

0

5

5

–

E 101/43/9

Radnor and area

9.8.1402

10

22

32

1:2.2

E 101/43/11

Swansea

10.1402

4

8

12

1:2

SC 6/1202/17 m. 2

Radnor and area

2.10.1402

11

16

27

1:1.5

E 101/43/11

Narberth

1.11.1402

10

20

30

1:2

E 101/43/23

Haverford

0.0.1403

3

12

15

1:4

BL Cleo. F III, f. 42d

Montgomery Castle

4.2.1403

20

100

120

1:5

E 101/43/20

Llanbadarn Fawr

17.4.1403

1

8

9

1:8

E 101/404/24 (2), m. 16d

Ludlow Castle

17.4.1403

1

8

9

1:8

E 101/404/24 (2), m. 16

Radnor and area

27.4.1403

7

14

21

1:2

E 101/43/11

Caernarfon Castle 12.6.1403 and town

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/24, m. 5d

Llanbadarn Fawr

13.6.1403

3

30

33

1:10

E 101/404/24 (1), f. 9v

Conwy Castle

13.6.1403

1

13

14

1:13

E 101/43/24, m. 5

Conwy town

14.6.1403

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/24, m. 4

a

henry iv and henry v Garrison/standing force (cont.)

Date (start)

Men-atarms

Archers

Total

Cydweli Castleb

24.6.1403

1

6

Radnor and area

24.6.1403

11

60

Harlech

26.6.1403

2

24

26

Flint Castle

4.8.1403

0

6

Flint Castle

29.9.1403

0

Carmarthen

29.9.1403

121

Rhuddlan

29.9.1403

1

6

7

Brecon Castle and 9.10.1403 lordship

100

300

400

7

19

115 Ratio

Reference (TNA)

7

1:6

DL 29/584/9842 m. 1

71

1:5.5

E 101/43/11

1:12

E 101/404/24 (1), f. 13v

6

–

E 101/43/24, m. 5

12

12

–

E 101/43/24, m. 5

452

573

1:3.7

E 101/43/13

1: 6

E 101/43/24, m. 5

1:3

E 403/578, m. 1

26

1:2.7

E 101/43/11

Radnor and area

31.10.1403

Flint Castle

2.11.1403

0

18

18

–

E 101/43/24, m. 5

Carmarthen town

21.12.1403

60

200

260

1:3.3

E 403/578, m. 14

Caernarfon town

24.1.1404

4

43

47

1:10.8

E 101/43/24, mm. 2, 3

Radnor and area

24.1.1404

14

32

46

1:2.3

E 101/43/11

Rhuddlan

9.2.1404

1

16

17

1:16

E 101/43/24, m. 5d

Conwy Castle

9.2.1404

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/24, m. 5

Brecon Castle and 15.2.1404 lordship

100

300

400

1:3

E 403/578, m. 17

Caernarfon Castlec

28.2.1404

1

21

22

1:21

E 101/43/39, m. 1

Caernarfon town

12.3.1404

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 2

Radnor and area

18.3.1404

4

12

16

1:3

E 101/43/11

Cardigan and Llanbadarn Fawr

31.3.1404

12

45

57

1:3.8

E 101/43/36, m. 1

Conwy Castle

15.5.1404

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/24, m. 6

Cydweli

1.7.1404

1

8

9

1:8

DL 29/584/9842

Welsh March

1.7.1404

42

70

112

1:1.66

E 101/404/24 (2), m. 16d

Brecon

1.8.1404

0

20

20

–

E 101/404/24 (2), m. 16d

Rhuddlan

30.8.1404

1

19

20

1:19

E 101/43/24, m. 5d

Rhuddlan

7.9.1404

1

19

20

1:19

E 101/43/35, m. 1

Radnor and area

28.9.1404

2

13

15

1:6.5

E 101/43/11

Caernarfon Castle 29.9.1404

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1

Caernarfon town

29.9.1404

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1

Beaumaris

29.9.1404

2

30

32

1:15

E 101/43/35, m. 1

Conwy Castle

29.9.1404

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1

henry iv and henry v

116 Garrison/standing force (cont.)

Date (start)

Men-atarms

Archers

Total

Conwy town

29.9.1404

Rhuddlan Flint Castle

Ratio

Reference (TNA)

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1

29.9.1404

1

29.9.1404

0

19

20

1:19

E 101/43/35, m. 2

18

18

–

E 101/43/35, m. 1

Herefordshire

1.10.1404

Chester Castle

24.10.1404

101

204

305

1:2

E 101/404/24 (1), f.16v

0

8

8

–

E 101/43/35, m. 2d

Cydweli Castle

25.12.1404

1

21

22

1:21

DL 29/584/9842 m.

Caernarfon Castle 21.3.1405

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Caernarfon town

21.3.1405

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Beaumaris

21.3.1405

2

30

32

1:15

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Conwy Castle

21.3.1405

1

12

13

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Conwy town

21.3.1405

2

24

26

1:12

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Rhuddlan

21.3.1405

1

19

20

1:19

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Flint Castle

21.3.1405

0

18

18

–

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Chester Castle

21.3.1405

0

8

8

–

E 101/43/35, m. 1d

Caernarfon Castle 1.2.1406 and town

14

53

67

1:3.8

E 101/43/39, m. 1

Cydweli Castle

29.9.1406

4

17

21

1:4.25

DL 29/584/9842 m.

Cydweli Castle

1.5.1407

2

12

14

1:6

DL 29/584/9842 m.

Notes   For additional comment on, and analysis of, garrison strengths in Wales during the rising, see W.R.M.

†

Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry’s War: Armies, Garrisons and Supply during the Glyndŵr Rising’, BBCS 34 (1987), pp. 168–71. This table has been adapted from one originally collated by David Simpkin. I would like to thank him and the Soldier Project for its use. Note that Llanbadarn Fawr and Aberystwyth are the same castles; the table preserves the original terminology. a   These twelve men are listed as ‘watchmen’. b   Those present in the castle also included thirteen men employed as watchmen and a chaplain. c   No period of service stated, but payments for owed wages apparently made on this date. Garrison size for this date given as 1 + 12 in E 101/43/35, m. 2.

Table 2 provides numerical details of the eight extant muster lists (or sets of muster rolls) for the ‘English’ garrisons during the Welsh revolt. It should be remembered that Marcher lords were generally responsible for defending their lordships against the rebels at their own expense and no records of their expenditure in protecting their own interests are known to have survived. The reason that these musters were made at all is because these garrisons were, for one reason or another, paid by the Crown. In the case of Bishop’s Castle, Shropshire, and La Pole (Welshpool), Powys, this would not normally have been the case; the bishop

henry iv and henry v

117

of Hereford or Lord Charlton would have been expected to maintain their own interests. For Bishop’s Castle, the temporalities of the bishopric had come into the hands of the Crown following the death of John Treffnant, bishop of Hereford (29 March 1404). A note on the muster roll for Welshpool shows that Charlton was maintaining his own household and retinue at his own expense, that is, at the expense of the community of the lordship. The garrison was presumably serving for royal pay in support of Charlton’s continuing commission from the Crown to maintain the peace in the central March.12 The composition of the garrisons suggests that it was formed of local men, often of some status. Other castles were maintained at royal expense because their lords were minors, and the revenues of the lordships were being severely depleted by the rebellion. Examples include the Mortimer lordships of Denbigh and Radnor and also the Pembrokeshire lordship and castle of Narberth which came into royal hands in November 1402 when its custodian, Edmund Mortimer, was captured by the rebels and later joined them, going so far as to marry one of Glyndŵr’s daughters.13 A prosopographical approach to the surviving records reveals the extent of the involvement of English and Welsh communities in the containment and repression of the rebellion. Davies provided outlines of the careers of the key men of the localities who managed the war effectively: local men such as Robert Parys and his son, who led the defence of Caernarfon; experienced soldiers like Richard Arundel at Hay; and local lords like Charlton of Powys or Thomas Carew in Pembroke who were – like the men they commanded – defending their own interests.14 Whilst it is possible to detect the numbers of men placed in garrisons and the expenditure required to maintain them, the origins and ‘military careers’ of the participants need further study. Though admittedly an incomplete picture, the surviving financial records for castle garrisons and standing forces provide effective coverage of the height of the rebellion between 1402 and 1408. Musters survive for Montgomery and Bishops Castle (Shropshire) between 1404 and 1408, for Narberth in 1404–5 and for Carmarthen and Newcastle Emlyn between 1402 and 1404. Records of the garrison of Brecon appear in the wardrobe book of John Spenser for 1404. For 1405, records of the garrisons of La Pole (Welshpool), Carmarthen and Llanbadarn Fawr survive, and, inevitably, examples from these sources are the most accessible.15   CPR 1401–5, pp. 21, 24.   Edmund Mortimer had been granted Narberth by his brother, the earl of March, in July 1397: CPR 1396–99, p. 256. For the garrison of Narberth, TNA E 101/43/23 and for more details concerning the importance of Narberth see Turvey, ‘The Marcher Shire of Pembroke’, pp. 156–7.  14   Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyndŵr, ch. 8. For the Parys family more generally, R.A. Griffiths, ‘An Immigrant Elite in the Later Middle Ages: Locating the De Parys Family in North Wales and Chester’, WHR 25 (2010), pp. 168–200.  15   Montgomery and Bishops Castle: TNA E 101/44/6, E 101/44/14; Narberth: TNA E 101/43/23; Carmarthen and South Wales (1403): TNA E 101/43/21; Carmarthen and Newcastle Emlyn (1404): TNA E 101/43/29; Cardigan and Llanbadarn Fawr (1405): TNA E/101/44/4; La Pole (1404–5): TNA E 101/44/3.  12  13

henry iv and henry v

118

Table 2: English garrisons in Wales and the Welsh March for which musters survive, 1400–9 Place

Date (start)

Captain

Men-atarms

Archers

Ratio

Reference (TNA)

Narberth

1.11.02

Carew, Sir Thomas

10 (1 knight)

20

1:2

E 101/43/23

Bishop’s Castle

26.3.04

Brigge, John

7

30

1:4.2

E 101/43/28

Cardigana

31.3.04

Burton, Sir Thomas

12 (1 knight)

45

1:3.75

E 101/43/36

Llanbadarn Fawra

31.3.04

Burton, Sir Thomas

12 (1 knight)

45

1:3.75

E 101/43/36

Carmarthen

1.5.04

Villeneuve, Rustin

81 (6 knights)

240

1:3

E 101/43/29

Newcastle Emlyn

1.5.04

Villeneuve, Rustin

10

25

1:2.5

E 101/43/29

Montgomery

1.12.04

Furnivall, Lord Thomas

45

140

1:3.1

E 101/44/6

Bishop’s Castle

1.12.04

Furnivall, Lord Thomas

5

10

1:2

E 101/44/6

Welshpoolb

6.12.04

Charlton, Lord Edward

20

84

1:4.1

E 101/44/3

Cardigana

27.4.05

Burton, Sir Thomas,

10

40

1:4

E 101/44/4

Llanbadarn Fawra

27.4.05

Burton, Sir Thomas

10

40

1:4

E 101/44/4

Montgomery

25.4.07

Furnivall, Lord John

24 (1 baron) 101

1:4

E 101/44/14

Notes a   These garrisons were held jointly. ‘Lampadervaur’ is how the garrison is described in the document, but the castle was also known as Aberystwyth or Llanbadarn Fawr in the period in question. b   This was probably not the full strength of the garrison at Welshpool (Pole) as the men in the muster were said to be ultra familia et retinencia of Edward Charlton, Lord of Powys.

  What these reveal is the gap between stated English policy, as willed by parliament, and military expediency. The legislation imposed by parliament in 1402 that

There are a number of surviving accounts for castle constables, including Denbigh and Caernarfon (1404–6): TNA E 101/43/39, that give names. Nominal evidence for other garrisons can be reconstructed from financial documents: Conwy (1403–4): TNA E 101/43/24; Cydweli (1402–8): TNA DL 29/584/9242; Brecon (1404): TNA 101/404/24 (2) m. 16d; Harlech (before its surrender to Owain, 1403): E 101/404/24 (1) fol. 10.

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Welshmen should not be armed ‘except those which be lawful liege people to our sovereign Lord the King’, or that Welshmen should not have or keep castles and walled towns nor be allowed to hold offices, not even those Englishmen married to Welsh women, was completely and utterly impractical.16 The surviving musters show that garrisons in South Wales were routinely dominated by local Welshmen, the majority population in any event, who had as much to lose from the effects of the rebellion as the English communities in their midst. This is unsurprising; war in Wales was not much like the war in France, nor even the expeditions to Scotland and Ireland. The only predictable factors were bad weather and appalling terrain. One consequence, illustrated by a report from the earl of Somerset to the king’s council in 1403, was an unwillingness to serve there. That the earl stated that his knights, esquires and other troops would not stay in Carmarthen a day longer than their contracts prescribed at any price (pour chose du monde) should provoke no great wonder.17 The military response to the revolt in Wales was often, from the perspective of English commanders, frustratingly fragmented. In 1402–3, Richard Grey of Codnor found that the men of Pembroke refused to render military aid beyond the boundary of the lordship, while other commanders found that they had no authority to chase rebel forces into neighbouring lordships, or even royal lands, without first obtaining licence to do so.18 Our perspective on the men who fought against the rebels is largely financial. Administrative records give numbers, rates of pay, duration of service and, occasionally, names. A cywydd composed by Madoc ap Goronwy Gethin praising the river Dee for bursting its banks and preventing the English entering Maelor Cymraeg (otherwise Iâl, the Arundel lordship of Bromfield and Yale), illustrates the tone of Welsh perspectives on the opposition to the revolt. The account it gives cannot be related to any other source, a problem that is all too common. Dyfrdwy fawr, gannawr gynnrych Dyfr gwrdd a lvdd, Deifr a gyrch; Dewr a chadarn i’th varnwyd Dwfr rhyfeldwydd agwrdd wyd Ban fy fwyr, caetha cad Bwgyth Saeson a’i bygad O ladd a llosgi ar lenn Maelawr, oleuwawr lawen … … Mefyl i’r Sais a’n treisiai Hir i druth a hwyr I drai; Pan ddelai, erfai aerfaeth Y gwyr i’r cyrch gwewyr caeth Mud glud glodrudd, treiddydd tref

  I. Bowen (ed.), The Statutes of Wales (London, 1908), pp. 35–7.  PPC, i, pp. 217–18, cited in Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p. 241.  18   Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyndŵr, p. 257.  16  17

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120 O nidr nid ai yr yn adref Rhai a faeddudd glud glodlif A’r llaill foddyd ar llif.

Great Dee, product of the wave foam Strong water that will hinder, that will rush upon the men of Deira; Brave and strong were you adjudged Water and warlike tumult you are mighty When the threat of the Saxons Most grievous of conflicts And their host was at its greatest In killing and burning along the borders Of Maelor of bright joyous aspect … … Shame to the Saxons who would oppress us Great his deceit and slow to retire When the men came splendid battle trained To the attack (with their) sharp spears A relentless renowned flow, frequenter of townships Through hindrance not one returned Some you beat, a relentless celebrated deluge Others you drowned in the flood.19

Llywelyn ab y Moel (d. 1440) provides a more direct impression of the guerrilla warfare characteristic of this revolt. His poem, generally known as ‘Y Frwydr Waun Gaseg’ (The Battle of Waun Gaseg), offers a rebel’s view of the ‘English’ military forces from somewhere in south-east Wales. Identification of the location is difficult: there were three places with the name Waun Gaseg, one near Monmouth, another near Llanbadog, immediately to the north of Usk, and a third a mile or so to the north of the Cistercian abbey of Cwmhir near New Radnor in the lordship of Maelienydd. It is far from certain that the poem even dates to the period of rebellion, since Llywelyn, by his own admission, seems to have been involved in banditry in later years. There has been an understandable desire to associate the poem with the known narrative of the rebellion in south-east Wales, particularly with the defeat and capture of Gruffudd ab Owain, Glyndŵr’s eldest son, at Pwll Melyn in 1405.20 The self-deprecating tone of the poem – Llywelyn and his fellows merely talk a good fight and flee when the English soldiers appear – and the absence of any mention of Gruffudd ab Owain Glyndŵr rather count against that suggestion. Whether Llywelyn’s account is accurate, or even concerns

  D.H. Evans, ‘An Incident on the Dee during the Glyndŵr Rebellion?’ Denbighshire Historical Society Transactions 37 (1988), pp. 5–40.  20   See Cledwyn Fychan, ‘Llywelyn ab y Moel a’r Canolbarth’, Llên Cymru 15 (1984–88), pp. 289–307, and E. Roberts, ‘Uchelwyr y Beirdd’, Denbighshire Historical Society Transactions 24 (1975), pp. 38–73, discussed by R. Iestyn Daniel (ed.), Gwaith Dafydd Bach ap Madog Wladaidd ‘Sypyn Cyfeiliog’ a Llywelyn ab y Moel (Aberystwyth, 1998), pp. 138–9.  19

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the events of the rebellion at all, it is an interesting evocation of how the garrison forces described above might have been employed.21 Nacha’ gwelem o’n hemyl Ellwng i’n plith (chwith fu’r chwŷl) Ar hyd gorlechwedd rhedyn O feirch mwy no chanmeirch ynn A chyda hwynt, pwynt apêl, Awchus leferydd uchel. Simwned eurged arwgainc (Sym brochwart ffromart o Ffranic, Gên âb, yn canu tabwrdd) O glariwn uwch no gwn gwrdd. … Trosasant tros nawnant ni, Tresor gwŷr esgor Gaer Wysg, Troisiad geifr, trwsiad gofrwysg. Twrn girad traw i’n gorwyf Tost wyf ynn weled, tyst wyf, Ar Waun Gaseg, wen gysellt, Wewyr ein gwŷr yn y gwellt. Beside us suddenly we espied Through the bracken – woe betide! – Into our midst in full course Charging, more than a hundred horse. And with them came – and ’pon my word More piercing din was never heard – A whippersnapper, spruce and trim – French badgerward would blush at him – Whose monkey mouth from his bugle blew Sounds ruder than a cannon ever knew. … As goats are driven, they drove us then with the wild rush of Usk’s picked men. A rude turn to our pride had we, And bitter was it there to see, Flung on Waun Gaesg’s grassy green, Our bloodless lances, bright and clean.22

Since Llywelyn calls the soldiers tresor gwŷr esgor Gaer Wysg (the treasure men of Usk Castle camp), the location within the lordship of Usk, and a date within the period of rebellion seem most probable. The description tresor gŵyr could refer to the fact that the men were fighting for pay, in contrast to – as Llywelyn saw them

  Llywelyn ab y Moel, otherwise Llywelyn ap Moel y Pantri, WBO, accessed 24 November 2012.   Iestyn Daniel (ed.), Gwaith Dafydd Bach et al., ‘I frwydr Waun Gaseg/The Battle of Waun Gaseg’, lines 17–26, 39–45, pp. 94–5. The translation is from G. Jones, The Oxford Book of Welsh Verse in English (Oxford, 1977), pp. 57–8.  21

 22

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– the rather nobler aims of the rebels. If they were camped near the castle, as the poem suggests, then it might be that Llywelyn had a royal expeditionary force, rather than a garrison, in mind. The Marcher shire of Pembroke, so distant from prospects of external support, had little choice but to negotiate terms with the rebels or to frustrate their efforts. Turvey’s analysis of resistance to the revolt in Pembrokeshire shows that, almost exclusively, it was a local affair managed by local men. The exception was the keeper of the earldom of Pembroke. Francis de Court was appointed keeper of the earldom and the lordship of Cilgerran and was in residence and active against the rebels from 1402 onwards. Although he was probably Italian, he had been a member of Henry’s court and his presence was an indication of the seriousness of the rebellion, as such authority was ordinarily delegated to local officials.23 The imposition of an outsider like de Court was unusual, and elsewhere many of the smaller garrisons were compelled to rely on local resources. More significant military action, however, required external support. The force that retook and occupied Carmarthen in 1403, though it contained local elements under the treasurer of Carmarthen, John de Morehay, consisted of many men from the south-west of England including the unlikely person of the bishop of Bath and Wells. Such men were necessarily a feature of the resistance to the rebellion throughout its course, particularly for resupplying the castles of the Welsh coast by sea.24 The expeditionary army led by Sir Richard d’Arundel in 1405 gives a picture of a society divided by rebellion.25 Though d’Arundel himself was an experienced soldier and commander, the bulk of the 400 men under his leadership can be identified as local men. The evidence of toponyms, which, in a Welsh context, are probably more reliable than would be the case in England, suggests that the expedition led by d’Arundel in southern Wales in 1405 was dominated by the men of the border counties and the lordship of Brecon. Some were drawn from the Welsh squirearchy, with others from among the merchants and burgess of the towns of South and West Wales and the March. Many of the latter appear to have originated from the Lancastrian estates within Wales, though some are more readily identifiable than others: Hugh and Davy Brecknock probably emanated from the lordship of Brecon; the two William Havards – junior and senior – were from Pontwilym, in the same lordship. A relative, probably William the elder’s father, John or Jankyn Havard, was constable of Dinefwr (Carmarthenshire) in the Twyi valley. It says something for the adaptability of fifteenth-century Welsh society that John Harvard, ‘hoyw Frytyn/a merry Briton’, could receive praise in the poetry

  R.F. Walker (ed.), Pembrokeshire County History, volume II (Haverfordwest, 2002), pp. 227–8.   R.A. Griffiths, ‘Carmarthen’, in idem (ed.), Boroughs of Medieval Wales (Cardiff, 1978), pp. 154–5.  25   TNA E 101/44/7.  23

 24

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of Guto’r Glyn later in the fifteenth century.26 Guto also praised his fellow poet, and confessed rebel, Llywelyn ab y Moel while Ieuan ap Hywel Swrdwal, praising Sir Richard Gethin of Builth, who had prospered in the wars in Normandy, remembered that ‘Ei dad a dorrai siad Sais’ (his father would crack an English skull).27 Sir Richard’s father was one of Glyndŵr’s lieutenants, Rhys Gethin. The legacy of rebellion had to be carefully negotiated.28 An example of the difficulty of differentiating Welsh from English was a man from Brecon, William Sourdeval, who served in d’Arundel’s army. William’s son, indicted in the great sessions that drew a line under the rebellion in 1413, was recorded as William Fychan ap Gwilym Sourdeval, indicating that the family had adopted something of the Welsh society in which they lived. These cultural connections went further later in the century when the Sourdevals or Swrdwals produced poets of their own.29 Thomas Bannow, a merchant of Carmarthen engaged in the Gascon wine trade, also served as a man-at-arms in d’Arundel’s expedition in 1405. Returning from Gascony in 1402, he had been captured and subsequently ransomed by a Scots fleet operating off the Welsh coast. Proving that not only the Welsh and Scots were the adversaries of the loyal residents of Wales, on his return to Carmarthen, he suffered further misfortune. He was detained, unlawfully, by the men of Walsall. Philip Bannow, presumably a relative, served in the same capacity, as did a number of his fellow Carmarthen burgesses.30 Notable among these was one of Welsh origin, Hywel ap Philip, a merchant who had previously served as deputy constable of   ‘Moliant i Siancyn Havart o Aberhonddu/Praise to John Havard of Brecon’, www.gutorglyn. net/ poem 31, line 2.  27   Lewis, ‘Opening up the Archives of Welsh Poetry’, pp. 9, 14, citing D. Foster Evans (ed.), Gwaith Hywel Swrdwal (Cardiff, 2000), ‘Moliant i Syr Rishart Gethin ap Rhys Gethin o Fuellt/Praise to Sir Richard Gethin ap Rhys Gethin of Builth’, line 32 on p. 94.  28   William Havard the elder is probably to be identified with William fitz Jankyn, burgess of Brecon, who was rewarded with forfeited rebel lands in 1403 by way of compensation for lost goods to the value of £200: TNA DL 42/15 fol. 158–158v, cited in R.R. Davies, ‘Brecon’, in Griffiths (ed.), Boroughs of Medieval Wales, p. 66. See also Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 248–9; For Guto’r Glyn’s elegy to Llywelyn ab y Moel on his death, see ‘Marwnad i Llywelyn ab y Moel/Elegy for Llywelyn ab y Moel’, www.gutorglyn.net poem 81. For the career of Rhys Gethin, see Cledwyn Fychan, Pwy Oedd Rhys Gethin? Yr Ymchwil am Gadfridog Owain Glyndŵr (Aberystwyth, 2007).  29   For William Swrdwal, see Evans (ed.), Gwaith Hywel Swrdwal; R.R. Davies, ‘Race Relations in Post-Conquest Wales: Confrontation and Compromise’, THSC (1975 for 1974), p. 52, citing TNA JUST 1/1152 m. 11.  30   TNA E 101/44/7. The Bannow family had a far wider presence in south-west Wales; Philip Bannow (d. 1430) was resident in Carmarthen, and bailiff of the town twice: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 335, 337. John Bannow, burgess of Tenby, was ordered to take corn and other foodstuffs to the castle of Cydweli in 1403, CCR 1401–5, p. 34, and also shipped merchandise to Spain in 1405 for which he received a general pardon in 1414. He was witness to a document releasing two burgage plots in Tenby on 16 April 1403: NLW Picton Castle 24. He may have to be distinguished from John Bannow of Carmarthen: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 290, 347, 353. Thomas himself was clearly involved in the Gascon wine trade before his capture by the Scots; Cal. Anc. Pet., p. 457.  26

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Carmarthen Castle before 1397–98 and twice as bailiff of the borough, in 1387–88, and again in 1395–96. Other parts of the southern principality were also represented. Richard Mortimer, for example, was probably from the Cardiganshire family of that name, established there since the late thirteenth century. He had already served among the men-at-arms in the garrison of Carmarthen under John Beaufort, earl of Somerset, in 1403.31 Others were drawn from across southern Wales and the southern liberties in the March, men such as John Somery, lord of Dinas Powys in Glamorgan, and Robert Greyndor (d. 1443) of Monmouth and Abenhall, Herefordshire. Such examples could be multiplied. These men and their families were securely embedded in their localities, descendants of settlers who had followed the earliest Marcher conquerors in South Wales, and also of the Welsh elites of these areas.32 Relatively few can be shown to have had much in the way of earlier military experience, and only in a few rare cases can this experience be demonstrated to have translated into a longer career. One such man, Robert Boys, served as a man-at-arms in the retinue of Edmund Mortimer, earl of March, in France in 1421. It is possible that he was the ‘Robinet’ who served as an archer in the expedition led by Richard Arundel in 1405.33 Despite the state of war in Wales, some Welshmen served abroad in this period. Two Pembrokeshire men took letters of protection to serve at Hammes Castle in the Calais March in April 1401 under Sir Thomas Swinburne. These men, Richard Sumnour and John Wyseman, were from the English community of the Marcher county that had been unaffected by the first – unsuccessful – thrust of the rebellion in North Wales in the autumn of 1400 and the spring of 1401. More surprising is the presence of Ralph Tudor as an esquire with John Beaufort, duke of Somerset, in Calais itself in 1405.34 Similarly, one Maredudd ap Madoc was granted letters of protection to serve in Ireland with Henry IV’s son Thomas in 1403, when the revolt was approaching its height.35

  R.A. Griffiths, ‘Medieval Carmarthen’, in Griffiths, Conquerors and Conquered, p. 184; for his service in 1403, TNA E 101/43/21 m. 1.  32   A John Somery also served in the retinue of the earl of Arundel in 1415: TNA E 101/47/1 m. 1. Robert Greyndor or Greindor was the son of Sir John Greindor and also served in his father’s retinue with Henry IV in Scotland in 1400: TNA E 101/41/1 m. 21; Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 235–7. For further details of the interests of these families and others, see Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 413–424.  33   TNA E 101/50/1 m. 1.  34   Sumnour and Wyseman: TNA C 76/85 m. 9. A John Wyseman served in 1415: TNA E 101/45/17 m. 4. Ralph Tudor esquire: TNA C 76/88 m. 11; he might possibly be identified with Raulyn Tudor, an esquire in the retinue of Sir John d’Arundel in Arundel’s naval expedition of 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 m. 6.  35  CPR 1401–5, p. 195. An esquire of this name served in the garrison of Montgomery from 1404–1408 and might plausibly be the same individual: TNA E 101/44/6 and TNA E 101/44/14.  31

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The Prince’s Household While the persistence of English royal authority against the rebels depended on Welshmen, Prince Henry’s own household, from the available evidence, was all but exclusively English. The wardrobe book of John Spencer, controller of the wardrobe of Prince Henry, for the years 1403–6, reveals significant detail relating to various aspects of the war in Wales: the garrisons of several of the castles of North Wales and Brecon, the role of the prince’s household in the expeditionary army sent to North Wales in 1403, and the English relief force sent to the besieged castle at Harlech before its loss to Glyndŵr in 1404. The named individuals are, unsurprisingly, almost exclusively of the rank of esquire and above. The Welsh connections of many of these men were frequently somewhat tenuous. Most were men of the border counties and from the prince’s demesne, especially Cheshire. A notable exception was Thomas Griffith, son of Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II, who served with four archers for twenty-eight days in 1404. He was a Staffordshire man rather than a Welshman, holding no office in Wales though his son and grandson did. It is unlikely that this single instance reflects the sum of Griffith’s service, nor that of Thomas Howell of Pembrokeshire who appears in the same record.36 This was another burden among many for Cheshire. This burden greatly increased when the men of Flintshire joined the rebellion after 1403. Prior to this point, the county of Flint had been more or less responsible for its own defence and dependent upon the county’s Welsh community.37 The documents of the county palatine reveal the financial dependency of the North Wales castles on Cheshire revenues, though these were insufficient to meet the demands of the garrisons for pay, provisions or reinforcements. In consequence, the unfortunate garrisons were largely left to their own devices to ride out the storm. Eight archers who survived the siege of Harlech by the Welsh were only paid after the castle fell, disease and starvation having compelled their surrender in 1404.38 Similarly, the men of Cheshire were repeatedly arrayed for their own defence, their own interests being, in common with those of the lordships of the March and the border counties, threatened by the existence of the rebellion to the west.39 Two of the most interesting examples of the effects of the rebellion on the Marcher gentry were Sir Laurence Berkerolles, lord of Coity, in Glamorgan, and

  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 263. He served in North Wales 17 April–18 July 1403: TNA E 101/404/24 (2) m. 16.  37   For example, DKR 36, pp. 37, 45, 55, 63.  38   For payments to the Harlech garrison in 1402–3, TNA E 101/404/24 (1) fol. 10; and its surrender, Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, pp. 116–17.  39   A. Curry, ‘The Demesne of the County Palatine of Chester in the Early Fifteenth Century’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Manchester, 1977), pp. 280–6. For a general summary of the financial straits suffered by the prince’s administration, see R. Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales and the Royal Exchequer, 1400–13’, BBCS 32 (1985), pp. 202–15.  36

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East Orchard, Merthyr Mawr and Lampha, in the lordship of Ogmore, and John Fleming of Cowbridge, who was deputy steward of the king’s lordship of Ogmore by 1400. As men from established families in southern Wales, that they should have served on this occasion is far from remarkable. Berkerolles served with his lord, Edward Despenser, in 1372, as did Fleming. This is the only evidence of Berkerolles having pursued a military career. Fleming, however, also served as a man-at-arms in Ireland between 1389 and 1392.40 In their civilian life both men were typical of their contemporaries, such as the Stradlings of St Donats and the de la Beres of Weobley Castle, in the lordship of Gower. All of them had interests in south-west England as well as in southern Wales. The rebellion marked a parting of the ways, since Berkerolles, whose primary residence had been Coity Castle since 1384, was besieged by Glyndŵr between 1404 and 1405. Fleming, for reasons of his own, joined the rebels and may even have been among the besiegers.41 The general implication of the available evidence is that the period of rebellion produced a marked remilitarisation of the shires and March of Wales, and provided a generation of men with significant, intensive, if occasionally reluctant military experience. Self-reliance rather than massed campaigns eventually proved the most effective policy. The evidence of muster and pay records show that English interests in Wales were largely maintained by men who had not hitherto considered themselves as soldiers. It appears that only a relatively small proportion developed this into a military career – a number of these are discussed with relation to the campaign in France in 1415 below – though the next generation of Welshmen more than made up for this deficiency. The effect of the remilitarisation of Welsh society should not be overstated. The economic devastation and the retreat of external administration and control that characterised Wales and its March in this period were more pertinent. The military skills and rediscovered Welsh belligerence, once directed overseas, became tools in this process. After the Rebellion The wars in Wales coincided with instability and outbreaks of civil war in France, owing to the mental frailty of Charles VI. In August 1411, towards the end of the rebellion in Wales, negotiations between the English and the Burgundian faction began. They were clearly sufficiently advanced by mid-August for Henry IV to order all those holding royal annuities to muster in London on 23 September in preparation for an expedition in support of the Burgundians – a recruitment tactic employed again in 1415. His stated intention was to defend the Calais March and the king’s friends and allies in adjacent parts. He eventually decided against this

  TNA E 101/41/18, m. 4.   R.A. Griffiths, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Siege of Coity Castle, 1404–1405’, Morgannwg 45 (2001), pp. 19–23. A William Fleming was among those whose lands were confiscated in the lordship of Newport though he may have been unrelated: TNA SC 6/924/21.  40  41

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course of action but approaches to the prince of Wales in early September resulted in Thomas, earl of Arundel (b. 1392), landing at Calais with 200 men-at-arms and 800 archers to serve for two months, undoubtedly with the prince’s approval. The prince may have contributed to the costs of the expedition and Arundel certainly received money from his Welsh tenants towards his campaign.42 The army, however, was paid for by John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy.43 Arundel’s men joined William Bardolf, lieutenant of Calais, with approximately 300 men from the garrison there, who had been serving under Burgundy since July. This accords with chronicle sources which suggest that the army totalled between 1,200 and 2,600 men. Chroniclers also name Sir Robert Umfraville, Gilbert Umfraville, Sir John Grey, John Phelip and William Porter. Monstrelet noted that the earl of Pembroke – a title not held at that date – was also present. This is a confused reference to the Milanese esquire, Francis de Court, who had been keeper of the lordship of Pembrokeshire throughout the rebellion.44 Another man with strong Marcher connections known to have been present was the Lollard, and later rebel, Sir John Oldcastle.45 Welsh participation among Arundel’s army cannot be quantified, but one of the earl’s archers, who was wounded in the leg at St Cloud and perhaps had his horse killed under him, was named Hugh Thue (Huw Ddu). He was almost certainly one of the earl’s Welsh tenants. The duke gave him 11 francs and 5 sous to buy another horse and to pay for his needs while he recovered from his wounds.46 The relevance of this expedition to the situation in Wales is that some insight can be gained into the process of reconciliation of rebels to the Crown by means of military service. Three letters survive relating to one individual’s attempt to secure pardon and favour apparently through service on this campaign.47 These letters are relatively well known, but their military context is worth recording. The first, dated at Ruthin on 23 June, was sent by Reginald, Lord Grey, to his ‘Ryght heigh and myghty Prynce, my goode and gracious lorde’. The prince can only be Henry of Monmouth. The second is a letter from Gruffudd ap Dafydd ap Gruffudd to Grey himself, dated 11 June. The third is Grey’s reply to Gruffudd and was clearly composed in the same month. Internal references to preparations for an overseas

  Ll. Beverley Smith, ‘Seigniorial Income in the Fourteenth Century: The Arundels in Chirk’, BBCS 28 (1978–80), p. 449.  43   A. Tuck, ‘The Earl of Arundel’s Expedition to France, 1411’, in G. Dodd and E. Biggs (eds), The Reign of Henry IV: Rebellion and Survival, 1403–1413 (York, 2008), pp. 230–2.  44   Curry, Agincourt: A New History, p. 24; Walker (ed.), Pembrokeshire County History, volume II, pp. 227–8.  45   A. Curry, ‘After Agincourt, What Next?’ in L. Clark (ed.), The Fifteenth Century 7: Conflicts, Consequences and the Crown in the Late Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2007), pp. 23–51.  46   Tuck, ‘The Earl of Arundel’s Expedition’, p. 234.  47   J. Beverley Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, BBCS 22 (1966–68), pp. 150–60. Smith also neatly summarised the debate surrounding these documents. Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, pp. 266, 297, endorses 1411 as the year in question.  42

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expedition refer to the recruitment of Arundel’s army in September or October 1411. The letters clearly refer to these preparations being in the past, so the letters themselves must have been composed in June 1412, some time after the expedition’s return from France, as Arundel did not serve in the subsequent campaign sent to assist the Armagnacs in 1412. Taken together, the letters provide a mass of interesting information surrounding the state of the north-east March in the dying phase of the rebellion. Despite the recovery of seigneurial revenues in the immediate post-rebellion period, and the regular presence of Marcher lords, everyday authority in the March was at a premium. Powell’s study of disorder in Shropshire during the same period demonstrates that such difficulties were far from confined to the Marcher liberties but were part of a wider malaise with Arundel and his retainers at its centre. The case of one of the letter writers, Gruffudd ap Dafydd ap Gruffudd, makes this obvious. Gruffudd was an apparently unrepentant rebel, acting with transparent impunity beyond the reach of royal justice. In 1411 he stated that he was under the ‘protection’ of Maredudd ab Owain, last surviving son of Owain Glyndŵr, and in a position – so he felt – to engineer his peace on good terms.48 Gruffudd implied he had been promised a handsome arrangement, made under safe conduct in the Arundel lordship of Chirk, negotiated through his cousins and formalised in front of John Trefor, onetime chamberlain of Chester and Glyndŵr’s bishop of St Asaph. In return for forsaking rebellion, John Wele, steward of Oswestry, allegedly promised Gruffudd the offices of ‘maester forester and “keyshat”’ in ‘Chirk is lond’ (the lordship of Chirk) and a royal pardon.49 These offers were made without official sanction. When similar negotiations conducted by Wele in 1409 came to the notice of royal authority in 1414, Wele required the intervention of the earl himself to extricate him from the ensuing proceedings.50 In return for his pardon, Wele apparently offered to take Gruffudd overseas in paid service. Gruffudd promptly found two men, armour and horses and contacted the receiver of Chirk, Peter Cambrey, for the agreed wages at the point of muster in Oswestry.51 Cambrey, who was also planning to serve, had neither wages nor place in his retinue for Gruffudd and referred him to Sir Richard Lacon. Sir Richard was a Shropshire knight and sometime steward of the Arundel lordship of Clun who served with   The concept of ‘protection’ in this context really warrants more detailed study.   ‘Keyshat’ is probably a corruption of Cais, or sergeant.  50   Wele was steward of Oswestry 1408–15; Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, pp. 251–2.  51   Cambrey was still receiver of Chirk in 1416–17 and served in the garrison of la Pole (Welshpool) in 1403–4 as a man-at-arms: Smith, ‘The Last Phases of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, pp. 251–2; TNA E 101/44/3 m. 2. The family, apparently originating in Cambrai, had been associated with La Pole as burgesses since the thirteenth century and Peter himself had been a bailiff of the borough in 1396: Shropshire Archives D593/A/1/16/12, cited by P.G. Barton, ‘Welshpool Burgesses from 1241 to 1485: The Lilleshall Abbey Leases’, Montgomeryshire Collections 95 (2007), pp. 40, 54.  48

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Arundel in 1415. Cambrey and Lacon, with the sheriff of Merioneth, Thomas Straunge, then allegedly made moves to apprehend Gruffudd on the grounds that his safe conduct did not apply outside the lordship of Chirk and he was forced to flee. The indirect result was the appeal contained in his letter.52 There is a strong suggestion of collusion among these Arundel servants. Their actions should remind us of the particularity of Marcher administration in general and that, even among lordships held by the same lord, custom in one lordship could not necessarily be transferred to another. This is not to say that Wele and Lacon were blameless. With other servants of the earl of Arundel, they were indicted for a variety of offences in Shropshire before the King’s Bench at Shrewsbury in March 1414.53 How much Gruffudd’s account should be trusted is open to question. It seems unlikely that such an important official as Wele had planned to serve overseas in 1411. Four years later, when his lord served in France with Henry V, Wele’s role was to ensure the peace in North Wales. This failed attempt at buying loyalty from a former rebel with the carrot of military service is intriguing. Gruffudd ap Dafydd ap Gruffudd clearly regarded himself as a man of some substance in his own community and paid military service in an expedition was some reward in itself. Like many rebels, he sought pardon but hoped to gain favour. The offices in Chirk would no doubt have had their dividends in both respects and done much to buttress the damaged authority of Marcher administration. Evidence of a different sort, but for a similar phenomenon, can be found in the records of the Welshmen recruited from Henry V’s Welsh principality shires in 1415. While it would be unwise to regard the musters as a catalogue of South Wales rebels of the previous decade, another unusual feature of these musters is suggestive. Those sealed at Carmarthen – but not those sealed at Brecon – list no fewer than 117 men serving in the place of another named individual. At the very least this implies that the men who provided substitutes had been summoned in person. Several who can be identified were former rebels; they probably represent many more. Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Henry Dwnn, Rhys ap Llywelyn, and Maredudd ab Owain were among the men-at-arms mustered at Carmarthen;

  Sir Richard Lacon was MP for Shropshire in 1413 and 1433 and steward of Oswestry between 1420 and 1422, serving on the expedition to France with Arundel in 1415 (he is not described as a knight in Arundel’s retinue) and with Bedford in 1420: 1415, TNA E 101/47/1 m. 1 and in 1420 TNA E 101/49/36 m. 7. With Thomas Straunge he was one of four men who entered into a recognisance for the keeping of Chirk Castle in 1420. Straunge also served as sheriff of Merioneth in 1415 (see below) and it is possible he served with Arundel in 1387 and 1388: TNA E 101/41/5 and TNA E 101/40/33. Smith, ‘The Last Phases of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, p. 251, E. Powell, Kingship, Law and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Oxford, 1989), pp. 233–5.  53   E. Powell, ‘Proceedings before the Justices of the Peace at Shrewsbury in 1414: a supplement to the Shropshire Peace Roll’, EHR 99 (1984), pp. 537–9.  52

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possibly they were repenting publicly for their rebellion and served in person.54 Rebellion may not have been the only factor. A former rhingyll of Caerwedros (Cardiganshire), Einion Gethin, had forfeited his assets, consisting of eighty sheep, two oxen, one cow and a horse in 1408. He had served as reeve in Caerwedros in 1410, and in 1415 served as a substitute for Rhys ap Dafydd ab Ieuan Boule. Pardon might have been part of Einion’s motivation, though others, like Maredudd ap Rhys Fychan, bailiff of Mabelfyw (Carmarthenshire), in 1415 may have felt these official responsibilities outweighed the military need of the Crown and supplied a substitute to serve in his stead.55 Powell suggested that Henry V’s ‘main instruments in restoring public order were conciliation and recruitment to military service’.56 These examples demonstrate the interaction of the two approaches. France, 1415 Henry of Monmouth’s accession to the throne of England meant that the Crown enjoyed a hitherto unparalleled dominance over Wales and the March. The shires of the principality he had held as prince were brought under the same rule as the Marcher estates of the duchy of Lancaster. From his father’s first wife, Mary de Bohun (d. 1394), came the estates of the earls of Hereford. These included most of the lordships of Brecon and Hay, together with Cantref Sylef and Llywel. Following the death of John of Gaunt, Henry IV had held the lordships of Ogmore, Cydweli, Monmouth and Three Castles. With the earldom of Pembroke in royal hands as well, and the estates of the earldom of March subject to another minority, Henry V enjoyed territorial dominance over southern Wales. Only Glamorgan, the largest of the Marcher liberties, lay outside his hands. However, security of these estates remained a burden, though their revenues could help to offset this to some degree. Although, as we have seen, efforts at achieving accommodations with former rebels were on-going by judicial and other means, the reopening of the war with France required more concentrated efforts. Between 1415 and the end of Henry V’s reign, the rapprochement between the king and his Welsh subjects was far from complete. Rebellion was suspected as late as   TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2; of these only Gruffudd Dwnn remained in France long enough to serve at Agincourt and, as the grandson of the notorious Henry Dwnn, received pardon with him in 1413 and letters of denizenship in 1421: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 201–2. Rhys ap Llywelyn and Maredudd ab Owain fell ill at Harfleur and returned home: TNA E 101/45/1 m. 12. Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Trahaiarn seems to have remained in West Wales; see above. For their rebellion, R.R. Davies, ‘The Bohun and Lancaster Lordships in Wales in the Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries’ (unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1965), pp. 272–3, Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, pp. 311–13.  55   For Einion Gethin, TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2d and Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 493, 497, 514; Maredudd ap Rhys Fychan: TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2 and Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 382; that he received two general pardons, in April 1416 and in March 1417, may be unrelated.  56   Powell, Kingship, Law and Society, p. 229.  54

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1417, and the county of Merioneth was – and remained for large parts of the fifteenth century – a ‘wild west’, subject to only the most limited of government. The security of the county was therefore of great importance, and not to be entrusted to the Welsh. The reiteration, in 1417, of statutes of the fourth year of Henry IV, to the effect that castle constables should be resident in their posts and should be of English birth, was apparently on the recommendation of the constable of Harlech. It illustrates the extent of this mistrust. More broadly, it also emphasises the inability of English authorities to fully control the situation. While Glyndŵr was no longer a threat militarily, he was unlikely to be betrayed; he therefore kept his freedom and still possessed the potential to inspire discord. Plans for the invasion of France made this a threat that needed to be neutralised. On 5 July 1415, Gilbert Talbot, the justiciar of Chester, was authorised to receive Owain into the king’s peace, an offer which appears magnanimous, but was merely official recognition of the status quo. If contact was made, Glyndŵr must have declined, and probably died in the autumn of 1415. That intelligence of this had reached the English government is suggested by the fact that Talbot was issued with similar instructions, this time directed at Glyndŵr’s last surviving son, Maredudd ab Owain, on 24 February 1416.57 Drawing a comprehensive picture of the measures taken in 1415 against further rebellion after the reopening of the war with France is difficult. The accounts of the chamberlain of North Wales do not survive for the first four years of Henry V’s reign. In South Wales, the equivalent chamberlain’s accounts are unavailable from Michaelmas 1415 to Michaelmas 1416. Even in generally well-documented lordships such as Chirk, the records for 1415–16 have been lost, though in the Lancaster lordships in southern Wales, a reasonable impression of the military preparedness in this period can be obtained. The degree to which Welshmen were trusted to participate in these measures is difficult to gauge. In North Wales, in particular, the surviving evidence strongly suggests that Englishmen were employed, though in the southern shires and March, the picture is more varied. The bishops in England and Wales were ordered to array their clergy, by writs dated at Winchester on 28 May 1415. The newly installed bishop of St Davids, Stephen Patrington, found only forty men ‘well and competently arrayed and armed and two hundred other persons who were bowmen, well arrayed and armed with bows, swords and other kinds of weapons according to their condition’.58 Deeming these inadequate, he compelled a further 124 to be arranged. In the diocese of Llandaff, the bishop, despite complaining of the lawless conditions of his diocese,

  There is reasonable fifteenth-century evidence that Glyndŵr died in September 1415, J.R.S. Phillips, ‘When Did Owain Glyndŵr Die?’, BBCS 24 (1970), pp. 59–77. The instructions to Talbot can be found in CPR 1413–16, pp. 342, 404. Owain’s last surviving son, Maredudd, eventually accepted pardon on 8 April 1421: CPR 1416–22, p. 335. J.H. Wylie and W.T. Waugh, The Reign of Henry the Fifth, volume I: 1413–1415 (London, 1914), pp. 113–14.  58   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 257.  57

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conducted no fewer than three arrays in person at Cardiff, Magor and Usk. These yielded 230 men from among his clergy and their households, twenty-four of whom were equipped to the standard of a man-at-arms.59 That even the clergy could produce such a relatively large number of armed men is suggestive of the militarisation of Wales and the March during the rebellion. The lords of the March were also ordered to garrison their castles and Henry himself spent significant sums on gunpowder artillery for his own castles in his principality and duchy.60 External forces were also deployed to keep the peace in Merioneth, the heartland of the rebellion. From 24 March, sixty men-at-arms and 120 archers were divided equally between the Cistercian Abbey of Cymer, near Dolgellau. A similar force, paid from the revenues of South Wales, was established at another Cistercian abbey, Strata Florida (Welsh: Ystrad Fflur), near Aberystwyth on the southern borders of Merioneth.61 From 24 June, until Michaelmas, another 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers were to be deployed between North and South Wales under the joint leadership of Thomas Straunge, the sheriff of Merioneth, and John Merbury, chamberlain of South Wales. Finally, a similar number of troops was deployed from Michaelmas until the end of December.62 These men were probably English. The sixty men-at-arms and 120 archers employed in South Wales between 26 August and 28 November 1415 were commanded by John Merbury, Richard Oldcastle (constable of Aberystwyth) and Sir Robert Whitney, all Herefordshire men. In North Wales, £263 was paid to John Wele, recently steward of Oswestry, and Thomas Straunge. It is probable that these men were drawn from the earl of Arundel’s Shropshire estates.63

  Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 256–8. The returns from the northern dioceses of Bangor and St Asaph have not survived.  60   TNA E 403/623 m. 5.  61   Very similar precautions were made in 1412: PPC I, pp. 35, 38.  62  PPC II, p. 179. The account printed there, London, BL Cotton Cleopatra F. III fol. 137 runs from 24 June 1415 to 24 June 1416. The total cost of these measures was £1,496.  63   TNA E 403/621 m. 6. Note that the payment for the force in North Wales was not made to the chamberlain of North Wales, Thomas Walton, but directly to Straunge, who, as sheriff of Merioneth, presumably assumed military command. Wele was steward of Oswestry between 1408–1415; Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, pp. 250–1.  59

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Table 3: Garrison strengths in Wales in 1415† Castle

Lordship/county

Constable

Garrison

Aberystwyth Flint

Cardigan

Richard Oldcastle

12 men-at-arms; 8 archers

Flint

Sir Roger Leche

1 man-at-arms; 6 archers

Rhuddlan

Flint

Nicholas Saxton

1 man-at-arms; 6 archers

Carreg Cennen

Cydweli

Rhys ap Thomas

6 archers

Cydweli

Cydweli

Walter Moreton

12 archers

Brecon

Brecon

John Merbury

12 archers

Skenfrith

Monmouth

Thomas Andrewe

6 archers

Hay

Hay

John Philpot

6 archers

Grosmont

Monmouth

John Scudamore

a

4 archers

Notes †   The totals and named constables for the Lancaster castles are drawn from TNA DL 29/584/9243 (Receivers

Accounts for Cydweli 2–3 Hen V) and TNA DL 29/731/12021 (Duchy of Lancaster Valors 2–3 Hen V). a   Sir John Scudamore was with the king in France in 1415 and into 1416. It is likely that many of these constables were similarly absentees.

The most obvious precaution taken against renewed rebellion, however, was the establishment of garrisons. Table 3 details the size of the garrisons installed in a number of castles in the principality and within the royal demesne in the March. The constables of Cardigan, Carmarthen and Dinefwr were all paid from the revenues of South Wales but there is no evidence in the chamberlain’s accounts that they were garrisoned after 1413. Perhaps in 1415 the standing forces noted above were employed. The garrisons of Flintshire were paid from the revenues of the earldom of Chester. The respective chamberlains’ accounts provide this information. The castles of North Wales must have been garrisoned as well but no chamberlains’ accounts survive for the shires of North Wales until 1418. Welshmen in Henry V’s Army in 1415 The role of Welsh archers in Henry V’s victory at Agincourt has proved to be an enduring myth and, like most myths, it has been treated relatively uncritically. Though it has long been established that Welshmen played only a relatively small part in Henry V’s invasion army in 1415, it is only recent work that has shown the nature of this involvement.64 With the efforts made to secure Wales in 1415, and the recent history of sustained rebellion, it might be surprising that Welshmen served

  J.H. Wylie, ‘Some Notes on the Agincourt Roll’, TRHS Third Series 5 (1911), pp. 105–40, at p. 128; Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, pp. 26–8. For the full reassessment of the companies of archers from the royal demesne which is précised here, Chapman, ‘The King’s Welshmen’, pp. 41–64.  64

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overseas at all. However, Shakespeare’s portrayal of the Welsh captain, Fluellen, has been hugely influential, and reassessment of J.H. Wylie’s analysis, used by H.T. Evans and other more recent historians, has been slow in coming.65 Welshmen were directly recruited by Henry V from his demesne and served in France as part of the king’s own forces. Others served in small numbers in the retinues of Marcher lords. The distrust of Welshmen following the rebellion was such that this was entirely predictable. Most importantly, in the eyes of contemporary commentators, they made no special contribution to the outcome of the battle. Within Welsh society, Agincourt was not deemed important. Despite the abundance of Welsh language praise poetry that survives from the fifteenth century, and the large amount devoted to descendants of Dafydd Gam, who died at Agincourt, no mention of Agincourt is found in any of them.66 Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Hywel, or Dafydd Gam, seems to be viewed through the prism of Shakespeare, where he is mentioned among the dead, presumably because of the playwright’s use of Hall and Holinshed. Wylie suggests that Dafydd was also known as ‘Fluelin’, but on what basis is not made clear. Barker, echoing this, goes further, describing him explicitly as ‘the inspiration for Shakespeare’s Fluellen’, a link even accepted by the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.67 In the histories of Hall and Holinshed, Gam is noted among the battle dead and termed an esquire, but there is no mention of his being Welsh or hailing from Brecon.68 There were some distinctive features of Henry V’s recruitment from his Welsh estates in 1415 that seem to have been repeated in subsequent years. Welshmen were to play a distinctive role in the wars in France that followed and that, in turn, made a significant contribution to Welsh society in the fifteenth century. So how many Welshmen were recruited to Henry V’s army in 1415? How many of those fought in the battle of Agincourt? Neither figure is easy to establish with accuracy. The full numbers of those recruited from the Welsh March will never be known, though the available records provide some interesting insights. These will be discussed later. The details of the composition and organisation of the men

  The most recent scholarly works on 1415 are Curry, Agincourt: A New History and its companion piece, Curry, Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations.  66   This observation was made in the course of a discussion with Dylan Foster Evans, Barry Lewis and Ann Parry Owen: it is an interesting, and perhaps revealing omission.  67   J. Barker, Agincourt: The King, the Campaign, the Battle (London, 2005, 2nd edn, 2007), pp. 319–20, citing Wylie and Waugh, Henry the Fifth, volume I, pp. 188–9. For their probable source, see S.R. Meyrick (ed.), Heraldic Visitations of Wales and Part of the Marches between the years 1586 and 1613 under the authority of Clarencieux and Norroy, Two Kings of Arms, by Lewis Dwnn, Deputy Herald at Arms, 2 vols (Llandovery, 1846), volume II, p. 56, and G. Davies (ed.), Theophilus Jones, History of Brecknockshire (Brecon, 1898), pp. 45, 47, 50; T.F. Tout, ‘Dafydd Gam (d. 1415)’, rev. R.R. Davies, in Oxford DNB, accessed 7 January 2011.  68   Curry, Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, pp. 243, 259. Hall drew on the chronicle of Basset and Hanson and therefore chose to ignore the inclusion of ‘Welshman’ for Gam.  65

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raised from the royal demesne in Wales, however, are far better documented. These survive in the receipt for payment made to the leaders of the soldiers from the royal estates in southern Wales. Rather than being true records of a muster, these are the copies of the particulars of account of the chamberlain of South Wales, John Merbury.69 These indentures are not the same as those struck between the Crown and its captains for military service. If any were ever made, they have been lost and therefore their terms of service are unknown. The document consists of a file of nine indented membranes sewn together, recording three separate payments to soldiers. They detail three apparently separate musters of men recruited from the counties and liberties dependent upon their principality and those of two of the chief Lancastrian estates, the lordships of Brecon and Cydweli, with their neighboring and dependent lordships. The indentures were sealed between John Merbury and the men-at-arms (five each from Cardiganshire and Carmarthenshire with ten drawn from the lordship of Brecon) leading the archer companies.70 They show that three musters were held. The muster of the royal counties of Cardiganshire and Carmarthenshire was taken at Carmarthen, and that for the Lancaster lordships of Brecon, Hay and Huntington, as well as other minor lordships then in royal hands including Llanstephan, St Clears, Oysterlow and Talacharn, was apparently made at Brecon.71 The third muster of men was held at Cydweli. The men-at-arms named in the documents were presumably responsible for co-ordinating the recruitment of the archers and leading them. With the exception of the small retinue from Cydweli, the names of the men recruited for service are listed first by lordship and then by commote. From the royal shires of South Wales and their dependent lordships came ten menat-arms and thirteen mounted archers with 323 foot archers. From Brecon and other Lancaster lordships, there were ten men-at-arms, fourteen mounted archers and 146 foot archers. Both musters are dated 26 June 1415, though this smacks of administrative neatness. It is highly improbable that Merbury could have been in both Brecon and Carmarthen, more than 40 miles distant, to supervise both of

  TNA E 101/46/20.   The men-at-arms from Carmarthenshire were John ap Rhys, Henry ab Ieuan Gwyn, Rhys ap Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Fychan, Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Trahaiarn, Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Henry; from Cardiganshire: Maredudd ab Owain, Owen Mortimer, Owain ap Siencyn Llwyd, Llywelyn ap Gwilym Llwyd, Walter ap Gruffudd ab Ieuan. Those from Brecon: Watcyn Llwyd, Andrew ap Lewis, Ieuan ap Rycard ap Madoc, Gwilym ap Hywel ap Gwilym, Mabe Maredudd ap Rycard, Siencyn ap Meuric ap Rycard, Siencyn ap John ap Rhys, Philip ap Gwilym Bras, Rycard ap Meuric ap Rhys and Richard Boys. Finally, those from Cydweli were Gruffudd ab Ieuan Iscoed, Thomas ap Dafydd ap Thomas and Hywel ab Ieuan ap Hywel. The spelling of these names has been modernised though the distinction between Richard and Rycard has been retained. Details of these payments and indentures of receipt are reiterated in several surviving documents including TNA C 47/10/33/12 and E 101/45/5 m. 3.  71   TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2d and m. 3 respectively.  69

 70

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these musters in the course of the same day. With the three men-at-arms, three mounted archers and three foot archers from the lordship of Cydweli, we have a total of 525 men. Attached to these indentures is a warrant for reimbursement from the issues of the royal lands of South Wales, for the payment of the nine men from the lordship of Cydweli. Written in French – the remainder of this document is in Latin – this indenture was sealed by Thomas Walter, Merbury’s lieutenant as chamberlain, and Hugh Eyton, receiver of the Lancaster lordship of Cydweli (and also janitor of the royal castle of Aberystwyth), and was dated 6 April 1415. The men from Cydweli were paid on 20 June to serve for a full quarter commencing on 1 July.72 The terms of main indentures of receipt, however, are identical, recording the payment of wages for forty-five and a half days’ service (half a quarter of one year) to serve with the king on his expedition to France. Payment of these wages was to begin on 6 July, though no further mention is made of the period of service intended. At the foot of each indenture are the remains or traces of ten seals on separate tags, which makes it likely that the seals were those of the men-at-arms leading the retinues. Meaningful detail is visible on only two of the surviving seals however, and the best surviving seal bears the initials RB. This identifies the seal as that of Richard Boys, a man-at-arms from the lordship of Brecon.73 A minor but still significant orthographical point illustrates the linguistic divisions between Welsh and English in these documents. Richard Boys has his name written in the usual Latin manner, an abbreviated rendering of Ricardus. His Welsh counterparts, both among the men-at-arms and in the lists of archers, however, have the name spelt out in full as Rycard or Ricard, hinting at the Welsh form, Rhisiart. Interestingly, and for no readily explicable reason, no mention is made of the smaller Lancaster lordships of Ogmore, Monmouth and Three Castles. The only surviving receiver’s account from these lordships is for Monmouth and there are no hints in the other campaign accounts that similar archer companies were recruited from these lordships in 1415.74 In 1415, most of the indentures of war were made around mid-April and were generally sealed on 29 April.75 The first evidence for our force comes from 7 May, when £435 was transferred from the Exchequer to the chamberlain via the account of the sheriff of Hereford and the hands of William Botiller, a Lancastrian career civil servant and receiver in the lordship of Brecon.76 Henry V also called upon his demesne in Cheshire and Lancashire. In 1415, 247 men were raised from

  TNA E 101/46/20 m. 5.   TNA E 101/46/20 m. 3.  74   Receiver’s accounts for Monmouth, TNA DL 29/615/9844.  75   Curry, Agincourt: A New History, p. 69.  76   TNA SC 6/1222/14 m. 7–8. R.A. Griffiths, ‘William Botiller: A Fifteenth-Century Civil Servant’, in idem, King and Country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century (London, 1991), p. 181, n. 4.  72  73

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Cheshire and paid from its revenues, while 500 were recruited from Lancashire and paid directly by the Crown. These men were divided into groups of fifty, each group under the command of a local knight or esquire, often in addition to their personal retinue.77 In the earldom of Chester, some of the soldiers were paid from the revenues of the earldom. There is no suggestion in South Wales that any of the Lancaster lordships contributed in a similar manner. The Welsh archers were paid from the Exchequer throughout. The roles played by Merbury, Botiller, Eyton and Thomas Walter in the recruitment exercise demonstrate the close administrative relationship between the royal shires and the Lancastrian estates in the Welsh March. John Merbury was the chief financial and administrative officer of the extensive royal demesne in southern Wales. Merbury had been in Lancastrian service since at least 1395, and had subsequently served Henry of Monmouth during his time as prince of Wales. He was appointed to the office of chamberlain of South Wales in March 1400, and in February 1414 he was made steward of the lordship of Brecon. In 1417, he acquired the office of steward in the lordship of Cydweli and was appointed justiciar of South Wales in 1422.78 In each of the three indentures of receipt from 1415, however, he is described as chamberlain of South Wales, suggesting that the documents were drawn up in the Carmarthen exchequer. This was evidently the senior position, which indicates that the royal demesne in southern Wales, whether princely or ducal, was treated as a single unit under Henry V. Some of the archers recruited from Wales were diverted from their service in France to keep the peace in South Wales. Welshmen were also used to keep the peace. A force of nine men-at-arms, nine mounted archers and thirty-eight foot archers (valletorum ad pedes) were paid between 6 July and 11 November 1415.79 Four of the men-at-arms are named in the chamberlain’s account: Henry Gwyn;80 Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Trahaiarn;81

  Curry, Agincourt: A New History, pp. 60–1.   For full details of his origins and career, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 181–2.  79   For this period of a quarter of a year plus thirty-six days (three-eighths), they were paid £105 10s. 4½d. in addition to the £27 4½d. paid to them as a regard: TNA SC 6/1222/14, m. 3 and E 101/46/20, m. 2.  80   He is probably to be identified with the man of that name receiving the wages of the forester of Cydweli in 1415–16: TNA DL 29/584/9243.  81   He appears in TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2 as a man-at-arms. He was outlawed in 1397–98 and again for rebellion by 1401 when his property in Cantref Mawr was forfeited to Dafydd Gam. He was bailiff itinerant of Cantref Mawr in his own right in 1412–13 and 1419–20, and with Rhys ab Ieuan Fychan (who served as an archer from Widigada, Cantref Mawr in 1415) in 1413–14. He was subsequently the beneficiary of a general pardon: C 64/37 m. 5. See Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 298–9, 368.  77  78

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Llywelyn ap Gwilym Llwyd;82 and Ieuan Teg.83 All but Henry Gwyn were among the men raised from South Wales and mustered at Carmarthen to serve in France. Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Trahaiarn is the best documented of the three. His lands in Cantref Mawr (Carmarthenshire) had been forfeited to Dafydd Gam in November 1401 and presumably he had pardon, as well as mere wages, to gain. Ieuan Teg and Llywelyn ap Gwilym Llwyd had enlisted to serve as archers in France and both later held administrative offices in the royal shires of South Wales. For this period of a quarter of a year plus thirty-six days they were paid £105 10s. 4½d. in addition to £27 0s. 4½d. paid to them as a regard.84 The payment of regard in this context is surprising, and there are two possible explanations. The first is the usual reason for such payments, to offset the costs of men-at-arms equipping themselves for military service. Since these four named men-at-arms were among those recorded on the indentures made at Carmarthen, it is probable that they were already sufficiently equipped, so in this instance the money was probably to pay for horses. They presumably took responsibility for the payment from the chamberlain. Since their leaders were known to have been those recruited to serve in France, it is likely that their men were recruited from the same source, meaning that of the 525 men initially mustered, fifty-six are likely never to have left Wales at all. Even if the remaining 469 Welshmen from the royal demesne arrived safely in France, there were further losses before the battle. The unpleasant estuarine conditions at the mouth of the river Seine caused a significant number of casualties among the besieging army, most notably Thomas, earl of Arundel, and Richard Courtenay, bishop of Norwich. Many others also suffered and Allmand calculated that at least 1,687 men were officially regarded as ‘unfit for service’ by the end of the siege.85 Some of these men were given licence to return to England and several lists of the sick survive. They are not, of course, comprehensive and obviously fail to record those who left of their own accord. Adam Usk noted that there were some who ‘disgraceful to relate, simply deserted the army, to the king’s fury’.86 One of these lists, however, reveals that a good proportion of

 82   He may be identified with an archer of that name from Ystlwyf (Oysterlow, a dependent lordship of Carmarthenshire) in TNA E 101/46/20, m. 2. He was bailiff itinerant of Cardigan in 1409–10 and held several other offices: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 305.  83   Ieuan Teg was later reeve of Perfedd (Cardiganshire), 1424–25. He is possibly to be identified with Ieuan Teg ap Dafydd Llwyd (Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 454); a man of this name appears as an archer of Maenordeilo (Cantref Mawr): TNA E 101/46/20, m. 2.  84   TNA, SC 6/1222/14, m. 3 and E 101/46/20 m. 2.  85   C.T. Allmand, Henry V (New Haven and London, 1997), p. 211, Curry, Agincourt: A New History, p. 131, suggests at least 1,330.  86   TNA E 101/45/1 details the sick from this company. Barker, Agincourt, p. 320 is apparently unaware of their presence in this document. Given-Wilson (ed.), Adam Usk, pp. 256–7, ‘quidam ­ignominiose quia desertores milicie et cum regis indignacione, ad propria remearunt.’

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the Welshmen recruited from the royal demesne made it as far as Harfleur, since they are recorded among the sick. Evans, citing Wylie, stated that fifty-four of the archers also suffered, but detailed examination of the lists and comparison with the initial musters suggests that all is not quite as it seems. The vagaries of English interpretation of Welsh names mean that it is far from clear that all the king’s Welshmen on the sick lists also appear in the musters made at Brecon, Carmarthen and Cydweli. This interpretation is also at fault since it ignores the men with ‘English’ names who appear in both the sick lists and the initial musters.87 For the reasons noted above, Wylie’s figure must be an underestimate. It is impossible to give exact figures except for the men-at-arms. From those names which can be matched with certainty, however, it is obvious that the attrition rates among the men from the royal counties were far greater than for those from Brecon and the other Lancaster lordships. Two of those from Brecon fell ill compared to four from the principality, but such a sample is too small to be considered wholly reliable. These may represent lacunae in the surviving records, but it is possible that they reflect a difference in deployment. The fate of those of the special Welsh company who remained with the army is also far from clear, though none appear in the garrison placed at Harfleur. So exactly how many remained? From the 525 recruited, it is probable that fifty six never left Wales and that at least sixty, and probably rather more, of the remainder were given license to return from Harfleur through illness. Without allowing for any men left behind or possible desertions, a maximum of 400 could have joined the march to Calais, and therefore fought at Agincourt. Whatever the size of Henry V’s army at that battle, it is apparent that ‘his’ Welshmen were only a small part of it.88 So what of other Welsh involvement in the battle? We have already encountered Dafydd Gam, who had a small retinue of just three archers, none of who are named in the surviving sources. Gam died at the battle and there is a tradition that his son-in-law, Roger Fychan of Bredwardine (Herefordshire), died with him.

  Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, pp. 26–7 n. 4 suggests that five men-at arms and fifty-four archers were among the sick; these figures are taken from Wylie, ‘Some Notes on the Agincourt Roll’, p. 135. By my count, the figure for men-at-arms appearing in both the musters and the sick lists is six (Watcyn Llwyd and Andrew ap Lewis, both from Brecon; Rhys ap Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Fychan from Carmarthenshire; Maredudd ab Owain, Walter ap Gruffudd ab Ieuan and Owain ap Siencyn from Cardiganshire). While the figure for the archers reflects the men with Welsh names listed as serving with the king in TNA E 101/45/1, not all can be positively identified in the original musters. As noted, this of course ignores those men with ‘English’ names, such as John Wheler, John Body and John Cooke. This also applies to names where the clerk omitted the ‘ap’ from the name, for example, Andrew ap Lewis (TNA E 101/46/20) became Andrew Lewes (TNA E 101/45/1).  88   For more detail, Chapman, ‘The King’s Welshmen’, pp. 51–8.  87

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This tradition is problematic, not least because there is no mention of it in the fifteenth century. Moreover, a man named Roger Fychan served in the retinue of the earl of Warwick as a man-at-arms in 1417.89 Roger is an unusual name in Welsh contexts, and the suggestion that he served as an archer with his fatherin-law is made harder to believe by his memorial effigy in Bredwardine church. This effigy is that of a man-at-arms in full armour and, interestingly, is probably from the 1440s.90 Dafydd Gam’s retinue was the only one recruited by a Welshman acting independently. In the retinues of the Marcher lords, even fewer Welshmen were present. Even the retinue of Thomas, earl of Arundel, the most substantial of the Marcher lords to serve in 1415, contained only forty Welshmen among the 470 men named in his post-campaign accounts. These are unusually detailed, probably because they were submitted after the earl’s death from illness contracted at the siege of Harfleur. By the standards of other Marcher lords, however, this was a substantial contribution. Only five of the 60 men led by Sir John de Grey of Ruthin were Welshmen from his lordship of Dyffryn Clwyd. Similarly, among the retinue of the duke of York, only five men from 500 bore Welsh names.91 Even in Arundel’s retinue, all Welshmen present served as substitutes for Englishmen who had fallen ill or died. The esquires Morgan ab Iorwerth and Ednyfed ap Maredudd, for example, replaced Roger Gunter and William Waleys on 4 October. On the same day, John Coursoun was replaced by John Cloneslond, presumably from the Arundel lordship of Clun. Among the archers, John del Chambre was replaced by Tudur ab Ithel on 28 September, the same day as the earl himself returned to England. Although not all these substitutes were Welsh, it must be assumed that the earl or his officers had maintained them up until that point, but whether they had waited with the army at Harfleur or were shipped over to France from the earl’s estates in Sussex or elsewhere as need demanded is unknown.92 While it might be that some, like several of those serving the Crown in 1415, hoped to receive pardon, the most prominent Welshman in Arundel’s retinue was no rebel. ‘Jakke ap Guillem’, who replaced Thomas Parker, esquire, at Harfleur on 4 October, was chief forester in the lordship of Chirk from at least 1407–8 until 1417. He may be identified with John or Jankyn ap Gwilym who had held the same office in the

  TNA E 101/51/2 m. 12.   My thanks to Rhianydd Biebrach and Dave Underhill for their views on the date of this effigy. See also Chapman, ‘The King’s Welshmen’, pp. 60–2.  91   TNA E 101/47/1 – though all of the Welshmen present in this retinue appear to have served as substitutes for men who died – and E 101/47/7 respectively; York’s retinues: TNA E 101/45/2 and E 101/45/19.  92   The substitutions were made on 28 September, 4 October and 8 October, which suggests that they were dependent upon the availability of shipping: TNA E 101/47/1, mm. 1–2.  89

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1390s and, if so, was one of the very few men to have served Earl Richard and Earl Thomas as well as Richard II during the short period when the Arundel estates were part of the principality of Chester.93 In other respects, Jakke ap Gwilym was far from unusual among the esquires of Arundel’s retinue. Many had long service in the earl’s administration and had profited from his power and protection in the face of the disputes and rebellions in the March of Wales and in England during Henry IV’s reign.94 Welsh archers, therefore, were present in numbers at the battle, and were important in the contribution of the royal demesne to Henry V’s army. Theirs was not an overwhelming presence, however, and security in Wales was probably more important than the provision of soldiers for the army as a whole. The presence of former rebels in that army would have aided the situation to an extent, but it is revealing for the state of Wales in 1415 that no attempt was made to recruit from the northern shires of the principality. Two Welshmen not named in the musters are known to have fought at Agincourt and their case is an interesting one. One reason for this is that two Welshmen, Thomas Basseleg of Cardiff and John William, alias John ‘ap Hywel’, were arrested at Sawston, Cambridgeshire, while on pilgrimage to Walsingham by men of Sir Edmund de la Pole. Their pilgrimage was motivated, so a writ protesting at their false imprisonment suggests, by a vow made on the field of Agincourt.95 Even pious intent, however, was insufficient to overwhelm the suspicion felt by Englishmen towards Welshmen in the years after 1415. Welshmen, exiles following the defeat of Glyndŵr, also fought on the French side at Agincourt. One, William Gwyn of Cydweli, is known to have died there and, in all likelihood, he was not alone.96 After 1415 In general, English armies raised between 1416 and 1422 followed the pattern set in 1415. In Wales, in 1417, 1418 and 1420, Henry exploited both his duchy estates and principality lands in Wales as a recruiting ground, albeit on a smaller scale than in 1415. In much the same way so did the lords of the March. Such recruitment formed part of a process of reconciliation, otherwise secured by communal fines and judicial sessions. The wider pacification of Wales and the reintegration of its

  It is quite possible that he was also the John or Jankyn ap Gwilym who held these offices after 1397. For Jakke ap Gwilym, see NLW Chirk Castle D nos. 56–8.  94   Powell, Kingship, Law and Society, pp. 232–4.  95   TNA C 1/68/213, cited in Barker, Agincourt, p. 262. Barker’s account of Welsh involvement in the battle and campaign should be treated with extreme caution.  96   Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, p. 23.  93

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people into the English realm was a long process. The south and east of Wales and its March, through connections of trade and commercial interest, adapted more quickly than the relatively isolated north and west.97 Only in 1419 and 1420 are there any definite suggestions of an archer company drawn from the king’s Welsh demesne lands in the manner of 1415. Nevertheless, it is clear that involvement in the 1415 campaign began military careers among Welshmen, some of which can be shown to have begun in the heat of rebellion. This period also witnessed the rise to prominence of a number of Welsh captains independent of either king or Marcher lords. This phenomenon, unremarkable in itself and long common among sections of the English military class, was, however, unusual in Wales; only Sir Gregory Sais or Owain Lawgoch and, later, his confederate, Ieuan Wyn had really achieved this distinction before.98 The rebellion led by Owain Glyndŵr had remilitarised the Welsh March, as demonstrated by the rebuilding and re-equipping of castles there. For the people of Wales, experience of conflict at home flowed into the wars fought in France after 1415 and long into the reign of Henry VI. In many ways the period of rebellion represents a reversion to the political situation before the conquest of Gwynedd. In the shires of Caernarfon, Anglesey and Merioneth, royal authority was all but absent, and the Crown’s outposts within these areas were isolated. Those lords of the March who were of age were present by royal command in their lordships. Their role as military commanders was bolstered, as with the earlier Welsh lords, by those men of their lordships who had not joined the rebels. For the uchelwyr, war in the English cause became once more an honourable pursuit to be praised and rewarded in their own society. The praise poetry of the fifteenth century is littered with references to the wars in France and can offer some distinctively Welsh insights into the conduct and perception of the wars in France and later in the English realm.99 Beyond the elite, however, evidence is scant and far less clear cut. The company of Welsh archers recruited in 1415 may not have been unique but evidence for similar levied companies in later years is tangential and fragmentary. In 1417, for example, there is a mention in the receiver’s account of Monmouth that John Merbury and John Russell recruited thirty men, each with a horse, for the invasion of Normandy. It may be significant that there is

  R.A. Griffiths, ‘After Glyn Dŵr: An Age of Reconciliation?’ Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002), pp. 139–64.  98   Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’; idem, Owen of Wales.  99   For example, Chapman, ‘He took me to the Duke of York’; B.J. Lewis, ‘Late Medieval Welsh Praise Poetry and Nationality: The Military Career of Guto’r Glyn Revisited’, Studia Celtica 45 (2011), pp. 111–30.  97

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no record of any group of men from this lordship serving two years earlier.100 In August of that year letters of protection were granted, in Normandy, to two men from the lordship of Cydweli, William ap Gruffudd, serving in the retinue of John Steward, and Maredudd ap William ap Patrick, serving in the retinue of Thomas Rempston.101 In 1418, additional men were recruited to bolster the army laying siege to Rouen. Local records suggest coercion played a part in recruitment. Those selected could be excused on payment of a fine, a common arrangement which occurs in the court rolls of Ruthin in the fourteenth century. Four men, however, were told by the receiver of Cydweli that they had been selected to go to Rouen as men-at-arms: since one of the men in question was over seventy, the tenants of the lordship promptly reported the receiver for extortion.102 Welshmen did not only serve Henry V in Normandy. Among the army sent to Aquitaine under John Tiptoft in 1415 that remained there until 1417 were John Burghull of Llanfilo in the lordship of Brecon and one Morgan Fychan.103 After the rebellion the Marchers continued to exploit their estates to fill their retinues. The retinue of Richard Beauchamp, Lord Abergavenny and, after 1415, lord of the largest Marcher lordship, Glamorgan, in the army of Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, in 1417 shows this clearly. With his greatly increased status, Beauchamp had taken a retinue of 150 to France in 1416 and took 207 men with him a year later.104 While there are no surviving musters for the 1416 expedition, it is not unreasonable to suggest a substantial overlap between this and the well-recorded retinue of the following year. Beauchamp was accompanied by a remarkable number of men from south-east Wales, including William Gamage of Coity and Caldecot and Sir John Stradling (d. 1435).105 Sir John’s elder brother, Edward, had fought at Agincourt in the retinue of Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, and enjoyed a substantial administrative career in South Wales and the March. While Sir Edward was usually resident at St Donats, Sir John’s interests were primarily in the west of England. Given the litigation, public disorder and attempted siege of Coity

  TNA DL 29/615/9845 m. 3.   DKR 41, p. 795. 102   Curry, Agincourt: A New History, p. 61. For examples of similar fines from Ruthin, see Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 80–84. 103   TNA E 101/48/4. Burghull may also have served in South Wales under the command of Lord Grey of Codnor in 1403 (TNA E 101/43/21) while the family were long established in Brecon: Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 416–17. 104   The size of his retinue in 1416 is given in his indenture, TNA E 101/48/10/139, and confirmed in the issue roll, TNA E 403/624 m. 4. 105   R.A. Griffiths, ‘The Rise of the Stradlings of St Donats’, Morgannwg 7 (1963), pp. 15–47; WBO s.v. ‘Stradling’ and ‘Gamage’; ‘Stradling Family (per. c. 1290 – 1480)’, in Oxford DNB, accessed 4 May 2014. 100 101

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Castle that embroiled the two families in relation to the disputed inheritance of Sir Laurence Berkerolles (d. 1411), it is interesting, and possibly surprising, to see these two men serving together in the same retinue.106 Many of the other men-atarms were from local Welsh families and some, such as Dafydd Mathew, whose effigy can be found in Llandaff Cathedral, were among the emerging Anglo-Welsh gentry of the lordship. His military career may have begun during the rebellion in the English cause; a man of this name was paid expenses for travelling between Hereford and Henley on the prince’s business in 1404. His later career saw him serve not only with Beauchamp, a local lord, but also in the retinue of Richard Woodville in 1421.107 We know little of the archers in this army, but it is possible that the author of the Chronique Normande, writing in the 1430s, had Welshmen rather than Irishmen in mind when writing his account of Henry V’s invasion in 1417. The English king was in his country with his prisoners. He never slept but continually looked to his own interests and made alliances and provision as he saw fit, of young men from various lands, some Irish, all with bare feet and no shoes, dressed in scruffy doublets made out of poor bedding, a poor skullcap of iron on their heads, a bow and a quiver of arrows in their hand and a sword hanging at their side. That was all the armour they had. There was also a large quantity of scum [meunes merailles] from several lands.108

Only in the army in Normandy in the summer of 1419 is there direct evidence of archer companies of similar type to that recruited in 1415. The king ordered successive musters of ‘the men of Wales’ (and the other parts of the royal demesne, Cheshire and Lancashire) on 14 July at Mantes, 7 August at Pontoise and 18 September at Gisors.109 Several of those who served in 1415 were granted letters of protection to serve earlier in the same year so there would seem to have been a degree of continuity.110 In John, duke of Bedford’s army in 1420, four retinues in particular are of interest. These were led by Sir Thomas Barre of Herefordshire, Thomas Eston, Walter de la Field and Lewis Powell. Walter de la Field’s retinue of three men-

  Griffiths, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Siege of Coity Castle’, pp. 23–5.   Glam C. H. III, pp. 307, 410; TNA E 101/404/24 fol. 35; TNA E 101/49/37 m. 3. For his effigy, R. Biebrach, ‘Memorialisation and the Gentry of Glamorgan, 1250–1550’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Swansea University, 2010). 108   Translated from C. Robillard de Beaurepaire (ed.), Chroniques Normande de Pierre Cochon, cited in Curry, Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, pp. 112–14. 109  DKR 42, pp. 322, 324, 326. 110   For example, John or Jankyn ap Rhys – who had been among those held hostage in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the surrender of Aberystwyth Castle in 1407 – 30 September 1419: DKR 41, p. 800; Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 326–7; Maredudd ab Owain ap Gruffudd: R.A. Griffiths, ‘Gentlemen and Rebels in Medieval Cardiganshire’, Ceredigion 5 (1966), pp. 59, 61, 68. Both had been men-at-arms in 1415. 106 107

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at-arms and nine archers contained the constable of Whitecastle (Monmouth), Thomas Andrew, as a man-at-arms, while Thomas Eston brought three archers who had served with Lord Grey of Ruthin in 1415. The retinue of Lewis Powell is the most suggestive. It contained twenty-five men-at-arms, all apparently Welsh, and fifty-seven archers.111 Making direct comparisons between Powell’s retinue in 1420 and the records relating to 1415 is difficult; Welsh patronyms expressed to a single generation cannot provide certainty. The 1415 documents are remarkable in providing most names to at least three generations, doubtless for precisely this reason. Ironically then, it is among the English names in Powell’s retinue that the clearest evidence is found. Most compelling are three archers, Rhys ap Dafydd ap Thomas, John Herry and Walter Towker. These men are listed together as mounted archers from the lordship of Cydweli in 1415 and also appear together in 1420.112 The archer Philip Squire is another who can be found in both forces.113 The menat-arms provide further examples; two, Jankyn Llwyd and Hywel ap Madoc, served in both retinues.114 Powell’s retinue also contained John Bala, his name suggesting that he might have originated from Bala, Merioneth, and hinting that this retinue might have drawn from the principality of North Wales.115 With this possibility in mind, there is the tantalising, if improbable, chance that the Owain ap Maredudd, a man-at-arms in the same retinue, was Owain ap Maredudd ap Tudur – Owen Tudor, grandfather of Henry VII. Owain’s first known appearance in English service was in 1421 when ‘Owen Meredith’ joined the retinue of Sir Walter Hungerford, steward of the king’s household.116 Owen Tudor’s later career in France, although obscure for the most part, was representative of his generation of the Welsh squireachy. A reformed rebel, he reached some sort of accommodation with Henry V’s regime and acted with a degree of independence which was unusual for Welshmen before Glyndŵr’s revolt. Nevertheless, others established careers in the reign of Henry V which they had begun during the rebellion. William Porter of Cardigan was given letters of protection to serve with Sir John Popham in 1416. He may have served in 1415 and

  TNA E 101/49/36 m. 12. The identity of ‘Lewis Powell’ is uncertain; none of the obvious variants – Lewis ap Hywel, Llywelyn ap Hywel, etc. – can be identified in any other military sources. 112   TNA E 101/46/20 m. 4; E 101/49/36 m. 12. John Herry also served as an archer in the retinue of Sir Richard Arundel in the Welsh expedition of 1405: TNA E 101/44/7. 113   TNA E 101/46/20 no. 3 m. 1; E 101/49/36 m. 12. 114   TNA E 101/46/20 m. 3. Jankyn Llwyd was among the archers from the lordship of Hay; Hywel ap Madoc (TNA E 101/46/20 m. 2d( was among the archers from the commote of Penrhyn (Carmarthenshire). 115   A man of the same name was an archer in Humphrey, duke of Gloucester’s retinue in 1415: TNA E 101/45/13 m. 2. It is possible that ‘Bola’ (English: ‘belly’) was meant. 116   TNA C 76/104 m. 18. 111

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was a member of the garrison of Aberystwyth under the command of Thomas Burton in 1405.117 This generation of men served in a more independent fashion than had previously been usual for Welshmen in English armies. Unlike men of their fathers’ generation, they were not dependent upon the participation of their lords. The remilitarisation of Wales under Glyndŵr coincided with the beginnings of a process of consolidation among the elite of England. Marcher lordships became vested in fewer hands and thus their lords were routinely absent from their Welsh estates. One result was the increased independence of action of the native gentry, which Ralph Griffiths described as ‘a phenomenon of outstanding importance’.118 Richard Boys, a man-at-arms with the army raised from the Lancaster estates in 1415, may well have been the man of this name in the retinue of Robert, Lord Willoughby, in 1417. In association with Henry’s invasion of Normandy, Welshmen – often the same men who appear in military contexts – found employment in its administration. Dafydd ap Rhys of Pencoed, Herefordshire, was on a commission to redress infractions of the truce with Burgundy in June 1418. At this time it is evident that he was serving with Sir Thomas Barre who had petitioned for the protection of twelve men, ‘his servants’, including Dafydd, from malicious persecution by several other Herefordshire men led by John Abrahall. In February 1419 Dafydd was granted another protection to serve with Barre and once more in 1420. A year later, 2 June 1421, he received protection to serve with John, Lord Furnivall, Barre having died on 13 February of that year.119 The most significant men to follow successful military careers did so largely after Henry V’s death. Gruffudd Dwnn of Cydweli, onetime rebel, served at Agincourt and made an extremely successful career in France, earning captaincies in Normandy and, remarkably, the constableship of Cydweli Castle that, as a young man and adherent of Glyndŵr, he had besieged. Mathau Goch of Maelor and Sir Richard Gethin of Builth prospered and became important men through their service in the wars in France. The highest achiever of them all, William Herbert, created earl of Pembroke in 1468, began his career in France. Glyndŵr’s rebellion left a problematic legacy, but for some Welshmen, it opened the path to personal success through the military profession.

117   TNA C 76/99 m. 5. Porter should not be mistaken for the Northamptonshire knight of the same name; Sir John Popham seems to have been without obvious Welsh connections since his estates were in Hampshire and Suffolk. 118   R.A. Griffiths, ‘Gruffydd ap Nicholas and the Rise of the House of Dinefwr’, NLWJ 12 (1964), p. 256. 119   References to Dafydd ap Rhys (1418), petition by Sir Thomas Barre, Cal. Anc. Pet., p. 476 and references; (1419), Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, p. 39; (1420), C 76/102 m. 4 (though his name does not appear in Barre’s muster for six men-at-arms and eighteen archers), TNA E 101/49/36 m. 12 and (1421) C 76/104 m. 9.

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Conclusions Wales was remilitarised during the Glyndŵr decade. Many men who cannot be traced in military service before 1400 can be observed frequently after 1415. This was one of many important results of the rebellion. The goal of independence was not achieved but the wars in Wales gave many men a taste for military service and a pressing need to participate in it to secure pardon. Those who served in English armies after the conclusion of the rebellion, most notably in 1415, did so partly because they were compelled to. Welsh archers were summoned from the southern counties of the principality and the Marcher estates in the royal demesne. In the former, many had been rebels, probably summoned in person. Similar methods may have been employed in 1416, 1417 and 1418. Such coercion was just as irksome as the large communal fines imposed for rebellion throughout Wales and the March and provided local officials with opportunities for extortion. Henry V used his royal demesne as a recruiting ground and from this we may discern something of his strategic intentions. The foot archers raised from his Welsh lordships were ideally suited to sieges and garrisons. They were intended to bolster forces of invasion and occupation. In some cases, however, it was the start of military careers that brought prosperity to those concerned. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Henry Bolingbroke owed a significant debt to his Welsh tenants in the process of revolution in 1399. As Henry IV he exercised hitherto unprecedented authority over the March of Wales and, through his son, the shire of the principality. Owain Glyndŵr’s rebellion therefore was a personal challenge to the Crown as much as Owain’s claim to the title prince of Wales was symbolic to the Welsh community in a time of rebellions and unrest in England. The result was that Henry of Monmouth was the first English prince of Wales to have to fight to secure his title. In Wales, both support for the rebellion and opposition to it had a variety of motivations. Active participation in the military struggle might have been a matter of political conviction and opposition to English rule. These were ideas that had gathered support in the 1370s and perhaps had been fostered further in the unrest of the later 1390s. It is all but certain that Owain’s declaration was the premeditated act of an experienced soldier, trained for war and surrounded by men, his cousins, his friends and neighbours and even his ‘prophet’, who had experience in English armies over a considerable period. This is evident in the way that they fought and in their successes. The only royal castles taken and occupied for a substantial period were Conwy, Aberystwyth and Harlech, but many other castles, notably Coity and even mighty Caernarfon, were severely pressed for long periods. The raiding carried out by the rebels was a tactic common in Wales for centuries but used the techniques of the chevauchée, burning and laying waste to large areas

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and important centres such as Cardiff and spreading violence and destruction into the border counties.120 These were methods honed in France and in the Scottish borders. Glyndŵr’s opponents, however, had different motivations. For those living in Wales there was self-interest and the protection of property and their livelihoods together with loyalty to the English Crown. Many suffered for this both during the rebellion and afterwards. Their military involvement was significant. They held remote castles for long periods with a handful of men and guided English ­expeditionary armies as well as being involved in English expeditions themselves. Not every Welshman was convinced of the rightness of Owain Glyndŵr’s cause and eventually many prospered from their decisions, their gains being partly responsible for what Ralph Griffiths has called ‘a phenomenon of outstanding importance’, that is, the rise of the Welsh gentry in the fifteenth century.121 Others, having found pardon, prospered too and they, their sons and grandsons had extensive military careers of their own.122 This was bolstered not only by the reallocation of rebels’ lands and the gradual decline of English government in Wales attested by the lawlessness of the middle years of the fifteenth century but also by the opportunities presented by military service in Lancastrian Normandy. From the perspective of Henry V, it is useful to consider the process of reconciliation in Wales alongside his reconciliation with many of the repentant rebels of his father’s reign. Henry V was able to look beyond his own shores. Examining at the ways in which Henry recruited from his own demesne lands in Wales in 1415, for example, we can see how he employed military recruitment as a tool of peace-­ making. Rebels were brought into the fold alongside those who had resisted them. Some seem to have been given little choice and were summoned individually to repay their lord for their rebellion. Others may simply have served as an extension of their earlier service against Glyndŵr’s rebels. For the king they provided useful manpower to support an army which he intended to be one of conquest. As Powell discerned, Henry V was adept at putting trouble-makers at home to good use overseas. For the individuals concerned, this route to favour could result in military careers and reward. Many of those who secured pardons in that way were only occasional soldiers, but others, the younger rebels like Gruffudd Dwnn of Cydweli, or their sons, like Richard Gethin of Builth, became professional soldiers

  H. Watt, ‘“On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh”: The Effect of the Glyn Dŵr Rebellion on Tax Collection in England’, in Dodd and Biggs (eds), The Reign of Henry IV, pp. 48–81. 121   Griffiths, ‘Gruffydd ap Nicholas and the Rise of the House of Dinefwr’, p. 256. 122   See, for example, Henry Griffith of Ewyas: Chapman, ‘He took me to the Duke of York’, pp. 103–34. 120

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and provided a focus for recruitment for war just as Owain Lawgoch, Sir Gregory Sais or the Black Prince had done before.123

  Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years War’, pp. 40–6.

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part ii

6

War and Welsh Society Military Obligation and Organisation

The period discussed in this book was one of significant change in the nature of military service in both England and Wales. The conquest of Wales by Edward I completed a process of expansion by the English Crown into Wales which had lasted centuries. It also marked the beginning of the end of another process, the transition from armies with a feudal component that held land in return for military service to armies recruited by various methods in return for pay. The settlement imposed upon Edward’s newly conquered territories in Gwynedd – the statutes of Rhuddlan of 1284 – imposed legal and administrative conditions upon the Welsh. In common with similar provisions in England, they also imposed conditions upon men to serve in arms against the king’s enemies. This chapter and that which follows will consider the theoretical implications of this settlement: military obligation in law and custom, and then their practical application in the practices and processes of recruitment, payment and deployment. The nature of military obligation, as it existed in the English realm in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, was in flux. English kings had long found the apparently simple demands of the feudal summons a severe constraint on their ability to wage war. For this reason they had employed mercenaries and sought ways around its restrictions since at least the early twelfth century. Welshmen, paid for their service were often part of the solution. Edward I’s Welsh wars changed the state of military obligation in England. The duty of all free men in England to possess the arms and military equipment appropriate to their status and wealth had been set out by Henry II in the Assize of Arms in 1181. In their laws, the Welsh princes invoked similar obligations, although these were not generally tied to land until Llywelyn ab Iorwerth made attempts to establish a military elite based on tenure of land in the thirteenth century.1 In November 1282 all free men

  M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience (New Haven, CT, 1996), chs. 3 and 4; Stephenson, The Governance of Gwynedd, chs. 2 and 7.  1

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with at least twenty liberates of land who were not serving in the Welsh war were summoned to appear at Northampton early in the next year, together with shire and borough representatives. Edward’s objective was doubtless to secure financial grants in return for the service they were not doing. If so, he was unsuccessful and the obligation of military service inherent in the summons was not recognised. The Statute of Winchester, proclaimed in 1285, redrew these obligations in light of Edward’s experiences in the Welsh war and established that in England every able-bodied man had the obligation to serve the king in the defence of the realm. In return, military service would yield guaranteed rewards. Directly, these might take the form of payment of wages, by income from the ransoming of prisoners or the capture of booty. Indirectly, rewards might take the form of patronage, fees and offices. Following the conquest of Wales, reciprocal bonds of obligation and reward implicitly extended into Edward’s lands in Wales and those held of him in the March. That said, the nature of military obligation that already existed in Wales was extremely varied, a consequence of the protracted nature of English conquest. In this chapter, I will, first explore the varied nature of military obligation within Wales and then examine how the nature of reward and obligation was incorporated into the society of the shires and March of Wales. Obligation The basis of obligation for military service in Wales and the March was forged by the political relationships and institutions by which both Norman and Welsh lords exercised their authority. English and Welsh systems of military obligation had overlapped and informed each other over the two centuries before the conquest of Gwynedd. To a degree, it is possible to observe continuity even after this point.2 The wars of Edward I against the princes of Gwynedd after 1277 were conducted, to a great degree, by Welshmen against other Welshmen. Edward’s wars were partly a contest for overlordship: they were a competition which the English Crown and the lords of the March were better equipped to win than the Welsh princes. It is less than surprising, therefore, that the basis of military obligation in the shires and the March of Wales after 1284 varied according to region but were linked, inextricably, into contemporary developments in England. Survivals from Welsh law will be explored later in the chapter, but William Rees, and more recently, Rees Davies, have argued that strategic demands of border warfare in the thirteenth century ensured that the military institutions characteristic of early Norman England survived in the March long after they had become obsolete in England.3 Indeed, there is evidence that some of these anachronisms   F. Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, 1066–1300 (Woodbridge, 1994).  Rees, South Wales and the March; Davies, Lordship and Society, ch. 3; Davies, Lordship and Society, ch. 3.  2

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retained practical military effect well into the fourteenth century and possibly later. In Gwynedd, in the thirteenth century, developments in the conduct of warfare necessitated several major adjustments to social structure. As T.P. Ellis observed, ‘Military service for a few became a “due attached to land” rather than a privilege incidental to status.’4 Keith Williams-Jones has related the increasing military demands of the thirteenth century under Llywelyn ab Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd to the economic problems faced by those princes and the changing nature of the military elite that resulted from their attempts at expansion. David Stephenson has developed our understanding of this process in relation to the attempts of its princes of Gwynedd to develop a proto-state in Welsh-ruled Wales, while Sean Davies’s examination of the military institutions of Wales before 1283 has placed these developments in a wider context. The influence of English practice and, beyond that, wider theories of kingship across Europe called for the codification of rights and obligation. As Louis IX did in France, so did Edward I in England and in Gascony. The assize of Welsh law Edward instigated after his victory in the first Welsh war of 1277 was intended to subject Wales to English rule. Governance went hand in hand with military obligation. This was already the case before the conquest.5 Norman Survivals in the March: Castle-Guard and Knight’s Fees The basis of military obligation in England since the Norman conquest had been the knight’s fee, whose holder was obliged to provide a knight or knights for a set period of service at his lord’s request. Feudal service of this kind restricted the kinds of military operations that could be undertaken, since the usual period of feudal service, forty days, made the raising of armies overseas in particular difficult. It was gradually superseded, with the feudal host being replaced by men of the royal household and paid infantry. The ‘money fief ’, a financial payment in lieu of land but obliging the recipient to fight, had been developed in the late twelfth century. Developments in the ability of kings of England to raise funds by direct taxation in the course of the thirteenth century made the routine payment of troops a practical proposition. By the end of the first quarter of the fourteenth century, military elements of feudal obligation, in England at least, were an anachronism and had been more or less abandoned as a direct means of raising troops. In areas such as the March of Wales, however, military service might still take the form of castle-guard, whereby tenants or communities were to provide soldiers of various kinds to guard their lord’s castle. In much of England and Wales this was an anachronism which had been commuted to monetary renders before the mid-thirteenth century.   T.P. Ellis, Welsh Tribal Law and Custom in the Middle Ages, I (1926), p. 339; Stephenson, The Governance of Gwynedd.  5   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, introduction; Davies, Welsh Military Institutions.  4

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Owing to the fragmentary nature of the Anglo-Norman conquest in Wales, the Welsh knight’s fee was ‘a splendidly hybrid phenomenon’ which arose from the specific needs of the individual Marcher lordship.6 Nevertheless, most Marcher knights held their fees on similar terms to knights in England. The land they held in return for military service descended by the rules of primogeniture. They were subject to wardship and marriage, that is, their lords claimed the right to have custody of the lands of minor heirs and to dispose of their marriages and the marriages of tenants’ widows.7 Professor Rees’s maps show that there were around 500 knights’ fees in the ‘Marcher lordships south of the Severn’. Of these, 400 appear to have been ‘normal’, English-style knights’ fees, although fifty of them were held by men with Welsh names. Iorwerth ap Rhys, for example, held half a knight’s fee of the Clare lords of Gwynllwg in the early fourteenth century.8 Around 100 estates in the Welsh March were held as Welsh knights’ fees or as fractions or multiples of Welsh knights’ fees. Thus, in the lordship of Usk, three Welsh knights’ fees were held by Iorwerth Fychan, John ap Gruffudd and others ‘and their partners who render no rent but give relief, to wit, 50s. for a whole fee, but their heirs shall not be in wardship nor shall the lord have the marriage of them’.9 Holders of knight’s fees could form a specific group. In Brecon in 1292, for example, a royal tax commissioner acknowledged the separateness of those holding by knight service in the lordship by allowing them to pay subsidies to the lord of Brecon as a distinct group. Such independence was yet more pronounced in the lordship of Blaenllyfni, where a separate officer, the ‘beadle of the knights’ (bedellus militum), was administratively and fiscally responsible for this group.10 Other examples of fees can be found in the royal shires in North and West Wales. The half fee of Llanteilo Abercywyn (Carmarthenshire) was held in return for an armed man and unbarded horse or else two footmen, according to the custom of those parts, at his own expense for three days at the summons of the king’s bailiff. In the lordship of St Clears, the obligation imposed on the lord of Amgoed was the service from this knight’s fee of a barded (covered) horse or four footmen (as the lord chose) for three days on summons at his own cost. If the superior lord required them for longer, they remained with him at his cost. In this instance Welsh tenants were also to serve in their lord’s army on the same terms.11 In Glamorgan, the heirs of the original Norman conquerors of Morgannwg based their authority on their rights as successors to those they or their ancestors

 Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 76.   M. Lieberman, The March of Wales 1067–1300: A Borderland of Medieval Britain (Cardiff, 2008), p. 62.  8   CIPM V, no. 538, p. 335  9   Ibid., p. 337 10  Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 414–15. 11  Rees, South Wales and the March, 62.  6

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had defeated. This conquest was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion, commote by commote, largely independently of their theoretical overlord, the king of England. The pre-conquest Gwlad (land), Morgannwg, was divided and the kingly authority (Brenhiniaeth) was diluted to that of lordship (Arglwddiaeth). Thus in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the lordships of Coity, held by the Turberville family, and that of Afan, held by the descendants of Iestyn ap Gwrgant, were, in the eyes of the English Crown, equivalent to tenure ‘with royal liberty’. The Norman lord of Glamorgan had rights of wardship and marriage only.12 Seigneurial control was comprehensively extended by the Clare and Despenser lords of Glamorgan over the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Their liberties, in common with those of many lords in the March of Wales, were not only preserved but extended. Lieberman describes how military fees in Glamorgan, generally expressed in terms of castle-guard, were commuted to cash by the late twelfth century. These cash renders survived in Ogmore, and very probably in the other mesne lordships of Glamorgan, well into the fifteenth century. These were, however, indicative of English rather than Welsh landholding in the March. Nothing is known of the military obligations incumbent upon the Welsh population.13 Castle-guard In Marcher liberties which had been detached at a relatively late date from counties on the English border, feudal duties of castle-guard retained their currency far later than in the rest of England in response to the threat posed by the Welsh princes. Examples of such anachronisms can even be found after the conquest of Gwynedd. A development was a form of tenure relating to the new borough attached to the castle of Holt. Both town and castle were new creations, both being recorded for the first time in 1311. In that year, the earl of Surrey, as lord of Bromfield and Yale, bestowed 400 acres on John Wysham, one of his retainers, for an annual rent of £10 and the performance of the duties of a knight’s fee which included finding a manat-arms with a barded horse to remain at Holt Castle for forty days in time of war.14 More remarkably, some forms of Welsh tenure were converted at Radnor to provide services of the same kind by English lords. Details about castle-guard service apparently surviving in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century sources probably provide better evidence for earlier periods than for the survival of castle-guard in the period they describe. In 1313, for example, John Hastings, lord of Abergavenny, was said to have owed the king the duty of guarding the country of upper Gwent ‘if there shall be common war between the king and the prince of Wales’. By 1313 this was nonsense and the reference to a ‘prince of Wales’ must have

  Smith, ‘The Lordship of Glamorgan’, pp. 16–18.   M. Lieberman, ‘Anglicisation in High Medieval Wales: The Case of Glamorgan’, WHR 23 (2006), pp. 12–14; R.R. Davies, ‘The Lordship of Ogmore’, Glam. C. H. III p. 296. 14   CPR 1307–13, pp. 405–6. 12

13

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been anachronistic, referring back to the mid-thirteenth-century situation, since the title only came into regular usage during the reign of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth.15 The tenure remained and was recalled, however, perhaps because it was a relatively recent innovation. At Holt, the duty of castle-guard was called upon as late as 1387. The lord of Bromfield and Yale paid out sum of 100s. to maintain an unspecified number of radmanni as a garrison for Holt Castle for six weeks. The term radmanni referred to the duty of burgesses of the borough of Holt for provision of riding service or escort duty within the lordship of Bromfield and Yale. On this occasion, however, castle-guard is clearly what was demanded and such obligations were doubtless called up during the years of the Glyndŵr rebellion.16 In the reign of Richard II, at Llanfihangel Ystern Llewern in the lordship of Three Castles, free tenants of the manor were expected to supply a footman, suitably equipped with a sword or knife (fifteen inches long), to serve in defence of the manor; if the army went beyond the boundaries of the lordship; a wage of 2d. per day was due, rather less than the contemporary wage of 6d. per day paid to mounted archers in royal armies. It is worth noting, however, that Richard did pay companies of foot soldiers from South Wales at that rate on his expedition to Scotland, recruited by feudal summons, in 1385.17 Davies suggests that similar obligations may have been exploited by Henry Bolingbroke on his return from exile in 1399.18 The revolt of Owain Glyndŵr occasioned new forms of what might be described as military tenure. For much of Henry IV’s reign the Crown was severely short of money. As a result, the escheated lands of rebels formed a welcome resource. On 1 December 1401, Miles Water, king’s esquire, was granted lands and rights of no fewer than six individuals in the lordships of Brecon, Dinas, Talgarth and Clifford to the value of £47 6s. 8d. In return he was expected to defend the town of Brecon, in the company of two archers, at his own expense. Whether the lands he received would generate their full value in the midst of rebellion is not known, but Miles was among the men-at-arms accompanying Sir Richard Arundel in southern Wales in 1405 and he seems to have remained there. A second Miles Water, presumably his son, can be found in the garrison of Rouen in 1436 under the captaincy of John Morgan, an esquire in the retinue of John Talbot.19 The grant to Miles senior in 1401 was not a unique arrangement. On 14 May 1404, James Howell, serving as a man-at-arms in the garrison of Narberth between 1402 and 1404, was granted lands in Newcastle Emlyn, Pembroke and Carmarthen formerly belonging to

  CIPM V no. 412, p. 232.   Pratt, ‘Bromfield and Yale in English Politics, 1387–99’, p. 111 n. 3 17   D.J. Cathcart King, The Castle in England and Wales: An Interpretative History (London, 1988), p. 17; Rees, South Wales and the March, pp. 64, 147, n. 2, citing TNA DL 43/13/8; for 1385, see TNA SC 6/1221/16. 18  Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 82–4. 19   CPR 1401–5, p. 320; TNA, E 101/44/7 m. 4. For Miles Water the son, see BnF 25772/1057. 15

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one John ap Llywelyn.20 Such grants show something of the desperation of the English authorities at the height of the revolt. They were made possible by the availability of land taken from rebels but usefully meshed with forms of tenure which had retained their military significance into the late fourteenth century. It may be pertinent that Henry V revived feudal obligations in a similar fashion in Normandy following his invasion in return for grants of land. Elsewhere the knight’s fee, and the obligations attached to it, were already a dead letter by the 1320s. The trend towards armies recruited for pay and the change in the way these armies were formed, made possible by the availability of Welsh foot soldiers among other factors, had made them redundant. Welsh Survivals What we now know of Welsh custom, informed by the copies of Welsh laws surviving from the thirteenth century onwards, may reflect practice which had been in use for a considerable period, albeit adapted over time. The codes survive in a form useful to contemporary practitioners of the law rather than as royal proclamations from the distant past. They provide a reasonable impression of the practice of law during the last years of Pura Wallia. William Rees provides us with a brief summary: warfare was a concern of the elite. ‘In tribal days, fighting fell mainly on the free though certain of the non-tribesmen had served in a labouring capacity.’21 While the terminology of Rees’s statement might be outdated, the principles of military obligation it describes are relatively straightforward. A tywysog (prince) was constantly attended by a band of armed retainers, his teulu (familia or household), and had an unlimited right to their service within his own gwlad (land) and beyond. These men were maintained by food renders due to them and to their lord which were consumed on a cylch (circuit) around the gwlad. By the thirteenth century, however, in Wales as in England, cash was more convenient than renders in kind. The tywysog could also call upon any of the freemen within his gwlad for service at his request. This service was unlimited within his gwlad and was for a maximum of six weeks in his lluyd (his army or host). The question of service within a gwlad or Marcher lordship which retained elements of these structures and customs is, for most purposes, beyond the scope of this study. With the exception of the period of the Glyndŵr rebellion, when individual lords were required to organise the defence of their lordships, it was seldom, if ever, enacted: service was owed to the lord rather than directly to the Crown. In contrast to a fief in England, a communal obligation was ‘owed collectively by all Welsh freemen in a

20   CPR 1401–5, p. 390–1 and TNA, E 101/43/23 m. 1. For other examples elsewhere in Wales, W.R.M. Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry and Wales, 1400–1408’ in M. Hicks (ed.), Profit, Piety and the Professions in Later Medieval England (Gloucester, 1990), pp. 51–61 at p. 55 n. 21. 21  Rees, South Wales and the March, p. 62.

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gwlad because of their social status’.22 Suppe noted the survival of this service in two contexts: as an obligation relating to landholdings in two Marcher lordships in north-east Wales revealed by fourteenth-century extents and in the Quo Warranto proceedings of 1356 relating to the shires of North Wales.23 Payments based on like obligations also survived in the lordship of Powys well into the fourteenth century. The effect of external overlordship by the princes of Gwynedd and the kings of England in the thirteenth century was that the army came to be raised on territorial principles rather than as a consequence of social position and family bonds. These were based on the commote, the service being due to the lord of the commote, whether he was subject to Llywelyn ap Gruffudd or Edward I. The earlier personal service of the lords was preserved, however, served as the basis of their tenure, and was employed to recruit armies as late as 1415. Thirteenth-Century Innovations: the March The completion of the Anglo-Norman conquest of Wales introduced a new military infrastructure to the March of Wales, some of which overlaid existing Welsh mechanisms. Military service on a ‘feudal’ pattern had been an essential element of the extension of seigneurial authority over mesne lords throughout the March, both Anglo-Norman and Welsh. These mechanisms were necessarily forms of elite tenure which derived in large part from the rights of the overlord as successor to a Welsh predecessor or as a relic of the needs of military service to secure these conquests. For Welsh tenants in the southern Marcher lordships, models of military obligation were relatively consistent. The men of the Welshries of lordships or commotes of shires all served at their own expense under the banner of their lords or under the command of the king or his bailiff with subordinate officers (centenars and vintenars). The community contributed to the expense if operations were conducted beyond the commote. Some of these expenses were very carefully itemised. Take, for example, Roger Mortimer’s commote of Iscoed (Cardiganshire). The free Welsh of Commote Iscoed in Cardiganshire served with their lord at their own expense for three days and three nights, but if the lord went beyond the Cardiganshire boundary, he should, from that night, contribute towards the expenses of the fighting men, viz. for each footman 2d., and each captain 4d. a day. No one should be compelled to retain or buy a horse or even to bring one ‘except for his own honour’; each horseman with a fully barded horse received 1s. and with an unbarded horse 6d.24 In the adjoining barony of Cemais

 Suppe, Military Institutions, p. 126. ch. 5, pp. 1205–42, gives a fuller analysis.   Record of Caernarvon, p. 150. 24   Half of Commote Iscoed had been granted to Roger Mortimer: Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 11, n. 53 citing Cal. Charter Rolls 1257–1300, p. 281; Ministers’ Accounts of West Wales (1277–1306), ed. M. Rhys, Cymmrodorion Record series 13 (1936); Cal. Ch. Rolls Various, pp. 182, 185–6 ‘by service of going in the army of the lord of the commote’. 22 23

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(Pembrokeshire), gabularii, bondmen, as well as freemen served in the lord’s army. A freeman convicted for non-attendance was liable to a fine of 5s., but the gabularius was at the lord’s mercy.25

Interestingly, the same Cemais charter specifies that all prisoners captured by either free men or gabularii went to the lord, who received the ransoms. It must be asked at what level these customs were maintained and for how long. Similar processes can be identified in the shires of North Wales which were created by the settlement of 1284. These followed recognisably English models, as did much of shire administration, though in places they were overlaid upon existing Welsh institutions. The preservation of several forms of Welsh elite tenure, notably that known as Wyrion Eden (the grandsons of Ednyfed) in the post-conquest environment, has also interested historians with reference to those established in the thirteenth century by the rulers of Gwynedd.26 Welsh Barony Another consequence of the conquest was the recognition of a class known as Welsh barons. Those members of Welsh princely dynasties who survived the conquest with their lives and lands intact, having made their peace at the right time, retained their lands as tenants-in-chief of the king. The tenure called Tir Pennaeth, literally land held in chief, was initially confined to such men, but being tied to land, was extended more widely by marriage and partible inheritance. In Powys this was achieved by the direct conversion of a principality into a Marcher lordship, but for the descendants of the lords of Edeirnion in Merioneth or the princes of Deheubarth special provision was made.27 They took the English style of baron and were referred to collectively as Barwniaid – an appropriate title for men descended from royal houses which had ruled over commotes or even kingdoms.28 The importance of these Welsh barons after the Edwardian conquest was confirmed by the marriage of Ednyfed Fychan to a daughter of the Lord Rhys of Deheubarth (d. 1197). This elevated Ednyfed’s descendants to the ranks of the aristocracy by right. De facto they were the chief Welsh beneficiaries of the conquest and their  Rees, South Wales and the March, p. 63 citing Cartae baronije de Kemeys in com[itatu] Pembroke, ed. Thomas Phillipps (Middle Hill Press, 1841), p. 30. 26  Stephenson, The Governance of Gwynedd, particularly ch. 7, ‘Recruitment and Rewards’, pp. 95–135; Roberts, ‘Wyrion Eden’ and ‘Teulu Penmynydd’, in idem, Aspects of Welsh History, pp. 179–214; 240–74. 27   A.D. Carr, ‘The Barons of Edeyrnion 1282–1485: A Study of Tenure by Welsh Barony, with Special Reference to Edeyrnion’ (unpublished MA thesis, University of Wales Bangor, 1963), pp. 44–68; Carr, ‘An Aristocracy in Decline; T. Jones Pierce, ‘Medieval Cardiganshire – A Study in Social Origins’, in J. Beverley Smith (ed.), Welsh Medieval Society, Selected Essays by T. Jones Pierce (Cardiff, 1972), pp. 309–28. 28   Carr, ‘The Barons of Edeyrnion 1282–1485’, pp. 69–103. 25

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possession of lands held by barony went some way to legitimising their position. As Carr has noted, most marriages within this class were with members of other families of the same rank although, as the fourteenth century went on, baronial status was gradually lost as the lands and wealth that went with them were divided between heirs.29 Military service was, as for all tenants-in-chief, part of the status of the Welsh barons. At his death in 1320, Madoc ap Gruffudd of Glyndyfrdwy held his lands ‘of the king in chief … by fealty and service of going with his men in the king’s army, when reasonably warned, at the king’s cost, and doing suit at the county of Merioneth for the said land’.30 Similarly, according to a jury in West Wales in 1308, Llywelyn ab Owain ap Maredudd, a descendant of the Lord Rhys of Deheubarth had held his lands on the following conditions. by the Welsh tenure of Pennaethium – by fealty and service, that he and all his tenants whenever necessary were bound to come at the summons of the king’s bailiffs for three days at their own cost, and he owed suit at the court of Cardigan called the Welsh county. After his death, the king was entitled to 100s. Ebediw [heriot] and according to Welsh custom the lordship should be divided between his sons. The king cannot claim wardship or marriage.31

It seems that, on occasion, Welsh barons and their men were summoned specifically to serve in England’s wars. On 7 November 1338, five ‘nobiles’ of North Wales, with Gruffudd ap Madoc of Hendwr, were ordered to appear at Great Yarmouth by the feast of St Thomas the Apostle (21 December), to take part in Edward III’s expedition to Flanders. In the event, they were paid only for twelve days and did not continue in service further than the Norfolk coast, but the fact that they were mentioned separately in the Wardrobe account confirms their importance.32 In the summer of 1335, a dozen men of similar status, including the aged Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, were pardoned from serving in Scotland.33 The implication is that some form of royal summons had been issued. It should be recalled that one of the 29   For the extent of intermarriage in this class, see Carr, Medieval Anglesey, pp. 180–1; Davies, ‘Owain Glyndŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’, pp. 159–63. 30   CIPM VI, no. 256, p. 150. 31   CIPM V, no. 91, p. 42. 32   They were Gwilym ap Gruffudd of Anglesey, Gruffudd ap Hywel ap Gruffudd of Anglesey, Ieuan ap Gruffudd of the county of Caernarfon, Pottano Bleyz of ‘Melionnez’ (it is probable that Merioneth is meant), and Gruffudd Crach who had also served as commissioner of array in North Wales for the same campaign. Both Gruffudd ap Hywel and Gwilym ap Gruffudd were among those indicted for conspiracy in relation to the death of William de Shaldeford in 1345: Treaty Rolls, nos. 869–99, pp. 320–1. 33   Sir Gruffudd Llwyd died before the end of July 1335, CIPM VII, p. 453. Rot. Scotiae, I, pp. 311–12, 333–4. The twelve concerned were Gruffudd ap Rhys (Sir Gruffudd Llwyd); Gruffudd ap Madoc (his identity is uncertain; he is possibly to be identified with the man of that name among those attainted for the murder of William de Shaldeford in 1345, but may be Gruffudd ap Madoc of Hendwr and Glyndyfrydwy, the grandfather of Owain Glyndŵr, who came of age in 1324. It is not impossible that these are one and the same individual); Gwilym ap Gruffudd; Iorwerth ap Gruffudd; Hywel ap

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suggested reasons for Owain Glyndŵr launching his rebellion was the failure of Reginald de Grey to pass on a similar summons to serve in Scotland in 1400. Owain had justification that his birth and status warranted such a summons; he was descended from two Welsh royal lines and held a small part of his estates as a Welsh baron. He served in the last assemblage of the feudal host in Scotland in 1385 and it is possible that he had been summoned to serve on that occasion by Richard II. What is known of Owain’s military career suggests that it was entirely consistent with that of a relatively wealthy esquire, a representative of an elite in decline. The survival of such elite tenures did not guarantee economic prosperity though it protected social status. The decline of the hereditary Welsh elite and their military status can be seen in 1345 and 1346. John de Weston, then chamberlain of North Wales, arrayed 100 spearmen (hommes a lances) at Conwy on 13 May 1346, describing them as ‘of the most gentle birth in North Wales’.34 If Weston’s wording is to be taken at face value, then these men were of a different quality from the general infantry, which might, in turn, explain their attitude to the wages – the quantity of which is unknown but which they clearly considered inadequate – that the prince had supplied through his officials. A year earlier, Roger Trumwyn, Weston’s immediate predecessor, confided to the prince of Wales and his council that men who had been paid as men-at-arms were not of the standard expected. It is tempting to believe these men came from the same social group as Weston’s array.35 When mustering the men of Merioneth at Conwy in 1345, Roger Trumwyn, the deputy justiciar of North Wales, reported that the Welsh refused to be led by a Welshmen unless he held of the king by barony. Trumwyn explicitly recorded the Welsh term Pennaeth rather than some other privileged tenure. He declared that the men of North Wales wished to be led by an Englishman, as they had not been led by a Welshman since the death of Sir Gruffudd Llwyd ten years earlier: And if the court [of the Prince of Wales] wills that they must be led by a Welshman, it were good to command that they be leaders from those who hold by franchise of barony [Pennaeth] in the said land and not by people of lesser estate.36

Trumwyn was not entirely correct, since Welshmen had led levies from North Wales in the intervening period. For example, in 1339, Cynwrig Ddu and Gruffudd ap Madoc of Hendwr, the latter a Welsh baron, acted as leaders of Welshmen recruited to serve in Flanders.37 In 1346, the arrayed Welshmen were probably

Gruffudd; Dafydd ab Adda; Tudur ap Goronwy of Penmynydd; Gruffudd ab Ednyfed; Hywel ap Tudur; Ieuan ap Hywel; Tudur ap Hywel and Iorwerth ap Tudur. 34   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 235. 35   Ibid., pp. 246–7. 36   Ibid., p. 248. Sir Gruffudd Llwyd held his lands in Tir Pennaeth in Llanrhystud (Cardiganshire). 37   This is not strictly accurate, though it may apply to the men of Anglesey; there is clear evidence of Welsh leadership of levies in the earlier Flanders campaign of 1338–40: Lyon et al. (eds), The Wardrobe

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pressing the point because many of the members of the native elite had been implicated in the murder of Trumwyn’s predecessor on St Valentine’s Day that year and had consequently been imprisoned. A more significant contradiction can be observed in a letter from Richard Talbot, deputy justiciar of South Wales, dated shortly before 24 May 1345.38 This notes the appointment of Owain (ap Llywelyn) ab Owain with Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd as leaders of 500 Welsh foot ‘shortly to be sent to join the king at Sandwich’. Both Owain and Sir Rhys were Welsh tenants-in-chief and by status Welsh barons, holding their lands (at least in part), by Tir Pennaeth, but the men of South Wales insisted on being led by Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd. The difference between the men was a matter of royal patronage rather than social standing; Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain was distantly descended from the Lord Rhys (d. 1197) and was an experienced military leader who had already served as a commissioner of array and would again. Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, however, was more distantly descended from the Lord Rhys of Deheubarth but was a significant royal servant who received robes and other gifts from at least two kings and a prince of Wales as well as being de facto governor of the royal lands in South Wales for a generation.39 Other forms of privileged tenure survived in Gwynedd from the pre-conquest period. The most notable, because its holders came to dominate the administration of the shires of North Wales, Flintshire and, in the person of Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, South Wales as well, was the tenure of Wyrion Eden. In time, one of their number was to take the throne of England at Bosworth. Wyrion Eden tenure was a set of specific privileges granted to the Ednyfed Fychan (d. 1246) by Llywelyn ab Iorwerth to support him as distain or steward of his household. Though Wyrion Eden tenure is the best known of its type, it was far from unique. The descendants of those men who exercised power and authority in the name of the princes of Gwynedd in the thirteenth century were intent on retaining similar rights in the mid-fourteenth century.40 These land-based privileges set those who received them apart from other freemen, but the resulting distinction provided benefits which were predominately social and had no more than the usual military obligations attached to them.41 Under the Welsh princes, such men were the rough equivalent of the household knights of the English Crown and it is no accident that the majority of those Welshmen promoted to the rank of knight in the fourteenth century were drawn from this pool of tenants-in-chief.42 Their standing in Welsh Book, pp. 361–2. 38   For Sir Richard Talbot, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 105. 39   For his descent from the Lord Rhys, see Lloyd, Owen Glendower, p. 17. For a brief illustration of the contrast in wealth between ‘Owain ab Owain’, as the Crown generally knew him, and Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 9. 40   For examples from Anglesey see Carr, Medieval Anglesey, pp. 108–110. 41   Stephenson provides several examples: The Governance of Gwynedd, pp. 102–19. 42   Chapman, ‘Rebels, Uchelwyr and Parvenus’.

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society as much as the value of the lands themselves made them invaluable to successive English kings. Penteulu Land and priviledge may have conferred military leadership on an elite group of Welshmen after the conquest, but survival of the office of penteulu, the head of the prince’s teulu, in the lordships descended from the princes of Powys was on account of its financial value. According to Welsh law, the penteulu was responsible for correcting wrongs committed in the prince’s court. He was also responsible for assembling the prince’s army. The penteulu was entitled to a circuit (cylch) through the gwlad after Christmas. The renders of this circuit were originally in kind: food and lodging. By the second half of the thirteenth century this circuit had probably been commuted into a money render. In Gwynedd, the military role of the office had been overtaken by the prince’s distain or steward and was rendered extinct after the conquest.43 In the lordships of Powys and Chirk, however, it can be traced until almost the end of the fourteenth century, its survival in Powys being due to this area becoming a Marcher lordship by conversion rather than conquest and, as David Stephenson suggests, in all probability because revenue was associated with it.44 The account of the chamberlain of North Wales of 1306–7, recording the revenues of Powys following the death of Owain de la Pole, shows ‘£4 13s. receptis de exitibus eschaetrie ballive Pentaleur de Powys Gwenonwyn et ballive advocarie totius terre per manus Roberti de Eccleshale escaetoris hoc anno xxxv’.45 The sum is relatively small but probably only represents the lord of Powys’s share of the penteulu levy. A decade and more later, the office fell (albeit temporarily) into the hands of the descendants of the line of northern Powys. Madoc ap Gruffudd of Hendwr had been appointed a commissioner of array in Powys during the civil war of 1321 and successfully petitioned for appointment as penteulu in that lordship during the temporary forfeiture of John Charlton I for his support of Thomas of Lancaster.46 A clearer demonstration of the value of the office can be found attached to the

43   The place of the office of distain in the fratricidal politics of Gwynedd is discussed in Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, pp. 32–7, and in Stephenson, The Governance of Gwynedd, pp. 11–20. For more complete assessments from the earliest times, S. Davies, ‘The Teulu c. 633–1283’, WHR 21:3 (2003), pp. 413–54; A.D. Carr, ‘Teulu and Penteulu’, in T.M. Charles Edwards, M.E. Owen and P. Russell (eds), The Welsh King and His Court (Cardiff, 2000), pp. 63–81. 44   David Stephenson, pers. comm. 45   J. Griffiths, ‘Early Accounts Relating to North Wales temp Edward I’, BBCS 16 (1955), p. 125. I would like to thank Dr Stephenson for his thoughts on the subject and for reminding me of this reference. 46   CPR 1321–24, p. 373, the original petition is TNA SC8/51/2534, reproduced in translation in Cal. Anc. Pet., p. 73. Charlton had been temporarily dispossessed owing to his adherence to Thomas of Lancaster. Charlton’s long time enemy, Gruffudd de la Pole (son of Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn), lord

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inquisition post mortem of John Charlton III in 1374. A subsequent inquisition ad quod damnum, headed by Thomas de Houton in 1375, revealed that the profits of the office of penteulu were rendered yearly from the rents and pleas and perquisites of court throughout the lordship and were not held of anyone, nor for any service. The receipts reflect the inflation of the financial value of lordship in the March over the fourteenth century. By 1375 the office yielded £48 12s. 11¼d. annually, split between various members of the Charlton family.47 Its existence demonstrates that the office had survived the thirteenth century under Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn and his son Owain de la Pole and, although the names of the office holders are unknown to us, it may have retained a military component. If John Charlton II and John Charlton III had conferred the office on their brothers, then, as Carr suggests, it is very likely that it had been conferred by Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn (d. 1286) upon his sons as native lords of Powys.48 The financial legacy of the office was not confined to the lordship of Powys. Two fourteenth-century extents of Chirk, formerly part of Powys Fadog, made in 1332 and 1391–93, refer to a payment called treth penteulu (the tax or rate of the penteulu).49 This was due from the unfree gafaelion (holdings – see glossary) in the commote of Mochnant Is Rhaedr at the feast of the Nativity of St John the Baptist (24 June). The editor of this extent suggests that this payment was identical with the pastus principis of familiae principis (payments owed for the maintenance of the prince’s household) due in the lordship of Denbigh from unfree tenants in all the commotes of that lordship except Rhufoniog Uwch Aled. This exemption is explicitly noted in the survey of Denbigh of 1334 when the total sum due amounted to £4 7s. 3¼d. payable in instalments at Christmas, mid-Lent, the Nativity of St John the Baptist and Holy Cross Day (14 September). Carr suggests that the word familia indicates that this payment was a commutation of the great cylch of the teulu and penteulu.50 Despite this survival, there is no clear evidence that the office of penteulu, if it survived as anything other than a money render, fulfilled any military role after 1282.

of Mawddwy, had also been allied with Lancaster; G.A. Holmes, The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1957), p. 135. 47   CIPM XIV no. 19 pp. 22–3. The exact dues payable from each part of the lordship are included with the extents attached to the original. The office had been held by Owen de Charlton (d. 29 January 1368): CIPM XII p. 197. The grant of this office made by John Charlton III to his brother Roger de Charlton, knight, was confirmed for life on 12 April 1375: CPR 1374–77, pp. 148–9. 48   Carr, ‘Teulu and Penteulu’, pp. 79–80. 49   Jones (ed.), The Extent of Chirkland, 1391–1393, p. xxiv; G. Rex Smith, ‘On the Extent of the Lordship of Chirk, 1332’, Cambrian Medieval Celtic Studies 63 (2012), 91–100. 50   Carr, ‘Teulu and Penteulu’, p. 80.

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Lower Level Survivals Military obligation at a lower level in society was subject to considerable variation. The service required of Adda ap Cynwrig, an inhabitant of Bromfield and Yale in 1315 (a lordship created after 1282) for his messuage and for half a gafael (an unfree tenement) of land in Gwensanau, was explicitly military. This service was not confined to Wales: ‘he goes with his lord [in this instance, Earl Warenne] to war in England, Wales and Scotland as above said.’ The full terms are noted earlier in the extent: ‘equipped by the earl, and [he] will remain with his person at his will.’51 Far from simply annexing existing rights of military lordship inherited from the princes of Gwynedd, John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, had extended them to suit not only his own purposes, but also those of the king. Later extents of Bromfield and Yale in 1331 and of Chirk in 1391–93 reveal a complex set of military obligations due from the Welsh tenants of each lordship. Despite the employment of the radmanni of the borough of Holt to garrison the castle in 1387, it is doubtful that such obligations were reflected in the retinues recruited by the earls of Arundel in the 1380s and later.52 Similar obligations appear in an extent of the lordship of Hay from 1340. There Welsh tenants of the Welshry of the lordship were obliged to go with the lord, for military service, for one day at their own cost and outside the lordship at the lord’s expense. The English tenants of the military fees within the lordship and within the borough of Hay also had military elements, but these were probably not derived from Welsh law.53 In the same way that the cylch of the penteulu survived as a cash render, so carrying services associated with wars between Welsh princes survived as financial levies on communities. Court rolls from Anglesey in September 1346 reveal that non-payment of army money was routine. In the commotes of Twrcelyn and Talybolion, thirty of the thirty-five townships were indicted and fined a shilling each for non-payment. One, Bodaeon, was fined 2s. for not sending a representative to the muster held at Conwy. These obligations clearly originated in Welsh law: before the Edwardian conquest, the unfree were expected to supply, among other things, sumpter horses for the prince’s army.54 By 1346, this due remained, in effect commuted to cash, as is shown by a fine of 12d. levied on the bondmen of the

51   T.P. Ellis (ed.), The First Extent of Bromfield and Yale AD 1315, Cymmrodorion Record Series 11 (London, 1924), pp. 81, 87. 52   Jones (ed.), The Extent of Chirkland, 1391–1393, p. 61; Ellis (ed.), The First Extent of Bromfield and Yale, pp. 81, 87. For example, those claimed for Penmynydd, Trecastell and Erddreiniog by Hywel ap Goronwy in 1348: Record of Caernarvon, p. 150. Others in Anglesey are noted in E.N. Baynes, ‘Penrhôs, in Twrcelyn, in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, Anglesey Antiquarian Society and Field Club Transactions (1921), 21–33. 53   R. Morgan, ‘An Extent of the Lordship of Hay 1340’, Brycheniog 28 (1995–96), pp. 15–21. 54   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, p. cxiii

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commote of Dindaethwy, Anglesey, for their failure to provide such beasts.55 The communal element, in the widest sense, of the resulting army is made apparent; even those not obliged to serve in person had to provide animals to the cause. These court rolls also suggest that the levies from the royal shires were intended to be self-funding at least until they joined the king’s army.56 Davies offers several examples from the records of Marcher government which suggest similar obligations existed there and that subsidies were frequently ordered by the lords of the March to fund military expeditions. The men of Chirkland were compelled to pay war subsidies, of 40 marks in 1341 and another 20 marks in 1345. In 1339 their neighbours in Bromfield and Yale were ordered by their lord, the earl of Surrey, to pay 200 marks towards his costs ‘in defensione status regni Anglie’.57 Even as late as 1411, a court roll for the commote of Naheudwy in the lordship of Chirk reveals that the community made a donum to their lord, the earl of Arundel, ‘ad ­equitanciam suam in partibus Francie’.58 The campaign led by the earl of Arundel in 1411 was exceptional in that it was privately funded by the duke of Burgundy, but the Welsh lands of the earl clearly made their contribution too. Such subsidies were a benefit of Marcher lordship; the imposition of them not only boosted their lord’s resources, but also enhanced the holder’s authority over his tenants. Conclusions In many respects, the administration and patterns of service found amongst Welshmen differed relatively little from those of contemporary Englishmen in practical terms. The nature of military obligation, however, had peculiarly Welsh characteristics that had evolved separately from English practice and their variety is striking. The lordships of the March and the divisions of the royal estates in Wales were reflected in the structure of the retinues of their respective lords, and examples of these are explored in earlier chapters. In the March, military tenure and structures preserved structures which, in England, would have appeared archaic; in the March they had a practical force as late as the second half of the thirteenth century. Although these may have declined in importance thereafter, the memory of their value in the relatively recent past goes some way to explaining why they were recorded so assiduously in inquisitions held in the fourteenth century. Elsewhere in the March, especially in the lordships of the north-east March created

  Jones, ‘Anglesey Court Rolls’, p. 40.   For examples of the survival of pre-conquest and other medieval divisions and settlement patterns in the same part of Anglesey into the sixteenth century, T. Jones Pierce, ‘An Anglesey Crown Rental of the Sixteenth Century’ and ‘Medieval Settlement in Anglesey’, BBCS 10 (1940), pp. 156–76. 57   Smith, ‘Seigniorial Income in the Fourteenth Century, pp. 448–9. For military subsidies more generally, see Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 83. 58   Smith, ‘Seigniorial Income in the Fourteenth Century’, p. 449. 55

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in the aftermath of the conquest (Denbigh, Chirk, Bromfield and Yale), some of the military tenures recorded were new creations. They may have owed something to earlier Welsh law, but their terms were particular to the period of the conquest and the needs of England’s wars. They reflected the demands placed upon their lords by their king, but also enabled these same lords to assert authority over their Welsh tenants. The terms of these tenures also illustrate the possibility of independent military service for the defence of the lordship and the expectation that it might be required, which, in the thirteenth century, may have been the case. Whether these obligations were ever activated in the fourteenth century or beyond is not certain, but it is likely that the lands granted in return for specific service in Brecon in the course of the Glyndŵr rebellion were among the last such creations in the English realm as a whole. After the Edwardian conquest, the nature of military obligation in the former Pura Wallia appears to have changed relatively little. This stability was ensured by the retention of Welsh law for the purpose of land holding. More surprising is the fact that the communal basis of recruitment and other obligations relating to military service were retained not only as theoretical obligations, but also as a practical element of the process of military recruitment. This is because they had the practical value of coercion. Those Welsh communities which failed to co-operate with military demands could be pursued through the courts and thereby generate income for the Crown. By contrast, the office of penteulu in what had been Powys Fadog and Powys Gwenwynwyn probably lost its military function relatively quickly and survived only because of the financial value attached to it. The survival of members of Welsh royal lines as barons after the conquest was a consequence of their loyalty, or political shrewdness, in 1282. The military elements of the resulting tenures also appear to have been called upon by successive English kings as late as the 1330s, and might have been expected by Richard II when Owain Glyndŵr joined the last feudal army summoned in England in 1385. Following the death of the first post-conquest generation of the Welsh elite, most of the descendants of the princes of Powys and Deheubarth descended into obscurity or oblivion. This might have been through rebellion, as in case of Rhys ap Maredudd, or through dilution of status by the partible inheritance of land. Those who thrived – the descendants of Ednyfed Fychan – partook in the status that Tir Pennaeth gave them but retained their privileges by virtue of the other estates they held by different forms of tenure and had greater opportunities to escape partible inheritance. It is no accident that three of the handful of Welsh knights in the fourteenth century – Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd I and Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II – acted on their military obligations but also had resources independent of their baronial status to support them. At lower levels of society, Welsh archers and spearmen would have had less freedom in their service. Military lordship, as a concept and as a display of seigneurial authority, was a constant presence from 1283 to 1422 and, to an extent,

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beyond. Such troops were, however, dependent upon their lords for opportunities. The modes of recruitment were very similar to those in England and the role of Welsh archers mirrored those of the English shire levy. The Welsh wars of conquest created a militarised society. They also refined English systems of military organisation which were put to use in the wars in Scotland and in the early stages of the wars in France. The men of Wales were called upon for their experience as much as were those of England’s northern borders. Military experience, however, was not the sole element of continuity. The apparent preservation of communal obligations after the Edwardian conquest played a role which was significant, if difficult to define precisely, from the post-conquest settlement until the close of the first phase of the wars with France in 1359. Subsequent developments, principally the adoption of the indenture system and the unprecedented absence of conflict in the lands of Wales, led to a decline in the need for the numerous, if low-skilled, troops that Wales could easily provide. So numerous were these troops that, to an extent, the mechanisms of recruitment employed by commanders have been obscured.

7

Going to War: Recruitment and Deployment

The processes by which the Welsh went to war in the later Middle Ages were, necessarily, a reflection of the wider society of the shires and March of Wales. In general, for the English Crown and for English lords, the benefit of their Welsh estates was overwhelmingly financial; studies of Marcher estates in the fourteenth century have frequently commented upon the ways in which lords extracted increasing revenues from their property as well as the ways in which they protected and furthered their interests at the expense of their tenants.1 The military foundations of these estates went some way towards providing a foundation for the authority of the Marcher lords. Most claimed their authority by usurping the native princes and relied upon their Welsh tenants to support their interests against those of the surviving Welsh rulers in the thirteenth century. The completion of the conquest of Pura Wallia did nothing to undermine this. Going to war remained a key obligation of Welsh tenants to their English lords just as it had to their Welsh princes. This chapter follows on from the last in considering the practicalities of raising troops for the shires and liberties of Wales and how these related to the theory of obligation. It examines the ways in which Welsh soldiers came to be included in English armies, the process of selection and the ways in which Marcher lords responded to the impositions of the Crown and the exigencies of England’s wars. Since, with the exception of rebellions against English rule, these wars were conducted far from Wales, this chapter also examines the ways by which soldiers from Wales went to English armies and the measures taken to ensure their integration. Recruitment: The Welsh and Scottish Wars It is in the recruitment of English royal armies that military reality overtakes the theory of obligation. As we have seen, there were numerous survivals of military  Davies, Lordship and Society, chs 8 and 17.

 1

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obligations in royal shires and Marcher liberties. It is all but impossible to establish how these were reflected in the general processes of military recruitment with precision. The abandonment of feudal service and the rise of paid infantry in the reign of Edward I was noted by Morris at the beginning of the twentieth century. The process by which pay became the norm for soldiers in royal armies and the eventual universality of recruitment by indenture by the middle years of the reign of Edward III have been developed subsequently by others, most notably in the pioneering work of A.E. Prince and more recently in the detailed studies of Prestwich and Ayton.2 These processes were themselves replaced as wars in France required a different sort of army, one that was mobile and fast moving. After 1360, English armies were almost exclusively recruited by indentures of war. These were not, in themselves, a novelty but the privatisation of the process of military recruitment resulted in different processes and different types of documents recording them, notably the indentures themselves and the muster rolls which provided part of the audit trail demanded by royal bureaucracy. Muster rolls are an especially useful resource for military historians and even more so now they have been made available as a searchable online resource.3 The conclusions arising from this have been published by Anne Curry, Adrian Bell, Andy King and David Simpkin and their research offers the widest perspective on armies of this period. Examples from the shires and March of Wales are explored in later chapters, but will be summarised here to provide context.4 Commissions of array During Edward I’s reign the adoption of armies significantly bigger than had previously been employed meant that more sophisticated means of recruiting were required. It appears that the chief organisational innovation that enabled this, the commission of array, originated in Edward I’s Welsh wars. In the first Welsh war of 1277, the sheriffs of the English shires were used to raise levies of infantry from their counties in order to ‘keep the peace’, the lords of the March acting in similar fashion though in their case, self-interest – the desire to defend their property – reinforced royal command.5 This was a direct extension of the Marcher lords’ traditional military duties. In time of war in Wales, these had long included the finding of men for the king’s army as well as protecting their estates. By the time  Morris, Welsh Wars; Prince, ‘The Strength of English Armies under Edward III’; idem, ‘The Indenture System under Edward III’; A. Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment in Fourteenth-Century England’, in A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (eds), The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2011), pp. 9–60; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages.  3   The AHRC funded ‘Soldier in Later Medieval England, 1369–1453’ project at www.­medievalsoldier. org.  4  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, Introduction.  5   CPR 1272–81, p. 218.  2

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of the final Welsh war in 1282, this responsibility had passed into the hands of men drawn from Edward’s own household, although in the Marcher liberties, seigneurial officials were employed. Once the administration of the shires of Wales had been codified and made subject to royal control, the commissions of array employed in England were also employed in Wales. In the liberties of the March the commission was passed to the lord’s steward and thus through his officers, as the king had no representatives of his own and could not compel recruitment there by his own authority and attempts to do so were vigorously resisted.6 From Edward I’s first Welsh war in 1277 until the rebellions of 1294–95, English wars in Wales were conducted by the king in person.7 His armies were therefore arrayed by members of his own household. As we shall see, the way in which Edward I waged war would not have been possible without the Welshmen of the shires and the March of Wales. Morris identified ‘Welsh friendlies’ among Edward’s armies in Wales in 1277 and 1282.8 For instance, the army raised against Rhys ap Maredudd in the summer of 1287, drawn mostly from within Wales and the March, mobilised over 20,000 Welshmen. At Falkirk in 1298, 10,900 in an army of over 25,000 were Welshmen.9 Though chronicle evidence suggests that the Welsh were somewhat unwilling participants at Falkirk, and that they were unruly and ill disciplined, they were a constant feature for the remainder of Edward I’s reign and into that of his son. Prestwich notes that The process of recruitment usually produced a sufficient number of men, but their quality was woeful. This is not surprising; it was tempting for a village to select those who could be most easily spared rather than those who were likely to be the best soldiers.10

Welshmen, however, became Edward I’s most consistent soldiers. Tellingly, of the 3,000 infantry who gathered on the south shore of the Solway Firth with Edward I on his last campaign, only ninety-seven were English: the remainder were Welsh.11 Regardless of the quality of the troops obtained, the processes employed in Wales were no different from those developed in England. Commissions of array appear to have been issued through local officers to each community within the commotes of both the shires and the March informing them of the dates of assembly. The benefits of appointing commissioners of array as opposed to household officials or sheriffs were obvious. Unlike sheriffs, who served only for a term of

 6   Prestwich, ‘Liberties and Military Recruitment’, p. 114; J. Beverley Smith, ‘Marcher Regality: Quo Warranto Proceedings relating to Cantrefselyf in the Lordship of Brecon, 1349’, BBCS 28 (1979), pp. 270–2. Cydweli in 1415: TNA E 101/46/20 m. 4.  7   The exception was the suppression of the revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd, 1287–88 when Edward I was abroad.  8  Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 93, 94, 122, 134, 149 and others.  9  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 94–5. 10   Prestwich, ‘Liberties and Military Recruitment’, p. 113. 11   TNA E 101/373/15 fols 13r–19r.

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one year, commissioners of array could be appointed repeatedly and for as long as was required. The convenience of this was such that, in England in the fourteenth century, only 6 per cent of those men who served as both sheriffs and arrayers simultaneously.12 In the shires of Wales, the commissioners appear to have acted in the same manner as those holding similar offices in England. In Wales, the first commissions of array appear in the patent rolls during the king’s absence on the Scottish campaign in the winter of 1297–98. The writ ordering the recruitment of Welshmen to serve in Flanders on 13 July 1297 is a commission of array in all but name, but recruitment for the Falkirk campaign of 1298 marked a change of approach. It put recruitment throughout the royal shires and the March under the control of royal officials, notably John de Havering, justiciar of North Wales, Reginald de Grey, justiciar of Chester and William Felton, constable of Beaumaris. The co-ordination of recruitment across the different polities of the March became part of the routine duties of royal officials and of local figures with military experience. The business of direct recruitment within the Marcher liberties was co-ordinated by the lords and their officials. Distinction between the men of individual liberties was scrupulously observed in the payrolls and by the provision of standards and uniforms.13 Many served as commissioners of array on several occasions. Walter de Pederton, noted earlier, was a royal clerk who served as justiciar of West Wales in his own right for several periods between May 1290 and 1305 and served on commissions of array in 1294, 1297, 1308 and 1309. In 1294 he led the men of South Wales selected to serve in France as far as Winchester before the force was disbanded because of the rebellions in Wales. As a king’s clerk serving later in the household of Edward of Caernarfon, his role as a leader of troops was relatively unusual, though it was common for secular men appointed as commissioners of array to do this.14 The career of Warin Martyn demonstrates some of the difficulties of the job. He was appointed as deputy justiciar in April and May 1298 to lead 2,500 men from West Wales to Carlisle by 30 May and again for a similar purpose in 1301. As a leader of men he twice found it necessary to secure pardons for himself which indemnified him from the actions of his men.15 Later, Welsh royal servants, notably Sir Morgan ap Maredudd, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd and Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, were employed almost as permanent commissioners of array in both the shires and the March of Wales. It seems likely that this was just one function of their roles as royal representatives in these communities.

  R. Gorski, The Fourteenth-Century Sheriff: English Local Administration in the Late Middle Ages (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 146–7. 13   CPR 1292–1301, pp. 342–3; CCR 1296–1302, pp. 44, 208. See also Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, pp. 99–100. 14   See p. 39. For full references and details of his career, see Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 93–4. 15   Ibid., p. 94. 12

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This is indicated by the receipt, on a near annual basis, of robes from both Edward I and Edward II. The display of their association with the king was more for the benefit of their communities than their presence at court: it is likely that these men were seldom attendant on the king in person except when on campaign. As liveried retainers of the Crown, these knights could proclaim their wider authority and status in their communities and, just as importantly, over their own social equals.16 The ability of the Crown to order recruitment from the March of Wales appears to have been respected by its lords, provided that it was the king himself who issued the writs of array and royal appointees did not attempt to recruit directly in Marcher lordships. The commissioners’ role was as auditors of the processes of the lord’s steward in the selection of men from assemblies held at the castle gate, since the men were to serve at the king’s wages once outside their lordships.17 The service of Marcher tenants beyond the bounds of their lordships was at first discretionary, at least in those parts of the March established before Edward I’s time. The first occasion on which Edward I endeavoured to recruit men from the lordship of Glamorgan for service in a royal army outside Wales was in 1292. The grant of 500 men was only given by Earl Gilbert de Clare on the promise that it would not be taken as a precedent.18 If the lord of a particular liberty was unwilling to co-operate with the Crown for any reason then the king could not intervene independently to recruit men from his lordship, though he might try. Edward I’s campaign to Flanders in 1297, against the backdrop of baronial opposition, provides an obvious example; the earl of Hereford, lord of Brecon, refused to allow his tenants to serve in the royal army. The men recruited from West Wales, however, were permitted to pass through his lordship on their journey to the English coast.19 Recruitment of men from specific English liberties was not unknown when the occasion required. In 1307, commissions were issued for some of the liberties of northern England. Among them were Penrith, Cockermouth and Egremont, the liberty of the bishop of Carlisle and Tynedale all, incidentally, from the precise area where the royal army was to assemble.20 The remainder of that army was Welsh, but local knowledge provided by these men was essential. Generally, the consent of the Marcher lords was given without murmur unless, as in 1297 or 1321–22, they were in dispute with the king. Only when there was a prince of Wales independent of the king, and intent on exercising his authority did difficulties arise. In 1345 such a dispute was described in a letter by Roger   For example, robes were granted to Rhys ap Gruffudd and Gruffudd Llwyd as valets of the king’s chamber at Westminster and Langley respectively in 1310: BL Cotton Nero VIII fol. 83v. My thanks to Dr Chris Candy for useful discussion on this subject. 17  Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 82–3. 18   Parl. Writs I, p. 391. 19   BL Add. MS 7965, fols 81–5 and N.B. Lewis, ‘The English Forces in Flanders, August–November 1297’, pp. 310–318. 20   Parl. Writs, I, pp. 279–80, cited in Prestwich, ‘Liberties and Military Recruitment’, p. 114. 16

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Trumwyn, the deputy justiciar of North Wales, to the prince’s central officials. Among the writs of array directed at the Marcher lords was one to John Charlton, lord of Powys. Sealed with the prince’s seal of the Caernarfon exchequer, the writ was refused by Charlton and returned intact to Trumwyn in direct defiance of the prince’s authority. By this, Charlton was emphasising that the right to recruit was a kingly and not a princely prerogative. Charlton, a first generation Marcher lord who had acquired the status through marriage to a daughter of Owain de la Pole, the last Welsh lord of Powys, was more vociferous than most about promoting the rights attached to this status. His sense of his rights as a lord of the March was expressed at every opportunity. On another occasion, in 1333, he proclaimed – to no less august a personage as a commissary of the abbot of Clairvaux – ‘I am Pope; I am King, and Bishop, and Abbot in my land’ (Je suis Papes, Je suis R[oys] et Abbes en ma terre).21 Such a man was not going to be disturbed by a young prince whose status in Wales, as a royal tenant-in-chief, was equal to his own. Even in those lordships which received the writ, Trumwyn, for the same reason, could not be sure that men from the March would serve, a concern which led him to raise a further 500 men from the northern counties of the principality. Three years earlier, in 1342, in similar circumstances, royal authority had tested the patience of the lord of Brecon. Sir Philip ap Rhys and Miles Pichard were ordered to array 200 Welshmen from Blaenllyfni, Pencelli and Cantrefselyf. Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford, insisted that Pencelli and Cantrefsylef were his lordships and that the process of recruitment was the province of his officials. He petitioned, successfully, that the two men should be appointed only to array from Blaenllyfni. To some extent the petition was not concerned with the protection of the lord’s rights, but was part of a systematic campaign to extend the powers he exercised over Cantrefsylef and Pencelli and Sir Philip ap Rhys, his tenant. In other words, it was not entirely a problem of the specific action as the man nominated to enact it.22 In contrast, commissioners of array in the shires of Wales were effectively deputies to the justiciars. This deputy might have been the chamberlain, since holders of this office were usually resident; the justiciar was routinely an absentee who exercised his duties by a lieutenant, often the chamberlain. In December 1332, for example, Edward III appointed Sir Walter de Mauny, who had accompanied Edward’s wife Philippa from Hainault, as sheriff of Merioneth for an unprecedented life term. Mauny received the revenues of the entire county and its officers but executed none of the responsibilities (nor ever, as far as is known, visited Wales). The terms of the grant make allowances for this; among other caveats, Edward assigned military recruitment to his own officials and, after 1343, those of his son.

21   This statement concerned the status of the abbey of Ystradmarchell/Strata Marcella and was made 1333; Cal. Anc. Pet., pp. 411–12. Charlton was denying the commissary access to the abbey by force of arms. 22   Smith, ‘Marcher Regality’, p. 271; Davies, ‘The Bohun and Lancaster Lordships’, pp. 125–31.

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He [Edward III] grants also that if he should cause men of Wales of whatsoever condition in the said country to be chosen to serve him in his wars, the said Walter shall not be charged with finding such men, and that no minister of the king but he and his deputies who shall make executions of the king’s mandates there shall meddle in anything within the county.23

This specific injunction says much for the English perspective on these parts of North Wales; an officer who, by definition, was an absentee could not be allowed to frustrate the efficient recruitment of men for royal armies in the county of Merioneth. Mauny’s deputies would not be chosen by him but the offices would be let at farm (from which Mauny would have benefited) to an appropriate man from the locality. In October 1334, for example, the muster at Harlech was undertaken not by the sheriff, Walter Mauny, but by Roger Corbet, John de Leyburn and a Welsh baron, Gruffudd ap Madoc of Glyndyfrydwy. Gruffudd also served as a commissioner of array in 1333.24 In 1345, however, it is clear that in North Wales sheriffs or their deputies were responsible for disseminating the writs of array.25 Recruitment for Indentured Armies As England’s wars turned to face Europe so the needs of its armies changed. The mechanisms required to produce large armies of foot soldiers designed to intimidate were not suitable to produce armies suitable for the chevauchée. Until 1359, it would be a reasonable expectation that every fit Welsh male of military age would not only be eligible for military service but might be called upon to perform it. After the peace of Brétigny had ended and war restarted formally in 1369, English armies predominately fought in France and went about on horseback. The size of armies was generally reduced and archers routinely served in mixed retinues with men-at-arms. This reflected the changed purpose of the war. Armies were meant not to draw the enemy into combat, but to move quickly through the countryside causing maximum disruption. The Crown passed the business of finding its soldiers to individual commanders who, by various means, recruited men to serve with them. In Wales, the natural consequence is that documentation recording the recruitment of soldiers all but vanishes. For the most part, the officials responsible for local government were not involved.26 Even if they had been, evidence for active military recruitment on the part of local officials is rare in the surviving records which they returned to the Exchequer. Royal lordship remained an important influence on military recruitment from the shires on exceptional occasions. These were in 1377, when invasion threatened   CPR 1340–43, p. 304. My italics.   Rogers is incorrect in suggesting that Mauny was at Harlech in person: War Cruel and Sharp, p. 82, n. 33 citing R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots (Oxford, 1965), p. 173. For Gruffudd ap Madoc as commissioner of array, see Rot. Scot. I, pp. 228–30. For evidence of several of Walter Mauny’s representatives in Merioneth and as constable of Harlech, see TNA SC 6/1288/3. 25   See letter from Roger Trumwyn, Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 247. 26   Ayton, ‘Military Service and the Dynamics of Recruitment’, pp. 9–60. 23

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Wales and London, and in 1385, when Richard II raised a feudal host and seems to have revived earlier practices of recruitment in Wales. Richard’s two expeditions to Ireland (1394, 1399) departed from Wales and, as might be expected, there is evidence for more recruitment from Wales than might otherwise have been the case. Welshmen recruited were companies of foot archers: 340 in 1385; sixty, with nine mounted archers led by four esquires with a ‘baneour’ (Welsh: Banewr – standard bearer) in 1394.27 It is possible that similar efforts were made in 1399, but for that campaign the full records have not survived. Despite Henry IV’s extensive Welsh estates and the support they gave in 1399, there is no evidence that Henry drew on his estates in a similar manner for his Scottish campaign in 1400. In 1394 archers drawn from North Wales were led by Rhys ap Tudur, a king’s esquire. It is possible that recruitment was conducted through his personal connections – he and his brother Gwilym were the leading uchelwyr of Anglesey – rather than communal obligation. The possible reasons for the recruitment of foot archers for these campaigns is discussed in earlier chapters, but whatever the reason, it was a reflection on the relative poverty of the Welsh and the changed nature of English armies. Foot archers were famously recruited again in 1415 in the rather strained circumstances following Glyndŵr’s rebellion. This incident was exceptional in every way, since the chamberlain of South Wales, John Merbury, appears to have recruited by individual summons. It is probable that such summonses drew upon lists of those who had formally submitted to the king’s peace at the end of the rebellion. No such lists survive for Cardiganshire or Carmarthenshire, where many of those apparently supposed to serve provided substitutes, but two later copies of lists of those who submitted in Anglesey have survived.28 Many of the men who served in 1415, therefore, were probably former rebels and service secured their pardon. In the earldom of Chester, and by extension, Flintshire, the lordship of a royal earl and the counties’ relative wealth meant that opportunities for a military career were frequent. Direct royal lordship facilitated recruitment in the royal shires but private lordship retained its significance as a recruitment tool in the March. This was, ironically, one of the reasons for the declining participation of the Welsh in war between 1369 and 1415. The path to a profitable career came through those with personal access to a powerful lord. Otherwise, only Marcher lords were really in a position to recruit from their own estates; few Welsh esquires had the resources to operate as captains in their own right. Some, such as the FitzAlans in their lordships in the north-east of Wales or the Despensers in Glamorgan, were regular participants in royal armies and recruited from their estates in both England and Wales.29

 Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 239; TNA, E 101/402/20 fol. 39v.   Chapman, ‘The King’s Welshmen’, pp. 56–8; G. Roberts, ‘The Anglesey Submissions of 1406’, BBCS 15 (1952), 39–61. 29  Bell, War and the Soldier, p. 134. 27 28

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Elsewhere, the Mortimer earls of March were blighted by a string of minorities and the bulk of their military service was in Ireland, as were their estates.30 They too recruited from their Welsh estates; in 1375, Earl Edmund (d. 1381) recruited ninety-two archers to serve in his retinue in Brittany.31 Marcher lords could and did use their estates to ease the process of recruitment. This continued into the fifteenth century. In 1415, for example, Thomas, earl of Arundel, appears to have maintained Welshmen as substitutes for those who fell ill at Harfleur and were invalided home; these were the only Welshmen to serve as archers in his retinue.32 Elsewhere, however, direct military lordship in the March went into relative decline. In Brecon, the line of Bohun earls died out in 1372 and this lordship, with others in South and West Wales, became part of the enormous estates of John of Gaunt. Although there is evidence that Gaunt recruited from these estates, they only formed a really important military resource when the Marcher estates of the duchy of Lancaster became part of the royal demesne after the usurpation of Henry Bolingbroke and return to peace. After the death of John Charlton III in 1374, the Charlton lords of Powys showed no particular interest in war until compelled to do so by the Glyndŵr rebellion. There were other disincentives to recruiting from Wales and its March. Wales was relatively remote from all theatres of war except Ireland and relatively few expeditionary armies ventured there. This was a disincentive to recruitment for captains without estates in the Welsh March. Since indentees were only paid by the Crown from the point at which they joined the army, it was incumbent upon individual captains to provide some form of financial support until that point. As war increasingly became a matter of private enterprise in the second half of the fourteenth century, there were few Welshmen in a position to make their way as entrepreneurs. This may be observed in the careers of Owain Lawgoch, fighting in the French cause, and the Flintshire knight, Sir Gregory Sais. Sir Gregory was the only significant Welsh captain on the English side in the second half of the fourteenth century and the first two decades of the fifteenth. Sir Gregory made a career fighting in the Free Companies in the 1360s, served in Aquitaine from 1369 until c. 1375 (apart from brief periods of captivity), and, having married a Gascon, maintained his interests there until his lands were lost. When he returned to Flintshire, he co-ordinated forces against possible invasion in Pembrokeshire in 1377 and served as lieutenant of Brest from 1378 to 1381, as captain of Berwick in 1383–84, and finally as a captain in the Calais garrison in 1386. The few musters which record his retinues show that they were mainly composed of men from Flintshire, North Wales and the earldom of Chester. The last is not surprising given that Sir Gregory came from Flintshire, part of the Black Prince’s earldom of   Two of the Mortimer earls, Edmund (d. 1381) and Roger (d. 1398), died in Ireland in this period.  Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 82, citing BL Egerton Roll 8751; TNA, E 101/34/6. 32   TNA, E 101/44/30 no. 1 m. 15. 30 31

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Chester.33 Owain Lawgoch’s career was remarkably similar in some respects to that of Sir Gregory Sais. He too had served in the Free Companies and it is likely that many Welshmen who flocked to the cause of an independent Wales under Owain and fought for the French did likewise.34 The known military career of Owain Glyndŵr demonstrates the importance of personal connections with captains and Marcher lords. Owain served with Sir Gregory Sais at Berwick and, according to his testimony in the Scrope–Grosvenor case, in Scotland in 1385. His only other known service was at sea in the retinue of the earl of Arundel in 1387. This connection was through personal, administrative service. Glyndŵr’s father, Gruffudd Fychan, had served as steward of the Arundel lordships of Oswestry and Chirk, while Owain’s father-in-law, the jurist Sir David Hanmer (d. c. 1387) served on the earl of Arundel’s Marcher council in 1386–87.35 Owain, in contrast, took what appears to have been an unusually martial path, although this may seem so simply because his career is more easily traced because of the changing nature of English armies. Concrete evidence for anything other than occasional service for more than a handful of individuals in the period between 1369 and 1400 is thin; most known claims of service by the Welsh squirearchy in France, for example, were made in the mouths of poets but cannot be verified by the administrative records. Many of those the poets praised first come to light as soldiers during and after Owain’s rebellion and not before. That said, many of those recruited to Owain’s cause who had served earlier would have seen war as part of their status in society. Therefore we might expect that they would have sought out opportunities to fight. It may simply be a problem of evidence. Letters of protection and attorney, sought by those intending to serve overseas to gain protection from legal action during their absence, were issued in abundance between 1369 and 1453; 25,000 survive, of which approximately 7,500 offer a place of origin. Just sixty-eight (1.3 per cent of the total where the nationality is given) of those issued in this period were granted to men described as hailing from Wales.36 While the administrations in Carmarthen and Caernarfon probably issued their own letters of protection, as did the palatine county of Chester, and Marcher lordships certainly did, the king’s jurisdiction in Wales was distinct from that in England.37 The hints at networks and relations of captains and locality are therefore not easily available to those studying the recruitment of Welsh soldiers.

  Carr, ‘A Welsh Knight in the Hundred Years War’; TNA, E 101/39/39.   Siddons, ‘Welshmen in the Service of France’, pp. 161–84. 35   Goodman, ‘Owain Glyn Dŵr before 1400’, pp. 67–70; Ll. Beverley Smith, ‘Glyn Dŵr, Owain (c. 1359–c. 1416)’, in Oxford DNB, accessed 5 Dec 2013. 36  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, Table 6.4, pp. 223–4. 37   Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, p. 259. 33

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Defence of the Realm There were other limitations on the ability to recruit men from the shires and liberties of Wales beyond the will of Marcher lords and the reticence of the native population. As has been noted in earlier chapters, fear of invasion of England via Wales, or the turbulence of the Welsh, was a frequent concern for the English administration. The examples of the preparations made in 1415 or in the 1370s under the threat of Owain Lawgoch are representative here. On both occasions, garrisons were reinforced and special attention was paid to securing sites which would be convenient for an invading army, notably, in 1377, Milford Haven. Defensive measures could only be effective with the co-operation of the men on the ground, both Marcher lords and local administrators, since English kings and their most senior officials seldom visited Wales unless en route to Ireland or to extinguish rebellion. Perhaps the most extreme example of this concern – and of governmental ignorance – comes from 29 April, 1347 when men were being recruited to reinforce the siege of Calais: Order to the Justice of North Wales or his Lieutenant – as the prince has been informed that the island of Anglesey in the principality of North Wales is surrounded by sea and that enemies from a foreign country often try to land there to do what mischief they can so that the island must needs be furnished with men to withstand them, and that he, the said justice, by virtue of orders from the said prince to array Welshmen in North Wales has assessed the island at too great a number of men whereby peril might easily arise to the Prince and the island, – to deduct a third part from the men assessed on the island and add the same number to the contingents of Merionith and Caernarfon.38

At the same time, a small garrison was placed in the castle of Criccieth. These four men were paid only 2d. per day. It can be no accident that shortly afterwards, workmen – those same men previously employed as soldiers, as it happens – were employed at Cricieth (at the cost of 4d. per day) to make repairs.39 While in emergencies, garrisons were hurriedly installed in Wales, and orders made to the Marcher lords, permanent garrisons appear to have been relatively unusual from the middle of the fourteenth century. As E.A. Lewis observed, ‘The early garrisons [of the castles of the north principality] were constituted on the lines that the constable should retain a stipulated number of soldiers and to maintain the same out of his allotted fee.’40 The Crown would pay for any additional soldiers. The usual number for Caernarfon, Conwy and Beaumaris would be about sixteen. The difficulty with this arrangement was that the fee for the constables of the castles on North Wales was only £20, a sum which, at the rate of even 3d. per day would pay for only four archers for a year’s service. Even a lower wage rate would require a constable to make use of his own resources, rendering the office of constable   Reg. B.P. I, p. 73.   Reg. B.P. III, pp. 99, 156. 40   E.A. Lewis, The Medieval Boroughs of Snowdonia (London, 1912), p. 107. 38

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unprofitable. Although from time to time, additional wages passed through the hands of the chamberlains of North and South Wales, there is no obvious evidence of how such men were paid in other financial records. It is little wonder that, when assembled in 1340, a jury from the town of Conwy confirmed that the constable of Conwy should maintain sixteen men, one chaplain and one watchman out of his annual fee, but the fact was that he sometimes kept ten and sometimes eight.41 In the fourteenth century, beyond the administrative centres of the south and north of the principality (Carmarthen and Caernarfon), evidence for royal contributions to garrisons is scant. This is a marked contrast between the March of Wales and the March of Scotland, where the threat of military incursions was more consistent and more immediate. In the March of Wales, as in England, ‘any rights the liberties might have had could be swept aside by the Crown as far as military affairs were concerned, in times of necessity’.42 In England, however, liberties were usually small and surrounded by English counties and their administration. The fragmentation of government of the March of Wales and its liberties made ‘sweeping aside’ very much more difficult to achieve. In the main, military affairs of individual lordships were left in the hands of Marcher lords and their administrators (the latter often at their considerable financial profit), even at the height of Glyndŵr’s revolt. Such fragmentation and the resulting parochialism could take many forms. In 1402 Richard, Lord Grey of Codnor, found that officials of the Lancaster (and therefore, part of Henry IV’s own private estates) lordship of Monmouth would not hand over money assigned to him by the king on the grounds that it was duchy rather than royal income. More seriously, other commanders were equally infuriated by the realisation that they had no authority to pursue rebel forces into neighbouring lordships without first securing written licence to do so.43 These examples of bureaucratic obfuscation emphasise the potential powerlessness of royal authority over the March even in a time of crisis. Troop Movements The manner in which Welsh infantry was arrayed and assembled is rather clearer than for their English counterparts because of the nature of the Welsh March. Writs of array had to be sent to the lords of each lordship individually and the resulting troops arrayed at assemblies within each lordship or within each shire. The levies then had to be assembled and marched to either the Scottish border or the south coast of England.

  Ibid., p. 108.   Prestwich, ‘Liberties and Military Recruitment’, p. 118. 43  Davies, Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr, p. 257; M.D. Legge (ed.), Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions from All Souls MS. 182 (London, 1941), no. 257. 41

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The array itself was generally conducted at a convenient point for assembly near a centre of royal administration in the shires. In 1345, the men of North Wales assembled at the ferry at Conwy – safely outside the walls of the town – while in South Wales in the same year, in 1415 and on other occasions, they assembled at, or more likely just outside, Carmarthen. In the March, it was before the castle gate that like assemblies were made, as at Ruthin in 1360 and at Brecon and Cydweli in 1415, as befitted the castles’ status as the centres of the lord’s authority.44 As we have seen, communities were required to send men to the muster and were fined if they did not do so. It was there that men were selected from those who mustered, according to the demands of the expedition. The organisation of Welsh musters and levies can give a better picture of the logistical challenge facing the English kings. Arrays of the different shires and liberties would be assembled en route. The writs of array for the army intended to serve in the war of St Sardos in 1324 provide an example. The initial plan was that the men of the shires of North Wales, the lordships of Moldsdale, Denbigh, Dyffryn Clwyd, Bromfield and Yale, the lands of the earl of Arundel (Chirk and Oswestry), la Pole (the lordship of Powys) and the county of Flint should assemble at Bala in Merioneth on the Friday before mid-Lent (15 March). This plan was later refined: while the bulk was still to be drawn from the men of the principality, 200 of the best men from the two halves of the principality, each with two constables, were summoned with numerous small contingents of foot from no fewer than fourteen lordships. From all but one of these lordships was drawn a man-at-arms to act as constable. Only the men from the shires of North Wales were assembled at Bala with their constables and, in addition, the sheriff of each of the three counties, their sub-sheriffs and four of the best men of each county. At Bala they received their wages for the march to Shrewsbury, where they joined the levies raised from the lordships of Denbigh, Moldsdale, Dyffryn Clwyd, Bromfield and Yale, La Pole (Powys), Flint and Oswestry and Chirk. The array of these men was held at Shrewsbury on mid-Lent Sunday, 17 March 1325, by Alan de Charlton and Giles de Beauchamp. Those selected were then paid for a further seven days for their march to Portsmouth. The men of the lordships of Brecon, Builth, Elfael, Maelienydd, Radnor, Gwerthrynion and Abergavenny were assembled and arrayed at Hereford on the Tuesday following (19 March).45 The 200 men of the royal lands of South Wales (Cardigan, Carmarthen and the stewardship – Cantref Mawr, the stewardship was then in the hands of Sir Hugh Despenser) were to be arrayed, led and paid from the revenues of the chamberlain of these lands separately. Their leaders, Rhys ap Gruffudd and Sir Roger Pichard

  Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 247–9; Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 75, citing TNA, SC 2/218/8 m. 5; TNA, E 101/46/20. 45   CPR 1325–7, pp. 96–7. 44

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of Herefordshire,46 were to conduct these men directly to Portsmouth, all to arrive there by the Sunday following mid-Lent (24 March). From the point of muster it is likely that soldiers from North Wales would march along the coast (the modern A55) to Chester and from there north through Staffordshire towards Carlisle or Newcastle or south towards Shrewsbury as required. Payment for their service usually commenced at the point the levies departed the principality or Marcher lordship.47 The alternative location for musters of men from North Wales, more practical for departure to the south coast of England, seems to have been Bala in the south-east of Merioneth. The routes taken by the men of South Wales seem to have been more varied. If they were intended to serve in Scotland, then their march may, as in 1385, have taken them from Builth via Brecon to the Severn Valley and from there either north towards Chester or south towards Gloucester before branching southwards toward Salisbury and thence to the ports of the south coast of England.48 In 1415, men from southern Wales travelled in this direction since complaints were made at Warminster (Wiltshire) of Welshmen and Englishmen failing to pay for provisions there.49 Much earlier, in 1294, the men of South Wales were turned back at Winchester when rebellion broke out at home.50 Hewitt notes that the Welshmen raised to serve with the Black Prince in Gascony in 1355 sailed from Plymouth and passed through Salisbury. From Salisbury they may well have taken the road west via Yeovil and Exeter, the route of the modern A30 or A303. These marching routes were clearly well defined: in 1307 a grant of pontage was made to maintain a bridge at Wychnor, Staffordshire, for the explicit convenience of the Welsh and Irish travelling to the king’s wars in Scotland.51 Perhaps surprisingly, considering the length of the Welsh coastline, and the coastal economy around Severnside, with its trade links both to Gascony and across the Irish Sea, there seems little evidence of Welsh soldiers making their journeys around England by sea. In 1297, six boats were employed to transport men recruited from Glamorgan across the Severn estuary.52 The South Wales chamberlain’s account for 1345 includes the wages for five masters of ships and 121 sailors along with those for foot soldiers intended to serve in Brittany. These ships and sailors, presumably drawn from the ports of the region – the majority probably from Carmarthen

 Griffiths, Principality of Wales, p. 261. Pichard had also served in the retinue of Thomas de Brotherton a year earlier in Scotland: CPR 1321–24, p. 187. Shortly after his return he was awarded the constableship of Dryslwyn Castle. 47   Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 247–9. 48   TNA SC 6/1221/16. 49  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, pp. 17–18; Warminster, 1415, CCR 1413–19, p. 223. 50   CPR 1292–1301, p. 96. 51   CPR 1301–1307, p. 517; the existence of the bridge on the Roman road of Icknield or Ryknild Street (on the modern A38) may be preserved in the name of the hamlet of Wychnor Bridges in Wynchnor parish: VCH Staffordshire I, p. 187 and II pp. 275 n., 342. 52   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 60. 46

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where the troops were mustered – indicate that, on this occasion, the arrayed troops were intended to complete their journey by ship. It is probable that these men and these ships were among the 600 led by Edmund Hakelut which were compelled by winter storms to land on the Isles of Scilly, causing significant damage and expense to the islanders and their lord.53 Arraying ships from the ports of Wales was not always straightforward. A year later, only four ships of any size were found in the Welsh ports, although it is known that many more existed.54 An example which might refer to another occasion can be found in Dafydd ap Gwilym’s mention of a Gascon ship (Gwasgwynes y gwaisg – a Gascon mare) taking his lover’s husband to war: Dafydd hopes that the ship will sink, taking his lover’s husband with it.55 While we should be wary of accepting Dafydd’s account of the ship’s origin, use of a Gascon vessel, or even one regularly used for Gascon trade, would be quite probable in time of war. Judicial records can also illuminate the routes and staging posts used by soldiers from Wales and can produce evidence of connections between military service and ‘civilian’ life. In July 1302, a commission of oyer and terminer was appointed to investigate the robbery and murder of Welshmen in the service of the prince of Wales at Wigan, while they were returning from Scotland.56 On 22 August 1346, four days before the battle of Crécy, the townships of Penaran, Pennatlliw, Llangwyair Maestran and Gwernefail (Merioneth) presented before the county court held at Harlech that, while in England, with the army about to go to France, Gwyn ab Iorwerth Llwyd had been attacked and wounded on 3 June. The case was brought before the county court because Gwyn had returned home before dying of his wounds at Penaran. His assailants were also from Merioneth: Owain de la Pole ap Gruffudd Gethin and one Llywelyn Goch ap Meurig Hen of the commote of Tal-y-bont. Owain and Llywelyn, together with Llywelyn’s brother, Hywel Tew, all subsequently fled. The fate of Owain and Hywel is unrecorded, but Llywelyn was apprehended and was imprisoned at Harlech where he appeared before the court on 13 November 1346.57 Despite the fate that might have been expected, Llywelyn clearly survived and became one of the leading poets of the fourteenth century. In an awdl of confession to God, composed in his old age, he admitted to having broken all of the Ten Commandments.58 Whether this awdl can be read   TNA SC 6/1221/4 m. 4; CPR 1343–45, p. 494.   G. Cushway, Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377 (Woodbridge, 2011), p. 89. 55   ‘I Ddymuno Lladd y Gŵr Eiddig/To wish the jealous husband killed’, www.­dafyddapgwilym.net poem 116, lines 23–30; see also p. 71. 56   CPR 1301–7, p. 85. 57   A.D. Carr, ‘The Coroner in Fourteenth Century Merioneth’, Journal of the Merioneth Historical and Record Society, 11:3 (1992), pp. 250–1. 58   ‘I have committed constant violence deserving your punishment … I have broken the Ten Commandments, faith’s comely treasure/Gwneuthum ddiais drais Dy gerydd … Gwneuthost hagr 53

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as a confession to this particular murder is moot; the case reflects the communal tensions and casual violence present in Edward III’s armies and in the community of Merioneth. A coroner’s account from Wiltshire in the same year tells a similar story, this time from 2 June. An Englishman, John Bullok, was wounded in the head by a sword wielded by Ieuan ap Hywel Grath at Bemerton, near Wilton. In itself, this shows how soldiers were dispersed around the point of embarkation, in this case Portsmouth which is over 30 miles distant from Wilton. The intention was presumably to reduce the burden on the local population and the risks to them. John Bullok’s death shows that this was only partially successful. A third example, illustrating the same phenomenon, comes from a year earlier, in June 1345. Gwenllian ferch Tudur ap Wyn Sais of Penllyn (Merioneth) accused Ednyfed ap Cynwrig Chwith (left-handed Cynwrig) of Penrhyn in Ardudwy of causing the death of her brother (in fact, half-brother),59Adda ap Madoc, at Winchester on 21 June 1346 The records of local justice can also furnish us with details of communal obligation and, while this is discussed in more detail in chapter 8, the records of the hundred court of Dindaethwy, Anglesey, offers a tantalising detail. On 10 July 1346, two amercements for non-appearance before the court were cancelled because Ieuan ap Dafydd ab Iockyn and Dafydd Ddu ap Gruffudd ab Einion were ‘with the army’. The third person excused an amercement for the same reason is unique: her name was Gwenllian ferch Hwfa.60 The Benefits of Service: Payment Reward for military service from the reign of Edward I onwards was in the form of a daily wage. Welsh law had made provision for those serving beyond the bounds of their lands to serve at their prince’s expense and this, as was observed in Chapter 6, was founded in the tenure of land. The payment of reasonable wages in time of war was, even by the 1290s, assumed rather than a matter of dispute for the inhabitants of Wales. In the period before the universal adoption of recruitment by indenture, it has been assumed that Welshmen were being paid less than their

a theg, ofeg ufydd.’ The awdl is edited in Johnston (ed.), Gwaith Llywelyn Goch ap Meurig Hen, poem 7, ‘Awdl gyffes’, lines 15, 22 on p. 40. The translation is taken from J.P. Clancy, Medieval Welsh Poems (Dublin, 2003), pp. 229–30. Llywelyn Goch (fl. c. 1330–c. 1390) and his work are discussed by R. Bromwich, ‘The Earlier Cywyddwyr: Poets Contemporary with Dafydd ap Gwilym’, in A.O.H. Jarman, Gwilym Rees Hughes, D.R. Johnston and R.G. Gruffydd (eds), A Guide to Welsh Literature, volume II: 1282–1550 (Cardiff, 1992), pp. 161–5. I am grateful to Ann Parry Owen and Jenny Day for providing references to the awdl and the English text and to Dylan Foster Evans for drawing this example to my attention. 59   Carr, ‘The Coroner in Fourteenth Century Merioneth’, p. 253. 60   Jones, ‘Anglesey Court Rolls’, p. 41.

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fellow foot soldiers raised in the English counties.61 Generally, this is not the case. From the reign of Edward I until Edward III’s Reims campaign in 1359, Welsh foot soldiers, spearmen and archers were paid at the same rate, 2d. or 3d. per day, as English foot soldiers levied from the English shires. They were paid from the point at which they left their home lordship or liberty, generally at their lord’s expense until they joined the royal army at its point of muster. There were minor differences regarding their constables and leaders, primarily because these men appear to have occupied a superior position to that of their English counterparts because of the greater numbers under their command.62 The standard bearers, chaplains, doctors, criers and, on occasion, interpreters were paid at twice the rate of the general infantry, that is, at 4d. or 6d. per day. Since these roles did not generally exist in levies of English foot soldiers, they must be regarded as special cases and are discussed in Chapter 8. After the recommencement of the French wars in 1369, no differences have been discovered in the pay between Welsh and English members of indentured retinues, even when, as in 1415, the majority of the Welsh archers served on foot rather than with horses; men-at-arms were paid at the usual rates of 12d. per day and archers 6d. An important difference in the organisation of war after 1369 was that the indentures of war generally specified that soldiers only entered royal pay at the point when they mustered at the place of army assembly or embarkation; there was no formal provision for communities to contribute to the travel expenses of soldiers raised from them. In a relatively poor society such as Wales, situated a long way from the principal muster points on the south coast of England or the borders of Scotland, this was a considerable burden and, for captains, a significant incentive to raise men from as close to the intended action as possible.63 There are a number of occasions where Welshmen were paid less that their English comrades. These relate almost exclusively to their intended military function and, with the exception of the expeditions to Scotland in 1385 and to Ireland in 1394, all relate to the reign of Edward III. The tactical approach and geographical scale of his campaigns, first in Scotland and then in France, made large forces of foot archers an expensively maintained asset of dubious value. While such soldiers continued to be recruited for French campaigns as late as 1359, and for service in Ireland into the 1360s, they were exceptionally rare thereafter, 1415 being the principal example. This reflected the changed circumstances of English warfare. As Ayton and others have noted, even when foot archers of any origin were recruited after the siege of Calais, they rarely served for very long in France, if indeed they ever departed England. In the campaign to Flanders of 1339–40,

  Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 55–6; Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 104.   For example, BL Add. MS 7966 (1301), BL Add. MS 7967 (1324–5), TNA E 101/393/11, fols 79r–116v (1359). 63  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 227. 61

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Welshmen are recorded as being paid less than their English colleagues, 2d. per day rather than 3d.64 This is because, as the Wardrobe book makes clear, they were serving in England (quia in Anglia). Many Welshmen who were recruited never left England in the course of this campaign, in common with other troops from the English counties. This was due to the lack of availability of shipping and the requirements of the army and not through any fault of the Welsh themselves. Welshmen who did embark for France on this occasion were paid at the higher rate of 3d. per day. Later, in 1355, the foot soldiers raised to go with the Black Prince on his Gascon chevauchée were again paid at 2d. per day relative to the 3d. paid to archers in the retinues of his other commanders. This is probably because they were recruited to serve on foot; evidence of the pay account suggests that, on arrival in Gascony, they were soon provided with mounts, if not necessarily with an increment to their wages.65 Other Rewards Later in the fourteenth century, allegiance to France and support of Owain Lawgoch caused those who had served in France for prolonged periods to be treated with suspicion. One such example concerns a burgage in Hope owned by David, son of Roger Cooper, that was granted to Roger le Clerk of Hope on 25 September 1379 on the grounds that David was an adherent of Owain Lawgoch. When David was finally presented before the court, twelve years later, his defence was that he had been in the king’s service in France. A pardon dated 30 July 1389 was produced in court, though most of David’s lands had long been confiscated and redistributed, but those of his lands still in royal hands were restored to him. It is what this pardon described that provides its interest here. David had given twenty-eight years of good and loyal service in English armies in Aquitaine. In its original form, the pardon was addressed to David Hope. It was therefore reissued under his full name on 11 May 1390, and it included testimonials from John Harpenden, lately captain of Aquitaine, Archambaud de Grailly (by then Captal de Buch), Gailard de Durffert (lord of Duras, Flanders) and William Raymont of Madellant (lord of Reasan), all of whom stated that he had never been an adherent of Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, and by extension, the king of France.66 According to the first version of this pardon, the accusation originated with his enemies, though it is equally possible that such accusations represented a form of potentially profitable

 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, pp. 259–60, Prince, ‘The Strength of English Armies’, pp. 353–71; Lyon et al. (eds), The Wardrobe Book, p. 361 (fol. 144). 65   Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 63–4; Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, pp. 14–22. 66  Carr, Owen of Wales, pp. 60–1. The full references are to be found there. The pardons can be found in CPR 1388–92, pp. 93, 243. 64

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speculation on the property of soldiers whose whereabouts were unknown for years on end.67 His contemporary, Bleddyn ap Dafydd ap Madoc, another Flintshire man of Caerfallwch (Rhosemor, near Flint), really had fought in the service of France in the company of Owain Lawgoch, having first been captured three times while in English service. On the last occasion he endured imprisonment for two years before joining Owain. Six years after Owain’s death, he received his pardon, presumably having been taken for a fourth time in 1384. Doubtless it was his sufferings for the English cause that secured his pardon but we must doubt how sincere his contrition actually was; in his old age he died on the field of Shrewsbury as an adherent of Owain Glyndŵr in 1403.68 In cases of rebellion, it is clear that military service could and did ease the path to favour. There are numerous examples from the period after the Glyndŵr rebellion. Some of those who had been rebels enjoyed a long and successful career in Normandy and prospered as professional soldiers.69 The differing treatment meted out to two of the leaders of the rebellion of 1294–5, Morgan ap Maredudd, leader of the revolt in Glamorgan, and Madoc ap Llywelyn, instigator of the revolt in Gwynedd, show this clearly. Morgan, arguably in rebellion against his lord, Gilbert de Clare, came to peace with Edward I in person and gained favour as well as pardon; he served repeatedly in Edward’s wars and was eventually knighted. Madoc was imprisoned for the remainder of his days, but his son, Maredudd, was taken into the royal household which allowed him a degree of independence, if not actual freedom, and the possibility of reward. At York in 1312, Maredudd, ‘staying in the king’s service’, was granted the lands of Dafydd ap Llywelyn, presumably his uncle, in Llanllibio, Anglesey, which should have descended to his father.70 Military service could be a means of retrieving favour. Llywelyn Fychan of Penllyn, Merioneth, was rhingyll of that commote between 1334 and at least October 1339. While serving in Scotland in 1334 he gained permission to appoint a deputy.71 He clearly neglected his duties later. In October 1339, Llywelyn received a pardon for ‘concealing the king’s rights’ in return for his service overseas, at the cost of either finding sureties for his future good conduct or by serving in the king’s armies at the king’s wages.72 In other words, his punishment for defrauding the

  Between the confiscation and the pardon he served in the Calais garrison under Sir Gregory Sais in 1386: TNA E 101/42/14. 68   CPR 1381–5, p. 381; Davies, ‘Owain Glyn Dŵr and the Welsh Squirearchy’, pp. 164–5, n. 58, citing TNA CHES 25/24 m. 16v, 3/23 no. 10; Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, p. 240. 69   For examples, see Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, pp. 19–22; Lewis, ‘Opening up the Archives of Welsh Poetry’, pp. 2–3; Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years War’, pp. 36–8. 70   CPR 1307–13, pp. 461–2; Carr, Medieval Anglesey, p. 35. 71   D.L. Evans, ‘Walter Mauny, Sheriff of Merioneth, 1332–72’, Journal of the Merioneth Historical and Record Society 4 (1961–64), p. 197. 72   CPR 1338–40, p. 344. 67

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king as one of his officers was to do something his position in society would have all but obliged him to do in any event, while being paid for the privilege! Rewards also came in the form of grants of property: timber from their lord’s woods, deer from their park, horses, hunting dogs or administrative offices might be awarded. Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd II was rewarded with the custody of a valuable prisoner, Florimond de Sully, after Poitiers, but other evidence for members of Welsh squirearchy having the resources to maintain prisoners taken in war is scarce. An exception can be found in the Caernarfonshire court rolls at the end of the fourteenth century. A Frenchman who had been taken captive during Edward III’s wars by one Gruffudd Fantach (gap-toothed or toothless) had been brought back to Gruffudd’s house (mansio) in Llanfair in the commote of Uchaf (Caernarfonshire). He was regarded as his captor’s own man and villein (ut de homino suo captivo et villaino) and by virtue of that fact Gruffudd’s heir, Dafydd, was able to claim possession of all his land and goods.73 The effects for the unfortunate Frenchman were profound; he was, de facto, a slave in an alien land subject to his lord’s will. Another example, albeit more tentative, may have lived in Dindaethwy in Anglesey. Janyn Franc, who was pardoned an amercements in the hundred court there in 1382–83 because he had nothing, may simply have been able to speak French and was not himself a Frenchman. It is possible, however that he, like Gruffudd Fantach’s captive, was a victim of the French wars, destined to see out his days a long way from home, a fact that would account for his lack of resources.74 Another example of reward, in the broadest sense, was the prospect of an advantageous marriage. Sir Gregory Sais was fortunate enough to marry a Gascon heiress, but another more prosaic, though representative, example was a relative of Owain Glyndŵr. Dafydd ap Dafydd ap Madoc of Hendwr (Eifionydd, Merioneth), generally known as Dafydd de Hendwr (d. 1390), contracted two advantageous marriages outside Wales, perhaps as a result of connections made through military service. His first wife, Sibilla de Cornwall (d. before 1387) seems actually to have come from that county, since at the time of Dafydd’s death he was found to have estates both there and in Edeirnion. His second wife, Elizabeth Devereux (d. 1396), was from a Herefordshire family and after Dafydd’s death, she married another Welshman, Ieuan ap Dafydd ab Ithel. Either Thomas (b. c. 1387, d. 1431), son of Dafydd and Elizabeth, or Thomas’s son Richard, seems to have surrendered the family’s estates in Edeirnion to cousins who were in possession at the time of Thomas’s death.75 By the 1410s, the family’s lands and interests were established in Cornwall. Thomas’s recorded military service was confined to naval expeditions

  TNA WALE 20/1, cited in Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, p. xcvi.  Carr, Medieval Anglesey, p. 116, citing TNA, SC 6/1150/9 m. 7a. 75   A.D. Carr, ‘An Edeirnion Inquisition, 1390’, Journal of the Merioneth Historical and Record Society 6:1 (1969), pp. 1–7. 73

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in 1417 and 1418 led by major landowners from the south-west of England, Hugh Courtenay, earl of Devon, and Sir Thomas Carew, coincidentally a major landowner in Pembrokeshire.76 A more direct example is that a daughter of Owain Glyndŵr was said – by Edmund Beaufort in 1433 – to have married Sir John Scudamore, probably in the 1380s. Were it not for Owain Glyndŵr’s later career, such a match would have been unremarkable. Both men had served in the retinue of the earl of Arundel in 1387, both were established members of the squirearchy in the March and held administrative offices as well as following careers in arms.77 Conclusions In the period in which Welsh soldiers made their most significant contributions towards English armies, between 1282 and c. 1360, the pattern of recruitment and the manner by which it occurred seem to have been relatively predictable and determined, to an extent, by personal and communal obligation. Communities in both the March and the shires of Wales were required to despatch men and resources to the muster where their lord’s officials lord selected who should serve. Some of these obligations, the requirement to provide pack horses, for example, probably have their origins before the Edwardian conquest; similar powers were previously exercised by the princes. Such summonses were enforced by the possibility of fines levied not upon individuals but upon communities, but the means by which communities selected individuals to send to the muster remain obscure. The modifications to the process revolved around money. Wars were routinely conducted beyond the bounds of the shire or the lordship at the king’s behest. The lands of Wales became a recruiting ground for these wars at a time when infantry components of royal armies received pay for their services. As the size of armies gradually decreased over the fourteenth century, so the process of selection became more sophisticated. In the 1290s and the first two decades of the fourteenth century it seems probable that any man who appeared capable of the journey would have been selected. Later, royal officials were in a position to be more discerning, selecting only the best men – in terms of both competence and occasionally status – from those who turned up to the muster, up to the quota imposed from above. In Wales, and probably in the liberties of the March, Welshmen recruited for service in Scotland or France were paid from the revenues of their counties or lordships until they joined the main army. The wages bear comparison with those in labouring trades.Wages for building workers in southern England have been calculated to have risen from 3d. to 5d. per day between the 1340s and 1390s while those of unskilled workers doubled from 1½d.   1417: TNA, E 101/48/14 m. 1, C 76/100 m. 22 (which states Thomas to have been resident in Cornwall); 1418: E 101/49/34 m. 1. 77  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 139–40. 76

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to 3d. per day over the same period. More recent research has cast some doubt on these figures, and Wales was significantly less prosperous than the south of England, but the general point is valid. Soldiering provided reasonable rates of pay.78 Payment was an important consideration; it discouraged depredations on the general population in England and placed significant demands on the resources of these communities which sent the troops. The routine provision of translators, chaplains and doctors – and their superior rates of pay – in the mass armies of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries shows that English commanders recognised the difficulty of integrating a people who were predominately monolingual into armies which would have been otherwise anglophone. The burden of providing these wages is shown by the difficulties faced by royal officials if the appropriate permission from the Exchequer or central royal officials to release the monies was not received or, more seriously, when the revenues of the shires of Wales were granted away in patronage, leaving the officials with insufficient funds. If Marcher lords were active in war, it is probable that their officials were ordered to procure troops from within their liberties. The processes by which Welsh soldiers joined English armies and the routes they travelled naturally followed the key land routes across England and Wales. The expense of shipping Welsh troops to the main points of assembly – the ports of the south coast – allied to the relative lack of large ships in Welsh ports account for the rarity of Welshmen making the first phase of their journeys to war by sea. Incidents of crime among troops provide insights into the way in which soldiers were dispersed around the hinterland of English ports such as Winchester in 1294, Wilton (Wiltshire) in 1346 and Warminster (Wiltshire) in 1415. After 1369, however, the poverty of Wales counted against the military aspirations of the Welsh, given the Crown’s preference for armies with equal numbers of men-at-arms and archers. For all the martial emphasis of the poets, there were few Welshmen who could afford to participate in war as men-at-arms. Only a handful of Welshmen made successful careers as soldiers. Sir Gregory Sais is the most notable and best documented, as befits a man with an international chivalric reputation. For the rest, the most representative are those who fought and died on the side of France under the leadership of Owain Lawgoch. Their motives, however, were clearly of a different character, although many had evidently started their careers, as Owain had done, in English service before becoming routiers. In a society where military service was a key component of elite identity, but where the opportunities were increasingly expensive, recruitment of soldiers from Wales in the second half of the fourteenth century was less common and is more difficult

78   C. Dyer and S.A.C. Penn, ‘Wages and Earnings in Late Medieval England: Evidence from the Enforcement of the Labour Laws’, in C. Dyer (ed.), Everyday Life in Medieval England (2nd edn, London and New York, 2000), pp. 167–90, citing H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, A Perspective of Wages and Prices (London, 1981), pp. 13–59.

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to trace through lack of sources. Both factors are related. There was no prince of Wales between 1376 and 1400 and many records were lost in the course of the rebellion. After the rebellion in the first decade of the fifteenth century, reconciliation with authority was the key lever of military recruitment.

8

The Distinctiveness of the Welsh Soldier Equipment and Organisation1

The story of the Welsh archer is one that has grown in the telling over the centuries.2 If romantic accounts are to be believed, Welsh archers won the battle of Agincourt, and probably Crécy and Poitiers as well. The actual evidence for this idea is slight and fraught with difficulties. Undoubtedly, the Welsh were well known as soldiers to the kings and barons of England by the twelfth century. Writing towards the end of that century, Gerald of Wales noted that archery was a particular specialism of the men of Gwent, though it was not confined to that area nor to the Welsh.3 Between 1277 and 1360, when the greatest use was made of Welsh soldiers in large numbers, it could be said that English armies had a ‘Welsh’ flavour. It would have been difficult for the infantry elements of the armies of Edward I and Edward II to have taken the form they did without their Welsh subjects. To a lesser extent this is also true of the armies of Edward III, but thereafter the changing nature of English armies led to a decline in the participation of Welshmen in war. Welsh soldiers were a significant part of English armies until about 1359, a fact noticed by contemporary chroniclers and in the pay accounts of the armies themselves. To what extent then did Wales produce a distinctive type of soldier in the period between the Edwardian conquest and 1360? Were Welsh soldiers in English armies perceived to be ‘different’ from their English fellows? How did Welsh culture recognise achievements in war, given that it was in the service of their erstwhile conquerors? The extremely rich legacy of literature in the Welsh language, mostly in the form of praise poetry, has generally been undervalued by historians, although H.T. Evans’s

  I would like to express my thanks to Jenny Day for reading this chapter in draft and offering comments and suggestions concerning my interpretation of the Welsh literary sources, and to Sara Elin Roberts for clarifying and correcting my understanding of details from the Welsh law texts. Any remaining errors are entirely my own.  2   See, for example, G.A. Hansard, The Book of Archery (London, 1840), pp. 162–207.  3   Gerald also tells of evil Norman archers of St Clears coming to a bad end, cited in Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, p. 153.  1

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pioneering book, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, devotes its first chapter to the value of the medium.4 This chapter will discuss how Welsh soldiers were perceived within their own society. It will also consider how they were armed and how the type of soldier Wales could provide affected the conduct of England’s wars. Tactics The idea of distinctively Welsh tactics having any influence upon the way England conducted its wars can be discounted. The influence of Edward I’s Welsh wars on the mixed formations of archers and men-at-arms that was to be characteristic of Edward III’s armies. as posited by Morris. has probably been overstated.5 That said, the ability of the Crown in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries to recruit enormous numbers of infantry soldiers was greatly bolstered by the conquest of Gwynedd. This shaped their strategy in their wars in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, in France. The reasons for this are twofold. First, without the native princes, the risk of war in Wales and the March was greatly reduced. Secondly, although relatively poor, the economy of Wales could support a greater population than it could employ. Arable farming was limited, in the north and west, and the maintenance of livestock required only limited manpower. Though land was generally poor in the mountainous heartlands of Gwynedd, arable production in the southern and central March was really quite extensive. Edward I’s understanding that the economy of Gwynedd rested in the fields of Anglesey is demonstrated in the tactics he employed in the summer of 1282; on invading Anglesey, he reaped the harvest.6 Overall, therefore, the land of Wales was capable of supporting a substantial surplus population ripe for employment in royal armies. Gerald stated that the diet of the Welsh consisted of oats, dairy products and meat.7 Certainly the Brabantine chronicler, Lodewyck van Veltham’s observations of Welsh soldiers in 1297 suggest that a diet rich in milk and cheese was familiar to the large number of Welsh infantry serving outside Ghent.8 In addition, both before and after the conquest of Gwynedd, the Welsh were frequently – though not exclusively – portrayed as either not understanding or not following the ‘rules’ of war. This is a persistent theme. Gerald of Wales commented upon it, observing that the Welsh were ‘a people which will never draw up its forces to engage an enemy army in the field, and will never allow itself to be besieged

 Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, ch. 1, pp. 1–10. For a more recent view, see Lewis, ‘Late Medieval Welsh Praise Poetry’.  5  Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 68–9.  6  Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 181–2.  7   Gerald of Wales, p. 223.  8  Carr, Medieval Anglesey, pp. 138–9; Davies, Lordship and Society, ch. 17, especially 392–413; Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 64.  4

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inside fortified strong points’.9 Gerald’s judgement was coloured by the conventions of contemporary chivalry and the experience of the Marcher elite. He wrote of the Welsh of his time: Their sole idea of tactics is either to pursue their opponents or else to run away from them. They are lightly armed and they rely more on their agility than their brute strength. It follows that they cannot meet the enemy on equal terms or fight violently for very long … they harass their enemy by their ambushes and night attacks … they are difficult to conquer in a long war, for they are not troubled by hunger or cold, fighting does not seem to tire them, and they do not lose heart when things go wrong, and after one defeat they are ready to fight again and once more face the hazards of war.10

In an account of the battle of Lincoln (1141), Henry of Huntingdon stated that the Welsh were ‘rash, ill-armed and ignorant of the art of war’. However, Sean Davies notes that Huntingdon’s purpose was to denigrate the forces with which the Welsh were allied and should not be taken as evidence of their incompetence as soldiers.11 The author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi followed a similarly negative path in his description of Welshmen in the retinue of the earl of Hereford, probably from his lordship of Brecon, referring to the earl’s confrontation with the king in 1312: ‘a crowd of Welsh, wild men from the woodlands’ (comitiva comitis Herefordie turba Wallesium vallata, silvestris et fera). The author’s point was that just as the woods were a dark and dangerous obstacle on the borders of England, so their inhabitants presented a threat to civilised England.12 Welsh tactics, from the little we know about them, seem not to have influenced Edward I’s strategy even when he was using Welsh troops from the March and from those Welsh lords opposed to Llywelyn. Often the same sources taint the Welsh soldiers with cowardice or evasiveness in military matters, as an adjunct to their alleged lack of ‘civility’ which extended into their manner of fighting. Such reluctance, it was believed, was shaped by the landscape of their native land. It is obvious that there was an appreciation, in some quarters at least, that fighting a war in Wales required a different approach. According to Gerald, the tactics of French troops are no good at all in Ireland or Wales … Against an army so mobile and lightly armed as the Welsh, who always prefer to do battle on rough terrain, you need troops with little equipment who are used to the same sort of warfare.13

If these qualities were desirable against the Welsh in the late twelfth century, so too were they against the Scots in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Edward I’s invasion of Gwynedd foreshadowed his approach to his wars in Scotland. Enormous forces of paid infantry were put into the field and by such means, land     11   12   13    9

10

Gerald of Wales, p. 267. Ibid., p. 176. For the full discussion, see Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, pp. 136–40. Vita Edwardi Secundi, pp. 56–7. Ibid., p. 269; Suppe, Military Institutions, especially ch. 3.

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and resources were denied to the defenders of territory. The application of overwhelming force worked in the conquest of Gwynedd because Edward was able to pay for it and to sustain it from the resources of the English border counties and Marcher lordships. Part of the reason that this approach failed in Scotland was that it was simply bigger and further from the centres of English population. If the tactics of the Welsh were not employed directly, their expertise was valued. In 1300, the Welsh were excused from serving against the Scots, ostensibly for their service in earlier campaigns. In their absence, such qualities were apparently missed. Rishanger’s Annales Regis Edwardi Primi laments their absence in its description of the battle between the English and the Scots – more accurately, the Scots’ retreat – immediately after the successful siege of Caerlaverock in 1300.14 The idea of Welsh reluctance to engage in set-piece battles is a theme repeated in accounts of the battle of Shrewsbury of 1403. In these accounts, however, the aim was vilification of Owain Glyndŵr, albeit sometimes centuries after the event. The tradition can be found in a number of nineteenth-century descriptions of ‘Glyndŵr’s oak’, a tree from which Glyndŵr was supposed to have witnessed the battle without participating himself. Early Welsh relations of this tradition (possibly informed by English prejudice) paint this as cowardice, though glossed by the eighteenth-century writer Thomas Pennant as a result of impatience on the part of Hotspur (Henry Percy) and Edmund Mortimer. All suspect that Owain could have been present, but, whether out of choice or misfortune, he was not.15 The view of Morris, drawing upon the ideas of Charles Oman, was that ‘Edward I began to combine horse and foot in the field’, adding that ‘it is notorious that he first riddled his enemy with arrows, and then rode him down’.16 Subsequent analysis has shown that the available evidence cannot sustain this view. Specific evidence of English battle tactics is very limited, understandably because only a very few battles were actually fought and won: Irfon Bridge (1282), Maes Moydog (1295), Dunbar (1296), Falkirk (1298) and Methven (1306). Only Falkirk was actually fought by a full-scale army under royal command. The evidence is insufficient, in Prestwich’s view, to support Morris’s interpretation.17 The main account of the battle of Irfon Bridge (1282) by Walter of Guisborough, for example, is suspiciously similar to his version of the battle of Stirling Bridge.18 It is not safe to say much more than that the battle was hard fought; good evidence for the combination of cavalry and archers is lacking. At Falkirk, Edward’s archers were as effective at hurling stones

  Rishanger, p. 442.   A full assessment of this tradition can be found in E.R. Henken, National Redeemer. Owain Glyndŵr in Welsh Tradition (New York, 1996), pp. 121–5. 16  Morris, Welsh Wars, pp. 68–9. 17   Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’, pp. 241–2. 18  Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, p. 563, refers to a ‘disturbing similarity’. 14

15

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at the Scots as they were at shooting at them.19 The best evidence for the battle of Maes Moydog reveals little more than that the Welsh stood their ground, waiting for the English to attack, and that any intermingling of archers and men-at-arms in the English army was most probably a result of confusion on the part of the earl of Warwick’s troops rather than ‘normal’ practice (unfortunately the evidence for the weapons used by the infantry is absent in the surviving pay accounts).20 Chivalry and Horses Horses held a significant part in Welsh culture from the earliest recorded periods. Sean Davies has made a good case for mounted soldiers having an important role in battle from the post-Roman period through to the Saxon incursions into Wales in the tenth and eleventh centuries, arguing that mounted warfare in itself was not a Norman introduction to Wales.21 The Welsh law texts, mostly dating from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, specify that the officers of a prince’s court were entitled to the possession of a horse and the same texts record possession of a stud as one of a king’s ‘three indispensables’, together with his herds of cattle and pigs.22 Horses were, therefore, an essential component of elite identity and so there are references to a chief groom and other grooms in the context of the court.23 Similarly, the social structure of the court is suggestive of an elite culture capable of maintaining mounted soldiers in a manner that was analogous to the AngloNorman model. This is reflected in Welsh vocabulary describing such arrangements. Native words were used, rather than borrowings from Anglo-Norman or French, reflecting a social system that was in place before the coming of the Normans. In the Welsh laws, men of the rank of squire in an English context might be called gwas (generally meaning servant) or gwas ystafell (servant of the chamber or, in the law texts, chamberlain), the Welsh word for a man who might be regarded as a warrior aristocrat.24 More simply, a knight was marchog (a horseman), though there seems not to have been a direct relationship between the English idea of a knight and marchogion in the thirteenth century. Poets used the two as synonyms by the

  The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough: previously edited as the chronicle of Walter of Hemingford or Hemingburgh, ed. H. Rothwell (London, 1957), p. 328. 20  Prestwich, Edward I, p. 223; J.G. Edwards, ‘The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh Campaign of 1294–5’, EHR 39 (1924), pp. 1–12. 21  Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, pp. 157–69. 22   D. Jenkins (ed. and trans.), The Law of Hywel Dda Law, Texts from Medieval Wales (Llandysul, 1986), p. 40 23  Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, pp. 158–72. 24   S.E. Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, An Edition and Study of Peniarth MS 259B (Leiden and Boston, 2011), pp. 69, 73, 75, 121. 19

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end of the fourteenth century and, fifty years later, the desire that a squire should be made a knight was far from unusual.25 Heavy cavalry, however, was not a feature of warfare in pre-conquest Wales. References to barded (or covered) horses being ridden by Welshmen in the late thirteenth century suggest that some form of ‘cavalry’ was not unknown, but excepting mounts for centenars and vintenars (mounted men), horses were not a Welsh contribution to English armies after the conquest. The reasons for this lack of heavy cavalry in pre-conquest Gwynedd were partly geographical; this style of fighting, well developed in France and England by the thirteenth century, was of limited use in Welsh terrain dominated by hills, mountains and forests. This is not to say that horses played no part in the wars fought between the Welsh princes: the law texts have much to say on horses and the distinction between different types of horse, their value and uses. An amws, a term usually translated as ‘destrier’, the most expensive type of horse in the Middle Ages, purposely bred for war, was given twice the value of the next most valuable type, a riding horse or rouncey (rhwnsi). The values given for different types of horses vary between manuscripts of the laws – and the financial values given should be regarded in relative terms rather than cash equivalents in English terms – but are worth recounting in full. The so-called ‘Pontefract Manuscript’ (Llawysgrif Pomffred, NLW MS 259B), a sixteenth-century copy of a probable fourteenth-century original or originals, provides the following: ‘The value of a destrier [amws] is a pound. A palfrey, 90d. A riding-horse, 120d. A sumpter horse, 80d. The value of a stallion, three strong mares. The value of a gelding, 120d. A serving horse, 60d.’26 There may be reason to doubt that the amws was a direct equivalent of the kind of highly bred warhorse found elsewhere in Europe. Certainly, the law texts make clear that the keeping and conditioning of such horses were important. ‘A destrier which is fattened for six weeks over a manger is worth a pound.’27 This version goes on to suggest that a destrier kept outside loses that status. The Pontefract Manuscript differs slightly: ‘A destrier grazing outside, it loses its status and although it loses the status of a destrier, it does not lose the status of a palfrey.’28 It is possible that in a Welsh context, a good-quality horse, suitably kept, could be used as a horse in a military context, but not necessarily as a mount in battle. There is no mention in the laws of the training of horses for such a role. The riding horse or rhwnsi (a borrowing from Anglo-Norman: rouncie, runic, runcin) is a more straightforward sort of beast and 25   Ibid. p. 166; Livingston and Bollard (eds), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook, text 5, lines 37–49, 70–2 on pp. 20–3; these lines praise the Welsh knights of Owain’s time (the soldiers, Sir Gregory Sais and Sir Hywel of the axe, and the jurist, Owain’s father-in-law, Dafydd Hanmer); Chapman, ‘He took me to the Duke of York’, p. 126, n. 127. 26  Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, p. 187. The history of the manuscript and its possible origins are on pp. 15–20. 27   Jenkins (ed. and trans.) The Law of Hywel Dda, pp. 173, 286. 28  Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, p. 217.

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analogous to the English use of horses as mounts suitable for lower-status mounted men such as vintenars and centenars in Edward I’s armies.29 Given the rate of expansion of the influence of Gwynedd and the need for haste in military activity, the number of horses of various kinds required for military purposes was surely fairly high, in proportion to manpower, by Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’s day. But to have maintained high-quality warhorses in sufficient numbers to be useful in war would have been too costly for the economy of Gwynedd. Keith Williams-Jones noted that the infrastructure required by a mounted army, in terms not only of horses, but also of their armour, food and maintenance, was inherently related to the politics of expansion. Llywelyn’s wars, not only with the English Crown but with his fellow princes and the lords of the March, were compelled by economic necessity. To sustain a competitive army to secure political capital, Llywelyn required more financial resources, and thus more land.30 Certainly, maintaining a force of horses for the household was expensive, as later evidence for the value placed on it shows. An extent of Chirk in the late fourteenth century shows that the cylch (circuit) of each of the members of the prince’s household had been commuted for cash, but the origins of these dues, owed between Christmas and March, were recorded. The cylch equorum domini (the circuit of the lord’s horses), the cylch equorum seneschalli (the circuit of the horses of the steward) and the cylch ebolion et greawr (the circuit of the colts and groom) all survived in Chirk as cash renders, the valuable legacy of the princes of northern Powys whose financial returns replaced renders in winter fodder and in kind.31 The Welsh did not lack the means to sustain some good-quality horses, but did not possess enough to provide a force of heavy cavalry capable of meeting an equivalent English force on equal terms. Horses were bred in Wales to suit Welsh conditions. At the end of the twelfth century, Gerald of Wales extolled the virtues of Welsh horses, especially from Powys, in terms that suggest animals from studs there could stand comparison to the Anglo-Norman equivalents. ‘A superb race of blood-stock is now bred there [Powys], tracing its descent from the Spanish horses that Robert de Bellême, earl of Shrewsbury, had gone to pains to have imported long ago.’ Around the same time, both the Lord Rhys (d. 1197) and Llywelyn ab Iorwerth (d. 1240) were required to give tribute to King John in the form of horses, while the romance tale Fouke le Fitz Waryn says that ‘Morys le fitz Roger de Powys’ gave ‘un destrer gras e beal’ also to King John.32 Even in the Viking age horses

 Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 53, Jenkins (ed. and trans.), The Law of Hywel Dda, p. 286.   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, pp. cxiii–cxvii. 31   Jones (ed.), The Extent of Chirkland, 1391–1393, pp. xxiii–iv; Rex Smith, ‘On the Extent of the Lordship of Chirk’. 32   Gerald of Wales, p. 201, n. 416; Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, pp. 171–2; D. Jenkins, ‘The Horse in the Welsh Law Texts’, in S. Davies and N.A. Jones (eds), The Horse in Celtic Culture: 29 30

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were exported from Wales to Ireland, and the good name of Welsh horses would continue for a long time.33 A text from the mid-sixteenth century says that the best warhorses – albeit in a rather different context – came from the Scottish borders and eastern Wales.34 Despite this apparent Welsh expertise in horse-breeding, when John de Havering was recruiting troops in North Wales in 1297, he reported that he could find no constables as there was no one with an appropriate mount.35 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, however, was reported as having upwards of 300 barded as well as other uncovered horses at his command during campaigns in mid-Wales in the early 1260s. Llywelyn’s tactics at this point were more akin to the chevauchée than anything used by English armies at the same time, so the horses need not have been extremely good ones, but this is not to say that these tactics informed English practice: chevauchée became the dominant English tactic more than seventy years after the conquest of Gwynedd.36 It should also be noted that constables, with suitable horses, appear in the company of Welsh levies of foot soldiers routinely after 1297 so it may be that Havering had too high a standard in mind, or that Llywelyn’s horses and breeding stock had been taken as profits of war during Edward I’s conquest. The general pattern of warfare in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries greatly reduced the importance of the warhorse, as Andrew Ayton’s work has demonstrated for the reign of Edward III; English armies were mounted but fought their battles on foot, a phenomenon that Rogers, following the observation of the Italian humanist, Petrarch, about the transformation of the English made in 1360, suggests was revolutionary and singularly effective.37 It may simply be that,

Medieval Welsh Perspectives (Cardiff, 1997), pp. 64–81, at p. 78, referring to Fouke, 23.34–5. My thanks to Jenny Day for these references. 33   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, p. cxxv, referring to B.G. Charles, Old Norse Relations with Wales (Cardiff, 1934), p. 162; see also N.A. Jones, ‘Horses in Medieval Welsh Court Poetry’, in Davies and Jones (eds), The Horse in Celtic Culture, pp. 82–101; J.P. Day, ‘Arfau yn yr Hengerdd a Cherddi Beirdd y Tywysogion’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Aberystwyth University, 2010), p. 206 34   P.S. Donaldson (ed.), ‘George Rainsford’s Ritratto d’Ingliterra (1556)’, in Camden Miscellany, Camden fourth series, vol. 27 (London, 1979), p. 91. 35   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 80; CPR 1292–1301, p. 470, shows that Einion Llwyd complained that Edmund Mortimer had taken no fewer than eighty horses from him in Maelienydd, but the valuation of £100 for these suggests that they must have been of poor quality. 36   Cal. Anc. Corr., p. 18; a figure of 180 is given for the campaign of 1261. In Foedera I, p. 423, Llywelyn was said to have entered the lands of Roger Mortimer in 1263 cum trecentis equituris armatis (with 300 mounted armed men). Three years previously, in 1260, Llywelyn, while attacking Dyfed, is reported as having had in his army 240 equos loricatos jumentis nudis (covered horses, uncovered mules): Annales Cambriae, ed. W. Ab Ithel (London, 1860), p. 98; Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, p. cxiv. 37  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, ch. 1, pp. 9–25; Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, pp. 249–51.

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as in Gwynedd, maintenance of highly bred warhorses, with the accompanying demand for high-quality fodder in large quantities, was simply unsustainable. Horses seem not to have been restricted to the elite. According to Welsh law, the unfree were expected to supply, amongst other things, sumpter horses for the prince’s army. Doubtless, most bond townships could normally provide the proscribed quota of pack horses when required to do so, but when the mules of the bishop of Bangor’s lay tenants had to be pressed into the prince’s service, as happened in 1261, it was indicative of the extreme pressure on primary resources.38 The responsibility to provide pack horses was invoked in 1346 when various communities in Anglesey were fined for failing to provide such animals or a cash equivalent.39 The availability of any kinds of warhorse from Wales in large quantities was probably beyond the Welsh economy even in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. There are very few mentions of hobelars in a Welsh context before the 1330s, and even then only in small numbers.40 The English counties and Welsh shires and lordships provided only foot archers and these were described as such.41 Later, the mixed retinues of mounted archers and men-at-arms were less reliant on high-quality horses.42 After the recommencement of the war with France in 1359, foot archers were seldom employed in English armies. Companies of foot archers from several Welsh lordships were employed in Ireland under Lionel of Antwerp in the early 1360s, but not all Welsh archers there were foot archers. A fair number were included among the ordinary retinues of several of the commanders. Equally, there were several levies from English counties, and these were a mix of mounted and foot archers.43 Even then, these officials occasionally felt that the quality available – particularly of men-at-arms – left something to be desired, though this resulted at least in part from the expectations of the king’s writs of array. In 1327, 1334, 1335 and 1340, large numbers of men-at-arms were recruited from the royal lands in Wales, but by 1345, it appears that they were not equipped to the standard expected of men-at-arms by the English authorities. The official responsible for the muster in 1345, Roger Trumwyn, clearly unimpressed, felt compelled to inform the prince that he would ‘not find them to be of such condition as they make themselves out to be’. Perhaps one of the problems was the quality of their horses.44 That said, after archers became   Williams Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, p. cxxiii.   Jones, ‘Anglesey Court Rolls’, pp. 33–49. 40   Rot. Scotiae, I, pp. 504–6. 41   (1342) TNA E 36/204 fol. 109v; (1359) E 101/393/11 fols 80–6. 42  Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, ch. 6, pp. 194–256. 43   TNA E 101/28/15, mm. 3–4d. For archers in other retinues on the same expedition, Hywel ab Einion, John Kenewrek (ap Cynwrig) and others, Welshmen in the retinue of the earl of Stafford for example, see TNA E 101/28/15, m. 3. 44   Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 246–7. The French original is transcribed in Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 102–3. 38

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routinely mounted after 1359 and the quality of horses a less pressing consideration, with a few exceptions, Welshmen were mounted in the usual manner and no difficulties in finding suitable horses seem to have been experienced. Weapons of the Welsh at War In his great book on the Welsh wars, Morris made much of the changes to the infantry that took place under Edward I. He considered that from ‘an ill-combined rabble’ in 1277, Edward I created an army which, although it lacked ‘the organisation of a Marlborough or a Frederick’, he felt able to compare, in a reference which was contemporary in 1901 but which now seems baffling, to that of the Boers. Michael Prestwich’s recent summary of the military developments of Edward I’s reign indicates some of the difficulties and errors with Morris’s thesis.45 Morris emphasised the increased use of the longbow with its tactical use in battle, and the organisation of the infantry into thousands, hundreds and twenties. Prestwich notes that hundreds and twenties can be found in twelfth-century English armies and that evidence for a transformation in the weapons used by foot soldiers in English armies is scant indeed.46 The writs appointing commissions of array did not go into any more detail than asking for ‘foot soldiers skilled in arms’. Although archers and crossbowmen were specified on occasion, such as in 1295, it is not until the 1330s and 1340s that similar writs became prescriptive. There is no great consistency in the terminology with which royal clerks recorded Edward I’s infantry. They were usually recorded in the pay accounts either as pedites or sagittarii – footmen or archers. Those from Wales were often referred to simply as ‘Welsh’.47 This is unhelpful. A general pattern can be discerned, however, and records for later reigns are better at differentiating between different types of soldier. This reflects an increased interest by commanders in what their expensive troops were actually capable of. The evidence of the payrolls certainly shows that, while some spearmen are listed early in Edward I’s reign, thereafter the men are usually described as archers, with occasional exceptions such as a group of ninety slingers from Sherwood Forest who served in Scotland in 1303. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Crown did not concern itself greatly with the way in which the infantry were equipped. Edward I’s archers seldom received weapons from the government; this was the duty of the communities from which they were drawn. An archer, therefore, might have no more than a single quiver of two dozen arrows with him and, once these

 Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 99; Prestwich, ‘Edward I’s Armies’.  Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp. 127–8. Organisation into hundreds shortly before Edward’s accession is noted by A. Lewis, ‘Roger Leyburn and the Pacification of England, 1265–7’, EHR 54 (1939), p. 206. 47   BL Add. MS 8835, fol. 73. 45

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had been expended, was all but useless on the battlefield. At Falkirk, the infantry were reduced to hurling stones at the enemy. The majority of administrative documents are concerned with rates of pay and expenditure rather than the weapons carried by soldiers. In 1287, for example, the Welshmen raised in response to the revolt of Rhys ap Maredudd in Carmarthenshire are described as peditibus (footmen), as are those of the English counties.48 While we might assume that bows were the weapon of choice, this cannot be demonstrated on this evidence, and the account does not mention the purchase of bows, arrows or bowstrings. Excavations at Dryslwyn, however, record not only stones used by a trebuchet but over 100 arrow heads, mostly of the slender, bodkin type commonly associated with the longbow.49 In 1297, Walter of Guisborough reported that the French feared the English king’s foot soldiers ‘because many of them were archers’, suggesting that their weapons were both powerful and effective over long distances. The clerks recording payments made to Edward’s soldiers – most of them Welsh – on this occasion made no distinctions.50 Evidence from outside Wales as to what Edward I expected from his foot soldiers is far from helpful. In letters of 1300 and 1307, the king simply referred to footmen (genz de pie). A muster from East Anglia in Edward I’s reign suggests that very few men possessed bows and the Crown made no efforts to supply men with bows and, more significantly, with arrows.51 Nicholas Huggate, treasurer of the expedition to Gascony in 1324–26, used vadia sagittorum as a heading, but generally described them, as he did the levies of the English counties, as hominibus peditibus.52 Another occasional variant, common to English and Welsh levies, was peditibus ad arma. It is not known precisely how they were armed and the usual phraseology of the writs is unhelpful, the most common phrase being armis competentibus bene muniti found between 1298 and 1333. One of the earliest specific references comes from a writ of array for eighty men of Maelor Saesneg who were to come armed arcubus et sagittis (with bow and arrows). Writs for English counties of the same date were expressed in identical terms.53 In 1342, the term sagittar’ peditibus was still in use and we can be more confident that the men were indeed so armed. By the time of the siege of Calais in 1347, the arsenal at the Tower was producing both bows and arrows in significant quantities and the Crown was, presumably, issuing these to the soldiers in its pay.54

  Byerly and Byerly (eds), Records of the Wardrobe and Household, pp. 424–35.   S.E. Rees and C. Caple, Dinefŵr Castle, Dryslwyn Castle (Cardiff, 1999), pp. 15–17. 50   Prestwich, ‘Welsh Infantry in Flanders in 1297’, p. 64. 51   TNA SC 1/61, nos. 63, 68; Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 101. 52   BL Add. MS 7967, fols 90–8. 53   Rot. Scotiae, I, p. 228; A similar writ for the same campaign addressed to the men of Lancashire can be found in ibid., p. 235. 54  Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III, pp. 63–71. 48

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The Bow and the Spear It is a common observation among generations of historians, following on from Oman and Morris, that it was the Welsh who introduced English kings to the longbow and that Edward I’s experience led to rapid technological development. ‘The bow of Edward I was probably at first not much more powerful than the short bow of Hastings (1066) or Northallerton (the battle of the Standard, 1138), but it was a longbow.’55 If the longbow was so peculiarly Welsh, and so singularly effective, and Welshmen so commonly part of the military arrangements of the Angevin kings, why did the English Crown not adopt it before the late thirteenth century? The answer must be that the evidence cannot sustain the premise. Rather, the distinction between the Welsh ‘shortbow’ and the later English ‘longbow’ is artificial. Strickland and Hardy dispensed with the arguments of Morris and Oman who had advocated a great technological change around 1300 and the full development of the 6-foot yew bow as a tactical force in the reign of Edward III.56 Clifford Rogers has developed the technological argument as part of his thesis advocating an ‘infantry revolution’ around 1302–46.57 Archaeological evidence reveals remarkably similar longbows of around 6 feet in length from several contexts and periods dating between c. 200 AD and 1545.58 The Normans were able to make effective use of archers at Hastings though the bows used there are a matter of conjecture.59 The continuation of Brut y Tywysogyon refers to Welshmen inflicting heavy casualties on English-led forces at the battle of Coed Llathen in 1256. The use of bows here was tactical; these forces were encamped in a superior position to their attackers. The rout of the survivors at Cymerau later in the same day was inflicted by a pursuing force in hand-to-hand combat.60 That bows were a regular part of the weaponry of Welsh and English, or AngloNorman, soldiers should not be surprising. Gerald’s descriptions of the power of Welsh bows – which he states were made of elm rather than yew – are rightly famous. He said that the iron heads of their arrows penetrated the oak door of Abergavenny Castle ‘which was almost as thick as a man’s palm’.61 On another occasion, an Anglo-Norman man-at-arms was said to have been shot through the leg, the arrow piercing his iron cuishes (armour for the thigh) and leather tunic on both sides, passing through his saddle and killing his horse. While these claims  Morris, Welsh Wars, p. 99.   Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow. 57   Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, pp. 241–78; idem, ‘The Development of the Longbow in Late Medieval England and “Technological Determinism”’, JMH 37 (2011), pp. 321–41. 58   Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, pp. 39–43; 44–8. The illustration and table of measurements at p. 39 is particularly illuminating. 59  Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, p. 151. 60   Jones (ed.), Brut y Tywysogion, p. 113. 61   Gerald of Wales, p. 113. 55

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might not sound out of place in Hollywood depictions of Robin Hood, they attest to the reputation of the ‘rough, unpolished’ Welsh bow. The implication, of course, is that other sorts of bows were well known and understood by Gerald’s audience but much ink has been spilt attempting to establish what was meant. Any geographical distinction between north and south is undermined by Gerald’s own generalisation that the 3,000 Welshmen persuaded to take the Cross in 1188 were all skilled with the spear and the bow, regardless of which part of Wales they came from.62 The Brabantine chronicler van Veltham noted a multiplicity of arms among Welshmen in Edward I’s army in 1297. ‘Their weapons’, he wrote, ‘were bows, arrows and swords. They also had javelins.’63 In addition, van Veltham noted that they had no armour and went bare-legged, even in the depths of winter. Certainly, by the end of the thirteenth century, no distinction between spearmen from the north and archers from the south is made in English or Welsh chronicles, nor in commissions of array.64 Strickland and Hardy gather together many examples of Welsh soldiers in English service in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and take pains to qualify the use of Welsh soldiers by Marcher lords and English kings before and during the conquest of Pura Wallia.65 The toughness and ubiquity of the Welsh in the armies of Henry II was such that one modern biographer of the first Angevin king termed the Welsh ‘the Ghurkhas of the twelfth century’.66 Although much effort has been expended on the debate, there is little in the way of conclusive evidence; the famous artistic depictions of Welshmen in the margins of the Littere Wallie are crude in execution and doubtful as to their accuracy, though the dress worn by the figures is similar to that in van Veltham’s description. They wear no armour, their legs are bare.67 Bows and spears, together with a knife or dagger, are mentioned in the Welsh laws as are arrows and bows; an arrow is valued at a farthing, a bow with twelve arrows at 4d. pence, a spear at 4d.68 There is no evidence that Edward I or Edward II made much, if any, effort to provide their infantry with longbows though such weapons were clearly in use. By the mid-fourteenth century, Edward III had seen

 Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, p. 151, n. 49; Gerald of Wales, p. 204.   van Veltham, Spiegel historicaal of rym-Spiegel, translated by Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, p. 166. 64   Jenny Day suggests that, in the absence of references in sources to archery in the armies of Gwynedd, that the men of Gwynedd favoured javelins as their ranged weapons (for warfare) in the time of the princes; Day, ‘Arfau yn yr Hengerdd a cherddi Beirdd y Tywysogion’, pp. 207–8, and see also pp. 84–94 (history/archaeology) and pp. 240–50 (poetry). 65   Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, pp. 84–94. 66   W.L. Warren, Henry II (London, 1973, reprinted 1983), p. 40. 67   van Veltham, Spiegel historicaal, pp. 215–16; TNA E 36/274 fols. 36, 429. 68  Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, p. 151; these are illustrated in NLW Peniarth MS 28 fol. 23v. http://digidol.llgc.org.uk/METS/LHW00001/­physical?div=57&subdiv=0&locale=cy&mode= reference; Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, pp. 126–7. 62

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the value of providing bows and arrows centrally and went to great trouble to equip the Tower as an arsenal equal to the task. The longbow was a mass-produced weapon deployed by skilled men trained for its use from a young age. Contrary to myth, the best were made from imported yew.69 Probably the best indication of what these bows were like comes from the wreck of the Mary Rose and dates from the sixteenth century. By the mid-fifteenth century the equipment of soldiers was the responsibility of individual captains: the equipment prescribed in an indenture of 1441 included ‘a good jakke of defence, salades [a salet], swerds and sheves of xii arrows at least’, and all archers were to be mounted. None of this was generally supplied centrally.70 The idea that the men of North Wales preferred spears at the expense of the bow is based on a misunderstanding by later commentators of what Gerald of Wales wrote about the expertise of the men of Gwent with the bow. Unlike the bow, the spear or lance was genuinely characteristic of Welsh levies. Gerald identified this weapon with Gwynedd but the spear was always the standard weapon for Welsh troops in the years before the Edwardian conquest.71 It remained in use in English armies after the conquest too. It was cheap, easily made with only a small amount of metal, could be used either on horseback or on foot, and could be thrown or kept in hand as a stabbing weapon. It could also, as the schiltroms of the Scots demonstrated at Bannockburn, be employed usefully against cavalry. Even as late as the 1330s, the usual form of writs of array to the shires and March of Wales was for half the levies to be archers and half to be spearmen.72 That the only spearmen (homines ad lanceas) explicitly requested by the English Crown were recruited from Wales suggests that this was a particular Welsh strength and that a definite use was envisaged by their commanders, though specific evidence is rare. On at least one occasion, small companies of Welsh spearmen were employed as protection for the flanks of the archers. At Clairfontaine, on 23 October 1339; ‘le roy … myst ses gents en arraie, les archiers a l’encoste des gentes d’armes, et les Galoys ove lour lances encoste eux’. The provenance of this account is uncertain. Though included in an edited version of Froissart’s works, it seems probable that the campaign diary from which this account was taken was written by a soldier in the English army and not by Froissart himself. The two companies can have been no more than forty strong since only eighty Welshmen were in pay at the time.73 It should be remembered in   Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, pp. 42–3.   From the expedition to France led by Richard, duke of York, in 1441: TNA C 47/10/26 no. 8, cited in A.E. Marshall, ‘The Role of English War Captains in England and Normandy, 1436–1461’, unpublished MA thesis (University of Wales, Swansea, 1974), pp. 88–9. 71  Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, p. 149. 72   For example, CCR 1339–41, p. 186; Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 57–60, gives a range of further examples. 73   ‘The king … mustered his men in array, the archers outside the men at arms, and the Welsh with their lances outside them’: ‘1339 Campaign Diary’, in Froissart, Oeuvres, cited in Rogers, War Cruel 69

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this context that these men were not men-at-arms, as the term ‘lance’ implies later in the century. Welsh spearmen were specially identified in plans for a campaign to France in 1341; although the campaign never took place, these plans do indicate that spearmen played a part in the tactics Edward III wished to employ.74 By 1359, the distinction between mounted archers and foot archers is more apparent, and by this date, there is no mention of spearmen whatsoever in the accounts of either chroniclers or clerks. The Welsh specialism as spearmen should be compared to the companies of crossbowmen raised from various English boroughs for service in Wales and in Scotland in the reign of Edward I. For a time, it was a specific tactical advantage, but the importance of this skill appears to have diminished, along with the role of the foot soldier, midway through the reign of Edward III.75 When the term ad lanceas reappears in royal accounts in the later fourteenth century, it refers to men-at-arms. Then, the weapon being described must have been some form of polearm, an altogether more sophisticated and expensive piece of equipment than a simple spear or javelin.76 Spears and lances appear frequently in Welsh poetry, but it seems that most descriptive references in poems from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries refer to the couched lance used in tournaments rather than in battle. This is not to say that couched lances had gone out of use. An inventory of St Saveur Castle in Normandy from Richard II’s reign makes reference to fifteen iron lances and another pair not made of iron. The same inventory records iii avant plates pro hastiludes, that is, front plates used for sports among the garrison.77 Tournaments were part of some campaigns, notably Richard II’s to Scotland in 1385 and in Henry IV’s campaign in 1400 when one was held at York. It is entirely possible that Owain Glyndŵr engaged in such activities himself as a fitting activity of what has been termed a ‘socio-professional’, that is, one who engaged in war because that was an expectation of his place in his society.78 Glyndŵr was praised for his skill in this sort of combat by the poet Gruffudd Llwyd: ‘Yn ymwan ar dwrneimant / Yn briwio cyrff, yn bwrw cant / jousting in a tournament / bruising bodies, unhorsing a hundred.’79 That said, the framing of these lines within the poem, like much else in the content of the poems dedicated

and Sharp, pp. 169–70. 74   Prestwich, ‘English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War’. 75   Or indeed to the ‘slingers’ from Sherwood Forest, employed in Scotland in 1301: CPR 1301–7, p. 1. 76   A full discussion of the lance both as equipment and a fighting unit can be found in Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, pp. 101–3, 5. 77   Ibid. p. 102. 78   Ibid. p. 24; for ‘socio-professionals’, see ibid. Conclusions, pp. 260–4. 79   Livingston and Bollard (eds), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook, text 5, lines 73–8, pp. 22–3. See also J.P. Day, ‘“Arms of Stone upon my Grave”: Weapons in the Poetry of Guto’r Glyn’, in B.J. Lewis, A. Parry Owen and D.F. Evans (eds), ‘Gwalch Cywyddau Gwŷr’: Essays on Guto’r Glyn and Fifteenth Century Wales (Aberystwyth, 2013), pp. 233–82 at pp. 243–7 and eadem, ‘The Imagery of the Brigandine in Two Fifteenth-Century Welsh Request Poems’, Studia Celtica 47:1 (2013), pp. 167–78.

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to Owain, is prophetic in tone. The passage begins ‘if he shall be healthy and free, he will win, when he desires’, and it ties in with the poem’s wider theme that Owain deserved to be knighted.80 Like most men-at-arms of his day, Owain would have taken to the battlefield on foot rather than on horseback. Gruffudd’s poem, therefore, is representative of chivalric combat, or possibly wish-fulfilment, rather than the real thing; the praise it conveys is for Owain’s elite status and skill at arms rather than his prowess as a soldier.81 In fact, much of Owain’s known military career took place at sea and this is not recorded in the surviving poetry dedicated to him. Interestingly his time in Scotland, in 1384 was under Sir Gregory Sais, a Welsh captain, but described by Gruffudd Llwyd – with reference to his byname ‘Sais’ (English) – as ‘a second St George / a Grigor, ail Sain Sior, Sais’.82 The poets certainly suggest that couched lances may have been used in skirmishes in the fifteenth century; Guto’r Glyn, for example, praised the Welsh captain, Mathau Goch, for skill with the lance in the context of Lancastrian Normandy – ‘Pan fu ymgyrchu gorchest / Ym min Rhôn a’i wayw mewn rhest / When there was a trial of strength in battle on the outskirts of Rouen / with his spear in its rest on his armour’.83 The ‘trial of strength’, however, might equally have been a tournament among soldiers of the English garrison. The highest status weapons of the period of course, were swords. Swords were clearly carried by even the relatively poorly equipped Welsh troops of Edward I’s armies. While records of the use of swords in a military context are hard to come by, there is clear evidence of their presence at home. The manuscripts of the Welsh laws describe swords of different forms of decoration and of different colours. A sword ‘ground on the stone’ was worth 12d., a ‘blue-bladed’ sword, 16d. and a ‘white-bladed’ sword 24d.84 A surviving calendar of inquests from Merioneth taken between 1336 and 1346 records that, of thirty-three violent deaths investigated by the coroner, eight were inflicted by swords (as opposed to six by knife and only one by an arrow).85 Since several of these deaths, such as that of Meurig ap Cadwgan   Livingston and Bollard (eds), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook, text 5, lines 77–8, pp. 22–3.   For the use of weaponry as metaphor and description in pre-conquest Welsh poetry see Day, ‘Arfau yn yr Hengerdd a cherddi Beirdd y Tywysogion’. 82   Livingston and Bollard (eds), Owain Glyndŵr: A Casebook, text 5, line 44 on pp. 22–3. 83  ‘Moliant i Fathau Goch o Faelor / Praise to Mathau Goch of Maelor’: www.gutorglyn.net, poem 3, lines 15–16. A more evocative description is ‘Troi blaen gwayw, graen o’i grwm / Tua’i fwnwgl, tew fonwm / Treiglo’r anfad benadur / Tros ei farch, pand trawsa’ fur? / He pointed the tip of his spear/ terrible was he in his hunched posture, towards his neck, / the fat lump, toppled the heinous lord / off his steed, was he not a most oppressive chief?’: ‘In praise of Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd Deuddwr of Collfryn’, www.gutorglyn.net, poem 83, lines 39–42. My thanks to Dr Jenny Day for this reference and for several useful discussions on this subject concerning drafts of ‘“Arms of Stone upon my Grave”’, pp. 233–82. 84  Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, pp. 134–5; Jenkins (ed. and trans.) The Law of Hywel Dda, p. 300. 85   The weapon was not recorded in all cases however. Carr, ‘The Coroner in Fourteenth Century Merioneth’, p. 249. R.F. Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 31–2, makes no 80 81

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Llwyd at Penmaen in 1339, were claimed to be in self-defence, the implication is that these were personal weapons carried openly. Another coroner’s account from Wiltshire in 1346 suggests that an unfortunate Englishman was wounded in the head by a Welsh soldier’s sword and died from his injuries.86 The familiarity of such relatively high-status military equipment speaks volumes about the extent of militarisation in the society of fourteenth-century Wales. Froissart, of course, mentions that the Welsh infantry who fought at Crécy wielded long knives and there is some justification for believing this statement to be accurate. In the reign of Richard II, at Llanfihangel Ystern Llewern in the lordship of Three Castles, free tenants of the manor were expected to supply a footman, suitably equipped with a sword or knife (15 inches long), a relatively substantial weapon that accords with the illustrations found in the Littere Wallie dating from Edward I’s reign.87 In poetry, various weapons were also used figuratively to represent patrons, thereby praising their military prowess or, in a more general sense, their protective or ‘forceful’ role in society: even a clergyman might be described as a ‘sword’.88 This might be more than simply figurative. In 1415, Henry V ordered the mustering of clergy for the defence of the realm; in the dioceses of St Davids and Llandaff, no fewer than sixty-four of the clergy and their households were arrayed as men-at-arms.89 Corporate Identity: Organisation, Uniforms and Standards To remark that one was Welsh or English in fourteenth-century Wales, Rees Davies observed, was to comment upon the obvious.90 The most immediate marker to the observer was language. Throughout the Welsh involvement in the wars of the three Edwards, language can go some way to explaining the apparent sophistication of Welsh levies of infantry as opposed to English. Welsh levies from both the shires and the March brought their own doctors, chaplains, criers (proclamatores) and on

specific mention of the use of swords among weapons used in homicide in England. 86   TNA JUST 2/195 m. 9; I owe this reference to Professor Chris Woolgar. 87   Cathcart King, The Castle in England and Wales, p. 17; Rees, South Wales and the March, pp. 64 and 147, n. 2, citing TNA DL 43/13/8; Edwards, Littere Wallie, pp. xxviii–xxix. The original images are in TNA E 36/274. 88   See www.gutorglyn.net, ‘In praise of Sir Hywel ap Dai of Northop’, poem 70, lines 21–2: ‘Llyna baun llên a bonedd, / Llyfr a chloch, llaw fawr a chledd/behold a peacock of doctrine and pedigree, / book and bell, great hand and sword’; and www.gutorglyn.net, ‘In Praise of Abbot Thomas of Shrewsbury’, poem 77, lines 37–8: ‘Cledd gwŷr yr eglwys a’u clod, / Colector ysgolheictod/Sword [i.e., defender] of ecclesiasts and their renown, / collector of scholarship.’ I owe these references to Dr Jenny Day. 89   CPR 1413–17, p. 46, Cal. Anc. Corr., pp. 56–8. 90   Davies, ‘Race Relations in Post-Conquest Wales’, p. 32.

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occasion, interpreters. Each of these groups can be ascribed to the need for clear communication within the army. The role of doctors is particularly interesting, although their names are never given in payrolls and their origins can only be guessed at, but there is other evidence for doctors in contemporary Welsh society. The Welsh laws record the doctor as one of the king’s court officers, whose responsibilities included the treatment of all of those in the court rather than just the king or prince.91 Keith Williams-Jones noted that doctors (meddygon) were fairly numerous in Edeirnion (Merioneth) according to the 1292–93 lay subsidy rolls. They were also relatively wealthy: one of the five appearing in the commote was assessed as highly as 10s. 3d. and doctors are mentioned at least once in the lists for every other commote in Merioneth except Ystumanner.92 That levies of Welsh soldiers were accompanied by people whose skills served to integrate speakers of a foreign tongue into a predominately anglophone army (with commanders who were probably francophone among themselves) should not come as a surprise but there were other mechanisms employed to draw Welshmen together within the context of a larger force. The provision of uniforms would be the most obvious example to anyone seeing an English army in the fourteenth century. The value of uniform in allowing identification of friend from foe on the battlefield was well established and became increasingly developed through full livery coats and the provision of livery badges. Even by the 1150s, Lachaud notes that it was common for lords to provide uniforms for their households, both civil and military.93 The effectiveness of these developments can be measured by the legislation passed restricting the use of livery outside military contexts. Such symbols of loyalty were ubiquitous in medieval society and carried messages of belonging whose power was especially enhanced when applied to armed men. We should be careful of projecting later ideas of esprit de corps developed in sophisticated regimental uniforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but the shires of Wales and the March do provide some interesting evidence for this debate.94 Richard II introduced a requirement that the cross of St George be worn by English soldiers in the military ordinances for his

  Jenkins (ed. and trans.), The Law of Hywel Dda, pp. 24–5.   Williams-Jones (ed.), Merioneth Lay Subsidy Roll, pp. cx, 84; for doctors in medieval Wales more generally, see J. Cule, ‘The Court Mediciner and Medicine in the Laws of Wales’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 21 (1966), pp. 213–36. 93   F. Lachaud, ‘Dress and Social Status in England before the Sumptuary Laws’, in P. Coss and M. Keen (eds), Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England (Woodbridge, 2002), p. 120, cited in R.W. Jones, Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 58. 94   Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, p. 56 and appendix II, p. 106 makes this suggestion. For the most recent analysis, see Jones, Bloodied Banners. 91

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Scottish campaign in 1385. This became the norm thereafter. There are examples of a variety of attempts to distinguish one army from another, notably at Haildon Hill in 1333, where the Melrose chronicler records that the Scots wore their shirts over their armour to distinguish them from the English.95 The provision of uniform for soldiers in the fourteenth century is first noted in 1321, in association with the Marcher barons’ confrontation with Edward II over the influence of the Despensers. The descriptions of the colours involved on this occasion vary, but the intention, that the men raised in support of a particular cause were readily identifiable as representatives of one lord or another and by this means reinforcing their authority, was the same. The best accounts of uniform applied to levies of Welsh soldiers emerge from the 1340s. The provision of uniforms was part of a wider process; shire levies had routinely worn uniforms since the 1330s, adding considerably to the costs of recruiting armies, and to the irritation of the localities since they were obliged to pay. Even in the 1330s, this provision was not entirely new, since references to white tunics, or blaunchecotes, occur with reference to recruitment of men from Launditch Hundred, Norfolk, for the abortive campaign to Gascony in 1295. The cost of these items, however, 3s. apiece, may suggest that these were actually padded jackets or aketons rather than simple surcoats.96 Linen garments adorning the bodies of the fallen at Bannockburn are described in Barbour’s The Bruce, though Barbour’s account was composed over forty years after 1314 so it may be representative of infantry clothing or the middle years of the fourteenth century. Though Barbour describes these casualties as ‘Walismen’, Welshmen and foot soldiers in English armies had become synonymous.97 White coats are mentioned until at least the early fifteenth century. The poet Llywelyn ab y Moel, possibly describing his involvement in the Glyndŵr rebellion, gives an account of his flight from soldiers near Usk in south-east Wales in which he refers to his ‘white coat’ ([g]wen bais). In each case these ‘white coats’ may refer to the outer cloth covering of a coat of plates or similar, although the editor of Llywelyn ab y Moel’s work suggests that the whiteness of Llywelyn’s coat could equally refer to the coat being ‘unstained’ by any blood.98

  Thomas Burton, Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, volume, II, ed. E.A. Bond (London, 1868), p. 370, quoted in Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, p. 73. For other examples and analysis of this phenomenon, see Jones, Bloodied Banners, pp. 58–67. 96  Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, p. 101 97   Skeat (ed.), The Bruce, p. 419. 98   Iestyn Daniel (ed.), Gwaith Dafydd Bach’ ap Madog et al., poem 9: ‘I frwydr Waun Gaseg/The battle of Waun Gaseg’, line 54, p. 95. 95

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The lords of the March had long formed their tenants into proprietary armies, under their lord’s standard and in their lord’s livery, drawing pay from him. In 1342, red and white cloth was acquired for the earl of Arundel’s Welshmen going abroad in royal service. The officers of the Black Prince, only recently established in his principality, understandably wished to remind the prince’s neighbours of the scale of the military resources under his control.99 In September 1346, the justiciars of North and South Wales were instructed to provide each man recruited to serve overseas with a short coat and a hat (une courtepy et un chaperon partiez de meme le drap) of these colours with green on the right (le verte a destre). Evans suggested that this was to inspire greater discipline in the ‘unruly Welsh’ so often accused of ‘light-headedness’, or, from the choice of colour to inspire a national feeling, an esprit de corps. This theory has found some support, since Prys Morgan says something similar, hinting at some lost earlier significance of these colours and to the adoption, anachronistically, of the leek as a national symbol.100 The poet Llywarch ap Llywelyn ‘Prydydd y Moch’ (fl. 1173–c. 1220), in a poem addressed to Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, describes him as clothed in green and white, while a poem of lament composed following the death of his grandson, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, attributed to Llywelyn Offeiriad (Llywelyn the priest, fl. c. 1270–90), describes him as accompanied by thousands of men clad in green and white.101 This could simply be an indication of the prestige of those who accompanied Llywelyn, however; apparently green was a high-status colour for clothes, according to later medieval Welsh poetry.102 Tying these details together and applying them to the mid-fourteenth century are obviously problematic, and among the difficulties with this theory are that English archers recruited from the earldom of Cheshire – not only the county of Flintshire, both in the prince’s hands – were dressed in like manner in 1359.103 The choice of green and white in the 1340s seems rather more likely to have been intended as a statement by the prince of Wales, mindful of his rights and, more importantly, the opinion of his neighbours in the March. In this way, the Black Prince could be seen to be demonstrating his superior holdings, of both land and

99   NLW Chirk Castle Collection, D. 9 (1342), cited by Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 81. Red and white are consistently given as the livery colours of the FitzAlan earls of Arundel in later sources: Siddons, Heraldic Badges, volume I, p. 52. 100   Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, p. 56 and appendix II, p. 106; P. Morgan, ‘From Death to a View: The Hunt for a Welsh Past in the Romantic Period’, in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1992), p. 80. 101  Siddons, Heraldic Badges, volume I, pp. 51–2. 102   A.M. Jones, ‘Gwisgoedd ac Ategolion yn Llenyddiaeth yr Oesoedd Canol c. 700–c. 1600’ (unpublished PhD, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2007), pp. 104–5; my thanks to Jenny Day for making me aware of this reference. 103   For example, the force of 400 archers recruited from Cheshire for the 1359 campaign was to be dressed in this manner: Reg. B.P. III, p. 349.

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men, in Wales. In this he was visibly asserting his rights and displaying his military prowess through not only his own mastery of arms but also the weight of numbers. A distinctive uniform such as this could serve only to heighten this impression, both on the march and, especially, on the battlefield, at the expense of the efforts made so diligently by the Marchers to remind him of their own rights in the summons for the campaign of the previous year.104 There is other evidence which suggests that green and white may have been used as livery colours by Edward III and Richard II.105 Philip Morgan, in his study of the prince’s lands in Cheshire, notes that the prince decorated a chamber in his palace at Westminster in these colours. Green cloth for his exchequer in Chester may reinforce this impression.106 Since both men from the principality and from Cheshire wore these uniforms of green and white, it is possible that similar uniforms were also worn by the men of the Black Prince’s duchy of Cornwall. Froissart states that the Welsh and the Cornish served together with the prince at Crécy.107 None of the available medieval records offers evidence of the prince’s Cornishmen wearing uniforms, but intriguing evidence emerges two and a half centuries later in the early years of the civil wars of the seventeenth century. A pamphleteer in 1642 printed a letter which recorded that ‘the gentry in the generality … [had] inrolled themselves in a livery of white and greene’. Mark Stoyle notes that white and green were the colours of the Tudors, and that by wearing them the Cornish proclaimed their support for the Crown, as ‘loyal Britons’.108 Had the Tudors adopted the livery colours of the princes they had once served? The descendants of Ednyfed Fychan enjoyed conspicuous success after the conquest and assumed the place of the princes – a fact recognised in how the poets treated them – so it is not impossible that they usurped another element of their former masters’ power. These references in themselves suggest repetition; it would be a significant stretch to say that a livery of green and white was current – with royal sanction, no less – from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. More plausibly, one might suggest that any reference was a Tudor reinvention. In the fourteenth century, however, the use of these uniforms emphasises that war on such a large scale was an opportunity for display, not only of military resources, but of financial clout derived from the estates of the March and the shires of the principality, by means of a corporate image. We are fortunate that

  Smith, ‘Marcher Regality’, pp. 270–2; Cal Anc. Corr., pp. 246–7.  Siddons, Heraldic Badges, volume I, p. 52. 106   P.J. Morgan, War and Society in Late Medieval Cheshire, 1277–1403 (Manchester, 1987), pp. 104–5, 107. 107  Froissart, Oeuvres, volume V, pp. 65–6. 108   The quotation is from the Thomason Tracts held at the British Library, E.114 (6); http://gateway. proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.882003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:image:111221:4 accessed 25 May 2012; see also M. Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers. An Ethnic History of the English Civil War (New Haven, CT, and London, 2005), p. 42, n. 49. 104 105

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so much evidence concerning military uniforms and dress emerges from Welsh contexts in the fourteenth century. While the provision of uniforms was not confined to Welsh infantry, an obvious visual identifier of Welsh levies of infantry was the profusion of standards carried by them. Levies of English counties did not generally employ separate standard bearers, but pay accounts in the reigns of the three Edwards reveal that Welsh standard bearers were routinely paid as part of the levies and always at a superior daily rate of either 4d. or 6d. Banners and standards appear to have been attached to the shires of the principality or lordships and, so far as can be established, they seem distinct from the men who led them since their bearers were paid by the Crown. Some at least were in the gift of their lords. In 1322, Edward II granted new banners as reward for good service to the men of North Wales, through their leader Sir Gruffudd Llwyd. Standards could also emphasise Marcher particularism. In light of the encroachment of the Black Prince and his officials in the March, the lord of Brecon bought three standards for his Welshmen going overseas on royal service in 1346.109 Later references to standards in the retinues of Welsh lords are unusual, but one survives in the person of Gruffudd Goch ‘Baneour’ (in English Bannerer or Welsh Banewr) for John Charlton III, lord of Powys, in a muster roll for the naval campaign of 1372. A Gruffudd Goch, aged ‘56 years and more’ is noted in a proof of age inquisition held at Welshpool on 24 July 1382, as were John Bitterly and Maredudd ap Gruffudd, also both in their fifties, archers in the same retinue.110 This is interesting for two reasons. The first is that a standard bearer is mentioned in the muster roll at all; muster rolls did not normally record the banners of individual lords. The second is that the lord’s standard was in the hands of a Welsh esquire, particularly in a retinue where Welshmen were in a clear minority among the men-at-arms (just four among forty had recognisably Welsh names).111 These standards were signals of the military prowess of the lords and the communal identity of the lordships. This is probably the key difference between the levies of the English counties, and the shires and March of Wales where, even in the fourteenth century, part of the function of these banners must have been to emphasise the authority of the lord of a particular Marcher liberty; lordship was military in character and very tightly defined geographically.

  Fryde, ‘Welsh Troops in the Scottish Campaign of 1322’, pp. 82–4; TNA DL 29/671/10810, m.13, noted in Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 81. 110   TNA E 101/31/37 m. 1. The inquisition can be found in CIPM XV, pp. 268–70. Llywelyn, a probable brother of a third archer, Ednyfed ab Einion ap Kelennyn, is also named. 111   TNA E 101/31/37 m. 1. 109

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Conclusions It is clear that when Welshmen were differentiated in English accounts, it was more because of their origins than any particular military factors. Exposure to the Welsh did not introduce the longbow to the English in the course of the Welsh wars. Strickland notes that record evidence makes very clear that longbows of over 6 foot were commonplace in English society by 1300 and their presence was noted in Edward I’s continental campaigns. That longbows were clearly in regular use in the thirteenth century should not be doubted but it was not until the 1340s and 1350s that forces armed with such weapons were capable of defeating larger, better-equipped, armies. This indicates very strongly that developments were tactical rather than technological. Since these successes came two generations after Edward I’s victories in Wales it is impossible to ascribe the influence of the Welsh or ‘their’ bow in an analysis of Edward III’s successes in France.112 In the period in which English armies were dominated by Welsh foot soldiers, from the 1290s until the mid–1340s, we reach a conclusion that might seem surprising: it was the spear and not the bow that was the most distinctively ‘Welsh’ weapon. The conclusion often drawn from Gerald of Wales’s account of war in Wales – that men in southern Wales preferred the bow and those in the north the spear – is not a reflection of reality in the twelfth century. Earlier chapters have shown that this distinction was not recognised by the English Crown in the fourteenth century either. Gerald’s descriptions provide anecdotal evidence of Welsh prowess in archery, but there is no clear evidence that the use of bows was at all unusual in England. Wales in the later Middle Ages was a heavily wooded country and iron was an expensive commodity so bows and spears, which use much of one and little of the other, would be expected. It is revealing that English recruiters specifically recruited Welsh spearmen and there is a suggestion that they had a defined tactical role. After 1360, however, any distinctively Welsh quality was lost; a Welsh archer at, for example, Agincourt, was an archer who just happened to be Welsh. His equipment and role would be no different from those of an archer from Somerset or Norfolk. Welsh contingents in English armies, however, would have been clearly different from levies from the English counties. The provision of doctors, chaplains, criers and interpreters was pragmatic and entirely necessary. In the early fourteenth century a higher proportion of Welsh communities served in English armies than was the case in many English counties, particularly those in the south of England. The profusion of standards and the development of uniforms among Welsh levies were a reflection of this and of the importance of the image of lordship in the shires and March of Wales in the fourteenth century. There is no evidence, however, that this continued in the years after the Glyndŵr rebellion.

  Strickland and Hardy, The Great Warbow, p. 166.

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The relative poverty and geography of Wales counted against the Welsh princes adopting heavy cavalry before their defeat and although horses of other kinds were common they were not generally of sufficient quality to serve as mounts for menat-arms. That said, many of the Marcher lords developed parks as studs and there is evidence that members of the Welsh elite enjoyed tournaments and bought into European chivalric culture. Although the evidence available from Welsh sources is extremely limited, it seems that swords were common in Wales by the fourteenth century despite their high status and cost. The Welsh law texts, derived from earlier sources, but still in use following the conquest, provide values for different types of sword. A sword with gold or silver on it was valued at 24d. as was one without. A battle axe, in contrast, was valued at 2d.113 By the fifteenth century swords were considered a familiar part of any soldier’s equipment but in Wales they seem to have been particularly representative of a militarised society. The general historiographical impression – even in the works of Morris – is that Wales could only provide a second-rate sort of a soldier, paid less than his English counterpart and not fit to be trusted. This is an image drawn largely from English chronicles of the fourteenth century and from wider perceptions of the Welsh as a strange and barbarous people.114 If the Welsh foot soldiers, archers or not, of Edward I’s day were a dangerous rabble, then so too were their English comrades. By the period of this study, the evidence, limited though it is, strongly suggests that all used a longbow.

 Roberts, Llawysgrif Pomffred, pp. 126–7.   R.R. Davies, ‘Buchedd a Moes y Cymry [The Manners and Morals of the Welsh]’, WHR 12 (1984), pp. 155–9. I would like to express my thanks to Rachel Evans for helping me get to grips with the Welsh text of this piece by translating several key passages not included in the English summary of the Welsh text of this article.

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The military importance of Wales and its March changed markedly between the late thirteenth century and the early years of the fifteenth century. Welsh soldiers served every English king in this period but did so in ways that followed the needs of England. Contrary to myth, the Welsh archers in Henry V’s army did not win the battle of Agincourt for him and it was rare that Welsh soldiers performed truly notable service. Welshmen feature only occasionally in chronicle accounts of warfare in the period and, of the great battles of the Hundred Years War, it was only at Crécy that their role was noted directly. In truth, by 1346, the ‘golden age’ of the Welsh soldier had passed. In Edward I’s reign, the ability of the English Crown to raise enormous armies of Welshmen from the newly conquered lands in Wales was transformative. Edward I’s great military achievement was the integration of the men of the lands of Wales into the English war machine he and his officials had created to fight them. In truth this task was made easier by the nature of the Welsh wars. These were primarily conflicts between Welshmen in which the English became involved. As a result, members of the Welsh elite were familiar with the English court through diplomatic missions, as hostages or as exiles. Welsh warriors had guided and fought alongside English forces. As overlord of all the shires and March of Wales after 1282, Edward seems to have met only occasional resistance to recruiting from the Marcher lordships in his arrays of men. On occasions the lords of the March allowed royal officials to supervise their tenants when they served as soldiers, but this co-operation as not to be taken for granted. Edward I’s ‘infantry revolution’, in which the king of England was able to routinely raise and sustain armies over 10,000 men, would not have been possible without the resources of the men of Wales that the conquest of Gwynedd provided. While he would not have been able to raise infantry armies of the scale he fielded at Falkirk without 10,000 Welshmen, it should be remembered that just as many Englishmen served in Edward’s infantry as Welsh, albeit drawn from a much larger population. The men of the counties that bordered Wales and in midland England

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had experienced war in Wales, but the impact of demands for soldiers on these wealthier and more densely populated areas distant from the theatres of war must surely have been less. It was only in the 1320s that the men of Cornwall were called upon to serve in Scotland, for example. It should be admitted that the quality of Edward I’s infantry must have left much to be desired. A further admission is that we know very little about how they were equipped or what purpose they actually served in battle. Prestwich’s analysis is fairly damning, but he notes that Welshmen were certainly the most reliable members of Edward I’s armies and a vital part of Edward II’s. Under these two kings, England’s wars against the Scots and, to some extent, against the French would have been conducted very differently without their Welsh soldiers. Tactically, the conquest of Wales was extremely significant even its strategic consequences were limited. If Edward I had reaped the military rewards from his conquest, Edward II reaped yet more. For Edward I, his conquest provided a source of men experienced in conflict over several generations, led by a native elite that had chosen to support him over their own princes. Edward II’s armies also contained more Welshmen than was proportionate and the loyalty of Edward II’s Welsh lieutenants was a marked feature of the latter stages of his reign. The post-conquest uchelwyr, led by the descendants of Ednyfed Fychan, were inclined to rule large parts of the principality as de facto lords rather than servants. They remained loyal even during the serious rebellions against Edward I’s rule and where they led, others followed. It was their support for Edward II that maintained Edward on his throne and vanquished his enemies in the winter of 1321–22. The defeat of the earl of Lancaster at Boroughbridge was the end of a civil war that had largely been won by Edward’s Welsh supporters in the March of Wales. It was thus no accident that it was to Wales that Edward II fled when Isabella and Mortimer invaded. It is also no accident that Roger Mortimer’s agents were directed to detain the leaders of the men of the principality. The imprisonment of Sir Gruffudd Llwyd in 1326 had the desired result; no forces were raised from North Wales to support Edward II. It is also no accident that Sir Gruffudd Llwyd and his cousin, Rhys ap Gruffudd, were implicated in several plots hatched against Isabella and Mortimer’s regime, nor that Rhys was knighted soon after Edward III had seized power. Edward III’s reign witnessed a degree of change. This was a consequence not only of the changing nature of warfare and, as Edward III’s reign went on, the reliance on mounted troops which could be supplied more readily in suitable quantities from English sources rather than Welsh. In Edward III’s early campaigns in Scotland he followed a pattern of organisation familiar to his grandfather, but over the course of his long reign and the shift from the Scottish borders to France, the trend was towards smaller, more mobile, mounted armies and the tactic of the chevauchée. In the early skirmishes in France, however, Welsh soldiers retained a special place but one that contradictsthe traditional image of the Welsh archer. It was the capacity of the lands of Wales to provide men skilled in the use of the

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spear rather than the bow that is notable in the armies of the 1330s and 1340s. This declined alongside the levies of infantry after early experience in the wars in France. The watershed was the Reims campaign of 1359 when the majority of the infantry arrayed left the army very shortly after it was assembled. In this light, the role of Edward of Woodstock, the Black Prince, was significant. Edward III had never been prince of Wales, and between 1307 and 1343 the title had been in abeyance. Welshmen were extremely rare in the household of the king but appeared in small numbers in the household of his eldest son. They prospered in the prince’s service, particularly in Gascony. This was notorious even in the papal court; when Alexander Dalby, one of the prince’s clerks, was nominated as bishop of Bangor, a papal mandate was issued to the archbishop of Bordeaux to inquire whether Dalby could understand and preach in Welsh as, it was said, many in his diocese spoke Welsh. Such men could only have been soldiers or sailors.1 The report does not survive, but it is revealing that Dalby was not appointed. The loss of military records from Aquitaine in this period is significant from a Welsh perspective. The military careers of a great many Welshmen serving in France in the second half of the fourteenth century, hinted at by poets, are only represented in bureaucratic detail by those who fought on the French side with Owain Lawgoch. Part of Owain’s success in appealing to the Welsh stemmed from their prince’s ambitions and the ignorance of his officials of his shires and their neighbouring March. The reaction of Marcher lords to the prince’s summons for men to serve in the campaign of 1345 are indicative (though the presumption can only have been on the part of the young prince’s officials), and briefly challenged the effectiveness of the military organisation of Wales under the Black Prince. In 1345, both John Charlton I and the earl of Hereford gave clear statements of intent. Charlton refused to receive the summons from the prince, while the earl acted against the commissioner of array (his tenant) to secure his rights. Recruitment for royal armies remained a privilege of the king, not even to be alienated to his eldest son. Otherwise, the prince identified his tenants in war as belonging to him by use of uniforms for his Welsh and English soldiers alike. His Welsh estates were visibly part of his wider demesne. Richard II – another English monarch never formally invested with the title prince of Wales before becoming king – nonetheless used the style for correspondence issued by his Welsh exchequer.2 This personal lordship had important military implications, and the strategies he employed make an interesting comparison to those he used in England. As in England, he made king’s esquires of leading members of both Welsh and English communities. Moreover, he actually visited his Welsh estates while en route to campaign in Ireland in 1394 and 1399, bestowing   Calendar of Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland, volume IV: 1362–1404 (1902), p. 25. 2   Davies, ‘Richard II and the Principality of Chester, 1397–9’, p. 265. 1

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personal favour as well as using offices in Wales as sources of patronage for members of his court. The king’s earldom of Cheshire, however, was vastly more important both financially and as a source of patronage, especially when it was combined with the earl of Arundel’s estates in north-east Wales after the earl’s execution in 1397. In combining these estates and declaring them a principality in their own right, Richard created a source of prestige with which he rewarded others. It was from Cheshire that Richard recruited his permanent bodyguard of archers and esquires, with only a handful of men from Flintshire. Patronage was rarely extended to Welshmen and the benefits for the Welsh elite were limited. The family of Tudur ap Goronwy, particularly his sons Rhys and Gwilym, benefited hugely and it may be no accident that after Richard’s fall it was they who were leading lights in the rebellion of their cousin, Owain Glyndŵr. It is notable, however, that on the campaigns Richard led in person in 1385 and 1394 (and possibly in 1399) that companies of Welsh archers were specifically recruited from the royal demesne.3 Their recruitment could be seen as both militarily expedient and also an expression of personal authority. Richard’s fall was, in part, attributable to the military resources his opponents could muster in Wales. Henry Bolingbroke’s Lancastrian inheritance added to his own Marcher estates, and the loyalty of his tenants to him rather than to Richard contributed in no small way to the success of the Lancastrian revolution. It is notable, too, how easily many of those who had been rewarded by Richard slipped into service of the new regime of Henry IV. Even more remarkable is how many of these men remained loyal to the Lancastrian cause during the Glyndŵr rebellion. The careers of men like Dafydd Gam, who died at Agincourt, his father, Llywelyn ap Hywel, their contemporary in Brecon, Dafydd ap Thomas ap Dafydd, and their neighbour in Herefordshire, John ap Harry, testify to the extent of the support Henry IV enjoyed from his Welsh tenants. The war against Owain Glyndŵr was won because not all Welshmen supported Owain. The evidence of the accounts surviving from the period shows that Welshmen were sufficiently concerned for the security of their property and for the English Crown to enrol in garrison forces and in the armies that defeated the rebels. Gerald of Wales’s assertion about the Welsh in the twelfth century accurately reflected Welsh society in the early years of the fourteenth century and again in the years after the Glyndŵr rebellion. Not only the leaders but the entire nation are trained in war. Sound the trumpet for battle and the peasant will rush from his plough to pick up his weapons as quickly as the courtier from the court.4

  In 1385, 340 archers were recorded in the issue roll: TNA E 403/508 m. 3. In 1394, 140 were accounted for: TNA E 101/402/20 fol. 39v.  4   Gerald of Wales, p. 233.  3

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The rebellion might have ravaged Wales but it founded military careers. For some, the start of a career in English service was among the company of 500 soldiers raised from the Lancastrian estates and the southern shires of the principality to go to France in 1415. This was a highly unusual force which was recruited on the basis of pardon and personal lordship. The only obvious parallel for these 500 archers, marching on foot, was from the reign of Richard II. This followed a campaign of financial punishment coupled to judicial extortion. It was also an exploitation of the personal demesne of the Crown which, almost in passing, offered an opportunity for personal recovery and redemption for their rebellion. The subsequent careers of these men illustrate the effects of the remilitarisation of the lands of Wales occasioned by the rebellion. For some, the younger rebels and their sons in particular, involvement in rebellion transferred relatively seamlessly into service against France. As H.T. Evans noted, long ago, Welsh-language literature is littered with references to English service in France, and examination of the records of military matters in Lancastrian Normandy shows just how many Welshmen served there.5 Although this is beyond the scope of this book, a more detailed examination of these records might yield a far better understanding of the elite of fifteenth-century Wales. We can see that the place of war in Welsh society changed over the period of this study. The fourteenth century was unique in the history of medieval Wales in that, after the reign of Edward II, the lands of Wales were generally at peace, as much as anywhere else in the English realm. The changes in military organisation concentrated in Edward III’s reign meant that, for the Welsh peasantry, England’s wars were an increasingly distant feature of everyday life. The end of mass levies of the population to fight in Scotland, coupled with the increased cost of participation in war, meant that military participation was confined largely to members of the Welsh elite. It is no surprise, therefore, that the chief beneficiaries of service in English armies before the Glyndŵr rebellion were the Welsh squirearchy. After the rebellion, as Ralph Griffiths noted, the rise of the Welsh gentry in the fifteenth century was ‘a phenomenon of outstanding importance’.6 As a group they deserve greater study in their own right, but it can be seen that there was substantial continuity between the men who served the princes and, in turn, abandoned them and went on to serve Edward I and Edward II as leaders and centenars of the great Welsh levies and as esquires in the armies of Edward III and Richard II. Most notable, of course was the line of Ednyfed Fychan, but this prolific lineage was far from unique. In the lordship of Cydweli, for example, Henry Don, who joined Glyndŵr’s rebellion, had earlier been important in the administration of the lordship and had campaigned with his lord, John of Gaunt in 1371–72 and in  Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, ch. 1; Lewis, ‘Opening up the Archives of Welsh Poetry’, pp. 5–18.  6   Griffiths, ‘Gruffydd ap Nicholas and the Rise of the House of Dinefwr’, p. 256.  5

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Ireland with Richard II in 1393–94.7 His father had been a commissioner of array while his grandson, Gruffudd, also a rebel, was eventually rewarded with the constableship of the castle of Cydweli, a fortress that he had helped besiege during the rebellion, as he had many castles in France and the castle of Carmarthen.8 In the lordship of Brecon, Einion Sais and his descendants, notably Dafydd Gam, had served successive lords of Brecon and ultimately could trace their line back to the native princes of that area.9 The role of the Cambro-Norman gentry of the March of Wales has been rather underreported.10 The Puleston family, early settlers in the lordship of Bromfield and Yale and in Flintshire, had come to be regarded as wholly Welsh by the fifteenth century.11 Their administrative and military careers mirrored those of their Welsh neighbours, albeit from a different starting point. One, Robert Puleston, originally from Puleston, Shropshire, was sheriff of Anglesey, murdered by rebels in 1294. Later members of the family served in Ireland and France and joined Welsh-led rebellions. At least one followed Owain Lawgoch, others supported Owain Glyndŵr. Service in English armies was a gateway to rewards in a variety of tangible forms: grants of land, offices and pardons. It is obvious that military activities and leadership in war were only parts of much wider careers and this is shown in the administrative records of the principality and in the surviving records of the Marcher lordships. Less tangible, to the historian, was the recognition in the context of their own society. Involvement in war was an expectation incumbent upon the courtiers of the princes before the Edwardian conquest and, unsurprisingly, the post-conquest uchelwyr, the squirearchy of Wales. The surviving corpus of poetry shows that this was a society imbued with martial values and that, for Welshmen of praiseworthy status, a career in arms went hand in hand with their station in society. This, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, was a common feature of the English military elite, Men of knightly status and those who aspired to it in the fourteenth century confirmed their status by feats of arms. That made them what Curry and others have termed ‘socio-professionals’: regular military service defined their place in the social order and, through wages, increased their means to do so.12 In the absence of promotion to knighthood among the Welsh  Davies, Lordship and Society, p. 422.  Griffiths, Principality of Wales, pp. 201–2.  9  Davies, Lordship and Society, pp. 225–6, 423. 10   The exception, as ever, being Rees Davies. See Lordship and Society, ch. 16, ch. 17, pp. 413–24 and ch. 18, especially, pp. 443–56. 11   Examples of Welsh praise poetry to the Puleston family include www.gutorglyn.net nos. 53, 72, 74. Members of the family were among the most important patrons of poets in north-east Wales in the fifteenth century. Praise to them survives from Guto’r Glyn, Hywel Rheinallt, Hywel Cilan, Gutun Owain and Hywel Dafi, among many others. 12  Bell et al., The Soldier in Later Medieval England, pp. 260–1.  7  8

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squirearchy, these expectations can be witnessed at first hand at a much lower level of society than in England. What we find in a Welsh context is evidence of the pressures exerted from within a society. As the ultimate reward for members of the squirearchy, knighthood was notable by its rarity. Knighthood was not only a mark of military regard among Welshmen. The association of knighthood with mounted combat and, with it, the trappings of rank and nobility, was recognised in the Welsh term marchog, but few Welshmen were actually made knights in the fourteenth century. Only for Sir Gregory Sais was promotion to knighthood recognition for military service alone. Sir Morgan ap Maredudd, Sir Gruffudd Llwyd, Sir Rhys ap Gruffudd and his son were all granted the rank in recognition of their leadership of the Welsh communities in the royal shires of Wales or, in the case of Sir Morgan, as recognition of his political importance. The rarity of Welshmen promoted to the rank of knight gave it greater value. From this relative rarity of Welsh knights emerges a wider truth. In the fourteenth century, at least, there were relatively few Welshmen who could be described as ‘professional soldiers’. Later medieval Wales was a relatively poor society and maintaining the lifestyle expected of a knight was an expensive business. Soldiering was, nevertheless, an integral part of a successful public career and the evidence of Welsh praise poetry is that military service attracted great prestige – indeed that it was a social responsibility – and that the profits of it were displayed in good horses, fine armour, largesse, in the form of patronage, consumption of French wine and fine living. Welshmen were disproportionately seen as soldiers by outsiders, however and this is because, beyond the borders of Wales and its major settlements, Hereford, Chester, Bristol and Shrewsbury, Welshmen were generally experienced by the people of England as soldiers going to Scotland or France. The cadre of praise poets had expectations that their patrons would perform on the battlefield and gain reward for their success. This was not without ambiguity. In the early years of the fourteenth century, praise poetry was careful not to mention the fact that these wars were in the service of their conquerors. Inflicting defeat on the English – the hated Saxons – was emphasised; references to defeat of Scots or Frenchmen appeared in quantity only in the reign of Edward III. Praise of the sort composed for that king seems to have been unthinkable for either his father or, more particularly, his grandfather. A similar ambiguity can be witnessed in the aftermath of the Glyndŵr rebellion. Despite the fecundity of the many descendants of Dafydd Gam, who died at the battle of Agincourt, no mention of that battle was made in praise to them. Indeed, no mention of that battle can be found in any of the praise poetry surviving from the fifteenth century, though reference to the rebellion that preceded it and success against Englishmen was common enough. ‘Breaking castles in France’ (torri castellau yn Frainc) was praiseworthy; being associated with English successes was secondary to personal achievements. The value of this praise poetry is twofold. It can provide biographical detail and hint at how Welshmen participated in war. More importantly, however, it can

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show how the attitudes of the society from which soldiers were drawn motivated military participation. The development of Welsh praise poetry and its consideration of the Hundred Years War is a theme I hope to return to in the future. Just as praise poetry had deliberate anachronisms, so too did the military obligations placed upon Welshmen in the shires and March of Wales. Forms of military obligation found in Welsh law codes were reiterated and expanded following the conquest. The general principle of Welsh military obligation – free service within the boundaries of their lords’ lands, paid service beyond those borders – was maintained. This was much more formalised than in an English context and there is evidence that these obligations carried a real importance much later in Wales than they did elsewhere. The demand of Welsh infantry to be led by their traditional elite made in 1345 shows that these carried a force beyond the simple recitation of military responsibilities in grants of land before inquisitions post mortem. The demand of Marcher lords to be recognised as subject only to the king and to retain the right to recruit from among their own tenants in the same year makes a similar point. Forty years later, the small companies of archers recruited by Richard II in Scotland and Ireland owed something to the feudal tradition as well as being militarily expedient. The way in which they seem to have been recruited and the rates of pay were clearly obsolete; companies of arrayed foot archers being paid 2d. per day were not usual in the 1380s, but mirrored Richard’s use of the feudal summons: there is reason to believe that these rates of pay were set in the terms of obligation of communities to their king. Henry IV created new holdings by military tenure during the Glyndŵr rebellion, among the last created in the English realm. It is notable that Henry V and Henry VI used similar means in Normandy to attempt to secure the English position in France. Experience in Wales may have informed this decision. Geographically, Wales was a convenient back door into the English realm and control of the country and the military resources it offered were recognised as vital. This is one reason that the traditional Welsh elite were able to maintain their position in society and perhaps why service in Henry V’s army in 1415 was ignored in fifteenth-century praise poetry. The king had compelled many of those who had served in that army to fight, in part punishment for their rebellion. It is ironic that the medieval Welsh soldier is remembered in the public mind for his service at Agincourt. What is remembered is not the relatively small contribution of Welshmen in that battle, but Shakespeare’s caricature of the garrulous Welsh soldier of the late sixteenth century. Fluellen in Henry V displayed manners and habits on the Tudor stage that were familiar to a metropolitan audience.13 He

13   See, for example, E.J. Miller, ‘Wales and the Tudor Drama’, THSC (1948), pp. 170–83; M.R. Cull, ‘Staging Cambria: Shakespeare, the Welsh, and the Early Modern English Theatre, 1590–1615’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio State University, 2008), particularly, ch. 2, ‘The Disciplines of the Wars: Welsh Militarism and English Patriotism on the 1590s Stage’, pp. 124–67; A.J. Chapman,

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makes the point that it was Welshmen who served the Black Prince at Crécy, not at Agincourt. What we remember is not the complex place of Welshmen and Welsh society in the late medieval English realm but the outsider’s perspective. Welshmen beyond Wales were soldiers.

  ‘The Welsh Soldier in Later Medieval England, c. 1282–1422’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2010), ch. 4, ‘The Image of the Medieval Welsh Soldier’, particularly, pp. 211–17. 13

appendix

1

The Size of English Armies and Their Welsh Constituents

appendix 1

228

Table 4: Select examples of the size of English armies and their Welsh ­constituents, temp. Edward I and Edward II Campaign

Overall size of army

1287 1294–95 (Wales) 1296 (Scotland)

Total infantry

Non-Welsh

Welsh

Percentage Welsh1

22,0002

22,000

2,500

19,500

88

3

31,000 + 16,0004

47,000

–

–

–

11,000

10,000

10,000

–

–

–

7,300

7,300

2000

5,297

72.5

c. 50,000

1297–98 (Flanders) 1298 (Falkirk)

Foot soldiers

25,700

25,700

14,800

10,900

42

1300 (Caerlaverock)

Welsh exempted from summons

9,000

9,000

9,000

–

–

1301

Number of cavalry unknown

12,500

12,500

8,000

4,500

36

1303

No Welsh summoned

7,500

7,500

7,500

–

–

1306

1,500

1,200

1,200

3005

20

1307

2,919

2,919

97

2,8186

 96.5

–

–

–

c. 3,2007

–

2,250

2,000

–

–

Unknown

–

1319

c. 10,000

7,000

4,500

4,500

c. 2,500

36

1322

c. 22,000

20,000

13,500

13,500

6,490

32.5

1314

1316 (Glamorgan)

c. 29,000

No surviving payroll

Notes 1   Where calculable. 2   Total number of all three armies in the field November 1287: Byerly and Byerly (eds) Records of the Wardrobe and Household, pp. 423–41. 3   Note, not all were in the field at the same time and the total was divided between three armies. 4   Maximum figures between November and December 1294. 5   From North Wales only: the numbers serving from the March and South Wales are unknown. 6   Figures taken from references in Fryde (ed.) List of Welsh Entries in the Memoranda Rolls. 7   Welshmen from Cardiganshire and Carmarthenshire volunteered to serve at their own expense, in return for confirmation of their rights and liberties: CPR, 1313–17, p. 433.

appendix 1

229

Table 5: Select examples of the size of English armies and their Welsh ­constituents, temp. Edward III Campaign Overall size of army1

Infantry foot Total (infantry infantry mounted)

Non-Welsh

Welsh

Percentage Welsh1 (infantry only)

1327

No surviving payroll

–

–

–

–

–

1333

No surviving payroll

–

–

–

–

–

1334–35

6,200

2,690 (2,270)

4,960

3,960

1,000

20

1335

15,000

4,000

6,637

3,647

2,990 (+ 87)2

45

1336

3,500

967 (1,794)

2,761

1338–39

4,600

1,700 (1,100)

1341 Planned only (France, proposed)

2,171

590

3

46

2,800

2,000

800

40

7,952

11,558

3,952

4,0004

35

1342–43

5,5005

1,750 (1,750)

c. 3,600

c. 2,500

c. 1,0006

28

1345

2,000

1,000 (500)

1,500

1,000

500

25

c. 8,000

c. 8,000

c. 3,500

c. 4,5007

56

–

–

–

1346

c. 14,000 (based on incomplete data)

1347 (Calais)

c. 32,000 (though only c. 10,000 at any one time)

25,000 (5,000)

–

1355–56

2,750

6008 (1,000)

1,600

1,000

600

38

1359–60

10,000

4,000 (3,000)

7,000

5,000

1,100

16

Notes 1   The figures given are an approximation based upon the the known maximum documented size of the army concerned.   With 87 hobelars, 54 of whom were from the earl of Arundel’s estates in the March: Chirk, Clun, Oswestry. 3   From the royal shires in Wales with the exception of 100 men from Powys paid for only six days’ service. 4   2,000 foot archers and 2,000 spearmen. 2

230

appendix 1

5   There is uncertainty about this figure. See Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, Appendix 2. Approximately 1,000 Welshmen were in pay at any one time. 6   In common with most foot soldiers on this campaign, the majority left royal pay by Christmas, 1342. 7   Perhaps half of these were armed with spears, the remainder with bows. 8   There is evidence that the foot archers serving in Gascony were provided with mounts; Evans, ‘Some Notes on the Principality of Wales’, pp. 63–4.

appendix 2

Important Welsh Figures

Dafydd ap Gwilym  A poet (fl. c. 1330–c. 1360), best known for his cywyddau. Traditionally he was credited with transforming Welsh poetry and popularising the cywydd form, but he was one of several poets in the period. Highly prolific and extremely popular, Dafydd ap Gwilym wrote traditional poetry in traditional metres, but a large corpus of love poetry and poems to women and lovers is attributed to him, mostly in the cywydd metre. For his work see www.dafyddapgwilym.net. Ednyfed Fychan  (d. 1246) The son of Cynwrig ab Iorwerth ap Gwrgant; the family came from the cantref of Rhos in north-east Wales. He was the distain of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth (q.v.) from c.1220, retaining the office until his death. The value of Ednyfed’s service was reflected in the lands and privileges granted to him by Llywelyn. His descendants held these lands by a tenure described as that of Wyrion Eden (‘the grandsons of Ednyfed’), which involved exemption from all rents and obligations except suit to the prince’s court and military service. His numerous descendants came to dominate the government of the English principality of Wales and included the Tudor kings and queens of England. Glendower, Owen  See Owain Glyndŵr Iolo Goch  (fl. 1345–97), poet, of Llechryd in the parish of Llanefydd in the Marcher lordship of Denbigh. His most famous patron was Owain Glyndŵr, to whom he addressed three poems in the 1380s but he also addressed poems to Roger Mortimer, earl of March (d. 1398), and Edward III. Llywelyn ap Gruffudd (d. 1282), prince of Wales, grandson of Llywelyn ab Iorwerth. His rise to power re-established Gwynedd’s political and military power over other Welsh lords in the 1250s. Attempts to consolidate this via a feudal relationship with the English Crown resulted in war in 1277 and 1287. His death in battle, probably in the vicinity of Irfon Bridge, near Builth, confirmed Edward I’s conquest of Gwynedd.

232

appendix 2

Llywelyn ab Iorwerth  (c. 1173–1240), prince of Gwynedd and, from 1230, prince of Wales. He stands out as one of the greatest rulers of independent Wales and he is remembered as Llywelyn Fawr or Llywelyn the Great; the title seems first to have been used by the English chronicler Matthew Paris. Having started from nothing, he ended his days as prince of Wales in all but name, having achieved this position entirely through his political and military ability. Owain Glyndŵr  (c. 1359–c. 1416) (Owain ap Gruffudd Fychan, Owen Glendower), squire in English armies, rebel leader in Wales, declared prince of Wales on 16 September 1400. He was the leader of the most serious and widespread rebellion against English rule since the Edwardian conquest of 1282–83.

Glossary

awdl

ap cantref

centenar

chamberlain

chevauchée

One of the traditional metres of Welsh poetry, awdl is sometimes translated as ‘ode’. Traditionally it was a metrical composition – so using cynghanedd, the strict-metre system in Welsh poetry – with a single end-rhyme throughout, but by the fifteenth century an awdl could be a poem containing several sections in different metres.1 Meaning ‘son of ’, the basic unit of Welsh patronymic naming. Before a vowel, ap becomes ab. Each Welsh kingdom/territory was divided into these. The term means ‘a hundred townships’, but was not analogous to the English shire hundred. Cantrefi were divided into smaller units, the commotes. A soldier in English armies commanding 100 men, divided into groups of twenty, each under a vintenar (q.v). The chief financial officer of one of the parts of the principality of Wales under the English kings and princes. He was frequently the most senior official to occupy his post in person since the justiciars (q.v.) were often absentees. A tactic commonly used by the English in France: long-distance, mounted raids designed to damage property and undermine authority in the area raided.

  J.T. Koch, Celtic Culture: A Historical Encyclopaedia, 5 vols (Santa Barbara and Oxford, 2006), volume I, p. 148.

1

234

commote

crach, grach

cwmwd cywydd (pl. cywyddau)

distain

du, ddu ferch fychan

gafael

  Ibid., p. 542.

2

glossary

From Welsh, cwmwd, a subdivision of the cantref, usually corresponding in size to the English shire hundred and retained in both shires and March of Wales. Meaning ‘scabby’, a common descriptor occurring in Welsh personal names. Often spelt gragh or cragh in the Middle Ages. See commote. Welsh poetry involved a complex combination of both cynghanedd, the rhyme-and-alliteration system necessary in each line of strict metre poetry (canu caeth), and also different metres which determined the form which the poem would take – the number of syllables in a line, end-rhyme or rhyming pattern in the whole. The cywydd was one of the traditional metres and became popular in the fourteenth century. The cywydd form commonly consisted of seven-syllable couplets with one line rhyming on the stressed syllable and the other on an unstressed syllable.2 Fourteenth-century poets writing in this metre are often known collectively as the cywyddwyr. The seneschal or steward of a Welsh ruler. In thirteenth-century Gwynedd the role developed from that of a household official to being the chief administrative official of the kingdom. Ednyfed Fychan (see Appendix 2) and his descendants were distain to the princes of Gwynedd for three generations. Meaning black, often used in personal names. A mutated form of merch, the femine equivalent of ap (q.v.), meaning ‘daughter of ’. A mutated form of bychan, meaning small. As part of a personal name it generally indicates that father and son shared the same name: Gruffudd Fychan being Gruffudd ap Gruffudd, for example. Where this was not the case it is possible that it was a reference to physical stature. In fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Wales the native population held land in gwelyau (see gwely) and gafaelion, holdings. In some parts of Wales it was the predominant unit of tenure, in others it was a subdivision of the gwely (q.v.). Gafael always stands for a piece of land. Usually the

glossary

goch, coch

gwely

Gwynedd

hobelar

household indenture

235

holding of a branch of a lineage, but not always simply a share of the inheritance arising from the partition of land. In normal use it means land transmitted and shared by lineages. Goch, the mutated form of coch, meaning ‘red’, often used in personal names, probably as a description of hair or complexion. In modern Welsh, beds, in medieval Welsh, lineages. Gwelyau were free kindred groups, descended from a common ancestor and sharing proprietary rights of land, also the actual land held by the group. Gwely usually referred to a unit of land, always referred to land in the possession of the whole or part of a lineage. See also gafael. The kingdom of north-west Wales which remained under the rule of its native princes until conquest by Edward I. Thereafter, it was divided into the shires of North Wales (q.v.). The name continued to be used in Welsh language contexts long after the conquest. A type of lightly equipped mounted infantry soldier. The derivation of the term ‘hobelar’ supposedly stems from the hobby or hobin, the small horse that these troops habitually rode; this name in turn coming from the Gaelic word obann meaning ‘swift’.3 The word first appears in the late thirteenth century and appears to go out of use c. 1340.4 The military followers or retainers of a lord, prince or king (Latin, familia) in medieval Europe. A common form of medieval contract. Two or more identical copies were produced and the copies separated with a zig-zag cut. Copies were retained by each of the parties to the contract. Military indentures specified periods of service, rates of pay and the distribution of booty and other rewards.

3   J.E. Morris, ‘Mounted Infantry in Medieval Warfare’, TRHS 3rd series, 8 (1914), pp. 77–102; J.F. Lydon, ‘The Hobelar: An Irish Contribution to Medieval Warfare’, Irish Sword 2 (1954), pp. 12–16. 4   R. Jones Rethinking the Origins of the ‘Irish’ Hobelar, Cardiff Historical Papers 2008/1 (Cardiff, 2008): www.cardiff.ac.uk/share/resources/CHP%202008.1%20Jones.pdf.

236

justiciar

March

Marcher lordship

marchog marwnad

man-at-arms

mounted archer

North Wales

glossary

The most senior official of North or South Wales under English rule. The office was frequently granted to absentees who fulfilled their duties either through deputies or through the chamberlain (q.v.). From Anglo-Norman marche and post-classical Latin marchia meaning borderland. Before 1282, the March of Wales occupied the borderlands between England and Pura Wallia (Welsh-ruled Wales). It encompassed almost all of South Wales and the eastern borders. Note that many of the Marcher lordships subsequently became counties under the Act of Union in 1536 but their changes then and subsequently mean that the the lordships of Glamorgan and Brecon, for example, are not interchangeable with the pre–1974 counties with similar names. One of forty or so quasi-independent liberties subject to the English Crown both on the boundary of England and Wales and also across southern Wales, established by Anglo-Norman lords by right of conquest or marriage from the early twelfth century onwards. A Welsh term meaning a mounted man or soldier, the term usually used for the rank of knight. A poetic elegy, to commemorate the life and achievements of a patron. Although many were composed after the patron’s death, especially if it was sudden or violent, others were probably composed in advance, and some were performed before the patron and his friends and family. From French hommes d’armes (literally, an armed man); a soldier of the social rank of esquire or above, they would be expected to be mounted and fully armoured. In English armies the dominant form of soldier in the second half of the fourteenth century. Such soldiers did not usually fight on horseback, but were so described to differentiate them from foot archers, who travelled on foot and were lower paid in consequence. The northern division of the principality of Wales, including the shires of Anglesey, Caernarfonshire and Merioneth.

glossary

penteulu

Powys

principality of Wales

sais

shire South Wales

Statute of Rhuddlan

teulu

5

  See Chapter 7, pp. 165–7.

237

The commander of a Welsh ruler’s teulu, or household troops/warband. He was one of the twenty-four officers of the court in Welsh law, and was the man in charge of the warband, but the role continued to develop and he became, in effect, the chief military figure in pre-conquest Gwynedd. Dues related to the penteulu of Powys survived into the fourteenth century, though the office had lost its military role by then.5 Territory in mid-Wales that was originally an independent kingdom but in the thirteenth century was subject to the princes of Gwynedd and later, as a Marcher lordship, the English Crown. The area of Wales granted to the eldest son of the English king following Edward I’s conquest of Gwynedd, managed by the Crown directly in the absence of a prince. From Saeson, meaning Saxon, and frequently found in Welsh names where it probably implies either that the bearer could speak English or, less charitably, that he had assumed English manners and habits. In medieval Wales, used to refer to the counties of Wales established by the Edwardian conquest. The southern division of the principality of Wales, including the shires of Carmarthenshire and Cardiganshire This was a royal ordinance issued in 1284 and otherwise called the Statute of Wales. It was intended to settle the government of Wales after the completion of Edward I’s conquest in 1282–83. It formalised the means by which the English principality of North Wales was governed until 1535. English criminal law was introduced, but Welsh custom and law continued to operate in civil proceedings and the shire of North Wales were established on an English model. The household troops or warband of a Welsh ruler, equivalent to the familia or household (q.v.) of an English king or lord.

238

uchelwr (pl. uchelwyr)

vintenar

glossary

The term generally used for the land-owning class. It originally meant any Welshman with free status, but it later came to apply to those families of good descent who were the traditional leaders of their communities and the patrons of poets. A soldier in an English army responsible for leading twenty men who would often, but not always, be mounted.

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Index Abenhall (Herefordshire), 124 Aberafan, 85 Abergavenny, 52, 53, 157, 183, 205   see also Beauchamp, Richard, lord Abergavenny Aberystwyth, 14, 15, 100n., 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 132, 133, 136, 144n., 146, 147   see also Llanbadarn Fawr Abrahall, John, 146 Adam Sais, 87n. Adda ap Cynwrig, 167 Adda ap Madoc, 186 Afan, 62, 84, 157 Agincourt, battle of (1415), 6, 130n., 133, 134, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 194, 216, 218, 221, 224, 225, 226 Andrew ap Lewis, 135n., 139n. Anglesey, 3, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 33, 35, 37n., 40, 44, 45, 48, 60n., 61, 65, 68, 79, 81, 88, 90, 100, 101, 106, 111, 142, 162n., 167, 168n., 178, 181, 186, 189, 190, 195, 202, 223, 236   soldiers from, 22, 29n., 48, 61, 65, 164n. Anian, bishop of Bangor, 16 Antwerp, Lionel of, 96, 97, 98, 202 Archenfield (Herefordshire), 51 arrows, see weapons Arundel, earls of, see FitzAlan D’Arundel, Sir John, 124n. Arundel, Sir Richard, 117, 122, 123, 124, 144n., 158 Audley, Hugh, 41, 47 Audley, James, 53 Avene, John de, 62 Avene, Leisan de, 84–5, 85n. Badlesmere, Bartholomew, 40, 41 Bangor   bishops of Anian, Dalby, Alexander, Einion Sais cathedral, 13   estates and diocese of, 88, 132n., 202, 220 Bannockburn, battle of (1314), 5, 36, 37, 38, 38–40, 55, 58, 84, 207, 212 Bannow, John, 123n.

Bannow, Philip, 123 Bannow, Thomas, 123 Barneby, Thomas, 113 Barre, Sir Thomas, 144, 146 Basseleg, Thomas, 141 Bawdrip (Somerset), 84n. Bawdrip, Henry, 84n. Bawdrip, Stephen, 84 Beauchamp, Giles de, 48, 183 Beauchamp, Guy de, earl of Warwick, 38, 39 Beauchamp, Richard, lord Abergavenny, 144, 145, 146 Beauchamp, Richard, earl of Warwick (d. 1439), 113, 139 Beauchamp, Thomas, earl of Warwick (d. 1401), 80, 83 Beauchamp, Walter de, 25 Beauchamp, William de, earl of Warwick (d. 1298), 14, 21, 22, 23, 198 Beauchamp, Sir William, 87, 88 Beaufort, Edmund, 191 Beaufort, John, duke of Somerset, 124 Beaumaris, 41, 79, 88, 101, 114, 115, 116, 174, 181 Bel, Jean de, 60 Bemerton, 186 Benedict ap William, 91 Berkeley Castle, 54, 60 Berkerolles, Sir Laurence, 84, 125–6, 144 Berwick, 37, 40, 44, 45, 46, 58, 70, 89, 92, 179, 180 Bigod, Roger, earl of Norfolk (d. 1306), 21, 23, 26, 27 Birchore, David, 92 Birchore, John, 92 Bishop’s Castle, 116, 117, 118 Blaenllyfni, 156, 176 Bleddyn ap Dafydd, 81n. Bleddyn ap Dafydd ap Madoc, 189 Bleddyn ap William ap Gruffudd, 90n. Bleddyn Arow, 71 Bluet, Geoffrey, 98 Bluet, Ralph, 84

index Bluet, Sir Walter, 84 Body, John, 139n. Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (II, d. 1298), 14, 25, 27, 38, 175 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (III, d. 1322), 41, 46, 47, 52, 196 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (IV, d. 1361), 176, 220 Bohun, Humphrey de, earl of Hereford (V, d. 1373), 79, 82, 97 Bohun, Mary de, 130 Bordeaux, 72, 82, 220 Boroughbridge, battle of (1322), 37, 48n., 49, 219 Botiller, William, 136, 137 Bourchier, Sir Thomas, 81 Boys, Richard Brecknock, Davy, 122 Brecknock, Hugh, 122 Brecon, 13, 14, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 31, 41, 46, 48, 51, 52, 62, 97, 99, 105, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 143, 156, 158, 175, 176, 183, 184, 196, 215, 225, 236   castle and garrison of, 104, 115, 117, 118, 133, 183   stewards of, see Merbury, John Bredwardine (Herefordshire), 140 Brittany, 64, 81, 82, 84, 99, 179, 184 Bromfield and Yale, 45, 48, 94, 95, 119, 157, 158, 167, 169, 223 Broun, Thomas, 84 Brounhill, Laurence, 86n. Brown, William, 62 Bruce, Edward, 40, 43, 48, 53 Bruce, Robert, king of Scots, 32, 38, 39 Bryn Derwin, battle of (1255), 12 Bryn Glas, battle of (1402), 94 Builth, 16, 29n., 49, 53, 61, 91, 105n., 123, 146, 148, 183, 184, 231 Bullok, John, 186 Burgh, Elizabeth de, 97 Burghill, John, 99, 143 Bury St Edmunds, 63 Buxhill, Sir Alan, 81 Cadwgan ap Hywel, 52 Caernarfon, 21, 117, 180, 182, 184   castle, 36, 60, 147   exchequer, 176   garrison, 114, 115, 116, 181

255

  shire of, 3, 18, 45, 48, 61, 93, 142, 162, 190, 236 Caerphilly, 23, 41, 52, 53n. Calais, 77, 80, 81, 83, 85, 92, 96, 124, 126, 127, 139, 189n.   siege of (1346–47), 65, 68–70, 181, 187, 204, 229 Calverley, Sir Hugh, 81, Cambrey, Peter, 128, 129, 179 Camvill, Geoffrey de, 29 Camvill, William de, 29 Cantref Bychan, 49, 53 Cantref Mawr, 46, 49, 65n., 85n., 107n., 137n., 138, 183, 185n. Cantrefselyf, 105, 130, 173n., 176 Cardiff, 33, 42, 52, 85, 132, 141, 148 castle, 42, 84 Cardigan, 100, 114, 115, 117n., 118, 133, 138n., 145, 146, Cardiganshire, 3, 17, 18, 19, 21, 46, 64, 73, 91, 100, 101, 103, 124, 130, 135, 139n., 160, 162, 178, 237 Carew, 86 Carew, Sir Thomas, 117, 118, 191 Carlisle, 25, 33, 40, 42, 90, 174, 175, 184 Carmarthen, 14, 17, 18, 39, 86, 113, 119, 122, 123, 129, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 158, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185   castle, 124, 223   garrison, 114, 115, 117, 118, 124   shire of, 3, 4, 12, 19, 26, 46, 64, 65n., 89, 91, 135, 178, 183, 185, 204, 228, 237 Carreg Cennen, 15, 17, 104, 133 Castets-en-Dorthe, 72 castle guard, 155–8 Castle Goodrich, Thomas de, 64 Caus, 14, 97, Caus, Ithel de, 97 Cedewain, 13, 22, 27n., 61, 98, 105n. Cemais (Pembrokeshire), 18, 26, 53, 86, 97, 101n., 160, 161 Ceri, 13, 27n., 105n. chaplains, 37, 62n., 65, 70, 72, 91, 100, 116, 182, 187, 192, 211, 216 Chaworth, Payn de, 14 Chepstow, 27 Chepstowe, Philip, 85 Chester, 15, 21, 22, 28, 43, 184, 214, 224   abbey, 95   castle, 110, 116

256

index

  chamberlains of, 93, see also Parys, Robert, Trefor, John   earldom of, 3, 8, 12, 14, 18, 50, 53, 133, 137, 178, 179, 180   earls of, see Woodstock, Edward of; Edward II   justiciars of, see Grey, Reginald de; Ingham, Oliver; Mascy, Richard; Talbot, Gilbert   principality of, 101, 103, 106, 140 Chamberlains, see Chester; North Wales; South Wales Charles V, 79, 80, 81, 82 Charles VI, 93, 126 Charlton, Alan de, 183 Charlton, Sir Edward, 105n., 118 Charlton, John I, 39, 42, 46, 48, 96, 165, 176, 220 Charlton, John II, 62, 166 Charlton, John III, 82, 166, 179, 215 Charlton, John IV, 105 Chirk, 39, 41, 47, 48, 68, 94, 102, 128, 129, 131, 140, 165, 166, 167, 169, 180, 183, 200, 229 Cilgerran, 86, 122 Clairfontaine, 64, 207 Clanvowe, Sir Philip, 64 Clare, Elizabeth de, 53 Clare, Gilbert de (d. 1295) 18, 20, 24, 175, 189 Clare, Gilbert de (d. 1314), 23, 40, 84 Clare, Isabel de, 17n. Clement, Geoffrey, 11 Clifford, 158 Clun, 22, 46, 48, 53, 94, 128, 140, 229 Cockermouth, 175 Coed Llathen, battle of (1256), 205 Coity (Glamorgan), 41, 84, 125, 126, 143, 145, 147, 157 Coneway, Sir Henry, 89, 90n., 92, 98 Conwy, 46, 61, 68, 106, 147, 163, 167, 181, 182, 183, 184   ferry, 184   garrison, 114, 115, 116,   river, 12, 16 Cooke, John, 139n. Cornwall, Sibilla de, 190 Cottingham, Roger de, 26 Court, Sir Francis, 127 Courtenay, Hugh, earl of Devon, 191 Courtenay, Sir Philip, 83 Courtenay, Richard, bishop of Norwich, 138 Cowbridge, 97, 126

Crach Ffinnant, 111 Crécy, battle of (1346), 1, 5, 6, 65–9, 76, 80, 103, 194, 210, 214, 218, 226 Creton, Jean, 105 Cricieth, 73, 74n., 114, 181 criers, 62, 65, 187, 211, 216, Cromwell, John, 39, 42 Cydweli, 26, 62, 80, 100, 104, 105, 114, 115, 116, 118n., 123n., 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 146, 149, 173n., 183, 222, 223 Cymer, 132 Cymerau, battle of (1256), 205 Cynwrig ap Cynwrig ap Bleddyn, 90n. Cynwrig ap Davy [Dafydd], 99n. Cynwrig ab Ieuan ap Llywelyn, 88n. Cynwrig ab Iorwerth, 64,n. Cynwrig ab Iorwerth ap Gwrgant, 231 Dafydd ap Bleddyn Fychan, 70, 72 Dafydd ap Cynwrig, 25 Dafydd ap Dafydd ap Madoc, 190 Dafydd ap Gruffudd, prince of Wales, 16, 18, 24, 34 Dafydd ap Gwilym, 7, 44, 59, 69, 71, 185, 251 Dafydd ab Ieuan ap Trahaiarn, 135n. Dafydd ap Llywelyn, 189 Dafydd ap Llywleyn ap Bleddyn, 90n. Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Sais, 106 Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Philip, 65 Dafydd ap Llywelyn Foel, 45 Dafydd ap Llywelyn ‘Merton’, 81n. Dafydd ap Meurig, 81, 82n. Dafydd ap Rhys, 146 Dafydd Fychan, 52 Dafydd Fychan ap Dafydd Llwyd, 93 Dafydd Gam ap Llywelyn ap Hywel, 134 Dalby, Alexander, 220 Damory, Roger, 41 Deganwy, 12 Deheubarth, 12, 14, 15, 17, 110, 161, 162, 164 Rhys, lord of (d. 1197), 12, 161–2, 164, 200 Denbigh, 21, 45, 48, 53, 80, 98, 112, 114, 117, 166, 169, 183, 231 Despenser, Anne le, 98n. Despenser, Edward (d. 1375), 75–6, 83, 84, 97, 98n., 126 Despenser, Hugh (d. 1326), 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 212 Despenser, Hugh, earl of Winchester, 36, 53, 212 Despenser, Sir Hugh, 183

index Despenser, Thomas (d. 1400), 105 Devereux, Elizabeth, 190 Dindaethwy (Anglesey), 168, 186, 190 Dinefwr, 14, 17, 122, 133 doctors, 61, 62, 65, 91, 192, 211, 216, Dolforwyn, 14, 62n. Dryslwyn, 17, 18, 19, 194n., 204 Dwnn, Gruffudd, 62 Dwnn, Gruffudd (Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Henry), 129, 130n., 146, 148 Dwnn, Henry, 100, 130n., 222 Dwnn, Maredudd, 100, 101 Dyffryn Clwyd, 48, 54, 758, 140, 183   see also Grey, Ruthin East Orchard, 126 Edeirnion, 16, 17, 161, 190, 211 Edlogan, 52 Ednyfed ap Cynwrig Chwith, 186 Ednyfed Fychan (d. 1246), 13, 16, 35, 73, 110, 161, 164, 169, 214, 219, 222, 251 Edward I, 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38 Edward II, 2, 5, 23, 24, 36, 38, 43, 50, 51, 54, 55, 59, 61, 108, 172, 175, 194, 206, 212, 219, 220, 222, 228   as Prince of Wales, 16 Edward III, 2, 5, 22, 44, 45, 53, 54, 55, 57–60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 81, 85, 96, 162, 176, 177, 186, 187, 190, 195, 201, 205, 206–7, 208, 214, 215, 216, 219, 222, 224, 233 Edward ap Bleddyn, 81n. Edward of Woodstock, the Black Prince, 1, 6, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 87, 88, 149, 179, 184, 188, 213, 214, 215, 220, 226 Eggerton, William, 106 Egremont, 175 Einion ab Ieuan, 30 Einion ab Ithel ap Gurgennu, 93 Einion ap Gruffudd ap Llywelyn, 93 Einion ap Hywel, 88n. Einion Fychan, 67 Einion Sais, bishop of Bangor, 41 Elfael, 13, 14, 27, 52, 53, 183 Ellerker, John de, 63 Emral, 98 Esthall, Thomas, 33, 37 Eston, Thomas, 145 Ewloe, 72

257

Eyton, David de, 95 Eyton, Hugh, 136, 137 Falkirk, battle of (1298), 29, 34, 173, 174, 197, 204, 218, 228 Fantach, Gruffudd, 190 Farley, William de, 65 Ferrers, Herbert de, 54n. Field, Walter de la, 144 FitzAlan, Alice, 105n. FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d. 1326), 39, 46, 48 FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d. 1376), 61, 68, 75, 229 FitzAlan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d. 1397), 90, 94, 101, 102, 107, 108, 129n., 167, 180, 187 FitzAlan, Thomas, earl of Arundel (d. 1415), 102, 103, 105, 109, 124n., 127, 128, 129, 138, 140, 168, 179 FitzAlan family   estates of, 53, 68, 95, 102, 103, 110, 112, 119, 132, 178, 221   see also Bromfield and Yale; Chirk; Clun; Ruyton-of-the-Eleven-Towns   livery colours, 213 Fitzwarin, Fulk, 62, 94 Flanders, 1, 2, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 37n., 44, 62, 63, 64, 162, 163, 174, 175, 187–8, 228 Flint, 72, 83n., 92, 16   castle of, 115, 116 Flintshire, 3, 50, 62, 63, 68, 70, 71, 72, 81, 82, 83n., 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 101, 102, 103, 110, 125, 133, 164, 178, 179, 183, 189, 221, 223 Fort, John, 92, 103 Fort, Thomas, 92, 103 Franc, Janyn, 190 Fwyall, Syr Hywel [Sir Hywel of the Axe], see Hywel ap Gruffudd, knight Gam, Morgan, 84 Gamage, William, 143, 145 garrisons, 40, 42, 52, 58, 75, 83, 92, 95, 104, 110, 113–18, 119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127,128n., 132, 133, 139, 145, 146, 147, 158, 159, 167, 179, 181, 182, 208, 209, 221 Gascony, 2, 15, 17, 20, 22, 24, 26, 34, 51, 62, 70, 71, 72, 74, 77, 79, 123, 155, 184, 188, 204, 212, 220, 230

258

index

Gaunt, John of, duke of Lancaster, 80, 83, 87, 89, 91, 96, 107, 130, 179, 211 Geoffrey Cyffin ap Morus, 74n. Gervase, parson of Llanfaes (Anglesey), 37 Ghent, 28, 91, 195 Giffard, John, 41, 42 Gisors, 144 Glamorgan, 14, 20, 23, 25, 27, 33, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 62, 83, 84, 97, 99, 95, 105n., 124, 125, 130, 143, 145, 146, 157, 175, 178, 184, 189, 228, 236   soldiers from, 46, 48, 75–6, 97, 184 Gloucester, 18, 51n., 62, 105, 184 Gloucestershire, 54, 81, 84, 85, 98n., 113 Gloucester, Walter de, 33 Glover, Roger, 95 Glyndŵr, Owain, 2, 3, 8, 44, 62n., 78, 79, 86, 88, 89, 90, 94, 98, 100, 101, 102n., 106, 107, 108, 109, 110–24, 125, 126, 128, 131, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 158, 159, 163, 169, 178, 180, 182, 189, 190, 191, 197, 208, 212, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 232 Glyndyfrdwy, 61, 62n., 110, 111, 162, 163n., 177 Godenogh, John, 63 Goronwy ap Gruffudd, 70, 72 Goronwy ap Tudur, 45n. Goronwy ap Tudur (d. 1382), 79, 88, 89 Gosforth, 46, 46n. Gower, 19, 23, 47,49, 52, 80, 83, 97, 126   soldiers from, 25, 97n. Grandison, Otto de, 15, 16 Grandison, Thomas, 81 Graunt, David, 27 Grey, Reginald de, 163, 174 Grey, Roger de, 43 Greyndor, Robert, 33 Greyndor, Robert (d. 1443), 124 Grosmont, 133 Gruffudd ab Ednyfed Fychan, 15 Gruffudd ab Ieuan Iscoed, 135n. Gruffudd ab Iorwerth ap Meilyr, 68 Gruffudd ap Dafydd ap Gruffudd, 127, 128, 129 Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn, 13, 17, 18, 25, 42, 166 Gruffudd ap Hywel, 54n., 162n. Gruffudd ap Llywelyn Fychan, 85n. Gruffudd ap Madoc, 61, 88n., 162, 163, 177 Gruffudd ap Madoc Gloddaith, 74 Gruffudd ap Maredudd ab Owain, 24n. Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Dafydd, 88

Gruffudd ap Maredudd ap Henry, see Dwnn, Gruffudd Gruffudd ap Tudur, 16 Gruffudd Crach, 62 Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd ap Goronwy, 54n. Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd ap Madoc, 180 Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd Hagr, 85 Gruffudd Goch, 215 Gruffudd Llwyd, poet, 208, 209 Gruffudd Llwyd ap Rhys, knight, 16, 162n. Gruffudd Makarewy, 30 Guesclin, Bertrand du, 82 Gunter, Roger, 140 Guto’r Glyn, 7, 73, 123, 209, 210n., 223n. Gwenllian ferch Hwfa, 186 Gwenllian ferch Tudur ap Wyn Sais, 186 Gwernefail, 185 Gwilym ap Gruffudd, 62n., 162n., 163n. Gwilym ap Hywel ap Gwilym, 135n. Gwilym ap Tudur, 88, 90, 93, 100, 101n., 106, 115 Gwyn ab Iorwerth Llwyd, 185 Gwyn, William, 141 Gwynllŵg, 23, 80, 156, see also Newport, lordship of Hagnaby Priory, 22, 23 Haildon Hill, battle of (1333), 5, 212 Hakelut, Edmund, 47n., 52, 65, Hakelut, Walter, 27, 37, 39 Harfleur, 80, 130n., 139, 140, 179 Harlech, 106, 113, 114, 115, 118n., 125, 131, 147, 177, 185 Harley, Robert, 62 Hastings, battle of (1066), 205 Hastings, John, earl of Pembroke, 82, Hastings, John, lord of Abergavenny, 157 Hastings, Laurence, 53 Havard, John/Jankyn, 122, 123n. Havard, William/William fitz Jankyn, 122, 123n. Havard, William (the younger), 122 Havering, John de, 18, 29, 31, 174, 201 Hawarden, 80, 106 Hendwr, 162, 163, 165, 190 Hendwr, Dafydd de, see Dafydd ap Dafydd ap Madoc Hendwr, Richard de, 190 Hendwr, Thomas de, 190

index Henry IV, 91, 103n., 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 124, 126, 130, 131, 141, 147, 158, 178, 182, 208, 221, 225 Henry V, 1, 3, 8, 91, 103n., 109, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 159, 210, 218, 225 Henry VI, 142, 225 Henry VII, 145 Henry ab Ieuan Gwyn, 135n. Herbert, William, earl of Pembroke (d. 1469), 146 Hereford, 27n., 48, 105, 183, 224   bishops of, 117 see also Cantilupe; Treffnant   earls of, see Bohun   sheriffs of, 136, see also John ap Harry Herefordshire, 51, 93, 94, 104n., 105, 113, 116, 124, 132, 139, 143, 144, 146, 183, 190, 221 hobelars, 202, 47, 61, 99, 229, 235 Holt, 95, 110, 157, 158, 167 horses, 72, 75, 128, 138, 167, 187, 190, 191, 198–203, 217, 224 Houton, Thomas de, 166 Howell, James, 158 Howell, Thomas, 125 Huscard, Richard, 86n. Hywel ap Dai of Northop, Sir, 210,n. Hywel ap Goronwy, 167n. Hywel ap Gruffudd, 62n., 163n. Hywel ap Gruffudd, knight, 70, 73–4, 88n., 199n. Hywel ap Gruffudd ab Ednyfed Fychan, 15, 16 Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Geruarth, 45 Hywel ap Gruffudd ap Hywel, 54n. Hywel ap Hywel, 62 Hywel ap Lewis, 87 Hywel ap Madoc, 145 Hywel ap Meurig, knight, 31 Hywel ap Philip, 123 Hywel ap Tudur, 62n., 163n. Hywel ap Tudur ab Ithel, 93 Hywel Tew, 185 Iestyn ap Gwrgant, 157 Ieuan ab Einion, 87n. Ieuan ab Ieuan ‘Waspur’, 81n., 90 Ieuan ap Dafydd ab Iockyn, 186 Ieuan ap Dafydd ab Ithel, 190 Ieuan ap Gruffudd, 162n. Ieuan ap Hywel, 62n. 91, 163n. Ieuan ap Hywel ab Ieuan, 85

259

Ieuan ap Hywel ap Gwyn, 88n. Ieuan ap Hywel Grath, 186 Ieuan ap Hywel Swrdwal, 123 Ieuan ap Llywelyn, 26 Ieuan ap Morgan, 63 Ieuan ap Rycard ap Madoc, 135n. Ingham, Sir Oliver de, 60, 91n. interpreters, 65, 91n., 187, 216 Iolo Goch, 7, 44, 58, 59, 67, 69, 73, 88, 231 Iorwerth ap Gruffudd, 54n., 163n. Iorwerth ap Hywel ap Madoc, 90n. Iorwerth ap Rhys, 156 Iorwerth ap Tudur, 62, 163n. Iorwerth Fychan, 156 Ipswich, 62, 63 Ireland, 2, 29n., 40, 43, 78, 88, 91, 92, 95, 96–104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 119, 124, 126, 178, 179, 181, 187, 196, 201, 202, 220, 223, 225 soldiers from, 25, 26, 32, Isabella of France, queen of England, 51, 52, 53, 54, 60, 61, 219 Ithel ap Bleddyn ab Ithel, 93 Ithel ap Llywelyn ap Dafydd, 88n. Ithel Moel ap Dafydd, 93 Jakke ap Guillem, see John ap Gwilym Jean II, king of France, 70, 72, 74, 77 Joce, Sir John, 86 John ap Cynwrig, 202n. John ap Gruffudd, 156 John ap Gwilym, 102, 110n., 140–1 John ap Harry, 104n., 221 John ap Llywelyn, 159 John ap Rhys, 135n. John ap Rhys, farmer of moveables, Glamorgan, 84 Jordan, David, 87, 88 Jordan, Peter, 86 Kellow, David, 91 Kermond, John de, 65 Kildrummy, 32 knights’ fees, 156 Knockin, 90 Knovill, Bogo de, 52 Lacon, Sir Richard, 128, 129 Lampha, 126

260

index

Lancaster, Duchy of, 4, 93, 104, 113, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 146, 179, 182 Lancaster, Edmund of, 15, Lancaster, Henry, duke of, 52, 66, 70, 72, 74 Lancaster, Thomas, earl of, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45–50, 53, 165, 166n., 219 Langley, 175n. Langley, Edmund of, earl of Cambridge, 87 Langton, John de, 62 La Rochelle, 82, 83, 86 Launditch hundred (Norfolk), 212 Lawgoch, Owain, 2, 78, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 98, 107, 142, 149, 179, 180, 181, 188, 189, 192, 220, 223 Lestrange, Sir Roger, 89–90 Lewys Glyn Cothi, 7, 74n. Leyburn, John de, 61, 177 Llanbadarn Fawr, 18, 52, 114, 116, 117, 118, 135 Llanbadog, 120 Llanberis, 24n. Llandaff, 26   cathedral, 144   diocese of, 53, 131, 210 Llandovery, 15, 17, 18, 19 Llandysul, 103, see also Llywelyn ap Philip Llanefydd, 231 Llanfaes, 37n. Llanfari, 190 Llanfihangel Ystern Llewern, 158, 210 Llanfilo, 99, 143 Llangwyair Maestran, 185 Llanllibio (Anglesey), 189 Llanrhystud, 163 Llanstephan, 29, 87, 92, 103 Llanteilo Abercywyn, 156 Llantrisant, 52, 84 Llywelyn ab Iorwerth, Prince of Wales Llywelyn ab Ithel ap Llywleyn, 89, 90n. Llywelyn ab y Moel, poet, 120, 121, 123, 212 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, prince of Wales, 2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 24, 30, 36, 41, 155, 160, 200, 201, 213, 231 Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Fychan, 81n., 135n., Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Maelor, 15 Llywleyn ap Gwilym Llwyd, 135n., 138 Llywelyn ap Hywel, 221 Llywelyn ap Llywelyn, 89, 90n. Llywelyn ap Philip, 103 Llywelyn Bren (alias Llywelyn ap Gruffudd ap Rhys), 41

Llywelyn Ddu, 45n. Llywelyn Fychan, 189 Llywelyn Fychan ap Llywelyn Goch, 107 Llywelyn Goch ap Meurig Hen, 185 Lochmaben, 32 London, 18, 28, 93, 95, 104n., 126, 178,   Tower of, 42 longbows, see weapons Loring, Sir Nigel de, 64 Louis IX, king of France, 12, 155 Ludlow, 114 Maes Moydog, battle of (1295), 22, 197, 198 Mabe Maredudd ap Rycard, 135n. Madoc ap Arwdr, 19 Madoc ap Goronwy Gethin, 119–20 Madoc ap Gruffudd, 162, 165 Madoc ap Gruffudd Hagr, 85 Madoc ap Hywel, 65 Madoc ap Llywelyn, 21, 22, 189 Madoc Fychan ap Madoc ab Arawdr, 19 Magor, 132 Mallenfaunt, William, 86n. Manorbier, 86 Mantes, 144 March, earls of Maredudd ap Gruffudd, 215 Maredudd ap Henry Dwnn, 101 Maredudd ap Madoc, 124 Maredudd ab Owain, 129, 130n., 135n., 139n., 144 Maredudd ab Owain Glwyndŵr, 128, 131 Maredudd ap Rhys Fychan, 130 Maredudd ap William ap Patrick, 143 Marshal, William (II), earl of Pembroke, 17 Martletwy, 87 Martyn, Warin, 29, 174 Mascy, Richard, 31 Massy, Richard, 90 Mathau Goch, 146, 209 Mauny, Sir Walter, 63, 176, 177 Merbury, John, 132, 133, 135, 137, 142, 178 Meredith, William, 91 Merioneth, 3, 18, 24n., 73, 131, 132, 142, 145, 161, 162, 177, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 210, 211, 236   sheriffs of, see Mauny, Sir Walter de; Straunge, Thomas   soldiers from, 18, 20, 45, 48, 61, 65, 90, 93, 162, 163

index Meurig ap Cadwgan, 209 Milford Haven, 86, 87, 104, 181 Minsterworth, Sir John, 81, 82n., 85, 86 Moldsdale, 80, 106 Monmouth, 18, 80, 98n., 104, 105, 110, 120, 124, 130, 133, 136, 137, 142, 144, 182   Monmouth cap, 1 Montgomery, 14, 21, 22, 53, 61n., 114, 117, 118, 124n.   treaty of (1267), 12, 13, 17 More, Stephen de la, 33 Morgan ap Maredudd, 23, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 41, 174, 189, 224 Morgan Fychan, 143 Morgan l’archer, 87n. Mortimer, Edmund (of Wigmore), 27, 201n. Mortimer, Sir Edmund, 94, 105, 117, Mortimer, Edmund, earl of March (d. 1381), 82, 98, 124 Mortimer, Owen, 135n. Mortimer, Richard, 124 Mortimer, Roger, 100, 160 Mortimer, Roger (fl. 1260), 201n. Mortimer, Roger (of Chirk), 14, 15, 53 Mortimer, Roger (of Wigmore, d. 1330), earl of March, 39, 41, 43, 47, 51, 219 Mortimer, Roger, earl of March and earl of Ulster (d. 1398), 101, 231 Narberth, 49, 114, 117, 118, 158 Navarre, Charles of, 70, 72, 81 Neath, 85 Neville, John, lord, 83 Neville’s Cross, battle of (1346), 69 Newcastle Emlyn, 17, 19, 117, 158   garrison, 118 Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 28, 39, 50 Newport (Pembrokeshire), 86 Newport, lordship of, 35, 47, 126n., see also Gwynllŵg Norfolk, 162, 212, 216 Norfolk, earls of, see Bigod, Roger North Wales, principality of   Chamberlains, 70, 95, 131, 163, 165   see also Barneby, Thomas; Ellerker, John de; Trumwyn, Roger; Walton, Thomas; Weston, John de  justiciars, see Delves, John de; Grandison, Otto de; Havering, John de; Mortimer,

261

Roger, earl of March (d. 1330); Trumwyn, Roger Northborough, Robert, bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, 52 Northbourne, 74 Norreys, John, 84 Norreys, John de, 54n., 62 Norreys, Laurence, 84 Ogmore, 105, 126, 130, 136, 157 Oswestry, 15, 26, 46, 53, 68, 73, 74n., 94, 102, 110, 128, 132, 180, 183, 229 Owain ap Gruffudd ab Einion, 100 Owain ap Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn: see de la Pole, Owain Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain, 101 Owain ap Llywelyn ab Owain (alias Owain ab Owain), 64, 67, 164, Owain ap Maredudd, 145 Owain ap Maredudd ap Tudur (alias Owen Tudor), 145 Owain ap Siencyn Llwyd, 135n., 139n. Owain ap Tomas ap Rhodri, see Owain Lawgoch Owain de la Pole ap Gruffudd Gethin, 185 Parker, Thomas, 140 parliament, 26, 45, 49, 50, 54, 87, 111, 118 Patrington, Stephen, 131, Pederton, Walter de, 21, 31, 174 Pembroke   castle, 104   earls of, see Court, Francis de; Hastings, Herbert; Marshal, Valence   marcher shire and lordship, 18, 26, 52, 53, 86, 87, 88, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 117, 119, 122, 124, 125, 127, 130, 158, 161, 179, 190 Penaran, 185 Pencelli, 176 Pencoed (Herefordshire), 146 Penllyn (Glamorgan), 54, 62, 84 Penllyn (Merioneth), 186, 189 Penmark, Stephen, 85 Pennaeth, 161–3, 169, Pennatlliw, 185 Penrhosllugwy (Anglesey), 49 Penrith, 175 penteulu, 165–6 Perfedd (Cardiganshire), 138 Perfeddwlad, 12

262

index

Perrot, Peter, 86n. Perth, 32 Philip ap Gwilym Bras, 135n. Philip ap Hywel, 27, 31 Philip ap Rhys, knight, 176 Philip VI, king of France, 66 Philippa of Hainault, 176 Picardy, 70, 80, Pichard, Miles, 176 Pilton, 86 de la Pole   Sir Edmund, 141   Gruffudd (Gruffudd Fychan ap Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn), 34, 42   Hawise, 42   Owain, 18, 165, 166, 176   Sir William/Gwilym, 25, 28, 29, 34 Plymouth, 65, 70, 72, 87, 92, 184 Poitiers, battle of (1356), 70, 71, 73, 74, 87, 103, 190, 195 Pontefract Manuscript, 199 Portsmouth, 65, 66, 183, 184, 186 Powell, Lewis, 145 Powys, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25, 28, 29, 34, 39, 42, 46, 48, 62, 82, 96, 99, 105, 110, 116, 117, 118, 124, 160, 161, 165, 166, 169, 176, 179, 183,200, 215, 229, 237 proclamatores, see criers Radcot Bridge, battle of (1387), 95 Rhisierdyn, 73, 74n., 77, 88 Rhuddlan, 16, 98, 110   castle, 43, 92   garrison, 114, 115, 116, 133   see also Statutes of Wales Rhys ab Adda Fychan, 103 Rhys ab Ednyfed Fychan, 15 Rhys ab Ieuan Fychan, 137n. Rhys ap Dafydd ab Ieuan Boule, 130 Rhys ap Dafydd ap Thomas, 145 Rhys ap Gruffudd I, 37, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 60, 61, 64, 67, 87, 103, 164 Rhys ap Gruffudd II, 73, 87, 103 Rhys ap Hywel, Master, 31n. 47, 52 Rhys ap Llywelyn, 129 Rhys ap Llywelyn ap Gruffudd Fychan, 135n., 139n. Rhys ap Maredudd, 14, 17–20, 169 Rhys ap Roppert, 68 Rhys ap Thomas, 133

Rhys ap Thomas ap Dafydd, 101 Rhys ap Trahairan, 30 Rhys ap Tudur, 88, 90, 93, 100, 106, 115 Rhys Fychan, 67 Richard II, 78, 79, 85, 87, 88, 91, 99, 101n., 107, 108, 111, 141, 158, 163, 169, 178, 208, 210, 211, 214, 220, 222, 223, 225 Robert, prior of Carmarthen, 39 Roger Fychan, 139 Rouen, 80, 140, 143, 158, 209 Runus Bwl, 42 Ruthin, 43, 73, 94, 110, 127, 140, 143, 143n., 144, 183   see also Dyffryn Clwyd, Grey Ruyton-of-the-Eleven-Towns, 94 Rycard ap Meuric ap Rhys, 135n. sailors, 65, 184, 185, 220 St Asaph   bishops of, see Trefor, John   diocese of, 132n. St Briavels, 51, 60 St Cloud, 127 St Davids   bishops of, see Patrington, Stephen   diocese, 53, 230 St Donats, 84, 126, 143, 146 St Saveur, 208 Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue, 72 Sais, Sir Gregory, 6, 82, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 107, 108, 142, 149, 179, 180, 189n., 190, 192, 199n., 200n., 209, 224 Sandwich, 74, 82, 164 Sawston, 141 Scilly Isles, 65, 185 Scudamore, Sir John, 133, 191 Scurlag, John, 86n. Senghenydd, 85 Severn, river, 27, 28, 48, 84, 105, 156, 184 Shakespeare, William, 1, 134, 225 ships, shipping, 15, 65, 71, 72, 83, 2, 93, 113, 140n., 184, 185, 188, 192 Shrewsbury, 21, 48, 129, 183, 184, 189, 197, 210n., 224 Siancyn ap Madoc Llwyd, 90n. Siencyn ap Meuric ap Rycard, 135n. Siencyn ap John ap Rhys, 135n. Skenfrith, 104, 133 Sluys, 91, 93 Somery, John, 124

index Somery, Walter, 99 Southampton, 82 South Wales, principality of   Chamberlains of, 66, 91, 95, 131, 133, 176, 183, 184   see also Castle Goodrich, Thomas de; Merbury, John; Pederton, Walter; Robert, prior of Carmarthen  justiciars, see Clement, Geoffrey; Martyn, Warin; Talbot, Robert; Tiptoft, Robert Squire, Philip, 145 Stackpole (Pembrokeshire), 98, 99n. Stackpole (or Stackboll), John, 98, 99n. Stackpole, Philip de, 99n. Stafford, Edmund, earl of Stafford, 113 Stafford, Hugh, earl of Stafford, 97 Stafford, Ralph, earl of Stafford, 80, 97 standards, standard bearers, 44, 47, 50, 61 62n., 63, 65, 91, 100, 174, 178, 187, 213, 215, 216 Staundon, Robert, 18 Stirling Bridge, battle of (1297), 197 Stradling family, 126 Stradling, Sir John, 143, 145, 146n. Stradling, William, 84 Strata Florida, 132 Strata Marcella, 176n. Straunge, Thomas, 129, 132 Sully, Florimond de, 190 Sutton, Philip, 86n. Swansea, 19, 114 Talbot, Gilbert, 131 Talbot, John, 158 Talbot, Richard, 94, 164 Talgarth, 52, 158 Talybolion (Anglesey), 68, 167, Tal-y-bont (Merioneth), 185 Tany, Luke de, 15 Tenby, 86, 123 Thomas ap Dafydd ap Thomas, 135n., 221 Thomas ap Rhydderch, 4 Thomas ap Rhys ap Gruffudd II, 103, 125 Three Castles (lordship of ), 80, 91n., 105, 130, 136, 158, 210 Tiptoft, John, 143 Tiptoft, Robert, 17, 18 Tours, 72 Trefor, Syr Dafydd, 74n. Trefor, John, 128 Tregarnedd (Anglesey), 33

263

Tregrug, 52 Trumwyn, Roger, 47n., 163, 164, 176, 184, 202 Tudor, Owen (Owain ap Maredudd ap Tudur), 101n., 145 Tudor, Ralph, 124 Tudur ap Goronwy, 62n., 221 Tudur Fychan ap Tudur, 16 Turberville family, 157 Turberville, Byrol de, 25 Turberville, John, 63 Turberville, Payn de, 41 Twrcelyn (Anglesey), 68, 167 uniforms, 212–15 Usk, 26, 33, 52, 81, 84, 97, 98, 105, 120, 121, 132, 156, 212 Usk, Adam, 105, 138 Usk, Geoffrey de, 97n. Valence, Aymer de, earl of Pembroke, 32, 40 Valence, William de, earl of Pembroke, 18 van Veltham, Lodewyck, 28, 195, 226 Vienne, Jean de, 89, 93 Veel, Robert le, 27 de Vere, John, earl of Oxford, 64n. de Vere, Richard, duke of Ireland, 94, 95 Wales, Statutes of, 16, 152, 237 Walsh, Adam le, 52 Walsingham (Norfolk), 141 Walsingham, Thomas, 93 Walter ap Gruffudd ab Ieuan, 135n., 139n. Walter, Thomas, 136 Walton, Thomas, 132n. Warminster, 184, 192 Warwick, earls of, see Beauchamp Watcyn Llwyd, 139n. Water, Miles, 158 Waun Gaseg, 120, 121, 212n. Wele, John, 128, 129, 132 weapons, 203–10   arrows, 28, 144, 197, 204–10   axes, 73, 74, 217   bows, 23, 28, 131, 204–10, 216, 230n.   knives, 67, 158, 206, 209   lances, 64, 66, 70, 80, 120, 163, 207–08   spears, spearmen, 39, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 74, 76, 120, 163, 169, 187, 203, 206–8, 216, 220, 229n., 230n.

264

index

  swords, 25, 28, 59, 70, 131, 144, 158, 186, 206, 209, 210, 217 Weston, John de, 163 Wetwang, Walter, 66 Wheler, John, 139n. Whitecastle, 145 Whitney, Sir Robert, 132 Wigan, 184 William ap Maredudd ap Gruffudd, 93 William Fychan ap Gwilym Sourdeval, 123 Wilton, 186, 192 Winchelsea, 26, 64, 82 Winchester, 21, 131, 154, 174, 184, 186, 192 Statute of, 154 Windsor, 73–4 Windsor, Sir William de, 84n., 97, 98, 99 Wogan, Sir Henry, 86

Wogan, Matthew, 86n. Woodstock, Thomas of, duke of Gloucester, 94 Woodville, Richard, 144 Wychnor, 184 Wydlok, John, 86n. Wyrion Eden, 161, 164, 231 Wyriot, John, 86n. Wyriot, Richard, 86n. Yale, Hugh, 99 Yeovil, 184 Yonge, Morgan, 90 York, 45, 49, 58, 189, 208 York, Edward, duke of, 140 Yorkshire, 25, 31, 45, 47, 61, 89, 91 Zouche, Alan la, 52

Warfare in History

The Battle of Hastings: Sources and Interpretations, edited and introduced by Stephen Morillo Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology, Kelly DeVries The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340 (second edition), J.F. Verbruggen Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside, Nicholas Wright Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War, edited by Christopher Allmand The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, edited by Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History, Gervase Phillips The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066, Kelly DeVries The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, edited by Clifford J. Rogers The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, Anne Curry War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360, Clifford J. Rogers The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, edited by Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach The Battle of the Golden Spurs (Courtrai, 11 July 1302): A Contribution to the History of Flanders’ War of Liberation, 1297–1305, J.F. Verbruggen War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger Swein Forkbeard’s Invasions and the Danish Conquest of England, 991–1017, Ian Howard Religion and the conduct of war, c.300–1215, David S. Bachrach Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 1356–1406, Sergio Boffa Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity, 1450–1600, Yuval Harari The Place of War in English History, 1066–1214, J.O. Prestwich, edited by Michael Prestwich War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century, Adrian R. Bell German War Planning, 1891–1914: Sources and Interpretations, Terence Zuber The Battle of Crécy, 1346, Andrew Ayton and Sir Philip Preston The Battle of Yorktown, 1781: A Reassessment, John D. Grainger Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550, Yuval Noah Harari

Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative, Natasha R. Hodgson The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn, David Simpkin The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558, David Grummitt Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560, David Potter Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield, Robert W. Jones Alfred’s Wars: Sources and Interpretations of Anglo-Saxon Warfare in the Viking Age, Ryan Lavelle The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588–1688, Olaf van Nimwegen In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356, Peter Hoskins Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, Charles D. Stanton Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century, Craig L. Lambert Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377, Graham Cushway The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, edited by Adrian R. Bell and Anne Curry Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, David S. Bachrach Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century, Timothy Guard The Norman Campaigns in the Balkans, 1081–1108, Georgios Theotokis

SOLDIERS IN THE

LATER MIDDLE AGES 1282–1422

“Not only the leaders but the entire nation are trained in war. Sound the trumpet for battle and the peasant will rush from his plough to pick up his weapons as quickly as the courtier from the court.” So wrote Gerald of Wales at the end of the twelfth century; and war continued to define the experiences of Welshmen in the succeeding years.

ADAM CHAPMAN is Editor and Training Coordinator with the Victoria County History of the Counties of England at the Institute of Historical Research, London. Cover illustration: A Welsh soldier of the fourteenth century. The effigy depicts Gruffudd ap Llywelyn ap Ynyr (d. c. 1320) wearing mail and a padded surcoat. It can be found in the church of St Garmon (St Germanus of Auxerre) in Llanarmon-yn-Iâl, Denbighshire. Photograph courtesy of and copyright Martin Crampin.

GENERAL EDITORS: Matthew

Bennett, Anne Curry, Stephen Morillo

an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620–2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com

1282–1422

CHAPMAN

Warfare in History

IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

This book explores the role of the Welsh in England’s armies and in England’s wars between Edward I’s conquest of Wales in the 1280s, through the wars in Scotland and France and the revolt led by Owain Glyndŵr, concluding with Henry V’s conquest of Normandy following his victory at Agincourt in 1415. It examines the structure and composition of armies and the social networks and hierarchies which underpinned them: what sort of Welshmen became soldiers? How was Welsh society organised for war? What impact did wider political considerations have upon Welshmen in England’s armies? These questions are answered using both well-known sources, such as the financial records of the English crown, and others less familiar, including the records of local administration and the large surviving corpus of Welsh-language poetry.

WELSH SOLDIERS

WELSH

WELSH SOLDIERS IN THE

LATER MIDDLE AGES 1282–1422

A

D A M

C

H A P M A N