War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control 9781626376427

Citation preview

War Games

War Games US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Stephen J. Cimbala

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2017 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2017 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-62637-619-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

4

3

2

1

Contents

vii ix

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix Coping with Nuclear Crisis Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient? Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible? Controlling Nuclear Proliferation Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles? The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense Geography and Nuclear Strategy The Putin Factor The Way Forward

Appendix 1: Notes on Methodology Appendix 2: Nuclear Modernization and Cost Comparisons Bibliography Index About the Book

v

1 13 27 39 53 69 89 107 131 149 169 191 221 235 241 245 247 263 278

Tables and Figures

Tables 2.1 Selected Computer Network Attacks, 2007–2013 2.2 Comparative Attributes of Cyber War and Nuclear Deterrence 3.1 New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons, September 1, 2015 6.1 US Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit 6.2 Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit 6.3 US Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit 6.4 Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit 7.1 Attributes of Generic Nuclear Deterrence Strategies 10.1 US Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2016 11.1 US-Russian Forces in the Analysis, New START 1,550 Deployment Limit 11.2 US-Russian Forces in the Analysis, New START 1,000 Deployment Limit 14.1 Relevance of Cold War Concepts of Nuclear Strategy for Cyber War A.1 Tritten Model Illustrative Spreadsheet A.2 Tritten Model Notional Outcomes A.3 Scouras Model: Sample Output for US Forces, New START 1,550 Deployment Limit, Balanced Triad

vii

16 18 28 83 83 84 84 96 151 184 185 238 242 243 243

viii

Tables and Figures

Figures 2.1 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force 2.2 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force 2.3 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 500 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force 3.1 US-Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 1,550 Deployment Limit 3.2 US-Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 1,000 Deployment Limit 3.3 US-Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 500 Deployment Limit 4.1 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Operationally Deployed Warheads 4.2 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Surviving and Retaliating Warheads 7.1 US-Russian Total Strategic Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit 7.2 US-Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit 7.3 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Total Strategic Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit 7.4 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit 9.1 Total Strategic Weapons, Holding Model 9.2 Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, Holding Model 9.3 Total Strategic Weapons, Folding Model 9.4 Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, Folding Model 11.1 Attacker’s and Defender’s Priority Target Sets 11.2 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit 11.3 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit 11.4 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses, 1,550 Deployment Limit 11.5 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses, 1,000 Deployment Limit

20 21 22 32 33 34 45 46 98 98 100 100 135 135 138 138 176 179 181 181 182

Acknowledgments

Grateful acknowledgment is made to the following people for helpful comments, inspirational ideas, and received wisdom pertinent to the subject matter of this study. All are absolved of any responsibility for the arguments, opinions, or other contents herein: John Arquilla, Stephen Blank, Paul Bracken, Daniel Cohen, Martin Edmonds, Peter Kent Forster, Andrew Futter, David Glantz, Colin Gray, Mike Gruntman, Michael Guillot, Dale Herspring, Hunter Hustus, Jacob Kipp, Larry Korb, Elizabeth Koslowski, Steve Lambakis, Christine Leah, Adam Lowther, Roger McDermott, Olga Oliker, Keith Payne, Gabi Siboni, Timothy Thomas, Mikhail (Misha) Tsypkin, and John Allen Williams. Special acknowledgment is made in Appendix 1 to former coauthors and experts James Scouras and James J. Tritten for use of methodologies originally developed by them. I am especially grateful to Larry Korb for access to the Center for American Progress analytical model for choosing among nuclear modernization options. Grateful acknowledgment is also appropriate to Pennsylvania State University for research support, including approvals from Kristin Woolever, chancellor; Cynthia Lightfoot, director of academic affairs; and Lee Ann Banaszak, head of the Department of Political Science. Special recognition is due to Lisa Krol for staff support and a wonderful sense of humor despite my distractions. Our campus librarians and information technology specialists came through with timely assistance and many useful suggestions. I appreciated the opportunity to work with Lynne Rienner Publishers again, having coauthored (with Sam Sarkesian and John Allen Williams) the fifth edition of our national security text, US National Security, in 2013. I am grateful for the enthusiasm and support of Lynne Rienner and her staff, including Caroline Wintersgill and Alejandra Wilcox, and for the editorial work of Steve Barr. This book is dedicated to my wonderful family, including my wife, Betsy; sister, Michele; daughter-in-law, Kelly; and sons, Christopher and David, with all my love.

ix

1 US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Professors are ill advised to preempt politicians and pundits in day-to-day policy debates. Politicians and pundits can always steal a march with respect to timely commentary and media pizzazz. On the other hand, the role of academics and other scholars is to provide background, perspective, and above all context for important issues in national security policy and international relations. The present book was motivated by such a desire. In the aftermath of Russia’s takeover of Crimea in March 2014 and destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the United States and Russia have been at loggerheads with respect to many parts of their respective national security agendas. In Europe, the collision course is understandable. The United States and its European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) viewed the Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s support for rebel enclaves in southeastern Ukraine as more than a temporary provocation. It was, in the minds of many political and military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, a rewriting of the post–Cold War rules of the road for European peace and security.1 Putin’s use of unconventional military operations and political warfare against Ukraine was seen by NATO as an imminent threat to a number of its member states, especially the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, NATO responded with atypical unity in moving to formulate both political responses and military countermeasures against Russia. In February 2016, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced that the United States would more than quadruple its European Reassurance Initiative to strengthen allies and partners and to deter Russia from further aggression.2 NATO ministers approved troop deployments on the eastern flank of the alliance for the first time since the end of the Cold War, and plans were laid down for increased “forward presence” by means of allied maritime forces in the Baltic Sea and land forces to reinforce defenses in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania.3 1

2

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

The disagreements between NATO and Russia over Ukraine were part of a larger picture of worsening relations that accelerated with Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012. The “reset” in US-Russian relations that took place during President Obama’s first term in office was on the rocks by the end of his second term. In this climate of mistrust and rivalry between the two powers, nuclear arms control returned to hibernation. The optimistic momentum surrounding the conclusion of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement in 2010 (going into effect in February 2011) gave way to stasis and neglect at the political level in Washington and Moscow for the remainder of Obama’s term in office. Meanwhile, Russia moved to increase its defense budgets and reform its armed forces with more modern equipment, with better personnel obtained through contract service, and with revised military doctrine and organization to move away from the former Soviet model toward forces that were lighter, more rapidly deployable, better equipped, and supported by improved command-control and communications. Russia also indicated its desire to modernize its strategic and other nuclear forces with newer generations of weapons and launchers.4 US-Russian and NATO-Russian political disagreements on Ukraine, on Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015–2016, and on some other contentious security issues showed little sign of resolution as Obama entered his final year in the White House. Nevertheless, there were exceptions to the doom and gloom as between Washington and Moscow. In summer 2015, Russia supported the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations Security Council in reaching an international agreement with Iran to restrain the latter’s nuclear program. And the United States and Russia worked to “deconflict” their respective air sortie zones over Syria in 2015 and 2016 even as they supported opposite sides in that raging civil war. As well, Presidents Putin and Obama brokered a temporary “cessation of hostilities” in Syria in the last week of February 2016 in order to provide for humanitarian relief to threatened civilians and to create a temporary breathing space from continued fighting. Despite the negativity that dominated US-Russian and NATO-Russian relations on security issues from 2012 through 2016, I argue in this book against the “conventional wisdom” in US government and public commentary. Conventional wisdom holds that nuclear arms control is politically impossible, or unnecessary, and strategically misguided, given the temperature of US-Russian and NATO-Russian relations, now and for the foreseeable future. To the contrary: cooperative security measures and political collaboration on nuclear arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation are necessary and continuing responsibilities for the United States and for Russia. These two great powers must understand correctly the overall inter-

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

3

national security context that privileges a need for their leadership on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Simply put: if Washington and Moscow do not lead, nothing good will happen. Absent their leadership, we can expect that nuclear weapons will continue to spread among more states; that some existing nuclear weapons states will increase the size of their nuclear arsenals and supporting infrastructure; that the risk of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear materials or weapons will increase; and finally that the risk of nuclear war between states already armed with nuclear weapons, especially but not exclusively outside Europe, will become greater as time passes. We can do better. This book explains why and how.

Structure of the Book

The focus of Chapter 2 is the relationship between the information age and nuclear weapons. Much if not most of our “canon lore” about nuclear weapons and nuclear-related issues (including arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation) comes from the technological environment of the Cold War. In the twenty-first century, nuclear weapons will be embedded in organizations and polities that are “wired” for decisionmaking by information systems and networks. This info-impacted environment for nuclear decisionmaking calls into question some of the more important policy theorems and military shibboleths of the first nuclear age. For example, cyber intelligence probes, or cyber attacks on networks or other components of strategic information systems, may precede or accompany kinetic attacks (conventional or nuclear) in military and defense planning. However, cyber deterrence and nuclear deterrence are different paradigms for influence: first, the identity of cyber attackers may not be known; second, cyber does not require an expensive industrial infrastructure; and third, cyber attacks, however destructive and malicious they might be in the digital domain, do not approximate the physical destruction of nuclear weapons. In matters having to do with strategic nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia are permitted to walk and chew gum at the same time. Chapter 3 considers how the United States in particular might be able to reconcile the goal of modernizing its long-range nuclear weapons and launchers with the continued pursuit of US-Russian nuclear arms reductions. Modernization need not imply a larger force: a force smaller in size but with enhanced performance characteristics might serve equally well as the basis for stable deterrence. Analysis shows that the United States and Russia could maintain a stable equilibrium of second-strike retaliatory forces even at post–New START levels lower than those agreed in that treaty, signed in 2010 and entering into force in 2011. Admittedly, conflicts

4

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

as between NATO and Russia in 2014–2015 over the status of Crimea and Ukraine reduced the likelihood of prompting forward movement on a post– New START accord. Notwithstanding political tensions over Ukraine, and enhanced alliance responsiveness by NATO in order to support deterrence and stability in Europe, expert dialogues on nuclear matters continued and arms control advocates awaited a more propitious political climate. In Chapter 4, the problem of expanding US-Russian strategic nuclear arms reductions to include China as an equal participant is addressed. There are good reasons to do so. China is the world’s second largest economic power. Its military, including the number and diversity of its nuclear capable launch platforms, is growing. China’s political influence and military reach in the Pacific basin are waxing, and China’s territorial ambitions in the region have already clashed with those of other regional powers as well as the United States. On the other hand, compared to the United States and Russia, China has less experience than they do with respect to Cold War or post–Cold War style nuclear arms reduction talks. Whether China would be agreeable to increased transparency with respect to the numbers, operational deployments, and other aspects of its nuclear-military complex, as required in past USRussian arms agreements, is uncertain. Regardless of these asymmetries in perspectives on nuclear arms control, failure to engage China on this issue could result in the deployment by China of increased numbers of offensive long-range nuclear weapons and launchers to the detriment of stable deterrence on all three sides of the Washington-Beijing-Moscow triangle. Isolation of China in this regard could also increase the probability of misperception in a crisis as between China and the United States, or China and Russia, contributing to the stronger likelihood for a mistaken nuclear preemption. Chapter 5 examines how nuclear crisis management might differ in the information age from the assumptions on which pre-digital crisis management was assumed to have operated. First, nuclear crisis management in the Cold War setting required that states have secure and reliable means of communication. Second, the fidelity of these means of communication (such as hotlines or other means for candid exchanges between leaders) was not to be tampered with by the other side. The United States preferred that Soviet crisis-time communications work well and vice versa. A third aspect of successful crisis management required that the pace of events be slowed to allow leaders time to more clearly comprehend one another’s objectives and motives. And fourth, it was taken for granted that, if crisis management failed and an attack were launched, the identity of the attacker would be obvious and therefore accountability would be easy to assign. However, in a digital world, nuclear crisis management might differ from the preceding assumptions. Cyber war or software malfunctions might interfere with reliable communication; cyber attacks could take place more rapidly than deci-

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

5

sionmakers are able to interpret the results or resolve upon an appropriate response; and the identity of a cyber attacker might remain unclear for the duration of a crisis, and indeed a third party could “impersonate” a US or Russian communication or create an information embolism in either state’s networks. In an extreme case, a state-directed hacker or individual malware malcontent might trigger an incorrect attack warning or trigger an inauthentic launch command. In Chapter 6, the subject of controlling or terminating a nuclear war is taken up. During the height of the Cold War, marked by extravagant numbers of nuclear weapons and launchers deployed by the Americans and Soviets, the very idea of controlling or limiting a nuclear war resembled a fool’s errand. Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the second nuclear age, however, the issue of nuclear war termination merits more careful scrutiny. The principal Cold War danger of a massive US-Soviet nuclear conflict has now receded in favor of nuclear risks arising in the regions outside Europe: in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. In a case of nuclear first use or a nuclear exchange outside Europe, the United States and Russia could have a shared interest in preventing additional attacks, in limiting the geographical spread of the conflict, and in bringing about a ceasefire or other war termination as rapidly as possible. The sensitivity of this subject matter makes it difficult to coordinate scenario planning and war gaming as between Washington and Moscow. But some tabletop exercises of the “what if” kind, including policymakers as well as analysts from both the United States and Russia, would do no harm. The problem of containing a nuclear war is particularly acute in Asia, where the possibility of military outbreaks between India and Pakistan, or between North and South Korea, cannot be ignored. And failure to prevent Iran from becoming a de facto nuclear weapons state could lead to regional nuclear proliferation (Saudi Arabia, Turkey) and later to nuclear conflict between regional powers. Could the United States and Russia reduce their current numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and launchers to levels significantly below the New START levels agreed upon by the two states in 2010? This issue is taken up in Chapter 7. Some academic and military experts have argued that the United States and Russia could maintain stable deterrence at so-called minimum deterrence levels. Although there is no universally accepted definition of minimum deterrence, advocates usually have in mind reductions in the numbers of operationally deployed warheads for each state to several hundreds of weapons. Critics of minimum deterrence raise several points of concern. First, minimum deterrence limits the range of targeting options for commanders and political leadership, should deterrence fail. Second, smaller nuclear forces compared to larger ones lack flexibility and resilience neces-

6

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

sary for the conduct of nuclear force operations. Third, minimum deterrence for the United States could fall short of protecting its extended deterrence commitments to allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Fourth, minimum deterrence forces might be neutralized by even modest breakthroughs in missile defense technologies. Fifth, the United States and Russia cannot afford to downsize their respective arsenals unless other nuclear weapons states are included and required to make proportionate reductions in their respective inventories. Despite these doubters, advocates of minimum deterrence contend that it is a necessary way station toward the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world and, in the interim, a less dangerous and expensive nuclear-strategic posture for the larger nuclear weapons states. The preceding discussion brings us to the problem of nuclear abolition, discussed in Chapter 8. Nuclear abolition has been the dream of scientists, policy advocates, and some governments almost since the dawn of the nuclear age. Experts and lay observers recognized that reliance on nuclear deterrence to preserve peace and security was at best a necessary evil—and at worst a bargain with the devil. The challenge of nuclear abolition is twofold: Is it desirable? And is it feasible? Disagreement exists on both issues. Some argue that nuclear deterrence helped to stabilize US-Soviet relations during the Cold War and will continue to do so among present and prospective nuclear weapons states. Others contend that nuclear weapons actually made the Cold War more dangerous and that the preservation of the nuclear taboo in international relations was more a matter of luck than of successful management. Whether the preservation of nuclear arsenals is desirable or undesirable, the second issue is the feasibility of getting states to dismantle their nuclear weapons and supporting nuclear infrastructure. The existing nuclear weapons states would almost certainly have to empower some international authority to conduct intrusive inspections and to provide independent verification of disarmament and dismantlement. Giving a briefing to this effect in Moscow, Islamabad, Beijing, or Tel Aviv would be challenging, to put it mildly. On the other hand, feasibility is fungible. Before World War II a US military superpower astride the globe seemed inconceivable. Numerous experts denied that an atomic bomb could ever be built or that it would work as intended even after having been constructed. Many experts failed to foresee the timing of the end of the Soviet Union. Where there’s a will, there’s a way, as the saying goes. The problem is that states that now have nuclear weapons don’t want to give them up. Perhaps it will take a catastrophic nuclear accident or a deliberate nuclear first use for the idea of nuclear abolition to increase in feasibility as well as in desirability. If nuclear abolition falls short of realization (and it’s worth emphasizing that, even if this controversial end state materializes, the knowledge of how to manufacture nuclear weapons and delivery systems cannot be for-

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

7

gotten), it will remain the task of the international community to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Not everybody agrees with the preceding statement, as noted in Chapter 9. Some academic commentators and military experts feel that the spread of nuclear weapons is to be more welcomed than feared. To be fair, these commentators do not favor random and altogether undisciplined proliferation. It matters who owns the weapons as much as it does how many nuclear weapons states there are. For example: everyone worries about North Korea’s nuclear weapons because of its revisionist pronouncements and frequent threats to international peace and security; but almost no one worries about British or French nuclear weapons, because they are status quo powers without systemically revisionist objectives and are also democracies with public accountability. Nevertheless, the “more is better” school with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons expects that nuclear deterrence will work in the twenty-first century about as well as it did in the twentieth. Other academics and military experts are skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons among more state actors can be anything other than destabilizing to the international order. Future quarrels between nuclear weapons states may be based on political issues like nationalism, religion, or other questions of identity that are not so easily resolved by negotiation and compromise. Then, too, new nuclear powers will have a steep learning curve with respect to the management of nuclear force operations, especially during crisis or conventional war. This is a challenge with respect not only to learning on the part of top political or military leaders, but also to “organizational” learning. Too little respect is paid to the distinction between individual and organizational learning in the literature of international relations. Leaders must institutionalize their desires into the procedures and behavioral routines of government bureaus and organizations, including military organizations. Otherwise, organizations will repeat those procedures and routines that are already embedded in their memory banks, regardless of their applicability to the exigent circumstances. Another organizational issue that requires attention from new and older nuclear powers is that organizations will be operating in an information-rich environment and doubtless be flooded with misleading or useless indicators, apart from intentional cyber sabotage, that complicate accurate intelligence, warning, and response. These issues of organizational learning and their implications for deterrence also appear in Chapter 10, which considers the role of weapons other than strategic nuclear weapons in US and Russian nuclear strategy and policy. During the Cold War, the assumption was that US operational or tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe were important symbols of the US extended deterrence guarantee to its NATO allies against Soviet attack. In addition, substrategic nuclear weapons involved the European members of

8

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

NATO in the dialogue about policy, with respect to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence or (presumably) for escalation in the face of an otherwise successful Soviet attack with conventional forces. Third, Soviet planners of an attack would have to preemptively target and destroy nuclear weapons storage sites and launchers, among other targets, thereby immediately escalating the conflict from a “conventional” toward a “nuclear” threshold even if the weapons used by the Soviet Union were conventional missiles or bombs. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons also posed some dilemmas for NATO. First, a decision in favor of nuclear first use would presumably require alliance unanimity; such political unity might not be available, especially under the duress of a crisis or of a conventional war already in progress. Second, escalation might take place gradually, with the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war obscured by a series of ambiguous incidents and contradictory after-action reports. Third, would a more credible deterrent posture for NATO be a clear firebreak between the employment of tactical nuclear weapons and weapons of longer ranges, including strategic nuclear forces, or, to the contrary, should the Soviets be persuaded that such a firebreak cannot be maintained and that a rapid jump from theater to intercontinental nuclear forces was more likely? The Soviet Union no longer casts its brooding omnipresence over Europe, but a revived Russia has caused NATO to ramp up its budgets and deployments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. It’s hard to see how NATO tactical nuclear weapons add to the credibility of its deterrent against Putin’s new form of “hybrid war” based on unconventional and political warfare, deception, and covert action. It’s equally hard to imagine NATO as currently organized (twenty-eight members compared to its Cold War membership of sixteen) making a prompt decision for nuclear first use, as opposed to a decision made by an individual nuclear weapons state member of the alliance. Chapter 11 considers the issue of missile defense in terms of its relationship to US-Russian nuclear deterrence and arms control. Even before Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine roiled relations with Washington, friction had developed over US plans to deploy its components of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) on the territories of allied NATO members and at sea. Russia complained that the system was intended not as a deterrent against attacks from rogue states such as Iran; instead, according to President Putin and others, it was designed to negate Russia’s deterrent by nullifying its second-strike nuclear retaliatory forces. US technical demonstrations that NATO missile defenses would not pose a meaningful threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear retaliatory forces were met with Russian disbelief and hyperventilation (meanwhile, Russia continued working to develop its own advanced missile defense and

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

9

air defense systems). Russia attempted to include in the New START agreement of 2010 a provision that would limit further US missile defense deployments, but the United States resisted on the grounds that missile defense was a separate issue, and in any case the United States and NATO were committed to deployment of at least the first three phases of the EPAA. US critics of missile defense argued that current and immediately prospective technologies were flawed and unnecessarily provocative of Russian distrust. Meanwhile, technologies for theater as opposed to strategic missile defense were improving apace, and US efforts to encourage allies in Asia such as Japan and South Korea to adopt US systems for antimissile defense (either land- or sea-based) were meeting with favorable reviews, albeit annoying to China. With regard to the role of strategic defenses as between the United States and Russia in a post–New START world, existing and near-term missile defenses for both sides are at least theoretically compatible with the preservation of second-strike capability and stable deterrence. Geography is an important context for the making of all strategy, including nuclear strategy, as Chapter 12 explains. Nuclear weapons have launch sites and intended trajectories with geographical and geostrategic parameters. States’ definitions of their vital interests are determined in part by their geographical shapes and locations: for example, being landlocked versus having ready access to seas and oceans, or having a smaller or a larger territory to defend. States with larger territories, like the United States and Russia (also China), have more options with respect to the operational deployment and use of nuclear weapons. If states with larger territories also have easy and defensible access to the world’s major waterways, they can deploy not only land-based and airborne nuclear weapons, but also seabased ballistic and cruise missiles aboard submarines and surface craft. There are physical and other limits to what can be done with force deployments even in continental-sized countries. For example, a proposed MX/MPS basing system for shuttling moveable nuclear ballistic missiles around a “racetrack” located in the southwestern United States came under fire and was eventually ruled out due to environmental objections from politicians and publics in several states. Strategic depth (or lack thereof) will become a more important issue if there is an increase in the number of smaller-state proliferators, with implications for escalation control and war termination. Larger territories also allow states to spread out potential military targets and to deploy more different kinds of launchers, as in the case of US and Russian land-based missiles and bombers. On the other hand, nuclear weapons can be great equalizers when used by a smaller state as a deterrent against another state with larger territory and more capable conventional forces, as in the case of Pakistan with respect to India. More

10

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

important than territory with respect to the research and development and deployment of nuclear weapons and launchers is the state’s level of advanced technology, education, and bureaucratic management for strategic effect. Given the dependence of all modern polities on advanced technology and infrastructure that is vulnerable to nuclear destruction, a small number of nuclear strikes, even against a country with a large territory, can immobilize its government and economy in addition to causing large loss of life. Nevertheless, geography still matters in nuclear deterrence and arms control, as demonstrated by recent US claims that Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 by having tested a cruise missile of prohibited range. Intermediate and shorter-range groundlaunched missiles were banned by treaty because, in Europe’s geographical space, their reach was sufficient to cause considerable nuclear-strategic instability across the breadth of NATO and Warsaw Pact membership. At the same time, Russia may now be having buyer’s remorse about the INF Treaty as it faces a growing arsenal of Chinese ballistic missiles of various ranges and deteriorated political relations with NATO Europe. Russia’s desultory detour into sparring with NATO Europe came with the return of Vladimir Putin to Russia’s presidency in 2012. As Chapter 13 notes, Putin’s seizure of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine unleashed a tide of military uncertainty and political hostility as between NATO and Russia. Russia saw the annexation of Crimea as part of its historical birthright and as necessary to keep the Black Sea Fleet as its southern maritime bastion afloat. Russia also acted to support separatists in eastern Ukraine in order to bring to heel the political ambitions of the Petro Poroshenko government. Russia would tolerate an “independent” Ukraine but not one whose regime, from the Kremlin’s perspective, was anti-Russian and a vector for spreading the Orange Revolution from Kiev to Moscow. The nuclear aspect to Putin’s more assertive behavior was two-sided. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces guarantee it admission to the top table of world powers, regardless the ups and downs of its conventional force modernization or of its petro-dependent economy. Therefore Russia’s strategic and tactical nuclear weapons provide nullification of NATO military aggression or coercive diplomacy based on NATO’s conventional military superiority, as Russia sees it. Russian military doctrine has long averred that Russia will not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons when the survival of the state is in question or otherwise vital interests are at risk. This argument that the limited use of nuclear weapons could serve as a means of strategic “de-escalation” seems grotesquely inappropriate for the purpose intended, but until Russia’s conventional military forces are sufficiently modernized, Russia sees this contradiction as a matter of military necessity in declaratory policy. In practice, it is hard to imagine that NATO and Russian leaders would not find some

US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

11

means of political settlement for any conflict before resorting to the use of any nuclear weapons, which would open the door of uncertainty to the loss of modern European civilization and more. Chapter 14 summarizes some of the major challenges to nuclear security in the second nuclear age. Two challenges stand out for international relations theorists, for policymakers, and for military planners. The first of these challenges is the growing significance of nuclear risk management in regions outside Europe, especially in East and South Asia. Of course, Russia’s annexation of Crimea was a reminder that peace and stability can no longer be taken for granted in Europe. On the other hand, Russia and its NATO interlocutors have had considerable experience in nuclear risk management as a result of their Cold War and post–Cold War experiences. The second key challenge is the anticipated enhancement and more widespread availability of low-yield nuclear weapons, mated to increasingly accurate delivery systems. These technologies might tempt otherwise risk-averse decisionmakers in a crisis to climb higher on the ladder of diplomatic coercion in the expectation that there were “winnable” moves involving low-yield nuclear exchanges. Added to these two major challenges are two others that intersect with nuclear dangers per se: first, the growing significance of cyber and information warfare and deterrence, supposing that the term deterrence applies to the cyber realm; and second, the increasing sophistication of both conventional and nuclear C4ISR systems (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Advanced tools for seeing and knowing the battlespace, for connecting shooters and sensors, and for automating decisions in real time or nearly so, pose decision dilemmas and ethical conundrums for future leaders. Are robo-nukes, mini-nukes, or cybernukes in the future of US, Russian, or other states’ weapons development? Regardless of the complexity of technology, the source of problems in nuclear instability or proliferation is politics, and therein, for better or worse, lie the remedies.

Notes 1. Rebecca Kheel, “Top U.S. Commander: Russia Wants to ‘Rewrite’ International Order,” The Hill, February 25, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 40, February 26, 2016, [email protected]. 2. Evelyn Farkas, “How We Can Defeat Putin,” Newsweek, February 20, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 36, February 22, 2016, [email protected]. 3. Julian E. Barnes and Thomas Grove, “NATO Set to Approve Baltic Force at Warsaw Summit,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 126, July 8, 2016, [email protected]. See also David Petraeus, “Putin Hasn’t Given Up His Designs on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2016, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.

12

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

4. See, for example, “Russia Tests Secret Missile After NATO Shield Launched,” BBC News Europe, May 23, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk; “Missile Launched in Russia a Snub for U.S.,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, May 24, 2012, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 95, May 24, 2012, [email protected]; Oleg Nekhay, “Russia Tests Next Generation Missile,” Voice of Russia, May 24, 2012, http://english.ruvr.ru.

2 Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

The information age has arrived, including in military affairs, but theory and policy related to nuclear deterrence remain info-underachievers. Future military conflicts, including those involving the exercise of nuclear deterrence and crisis management, will take place in a cyber-impacted decisionmaking environment for policymakers and for military planners. Information or cyber warfare has arrived, and although it is not the driver of every conflict, it creates a digital context within which all else happens.1 On the other hand, far too often nuclear deterrence and cyber warfare issues are treated as separate and distinct compartments. This cybernuclear separatism is understandable as a matter of division of labor among experts, but it casts a shadow over the reality of nuclear deterrence or crisis management under cyber-intensive conditions. In the discussion that follows, I first examine some of the broader theoretical implications of the nuclear-cyber nexus for students of national security policy and warfare. Second, I focus specifically on US-Russian strategic nuclear deterrence and arms control as policy-related settings for nuclear and cyber relationships. Third, I analyze how the combination of nuclear and cyber attacks might at least hypothetically impact nuclear deterrence stability. Finally, I draw pertinent conclusions about the nuclearcyber interface insofar as it might pertain to future arms control, nonproliferation, and deterrence.

How Far Apart?

What are the implications of potential overlap between concepts or practices for cyber war and for nuclear deterrence?2 Cyber war and nuclear weapons seem worlds apart. Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a nonnuclear, or even a postnuclear, military-technical arc of development. War in the digital domain offers, at least in theory, a possible means of crippling or 13

14

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

disabling enemy assets without the need for kinetic attack, or while minimizing physical destruction.3 Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are the very epitome of “mass” destruction, such that their use for deterrence, or the avoidance of war by the manipulation of risk, is preferred to the actual firing of same. Unfortunately, neither nuclear deterrence nor cyber war will be able to live in distinct policy universes for the near or distant future. Nuclear weapons, whether held back for deterrence or fired in anger, must be incorporated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The weapons and their C4ISR systems must be protected from attacks both kinetic and digital in nature. In addition, the decisionmakers who have to manage nuclear forces during a crisis should ideally have the best possible information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber forces and command systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk-acceptance of possible opponents. In short, the task of managing a nuclear crisis demands clear thinking and good information. But the employment of cyber weapons in the early stages of a crisis could impede clear assessment by creating confusion in networks and the action channels that are dependent on those networks.4 The temptation for early cyber preemption might “succeed” to the point at which nuclear crisis management becomes weaker instead of stronger. As Andrew Futter has noted, With US and Russian forces ready to be used within minutes and even seconds of receiving the order, the possibility that weapons might be used by accident (such as the belief that an attack was underway due to spoofed early warning or false launch commands), by miscalculation (by compromised communications, or through unintended escalation), or by people without proper authorization (such as a terrorist group, third party or a rogue commander) is growing. Consequently, in this new nuclear environment, it is becoming progressively important to secure nuclear forces and associated computer systems against cyber attack, guard against nefarious outside influence and “hacking,” and perhaps most crucially, to increase the time it takes and the conditions that must be met before nuclear weapons can be launched.5

Ironically the downsizing of US and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the concurrence of cyber and nuclear attack capabilities more alarming. The super-sized deployments of missiles and bombers and redundant numbers of weapons deployed by the Cold War Americans and Soviets had at least one virtue. Those arsenals provided so much redundancy against first-strike vulnerability that relatively linear systems for

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

15

nuclear attack warning, command-control, and responsive launch under or after attack sufficed. At the same time, Cold War tools for military cyber mischief were primitive compared to those available now. In addition, countries and their armed forces were less dependent on the fidelity of their information systems for national security. Thus the reduction of US, Russian, and possibly other forces to the size of “minimum deterrents” might compromise nuclear flexibility and resilience in the face of kinetic attacks preceded or accompanied by cyber war.6 Bruce Blair, a former Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch control officer and a leading expert on nuclear command and control systems, has also noted, “The communications and computer networks used to control nuclear forces are supposed to be firewalled against the two dozen nations (including Russia, China and North Korea) with dedicated computer-attack programs and from the thousands of hostile intrusion attempts made every day against U.S. military computers. But investigations into these firewalls have revealed glaring weaknesses.”7 The preceding discussion does acknowledge that nuclear- and cyberrelated theories, and derivative policy prescriptions, have unique attributes and warning signs against facile analogies. Nevertheless, the cyber domain cuts across the other geostrategic domains for warfare: land, sea, air, and space. On the other hand, the cyber domain, compared to the others, suffers from lack of a historical perspective: the cyber domain “has been created in a short time and has not had the same level of scrutiny as other battle domains,” as Major Clifford Magee of the US Marine Corps has argued.8 Brian Mazanec also notes that there exists “relative secrecy surrounding most cyber operations with no extensive record of customary practices of states.”9 James Wood Forsyth Jr. and Billy Pope emphasize that cyberspace has enabled a new form of war that “no one can see, measure, or presumably fear.”10 Some experts anticipate that, since we are in the early stages of cyber war and other cyber conflict, we can anticipate that more numerous and more sophisticated cyber weapons will be developed and integrated into states’ national military strategies and operational planning guidance. As Mazanec has argued, Thus, cyberwarfare capabilities will play an increasingly decisive role in military conflicts and are becoming deeply integrated into states’ doctrine and military capabilities. Over 30 countries have taken steps to incorporate cyberwarfare capabilities into their military planning and organizations, and the use of cyberwarfare as a “brute force” weapon is likely to increase. Military planners are actively seeking to incorporate offensive cyber capabilities into existing war plans, which could lead to offensive cyber operations playing an increasingly decisive role in military operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.11

16

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Table 2.1 summarizes information about some of the more publicized computer network attacks between 2007 and 2013. Of course, computer network attacks are not the only cyber threat posed by potential US adversaries or other state or nonstate actors. According to Joel Brenner, former inspector general and former senior counsel at the National Security Agency (NSA), The U.S. Navy spent about $5 billion to develop a quiet electric drive for its submarines and ships so they’d be silent and hard to track. Chinese spies stole it. The navy spent billions more to develop new radar for their

Table 2.1 Selected Computer Network Attacks, 2007–2013

Attack Name

Estonia

Date

Target

April–May 2007 Commercial and governmental web services (civilian target)

Effect

Major distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack

Suspected Internet Tools

Russia

Syrian air September 2007 defense system (part of Operation Orchard)

Military air defense system (military target)

Degradation of air Israel defense capabilities allowing kinetic strike

Georgia

July 2008

Commercial and governmental web services (civilian target)

Major DDOS attack

Stuxnet

Late 2009 through Iranian centrifuges Physical destruction 2010, possibly (military target) of Iranian as early as 2007 centrifuges

Saudi Aramco

August 2012

State-owned commercial enterprise (civilian target)

Russia

United Statesa

Large-scale destruction Iran of data and attempted physical disruption of oil production

Operation Ababil September 2012– Large US financial Major DDOS March 2013 institutions (civilian attack target)

Iran

Source: Brian M. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2015), p. 81. Notes: Computer network attacks include computer network exploitation. A typology of cyber-nuclear espionage attacks by intent appears in Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute, July 2016), p. 21. a. Some attribute Stuxnet to the United States and Israel.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

17

top-of-the-line Aegis Cruiser. Chinese spies stole that, too. The electronic intelligence services of the Chinese and the Russians are working us over—taking advantage of our porous networks and indifference to security to steal billions of dollars’ worth of military and commercial secrets. Some of our allies, like the French and the Israelis, have tried it too.12

According to Brenner, the US military-industrial complex “is the world’s fattest espionage target” and more than a hundred foreign intelligence services target the United States.13 As a reminder of this horse race between cyber attackers and defenders, the US government reported large attacks by Russian hackers against the Internal Revenue Service, and by Chinese hackers against the majority of US federal agencies, during the first week of June 2015.14 Notwithstanding the significance of cyber-related challenges to US national security, it does not necessarily follow that deterrence concepts or methods will be applicable to cyberspace. As Dorothy Denning has noted, authors who have compared nuclear deterrence to cyber deterrence “have generally found that the principles that have made nuclear deterrence effective for over half a century fall apart in cyberspace.”15 She cautions, “Just as we do not sweep all physical weapons into a single strategy of deterrence, we should not try to sweep all cyber weapons into a single strategy. Rather, we need to narrow our treatment of deterrence as it relates to cyberspace.”16 Denning suggests two possible approaches to the application of deterrence to cyberspace. The first is focusing on specific types of cyber weapons where deterrence might be feasible, such as nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. A second approach to deterrence in cyberspace, according to Denning, might be the application of existing deterrence regimes to some cyber activities, including international regimes governing states’ behavior or domestic regimes dealing with criminal behavior.17 Table 2.2 summarizes some of the major genetic markers that set unique identities for cyber war and nuclear deterrence, even as they are pushed closer together by technology creep, by the demands of policy and strategy, and by international rivalry.

The Risks of Togetherness

Caveats and Complexities The cyber context complicates the life of military planners and defense forecasters. Future estimates should take into account the possible threat of nuclear first strike or retaliation, together with the use of long-range, conventional systems for prompt global strike, and cyber attacks. According to Panayotis Yannakogeorgos and Adam Lowther at the US Air Force Research Institute, “As airmen move toward the future, the force struc-

18

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Table 2.2 Comparative Attributes of Cyber War and Nuclear Deterrence Cyber War

Nuclear Deterrence

Source of attack may be ambiguous; third-party intrusions masquerading as other actors are possible.

Source of attack is almost certain to be identified if the attacker is a state, and even terrorist attackers’ nuclear materials may be traceable.

Damage mostly to information systems, networks, and their messaging contents, although these might have spillover effects to the operations of military combat systems, the economy, and social infrastructure.

Failure of deterrence can lead to historically unprecedented and socially catastrophic damage, even in the case of a “limited” nuclear war by Cold War standards.

Denial of attacker’s objectives is feasible if defenses are sufficiently robust or penetrations can be repaired quickly.

Deterrence by means of threat to deny the attacker its objectives is less credible than the threat of punishment by assured retaliation (although improved missile defenses seek to change this).

The objective of cyber attacks is typically disruption or confusion rather than destruction per se.

Nuclear deterrence has rested for the most part on the credible threat of massive, prompt destruction of physical assets and populations.

Cyber war and information attacks can continue over an extended period of time without being detected and sometimes without doing obvious or significant damage; some are not even reported after having been detected.

The first use of a nuclear weapon since 1945 by a state or nonstate actor for a hostile purpose (other than a test) would be a game-changing event in world politics, regardless of the size of the explosion and the immediate consequences.

The price of entry for engaging in cyber war is comparatively low; hackers span the spectrum from individuals to state entities.

Building and operating a second-strike nuclear deterrent requires a state-supported infrastructure, scientific and technical expertise on a large scale, and long-term financial commitments.

Sources: Author. See also Dorothy E. Denning, “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly 77 (Second Quarter 2015), pp. 8–15; Edward Geist, “Deterrence Stability in the Nuclear Age,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 44–61; Timothy L. Thomas, Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2012), pp. 60–66; Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012); Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009).

ture—and, consequently, force-development programs—must change to emphasize the integration of manned and remotely piloted aircraft, space, and cyber-power projection capabilities. In other words, when formulating options to defend the nation’s interests, airmen should present proposals that fully integrate air, space, and cyber capabilities into the solution.”18 The US Department of Defense and other government agencies, together with military and information technology (IT) experts, anticipate that future

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

19

interstate conflict will include cyber attacks and information wars.19 But the term cyber war may be misleading, since attacks on computers and networks are only one means of accomplishing the objective of neutralizing the enemy’s critical infrastructures.20 For example, one purpose for activity that the Department of Defense refers to as information and infrastructure operations (I20s) would not be mass destruction (although destructive secondary effects are possible) but mass or precision disruption.21 This concept lends itself to consideration for a deterrent mission based on the credible threat of conventional or nuclear response. One must always remember, however, that the unique and prompt lethality of nuclear weapons creates a separate grammar for the conduct of nuclear war, even if such a war would remain within the boundaries of strategic logic.22 As Colin Gray has warned, “First, except for highly unusual cases, cyber power is confined in its damaging effects to cyberspace. This is not to understate the problems that can be caused by cyber attack, but it is to claim firmly that the kind of damage and disruption that cyber might affect cannot compare with the immediate and more lasting harm that nuclear weapons certainly would cause.”23 Analysis Therefore, a more rigorous “strength test” for the various US and Russian New START and lower forces should allow for the possibility of mixed nuclear and conventional or cyber strikes. The result would be an estimate of each state’s performance based mostly on its surviving nuclear delayed response force and already missing much or most of its prompt response force. Prompt response forces would be mainly silo-based ICBMs, although some submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could also be assigned this mission. Delayed response forces would include SLBMs not tasked for prompt missions, mobile ICBMs, and bombers. Of course, all elements of each triad of strategic nuclear forces would suffer at least some attrition during early exchanges. This procedure is admittedly a heuristic substitute for the more sophisticated modeling that will eventually be needed to estimate possible consequences of cyber attacks combined with kinetic strikes. The results of hypothetical nuclear force exchanges between these Russian and US truncated delayed response forces are summarized in Figures 2.1 through 2.3. Figure 2.1 summarizes pertinent outcomes for the prewar deployment limit of 1,550 operationally deployed warheads; Figure 2.2 for the 1,000 warhead limit; and Figure 2.3 for the 500 warhead ceiling. These figures show that each state has numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons sufficient to satisfy the criterion of “unacceptable damage” in a second strike so long as unacceptable damage is defined by reasonable political and military standards.24 On the other hand, some expert analysts have

20

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Figure 2.1 US–Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; RO = ride out attack.

suggested that improving accuracies for long-range nuclear and conventional weapons may make counterforce strategies attractive to some states, including nuclear weapons states other than the United States and Russia.25 In contrast, other researchers have warned that even nuclear wars smaller than those involving the United States and Russia, such as a future nuclear conflict between Israel and Iran, could result in historically unprecedented and socially unmanageable consequences for both sides (in addition to uncertain side effects for the rest of the region).26 Thus the appeal of nonnuclear systems, including cyber weapons, for prospective attackers, rests in part on their putative capacity for mass disruption combined with precise lethality.

Conclusion

The awesome power of nuclear weapons and the speed with which they can accomplish mass destruction make them unique as instruments for deterrence. On the other hand, experts disagree as to whether “deterrence” even applies to cyber conflicts, and if so, to what extent. Despite the qualitative differences between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflict, military planners

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

21

and policymakers will find points of intersection between nuclear and cyber problems. The issue of truly “strategic” cyber war, apart from kinetic attacks, poses a less imminent concern than does cyber as an enabler (or disabler) of success in conventional war or in nuclear deterrence. The future of digital technology as it applies to military affairs is a magical mystery tour of unknowns. But a safe wager is that future nuclear command-control and communications systems, however driven by digital improvements, will nevertheless have to satisfy the policy and strategy requirements for prompt response to authorized commands, for avoidance of false positives in early warning and reaction, and for maintaining a spectrum of viable options for policymakers and commanders even under the duress of war or of imminent threat of war. Second, if cyber deterrence is not the same as nuclear deterrence, can cyber arms control, along the lines of nuclear arms control as practiced hitherto, be feasible in a US-Russian or other context? Russian security expert Vladimir Batyuk, commenting favorably on a June 2013 US-Russian agreement for protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials (a successor to the recently expired Nunn-Lugar agreement on nuclear risk reduction), warned that pledges by Presidents Putin and Obama for cooper-

Figure 2.2 US–Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force

Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; RO = ride out attack.

22

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Figure 2.3 US–Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 500 Deployment Limit, Delayed Response Force

Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; RO = ride out attack.

ation on cyber security were even more important: “Nuclear weapons are a legacy of the 20th century. The challenge of the 21st century is cybersecurity,” he noted.27 On this point, there is another overlap between nuclear and cyber security: reliable cyber is a necessary condition for verification of arms control agreements.

Notes I gratefully acknowledge encouragement by Paul K. Davis, RAND Corporation, to pursue this topic as well as his helpful insights. He is not responsible for any arguments in this chapter. 1. P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). US defense strategy defines three primary Department of Defense cyber missions: defense of department networks, systems, and information; defense of the US homeland and national interests against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and providing cyber support for military operations and contingency plans. See US Department of Defense, Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC, April 2015), esp. pp. 4–6, www.defense.gov. See also Cheryl Pellerin, “DARPA’s Plan X Gives Military Operators a Place to Wage Cyber War,” DOD News, Defense Media Activity, May 12, 2016, www.defense.gov.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

23

2. Useful commentaries offering diverse perspectives on this topic include Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute, July 2016), www.rusi.org; Edward Geist, “Deterrence Stability in the Cyber Age,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 44–61; Robert Spalding III and Adam Lowther, “The New MAD World: A Cold War Strategy for Cyberwar,” National Interest, June 22, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org; Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar; Colin S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2013); Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012); Kamaal T. Jabbour and E. Paul Ratazzi, “Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?” in Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 33–45; Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009). 3. On the information operations concepts of major powers, see Timothy L. Thomas, Russia: Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015), chap. 7; Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows over Information Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005), chaps. 5–6, 10, 14. See also Pavel Koshkin, “Are Cyberwars Between Major Powers Possible? A Group of Russian Cybersecurity Experts Debate the Likelihood of a Cyberwar Involving the U.S., Russia, or China,” Russia Direct, August 1, 2013, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 143, August 6, 2013, [email protected]. 4. Cyber weapons are not necessarily easy to use effectively as enabling instruments for operational-tactical or strategic effect. See Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. chaps. 4–5. 5. Andrew Futter, “Cyber Threats and the Challenge of De-Alerting US and Russian Nuclear Forces,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 15, 2015, http://nautilus .org. See also Franz-Stefan Gady, “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?” The Diplomat, May 4, 2015, http://thediplomat.com. 6. An expert critique of proposals for minimum deterrence for US nuclear forces appears in Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, National Institute Press, 2013). For a favorable expert assessment of the prospects for minimum deterrence, see James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 74–89. 7. Bruce G. Blair, “Could Terrorists Launch America’s Nuclear Missiles?” Time, November 11, 2010, http://content.time.com. 8. Clifford S. Magee, “Awaiting Cyber 9/11,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 70 (Third Quarter 2013), p. 76. 9. Brian M. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2015), p. 80. 10. James Wood Forsyth Jr. and Billy E. Pope, “Structural Causes and Cyber Effects: Why International Order Is Inevitable in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2014), p. 118. 11. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” p. 83. 12. Joel Brenner, Glass Houses: Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent World (New York: Penguin, 2013), p. 3.

24

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

13. Ibid., p. 73. 14. David E. Sanger and Julie Hirschfield Davis, “Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers,” New York Times, June 4, 2015, www.nytimes.com; Chris Frates, “IRS Believes Massive Data Theft Originated in Russia,” June 4, 2015, www.cnn.com. 15. Dorothy E. Denning, “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly 77 (Second Quarter 2015), p. 11. 16. Ibid., p. 12. 17. Ibid., pp. 13–15. 18. Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos and Adam B. Lowther, “Saving NATO with Airpower,” Royal Canadian Air Force Journal no. 1 (Winter 2013), p. 70. 19. One reason for this is the high degree of interest shown by possible future US peer competitors or other powers in cyber deterrence, suasion, and attack. See, for example, Timothy L. Thomas, Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2012); Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011). See also US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC, July 2011), www.defense.gov; White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC, May 2011), www.whitehouse .gov; Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Builds a Cyber ‘Plan X,’” Washington Post, May 31, 2012, p. A1, http://global.factiva.com; Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyberpower, p. 8; Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow, “Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 61 (Second Quarter 2011), pp. 18– 23; Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009); P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Penguin, 2009); John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), esp. chaps. 6–7; Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 15– 31. 20. Miller, Kuehl, and Lachow, “Cyber War.” 21. Ibid. An example of such an attack was provided by the Stuxnet “worm” used to attack Iran’s centrifuges as part of its nuclear program. Some 1,000 of 5,000 centrifuges were reportedly temporarily disabled by the United States and Israel as part of a US program called Olympic Games that began under George W. Bush and continued into the Obama administration. See David E. Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” New York Times, June 1, 2012, http://globa .factiva.com. 22. Patrick M. Morgan discusses the relationship between reexamination of deterrence theory and practice and cyber security in his article “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today,” Contemporary Security Policy no. 1 (April 2012), pp. 85–107, esp. pp. 101–103. 23. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyberpower, 2013. 24. According to some experts, the United States could conceivably satisfy its requirements for strategic nuclear deterrence with fewer than 400 deployed warheads on intercontinental launchers. See James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 3–12. 25. See for example Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of

Nuclear Deterrence in the Cyber Age

25

Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 3–14. 26. Cham E. Dallas, William C. Bell, David J. Stewart, Antonio Caruso, and Frederick M. Burkle Jr., “Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale,” Conflict and Health, May 10, 2013, www.conflictandhealth.com. See also Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran, Israel, and Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 19, 2007); US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 1979), esp. pp. 27–44 for case studies of attacks on a single city—the Office of Technology Assessment cautions that the effects of even a small or limited nuclear attack would be “enormous” (p. 4). 27. Vladimir Batyuk, cited in Jonathan Earle, “U.S. and Russia Sign New AntiProliferation Deal,” Moscow Times, June 19, 2013, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 111, June 19, 2013, [email protected].

3 Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

The United States faces important near-term choices about the long-range future of its strategic nuclear forces, within a context of uncertainty with respect to future budgets and international threat assessments. US and NATO relations with Russia in 2014 and 2015 were marked by conflict over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. In addition, Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian conflict in September 2015 cast shadows over the possibility of bilateral nuclear cooperation between Washington and Moscow.1 The discussion that follows examines options for post–New START strategic nuclear arms reductions, and for force modernization, by the United States and Russia, notwithstanding present disagreements over Ukraine, Syria, and other issues. First, the expectations of New START and their implications for modernization and arms control are reviewed. 2 Second, within this framework, the possibility of reducing either US or Russian strategic nuclear delivery systems from a triad to something else is investigated. Third, the implications of missile defenses for post–New START security environments are considered. Fourth, analysis of possible post–New START arms control regimes reveals important trade-offs in moving from higher to lower levels of armament.3

Is New START the End—or Beginning?

The New START agreement of 2010 (entering into effect in 2011) requires that Russia and the United States reduce their numbers of operationally deployed warheads on intercontinental launchers (land- and sea-based strategic missiles and heavy bombers) to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed launchers by 2018.4 Each state deploys a triad of long-range, nuclear-capable launchers, and both Russia and the United States are committed to extensive nuclear modernization programs over the 27

28

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

next decade or so, including their strategic and tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons.5 Analysts and policy planners in Moscow and Washington seem to assume that Russia and the United States will both continue to field three distinct types of intercontinental or transoceanic nuclear delivery systems: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy, or long-range, bombers. The New START agreement also assumes that deployments through 2018 will consist of a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber-delivered weapons for each state. Data exchanges required by New START reported the numbers of deployed and nondeployed launchers and warheads for the United States and for Russia as summarized in Table 3.1. It is not inconceivable that both US and Russian nuclear modernization plans over the next two decades, ambitious as they are, may be restricted by domestic political conditions, including budgetary restraints. Russia’s economy, as a result of US and European Union sanctions following its annexation of Crimea and proxy war in Ukraine, as well as falling oil prices in 2014, may demand some painful trade-offs between guns and butter. Even within prospective military budgets, some modernization of conventional and nuclear forces may have to be deferred temporarily or postponed indefinitely. For the United States, budget sequestration has imposed mandatory across-the-board cuts on defense and nondefense spending over the course of a decade. Although Congress has options to permit above-the-caps spending in a given year, the post-sequester environment will surely result in additional scrutiny for any newly proposed defense spending, including force modernization.6 Table 3.1 New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Weapons, September 1, 2015 Category of Data Deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers Warheads on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers Deployed and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs, deployed and nondeployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers

United States

Russia

762

526

1,538

1,648

898

877

Source: US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” fact sheet, October 1, 2015, www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/247674.htm.

Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

29

Triads Triumphant or Triage?

Faced with fiscal constraints and hard choices among nuclear modernization priorities, either the United States or Russia might take closer looks at eliminating one or more components of their traditional strategic nuclear triads of missile and airborne launchers. The US and Russian legacy triads have very different emphases with respect to basing modes. Russian strategic nuclear forces have, following their Soviet legacy, emphasized the development and deployment of ICBMs compared to submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. For the United States, the ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) emerged as the most second-strike-survivable component of the strategic nuclear triad. In addition, US submarine-launched ballistic missiles have attained degrees of promptness and accuracy that make them available for either early or delayed strikes against a variety of targets, including military and command-control systems. With regard to intercontinental bomber forces, the United States led in this area throughout the Cold War and continues to do so. Russia’s bomber force is the least-reliable component of its strategic triad, and it appears that upgrades to the existing force structure will be mandatory in the next several decades. On the other hand, the United States has virtually nothing in the way of national air defense against penetrating or standoff bombers, while Russia has continued to deploy and upgrade its notional strategic antimissile and antidefenses, especially near Moscow. Given these asymmetries in US and Russian capabilities and priorities, some have suggested that each state might give up one or more components of its nuclear triad. If Russia and the United States ever resume discussions about post–New START arms reductions, the elimination of one or more types of US or Russian launch systems might be a more “efficient” way to draw down forces, as opposed to an across-the-board arbitrary reduction in the total number of deployed warheads while maintaining all three kinds of land-based, sea-based, and airborne launch platforms. So, for example, the United States might eliminate its ICBM force and maintain a dyad based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (or SLBMs and sea-launched cruise missiles) and bombers. 7 Russia, in turn, might dispense with its heavy bomber force as a component of its strategic nuclear triad, assigning conventional missions to legacy bombers and developing newer generations of nuclear-capable bombers for missions of shorter ranges. Elimination of each force component by the United States or by Russia would not necessarily have to be permanent or irreversible. Politics being what they are, prudent hedges are recommended by conservative planners. For example, the US ICBM force might be converted entirely for the mission of conventional prompt global strike (CPGS). This step would move beyond earlier proposals for a niche CPGS mission into a more broadly available

30

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

long-range, prompt conventional global-strike capability against targets that required timely and lethal strikes without the collateral damage or escalation potential of nuclear attack.8 Past objections to long-range, conventional prompt global-strike missions have included the problem of missiles overflying Russian or Chinese territory on their way to targets elsewhere, leading to mistaken nuclear “retaliation” by Moscow or Beijing.9 However, this problem, of potential “warhead ambiguity” between conventional and nuclear weapons on prompt global launchers, might be mitigated by transparency or other measures, including periodic on-site inspections. In 2008, Congress directed that no additional funds be spent on ICBM or SLBM conventional prompt global-strike options. Congressional budgets have since denied support for all-ballistic global-strike systems in favor of delivery systems beginning with a ballistic launch and transitioning to a hypersonic boost-glide delivery stage. However, the technology for hypersonic boost-glide systems is less mature than all-ballistic options. The case for an all-conventional ICBM force in terms of its potential for increasing usable US military options is put assertively by Robert Butterworth: “It provides military options for responding to armed aggression when an attack is first underway. It provides additional assurance to allies and partners that the United States can provide timely assistance without being self-deterred. It can ensure dominance under the nuclear threshold, helping control escalation, because no militarily compelling defense against ICBMs is in the offing.”10 Under the protocols of New START, removal of nuclear warheads from the Minuteman force and their replacement by conventional weapons would still require that those conventional warheads and launchers be counted against the allowable limits of 1,550 operationally deployed warheads and 700 deployed launchers. The reason for this New START protocol is that the United States (or Russia), once having substituted conventional for nuclear warheads on one or more nuclear-capable launch systems, might later reverse that decision and so reload nuclear weapons. Although this New START protocol might seem ironically counterproductive with respect to the overall objective of nuclear reductions, it does provide a reassuring hedge for conservative military planners, in case political winds change or technologies take unexpected turns. The discussion in this section thus far has emphasized the fiscal or technology-related aspects of warhead conversion or elimination of one or more elements of the US or Russian strategic nuclear triads. But strategy and arms control also matter. Reliable deterrence demands that forces be capable of supporting the credible threat of second-strike retaliation under the most demanding conditions. Could US and Russian forces fulfill this requirement at various deployment levels with a dyad instead of a triad of strategic nuclear forces?

Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

31

Whether nuclear-strategic dyads will suffice for deterrence as well as triads depends on the perceptions and expectations of the state being deterred. Perceptions and expectations are highly situation-dependent. For example, other things being equal, a “better” deterrent is one that makes the “attacker’s problem” (meaning a prospective first striker) harder to solve and the defender’s challenge (meaning a prospective second striker) easier to solve. From this perspective, a triad may increase the uncertainty of an attack planner because the attacker must plan against three kinds of retaliatory forces instead of two. This introduces a qualitative uncertainty into the equation for the attacker, even if the actual number of targets is the same for a defender in a dyad or triad configuration. For example, even if US ICBMs are not as first-strike survivable as are SLBMs, they require an attacker to plan very different kinds of strikes, compared to attacks on submarines or bombers, in order to guarantee an “acceptable” or even tolerably desperate outcome. An attacker cannot be sure that ICBMs on high alert during a crisis would not be launched “on warning” or “under attack” as opposed to riding out the attack and then retaliating as in canonical scenarios. In addition, the dispersion of US ICBM launchers and control centers means that an attacker who is planning conservatively would probably need to allocate two warheads to each silo and launch-control center, or about 900 warheads assigned to this mission.

Analysis and Options

To test some of the preceding points of discussion and hypotheses, I analyzed the relative performances of different US and Russian strategic nuclear force structures at various levels of maximum warhead deployment: 1,550 New START compliant; 1,000 incremental reduction below New START; and a 500-warhead minimum deterrent force. Each country was assigned four possible mixes of forces. For the United States, alternative force structures included (1) a balanced triad; (2) a dyad of submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and bombers; (3) a dyad of SLBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles; and (4) a monad consisting entirely of SLBMs. For Russia, alternative force structures included (1) a balanced triad; (2) a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs; (3) a dyad of ICBMs and bombers; and (4) a force made up entirely of ICBMs. The outcomes of these nuclear force exchanges are summarized in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. These figures summarize a considerable amount of data and analysis, but certain trends are clear. Deterrence stability exists not only across all force sizes, but also across all force structures. Dyads are about as good as triads in delivering second-strike capability, all else being equal. On the

32

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Figure 3.1 US–Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 1,550 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

other hand, the objective of strategic nuclear forces is deterrence—and deterrence rests on raising the uncertainties in the minds of prospective attackers. A triad, compared to a dyad or a monad, requires the first striker to plan not only against a larger number of targets, but also against a different “theory of nuclear battlespace.” Second, as total force sizes decline, it becomes more important to increase their survivability levels. This might mean that smaller force sizes demand greater diversity in delivery systems. Third, with regard to deterrence and crisis stability, there is a difference between forces that are capable of prompt launch if necessary and forces that might be irrevocably tasked for prompt launch once warning of attack has been confirmed. The preceding discussion emphasizes US and Russian forces deployed on launchers of intercontinental range. But future US nuclear modernization will also have to consider the need to deter or manage regional nuclear conflicts or conventional wars with the possibility of nuclear escalation. Accordingly, US planners may decide to reconsider the utility of limited nuclear options, including low-yield, high-accuracy nuclear weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons delivered by airborne launch platforms.11 The Pentagon and the US Department of Energy are reportedly developing new generations of nuclear weapons with variable yields and precision

Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

33

guidance. The argument by some developers and planners is that smaller yield and precision guidance will enable the United States to pose more credible threats and increase the reliability of deterrence under some foreseeable or plausible circumstances.12 Arguments about less-than-strategic nuclear weapons have always had two sides. One side questions whether limited nuclear use can be sealed off from escalation to broader and more destructive conflicts. The other side regards the threat of total war as less than credible in a variety of foreseeable circumstances, especially in the multipolar nuclear system of the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

First, US strategic nuclear modernization does not necessarily preempt opportunities for US-Russian nuclear arms reductions. Certainly the political winds blowing against post–New START nuclear arms reductions were formidable in 2014 and 2015. As well, the apparent violation by Russia of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, for having tested a groundlaunched cruise missile of prohibited range, created another possible com-

Figure 3.2 US–Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 1,000 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

34

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Figure 3.3 US–Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons by Type of Force Structure, 500 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

plication for nuclear arms reduction efforts.13 But even during the most frustrating periods of Cold War politics, the Soviets and Americans negotiated strategic nuclear arms control agreements from which both sides benefited. In addition, shifts in political moods affecting the probability of successful arms control could follow changes of leaders in the United States or in Russia. Even under existing political leadership, Russia’s 2015 national security strategy identifies a number of perceived security threats to Russia but also notes interest in a “partnership” with the United States on the basis of coinciding interests in a number of areas, including “improvement of international treaty mechanisms for arms control” and “solutions to nonproliferation issues with weapons of mass destruction.”14 Second, reductions in the numbers of US and Russian operationally deployed weapons on intercontinental launchers, below the New START maximum of 1,550 warheads on 700 launchers, are likely to be only incremental and not a drastic departure from New START levels. Analysis suggests that reductions to 1,000 or so peacetime-deployed weapons would leave policymakers and military planners in Washington and Moscow with the nuclear flexibility and resilience they require for their assigned missions and for unforeseen “Black Swan” circumstances.

Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

35

On the other hand, more ambitious reductions to minimum deterrence levels of several hundred weapons could reduce nuclear flexibility and resilience to unacceptable levels, especially for US extended deterrence requirements and for Russia’s need for nuclear compensation against conventional force deficiencies. Of course, as prior discussion about missile defenses has indicated, all bets on deterrence based on assured vulnerability and second-strike retaliation assume a stable environment with respect to offense-defense interactions. Future BMD technologies may close this gap between offenses and defenses with respect to regional ballistic missile threats if not global ones. Third, it is important to recall that in nuclear arms control, as in all matters involving the nexus between policy and strategy, politics remains the master faculty in the equation.15 This political context for nuclear arms control includes US national military strategy that requires the performance of US nuclear forces in a variety of deterrence, diplomatic suasion, and defense missions.16 Therefore, a US nuclear arms control “success story” requires the collaboration of other nuclear powers in limiting the scope and character of the arms race and in controlling risky and provocative behavior. Russia and other nuclear weapons states will have to decide about the priority of nuclear modernization compared to arms control, based on their own threat assessments and national priorities. The United States cannot negotiate with itself, either in a post–New START framework or in something more ambitious.

Notes 1. Steven Lee Myers and Eric Schmitt, “Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice,” New York Times, October 14, 2015, www .nytimes.com. 2. For expert assessments, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 3 (2016), pp. 125–134, DOI 10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359; Mark Schneider, “Russia’s Growing Strategic Nuclear Forces and New START Treaty Compliance,” Information Series Issue no. 407 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 21, 2016), www.nipp.org; Schneider, “The Russian Nuclear Weapons Buildup and the Future of the New START Treaty,” Information Series Issue no. 414 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, October 27, 2016), www.nipp.org; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 3 (2015), pp. 84–97. For contrasting views of strategic stability, see Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2013). 3. For perspectives on nuclear modernization, see Adam B. Lowther and Stephen J. Cimbala, eds., Defending the Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization Still Matters (London: Routledge, 2017); Lawrence J. Korb and Adam Mount, Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, February 2016), www.americanprogress.org; and

36

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 2 (2015), pp. 107–119, http://thebulletin.sagepub.com. 4. US Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. 5. For the United States, see Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024 (Washington, DC, January 2015), https://www .cbo.gov; John B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014), http://cns.miis.edu. For Russian nuclear modernization, see Kristensen and Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016”; Mark B. Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrines of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, prepared testimony, US House of Representatives, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Washington, DC, October 14, 2011; Mark B. Schneider, Russian Nuclear Modernization (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 20, 2012), www.nipp.org; Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org. 6. Additional perspective on the US budgetary picture as it might affect nuclear force modernization is provided in Michaela Dodge and Adam B. Lowther, “Nuclear Budgeting: The Perilous Impact of Uncertainty.” See also chapter 4 in Lowther and Cimbala, Defending the Arsenal, pp. 48–66. One expert defense panel warned that attempting to solve US government fiscal problems through defense budget cuts “is not only risky, it also will not work,” and that sustained, significant cuts to US defense budgets will increasingly jeopardize US national security; see William J. Perry and John P. Abazaid, Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, July 2014), pp. x–xi, https://www.usip.org. 7. Former secretary of defense William J. Perry, for example, has referred to the ICBM force as “destabilizing” and the most likely source of an accidental nuclear war. See Aaron Mehta, “Former SecDef Perry: US on ‘Brink’ of New Nuclear Arms Race,” Defense News, December 3, 2015, www.defensenews.com. See also William J. Perry, “William J. Perry on Nuclear War and Terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 8, 2015, http://thebulletin.org. 8. Corentin Brustlein, Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits, Proliferation Paper no. 52 (Paris: IFRI Security Studies Center, January 2015), www.ifri.org, provides important commentary on this issue. 9. Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014), www.crs.gov, offers expert assessments on this and other issues related to conventional prompt global strike. 10. Robert L. Butterworth, “Minuteman for the Joint Fight,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2015), p. 8. 11. Wallace R. Turnbull III, “Time to Come in from the Cold (War),” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (Fourth Quarter 2015), pp. 38–45. 12. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves Some Uneasy,” New York Times, January 11, 2016, www.nytimes.com. 13. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” New York Times, July 28, 2014, www.nytimes.com. For expert assessment, see Mikhail Tsypkin and David Yost, Responding to Russian Noncompliance with

Balancing Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

37

Nuclear Arms Control Agreements, draft for distribution (Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School, October 9, 2015). 14. British Broadcasting Corporation, “Russian Security Blueprint Sees NATO Expansion as Threat,” December 31, 2015, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 1, January 2, 2016, [email protected]. See also “Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2016 in 9 Key Points,” January 1, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 1, January 2, 2016, [email protected]. 15. Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2015), esp. pp. 7–22. 16. Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

4 Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

Modernization of China’s nuclear and missile forces raises a number of issues for its neighbors in the Asia Pacific region, including Russia, and for the United States. One of these issues might be strategic nuclear arms control. The United States and Russia, most recently in their New START agreement of 2010, conducted bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms reductions much in the same fashion as did the Cold War Americans and Soviets. Future negotiations of this type might arguably include China, but the agenda for doing so could be complicated. China’s views of military strategy and the role of nuclear deterrence could differ in important ways from the Russian or American perspectives, including Chinese perspectives on nuclear transparency.1 The following discussion considers some of the more important policy and strategy issues in moving from a two-sided to a three-sided strategic nuclear arms control format, including the problem of escalation control during a crisis. As a thought experiment, I also describe and analyze a hypothetical multilateral nuclear arms control agreement that provides for nuclearstrategic stability among most currently recognized nuclear weapons states. Finally, I draw conclusions about the implications of China’s nuclear modernization for nuclear stability and arms control in Asia and elsewhere.

Chinese Military Modernization and Nuclear Weapons

China’s military modernization, both currently in progress and prospective, may entitle Beijing to a seat at the table of future Russian-American nuclear arms talks. Among other indicators, China is reengineering some of its intercontinental ballistic missiles to carry multiple warheads, suggesting a break from an apparent past preference for nuclear minimum deterrent forces.2 The decision to equip the DF-5 ICBM with MIRV capability (multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles) may in part be prompted by 39

40

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

the US geostrategic pivot toward Asia and growing US interest in regional missile defenses for Asia. Along with this, China’s fleet of nuclear attack submarines supports an ambitious antiaccess, area denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter US military intervention to support allied interests in Asia against Chinese wishes.3 Under President Xi Jinping, China has also been more assertive on other military-strategic issues, including the construction of Chinese military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea; claiming extended “air defense identification zones” whose transit would require permission from China; and developing a larger inventory of cyber weapons to support its diplomatic and military strategy.4 China’s diplomacy also creates additional space for maneuver on arms control and other issues. As nuclear arms control expert Alexei Arbatov has noted, Beijing’s “cautious and multivectored” policies “have allowed it to assume the role to which Russia has traditionally aspired—that of a balancer between East and West. In fact, it is Russia, with its new policy of “Eurasianism,” that has become the East.” 5 On the other hand, China’s political and military objectives in Asia and worldwide differ from those of the United States and Russia, reflecting China’s perception of its own interests and of its anticipated role in the emerging world order.6 Entering China into the US-Russian nuclear deterrence equation creates considerable analytical challenges, for a number of reasons. First, China’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power in Asia, including the distribution of nuclear and missile forces. China’s military modernization draws not only on its indigenous military culture but also on careful analysis of Western and other experiences. As David Lai has noted, “The Chinese way of war places a strong emphasis on the use of strategy, strategems and deception. However, the Chinese understand that their approach will not be effective without the backing of hard military power. China’s grand strategy is to take the next 30 years to complete China’s modernization mission, which is expected to turn China into a true great power by that time.”7 China’s strategic missile force—the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force—is among the beneficiaries of its military modernization. Second Artillery made major strides in the Hu Jintao era (beginning in 2002 when Hu became secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party and president of China). Second Artillery’s main mission is described in its publications as “dual deterrence, dual operations”: nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterstrikes as well as conventional deterrence and conventional precision strikes.8 Chinese military publications specify a number of campaign deterrence missions that might be undertaken by Second Artillery in peacetime or under conditions of crisis or war, including war prevention, escalation control, using nuclear deterrence to “backstop”

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

41

conventional operations, and strategic compellence of enemies by means of deterrent actions.9 Chinese military modernization and defense guidance for the use of nuclear and other missile forces hold some important implications for US policy. First, Chinese thinking is apparently quite nuanced about the deterrent and defense uses for nuclear weapons. Despite the accomplishments of modernization thus far, Chinese leaders are aware that they are far from nuclear-strategic parity with the United States or Russia. On the other hand, China may not aspire to this model of nuclear-strategic parity, as between major nuclear powers, as the key to war avoidance by deterrence or other means. China may prefer to see nuclear weapons as one option among a spectrum of choices available in deterring or fighting wars under exigent conditions, as well as means of supporting assertive diplomacy and conventional operations when necessary. Nuclear-strategic parity as measured by quantitative indicators of relative strength may be less important to China than the qualitative use of nuclear and other means as part of broader diplomatic-military strategies.10 As two expert commentators have noted, “Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a more offensive strategy is a crucial factor in U.S.-China strategic stability and the future of East Asian security.”11 Second, China is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons, but also in the realm of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as information technology, including for cyber war. 12 Having observed the US success in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, Chinese military strategists concluded that the informationization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence and defense operations.13 China’s growing portfolio of smart capabilities and modernized platforms includes, in addition to items previously noted, stealth aircraft, antisatellite warfare, quiet submarines, “brilliant” torpedo mines, improved cruise missiles, and the potential for disrupting financial markets. As Paul Bracken has noted, the composite effect of China’s developments is to make its military more agile: “By agility I mean the ability to identify and seize opportunities and to move more quickly than rivals. This nimbleness is reflected in China’s mobile missiles, a reactive air and sea response against the U.S. Navy, and information warfare. What all of these have in common is quick action.”14 The emphasis on agility instead of brute force reinforces the traditional emphasis in Chinese military thinking since Sun Tzu on the acme of skill as winning without fighting but, if war is unavoidable, getting in the first and decisive blows. It also follows that one should attack the enemy’s strategy and alliances making maximum use of deception, based on superior intelli-

42

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

gence and estimation. The combination of improved platforms, commandcontrol, and information warfare should provide options for the selective use of precision-fire strikes and cyber attacks against priority targets, avoiding mass killing and fruitless attacks on enemy strongholds.15 A third aspect of the Chinese military modernization that is important for nuclear deterrence and arms control in Asia is the problem of escalation control. Two examples or aspects of this problem might be cited here. First, improving Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and for conventional war fighting, increases Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an antiaccess, area denial strategy against the United States, or against another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asia. This confidence might be misplaced in the case of the United States. The United States is engaged in a pivot in its military-strategic planning and deployment to Asia, and toward that end is developing its doctrine and supporting force structure for “AirSea Battle” countermeasures against Chinese antiaccess strategy.16 A second aspect of the problem of escalation control is the question of nuclear crisis management as between a more muscular China and its Asian neighbors or others. Asia in the Cold War was a comparative nuclear weapons backwater, since the attention of US and allied NATO policymakers and military strategists was focused on the US-Soviet arms race. The world of the twenty-first century is very different. Europe, notwithstanding recent contretemps in Ukraine, is a relatively pacified security zone compared to the Middle East or to South and East Asia, and post–Cold War Asia is marked by five nuclear weapons states: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The possibility of nuclear first use, growing out of a conventional war between, say, India and Pakistan, or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts. It might start a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, or the Kim Jong-un regime might implode, leaving uncertain the command and control over its armed forces, including nuclear weapons and infrastructure.17 The problem of keeping nuclear armed states below the threshold of first use, or containing escalation afterward, was difficult enough to explain within the more simplified Cold War context. Uncertainties are even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war. Then, too, there is the possibility of a US-Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict, accompanied by political misunderstanding and the readying of nuclear forces as a measure of deterrence. The point is that US and Chinese forces would not actually have to fire nuclear weapons to use them. Nuclear weapons would be involved in the conflict from the outset, as offstage reminders that the two states could stumble into a process of escalation that neither had intended.

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

43

There is an important correction or cautionary note that needs to be introduced at this point. Policymakers and strategists have sometimes talked as if nuclear weapons always serve to dampen escalation instead of exacerbating it. This might be a valid theoretical perspective under normal peacetime conditions. On the other hand, once a crisis has begun, and especially after shooting has started, the other face of nuclear danger will appear. Reassurance based on the assumption that nuclear first use is unthinkable may then give way to its becoming very thinkable. The challenges posed for US leaders in balancing deterrence and reassurance with respect to China are considerable. US policymakers seeking to influence Chinese decisionmakers might emphasize either deterrence or reassurance, or they might prefer a combination of the two. Signals of deterrence or reassurance will be perceived by the intended recipients based on the recipients’ own perceptual and motivational or reasoning biases.18 But perceptual and reasoning biases are not just independent variables that provide motivational constraints for leaders. Perceptions and motivations are also subject to influence as dependent variables by the exigent conditions of a particular situation, including the interactions among policymakers and other leaders. Thus, during a crisis involving the possible use of force by one or more states, leaders’ motivational constructs may vary across a spectrum of cognitive constraint and subjective judgment. For example, some members of the John Kennedy administration’s “ExComm” senior advisory group for the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 shifted their assumptions about the motivations of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, as well as their preferences for stronger or weaker action to remove the Soviet missiles based in Cuba, quite drastically during their thirteen days of deliberation. Others even wondered whether Khrushchev had been deposed by the Politburo from his position as head of government.19 As Michael Chase has warned with regard to the issue of US-Chinese crisis management, Miscalculation in the midst of a crisis is a particularly troubling possibility, one that could be heightened by uncertainty over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. The most serious concern is that some of the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could easily be interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning, but as preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing crisis stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthening deterrence.20

The preceding discussion is not an argument for Chinese inconsistency in the application of their strategic thinking to actual practice. Nor does it suggest that China would be any more predisposed to the prompt use of nuclear force than other nuclear weapons states. The commentary on this

44

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

aspect of escalation control emphasizes, instead, that there is likely to be a considerable amount of two-sided improvisation about escalation control during any future nuclear crisis in Asia.

Methodology and Assessment

Perspectives The previous section has established that China’s geostrategic view and its military modernization cannot be fitted easily into existing models of nuclear conflict. However, China’s participation in future evolutions of strategic nuclear arms control will require its military planners to prepare some estimates of the outcomes of nuclear force exchanges. Odds are that nuclear war between China and either Russia or the United States is extremely unlikely. But since politics has a way of driving strategy, sometimes over the brink, Chinese as well as US and Russian armed forces will have to plan for unexpected as well as more probable wars. In addition, the nuclear balance matters insofar as China prefers to maintain a secure second-strike capability against the United States or Russia, regardless the pace of its modernization. The debate within China relative to its nuclear force modernization doubtless includes arguments about “how much is enough” to accomplish this fundamental mission of assured retaliation under all conditions. The preceding considerations also suggest that descriptions of China’s nuclear modernization as a “minimum deterrent” are probably misleading. Smaller forces are not necessarily less potent than larger ones for the purpose of supporting their states’ political objectives. This is true not only because a small number of nuclear weapons can do such considerable damage, but also because the “leverage” provided by nuclear weapons lies not just in their assumed value for deterrence of nuclear attack. It also lies in their usefulness as backdrops for political influence, for international status, and for crisis management support. In addition, deterrence might fail in stages instead of all at once in a crisis among two or more nuclear weapons states. The first use of a nuclear weapon since the bombing of Nagasaki might not be a purposeful or deliberate shattering of the nuclear taboo as commonly understood, but an ambiguous or unclear event such as a nuclear accident, a tactical launch by unauthorized commanders, or an incident at sea involving nuclear-capable ships and headstrong commanders.21 The preceding arguments suggest that including China in strategic nuclear arms limitation talks is a necessary condition for doing the serious business of nuclear nonproliferation. On the other hand, China is unlikely to buy into the necessary challenges of bargaining and transparency implied by multinational arms control unless other current nuclear weapons states,

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

45

especially in Asia, are also included. So a tripartite forum for strategic nuclear arms control will need to expand into a multilateral forum including eight acknowledged or de facto nuclear weapons states: the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China), plus India, Israel, and Pakistan. The assumption of nonparticipation by North Korea is based on the uncertainty of situations there; Iran is under international agreement to cap its nuclear research program short of weaponization.22 In the eight-sided multilateral forum just described, a hypothetical tiered agreement among the existing nuclear weapons states could be constructed as follows, based on the numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons on long-range launchers (defined as weapons of intercontinental or intermediate range): tier one, the United States and Russia, permitted a maximum of 1,000 each; tier two, China, France, and the United Kingdom, allowed a maximum of 500 operationally deployed weapons per state; and tier three, India, Israel, and Pakistan, permitted a maximum of 300 operationally deployed weapons. Data Analysis Figure 4.1 summarizes the numbers of operationally deployed weapons assigned to each nuclear weapons state under the agreed protocols, as

Figure 4.1 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Operationally Deployed Warheads

46

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

described earlier. The weapons for each state are also categorized by type of launcher. Of course, these numbers are hypothetical, but they are consistent with states’ capabilities for modernization and past emphases in force building.23 Figure 4.2 summarizes the outcomes of nuclear force exchanges among the powers by comparing their numbers of second-strike surviving and retaliating forces, according to canonical standards of assessment and under each of four operational conditions: (1) retaliating forces are on generated alert, and launched on warning; (2) forces are on generated alert and ride out the attack before retaliating; (3) forces are on day-to-day alert and launched on warning; and (4) forces are on day-to-day alert and riding out the attack before retaliating.24 These results are admittedly conjectural and suggestive. For example, who knows exactly how survivable a Pakistani aircraft might be against a preemptive Indian nuclear missile attack, or vice versa? But some assumptions have to be made for analytical purposes, and doubtful readers are invited to improve upon the results summarized in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Surviving and Retaliating Warheads

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

47

Implications Although China’s projected intercontinental-range nuclear forces are small compared to those of Russia and the United States, they, and Chinese nuclear forces of shorter ranges, are not negligible. Against New START or similar US and Russian deployment levels, China should be able to guarantee minimum deterrence and more at the end of the decade. Especially important are improvements in China’s long-range mobile land-based missile and ballistic missile submarine forces, relative to their survivability against surprise attack. Mobile land-based missiles, as seen from the Chinese perspective, increase force survivability and reduce the incentive to launch on warning or preempt, thereby reinforcing deterrence and crisis stability. On the other hand, some Pentagon appraisals apparently take a more pessimistic view of China’s mobile land-based missiles, seeing those missiles as a possible indicator of departure from China’s declaratory “no first use” doctrine and toward a doctrine of nuclear war fighting.25 Since Russia deploys its own mobile strategic land-based missiles, it is hardly in a position to contest China’s modernization in this respect. What is unique about China is the existence of many miles of tunnels in which missiles of various ranges can be stored, moved from one location to another, and perhaps launched. How these subterranean adjuncts to other forces would play into future scenarios is a subject for another arms debate. As one expert commentator has noted, China may, consistent with its traditions and unique strategic culture, depart from precedents set by the United States and Russia: “In particular, in parallel to gradually building up and improving the characteristics of its strategic, intermediate-range, and tactical ballistic missiles (the last two types can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads), a portion of its missile and nuclear arsenal may be stockpiled in underground tunnels. This would be a unique development in a global nuclear arms race that has now lasted for almost seventy years.”26 This book is about deterrence and arms control, and not about actually having to fight a nuclear war. So the question for China remains: Are the incremental gains from a more aggressive nuclear force modernization, compared to a slower pace, worth the costs, not only in yuan, but also in the possible reactions of the United States and Russia? A more aggressive nuclear modernization by China might provoke a response from Russia or the United States to offset the effects of China’s nuclear rise. Russia and the United States would not have identical perspectives on this issue, so identical responses would be unlikely. Russia declares its new strategic partnership with China to offset the post-Ukraine malaise between Russia and NATO and for longer-term economic benefits. But Russia also has a lengthy contiguous border with China and much of its state territory is within range of Chinese weapons that are less than intercontinental in range. For its part,

48

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

the United States declares that it is not trying to contain China with its pivot to Asia, but nobody in Asia believes this and some welcome it (Japan, Taiwan). Meanwhile, good economic relations are important for both the US and Chinese economies: prolonged or profound military confrontation between Beijing and Washington would shake up not only their own stock markets, but also markets globally. Thus the Chinese, Russian, and American motivations for nuclear force modernization, as well as for arms control, are complex, overlapping, and embedded in the foreign policy objectives as well as the domestic politics of each state. For example, renewed conflict between Russia and the West has increased China’s influence in a multipolar world. Thus China’s nuclear modernization program is part of its assertion of a higher profile in global affairs: a stronger military card to play alongside its growing economic strength. On the other hand, China’s nuclear and other military modernizations also have a practical side: in deterring, or coercing if necessary, the United States, India, and Russia.27

Conclusion

China’s military modernization and economic capacity create the potential for it to deploy within this decade or soon after a more than minimum nuclear deterrent sufficient to guarantee unacceptable retaliation against any attack, especially if China’s less-than-intercontinental-range forces are taken into account. China’s missiles and aircraft of various ranges can inflict damage on Russian state territory and on US-related targets in Asia, including US allies and bases. Nevertheless, an open-ended Chinese nuclear modernization in search of nuclear-strategic parity or superiority compared to the United States and Russia is improbable and, from their perspective, pointless. China’s nuclear modernization is not necessarily incompatible with its engagement with Russia and the United States on strategic nuclear arms control. But the terms of endearment for China to engage with Washington and Moscow on nuclear arms limitation will be complicated by China’s regional military priorities in Asia, by US extended deterrence commitments to regional allies, and by China’s nuanced strategic thinking, including its ability to exploit information and electronic warfare as well as military uses of space (and space denial to adversaries). Chinese use of antiaccess, area denial strategies in opposition to US AirSea Battle creates a potential issue of escalation control for the two states to resolve, preferably in negotiations and military exchanges as opposed to improvisation under the duress of a crisis. Finally, China’s hitherto opacity about the status of its nuclear forces must be

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

49

slowly influenced toward a greater openness and fuller disclosure of its holdings and deployments. As Susan Turner Haynes has noted, From the U.S. point of view, the security dilemma between it and China is exasperated by the United States not knowing exactly the extent of China’s nuclear capabilities. According to the United States, without such a priori knowledge, any bilateral or trilateral agreement—whether focusing on quantitative or qualitative restrictions—will be futile. Of course, China could argue the same in terms of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia, since these weapons have never officially been counted. Of more importance to China is the transparency of US intent.28

Finally, what are the implications of the preceding findings and arguments for US and NATO interests in maintaining strategic stability in Europe, or elsewhere outside Asia? China’s military modernization, according to my arguments above, is not necessarily destabilizing even to balances of power in Asia, let alone in its impacts beyond Asia and the Pacific Rim. China’s nuclear modernization is compatible with more than one kind of grand strategy: either defensive realism or offensive realism. Defensive realism is based on a selective expansion of interests and capabilities, connected to a strict definition of vital national interests. Offensive realism offers a more ambitious definition of vital interests and a greater willingness to assert and support those interests with military power for coercion or war. Regardless of China’s choice of grand strategy, one cannot imagine a world in which nuclear-strategic stability crumbles in Asia without also posing threats to the vital interests of the United States and Europe, in and outside Asia.

Notes 1. For example, whether China might abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for something more ambitious is discussed in Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security no. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 7–50. 2. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful,” New York Times, May 16, 2015, www.nytimes.com; “China Buys Into Multiple Warheads,” New York Times, May 20, 2015, www.nytimes.com. 3. Jeremy Page, “Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2014, http://online.wsj.com. See also, on China’s emerging strategy and military capabilities, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, annual report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2011), www.defense.gov. 4. Sanger and Broad, “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful.”

50

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

5. Alexei Arbatov, “Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Control,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 9, 2014, http://carnegie.ru. 6. See, for example, Bernard D. Cole, “Island Chains and Naval Classics,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, November 2014, www.usni.org. 7. David Lai, “The Agony of Learning: The PLA’s Transformation in Military Affairs,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2012), p. 369. 8. Michael S. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2014), pp. 301–353. 9. Ibid., p. 309. 10. See Mark B. Schneider, testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC, March 26, 2012, www.uscc.gov. 11. Cunningham and Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation,” p. 7. 12. David E. Sanger, “U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace,” New York Times, September 19, 2015, www.nytimes.com. 13. See Timothy L. Thomas, Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2012), esp. chap. 2. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era,” p. 331, notes specifically that Second Artillery has benefited from the expansion and improvement in C4ISR capabilities. 14. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New World Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012), p. 206. 15. For a discussion of this, see Lai, “The Agony of Learning,” pp. 364–365. 16. Expert assessment of this concept appears in Jan Van Tol, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), www.csbaonline.org. 17. Kang Seung-woo, “NK Could Play Nuclear Option,” Korea Times, August 12, 2014, http://m.koreatimes.co.kr. 18. See Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 19. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 20. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era,” p. 340. 21. For some illustrative scenarios, see George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 24–52. 22. David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached with World Powers,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. See also Lawrence Korb and Katherine Blakely, “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 15, 2015, thebulletin.org; David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Leap of Faith on Iran,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. 23. See, for example, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006), esp. pp. 35–46, which includes references to pertinent Central

Nuclear Arms Control: Adding China to the Mix

51

Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense assessments; and Schneider, testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. For US and Russian forces, see Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014); Mark B. Schneider, The State of Russia’s Strategic Forces, Defense Dossier no. 12 (Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy Council, October 2014), pp. 13–18, www.afpc.org; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 1 (2014), pp. 85–93, http://bos.sagepub.com; Hans M. Kristensen, Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces, Special Report no. 5 (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, December 2012), www.FAS .org; Arms Control Association, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART; Arms Control Association, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” www .armscontrol.org/factsheets/RussiaStratNukeForceNewSTART; Joseph Cirincione, “Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons,” New America Foundation, June 29, 2011, http://newamerica.net; Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org. 24. Grateful acknowledgment is made to James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM@) in this analysis for making computations and drawing graphs. He is not responsible for any of the analysis or argument in this chapter. 25. Kristensen, Norris, and McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. War Planning, p. 50. 26. Arbatov, “Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Control.” See also Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, annual report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2014), p. 29, www.defense.gov. 27. Arbatov, “Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Control.” 28. Susan Turner Haynes, “China’s Nuclear Threat Perceptions,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2016), p. 54.

5 Coping with Nuclear Crisis

If the ultimate weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons— and the supreme weapons of soft power—information warfare—are commingled during a crisis, the product of the two may be an entirely unforeseen and unwelcome hybrid. Crises by definition are exceptional events. No Cold War crisis took place between states armed both with advanced information weapons and with nuclear weapons. But given the durability of the two trends, interest in information war and in nuclear weapons, the potential for overlap, and its implications for nuclear crisis management deserve further study and policy consideration. The discussion here proceeds toward that end by looking at relevant concepts and examples, some admittedly speculative.1

Definitions

For present purposes, information warfare or cyber war can be defined as activities by a state or nonstate actor to exploit the content or processing of information to its advantage in time of peace, crisis, or war, and to deny potential or actual foes the ability to exploit the same means against itself. Two widely used alternative paradigms for the analysis of information war or cyber war are strategic information warfare, emphasizing attacks on critical national infrastructures (including information systems and networks) and cyber war, emphasizing the use of information technology to improve performance in battle.2 Crisis management, including nuclear crisis management, is both a competitive and a cooperative endeavor between military adversaries. A crisis is, by definition, a time of great tension and uncertainty.3 Threats are in the air and time pressure on policymakers seems intense. Each side has objectives that it wants to attain and values that it deems important to protect. During a crisis, state behaviors are especially interactive and interdependent with those of another state. It would not be too far-fetched to refer to this interdependent 53

54

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

stream of interstate crisis behaviors as a system, provided the term system is not understood as an entity completely separate from the state or individual behaviors that make it up. The system aspect implies reciprocal causation of the crisis behaviors of A by B, and vice versa. One aspect of crisis management is the deceptively simple question: What defines a crisis as such? When does the latent capacity of the international order for violence or hostile threat assessment cross over into the terrain of actual crisis behavior? A breakdown of general deterrence in the system raises threat perceptions among various actors, but it does not guarantee that any particular relationship will deteriorate into specific deterrent or compellent threats. Patrick Morgan’s concept of “immediate” deterrence failure is useful in defining the onset of a crisis: specific sources of hostile intent have been identified by one state with reference to another, threats have been exchanged, and responses must now be decided upon.4 The passage into crisis is equivalent to the shift from Thomas Hobbes’s world of omnipresent potential for violence to the actual movement of troops and exchanges of diplomatic demarches. All crises are characterized to some extent by a high degree of threat, a short time for decision, and a “fog of crisis” reminiscent of Carl von Clausewitz’s “fog of war,” which confuses crisis participants about what is happening. Before the discipline of crisis management was ever invented by modern scholarship, historians had captured the rush-to-judgment character of much crisis decisionmaking among great powers. 5 The influence of nuclear weapons on crisis decisionmaking is therefore not easy to measure or document, because the avoidance of war can be ascribed to many causes. The presence of nuclear forces obviously influences the degree of destruction that can be done should crisis management fail. Short of that catastrophe, the greater interest of scholars is in how the presence of nuclear weapons might affect the decisionmaking process in a crisis. The problem is conceptually elusive: there are so many potentially important causal factors relevant to a decision with regard to war or peace. History is full of dependent variables in search of competing explanations.

Crisis Management: The Requirements

The first requirement of successful crisis management is communications transparency. Transparency includes clear signaling and undistorted communications. Signaling refers to the requirement that each side must send its estimate of the situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to have identical or even initially complementary interests. But a sufficient number of correctly sent and received signals are prerequisite to effective

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

55

transfer of enemy goals and objectives from one side to the other. If signals are poorly sent or misunderstood, steps taken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, including miscalculated escalation. Communications transparency also includes high-fidelity communication between adversaries, and within the respective decisionmaking structures of each side. High-fidelity communication in a crisis can be distorted by everything that might interfere physically, mechanically, or behaviorally with accurate transmission. Electromagnetic pulses that disrupt communication circuitry and physical destruction of communication networks are obvious examples of impediments to high-fidelity communication. Cultural differences that prevent accurate understanding of shared meanings between states can confound deterrence as practiced according to one side’s theory. As Keith Payne notes, with regard to the potential for deterrence failure in the post–Cold War period, “Unfortunately, our expectations of opponents’ behavior frequently are unmet, not because our opponents necessarily are irrational but because we do not understand them—their individual values, goals, determination, and commitments—in the context of the engagement, and therefore we are surprised when their ‘unreasonable’ behavior differs from our expectations.”6 A second requirement of successful crisis management is the reduction of time pressure on policymakers and commanders so that no unintended, provocative steps are taken toward escalation mainly or solely as a result of a misperception that “time is up.” Policymakers and military planners are capable of inventing fictive worlds of perception and evaluation in which “H-hour” (the hour on which an attack is to be initiated) becomes more than a useful benchmark for decision closure. In decision pathologies possible under crisis conditions, deadlines may be confused with policy objectives: ends become means, and means, ends. For example, the war plans of the great powers in July 1914 contributed to a shared self-fulfilling prophecy among leaders in Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna that only by prompt mobilization and attack could decisive losses be avoided in war. Plans predicated on the unchangeable structure of mobilization timetables proved insufficiently flexible for policymakers who wanted to slow down the momentum of late July and early August toward an irrevocable decision in favor of war. One result of the compression of decision time in a crisis, compared to typical peacetime patterns, is that the likelihood of Type I undetected attack and Type II falsely detected attack errors increases. Tactical warning and intelligence networks grow accustomed to the routine behavior of other state forces and may misinterpret nonroutine behavior. Unexpected surges in alert levels or uncharacteristic deployment patterns could trigger misreadings of indicators by tactical operators. As Bruce Blair has argued,

56

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

“In fact, one distinguishing feature of a crisis is its murkiness. By definition, the [undetected attack] and [falsely detected attack] error rates of the intelligence and warning systems rapidly degrade. A crisis not only ushers in the proverbial fog of crisis symptomatic of error-prone strategic warning but also ushers in a fog of battle arising from an analogous deterioration of tactical warning.”7 A third attribute of successful crisis management is that each side should be able to offer the other a safety valve or a face-saving exit from a predicament that has escalated beyond its original expectations. The search for options should back neither crisis participant into a corner from which there is no graceful retreat. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, President Kennedy was able to offer Soviet premier Khrushchev a face-saving exit from his overextended missile deployments. Kennedy publicly committed the United States to refrain from future military aggression against Cuba and privately agreed to remove and dismantle Jupiter mediumrange ballistic missiles previously deployed among US NATO allies. 8 Kennedy and his inner circle recognized, after some days of deliberation and clearer focus on the Soviet view of events, that the United States would lose, not gain, by a public humiliation of Khrushchev that might, in turn, diminish Khrushchev’s interest in any mutually agreed solution to the crisis. A fourth attribute of successful crisis management is that each side maintains an accurate perception of the other side’s intentions and military capabilities. This becomes difficult during a crisis because, in the heat of a partly competitive relationship and a threat-intensive environment, intentions and capabilities can change. Robert Jervis warned that Cold War beliefs in the inevitability of war might have created a self-fulfilling prophecy: “The superpowers’ beliefs about whether or not war between them is inevitable create reality as much as they reflect it. Because preemption could be the only rational reason to launch an all-out war, beliefs about what the other side is about to do are of major importance and depend in large part on an estimate of the other’s beliefs about what the first side will do.”9 Intentions can change during a crisis if policymakers become more optimistic about gains or more pessimistic about potential losses during the crisis. Capabilities can change due to the management of military alerts and the deployment or other movement of military forces. Heightened states of military readiness on each side are intended to send a two-sided signal: of readiness for the worst if the other side attacks, and of a nonthreatening steadiness of purpose in the face of enemy passivity. This mixed message is hard to send under the best of crisis management conditions, since each state’s behaviors and communications, as observed by its opponent, may not seem consistent. Under the stress of time pressures and of military threats, different parts of complex security organizations may be making decisions

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

57

from the perspective of their narrowly defined, bureaucratic interests. These bureaucratically chosen decisions and actions may not coincide with the policymakers’ intent, or with the decisions and actions of other parts of the government. As Alexander George has explained, It is important to recognize that the ability of top-level political authorities to maintain control over the moves and actions of military forces is made difficult because of the exceedingly large number of often complex standing orders that come into effect at the onset of a crisis and as it intensifies. It is not easy for top-level political authorities to have full and timely knowledge of the multitude of existing standing orders. As a result, they may fail to coordinate some critically important standing orders with their overall crisis management strategy.10

As policymakers may be challenged to control numerous and diverse standard operating procedures, political leaders may also be insufficiently sensitive to the costs of sudden changes in standing orders or unaware of the rationale underlying those orders. For example, heads of state or government may not be aware that more permissive rules of engagement for military forces operating in harm’s way come into play once higher levels of alert have been authorized.11 Nuclear Crisis Management and Information War

Information or cyber warfare has the potential to attack or to disrupt successful crisis management on each of the preceding attributes.12 First, information warfare can muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications networks.13 The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. But destroyed or altered information may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been correctly interpreted when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal “resolve” instead of “yield” to its opponent on a particular issue. Side B, misperceiving a “yield” message, may decide to continue its aggression, meeting unexpected resistance and causing a much more dangerous situation to develop. Information war can also destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for successful crisis management. One way information war can do this is to disrupt communication links between policymakers and military commanders during a period of high threat and severe time pressure. Two kinds of unanticipated problems, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, are possible under these conditions. First, political leaders may

58

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

have pre-delegated limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restrictive conditions: only when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of pre-delegation, would military commanders be authorized to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their command. Clogged, destroyed, or disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military commanders perceived a situation to be far more desperate, and thus permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really was. For example, during the Cold War, disrupted communications between the US National Command Authority and ballistic missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a joint decision by submarine officers and crew to launch in the absence of contrary instructions. Second, information warfare during a crisis will almost certainly increase the time pressure under which political leaders operate. It may do this literally, or it may affect the perceived time lines within which the policymaking process can make its decisions. Once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications system being subverted by phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the possible loss of military options will be enormous. In the case of US Cold War nuclear war plans, for example, disruption of even portions of the strategic command, control, and communications system could have prevented competent execution of parts of the SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan—the strategic nuclear war plan). The SIOP depended upon finely orchestrated time-on-target estimates and precise damage expectancies against various classes of targets. Partially misinformed or disinformed networks and communications centers would have led to redundant attacks against the same target sets and, quite possibly, unplanned attacks on friendly military or civilian installations. A third potentially disruptive effect of information war on nuclear crisis management is that information war may reduce the search for available alternatives to the few and desperate. Policymakers searching for escapes from crisis denouements need flexible options and creative problem solving. Victims of information warfare may have a diminished ability to solve problems routinely, let alone creatively, once information networks are filled with flotsam and jetsam. Questions to operators will be poorly posed, and responses (if available at all) will be driven toward the least common denominator of previously programmed standard operating procedures. Retaliatory systems that depend on launch-on-warning instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially vulnerable to reduced time cycles and restricted alternatives: “A well-designed warning system cannot save commanders from misjudging the situation under the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of launch on warning. Such a posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates to converge

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

59

on reality. Rapid reaction is inherently unstable because it cuts short the learning time needed to match perception with reality.”14 The propensity to search for the first available alternative that meets minimum satisfactory conditions of goal attainment is strong enough under normal conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations.15 In civil-military command and control systems under the stress of nuclear crisis decisionmaking, the first available alternative may quite literally be the last. Or so policymakers and their military advisers may persuade themselves. Accordingly, the bias toward prompt and adequate solutions is strong. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, a number of members of the presidential advisory group continued to propound an air strike and invasion of Cuba during the entire thirteen days of crisis deliberation. Had less time been available for debate and had President Kennedy not deliberately structured the discussion in a way that forced alternatives to the surface, the air strike and invasion might well have been the chosen alternative.16 Fourth and finally on the issue of crisis management, information war can cause flawed images of each side’s intentions and capabilities to be conveyed to the other, with potentially disastrous results. Another example from the Cuban missile crisis demonstrates the possible side effects of simple misunderstanding and noncommunication on US crisis management. At the most tense period of the crisis, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course and strayed into Soviet airspace. US and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a possible Arctic confrontation of air forces loomed. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that Soviet air defenses might have interpreted the U-2 flight as a prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling for a compensatory response by Moscow. 17 Fortunately, Moscow chose to give the United States the benefit of the doubt in this instance and to permit US fighters to escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled U-2 mission was not scrubbed once the crisis began has never been fully revealed; the answer may be as simple as bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the chain of command by policymakers who failed to appreciate the risk of “normal” reconnaissance under these extraordinary conditions. The preceding discussion and examples are underscored by the assessment of expert analyst Martin Libicki about the relationship between cyber war and crisis management: To generalize, a situation in which there is little pressure to respond quickly, in which a temporary disadvantage or loss is tolerable, and in which there are grounds for giving the other side some benefit of the doubt is one in which there is time for crisis management to work. Conversely, if the failure to respond quickly causes a state’s position to erode, a temporary

60

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control disadvantage or degree of loss is intolerable, and there are no grounds for disputing what happened, who did it, and why—then states may conclude that they must bring matters to a head quickly.18

Scenarios and Risks

The outcome of a nuclear crisis management scenario influenced by information operations may not be a favorable one. Despite the best efforts of crisis participants, the dispute may degenerate into a nuclear first use or first strike by one side and retaliation by the other. In that situation, information operations by either, or both, sides might make it more difficult to limit the war and bring it to a conclusion before catastrophic destruction and loss of life had taken place. Although there are no such things as “small” nuclear wars, compared to conventional wars, there can be different kinds of “nuclear” wars, in terms of their proximate causes and consequences.19 Possibilities include a nuclear attack from an unknown source; an ambiguous case of possible, but not proved, nuclear first use; a nuclear “test” detonation intended to intimidate but with no immediate destruction; or a conventional strike mistaken at least initially for a nuclear one. As George Quester has noted, “The United States and other powers have developed some very large and powerful conventional warheads, intended for destroying the hardened underground bunkers that may house an enemy command post or a hard-sheltered weapons system. Such ‘bunker-buster’ bombs radiate a sound signal when they are used and an underground seismic signal that could be mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.”20 The dominant scenario of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union preoccupied Cold War policymakers, and under that assumption concerns about escalation control and war termination were swamped by apocalyptic visions of the end of days. The second nuclear age, roughly coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, offers a more complicated menu of nuclear possibilities and responses.21 Interest in the threat or use of nuclear weapons by rogue states, by aspiring regional hegemons or by terrorists, abetted by the possible spread of nuclear weapons among currently nonnuclear weapons states, stretches the ingenuity of military planners and fiction writers. In addition to the world’s worst characters engaged in nuclear threat or first use, there is also the possibility of backsliding in political conditions as between the United States and Russia, or Russia and China, or China and India (among current nuclear weapons states). The nuclear “establishment”— comprising the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—thus includes cases of current debellicism or pacification that depend upon the continuation of favorable political auguries in regional or global politics.

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

61

Politically unthinkable conflicts of one decade have a way of evolving into the politically unavoidable wars of another—World War I is instructive in this regard. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a reminder that local conflicts on regional fault lines between blocs or major powers have the potential to expand into worse conflicts. So too were the Balkan wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s a reminder of this. In these cases, Russia’s one-sided military advantage relative to Georgia in 2008, and NATO’s military power relative to that of Bosnians of all stripes in 1995 and Serbia in 1999, contributed to war termination without further international escalation. Escalation of a conventional war into nuclear first use remains possible where operational or tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed with national or coalition armed forces. In allied NATO territory, the United States deploys several hundred substrategic, air-delivered nuclear weapons among bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.22 Russia probably retains several thousands of operational or tactical nuclear weapons, including significant numbers deployed in western Russia.23 The New START agreement establishes a notional parity between the United States and Russia in nuclear systems of intercontinental range.24 Apparent stability at this topmost layer of nuclear-strategic interaction does not, however, guarantee that stability is automatic at lower rungs of the escalation ladder. US and allied NATO superiority in advanced technology, information-based conventional military power leaves Russia heavily reliant on tactical nukes as compensation for comparative weakness in nonnuclear forces. NATO’s capitals breathed a sigh of relief when Russia’s officially approved military doctrine of 2010 did not seem to lower the bar for nuclear first use, compared to previous editions.25 Russia’s military doctrine indicates a willingness to engage in nuclear first use in situations of extreme urgency for Russia, as defined by its political leadership.26 And despite evident superiority in conventional forces relative to those of Russia, neither the United States nor NATO is necessarily eager to get rid of their remaining substrategic nukes deployed among US NATO allies. An expert panel convened by NATO to set the stage for its 2010 review of the alliance’s military doctrine was carefully ambivalent on the issue of the alliance’s forward-deployed nuclear weapons. The issue of negotiating away these weapons in return for parallel concessions from Russia was left open for further discussion. On the other hand, the NATO expert report underscored the present majority sentiment of governments that these weapons provided a necessary link in the chain of alliance deterrence options.27 Imagine now the unfolding of a nuclear crisis or the taking of a decision for nuclear first use, under the conditions of both NATO and Russian campaigns employing strategic disinformation and information operations intended to disrupt opposed command-control, communications, and warn-

62

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

ing systems. Disruptive information operations against enemy systems on the threshold of nuclear first use, or shortly thereafter, could increase the already substantial difficulty of bringing fighting to a halt before a European-wide theater conflict or a strategic nuclear war. All of the previously cited difficulties in crisis management under the shadow of nuclear deterrence pending a decision for first use would be compounded by additional uncertainty and friction after the nuclear threshold had been crossed. Three new kinds of frictions would be posed for NATO. The cohesion of allied governments would be tested under conditions of unprecedented stress and danger, doubtless aided by a confused situation on the field of battle. Second, reliable intelligence about Russian intentions following Russian or NATO first use would be essential, but challenging to nail down. Third, the first use of a nuclear weapon in anger since Nagasaki would establish a new psychological, political, and moral universe within which negotiators for de-escalation and war termination would somehow have to maintain their sangfroid, obtain agreed stand-downs from their militaries, and return nuclear-capable launchers and weapons to secured, but transparent, locations. All of this would be taking place within the panic-spreading capabilities of 24/7 news networks and the Internet. A “man from Mars” might well say, okay, if information operations get in the way of de-escalation, then omit them. But the political desire to do so is in conflict with the military necessity for timely information gathering, assessment, and penetration of enemy networks—in order to accomplish two necessary, but somewhat opposed, missions. First, each side would want to anticipate correctly the timing and character of the other’s decision for nuclear first use—and, if possible, to throw logic bombs, Trojan horses, electronic warfare, or other impediments in the way (or, if finesse is not at hand, bombing the relevant installations is always an option, although an obviously provocative one). The second, and somewhat opposed, mission is to communicate reliably with the other side one’s preference for de-escalation, one’s willingness to do so if reciprocity can be obtained, and one’s awareness of the possibility that the situation will shortly get out of hand. Consider the Russian general staff and president’s office filtering this hydra-headed group of messages while forces were grappling in Georgia or Ukraine (having been taken into NATO membership the previous year, over Russia’s objections). The problem of nuanced messages and the management of de-escalation, even short of war, was illustrated by NATO’s command-post exercise Able Archer in November 1983. Able Archer was intended to simulate, among other things, the taking of an alliance decision for nuclear first use. However, some in the Russian intelligence services apparently mistook this exercise for the real thing—or, they judged, it was close enough to merit pushing their

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

63

alarmism up the chain of command to Moscow central command. Russian sensitivities to the possibility of US or NATO nuclear first use were high at this time, partly due to NATO’s decision to begin deploying Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles of intermediate range in Europe, beginning in the fall of 1983. Although forces were not alerted and no immediate nuclear scare captured the imagination of leaders in Washington, Moscow, or Brussels, the case illustrates how mistaken interpretations of “normal” events can overvalue pessimistic assessment at just the wrong time.28 Similar problems in coordinating the management of de-escalation and conflict termination with the conduct of information operations might appear in two other situations. First, already alluded to, is the use of a bunker-busting or other advanced technology conventional weapon that the other side, during the fog of crisis or war, confuses with a nuclear first use or first strike. Russia expressed this concern specifically during New START negotiations in 2010, with regard to US plans to deploy some conventionally armed ballistic missiles on nuclear-capable intercontinental or transoceanic launchers. New START counting rules will regard conventionally armed ballistic missiles as also nuclear-capable launchers and, therefore, subject to overall restrictions on the numbers of deployed launchers and weapons. US plans for prompt global-strike systems including missiles or future space planes were first approved during the George W. Bush administration and carried forward under the Obama administration. A second illustration, apart from escalation in Europe, of the problem of managing escalation control and conflict termination along with information operations, is provided by the possibility of a joint NATO-Russian system of theater missile defense (possibly including air defenses). The idea has expert and highly visible political proponents on both sides of the Atlantic, and official Russian commentators have not closed the door to the possibility of some cooperation on ballistic missile defenses. Here NATO and Russia are facing in two political directions: wariness, but also openness, toward one another; and second, concern about possible future Iranian or other Middle Eastern nuclear weapons in the hands of leaders beyond deterrence based on the credible threat of nuclear (or other) retaliation. However, the problems of obtaining missile defense cooperation as between NATO and Russia are not only political. Even with the best of intentions among US, NATO, and Russian negotiators, the military-technical problems of coordinating BMD command-control and communications systems are considerable. Indeed, they are not strictly “military-technical” but also heavily embedded with issues of political sovereignty, classified intelligence, and trust among governments and militaries. Even the militaries among NATO members differ as to their national traditions, military service

64

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

identities, experiences in nuclear arms control, and willingness to share online information in real time with temporary partners who may be future enemies. For example, if a European theater-wide system of intelligence and missile attack warning is established, how many capitals will host relevant servers and receive timely output? Who will decide that a missile warning is now a threat requiring activation of the European BMD system—can a single nation do so if a missile is headed its way, or must NATO (including the United States) and Russia agree before taking responsive action? If a political crisis as between NATO and Russia erupts after a cooperative BMD system has been established, will Russian or US cyber warriors attempt to spoof or otherwise negate the other’s missile defense component? Would it be better to reassure Russia as to the surety of its individually based, or shared-with-NATO, missile defenses, as against the possibility of a conventional or nuclear preemption? Neither Russia nor the United States will want to relinquish sovereign control over its part of any cooperative missile defenses. However, would it be prudent to announce a withdrawal from the cooperative aspect of the regional BMD system during a crisis, or to maintain the fiction of cooperation while attacking the other side’s cyber systems with Trojan horses, logic bombs, and trap doors—just in case? Perhaps, in future nuclear or other crises, the US and Russian cyber commands should have their own direct hotline—or, in this case, encrypted digital link.

Conclusion

The possible combination of information warfare with continuing nuclear deterrence after the Cold War could have unintended by-products, and these may be dangerous for stability. Optimistic expectations about the use of information warfare to defeat or disrupt opponents on the conventional, high-technology battlefield—in cases where nuclear complications do not figure—may be justified. On the other hand, where the nuclear specter overhangs the decisionmaking process between or among states in conflict, the information warriors’ efforts to obtain dominant battlespace knowledge may provoke the opponent instead of deterring it. The objective of information war in conventional warfare is to deny enemy forces battlespace awareness and to obtain dominant awareness for oneself, as the United States largely was able to do in the Gulf War of 1991.29 In a crisis with nuclear weapons available to the side against which information war is used, crippling the foe’s intelligence and command and control systems is an objective possibly at variance with controlling conflict

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

65

and prevailing at an acceptable cost. And under some conditions of nuclear crisis management, crippling the C4ISR of the foe may be self-defeating. Deterrence, whether it is based on the credible threat of denial or retaliation, must be successfully communicated to—and believed by—the other side.30 In this regard, it is important to recognize the research of the European Leadership Network (ELN) on close encounters (military-military or militarycivilian) between NATO member states and partners and Russia. The ELN tabulated more than sixty dangerous incidents in the Euro-Atlantic area between March 2014 and March 2015 alone.31 With regard to interpretation of its findings, the ELN notes, Against the backdrop of wider mistrust and tension in the NATO-Russia relationship, the ongoing incidents have the potential to trigger a major crisis between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed alliance. More specifically, if additional crisis avoidance mechanisms are not put in place, more recent assertive Russian military activities, coupled with reassurance measures adopted by NATO in response, will increase the risks to stability in Europe.32

The group’s case for additional crisis avoidance mechanisms was reinforced by the Turkish shootdown of a Russian combat aircraft in November 2015 that Turkey claimed had strayed over the Syrian-Turkish border into Turkish airspace. Russia denied that its aircraft was in Turkish airspace at the time it was attacked. Russian lives were lost in the incident. Fortunately, Russia chose to protest the Turkish shootdown by imposing economic sanctions and not by prompt military retaliation in kind. Incidents such as this have an inherent potential for misunderstanding of intentions and for mistaken decisions for political and military escalation based on those misunderstandings.

Notes 1. For important insights on this topic, see Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute, July 2016), www.rusi.org; Andrew Futter, “War Games Redux? Cyberthreats, U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability, and New Challenges for Nuclear Security and Arms Control,” European Security (December 2015). 2. John Arquilla, “From Blitzkrieg to Bitskrieg: The Military Encounter with Computers,” Communications of the ACM no. 10 (October 2011), pp. 58–65. P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman suggest that the best way to classify cyber attacks is to determine which among the “CIA triad” of information security goals is being threatened: confidentiality, integrity, and availability; see Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 70.

66

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

3. For important concepts, see Alexander L. George, “A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management,” for the political and operational requirements of crisis management, and Alexander L. George, “Strategies for Crisis Management,” for descriptions of offensive and defensive crisis management strategies; both in Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 22–27 and 377–392, respectively. See also Ole R. Holsti, “Crisis Decision Making,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), Volume I, pp. 8–84; Phil Williams, Crisis Management (New York: Wiley, 1976); Alexander L. George, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution Through Coercive Diplomacy,” in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1994), pp. 111–132. 4. See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 351–355. 5. See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace (New York: Viking, 1971), pp. 99–109; Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958); D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1983). 6. Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 57. See also David Jablonsky, Strategic Rationality Is Not Enough: Hitler and the Concept of Crazy States (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, August 8, 1991), esp. pp. 5–8, 31–37. 7. Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 237. 8. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 122–123. 9. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 183. 10. Alexander L. George, “The Tension Between ‘Military Logic’ and Requirements of Diplomacy in Crisis Management,” in George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, p. 18. 11. Ibid. 12. For useful definitions of cyber attack and cyber war, see Paul K. Davis, “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar,” International Law and Politics no. 47 (2015), pp. 327–355, esp. p. 328. 13. A virus is a self-replicating program intended to destroy or alter the contents of other files. Worms corrupt the integrity of software and information systems from the “inside out” in ways that create weaknesses exploitable by an enemy. 14. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 252. 15. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 140, 146. 16. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 335–336. 17. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 141. See also Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 147; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, p. 342. 18. Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012), p. 145.

Coping with Nuclear Crisis

67

19. For pertinent scenarios, see George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 24–52. 20. Ibid., p. 27. 21. Assessments of deterrence before and after the Cold War appear in Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), pp. 98–106; Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: TimesHolt, 2012); Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 351–383; Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age; Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. 22. For detailed information on US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, see Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post–Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005). 23. For pertinent insights and analysis, see Pavel Podvig, “What to Do About Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 25, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 43, March 3, 2010, [email protected]; Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Eurasian Security,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Defense Monitor, March 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 46, March 8, 2010, [email protected]. 24. US Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. 25. Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 35, February 19, 2010, [email protected]. See also Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle” (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 5, 2010), http://cns.miis.edu. 26. See the analysis in Keir Giles, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010: NATO Research Review (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, February 2010), esp. pp. 1–2, 5–6. 27. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement—Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels, May 17, 2010), pp. 43–44. 28. On Able Archer and its implications, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990), pp. 599–601. Additional parts of the background relevant to political tensions at this time included US-announced plans for the Strategic Defensive Initiative in the spring of 1983, the KAL 007 shootdown by a Soviet fighter in September 1983, and an ongoing KGB-GRU intelligence operation (RYAN) to detect telltale signs of any US or NATO decision for a nuclear attack; Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582–598.

68

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

29. As David Alberts notes, “Information dominance would be of only academic interest, if we could not turn this information dominance into battlefield dominance.” Alberts, “The Future of Command and Control with DBK,” in Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, eds., Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 80. 30. As Colin S. Gray has noted, “Because deterrence flows from a relationship, it cannot reside in unilateral capabilities, behavior or intentions. Anyone who refers to the deterrent policy plainly does not understand the subject.” Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1996), p. 33. 31. European Leadership Network, “Managing Dangerous Incidents: The Need for a NATO-Russia Memorandum of Understanding,” March 7, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 46, March 7, 2016, [email protected]. 32. Ibid.

6 Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

During the Cold War, and especially in the 1980s, there were some serious efforts in the academic and policy communities to study the question of how a nuclear war could end.1 The large nuclear arsenals of the Americans and Soviets, the drift of US and Soviet military thinking, and the policy-related anxieties of other skeptics all precluded closure on this question before the Cold War ended. In a policy debate polarized between “deterrence only” and nuclear “prevailing” schools of thought, the question of how to conduct a nuclear war under continuing control of policy and coherent strategy received short shrift. The subject of controlling a nuclear war should be reopened now. The political and technical environments relevant to starting and stopping a nuclear war are markedly different from the Cold War context. It would be a major tragedy if, in the aftermath of the first nuclear weapons fired in anger since Nagasaki, neither the United States nor other great powers had thought through how to abort a nuclear war in its early stages. For unlike the hypothetical Armageddon between the Americans and Soviets that never occurred in the last century, smaller but highly destructive nuclear wars may take place in this century. Some of these conflicts have the potential to spread into a wider war—for example, as between India and Pakistan—that could engulf other nuclear powers in the Asia Pacific region, including Russia and the United States. In addition, although the likelihood of any deliberate nuclear attack by the United States or NATO against Russia, or vice versa, is obviously small to nonexistent, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation into nuclear first use in Europe is not excluded—including in Russia’s declaratory military doctrine and in NATO contingency planning.2

Deterrence: How Reliable?

The first use of a nuclear weapon by one state against another since 1945 will create a tectonic shift in the expectations of policymakers and military 69

70

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

planners worldwide. The nuclear taboo that supposedly held back the hands of crisis-bound policymakers during the Cold War and for the remainder of the twentieth century will have been shattered. Left in its place will be uncertainty, and the plausible expectation that a first use may be followed by retaliation and further escalation. Of course, a nuclear power could choose to attack or coerce a nonnuclear state. Such a one-sided attack could bring condemnation from the international community and responses from allies of the victim, including those with nuclear weapons. We all assume that the probability of a nuclear war is related, in some unquantifiable but definable way, to the numbers of states with nuclear weapons and to the friendliness or animosity in their relations. Unfortunately for peace in the twenty-first century, the roster of states with nuclear arsenals is increasing. North Korea’s official acknowledgment of its nuclear weapons capability has been followed by off-and-on international efforts among the group of five in Asia (the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea) to negotiate a freeze and then a reversal of North Korea’s military nuclear program. These efforts have proved frustrating in the extreme for the interlocutors with North Korea, and uncertainty about North Korea’s intentions was increased by the death of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il in January 2012 and his succession by his son, Kim Jong-un. Compared to his father, the younger Kim was a political and personal blank slate. Kim Jong-un soon consolidated his hold on power and continued the North Korean tradition of periodic threats against South Korea and the United States. In addition, North Korea conducted another nuclear test in 2013 (earlier tests took place in 2006 and 2009) and also conducted missile tests in violation of UN restrictions. In addition to North Korea’s entry into the club of nuclear weapons states, Iran was suspected of having a strong intent to weaponize its nuclear fuel cycle. Negotiations between the P5 members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) plus Germany with Iran sought to create an ongoing diplomatic engagement, supported by pressure on Iran from the International Atomic Energy Agency for additional transparency about its nuclear aspirations and infrastructure. Part of the problem for the P5+1 negotiators with Iran was to determine exactly with “whom” or what domestic factions they were negotiating: it appeared that alternative hard and soft views within Iran’s political and military elites, including its Revolutionary Guard and religious leadership, created a shifting kaleidoscope of Iranian intentions and negotiating positions. A series of UN resolutions since 2006 increased pressure on Iran to comply with international arms control inspectors, to restrict its trade in nuclear and military-related materials and equipment, to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, and to limit the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and others suspected of engaging in prohibited activ-

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

71

ities. The European Union in January 2012 agreed on an oil embargo against Iran effective from July of that year and a freeze on the assets of Iran’s central bank. In March 2012, Iranian banks, in breach of UN sanctions, were disconnected from SWIFT, the global coordinating hub for international financial transactions. A number of states imposed bilateral sanctions against Iran, especially the United States with its almost total economic embargo and arms ban, including sanctions on Iranian financial institutions and companies doing business with Iran. 3 The diplomatic endgame included showdown negotiations between Iran and the P5 plus Germany in 2014 and 2015, with a July 14, 2015, agreement in a joint comprehensive action plan. In the action plan, Iran agreed to limitations on its ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium (including stockpile reductions) in return for the lifting of US and other economic sanctions.4 The problem of containing proliferation among rogue or other state actors was actually a two-part one. The first part was what to do with additional states having become nuclear-capable. The second aspect was the valid concern that rogue nuclear powers might pass nuclear technology or know-how to nonstate actors, including terrorists. It was known, for example, that al-Qaeda even before 9/11 had attempted to acquire nuclear weapons–grade material. The United States and other countries with large coastlines and national territories were vulnerable to various attacks by weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Optimists about the probable consequences of further nuclear weapons spread among states might argue, as some have done, that deterrence would still work in the future as it presumably had done during the Cold War. The optimism was very much based on after-the-fact hindsight that we survived the Cold War without accidentally or deliberately setting off a US-Soviet nuclear exchange leading to a global catastrophe. Persons living through the Cold War and its various crises, especially the Cuban missile crisis, had a somewhat less deterministic view about the success of deterrence. Even if Cold War deterrence was as overdetermined as optimists supposed, deterring terrorists and other nonstate actors from nuclear adventurism was another task altogether. We will leave the problem of deterring nonstate actors for another study, assuming for the moment that “deterrence” as a robust concept applies at all to the problem of preventing terrorist attacks.5 The objective of deterring rogue or other states is sufficiently challenging for Western planners and policymakers. Some government officials and others concerned about the behavior of rogue actors have concluded that they are, in all likelihood, beyond the grasp of rational deterrence strategies. At least rogues might not be amenable to military persuasion by the US or Western model of rational deterrence.

72

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

The US model of deterrence rationality emphasizes the calculation of costs and benefits attached to various alternative courses of action. Decisionmakers choose the alternative with the smallest anticipated cost and the largest potential benefit, relative to other available alternatives. Deterrence theory is thus one aspect of public choice theory, and as such it works only within a limited frame of reference or “bounded rationality.” Within this framework, adversaries are assumed to have accurate information about one another’s goals, alternatives, and positive or negative weights assigned to various options. The vulnerabilities of this model of analysis, applied to the real world of nuclear crisis management, are serious and potentially deadly.6 It is not so much that deterrence theory is more deficient in the abstract, compared to other possible approaches to conflict management. The challenge lies in applying the abstract logic to myriad concrete situations. The specific circumstances of a crisis are important in understanding how it tumbled into a war. Once deterrence has failed (presumably) and war has broken out, the course of battle influences the options remaining for policymakers and commanders who wish to stop the war sooner, instead of later. It is a mistake to suppose that an outbreak of war is necessarily the result of deterrence failure. An adversary may be bent on attack come what may. Thus the motives and mind-sets of possible enemies are as important as are their capabilities for determining whether, and when, they might attack. History is full of wars begun under assumptions about enemy intentions and capabilities that were later proved, by the test of battle, to have been fallacious. Attackers have not infrequently begun wars against states with greater military capabilities. Often the attackers in question doubted the resolve of the defenders. In other instances, states misperceived one another’s intentions relative to war because they failed to comprehend essential aspects of the other side’s strategic culture, military planning priorities, or “art of war.” Wars undertaken by leaders who get one or more of these things wrong are sometimes referred to as “accidental” or “inadvertent” (usually by political scientists who favor these concepts, less often by historians who are more skeptical). Deterrence during the Cold War, at least in US academic discourse and public policy analysis, was in constant danger of overstretch. For some analysts and policymakers it became a talisman that substituted for hard data or serious thought. Deterrence was also sometimes substituted for policy instead of for military strategy (separate problems, but related). The “domino theory” by which US military escalation of its commitment to the war in Vietnam was justified is one example of deterrence (and its twin, credibility) having been stretched across the conceptual and geographical fault lines that separated war in Europe from war in Asia.

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

73

It would be premature to declare that aspiring nuclear powers including rogue states are beyond deterrence in the sense of existential deterrence. But deterrence will certainly operate differently in the twenty-first century compared to the Cold War. One reason for this is related to nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons were the hallmark of great powers that were, during the Cold War, mostly content with the geopolitical status quo. Future nuclearaspiring or nuclear-capable states, on the other hand, may be revisionists with regard to their international policy objectives. In fact, the very term rogue or state of concern implies as much: the rogue is only roguish from the standpoint of those who favor the existing system and its parameters. Those who wish to overturn the system might regard rogues as heroes. In the eighteenth century, American and French revolutionaries were rogues against the established order: now their successor states are part of it. Another question raised about deterrence is whether it can apply to heads of state, military leaders, or terrorists whose motives are apocalyptic or otherwise nonrational. Of course, this begs the question: What is a rational motive?7 We will not get into this matter judgmentally. Suffice it to say that one state’s rationality may be another’s irrationality, but the distinction is not a clinical one. Individuals who are clinically suspect may nevertheless make clear decisions on behalf of their states in troubled times; indeed, many have done so. Rationality has to do with the logic of means-ends connections: Is the state acting in a way that maximizes its likelihood of success, or minimizes its probability of failure, in the event? In a crisis between two nuclear powers, the difficulty rises because the decision logics or “rationalities” of the two sides are interdependent. Each has a sequence of moves that may be more, or less, logical in reaction to the move of the other. This interdependency of moves and motives is what makes nuclear or other crises so hard to manage.8 Imagine a two-dimensional chess game with the players blindfolded, and with each side permitted a finite number of mistakes (say, two wrong moves) before the players and the board are blown to smithereens. The example is not fatuous: US president John Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev played something like this during the Cuban missile crisis.

Escalation Control: Principles

As related to the problem of ending a nuclear war, theories of escalation control have several key propositions on offer: all are controversial, but none is self-evidently impossible. First, even nuclear war, however destructive, would involve political goals, at least at the outset. Second, states and leaders can be expected to recognize certain rules of the road about fighting

74

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

and ending wars, despite cultural and national differences. Third, although time pressures and the military planning process impose constraints upon escalation control for war termination, success is not precluded in practice.9 Paul Bracken has argued, with reference to defensible Cold War views of this matter, “The assumption of robustness with respect to time pressures and planning rigidities is supported by the certainty that in a nuclear crisis each nation’s top leader would be at the helm, overriding bureaucratic obstacles of delay and omission.”10 The idea of ending a nuclear war already in progress implies that deterrence can be applied to the problem of limiting a war as well as preventing it. A nuclear war is a failure of deterrence that has already happened. Worse, however, would be for the various parties to the conflict to continue firing until their arsenals had been exhausted or all major cities destroyed. Getting combatants to the bargaining table after the shock of nuclear combat would not be easy. Unless the war had been started by mistake, say an accidental launch or a rogue commander, important issues of state would be in dispute. In addition, the anger of survivors at the consequences of nuclear attacks on their society would be difficult for governments to manage. Survivors’ demands for retaliation and revenge might overwhelm policymakers’ efforts to arrange ceasefires or surrenders. The termination of a nuclear war, as in any war, has both military-tactical and politico-strategic aspects.11 The tactical situation on the battlefield is obviously important. After the early nuclear attacks have taken place, each side may have surviving forces. The surviving forces are bargaining assets that can be used in negotiating a ceasefire or peace agreement. Even a few surviving forces on either side can threaten to inflict a great deal of societal destruction on the other, and its leaders might prefer to negotiate instead of continue fighting. However, in the chaos attendant to nuclear war, even a “small” regional war by Cold War standards, leaders and their military advisers might not have reliable information about the status of the enemy’s forces and command-control systems. Command-control systems present an anomaly to planners who might want to leave the door open for intrawar deterrence and nuclear war termination. On one hand, in traditional military thinking based on experience in conventional war fighting, attacking command-control and communications systems makes perfect sense. It is an efficient way to destroy the opponent’s military cohesion and coordination. Attacks on the enemy’s brain and central nervous system, as were carried out during Operation Desert Storm, are important “force multipliers” that can be used to win a war quickly and save both friendly and enemy casualties. But in a nuclear war, the destruction of enemy political or military command and control systems would almost certainly exacerbate the

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

75

problem of ending the war, and at two levels. At the tactical level, the destruction of military control systems would cut the nuclear retaliatory forces and their commanders into separate pieces. Each piece would be programmed to continue firing and fighting unless otherwise directed to stand down. However, the stand-down orders might never reach the relevant field commanders having custody of nuclear weapons, or those authorized to fire them (who might be the same people, but not necessarily). Thus, outliers in the nuclear military chain of command might not hear, or want to hear, ceasefire orders.12 Destruction of the main political center of the opponent might paralyze its civilian leadership and make it impossible for the president or prime minister, or other surviving cabinet officials, to gain secure and reliable control over the armed forces.13 Consider, for example, an Iranian attack on Israel, or a Pakistani strike against India, that succeeded in decapitating the heart of the enemy’s political leadership. Effective control over the armed forces of the attacked states would almost certainly pass directly to the military and other security organs. The surviving political leadership in Tel Aviv and in India would at least temporarily be the prisoners of fast-moving events and asserted military imperatives. It would take considerable time, and at least the appearance of an interim ceasefire, before anything like normal relationships between politicians and the armed forces were reestablished. Assessment of the viability of command-control systems under the stress of nuclear or other WMD attacks is made difficult by the scarcity of reliable information in the public record. It might be supposed, for example, that each state or government has official, written arrangements for delegation of political office and for devolution of military command during crisis and war. But this assumption could be mistaken for nuclear-aspiring or new nuclear states. Even if written protocols exist, they may not be adhered to, or may not correspond to reality once the shooting starts. In addition, the delegation of political authority and the devolution of military commandcontrol may differ in important ways. Another uncertainty with respect to nuclear crisis or wartime command-control systems is how they might be impacted by strategic or operational cyber war. For example, cyber attacks preceding or accompanying kinetic attacks might make it more difficult to control military operations and to assess enemy intentions accurately, thereby confounding negotiation for war termination.14 We do know something about the US systems for political delegation and military devolution of command. The American Presidential Succession Act and various other legislative enactments, as well as constitutional requirements, clarify both nonemergency and emergency procedures for answering the question “Who is in charge?” if the president is killed or dis-

76

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

abled. The military chain of command, although it begins with the presidential center, is not identical to the political one. The wartime devolution of military command proceeds from the president, to the secretary of defense, and then to the regional or functional combatant commanders (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff). This system ensures that, even if the political decision center is paralyzed by a surprise attack, the military commands authorized to retaliate can do so in a timely manner. These command and control arrangements were worked out over many years of Cold War trial and error. They were, and are, intended to provide a solution for the oxymoronic requirement that forces “never” be fired without appropriate authorization but “always” respond promptly when authorized missions are required.15 In the early years of the nuclear age, US policymakers and military leaders struggled to define a rule set for the control of nuclear weapons in peacetime and for the management of nuclear forces during crisis and war. As is well known, the Harry Truman administration initially assigned custody over atomic weapons to a civilian agency. The weapons could only be released to the military by presidential order. As this became impracticable in the missile age, systems were required for dispersing weapons to the military while maintaining them in secure storage to prevent accidental or unauthorized use. In addition, land-based, sea-based, and air-launched weapons required platform-specific protocols: aircraft could surge to failsafe points and wait for confirming orders before proceeding to attack. Missiles, on the other hand, were not subject to recall: their launch was an irrevocable decision for war.

Escalation Control: New Challenges

The details of US and Soviet Cold War force operations, including command and control, are not important here. Enough has been presented to make the point that only over considerable time, and as a result of much trial and error on the part of operators and analysts, were these systems established as reliable against usurpers or accidents and as responsive to authorized commands. The lessons learned by the Americans and post–Cold War Russians in this regard have not necessarily been passed along to future generations of nuclear-capable states. The extent to which some existing nuclear powers, to say nothing of future ones, accept the idea of deterrence based on second-strike capability, as opposed to preemption, is unclear. Nor are the relationships among the highest levels of political and military command, with regard to the alerting of forces in crisis or the employment of forces in war, altogether clear for states such as Pakistan and North Korea. The manner in which custody of nuclear weapons along with the authority

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

77

to fire them has been delegated to field commanders in India, Pakistan, Israel, or North Korea is a closely guarded secret. Once nuclear weapons had been fired in anger in South or Northeast Asia or in the Middle East, would political leaders be able to maintain continuing control over force employment, targeting, and termination decisions? States with small inventories of weapons, especially if they were first-strike vulnerable, might follow the logic of “use them or lose them” and expend rapidly their existing arsenals. On the other hand, even smaller states might want to maintain some forces in reserve in order to avoid nuclear blackmail in the post-attack phase of a war. A small residue of survivable forces, perhaps tactical missiles or nuclear-capable aircraft of limited range, could be the difference between an imposed surrender and a negotiated peace. In order for negotiations between India and Pakistan, or Israel and a nuclear Iran, to take place after the nuclear threshold had been crossed, leaders in firm control of their nuclear forces would be prerequisite. Leaders would have to survive the early attacks, communicate with their nuclear forces, and impose targeting restraints or even nuclear ceasefires. These steps to expedite negotiation might not be possible. Rogue commanders once enabled to fire nuclear weapons, and having observed unprecedented destruction on their own country, could resist ceasefires and become bent on revenge or holocaust. Once delegation of nuclear release authority has been passed from senior politicians and military commanders to force operators, retrenchment and “putting the genie back in the bottle” would call for wartime commanders to put professional obligations and the military chain of command ahead of personal agendas and motives. Some might, and some might not. Nor is this problem one that has been entirely done away with among mature nuclear powers. Russia in the 1990s was an economic basket case. As its economy lagged, its conventional military forces became cashstarved and operationally deprived of oxygen. Consequently, Russia became primarily dependent upon its nuclear weapons, especially its long-range weapons, for deterrence of major nuclear or conventional attacks on its state territory. Russia’s position in the 1990s was like NATO’s during the Cold War: presumed inferiority in conventional forces, and therefore an acknowledged reliance on nuclear weapons to cover more bets. In addition, Russia’s missile warning and control systems deteriorated, including its satellite and ground-based radar networks, after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s nuclear weapons complex and its nuclear scientific establishment were also casualties of its free-falling economy. The United States established programs of military assistance to Russia in the 1990s in order to improve Russia’s handling of nuclear materials and weapons, including accurate accounting and safe storage and dismantlement.

78

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

The previous sentence marks an ironic turn of events, compared to the Cold War. The US government is now a large “investor” in Russian nuclear safety and security. The concern in Washington is no longer the prospect of a deliberate Soviet nuclear attack, but of Russian loss of political or military control that leaves nuclear weapons and launchers in the hands of regional warlords. This subject is almost taboo in official diplomatic circles, but interestingly the topic of Russian breakup or deconstruction into a plurality of regional entities is the subject of much speculation among Russians. Russian media and polling organizations frequently sample public opinion on this issue, and about a third of Russians generally regard the possibility of a breakup of post-Soviet Russia as more than trivial. The question, in such an event, is whether the split would be a case of gradual and consensual political devolution, or whether it would be more like a nasty divorce or a civil war. The current administration of President Vladimir Putin has made clear its intent to resist any regionalization or other dismemberment of Russia. Putin’s firm opposition to Chechen terrorism and insurgency, and his absolute “nyet” to the demand for political autonomy or independence for that troubled region, have been consistent, and emphatic: there will be no departure from Russia by means of armed resistance. US policy is that Russia should, indeed, hold together, for a major breakup of Russia would destabilize the entire central Eurasian subcontinent with ripple effects to the west, east, and south. An immediate concern about a fissiparous Russian polity would be the consequences for the command and control over its nuclear weapons and launch platforms. The United States and its allies have been there once before. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet breakup, the post-Soviet states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were suddenly numbered among the world’s nuclear powers. The fates of their respective nuclear arsenals were up for grabs, and various heads of state in these countries sought to play the nuclear card for economic assistance or for the temporary prestige it might bring them. US policy was to establish Russia as the logical and legal successor state to the Soviet Union for the purpose of controlling nuclear weapons and forces. Otherwise, dispersal of nuclear weapons among postSoviet states could lead to chaos, including the unauthorized distribution of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials among terrorists. After considerable political wheeling and dealing in the early 1990s that involved the United States, Russia, and the new trio of nuclear powers, agreement was reached for the forces of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to be “returned” to Russia (standing in for the former Soviet Union) or dismantled. Russia’s nuclear weapons deployed for use on intercontinental missiles or long-range bombers are, according to Russian officials, under secure storage and control in peacetime. (Weapons grade or other nuclear materials,

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

79

including vast stores of uranium and plutonium, are another matter. US and other nonproliferation experts remain concerned about leakage from Russia’s nuclear weapons complex or other sources of nuclear or radiological materials. This is a separate, albeit important, subject.16 In the nearest approximation to a nuclear crisis during the 1990s, the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket in January 1995 was temporarily confused by Russian warning systems with a possible US missile launch from a ballistic missile submarine. Russian nuclear forces were alerted. Russian president Boris Yeltsin, together with his defense minister and chief of general staff, used for the first time in the post–Cold War era their nuclear “footballs” or briefcases that accompany the head of state and his principal military advisers. Russian tracking of the missile trajectory eventually established that its path was headed out toward sea and away from Russian territory.17 It turned out that the Black Brant missile launch that temporarily alarmed the Russians had been the result of a diplomatic snafu. The Norwegian government had notified the Russian foreign ministry months in advance of the planned rocket launch and its purpose: gathering scientific data on aurora borealis. But the communication got lost in the Russian bureaucracy and never made it to the desks of the responsible officials in the Russian armed forces and defense ministry. The preceding résumé of concerns about mature nuclear powers is not intended to single out Russia, but to caution against casual acceptance of the assumption that rogues or new nuclear states would be more likely to start a war, and less willing to end a war short of Armageddon, than longstanding nuclear powers would be. Of course, the larger and more diverse arsenals of the major powers give them options for controlling conflict and for intrawar deterrence, compared to smaller powers. And even at lower levels of force size, the qualities of forces and their operational parameters are partial determinants of their ability to maintain political and military control during a nuclear war. That having been said, the decisions for prolonging or ending a war are very subjective ones, based on the motives and personalities of leaders and, as well, the moods of publics who have been subjected to attacks. An additional variable for any state engaged in a nuclear war will be the policymaking process in that state: how power and influence are distributed among office holders and politically influential persons. We have some ideas about how the process of national security decisionmaking would work in the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia, since these polities have been studied extensively by insiders and outsiders. But what power shifts would take place after war began in India, Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran? North Korea is virtually opaque to foreign intelligence. Pakistan is a government under siege from jihadists whose

80

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

influence extends into its military and intelligence organs. The regime in Tehran is torn between traditionalist ayatollahs with visceral hatred for the United States and Israel, and modernizers who would prefer to focus on economic development and gradual social change. India is the world’s largest democracy and a remarkably stable one, but under the stress of a nuclear attack the relationship between its military and its government might undergo drastic change, compared to its peacetime condition. Recall that one Indian prime minister during the Cold War was assassinated by several of her own official bodyguards. For that matter, what could we expect from a US president in the aftermath of a nuclear attack on US soil by a rogue, or other, state? US history is not inspiring of confidence that cool heads would prevail and that government would seek to manage a conflict toward “victory” at the lowest possible level of destruction or to negotiate an agreed peace. US reaction to 9/11 was instructive: not only terrorists everywhere, but regimes that aided terrorists, were now placed into the crosshairs of US vengeance. Al-Qaeda deserves all the opprobrium it received, but the point here is a different one. Americans and their political leaders are not, by temperament and training, accustomed to dealing out military punishment in measured doses. The likely reaction to a nuclear attack even by terrorists on US soil would be an elite and public demand for a Carthaginian peace. This and the two preceding sections have discussed only some of the problems attendant to ending a nuclear war. I have not emphasized technical problems or military doctrine, but issues related to the nexus between politics and warfare—that is, strategy. In the next section, I will try to interrogate the issue of nuclear war termination by modeling some of the possibilities, using alternative future US and Russian forces for the development of insights and hypotheses.

Modeling Nuclear War Termination

Approach The dynamics of ending a nuclear war resist rigorous modeling for two reasons. First, no two-sided nuclear war has ever been fought; and second, the complexity of nuclear operations, unrestrained by efforts to limit the war in duration and intensity, is sufficiently challenging for any researcher. Even more complicated would be the effort to fight and limit a nuclear war at the same time. Nevertheless, this is precisely what leaders would attempt to do, unless they had taken leave of their political and military senses. Fighting for honor or revenge, or even more apocalyptic motives, with nuclear weapons,

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

81

is a luxury that only stateless terrorists can afford. Leaders of governments have a responsibility to their states and societies. By whatever chain of events a nuclear war had got started, it would be imperative to shut it off as soon as political will could be exerted in that direction. The possibility that heads of state would not just throw up their hands and passively await Armageddon, once nuclear war had begun, was a controversial offering on the plates of policymakers and analysts during the Cold War. The major reason for resistance to the study of nuclear war termination was the massive size of US and Soviet arsenals. It was simply assumed that even a “small” nuclear exchange involving the two Cold War superpowers would leave their societies with unacceptable, and perhaps irreparable, damage. And indeed, a nuclear war in which several thousand warheads exploded on the American or Russian heartlands, the result of socalled counterforce attacks, would have created a post-attack, prehistoric residue that only novelists could imagine. On the other hand, in the twenty-first century the possibility of limiting nuclear war to less than Armageddon is not only a hypothetical one. A regional nuclear war on the Korean peninsula or the Indian subcontinent would be a holocaust for the immediate victims, but it would not necessarily inflict catastrophic damage on the planet. In addition, the equation has changed considerably as between the Americans and Russians in the twentyfirst century, compared to the Cold War condition of self-annihilating forces. Under the constraints of the New START agreement negotiated between the United States and Russia in 2010 and entering into force in February 2011, the United States and Russia may each deploy a maximum of 1,550 warheads on no more than 700 deployed intercontinental missiles and long-range bombers.18 The two states must reach these agreed levels of deployed long-range weapons by the year 2018. The New START agreement provides for inspections and verification by the two sides of their respective arsenals. Much to the frustration of Russia, New START includes no limitations on US or NATO missile defenses, including those proposed for future deployment in Europe. The United States and NATO’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) for European missile defenses enters its third of four phases in 2018, and Russia has expressed concern that the EPAA could provide NATO with the means of nullifying Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent.19 Since the NATO Lisbon summit of 2010, NATO and Russia have been negotiating about the possibility of creating an agreed regime for missile defenses in Europe. The return of Vladimir Putin to the office of Russian president in May 2012 simultaneous with a US presidential election year placed ballistic missile defense negotiations on a slow track of continued technical exchange but little political agreement.

82

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

With peacetime deployed forces of 1,550 warheads or fewer, the United States and Russia will not have the redundant forces of the Cold War (“overkill”) to compensate for poor decisions about strike planning, targeting, and other aspects of force management. With more than 10,000 warheads deployed on strategic launchers by each side during the early 1980s, for example, either the United States or Russia could have launched a highly destructive counterforce first strike against the other; retained a reserve force for follow-on, counter-city attacks; and withheld sufficient forces to deter a third party from intervening in the conflict (e.g., China, the UK, or France). Restricted to the smaller forces of the New START regime or even more restrictive post–New START agreements, the United States and Russia must plan with more care for a post-attack world before committing themselves to strikes against one another. Consider the arithmetic. A US first strike against Russian counterforce targets (land-based missiles, submarine bases, bomber bases, and associated military command-control), or a Russian first strike against the United States of a similar nature, would require hundreds of fastflying warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs. The second striker would require a similar number of warheads to put at risk the unused portion of the first striker’s force. Both would be left with a residue that might be essentially equivalent to the remaining weapons of its opponent. But the remaining forces would offer fewer options for post-attack coercion against one another, or against third parties, compared to the Cold War forces. To illustrate these points, I will generate hypothetical, but not unrealistic, Russian and US forces for the New START agreement and for a post– New START reductions treaty that caps each state’s numbers of deployed intercontinental nuclear weapons at 1,000.20 Each country will be assigned variable force structures, in addition to the traditional strategic nuclear triad of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers, for comparative purposes. In this analysis, I compare the performances of the various forces in a simple attack model: each side absorbs a counterforce first strike. I calculate the surviving warheads for each force under four conditions of alertness and launch readiness: (1) generated alert, launch on warning; (2) generated alert, ride out the attack; (3) day-to-day alert, launch on warning; (4) day-to-day alert, ride out the attack. For the United States, I generate the following alternative force structures: (1) a balanced triad of landbased, sea-based, and air-delivered weapons; (2) a dyad of land- and seabased forces only (no bombers); (3) a dyad of sea-based and bomber forces only (no ICBMs); (4) a force entirely based on sea-based weapons (SLBMs only). Russian forces in the analysis are (1) a balanced triad; (2) a dyad without bombers; (3) a dyad without SLBMs; (4) a force entirely based on ICBMs.

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

83

Analysis The results of the analysis pursuant to the preceding model are summarized in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for the case of US and Russian forces under a prewar deployment limit of 1,550 weapons. These tables show the numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads for each state under each force structure and retaliatory alertness-readiness posture. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarize information similar to that provided in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, but this time for the case of a 1,000 prewar deployment limit on long-range weapons for each state. The findings suggested by the data in Tables 6.1–6.4 offer pertinent insights into the management of forces for intrawar deterrence and war termination. First, from the perspective of deterrence prior to the outbreak of war, any of these force structures can guarantee unacceptable damage or assured retaliation against the opponent’s society. Within the higher (1,550) or lower (1,000) deployment ceilings, each state remains in a nuclear hostage condition to the other. Second, while there are some advantages especially for Russia in higher alert levels and prompt launch doctrines, the

Table 6.1 US Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit

Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

Balanced Triad

No ICBMs

No Bombers

SLBMs Only

1,275 935 955 615

1,201 1,201 781 781

1,248 965 940 657

1,166 1,166 781 781

Source: Author, based on AWSM@ model developed by James Scouras (who is not responsible for its use here, or for any of my arguments or analysis). Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Table 6.2 Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit

Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

Balanced Triad

No Bombers

No SLBMs

ICBMs Only

1,062 644 591 101

1,240 591 825 124

1,367 187 1,311 131

1,383 138 1,383 138

Source: Author, based on AWSM@ model developed by James Scouras (who is not responsible for its use here, or for any of my arguments or analysis). Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

84

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Table 6.3 US Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit Balanced Triad Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

830 587 622 379

No ICBMs 735 735 469 469

No Bombers 795 552 622 379

SLBMs Only 778 778 521 521

Source: Author, based on AWSM@ model developed by James Scouras (who is not responsible for its use here, or for any of my arguments or analysis). Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Table 6.4 Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit Balanced Triad Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

830 575 401 77

No Bombers 826 549 411 83

No SLBMs 881 138 825 83

ICBMs Only 879 88 879 88

Source: Author, based on AWSM@ model developed by James Scouras (who is not responsible for its use here, or for any of my arguments or analysis). Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

marginal gain in military effectiveness is offset by the higher risk of dependency on hair trigger responses. Third, as the numbers of forces come down, the qualities of forces matter more. With the plurality of forces that the Cold War permitted, it seemed self-evident to US and Soviet planners that a triad of land-based, sea-based, and bomber-delivered weapons was the most preferred force structure. A triad of launch platforms, compared to a dyad or monad, complicated the attack calculus for any first striker. But with smaller total forces, reduced to 1,000 deployed warheads or so, every platform must be justified on the grounds of intrinsic cost-effectiveness, such as its survivability and penetration capability per unit. In this regard, the high survivability of ballistic missile submarines compared to bombers and land-based missiles makes them more appealing as forces shrink. Ballistic missile submarines can launch weapons other than ballistic missiles and can, if necessary, be used as firststrike counterforce weapons. Fourth, from the standpoint of intrawar deterrence and conflict management, submarines and bombers are more flexible than ICBMs, especially silo-based ICBMs. Bombers can be recalled after launch, and submarines

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

85

can escape detection from satellite or other surveillance. But even roadmobile land-based missiles are a high risk for prompt destruction, given the reconnaissance and location technology available today to attackers. What can be seen can be hit, and what can be hit can be destroyed—even with conventional weapons. In fact, it might be possible for some ICBMs to be loaded with conventional instead of nuclear warheads for use in “prenuclear” first strikes, as demonstrative attacks that would threaten pieces of the other side’s deterrent without crossing the nuclear threshold or causing mass casualties. Fifth, although not measured in this model, the substitution of nucleararmed cruise missiles aboard surface ships and submarines might be justified as a fourth arm of the nuclear-capable quadrad. In this model, some ICBMs would remain nuclear-armed and others would carry conventional warheads. The nuclear warheads offloaded from ICBMs could be assigned to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) that would be relatively more mobile and survivable compared to their land-based counterparts. Eventually, the United States might prefer to retire its land-based missile force entirely. The George W. Bush administration opened the door to a more flexible construction of US strike forces with its concept of a new triad consisting of nuclear and nonnuclear long-range attack forces; antimissile defenses; and improved defense infrastructure for the support of nuclear and nonnuclear forces. The Obama administration has continued research and development into missile defenses and improved conventional offensive weapons, together with its emphases on preparation for, and defense against, operational and strategic cyber war. Some expert analysis suggests that future US and Russian longrange nuclear forces could be reduced along with increased deployments of antimissile defenses, passive defenses for offenses, and increased emphasis on the removal of nuclear weapons from launchers reliant upon hair trigger responses.21

Conclusion

Nuclear war termination was controversial during the Cold War and, for different reasons, it will continue to be so. Contemplation of the awfulness of nuclear war is certainly not to be expected of most politicians or publics, apart from the now-ubiquitous fears of nuclear terrorism after 9/11. But apart from terrorism, states still have the responsibility for world order, and peacemaking does not stop after war has begun. Political leaders and military planners in nuclear-armed and other leading states need to think through, before the fact of deterrence failure, what the downstream steps would be.22 Military machines should not be permitted to run on nuclear autopilot.

86

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

The preceding illustrations do not constitute a prediction, but a template for considering some aspects of the problem of nuclear conflict termination. I have used US and Russian forces because we know something about how each state has operated its nuclear forces during peacetime and in crises—and because they have committed themselves to structural and operational arms control through the year 2018. Finally, the diversity of US and Russian launch platforms, even at lower levels of force size, holds implications for smaller nuclear power and for nuclear-aspiring, but currently nonnuclear, states. Forces do not fire themselves. The management or prevention of nuclear proliferation is made harder by the uncertainty about relationships between politicians and their militaries in countries that are only notional democracies, or less democratic than that. How will arrangements for delegation of authority and nuclear enablement for deterrence or war fighting be handled in a future nuclear-armed Iran or Egypt or, for that matter, in currently nuclear-capable North Korea and Pakistan? Opacity in these matters is not reassuring, and dictatorships have a way of appearing solid on the outside, but brittle on the inside, once a diplomatic crisis has begun to slide into a war. In addition, future deterrence and war termination strategies will have to take into account the possible conjunction of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear ones, with strategies for cyber conflict.

Notes 1. See, for example, Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Strategic War Termination (New York: Praeger, 1986); Paul K. Davis, “A New Analytic Technique for the Study of Deterrence, Escalation Control, and War Termination,” in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 35–60; George H. Quester, “War Termination and Nuclear Targeting Strategy,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 285–305. For perspectives on this issue at the end of the Cold War, see the essays in Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992). 2. Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 35, February 19, 2010, [email protected]. 3. See Valerie Lincy and Gary Milhollin, Iran’s Nuclear Timetable, Iran Watch, February 24, 2015, www.iranwatch.org (regularly updated). 4. An expert assessment of the joint comprehensive action plan appears in Dalia Dassa Kaye, Lynn E. Davis, Alireza Nader, Jeffrey Martini, and Larry Hanauer, RAND Experts Q&A on the Iran Nuclear Deal, One Year Later (Santa Monica: RAND, July 14, 2016), www.rand.org. See also David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached with World Powers,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. For the text of the joint comprehensive action plan (Vienna, July 14, 2015), see European Union, European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu. See also Lawrence J. Korb and Max Andonov, “Iran Is the

Nuclear War: Managing Pandora’s Box

87

New USSR: And That Means the Deal Is a Good Thing,” Politico, July 16, 2015, www.politico.com; Lawrence Korb and Katherine Blakely, “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 15, 2015, http://thebulletin.org; David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Leap of Faith on Iran,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. 5. For informative discussions of nuclear terrorism, see Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (New York: Prometheus, 2008); Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times-Holt, 2004). 6. For pertinent critiques of deterrence theory as applied to post–Cold War issues, see Andrew Futter, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Sage, 2015); Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012); Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001). 7. On the issue of rationality and deterrence, see Morgan, Deterrence Now, pp. 42–79. 8. The work of Thomas Schelling on this topic as applied to nuclear deterrence is seminal, as in his book Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). See also Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), esp. pp. 171–184. 9. Paul Bracken, “War Termination,” in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 197–214. 10. Ibid., p. 201. 11. Paul Bracken, “Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority,” in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, pp. 352–372, esp. starting at p. 355, offers similar if slightly different distinctions between “provincial” and “political” control. Provincial control includes strategic and tactical control of the armed forces; political control deals with grand strategy, which is essentially policy. 12. Various aspects of this issue are discussed in Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 13. Perspectives on this and related problems appear in Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody, “Continuing Control as a Requirement for Deterring,” in Carter, Steinbruner, and Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, pp. 142–196. See also Bracken, “Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority,” p. 359; as Bracken observes (p. 356), delegation of nuclear command authority by political leaders to others will not happen except in the most dire circumstances—which are exactly those in which a nuclear war will most likely take place. 14. Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow, “Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 61 (Second Quarter 2011), pp. 18–23, esp. p. 21 on escalation control of I20s (information and infrastructure operations). See also US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Washington, DC, July 2011), www.defense.gov; White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, DC, May 2011), www.whitehouse.gov. For pertinent

88

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

commentary on these documents and related issues, see Rosemary M. Carter, Brent Frick, and Roy C. Undersander, “Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 66 (Third Quarter 2012), pp. 22–27. 15. This perspective is developed in Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 12–28. See also, in the same volume, his comments on civilian control after the decision to use nuclear weapons, pp. 55–66. 16. See Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe (New York: Doubleday, 1997), for pertinent cases and arguments based on Russian post–Cold War experience in the 1990s. 17. Ibid., pp. 240–244. 18. US Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. 19. Daniel Goure, “The Obama Administration’s Phased-Adaptive Architecture: Technological, Operational, and Political Issues,” Defense and Security Analysis no. 1 (March 2012), pp. 17–35. See also Patrick J. O’Reilly, Ballistic Missile Defense Overview (Washington, DC: US Missile Defense Agency, March 26, 2012), esp. pp. 7–8; Patrick J. O’Reilly, unclassified statement before the US House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, regarding fiscal year 2011 missile defense programs, Washington, DC, April 15, 2010. 20. For expert estimates, see Mark Schneider, “The Russian Nuclear Weapons Buildup and the Future of the New START Treaty,” Information Series no. 414 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, October 27, 2016), www.nipp.org; Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” from his blog Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, April 9, 2010, http://russianforces.org; Arms Control Association, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” www.armscontrol.org/factsheets /USStratNukeForceNewSTART; Arms Control Association, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” www.armscontrol.org/factsheets /RussiaStratNukeForceNewSTART; Joseph Cirincione, “Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons,” New America Foundation, June 29, 2011, http://newamerica.net. 21. See, for example, James Cartwright, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture (Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, May 2012), www.globalzero.org. 22. An excellent case is made for this point in George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 24–52, 90–126.

7 Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

Minimum deterrence as a politico-military construct for nuclear arms control has much appeal for expert and lay audiences. In its favor, minimum deterrence has been proposed as an attainable utopia, in contrast to the more elusive condition of nuclear abolition, for those dissatisfied with the present condition. On the other hand, minimum deterrence requires clearer specification, compared to other options for US or other states’ nuclear weapons policy. The following discussion first considers some of the broader politico-military and arms control contexts for the viability of any minimum nuclear deterrence regime. Second, this chapter locates minimum deterrence within a spectrum of broader deterrence/arms control options and evaluates the deterrence and crisis stability of some alternative minimum deterrence regimes.

Minimum Deterrence: The Larger Context

The idea of minimum deterrence has caught fire among civilian and military policy analysts and other close students of nuclear arms control.1 Minimum deterrence might appeal as an acceptable alternative to the more utopian construct of nuclear abolition, endorsed in principle by US president Barack Obama and a number of leading former policymakers and military commanders.2 Minimum deterrence might also be acceptable to military planners who want to maintain a viable US nuclear deterrent at an acceptable cost.3 In addition, experts on nuclear nonproliferation might favor minimum deterrence as a way station toward multilateral nuclear arms reductions and further measures of cooperative threat reduction, as among nuclear weapons states as well as nuclear-threshold or nuclear-aspiring powers.4 However, discussion of minimum deterrence can bring participants into the land of mystery and confusion, unless the discussion is disciplined by political and military-strategic clarity. A nuclear deterrent force can be 89

90

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

described as minimum or maximum depending upon the security dilemmas facing various states, including their expectations about probable opponents’ security objectives, military capabilities, and decisionmaking styles. Pakistan, Britain, and Israel all are regarded as nuclear weapons states, but their perceived security dilemmas, expectations about deterrence requirements, and decisionmaking patterns vary markedly. Minimum deterrence is not one remedy that fits all states, but a conceptual framework that could induce helpful expectations about deterrence stability and security cooperation, given favorable political winds. From the same perspective, the adequacy of a minimum or larger deterrent cannot be defined by numbers of weapons alone, but by the political and military-strategic context within which they might be used: for deterrence or otherwise. Assumptions can go wild as deuces in discussions of nuclear deterrence, since we thankfully have no historical examples of a two-sided conflict with nuclear weapons. The following assumptions guide further discussion here.5 First, the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack or nuclear coercion. The avoidance of war by means of deterrence is the ultimate rationale for nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is a subjective, not an objective, construct. Deterrence is in the eye of the state being deterred. The recipient of a deterrent threat, not the threatener, gets the final vote on whether deterrence has worked.6 Third, a failure of deterrence that results in the first nuclear attack of the twenty-first century will be a historic page-turner and political game changer that reboots some prior assumptions about politics and military strategy. Reactions to the first nuclear weapon fired in anger since Nagasaki might be dominated by the feeling that the nuclear taboo has been irretrievably shattered. On the other hand, there is the opposite possibility that such an event might sober leaders and promote greater determination toward international arms control and denuclearization—in other words, leaders and publics might run away from religion or embrace it all the more fervently. A fourth assumption is that there is not necessarily any single number of deployed weapons that can guarantee a state that its deterrent is proof against intimidation or first-strike destruction. Although the numbers of weapons deployed might matter in a political confrontation between nuclear-armed states, the numbers are meaningful only within a larger context of decisions about the deployment of nuclear-capable launchers, the survivability of launchers and command-control systems, and extant protocols for dealing with nuclear warning and response. States are not automatons, and military forces are living social organisms as well as collections of weapons and procedures. There is no guaranty that any number of nuclear weapons deployed in any configuration will be supported in extremis by rational or sensible decisionmaking. Thus the study of civil-

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

91

military relations in nuclear-armed states becomes all the more important as more states seek or acquire nuclear forces, notwithstanding how undesirable the further spread of these weapons might be. A fifth assumption is that nuclear weapons deployments and deterrence based on nuclear forces do not take place in a historical or military-technical vacuum. We are in the information age: nuclear weapons were products of the industrial age and its emphasis on mass destruction as the acme of strategy and military art. The information age privileges precision-targeted, longrange, and stealthy conventional weapons and C4ISR systems that enable network-centric warfare across a spectrum of nonnuclear conflicts. In this context, nuclear weapons appear as atavistic troglodytes that belong in Indiana Jones’s museum: good for mass killing but not for effects-based operations, as they say in the Pentagon. Yet nuclear weapons, however retro from the standpoint of high-end, information-based conventional forces, retain a stubborn appeal to states for reasons of deterrence and dissuasion, prestige, swaggering, and head-butting, even as they raise the prospect of scoring an “own goal” in the process of actual use. As Lawrence Freedman has noted, it remains the case in the present century that, although there is no such thing as a nuclear strategy per se, military strategists must take nuclear weapons into account.7 Given these assumptions, let us proceed to discuss and analyze the concept of minimum deterrence within the context of present and foreseeable national security and nuclear arms control issues. The elements of that context are (1) a recently ratified New START agreement between the United States and Russia, entering into force on February 5, 2011;8 (2) the possibility of further, post–New START reductions in US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, perhaps leading to multilateral force reductions among the P5 and other existing nuclear weapons states; (3) President Obama’s agenda for further denuclearization and arms limitation, including the willingness of the United States and other outliers to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and passage of an international Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty; and (4) NATO-Russian security cooperation with respect to the limitation of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployments in Europe, the shared development or deployment or both of theater missile defenses in Europe, and the transformation of political expectations in Europe to include an Atlantic-toUrals regime of assumed security community (defined as the absence of any expectation of intramural warfare among its members, as now exists among member states of NATO). On the possibility of redefining security space in Europe including western Russia, the conclusion of New START does not necessarily provide an ensured glide path toward a preferred destination, either for NATO or for Russia. Obstacles standing in the way of further progress toward denu-

92

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

clearization and demilitarization in Europe include (1) Russian doubts about US intentions with respect to European and global missile defenses; (2) disagreements among NATO members about the trustworthiness of Russia as a security partner; and (3) the asymmetrical military positions of NATO and Russia, with respect to their relative dependencies on conventional or nuclear weapons. Doubtless domestic politics in the member states of NATO and within Russia play into disagreements about each of these three issue areas. With respect to the first issue, missile defenses, the Obama administration revised the George W. Bush plan for missile defenses in Europe for both political and military-technical reasons. The revised plan, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and experts from the Pentagon’s missile defense agency, would permit quicker deployment of more reliable antimissile technologies, on sea-based platforms as well as land sites, than called for in the original Bush program.9 In political terms, the revised Obama ballistic missile defense plan was intended to mollify Russian concerns about the possibility that US missile defenses deployed in Europe would nullify Russia’s assured nuclear second-strike capability.10 Russian fears on this point can be traced all the way back to the Cold War and US president Ronald Reagan’s proposal for a nationwide Strategic Defense Initiative to render ballistic missiles obsolete. The technical immaturity of missile defenses relative to offenses is less impressive for Russian pessimists than are their doubts about US and NATO intentions. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the New START agreement, NATO and Russia have agreed to reboot discussions on cooperative missile defenses with respect to threats from Europe posed by outside nuclear forces, such as Iran.11 Second, doubts held by some Russians about NATO’s trustworthiness as a security partner are mirrored by some governments in NATO, especially those states subject to future coercion by a Russia with a modernized and rebuilt military. These doubts about Russia within the ranks of NATO impact expectations for conventional or nuclear arms control in Europe. Doubts in both directions, East-West and West-East, also influence debates over further expansion in the membership of NATO. Russia’s leadership has made it clear that the accession of Georgia or Ukraine to full membership in NATO would be troublesome to transatlantic relations and, in the case of Ukraine, probably destructive of Obama’s reset, and more. NATO’s perceived need for Russian support for the alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan is also hostage to Russia’s opposition to further NATO expansion. A third pertinent issue is the post–Cold War asymmetry between NATO and Russia with respect to Russia’s reliance on nuclear compared to conventional military forces as the makeweights of its national security policies. Russia’s weaker conventional forces relative to NATO’s place more burden

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

93

on its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons to cover a wider range of deterrent situations and conflicts. Conversely, the United States and NATO have advantages in information-based conventional warfare, including bellwether technologies for precision deep strike, C4ISR, and stealth. Russia’s greater reliance on nuclear weapons includes both its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. This poses the risk for NATO that even an outbreak of conventional warfare across the fault lines of former Soviet security space could rapidly trip into tactical or theater nuclear war, supported by the brooding omnipresence of Russian and US strategic nuclear weapons. Granted, in the present political climate, such an event is not only improbable, but also unimaginable. But Russian and other military planners get paid to develop contingency plans for worst cases as well as better ones. Underlying all of the preceding discussion is the matter of choosing among paradigms for the interpretation of past and current security-related activity, and for anticipation of probable futures, however hazardous the enterprise. One simply cannot get away from the problem of paradigms and futures, because, for example, a US or other policy of minimum nuclear deterrence makes more sense in some kinds of worlds than in others. Alternative nuclear worlds can be imagined that include (1) freezing the number of nuclear weapons states at the present number, and possibly reversing North Korea’s nuclear weapons status, with unsuccessful terrorist efforts to acquire or to use nuclear weapons; (2) continued “slow rolling” nuclear proliferation among state actors, with unsuccessful terrorist efforts to acquire or to use nuclear weapons; (3) slow nuclear weapons spread among state actors, with successful acquisition of nuclear materials by at least one terrorist group, although no actual use of nuclear weapons; (4) slow spread of nuclear weapons among state actors, with successful acquisition of nuclear materials by at least one terrorist group who uses them for nuclear blackmail without actual detonations; (5) rapid spread of nuclear weapons among state actors, with successful acquisition of nuclear materials by at least one terrorist group who detonates an actual nuclear bomb in one city. Doubtless other possibilities can be imagined, but the point is clear. In nuclear worlds 1 and 2, one can still hypothesize that minimum deterrence could be a soft sell among some, although not all, of the existing nuclear weapons states. Even in world 3, where nuclear weapons spread among states remains slow and terrorists have acquired but not used nuclear weapons for blackmail or attacks, a briefing for minimum deterrence might hold the attention of an expert audience. But in worlds 4 or 5, with slow or fast proliferation among states and actual terrorist uses of nuclear materials or nuclear weapons or both for blackmail or murder, minimum deterrence will be a hard sell for active-duty policymakers and military planners, whatever its appeal to theorists.

94

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Since political and military futures are indeterminate, policymakers have the opportunity to shape their environments toward constrained nuclear proliferation. 12 Factors favoring constrained nuclear weapons spread might include (1) the ethical and moral inhibitions on the part of many governments and military professionals against the possession or use of nuclear weapons for deterrence or for warfare; (2) the possibility that sensible or rational decisionmakers will find other and less destructive military means to accomplish their political objectives, including advanced conventional weapons, alliances for extended deterrence protection by existing nuclear powers, or modification of their political objectives for the purpose of war avoidance; and (3) the inertial effect of a presumed nuclear taboo in existence since Nagasaki, and the related uncertainty of a new world following the first nuclear attack in the twenty-first century.13 There are, in symbolism as well as in substance, no such things as small nuclear wars or nuclear attacks.14 Of course, the contrasting forces that might favor additional nuclear weapons spread among state actors, with possible spillover into the hands of terrorists, are recognized by many experts. States see nuclear weapons as deterrents against nuclear coercion or attack from other states. Nuclear weapons are thought by some states to confer prestige and to provide a costeffective entry into the ranks of major military powers. Other states might see nuclear weapons as a “last-ditch upper of the ante” against a catastrophic defeat in a conventional war.15 Nuclear weapons are also used for diplomatic swaggering and posturing in order to buff the image of states whose military credibility might otherwise be questioned by onlookers and possible adversaries. Finally, nuclear weapons can serve a variety of domestic policy needs for states and regimes, including the appeasement of powerful military or nuclear industry groups and hawkish parliamentary factions. One critical indicator of which world we’re headed for is the fate of the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime. In my judgment, that regime of international institutions, procedures, and consultations has performed admirably in the past and with more success than pessimists, including former US presidents and prominent nuclear weapons scientists, had anticipated. In some ways it performed too well: leading to complacency in some quarters that nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century will continue to spread slowly, if at all. I agree with Kenneth Waltz’s argument (to a point) that the existence of survivable nuclear forces can induce caution on the part of otherwise attack-prone or brinkmanship-oriented political leaders and their military advisers.16 Cold War experience supports this argument. On the other hand, Scott Sagan is equally persuasive on the point that the character of regimes and domestic policymaking processes, as well as organizational aspects of military decisionmaking, count for a great deal in

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

95

nuclear crisis management.17 The post–Cold War world may provide a plurality of regimes and political cultures that challenge the requirements for successful nuclear crisis management, especially the need for transitive expectations, clear communications, and shared understandings about nuclear danger. Defining minimum deterrence for a plurality of worlds poses a potentially open-ended research agenda. The present international system, or possible iterations of it during the first quarter of the twenty-first century, offers a sufficient number of uncertainties and unknowns to challenge theorists and planners. What might minimum nuclear deterrence mean in the present and near term, given the inexorable weight of precedent on policymakers and on their available options? How viable might any minimum deterrence regime be, even if agreed to by the leading nuclear weapons states or all of them? The following discussion attempts to clarify these issues with conceptual boundaries and empirical referents.

Defining and Measuring Minimum Deterrence

Defining Minimum Deterrence The meaning of minimum deterrence is not necessarily obvious without having addressed the question, “Compared to what?” Nuclear strategists would probably agree that minimum deterrence lies somewhere between assured destruction, as emphasized during Cold War discussions about nuclear strategy, and nuclear abolition. Exactly where is more debatable. At least four kinds of variables are in play in classifying nuclear strategies: (1) the political and military objectives for which forces are tasked; (2) the specifics of nuclear targeting plans, related to retaliatory objectives but not necessarily reflecting the actual intent of policymakers; (3) the numbers of weapons and launchers deployed and their assumed rates of survivability against first or later strikes; and (4) the command-control systems and operational protocols of the state’s nuclear forces, including their dependency on high states of alert or prompt launch for survivability. During the height of the Cold War, this might have led to a spectrum of possible nuclear deterrence strategies, as summarized in Table 7.1. This table cannot capture all the nuances or possible variations within, and among, these three kinds of strategies. In addition, states’ declaratory strategies are not always consistent with their operational policies.18 But the table illustrates some of the qualitative and quantitative points of similarity and difference among these kinds of generic nuclear strategies. For present purposes, minimum deterrence in today’s world implies a state arsenal with several hundred or fewer operationally deployed, intercontinental, or

Table 7.1 Attributes of Generic Nuclear Deterrence Strategies Counterforce War Fighting

Assured Destruction

Minimum Deterrence

Objectives and Targeting

Victory or “prevailing” in a protracted conflict by imposing escalation dominance on the opponent at any phase.

Inflict retaliatory strikes sufficient to impose “unacceptable” damage on any attacker, including its remaining forces; command, control, and communications; industry; and population.

Impose unacceptable damage to the attacker’s society and civilian population or national infrastructure, although with forces less than those required for assured destruction.

Number of Weapons Launchers Required

Numbers of survivable weapons capable of attacking or holding at risk military; command, control, and communications; industry; and population targets, if necessary through phases of a protracted war; may also require antimissile defenses for protecting population and forces; requires numbers of deployed warheads in the thousands, well above the threshold for assured destruction.

Numbers of survivable weapons capable of attacking military; command, control, and communications; industry; and population targets, and inflicting “unacceptable” damage; allows for flexible targeting but does not envision fighting a protracted nuclear war to a successful conclusion; requires numbers of deployed warheads in the thousands, fewer than required for strategies of counterforce war fighting.

Numbers of survivable weapons sufficient to destroy major infrastructure and the sinews of a modern national economy, while not necessarily emphasizing the destruction of urbanindustrial areas, but also not necessarily guaranteeing “city avoidance”; requires numbers of deployed warheads in the hundreds.

Command-Control and Alert-Launch Protocols

Political and military command, control, and communications must not only be survivable against initial attacks but also endure through various phases of a protracted conflict; some proportion of the force will be on hair trigger alert even in peacetime.

Political and military command, control, and communications must be survivable against second-strike retaliation and for post-attack negotiation for war termination; no forces on high alert required in peacetime but not precluded either.

Political and military command, control, and communications must be survivable against second-strike retaliation; no forces on high alert in peacetime.

Sources: Author. See also Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 74–106; Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 58–97; Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 57–83; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), esp. chaps. 3–4; Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?” in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 215–244.

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

97

transoceanic-deployed nuclear weapons. Substrategic nuclear weapons, including tactical or operational weapons that are deployed on land, at sea, or air-delivered, have both political and military-operational contexts requiring separate discussion. There is certainly the possibility that, in any multilateral, constrained nuclear proliferation regime, some weapons of medium or intermediate range might have to be included as strategic based on their potential effects against likely regional adversaries. Measuring Minimum Deterrence Apart from the problem of defining minimum deterrence, there is, as noted earlier, the question whether a minimum deterrence regime is viable, in either of two senses: (1) as between the United States and Russia under a post–New START regime between now and eventual fulfillment of the reductions required by New START, or slightly beyond that time line; and (2) as among the currently recognized nuclear weapons states either acknowledged or de facto. This latter membership includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus India, Israel, and Pakistan— with North Korea as a declared nuclear weapons state, but with multilateral efforts in progress to reverse North Korean nuclear proliferation. The figures that follow permit us to interrogate the deterrence and crisis stability of these two regimes: a bilateral US-Russian regime, and a multilateral, constrained nuclear proliferation regime that assumes eight nuclear weapons states, a reversal of North Korean nuclear proliferation, and a willingness by Iran to stop short of nuclear weapons status.19 Figures 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the deployments and outcomes characteristic of a US-Russian post–New START regime with a maximum number of 500 deployed long-range weapons for each state consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and longrange bombers. Figure 7.1 shows the numbers of initially deployed weapons for each state, under each of four hypothetical force structures. For Russia, the force structures include (1) a balanced triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers; (2) a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs with no bombers; (3) a dyad of ICBMs and bombers without SLBMs; and (4) a retaliatory force composed entirely of ICBMs. For the United States, the alternative force structures include (1) a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers; (2) a dyad of SLBMs and bombers without ICBMs; (3) a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs without bombers; and (4) a retaliatory force composed entirely of SLBMs. Although for purposes of New START the United States and Russia are committed to modernization and deployment of all three components of their existing strategic nuclear triads, future agreements, delayed modernizations, budgetary problems, or other factors might cause either state to revisit this decision.

Figure 7.1 US-Russian Total Strategic Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit

Figure 7.2 US-Russian Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

99

Even if not, alternative forces create comparative templates to weigh against the baseline case of strategic triads. In Figure 7.2, the numbers of surviving and retaliating US and Russian second-strike strategic nuclear weapons are tabulated for each of the force postures just listed, under each of four possible operational conditions of alertness and launch protocols: (1) generated alert, and launch on warning; (2) generated alert, riding out the attack and retaliating; (3) day-to-day alert, and launch on warning; and (4) day-to-day alert, and riding out the attack. One might anticipate that, in general, the numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads would diminish as we proceed from options 1 through 4, but that progression is not necessarily automatic, depending on the specific circumstances of attack and response. The numbers summarized in Figure 7.2 provide two interesting results. First, for all US and Russian force structures in the analysis, and for all levels of alertness and launch doctrine except one (Russia, on day-to-day alert and riding out the attack), each state retains several hundred survivable and retaliating warheads after having absorbed a first strike. During any nuclear crisis, neither Russia nor the United States is likely to be in this relatively most “relaxed” posture. A second finding is that the redundancy and flexibility offered by a strategic nuclear triad for each state, whatever its other benefits, does not necessarily guarantee more surviving and retaliating weapons than does a well-performing dyad of weapons. For example, on generated alert and riding out the attack, the US minimum deterrence triad is outperformed by a force without ICBMs, without bombers, and with only submarine-based missiles deployed. The differences are not statistically significant and the forces are entirely hypothetical, but they indicate that elbow room exists for future force restructuring of mixes in delivery systems. What about the viability of a constrained nuclear proliferation regime that includes current nuclear weapons states, with the exception of North Korea? Figure 7.3 shows a hypothetical tiered regime in which the United States and Russia are limited to a maximum of 500 deployed weapons each; the United Kingdom, France, and China to 300 each; and India, Israel, and Pakistan to 150 each. Force mixes for each state are admittedly hypothetical, based on history and supposition. In Figure 7.4, the numbers of second-strike surviving weapons for each state are calculated against a first strike from a notional attacker. As noted earlier, precision is complicated in this case because of the many unknowns in estimating future force structures for states other than the United States and Russia, and because some states’ substrategic weapons could have strategic effects against regional enemies. My profiles are therefore restricted to generic kinds of forces that might be deployed and their probable survivability rates against attacks from any direction.

Figure 7.3 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Total Strategic Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit

Figure 7.4 Constrained-Proliferation Model, Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, 500 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

101

The findings in Figure 7.4 show that even smaller states’ forces, although more first-strike-vulnerable than those of larger nuclear powers, can provide for sufficient numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons under most circumstances of alertness and launch doctrines—with the exception of smaller states’ arsenals under the most vulnerable posture of day-to-day alert and riding out the attack (DAY, ROA). Unfortunately this state of affairs might encourage breakout or sneaking around arms limitations on the part of the smaller powers. However, in every other case of alertness and launch doctrines, even the smaller states’ arsenals can provide for sufficient numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons to create many tens of “disasters beyond history” (ten weapons on ten cities, according to former Kennedy administration national security adviser McGeorge Bundy). In addition to the numbers of weapons deployed and their alertness and launch protocols, each state’s mix of launch platforms (land-based, seabased, or airborne) is important in reassuring its leaders against fears of first-strike vulnerability. Land-based ballistic missiles, unless deployed in very survivable basing modes such as hardened silos or with mobile platforms, may invite preemptive attack on themselves, compared to bombers or submarine-launched missiles. In addition, the option of deploying sealaunched or air-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs or ALCMs) instead of ballistic missiles might provide more survivable and crisis-stable options for states with smaller numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. If the US-Russian minimum deterrence relationship can satisfy stability criteria within a maximum deployment limit of 500 weapons, can the same expectation be broadened and deepened to include eight states in the constrained-proliferation model? The short answer is it depends on politics! As in the case of a reset in US-Russian relations contributing to a more permissive climate for New START accomplishment, so too would some resetting of political expectations among nuclear weapons states expedite achievement of a minimum deterrent regime. It’s easy to dismiss the constrained-proliferation model illustrated here as too optimistic, but it does not call for heroic political measures—other than a dose of political realism. Political realism cautions against a nuclear arms race undisciplined by any international control regime or great power concert. Agreement on a minimum deterrent standard for a fixed number of accepted nuclear weapons states, while drawing a firm line against others joining that club, appears as a controversial choice until the alternatives are considered. The most probable alternative is to rely on traditional patterns of power politics, supplemented by a nonproliferation regime of gradually diminishing status and by unilateral guarantees of extended deterrence, for the avoidance of both nuclear proliferation and nuclear war. So the minimum deterrent–based

102

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

constrained-proliferation model (illustrative deployments as shown in Figure 7.2) is, in this context, hopeful, but far from utopian. Of course, since politics rules strategy, the appropriate briefings for minimum deterrence will be more difficult to give in some states than in others. But China has followed a declaratory policy of minimum deterrence for many years (at least in numbers of long-range weapons deployed, albeit with plans for qualitative modernization in progress).20

Conclusion

Minimum deterrence may be an idea whose time has arrived, at least for academic strategists and students of nuclear arms control.21 Its broad appeal to governments and their military establishments remains to be demonstrated. As between the United States and Russia, a minimum deterrence regime with a maximum number of 500 deployed long-range weapons could certainly provide for adequate numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons to ensure deterrence and crisis stability. As political relations between the two states improve, the probability increases for an agreed minimum deterrence standard. Nor is it precluded that the emergence of a genuine security community across the breadth of Europe, including NATO and Russia, would make nuclear deterrence within that community neither necessary nor desirable.22 Generalizing minimum deterrence across eight instead of two states is more problematic. A great deal of diplomatic persuasion would have to accompany increased military-to-military consultation in order to obtain consensus in favor of any particular agreement. The illustration here is one possible path to a multilateral constrained-proliferation regime, but neither this model nor others with the same object can overcome paranoia and nuclear fixation in states’ domestic politics. Iran and North Korea will be test cases for the current nuclear nonproliferation regime, not only because they add new counters on the nuclear chessboard, but also because they invite regional instability that could eventually topple the chessboard and the nuclear taboo with it. The plurality of nuclear ownerships may have more to do with future deterrence and crisis stability than with sizes of arsenals; with nukes, small numbers can create considerable menace, and without necessarily being fired.

Notes 1. For important arguments and pertinent citations in recent studies, see James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 3–12; James

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

103

Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 74–89; Stephen M. Walt, “All the Nukes You Can Use,” May 24, 2010, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com. An important critique of minimum deterrence appears in Keith B. Payne, “Why US Nuclear Force Numbers Matter,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2016), pp. 14–24. For comparison of Cold War and twenty-first-century requirements for deterrence and their implications for US nuclear modernization, see Michelle K. Stinson, “The Future US Nuclear Strategic Environment,” in Adam B. Lowther and Stephen J. Cimbala, eds., Defending the Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization Still Matters (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 4–20. 2. See, for example, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. See also Henry A. Kissinger, “Containing the Fire of the Gods,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009, www.iht.com; “David Miliband Sets Out Six-Point Plan to Rid World of Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, February 4, 2009, www.guardian.co.uk; Jennifer Loven, “Obama Outlines Sweeping Goal of Nuclear-Free World,” Associated Press, April 5, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 66, April 5–6, 2009, [email protected]. For insightful commentary on this topic, see Thomas C. Schelling, “A World Without Nuclear Weapons?” Daedalus no. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 124–129; Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New York: Holt, 2007), esp. pp. 201–223; Lawrence Freedman, “Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament,” in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 56–69; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), chap. 4, esp. pp. 82–85. 3. Minimum deterrence has, in fact, a considerable pedigree, dating back to some of the earliest US debates on nuclear strategy and deterrence. Minimum deterrence strategies have variations and are sometimes referred to as “deterrence only” or “finite deterrence” strategies. See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 7–13; Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 281–284. See also John Baylis, “Nuclear Weapons, Prudence, and Morality: The Search for a ‘Third Way,’” in Baylis and O’Neill, Alternative Nuclear Futures, pp. 70–86, esp. pp. 78–81. 4. For example, an expert assessment in 1999 concluded that nuclear abolition was impractical of realization, leaving the practical question whether the United States could or should reduce its arsenal to hundreds of nuclear weapons any time in the next two or three decades. See Center for Nonproliferation Research–National Defense University and Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), esp. pp. 3.15–3.18. 5. For assessments of deterrence before and after the Cold War, see Andrew Futter, The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (London: Sage, 2015); Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012); Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now

104

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Gray, The Second Nuclear Age; Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chaps. 11–12; Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 6. On this point, see Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 164. 7. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 458–464. 8. The text of the New START treaty appears in US Department of Defense, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. See also Amy F. Woolf, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2015); “Lavrov, Clinton to Bring New START Into Force on February 5,” RIA Novosti, February 1, 2011, http://en.rian.ru. Indispensable as a resource is Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” from his blog Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, April 9, 2010 (regularly updated), http://russianforces.org. Contrasting appraisals of New START appear in Steven Pifer, “New START: Good News for U.S. Security,” Arms Control Today, May 2010, www.armscontrol.org; Keith B. Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Deal,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, April 8, 2010, [email protected]; Jonathan Schell, “Nuclear Balance of Terror Must End,” April 8, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, April 8, 2010, davidjohnson @starpower.net; Alexander Golts, “An Illusory New START,” Moscow Times, March 30, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 62, March 30, 2010, davidjohnson @starpower.net. 9. Robert M. Gates, “A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe,” New York Times, September 19, 2009, www.nytimes.com. The Obama Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense will retain and improve some technologies deployed by the George W. Bush administration, but shift emphasis to other interceptors, supported by improved battle management and command-control and communications systems and launch detection and tracking. See Patrick J. O’Reilly, unclassified statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, regarding fiscal year 2011 missile defense programs, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, April 15, 2010. Early assessments of the revised Obama missile defense plan include George Friedman, “The BMD Decision and the Global System,” Stratfor, September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 175, September 22, 2009, [email protected]; Alexander Golts, “Calling Moscow’s Bluff on Missile Defense,” Moscow Times, September 22, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 175, September 22, 2009, [email protected]; Alexander L. Pikayev, “For the Benefit of All,” Moscow Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 174, September 21, 2009, [email protected]; Strobe Talbott, “A Better Base for Cutting Nuclear Weapons,” Financial Times, September 21, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 174, September 21, 2009, [email protected]. 10. A critical expert appraisal of the Obama missile defense plan appears in George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control Today, May 2010, www.armscontrol.org. See also William J.

Minimum Deterrence: Prudent or Insufficient?

105

Broad and David E. Sanger, “Review Cites Flaws in U.S. Antimissile Program,” New York Times, May 17, 2010, www.nytimes.com. A more favorable expert assessment appears in Hans Binnendijk, “A Sensible Decision: A Wider Protective Umbrella,” Washington Times, September 30, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 181, September 30, 2009, [email protected]. Continuing Russian doubts are noted in “Russia Still Suspicious of U.S. Missile Defense Plans,” Reuters, September 29, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 181, September 30, 2009, [email protected]. For additional background, see Arms Control Association, U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance, n.d., www.armscontrol.org/print/4061. 11. Vladimir Kuzmin, “From START to Euro-ABM,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 31, 2011, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 18, January 31–February 2, 2011, [email protected]. 12. See Stephen J. Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009), for an assessment of possible areas of US-Russian cooperation and pertinent obstacles. Important trends in Russian security and defense policy are traced in Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), chap. 5, esp. pp. 162–174. 13. Possible scenarios are examined in George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). On the concept of a nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 327–360. 14. As Colin Gray has noted, a small nuclear war is an oxymoron. See Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 93–97. 15. I gratefully acknowledge Gregory Treverton for this felicitous phrase. He bears no responsibility for its use here. 16. Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 1–45. 17. Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 47–91. See also on these points Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chap. 5. 18. On this point, see especially Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 57–83; Desmond Ball, “U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?” in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 215–244. 19. I am grateful to James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM@) model for making calculations and drawing graphs. He is not responsible for its use here, or for any arguments or opinions in this chapter. For additional information on pertinent methodology, see Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 20. See the concise and informative article by Dean Cheng, “Chinese Views on Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 60 (First Quarter 2011), pp. 92–94. For a broader appreciation of Chinese military doctrine, see Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2010), pp. 99–133.

106

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

21. Deterrence studies have not infrequently disappointed even some of their most important contributors. For example, according to Patrick Morgan, “Neither purveyors of rational deterrence nor their critics provide a reassuring theory for guiding policy. As a result, debates about deterrence strategy never get resolved.” Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 167. 22. Some have argued that the United States and Russia are ready for this step now. See Samuel Charap and Mikhail Troitskiy, “Time to Put an End to MAD,” Moscow Times, January 18, 2011, www.themoscowtimes.com.

8 Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

Even before US president Barack Obama declared in favor of nuclear abolition, other policy elites, military experts, leading academics, and media pundits, among others, were advocating for a nuclear-free world.1 Very much like the “nuclear freeze” movement of the 1980s and other popular groundswells against nuclear weapons, the current interest in abolition is motivated by the best of intentions. However, good intentions butter parsnips neither in policy nor in strategy.2 US, NATO, Russian, and other policy and strategy must be formulated with reference to the practical problems that confront leaders who can expect to be held accountable for their decisions. Therefore, the following discussion reviews some of the difficulties in the way of realizing nuclear abolition in fact, as opposed to a demonstration of its presumed desirability in theory.3

Defining Nuclear Abolition

By nuclear abolition one might intend to convey a proposal in favor of any one of the following: elimination of all deployed nuclear weapons; elimination of all deployed and stored nuclear weapons; the preceding plus international control of weapons-grade materials or nuclear fuel cycles or both; all of the preceding plus dismantling of manufacturing and construction facilities, and perhaps laboratories, deemed suspect or renegade by appropriate international authority; and all of the preceding plus the availability of armed forces “on call” to international authority for the purpose of preemptive or preventive intervention to disarm rogue states or nuclear terrorists. Many people speak of nuclear “abolition” when they actually mean to refer to nuclear disarmament. They recognize that the world cannot return to a time before nuclear knowledge existed, and they doubt that states would voluntarily give up sovereignty to the extent necessary for the high end of the abolition curve. Nuclear disarmament sounds more practical, although 107

108

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

daunting in its own right, than nuclear abolition. To disarm implies the removal or destruction of actual weapons from the arsenals of states. Disarmament has a track record in history. Both conventional and nuclear disarmament have been accomplished by international agreement, as in arms control negotiations; by self-abnegation, when a state voluntarily gives up arms; or by imposition, when outsiders coerce or compel surrender of weapons. The last option frequently follows on the heels of military defeat. Nuclear arms control grew up as a preferred means of limitation during the Cold War because disarmament failed to appeal to the United States, to the Soviet Union, and to other members of the original nuclear club (also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council). Arms control seemed less threatening to besieged policymakers and military planners with defense problems to solve than did the idea of disarmament. As Jonathan Pearl has explained, “The shift toward arms control was particularly consequential, since there is a fundamental tension between policies centered on arms control and those centered on disarmament. By definition, disarmament changes the nature of the military balance, whereas most forms of arms control (e.g., arms reductions, limitations, and test bans) are directed at stabilizing an existing situation.”4 In addition, US approaches to Cold War arms control emphasized that the negotiation of arms limitations had to take into account more than the numbers of nuclear weapons. The qualities of weapons deployed or withheld, and their psychological impacts for nuclear stability, were judged to be of primary significance for the avoidance of war. Influential early Cold War thinkers, American and otherwise, emphasized that the major purpose of nuclear weapons after Nagasaki would be the avoidance of war, not the achievement of military victory in the traditional sense. Therefore, the appeal of deterrence as an experiment in applied psychology, relative to the maintenance of nuclear stability and the avoidance of nuclear war, became seminal. Thomas Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance” recognized the reciprocal responsibility of both sides for a failure of deterrence, in that they shared the power to pull both contestants over the rope and into the mud beyond it.5 With hindsight, deterrence worked well enough during the Cold War, at least from the US and allied NATO standpoint.6 We had the right number of nuclear wars: none. We had the right number of major wars in Europe: none. And the United States and NATO prevailed politically at the endgame of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union collapsed without kicking off a third world war with its death rattle (a consequence by no means impossible, given the indeterminacy of the outcomes of the upheavals in Moscow from August 19 to 21, 1991). However, and paradoxically, these “successes” were not necessarily or irrefutably caused by finesse in the practice of deterrence. As

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

109

Lawrence Freedman has noted, with respect to the status of deterrence as an explanatory concept after the end of the Cold War, “The concept [of deterrence] appeared overextended and vulnerable to the criticism of politicians and academics, and then to the loss of the adversary that had served as its focal point. In a more complex international environment deterrence seemed redundant as a policy while, as the result of the sustained critique, more suspect as a concept. From dominating Western strategic thinking it moved to the margins.”7 Instead, it is equally likely that the avoidance of World War III during the first nuclear age was overdetermined: by the remembered devastation of World War II that no one wished to repeat, with or without nuclear weapons; by the lack of any dispute between the Soviets or the Americans over contiguous heartland territory; by the ambiguity of whether, and to what extent, NATO would hang together in the face of Soviet intimidation or war (always scenario-dependent); and as counterpart, by whether the outbreak of major war in Europe would provide the opportunity for revolt against Soviet domination by the states of Eastern and Central Europe included in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The political contexts within which any nuclear war would have to be fought, as opposed to deterred or otherwise avoided, pushed national leaders toward nuclear restraint and against excessive faith in nuclear deterrence and brinkmanship. As Michael Krepon has noted, “There was no greater safeguard during the first nuclear age than the distance between the plans of nuclear strategists and the political instincts of national leaders. The separate worlds of the weapon strategists and political leaders became the most important fail-safe mechanism to prevent a nuclear holocaust.”8 Overdetermined or not, relative peace in Europe from 1946 to the end of the century, compared to the first forty-five years of the same century, had something to do with the existence of nuclear weapons. And not only the existence of weapons—but also the numbers and varieties of nuclear-capable launch systems, the preparation of detailed war plans, and the rehearsal of command and control procedures in the event that deterrence failed. These exercises and plans, at least on the US side, sometimes took on a surreal aspect, with aspirations for post-Armageddon skirmishing by surviving remnants of depleted Soviet and US nuclear arsenals, commanded by ghostly apparitions from bunkered bivouacs. Nevertheless, the Americans and the Soviets took seriously the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war and prepared for the worst. Arguably, these preparations, grisly as they were, strengthened the credibility of deterrence that made possible the bypass of nuclear destruction between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War. Deterrence was a substitute for abolition, although not an adequate one in the minds of those who favored more complete nuclear disarmament.

110

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

The Priority of Politics

This résumé of past experience has a point for future advocates of nuclear abolition, however they define the term. Nuclear weapons in the Cold War acted more as pacifiers than they contributed to the onset of war and mass destruction. They did so because politics rules over military strategy, including arms control.9 The two nuclear-armed superpowers of the Cold War found that they had to contest for global influence beneath the nuclear threshold. As US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev eventually made official, a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought. On the other hand, the capacity for making credible threats of nuclear first use or retaliation outlived the Cold War and created a second nuclear age. This second, post–Cold War nuclear era offered an international system that was potentially less well fitted for compatibility with nuclear weapons than was the Cold War. When President George H. W. Bush called for a “new world order” in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, he envisioned solidarity among existing nuclear weapons states that would prove to be elusive. In addition, he could not have foreseen the threats that would appear over the horizon, including early in the next century. International politics, by the time of President George W. Bush, had moved well beyond the constraints of Cold War political alignments. Relations between the United States and Russia were officially nonhostile, although tinged with feelings of competitive envy on the part of Putin’s Russia. Instead of the focused threat of the Cold War, Washington and NATO were now faced with diffuse threats from various quarters. Among these dispersed and uncertain sources of threat were the nonstate actors, including transnational terrorists like al-Qaeda, capable of inflicting strategic harm on the United States and its allies. Two aspects of these post–Cold War terrorist organizations were chilling for US and allied defense planners. First, jihadist terrorists were sometimes motivated not only by concrete objectives, but also by apocalyptic or chiliastic visions that included their own martyrdom. Their demands were as nonnegotiable as their tactics were brutal and their hatred feral. A second aspect of the “new terrorism” of the twenty-first century was the possibility that terrorists or other irregular warriors might acquire weapons of mass destruction—including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Although none of these possibilities was encouraging, the acquisition or use by terrorists of nuclear weapons was the most discouraging possibility. The civilized world reacted in horror to the attacks of 9/11, not only on account of the destruction actually accomplished, but also because of the residual fear of “what next?” And “next” might very well be an exploding nuke in a major US or allied city. Nuclear learning was so

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

111

widely distributed by the dawn of the millennium that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon by getting hold of fissile material and assembling it themselves, or by stealing or otherwise acquiring an assembled weapon from a nuclear weapons state or a black market supplier. These fears of nuclear terrorism were realistic, and all the more threatening because nuclear terrorism reboots the politics of nuclear war and deterrence. Terrorists have no central government or state to defend. Unlike states, terrorists are organized along the lines of networks instead of hierarchies. Therefore, they present a poor target for nuclear deterrence or coercive diplomacy as practiced during the Cold War. In addition, their motives, if based upon visions of the end of days instead of the end of regimes or governments, elide the cost-benefit calculus of most deterrence models. Recognition of these and other possible limitations in applying deterrence to nonstate actors, the George W. Bush administration turned to the option of preemption or preventive war to disarm regimes that might harbor terrorists or, when possible, to strike directly at the terrorists. Preemption and preventive war are alternate forms of anticipatory attack.10 Preemption assumes that an opponent has already set in motion an attack, or is about to do so. The decision is irrevocable. Preemption is therefore a decision to strike first in order to limit the damage that would result, compared to striking second. Preventive war, on the other hand, anticipates a future attack by another state or entity but is not based on intelligence that an enemy attack is actually under way, or has actually been irrevocably decided upon. By way of example, Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1967 was a case of preemption. In the early years of the Cold War, various arguments were made by US leaders for preventive war against the Soviet Union before the latter became a peer competitor in nuclear capability. The distinction between preemption and preventive war can be indistinct at the margin and submerged in the documentation, depending on the historical case. The July crisis of 1914 provides illustrations of reasoning in favor of preventive war or preemption by political leaders and military planners among the Entente and Alliance powers. The George W. Bush administration found it difficult to act preemptively against terrorist networks, although one could hunt them down and destroy them after the fact. However, preemption against states that might be suspect of sponsoring or harboring terrorists was another option. The most visible and controversial case in point was, of course, Iraq under Saddam Hussein. US and allied intelligence estimated in 2002 and 2003 that Iraq had substantial quantities of WMD still undiscovered by UN inspectors. The possibility that Iraq might have a reconstituted nuclear development program, despite its apparent destruction after the Gulf War of 1991, could not be ruled out by intelligence estimators. Based on these

112

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

now-controversial assessments, the Bush administration opted for war and regime change in Iraq. Bookshelves groan as to whether this was a war of choice or a war of necessity, but that judgment is not the issue here. For present purposes, it suffices to note that, faced with a possible threat of WMD use by Hussein or allied terrorists, Bush opted for preventive war (mistakenly called preemption by some) against Iraq. The George W. Bush decision to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein became controversial, not to say white-hot, in US politics after postwar weapons inspectors found no evidence of any WMD in Iraq. Critics charged that Bush and his advisers deliberately politicized and biased prewar intelligence estimates to inflate the threat of WMD and any Saddamterrorist connections. There is within this episode, to be sure, a warning about the dangers of confusing intelligence estimation with marketing and sales. Nevertheless, the US decision for preventive war was not made with the hindsight of postwar inspections: policymakers were obliged to depend upon fuzzy sets and imperfect indicators of the “perhaps” variety. Anyone who has dealt with intelligence estimations in the US or other governments with large intelligence communities will report that national “estimates” are almost always based on a mixture of fact and conjecture. And the quantity of conjecture is higher as the stakes inherent in the decision rise: for those making it, and for others who will feel the consequences. Seeing history in retro through the lenses of George W. Bush decisionmakers provides a case study in support of the heading for this section. As political actors, intentions, and policies change, strategy must follow. Bush’s strategy may have succeeded or failed in Iraq, or with regard to the war against al-Qaeda still in progress. However, the conjunction of rogue states and outlaw movements with the possibility of shared WMD is a realistic, and suitably frightening, one for US and other twenty-first-century military planners. Worse is the recognition by counterterror and counterinsurgency experts that both of these forms of conflict begin at home. The internal security of states (homeland security in the US vernacular) is the front line in the war against transnational or other terrorist groups. Thus the United States and NATO cannot impose success in counterterror or in counterinsurgency on other governments (unless regime change is on the menu, but even then, difficulties arise—viz. Iraq from 2003 to 2006), but must work with sometimes recalcitrant regimes to improve their domestic intelligence and police work. The case of Iraq from “mission accomplished” to the fall of 2006 also shows that the military aspects of strategy, important as they are, are insufficient by themselves to resolve the turbulence of civil war and humanitarian disasters in failed states or otherwise troubled polities. As US general David Petraeus said, with reference to US military operations in Iraq and the

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

113

objective of a stable and democratic regime, “We cannot kill our way out of this problem.” The political, cultural, socioeconomic, and other “soft” aspects of Iraqi society and US influence would weigh heavily in the balance. So too would the battle of ideas, between advocates of democracy and proponents of authoritarianism that might contribute to terrorism. The competition in soft power, including ideas, requires of US forces a combination of military, diplomatic, psychosocial, cultural, and other skill sets that their forefathers-in-arms might never have acknowledged, let alone practiced. If Shakespeare’s admonition that “we must be cruel only to be kind” seemed to apply to mass industrial warfare with its large amounts of collateral damage, the reverse epigram might be better used for the “new war” or “long war” against terror networks and insurgents—the counterterror side must be kind (to the general population, by providing security and the means for reconstruction of economies and societies) in order to be cruel (to the enemy). What has the preceding discussion to do with nuclear danger? Two things: one fairly obvious, and one relatively less so. The more obvious point is that terrorists armed with nukes require increased seriousness on the part of states in favor of nuclear containment and nonproliferation— whether those states are committed to nuclear abolition or simply to the avoidance of nuclear terrorism. Second, and relatively less obvious, is that the creation of additional nuclear weapons states, although not necessarily leading to the diffusion of nuclear technology and know-how into the hands of terrorists, certainly increases the likelihood of such an outcome. The second point invites misunderstanding, addressed in the following section.

Weapons Are Effects, Not Causes

Weapons are dependent variables, more often than not. States go to war, as Thucydides noted, for motives of fear, honor, and interest. States arm because they fear for their security in an international system of endemic insecurity. This systemic condition cannot be erased by world government, by benign hegemony on the part of any single great power, or by prudence born of fear about nuclear self-destruction—despite the hopes pinned on each of these remedies by their proponents. At best, a balance of power among rival states and across different issue areas (political, military, economic, social, and so forth) maintains whatever systemic stability and predictability exists. These balances of power fluctuate through time and geostrategic space with respect to their ability to induce or to compel systemstabilizing behavior. Empires are not exceptions to the preceding generalizations. Some empires adapt to changed conditions better than others, but all

114

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

social systems are inherently entropic, and the international system offers the temptation of self-destruction by means of imperial overbite. The idea that nuclear weapons can be the cause of war is not mistaken in its entirety. It has the status of a valid warning about the decisionmaking processes within nuclear-armed states. Once having acquired a nuclear arsenal, states have every reason to want to maintain authoritative legal, and effectively secure, command and control of their nuclear forces. Politicomilitary command and control over nuclear weapons must accomplish at least three things: (1) nuclear weapons must not be launched or detonated accidentally; (2) nuclear forces must be timely responsive to duly authorized commands; and (3) peacetime nuclear custody must be proof against corruption of security, including theft or loss of nuclear materials or weapons. Every state that has chosen to develop and deploy nuclear weapons has had to deal with the checklist of missions noted in the preceding paragraph. The Cold War Americans and Soviets, over several decades of trial and error, developed processes and procedures to ensure that command and control functions were performed according to the requirements of policy and of military effectiveness. Given the differences between their respective political systems, the United States and the Soviet Union prepared to manage their forces somewhat differently in time of peace, crisis, and war. Nevertheless, the uniquely destructive character of nuclear weapons and the prodigious size of their respective arsenals mandated that, at least in dealing with one another, prudence was mandated in the management of nuclear operations. The unfolding of the Cuban missile crisis was both a demonstration of this point, and a syllabus of instruction for US and Soviet leaders about the potential for nuclear crisis management to escape their shared control. Today, most foreign offices worry less about another Cuba 1962 than they do about the possibility of “loose nukes” in states with large numbers of stored or deployed weapons or significant quantities of weapons-grade material. These weapons or materials could, as previously noted, find their way into the tool kits of terrorists or rogue states, including those inured to influence by deterrent threats. Even the post-Soviet Russian nuclear arsenal and weapons complex is a source of concern in this regard. Under the Nunn-Lugar program the United States has provided assistance to Russia for securing or dismantling nuclear weapons and materials for almost two decades. How loose are the nukes in nuclear weapons states with fewer years of experience in storing, guarding, transporting, and managing nuclear weapons is a matter for considerable argument. Pakistan, for example, has apparently taken promising steps to make its weapons more secure and has gone some way to provide transparency in this regard, for the benefit of the United States and other concerned parties. On the other hand, skeptics fret

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

115

that the problem in Pakistan (and elsewhere) is not so much the lack of technical safeguards as it is uncertainty about the political reliability, or lack thereof, of key players in the policy process—including the military and intelligence community. In the case of North Korea, a situation of considerable opacity exists with respect to the actual nuclear command and control procedures that are followed under normal peacetime conditions—let alone during a crisis or war. The predominant fear of outside observers is not the inadvertent loss or theft of nuclear materials or weapons. Instead, concern rests on the potential for North Korea to become a supplier state for other state and nonstate actors who want to acquire nuclear capability or know-how. These concerns are well grounded. The Israelis bombed a construction site in Syria in 2007 that was assessed by US intelligence as a reactor complex being built with support from North Korea. Once completed, the complex might have provided nuclear weapons–grade materials to Iran or other interested buyers. North Korea is also a leading exporter of ballistic missiles and missile technology, and past beneficiaries have included Pakistan, Iran, and Libya. North Korea’s own nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are additional reasons for US and other suspicions about its intentions. Its nuclear capabilities had been the subject of six-sided diplomatic parleys including North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan during the George W. Bush administration. The outcome of these negotiations remained inconclusive and they were suspended as pointless during the Obama administration. The regime of leader Kim Jong-un seemed hostile in its declaratory policy toward the United States and its allies, combining periodic threats of aggression with nuclear tests in 2013. The objective of the United States was to obtain the complete, verifiable, and irreversible destruction and dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons complex. However, it was obvious that this would not be accomplished, if at all, in a fortnight. Negotiations with North Korea are, even under the best of conditions, protracted and arduous. The benefits of a successful outcome are significant, and the risks of failure, not inconsiderable. If North Korea has become an irreversible nuclear weapons state, the possibility that Japan or South Korea will also go nuclear cannot be excluded. The nonproliferation regime might fall over backward from Asia, rippling into the Middle East or even into Europe. Or so, at least, is the stated fear of nonproliferation experts. The case of Iran makes the point, as does the situation in North Korea, that the character of regimes and of domestic policymaking processes cannot be separated from the issue of nuclear danger. Additional nuclear weapons states present not only a risk of deterrence failure and war, but also a greater potential for nuclear weapons spread. We have seen that the

116

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

“weapons don’t make war” argument can be overstated: insecure weapons or materials can leak to the bad guys, and unreliable militaries armed with nuclear weapons could possibly commit an act of unauthorized launch with deadly effect. But these arguments reinforce the point that the who of nuclear ownership is as important as the what of nuclear weapons. No one worries very much about a possible nuclear first strike by Britain against the United States, or vice versa. Few French citizens lie awake worrying about an attack from the United States, from England, or (nowadays) even from Russia. Most important, since the end of the Cold War few Americans and Russians, except for subject-matter experts and military planners, concern themselves very much with the possibility of nuclear first use by either state against the other. The cynic’s retort to the preceding point would be that capabilities are what count: intentions can change. The United States and other states must arm to do their worst against the most capable possible challenge that they might have to face. On the other hand, the “capabilities are what count” argument could be restated with mischief as “capabilities are what can be counted.” Intelligence organizations during the Cold War were fixated on numbers of missiles and launch systems to the sometime detriment of more reliable knowledge about intentions. This proved to be the case in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Among other surprises, knowledge by the United States of its apparent nuclear superiority relative to the Soviet Union, deliberately leaked to the press in 1961, had the effect not of deterring Moscow from adventurism, but the opposite. Khrushchev’s bold gamble in Cuba was partly motivated by a desire to reframe the perception of Soviet nuclear inferiority by a knight’s move of Soviet nuclear forces into Cuba. As in the case of the US fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941, one person’s deterrent was another’s instigation to design around it.

Deterrence Still Matters—but How?

The George W. Bush administration, perhaps overly impressed by the apparent novelty of the threat of unconventional warfare using weapons of mass destruction, ushered in a premature funeral service for deterrence. Deterrence had grown up in the context of the Cold War and nuclear weapons, especially focused on the bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the ambit of deterrence as a concept was broader than the Cold War or the US-Soviet rivalry. Deterrence expressed the understandable desire of states in the first nuclear age to attempt to achieve their policy objectives without nuclear war, but also without conceding any vital interest in the process of coercive bargaining. Nuclear deterrence provided a com-

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

117

promise between deterrence and Armageddon, albeit a Faustian bargain to some of its critics. Critics who regarded nuclear deterrence as unacceptable were not confined to the political left. Many military traditionalists preferred deterrence by denial, based on the capability of conventional forces to deny the opponent its objectives. The problem with deterrence by denial based exclusively on conventional forces was that, even before the nuclear age, it had a mixed track record. States repeatedly opted for war against enemies with superior capabilities, including those with larger and better-trained forces, superior technology, and (worst of all) a way of war that was one generation ahead of its contemporaries. Since the Melians refused to surrender to the Athenians, polities have defied odds or persevered in the face of them for reasons of state, for glory, for booty, or simply on account of cultural predispositions to fight. The historical record in favor of conventional deterrence prior to 1945, as well as afterward, was not one to inspire optimism or overconfidence. Nevertheless, some expert and lay opinion was still so horrified by the collateral damage attendant to even small nuclear wars that preferential treatment of conventional deterrence was argued for, if at all possible. NATO was faced with difficult decisions about the relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence throughout its Cold War history. Europeans wanted the US nuclear umbrella not only as a deterrent against a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, but also as a guaranty against any outbreak of major war in Europe. From their side of the Atlantic, many NATO European defense ministers and foreign offices regarded US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as coupling devices that would preclude separation of war in Europe from global war. The assumption was that the Soviet Union, faced with a stark choice between no war and total war, would opt for no war even if it meant the surrender of vital interests. Beginning with the Kennedy-Johnson administration and the US movement toward flexible response strategy, the United States preferred to mix conventional with nuclear deterrence and, in the process, to establish in the minds of some Europeans the fear of a firebreak between war in Europe and total war. This prospect Europeans regarded with apprehension, allowing the Soviet Union to divide the alliance and bite off parts of it without risking total war and societal destruction. The United States under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sought to improve both conventional defense and nuclear retaliatory forces, including those deployed in Europe. The US assumption was that a graduated deterrent instead of an all-or-nothing choice between defeat and doomsday was more believable to Moscow, and therefore more successfully deterring. At the center of the transatlantic flap, over whether graduated or eruptive deterrence was more credible in Moscow, was the other side of the coin:

118

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

How believable was it in Brussels, or in Washington? NATO never deployed sufficient numbers of conventional forces in Europe for a protracted war of the duration of World War II. Europeans refused to pay the defense budgets that such a force would have required, and the United States had neither the personnel nor the financial means to provide comprehensive conventional defenses for Europe. In addition to the apparent hopelessness of preparing to fight World War III with conventional weapons, the nuclear genie could not be put back into the proverbial bottle after 1945. Once the Americans and Soviets had deployed large, diverse, and presumably first-strike-survivable long-range nuclear forces, it seemed superfluous to prepare for a replay of the Battle of Kursk on the Central Front in Europe. NATO conventional forces, including US ones, forward deployed in Europe during the Cold War, therefore served a purpose other than the traditional definition of conventional deterrence by denial. In fact, they served several very important political purposes that otherwise contributed to conventional and to nuclear deterrence.11 First, forward-deployed US GIs would be killed in the earliest stages of any Soviet attack across the Fulda Gap or other probable access corridors from East to West. These casualties would become martyred heroes in the minds of an outraged American public thus susceptible to appeals for military escalation—including, if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation. Second, US and allied European conventional forces provided a flexible capability for managing and containing a diplomatic crisis short of war—as in Berlin during the late 1940s, late 1950s, and early 1960s. Conventional forces could, under some circumstances, give more credible support to coercive diplomacy than nuclear forces could— because conventional forces could be positioned into delicate spots, requiring the Soviets to accept the last clear chance to avoid a war. For example, Khrushchev regarded the allied presence in West Berlin as a bone in the throat of the Soviet Union, but also as a vulnerable point for diplomatic demarches and political bluster, supported by the shadow of Soviet military power nearby. His rhetoric in this regard was often menacing, but his military steps were measured. While some of the ebullient Soviet leader’s cautious behavior can be explained by the existence of US and NATO nuclear capabilities, Khrushchev also had to reckon with the risks created by NATO’s more-than-ceremonial ground, maritime, and tactical air forces deployed in Western Europe. This was especially true in a divided Germany with a truncated Berlin nested within its eastern, and Soviet-controlled, sector. A seizure of Berlin by Soviet forces would eventually overpower US and allied conventional forces there, but not before the escalation of fighting had led to significant casualties, televised civilian pandemonium on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and hasty discussions among military planners and their political principals about nuclear release and possible first use.

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

119

In other words, as George H. W. Bush once said, quoting Woody Allen, “Ninety percent of life is showing up.” NATO conventional forces in Europe, including those in Germany, were more than a public relations obstacle to Soviet military adventurism—even if a crisis were contained short of nuclear first use. The evident possibility of nuclear first use by either side changed the symbolism of the first use of conventional weapons fired in anger. Under the shadow of possible but uncertain nuclear escalation, each hour and minute of conventional war fighting, however localized, became a burning fuse leading to an unmanageable explosion. This uncertainty, about the degree and pace of escalation between two sides caught up in a process over which they might eventually lose control, was the centerpiece of Cold War deterrence. Nuclear escalation was neither definitely precluded nor assuredly guaranteed: instead it was circumstantially dependent, and the circumstances were nonlinear and probabilistically pathological. Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns” abounded. In short, neither nuclear nor conventional deterrence during the Cold War was as simple or one-dimensional as has been portrayed in many accounts. Nuclear deterrence then and now was, and is, multidimensional, nonlinear, and subjective in many of its aspects. It was not merely, or mainly, about toting up numbers of weapons and launchers and punching them through computer programs in order to determine hypothetical winners and losers in a nuclear war. Instead, Cold War deterrence, including the nuclear aspect of it, relied on designed ambiguity, deliberately created uncertainty, and bounded rationality with respect to the challenge of understanding the “other” and their mind-set. Whether it worked as intended would require postwar panels of military experts, historians, and applied psychologists, not to exclude rubbernecking political scientists, to ascertain on a case-bycase basis. The complexity of apparently simple Cold War deterrence holds a cautionary tale for later students of history and politics. Deterrence after the Cold War and in the present century is therefore not complicated compared to its mythical Cold War simplicity. It was always complicated and will remain so. If deterrence is ever oversimplified, it will work no longer. Like double agents and Swedish films, deterrence demands a certain mystique and ineffability for its realization in practice. It is software more than hardware, and it is more politics and strategy than it is tactics. The essence of deterrence in the new world order is not that it is no longer pertinent to the challenges faced by the United States and allied states. It is instead for them to comprehend the political landscape of the Middle East, South Asia, and other theaters of military action that might fast-forward challenges that were once on the periphery of concern for policymakers. In addition, deterrence, like defense, lives with advanced technology but is not about technology per se. Cold War theorizing was sometimes

120

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

handicapped by technological fetishism, and similar risks bestride post– Cold War thinking. An information-age “revolution in military affairs” may privilege the United States and other states with head starts in the development and deployment of systems for C4ISTAR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance), long-range precision strike, stealth, and other by-products of the information, communication, and electronics revolutions applied to warfare.12 However, evident US superiority in advanced-technology conventional warfare will not make nuclear weapons superfluous. Instead, states outgunned by the “shock and awe” machine of the United States will turn to asymmetrical approaches for deterrence of, defense against, or attack on US interests—and these approaches might include threat or first use of WMD. The United States and its allies must now find the means for deterrence of fighting networks in addition to state hierarchies, or, if networks are truly beyond deterrence, of defeating them.13 However, since the supply of potential recruits for terrorist cells, including some who might be interested in WMD, is theoretically endless, deterrence by denial cannot rest on a futile strategy of attrition (viz. Petraeus’s warning). Deterrence by credible threat of retaliation is also needed in the repertoire of states’ responses to terrorist threats—but retaliation that is lethal and focused for the purpose of disrupting networks, not destroying societies. In all likelihood, this excludes nuclear deterrence, except for the task of deterring nuclear weapons states in cahoots with terrorists.

Nuclear Complexity

Experience suggests that the objectives of nuclear arms limitation and confidence building are more within the reach of governments than the objective of nuclear abolition, however desirable it might prove to be. Nuclear abolition would not, for reasons discussed earlier, obviate the need for deterrence. In an abolition regime, conventional deterrence would be combined with nuclear forbearance so long as states regarded this situation as politically and militarily acceptable. When, on the other hand, states lost faith in a system based on nuclear abstinence and returned to bomb making and deployment, then they could redraw upon the storehouse of knowledge accumulated during the first and second nuclear ages. A fourth nuclear age, of post-abolition disillusionment replaced by nuclear realpolitik, might follow: and it might be more dangerous than either of the first two, as states with nuclear knowledge but denied arsenals now race to get systems promptly deployed for deterrence or coercion missions.

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

121

This future, of post-abolition nuclear deterrence, is not here yet. What is on offer is a mosaic of (1) US and Russian nuclear forces, downsized from their high Cold War sizes but periodically modernized and figuratively, if not literally, pointed at one another; (2) second-tier P5 nuclear forces held by the United Kingdom, China, and France, also undergoing or planning modernization; (3) the nuclear forces of India and Pakistan, officially acknowledged by their offsetting tests in 1998;14 (4) the nondeclaratory but de facto nuclear weapons–state status of Israel; (5) the suspected aspirations of Iran for nuclear weapons, notwithstanding the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 powers (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, and Germany) of July 14, 2015, imposing limits on Iran’s nuclear program;15 (6) the apparent nuclear arsenal now available to North Korea, absent diplomatic reversal of this situation;16 (7) the nuclear ambivalents or undecideds among states with perceived security dilemmas, uncertain about the viability of the nonproliferation regime; and (8) nonstate actors, including terrorists, who aspire to acquire fissile materials, assembled nuclear weapons, or other WMD for purposes ranging from the explicitly political to the apocalyptic. Of additional importance for nonproliferation historians, but not included here, are states that reversed a course of action initially plotted toward nuclear weaponization. This picture is not an entirely depressing one. Nuclear weapons have spread less rapidly than Cold War pessimists had forecast.17 As early as the 1960s, US and other experts and politicians were warning that as many as thirty countries might have nuclear forces within decades. Why was there a slow pub crawl into the nuclear club instead of mad rush? Many reasons present themselves, including the daunting obstacles facing a state that would construct a believable nuclear force, instead of a Potemkin village. Financial resources, military and scientific knowledge, and a civil-military relationship that can provide for both positive and negative control of nuclear forces—each of these requirements, and certainly all of them together, limit membership in the nuclear weapons fraternity to a small subset of the entire international system. On the other hand, the globalization of information and communications now spreads news reports and images across the planet with dramatic suddenness. Among these images are those of states seeking to project strength for the benefit of friends, enemies, and observers. Nuclear weapons can appeal to states with time-urgent security dilemmas that cannot be overcome by means of conventional deterrence, or defense, alone (e.g., Pakistan). Nuclear forces can also appeal to regional powers with large ambitions who seek to deter the United States or other outsiders from expeditionary interventions, including efforts at regime change (e.g., Iraq under Saddam Hussein before 1991, or Iran and North Korea now). Unfortunately,

122

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

terrorists and other actors apart from accountable government have also expressed interest in nuclear weapons, and not for deterrence missions. It should not be assumed, though, that only revisionist state or nonstate actors, who seek to overthrow the existing order or to disrupt international stability otherwise defined, retain an interest in nuclear weapons. No country included among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, who also constitute the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)–approved original nuclear weapons states, has offered to unilaterally disarm and dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Despite the inclusion in the NPT of an expectation that the current nuclear weapons states would follow through with their own eventual disarmament, the appeal of nuclear weapons has outweighed the temptation to take risks for nuclear peace. This apparent hypocrisy about disarmament on the part of the P5 has not gone unnoticed, or unremarked, by prominent nonsignatories of the NPT and others. The Cold War was the major justification for the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China to maintain nuclear weapons, but what now?18 The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have not changed the essence of the international political system—these events have merely rearranged the deck chairs on the Titanic. International systems, despite the insistence of some international relations theorists, do not dictate to states, and especially to the stronger states within the system, their primary decisions about ends, ways, and means. The international system is subsystem-dominant. Powerful actors shape, and reshape, the international order, unless and until resistant national or international forces rise to balance against them. No disrespect for international systems theory is intended by the preceding discussion. The international system matters a great deal as a level of analysis for theoretical explanation and prediction in world politics.19 There are behavioral regularities among nations that are created by their systematic interactions, and these include important regimes for international law, arms control, and other matters that cross state lines. Indeed, in certain aspects, finance and technology globalization create a more important “system” effect than hitherto, washing across national borders to impact directly upon consumers and governments. In some ways, we are indeed in a borderless world. Thus the objection here is not to the acknowledgment of the importance of international systems. Danger lies, instead, in the attribution to systems of powers that they cannot exercise and basing expectations for peace on that attribution. For example, it is to Jonathan Schell’s credit that he acknowledges the interactive relationship between nuclear abolition, which he urges, and world government.20 Without world government, nuclear abolition lacks an enforcement capability that portends a short history. But as

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

123

Schell would doubtless acknowledge, getting to world government is no easier, and arguably harder, than getting to nuclear zero in the numbers of deployed or other nuclear weapons. States might give up their nuclear weapons but would doubtless cling to their sovereignty with even more tenacity. For a state to give up its sovereignty is to give up its identity and that of its people. Herein lies the rub. The post–Cold War international order has been marked primarily by internal wars within states, as opposed to major interstate wars (with notable exceptions, such as the US and allied wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003). Many of these internal or substate wars have been fought over issues of identity (who are we?) in addition to the more traditional stakes of interstate wars (territory, economic resources, military power, dynastic succession). Wars of identity, including ethnic, religious, tribal, and clan affiliations (often mixed together in various ways), are not only about the primordial sources of tensions between disparate cultures trapped within the same polity. They are also about which culture or “nation” will rule by means of legitimated, or other, state power. From Bosnia to Bishkek, the paradoxical impact of the flattening economic and technological world is that sensitivities about origins, identity, and personal meaning are more inflammatory and more “political.” Perhaps this is not entirely paradoxical: perhaps, in an ever more globalizing world, particularistic affiliations seem in peril, and therefore people and leaders cling to them more tenaciously.21 Regardless of the impact of globalization on politics by way of cultural anthropology, the issue of empowered disparate ethno-national and religious groups, each seeking ownership of its own state, is pertinent to the quest for nuclear abolition. If more states are more vulnerable to internal dissatisfaction or revolt based on primordial values and affinities, then nuclear weapons may appeal more, instead of less, as symbols of sovereignty above the fray for national leaders. In 1998, the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan were followed by finger pointing and head shaking in Western foreign offices. In Indian and Pakistani villages, people reportedly danced in the streets. The appeal of nuclear weapons as a symbol of sovereignty is not limited to India and Pakistan, for obvious reasons. The symbolism is based upon destructive potential second to none among candidate weapons for mass destruction. That potential for nuclear destruction, attendant to even a “small” nuclear war, gets attention. The first nuclear weapon fired in anger since Nagasaki will grab the headlines and the attention of governments like no other event since 9/11.22 The objective of nuclear abolition, therefore, collides with the aspiration on the part of more peoples, including Palestinians, Kurds, and others located in dangerous neighborhoods, for their own territorial state. Sovereignty is prized more, not less, in the new world order than hitherto. Against this, inter-

124

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

national systems theorists and policy analysts can make a reasonable argument based on the tragedy of the commons. If nuclear “beggar thy neighbor” policies result in an unmanageable or unlimited spread of nuclear weapons, the entire system may reach a point of punctuated equilibrium after which outbreaks of nuclear war become, if not routine, at least no longer unthinkable. A worst-case scenario is that nuclear weapons become included as tactical options for use as well as for deterrence, along with other instruments of military power (much as US nuclear artillery shells and land mines were deployed in Europe during the Cold War, or their Soviet counterparts). Here the systems theorists are correct, but their assumed cure for the disease of hyper-sovereignty combined with nuclear weapons involves a bypass through world government or, more realistically, a stronger nonproliferation regime. The former is beyond political attainability by all indications of past practice; the latter is not. Because world government is not a plausible path to nuclear abolition, nuclear limitation or regulation by means of interstate agreement is the next best hope. It must be said, first, that nuclear limitation is not uncontroversial. Some states benefit from the existing balance of nuclear power, and they can be expected to defend the prevailing order. However, the majority of world governments and even nuclear weapons states ought to confront the prospect of uncontrolled proliferation with dread, and there is room for improvement in the nonproliferation regime that would leave sovereignty intact, discard superfluous nuclear weapons, and contribute to a reduction in the nonlinearity, and potential chaos, attendant to loose nukes and new nuclear weapons states. Toward that end, I had no quibble with the agenda set by the Obama administration for nuclear limitation: (1) further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems as between the Russians and the Americans, under a New START and post–New START regime;23 (2) US and other outliers’ support for, and ratification of, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; (3) support for widespread ratification and subsequent verification of the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty; (4) reaffirmation and strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 2015 review conference; and (5) backing for this and other measures intended to defend the “Allison line” (after scholar and security analyst Graham Allison) on proliferation (no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear weapons states) for as long as possible.24 These measures of nuclear limitation and strategic prudence will not constitute an antinuclear revolution. Nuclear limitation is not the same thing as nuclear abolition, or even nuclear marginalization. Far from having been marginalized, nuclear weapons remain important in the twenty-first century for those who hold them, for those who aspire to them, and for those who are affected by both existing and aspirational nuclear weapons states. Living

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

125

with the bomb is admittedly living below the best of all possible worlds, but it is also possible to live above the worst: bombs aplenty, in undisciplined and angry hands, crashing into deterrence and turning social values into depleted uranium.

Less Than Perfect Is Still Good

If nuclear abolition is unattainable, at least immediately, it does not necessarily follow that nuclear arms limitation is undeserving of accomplishment. In the case of the United States and Russia in their search for a limitation and reductions regime to replace START I, options are bounded by security commitments, by past practice, and by the willingness of governments and their negotiators to bargain toward a meaningful outcome. The “rationality” of arms control negotiations does not lie in the numbers of nuclear weapons and long-range launch vehicles, but in the assumed political rationale for each state’s deployments. In the present world, Russia and the United States deploy long-range nuclear weapons not only (or mainly) in view of their two-sided relationship, but also in view of their global responsibilities and interests. That having been said, Russia does regard the appearance of nuclearstrategic parity with the United States in long-range weapons as a visible symbol of its entitlement to international influence and respect. In addition, Russia’s nuclear forces, including its forces of intercontinental range, compensate across the deterrent spectrum for the deficiencies in its conventional military. The latter is undergoing a serious modernization and reform that will transform it from a mass mobilization conscript force, on the old Soviet model, to one built mostly on voluntary service and with smaller, more mobile, and high-tech-equipped troops. But this military reform will take years, if accomplished at all: meanwhile, nuclear forces of various ranges will have to substitute for the lacunae in Russian conventional forces, for better or worse. This situation increases Russia’s dependency on nuclear weapons, not only for deterrence of nuclear attack, but also for deterrence of large-scale conventional war and, under some conditions, for the favorable termination of a war by means of prompt, but limited, use of operational-tactical nuclear weapons.25 Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015 chilled the reset atmosphere surrounding the New START agreement of 2010, and put into temporary stasis other measures of US-Russian security cooperation. Post–New START nuclear arms reductions seemed unlikely until the departure of President Obama or President Putin, or both, from office. On the other hand, the United States has no interest in waging cold

126

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

or hot war against post–Cold War Russia. Apart from the NATO-Russian confrontation over Ukraine, the United States and Russia have other convergent, as opposed to divergent, interests, including controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, the status of Afghanistan, and the continuing challenges posed by terrorism. Further, the problems of terrorism and proliferation overlap with the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, by nonstate actors whose motives are possibly beyond deterrence by the usual means and methods.

Conclusion

Nuclear abolition, however appealing to many persons or governments, is unlikely to occur on a speedy timetable, due to political and technical obstacles in its path. The political obstacles are the more impressive. For better or worse, nuclear weapons are symbols of national sovereignty and international power, confer prestige in the minds of some, support “extended” deterrence for friends and allies, and backstop coercive diplomacy across a variety of issues. As Barry Posen has noted, states that have nuclear weapons will probably want to keep them, and some states that do not now have nuclear weapons will probably get them, for three reasons. First, nuclear technology is no longer esoteric. Second, nuclear weapons are great equalizers for lesser military powers against greater ones. And third, “on close analysis, a world of zero nuclear weapons probably would not be more stable and secure than the present situation.”26 On the other hand, nuclear weapons, thought to be system stabilizers during the Cold War, are potential contributors to system disruption in the twenty-first century. Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists are a nightmare perhaps beyond deterrence. And the appeal of nuclear weapons for additional countries in Asia or in the Middle East is a mistaken judgment that bases strategy on disruptive technology for those states, and a potential entrapment for others, including the United States and Russia. Obstacles in the path to nuclear abolition, however, provide no excuses for lack of progress in nuclear reduction and limitation. The United States and Russia should promptly pursue reductions in their numbers of operationally deployed nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental launchers, even below the currently agreed New START levels. In addition, USRussian nuclear force reductions by themselves can still leave at risk the nonproliferation regime, unless these bilateral accomplishments are supported by the multilateral agreements including the majority or entirety of nuclear weapons states. This is a question primarily of political will, not of technical capability. Technology is open-ended and possibly quite permis-

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

127

sive of a future with many fewer nukes and with fewer nuclear weapons states than pessimists now fear. If expert predictions that future technologies related to warfare will privilege “the many and the small” as opposed to “the few and the large” among weapons and delivery systems, we can imagine a shift in procurement and modernization priorities.27 Aerospace planes, unmanned aerial vehicles, smaller ballistic and other missile–firing submarines more numerous than hitherto, and other smart platforms, all supported by improved C4ISR capabilities, networks, and other cyber capabilities, could enable timely and decisive worldwide military options short of nuclear first use.

Notes 1. For recent discussions, see James Cartwright, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture (Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, May 2012), www.globalzero.org. See also Thom Shanker, “Former Commander of U.S. Nuclear Forces Calls for Large Cut in Warheads,” New York Times, May 15, 2012, www.nytimes.com. A historically grounded argument for nuclear abolition appears in Richard Rhodes, The Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and the Prospects for a World Without Nuclear Weapons (New York: Knopf, 2010), esp. pp. 291–303. See also George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13; Henry A. Kissinger, “Containing the Fire of the Gods,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009, www.iht.com; “David Miliband Sets Out Six-Point Plan to Rid World of Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, February 4, 2009, www.guardian.co.uk; Jennifer Loven, “Obama Outlines Sweeping Goal of Nuclear-Free World,” Associated Press, April 5, 2009, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 66, April 5–6, 2009, [email protected]. 2. For important counterarguments to nuclear abolition, see Alan W. Dowd and Adam Lowther, “The Myths of Nuclear Drawdown: A World Without Nukes Takes Us Backward, Not Forward,” American Legion Magazine, August 1, 2015, www.legion.org. For contrasting perspectives on this topic, see Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero,” Foreign Affairs no. 6 (November–December, 2008), pp. 80–95; Colin Gray, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies,” in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 4–30; Lawrence Freedman, “Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament,” in Baylis and O’Neill, Alternative Nuclear Futures, pp. 56–69; Michael MccGwire, “The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” in Baylis and O’Neill, Alternative Nuclear Futures, pp. 144–166. 3. A thoughtful appraisal of schools of thought on nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation appears in Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2016), esp. pp. 1–29. John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), makes the contrarian argument that the military value of nuclear weapons, including for deterrence, is actually very small and is often exaggerated.

128

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

4. Jonathan Pearl, Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, November 2011), p. 5. 5. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 121, n. 8. 6. Assessments of deterrence before and after the Cold War include Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). Michael Krepon emphasizes that deterrence in the first nuclear age “worked,” to the extent that it did so only in conjunction with containment, diplomacy, military strength, and arms control; see Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). 7. Freedman, Deterrence, p. 1. See also Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 435–457. 8. Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry, p. 55. 9. The point is made with appropriate emphasis in Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 17–46, who notes, “From a Cold War condition of notable, if understandable, underachievement, the scholarly authors of large organizing ideas have been working overtime since the USSR closed for business at the end of 1991. The problem is that from a condition in the 1980s wherein there was too little competitive theorizing of a basic kind about alternative political contexts, today we probably have too much of such theory” (p. 28). 10. Anticipatory attack is discussed in Karl P. Mueller et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006); and Colin S. Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2007). 11. Bernard Brodie’s discussion of the relationship between conventional denial and nuclear deterrence in NATO Europe has not been improved upon since. See Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 375–432, esp. pp. 396– 412. 12. For perspective on the information-led “revolution in military affairs” concept and its implications, see Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper no. 379 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2006), esp. pp. 11–26. For a more comprehensive historical assessment of the concept, see Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Cass, 2002). 13. This important point is argued in John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008). 14. Important studies include D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), esp. chap. 5; Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008). 15. David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached

Nuclear Abolition: Ideal . . . but Impossible?

129

with World Powers,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. For the text of the joint comprehensive action plan (Vienna, July 14, 2015), see European Union, European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu. See also David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Leap of Faith on Iran,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www .nytimes.com; Lawrence J. Korb and Max Andonov, “Iran Is the New USSR: And That Means the Deal Is a Good Thing,” Politico, July 16, 2015, www.politico.com; Lawrence Korb and Katherine Blakely, “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 15, 2015, thebulletin.org. 16. North Korea is a moveable feast. See, for example, Gordon G. Chang, “Be Afraid: China Can’t Control North Korea,” National Interest, April 25, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org; Baik Sungwon, “Analyst: North Korea May Already Have Militarized Warhead,” VOA News, April 24, 2014, http://m.voanews.com; “N. Korea Vows Not to Lay Down Nuclear Weapons,” Yonhap News Agency, April 23, 2014, www.globalpost.com. Useful expert assessment appears in Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007); Andrew Scobell, North Korea’s Strategic Intentions (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005). 17. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 125. 18. Paul Bracken notes that, even during the Cold War, motives other than those of the international rivalry between capitalism and communism or East and West mattered in states’ decisions to pursue nuclear weapons capability. See Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, pp. 95–106. 19. Competing theories of international politics, as Jack Snyder points out, perform various functions: they provide filters for interpreting complicated reality; they reveal the assumptions behind foreign and security policy debates; and they help to check one another by identifying weaknesses in arguments. See Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” in Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2008), pp. 4–11. Equally important is the recognition that general theorists of world politics are “ever willing to pass beyond Clausewitz’s ‘culminating point of victory’”; Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, p. 23. 20. Jonathan Schell, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger (New York: Holt, 2007). 21. Implications of a more technologically globalized, but politically fragmented, world include the priority of “culture” and “civilization” as axes of conflict. See Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), esp. chaps. 1–3; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1998), esp. chaps. 1–2, 10–11. Among studies of the military implications of these trends for the US armed forces, see Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (New York: Vintage, 2005). 22. George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 24–52, offers possible scenarios. 23. US Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. See also Arms

130

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Control Association, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START,” www .armscontrol.org/factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART; Arms Control Association, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START, www.armscontrol.org /factsheets/RussiaStratNukeForceNewSTART. 24. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times-Holt, 2004). 25. This notion of using nuclear weapons in a conventional war on Russian territory, or in a conflict otherwise threatening to Russia’s vital interests, has appeared in Russian military discussions since the end of the Cold War. It has, however, a long pedigree in Cold War debates on both sides of the Atlantic about the “spectrum of deterrence” and whether “firebreaks” between conventional and nuclear war are more, or less, advisable for deterrence. Some discussions departed from the reality that policymakers would have, in the exigent circumstances of an outbreak of war in Europe, very little time for decisions that would influence the course of events while events remained firmly under their control. In fact, the two sides probably constructed an inadvertent Cold War doomsday machine. 26. Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 73–74. 27. This case is argued in Arquilla, Worst Enemy, pp. 45–46.

9 Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

Experts disagree as to the expected future for nuclear weapons spread. On one hand, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime has been a qualified success, whatever counting rules are used. The number of states having acquired nuclear weapons during and after the Cold War has, thus far, fallen short of numerous doomsday predictions and worst-case scenarios.1 On the other hand, in the so-called second nuclear age following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, interest in nuclear weapons on the part of state and nonstate actors has increased, not diminished. 2 Pointers for this state of affairs include, for example, (1) China’s plans for modernization of its long-range nuclear arsenal, to include multiple warheads for intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) North Korea’s claim in May 2015 to have mastered the technology for miniaturizing nuclear missile warheads; and (3) Iran’s drawn out negotiations with the P5 plus Germany in 2014–2015 and the efforts of the latter to constrain Iran’s potential for breakout into nuclear weapons capability.3 Thus the control of nuclear weapons spread is both an urgent policy problem and a subject matter for contending theories of international politics.4 It is also a contentious matter as to how significant the problem really was in the past, or is now. For example, John Mueller contends, “Since 1945, we’ve been regularly regaled with predictions about the impending and rampant diffusion of nuclear weapons to new states and about the dire consequences that would inevitably follow from such a development. This endlessly and urgently repeated wisdom continues to flourish despite the fact that it has thus far proven to be almost entirely wrong.”5 In this chapter I examine alternative and hypothetical nuclear worlds for insights about the relationship between international stability and nonproliferation, supported by pertinent analysis. The discussion is of more than academic interest. Practical issues related to US national security and military strategy are also connected to the problem of nuclear weapons spread. First, for example, the US objective of strategic dominance of the 131

132

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

aerospace continuum, or at least its denial to hostile adversaries, will be resisted by a proliferation-permissive international order. Second, US ambitions for modernization of the strategic nuclear triad over the next three decades or so are, to some extent, hostage to the disruptive potential of nuclear weapons in the hands of state or nonstate actors with regionally hegemonic or nihilistic political objectives.6 And third, US interests in the preservation of international political stability, and in the avoidance of major interstate war, including nuclear war, cannot be accomplished unilaterally. Nonproliferation is among those stabilizing aspects of international systemic cooperation that require both nuclear and nonnuclear powers to exercise multilateral restraint, against both terrestrial and space-borne military deployments that exacerbate risks of unacceptable conflicts.

Turning Points

As the drama surrounding negotiation of the international agreement on the limitation of Iran’s nuclear program in 2015 reminded us, the issue of nuclear proliferation is approaching one of those turning points that Winston Churchill referred to as the “hinge of fate.”7 During the first decades of the twenty-first century, two possible futures have competed for policymakers’ and military planners’ attention and support. One future is a “holding” model in which the international community agrees to establish political and if necessary military barriers against the creation of new nuclear weapons states. Another, and contrary, future is a more pessimistic “folding” model: nuclear nonproliferation fails in Asia or in the Middle East or both, with potentially lethal consequences for international stability and peace. The cases of North Korea and Iran are only the most time-urgent among other possible leakages in the nonproliferation roof. At least four dangers stalk those who wish to avoid further nuclear weapons spread between now and 2020: nuclear weapons acquired, and eventually used, by terrorists; existing nuclear arsenals; new nuclear weapons states; and a potential collapse of the entire nonproliferation regime.8 In the aftermath of 9/11, US and other policymakers justifiably regarded the possibility of nuclear terrorism as the most imminent and important threat.9 However, the possibility of further nuclear proliferation among state actors, especially those who might be dissatisfied with the regional or international status quo, lays claim to equal significance on both theory and policy agendas. In this chapter, two alternative proliferation worlds or structures are contrasted. The first world is a proliferation-constrained international system. In this world, projected forward to the year 2020–2025 or so, the existing nuclear states agree to hold the “Allison line” of resistance to further

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

133

nuclear weapons spread at the big five nuclear powers and the de facto three additional nuclear weapons states: India, Pakistan, and Israel.10 The nuclear weapons program and infrastructure of North Korea are fully declared and ultimately dismantled, per agreements reached between North Korea and its five interlocutors on this issue (South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan). In addition, in this scenario, Iran does not develop or deploy a nuclear weapon, although it may have established a nuclear fuel cycle that puts it one step away from weaponization.11 In this optimist’s world for nuclear weapons spread, we assume that the existing nuclear powers also agree on some reductions or limitations on their numbers of operationally deployed nuclear weapons on long-range delivery systems between now and the period 2020–2025. For purposes of analysis here, a three-tiered system of nuclear powers is established: Russia and the United States each have a maximum of 1,000 operationally deployed warheads on long-range delivery systems; Britain, China, and France have 500 each; and India, Israel, and Pakistan have 300 each. These forces are notional, since it would be impossible to forecast in detail the exact composition of future delivery weapons and delivery systems. In addition, any analysis is complicated by the fact that, depending on the targets chosen by prospective nuclear attackers and retaliators, not all targeting for strategic effect (against key enemy forces, command centers, military and economic infrastructure, or populations) requires delivery systems of equivalent range. For example, India and Pakistan, or China and India, do not require weapons of intercontinental range in order to destroy many targets of presumed value to either state. The numbers of weapons assigned to each state are therefore permissive of a variety of actual ranges, relative to the assigned target base. The second proliferation world analyzed here is a more pessimistic one. In this world, nuclear weapons spread is not controlled within the framework of the eight de facto nuclear weapons states that currently exist. Instead, an Asian nuclear arms competition develops, and a folding model (of commitment to nonproliferation) displaces a holding model of proliferation constraint.12 In this model, nuclear weapons spread from North Korea to South Korea and Japan, and Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state. Asia (including the greater Middle East with nuclear strategic reach into Asia) is marked by an eight-sided nuclear arms competition: Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea remain as nuclear armed states, and they are joined in that club by South Korea, Japan, and Iran. For this second and more pessimistic nuclear world, I also project force structures forward to the approximate time bracket of 2020–2025. The structure for this folding world is less precisely stratified than the distribution of power among nuclear-armed states in the proliferation-constrained

134

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

model.13 As in the constrained or holding case, no attempt is made to project force structures with a level of specificity that would almost certainly be superseded by actual events. Instead, notional force structures with representative numbers of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers are projected for comparative and analytical purposes. Having set up the nuclear-constrained and nuclear-permissive scenarios as just outlined, we now require the application of appropriate analytical tools in order to answer questions of interest to theory and policy. How shock-resistant are these constrained and unconstrained nuclear worlds, in terms of their potential for deterrence and crisis stability—or instability? The results of nuclear force exchanges among states within each world will be tabulated in the next section in order to help answer this, and other, questions.

Methodology and Data Analysis

In this section, the outcomes of nuclear force exchanges in the proliferationconstrained or holding world are compared to those within the Asian nuclear arms race or folding scenario. Each state is subjected to a first strike on its nuclear retaliatory forces, and its numbers of surviving and retaliating weapons are calculated.14 The Holding Model Figure 9.1 summarizes the prewar forces for each of the states in the holding or constrained model. The numbers of surviving and retaliating warheads for each state in the holding model, following a nuclear first strike, are represented in Figure 9.2. Outcomes are displayed under each of four operational conditions: (1) forces are on generated alert and launch on warning; (2) forces are on generated alert and ride out the attack before retaliating; (3) forces are on day-to-day alert and launch on warning; and (4) forces are on day-to-day alert and ride out the attack before retaliating. In this model, with toplines of 1,000 deployed warheads each for the United States and Russia; 500 each for the UK, China, and France; and 300 each for other states, all states maintain survivable and retaliating forces sufficient to inflict historically unprecedented and socially unacceptable damage. However, some variations in the nuclear flexibility of the survivors are important. In general, larger states with higher numbers of initially deployed warheads retain more surviving forces. But this is not always true, and the “more is better” finding depends upon other variables, including the

Figure 9.1 Total Strategic Weapons, Holding Model

Figure 9.2 Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, Holding Model

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

136

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

kinds of forces deployed, and the operational assumptions and commandcontrol protocols for managing forces. Sea-based missiles are more survivable than land-based missiles, but sea-based forces require more sophisticated command-control and communications systems. Bombers are less survivable than submarines but more so than ICBMs (land-based strategic missiles) deployed in fixed silos. With regard to operational postures, forces on day-to-day alert and launched after riding out the attack are the most vulnerable. And forces that are on generated or high alert and launched on warning provide the greatest number of surviving and retaliating weapons. The data are more ambiguous for the intermediate cases: when forces are either on generated alert and riding out the attack, or on day-to-day alert and launched on warning. Some perform better with alerted forces riding out the attack and retaliating, but other states have relatively more survivors on day-to-day alert and launched on warning of attack. Force structure has something to do with the differences among states’ performance in the two intermediate cases. States more dependent upon submarine- and bomber-delivered weapons for survivability, compared to those more reliant on silo-based missiles, have additional leeway for delayed launch as opposed to prompt launch. On the other hand, the matter is complicated by the fact that ballistic missile submarines can also be used as first-strike weapons. And bomber-delivered weapons are variable in their composition: gravity bombs, air-launched cruise missiles, and short-range attack missiles. Crisis stability is a more nuanced construct than deterrence stability. Crisis stability has more to do with people than with forces or weapons. Crisis stability is driven by the expectations of political leaders and their military advisers. These expectations, and other components of leaders’ perceptual “frames” about their opponents’ capabilities and intentions, contribute to a mind-set through which crises are interpreted. Components of leaders’ mind-sets might include whether leaders are risk-averse or riskacceptant with respect to nuclear weapons; leaders’ past experience with crisis management and lessons learned; the structure of the policymaking process in national security affairs, as it impacts upon leaders’ perceptions of their alternatives; and leaders’ decisionmaking styles, including their willingness or unwillingness to tolerate dissenting views and the accuracy of their images of the enemy.15 In nuclear crisis management, the characteristics of deployed forces may also influence the outcome of interstate bargaining. These characteristics play into the larger matrix of human or social-psychological factors just noted. Forces contribute to crisis stability or instability as a result of their impact on generation stability or launch-on-warning stability.

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

137

The holding model of constrained proliferation is not one that is riskfree or invites complacency. As a number of former US policymakers and nuclear experts—George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn—have noted, “Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today’s environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers.”16 Even without the possibility of cyber warfare, cyber glitches can accomplish plenty of malice with forces dependent on prompt launch or generation for assured retaliation. Despite the ingenuity of artificial intelligence and other manifestations of information age derring-do, humans in the loop will still take the decisions for, or against, warfare. And there is little evidence that human decisionmaking, as opposed to the cyber-smart assists to C4ISR that now proliferate, has improved since the time of Thucydides. Wars are still fought for reasons of fear, honor, and interest— among other reasons—and will continue to be so. In my judgment, the Cold War was, from the standpoint of nuclear history, a breathing space during which nuclear weapons spread was limited by the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union—relative to other nuclear-capable or nuclear-aspiring powers. In other words, the Americans and Soviets locked down the problem of proliferation, and the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have now reopened Pandora’s box. It may well turn out that, as Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn have argued in the article just cited, that the world must now commit itself to nuclear disarmament or face uncontrolled nuclear proliferation with unacceptable consequences.17 The Folding Model However, misery is always relative. If the holding world is too dangerous with respect to the qualities and numbers of nuclear forces deployed, what about the folding world of spreading nuclear weapons in Asia or the Middle East or both, with strategic reach into Asia? Figure 9.3 summarizes the numbers of weapons available to each state by type of launcher, projected into a 2020–2025 time frame, obviously conjectural and subject to future adjustment. In Figure 9.4, for each state the numbers of second-strike surviving warheads and launchers (against a notional first strike) are reported under each of four operational conditions: (1) forces are on generated alert and launch on warning (maximum retaliation); (2) forces are on generated alert

Figure 9.3 Total Strategic Weapons, Folding Model

Figure 9.4 Arriving Retaliatory Weapons, Folding Model

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

139

and ride out the attack before retaliating (intermediate retaliation); (3) forces are on day-to-day alert and launch on warning (intermediate retaliation); and (4) forces are on day-to-day alert and ride out the attack before retaliating (minimum retaliation). As noted earlier, nuclear crisis stability is a more nuanced and subjective concept than deterrence stability per se. Although this is so in both the holding and the folding models, the degree of crisis instability in the holding model is constrained by denying nuclear forces to currently nonnuclear states, and by arbitrarily agreed ceilings on each state’s deployed forces. In the folding model, on the other hand, force sizes are unconstrained by international agreement and additional nuclear weapons states appear in the Middle East and Asia. The following findings with respect to the folding model suggest themselves. First, larger forces may be more survivable than smaller forces, but not necessarily so. The attacker’s first-strike strategy and the defender’s operational proclivities matter in predicting the outcomes of a possible war, but these cannot be known in advance (and may not be selected from a menu of available options until the very moment of a fateful decision). Second, as a force is reduced in size, the quality of the force matters more, because redundancy is not available as compensation for other misjudgments. “Quality” in this sense includes survivable basing modes, appropriately nuanced command and control (suited to the weapons systems at hand, and maintaining the appropriate balance between positive and negative control). Third, the folding model contains some of the same deficiencies, with respect to the avoidance of accidental or inadvertent war, or the control of escalation from conventional into nuclear war, as does the holding model. States’ forces in the folding model as well as in the holding model are too dependent upon high levels of alert and prompt launch for survivability even against notional attacks—of the kind that can be simulated—let alone against the creative mischief of which smart opponents are capable (cyberdisruption of nuclear command-control). Fourth, the stability of these or other nuclear worlds lies fundamentally not in technology, but in politics. The political aspirations of heads of state, their governments, and their peoples will do more to determine whether states acquire nuclear weapons and, if they do, what they propose to do with them. Clear thinking, not always evident in the academic or policy communities, is needed here. Unless or until the day of nuclear abolition has been reached, it does matter what kinds of regimes and societies go nuclear. All nuclear-armed animals are not equal. The issue is not rogue regimes so much as it is rogue or undependable systems and procedures for the peacetime and crisis management of nuclear forces. Undependable pro-

140

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

cedures, in turn, may result from civil strife and, in the extreme case, a failed state armed with nuclear weapons. Fifth, the preceding illustrations of opposite worlds with respect to nuclear proliferation are not intended as point predictions: futurology belongs to soothsayers, not to political scientists or historians. The models and data analysis help to establish insights and boundaries on discourse and to generate hypotheses for further study. For example, in the debate between the “more is better” school about nuclear proliferation and the “more is worse” counterarguments, who is right?18 The answer is, it all depends! A multivariate model of such complexity as to give a definitive answer to that question would defy gravity. On the other hand, the data here support the case for constrained, as opposed to unconstrained, proliferation, and warn against the soft erosion of nonproliferation standards by default, instead of design. Even in their most unprepared prewar postures (day-to-day alert, and riding out a first strike), states with modest numbers of survivable weapons can create radioactive deserts from cities. No political disagreement save the very survival of a state and society would justify a nuclear first strike.

Back to the Future?

But the preceding statement is a rational, or at least reasonable, statement. What if leaders armed with nuclear weapons are neither rational (making a logical means-ends connection) nor reasonable (by cultural standards of those seeking to deter them)? The “more is better” school may have debating points that are compelling for optimists about deterrence; unfortunately for this school, only a single case of misjudgment collapses the entire house of cards. In addition, although some “limited” nuclear wars may be confined to a single region or state territory, the breaking of precedent via the first two-sided nuclear war in history would realign the assumptions on which international relations have been hitherto constructed.19 Two points in the preceding paragraph, that leaders may make other than rational decisions by the standards of their opponents, and that limited wars can escalate into larger conflicts with unexpected velocity and consequences, are not speculative. History provides ample documentation for both points. For example, the July crisis preceding the outbreak of World War I moved rapidly from the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian archduke in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, to a war involving all the major powers of Europe by the first week of August. The great powers had ridden out prior crises over Bosnia, Morocco, and other issues throughout the preceding decade without an outbreak of general war, but in July–August 1914,

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

141

restraints failed and the adversary alliances, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, plunged into war. The outcome of this conflict was not only the demise of four empires (German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman) but also the devastation of European society and the remaking of the entire map of Europe and the Middle East. Even the British and French “victors” lost a generation of youth and experienced a postwar social and cultural malaise of lost confidence. Even many years afterward, historians and others have asked, How did it happen? One possibility is that leaders of the great powers of Europe at the time were insensitive to the distinction between war preparedness and crisis management. War preparedness was assumed to be a necessary and sufficient deterrent to enemy aggression. On the other hand, crisis management requires attention to the possibly provocative character of one state’s war preparations, relative to the expectations and war plans of others. For example, it now seems clear that some states’ mobilization plans were excessively reliant upon the prompt movement of forces to prewar battle stations and the rapid initiation of combat in order to preclude being caught on the hop by the other side. In the cases of Germany and Russia, for example, this produced a perfect storm of pessimistic expectations for defeat if mobilization was delayed. But mobilization undertaken for perceived defensive reasons by German and Russian leaders was interpreted by the other side as unnecessarily threatening and therefore requiring of a prompt counter-response.20 It can be argued that pre–World War I leaders made decisions that were both rational and reasonable, based on their social histories, cultural backgrounds, geostrategic objectives, and threat assessments. On the other hand, leaders in 1914 suffered from overconfidence, relative to their ability to engage in military brinkmanship and get away with it. The powers of Europe had experienced prior diplomatic and military crises since the turn of the century, but each of these had been contained before it could exacerbate into a more general war. In addition, political leaders’ knowledge of their own countries’ war plans, and about their implications for crisis management, was deficient. Leaders thought that military plans were more flexible than they actually were. Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, for example, agreed a partial mobilization in late July 1914, as opposed to a more general mobilization that might cause a German reaction leading to war. Nicholas’s general staff and war ministry insisted that a partial mobilization would be disruptive to the coherence of any plan for general mobilization later if necessary, and finally prevailed upon the tsar to approve general mobilization, effective July 31. Russia saw its mobilization as defensive, but the reactions of the Germans was to expedite their own mobilization, based on war plans calling for a prompt offensive westward against France before turning the bulk of their forces against Russia.21

142

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Our revisit to the July and August 1914 crisis and outbreak of World War I is therefore informative as to the risk of inadvertent or compound escalation that can drive control over events in directions not anticipated by policymakers and military planners. Inadvertent escalation is the expansion of a conflict that takes place when a previously observed threshold of fighting or coercive bargaining is unexpectedly crossed. Compound escalation is the movement of conflict from one arena to another, for example into another theater of operations, or into a fight about different issues, for reasons not anticipated by prewar planners or leaders. If, for example, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Soviets had responded to the United States by threatening or attacking Berlin, that would have been an example of compound escalation.22 For example, let’s say Iran gets a small nuclear force and chooses not to attack Israel, at least not directly. Instead, Iran creates disruptive political events in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere in the Middle East that create tensions with its neighbors, with Israel, and in the United States. Iran “keeps the pot boiling,” confident that its small nuclear deterrent will forestall outside powers from directly attacking its vital interests. Iran is well located to do this. Its support for anti-Israeli terrorists in Lebanon and Gaza, its proximity to Iraq and Afghanistan, and its ability to create naval havoc in the Persian Gulf, among other possibilities, encourage Iran to think that it can stir the pot repeatedly without losing control over events and receiving unacceptable consequences. Iran is, in this scenario, operating with expectations similar to those of the great European powers prior to July 1914. And then, unexpectedly, along comes a new Sarajevo. A terrorist group sponsored by Iran commits an act of mass murder in Israel, perhaps against high-ranking state officials or visiting dignitaries. A dirty bomb is also employed in which a conventional explosive is used to scatter radioactive materials in one or more Israeli cities. Iran’s government responds quickly with a denial that it had anything to do with the attacks, and this response may be literally true. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard may have plotted these attacks with the tacit connivance of some religious leaders but without necessarily informing a wider circle of political and military officials. Nevertheless, Israel retaliates against Iran by massive conventional bombing of its nuclear weapons sites, nuclear infrastructure, and other military targets, warning Iran that any further attacks on Israel by Iran or its proxies would involve unacceptable consequences for Iran. Nevertheless, Iran launches several surviving nuclear weapons by mobile land-based and sea-based missiles, striking military and civilian targets in Israel. Iran also threatens follow-on nuclear and other attacks on US military bases and other regional targets. Iranian “volunteers” pour over the borders into Afghanistan and Iraq, and US intelligence reports to the president that it suspects that terrorists in Lebanon or Gaza might have acquired weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

143

Scenario writers can conceive of variations on a theme in response to the preceding example.23 The description here illustrates how inadvertent and compound escalation can interact to take a conflict beyond its expected parameters and into terra incognita for which policymakers have not prepared a script, and for which military leaders may have no appropriate war plan. One reason for possible lack of preparedness is that the crossing of the line between conventional war and nuclear first use might not be obvious or undebatable.24 Would one side’s detonation of a nuclear weapon that produced no immediate civilian or military casualties—say, a demonstration shot offshore—be considered a case of nuclear first use? Suppose India or Pakistan, in the midst of a conventional war, were to authorize tactical field commanders who were being overrun to use nuclear ground-to-ground missiles—and chose to announce this decision publicly? One of the issues neglected in much analysis is the potential for mischief a nuclear weapons state has without even embarking on a war. Nuclear gamesmanship practiced during the Cold War could repeat itself among different actors in the Middle East, and East and South Asia, but this time unconstrained by the tightness of US-Soviet global nuclear bipolarity. A new nuclear weapons state with a small force relative to those of the P5 could nevertheless exploit its nuclear status for coercive diplomatic benefits, as North Korea has demonstrated. For example, nuclear forces can be placed on alert for prompt response during a crisis, and this can be done in a way that makes it apparent to US and other intelligence collectors. States can use maneuver by airborne or ship-based nuclear-capable delivery systems to send signals of diplomatic resolve, or unhappiness with the status quo. Russian president Vladimir Putin did exactly this in 2014 in response to US and NATO criticism of his annexation of Crimea and resistance to his destabilization of Ukraine. Russian nuclear-capable bombers appeared very near US and allied NATO airspace some hundreds of times during the year, sending a message that Russia is a major nuclear power and not to be trifled with. Nuclear weapons can be game changers in another way. Nuclear weapons change the calculus of escalation dominance within a region. Conflicts between conventional armed forces are often measured by objective measures such as casualty lists and territory acquired: the immediate outcomes of battle. In a regional nuclear context, on the other hand, what matters more is the management of risks and the control over escalation to one’s advantage. One important aspect of a nuclear Iran is that it would threaten Israel’s status as the only nuclear weapons state in the region. But Iran’s nukes would also alarm Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, who might seek their own nuclear arsenals. In addition, focusing on the most drastic possibilities of prompt nuclear attacks ignores the dangers at lower levels of the conflict spectrum. As Paul Bracken has noted, “The path to nuclear war

144

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

in the Middle East comes from mishandling these lower-level conflicts and crises, much more so than it does from the mullahs deciding one day to press the button. There will be a premium on crisis management skills. For this reason, the early years of a nuclear Middle East are likely to be especially dangerous, as each side feels out the other over limits and restraints.”25 The preceding discussion is not intended to argue that a repeat of World War I is necessarily in the cards.26 The analysis here does suggest, however, that history teaches pertinent lessons, not only for scholars, but also for policymakers and military commanders.

Conclusion

Neither complacency nor despair is advisable on the subject of nuclear weapons spread. Nor is nuclear escapism: the evil twin of historical determinism. The future is permissive of a world in which the great powers manage the spread of nuclear weapons within an agreed system of international security and stability. Alas, history also shows that leading powers can fail to step up to their responsibilities for system maintenance and for crisis management. Nowadays the leading states, including the P5 nuclear “originals,” have to deal with challenges to the nonproliferation regime from both state and nonstate actors, including terrorists and privateers trafficking in nuclear-related technology and know-how. The challenges are immense, and the responsibilities placed upon system stabilizers, both human and technical, are daunting. Therefore, and second, the United States and Russia, as the nuclear bellwethers in the international system, must lead the way to an improved international climate for nonproliferation. Where they lead, others can follow. Russia and the United States can and should do the following: (1) reduce to the extent possible any dependency upon prompt launch or preemption for surety in deterrence; (2) resist the temptation to make shortterm disagreements (Ukraine) the justification for ignoring longer-term issues of possible cooperation, including nuclear terrorism and weapons spread; (3) support improved control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials wherever they are located, against the risk of terrorism or diversion for other purposes; (4) support the providing of internationally supervised fuelcycle services to countries seeking nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in return for commitments by those states to nonproliferation; and (5) explore seriously the joint research, development, and deployment of US-NATO and Russian ballistic missile defenses against rogue state attacks or accidental launches from outside Europe, directed against any of Europe’s state territories.27 These steps will reduce, although not eliminate entirely, the risks of nuclear war—but they are worth taking, sooner instead of later.

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

145

Third, the return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of Russia in 2012 has doubtless been a setback to US-Russian relations, including nuclear arms control, and especially during the tumultuous dustup between Putin and NATO over Ukraine in 2014–2015.28 Cooperative threat reduction programs as between Washington and Moscow have been hindered or aborted, and a post-START regime for further reductions in the two states’ strategic forces seems further away than in 2010. However, it is the burden not only of arms control and disarmament specialists, but also of students of international politics and history more generally, to make known the imperative of nuclear limitation within the framework of stable deterrence and peaceful conflict resolution. The Owl of Minerva has not yet flapped its wings.

Notes 1. Richard D. Burns and Philip E. Coyle III, The Challenges of Nuclear NonProliferation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015). 2. See Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012), for a recent expert assessment. Bracken argues that the first and second nuclear ages actually overlapped instead of being entirely distinct phases of nuclear deterrence, arms control, and proliferation. 3. See David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful,” New York Times, May 16, 2015, www.nytimes.com; “China Buys Into Multiple Warheads,” New York Times, May 20, 2015, www.nytimes.com; Jethro Mullen, “North Korea Says It Can Miniaturize Nuclear Weapons,” May 20, 2015, www.cnn.com; Olli Heinonen, “Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 28, 2015, http://belfercenter .ksg.harvard.edu. 4. An expert appraisal appears in Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2016). 5. John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to AlQaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 89. 6. US modernization plans are reviewed in Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint, The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014), http://cns.miis.edu. 7. David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached with World Powers,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. For the text of the joint comprehensive action plan (Vienna, July 14, 2015), see European Union, European External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu. See also Lawrence J. Korb and Max Andonov, “Iran Is the New USSR: And That Means the Deal Is a Good Thing,” Politico, July 16, 2015, www.politico.com; Lawrence Korb and Katherine Blakely, “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 15, 2015, thebulletin.org; David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Leap of Faith on Iran,” New York Times, July 14, 2015, www.nytimes.com. On the preceding framework agreement in April 2015, see Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal,”

146

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

New York Times, April 2, 2015, www.nytimes.com; William J. Burns, “The Fruits of Diplomacy with Iran,” New York Times, April 2, 2015, www.nytimes.com. 8. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 87. 9. See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times-Holt, 2004). 10. The “Allison line” refers to the arguments of Graham Allison of Harvard University: no loose nukes; no new nascent nukes; and no new nuclear weapons states. See ibid., pp. 140–141. 11. Pertinent scenarios and their implications are discussed in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, October 2005). 12. Dangers of regional nuclear weapons spread in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia are emphasized in Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age. See also Sokolski, Underestimated, esp. pp. 63–66 on nuclear dangers in Asia. 13. Among pertinent literature, see, for example, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, annual report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2011), www.defense.gov; Robert A. Manning, Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World, report of the Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012), pp. 34–39, www.acus.org; David Lai, “The Agony of Learning: The PLA’s Transformation in Military Affairs,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2012), pp. 337–384; Mark B. Schneider, testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC, March 26, 2012, www.uscc.gov; Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006); Susan L. Craig, Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007); Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2006); Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007), esp. pp. 71–100 (very informative on North Korea’s possible motives for having a nuclear arsenal or deploying nuclear weapons, or both); D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the TwentyFirst Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), esp. chap. 5; Henry Sokolski, ed., Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006), esp. chaps. 1–3; Henry Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000). For force projections and scenarios for the Middle East, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Warfighting and Proliferation in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 17, 2007). 14. I gratefully acknowledge James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM@) for making calculations and drawing graphs. He is not

Controlling Nuclear Proliferation

147

responsible for its application here, or for any arguments or conclusions in this chapter. For additional information on pertinent methodology, see Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, A New Nuclear Century (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). 15. See Paul K. Davis, “Behavioral Factors in Terminating Superpower War,” in Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992), pp. 165– 182. See also Paul K. Davis, Studying First Strike Stability with Knowledge-Based Models of Human Decisionmaking (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989). 16. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. A skeptical appraisal of the possibilities for nuclear abolition appears in Lawrence Freedman, “Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament,” in John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 56–69. For the case that nuclear abolition is both desirable and feasible, see Michael MccGwire, “The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” in Baylis and O’Neill, Alternative Nuclear Futures, pp. 144–166. 17. For a concise appraisal of schools of thought on nuclear proliferation, see Sokolski, Underestimated, esp. p. 9. Sokolski distinguishes among an official arms control perspective; hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons; radical academic skeptics and finite deterrence enthusiasts; and radical academic skeptics and finite deterrence critics. 18. For an exchange of contrasting perspectives on this topic, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: Norton, 1995). 19. George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), esp. pp. 24–52. 20. Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (New York: Random, 2013), esp. pp. 317–377. 21. Ibid., pp. 602–603. 22. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, p. 133. 23. For expert assessments, see Gregory S. Jones, “Facing the Reality of Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2014), pp. 411–453; Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance—II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 16, 2012), www.csis.org. 24. Quester, Nuclear First Strike, pp. 25–30. 25. Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, p. 137. 26. See Graham Allison, “Just How Likely Is Another World War?” The Atlantic, July 2014, www.theatlantic.com. 27. Obstacles and challenges in the way of US-Russian cooperation on missile defense were noted in Pavel Podvig, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Missile Defense: Is It Really Possible? PONARS Policy Memo no. 316 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2003), www.csis.org. 28. The challenge facing US and European leaders with regard to Russia in 2015 is discussed in Nicholas Burns, “The Problem with Putin,” Boston Globe, March 3, 2015, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu. On Russia’s options going forward, see Richard J. Krickus, Russia After Putin (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2014).

10 Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent destabilization of eastern Ukraine derailed the Obama reset in US-Russian relations and created a deep feeling of distrust between NATO and Russia.1 In addition, Russian president Vladimir Putin explicitly introduced the threat of nuclear escalation into the crisis in Ukraine. In late August 2014, as Russian troops and military equipment flowed into eastern Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists there, Putin issued a public warning: “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations,” and added that “this is a reality, not just words.”2 Putin also indicated that Russia was strengthening its nuclear deterrent forces and noted, “it’s best not to mess with us” over Ukraine. 3 In mid-September 2014, Putin warned that Russia would counter military moves by the United States and NATO with nuclear and conventional force modernization. 4 Earlier in the same month, a Russian general and senior defense official called for Russia to revise its military doctrine and specify conditions under which Russia might launch a preemptive nuclear strike against NATO.5 The at least temporary freeze in US and NATO–Russian relations in 2014 left for future discussion the thorny question of US nuclear weapons deployed in five NATO countries and Russia’s other-than-strategic nuclear weapons located within its European theater of military operations. 6 Variously referred to as substrategic, nonstrategic, or tactical nuclear weapons, NATO’s other-than-strategic nuclear weapons involve both arms control and nonproliferation issues for the United States and NATO, for Russia, and for other states that might have deployed weapons of shorter than intercontinental range on various delivery vehicles.7 Among the arms control issues associated with substrategic weapons (my preferred nomenclature), the problem of nuclear first use takes pride of place. Nuclear first use is the emblematic failure for substrategic nuclear deterrence, just as nuclear first strike is the signal failure for strategic nuclear deterrence. 149

150

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

However, the two types of deterrence and arms control failure, first use and first strike, are related in theory and in practice. Among other relationships, a decision for nuclear first use can initiate a sequence of events that results in a larger, and more destructive, nuclear first strike. Declaratory policies of nuclear first use or first strike, even if intended for deterrence or reassurance, carry prospective costs and risks. The risks of nuclear first use policies on the part of NATO or Russia might increase if the spread of nuclear weapons, especially in Asia, is not contained within present boundaries. In addition, the unfortunate possibility of ambiguous lines between nuclear first use and first strike, and equally indistinct markers between preemption and preventive war, has the potential to turn one state’s deterrent into another’s provocation. In addition, nuclear policy experts and others are concerned that US, Russian, and Chinese nuclear modernizations over the next several decades could lead to a new generation of smaller, less destructive, and therefore potentially more “usable” nuclear weapons, ultimately destabilizing deterrence and arms race stability.8

Substrategic but Still Important

Russia’s nuclear weapons are, as prior discussion has established, its principal claims to military great power status unless, and until, its conventional forces are substantially improved. And quite understandably, given US president Obama’s call for a global nuclear zero and the emphasis placed by his administration on the New START arms reduction talks, media and public attention have focused on the limitation and ultimate fate of strategic nuclear weapons as opposed to others.9 Customary usage by arms control experts and military professionals refers to strategic nuclear weapons as those carried by missiles or bombers with intercontinental or transoceanic range—that is, more than 5,500 kilometers (the outer limit for intermediate-range weapons, one step below strategic). Some have also attempted to distinguish strategic nuclear weapons from others on the basis of their respective yields, but this practice is less reliable or consensual as among experts. A working compromise will be offered here. Strategic nuclear weapons are those operationally deployed or stored for possible deployment on launchers capable of ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers, or those deployed on US, Russian, or other states’ intercontinental delivery systems, according to the established protocols of agreed arms control treaties or other verifiable sources. For future reference here, nuclear weapons other than strategic ones will collectively be referred to as substrategic. I stipulate that this category subsumes nukes referred to in various media as “battlefield,” “tactical,” “theater,” and so forth—weapons intended for deployment on delivery sys-

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

151

tems of less than strategic, that is intercontinental, range.10 During the Cold War, the possibility of mutual nuclear annihilation as between the United States and Russia focused most arms control and military discussion on strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Notable exceptions included the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 (eliminating ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles of 500- to 5,500-kilometer ranges), and the unilateral-reciprocal Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of 1991–1992 between President George H. W. Bush and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin. Although the PNI agreements were not a formal treaty and included no provisions for verification, they resulted in the destruction of thousands of Russian and US substrategic nuclear weapons and the removal into storage of many others.11 Table 10.1 summarizes the approximate numbers of US substrategic nuclear weapons still deployed in Europe. One important difference between strategic and substrategic nuclear weapons, based on Cold War and subsequent experience, is that many substrategic weapons are intended for forward deployment with military forces in the field (such as divisions, tactical air wings, and fleets). They are embedded with the troops, so to speak, at the tip of the spear where conflict is likely to start. Strategic nuclear weapons are cosseted in specialized units, apart from regular forces and operating according to their own set of training regimens and protocols. In addition, strategic weapons are likely to be weapons of last resort, after other options have been exhausted—including other nuclear ones. Although all US, allied NATO, and Soviet Cold War nuclear weapons, including substrategic weapons, were supposedly under strict centralized control of their respective national governments, substrategic operational and tactical weapons were deliberately deployed with publicly ambiguous

Table 10.1 US Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2016 Country Belgium Germany Italy Netherlands Turkey Total

Base

Number of Weapons

Kleine Brogel Buchel Aviano Volkel Incirlik

20 20 50 20 50–90 160–200

Source: Hans Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005), p. 12. Grateful acknowledgment is made to Michael Brenner for this reference.

152

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

policy guidance as to exactly when, and under what conditions, they might be activated. This aspect of substrategic weapons deployment might have been intentional, for the purpose of reinforcing deterrence, but it opened the door to misperception during a crisis. For example, a NATO nuclear command-post exercise in early November 1983 called Able Archer may have unexpectedly played into Soviet fears of a US plan for a nuclear first strike, a misperception of Ronald Reagan administration thinking that was stoked by elements in Soviet intelligence and by recent political controversies over NATO “572” ballistic and cruise missile deployments, President Reagan’s Star Wars speech in March 1983, and the Soviet shootdown of KAL flight 007 in September of the same year.12 The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the advent of the twenty-first century have not witnessed the elimination of US, NATO, or Russian substrategic nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the United States still deploys hundreds of substrategic nukes on the state territories of NATO allies, and Russia’s large arsenal of substrategic nuclear weapons assuredly includes many deployed in its western military districts, intended for possible use in case of an attack by NATO. The latter’s group of experts tasked to prepare guidelines for the alliance’s new Strategic Concept in 2010 reiterated the need for a nuclear component of NATO’s deterrent, including US substrategic nuclear weapons deployed abroad.13 Implicit in these US, allied NATO, and Russian decisions with respect to substrategic nuclear weapons was another decision: to accept an unknown, but not insignificant, degree of risk of nuclear first use, in all likelihood developing on the heels of an outbreak of conventional war. Russia’s military doctrine published February 10, 2010, emphasized that nuclear weapons existed primarily for the purpose of strategic deterrence and the avoidance of nuclear war. The doctrine acknowledged that, in the case of regional or larger conventional wars, the possession of nuclear weapons “may lead to such a military conflict developing into a nuclear military conflict” and also noted, “The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”14 Russia’s 2010 military doctrine stopped short of references to the use of nuclear weapons in local wars and seemed to place less emphasis on nuclear weapons altogether than pessimists had feared.15 Similar language, appearing to raise instead of lower the nuclear threshold relative to pre-2010 formulations, was reaffirmed in 2014.16 Nevertheless, and consistent with earlier and later formulations of post-Soviet Russian military doctrine, the option of nuclear first use was not precluded.17 Also consistent with prior

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

153

and subsequent Russian military doctrine was the assumed potential for substrategic nuclear weapons to be employed in response to some kinds of conventional attacks, for the purpose of strategic de-escalation—that is, for limited use to inflict “calibrated” damage with the objective of obtaining escalation dominance and a favorable military outcome, while avoiding expansion of the conflict into a global war or a nuclear war between the United States, with or without NATO, and Russia.18 Nuclear policy expert and former deputy assistant secretary of defense Keith Payne has offered the following assessment: Yet, Russian nuclear strategy indeed appears to focus on using the threat of limited nuclear first use to compel the West to stand down and accept Moscow’s forceful expansionism without a strong military response. For example, the Russian military occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula was followed by Russian nuclear threats to deter any serious military efforts to restore Ukrainian territory. By all appearances, this strategy has worked for Moscow.19

Russian, US, and NATO declaratory and operational policies with respect to nuclear first use are of interest not just to their respective internal audiences. Other state actors, including those with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, will take note. For example, China’s official declaratory policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons has previously been one of no first use. On the other hand, military doctrine for the use of missiles in warfare notes that a strategy of active defense can include sudden first strikes in campaigns or battles as well as counterattacks in selfdefense into enemy territory.20 In addition, a vigorous debate has occurred among Chinese military and civilians about the viability of China’s “no first use” policy: partly in the context of US conventional military capabilities for long-range, precision strike against Chinese nuclear forces. According to one US expert on the Chinese military, [People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military thinkers] fear that a conventional attack on China’s strategic missile forces could render China vulnerable and leave it without a deterrent. This has led to a debate in China among civilian strategic thinkers and military leaders on the viability of the announced “no-first-use” policy on nuclear weapons. Some strategists advocate departing from the “no-first-use” policy and responding to conventional attacks on strategic forces with nuclear missiles.21

A further concern for US military observers is the apparent mixing of nuclear, nuclear-capable, and conventionally armed missiles within the same operational and tactical units. As Larry Wortzel, a US expert on the Chinese

154

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

military, has noted, the decision “to put nuclear and conventional warheads on the same classes of ballistic missiles and collocate them near each other in firing units of the Second Artillery Corps also increases the risk of accidental nuclear conflict.”22 Related to this concern about accidental or inadvertent nuclear war or escalation are the doctrinal emphases in PLA and Second Artillery thinking on the massing of decisive missile fires with surprise in a theater war; ambiguity about the kinds of warheads used in ballistic missile attacks on naval battle groups; and increasing Chinese interest in the military uses of space and in capabilities for attacking US C4ISR systems supporting warning, command-control, and missile defense.23

Dimensions of the Problem

The interest in Russia and NATO in the possibility of preemption, and in making more explicit the existence of preemption against terrorists or other nonstate actors, is quite understandable. In the aftermath of 9/11 and other high-profile terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe, the “war on terror” has carried NATO military operations into Afghanistan and realigned US military thinking and planning along the lines of asymmetrical warfare. Russia, also victimized by costly terrorist attacks since 9/11 and fighting against terrorists and insurgents in Chechnya, is as concerned as the United States and allied NATO countries are about the possible use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. Both NATO and Russian leaders recognize that nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists create an unacceptable risk of a catastrophic attack against their societies.24 Acknowledgment of the peril created by terrorists with nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, does not necessarily lead to conclusion in favor of nuclear preemption against such targets. There are several points to be considered in this regard. First, the United States now holds the high cards with respect to long-range, conventional precision-strike capabilities, supported by mastery of information and electronics technology and of technologies for C4ISR. Given accurate intelligence and targeting information, the United States and therefore NATO can strike across continents or oceans and against virtually any target on Earth’s surface with near impunity and unprecedented accuracy. Second, nuclear weapons have collateral damage that may be unacceptable to the user. The first use of nuclear weapons in anger since Nagasaki will bring international inquiries, and possibly recrimination, for the perpetrator. Even tactical or “mini” nuclear weapons will cause civilian casualties in unknown numbers. And if, in the aftermath of a nuclear preemption for the sake of counterterrorism, the target is misidentified or the intelligence is

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

155

at all flawed, the damage to the credibility of the attacker, in political and in moral terms, will be inestimable. For example, a preemptive nuclear attack on the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998, allegedly in cahoots with alQaeda and engaged in making or storing biological weapons, would have been worse than an embarrassment, given the ultimately ambiguous and widely disputed intelligence in support of that strike in 1998. Some contend that more precisely delivered nuclear weapons with reduced yields are ideal for “bunker busting” against terrorist or rogue state actor storage facilities for WMD. Nuclear weapons would have the advantage of burning up the residue of any chemical or biological weapons stored at the suspect site. However, the collateral damage to surrounding communities and facilities might still be extensive, and the distribution of radioactivity across the region would be subject to a number of uncertainties, including weather and seasonal variations in climate. The collateral damage from reduced-yield nuclear weapons might well exceed the expectations of optimists and, in the process, also bring into question US or NATO motives and ethics. It might be objected here that Russia, lacking the conventional military capabilities of the United States and NATO, has a stronger case for nuclear preemption against anticipated WMD attacks by terrorists. However, in carrying out a nuclear preemption, Russia faces some of the same decisionmaking trade-offs as NATO does, and possibly others.25 If Russia were to fire the first nuclear weapon since 1945 against terrorists, Russia’s neighbors and trading partners would hold their breath. They would worry whether this was a sign of Russian willingness to repeat the exercise under conditions of similar, or lesser, provocation. The United States and NATO would be discussing whether to increase their own preparedness for nuclear war and the adequacy of their current forces for nuclear deterrence. Russia’s economic relations with Western Europe could be destabilized and the Kremlin’s program for building an entirely more prosperous economy based on energy sales might be disrupted. In addition, Russia’s inclusion among the Group of Eight (G8) powers as an interlocutor rests not only on its raw economic or military power, but also on its perceived legitimacy and commitment to world order: soft power. Finally, there are the important particulars of any nuclear first use: against whom, and where. If Russia were to employ tactical or smaller nuclear weapons against terrorists on its own state territory, and if evidence proved that a terrorist WMD attack was indeed imminent, then the world would take notice, but the matter would be widely regarded as a justified self-defense of Russia’s homeland. More complicated would be the situation if Russia struck preemptively with nuclear weapons against alleged terrorists in its near abroad, especially in states that are in contention with Russia over various issues or being considered for membership in NATO. A

156

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

preemptive nuclear attack outside Russia’s own territory against terrorists, however threatening they are perceived to be, raises issues of violation of state sovereignty and sets the dangerous precedent that others can cross state boundaries in nuclear preemption of suspect terrorists. Neither NATO nor Russia faces easy issues, therefore, in deciding whether and when to use nuclear preemption, whether first use or first strike. Indeed, the distinction between first use and first strike is a problematical aspect of the case for nuclear preemption. This conceptual problem exists alongside another: the relationship between preemption and preventive war.

The Crucial Dichotomies: Preemption and Prevention, First Strike and First Use

Preemption and Prevention The distinction between preemptive and preventive attacks lies in the attribution of motive, by the defender against the attacker; in the reliability of the intelligence, relative to the plans of the attacker; and in the time available for making decisions, whether an attack is in progress or being imminently considered. If a defender has actionable intelligence that an attack has already been set in motion or is imminent, then preemption is a means of avoiding the worst effects of being surprised. Of course, people can quibble about what “actionable intelligence” means, but for the present discussion it means verifiable information from human or technical (or both) sources that an attack is in progress or is about to be launched. For example, the US nuclear attack warning system during the Cold War required confirmation by “dual phenomenology” (satellites and ground stations) before authoritative interpretation of an attack in progress was validated. In addition to the reliability of the defender’s intelligence about the attacker’s capabilities and plans, the matter of time is also important in the justification for preemption. Preemptive attacks assume that the option of forestalling the attack by diplomacy or deterrence no longer exists. The attacker has taken an irrevocable political decision for war. The defender’s options are to await the first blow, or alternatively to act first to minimize damage, or if possible to preemptively destroy the enemy’s strike capabilities. The time pressure for making these decisions creates a compression factor that can destabilize rational or even sensible decisionmaking. Even when nuclear weapons are not involved, crisis management often brings out the worst in decisionmaking pathologies by individuals and organizations. For example, the months of July and August 1914 present a rich tableaux of leaders who made mistaken assumptions about other states’ intentions, capabilities, arts of war, and politico-military staying power. Some heads of

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

157

state and foreign ministers were unfamiliar with their own country’s war plans and their implications for crisis management. In lieu of intelligence, stereotypical thinking about national character and military dispositions was available to take up the slack (“the Frenchman cannot be a very effective fighter, his voice is too high”). Added to this was the uncertainty about alliance cohesion on the part of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente: each state or empire had its own priorities, in policy and in strategy, and these priorities could not be synchronized under the time pressure between Sarajevo and the guns of August. In a crisis involving two nuclear-armed states with the capability for second-strike retaliation, time pressure becomes nerve shattering. The evidence from studies of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 shows that US and Soviet leaders operated under high personal stress and strained group decisionmaking throughout the thirteen days that were required for the crisis to run its course. US officials at one point wondered whether Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had actually been the victim of a coup and replaced by a hard-line Politburo coalition more determined for war. And the “known unknowns,” as Donald Rumsfeld might have said, are in retrospect equally discouraging for optimists about nuclear crisis management. One of these known unknowns was whether the Soviets had deployed any nuclear-capable delivery systems in Cuba in addition to the mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers that provoked the crisis. US officials at the time assumed not, but later historians determined otherwise. Nuclear-capable surface-to-surface short-range missiles were deployed with Soviet ground forces in Cuba, unknown to US intelligence at the time. And Soviet ground force commanders, in the event of a US military invasion, were presumably authorized to use nuclear-capable missiles in self defense. The result of this known unknown could have been World War III, as a US nuclear retaliation against Soviet nuclear first use in, or near, Cuba led to further escalation. Preventive war or attack differs from preemption, nuclear or otherwise. Preventive war is anticipatory of a possible future attack, but not an inevitable one. Israel’s attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 was motivated by Tel Aviv’s concerns about what Saddam Hussein might do should he acquire nuclear weapons at a future time. On the other hand, George W. Bush’s attack on Iraq in 2003 was, if we take the president at his word, preemptive. Iraq was thought by US and other intelligence services to have chemical and biological weapons in its possession, and its continuing interest in developing nuclear weapons was assumed on the basis of Hussein’s prior stiffing of UN international inspectors. Case studies of military decisionmaking lend themselves to conflicting interpretations. Two kinds of interpretations overlap: those of the policymak-

158

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

ers and advisers who participated in the decision; and those of academic or other observers of those decisions. Observers have the advantage of hindsight and distance from the actual events; insiders have the feel for the pressures experienced by those who had to act with incomplete information. For example, in the case of the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, it appears unwise in retrospect on account of the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In addition, the botched occupation following the end of the active combat phase on May 1, 2003, casts additional retrospective doubt on the validity of the entire US strategy and policy. On the other hand, Bush policymakers were leaning forward into the decision, not backward against the harsh verdict of history. They did interpret some intelligence with a preconceived bias, for which they paid a significant cost in public credibility. However, all administrations do that: separating the “facts” of intelligence collection and analysis from the “interpretations” placed upon those “facts” by policymakers and military advisers is virtually impossible. An interesting aspect of the Bush view of Iraq was that it was conditioned by the retrospective appraisal of the events of 9/11. Iraq was one front in the war on terror and Saddam Hussein might slip chemical or biological weapons to terrorists (or nuclear weapons, once he had them). Thus, by wrapping Iraq around the war on terror like a double helix, Bush, Dick Cheney, and their advisers misperceived a pattern of strategic cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda where none really existed. In reaction to the preceding critique, the George W. Bush administration might have responded that its war against Iraq was not preemptive, but preventive. It was to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons in the future that he might use against Israel or give to terrorists. This justification might have merit if the Bush administration had not insisted that the danger posed by Iraq’s WMD was imminent: that justification requires a case for preemptive, not preventive, war. The same problem applied to Bush’s national security strategy that defended preemption as a necessary tool for policymakers and commanders under some circumstances. Few experienced policy planners or military analysts would argue the point, but Bush’s usage of “preemption” often elided into “preventive” war and vice versa.26 First Use and First Strike The Cuban missile crisis provides an interesting overture for the second part of the problem of terminology related to nuclear first use: the distinction between nuclear first use and first strike. Canonical Cold War usage referred to a nuclear first strike as an attack involving missiles or bombers of intercontinental range. Theater or shorter-range attacks were usually described as first use. However, this distinction was somewhat muddied by the over-

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

159

lap between geography, alliance membership, and technology. An example is provided by the Soviet and then NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces during the 1970s and 1980s before they were disarmed by treaty in 1987. NATO ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles deployed in Europe were capable of striking targets not only within Eastern Europe, but also within Russia. Therefore, whereas NATO viewed its 572 deployments as offsetting capabilities in response to the Soviets’ SS-20 ground-launched ballistic missiles, Soviet military planners saw the NATO deployments as an escalation going beyond a symmetrical response to the Soviet initiative. One reason for this Soviet perception of NATO’s intentions was the capability of US Pershing II ballistic missiles to reach sensitive military and command targets in the western Soviet Union within minutes. Pessimistic Soviet military analysts might have interpreted the Pershing II as a first strike weapon, intended to neutralize or obviate a Soviet retaliation following a NATO nuclear first use. Further complicating the situation with respect to deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces was the two-way connection between those forces and the ladder of escalation. Looking downward, intermediaterange nuclear forces were connected to the conventional forces deployed in Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Looking upward, intermediate-range nuclear forces were connected to the strategic nuclear deterrents of both the Americans and Soviets (and, with more uncertainty, to the British and French national nuclear forces, the latter conditionally available to NATO but solely under French determination). Thus the intermediate character of intermediate-range nuclear forces rested only on the technical dimensions of their range and probable destructive power. But the political range of the capabilities of intermediate-range nuclear forces was more problematic. Intermediate-range nuclear forces for the Soviets threatened to create a seamless, preemptive, theater war fighting capability in Europe that would, if put into effect, impose a military defeat or stalemate on NATO while at the same time deterring the United States from escalating the conflict into a global nuclear war. Intermediate-range nuclear forces for the United States, from the Soviet perspective, threatened to undo this Soviet plan for decoupling the NATO theater from US strategic nuclear forces by raising the stakes and risks of any theater nuclear first use. However, the US and NATO 572 deployments could also raise risks for NATO. Soviet war planners might decide that they had to attack the NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces immediately upon the outbreak of any large-scale war, conventional or nuclear. Thus the intermediate-range nuclear forces could serve not as a firebreak between theater and global nuclear war, but as a detonator

160

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

of the entire US and Soviet nuclear arsenals by inadvertence, or by design. Instead of contributing to a separation of conventional from nuclear war in Europe, or creating a firebreak between theater and strategic nuclear war, intermediate-range nuclear forces could expedite the leap from nuclear first use into total war. In short, deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces were soon realized by both the Soviets and NATO to have created a zone of uncertainty with respect to deterrence and the control of escalation that was unacceptable. The walk from first use to first strike was too quick and too ambiguous for diplomats and war planners to sort out in the exigent circumstances of the fog of war. It was problematic enough to maintain any clear firebreak between tactical and strategic weapons once the nuclear threshold had been crossed—a distinction that the Soviets, as a matter of practice, disavowed, although they were well prepared for tactical nuclear first use apart from ordering a nuclear first strike by their long-range forces. The case of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe shows how the line between first strike and first use is as much a matter of arbitrary definition as it is a reliable guide to military effectiveness or deterrence credibility.27 If nuclear weapons of shorter range and lesser yields were capable of being used with the surgical precision of conventional weapons, then shorterrange and lower-yield nuclear weapons would be stronger candidates for preemption and first-use or first-strike missions. However, the advent of sanitized nuclear weapons, comparable in their collateral damage to conventional means, is not imminent, and ironically is not judged to be desirable by politicians or military planners. Nuclear weapons derive their deterrent effects from their awfulness: their capability to destroy not just military targets, but also societies and economies on a large scale, in a historically unprecedented short period of time. Even the most obtuse politician is thus pushed away from candidate scenarios for “victory” on offer from briefers on first use or first strike. A second implication of the results in the preceding analysis has to do with the issue of no first use as a declaratory or operational policy for US or other nuclear forces. No first use of nuclear weapons is an ethically admirable, and politically desirable, declaratory policy for states to have. However, it is highly conditioned on circumstances and scenario-dependent as to its effectiveness. NATO found a no first use policy inexpedient during the Cold War, on account of the presumed inferiority of NATO’s conventional forces compared to those of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact deployed in Europe. Russia now finds a no first use declaratory policy unpropitious for the same reason: the decrepit character of its conventional forces, compared to those of the United States and NATO or to Soviet forces of the late Cold War.28 NATO considers that its relationship with Russia is officially one of

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

161

openness to security cooperation, including the possibility of post–New START reductions in Russian and US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Nevertheless, an expert panel working up a new strategic concept for NATO reported in May 2010, As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with widely shared responsibility for deployment and operational support, at the minimum level required by the prevailing security environment. Any change in this policy, including in the geographic distribution of NATO nuclear deployments in Europe, should be made, as with other major decisions, by the Alliance as a whole.29

It is argued that doctrines of no first use are sometimes dysfunctional for deterrence, especially for the deterrent umbrella that the United States might want to extend to allies. As a case in point, the United States might want some states in the Middle East or Asia to be deterred from attacking regional US allies (Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Iraq) with conventional forces or with weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear. The credible threat of nuclear first use against such adventurism might give pause to aggressors who would otherwise be willing to gamble on US restraint. For example, US negotiators apparently informed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 1991, prior to the outbreak of Operation Desert Storm, that any Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons would put all US options on the table, including the possible first use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, this case might be interpreted not as a case of deterrence, but as an instance of escalation control for the management of a conflict that US officials and Iraqis knew to be inevitable. Extended deterrence does have the value of providing a US nuclear umbrella over states in Europe or Asia that might have deployed their own nuclear weapons in lieu of US protection. On the other hand, demonstrating that extended deterrence has worked because of US nuclear weapons, as opposed to other assets, is a more difficult brief now than it would have been during the Cold War. In conventional warfare, the United States, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, was unarguably superior to any other state as a military power with global reach.30 The case that nuclear umbrellas, as opposed to conventional raincoats, are necessary for the protection of allies against threats other than nuclear coercion or attack is weaker now than hitherto. As nuclear nonproliferation expert George Perkovich has noted, “Postulating the utility of nuclear weapons to deter anything less than threats to national survival may induce states to count on these weapons to prevent or halt crises in which nuclear weapons should or would not be used. It could even embolden allies to take actions that could start or intensify crises, counting on U.S. nuclear weapons to back them up.”31

162

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

A third aspect of this discussion is what to do with some 200 US substrategic nuclear weapons deployed in five other NATO member states. One school of thought regards these weapons as vital reminders of NATO’s commitment to the defense of its expanded post–Cold War membership. From this perspective, US European-based nuclear weapons reinforce the coupling of US and allied European political and military capabilities by the creation of shared risk, including the risk of nuclear escalation in, and beyond, Europe. Responding to proposals for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, and perhaps from Europe altogether, some expert commentators warned against possible repercussions for the credibility of NATO strategy and policy: Poland and the Baltic states in particular are likely to argue with merit that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to those commitments to their defense and to NATO’s mutual defense guarantee, “Article V,” as they understood it. They will be particularly worried that the security of the United States is being decoupled from the security of Europe—the new NATO countries still trust the U.S. more than their west European counterparts.32

On the other hand, the European political alignments of the twenty-first century are not those of the Cold War. The preparedness for an entire spectrum of nuclear wars, from local and regional to global conflicts, is neither necessary for credible deterrence nor responsive to the realistic threats facing modern Europe. Instead of former Soviet operational maneuver groups pushing westward with massive infantry and armored thrusts, NATO members now face the threats posed by possible Russian (or other) coercive diplomacy, including cyber-bullying, resource strangulation, brooding military maneuvers, and instigating diplomatic demarches intended to throw NATO cohesion off balance.33 If, against political odds, war does happen, US nuclear weapons deployed on European soil may invite preemptive attacks on themselves instead of deterring escalation to nuclear first use.34 As an alternative to a declaratory policy of nuclear first use, the nuclear powers might consider the doctrine of defensive last resort. Defensive last resort is one step less rigid than nuclear first use. A doctrine of last resort (presumably defensive in intent) was adopted by NATO in 1991, and as a declaratory policy it is more suited to the realities of operational policy and military practice. Under a doctrine of defensive last resort, the first use of nuclear weapons is not precluded, but it is also not encouraged as an early step on the ladder of escalation. As explained by the authors of an important study on nuclear arms control, “To recognize the possibility that in some future defense against aggression the use of the nuclear weapon could unexpectedly become the only alternative to an even worse disaster is not to encourage reliance by

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

163

planners on any such action, nor does it support any doctrine of early use. A doctrine of defensive last resort is fully consistent with a continuing American effort to sustain the worldwide tradition of nonuse.”35 The preceding point is reinforced by the blurred line between nuclear first use and first strike already noted here, and by the unhealthy dependency of current and possible future nuclear states on prompt launch and high alert (i.e., hair triggers) in order to guarantee the survivability and retaliatory credibility of their nuclear forces.36

Conclusion

The issue of substrategic nuclear weapons as between NATO and Russia is complicated by rationales that struggle for policy and strategy consistency. On the margin, US justifications for US substrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have more to do with maintaining alliance political solidarity than they do with any need to augment US or NATO military strength. On the other hand, Russia’s comparatively weak conventional military forces relative to NATO, together with its resentment of post–Cold War NATO enlargement and putative fears of NATO anti-Russian regime destabilization, place nuclear weapons in the foreground of Russia’s military options. The potential for misperception, should a conventional war in Europe near Russia’s borders get beyond Russia’s perceived ability to control it, is nontrivial. Added to that is Russia’s military-doctrinal stance acknowledging a willingness to use nuclear weapons first in an otherwise conventional war in order to avoid extreme and unacceptable consequences for the Russian state. The incorporation of Russian and NATO substrategic nuclear weapons into future nuclear arms control agreements is a subject of debate within NATO as well as a point of contention between NATO and Russia. Although all members of NATO, in theory, endorse the alliance’s 2012 review of deterrence and defense posture, favoring continued deployment of substrategic nuclear weapons in support of extended deterrence, in practice there are powerful political forces within some European member states that favor removal of these weapons as dangerously provocative or militarily superfluous or both. As Stefanie von Hlatky has noted, NATO members’ disagreements about nonstrategic nuclear weapons include diverse perceptions about extended deterrence, risk mitigation, and alliance cohesion: At the heart of this debate was the continued presence of forwarddeployed American nuclear weapons on European territory. Faced with different regional security preoccupations, some allies attempted to challenge the status quo while preserving alliance cohesion, while others, like France, favored the status quo above everything else. To overcome this

164

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control persistent disagreement, allies will need assurances with regard to the American commitment to Europe and the continued viability of extended nuclear deterrence, more generally.37

With regard to nuclear arms control, the incorporation of NATO and Russian substrategic nuclear weapons into post–New START reductions presents itself as a possible step for near-term consideration in Washington and in Moscow. Russia’s past position has been that the Kremlin will not discuss reductions in its European substrategic nuclear weapons until all US nuclear weapons deployed in five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) are repatriated to US soil. However, as an intermediate step, the United States and Russia might agree to increase transparency with respect to this category of weapons, providing one another with information about their numbers of weapons and the status of each (deployed, stored, awaiting dismantlement).38 This is already a hill-climb for Russia, since published estimates of its deployed and stored weapons vary considerably, and doubtless some weapons in this category are deployed not against NATO but in an easterly direction. Another complicating factor with respect to Russia’s transparency on nonstrategic nuclear weapons is the US concern that Russia has begun deploying a category of cruise missile that violates the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.39 But as challenging as transparency with respect to nonstrategic nuclear weapons might be, it would be a useful and militarily nonthreatening beginning toward the eventual inclusion of this category of weapon in US-Russian and NATO-Russian arms reduction talks.

Notes 1. Philip M. Breedlove, “NATO’s Next Act: How to Handle Russia and Other Threats,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 108, June 15, 2016, [email protected], reviews pertinent history and current challenges. 2. “Putin Threatens Nuclear War over Ukraine,” Daily Beast, August 31, 2014, www.thedailybeast.com. See also “Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces to Hold Major Exercise This Month,” Reuters, September 3, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com. 3. Jason Groves, “It’s Better Not to Mess with Russia: Putin’s Nuclear Warning to West on Ukraine,” Daily Mail, August 29, 2014, www.dailymail.co.uk. 4. For an expert assessment of Russia’s nuclear force modernization, see Mark B. Schneider, The State of Russia’s Strategic Forces, Defense Dossier no. 12 (Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy Council, October 2014), pp. 13–18, www.afpc.org. See also Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin Promises New Weapons to Fend Western Threats,” Associated Press, September 10, 2014, http://hosted.ap.org. 5. Vladimir Filonov, “Russian General Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against NATO,” Moscow Times, September 3, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com. 6. For an assessment of the pros and cons of maintaining, consolidating, or downsizing NATO’s substrategic nuclear weapons after the Lisbon summit, see Paul

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

165

Schulte, Is NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy a Relic of the Cold War? Policy Outlook (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2010). 7. See Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015), www.crs.gov, for expert analysis of arms control issues related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. 8. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Race for Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revive Cold War,” New York Times, April 16, 2016, www.nytimes.com. 9. Expert commentary on this point and related issues appears in George W. Ullrich, James Scouras, and Michael Frankel, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: The Neglected Stepchild of Nuclear Arms Control,” Air and Space Power Journal (July– August 2015), pp. 9–14, www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. 10. An informative discussion of this issue appears in Richard Weitz, “Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy,” paper presented at the conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy, Ft. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010, p. 19. 11. Ibid., p. 20. 12. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), pp. 590–600. 13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement—Analysis, and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels, May 17, 2010), pp. 43–44. 14. Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 35, February 19, 2010, [email protected]. According to Dale R. Herspring, the assumption that Russia’s nuclear deterrent can compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces, come what may, is questionable, in view of the dubious quality of one or more legs of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad; Herspring, “Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship,” paper presented at the conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy. 15. On this point, see Olga Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier,” National Interest, May 23, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 93, May 24, 2016, [email protected]. Aspects of the 2010 military doctrine are also analyzed in Keir Giles, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010: NATO Research Review (Rome: NATO Defense College, February 2010). 16. On the 2014 doctrine, see Yuri Smityuk, “Putin Endorses Updated Version of Russia’s Military Doctrine,” ITAR-TASS, December 26, 2014, http://itar-tass.com; Roger N. McDermott, “Putin Signs New Military Doctrine: Core Elements Examined,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 6, 2015, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 4, January 8, 2015, [email protected]; Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier.” 17. For expert analysis of the 2010 Russian military doctrine, see Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier”; Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020,” paper presented at the conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy; Marcel de Haas, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine: A Compromise Document,” Russian Analytical Digest no. 78 (May 4, 2010), pp. 2–4, www.res.ethz.ch; Nikolai Sokov, “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle” (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 5, 2010), http://cns.miis.edu.

166

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

18. Expert assessments of the role of limited nuclear first use in Russian doctrine and military practice appear in Oliker, “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier”; and Keith B. Payne, Responding to the Emerging Potential for War in Europe, Information Issue no. 406 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 2, 2016), www.nipp.org. See also Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian National Security Strategy,” paper presented at the conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy, pp. 13–17, on the concept of limited nuclear use with calibrated damage for the purpose of de-escalation. 19. Payne, Responding to the Emerging Potential for War in Europe. 20. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), p. 9. 21. Ibid., pp. viii–ix. 22. Ibid., p. 31. See also Michael S. Chase, “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2014), pp. 301–353. China’s Second Artillery Corps is, in its nuclear aspect, somewhat equivalent to former Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces or the current Russian Strategic Missile Forces. The Chinese Second Artillery Corps is technically a PLA branch, compared to the army, navy, and air force, which are services. The conventional missile forces are the most mature and dynamic of the Second Artillery’s forces and are more numerous than its nuclear missiles. In addition to prior sources, see Evan S. Medeiros, “Minding the Gap: Assessing the Trajectory of the PLA’s Second Artillery,” in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2007), pp. 143–189, esp. p. 182, n. 2. 23. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces, pp. 31–33. See also Medeiros, “Minding the Gap,” pp. 166–167; Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Command, Control, and Targeting Architectures: Theory, Doctrine, and Warfighting Applications,” in Kamphausen and Scobell, Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army, pp. 191–234. Also valuable and unique is Lonnie D. Henley, “War Control: Chinese Concepts of Escalation Management,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 81–103. 24. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times-Holt, 2004). 25. See Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Eurasian Security,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Defense Monitor, March 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 46, March 8, 2010, [email protected], for expert analysis. 26. In this discussion, I am not entering into the debate over whether the Bush administration purposely misrepresented the intelligence pertinent to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. That’s a different topic and there is already a large literature about this subject. Sensible commentary on this point appears in Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), esp. pp. 52–57. 27. Historical perspective and appraisal of current policy issues relative to intermediate-range nuclear forces are provided in Amy F. Woolf, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2016), www.crs.gov.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Deterrents or Combustibles?

167

28. Dale R. Herspring, “Putin and Military Reform,” in Dale R. Herspring, ed., Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 173–194. 29. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement—Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels, May 17, 2010), p. 44. See also “NATO Mission Statement Supports Retaining Tactical Nukes,” Global Security Newswire, May 17, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org. 30. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005), pp. 33–36. 31. George Perkovich, Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Broaden and Deepen the Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2010), p. 6. 32. Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, Germany Opens Pandora’s Box (London: Centre for European Reform, February, 2010), www.cer .org.uk. See also David J. Kramer, “U.S. Abandoning Russia’s Neighbors,” Washington Post, May 15, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 96, May 17, 2010, [email protected]. 33. Pertinent examples appear in Perkovich, Nuclear Weapons in Germany. 34. For a superior treatment of this subject, especially with regard to the tradeoffs between preserving the credibility of US extended deterrence for Europe on one hand, and achieving US and NATO nonproliferation and arms reduction goals on the other, see Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn, NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma (London: Royal United Services Institute, March 2010), www.rusi.org. 35. McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe Jr., and Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear Danger: The Road Away from the Brink (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 85. 36. George H. Quester makes the important point that the first use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki might be shrouded in ambiguity as to whether a state or other actor is responsible, whether the attack was accidental or deliberate, or other factors. See Quester, Nuclear First Strike, pp. 24–43. 37. Stefanie von Hlatky, “Transatlantic Cooperation, Alliance Politics, and Extended Deterrence: European Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons,” European Security no. 1 (2014), p. 7. 38. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, p. 33. 39. Woolf, Russian Compliance, pp. 11–15.

11 The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

The downward spiral of US-Russian relations on national security issues that followed Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012 accelerated dramatically in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and follow-on destabilization of eastern Ukraine.1 Among the areas of contention from the time of Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012, and even earlier, were missile defenses, including US and NATO missile defenses deployed in Europe. Russian political leaders and leading military commanders have specifically cited missile defenses as examples of US unilateralism and potential threats to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent.2 Russia’s further integration into post– Cold War and twenty-first-century Europe, as well as Russian-US cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and other issues, might be hostage to further deterioration in political relations, including over missile defenses. What’s true and what’s not about the issue of missile defenses and the probable impact of this issue on US-Russian security relations? First, neither missile defenses nor any other instruments of war (or deterrence) are things in themselves. They serve their political masters and the masters’ purposes—often more than one. Second, the Russian and US governments, including the post-Obama and post-Putin ones, can make a political mess of this issue and allow missile defenses to complicate security relations more than is necessary—or desirable. Third, missile defenses will not repeal the nuclear revolution. Therefore, the issue of nuclear deterrence between the United States and Russia is not a Cold War relic, but part of the syllabus for mastery by twenty-first-century politicians.3 That is because US-Russian deterrence now crosses over into nonproliferation and political stabilization in Asia and in the Middle East, as well as in Europe.4 In this chapter I first consider the political setting for Russian and US missile defense and related issues of nuclear arms control and deterrence. Second, the technology environment, pertinent to discussions of missile defenses and their relation to US and Russian security policy, is summarized. 169

170

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Third, an analysis is performed in order to establish some analytical benchmarks about missile defenses and their probable impacts, if any, on RussianUS nuclear deterrence, arms control, and politics.

The Political Setting

Russia and the United States have been drifting into separate orbits on issues related to nuclear arms control since the conclusion of the New START agreement, which was signed in 2010 and entered into effect in February 2011. Included among the bones of contention is the question of US ballistic missile defenses, including US national territorial antimissile defenses and US contributions to NATO’s European Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defenses in Europe.5 Russian president Vladimir Putin and other high Russian officials have raised objections to US plans to deploy components of missile defense systems ashore and afloat in Europe. Russian political and military leaders have indicated that they may hold hostage other nuclear arms control agreements and, as well, engage in offensive countermeasures to thwart any US defenses. For example, US deployment of the new Aegis Ashore missile defense site in Romania in May 2016 prompted Putin’s assessment that the BMD system was not actually a defensive system but part of the US strategic nuclear capability. In this regard, he commented, “Now, after the deployment of those anti-missile system elements, we’ll be forced to think about neutralizing developing threats to Russia’s security.”6 Russia’s improved economy under Putin from 2001 to 2010, compared to the 1990s, created additional confidence that Russia can maintain indefinitely a condition of apparent nuclear-strategic parity with the United States. This remains the case despite the US and European Union economic sanctions imposed on Russia after its annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine in 2014 and 2015. Russia expects to modernize its strategic nuclear forces under the constraints of the New START treaty. The treaty requires that the United States and Russia must each reduce their numbers of operationally deployed warheads on intercontinental launchers (including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) to 1,550 by the end of the year 2018. In addition, the treaty provides for inspections and verification measures to ensure compliance with its embedded timetable.7 Nuclear arms control is one important tool for US and Russian leaders, but it is not a substitute for coherent foreign policy, or for well-thought-out military strategy. One must continue to ask, Deterrence for what, and against whom? States do not fight because they have arms, but because they have political disputes that they are either unable or unwilling to resolve by

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

171

means short of war, including diplomacy. As instruments of war fighting, nuclear weapons offer a poor menu. They are the worst weapons of mass destruction thus far invented: a surgical nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons lies in this very impossibility of limiting the collateral damage of even a few nuclear detonations. Deterrence is a blunt instrument, as is war. Deterrence is a psychological transaction between states in a competitive, and probably adversarial, relationship. How can one know that a prospective opponent is truly deterred from one or another course of action? The absence of an undesired behavior does not demonstrate the success of deterrence: other reasons may have caused the prospective attacker to hesitate. Causation in matters of international politics, especially war and peace, is complex and includes a mix of objective and subjective factors. Even after the fact, historians argue about the causes of major wars; politicians coping with the same decisions in real time are even more challenged to get it right. Nuclear weapons grew up with the Cold War and with the adjustment of the Americans and Soviets to the idea of mutual deterrence and its military supports. The Cold War superpowers and their militaries had time to adjust to the oxymoronic condition that the threat of nuclear war could be a necessary means to the avoidance of nuclear war: or conventional war with a significant possibility of escalation into nuclear first use. The post–Cold War environment is unlikely to proceed at such a leisurely pace as did the first nuclear age.8 Instead, new nuclear forces in Asia and elsewhere will be chasing a clock of nuclear multipolarity and missile profligacy. Already nuclear-armed states in Asia include Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Other aspirants, presumably, wait in the wings. Decisions by Washington and Moscow about their bilateral nuclear deterrence relationship are also related to the issue of nuclear proliferation in Asia and elsewhere. Chinese nuclear modernization has immediate implications for Russia, for India, for the United States, and for Taiwan. Iranian nuclear weapons mated to appropriate delivery systems could threaten NATO Europe and Israel, not to mention Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. North Korean nuclear weapons raise issues with respect to future Chinese, Japanese, Russian, US, and South Korean foreign policy. The ability of the Americans and Russians to impose Cold War–style proliferation discipline over candidate and aspiring nuclear powers is a historical artifact.

The Technology Environment

Missile defenses have been controversial almost from the dawn of the nuclear age. Nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles seemed to overturn

172

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

the historical dictum that for every offense, there was (at least eventually) a defense. Despite the research and development efforts of US and Soviet or Russian scientists throughout the Cold War and afterward, neither was able to deploy nationwide missile defenses competitive with the speed and destructiveness of offenses.9 Part of the problem was that the task of missile defenses was so much harder than that assigned to offenses. Unless they were based on very advanced principles and based in space (contrary to treaties), missile defenses had to hit a bullet with a bullet during one of the four phases of the trajectory of a ballistic missile in flight. Interception had to take place within twenty minutes or so of enemy launch. Attack characterization and choice of response require strategic and tactical indications and warning, reconnaissance, surveillance, and command-control systems that have to perform flawlessly or nearly so. Because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the attacker needs to penetrate the defenses with only a small percentage of its first-strike weapons. The defender, in contrast, has to achieve perfect or nearly perfect intercept and destruction of attacking warheads; otherwise, even if retaliatory forces were saved from destruction, collateral damage to populations would be enormous. The problem of indications and warning provides one example of the difficulty of challenges facing prospective BMD systems: The critical mission of defending the U.S. homeland—homeland defense— requires a fully integrated capability to identify, categorize, and fuse strategic and tactical indications and warnings (I&W) by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Today’s fiscally constrained environment may encourage decisionmakers to eliminate perceived “redundancies” and create an I&W stovepipe for weapons release authorities (WRAs). In a mission area where time is of the essence and failure would result in grave damage to national security, such an arrangement would create an unacceptable risk to homeland defense.10

New information and electronics technologies may bring new hope to proponents of missile defenses. The US Missile Defense Agency is supporting research and development into competitive technologies for groundbased, sea-based, airborne, and space-based BMD interceptors and supporting command, control, and communications. The United States began deploying nationwide missile defenses in Alaska and California during the first term of President George W. Bush. It would not be too surprising if the present century witnessed dramatic technology breakthroughs in missile defenses. After all, ballistic missiles date from World War II and are now qualified for Social Security benefits. And, as Freeman Dyson has noted, it is not merely a matter of means, but also of ends, whether missile defenses are desirable:

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

173

When we are thinking about defensive weapons in general and about ballistic missile defense in particular, we should distinguish sharply between ends and means. Our experts in the arms control community have never maintained this distinction. They are so convinced of the technical superiority of offensive over defensive weapons that they let the means determine the ends. I say that we have no hope of escape from the trap we are in unless we follow ends which are ethically acceptable. The ends must determine the means, and not vice versa. The only acceptable end that I can see, short of a disarmed world, is a defensively oriented world.11

In recognition of the possibility that missile defenses may improve, offenses are unlikely to stand still. The standard scenario of US-Russian nuclear missile attack, with multiple firings of land- and sea-based missiles and air-launched weapons, will give way in the present century to improvised scenarios developed by new proliferators and smaller nuclear powers. Nuclear-capable short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may be commingled with conventional ground and tactical air forces. Regional enemies could pose the credible threat of nuclear or conventional first strike (supported by tactical nuclear weapons in reserve) within minutes that deprive the other side of unambiguous warning or accurate attack characterization. The avoidance of these regional nuclear wars may rise to the gold standard of deterrence for the first half of this century. In this political environment, technologies for theater or regional missile defenses will appeal to besieged leaders. This is especially the case as ballistic missile systems with advanced liquid or solid propellant propulsion are becoming more survivable, reliable, mobile, and accurate—along with the ability to strike targets over longer distances.12 Offenses may also evolve away from dependency on ballistic missiles as first-strike weapons. Cruise missiles offer precision strike power from land-based, sea-based, and airborne launchers—and over a variety of ranges. They can be armed with conventional, nuclear, or other WMD warheads. Cruise missiles can be made highly survivable against ballistic missile attack—making states less dependent on the use or lose dilemma. Cruise missiles require the mastery of first-generation information age technology, but that technology has been in existence for many years. Although cruise missiles are viewed as a second-strike weapon in many nuclear scenarios, in conventional warfare they have demonstrated their potential for prompt attacks. The United States has used cruise missiles to good effect in wartime and in coercive diplomacy during and since the Gulf War of 1991. Future US weapons for conventional prompt global strike could include hypersonic weapons such as scramjet-powered cruise missiles, capable of speeds comparable to ballistic missiles but with increased accuracy.13

174

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Cruise missile technology might be employed to adjust the intended flight pattern of ballistic missiles. This tactic would be designed to complicate the task of the defender’s BMD systems by varying the flight path of attacking missiles after initial launch. Whether such a hybrid ballistic-cruise missile (or a smarter ballistic missile) could adapt in flight to the defender’s tactics would be a complicated command-control problem, as well as a question of prewar strategizing. For example, is the defender’s shooting strategy one of random intercept or first come, first serve against a wave of attackers? Or does the defender have a preferential defense algorithm that provides for prioritizing of threat vehicles based on various criteria? An additional possibility in the development of missile defense technology is the use of cyber capabilities against enemy first-strike weapons and nuclear command-control systems. US defense experts are looking into the concept of full-spectrum defenses that would include not only protective or defensive measures against an attack already launched, but also proactive or preventive attacks by means of kinetic or cyber capabilities to blunt or forestall an attack.14 The appeal of full-spectrum missile defenses is based on the increased diversity of ballistic missile attack systems, on the limitations of traditional BMD technology against more complicated threats, and on the ability of US technologists to leverage the information revolution in favorable directions. On the other hand, existing US capabilities for BMD and for conventional prompt global-strike systems have already caused concern in Russia and China about deterrence stability. Cyber capabilities for preemptive nullification of another country’s warning, command-control, and missile launch systems, however intended as part of a full-spectrum defense, might instead be seen as components of a strategic first-strike policy, in combination with conventional prompt global-strike systems and kinetic missile defense backup.15 Russian president Putin and other Russian officials have asserted that no US missile defenses will be permitted to override Russia’s nuclear deterrent.16 Putin has referred specifically to Russian technology that would allow ballistic missiles to maneuver in flight. It is not entirely clear from these vague references whether it is the missiles themselves, or their respective reentry vehicles that contain the nuclear warheads, that would maneuver in response to defense interceptors.17 Maneuverable warheads are not a new technology, but interest may increase if missile defenses are deployed in significant numbers. Russia has also indicated its plans to place greater emphasis on its own air and missile defense forces, even as it continues to express doubts about the intentions of the United States and NATO in this regard. For example, Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced in August 2015 the creation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, bringing under a single command the air force and the Aerospace Defense Forces. According to Shoigu, “Air

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

175

forces, anti-air and anti-missile defenses, and space forces will now be under a unified command structure.”18 Some experts said that the Russian reorganization was at least a partial reaction to the perceived risk of NATO attacks against Russia, including those based on prompt global-strike weapons.19 Others pointed to both technical and management obstacles in standing up and operating the new command, including rivalries among generals for new ranks and positions.20 The interest in BMD technologies is as likely to be driven by political threat perceptions as it is to be the product of “eureka” in research laboratories. One of the principal dangers of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is that it could generate a reciprocal arms race in missile defenses, followed by an escalated competition in offenses, and so on. Although experts have focused on the dangers of a quantitative arms race in Asia and in the Middle East, the threat of a qualitative arms race is equally, or more, dangerous. Absent controls over regional nuclear proliferation, the appeal of BMD against missiles of short or medium range will grow—if only for psychological reassurance, and regardless the actual performance of BMD technologies. The symbolic reassurance that missile defenses seem to provide will be compounded by the fallacy of the last move arguments in regional arms races. Once a sufficient number of competitive offensive and defensive systems exist, calculations relative to deterrence stability will be labor intensive. Analysis

Caveats and Conundrums All models of nuclear warfare are subjective, regardless their pretensions to objectivity. Nuclear warfare includes the use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of avoiding war, by means of deterrence. Following Clausewitz, the strategist must acknowledge that weapons, including nuclear weapons, have purposes dictated by the requirements of state policy. State policy in the hands of rational or sensible decisionmakers should prefer other options to nuclear first strike. But rational and sensible are subjective terms, and highly culturebound. The exact political conditions under which a two- or multisided nuclear war might start are as numerous and idiosyncratic as they are unpredictable. And once the door has been opened to nuclear first use and retaliation, the admonitions of Clausewitz about the environment of war—characterized by uncertainty, friction, and chance—apply even more than they do to conventional war.21 These cautions about nuclear force exchange modeling are especially appropriate when defenses are entered into the equation. The most interest-

176

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

ing defenses, from the standpoint of military-strategic effectiveness, have yet to be invented. Projection of future defense capabilities is limited to “what if” and they are probably best represented as a spectrum of possibilities. The capabilities of offensive forces are (comparatively) well known as a result of extensive testing and field deployment. On the other hand, no one knows exactly how offenses and defenses will interact with regard to the performance of weapons in combat.22 A nuclear first striker opposed by active defenses must make a number of decisions relative to the expected performance of the defense and the defender’s preferred tactics. Which target sets will the defender seek to protect as its highest priorities: retaliatory forces, populations, commandcontrol, or other? The defender’s threat assessment must include some assumptions about the attacker’s targeting strategy, which is related to the attacker’s theory of war. Will the first striker attack the defender’s nuclear retaliatory forces, as in the canonical US-Soviet scenario of the Cold War? Or will the first striker aim for cities and other countervalue targets, against the expectation of many Western analysts but motivated by primordial rage based on nationality, religion, or an expectation of apocalypse now? A usefully oversimplified matrix summarizing the choices available to the defender and the attacker appears in Figure 11.1. If both sides have defenses, the first striker and second striker reverse positions in the matrix after the first strike has been launched. Now the initial attacker must task its defenses with the priority of defending its remaining retaliatory forces, its cities, or other targets. And the initial defender (now the retaliator) must decide whether to emphasize destruction of the attacker’s remaining forces or its societal values, including economic and population targets. Figure 11.1 Attacker’s and Defender’s Priority Target Sets

Defender’s Priorities

Defender’s Priorities

Attacker’s Priorities

Counterforce/ Counterforce

Counterforce/ Countervalue

Attacker’s Priorities

Countervalue/ Counterforce

Countervalue/ Countervalue

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

177

Merely walking oneself through the decisions required by this highly simplified model can make any rational and sensible analyst surrender to frustration. Who wants to make choices like these—among degrees of desperation or horror? No policymaker or military planner would prefer to do so. However, heads of state and military planners are marching to a different drummer than are analysts. They are required by their positions and duties to plan for the unexpected and the unpredictable—as bad as that might turn out to be. Policymaking and strategic planning are exercises in fear and humility under the best of conditions. As to the fear, policymakers live in the international system of Hobbes. You may not be interested in nuclear targeting, but nuclear targeting (to paraphrase Trotsky) is interested in you. This is the danger of nuclear proliferation: by putting more nuclear weapons out there in untested hands and untried minds, a cascade of imbecility leading to a powder train of nuclear first use becomes more probable. Probable is far from certain— history is full of “what if” counterfactuals, including likely wars that did not happen. Defenses thus have a somewhat ambivalent status with regard to their expected impacts on nuclear deterrence and proliferation. If missile defenses are used primarily for the purpose of protecting retaliatory forces, they could be seen as contributory to nuclear strategic stability—in accord with Cold War–style thinking about deterrence. However, populations, and politicians, might demand of missile defense technology that it provide for their own survival—instead of protecting weapons and supporting command-control systems. People and politicians are not deterrence theorists. Faced with exigent nuclear threats, they would be more likely to demand protection from defenses and retaliation from offenses. Of course, defenses could be tasked to protect both, but there is still the matter of setting priorities among missions for any force of finite size. Another ambiguity with regard to offense-defense interactions is that, once defenses pass a certain threshold of capability (relative to offenses), defenses become potentially offensive or first-strike weapons. For example, antimissile defenses, based in space and capable of neutralizing another state’s early warning and communications satellites, would be a logical part of an enhanced nuclear first-strike capability. In this case, space-based ballistic missile defenses would behave as an antisatellite weapon engaged in precursor attacks before ballistic missiles are launched or arrive at their intended targets. In response to such a deployment of space-based BMDs and antisatellite weapons by one state, others might deploy space-based defensive antisatellite weapons to neutralize the antisatellite of the provocateur. Antisatellite and defensive antisatellite weapons would then have their own two-way relationship, in addition to their connection to the matrix of offense and defense inter-

178

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

actions depicted in Figure 11.1. The offense-defense interaction problem might then resemble two-dimensional chess. In social issues related to national security, values and facts are commingled. How effective should defenses have to be before they are evaluated as worth deploying? Unfortunately for military planners, the effectiveness of antimissile defenses will never be known unless they are activated under duress. However, the object of deterrence is to preclude that possibility. Therefore, truly successful missile defenses will be tested only in the laboratory or in field-training exercises. Of course, we can fire our own test missiles against test antimissiles, but test conditions are unlikely to simulate the exigencies of war. The preceding list of obstacles to analysis of nuclear war is admittedly formidable. Analysis must proceed, obstacles or not. Even imperfect analysis can assist us in asking the right questions and in reality-testing with regard to the range of possible outcomes from (hypothetical) nuclear conflicts. During the Cold War and since, certain schools of thought have argued against nuclear force exchange modeling or other attempts to model nuclear war as dangerous: studying the problem makes it seem more “normal” and “acceptable” for policymakers to go there. I doubt, however, whether policymakers will base their choices for or against nuclear war on the decisions made by analysts or professors in published studies. More likely, political leaders will be motivated by one, or more, of the causal agents cited by Thucydides—fear, honor, and interest. Data Analysis Data analysis pertinent to this chapter proceeds in several steps.23 First, the performances of Russian and US New START–compliant strategic nuclear retaliatory forces will be compared under a variety of operational conditions. Second, each state will also be assigned a hypothetical post–New START deterrent force, with a maximum number of 1,000 operationally deployed warheads on intercontinental launchers, for similar performance comparisons. Third, the New START–compliant and post–New START forces of the two states will be supplemented with national antimissile defenses and then subjected to the same performance tests.24 Forces without defenses. Figure 11.2 summarizes the numbers of secondstrike retaliating US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads, within a New START–compliant upper limit of 1,550 operationally deployed weapons, under each of the following operational conditions: (1) generated alert, launch on warning; (2) generated alert, riding out the attack; (3) day-to-day alert, launch on warning; (4) day-to-day alert, riding out the attack. For the sake of

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

179

Figure 11.2 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,550 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

comparison, each state is given four alternative force structures in the analysis. For the United States, the alternatives include a balanced triad of nuclear delivery systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers); a dyad of SLBMs and bombers; a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs; and a force composed entirely of SLBMs. For Russia, the alternate force structures include a balanced triad; a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs; a dyad of ICBMs and bombers; and a force made up entirely of ICBMs. In Figure 11.3, the numbers of Russian and US surviving and retaliating warheads are compared, within a lower initial deployment limit of 1,000 warheads for each state, under the four operational conditions and alternative force structures for each state delineated in Figure 11.2. According to the results summarized in these two figures, Russia and the United States can fulfill the requirements of stable deterrence with either New START–compliant or post–New START reduced numbers of operationally deployed forces. Even in the worst-case situation for a retaliator (day-to-day alert and riding out the attack), each state has enough surviving and retaliating warheads to inflict unacceptable societal damage and, in addition, to strike at a variety of counterforce and other targets.25 In the standard case of generated alert and riding out the attack, the United States and Russia both retain several hundred surviving and retaliating warheads.

180

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Russia and the United States agree to reduce their numbers of operationally deployed weapons drastically below New START levels. How far could they go? In theory, they could reduce their deployed nuclear forces to several hundred weapons each: socalled minimum deterrent forces. 26 If enough of these weapons were deployed in survivable basing modes, then (depending on the scenario), perhaps 100–200 weapons might survive any first strike. However, Moscow and Washington would be unlikely to agree to limits so low. Their respective military establishments would be opposed on the grounds that these numbers were insufficient to provide for the target coverage required against prospective enemies. In addition, political leaders in Washington and in Moscow would be reluctant to shrink their arsenals to levels at, or near, those of other nuclear powers. The United States and Russia, as a matter of high policy, prefer to remain in an exclusive club of two (more or less equal) nuclear powers, maintaining a respectful distance between their forces and those of others. In part, this is Cold War nostalgia. But it also reflects their shared interests in nonproliferation, in nuclear arms control, and in using superior nuclear arsenals for political influence, especially with respect to other (and rising) nuclear states.27 Forces with defenses. What differences would national missile defenses

make in the results depicted in Figures 11.2 and 11.3? Since the exact capabilities of future defenses are unknown, we will use a dummy variable for this illustration by assigning to missile defenses an arbitrary capability to intercept or otherwise deflect at least half of the other side’s retaliating warheads. These defenses will be inserted into the equation for offenseonly retaliation as depicted in Figures 11.2 and 11.3, for the US and Russian forces with upper limits of 1,550 and 1,000 operationally deployed weapons. The results of these simulations with defenses appear in Figures 11.4 and 11.5. These findings are revealing of important insights relative to offensedefense interactions. Within the next decade, neither Russia nor the United States will in any likelihood be capable of deploying defenses that can nullify the greater portion of their nuclear deterrents. Indeed, their research and development bureaucracies and associated industries will be stretched to deploy missile defenses that can bend the curve even modestly. In other words, against realistic (although not necessarily realizable) defenses in the next decade or so, both Russia and the United States can remain confident that their retaliatory forces can perform the assured retaliation or assured destruction mission of inflicting unacceptable societal damage and, in addition, retain some additional weapons for attacks on the other side’s retaliatory forces, other military targets, and value targets.

Figure 11.3 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads, 1,000 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack. Figure 11.4 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses, 1,550 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

182

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Figure 11.5 US-Russian Surviving and Retaliating Warheads vs. Defenses, 1,000 Deployment Limit

Note: GEN = generated alert; DAY = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

So why consider deploying defenses at all? Defenses perform more than one function. They can provide additional deterrence and they can also serve to deny a rogue state the option of causing unacceptable first-strike damage to US or Russian state territory. Under conditions such that deterrence might fail no matter how reliable US or Russian second-strike capability might be (against nonrational leaders, or in the case of accidental or inadvertent launches), defenses can provide insurance against societal damage. Of course, whether defenses are tasked for denial of enemy objectives or as supplements to deterrence, defenses cannot substitute for the missions that offenses must perform. A secure nuclear second-strike capability remains the backbone of strategic nuclear deterrence. If Russian or US defenses are not necessarily superfluous, are they really necessary? This depends more on politics than it does on technology. If political relations between the two states remain officially nonhostile, albeit strategically competitive, room remains for cooperative security measures on a number of fronts, including further reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, and force restructuring that improves the prelaunch survivability and fidelity of US and Russian weapons and early warning systems, especially the Russian.

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

183

On defenses, the potential for cooperative security between the two states covers a broad spectrum. At one end, the United States and Russia might jointly deploy national missile defenses (or Russia and NATO might jointly deploy theater missile defenses). An intermediate option could permit unilateral-reciprocal initiatives that limited the United States and Russia to restricted-scope national or theater missile defenses against states outside Europe and among the ranks of current or future nuclear powers hostile to the United States or Russia. At the other end of the spectrum, Russian defense technology companies could share in contracts for US or NATO national or theater ballistic missile defense with Russia declining to deploy defenses of its own. Regardless the particular options chosen, making defenses into a frozen conflict as between the United States or NATO and Russia amounts to strategic nullification for its own sake. For example, as Vladimir Dvorkin has noted, with respect to the contradictions in Putin’s pronouncements on missile defense, Putin’s statement that Russia could defeat enemy anti-ballistic missile systems might lead one to conclude that the Kremlin would cross the U.S. missile defense program off the list of factors disrupting the strategic balance between the two countries, thus mitigating bilateral nuclear tensions. This, in turn, would likely have shifted the conversation to other destabilizing factors—and possibly spurred talks on additional strategic arms reductions. However, nothing of the kind happened.28

Most important, it remains amazing that some still question whether stable nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States is important. The answer lies in geopolitics as related to nuclear weapons spread. Multilateral security in Asia and in Europe is simply inconceivable without bilateral political and military security, including both stable deterrence and reassurance, as between the United States and Russia. The containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia and the continuation of a virtually debellicized Europe require Russia’s active political commitment and military forbearance. Russia is a necessary, not only a convenient, security partner for the United States and for NATO—for selfish as well as for altruistic reasons in Washington and in Brussels.

Conclusion

With respect to the issues of missile defense and nuclear arms control, the United States and Russia have been caught up in a paradigm of reciprocally assured negation. But a drifting apart of Russian and US international secu-

Table 11.1 US-Russian Forces in the Analysis, New START 1,550 Deployment Limit US Forces Balanced Triad

No ICBMs

ICBM SLBM Air All

400 1,080 48 1,528

0 1,440 48 1,488

400 1,134 0 1,534

0 1,440 0 1,440

Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

1,270 946 946 622

1,201 1,201 781 781

1,279 955 975 651

ICBM SLBM Air All

360 875 35 1,270

0 1,166 35 1,201

ICBM SLBM Air All

36 875 35 946

ICBM SLBM Air All ICBM SLBM Air All

Weapons Total weapons

Arriving weapons

Maximum retaliation Gen, LOW

Intermediate retaliation Gen, ROA

Intermediate retaliation Day, LOW

Assured retaliation Day, ROA

No Bombers

Russian Forces SLBMs Only

No Bombers

No SLBMs

ICBMs Only

847 512 76 1,435

907 512 0 1,419

1,327 0 76 1,403

1,417 0 0 1,417

1,166 1,166 781 781

1,232 844 845 415

1,231 713 899 339

1,250 472 1,194 417

1,275 425 1,275 425

360 919 0 1,279

0 1,166 0 1,166

762 415 55 1,232

816 415 0 1,231

1,194 0 55 1,249

1,275 0 0 1,275

0 1,166 35 1,201

36 919 0 955

0 1,166 0 1,166

374 415 55 844

298 415 0 713

417 0 55 472

425 0 0 425

360 586 0 946

0 781 0 781

360 615 0 975

0 781 0 781

762 83 0 845

816 83 0 899

1,194 0 0 1,194

1,275 0 0 1,275

36 586 0 622

0 781 0 781

36 615 0 651

0 781 0 781

374 41 0 415

298 41 0 339

417 0 0 417

425 0 0 425

Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Balanced Triad

Table 11.2 US-Russian Forces in the Analysis, New START 1,000 Deployment Limit US Forces Balanced Triad

Weapons Total weapons

Arriving weapons

Maximum retaliation Gen, LOW

Intermediate retaliation Gen, ROA

Intermediate retaliation Day, LOW

Assured retaliation Day, ROA

No ICBMs

No Bombers

Russian Forces SLBMs Only

Balanced Triad

No Bombers

No SLBMs

ICBMs Only

ICBM SLBM Air All

300 648 48 996

0 864 48 912

300 648 0 948

0 960 0 960

318 608 74 1,000

288 704 0 992

858 0 76 934

1,000 0 0 1,000

Gen, LOW Gen, ROA Day, LOW Day, ROA

830 587 622 379

735 735 469 469

795 552 622 379

778 778 521 521

833 663 385 165

829 684 373 170

828 293 772 238

900 226 900 226

ICBM SLBM Air All

270 525 35 830

0 700 35 735

270 525 0 795

0 778 0 778

286 492 54 832

259 570 0 829

772 0 55 827

900 0 0 900

ICBM SLBM Air All

27 525 35 587

0 700 35 735

27 525 0 552

0 778 0 778

116 492 54 662

113 570 0 683

238 0 55 293

226 0 0 226

ICBM SLBM Air All

270 352 0 622

0 469 0 469

270 352 0 622

0 521 0 521

286 98 0 384

259 114 0 373

772 0 0 772

900 0 0 900

ICBM SLBM Air All

27 352 0 379

0 469 0 469

27 352 0 379

0 521 0 521

116 49 0 165

113 57 0 170

238 0 0 238

226 0 0 226

Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

186

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

rity policies, especially with respect to nuclear arms control and deterrence stability, is neither necessary nor desirable. Therefore, US and Russian decisions with respect to the deployment of missile defenses or countermeasures should take into account not only short-term forces and imminent pressures, but also long-term consequences. A number of wrong conclusions were drawn from the end of the Cold War and carried forward into the present century. One of these was that Russia was obligated to accept a global security regime in which it was merely one among many US cooperative security partners. It was further assumed that Russia’s passivity to NATO expansion, and to US military intervention outside Europe and in areas of Russian economic or political interest, was assured. Russian strategic culture and geopolitics would all give way in the face of US global military and economic hegemony.29 Russia’s political and military resurgence after 2000 (compared to the 1990s) does not mean a return to the Cold War, but a reassertion of Russia’s significance as the geostrategic pivot of Eurasia. A politically stronger Russia with secure borders and a strong military is an international plus not a minus. Continued peace in Europe and in Asia requires that the United States and Russia push forward their cooperative security agendas: in nonproliferation (including the safety and security of weapons and fissile materials); in nuclear arms reductions; and in the inclusion of Russia within Euro-Atlantic security structures for the resolution of issues—including missile defenses.

Notes Grateful acknowledgment is made to Jacob W. Kipp for suggestions pertinent to this chapter. He is not responsible for any arguments or analysis herein. 1. See, among other expert assessments, Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson, Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, May 2015), www.atlanticcouncil.org; Douglas Mastriano and Derek O’Malley, Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe: An Appropriate U.S. Response, and the Implications for U.S. Landpower (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, March 2015), www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil; Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper no. 2 (Riga: National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014). 2. See, for example, “Putin: Russia Will Consider Tackling NATO Missile Defense Threat,” May 13, 2016; “Federation Council Not Ruling Out Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense Shield in Romania May Influence New START Treaty’s Fate,” May 13, 2016; and “5 Reasons Why US Antimissiles in Europe Threaten Russia,” May 12, 2016—all in Johnson’s Russia List no. 86, May 13, 2016, [email protected]. See also “U.S. Activates Romanian Missile Defense Site, Angering Russia,” Reuters, May 12, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 85, May 12, 2016, davidjohnson@starpower

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

187

.net; Gordon Lubold and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Dismisses Putin’s Objection to European Missile Systems: Polish and Romanian Sites Designed to Protect Against the Threat from Iran,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 87, May 16, 2016, [email protected]. Pertinent background is provided in Keir Giles with Andrew Monaghan, European Missile Defense and Russia (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2014); Andrew Futter, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy: Normalisation and Acceptance After the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2013). 3. Robin Emmott and Phil Stewart, “NATO Agrees Russian Deterrent but Avoids Cold War Footing,” Reuters, February 10, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 30, February 11, 2016, [email protected]. 4. On this point, see Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2016); Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012). 5. Karen Kaya, “NATO Missile Defense and the View from the Front Line,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 71 (Fourth Quarter 2013), pp. 84–89. See also Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2013); Patrick J. O’Reilly, Ballistic Missile Defense Overview (Washington, DC: US Missile Defense Agency, March 26, 2012), www.mda.mil; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),” fact sheet (Brussels, May 22, 2012), www.nato.int. 6. “US Missile Defense in Eastern Europe: How Russia Will Respond,” Sputnik, May 16, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 87, May 16, 2016, davidjohnson @starpower.net. 7. US Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Washington, DC, April 8, 2010), www.state.gov. 8. On the differences between Cold War and post–Cold War nuclear deterrence, see Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age; Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), esp. pp. 75–83; Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001); Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), esp. chap. 2. 9. For historical perspective on US and Soviet-Russian missile defenses, see Rebecca Slayton, Arguments That Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012 (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013); Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000). 10. Thomas K. Hensley, Lloyd P. Caviness, Stephanie Vaughn, and Christopher Morton, “Understanding the Indications and Warning Efforts of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,” Joint Force Quarterly 78 (Third Quarter 2015), p. 92.

188

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

11. Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 281. 12. Hensley et al., “Understanding the Indications and Warning Efforts,” p. 92. An informative case study is provided in Jacob L. Heim, “The Iranian Missile Threat to Air Bases: A Distant Second to China’s Conventional Deterrent,” Air and Space Power Journal (July–August 2015), pp. 27–50. 13. Robert Beckhusen, “Russia’s Future Air Force Could Resemble . . . the U.S. Air Force,” https://medium.com. 14. I am grateful to Andrew Futter for calling this possibility to my attention. 15. Andrew Futter, “Full Spectrum Missile Defense: Why Using Cyber to Counteract Nuclear Threats Is a Plan Fraught with Danger,” draft paper, April 2016. 16. For additional perspective on this topic, see Daniel Wagner and Diana Stellman, “The Prospects for Missile Defense Cooperation Between NATO and Russia,” Foreign Policy Journal, February 10, 2011, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 24, February 10, 2011, [email protected]; Stephen J. Blank, Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011), pp. 32–33. 17. See Richard Weitz, Russian-American Security Cooperation After St. Petersburg: Challenges and Opportunities (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007), pp. 17–18; Mikhail Nikolayev, “Hypersonics Will Punch Holes in American Missile Defense; Problem Is, the New Weapon Will Not Be Fielded Soon,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 21, 2007, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, March 22, 2007, [email protected]; Oleg Shchedrov, “Putin Still Opposed to U.S. Missile Shield,” Reuters, May 23, 2007, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 118, May 24, 2007, [email protected]; Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Leader Assails U.S. Defenses,” Associated Press, May 23, 2007, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 118, May 24, 2007, davidjohnson @starpower.net; Steve Gutterman, “Russia Boasts of New Missile,” Associated Press, May 30, 2007, www.philly.com. 18. Matthew Bodner, “Russian Military Merges Air Force and Space Command,” Moscow Times, August 3, 2015, www.themoscowtimes.com. 19. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Creates Powerful New Military Branch to Counter NATO,” The Diplomat, August 7, 2015, http://thediplomat.com. 20. Alexander Golts, “Russia’s Aerospace Forces Will Never Take Off,” Moscow Times, August 10, 2015, www.themoscowtimes.com. 21. Stephen J. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 8–12. 22. For an informative illustration, see Dean A. Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness,” Science and Global Security no. 2 (1999), pp. 183–215. 23. Grateful acknowledgment is made to James Scouras for use of his Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM@) in this chapter. He is not responsible for its use here, or for any arguments or analysis in this discussion. 24. Force structures are mine. The forces are notional and not necessarily predictive of actual future deployments. See also Pavel Podvig, “New START Treaty in Numbers,” from his blog Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, April 9, 2010, http:// russianforces.org. 25. US nuclear targeting involves an elaborate process that yields a number of major attack options providing for strikes against Russian and other states’ nuclear forces, conventional forces, leadership, and economic and other targets. See Matthew G. McKinzie, Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and William M.

The Contentious Issue of Missile Defense

189

Arkin, The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2001), pp. 9–13. Actual nuclear targeting decisions in both the United States and Russia are highly classified. 26. On minimum deterrence, see James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Minimum Deterrence and Its Critics,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 3–12; James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 74–89; Stephen M. Walt, “All the Nukes You Can Use,” May 24, 2010, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com. 27. For example, China is a potential benchmark competitor depending upon its future decisions about nuclear modernization and force sizing. See Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security no. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 7–50. See also Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), pp. 14–22. 28. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Risky Contradictions: Putin’s Stance on Strategic Arms and Missile Defense,” Carnegie Moscow Center, February 10, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 29, February 10, 2016, [email protected]. 29. See Marvin Kalb, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), esp. pp. 216–218 for prominent US and Russian expert views on this topic.

12 Geography and Nuclear Strategy

Geography and nuclear arms control might seem an odd match in subject matter. But there are a number of aspects of nuclear arms control, including proliferation, arms reductions, and missile defenses, that are embedded in geostrategic assumptions and perspectives. This chapter identifies some of the geostrategic contexts within which nuclear deterrence, war planning, and arms control must take place. As Colin Gray has noted, “The influence of geography upon the character of conflict is pervasive at all levels of analysis: policy, grand strategy, military strategy, tactics, and technological choices and performance.”1 Geography, including geopolitics and geostrategy, is among the fundamental contexts within which strategy making takes place: political, social-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geopolitical and geostrategic, and historical.2 One might, in deference to Sun Tzu, add moral-psychological to the list of important contexts for military affairs, although aspects of both are included in the political, historical, and sociocultural milieus.3 It follows that the relationship between geopolitics and geostrategy on the one hand, and nuclear weapons or nuclear arms control on the other, is also embedded in these various contexts for strategy.

The Nuclear Revolution Cannot Escape Geography— and Vice Versa

At the most basic level, geography and its evident facts, including distance, topography, weather and climate, and terrain, cannot be escaped. Some geopolitical theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may have overstated a good case for the relevancy of geostrategy. Nevertheless, real military planners must plan against the obdurate facts of the moment, and these facts include geography. For example, geography, including climate, is among the reasons for Russia’s history of resisting conquest successfully. 191

192

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Any state territory that can resist the predations of Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hitler must present formidable natural barriers, apart from the fighting power of its armed forces or the skill of its commanders. On the other hand, medieval Russia was less successful in warding off invaders from the east—including the Mongols. One reason for the greater success of easterly moving invaders against Russian defenders, compared to western ones, was of course the comparatively underdeveloped character of the Russian “state” in the former case. Another factor favoring the Mongols was their art of war and experience in waging fast-moving, cavalry-centered battle over unprecedented distances. No other force, from medieval times to the present, has mastered strategic movement over terrain, endurance of weather and climate, and the ability to strike from several main directions under coordinated command-control, as the hordes of Genghis Khan and several of his immediate successors. Geography defines the various media in which war takes place or might do so. Ancient and medieval warriors had to plan for war on land or at sea. Modern warfare takes place in, or is supported by, military activities on land, at sea, and in the air, space, and cyberspace. The last of these, cyberspace, is not strictly speaking a geographical expression. But activities that the United States and other countries carry out in cyberspace have military import, perhaps decisively under propitious conditions of war. Therefore cyberspace is another dimension for warfare, and perhaps a transgeographical one. But not so fast. Traditionalists would warn that armies, fleets, and air forces cannot move through cyberspace. Killing zones require kinetic action that must take place in natural land, sea, or airborne environments—and, perhaps within the present century, in space as well. The traditionalists’ caution is well intended, but cyber enthusiasts would argue that the behavior space within which geography influences war has changed. The arrival of the information age means that geography has become mated to “infography” in compelling ways. Electrons that carry the vital information necessary for military forces to operate, including everything from C4ISTAR to logistics, do travel in cyberspace. An opponent who could disrupt this flow could conceivably shut down a military operation by turning its brain and central nervous system into sand. Indeed, in information age warfare, disruption is every bit as important as destruction. The ability to disrupt one state’s art of war by denying it vital, timely information, compared to the performance of its opponent, is to bring the first state to the very threshold of defeat if not all the way over it. The preceding point was demonstrated by the Germans in 1940 against France, and by the United States and allied armed forces against Iraq in 1991. Even with regard to computers and other aspects of military cyber operations, however, geography still matters. Hackers, like terrorists, must have

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

193

safe havens from which to operate. Physical destruction of their locations may put them out of business temporarily or permanently. The challenge is to identify exactly who is hacking and from where. If hackers are located within a powerful state, such as China or Russia, kinetic responses are ruled out. Instead, cyber attackers may be vulnerable to cyber counterattacks. But even for that, we must know their global positioning coordinates. Hackers, like other regular or irregular forces, require food, water, sleep, and other necessities—and likely as not, they are on somebody’s payroll. Nor is it necessary to counterattack them all—a few exemplary disappearances or lives lost might suffice to send object lessons. But given the ease of Internet-enabled cyber attacks and the numbers of persons attracted to this malfeasance, the defenders will always be outnumbered and forced to rely on considerable measures of self-defense (e.g., firewalls, encryption) apart from the possibility of counterattack. If the dimensions of future warfare include land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace, nuclear weapons can be said to have a geographical aspect with respect to the first four, at least. Nuclear forces are based in certain locations; they are targeted on other locations; and they pose threats of intended and collateral damage that are considerable and unique. Nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, if that threshold is ever crossed in the twentyfirst century, are geographical and therefore geostrategic animals. From launchers based on land, at sea, or airborne, nuclear weapons can be fired through air and space, over land and sea, across distances that range tens to thousands of kilometers. The United States, with the world’s largest number of deployed, long-range nuclear weapons, can in theory hit any location on Earth with some kind of nuclear charge, should it choose to do so. In practice, neither the United States nor any other nuclear-armed state has an unlimited supply of ready weapons, so target plans must specify a finite menu of plausible options. These options must take into account many variables, including the exact locations of targets, topography (in the case of missile silos), weather (for enemy submarines tracking nuclear ballistic missile–firing submarines), physical locations of vital military targets and infrastructure (bases, airfields, military manufacturing plants), and other location-dependent activities. With respect to the construction of nuclear war plans for the purpose of deterrence, the sizes of notional countries of interest, in addition to other aspects of their geography, matter considerably. During the Cold War at various times, both the United States and Russia considered whether nuclear weapons would enable either side to deliver a knockout blow against the opponent’s military forces and society. Planners faced the fact that the United States and Russia, geographically speaking, were actually continents or continental-sized civilizations as much as they were countries or nation-

194

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

states. The scale of nuclear destruction required to destroy the Soviet or US armed forces during the height of the Cold War, under the most optimistic of assumptions about the performance of military systems, would also have rendered their societies, and those of their allies, radioactive deserts. What drove this lesson home for the United States was the Cuban missile crisis, although US and Soviet forces were smaller then than they would later become in the 1970s and 1980s. What drove the point home for the Soviet leadership was Chernobyl and its aftermath. Mikhail Gorbachev, if not some of his more hidebound military advisers, got the point that the costs of victory in a US-Soviet nuclear war would be unacceptable to the American and Soviet peoples and a crime against humanity—including socialist humanity. It took the United States and the Soviet Union a long time to recognize that, beyond a certain point, the accumulation of more weapons did not lead to an equivalent increase in security. One reason for this is geography, both human and natural. Nuclear weapons may cause a great deal of ruin in a nation, but only so much of this can be meaningful to military accomplishment. Some US and no doubt Soviet plans for nuclear war required such redundancy in the destruction of military and other targets that the expenditure of ammunition and the firing of rockets would have represented a macabre triptych of Wagnerian opera more than a sensible war plan. On the other hand, it has to be said that planners did the best they could, under the exigent circumstances of their political tasking and in the face of the limitations of available technology—and geography. For example, it soon became clear to US and Soviet planners that firing transcontinental or transoceanic ballistic missiles over the North Pole toward targets in Siberia or North Dakota made more sense than it did to fire them across the Atlantic or Pacific. On the other hand, nuclear war might begin in Europe or Asia as a conventional war, escalating to nuclear first use. So some significant portion of US and allied NATO nuclear ordnance and delivery systems had to be reserved for use in European or other theater operations. The Soviet Union, on its side, had to be concerned with its eastern flank, facing a nuclear-armed China and a US-protected Japan. Theater or local nuclear war planning required, for the Americans and for the Soviets, nuanced political and military guidance beyond the singular war plan for all cases and all-out destruction. Whether tasked for local or global thermonuclear war, US, allied NATO, and Soviet military planners faced geographical and geostrategic speed bumps. In the early years of the nuclear age, for example, US targeting of the Soviet Union was done largely by intuition and osmosis. Maps of the interior of the Soviet Union available in the late 1940s and early 1950s were often based on World War II German intelligence sources or Soviet defectors’ memories. Military overflights of Soviet territory by hostile air-

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

195

craft were always dangerous, and it is a reasonable inference that more intelligence missions crashed and burned inside Russia than US government officials have acknowledged. The Soviet shootdown of the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers created a large political embarrassment for the Eisenhower administration. It was not until the development of space reconnaissance satellites that the United States could establish with confidence the size and character of Soviet long-range missile and aircraft deployments. And when it did, this created a political firestorm in the Kremlin, leading to Khrushchev’s dangerous Cuban missile gambit as a shortcut to reversing the sudden appearance of US nuclear superiority. Imaging satellites and other telltales, including satellites and other instruments for collecting signals intelligence, provided an abundance of data for US and Soviet intelligence to pore over during the Cold War. However, geography still imposed limits. Overhead reconnaissance could not be conducted with equal vigilance over all locations of interest—there were simply not enough spaceborne or other platforms available. This meant, in the US case at least, that interagency controversies over the tasking of photo-reconnaissance satellites resulted in the creation of an interdepartmental referee for the purpose of setting priorities. In addition, satellites and other above-ground observations could not determine some important parameters of interest to nuclear target planners. For example, the singleshot kill probability of a US land- or sea-based strategic missile against a Soviet missile silo would have depended upon the hardness of the missile silo, the kind of soil in which it was embedded, whether the attacking warheads were ground- or air-burst, and other factors. In addition, Soviet ICBMs were not randomly located within its state territory, but purposely distributed across the breadth of the Soviet Union in order to minimize the likelihood of any successful US first strike or, in the event of a Soviet first strike, US counterforce retaliation. If land-based missiles posed targeting problems partly on account of geography and the limits of technology related to geography, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles were even more demanding. One could observe the locations of ballistic missile submarines when in port or departing from port for patrol destinations. But once at sea, “boomers” defied detection by overhead reconnaissance, and locating them, if possible at all, required sophisticated antisubmarine warfare forces (primarily state-of-the-art attack submarines). From public sources, it appears that the US boomers, at least, were virtually undetectable by hostile forces during the Cold War. After the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, US ballistic missile submarines faced no peer competitor, and no antisubmarine warfare force capable of global operations stalked them. However, the boomers were potentially vulnerable when in port, during the Cold War and

196

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

afterward, which is why a certain percentage of them were always kept at sea. Conversely, the Russian-fleet ballistic missile submarine force fell into hard times with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s economic problems in the 1990s impacted on defense spending, with the nuclear navy taking an especially hard hit. Plans to modernize the force were announced but not followed through. By the time Putin assumed the office of president in 2000, the sea-based leg of the Russian nuclear triad was in serious trouble, relative to Russia’s force of strategic land-based missiles. During Putin’s presidential term, the Russian economy improved over the preceding decade, and additional funds were devoted to military modernization. Russia has begun to deploy a new class (Borey) of ballistic missile submarines and is testing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (Bulava) for eventual deployment with those boats. Russia recognizes that the ballistic missile submarines constitute a uniquely survivable deterrent that is required for even the appearance of nuclear-strategic parity with the United States, let alone the reality of survivable forces. In the case of ballistic missile submarines, compared to land-based forces, geography imposes challenges relative to reliable command and control. Submarines, like other maritime forces, must operate with a certain degree of tactical and operational flexibility, compared to forces that are land-based. Admittedly, modern communications deny captains at sea the autonomy that great ships of the line used to have in the heyday of sail. Still it would be selfdefeating for submarine commanders not to have the wherewithal for timely and prompt decisions about maneuver and, if necessary, firing their weapons without prior clearance from regional or higher headquarters. Submarines capable of firing nuclear-armed ballistic or cruise missiles require much of the same tactical and operational flexibility as do those equipped with only conventional weapons. But no head of state or chief of the general staff wants to leave the decision for nuclear first use or retaliation, especially the decision to launch transoceanic ballistic missiles, to a tactical commander. Therefore the chain of command will impose certain constraints on commanders of nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines and state-of-the-art attack submarines, including the need for redundancy in the clarification of launch orders, careful screening of personnel for reliability, and specialized message systems from higher headquarters to the submarines on patrol. In the case of the Soviet Union, its Cold War nuclear-firing attack or ballistic missile submarines were undoubtedly staffed with political commissars whose approval was also required before launch orders could be authenticated and implemented. Compared to land-based forces and submarines, it might seem that strategic nuclear bomber forces appear to have fewer constraints imposed by geography or geostrategy. That impression is misleading. Bombers

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

197

require basing, and the operation of bomber bases for planes capable of delivering nuclear weapons over transoceanic or transcontinental distances is actually quite complicated. The first constraint imposed by geography, combined with technology, is that bombers cannot themselves carry enough fuel for intercontinental missions. They therefore require aerial refueling, a technique that is challenging even for the United States. Few states have succeeded in mastering this skill, and none on the scale that the United States is able to do. The reason for this is that, during the Cold War and even afterward, no other state even attempted to field a long-range bomber force of the size and complexity of the US airborne fleet. Modernization of the US bomber force was sporadic over the decades of Cold War, and has remained so since. Periods of high thrust in research, development, and deployment have alternated with slow progress. Nevertheless, old platforms endure: the redoubtable B-52 was still flying as a component of the US nuclear strategic triad into the twenty-first century. The command and control of bomber forces is also more complicated than it appears to be. This is, ironically, because bombers have one advantage over missiles: they can be sent aloft, flown partway toward their targets, and then recalled if crisis conditions change. During much of the Cold War, a certain percentage of the US strategic bomber force was always kept on ready or strip alert so that they could be scrambled out of harm’s way in case of Soviet first strike. If, however, a nuclear crisis were protracted, bombers would have had to return to base: they could not stay aloft indefinitely, or even as long as ballistic missile submarines could be kept dispersed and hidden at sea. Bombers could move from one location to another during a crisis as a signal to the other side of US seriousness about the stakes. This use of bombers for political signaling happened more than once during the Cold War, including in contretemps with both the Soviet Union and China. Forward basing of nuclear-capable bombers, say in Guam, did not commit the United States to irrevocable nuclear conflict, but it did create a greater capability for delivery of munitions of choice noted by potential adversaries and others. Another geographical or geostrategic aspect of bombers was their slow rate of flying, compared to missiles. This made missiles the preferred weapons for nuclear first strikes, once they were available in sufficient numbers, and bombers more appropriate for delayed as opposed to prompt missions. In addition, the technical capability for MIRVing long-range ballistic missiles (placing multiple warheads on a single missile and allowing each warhead to be directed to a separate target) increased the destructive capability of US and Soviet ballistic missiles by a significant factor—especially if either force were to be employed in a first strike. MIRV was also attractive to military planners and defense budget managers because it enabled more bang

198

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

for the buck: each single ballistic missile could deliver ordnance against as many as ten targets, as in the case of the largest Soviet intercontinental landbased missile (the SS-18). As a result, MIRVed ballistic missiles took on the aspect of the bad guys that threatened deterrence and crisis stability, compared to the bomber good guys whose platforms were now almost certainly confined to retaliation after attack. In addition, mistaken launches of bombers could, as noted earlier, be recalled before Armageddon ensued; ballistic missiles lacked this option (some scientists proposed the addition of a command destruct option for ballistic missiles, but policymakers and military commanders found the temptation resistible). Another asymmetry between Cold War bomber and missile forces, related to the overlap between geostrategy and technology, was the problem of defense against nuclear attack. As is well known, during the latter 1940s and much of the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union anticipated that a third world war would involve large-scale attacks by nuclear bomber forces. It was thought that air defenses could pose a credible threat of mitigation against bomber forces, protecting both military targets as well as civilian populations from mass destruction. However, once the intercontinental ballistic missile forces superseded long-range bombers as weapons of choice for prompt attacks, this relationship between the prospective attacker and defender changed. Air defenses might have promised some meaningful attrition against bombers, but no antimissile defenses worthy of the name were available or on the drawing boards. Admittedly the Americans and Soviets both tried hard—both states fielded more than one generation of strategic antimissile defenses from the 1960s to the 1980s. But not even Ronald Reagan’s dreams of a nationwide missile shield that would eventually make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” stood a chance in the 1980s against the threat posed by Soviet ballistic missile attack. The Soviets, relative to the possibility of a US nuclear missile attack, faced the same cul-de-sac.

Missile Defenses: Technology Interacts with Geography

Eventually negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union codified this counterintuitive relationship, between nuclear offenses and antinuclear defenses, into an arms control agreement—the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. It remained as one of the diplomatic benchmarks between the Cold War nuclear superpowers, along with the original Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the various SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) and START agreements. For some members of the US arms control community, the ABM Treaty was more than that. It symbolized deterrence

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

199

stability based on mutual vulnerability of both American and Soviet societies to unacceptable retaliation. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) or mutual assured retaliation was, according to this school of thought, not a choice, but a condition, imposed by technology. In fact, technology did favor the offense, but that did not necessarily argue for disinterest in antimissile defenses. After all, defenses could have been deployed and tasked with the protection of retaliatory forces, consistent with MAD doctrine. The Richard Nixon administration, seeking to begin deployment of limited missile defenses without jeopardizing talks with the Soviets about nuclear arms control, renamed the Sentinel ABM system as Safeguard and changed its primary mission from population protection to defense of ICBMs in the midwestern United States. However, SentinelSafeguard was involved in public and congressional controversy from the time of its first proposal by then–secretary of defense Robert McNamara in the Lyndon Johnson administration. Safeguard was finally deployed in 1975, but the House voted to deactivate the system almost immediately after it became operational. The SALT I and ABM signature agreements on offensive and defensive strategic arms limitations pushed antimissile defenses further onto the backburner of research and development, not to mention deployment, until the administration of Ronald Reagan. One of the underappreciated points about missile defenses, relative to offenses, during the Cold War was that the supremacy of offenses was not only imposed by technology. It was also a creation of geography. The task of missile defenses was made impossible not only because it was difficult to hit a bullet with a bullet, but also because there was so much US or Soviet territory to protect. The attacker could strike with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles against almost any portion of the defender’s retaliatory forces, and the defender could strike back with equal or greater unacceptable damage against the forces, society, and economy of the attacker. There was worse. In addition to the challenge of defending their respective state territories, the United States and the Soviet Union also had to defend their allies against nuclear first strikes or retaliation. This problem bedeviled NATO even without the complexity of missile defenses. How extensive was the extended deterrence provided by the US nuclear umbrella? Could the nonnuclear state members of Cold War NATO rely on US willingness to risk nuclear destruction of the American homeland in order to deter, or if necessary, to retaliate against, a Soviet attack? The problem was based on the antithesis between the requirement in NATO and US strategy for two necessary, but opposed, concepts: coupling and firebreaks. Nuclear coupling implied persuading the Soviets that any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would involve automatic US involvement and, presumably, escalation to global nuclear war. On the other hand, fire-

200

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

breaks of two sorts were argued for by some theorists and policymakers, usually Americans. The first firebreak was between conventional and nuclear war; the second, between theater nuclear war in Europe and socalled strategic or global nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. NATO lived out its Cold War existence with these two objectives poised in Kantian juxtaposition, and carrying very different implications for NATO policy and strategy. Those who favored nuclear coupling in NATO strategy deliberations emphasized that only the expectation of a seamless web of escalation, from nuclear first use to strikes against the American and Soviet homelands, would serve as a reliable deterrent to any war in Europe. The counterpoint was that overemphasis on coupling would prevent escalation control and conflict termination short of mutual societal destruction and, perhaps, global ecocide. A man from Mars might have agreed that nuclear coupling was less likely to fail as a deterrent, but if it did it was more likely to escape political control. The same observer might have agreed that firebreaks were more likely to allow for escalation control once deterrence had failed (either conventional or nuclear, or both), but an escalation ladder with prominent firebreaks might encourage brinkmanship and contribute to deterrence failure. Both the emphasis on coupling and the argument for firebreaks in NATO doctrine and strategy could be based on some abstract logic. But nuclear abstraction in this case crashed into geographical reality. A limited war from the US perspective could be, and almost certainly would be if nuclear weapons were employed, a total war for Europeans. In addition, US nuclear weapons and troops forward-deployed in Europe would create an immediate fear of escalation to global war, even for an initial Soviet attack with only conventional weapons. Given the Soviets’ geographical proximity to NATO’s European military assets and vital centers, as well as the Soviets’ superior numbers of ground forces deployed in Europe, a NATO decision to remain below the nuclear threshold was tantamount to an acceptance of at least partial defeat. Had the United States perfected a national missile defense for the American homeland in the 1980s, the deployment of such a system would have intersected with the firebreaks-coupling dilemma in the US-NATO relationship. Would the missile defenses include NATO Europe, either by means of technology transfer or by extending the reach of US interceptors, sensors, and command-control systems? The reaction of the Soviet Union to a plan for US ballistic missile defense protection for NATO Europe in the 1980s would have been less than inspiring of détente. In one stroke, Russia’s nuclear deterrent against the United States would have been nullified, along with its option to use coercive diplomacy against Western Europe during any nuclear or other crisis. Under these conditions, Soviet

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

201

leaders would have had to either accept de facto defeat in the Cold War or employ offensive countermeasures to US extended defenses for Europe— perhaps reigniting a hotter phase of the Cold War that would otherwise have petered out. Counterfactuals should never be followed into the wilderness of mirrors, so the “what ifs” of BMD counterfactuals have no tangible historical value. They only serve here the purpose of demonstrating that one cannot get away from geography, either terrestrial or celestial, even if the most optimistic assumptions about technology triumphalism are made. As in the past, any future US or other national missile defense system will be protecting some designated national or allied territories. These territories will presumably be the repositories of sovereign governments that claim a monopoly of legitimate force throughout their breadth and depth—including, for military and defense purposes, their national airspace and littoral waters. These territorial and national jurisdictions have symbolic and cultural importance: people will fight and die for them, regardless of the “rationality” of the reason for fighting. The war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falklands-Malvinas is merely one example of the obduracy of nationalism attached to territory—in this case, territory about as remote, forbidding, and inhospitable to normal creature comforts as travelers or military operations can abide. The idea that space-based missile defenses can supersede geography or geostrategy is mistaken, not only with respect to the past, but also with regard to the future of missile defenses or other advanced technologies. The information age has given rise to an informative, but dangerously seductive, vocabulary of terms that imply the irrelevance of all but cyber competencies in the operation of armed forces. But information technology cannot enable US or other military forces with superior fighting power unless technology innovation is coordinated with changes in military organization, doctrine, and training. Armies, fleets, and air forces must still deploy, and prepare to fight, in their respective environments. In addition, US military doctrine requires jointness across arms of service for the planning and conduct of military operations by regional or functional combatant commands (as in central command, Pacific command, and so forth). The same realities will influence future decisions about US or other missile defense deployments. Whom to protect, and against what, are the political decisions and threat assessments that will drive decisionmakers to choose among available technologies and weapons systems. These threat assessments will be influenced by geography and by assumptions about geostrategy. They will, for example, identify particular countries with specific locations, either as prospective ballistic missile attackers, or as territories to be defended against such attacks. For example, should North Korean nuclear

202

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

and missile capabilities require that the United States provide missile defenses for Japan, that Japan establish its own nuclear weapons capability, or that some regional BMD system be deployed to protect both South Korea and Japan? Currently the United States is limiting its response to the first option, by working with Japan to deploy sea-based ballistic missile defenses.

Remapping Strategy: East and West

However, the inability of the United States and other nuclear negotiators with North Korea (South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan) to rewind history and achieve the disarmament of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities may cause both Japan and South Korea to rethink their options. Japan’s extensive civil nuclear power industry incorporates the nuclear fuel cycle necessary for the manufacture of bomb-grade materials within months, should the government take a decision in favor of doing so. China’s reaction to a decision by Japan for nuclear weapons status would not be favorable, and an acceleration of its own nuclear weapons capabilities, including landand sea-based ballistic missiles, would be among Beijing’s options. Here we see one of the reasons why nuclear proliferation in Asia might be more dangerous than in Europe. It is sometimes supposed that cultural or other domestic political reasons make nuclear arms races more dangerous outside Europe, compared to the situation that obtained between the United States and Russia during the Cold War. Thus, for example, Indians and Pakistanis might be driven into war, including first and retaliatory uses of nuclear weapons, for reasons based on cultural antipathy, including ethnonational or religious hatred. The same fears have been expressed about a possible nuclear arms race in the Middle East: not only between Israelis and Iranians, for example, but also between Iranian Shiites and leading Sunni Arab state powers, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These concerns about states being driven beyond the brink by motives other than Europeanderived or Eurocentric political ideologies are certainly valid. States in the Middle East or Asia are not going to war over the distinction between communism and capitalism. On the other hand, it is also the geography of Asia that makes the possibility of nuclear weapons spread so immediately threatening to international stability. Nuclear Asia is a high-octane concentration of powerful and combustible appetites for growing international influence and respect within a very small geopolitical space. Stand in the middle of Urumqi in western China and draw a circumferential line from the west, through India and Pakistan, to the north, across southern Russia, southeast into China and North Korea, and across the Sea of Japan to the Japanese home islands. A

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

203

traveler who flew across this route would have crossed over five acknowledged or self-declared nuclear weapons states and a sixth (Japan) that was a turnkey away from joining the ranks. Worse is that some of these states with embedded memories of historical grievances are contiguous to one another: India and Pakistan, having fought three wars and a number of skirmishes during the Cold War; and North and South Korea, whose war beginning in 1950 has never been officially terminated by a final peace settlement (an armistice stopped the fighting in 1953). So thanks to geography, combined with disruptive technologies of the industrial age (missiles and weapons of mass destruction), the revised strategic map of Asia, including those parts of the Middle East within missile reach of Asia, threatens the durability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and raises the probability of nuclear first use in the twenty-first century. However, nuclear Asia is not isolated from the rest of the world— thanks in part to geography, combined with modern technology for military and commercial uses. Russia sprawls over eleven time zones, and in fact most of Russia’s state territory lies in Asia. Many of Russia’s most important natural resources are found in Asiatic, not European, Russia. The low population density of Russia’s Far East invites unofficial migration across Russia’s extensive border with China. Facing west, Russia’s economic and political integration with Western Europe is prerequisite to the continuation of Europe’s postmodern, debellicized status in the early twenty-first century. But a stable Russia available for partnership with NATO or with the G8 assumes a Russia whose economy can continue to grow and whose democratic institutions will provide for a favorable business climate under the rule of law. The evolution of Russia in this Westernized direction, and away from its more isolationist-narcissist proclivities of an imperial past (sometimes called “slavophilia,” but this term has its limitations as an opposed term for Westernization, since it implies that Russian nativist, anti-integrationist tendencies are based on race or nationality), cannot be taken for granted.4 Russia will insist upon a certain security perimeter in its near abroad including formerly Soviet-dominated parts of Europe. NATO’s expansion since the end of the Cold War troubles Russia, but not because Russia expects or fears a military invasion by NATO (although this hobgoblin is useful to Russian military atavists who are resisting reform of the Russian armed forces for other reasons). NATO enlargement bothers Russia for the same reason that US missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic do—geography, and their implications for geostrategy. During the Cold War, Soviet conventional military superiority in Europe was offset by US and allied NATO nuclear deterrence. In current, post–Cold War Europe, US and allied NATO conventional military forces are a generation ahead of Russia’s in the requisites of

204

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

information-based warfare, especially in capabilities for seeing and comprehending the battlespace; for sharing information within and across theaters of operations; and for delivering long-range precision strikes against a variety of fixed and mobile targets. US supremacy in these C4ISTAR dimensions of modern warfare—command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance—encourages Russians, including Russian military planners and political leaders, to rely on the threat of nuclear first use more than hitherto to deter any outbreak of conventional war in Europe threatening to Russia. In part, these technology-driven Russian fears are oxymoronic. Neither the United States nor NATO has any intention of invading or attacking Russia. To the contrary, the US administration under President Barack Obama indicated its desire to reset relations with Russia in a favorable direction, including in security and arms control matters. Unfortunately this shift in US approaches was not the end of the matter, and Russia’s fears were not based mainly on technology. They are based mostly on history, including Russia’s understanding of its history from a post–Cold War perspective, and geography. Post–Cold War Russia, especially under Putin, saw itself as under siege from NATO enlargement, from rebels in Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus, from demands for pluralist democracy inconsistent with Russian traditions, and from a potential security meltdown near its borders as a result of political revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Admittedly these are blinkered perceptions of Russian siloviki (people of force, including former and current holders of positions in intelligence, security, and defense) and others in Putin’s entourage, but those perceptions rest on a wider base of Russian experience with invasions from the west by Sweden, France, and Germany—all during “modern” European history. Currently Russia’s leadership is not fearful of a military invasion, but of the creep of democratic institutions to the doorstep of Russia or over the threshold. Both Dmitry Medvedev and Putin favor guided democracy with a dash of unofficially approved corruption and elitism, but not a return to communism. They and their fellow crony capitalists, including some who also hold positions of political influence or government office, would be at risk without a manipulated media sector, controls over the activities of political opposition, and a top-down federal government bureaucracy, especially in the security sector. The Rose and Orange revolutions unsettled the Kremlin because of the lethal combination of geography and democracy of the sort that Moscow does not want to import. Georgia and Ukraine are both adjacent to Russia; Ukraine was historically a part of the Russian and Soviet empires; and Georgia was a former Soviet republic. The incorporation of either Georgia or Ukraine, especially the latter, into NATO places that alliance’s military-strategic umbrella over a

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

205

democratic dagger pointed at Russia’s heart. In addition, and from Russia’s geostrategic perspective, NATO membership for Ukraine also pushes NATO’s border that much farther into Russia’s historic heartland, creating a contiguous security risk. This fear of NATO membership, and of EU suasion over a post–Viktor Yanukovych Ukrainian government, prompted Putin to annex formerly Ukrainian Crimea in March 2014 after a stealthy Russia-supported political incursion and military operation.5 NATO membership for Georgia, less immediately threatening but still opposed by Russia, would in Russia’s view open the door to insurgency and terrorism from jihadists and others crossing from sanctuaries in Georgia into southern Russia. NATO has some dilemmas too, with respect to any plans for enlargement to include eventual membership for Georgia. NATO is a military alliance with a guaranty that an attack on any member of that alliance is an attack on all, calling forth a collective military response. Think what this might have meant in August 2008 during Russia’s war against Georgia, had Georgia already been accepted into NATO membership or even into membership-in-waiting via the Partnership for Peace. Even for the United States with its global military reach, geography imposes stark choices. Would the United States have been able in the autumn of 2008 to undertake a military campaign in the Caucasus, given its existing (and exhausting of manpower) commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Asymmetry Agonists and Command-Control

Having read this far, some skeptics might react as follows. The author underestimates US military capabilities for control of the strategic commons against all comers, including from the seas, air, and space. In addition, the United States can conduct conventional deep strikes against targets with relative impunity and rapidly deploy forces into almost any contested area on short notice. During conventional deep strikes or rapid deployments, US and allied NATO military operations will be supported by one-of-a-kind logistics and information superiority. All of this is true, and it fuels a sense of military entitlement that is perhaps overdrawn at the bank. Military superiority in “system of systems” for advanced-technology conventional warfare is not necessarily transferable into all situations of armed suasion. Asymmetrical responses to apparent US superiority in conventional warfare include insurgency and terrorism (at the substate level) and weapons of mass destruction carried by ballistic or other delivery systems (at the state or interstate level). Antiaccess and area denial as a means of asymmetrical warfare will be used by future US and NATO opponents for excluding or deterring military interventions in their respective backyards. These means of

206

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

asymmetrical warfare might include, for terrorists or insurgents who are dedicated enough, suicides and homicides en masse. The detonation of an ammunition dump covered with radiological debris, biotoxins, or other unsavory materials in an urban area could complicate insertion of US or other foreign troops into hostile zones. So too could the use of ballistic missiles of various ranges in order to deliver biological or chemical charges against the logistics and communications tail of US or allied expeditionary troops engaged in activities as politically uncontroversial as humanitarian rescue (but for which side, and with what rules of engagement) to forces set upon the more politically contentious mission of regime change. The list of asymmetrical options against deploying US or other forces by regional adversaries of all stripes, including unconventional ones, admits of endless possibilities and typologies. All of these instruments of destruction and insurrection must, however, take place within a geographically bounded and defined security space. Even if one stretches the imagination to include a global security space or a regional one, geography underlies any operational definition of security and constraints on military actions taken on behalf of that concept. The Mongols without a Central Eurasian steppe on which to perfect their military art would have been just another tribe, and not a military phenomenon. A United States of America that halted its westward expansion at the Mississippi would never have attained its present status as a world power. An England that did not depend on transoceanic commerce for its economic growth and development, indeed for its very survival, would not have been motivated to develop a worldclass navy, or to enforce the Pax Britannica over an unprecedented global landscape. But geography is also a destiny that lures states to ruin, including Britain and Russia in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam. In the latter case, of the Americans in Vietnam, geography placed US president Lyndon Johnson in an untenable political and military position. The United States could not win the ground war by fighting only in South Vietnam: invasion of North Vietnam was the only way to disconnect the insurgency in the south from external, and decisive, support. On the other hand, in the midst of the Cold War, expanding the US ground war into North Vietnam risked drawing in both China and Russia, especially the former, as official belligerents. And China was now a nuclear power, apart from its capacity for sending endless numbers of “volunteers” into the fight in North Vietnam (as it had sent hundreds of thousands into the fight on the side of North Korea during the Korean war). Escalation of the ground war into North Vietnam, even if it had been feasible in terms of US domestic public opinion and available military manpower, would have occurred under the shadow of Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons. Those nuclear weapons, mated to ballistic missiles of various ranges, would not have had

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

207

to be fired by Russian or Chinese operators in order to send a message of resolve and deterrence. They would merely have had to be positioned close to the immediate theater of operations in North Vietnam to reduce the risk of US nuclear escalation in the face of conventional military defeat. Geography, in other words, imposed restraint not only on the conventional war in Vietnam, but also on the ability of the United States to make credible threats of nuclear escalation in a wider war. Russian and Chinese short- or medium-range ballistic missiles and tactical aircraft could have credibly threatened to impose local and regional nuclear costs for any US tactical use of nukes against North Vietnamese or allied forces. But it was not only the tactical capability of these Soviet and Chinese forces over a specific geographical area that, by itself, gave them their potentially dissuasive power. In addition, it was their connectedness to a larger and potentially more destructive chain of escalation that might, if it escaped reliable control by either side, erupt into war in Europe or, in the worst case, a global war. The preceding point should not be misunderstood. Escalation of the US war in Vietnam into a regional or larger nuclear conflict, after a US ground invasion of North Vietnam in order to depose the regime, was neither inevitable nor logically compelling as an option for policymakers. The invasion embodied unacceptable risks because it occupied the never-never land of risk: neither inevitable, nor impossible. It was a manipulation of the risk of uncontrolled escalation, under conditions of not only uncertainty (outcomes are known, but reliable probabilities are not attached to them) but also indeterminacy for relevant outcomes. In addition to its uncertain or indeterminate, but important, relationship to nuclear escalation, geography also influences the aspect of command and control over nuclear forces. This point has already occurred in another context, but the present discussion is specific to the issue of attacks on political and military command and control systems during wartime. In the logic of conventional war, it follows that wartime leadership, both political and military, offers legitimate targets for hostile ordnance. Although assassination as such is often not condoned, depending on the perspective taken by governments relative to international law, it has been accepted that heads of state who are wartime leaders, and their principal advisers, might be subject to enemy attack, including killing or capture. Thus US president Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill arranged a clandestine meeting in August 1941 at Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland—press accounts were blacked out until after the fact. US and British fears were not of media overexposure, but of German torpedoes. It has also followed, at least in modern times, that wartime military commanders are also subject to being killed in combat or capture. Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, architect of the operations plan for the attack

208

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, was specifically targeted and shot down over the Solomon Islands several years later by US naval aircraft. And the US government ordered General Douglas MacArthur to evacuate the Philippines for fear of his high-profile capture (or worse) at the hands of invading Japanese forces. What the Soviets would have done with Adolf Hitler, had they been able to capture him alive, is uncertain—but if Hitler, instead of taking a decision for suicide, had ordered his bodyguards to fight to the death with him from the Fuhrerbunker, Russian infantry would have obliged him. On the other hand, there are circumstances even in conventional war when it makes some sense to preserve the lives of surviving enemy military commanders or national leaders. The United States eventually decided that it was worthwhile to spare the life of Japanese emperor Hirohito and to leave him on the throne as a unifying cultural symbol in order to expedite Japan’s World War II surrender and postwar US occupation. This decision came rather late in the day, however; during earlier US air attacks on Tokyo, bombs had fallen more than once within the grounds of the Imperial Palace. In addition, heads of state and government are aware that, in time of total war, military defeat may place their lives and liberties at imminent risk. As German forces pushed into the western Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, early Soviet losses caused Joseph Stalin to consider relocating the entire government from Moscow to Kuybyshev. Although a great deal of wartime production was moved from western Russia eastward, the Soviet leader and his entourage remained in the Kremlin. Nuclear war, as it might have been fought between the United States and the Soviet Union during the last two decades of the Cold War, presented the possibility that strategy might require a bipolar approach to the survival of political leaders and military commanders. That is, however an exchange of nuclear weapons might have begun, political leadership on both sides would have some incentive not to permit escalation to continue on automatic pilot until arsenals were exhausted and entire populations and habitats were destroyed. For termination of any large-scale nuclear war, some surviving and authoritative political leaders on both sides would have to negotiate a ceasefire at least temporarily. This might be no easy matter to arrange, since early attacks could have destroyed some command-control facilities and incapacitated or killed a number of political leaders and military commanders. In the United States, the issue of command and control survivability also affected planning for nuclear war and, therefore, expectations about the impact of command and control arrangements for deterrence. Nuclear forces had to be made immune to accidental or inadvertent first use or first strike; equally important, the same forces had to be responsive to duly authorized commands. The US command and control system was designed over several decades to accomplish both of these objectives, and the accom-

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

209

plishment, such as it was, was both made possible, and made difficult, by geography. Geography dictated that surviving force commanders and political leaders could be located in only so many secure facilities, connected to others in the military or political chain of command. There were limits to how far the US presidential center (the president and his or her immediate retinue, including key political and military advisers and secure equipment) could be dispersed if the president was to retain the function of commander in chief. President George W. Bush discovered this fact during his peregrination around the country in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Eventually he insisted on a return to Washington, DC, where he could reestablish a visible command presence to reassure Americans. In order to preclude any enemy “decapitation” strike against the president that might otherwise disable the government from appropriate response, the United States has in place both a political line of succession and a military delegation of authority. The death or incapacitation of the US president automatically passes the office of president to the vice president, then to the Speaker of the House, the president pro-tem of the Senate, and the heads of cabinet departments in order of their creation. The military delegation of command authority, on the other hand, runs from the president to the secretary of defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and directly to the regional or functional military commanders. In theory, all of this was intended not so much for the survival of an actual nuclear war, but to raise the uncertainty level of any prospective attacker. Further confusing to presumed evildoers plotting nuclear attacks was the possibility that, under certain circumstances veiled in secrecy even more than most, surviving air force and navy commanders and their subordinates could be empowered and enabled to continue nuclear strikes beyond the early phases of a nuclear war. Academic theorists and think tank analysts proposed at various times that the United States or the Soviet Union might be able to fight and survive a protracted nuclear war, although the idea lent itself to a high giggle factor among military insiders and night club comedians. If we recall that all of this labor-intensive preparation for command survivability was for the purpose of preventing war, rather than actually having to fight a war, this nuclear command-control survivability issue sounds somewhat less macabre. However, even those who would have pressed the folly button at the thought of a controlled or protracted nuclear war, involving tens of thousands of US and Soviet nuclear warheads, would have to admit that the possible outbreak of a conventional war in Europe, amid predeployed US and Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, had an immediacy that departed from risibility. NATO had deployed nuclear weapons for use with operational field armies and air forces within the European theater of operations. In time of crisis, some of these nuclear charges would have to be

210

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

moved from peacetime storage sites to other locations, and some might even be mated to delivery systems such as missiles or bombers to avoid conventional or nuclear preemption. Soviet intelligence, in its turn, would have observed NATO movements of nuclear munitions from stored to usable positions, and this information would have ratcheted up Kremlin sensitivities to other signs of NATO readiness for war. Soviet countermeasures to NATO readiness measures would then be followed by NATO counter-countermeasures, and so on, until some NATO or Soviet field commander raised the issue of nuclear release authority for forces under his command. Something like this action-reaction pattern of expectations allegedly happened during a NATO command-post exercise in 1983 designated Able Archer. The exercise was intended to simulate the decisions and actions that would be required for NATO nuclear release during a crisis. Apparently some Soviet intelligence sources felt the exercise was too realistic and passed warnings to higher authorities of a possible US or NATO nuclear first strike. These misperceptions or exaggerations by fearful Soviet intelligence collectors were part of a mind-set encouraged by some KGB and military leaders who had previously set in motion a collection operation against NATO called RYAN, an acronym for a nuclear surprise attack.6 Had a nuclear war begun in Europe with the use of NATO or Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, the influence of geography on the course of events, including the likelihood of escalation to a wider war, would have been decisive. Within a small geographical space compared to the Soviet Union or North America, two opposed coalitions had commingled conventional and nuclear weapons, forces trained and tasked for both kinds of warfare, and war plans and exercises supposedly accommodating a transition from one kind of warfare to another. In addition, Soviet war plans apparently included preparations for prompt wartime attacks on both military and political command-control targets, including NATO political leaders perhaps targeted for assassination by Soviet special forces. Even prior to the introduction of nuclear weapons into this melee, command and control over the combatant forces of NATO deployed in Germany or Belgium would have been subjected to unprecedented strain, further increasing the possibility of military defeat and nuclear escalation out of desperation. However, the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO in West Germany and the probable response from Moscow would in short order have weakened knees in Bonn as well as in Brussels, opening intramural political debates about whether further resistance was militarily pointless or even humane. Further to the issue of geography, the French, in and out of NATO from the mid-1960s on, were a nuclear fudge factor. Their nuclear force de frappe (later, force de dissuasion) was tasked both for the eventuality of supporting

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

211

NATO and for the necessity of French national self-defense—but primarily for the latter. France’s notional targeting for “all azimuths” was a geographical expression of a military and political ambiguity deliberately created for its strategic effect. If a Soviet conventional or conventional and nuclear military campaign advanced to the point at which France feared for its vital interests, it reserved the option to launch preemptive nuclear strikes, either against Soviet forces already on NATO (but not necessarily French) territory, or, under greater exigency, against targets located in the Soviet Union (read: Moscow). This threat to tear an arm off the Soviet Union implied that France alone, whatever NATO chose to do, could create for Moscow costs disproportionate to the assumed gains from any offensive threatening to France. To reinforce this message, France deployed not only nuclear weapons for delivery by aircraft and land-based missiles, but also ballistic missile submarines presumably invulnerable to any Soviet first strike. Soviet plans for command-control survivability in the event of a nuclear war were neither more credible nor less complicated than those of the United States and NATO. Although Soviet military writings extolled the virtues of civil defense and strategic antimissile and antiair defenses in wartime, actual Soviet preparations for nuclear command-control survivability were bounded by the limits of science, politics, and geography. Secure redoubts and bunkers could be constructed for the party, government, military, and security elites, but they might inherit a country pushed backward into the economic and social conditions of the Russian “time of troubles” in the early seventeenth century—or worse, with radioactivity added in. Geography dictated that strategic defenses even more advanced than those of the Cold War would still have had to be tasked preferentially—in terms of protecting retaliatory forces compared to populations, or if populations, which regions would be assigned priority. The decision to deploy the antimissile systems that were available for the defense of Moscow reflected not only the constraints of the ABM Treaty, but also the traditional Kremlin expectation of self-preservation against all reasonable odds.

Arms Control and Geopolitics: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Future Quandaries

Soviet lack of faith in the survivability of their own nuclear command-control systems was evident in their leaders’ prompt and spirited reaction against NATO’s deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, including Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, in Europe beginning in 1983. NATO took this decision in response to Soviet deployments of intermediate-range SS-20 land-based missiles, beginning in the

212

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

1970s. Soviet objections to the Pershing II and cruise deployments were made on the basis that the SS-20s were not really a new kind of capability, but merely a modernization of previously deployed missile types. NATO judged that the Soviets were creating a new substrategic, nuclear war–fighting capability that would create a new rung on the ladder of escalation between theater and total war. SS-20s were mobile missiles with two MIRV warheads and an approximate maximum range of 4,400 kilometers. The Soviet concern about NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces was mainly with respect to the Pershing II: its range (maximum of about 1,800 kilometers) and speed permitted it to strike at some targets in the western Soviet Union, including command bunkers, within ten minutes of launch. Soviet leaders may have feared a NATO theater-strategic, countercommand first-strike capability based in Europe and usable in response to their own intermediate systems, closing an open seam in the spectrum of deterrence and placing the onus on the Kremlin for escalation outside Europe. If so, Soviet leaders were beginning to reason like their US and allied NATO counterparts, comprehending the introverted logic of deterrence that could posit a substrategic nuclear war contained below the threshold of global war and despite NATO nuclear attacks directly into the Soviet Union itself. It seems more likely that Soviet leaders did not anticipate NATO’s political reaction to the SS-20 deployments, or the solidarity that held together in NATO governments despite Soviet intimidation and domestic political opposition to the 572 deployments (including boisterous nuclear-freeze movements). But the Soviet fear of their command vulnerabilities to the Pershing II was real enough, and it begged the question of how much faith they had in the consequences of an even more robust US nuclear attack. The Pershing II missiles carried single warheads with an approximate maximum yield of 50 kilotons (compared to 250 kilotons for the MIRVed SS-20s). Geography, along with politics and military technology, had turned an incremental upgrade in military capabilities (from the Soviet standpoint), and an equivalent tit-for-tat response to Soviet missile enhancements (from NATO’s perspective), into a contretemps that was only resolved by the agreement signed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987 to dismantle and destroy all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles deployed worldwide (those with maximum ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers).7 This agreement could be seen in retrospect as the most significant and daring accord reached by the Cold War nuclear superpowers. SALT and START negotiations understandably had a special cachet for arms control gurus and for media aficionados. But the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was the first to require the elimination and destruction of an

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

213

entire class of deployed nuclear weapons and launchers, including those located in the western Soviet Union and targeted on both Europe and Asia. So pervasive and unprecedented was this treaty that two decades later, Russian president Vladimir Putin reopened the discussion in Russia of whether to continue to adhere to the INF agreement. He noted in 2007 that only Russia and the United States had taken the drastic step of eliminating this entire class of missiles under very different political conditions than those that obtained in the early twenty-first century.8 Putin had a point. Both the United States and Russia worried about the spread of ballistic missiles, including those of medium and longer ranges, to states with revisionist goals, regional grudges, or armed forces of dubious political reliability. Should the United States and Russia continue to practice INF chastity or self-denial while others indulged their appetites for missile coercion at longer ranges—including missiles that might be tipped in the future with weapons of mass destruction, including possibly nuclear ones? One of the things that had changed for Russia from 1987 to 2007 was its geography—compared to that of the former Soviet Union—especially by a western perimeter that was pushed eastward almost to Smolensk and Rostov-on-the-Don, as the non-Russian member states of the Soviet Union gained their political independence. The sensitivity in Russia toward NATO or US actions in its former Soviet space is not only political or military, but also based on the hard facts of geography. Russia need not possess a Barbarossa complex about invasion from the West in order to notice that NATO’s air-land conventional deep-strike options are, on a map table or in PowerPoint deluxe, impressive relative to Russia’s ability to trade space for time. The US military campaigns against Iraq in 1991 and in 2003 were carefully studied by Russian military experts, tracking the “shock and awe” capabilities for dismantling any opposed conventional force playing by similar rules of engagement and operating within the same battlespace. Indeed, the ability of the United States to quickly turn almost any location on the planet into target coordinates redefines battlespace to the detriment of those who plan for a war of attrition, compared to a rapid battle of annihilation. How much does the situation described in the preceding paragraph actually matter for Russia? If the United States, NATO, and Russia remain locked in a Cold War political world and in a similar military-strategic paradigm, then it matters a great deal, and the inferences for future Russian security are not very reassuring. However, policymakers are not automatons—the future is indeterminate—and politics is, or should be, the master faculty that rules over strategy. Therefore, the door is open for NATO and Russian political leaders to deconstruct old definitions of contested security space and reboot into another concept, of jointly shared responsibility for security in the North

214

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Atlantic and trans-Eurasian regions. Military retros in Russia who resist reform, on the grounds that NATO and the United States still constitute the major strategic threats to Russia, would be bypassed by the march of history. Issues as between Russia and the West would remain, but they would be resolved by diplomatic or other nonmilitary means, within a new security community from the Atlantic to the Urals. Admittedly, with the dustup over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and attempted destabilization of eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 in the rearview mirror, this vision of transEurasian security cooperation seems fantastical. However, the post-Putin security landscape might admit of a different and more optimistic perspective. The advantages to such a rethink of security, as related to geography, are several. First, the United States and Russia could bypass the otherwise distracting detour of coming clashes over the fault line territories between the former Russian and Soviet empires and the expanding geographical boundaries of NATO. Second, a US-Russian and NATO-Russian security condominium would expedite cooperation across a number of nonmilitary issues related to security, including economics and natural resources, human rights, and the rule of law in democratic societies. Third, military-to-military discussions and consultations on issues of international security, as between NATO and Russia, could be expedited, including on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation; terrorism, including WMD-equipped malefactors, and insurgency; missile defenses and the military uses of space; and the implications for NATO and Russia of rising regional military powers, including China and Iran. An additional benefit for modernizers in the Russian armed forces is that sideswipes from contact and cooperation with Western militaries would help to euthanize or convert forces resistant to reform. As Russia’s armed forces became more comparable to the voluntary forces of NATO members, momentum would increase in the direction of military professionalism in office and enlisted ranks, realistic general-staff mission planning, and the politico-military direction of the armed forces toward the cooperative Eurasian security tasks of the future (conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping, stability and security operations, and counterterrorism).9 Against this, NATO and Russian skeptics will raise two concerns. First, NATO’s fighting power will be dissipated into quasi-social enterprises and political great leaps forward, leading to mission malaise and lack of readiness for real war or necessary nuclear deterrent missions. Or second, Russia’s security will be compromised by absorption of its strategic uniqueness into a larger and riskier version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The heritage of Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov will disappear into a sinkhole of postmodern demilitarization, rendering future Russia vulnerable to new predations from the west,

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

215

east, and south, and perhaps also from space. And both NATO and Russian skeptics about Atlantic and trans-Eurasian political and military integration will ask hard questions about near-term political and military priorities, including, What is the prospectus for Afghanistan after NATO withdraws its combat forces as scheduled? How drastically can the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons on intercontinental launchers, and can further reductions empower their future leaderships to success on nonproliferation? Can the current situation with respect to US, NATO, and Russian exploitation of space—its use for military purpose without deploying weapons in space—be continued in the face of possible challenges from other powers? Can the world economy support continued military modernization in the industrialized and postindustrial worlds without collapsing budgets for nonmilitary components of security (including the public management of health, education, natural resources, and other ecological-environmental issues)? And can competent strategies be developed for proactively anticipating and defusing the culture wars about ethnicity, religion, and other primordial values that support war and terrorism within, and across, state borders? These questions have no easy or obvious answers, but they support the case for adaptive, scenario-based planning that some have argued for as a higher-profile activity for future Pentagon (and other) military leaders. Former US secretary of defense Robert Gates has maintained that the tendency within the US armed forces for preoccupation with future warfare claims too much attention, compared to the demands of military operations of the present. Gates referred to this syndrome as “next war–itis.” In response, some critics have warned that, as important as the war on terror or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may be, future conflicts may not repeat either the music or the libretto of current exigencies.10 War is fundamentally a two-sided, competitive affair: states and nonstate actors will design around the strengths and probe for the weaknesses of their opponents. Russia, for example, need not threaten Western Europe with military invasion or nuclear coercion: Moscow can simply turn off the gas tap. In addition, not all catastrophes are purpose-built; some result from the accumulation of low-amplitude dysfunctions having reached a point of punctuated equilibrium. For example, Pakistan poses not only the threat of nuclear war between Pakistan and India, but also the threat of insurrection and regime change that leaves its nukes in politically dangerous, or unknown, hands. Experts are often surprised in their anticipation of future war. Therefore, prudent planners should expect not to avoid tactical, operational, or even strategic military surprise. Instead, they should plan for minimizing the expected consequences of surprise and for responding decisively to the sources of menace. The relationship between nuclear weapons and geography

216

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

(or nuclear arms control and geostrategy) also follows this logic. Some surprising things will undoubtedly happen with nuclear weapons in what remains of the present century, but those surprises will be built on precedents already known: the locations and ranges of nuclear delivery systems, their stationary or mobile locations, their electronic and personnel command-control systems, and most important their political ownership and military custodians. All of these important variables related to the likelihood and effects of future nuclear use, for deterrence or worse, are delimited by geographical and geostrategic factors. Even taking advanced nonnuclear weapons into space, in order to threaten nuclear weapons based on the planet, involves the mastery of geospatial kinetic, electronic, and cybernetic forces and powers. At the other end of the spectrum, from space to the possibility of nuclear terrorism, nuclear strategy and geopolitics remain linked in an uneasy embrace. Terrorists, including possibly nuclear-armed ones, are about the denial of geography: they cross borders and shift faux identities in order to strike at preferred targets. Nuclear weapons acquired by terrorists will, in all likelihood, have been fabricated by someone else. The terrorists’ nukes will have been deliberately slipped to them by states or privateers, or terrorists will somehow have stolen them. However acquired, nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists cannot be deterred from use. Those states that allow terrorists to steal nuclear weapons, or mercenaries within their borders to sell them, are as morally accountable for the consequences of terrorist WMD attacks as they would be if their governments had deliberately abetted nuclear terrorism. This moral accountability should now be made into a legal one by the international community, with provisions for enforcement and consequences— including fines or jail terms for complicit officials. It will require the cooperation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as other nuclear weapons states, to accomplish this. But this new gold standard of accountability for fissile materials and weapons is a small price to pay, compared to the alternative. If governments cannot get this far, with respect to the risk management aspects of nuclear geostrategy, how much confidence can we have that they can master the larger challenges already discussed? Counterterrorism is as much a coordinate of credible nuclear geopolitics and geostrategy as is the heavenly gaze of star warriors, the fascination with advanced conventional blitzkrieg, or the toe-tapping resonance of networkcentric warfare from the heavens above to the caverns of the Hindu Kush.

Conclusion—and Further Thoughts

One can imagine a number of alternative nuclear futures, including nuclear abolition; nuclear marginalization, with greatly reduced arsenals compared

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

217

to now; nuclear abundance or plenty, with more nuclear weapons states and, probably, hair trigger weapons; defense dominance, relative to offensive missile and airborne weapons; and complex uncertainty, revealing no single trend line but a potpourri of competing state, interstate, and substate developments with respect to nuclear weapons and arms control.11 This template of alternative nuclear futures is intersected by the seven dimensions of strategy noted earlier: military, political, cultural and social, technological, historical, geostrategic and geographical, and economic. The result is a complicated mosaic for political leaders, military planners, and scholars to grapple with here and now—never mind tomorrow. The nuclear past already recorded provides some clue to the nuclear future and, therefore, to its relationship with geopolitics and geostrategy. Nuclear weapons did not disappear or even become marginalized with the end of the Cold War. They remain the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but political and bureaucratic inertia, combined with genuine security dilemmas, have moved history into a second nuclear age. In this second nuclear age, the world is no longer dominated by a political and military rivalry between two nuclear superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. Through a combination of deterrence, military strength, containment, diplomacy, and arms control, the first use of a nuclear weapon fired in anger since the bombing of Nagasaki failed to occur during the first nuclear age.12 Will a similar mixture of hard and soft power work to preserve a nuclear taboo in the twenty-first century, or will past tool kits be found wanting?13 Perhaps Martin Luther’s injunction to “sin boldly” applies to social scientific and historically based efforts to guesstimate the future. However, the reciprocal relationship between nuclear technologies, on one hand, and geopolitics and geostrategy, on the other, has a past, and from that some inferences follow. The geostrategic dimensions for future nuclear deterrence and arms control, or for war, if deterrence and other prophylactics fail, are land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Of course, nuclear weapons cannot actually detonate in cyberspace, but deficient preparation for war or deterrence in cyberspace can create vulnerabilities exploited by a dedicated enemy, including an enemy armed with nuclear weapons. States operating nuclear forces will therefore have to plan for (at least) a five-sided multidimensional behavior space, with respect to nuclear deterrence or antinuclear defenses. We can also anticipate that antimissile defenses (or ballistic missile defenses) and antiair defenses will improve, relative to the offensive weapons directed against them that date from the first nuclear age. The modern ballistic missile first appeared during World War II. Its ancestors date to antiquity: the Roman ballista or the rockets fired by Chinese combatants during the warring states period are exemplary. On the other hand, nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century will, unlike the situation in the

218

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

first nuclear age, appeal to the militarily weak as well as the strong. Rogue states and nonstate actors will see nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with missile and aircraft for delivery of WMD, as offsets or asymmetrical strategies as against the superior conventional militaries of the United States or others. A contradictory pattern may emerge, in which the major nuclear weapons states agree to freeze or cut their numbers of deployed warheads and launchers, while others see this as an opportunity to gain ground and improve their relative nuclear status—including, in the latter group, regional rogues and nuclear-armed rivals. Missile defenses may be tasked for deterrent and defense missions within a regional theater of operations more often than they are expected to deter, or defend against, attacks by major nuclear powers. Instead of the global nuclear war between superpowers that placed the entire planet in peril during the first nuclear age, we might see “small” nuclear wars or individual strikes confined within a single state or regional territory. The reactions of existing or future nuclear weapons states to one or several isolated and discrete uses of tactical or operational nuclear weapons are not necessarily predictable from past practice or policy statements. Once the tradition of nuclear nonuse since Nagasaki has been broken and the fighting subsequently contained to serious, but less than catastrophic, levels for the affected societies, we would be in a new world of nuclear expectations. Indeed, it might not even be clear who had fired the first shot, or whether an accidental or unauthorized missile launch had triggered the episode in question.14 If the nonproliferation regime proves unable to resist regional nuclear proliferation, the appeal of counterproliferation strategies, combined with antimissile and antiair defenses, will increase.

Notes 1. Colin S. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” in Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 147. Gray’s discussion of the relationship between geography and strategy includes political as well as physical geography and the impact of geography on strategic culture, with pertinent references to “classics” and modern studies. The significance of geography, geopolitics, and geostrategic thinking is also explicit in numerous contemporary works about strategy and global politics—including those with other messages. See, for example, Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2004). 2. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp. 3–6, 78–81. 3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 63–64. 4. A concise discussion of this issue appears in Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for

Geography and Nuclear Strategy

219

International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2009), pp. 14–15. 5. For expert analysis, see Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper no. 2 (Riga: National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014). 6. On Operation RYAN and Able Archer, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), p. 583; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, eds., Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975–1985 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 68–90; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 262. 7. This specification got around the difficulty that some technical experts referred to the Pershing II as a medium-range ballistic missile and others as an intermediaterange ballistic missile. For INF Treaty purposes, intermediate-range missiles were those with maximum ranges of between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles, between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. 8. In 2014 some US officials and policy analysts expressed concern that Russia had decided to violate the INF Treaty or was in fact already doing so. The Obama administration stated that it had raised the issue with Russia and briefed NATO allies of the United States. See Thomas C. Moore, “The Kremlin’s Dangerous Nuclear Gambit,” July 16, 2014, http://warontherocks.com. 9. For alternative scenarios in Russian policy and relations with the West, see Walter Laqueur, Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Marvin Kalb, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015); Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013); Aslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, pp. 146–148. 10. Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century (New York: Bantam, 2009), p. 299. 11. For an expansion, see Stephen J. Cimbala, Arms for Uncertainty (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013). 12. Michael Krepon, Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009). For other analyses of the second nuclear age, see Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: Times-Holt, 2012); Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), esp. pp. 95–124; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). 13. On the concept of a nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 327–360; George H. Quester, Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 14. For discussion of pertinent scenarios, see Quester, Nuclear First Strike, pp. 24–52.

13 The Putin Factor

Various Russian experts, pundits, and politicians anticipate the departure of Vladimir Putin from power in Russia as a welcome inevitability. Further, some argue that Putin’s loss of power will be followed automatically by the demise of post-Soviet Russia and its breakup into a much smaller Russia and a number of new ministates. This expected fall of postSoviet Russia is predicated on several assumptions. As Russia’s petrostate economy gradually collapses, Putin will lose legitimacy and popular support, especially among Russia’s professional middle class, which will turn decisively against him. In addition, Putin’s ruling circle of kleptocrats and siloviki will fall out among themselves, and their control will disintegrate into internal political warfare. Finally, citizens and politicians in economically disadvantaged or politically restless regions of Russia will seize local powers of government and economic assets, making the center gradually irrelevant and its control nonexistent. The desire to expedite the departure of Putin is understandable.1 He has scrambled the eggs of post–Cold War European stability by his annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. 2 His autocratic rule is regarded as a trashing of some post-Soviet expectations for a peaceful security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok that included Russia, other post-Soviet states currently outside Russia, and member states of the European Union and NATO. As well, Putin’s internal wars against his domestic political opposition have traduced the lines of legal and moral legitimacy, including the control of media, the prosecution and incarceration of opposition leaders, and most troubling, the accusation of complicity in the deaths of prominent Russians at home and abroad. 3 Critics feel that Putin’s crackdown on domestic critics and harassment of foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) go hand in hand with his escalation of military adventurism and political tensions abroad. In both domestic and foreign policy, he has sought to preserve the “power vertical” in Russia at a high cost, including the economic strangulation imposed 221

222

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

on Russia by sanctions imposed in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.4 Thus it is quite reasonable to welcome a post-Putin Russia as a possible door opener to Russia’s integration into the club of proto-democracies and well-behaved international actors. It is quite another thing, however, to root for Russia’s demise as a unitary nation-state.

Be Careful What You Wish For

The collapse of post-Soviet Russia is unlikely to be as neat and fortuitous in its outcomes for the West as was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Whereas the departure of Vladimir Putin from the Russian presidency is to be more welcomed than feared, the breakup of post-Soviet Russia is to be more feared than welcomed. The disintegration of post-Soviet Russia will create new power vacuums in Eastern Europe, in Central Asia, and in the North Caucasus region. These power vacuums could be filled by forces of political disorder, including terrorists of various political motivations, ethnic separatists, religious zealots, brigands, and criminals. A collapse of political authority in these and nearby regions is not in anyone’s interest, including that of the United States and NATO. Optimistic forecasts of Russian collapse imagine a pileup of former autocracies and emerging democracies seeking shelter under the umbrella of Western international organizations and military alliances. On the other hand, post-Soviet Russia’s collapse may not resemble the end of the former Soviet Union in 1991.5 Instead, it might look like the fall of the tsar and the end of autocracy in Russia as a result of World War I, except that no Soviet communism would be waiting in the wings. Instead of tyranny or democracy, Eastern Europe and Central Asia would be marked by political disintegration and military autarchy. And, faced with Russia’s loss of control over its own military and economy, what would its neighbors do—especially China? And speaking of control, we should also remember that Russia is one of the world’s two largest nuclear weapons states. Together Russia and the United States account for some 93 percent of nuclear weapons worldwide. The collapse of political authority in Russia could create a hiatus in which its nuclear forces and command systems operate without central political control and, therefore, potentially under the de facto command and control of others—including force commanders or renegade politicians with military connections. Recall the uncertainty that obtained during the abortive coup against then–Russian president Gorbachev from August 19 to 21, 1991. Gorbachev was held in isolation at his vacation dacha in the Crimea,

The Putin Factor

223

and for three days it was unclear who had effective control over the portable launch-control consoles with nuclear release codes.6 Fortunately the situation was resolved before ambiguities of command and control were turned into enduring risks of unsanctioned authority over nuclear first use. Further, in a situation of dispersed or ambiguous nuclear command authority, the danger is not only one of an actual firing of a nuclear weapon. Dissident officers and political allies could obtain nuclear weapons and use them for blackmail in a civil war against other factions controlling other forces. One might think that dissidents getting hold of nuclear weapons would be unable to fire them because the weapons were protected by electronic locks and the dissidents would not have access to nuclear launch codes. This assumption would be true for US weapons, at least in the short run, but US officials cannot guarantee that it holds true for other nuclear forces. It might turn out that some nuclear weapons in other countries were well protected and others less so (one of our nightmares, for example, about a breakdown of political authority in Pakistan). In short, a collapse of post-Putin Russia invites political chaos, military extremism, and international anarchy across a wide swath of Europe and Central Eurasia—with a nuclear back story. Better to support the constitutionally legitimate and domestically consensual retirement of Putin to some luxury villa in the Crimea, a suitable retreat under the exigent and foreseeable circumstances. Regardless of Russia’s decision for Putin to stay or to go, the discussion here will assume the “optimistic” outcome, in terms of preferences just argued, for Russia to avoid political fragmentation and dissolution. Under this assumption, Russia’s nukes will remain under its firm political and military control. What are the implications of this assumption for Russia’s future nuclear strategy and, therefore, for the United States and NATO?

NATO Challenges and Options

NATO’s Warsaw Summit of July 8–9, 2016, ratified a number of important decisions with respect to reinforcement of the alliance’s eastern flank, including the dispatch of four battalions to the Baltic states and Poland, and an additional four to Bulgaria and Rumania. At the same meeting, NATO also agreed to triple the size of the NATO Reaction Force to 40,000 troops and to increase the size of its Very High Readiness Joint Task Force to 13,000. The alliance also adopted a strategy and supporting action plans for dealing with the Russian threat of hybrid warfare and identified cyberspace as a domain of operations where NATO must defend itself.7 These and other measures taken by NATO were intended to send a message of

224

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

deterrence and military preparedness, as well as an indicator of alliance unity, but not necessarily a message of expectation that war was either imminent or probable.8 Experts foresee little likelihood of a direct military clash between the United States and Russia or between Russia and NATO. One reason for this low probability of general war in Europe, even if Russian pressure is extended into other areas outside NATO and formerly part of the Soviet Union, is the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe and offshore. Nuclear weapons provide a reminder that the risks of military escalation in East-Central Europe include the possibility of unforeseen costs unacceptable to either side. Unless and until Putin’s long-term path is clearer, the United States and NATO should remind Russian and other audiences that US nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe are important symbols of commitment to European security and democratic peace. Nor, despite the accomplishments of the US-Russia New START agreement of 2010, should the United States offer further reductions in long-range nuclear arsenals without a quid pro quo that includes a stable and democratic Ukraine freed from Russian intimidation and blackmail, let alone oblique threats of military invasion. NATO member states on the eastern periphery will undoubtedly see an imminent threat to their own independence and expect greater commitments from the alliance. NATO agreed in February 2016 to enhance its deterrent against Russian pressure on its Baltic and East European member states, by increasing its ability to rapidly deploy ground, naval, and air forces. NATO defense ministers agreed to create a network of approaches, including rotating troops, alliance outposts, prestored equipment, and war games, that would provide for rapid response without depending upon Cold War–sized military bases.9 NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg, anticipating a meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov later in the same week at the Munich security conference, emphasized the defensive character of the alliance’s strategy for the Baltics and Eastern Europe, noting, “We believe that especially when times are difficult, as they are now, it’s even more important that we have political dialogue, channels open, between NATO and Russia.” 10 Meanwhile, President Obama’s defense budget proposal for 2017 called for a 200 percent increase in US military spending for Europe, and US secretary of defense Ashton Carter explicitly stated that Russia now constituted a greater threat to US security than ISIS (and with the agreement of US director of national intelligence James Clapper).11 Russia’s reaction to these and other moves by the United States and NATO appeared in the speech at the Munich security conference later in February 2016 by Russian prime minister Dmitri Medvedev: “Speaking bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period of a new cold war. Russia has been presented as well-nigh the biggest threat to NATO, or to Europe, America and other countries (and Mr. Stoltenberg has just

The Putin Factor

225

demonstrated that). They show frightening films about Russians starting a nuclear war. I am sometimes confused: is this 2016 or 1962?”12 The New START agreement does not preclude the United States from deploying future missile defenses, despite Russian efforts during the negotiating process to restrict US degrees of freedom in this respect. But then– Russian president Medvedev and his predecessor-successor Putin have made it clear that Russia’s geostrategic perspective links US and NATO missile defenses to cooperation on other arms control issues. Meanwhile, the United States and NATO in 2011 moved forward with the first phase of a four-phase deployment of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defenses. In March 2013, US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel announced plans to modify the original plan for the EPAA by abandoning the originally planned deployments of SM3 IIB interceptor missiles in Poland by 2022. However, this step failed to reassure Russian doubters about US and NATO claims that their regional and global missile defenses were not oriented against Russia. Russian officials reiterated demands for a legally binding guarantee from the United States and NATO that Russian strategic nuclear forces would not be targeted by the system. Ironically Putin’s irredentism in Ukraine may result in a NATO re-reboot of its missile defense plans and a decision for placement of missile defense components in Poland after all. In turn, Russia’s response might be to fortify its Kaliningrad exclave with Iskander missiles, a high-precision tactical ballistic missile system very accurate for short distances and capable of being used with nuclear warheads.

Russian Nuclear Strategy

Russia’s 2010 military doctrine averred that the role of nuclear weapons is “prevention of nuclear military conflict or any other military conflict” and that they are regarded as “an important factor in the prevention of nuclear conflicts and military conflicts that use conventional assets (large-scale and regional wars).”13 The possibility that Russian nuclear weapons would be used in a conventional conflict for the purpose of de-escalation, by means of inflicting calibrated damage, first appeared in the 2000 military doctrine and is tacitly acknowledged as a possibility in the 2010 edition.14 Calibrated damage is a proportional amount of damage that is subjectively unacceptable to the enemy and exceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain from the use of force. This possibility, of using tactical nukes for strategic de-escalation of a conventional war in progress that is threatening to Russia’s vital interests, is not repudiated in Russia’s revised military doctrine signed by President Putin in December 2016, or in Russia’s updated national security strategy signed by Putin in December 2015.15

226

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Whether nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons would be used for this mission is unclear: the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Russian military strategy is a subject of uncertainty.16 Among the Russian armed forces, the navy is the principal advocate for maintaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons capabilities, regarding them as essential for any conflict with the US Navy. Another possible use for theater or tactical nuclear weapons is presented by Russia’s conventional military weakness relative to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to the greater size of PLA forces deployed into the Far Eastern theater of operations, there is also the possible inability of Russia’s air force to guarantee air superiority against attacking Chinese units.17 Although some Western experts regard Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons (as well as NATO’s) as passé and militarily superfluous, Russian arms control expert Alexei Arbatov commented in 2010 that the “colossal” US superiority in conventional weapons and the “growing lag” in delivery vehicles for the (Russian) strategic nuclear forces meant that “the role of [theater nuclear weapons] only grows as an instrument of foreign policy.”18 Russia also considers its nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to the nuclear forces of states other than the United States and NATO, especially for those states whose nuclear capabilities are able to reach Russian territory. One prospective use for Russian tactical nukes might be to take out enemy precision-strike and C4ISR capabilities, thereby leveling the playing field of advanced conventional warfare otherwise titled against Russia. For this and other reasons, NATO remains sensitive to the possible modernization of Russia’s nonstrategic missile forces. US reports to NATO in January 2014 claimed that Russia had tested a new medium-range ground-launched cruise missile, a possible violation of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987.19 One school of thought holds that, had the United States not conveyed an image of weakness over the past five years, Russia may not have so brazenly risked a larger conflict in order to annex Crimea. Another school regards Russian behavior as driven by Putin’s fears of losing power at home due to rising protest and economic stagnation, offset by Crimea and other demonstrations of nationalism and cries for a “New Russia” outside its current borders. Regardless the causes, the United States and NATO have choices about how to respond.

Russia and Strategic History

Earlier discussion begs the question as to whether Russia’s annexation of Crimea is part of a larger program of strategy and policy on the part of Putin

The Putin Factor

227

and his advisers or, to the contrary, a somewhat improvised and hasty reaction to events in Ukraine and their implications. Perhaps there is some truth in both interpretations. Putin’s actions in Crimea were not entirely sui generis: they were preceded by a context of demands upon Russia from its post–Cold War military and geostrategic setting, compared to that of the Soviet Union. Putin’s policy is not the result of psychodrama. It is the product of his having lived in strategic history and his (and our) understanding of that history. Neither in Russian nor in English is strategic history selfinterpreting. Heads of state and military commanders make strategic history as they go, doing their best to tie together the ends, ways, and means of politico-military action.20 The administration of President Barack Obama sought to reset relations with Russia during his first term in office, leading to the accomplishment of the New START agreement on strategic nuclear arms reductions in 2010 (which took effect in February 2011). However, subsequent USRussian and NATO-Russian disputes over the Obama plan for deploying missile defenses in Europe created obstacles to further progress on nuclear arms limitation, on nonproliferation, and on a revived deployment of conventional forces in Europe more acceptable to Russia than the defunct Cold War original version.21 In addition to an expanding NATO, encirclement by troubled or ambitious regional partners, and a deficient conventional military establishment, Russia of the early twenty-first century faced the inevitable need to adjust to postmodern warfare and the impact of advanced technology, conventional weapons, and command-control systems. Even if Russia could rebuild the Soviet ground forces of the 1980s, this would not suffice to ensure against future threats based on newer weapons and the strategies made possible by postindustrial technology. Postindustrial or third-wave warfare created a new military cyberspace in which the capability for systems integration across the parts of a knowledge-based strategy would prove to be decisive. The various parts included command, control, communications, and computers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; long-range precision strike; and stealth technology. And even if Russia had the military-industrial complex that it did during the Soviet era, it would still lag in smart technology on account of its underdeveloped private sector economy. Russian economic performance improved in the first decade of the twenty-first century relative to the miserable performance of the 1990s, mostly due to oil prices but also on account of a widespread perception of stronger state leadership. However, it was a larger challenge to convert this or other economic boomlets into permanent improvements in Russia’s hollowed-out and cash-strapped conventional forces.22 Improved economic performance is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a Russian army that can cope with third-wave, postindustrial

228

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

warfare. Smart soldiers and innovative commanders who can think outside the box are as important as technology, as the nature of warfare shifts from massive battles of attrition to flexible and small-scale military operations. In addition, future warfare will take place in at least five dimensions: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.23 These multiple environments for future war fighting make the challenges posed by the initial period of war especially problematic for technically backward militaries.24 The possibility of decisive losses within minutes or seconds in the initial period of war, including a possible cyber war that would create chaos with exclusively electronic casualties, is now within the reach of feasible or foreseeable military art.25 Russia’s historical exposure to attack and invasion, including the defeats imposed on the Soviet Union during the early stages of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa in 1941, remains in the DNA of today’s and tomorrow’s Russian political leaders and commanders.26 Russia’s national security concepts of the year 2010 and subsequently and its related military doctrine show its fears of surprise attack in the face of NATO conventional military superiority.27 A Barbarossa complex is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for present-day Russia to avoid wars or to prevail in war if necessary. However, Russian military planners might reasonably assume that the initial period of war can be one of great danger. What seemed politically absurd in a temporary surge of US-Russian reset and post–post–Cold War Europe was not necessarily impossible from the standpoint of Russian military pessimists. From the perspective of risk-averse Russian military planners, Russian forces drawn back to the western border districts of the current federation will be in very much the same position as those that faced the onslaught of Barbarossa in 1941. 28 Russian intelligence will place an equally high importance on the detection of enemy political decision to attack (strategic warning) as on the acquisition of order-of-battle data and other information essential for response to tactical warning. As Graeme Herd has noted, since 1991 shocks to Russian national consciousness and identity have been numerous: These shocks helped fuel a sense of encirclement and a profound diminution of strategic presence and prestige and so the need to re-assert Russian Great Power. In the field of decision-making, priority-setting and strategy formation, the political response has been towards the creation of a regime which is perhaps even more centralized than the Soviet template it replaced, one that is based on aggrandized personal networks rather than functioning institutions.29

Therefore NATO would be well advised to continue its program of political and military collaboration with Russia, notwithstanding angst over

The Putin Factor

229

Ukraine, and to encourage improvements in Russia’s early warning and control systems so that they are less susceptible to self-fulfilling pessimism. In addition, NATO enlargement should de-emphasize the alliance’s nuclear guaranty except as a last resort. In this regard, the United States and Russia would also be well advised to (1) continue pursuit of strategic nuclear arms reductions beyond the limits agreed in the New START treaty; (2) undertake NATO-Russian negotiations on the reduction and elimination of nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe; and (3) further pursue RussianNATO cooperation on European missile defenses as adumbrated in the Madrid discussions between Russian and NATO leaders in 2010. Reaching agreement on the reduction or elimination of European nonstrategic nuclear weapons or on missile defenses may present both domestic and foreign policy difficulties. As Nikolai Sokov has noted with respect to Russia’s perspective on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, “A solution to the paradox of [theater nuclear weapons]—assets that Russia apparently does not need, but continues to hold on to—can be found in domestic politics rather than in strategic planning. The Russian government attitude toward [theater nuclear weapons] appears to represent a complex mix of domestic and bureaucratic politics, (mis)perceptions, and idiosyncrasies.”30 In addition, the United States and Russia have an objective community of interest in lowering the nuclear threshold by improving the quality of Russia’s conventional forces (to a point) relative to its nuclear ones, so that Russia’s nuclear employment policies and declaratory doctrines are less forward-leaning with respect to nuclear first or early use in a conventional war. More specifically, Russia must be disabused of the notion that a nuclear first use in Europe or elsewhere would be an effective means of deescalation of an otherwise conventional conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Escalators run in two directions. Indeed, a more favorable climate for US-Russian and NATO-Russian cooperation on nuclear arms limitation should also contribute to more realistic threat assessments in Moscow with respect to the prevention or conduct of conventional warfare. Russia is not threatened primarily by NATO—unless Putin loses control of his limited-risk forward strategy in Ukraine and creates a self-negating feedback loop.31 Instead, the threat of regional wars on Russia’s periphery or terrorism and insurgent wars within Russia must now take pride of place in general-staff and defense ministry contingency planning. Preparedness for these contingencies of limited and local wars, regular and irregular, will require a smaller, more professional, and more mobile military than post-Soviet Russia has fielded hitherto.32 As well, Russia’s armed forces, together with the general staff and defense ministry, must be made accountable to their political leadership as an institutional, not a personal, matter. Unless these political

230

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

and military building blocks are put into place, Russia’s armed forces and military doctrine will be maladapted for the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

The role of nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian crisis, and in subsequent NATO relations with Russia, remains a subtle and important one. As Janis Berzins of the National Defense Academy of Latvia has noted, Russia’s Crimean campaign (and subsequent disruption of eastern and southern Ukraine) was achieved by the operationalization of what Russian military thinkers refer to as “new-generation warfare,” which includes a coordinated campaign of strategic communications using political, psychological, and information strategies.33 As Berzins notes, Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battle-space is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civilian population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country.34

Berzins’s assessment, that Russia regards the mind as a key part of the battlespace of future warfare, applies not only to the threat or use of conventional forces by Russia and possible opponents. The point also applies to the existence of nuclear deterrence and to the implicit threat of nuclear first use created by the very existence of nuclear weapons in Russia and NATO, and by their forward deployments in positions that make it impossible for either Russia or NATO to exclude them from a widening conventional war. Therefore NATO and Russia, even into the post–Cold War world and the twenty-first century, have maintained a nuclear umbrella over conventional deterrence that creates a deterrence system that is both potentially stabilizing, if leaders are risk-averse, and potentially destabilizing, if risk-acceptant leaders lose control over a process of escalation. Nuclear weapons connect the start of a small conventional war in Europe into a possibly greater chain of escalation, the threat of which is supposed to deter because it is not entirely predictable or manageable. In addition, nuclear weapons make the possibility of Russia’s disintegration in a conventional war very dangerous to Russia’s adversaries as well as to Russians, as the ownership of Russia’s post–Putin regime nukes becomes debatable, and possibly inscrutable. Meanwhile,

The Putin Factor

231

Putin’s short- and long-term motives, and Russia’s broader geostrategic options, with or without Putin, are cannon fodder for expert and public debate.

Notes 1. For assessments of Putin and Russia’s prospects under his leadership, see Walter Laqueur, Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West (New York: St. Martin’s, 2015); Marvin Kalb, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015); Timothy L. Thomas, Russia: Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015); Richard J. Krickus, Russia After Putin (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2014); Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014); Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013). See also Fiona Hill, Hearing on Understanding and Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies and Strategies, oral remarks, US Congress, House Armed Services Committee, February 10, 2013, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 39, February 25, 2016, [email protected]. 2. Philip M. Breedlove, Theater Strategy (Washington, DC: United States European Command, October 2015), www.eucom.mil. See also Andrew Tilghman, “Russian Aggression a Top Concern in U.S. European Command’s New Military Strategy,” January 27, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 20, January 28, 2016, [email protected]. 3. “What the Litvinenko Assassination Accusation Means for the Kremlin,” PBS Newshour interview with Steven Lee Myers of the New York Times and Michael McFaul, former US ambassador to Russia, January 21, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 15, January 22, 2016, [email protected]. 4. For expert assessments of Russia’s armed forces and Putin’s strategy, see Alexander Golts and Michael Kofman, Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, and Threat (Washington, DC: Center on Global Interests, June 2016, www.globalinterests .org; Ilya Yashin and Olga Shorina, eds., Putin.War: An Independent Expert Report, based on materials from Boris Nemtsov (Moscow, May 2015), www.putin-itogi.ru, translated into English by Catherine Fitzpatrick and available at http://4freerussia .org/putin.war; Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson, Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, May 2015), www.atlanticcouncil.org; Douglas Mastriano and Derek O’Malley, Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe: An Appropriate U.S. Response, and the Implications for U.S. Landpower (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, March 2015), www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil; Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper no. 2 (Riga: National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014). 5. Possible scenarios for Russian collapse are presented in George Friedman, “Putin Has Two Years to Hold Russia Together,” Business Insider, January 22, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 17, January 25, 2016, [email protected]; Nikolai Petrov, “Russia’s Ruling Regime Must Modernize or Face Collapse,” Moscow Times, January 22, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 15, January 22, 2016, [email protected].

232

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

6. Nikolai Sokov, “Controlling Soviet/Russian Nuclear Weapons in Times of Instability,” in Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, eds., Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2013), pp. 87–143. 7. John E. Herbst, “At Warsaw, NATO Agrees to Thwart Putin’s Revisionist Dream,” Atlantic Council, July 12, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 133, July 15, 2016, [email protected]. 8. Christopher S. Chivvis and Stephen J. Flanagan, “NATO’s Russia Problem: The Alliance’s Tough Road Ahead, Post–Warsaw Summit,” National Interest, July 13, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 133, July 18, 2016, [email protected]. 9. Robin Emmott and Phil Stewart, “NATO Agrees Russian Deterrent but Avoids Cold War Footing,” Reuters, February 10, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 30, February 11, 2016, [email protected]. 10. Jens Stoltenberg, quoted in Emmott and Stewart, “NATO Agrees Russian Deterrent.” See also Mark Galeotti, “Russia Is Only a Threat if We Let It Be One,” National Interest, July 21, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 138, July 22, 2016, [email protected]. 11. See Dana Rohrabacher, “Why Is America Restarting the Cold War with Russia? Washington’s Strategy Toward Moscow Is Outmoded and Misdirected,” National Interest, February 11, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 31, February 12, 2016, [email protected]. 12. Dmitri Medvedev, speech at a panel discussion, Munich Security Conference, February 13, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 32, February 15, 2016, [email protected]. 13. Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 35, February 19, 2010, [email protected]. 14. Ibid. 15. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia Overhauls Military Doctrine,” Defense News, January 10, 2015, www.defensenews.com; Artem Kureev, “Russia’s New National Security Strategy Has Implications for the West,” January 8, 2016, www.russia-direct.org. 16. For perspective on this topic, see Stephen J. Cimbala and Roger N. McDermott, “Putin and the Nuclear Dimension to Russian Strategy,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 4 (2016), pp. 1–19. See also Andrei Kokoshin, Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011). 17. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011), pp. 33–97, esp. pp. 70–72. See also Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name,” in Blank, Russian Nuclear Weapons, pp. 459–503. 18. Alexei Arbatov, cited in McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces,” p. 72. 19. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,” New York Times, January 29, 2014. The treaty bans deployment of nuclear or conventional ground-based missiles by NATO or the former Soviet Union (and now Russia) with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 20. On the concept of strategic history, see Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012).

The Putin Factor

233

21. For pertinent perspective and background, see Stephen J. Blank, Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011). 22. For contrasting assessments, see Mitchell Yates, “How Putin Made Russia’s Military into a Modern, Lethal Fighting Force,” National Interest, February 25, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 39, February 25, 2016, [email protected]; Mark Galeotti, “Don’t Buy the Hype: Russia’s Military Is Much Weaker Than Putin Wants Us to Think,” Vox, February 23, 2016, in Johnson’s Russia List no. 37, February 23, 2016, [email protected]. 23. For perspective on Russia’s challenges with respect to information and cyber wars, see Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January– March 2014), pp. 101–130. See also Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011). 24. For recent expert commentary on Russian views of future war, see Daniel Goure, “Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios, So Little Time, Money, and Forces,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 63–100; Jacob W. Kipp, “Smart Defense from New Threats: Future War from a Russian Perspective—Back to the Future After the War on Terror,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 36–62. 25. Russian and Soviet literature on this subject is extensive. See, for example, S. P. Ivanov, Nachal’nyy period voyny: po opytu pervykh kampaniy I operatsiy vtoroy mirovoy voyny [The initial period of war: On the experience of the first campaigns of the Second World War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974). For an appraisal of Soviet threat assessment between the two world wars, see John Erickson, “Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930–41,” in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 375–424. 26. For overviews of this issue, see David M. Glantz, “The Red Army in 1941,” and Jacob Kipp, “Soviet War Planning,” both in David M. Glantz, ed., The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June–August 1941 (London: Cass, 1993), pp. 1–37 and 40–54, respectively; Richard H. Phillips, Soviet Military Debate on the Initial Period of War: Characteristics and Implications (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, November 1989); Jacob W. Kipp, Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces, and the Initial Period of War: Military History and AirLand Battle (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, n.d.). 27. Kremlin, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” 28. In this regard, connections between the current thinking of the Russian military leadership and certain pre–World War II Soviet military theorists are examined in Steven J. Main, “‘You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders’: The Continuing Importance of Studying Soviet Military History—G.S. Isserson and Russia’s Current Geopolitical Stance,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2016), pp. 48–72. 29. Graeme Herd, “Security Strategy: Sovereign Democracy and Great Power Aspirations,” in Mark Galeotti, ed., The Politics of Security in Modern Russia (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), p. 8. 30. Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian National Security Strategy,” in Blank, Russian Nuclear Weapons, p. 216. 31. Tendencies toward escalation of Russian threat perceptions with regard to NATO and in defiance of reality are noted in Stephen J. Blank, “Lt. Kizhe Rides

234

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

Again: Magical Realism and Russian National Security Perspectives,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 2 (April–June 2014), pp. 310–357. 32. On the subject of accomplishments and disappointments in Russian military reform, see Roger N. McDermott, “The Brain of the Russian Army: Futuristic Visions Tethered by the Past,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January– March 2014), pp. 4–35; Alexander Golts, “Reform: The End of the First Phase— Will There Be a Second?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 131–146; Keir Giles, “A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 147–162. For additional perspective, see Dale R. Herspring, “Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship,” and Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020,” both in Blank, Russian Nuclear Weapons, pp. 1–31 and 33–97, respectively. See also Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2011); Rod Thornton, Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2011); Roger N. McDermott, The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges, and Policy Implications (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2011); Pavel Baev, “Neither Reform nor Modernization: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin’s Command,” in Galeotti, The Politics of Security in Modern Russia, pp. 69–88. 33. Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine. 34. Ibid., p. 5.

14 The Way Forward

The prestigious Valdai International Discussion Club, Moscow, host for a number of important international conferences, issued a report in April 2016 on the future of great power war.1 Authors Michael Kofman and Andrey Sushentsov anticipate that future wars among major military powers may see “a clear trend away from strict rules of warfare or the existence of any tangible separation between war and peace.”2 As they explain, in the relationship between technology and military art, there are some similarities between the period immediately preceding World War I and the present time: “Just as over a hundred years ago, modern war will be fought with technologies for which doctrines have yet to be developed, in domains previously unexposed to combat, and without rules.”3 Kofman and Sushentsov anticipate that the convergence of new weapons technologies with adaptive ways and means of warfare will result in a new paradigm that emphasizes cyber war and information operations, war in space, electronic warfare, special operations, and economic or financial wars. As they explain, “A future war among near peers is unlikely to start at the phalanx of formations arrayed at the front, but instead in space and cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The first salvo will be fired almost entirely with electrons, seeking to degrade command and control, important national infrastructure, and knock out or disable key enablers for the opponent’s military effort.”4 In some cases it may be possible to decide the outcome of a conflict, according to the Valdai report, by causing enough damage to critical command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as national infrastructure, that few, if any, kinetic operations may be required. In other instances, the cyber-electronic phase of the war would precede or accompany the use of kinetic attacks on a larger scale.5 In addition to other uncertainties, nuclear weapons present a complication for the application of this new paradigm of information-electronic-infrastructure warfare. First, the very existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of great or 235

236

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

medium powers creates uncertainty. Second, cyber and electronic strikes depend for their effectiveness on surprise and stealth, and favor the offense at the expense of the defense. An additional complication is that clear attribution of the identity of cyber attackers is often a challenging problem for defenders. Third, attacks on military command-control, communications, reconnaissance, and early warning systems may compromise the survivability and responsiveness of nuclear forces. Aware of this, nuclear weapons states may respond by deploying more weapons and launchers in prompt response or even hair trigger modes and be more willing to authorize preemptive attack under conditions of perceived threat and ambiguous information.6 This book has emphasized the point that twenty-first-century warfare, regardless of the specific gravity of its tactics and technologies, cannot avoid the brooding omnipresence of nuclear weapons, especially those held by the bigger nuclear weapons states. The United States and Russia are by a substantial margin the two largest nuclear powers. They have both cooperative and conflicting security agendas. Part of their future cooperative security agenda has to be the management of the nuclear arms race, the support for the nonproliferation regime, and the improvement of controls on nuclear use and other security measures to ensure against leakage of nuclear materials and weapons to terrorists or antisystemic state actors. However, for these cooperative security measures as between the United States (and NATO) and Russia to move forward, political will, as well as technical knowledge and security expertise, are required. Leaders of the current nuclear weapons states, especially Russia and the United States, must lead in order to reduce the risk of deliberate or inadvertent nuclear war or escalation. Of particular concern in this regard is the difference between the first nuclear age (roughly from the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War) and the current or second nuclear age into the twenty-first century. In the first nuclear age, the preoccupation of strategists was with the global US-Soviet political rivalry and the attendant possibility of a war in Europe or, by means of escalation, a regional or global nuclear war. In contrast, in the second nuclear age the main concern of strategists and arms control experts is the possibility of nuclear war in the regions outside Europe: in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. The reason for this rethinking about the locus of nuclear danger is that, while Europe cannot be taken for granted as a security community free of any threat of interstate violence, Europe (including Russia) and the United States went through a learning curve of many years’ duration about the problems related to the ownership and management of nuclear forces. Some lessons were learned the hard way, as about nuclear crisis management during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Newer nuclear powers in the Middle East (say Iran, if efforts to contain its nuclear program as agreed in 2015 do not hold), or in South and East Asia,

The Way Forward

237

must get up to speed with respect to the complexity of nuclear force operations and management in a shorter time than was permitted to the United States and its allied nuclear weapons states in Europe. Two things are especially important about this geographical and geostrategic shift in the locus of major nuclear danger, from inside to outside Europe. First, some nuclear weapons states in Asia, such as China and India, are also modernizing their conventional forces and military C4ISR systems, along with increasing the sizes of their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. This synergy between improving “brains” for conventional warfare and for nuclear deterrence creates an extremely competitive regional security space. Add to this the fact that steadily improving C4ISR systems depend on the digital domain for their fidelity and surety against accidental failure or sabotage. The result is that cyber vulnerabilities are added to a requirement for rapid decisionmaking about the trickiest kinds of decisions even short of an actual nuclear war (whether to put forces on alert as a reaction to the other side’s move or as a deliberate show of resolve or intimidation, for example). A second aspect of this non-European nuclear rivalry is that future versions of nuclear weapons, compared to the Cold War and immediate post– Cold War past, are likely to be smaller in yield and more precise in targeting. In the past it was assumed that even a “small” nuclear war, say tens of weapons or so, would create unacceptable damage in retaliation sufficient to deter a first striker otherwise bent on nuclear attack. But laboratories and scientists are working on making nuclear weapons more “usable” in the sense that they will be guided more directly to their precise targets and minimize collateral damage to surrounding society and economic infrastructure. Of course, all this is relative—even tens of weapons with minimum yields (say, lower than Hiroshima) would still create historically unprecedented damage to society. However, in policy and in strategy, perceptions (and misperceptions) have a way of becoming realities. If the expectation grows among policymakers and military planners that nuclear weapons are not only for deterrence (the avoidance of war by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation) but also for war fighting, so long as those weapons are below a certain low yield, a game changer may arrive in government and popular attitudes toward the nuclear taboo in existence since 1945. There is even the possibility of precision-guided weapons of intercontinental range (so-called prompt global-strike weapons) capable of attacking nuclear or other vital military targets rapidly and with high accuracy. Although current thinking is that prompt global-strike weapons would be armed with conventional warheads, there is also the possibility that they could carry nuclear weapons.7 In addition to nuclear weapons of lesser yield, and nuclear-capable delivery systems of greater precision, another technological wild card in the deck of deterrence, crisis, and arms race stability is introduced by the information

238

War Games: US-Russian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control

revolution and the advent of cyber war. There is a large debate about the relationship between nuclear weapons and cyber deterrence and whether the concept of deterrence fits at all into the cyber realm.8 As Martin Libicki has noted, “The prerequisites for a cyberattack are few: Talented hackers, intelligence on the target, exploits to match the vulnerabilities found through such intelligence, a personal computer or any comparable computing device, and any network connection.”9 However, this observation does not necessarily mean that cyber war by itself can have strategic effects against either military or civilian targets. There is considerable variation in the extent to which Cold War concepts for thinking about nuclear or conventional war and deterrence would still be relevant to cyber war in the twenty-first century. Paul Davis has made a systematic effort to identify the relative salience of concepts from Cold War analyses of nuclear strategy for cyber war, as summarized in Table 14.1. Table 14.1 Relevance of Cold War Concepts of Nuclear Strategy for Cyber War

Concept

Relevance to Cyber War

Comment

Assured destruction and assured retaliation

Low

Cyber war is not in the same league as nuclear war or kinetic war with precision weapons insofar as “assuring” anything, much less incapacitation or destruction.

Countervalue vs. counterforce

High

Collateral effects and related confusion are likely.

Strategic stability

Medium

Interest in normalcy, predictability, stability.

Crisis instability

Mixed

Relevance varies with issue: (a) Disarming first-strike capability: low relevance. (b) Avoiding perceived cost of going second: high relevance. (c) Seeing leverage in surprise attack in limited conventional war (e.g., to deactivate air defenses): high relevance. (d) Considering escalation to reestablish deterrence: high relevance.

Competitive strategy

High

The strategy of driving the adversary to spend vast sums on defense applies strongly to cyber war. Also, breakthroughs can render prior investments obsolete.

Extended deterrence

High

Extending standalone cyber deterrence may be unlikely, but cyber capabilities affect extended deterrence via war-fighting capability.

Source: Paul K. Davis, “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar,” International Law and Politics 47 (2015), pp. 344–345.

The Way Forward

239

Of course, US planners also need to know what Russian, Chinese, or other state actors’ views of nuclear deterrence and crisis stability might be, and how those views might influence their decisionmaking during a crisis or after an outbreak of war. In short, the United States and Russia, faced with new nuclear dangers and challenges, have cooperative security interests in at least this one issue area—whatever else they might disagree about. Successful nuclear arms control, management of nonproliferation, and the avoidance of other globally spawned nuclear danger cannot be accomplished without joint leadership as between the United States and Russia. They are “condemned to succeed” as the French say, by forces of technology, strategy, and policy. Those forces and their larger political contexts have been explained in more detail in the preceding chapters, but tracking this issue is a moveable feast. My modest contribution to this discussion is certainly not the last word on this topic in a new nuclear century.

Notes 1. Michael Kofman and Andrey Sushentsov, What Makes Great Power War Possible (Moscow: Valdai International Discussion Club, April 2016), http:// valdaiclub.com. 2. Ibid., p. 7. 3. Ibid., p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 10. 5. Ibid. 6. I gratefully acknowledge Andrew Futter for insights on this point. 7. For additional perspective on nuclear modernization, see Michaela Dodge and Adam B. Lowther, “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Challenges Ahead,” Focus Quarterly (Winter 2016), www.jewishpolicycenter.org. On US conventional prompt global-strike programs and missions, see Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014), www.crs.gov. 8. See, for example, Andrew Futter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Services Institute, July 2016), www.rusi.org; Paul K. Davis, “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar,” International Law and Politics 47 (2015), pp. 327– 355; Colin S. Gray, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2013); Martin C. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace (Santa Monica: RAND, 2012); Kamaal T. Jabbour and E. Paul Ratazzi, “Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?” in Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 33–45; Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009). 9. Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace, p. 14, n. 18.d.

Appendix 1 Notes on Methodology

Grateful acknowledgment is made to Dr. James Scouras and to Dr. James J. Tritten for use in this book of models originally developed by them. Neither is responsible for their use here.

Tritten Model

James Tritten’s forty-four-year career in the US Navy included many important appointments and assignments, including his service as professor and department head for national security studies at the US Naval Postgraduate School. In that capacity, Tritten developed a nuclear exchange model based on a spreadsheet that I have since modified, adapted for use as an Excel spreadsheet, and revised the database to account for changes in US and Soviet (and then Russian) forces. A sample output is reproduced in Tables A.1 and A.2 with notional numbers. The model assists the investigator by calculating formulas and by converting calculations into graphs. The investigator is required to specify the values for force structure, numbers of forces and weapons deployed, estimated performance characteristics of weapons, and other parameters. Tritten is not responsible for any of the analysis or arguments appearing in this book.

Scouras Model

James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the former chief scientist of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. He was formerly director for risk analysis at the Homeland Security Institute and has held research positions at the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses. He has also lectured at the University of Maryland on nuclear policy issues. Scouras coauthored our book A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (Praeger, 2002). 241

242

Appendix 1

Table A.1 Tritten Model Illustrative Spreadsheet Launchers Russian Forces SS-11/3 SS-13/2 SS-18 RS-24 silo SS-19/3 SS-27 silo Subtotal fixed land RS-24 mobile SS-27 mobile Subtotal mobile land Subtotal land-based SS-N-6/3 SS-N-8/2 Delta IV: SS-N-23 Borey-Bulava Delta III: SS-N-18 Subtotal sea-based Bear H6 Bear H 16 Tu-160 Blackjack Subtotal air-breathing Total Russian forces

0 0 30 0 20 60 110 85 27 112 222 0 0 64 64 0 128 63 0 13 76 426

US Forces Minuteman II Minuteman III Minuteman IIIA Peacekeeper/MX Subtotal land-based Trident C-4 Trident D-5/W-76 Trident D-5/W-88 Subtotal sea-based B-52G gravity B-52G gravity B-52H B-2 Subtotal air-breathing Total US forces

0 0 400 0 400 0 0 240 240 0 0 32 16 48 688

Warheads/Launcher

1 1 10 4 6 1 4 1

1 1 4 4 4 1 16 1

1 1 1 10 4 4 4.5 0 0 1 1

Total Warheads

0 0 300 0 120 60 480 340 27 367 847 0 0 256 256 0 512 63 0 13 76 1,435

0 0 400 0 400 0 0 1,080 1,080 0 0 32 16 48 1,528

The Scouras model is copyrighted as the Arriving Weapons Sensitivity Model (AWSM@) and is used here with permission. The model, based on an Excel spreadsheet, calculates the outcomes of nuclear force exchanges and can be used to create tabular output as well as graphs. Special features of the model include its ability to calculate and compare measures of sensitivity as related to nuclear-strategic stability. A sample output appears in Table A.3.

243

Appendix 1 Table A.2 Tritten Model Notional Outcomes Summary Descriptor

Number

Total Russian deliverable warheads Deliverable Russian reserve warheads Total US deliverable warheads Deliverable US reserve warheads Russian first-strike advantage US first-strike advantage Stability index

438.75 175.90 583.69 252.34 996.25 944.31 1.06

Note: Data in Table A.1 multiplied through matrix of seventeen parameters in order to produce summary descriptors.

Table A.3 Scouras Model: Sample Output for US Forces, New START 1,550 Deployment Limit, Balanced Triad Total Forces

Available Forces

Alert Forces

Surviving Forces

Arriving Forces

Gen, LOW ICBM SLBM Air All

400 1,080 48 1,528

400 972 43 1,415

400 972 43 1,415

400 972 43 1,415

360 875 35 1,270

Gen, ROA ICBM SLBM Air All

400 1,080 48 1,528

400 972 43 1,415

400 972 43 1,415

40 972 43 1,055

36 875 35 946

Day, LOW ICBM SLBM Air All

400 1,080 48 1,528

400 972 43 1,415

400 651 0 1,051

400 651 0 1,051

360 586 0 946

Day, ROA ICBM SLBM Air All

400 1,080 48 1,528

400 972 43 1,415

400 651 0 1,051

40 651 0 691

36 586 0 622

Note: Gen = generated alert; Day = day-to-day alert; LOW = launch on warning; ROA = ride out attack.

Appendix 2 Nuclear Modernization and Cost Comparisons

The Center for American Progress (CAP) in Washington, DC, has established a website (https://www.americanprogress.org) that permits an investigator to compare the Obama administration’s proposed nuclear modernization plan with an alternative plan suggested by CAP. In addition, the investigator can design a modernization plan of her or his choice by answering a series of questions. The program then calculates how expensive the alternative is compared to the Obama plan or the CAP alternative. The questions and my answers follow. 1. How many ICBMs should the US deploy after 2018? Answer: 300. Three hundred warheads are sufficient to maintain diversity in launch platforms and for complicating the first-strike calculations of any attacker by adding aim points that must be promptly and decisively neutralized. In addition, future portions of the ICBM arsenal might be used for conventional prompt global-strike missions. 2. The current ICBM force will reach the end of its life in the 2020s. What should we do? Answer: Extend the life of the current Minuteman III ICBM force through at least 2040 through incremental modernization. This preserves a necessary leg of the triad in the most cost-effective manner. 3. Should the B-52 bomber continue carrying nuclear weapons? Answer: Yes. 4. Should the stealthy B-2s be switched to only conventional missions. Answer: No. 5. How many new (LRS-B) bombers should the air force buy? Answer: 20. 6. How many of the new bombers should be nuclear capable? Answer: 20. 7. Should the US develop a new nuclear cruise missile? Answer: Yes. It may not be necessary to deploy as many as 1,000 long-range standoff

245

246

Appendix 2

(LRSO) cruise missiles, but the development is a prudent hedge against future air defenses and antiaccess, area denial strategies. 8. What should be done with tactical nuclear weapons? Answer: Remove them from Europe and retire them. At best these weapons convey a certain symbolism of NATO allied unity and US security guarantee, but a better symbol and effective counter would be improvements in NATO conventional forces and deployments in Eastern Europe. 9. Should the US consolidate its seven warheads into five basic types? Answer: Yes. The labs seem to think this is efficient and sensible from a scientific standpoint, although it might be expensive in the short term. 10. How many new Ohio-class replacement subs should be purchased? Answer: 12. Twelve subs is the minimum we should have regardless of warhead and launcher mix per sub, notwithstanding that there are development and deployment “gap” years when the number temporarily shrinks to ten. Twelve total means that ten are actually available at any given time, and given that this force is our ultimately survivable retaliatory force, ten operationally deployed subs are not too many. This also guards against possible breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare. On the other hand, regardless of the numbers, the next generation of Ohio-class subs will also have to upgrade command-control and communications systems appropriately, which will increase costs for reliable, survivable, and flexible command, control, and communications. 11. How many warheads should each submarine-launched ballistic missile carry, on average? Answer: This is a brain teaser, because one must figure downward from the New START ceilings (unless we abrogate that treaty). So we’ll probably deploy 1,080 New START–accountable warheads (perhaps some of them conventional instead of nuclear) on 10 to 12 boats with 20 launchers per boat. Obviously the launchers would have variable loads. The US Navy should have fun figuring this out. According to the readout, my force saves $334 billion compared to the Obama modernization plan, which is estimated to cost approximately a trillion dollars over a period of thirty years. The CAP force offers greater savings compared to the Obama plan, but with less capability, in my judgment.

Bibliography

Adamowski, Jaroslaw. “Russia Overhauls Military Doctrine.” Defense News, January 10, 2015. www.defensenews.com. Allison, Graham. “Just How Likely Is Another World War?” The Atlantic, July 2014. www.theatlantic.com. ———. Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York: Times-Holt, 2004. Arbatov, Alexei. “Engaging China in Nuclear Arms Control.” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 9, 2014. http://carnegie.ru. Arms Control Association. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START.” www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/RussiaStratNukeForceNewSTART. ———. “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START.” www.armscontrol.org /factsheets/USStratNukeForceNewSTART. Arquilla, John. “From Blitzkrieg to Bitskrieg: The Military Encounter with Computers.” Communications of the ACM no. 10 (October 2011), pp. 58–65. ———. Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008. Aslund, Anders, and Andrew Kuchins. The Russia Balance Sheet. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2009. Baev, Pavel. “Neither Reform nor Modernization: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin’s Command.” In Mark Galeotti, ed., The Politics of Security in Modern Russia. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, pp. 69–88. Baucom, Donald R. The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Baylis, John. “Nuclear Weapons, Prudence, and Morality: The Search for a ‘Third Way.’” In John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 70–86. Beckhusen, Robert. “Russia’s Future Air Force Could Resemble . . . the U.S. Air Force.” https://medium.com. Berzins, Janis. Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy. Policy Paper no. 2. Riga: National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, April 2014. Blair, Bruce G. “Could Terrorists Launch America’s Nuclear Missiles?” Time, November 11, 2010. http://content.time.com. ———. The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993.

247

248

Bibliography

Blank, Stephen J. Arms Control and Proliferation: Challenges to the Reset Policy. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011. ———. “Lt. Kizhe Rides Again: Magical Realism and Russian National Security Perspectives.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 2 (April–June 2014), pp. 310–357. ———. Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009. Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force and Space Command.” Moscow Times, August 3, 2015. www.themoscowtimes.com. Bracken, Paul. The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. ———. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age. New York: HarperCollins, 1999. ———. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. New York: Times-Holt, 2012. ———. “War Termination.” In Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, eds., Managing Nuclear Operations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 197–214. Breedlove, Philip M. “NATO’s Next Act: How to Handle Russia and Other Threats.” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2016). In Johnson’s Russia List no. 108, June 15, 2016, [email protected]. ———. Theater Strategy. Washington, DC: United States European Command, October 2015. www.eucom.mil. Brenner, Joel. Glass Houses: Privacy, Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent World. New York: Penguin, 2013. British Broadcasting Corporation. “Russian Security Blueprint Sees NATO Expansion as Threat.” December 31, 2015. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 1, January 2, 2016, [email protected]. Broad, William J., and David E. Sanger. “As U.S. Modernizes Nuclear Weapons, ‘Smaller’ Leaves Some Uneasy.” New York Times, January 11, 2016. www .nytimes.com. ———. “Race for Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revive Cold War.” New York Times, April 16, 2016. www.nytimes.com. Brustlein, Corentin. Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits. Proliferation Paper no. 52. Paris: IFRI Security Studies Center, January 2015. www.ifri.org. Burns, Nicholas. “The Problem with Putin.” Boston Globe, March 3, 2015. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu. Burns, Richard D., and Philip E. Coyle III. The Challenges of Nuclear NonProliferation. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015. Burns, William J. “The Fruits of Diplomacy with Iran.” New York Times, April 2, 2015. www.nytimes.com. Butterworth, Robert L. “Minuteman for the Joint Fight.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 3–16. Carter, Rosemary M., Brent Frick, and Roy C. Undersander. “Offensive Cyber for the Joint Force Commander.” Joint Force Quarterly no. 66 (Third Quarter 2012), pp. 22–27. Cartwright, James. Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture. Global Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission, May 2012. www .globalzero.org.

Bibliography

249

Chalmers, Malcolm, and Simon Lunn. NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma. London: Royal United Services Institute, March 2010. www.rusi.org. Chang, Gordon G. “Be Afraid: China Can’t Control North Korea.” National Interest, April 25, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org. Charap, Samuel, and Mikhail Troitskiy. “Time to Put an End to MAD.” Moscow Times, January 18, 2011. www.themoscowtimes.com. Chase, Michael S. “Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era: Doctrine and Capabilities.” In Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2014, pp. 301–353. Cheng, Dean. “Chinese Views on Deterrence.” Joint Force Quarterly no. 60 (First Quarter 2011), pp. 92–94. “China Buys Into Multiple Warheads.” New York Times, May 20, 2015. www .nytimes.com. Chivvis, Christopher S., and Stephen J. Flanagan. “NATO’s Russia Problem: The Alliance’s Tough Road Ahead, Post–Warsaw Summit.” National Interest, July 13, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 133, July 18, 2016, davidjohnson@starpower .net. Cimbala, Stephen J. Arms for Uncertainty. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013. ———, ed. Strategic War Termination. New York: Praeger, 1986. Cimbala, Stephen J., and Roger N. McDermott, “Putin and the Nuclear Dimension to Russian Strategy.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 4 (2016), pp. 1–19. Cimbala, Stephen J., and James Scouras. A New Nuclear Century. Westport: Praeger, 2002. Cimbala, Stephen J., and Sidney R. Waldman, eds. Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War. Westport: Greenwood, 1992. Cirincione, Joseph. Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. ———. “Strategic Turn: New U.S. and Russian Views on Nuclear Weapons.” New America Foundation, June 29, 2011. http://newamerica.net. Cockburn, Andrew, and Leslie Cockburn. One Point Safe. New York: Doubleday, 1997. Cohen, Ariel, and Robert E. Hamilton. The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2011. Colby, Elbridge A., and Michael S. Gerson, eds. Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, February 2013. Cole, Bernard D. “Island Chains and Naval Classics.” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, November 2014. www.usni.org. Congressional Budget Office. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024. Washington, DC, January 2015. https://www.cbo.gov. Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran, Israel, and Nuclear War. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 19, 2007. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Alexander Wilner. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance—II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 16, 2012. www.csis.org. Craig, Susan L. Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007. Cunningham, Fiona S., and M. Taylor Fravel. “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability.” International Security no. 2 (Fall 2015), pp. 7–50.

250

Bibliography

Czuperski, Maksymilian, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson. Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, May 2015. www.atlanticcouncil.org. Daalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. “The Logic of Zero.” Foreign Affairs no. 6 (November–December 2008), pp. 80–95. Dallas, Cham E., William C. Bell, David J. Stewart, Antonio Caruso, and Frederick M. Burkle Jr. “Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale.” Conflict and Health, May 10, 2013. www.conflictandhealth.com. Davis, Paul K. “Behavioral Factors in Terminating Superpower War.” In Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992, pp. 165–182. ———. “Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack, and Cyberwar.” International Law and Politics 47 (2015), pp. 327–355. ———. “A New Analytic Technique for the Study of Deterrence, Escalation Control, and War Termination.” In Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986, pp. 35–60. ———. Studying First Strike Stability with Knowledge-Based Models of Human Decisionmaking. Santa Monica: RAND, 1989. Dawisha, Karen. Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. Denning, Dorothy E. “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence.” Joint Force Quarterly 77 (Second Quarter 2015), pp. 8–15. Dodge, Michaela, and Adam B. Lowther. “Nuclear Budgeting: The Perilous Impact of Uncertainty.” Unpublished draft paper. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: US Air War College, March 2015. ———. “Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Challenges Ahead.” Focus Quarterly (Winter 2016). www.jewishpolicycenter.org. Dowd, Alan W., and Adam Lowther. “The Myths of Nuclear Drawdown: A World Without Nukes Takes Us Backward, Not Forward.” American Legion Magazine, August 1, 2015. www.legion.org. Dyson, Freeman. Weapons and Hope. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. Earle, Jonathan. “U.S. and Russia Sign New Anti-Proliferation Deal.” Moscow Times, June 19, 2013. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 111, June 19, 2013, davidjohnson @starpower.net. Emmott, Robin, and Phil Stewart. “NATO Agrees Russian Deterrent but Avoids Cold War Footing.” Reuters, February 10, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 30, February 11, 2016, [email protected]. European Leadership Network. “Managing Dangerous Incidents: The Need for a NATO-Russia Memorandum of Understanding.” March 7, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 46, March 7, 2016, [email protected]. Farkas, Evelyn. “How We Can Defeat Putin.” Newsweek, February 20, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 36, February 22, 2016, [email protected]. Feaver, Peter Douglas. Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. FitzGerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. Forsyth, James Wood, Jr., and Billy E. Pope. “Structural Causes and Cyber Effects: Why International Order Is Inevitable in Cyberspace.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2014), pp. 113–130. Forsyth, James Wood, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub Jr. “Minimum

Bibliography

251

Deterrence and Its Critics.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 3–12. ———. “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 74–89. Frates, Chris. “IRS Believes Massive Data Theft Originated in Russia.” June 4, 2015. www.cnn.com. Freedman, Lawrence. Deterrence. Cambridge: Polity, 2004. ———. “Eliminators, Marginalists, and the Politics of Disarmament.” In John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post–Cold War World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 56–69. ———. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. ———. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs. Adelphi Paper no. 379. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2006. Friedman, George. “The BMD Decision and the Global System.” September 21, 2009. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 175, September 22, 2009, davidjohnson @starpower.net. ———. “Putin Has Two Years to Hold Russia Together.” January 22, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 17, January 25, 2016, [email protected]. Futter, Andrew. Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy: Normalisation and Acceptance After the Cold War. London: Routledge, 2013. ———. Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy. London: Royal United Services Institute, July 2016. www.rusi.org. ———. “Cyber Threats and the Challenge of De-Alerting US and Russian Nuclear Forces.” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 15, 2015. http://nautilus.org. ———. “Full Spectrum Missile Defense: Why Using Cyber to Counteract Nuclear Threats Is a Plan Fraught with Danger.” Draft paper. April 2016. ———. The Politics of Nuclear Weapons. London: Sage, 2015. ———. “War Games Redux? Cyberthreats, U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability, and New Challenges for Nuclear Security and Arms Control.” European Security, December 2015. Gady, Franz-Stefan. “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?” The Diplomat, May 4, 2015. http://thediplomat.com. ———. “Russia Creates Powerful New Military Branch to Counter NATO.” The Diplomat, August 7, 2015. http://thediplomat.com. Galeotti, Mark. “Don’t Buy the Hype: Russia’s Military Is Much Weaker Than Putin Wants Us to Think.” Vox, February 23, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 37, February 23, 2016, [email protected]. ———. “Russia Is Only a Threat if We Let It Be One.” National Interest, July 21, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 138, July 22, 2016, [email protected]. Gates, Robert M. “A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe.” New York Times, September 19, 2009. www.nytimes.com. ———. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Geist, Edward. “Deterrence Stability in the Cyber Age.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 44–61. George, Alexander L. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Peaceful Resolution Through Coercive Diplomacy.” In Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview, 1994, pp. 111–132.

252

Bibliography

———. “A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management.” In Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder: Westview, 1991, pp. 22–27. Giles, Keir. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010: NATO Research Review. Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Division, February 2010. ———. “A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 147–162. Glantz, David M. “The Red Army in 1941.” In David M. Glantz, ed., The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June–August 1941. London: Cass, 1993, pp. 1–37. Golts, Alexander. “Calling Moscow’s Bluff on Missile Defense.” Moscow Times, September 22, 2009. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 175, September 22, 2009, [email protected]. ———. “An Illusory New START.” Moscow Times, March 30, 2010. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 62, March 30, 2010, [email protected]. ———. “Reform: The End of the First Phase—Will There Be a Second?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 131–146. ———. “Russia’s Aerospace Forces Will Never Take Off.” Moscow Times, August 10, 2015. www.themoscowtimes.com. Golts, Alexander, and Michael Kofman. Russia’s Military: Assessment, Strategy, and Threat. Washington, DC: Center on Global Interests, June 2016. www.globalinterests .org. Gordon, Michael R. “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty.” New York Times, July 28, 2014. www.nytimes.com. Gordon, Michael R., and David E. Sanger. “Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline, First Step Toward a Wider Deal.” New York Times, April 2, 2015. www.nytimes .com. Goure, Daniel. “Moscow’s Visions of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios, So Little Time, Money, and Forces.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 63–100. ———. “The Obama Administration’s Phased-Adaptive Architecture: Technological, Operational, and Political Issues.” Defense and Security Analysis no. 1 (March 2012), pp. 17–35. Gray, Colin S. The Future of Strategy. Cambridge: Polity, 2015. ———. The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2007. ———. Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2013. ———. The Second Nuclear Age. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. ———. Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 2006. ———. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History. London: Cass, 2002. Groves, Jason. “It’s Better Not to Mess with Russia: Putin’s Nuclear Warning to West on Ukraine.” Daily Mail, August 29, 2014. www.dailymail.co.uk. Haynes, Susan Turner. “China’s Nuclear Threat Perceptions.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2016), pp. 25–62. Heim, Jacob L. “The Iranian Missile Threat to Air Bases: A Distant Second to China’s Conventional Deterrent.” Air and Space Power Journal (July–August 2015), pp. 27–50.

Bibliography

253

Heinonen, Olli. “Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Time: A Fact Sheet.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 28, 2015. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu. Heinonen, Olli, and Simon Henderson. “How to Make Sure Iran’s One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 17, 2015. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu. Hensley, Thomas K., Lloyd P. Caviness, Stephanie Vaughn, and Christopher Morton. “Understanding the Indications and Warning Efforts of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense.” Joint Force Quarterly 78 (Third Quarter 2015), pp. 91–97. Herbst, John E. “At Warsaw, NATO Agrees to Thwart Putin’s Revisionist Dream.” Atlantic Council, July 12, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 133, July 15, 2016, [email protected]. Herd, Graeme. “Hybrid Conflict 2.0: Targeting the West.” In Per Concordiam, special issue: “Countering Russian Propaganda.” Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2016, pp. 7–13. ———. “Security Strategy: Sovereign Democracy and Great Power Aspirations.” In Mark Galeotti, ed., The Politics of Security in Modern Russia. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, pp. 7–27. Herspring, Dale R. “Putin and Military Reform.” In Dale R. Herspring, ed., Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, 3rd ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, pp. 173–194. ———. “Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship.” In Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, pp. 1–31. ———. “Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship.” Paper presented at the conference Strategy and Doctrine in Russian Security Policy. Ft. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 28, 2010. Hill, Fiona. Hearing on Understanding and Deterring Russia: U.S. Policies and Strategies. Oral remarks, US Congress, House Armed Services Committee, February 10, 2013. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 39, February 25, 2016, [email protected]. Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013. Holsti, Ole R. “Crisis Decision Making.” In Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, Volume I, pp. 8–84. Ivanov, S. P. Nachal’nyy period voyny: po opytu pervykh kampaniy I operatsiy vtoroy mirovoy voyny [The initial period of war: On the experience of the first campaigns and operations of the Second World War]. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974. Jabbour, Kamaal T., and E. Paul Ratazzi. “Does the United States Need a New Model for Cyber Deterrence?” In Adam B. Lowther, ed., Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 33–45. Jenkins, Brian Michael. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? New York: Prometheus, 2008. Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. Jones, Gregory S. “Facing the Reality of Iran as a De Facto Nuclear State.” In Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2014, pp. 411–453.

254

Bibliography

Kalb, Marvin. Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015. Kaye, Dalia Dassa, Lynn E. Davis, Alireza Nader, Jeffrey Martini, and Larry Hanauer. RAND Experts Q&A on the Iran Nuclear Deal, One Year Later. Santa Monica: RAND, July 14, 2016. www.rand.org. Kipp, Jacob W. Barbarossa, Soviet Covering Forces, and the Initial Period of War: Military History and AirLand Battle. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, n.d. ———. “Russia’s Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name.” In Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, pp. 459–503. ———. “Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Eurasian Security.” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Defense Monitor, March 5, 2010. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 46, March 8, 2010, [email protected]. ———. “Smart Defense from New Threats: Future War from a Russian Perspective—Back to the Future After the War on Terror.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 36–62. Kissinger, Henry A. “Containing the Fire of the Gods.” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2009. www.iht.com. Kofman, Michael, and Andrey Sushentsov. What Makes Great Power War Possible. Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, April 2016. http://valdaiclub.com. Kokoshin, Andrei. Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011. Korb, Lawrence J., and Max Andonov. “Iran Is the New USSR: And That Means the Deal Is a Good Thing.” Politico, July 16, 2015. www.politico.com. Korb, Lawrence, and Katherine Blakely. “This Deal Puts the Nuclear Genie Back in the Bottle.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 15, 2015. http://thebulletin.org. Korb, Lawrence J., and Adam Mount. Setting Priorities for Nuclear Modernization. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, February 2016. www.americanprogress .org. Koshkin, Pavel. “Are Cyberwars Between Major Powers Possible? A Group of Russian Cybersecurity Experts Debate the Likelihood of a Cyberwar Involving the U.S., Russia, or China.” Russia Direct, August 1, 2013. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 143, August 6, 2013, [email protected]. Krepinevich, Andrew F. 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century. New York: Bantam, 2009. Krepon, Michael. Better Safe Than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. Krickus, Richard J. Russia After Putin. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2014. Kristensen, Hans M. Trimming Nuclear Excess: Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces. Special Report no. 5. Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, December 2012. www.FAS.org. ———. U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post–Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning. Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005. Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, no. 3 (2016), pp. 125–134. ———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 3 (2015), pp. 84–97. http://thebulletin.sagepub.com.

Bibliography

255

———. “US Nuclear Forces, 2014.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 1 (2014), pp. 85–93. http://bos.sagepub.com. ———. “US Nuclear Forces, 2015.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 2 (2015), pp. 107–119. http://thebulletin.sagepub.com. Kristensen, Hans M., Robert S. Norris, and Matthew G. McKinzie. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006. Kuzmin, Vladimir. “From START to Euro-ABM.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 31, 2011. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 18, January 31–February 2, 2011, davidjohnson @starpower.net. — Lai, David. “The Agony of Learning: The PLA’s Transformation in Military Affairs.” In Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, eds., Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2012, pp. 337–384. Laqueur, Walter. Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West. New York: St. Martin’s, 2015. Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. ———. Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. We All Lost the Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Lewis, George N., and Theodore A. Postol. “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan.” Arms Control Today, May 2010. www.armscontrol.org. Libicki, Martin C. Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. ———. Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace. Santa Monica: RAND, 2012. ———. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica: RAND, 2009. Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. “The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 3–14. Lincy, Valerie, and Gary Milhollin. Iran’s Nuclear Timetable. Iran Watch, February 24, 2015. www.iranwatch.org. Loven, Jennifer. “Obama Outlines Sweeping Goal of Nuclear-Free World.” Associated Press, April 5, 2009. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 66, April 5–6, 2009, [email protected]. Lowther, Adam B., ed. Deterrence: Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Lowther, Adam B., and Stephen J. Cimbala, eds., Defending the Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization Still Matters. London: Routledge, 2017. Lubold, Gordon, and Julian E. Barnes. “U.S. Dismisses Putin’s Objection to European Missile Systems: Polish and Romanian Sites Designed to Protect Against the Threat from Iran.” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 87, May 16, 2016, [email protected]. MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. New York: Random, 2013. Maerli, Morten Bremer, Annette Schaper, and Frank Barnaby. “The Characteristics of Nuclear Terrorist Weapons.” In James J. F. Forest and Russell D. Howard, eds., Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, 2nd ed. New York: McGrawHill, 2013, pp. 209–222. Magee, Clifford S. “Awaiting Cyber 9/11.” Joint Force Quarterly no. 70 (Third Quarter 2013), pp. 76–82.

256

Bibliography

Main, Steven J. “‘You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders’: The Continuing Importance of Studying Soviet Military History—G.S. Isserson and Russia’s Current Geopolitical Stance.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January– March 2016), pp. 48–72. Manning, Robert A. Envisioning 2030: US Strategy for a Post-Western World. Report of the Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012. www.acus.org. Mastriano, Douglas, and Derek O’Malley. Project 1704: A U.S. Army War College Analysis of Russian Strategy in Eastern Europe: An Appropriate U.S. Response, and the Implications for U.S. Landpower. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, March 2015. www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil. Mathers, Jennifer. The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. Mazanec, Brian M. “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2015), pp. 78–98. McDermott, Roger N. “The Brain of the Russian Army: Futuristic Visions Tethered by the Past.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 4–35. ———. “Putin Signs New Military Doctrine: Core Elements Examined.” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 6, 2015. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 4, January 8, 2015, [email protected]. ———. The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges, and Policy Implications. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2011. ———. “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Reform and Nuclear Posture to 2020.” In Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, pp. 33–97. Medvedev, Dmitri. Speech at a panel discussion, Munich Security Conference. February 13, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 32, February 15, 2016, davidjohnson @starpower.net. Mehta, Aaron. “Former SecDef Perry: US on ‘Brink’ of New Nuclear Arms Race.” Defense News, December 3, 2015. www.defensenews.com. Miller, Franklin, George Robertson, and Kori Schake. Germany Opens Pandora’s Box. London: Centre for European Reform, February 2010. www.cer.org.uk. Miller, Robert A., Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow. “Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense.” Joint Force Quarterly no. 61 (Second Quarter 2011), pp. 18–23. Moore, Thomas C. “The Kremlin’s Dangerous Nuclear Gambit.” July 16, 2014. http://warontherocks.com. Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983. ———. Deterrence Now. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ———. “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today.” Contemporary Security Policy no. 1 (April 2012), pp. 85–107. Mueller, John. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Mueller, Karl P., et al. Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy. Santa Monica: RAND, 2006. Mullen, Jethro. “North Korea Says It Can Miniaturize Nuclear Weapons.” May 20, 2015. www.cnn.com. Myers, Steven Lee, and Eric Schmitt. “Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice.” New York Times, October 14, 2015. www.nytimes.com. Nakashima, Ellen. “U.S. Builds a Cyber ‘Plan X.’” Washington Post, May 31, 2012. http://global.factiva.com.

Bibliography

257

Nikolayev, Mikhail. “Hypersonics Will Punch Holes in American Missile Defense; Problem Is, the New Weapon Will Not Be Fielded Soon.” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 21, 2007. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, March 22, 2007, [email protected]. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement—Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO. Brussels, May 17, 2010. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011. Annual report to Congress. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2011. www.defense.gov. ———. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014. Annual report to Congress. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2014. www.defense.gov. Oliker, Olga. “No, Russia Isn’t Trying to Make Nuclear War Easier.” National Interest, May 23, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 93, May 24, 2016, davidjohnson @starpower.net. Oliker, Olga, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov. Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications. Santa Monica: RAND, 2009. O’Reilly, Patrick J. Ballistic Missile Defense Overview. Washington, DC: US Missile Defense Agency, March 26, 2012. www.mda.mil. ———. Unclassified statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, regarding fiscal year 2011 missile defense programs, US House of Representatives. Washington, DC, April 15, 2010. Page, Jeremy. “Deep Threat: China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance.” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2014. http:// online.wsj.com. Payne, Keith B. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996. ———. “Evaluating the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Deal.” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, April 8, 2010, davidjohnson @starpower.net. ———. The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001. ———. Responding to the Emerging Potential for War in Europe. Information Issue no. 406. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 2, 2016. www.nipp.org. ———. “Why US Nuclear Force Numbers Matter.” Strategic Studies Quarterly no. 2 (Summer 2016), pp. 14–24. Payne, Keith B., and James Schlesinger. Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, National Institute Press, 2013. Pearl, Jonathan. Forecasting Zero: U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, November 2011. Pellerin, Cheryl. “DARPA’s Plan X Gives Military Operators a Place to Wage Cyber War.” DOD News, Defense Media Activity, May 12, 2016. www.defense.gov. Perkovich, George. Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Broaden and Deepen the Debate. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2010. Perry, William J. “William J. Perry on Nuclear War and Terrorism.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 8, 2015. http://thebulletin.org. Perry, William J., and John P. Abazaid. Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future: The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, July, 2014. https://www.usip.org.

258

Bibliography

Petrov, Nikolai. “Russia’s Ruling Regime Must Modernize or Face Collapse.” Moscow Times, January 22, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 15, January 22, 2016, [email protected]. Pifer, Steven. “New START: Good News for U.S. Security.” Arms Control Today, May 2010. www.armscontrol.org. Podvig, Pavel. “New START Treaty in Numbers.” April 9, 2010. http://russianforces .org. ———. U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Missile Defense: Is It Really Possible? PONARS Policy Memo no. 316. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2003. www.csis.org. ———. “What to Do About Tactical Nuclear Weapons.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 25, 2010. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 43, March 3, 2010, [email protected]. Posen, Barry R. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014. “Putin Threatens Nuclear War over Ukraine.” Daily Beast, August 31, 2014. www .thedailybeast.com. Quester, George H. Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. ———. “War Termination and Nuclear Targeting Strategy.” In Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 285–305. Rhodes, Richard. The Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, and the Prospects for a World Without Nuclear Weapons. New York: Knopf, 2010. Rohrabacher, Dana. “Why Is America Restarting the Cold War with Russia? Washington’s Strategy Toward Moscow Is Outmoded and Misdirected.” National Interest, February 11, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 31, February 12, 2016, [email protected]. “Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2016 in 9 Key Points.” January 1, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 1, January 2, 2016, [email protected]. Sagan, Scott D. “More Will Be Worse.” In Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: Norton, 1995, pp. 47–91. ———. Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Samore, Gary. “Is the Iran Nuclear Deal Good for the U.S.?” Time, June 18, 2015. http://time.com. Sanger, David E. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.” New York Times, June 1, 2012. http://global.factiva.com. ———. “U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace.” New York Times, September 19, 2015. www.nytimes.com. Sanger, David E., and William J. Broad. “China Making Some Missiles More Powerful.” New York Times, May 16, 2015. www.nytimes.com. Sanger, David E., and Julie Hirschfield Davis. “Hacking Linked to China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers.” New York Times, June 4, 2015. www.nytimes.com. Sanger, David E., and Michael R. Gordon. “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Reached with World Powers.” New York Times, July 14, 2015. www.nytimes.com. SarDesai, D. R., and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds. Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Schell, Jonathan. “Nuclear Balance of Terror Must End.” April 8, 2010. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 69, April 8, 2010, [email protected]. ———. The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger. New York: Holt, 2007.

Bibliography

259

Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. ———. “A World Without Nuclear Weapons?” Daedalus no. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 124–129. Schneider, Mark B. The Nuclear Forces and Doctrines of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Prepared Testimony, US House of Representatives, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Washington, DC, October 14, 2011. ———. “The Russian Nuclear Weapons Buildup and the Future of the New START Treaty.” Information Series no. 414. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, October 27, 2016. www.nipp.org. ———. “Russia’s Growing Strategic Nuclear Forces and New START Treaty Compliance.” Information Series, Issue no. 407. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 21, 2016. www.nipp.org. ———. Russian Nuclear Modernization. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, June 20, 2012. www.nipp.org. ———. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities. Washington, DC, March 26, 2012. www.uscc.gov. Schulte, Paul. Is NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy a Relic of the Cold War? Policy Outlook. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2010. Scobell, Andrew. “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009.” In Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2010, pp. 99–133. ———. North Korea’s Strategic Intentions. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2005. Scobell, Andrew, and John M. Sanford. North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007. Shanker, Thom. “Former Commander of U.S. Nuclear Forces Calls for Large Cut in Warheads.” New York Times, May 15, 2012. www.nytimes.com. Shchedrov, Oleg. “Putin Still Opposed to U.S. Missile Shield.” Reuters, May 23, 2007. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 118, May 24, 2007, [email protected]. Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008. Siboni, Gabi, and Ofer Assaf. Guidelines for a National Cyber Strategy. Memorandum no. 153. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, March 2016. www.inss.org.il. Singer, P. W. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the TwentyFirst Century. New York: Penguin, 2009. Singer, P. W., and Allan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Slayton, Rebecca. Arguments That Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013. Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories.” In Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Essential Readings in World Politics, 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2008, pp. 4–11. Sokolski, Henry D., ed. Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008. ———, ed. Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000.

260

Bibliography

———, ed. Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and Strategic Studies Institute, June 2006. ———. Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2016. Sokolski, Henry, and Patrick Clawson, eds. Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, October 2005. Sokov, Nikolai. “Controlling Soviet/Russian Nuclear Weapons in Times of Instability.” In Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, eds., Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2013, pp. 87–143. ———. “The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle.” Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 5, 2010. http://cns.miis.edu. ———. “Nuclear Weapons in Russian National Security Strategy.” In Stephen J. Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, pp. 187–260. Spalding, Robert, III, and Adam Lowther. “The New MAD World: A Cold War Strategy for Cyberwar.” National Interest, June 22, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Sungwon, Baik. “Analyst: North Korea May Already Have Militarized Warhead.” VOA News, April 24, 2014. http://m.voanews.com. Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Thomas, Timothy L. Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows over Information Operations. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005. ———. Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and Technology Through Toughness. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011. ———. Russia: Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015. ———. “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies no. 1 (January–March 2014), pp. 101–130. ———. Three Faces of the Cyber Dragon: Cyber Peace Activist, Spook, Attacker. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2012. Thornton, Rod. Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2011. Tilghman, Andrew. “Russian Aggression a Top Concern in U.S. European Command’s New Military Strategy.” January 27, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 20, January 28, 2016, [email protected]. Tsypkin, Mikhail, and David Yost. Responding to Russian Noncompliance with Nuclear Arms Control Agreements. Draft for distribution. Monterey, CA: US Naval Postgraduate School, October 9, 2015. Turnbull, Wallace R., III. “Time to Come in from the Cold (War).” Joint Force Quarterly 79 (Fourth Quarter 2015), pp. 38–45. Ullrich, George W., James Scouras, and Michael Frankel. “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: The Neglected Stepchild of Nuclear Arms Control.” Air and Space Power Journal (July–August 2015), pp. 9–14. www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. The Effects of Nuclear War. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 1979.

Bibliography

261

US Department of Defense. Cyber Strategy. Washington, DC, April 2015. www.defense.gov. ———. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. Washington, DC, July 2011. www.defense.gov. Van Tol, Jan, with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas. AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010. www.csbaonline.org. Walt, Stephen M. “All the Nukes You Can Use.” May 24, 2010. http://walt .foreignpolicy.com. Waltz, Kenneth N. “More May Be Better.” In Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate. New York: Norton, 1995, pp. 1–45. Weitz, Richard. Russian-American Security Cooperation After St. Petersburg: Challenges and Opportunities. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007. White House. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World. Washington, DC, May 2011. www.whitehouse.gov. Wilkening, Dean A. “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness.” Science and Global Security no. 2 (1999), pp. 183–215. Williams, Phil. Crisis Management. New York: Wiley, 1976. Wolfsthal, Jon B., Jeffrey Lewis, and Marc Quint. The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear Modernization over the Next Thirty Years. Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014. http://cns.miis.edu. Woolf, Amy F. Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014. www.crs.gov. ———. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015. www.crs.gov. ———. Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2016. www.crs.gov. ———. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2015. Wortzel, Larry M. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007. Yannakogeorgos, Panayotis, and Adam B. Lowther. “Saving NATO with Airpower.” Royal Canadian Air Force Journal no. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 66–77. Yashin, Ilya, and Olga Shorina, eds. Putin.War: An Independent Expert Report. Based on Materials from Boris Nemtsov (Moscow, May 2015). www.putin-itogi.ru; translated into English by Catherine Fitzpatrick and available at http://4freerussia .org/putin.war. Yates, Mitchell. “How Putin Made Russia’s Military into a Modern, Lethal Fighting Force.” National Interest, February 25, 2016. In Johnson’s Russia List no. 39, February 25, 2016, [email protected]. Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds. North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2006.

Index

Ababil, Operation, 16(table) Able Archer, Operation (1983), 62–63, 152 abolition: arms limitation and, 125–126; conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117–119; defining, 107–109; desirability and feasibility of, 6–7; growing advocacy for, 107; impracticality of, 103(n4); intermediate-range nuclear missiles, 212–213; political priorities, 110–113; post-Cold War international complexity, 120–125. See also arms reduction accidental nuclear war or escalation, 154 actionable intelligence, 156 Aegis Ashore missile defense site, 170 aerial refueling, 197 air strikes: Cuban missile crisis, 59 Allison line of resistance, 132–133 al-Qaeda, 71, 80, 155, 157–158 alternative nuclear world scenarios: collapse of post-Soviet Russia, 221– 223; constrained-proliferation model, 45(fig.), 97–102, 100(fig.), 132–133; “folding” model of nonproliferation, 132–134, 137–140; geopolitical factors, 216–218; “holding” model of nonproliferation, 132– 137; international stability and nonproliferation, 131–132; minimum deterrence and, 93; post-abolition rearmament, 120–121; US and Russian forces at various levels of deployment, 31–33 American Presidential Succession Act, 75–76

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), 198–199 Arbatov, Alexei, 40, 226 Argentina: Falklands-Malvinas conflict, 201 arms control: cyber deterrence and nuclear deterrence, 21; defining abolition, 107–109; geopolitical factors, 211–216; incorporation of substrategic nuclear weapons, 164; minimum deterrence, 91–94; US missile defense forces, 8–9; US-Russian and NATO-Russian cooperation, 229– 230 arms race stability: cyber technology, 237–238 arms reduction: cyber and nuclear attack capabilities, 14–15; expanding to include China, 4; fiscal constraints on nuclear modernization, 29–31; future cooperative security agendas, 236; impracticality of abolition, 103(n4); modernization and, 3; stable deterrence, 5–6; US-Russia tensions over, 224; US-Russian negotiations within the national security strategy, 34–35. See also abolition arriving retaliatory weapons, 32(fig.)– 34(fig.); constrained-proliferation model, 100(fig.); “folding” model of proliferation, 138(fig.); “holding” model of proliferation, 135(fig.); measuring minimum deterrence, 98(fig.); outcomes of nuclear force exchanges, constrained-proliferation model, 46(fig.); US-Russian forces

263

264

Index

in the 1550 deployment limit, 183– 184(table) Asia: China’s assertive military modernization, 39–40; controlling and terminating nuclear war, 5; “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 132, 137–140; geographical challenges of proliferation in, 202–205; multilateral arms control forum, 45; nuclear risk management, 11; predicting the end of nuclear war, 69; shifting locus of nuclear danger, 236–237; US missile defense systems, 9. See also China assured destruction. See mutual assured destruction (MAD) asymmetry: approaches to deterrence, 120; Cold War bomber and missile forces, 198; denuclearization in Europe, 91–93; elimination of nuclear triad components, 29; geography and strategic control, 205– 211; preemption against terrorists, 154–155; rogue states and nonstate actors balancing with nuclear weapons, 217–218; US-RussiaChina engagement, 4 balance of power, 113–114 Balkan wars, 61 ballistic missile defense (BMD). See missile defense systems Baltic states: Russia’s aggression, 1–2 Barbarossa, Operation, 208, 228 Batyuk, Vladimir, 21 Belarus: post-Soviet nuclear powers, 78 Belgium: US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) Berlin, allied presence in, 118–119 Berzins, Janis, 230 Black Brant missile launch, 79 Blair, Bruce, 15, 55–56 bombers: budget constraints on US and Russian nuclear triad components, 29; geographical limits on technology, 196–197; “holding” model of proliferation, 136; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 97–99; New START provisions, 27–28

bounded rationality, 72 Bracken, Paul, 41, 74, 143–144 Brenner, Joel, 16–17 budget constraints: balancing defense budget cuts with national security interests, 36(n6); US defense cuts, 28–29 Bundy, McGeorge, 101 bunker-buster bombs, 60, 63, 155 Bush, George H.W., 119, 151 Bush (George W.) administration: command and control survivability, 209; global strike preparation, 63; missile defenses, 92; nationwide missile defense deployment, 172; Olympic Games program, 24(n21); preemptive action against terrorist networks, 111–112; preemptive attack on Iraq, 157–158; response to deterrence, 116–117; strike forces triad, 85 Butterworth, Robert, 30 C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance): Asian states’ modernization of, 237; geographical elements in cyber warfare, 192–193; “holding” model of proliferation, 137; incorporating nuclear weapons into, 14–15; information war and nuclear war, 64–65; network-centric warfare, 91; risk management, 11; Russian nuclear strategy, 226–228. See also command and control systems calibrated damage, 225–226 Carter, Ashton, 1, 224 cessation of hostilities: Syria, 2 Chase, Michael, 43 Chechnya: Putin’s opposition to terrorist and insurgent groups, 78 Chernobyl reactor crisis, 194 China: complexity of US-Russia-China engagement, 48–49; constrainedproliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45(fig.); cyber attacks, 16–17; deterrence and reassurance challenges, 43; escalation control, 42; expanding US-Russian arms reduction policy, 4; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–135;

Index military modernization, 39–44, 131; “no first use” policy, 153; planning for consequences of nuclear engagement, 44–45; retaliation as response to global-strike flyovers, 30; Russia’s nuclear strategy, 226; strategic implications of military modernization from the US-Russia perspective, 47–48; US missile defense systems, 9; US presence in Vietnam, 206–207; US-Chinese crisis management, 43–44 Churchill, Winston, 207 civil-military relations: attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); escalation of the crisis precipitating WWI, 141–142; minimum deterrence context, 89–95; nuclear crisis management and information war, 57–58; nuclear deterrence, 117 Clapper, James, 224 Clausewitz, Carl von, 54 Cold War: as “breathing space” for proliferation, 137; conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117–119; current US-Russian relations as new cold war, 224–225; deterrence function of nuclear weapons, 110; escalation control, 74; geographical aspects of missile defenses, 199–200; geographical aspects of nuclear war and escalation, 193–194, 209–211; impact of communications disruption, 58; “no first use” policy, 160– 161; nuclear arms control, 108–109; nuclear crisis management, 4–5; relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table); shaping nuclear policy and strategy, 3; Soviet response to NATO deployment of intermediaterange nuclear forces, 211–216 collateral damage of nuclear war, 117, 154–155, 171 command and control systems: attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); China’s expansion of, 41; consequences of the disintegration of post-Soviet Russia, 222–223; convergence of weapons

265

technology and strategies in future wars, 235–236; cyber attacks, 15; cyber capabilities with missile defense systems, 174; geographical aspects of command and control survivability, 207–211; geostrategic elements of bomber forces control, 197–198; managing nuclear operations, 114; nuclear crisis management and cyber war, 59; termination of nuclear war, 74–76; US military control of the “commons,” 205–211. See also C4ISR communications: attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); communications transparency in crisis management, 54– 57; controlling de-escalation, 62–63; Cuban missile crisis, 59; nuclear crisis management and information war, 57–60. See also cyber warfare compound escalation, 142–143 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 91 conflict management: management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 84–85. See also crisis management consequences of nuclear engagement, 44–45, 237 constrained-proliferation model, 45(fig.), 97–102, 100(fig.), 132–137 conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) mission, 29–30 conventional warfare and conventional weapons: asymmetrical response to US military superiority, 205–206; avoiding warhead ambiguity, 30; bunker-buster bombs, 60; conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117– 118; escalation of the crisis precipitating WWI, 140–142; geographical constraints in the war in Vietnam, 206–207; as nuclear deterrent, 130(n25); objective of information warfare, 64–65; Russian use of nuclear weapons, 225–226; Russia’s historical context of geostrategy, 191–192; US superiority, 161; USRussian cooperation over improving Russia’s conventional forces, 229

266

Index

cooperative security: Cold War legacy of, 186; common interests between the US and Russia, 239; future cooperative security agendas, 236; importance of US-Russia cooperation, 2–3; offensive and defensive operations, 182–183 counterforce war fighting, 20, 96(table) counterproliferation strategies, 217–218 coup attempt, Russian, 222–223 coupling, nuclear, 199–200 Crimea, Russian annexation of: impact on US-Russian security cooperation, 1, 4, 125–126; NATO deployments following, 8; nuclear aspect to Putin’s aggression, 10; Russia’s concerns over NATO enlargement, 204– 205; strategic value of, 226–227; threatening US-Russian long-range strategic planning, 27–28 crisis, nuclear. See nuclear crisis crisis avoidance mechanisms, 65 crisis instability: relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table) crisis management: China’s military modernization and, 42–43; China’s Second Artillery Force, 40–41; controlling de-escalation, 61–63; cyber war and nuclear war, 53–54; escalation of the crisis precipitating WWI, 141–142; exit strategy, 56; “holding” model of proliferation, 136; nuclear crisis management, 53–54; nuclear crisis management and information war, 57–60; pre-digital age and digital age crises, 4–5; requirements for, 54–57; scenarios and risks, 60–64; the shifting locus of nuclear danger, 236–237; time pressure reduction, 55–56; transparency in communications, 54–55; US-Chinese crisis management, 43–44; US-RussianChinese negotiations, 39. See also cyber warfare; nuclear crisis crisis stability, 136, 139 cruise missiles, 33–34, 173–174, 211– 212, 226, 245–246 Cuban missile crisis (1962): alternatives to air strikes, 59; face-saving exit, 56; first use and first strike, 158–

159; geographical aspects of nuclear war, 194; as “known unknown,” 157; nuclear crisis management, 114, 236–237; political gambling over deterrence, 116; potential for compound escalation, 142; rationality of diplomatic relations, 73; US assessment of Soviet intentions, 43 cultural differences: China’s military modernization, 40; crisis deterrence failure, 55; wars of identity, 123 cyber warfare: China’s military preparedness for, 41; comparative attributes of deterrence and, 18(table); computer network attacks, 2007–2013, 16(table); convergence of weapons technology and strategies in future wars, 235–236; cyber deterrence and nuclear deterrence, 13–17, 20–22; defining, 53; DoD cyber missions, 22(n1); geographical elements in, 192; “holding” model of proliferation, 137; military planning incorporating, 17–18; mixed nuclear and cyber attacks, 19–20; NATO preparations for defense of cyberspace, 223–224; nuclear crisis management, 4–5, 57– 60; Obama administration R&D efforts, 85; objectives in conventional and nuclear warfare, 19, 64–65; prerequisites for, 238; reducing exitstrategy options, 58–59; relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table); role of deterrence, 91; Russia’s preparation for future war scenarios, 227–228; shifting the locus of nuclear danger, 237; Stuxnet worm, 24(n21); time pressure, 58; use in missile defense technology, 174 cyber weapons: China’s military modernization and expansion, 40 Davis, Paul, 238 day-to-day alert, 46, 82, 99, 134, 136, 139–140, 178–179 de-escalation: inflicting “calibrated” damage, 153; NATO controlling, 61–64; Russian use of nuclear weapons for the purpose of, 10–11,

Index 225–226, 229; use of conventional weapons to facilitate, 62–63 Defense, US Department of, 18–19, 22(n1) “defensive last resort” policy, 162–163 delivery systems: attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); budgetary and logistical constraints of modernization, 29–31; constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45–46; diversity in, 32–33; New START criteria, 27–28. See also specific systems Denning, Dorothy, 17 deployed weapons: analysis of forces with antimissile defenses, 180–183; analysis of forces without antimissile defenses, 178–180; attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45; defining minimum deterrence, 95–97; guarantees of deterrence, 90–91; “holding” model of proliferation, 136–137; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 97–99; New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 28(table); New START treaty provisions, 81–82; perception of the opponent’s intention, 56–57; strategic and substrategic nuclear weapons, 151–152; US substrategic nuclear weapons in NATO member states, 162; US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) deterrence: abolition and, 120–121; attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); China’s nuclear crisis management preparations for regional conflict, 42–43; China’s Second Artillery Force, 40– 41, 154; China’s view of, 39; comparative attributes of cyber war and, 18(table); constraints on nuclear modernization, 30–31; conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117–119; conventional warfare as, 130(n25);

267

Cuban missile crisis, 116; cyber deterrence and nuclear deterrence, 20–22; cyber impact, 13; cyber technology and, 237–238; cyber warfare and, 13–17; deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, 159–160; desirability and logistics of proliferation, 7; first use as failure of, 149– 150; “folding” model of proliferation, 139; geographical aspects of nuclear war, 193–194; “holding” model of proliferation, 136; immediate deterrence failure concept, 54; importance of clear communications, 64–65; multi-dimensional nature and complexity of, 116–120; multiple functions of missile defense systems, 182–183; “no first use” policy, 160–161; nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployment, 8; nuclear arms control and, 108–109; principles of escalation control, 73– 76; as psychological deterrent, 171; relative performance of US and Russian nuclear force structures, 31–33; relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table); reliability and uncertainty of, 69–73; role of the ABM Treaty, 198–199; Russia’s military doctrine, 152–153; tactical weapons as, 149–164; US missile defense forces, 8–9. See also minimum deterrence; missile defense systems; nonproliferation disarmament: defining abolition, 107– 109. See also abolition domestic politics: constraining nuclear modernization, 28; devolution of command during nuclear crisis and war, 75–76; Russia under Putin, 221–222 Dvorkin, Vladimir, 183 dyads, nuclear-strategic: forces without defenses, 179; hypothetical New START scenarios, 82–84; measuring minimum deterrence, 97–99; New START compliance, 31–33; USRussian arms reductions, 29–32 Dyson, Freeman, 172 early warning systems: challenges to

268

Index

missile defense systems, 172; NATO cooperation with Russia over, 228– 229; time constraints and crisis management, 58–59 economic sanctions: against Iran, 71; Putin’s actions leading to, 221–222; Russia’s sanctions against Turkey, 65; US sanctions in Russia, 28, 170 economic status: constraining nuclear modernization, 28; Russia’s confidence in nuclear parity with the US, 170; Russia’s long-term nuclear strategy, 227–228; US-China economic relations, 48 effects-based operations, 91 Egypt: Israel’s preemptive strike, 111 electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, 17 escalation: accidental nuclear war or escalation, 154; China’s military modernization for escalation control, 42; China’s Second Artillery Force as control for, 40–41; complexity of USRussia-China engagement, 48–49; compound and inadvertent, 142–143; controlling de-escalation, 61–64; conventional to nuclear war, 61–63; deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, 159; deterrence and management of regional conflicts, 32–33; failure of nuclear first use capability as deterrent, 43; “folding” model of proliferation, 139; future cooperative security agendas, 236; geographical elements contributing to, 209–211; increasing political and military complexity of escalation control, 76–80; nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployment, 8; principles of escalation control, 73–76; Putin’s threat of, 149; time pressure causing, 55–56; velocity and consequences of irrational decisions, 140–141 escalation dominance, 143–144 espionage: cyber attacks, 15–17 Estonia: computer network attacks, 2007–2013, 16(table) Eurasianism, 40 Europe. See NATO; specific countries European Leadership Network (ELN), 65 European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), 8, 81, 170, 225

European Reassurance Initiative, 1 executive power: devolution of command during nuclear crisis and war, 75–76 exit strategy: cyber war reducing options, 58–59; face-saving exit from escalation, 56 face-saving exit from escalation, 56 financial institutions: computer network attacks, 2007–2013, 16(table) firebreaks, 199–200 first strike/first use: Able Archer, 152; attacker’s and defender’s priority target sets, 176(fig.); China’s “no first use” policy, 153; Cold War-era deterrence, 110; collateral damage stemming from, 154–155; controlling deescalation, 61–63; cruise missiles, 173; defining first strike and first use, 158–163; as failure of strategic nuclear deterrence, 149–150; first use and, 158–163; “folding” model of proliferation, 139; global political concerns over, 116; perceptions and expectations of deterrence, 31; Russia’s nuclear strategy for de-escalation through, 229; Soviet response to NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, 211–212; target choice, 155–156; vulnerability of small states, 76–77 Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), 91 flexible response strategy, 117 fog of crisis, 54 “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 132–134, 137–140 Forsyth, James Wood, Jr., 15 France: constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–135; purpose of nuclear program, 210–211 Freedman, Lawrence, 91, 109 future wars: convergence of weapons technology and strategies, 235–236; geographical aspects of, 193; Putin’s psychological strategy, 230; US preoccupation with, 215–216 gamesmanship, nuclear, 143 Gates, Robert, 92, 215

Index geography and geopolitics: adaptive, scenario-based planning, 215–216; affecting nuclear strategy, 9–10; anticipating future war scenarios, 215–216; asymmetrical response to US military superiority, 205–211; challenges of proliferation in Asia, 202–205; controlling and terminating nuclear war, 5; elements affecting geopolitics and geostrategy, 191– 198; firebreaks and nuclear coupling, 199–201; missile defense systems, 198–202; Russia’s concerns over US actions in the former Soviet Union, 213–214; shifting locus of nuclear danger, 236–237; US and NATO requiring Russian cooperation on arms control issues, 225 Georgia: computer network attacks, 2007–2013, 16(table); escalation of local conflicts, 61; Russia’s concerns over NATO enlargement, 204–205 Germany: allied presence in West Berlin, 118–119; escalation of the crisis precipitating WWI, 140–142; removal of US substrategic nuclear weapons in NATO member states, 162; US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) global strike missions: arms reductions under New START, 29–30; prompt global-strike weapons, 237; US plans for, 63 globalization: impact on politics of abolition and deterrence, 121–125 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 110, 212, 226; coup attempt against, 222–223; Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, 151; unacceptability of nuclear war with the US, 194 Gray, Colin, 19, 191 Group of Eight (G8) powers, 155 Gulf War (1991), 64–65, 173 hackers, 192–193. See also cyber warfare Hagel, Chuck, 225 Herd, Graeme, 228 H-hour, 55 high-fidelity communication, 55 Hirohito, 208 Hlatky, Stefanie von, 163–164

269

“holding” model of nonproliferation, 132–137 Hu Jintao administration, 40 humanitarian relief: Syria, 2 Hussein, Saddam, 111–112, 157 hybrid warfare, Russian threat of, 8, 223–224 hybrid weapons: ballistic-cruise missiles, 173–174; nuclear weapons and information warfare, 53 ICBM. See intercontinental ballistic missiles identity, wars of, 7, 123 immediate deterrence failure, 54 inadvertent escalation, 142–143 India: anticipating future war in, 215; constrained-proliferation model, 45, 132–133; geographical context of nuclear strategies, 9–10; multilateral arms control forum, 45 information systems, 14–15 information warfare. See cyber warfare information-electronic-infrastructure warfare, 235–236 infrastructure operations (I20s): purpose of, 19; vulnerability to nuclear strikes, 10 insurgency: as asymmetrical response to US military superiority, 205–206; Putin’s opposition to, 78 intelligence: cyber attacks, 17; preemption and prevention, 156–157 intention, perception of the opponent’s, 56–57, 156–158 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM): budget constraints on US and Russian nuclear triad components, 29–31; China’s military modernization, 39– 40; as destabilizing threat, 36(n7); fiscal constraints on modernization priorities, 29–31; geographical limits on technology, 195–196; “holding” model of proliferation, 136; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 97–99, 101; New START provisions, 28; New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 28(table); relative performance of US and Russian

270

Index

forces, 31–33; response to mixed nuclear and cyber attacks, 19 intermediate-range nuclear forces: arms control and geopolitics, 211–216; first use and first strike, 159–160; Pershing II missile, 159, 211–212, 219(n7); Russia’s INF violation, 226 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987): claims of Russian violation, 10, 33–34, 226; requirements of, 212–213, 219(n7); results of, 151 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 70 international systems theory, 122–124 Iran: domestic policymaking affecting nuclear intentions, 115–116; escalation dominance, 143–144; international nuclear agreement, 2; multilateral arms control forum, 45; nonproliferation failure, 132; as nuclear weapons state, 70; P5+1 negotiations, 131; power shifts following the onset of nuclear war, 80; the shifting locus of nuclear danger, 236–237; Stuxnet worm attack, 24(n21) Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 70–71 Iraq: Israel’s attack on Osirak nuclear reactor, 157; Russian concerns over US actions in former Soviet space, 213–214; US invasion, 111–113 Iskander missiles, 225 Isoroku, Yamamoto, 207–208 Israel: attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, 157; bombing Syria’s nuclear complex, 115; constrained-proliferation model, 45(fig.), 132–133; multilateral arms control forum, 45; preemptive strike on Egypt, 111; Stuxnet worm attack, 24(n21) Italy: US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) Japan: fate of WWII enemy military commanders, 207–208; geographical context of nuclear war, 194, 201– 203; North Korea’s nuclear program, 133; potential for going nuclear, 115 Johnson administration: geographical implications of the Vietnam conflict,

206–207; missile defense systems, 199 KAL flight 007, 152 Kazakhstan: post-Soviet nuclear powers, 78 Kennedy, John F. See Cuban missile crisis Kennedy administration: conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117. See also Cuban missile crisis Khrushchev, Nikita: allied presence in West Berlin, 118–119. See also Cuban missile crisis; Soviet Union Kim Jong-un, 115 Kofman, Michael, 235 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 214–215 Lai, David, 40 Lavrov, Sergei, 224 less-than-strategic nuclear weapons, 32–33 Libicki, Martin, 59–60 long-range strategic planning: balancing modernization and arms control, 27– 35; China’s grand modernization strategy, 40 loose nukes, 114 MacArthur, Douglas, 208 Magee, Clifford, 15 maneuverable warheads, 174 mass disruption, 19–20 Mazanec, Brian, 15 McNamara, Robert, 117, 199 Medvedev, Dmitri, 224–225 Middle East: “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 137–140; shifting locus of nuclear danger, 236– 237. See also individual countries military: tactical situation in nuclear war, 74–76; US military assistance to Russia, 77–78. See also civil-military relations military doctrine, Russia’s, 152–153 military-industrial complex, 17 minimum deterrence: attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); defining, 95–97; historical context, 103(n3); levels of, 5–6; measuring, 97–102; political and military context, 89–95 MIRV (multiple, independently tar-

Index getable reentry vehicles): China’s military modernization, 39–40; geostrategic elements of command and control, 197–198 Missile Defense Agency, US, 172 missile defense systems: analysis of forces with antimissile defenses, 180–183; analysis of forces without antimissile defenses, 178–180; contention between the US and Russia, 169–170; controlling de-escalation, 63–64; European deployment, 92; European Phased Adaptive Approach, 8, 170, 225; failure to equal offensive systems, 172; geographical limits on intelligence gathering, 195; geostrategic elements, 198–202; multiple functions of, 182– 183; neutralizing minimum deterrence forces, 6; New START provisions for future US deployment, 225; New START provisions for US and NATO, 81–85; offense-defense interactions, 35; as offensive, first-strike weapons, 177–178; Phased Adaptive Approach, 104(n9); political conditions dictating first use and retaliation, 175–178; political context, 170– 171; reevaluating the geostrategic map of Asia, 203; Russia’s concerns over deterrence, 8–9; Russia’s plans to develop and emphasize, 174–175; strategic planning for future scenarios, 217–218; technology environment, 171–175. See also C4ISR; command and control systems modeling: cyber attacks, 19; nuclear war termination scenarios, 80–85 modernization: arms reduction scenarios, 33–34; Asian states’ modernization of C4ISR systems, 237; China’s military modernization, 39–44, 131; relative performances of US and Russian strategic nuclear force elements, 31–33; the shifting locus of nuclear danger, 237; strategic implications of China’s military modernization from the US-Russia perspective, 47–48; US and Russian legacy triads, 29–31 Mongol invasion, 192, 206

271

Mueller, John, 131 Munich security conference, 224–225 mutual assured destruction (MAD): ABM Treaty addressing US-Soviet vulnerability, 198–199; attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); defining minimum deterrence, 95; relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table); US-Russian offense-defense interactions, 180– 181, 198–199 nationalism, geographical elements of, 201 NATO: command survivability preparations, 209–211; controlling de-escalation, 61–64; conventional and nuclear deterrence, 117–118; deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, 159–160; ELN research on conflicts, 65; firebreaks and nuclear coupling, 199–200; first use and first strike, 158–159; geostrategic mapping in Asia, 203– 204; minimum deterrence concept, 91–92; New START missile defense provisions for US and NATO, 81– 85; “no first use” policy, 160–161; nonstrategic nuclear weapons deployment, 7–8; Putin’s aggression Ukraine and Crimea, 10; role of geography in warfare, 194; Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine, 1–2; Russia’s concerns over security, 92; Russia’s strategic history, 227–229; Soviet response to intermediaterange nuclear forces deployment, 211–216; tactical nuclear weapons, 149–150; Warsaw Summit, 223–224 navy, Russian, 226 negotiated agreements: after the onset of nuclear war, 77; China’s inclusion in, 44–45; Cold War-era negotiations, 34; difficulty of negotiating with North Korea, 115; Iran, 2 Netherlands: US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) New START agreement: aggregate numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 28(table); analysis of forces without

272

Index

antimissile defenses, 178–180; arms reduction and nuclear modernization criteria, 27–28; initial optimism and subsequent stagnation, 2; leeway in future missile defenses deployment, 225; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; minimum deterrence, 91–92, 97–99; missile defense provision, 170–171; mixed nuclear and cyber attacks, 19; nuclear limitation agenda under Obama, 124; Obama’s resetting of US-Russian relations, 227; replacing nuclear warheads with conventional weapons, 30; Russia’s concerns over US escalation, 63; status in USRussian security cooperation, 125– 126; US missile defense provisions, 9; US-Russian forces in the 1550 deployment limit, 183–184(table); US-Russian negotiations within the national security strategy, 34–35 new terrorism, 110 “next war-itis,” 215 Nicholas II of Russia, 141 Nixon administration: antimissile defenses, 199 “no first use” policy, 153, 160–161 nonproliferation. See proliferation Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 122 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 7–8 North Korea: alternative nuclear world scenarios, 93; China’s nuclear crisis management preparations, 42; concerns over nuclear intentions, 115; geographical challenges of proliferation in Asia, 202–205; geographical elements in defense, 201–202; multilateral arms control forum, 45; nonproliferation failure, 132; as nuclear weapons state, 70; power shifts following the onset of nuclear war, 79– 80; proliferation-constrained international system, 132–133; technological achievements, 131 nuclear abolition. See abolition nuclear arms control. See arms control nuclear coupling, 199–200 nuclear crisis management. See crisis management nuclear crisis/nuclear war: accidental

nuclear war or escalation, 154; controlling and terminating, 5; convergence of weapons technology and strategies in future wars, 235–236; cyber technology, 237–238; defining crisis, 54; from diplomatic snafus, 79; future cooperative security agendas, 236; geographical aspects of, 193; geographical aspects of command and control survivability, 208– 210; management of forces scenario, 83–85; minimum deterrence policy, 89–94; mixed nuclear and cyber attacks, 19–20; modeling termination scenarios, 80–85; nuclear crisis management, 4–5; nuclear gamesmanship, 143; nuclear weapons as cause of, 113–116; predicting the endpoint, 69; principles of escalation control, 73–76; proximate causes and outcomes, 60; reliability of deterrence policy, 69–73; “small” nuclear wars, 60, 94, 117, 123, 218, 237. See also crisis management nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, 17 nuclear establishment. See nuclear states; P5 states nuclear states: controlling proliferation among rogue states and actors, 70– 72; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–137; importance in US-Russian arms reduction negotiations, 35; increasing numbers threatening peace, 70; modeling nuclear war termination scenarios, 80–85; multilateral forum for strategic nuclear arms control, 45; post-Soviet nuclear powers, 78; slower than predicted growth of, 121, 131. See also P5 states nuclear weapons: as cause of war, 113– 116; role of deterrence, 90 Nunn-Lugar agreement, 21 Obama administration: global strike preparation, 63; improving missile defenses and conventional weapons, 85; increase in defense spending in Europe, 224; minimum deterrence policy, 89; missile defenses, 92;

Index nuclear limitation agenda, 124; Olympic Games program, 24(n21); resetting US-Russian relations, 204, 227; Russia’s aggression in the Ukraine, 1–2; supporting nuclear abolition, 107 Olympic Games program, 24(n21) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 214 organizational learning, 7–8 P5 states: controlling and monitoring new nuclear states, 70–71; diplomatic engagement with Iran, 70; disarmament and nuclear arms control, 108; multilateral forum for strategic nuclear arms control, 45; nuclear crisis management within the changing political environment, 60–61; post-abolition rearmament potential, 121; tiered nuclear regime, 99–100 Pakistan: anticipating future war in, 215; appeal of nuclear deterrence and defense, 121; constrained-proliferation model, 45, 132–133; geographical context of nuclear strategies, 9–10; multilateral arms control forum, 45; nuclear states’ concerns over “loose nukes,” 116–117; power shifts following the onset of nuclear war, 79–80 parity, nuclear-strategic: China, Russia, and the US, 41 Payne, Keith, 55 Pearl, Jonathan, 108 Pearl Harbor, attack on, 207–208 People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF; China), 40–41, 154 Perkovich, George, 161 permanent members of the UN Security Council. See P5 states Perry, William J., 36(n7) Pershing II ballistic missiles, 159, 211– 212, 219(n7) Petraeus, David, 112–113 Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), 104(n9) policymaking process: prolonging or ending a nuclear war, 79–80 political sphere: “folding” model of pro-

273

liferation, 139–140; importance in US-Russian arms reduction negotiations, 35; minimum deterrence concept, 89; missile defense, 170–171; nuclear abolition, 110–113; nuclear crisis management within the changing political environment, 60–61; political conditions dictating first use and retaliation, 175–178; power vacuums following the disintegration of post-Soviet Russia, 222–223; principles of escalation control, 73– 76. See also civil-military relations; geography and geopolitics political will: future cooperative security agendas, 236 Pope, Billy, 15 power, distribution of: China’s military modernization altering, 40; “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 133–134; following the onset of nuclear war, 79–80; post-Cold War asymmetry informing security policy, 92–93; power vacuums following the disintegration of post-Soviet Russia, 222–223 Powers, Francis Gary, 195 predicting outcomes, 235–236 preemption: in the case of a Soviet attack, 8; collateral damage stemming from, 154–155; cyber capabilities with missile defense systems, 174; prevention and, 156–158; role of terrorism in applying, 111; second-strike capability based deterrence, 76–77; tactical nuclear weapons, 154 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), 151 prevention, 111; preemption and, 156– 158 proliferation: alternative nuclear world scenarios, 93–95; constrained-proliferation model, 100(fig.), 132–133; controlling rogue states and actors, 70–72; desirability and logistics of, 7; escalation velocity and consequences, 140–141; “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 133–134, 137–140; geographical challenges of proliferation in Asia, 202–205; turn-

274

Index

ing points in planning controls, 132– 134 prompt global-strike weapons, 237 Putin, Vladimir: Crimea annexation as long-term strategy component, 226– 227; domestic and foreign policy pursuits, 221–222; expediting the departure of, 221–222; hampering US-Russian missile defense negotiations, 81, 145; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 213; on missile defenses, 183; nuclear escalation threat, 149; objections to US missile defense systems, 170; the outcome of post-Soviet Russia, 222– 223; resisting Russian dismemberment, 78; Russia’s nuclear strategy, 225–226; Ukraine operation as security threat, 1–2; undermining New START “reset,” 125–126. See also Crimea, Russian annexation; Russia; Ukraine, destabilization of quadrad of weapons, 85 qualitative arms race, 175 Quester, George, 60 rationality: nuclear targeting, 175–178; nuclear war, 73; response to rational deterrence, 71–73, 89–91 Reagan, Ronald, 92, 110, 152, 212, 226 regional conflicts: China’s nuclear crisis management preparations, 42–43; escalation dominance, 143–144; missile defenses against first-strike threat, 173; Russia’s military doctrine, 152–153. See also India; Pakistan regional powers: appeal of nuclear deterrence and defense, 121–122 regulation: aspects of nuclear abolition, 6–7 retaliation: ABM Treaty addressing USSoviet vulnerability, 198–199; attacker’s and defender’s priority target sets, 176(fig.); China’s assured retaliation strategy, 41; in cyber warfare, 193; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 98(fig.), 99–102;

nuclear crisis management, 60; outcomes of nuclear force exchanges, 46(fig.); preemption and prevention scenarios, 157; as response to global-strike flyovers, 30; termination of nuclear war, 74–76; US-Russian forces in the 1550 deployment limit, 183–184(table). See also crisis management; second strike riding out the attack, 46, 82, 99, 101, 134, 136–140, 178–179 risk management: growing significance of, 11; “holding” model of proliferation, 137; nuclear crisis management, 60–64 rogue states: containing proliferation among, 70–72; “folding” model of proliferation, 139–140; multiple functions of missile defense systems, 182–183; nuclear states’ concerns over “loose nukes,” 116–117; strategic planning for future scenarios, 217–218; tactical nuclear weapon use, 155; US missile defense forces, 8–9. See also North Korea Roosevelt, Franklin D., 207 Russia: analysis of forces with antimissile defenses, 180–183; analysis of forces without antimissile defenses, 178–180; arriving retaliatory weapons by type of force structure, 32(fig.); complexity of US-RussiaChina engagement, 48–49; concerns over NATO expansion, 203–204; constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45(fig.); dependence on nuclear weapons, 77–78; escalation from conventional to nuclear war, 61–63; escalation of local conflicts, 61; escalation of the crisis precipitating WWI, 140–142; first use agenda, 155–156; fiscal constraints on nuclear modernization, 29–31; historical context of geostrategy, 191– 192; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–135; limitation and reductions regime, 125; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 98(fig.), 99–

Index 102, 100(fig.); military doctrine, 152–153; minimum deterrence concept, 91–92; New START missile defense provisions for US and NATO, 81–85; nuclear preemption agenda, 155; nuclear strategy, 225– 226; post–Cold War nuclear threat, 110; strategic history, 226–230; strategic implications of China’s military modernization from the USRussia perspective, 47–48; substrategic nuclear weapons, 150–154; Turkish shootdown of Russian aircraft, 65; US and NATO preparations for post-Soviet collapse, 223– 225; US missile defense forces, 8–9; US-Russian forces in the 1550 deployment limit, 183–184(table); US-Russian negotiations within the national security strategy, 34. See also New START agreement; Soviet Union Russian Aerospace Forces, 174–175 Safeguard (Sentinel ABM system), 199 safeguards: nuclear states’ concerns over “loose nukes,” 116–117 Sagan, Scott, 94–95 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreements, 198–199, 212– 213 Saudi Arabia: computer network attacks, 2007–2013, 16(table) Schell, Jonathan, 122–123 Schelling, Thomas, 108 Second Artillery Corp (China), 154 second strike: deterrence based on, 76– 77; “folding” model of nonproliferation failure, 137–139; measuring minimum deterrence, 99–102; outcomes of nuclear force exchanges, 46(fig.); perceptions and expectations of deterrence, 31; preemption and prevention scenarios, 157; relative performance of US and Russian nuclear force structures, 31–33; US missile defense as nullification of Russia’s, 8–9. See also retaliation security policy: Cold War shaping, 3; cyber impact, 13; future cooperative security agendas, 236; internal secu-

275

rity as the vanguard in war on terror, 112; minimum deterrence requirements, 89–90; practical issues of nuclear weapons spread, 131–132; Putin’s increased spending, 2 Sentinel ABM system, 199 Shoigu, Sergei, 174–175 signaling, 54–55 SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan), 58, 96(table) SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile): alternative force structures, 179; first-strike scenarios under New START limits, 82; fiscal constraints on modernization priorities, 29–31; geographical limits on technology, 195–196; management of forces scenario in the event of nuclear war, 83–85; measuring minimum deterrence, 97–99; New START scenarios, 184(table); New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 28, 28(table); relative performance of US and Russian forces, 31–33; response to mixed nuclear and cyber attacks, 19 SLCMs (sea-launched cruise missiles), 85, 101, 136 “small” nuclear wars, 60, 94, 117, 123, 218, 237 soft power. See cyber warfare South China Sea, 40 sovereignty: impact on politics of abolition and deterrence, 123–124 Soviet Union: deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, 159–160; nuclear war scenarios, 60; response to NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces, 211–216. See also Cold War; Cuban missile crisis; Russia space reconnaissance satellites, 195 space-based missile defense systems, 152, 172, 174–175, 177, 201 SSBN (ballistic missile submarines): budget constraints on US and Russian nuclear triad components, 29; fiscal constraints on modernization priorities, 29–31 Stalin, Joseph, 208

276

Index

“Star Wars,” 152. See also missile defense systems START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) negotiations, 212–213 state behavior: nuclear crisis management, 53–54; Russia’s history of defense against invasion, 192; terrorist group organization, 111 stealth forces: China’s military modernization, 41 Stoltenberg, Jens, 224–225 strategic information warfare: conventional war and nuclear deterrence, 21; cyber war analysis, 53; “folding” model of proliferation, 138(fig.). See also cyber warfare; missile defense systems strategic nuclear arms control, 3, 39. See also arms control strategic nuclear force structures: relative performance of US and Russian forces, 31–33 strategic planning: adaptive, scenariobased planning, 215–216; attributes of generic nuclear deterrence strategies, 96(table); China’s diplomatic tenor, 40; China’s emphasis on agility over force, 41–42; DoD cyber missions, 22(n1); incorporating cyber warfare capabilities, 15–18; New START treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive weapons, 28(table) strategic stability: relevance of Cold War concepts of nuclear strategy for cyber war, 238(table) strategic weapons: constrained-proliferation model, 100(fig.); “holding” model of proliferation, 135(fig.); measuring minimum deterrence, 98(fig.). See also specific weapons and systems Stuxnet worm, 16(table), 24(n21) substrategic weapons. See tactical nuclear weapons Sudan: preemptive nuclear attack on pharmaceutical attack, 155 surviving weapons: measuring minimum deterrence, 99–102 Sushentsov, Andrey, 235 Suvorov, Alexander, 214–215

SWIFT financial base, 71 Syria: computer network attacks, 2007– 2013, 16(table); threatening USRussian long-range strategic planning, 27–28; US-Russian agreement, 2 system, crisis as, 53–54 tactical nuclear weapons: defining, 150– 151; escalation from conventional to nuclear war, 61–63; European deployment, 7–8; first use and first strike, 158–163; possibility of preemption, 154; preemption and prevention, 156–158; Russia’s nuclear strategy, 225–226; US deployment in NATO countries, 149–150 targets: attacker’s and defender’s priority target sets, 176(fig.); role of geography in determining, 194; US military-industrial complex, 17 territorial conflict: China’s military expansion into the South China Sea, 40; Falklands-Malvinas conflict, 201 terrorism: alternative nuclear world scenarios, 93; appeal of nuclear deterrence and defense, 121–122; as asymmetrical response to US military superiority, 205–206; collateral damage stemming from counterterrorist first use, 154–155; compound escalation scenarios, 142; controlling nuclear weapons proliferation among, 71–72; counterterrorism and geostrategy, 216; as motivation for nuclear abolition, 110–111; as nuclear threat, 132; Putin’s opposition to terrorist and insurgent groups, 78 testing: Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 33–34 threats and threat assessment: characterizing a crisis, 54; role of deterrence, 90; Russia as threat to US security, 224; US-Russian and NATORussian cooperation, 229–230 tiered nuclear regime, 99–100, 133 time pressure reduction, 55–56, 58 tragedy of the commons, nuclear policies and, 124 transparency: avoiding warhead ambiguity, 30; China’s view on nuclear

Index transparency, 39, 44–45, 48–49; communications transparency in crisis management, 54–57 triads, nuclear strategic, 184–185(table); balanced triad under New START, 243; forces without defenses scenario, 178–179; geostrategic deployment, 196–197; hypothetical New START scenarios, 82–85, 97–99; minimum deterrence, 97–99; New START compliance, 31–33; New START prompt response forces, 19; New START provisions, 27–29; USRussian arms reductions, 29–31 Truman administration, 76 Turkey: shootdown of Russian aircraft, 65; US theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table) Type I undetected attack error, 55–56 Type II falsely detected attack error, 55–56 Ukraine, destabilization of: impact on US-Russian security cooperation, 1, 4, 125–126; NATO deployments following, 8; nuclear aspect to Putin’s aggression, 10; post-Soviet nuclear powers, 78; Russia’s concerns over NATO enlargement, 204–205; strategic value of, 229–230; threatening US-Russian long-range strategic planning, 27–28 unacceptable damage criterion, 19–20, 83–84, 96(table), 134, 199, 237 United Kingdom: constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45(fig.); FalklandsMalvinas conflict, 201; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–135 United Nations: pressing for Iran’s compliance, 70–71 United States: analysis of forces with antimissile defenses, 180–183; analysis of forces without antimissile defenses, 178–180; Cold War arms control policy, 108–109; complexity of US-Russia-China engagement, 48–49; constrained-proliferation model, operationally deployed warheads, 45(fig.); geographical aspects of nuclear war, 193; “holding” model of proliferation, 134–137; Iraq inva-

277

sion, 111–113; limitation and reductions regime, 125; measuring minimum deterrence, 98(fig.), 99–102, 100(fig.); military assistance to Russia, 77–78; New START missile defense provisions for US and NATO, 81–85; North Korea’s nuclear intentions, 115; power shifts following the onset of nuclear war, 80; practical issues of nuclear weapons spread, 131–132; strategic implications of China’s military modernization from the US-Russia perspective, 47–48; theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 2016, 151(table); USRussian forces in the 1550 deployment limit, 183–184(table). See also New START agreement unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 127 Valdai International Discussion Club (Moscow), 235 Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (NATO), 223–224 Vietnam, US presence in, 206–207 virus (cyber weapon), 57, 66(n13) viruses and worms (cyber weapons), 16(table), 24(n21), 57, 66(n13) Waltz, Kenneth, 94 warhead ambiguity, 30 Warsaw Summit (NATO), 223–224 World War I: escalation of the crisis precipitating, 140–142; as politically unthinkable conflict, 61; time pressure causing escalation, 55 World War II: as deterrent for nuclear war, 109; fate of enemy military commanders, 208; geographical influence on warfare, 192, 194–195; postwar allied presence in West Berlin, 118–119; Russia’s strategic history, 228 worms and viruses (cyber weapons), 16(table), 24(n21), 57, 66(n13) Wortzel, Larry, 153–154 Xi Jinping, 40 Yeltsin, Boris, 151

About the Book

Does it make sense for the United States to cooperate with Russia to resolve international security issues? Is it possible for the two countries to work together to reduce the dangers associated with nuclear weapons? Where does Vladimir Putin fit into the calculus? Engaging the debate on these contentious issues, Stephen Cimbala provides context for and policyrelevant analysis of current US-Russian nuclear relations. Stephen J. Cimbala is distinguished professor of political science at Penn State University Brandywine.

278