Cornerstones of Security : Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era 9780295801414, 9780295982960

Citation preview

Cornerstones of Security 

ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

IN THE

NUCLEAR ERA

Cornerstones of Security 

ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

IN THE

NUCLEAR ERA

Thomas Graham, Jr. and Damien J. LaVera University of Washington Press Seattle and London in association with Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. Washington, D.C.

To our families and to the dedicated men and women who constructed over many decades these cornerstones of security that protect us all.

Copyright © 2002 by Thomas Graham, Jr. and Damien J. LaVera Printed in the United States of America Design and composition by Watershed Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. University of Washington Press PO Box 50096 Seattle,Washington 98145 www.washington.edu/uwpress Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C. 20006 www.nti.org The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Science–Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Table of Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. The 1925 Geneva Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2. The Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Antarctic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3. The “Hot Line” Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-USSR Direct Communications Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.-USSR Direct Communications Link . . . . 26

4. The Limited Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

5. The Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies . . . . . . 35

6. Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Background on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Treaty of Tlatelolco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Summary and Analysis—Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Additional Protocol I to The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Treaty of Rarotonga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Summary and Analysis—South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

VI

 Contents

South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Protocol 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Protocol 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Protocol 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Treaty of Bangkok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Summary and Analysis—Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Treaty of Bangkok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Protocol to the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Treaty of Pelindaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Summary and Analysis—African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Protocol I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Protocol II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Protocol III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Mongolian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Summary and Analysis—Mongolian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Law of Mongolia on Its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status Adopted on 3 February 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Resolution 19 of the State Great Hural of Mongolia on Measures to be Taken in Connection with the Adoption of the Law on Its Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status, Adopted on 3 February 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Proposals for Additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Northeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Central and Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

7. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Documents from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Resolution on the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Final Document Issued by 2000 NPT Review Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between .......... and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards . . . . . . . 158

8. Special Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreements . . . . 191 The U.S.Voluntary Safeguard Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States . . 194 Protocol to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 EURATOM Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Contents  vii

Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Safeguards Agreement of 1991 . . . . . 254 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

9. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

10. The “Accidents Measures” Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . 290

11. The Biological Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction . . . 296

12. The Incidents at Sea Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas Signed May 25, 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304

VIII

 Contents

13. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 The 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309 Interpretation Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 Legal Debate on the ABM Treaty Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . 316 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission . . . . . . . . 320 Standing Consultative Commission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components . . . . . . . . . .323 Procedures Governing Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Protocol to the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements Regarding the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 SALT II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

Contents  ix

Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370 Soviet Backfire Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

14. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests . . . . . . . . . 374 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

15. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes . . . . . . . 436 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

16. The Environmental Modification Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465

17. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471

18. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481 Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments (Protocol I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485 Protocol on Prohibitions on Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489 Documents of the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol IV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502

19. Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504

X

 Contents

Protocol I to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505 Protocol II to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506

20. The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement . . . . . . 509 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510

21. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . 512 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles . . . . . . . . 573 Corrigenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 586 Agreed Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 Note of the Government of the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588 Note of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589 Exchange of Notes at Moscow May 28, 1988 Identifying and Confirming Which Documents, in Addition to the Treaty, Have the Same Force and Effect as theTreaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590

22. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty . . . . . . . . . 592 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598 Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment . . . . . . . . 615 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft . . . . 627 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 630 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 641 Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643 Protocol on Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654 Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 677

Cornerstones of Security  xi

Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678 Associated Statements and Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 679 Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693 Protocol on Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696 Protocol on Combat Helicopters MI-24K and MI-24R not Subject to Limitations on Attack Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696 Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment in Categories Limited by the Treaty and Located in Coastal Defense Forces, Naval Infantry, and Strategic Rocket Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 697 Joint Declaration of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Armenian Republic, the Republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Georgian Republic, in Connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698 Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698 Provisional Application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 704 Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 13 November 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705 Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . 705 Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708 Protocol on National Personnel Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709 Protocol on Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709 Protocol on Reduction Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 710 Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty Designated for Conversion for Non-military Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711 Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty Awaiting Export . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711 Protocol on Active and Passive Declared Site Inspection Quotas for the First Phase of the Reduction Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 712 Protocol on the Scale Distribution for the Common Expenses Associated with the Operation of the Joint Consultative Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713 Joint Extraordinary Conference Relating to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713 Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 714 Document of the Participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 718 Memorandum of Understanding,Vienna, 30 August 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 19 November 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 741 Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE.DOC/1/99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747

XII

 Cornerstones of Security

23. The Open Skies Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 822 Treaty on Open Skies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823

24. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II) . . . . . 883 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889 Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 932 Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1050 Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1060 Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-Weight Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . 1084 Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1086 Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1099 Relevant Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104 Related Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1105 Letters Signed by the U.S. and Soviet Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1110 Correspondences Related to the Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1129 Joint Statements Exchanged at the Final Plenary on July 29, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135 Other Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1137 Declarations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1143 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Start II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1147 Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1153 Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . 1157 Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1159

Cornerstones of Security  xiii

Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 Joint Agreed Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Primakov Letter on Early Deactivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1166 Albright Letter on Early Deactivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1167

25. The Chemical Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1168 The Chemical Weapons Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170

26. The Agreed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1268 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1270

27. Confidence and Security Measures Documents . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1272 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe . . 1273 Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and SecurityBuilding Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1286 Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1306 Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1340

28. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1375 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1375 The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1380 Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1404 CTBT Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly . . . . . . . . . 1432 Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization Adopted by the States Signatories . . . . . 1432

29. The Ottawa Convention on Landmines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1441 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1441 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1443

30. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1453 Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1453 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1454 Joint Declaration New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1455

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1460 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1466

Abbreviations and Acronyms ABACC Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of nuclear materials ABM antiballistic missile ACDA Arms Control Disarmament Agency, U.S. AFCONE African Commission on Nuclear Energy AHG Ad Hoc Group AID Agency for International Development, U.S. ALCMs air launched cruise missiles ANF Atlantic nuclear force ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BWC Biological Weapons Convention CCCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CCD Conference of the Committee on Disarmament CD Conference on Disarmament CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CSBM confidence- and security-building measure CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DOD Department of Defense, U.S. DOE Department of Energy, U.S. DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea EEZ exclusive economic zone EIF entry into force ENDC Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee EURATOM European Atomic Energy Agency Community FRG Federal Republic of Germany GDR German Democratic Republic GLCM ground-launched cruise missile IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IGY International Geophysical Year INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

JCG Joint Consultative Group JCIC Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission KEDO Korean Energy Development Organization LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MIRV multiple independently targettable reentry vehicles MLF multilateral nuclear force MOU memorandum of understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIS newly independent states NMD national missile defense NNWS non-nuclear weapon states NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NRRC Nuclear Risk Reduction Center NST Nuclear and Space Arms Talks NWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zones NWS nuclear weapon states OAU Organization of African Unity OPANAL Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PNE peaceful nuclear explosions PNET Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty POET Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments (CFE Treaty) PRC People’s Republic of China SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM surface-to-air missile SCC Standing Consultative Commission SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START Strategic Arms Reductions Talks SVC Special Verification Commission TLE treaty limited equipment TNF theater nuclear forces TTBT Threshold Test Ban Treaty USIA United States Information Agency ZOPAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

Preface n some respects, Cornerstones of Security is a project many years in the making.The inspiration and model for this book is a critically important product issued by the now-defunct Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) beginning in the 1970s. That book, entitled Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, compiled the texts of arms control and disarmament treaties in which the United States participated and narrative histories and summaries of those agreements.While the narratives were often and understandably written from a U.S. perspective, the book nevertheless became a resource valued and in demand around the world. Indeed, when U.S. diplomats participated in negotiations with their Soviet and other counterparts, it was not uncommon to see foreign diplomats referring to their own copies of the book. In the early 1990s, ACDA set out to update and re-release it. Unfortunately, that effort was sidetracked by disagreement in the interagency process about the characterization of the ABM Treaty. Those disagreements were never resolved, and the 1990 version of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements effectively would be the last. (There was a 1996 version, which updated the narrative but not the treaty texts.) The absence of updated versions of ACDA’s arms control treaty book left an ever-growing void in up-to-date arms control resource materials. In addition to serving as a valuable reference tool for diplomats, researchers, and legal scholars, the book had always—perhaps accidentally—told a compelling story of how the superpowers, and indeed the international community, put aside political divisions and set out to build a system to guard against the gravest dangers mankind has ever faced.As that story has continued to develop,ACDA has not been there to tell it. In the years since the last edition was printed, the world has seen the arrival of long-awaited and important agreements reducing strategic nuclear arsenals, banning nuclear testing, prohibiting the possession and use of chemical weapons, and banning antipersonnel landmines.The purpose of Cornerstones of Security is to fill the void left by the cessation of the publication of this important book—in other words, to update and expand upon its story. To accomplish this, we set out to parallel the ACDA treaty book as closely as possible.We started with the texts and summaries included therein, updated them, added agreements that the ACDA book left out, and included the ones negotiated afterward. As such, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the hard work done by the countless and mostly anonymous members of the ACDA staff who assembled the ACDA book over the years. To them we owe an enormous debt of gratitude. We are similarly indebted to Michael Duckworth, Marilyn Trueblood, and everyone else at the University of Washington Press. Their support of this project and their many contributions to our efforts cannot be understated. Nor can the contribution of Andrea Jarvela, whose skilled and thorough copyediting work is the sole reason the summaries are readable and consistent throughout. Her colleague at Watershed Books, Constance Bollen, carried the great burden of type-setting and designing the book—no small feat indeed! We reserve special thanks as well for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which supported this project as part of its work to increase public awareness of these global issues, especially Brooke Anderson and Jennifer Wethey. So, too, do our colleagues at the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) deserve credit. Many members of the board were leaders of the negotiations that produced many of

I

XVI

 Preface

the agreements included in this book. Just the opportunity to discuss these agreements and to work with them has contributed more to the development of this book than we can ever fully realize. Blake Mobley, Christopher Hynes, Joanna Sellan, and Stephanie Powell of the LAWS staff all contributed valuable research and editorial assistance to the book, as well. But we reserve our greatest appreciation to our wives and families for their continued support and counsel, without which this book would not have been possible. Indeed, without their inspiration it never would have been completed. Cornerstones of Security is, more than anything else, a tribute to their patience and understanding.

Introduction his book presents a chronology and history of international efforts to control weapons of mass destruction through legal arrangements. It covers more than forty agreements, negotiated during the last eight decades, to control conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in outer space, the Antarctic, Europe, Latin America, Africa, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and on the ocean floor.The agreements included herein have as few as two and as many as 188 parties.Viewed together, they paint a picture of a complex, intricate, and interconnected web of constraints that nations have embraced as part of an ongoing effort to make the world safe from the dangers posed by the ongoing development of weapons technology, principally weapons of mass destruction. To our knowledge, while there have been several excellent partial compilations, this book marks the first time since the end of the Cold War that the entire arms control treaty regime has been assembled in one collection, thus allowing the texts the full opportunity to tell their story. Scarcely has that story been more important. Arms control is not a new endeavor: it dates as far back as efforts by the medieval papacy in 1139 to ban the crossbow. But while the crossbow was viewed as “hateful to God,” it was soon eclipsed in destructive capabilities by the longbow, which was in turn eclipsed by the cannon, and so on. Technological development in military equipment continued unabated and at an ever increasing pace to the present. The first meaningful effort to control it did not come until the 1920s, after the horrific use of chemical weapons in World War I led to the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 and its entry into force in 1928. The protocol banned the use in war of chemical and biological weapons—although many of the states that ratified it in subsequent years did so with so-called second-use reservations, pursuant to which a Geneva Protocol party that is attacked with chemical or biological weapons retains the right to respond in kind.Thus, the protocol came to be considered, in effect, a ban on the first use of chemical and biological weapons.The Geneva Protocol, the first major arms control agreement of any impact, now has 134 parties and has been in force for almost seventy-five years. But aside from the success of the Geneva Protocol, the effort to limit armaments in the period between the first and second World Wars was a complete failure. Agreement after agreement either failed or never came into force, including the Versailles Treaty, the Washington Naval Agreement, the London Naval Agreement, and others. Even the Geneva Protocol had its problems: the United States refused to ratify it for almost fifty years. Nevertheless, the Geneva Protocol established the first steps in controlling chemical and biological weapons, an effort that continues to this day. After President Richard M. Nixon announced in 1969 that the United States unilaterally renounced the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—which provides that the parties “never in any circumstances” will develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons—was signed in 1972.The BWC was negotiated with no verification provisions, and in the mid-1990s the international community began an attempt to negotiate a protocol providing such provisions. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibited the possession, manufacture, and use of chemical weapons, was negotiated with extensive verification provisions, including on-site inspections.

T

2  Introduction

It was efforts to control the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, however, that would form the core of modern arms control.The devastation atomic bombs wrought upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was so great that the international community immediately recognized the need to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the first resolution passed by the United Nations called for the elimination of nuclear arms.At the same time, many statesmen, scientists, and politicians recognized the enormous potential of peaceful nuclear technologies to improve the human condition. The inherent difficulty of promoting the peaceful uses of the atom, without easing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ultimately led the Truman administration to propose the Baruch plan for international ownership and control over all nuclear resources in 1946. According to this plan, the United States would give up its nuclear weapons program after all other states agreed to accept international control over their nuclear programs. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were never able to reach an agreement, however. The plan ultimately faded and the Cold War nuclear arms race followed. Throughout the 1950s, the United States pursued the Atoms for Peace program, through which, from 1956 through 1962, the United States provided research reactors, nuclear training, and fissionable material to twenty-six nations. In exchange for the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to developing and friendly nations, the United States required safeguards—the continual monitoring of the transferred technology by inspectors to ensure it was not used for military purposes. By the mid-1960s, however, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached such a point that both sides recognized the need to do something to curtail it. At the same time, the potential capability of nations to develop nuclear weapons had spread to dozens of nations, with five (the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of China) having tested those weapons by 1964.Against this backdrop, the international community negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which for over thirty years has been a firm bulwark against the threat of nuclear weapons spreading across the globe. As a result of the NPT the international community has been largely successful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (notwithstanding fears widely held during the Kennedy administration that as many as twenty-five to thirty nations would have nuclear weapons integrated into their arsenals by the end of the 1970s and countless others today, thereby ensuring that virtually every conflict in the world would run the risk of going nuclear). While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that the number of nations possessing the technological capabilities to produce nuclear weapons has grown to more than seventy, only a handful have crossed the nuclear threshold. The NPT is rooted in a carefully crafted core bargain: in exchange for a commitment from non-nuclear weapon states parties (some 183 nations in 2002) to never develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards to verify compliance with this commitment, the five nuclear weapon states parties promised unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies (Article IV) and pledged to engage in negotiations to end the nuclear arms race, reduce nuclear weapons, and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals (Article VI). It is this basic bargain that for the last three decades has formed the central underpinnings of international arms control efforts. For the decades that followed the NPT’s entry into force, implementation of the nuclear weapon states’ Article VI commitments took the form of the strategic arms limitation and reduction agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Just as it had taken two decades to build arsenals in excess of 25,000 weapons on both sides, it would take decades more to reduce them. In 1972 and 1979 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed at

Introduction  3

the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II) to limit the numbers of strategic nuclear arms delivery vehicles—that is, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and long-range bombers. While these limits essentially were not lower than existing levels of the delivery vehicles and thus required few actual reductions, the SALT agreements were successful in that they capped the strategic nuclear missile race, structured the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, and paved the way for the arms reductions of the 1980s and 1990s. These arms reductions would not have been achieved without the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which was negotiated as part of SALT I. It prohibited the deployment of a nationwide missile defense by either the United States or the Soviet Union and, as amended in 1974, limited each side to one ABM deployment site with one hundred interceptors. By limiting the amount of defenses either side could deploy, the ABM Treaty made strategic offensive arms limitation possible. If strategic defenses were not limited, one nation could deploy an effective nationwide defense against a missile attack, forcing the other to build larger arsenals in order to overwhelm those defenses and thereby maintain a credible deterrent. Moreover, if one nation had an effective nationwide defense, it might be perceived as more inclined to initiate a first strike with the expectation that the remaining arsenal of the undefended opponent would be insufficient to penetrate the defensive shield, thereby creating an unstable situation. In the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed for the first time to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, all deployed and nondeployed missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers were destroyed, thereby eliminating the nuclear missile threat in Europe.The 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which arguably ended the Cold War, cut conventional force deployments in Europe to low, equal levels.The CFE Treaty limited each side to 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs)—with sublimits of 18,000 for armored infantry fighting vehicles and 1,500 for heavy armored combat vehicles—20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. In 1988, the Soviet Union alone had 41,000 battle tanks, 57,000 ACVs, and 42,000 pieces of artillery in the area of application established by the treaty. Finally, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II), signed in 1991 and 1993, reduced the number of each side’s deployed strategic warheads from 12,000 to 6,000 and should START II come into force, 3,500 respectively, far below Cold War peak limits.The Moscow Treaty of 2002 requires the United States and Russia to reduce this number to 1,750 to 2,200 by 2012, but unlike START I and START II does not require that reduced systems be eliminated, simply stored. These agreements were not reached in a vacuum. Arms control negotiations benefited greatly from improved superpower relations during the so-called détente period in the 1970s. Similarly, the INF and START treaties might not have been possible without the relaxation of tensions that preceded the end of the Cold War. Moreover, effective arms control agreements were possible only after the states improved their capacity to verify compliance with the agreements, first by satellite surveillance and later by negotiated on-site inspection arrangements. Nevertheless, the agreements reached during and immediately after the Cold War significantly reduced nuclear arsenals and were crucial elements of U.S. security. By stabilizing the arms race and providing a framework for U.S.-Soviet dialogue, bilateral, Cold War–era arms control efforts contributed greatly to international peace and stability. Arms control in the Cold War era also included regional efforts to control nuclear dangers.The most obvious example of these efforts is the development beginning in the late 1960s of a network of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs)—large geographic regions in which the testing, possession, and stationing of nuclear weapons are prohibited. In fact, the

4  Introduction

first NWFZ (in Latin America and the Caribbean), created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, predates the NPT.The NPT promoted the development of NWFZs by acknowledging the “rights of states to establish NWFZs in their respective territories” in Article VII. Following Latin America’s lead, other NWFZ regions sprang up over the years: the South Pacific in 1985 (Treaty of Rarotonga); Southeast Asia in 1995 (Treaty of Bangkok); and Africa in 1996 (Treaty of Pelindaba). An interesting and important development in the formation of the arms control treaty structure is the impact of the end of the Cold War on the numerous multilateral and bilateral international arms control agreements to which Russia and, as appropriate, other newly independent states have succeeded in place of the former Soviet Union. For example, Russia replaced the former Soviet Union as a party to the UN Charter and holds a permanent seat on the Security Council. The United States never recognized the Baltic states as being incorporated into the former Soviet Union, so the U.S. regards the Soviet Union as being replaced by twelve states, referred to as the newly independent states (NIS). With respect to the NPT, Russia has been recognized as the sole successor to the Soviet Union (because the United States only wanted to recognize one nuclear weapon state successor) and the other NIS joined the NPT as separate non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. For the INF Treaty (originally a bilateral treaty) the United States recognized all twelve NIS as successors. In its continued implementation, six are active and six inactive because, while only the active six had INF bases on their territory, the United States believed it was important to retain the prohibition on INF systems on all twelve. For the CFE Treaty, all NIS that have territory in the treaty zone are recognized successors, while only Russia is a recognized successor to the Hot Line Agreements. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty recognizes four NIS as successors to the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), as, in effect, did the ABM Treaty. Despite the success of efforts to bring all of the NIS into the arms control treaty structure, the post–Cold War era has seen efforts to further build the regime proceed slowly. In fact, progress has been difficult to find since the completion of START II and the CWC in 1993, which has placed strains on the regime.When the NPT was negotiated, it was given a twentyfive-year life span, with an option for either permanent, incremental, or no extension thereafter. In 1995, twenty-five years after its entry into force, the international community faced the choice of either extending the treaty indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods, which could have led to its eventual termination. Despite the treaty’s success in stemming proliferation, by 1995 a significant number of key non-nuclear weapon states had begun to be dissatisfied with the lack of progress made by the nuclear weapon states in fulfilling their Article VI side of the bargain. As a result, many were reluctant to accept a permanent NPT that would lock them into what they saw as an inherently discriminatory regime.While the NPT explicitly does not legitimize the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states, many nonWestern states were concerned that a permanent NPT would remove the incentive for the nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals.To address this concern, the NPT states parties negotiated an associated consensus agreement at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference called the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. It was intended to strengthen the regime and place politically, if not legally, binding conditions upon permanent extension of the treaty.The statement pledged the NPT states parties to work toward a number of objectives, including:  universalization of NPT membership;  reaffirmation of the Article VI commitments of the nuclear weapon states to

pursue in good faith measures related to eventual nuclear disarmament;

Introduction  5  completion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end     

of 1996; commencement of negotiations for a fissile material cutoff treaty; efforts by the nuclear weapon states to reduce global nuclear arsenals; the encouragement of the creation of new NWFZs; an enhanced verification system; and further steps to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be a threat to non-nuclear weapon states (a reference to legally binding negative security assurances whereby the nuclear weapon states promise not to attack NPT non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons—a central commitment).

The CTBT was perhaps the most important of these undertakings. Indeed, it has been a fundamentally important issue since the earliest days of the nuclear age. (After more than four decades of effort, a CTBT was finally negotiated in 1996, thereby banning all explosive nuclear tests and establishing an extensive verification regime to ensure compliance. Its entry into force remains some time off, however, thanks in large part to the U.S. Senate’s vote against ratification in October 1999.) With these commitments, the successful effort to make the NPT permanent—specifically the unanimous support generated for this outcome—was a singular victory for U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. Despite the successful NPT outcome, when the international community gathered five years later in April 2000 to review progress in implementing the Statement of Principles and Objectives, non-nuclear weapon states were again uncomfortable with the commitment of the nuclear weapon states to their NPT obligations and to the obligations accepted in 1995.To some degree, this criticism was directed primarily at the United States. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all signed and ratified the CTBT. France scaled back its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force, completely eliminated its ground-based nuclear arsenal, and dismantled its test site. The United Kingdom reduced its arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to a level lower than that of any other NPT nuclear weapon state and has reduced the alert status of its remaining nuclear arsenal. China has long maintained the most minimalist of nuclear deterrents. And Russia had pressed for reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 weapons or lower, with some in Moscow even urging the commencement of five-power discussions on strategic nuclear reductions. The United States government does not deserve sole blame, though. Indeed, the five-year period after the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and before the 2000 NPT Review Conference witnessed numerous setbacks to the regime generated from a variety of sources. These included nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate in 1999, the drive toward U.S. deployment of a national missile defense, which resulted in the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia’s reemphasis of the possible first use of nuclear weapons in connection with its revised nuclear doctrine in 2000, the stalled START process, and other setbacks. Nevertheless, against this backdrop—and after much poking and prodding—the states parties agreed to a Final Document that reaffirmed the core bargain of the NPT. Among the most important new commitments included in the 2000 Final Document was agreement to an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.This commitment lacked all of the previous references to “ultimate” or “general and complete” disarmament, which had in the past served to limit or condition the undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to pursue nuclear weapon elimination. Interestingly, all states parties present, including the United States, agreed as well that the ABM Treaty must be preserved and strengthened as the “cornerstone

6  Introduction

of strategic stability.” Also, the NPT states parties agreed in the Final Document to maintain the nuclear test moratorium pending entry into force of the CTBT. However, as has been widely reported in the press, the current administration appears to have a different view of the utility of the arms control treaty regime than its predecessors. It has accordingly taken a number of steps to undermine that regime. It has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, opposed U.S. ratification of the CTBT, sought to shorten the amount of time required to resume nuclear testing, undercut efforts to strengthen verification provisions of the BWC, threatened to cut funding for efforts to control nuclear weapons materials in Russia, crafted a nuclear posture review that contemplates the first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, names five such states in scenarios for possible use, calls for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, and so on. It has publicly stated that it is considering rescinding the U.S. commitment to the NPT-related negative security assurances and called into question the continued viability of the Agreed Framework reached with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) in 1994, whereby the latter agreed to freeze its nuclear program and remain a party to the NPT. Indeed, after North Korea’s announcement of a secret nuclear program in October 2002 and continued delays in deliveries of heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea, it may not be possible to revive the Agreed Framework, which could have serious repercussions.Against this backdrop, we undertook to create this definitive compilation of arms control treaties and agreements, along with brief commentaries on the background and negotiations of each, so that a comprehensive history of those agreements, and their role as cornerstones of security could be recorded. A few general notes on format and content: readers and researchers should understand that Cornerstones of Security is our attempt to pay tribute to the intent and impact of the agreements included herein. The challenge of finding a way to best accomplish this in a comprehensive yet usable volume was one we did not take lightly. Striking a balance between thoroughness and space was difficult, as was deciding what to leave out and what to include— with respect to various agreements and subsidiary documents as well as to elements of the analyses of the agreements.This was particularly the case with respect to agreements that are no longer in force or have been fully implemented. We are confident that all of the crucial documents are included: in other words, that every agreement required to tell the story of arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament in the nuclear era made the cut. After all, what has impressed us the most in working on this project has been the comprehensiveness of that story. We hope that Cornerstones of Security fully and appropriately conveys that story. We are grateful for the opportunity to tell it. And in preparing this volume, we hope that we have contirbuted to a fuller understanding of the importance of this structure of international arms control agreements that has protected us all for so many years. Washington, D.C. December 2002

1

The 1925 Geneva Protocol SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

hemical and biological weapons are two types of weapons of mass destruction that are closely linked historically and to which similar constraints were initially applied. The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, was signed in Geneva on June 17, 1925. Known as the Geneva Protocol, in effect it banned the first use of both chemical and biological weapons. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Biological Weapons Convention, was signed on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. It prohibits the possession of biological weapons. A multilateral convention banning the possession of chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, was negotiated in Geneva, signed in Paris on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Chemical weapons are essentially gas weapons; that is, chemical compounds that are in a gaseous state when activated and which are contained in shells, bombs, or spray tanks delivered by aircraft, artillery, or ballistic missiles. During World War I, both chlorine and mustard gas weapons were used. Although the far more deadly nerve gases had been developed prior to World War II, gas weapons were not used between major combatants in that conflict.Toxins are chemical compounds that are the product of processes involving biological organisms. Botulinus toxin, which causes botulism, is an example. Even though toxin weapons are inert, like chemical weapons, they are considered to be biological weapons because they are the product of biological processes. Biological weapons are essentially types of bacteria that are intended to be delivered in such a way as to cause disease.An example of a biological weapon is anthrax bacteria. At the invitation of Nicholas II, tsar of Russia, an international peace conference was convened at The Hague in 1899 with the avowed purpose of limiting the increasingly destructive nature of warfare.The first Hague Peace Conference resulted in a signed declaration that outlawed the use of asphyxiating gases in war. The second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons. Thus, poison gas was declared to be an illegal weapon prior to World War I. Nevertheless, it was put to widespread use by both sides beginning at Ypres, Belgium, in 1915. (Some reports suggest that the French initiated the use of poison gases in World War I when they used tear gas grenades against the Germans in the first month of the war.) Before the war was over, the use of this weapon had caused more than 100,000 deaths and more than one million casualties. It was regarded as a particularly noxious weapon by the public, which led to further efforts to ban it in the 1920s.

C

8  T HE 1925 G ENEVA P ROTOCOL

At the end of World War I, the victorious Allies reaffirmed in the Treaty of Versailles the prewar ban on the use of poison gas in war and prohibited Germany from manufacturing such weapons. Similar provisions were included in peace treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. At the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1922, the United States proposed that similar language prohibiting the use of poison gas in warfare be included in a treaty regulating the use of submarines.The U.S. proposal was adopted by the conferees, and the U.S. Senate subsequently approved the treaty without dissent. It never came into force, however, because the requisite French ratification was never obtained since France objected to the submarine provisions. In 1925, at a conference held in Geneva on supervision of the international arms trade, the United States proposed a ban on the export of gas for use in war. At the suggestion of France, the conferees decided to negotiate a protocol prohibiting the use in war of poison gas; and pursuant to a proposal by Poland, the protocol was broadened to ban bacteriological methods of warfare as well.The result was the Geneva Protocol. Signed on June 17, 1925, the Geneva Protocol restated the prohibition laid down previously by the Versailles and Washington treaties and added a ban on biological weapons. The protocol prohibits the use in war of chemical and biological weapons among parties. Being a rule of warfare, rather than an arms control agreement, it does not contain verification provisions. Because of reservations adopted by many parties upon ratification, the Geneva Protocol is generally an agreement prohibiting the first use in war of chemical and biological weapons among parties.The reservation adopted by France upon ratification in May 1926, is instructive in this regard. France declared that it is bound to the protocol’s strictures only as in regard to relations with other parties, and it is released from its obligations under the protocol with respect to any enemy state or states whose armed forces or allies do not observe the protocol’s provisions.The Netherlands (which became a party in 1930) and the United States adopted reservations to the protocol that bind each country to never use biological weapons against a party in any situation and to not use chemical weapons as long as such weapons are not employed against them. Other countries, such as Germany (1929), Switzerland (1932), and Mexico (1932), entered no reservations at all. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol by the United States was a special matter, however. Unlike the agreement reached at the Washington Naval Conference, the protocol encountered serious difficulties in the U.S. Senate. The U.S. delegation to the Washington Naval Conference included a U.S. Senator, which may explain that agreement’s favorable reception in the Senate.The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the protocol favorably, but because of strong lobbying against it by the Army Chemical Warfare Service and the chemical industry, it was not brought to a vote on the Senate floor.Thus, although a significant number of countries, including most of the great powers, ratified the protocol in the late 1920s and early 1930s, by the time World War II broke out, the United States had not. Nevertheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced on June 8, 1943, that the use of weapons covered by the Geneva Protocol had been “outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind.” Further, the United States believed that, in view of its widespread recognition for almost twenty years, by 1943 the first-use constraint established by the protocol had become part of customary international law. However, the United States still did not ratify the protocol, and in 1949 the Senate returned to President Harry S.Truman a number of older treaties that had not been ratified, including the Geneva Protocol. In 1966, the United States was criticized in the United Nations (UN) for the use of riot control agents (tear gas) and chemical herbicides in the Vietnam War. Hungary charged that the use of tear gas and chemical herbicides in war was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, the obligations of which, President Roosevelt had said, the United States would respect. The

T HE 1925 G ENEVA P ROTOCOL  9

United States argued that the protocol did not apply to nontoxic gases and herbicides. In its final form, the resolution introduced by Hungary, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly, simply called for strict observance by all states of “the principles and objectives” of the protocol and for universal adherence to it. Debate over the interpretation of the protocol continued in 1969. In that year, in a foreword to a UN report1 on chemical and biological weapons, the UN secretary general appealed for a “clear affirmation” that the protocol prohibits the use in war of all chemical and biological agents. Discussion in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva indicated that most countries represented there supported the secretary general’s interpretation, although the United Kingdom argued that only parties to the protocol had the right to interpret it. The disagreement led to introduction in the UN General Assembly of a resolution proposed by twenty-one countries asserting that the use in war of all chemical and biological agents was contrary to international law. The United States took issue with the resolution’s interpretation and argued that it was inappropriate for the General Assembly to use resolutions to interpret treaties. Nevertheless, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 80 to 3: the United States voted no, along with Australia and Portugal, and thirty-six countries abstained, including France and the United Kingdom. While the debate was under way, President Richard M. Nixon announced on November 25, 1969, that he would resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. He reaffirmed the U.S. policy of renunciation of the first use in war of lethal chemicals (adding to this renunciation incapacitating chemicals, but not riot control agents and tear gas). He also announced the unilateral renunciation of biological weapons. Some countries began to express support for the U.S. interpretation on chemical weapons. In 1930, during a discussion in Geneva, the United Kingdom had asserted that the Geneva Protocol covered tear gas. In 1970, however, the British foreign secretary stated in Parliament that, while this remained the British position, the riot control agent CS (what the United States was using in Vietnam) was not harmful to humans, unlike older tear gases, and therefore was not covered by the protocol. In the same year, the foreign minister of Japan asserted during debate on ratification in the Japanese Diet that the protocol did not cover tear gas and herbicides. Japan was the first militarily significant state to ratify the protocol after the debate over its interpretation, and it did so with U.S. understanding as to its coverage. In the transmittal documents dated August 11, 1970, that accompanied the protocol back to the U.S. Senate, Secretary of State William P. Rogers set forth a reservation that provided that the United States retained the right to retaliate in the event of a chemical weapon attack and asserted an interpretive understanding that the protocol did not cover riot control agents and chemical herbicides.The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, refused to accept the interpretation contained in Secretary Rogers’s letter. The committee chairman, Senator William J. Fullbright, stated that in his view and that of many committee members it would be in the interest of the United States to either ratify the protocol without “restrictive understandings” or to defer action until this became possible. As a result, the committee took no action on the protocol and held in abeyance approval of the Biological Weapons Convention, which was before it as well. The merits of this debate are unclear.There is no question that the use of poison gas in World War I caused the protocol to be negotiated, and that the prohibition on the use of 1

UN Secretary General U Thant. Foreword to Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants. Geneva: World Health Organization, 1970.

10  T HE 1925 G ENEVA P ROTOCOL

poison gas was what the Hague conventions negotiators had in mind. Chemical herbicides were unknown in 1925, so the negotiators could not have had them in mind. Riot control agents and chemical herbicides were not used in Vietnam as weapons themselves, but as adjuncts to other weapons, since used alone they are generally not lethal. The distinction between the two materials is that tear gas, used in conjunction with other weapons, may lead to immediate casualties (somewhat akin to the direct effect of poison gas), but herbicides used to defoliate forests normally would cause casualties over time. On the other hand, the protocol, by its title, prohibits “poisonous, asphyxiating and other gases,” and in 1930 the United Kingdom had taken the position that tear gas was covered (while later exempting CS). In 1974, the Ford administration began a new effort to obtain ratification of the Geneva Protocol (and of the Biological Weapons Convention). A compromise was painstakingly worked out by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), acting as mediator between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of Defense: the committee agreed to not rebut interpretation of the protocol coverage presented by the administration, and the administration agreed to “renounce as a matter of national policy” in an executive order first use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides.The first use in war of chemical herbicides was barred, except to control vegetation on U.S. military bases and around their immediate defensive perimeters. The first use in war of riot control agents was barred, except in defensive military modes to save civilian lives: examples included control of rioting prisoners of war; situations in which civilians are used by the enemy as a screen; rescue missions, such as retrieving a pilot downed behind enemy lines; and protection of rear-echelon areas in order to, for example, protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. In a carefully prepared question-and-answer session before the committee, ACDA Director Fred Ikle was asked what legal impediment there would be to subsequent presidents broadening the permissible use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. Ikle responded that there would be none, but that the policy was “inextricably” linked to Senate consent to ratification of the protocol. Therefore, such a change, he said, would be “inconsistent with the history of the ratification, and could have extremely grave political repercussions and, as a result, is extremely unlikely to happen.”2 Ikle’s testimony was presented on December 10, 1974; on December 12, the committee voted unanimously to report favorably on the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention.The committee, in its report, indicated that it attached particular importance to the exchange between its members and Director Ikle.The full Senate voted its approval, also unanimously, on December 16, 1974. The Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention were ratified by President Gerald R. Ford on January 22, 1975, and the U.S. instrument of ratification of the protocol was deposited with France on April 10, 1975, just two months shy of fifty years after it was first signed. Thus, U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol in 1975 raised, but did not settle, some of the interpretive questions related to the by then worldwide prohibition on the use in war of chemical and biological weapons. As foreshadowed by President Roosevelt’s statement in 1943, because of widespread and long-standing adherence to the principles of the Geneva Protocol, the constraints of the protocol—at least the constraints on first use—have become part of customary international law, binding on all states without regard to whether they are parties to it. 2

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements:Text and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990. pp. 13–14.

T HE 1925 G ENEVA P ROTOCOL  11

PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF B ACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE Signed at Geneva June 17, 1925 Entered into force February 8, 1928 The Undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective Governments: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the World are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatory and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear today’s date. The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding Powers. The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other powers which have already deposited their ratifications. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. DONE at Geneva in a single copy, this seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five. States which have deposited instruments of ratification or accession, or continue to be bound as the result of succession agreements concluded by them or by reason of notification given by them to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:3 Afghanistan, Angolo, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia (1ab), Austria, Bahamas (1ab2), Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados (2), Belgium (1ab), Belize, Benin, Bhutan (6), Bolivia, Botswana (1ab2), Brazil, Bulgaria (1ab), Burkina Faso (Upper Volta), Burma (1ab2), Cambodia, Cameroon, 3

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

12  T HE 1925 G ENEVA P ROTOCOL

Canada (1ab), Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile (1ab), China, People’s Republic of (1ab), China (Taiwan) (8), Comoros (7), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia (1b), Denmark, Djibouti (7), Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia (1ab), Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji (1ab), Finland, France (1ab3), Gambia, Germany (GDR/FRG), Ghana, Greece, Grenada (1ab), Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana (1ab2), Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India (1ab), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq (1ab), Ireland, Jordan (1abd), Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, North, Korea, South (1ab), Kuwait (1abd), Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya (1bd), Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives (Islands), Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia (1b), Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands (1cd), New Zealand (1ab), Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria (1ab), Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea (1ab), Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal (1ab), Qatar, Romania (1ab), Rwanda, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & The Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles (1ab2), Sierra Leone, Singapore (1ab2), Solomon Islands, South Africa (1ab), Spain (1ab), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname (1c4), Swaziland (1ab2), Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic (1d), Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (later Russia) (1ab), United Kingdom (1ab5), United States (1c), Uruguay (1abcd) With reservations to Protocol as follows: a–binding only as regards relations with other parties. b–to cease to be binding in regard to any enemy States whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions. c–to cease to be binding as regards use of chemical agents with respect to any enemy State whose armed forces or allies do not observe provisions. d–does not constitute recognition of or involve treaty relations with Israel. (2) By virtue of agreement with former parent State or notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations of succession to treaty rights and obligations upon independence. (3) Applicable to all French territories. (4) Applicable to Suriname and Curaçao. (5) It does not bind India or any British Dominion which is a separate member of the League of Nations and does not separately sign or adhere the Protocol. It is applicable to all colonies. (6) Deposited accession on June 12, 1978, but the French Government asked that accession take effect on date of notification by them Feb. 19, 1979. (7) Included in declaration by France. Continued application has apparently not been determined. (8) Effective Jan. 1, 1979, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

2

The Antarctic Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Antarctic Treaty, the earliest of the post–World War II arms limitation agreements, has significance both in itself and as a precedent. It internationalized and demilitarized the Antarctic continent and provided for its cooperative exploration and future use. It has been cited as an example of nations exercising foresight and working in concert to prevent conflict before it develops. Based on the premise that to exclude armaments is easier than to eliminate them once they have been introduced, the treaty served as a model, in its approach and provisions, for later “nonarmament” treaties including, for example, the treaties that excluded nuclear weapons from outer space and from the seabed, as well as the nuclear-weapon-freezone (NWFZ) treaties, which now collectively establish the land area of the Southern Hemisphere as off limits for nuclear weapons.Those NWFZ treaties, the treaties of Tlateloco (Latin America), Rarotonga (South Pacific), Pelindaba (Africa), and Bangkok (South Asia), now embrace some 110 nations. By the 1950s, seven nations (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) had claimed sovereignty over areas of Antarctica, based on discovery, exploration, or geographic proximity. The claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlapped. Eight other nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Japan, and South Africa) had engaged in exploration but had put forward no specific claims.The United States did not recognize the claims of other governments and reserved the right to assert claims based on exploration by its citizens.The Soviet Union took a similar position. Activities in the Antarctic had generally been conducted peacefully and cooperatively.Yet the possibility that exploitable economic resources might be found posed the possibility of future rivalry for their control. Moreover, although isolated and uninhabited, the continent could at some time become a potential site for emplacing nuclear weapons. Fortunately, scientific interests, rather than political, economic, or military concerns, dominated the expeditions sent to Antarctica after World War II. As a result, international scientific associations were able to work out arrangements for effective cooperation. In 1956 and 1957, for example,American meteorologists “wintered over” at the Soviet post, Mirnyy, while Soviet meteorologists wintered over at Little America on McMurdo Sound.These cooperative activities culminated in the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957–1958, a joint scientific effort by twelve nations (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to conduct studies on the Earth and its cosmic environment. In these years the desire to keep Antarctica demilitarized was general, and some diplomatic discussion of the possibility had taken place. On May 3, 1958, the United States proposed to

T

14  T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY

the eleven other nations participating in the IGY that a conference be held, based on three points of agreement that had been reached in informal discussions: 1. that the legal status quo of the Antarctic continent remain unchanged; 2. that scientific cooperation continue; and 3. that the continent be used for peaceful purposes only. All participating nations accepted the U.S. invitation, and the resulting Washington Conference on Antarctica convened on October 15, 1959. No insurmountable conflicts or issues divided the conference, and negotiations culminated in a treaty signed by all twelve nations on December 1, 1959. U.S. ratification was deposited August 18, 1960, and the treaty entered into force on June 23, 1961, when the formal ratification of all participating nations had been received. Article I of the treaty provides that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only. It specifically prohibits “any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.” Military personnel or equipment, however, may be used for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. Article I also prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica, subject to certain future international agreements on these subjects. All contracting parties entitled to participation in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the treaty have the right to designate observers to carry out inspections in all areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations, and equipment and ships and aircraft at discharge or embarkation points. Each observer has complete freedom of access at any time to any and all areas of Antarctica. Contracting parties may also carry out aerial inspections. These are provisions for amending the treaty and for referring disputes that cannot be handled by direct talks, mediation, arbitration, or other peaceful means to the International Court of Justice, and for calling a conference in thirty years to review the treaty’s operation if any parties request it. Such a conference has not been called. Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all exercised the right of inspection.The United States conducted inspections in 1971, 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1989, and 1995. No military activities, armaments, or prohibited nuclear activities were ever observed, and all scientific programs were in accord with previously published plans. The observed activities at each station complied with the provisions and spirit of the Antarctic Treaty. These inspections were important, as they were the first on-site inspections to verify arms control limitations to which the Soviet Union had agreed. They were the early precedent of the significant inspections provided for in the arms control treaties of the 1980s and 1990s. In accordance with Article IX of the treaty, twenty-three consultative meetings were held between 1961 and 2000. Numerous recommendations on measures to further the treaty’s principles and objectives were adopted, many of which entered into force. There are now twenty-seven contracting parties entitled to participate in these meetings: the original twelve signatory states plus Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Ecuador, Germany, Finland, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY Signed at Washington December 1, 1959 Entered into force June 23, 1961

T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY  15

The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord; Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind; Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. 2. The present treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes. Article II Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present treaty. Article III 1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: (a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations; (b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations; (c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available. 2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of cooperative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica. Article IV 1. Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;

16  T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY

(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other States right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 2. No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force. Article V 1.Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited. 2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. Article VI The provisions of the present treaty shall apply to the area south of 60˚ South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area. Article VII 1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment. 2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. 3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present treaty enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of (a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; (b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and (c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present treaty.

T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY  17

Article VIII 1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article III of the treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Article IX 1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty, including measures regarding: (a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; (b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; (c) facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; (d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the treaty; (e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; (f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. 3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 4.The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures. 5.Any or all of the rights established in the present treaty may be exercised from the date of entry into force of the treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article. Article X Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present treaty.

18  T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY

Article XI 1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2.Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article XII 1. (a) The present treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. (b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present treaty on the date of the expiration of such period. 2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the treaty. (b) Any modification or amendment to the present treaty which is approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present Article. (c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice of the depositary Government. Article XIII 1.The present treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to accede to the treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the treaty. 2. Ratification of or accession to the present treaty shall be effected by each State in accordance with its constitutional processes.

T HE A NTARCTIC T REATY  19

3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present treaty shall enter into force for those States and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its instrument of accession. 6.The present treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XIV The present treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present treaty. DONE at Washington this first day of December, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-nine. States Parties1 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of), Korea (Republic of), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay

1

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

3

The “Hot Line” Agreements SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he need to ensure quick and reliable communication between the heads of governments of nuclear weapon states first emerged in the context of efforts to reduce the danger that accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack might trigger nuclear war. In 1954, the Soviet Union was the first nation to propose specific safeguards against surprise attack; it also expressed concern about the danger of accidental war. At the initiative of Western governments, a conference was held in Geneva in 1958. Although it recessed without achieving results, the conference stimulated technical research on the issues involved. In the spring of 1962, the United States submitted a draft treaty outline and the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC),1 each of which included different risk-reducing provisions. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 underscored the importance of prompt, direct communication between heads of states. In June 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral agreement establishing a direct communications link, known as the “hot line,” for use in time of emergency. The original agreement provided for a wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, and, as a backup system, a radiotelegraph circuit routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow. Since its installation, the communications link has proved its worth. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, for example, the United States used it to prevent possible misunderstanding of U.S. fleet movements in the Mediterranean Sea. It was used again during the 1973 ArabIsraeli war. Its significance is further attested to by future agreements to modernize it. A September 30, 1971, agreement, negotiated by a special working group of the U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) delegations, provided for the addition of two satellite circuits, which became operational in 1978. Subsequent discussions resulted in an accord, signed on July 17, 1984, to add a facsimile transmission capability to the hot line, which became operational in 1986. This capability allowed the heads of government to exchange messages far more rapidly than with the previously existing teletype system.They could also send detailed graphic material, such as maps, charts, and drawings, by facsimile.This agreement was subsequently updated by an exchange of diplomatic notes in Washington, D.C., on June 24, 1988. It should be noted that in all these arrangements, care was taken to ensure that the heads of the two governments could never communicate directly, but rather would always communicate via intermediaries.The two bureaucracies regarded this as stabilizing.

T

1

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva beginning in 1962. In 1969, with the addition of new members, the name was changed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). An even larger group, the Committee on Disarmament (CD), was established in 1979.

T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS  21

The agreement was again updated on October 15, 1999, when the United States and Russia signed a memorandum establishing communication lines between the vice president of the United States and the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation and between the U.S. national security adviser to the president and the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. In April 1998 the United States signed a bilateral agreement with China, establishing a hot line intended to increase confidence between the two countries during times of crisis.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS R EGARDING THE E STABLISHMENT OF A D IRECT C OMMUNICATIONS L INK Signed at Geneva June 20, 1963 Entered into force June 20, 1963 For use in time of emergency the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to establish as soon as technically feasible a direct communications link between the two Governments. Each Government shall be responsible for the arrangements for the link on its own territory. Each Government shall take the necessary steps to ensure continuous functioning of the link and prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received by means of the link from the head of government of the other party. Arrangements for establishing and operating the link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof. DONE in duplicate in the English and Russian languages at Geneva, Switzerland, this 20th day of June, 1963. For the Government of The United States of America: Charles C. Stelle, Acting Representative of the United States of America to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Semyon K.Tsarapkin, Acting Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link The direct communications link between Washington and Moscow established in accordance with the Memorandum, and the operation of such link, shall be governed by the following provisions: 1.The direct communications link shall consist of:

22  T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS

a.Two terminal points with telegraph-teleprinter equipment between which communications shall be directly exchanged; b. One full-time duplex wire telegraph circuit, routed Washington-London-CopenhagenStockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, which shall be used for the transmission of messages; c. One full-time duplex radiotelegraph circuit, routed Washington-Tangier-Moscow, which shall be used for service communications and for coordination of operations between the two terminal points. If experience in operating the direct communications link should demonstrate that the establishment of an additional wire telegraph circuit is advisable, such circuit may be established by mutual agreement between authorized representatives of both Governments. 2. In case of interruption of the wire circuit, transmission of messages shall be effected via the radio circuit, and for this purpose provision shall be made at the terminal points for the capability of prompt switching of all necessary equipment from one circuit to another. 3.The terminal points of the link shall be so equipped as to provide for the transmission and reception of messages from Moscow to Washington in the Russian language and from Washington to Moscow in the English language. In this connection, the USSR shall furnish the United States four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one years supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions, and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the Russian language. The United States shall furnish the Soviet Union four sets of telegraph terminal equipment, including page printers, transmitters, and reperforators, with one years supply of spare parts and all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, to provide for transmission and reception of messages in the English language. The equipment described in this paragraph shall be exchanged directly between the parties without any payment being required therefor. 4.The terminal points of the direct communications link shall be provided with encoding equipment. For the terminal point in the USSR, four sets of such equipment (each capable of simplex operation), with one years supply of spare parts, with all necessary special tools, test equipment, operating instructions and other technical literature, and with all necessary blank tape, shall be furnished by the United States to the USSR against payment of the cost thereof by the USSR. The USSR shall provide for preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the United States for reception of messages from the USSR.The United States shall provide for the preparation and delivery of keying tapes to the terminal point of the link in the USSR for reception of messages from the United States. Delivery of prepared keying tapes to the terminal points of the link shall be effected through the Embassy of the USSR in Washington (for the terminal of the link in the USSR) and through the Embassy of the United States in Moscow (for the terminal of the link in the United States). 5.The United States and the USSR shall designate the agencies responsible for the arrangements regarding the direct communications link, for its technical maintenance, continuity and reliability, and for the timely transmission of messages. Such agencies may, by mutual agreement, decide matters and develop instructions relating to the technical maintenance and operation of the direct communications link and effect arrangements to improve the operation of the link. 6.The technical parameters of the telegraph circuits of the link and of the terminal equipment, as well as the maintenance of such circuits and equipment, shall be in accordance with CCITT and CCIR recommendations.

T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS  23

Transmission and reception of messages over the direct communications link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of international telegraph and radio communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions. 7.The costs of the direct communications link shall be borne as follows: a.The USSR shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Moscow to Helsinki and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Helsinki to London. The United States shall pay the full cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from Washington to London and 50 percent of the cost of leasing the portion of the telegraph circuit from London to Helsinki. b. Payment of the cost of leasing the radio telegraph circuit between Washington and Moscow shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the parties.The USSR shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Moscow to Washington. The United States shall bear the expenses relating to the transmission of messages from Washington to Moscow.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON M EASURES TO IMPROVE THE U.S.A.-USSR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK Signed at Washington September 30, 1971 Entered into force September 30, 1971 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Noting the positive experience gained in the process of operating the existing Direct Communications Link between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was established for use in time of emergency pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed on June 20, 1963, Having examined, in a spirit of mutual understanding, matters relating to the improvement and modernization of the Direct Communications Link, Having agreed as follows: Article 1 1. For the purpose of increasing the reliability of the Direct Communications Link, there shall be established and put into operation the following: (a) two additional circuits between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics each using a satellite communications system, with each Party selecting a satellite communications system of its own choice, (b) a system of terminals (more than one) in the territory of each Party for the Direct Communications Link, with the locations and number of terminals in the United States of America to be determined by the United States side, and the locations and number of terminals in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be determined by the Soviet side. 2. Matters relating to the implementation of the aforementioned improvements of the Direct Communications Link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

24  T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS

Article 2 Each Party confirms its intention to take all possible measures to assure the continuous and reliable operation of the communications circuits and the system of terminals of the Direct Communications Link for which it is responsible in accordance with this Agreement and the Annex hereto, as well as to communicate to the head of its Government any messages received via the Direct Communications Link from the head of Government of the other Party. Article 3 The Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed on June 20, 1963, with the Annex thereto, shall remain in force, except to the extent that its provisions are modified by this Agreement and Annex hereto. Article 4 The undertakings of the Parties hereunder shall be carried out in accordance with their respective Constitutional processes. Article 5 This Agreement, including the Annex hereto, shall enter into force upon signature. DONE at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: William P. Rogers For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: A. Gromyko

Annex to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-USSR Direct Communications Link Improvements to the U.S.A.-USSR Direct Communications Link shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions set forth in this Annex. I. Circuits (a) Each of the original circuits established pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963, shall continue to be maintained and operated as part of the Direct Communications Link until such time, after the satellite communications circuits provided for herein become operational, as the agencies designated pursuant to paragraph III (hereinafter referred to as the “designated agencies”) mutually agree that such original circuit is no longer necessary.The provisions of paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963, shall continue to govern the allocation of the costs of maintaining and operating such original circuits. (b) Two additional circuits shall be established using two satellite communications systems. Taking into account paragraph I (e) below, the United States side shall provide one circuit via

T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS  25

the Intelsat system and the Soviet side shall provide one circuit via the Molniya II system.The two circuits shall be duplex telephone band-width circuits conforming to CCITT standards, equipped for secondary telegraphic multiplexing.Transmission and reception of messages over the Direct Communications Link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of international communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions. (c) When the reliability of both additional circuits has been established to the mutual satisfaction of the designated agencies, they shall be used as the primary circuits of the Direct Communications Link for transmission and reception of teleprinter messages between the United States and the Soviet Union. (d) Each satellite communications circuit shall utilize an earth station in the territory of the United States, a communications satellite transponder, and an earth station in the territory of the Soviet Union. Each Party shall be responsible for linking the earth stations in its territory to its own terminals of the Direct Communications Link. (e) For the circuits specified in paragraph I (b):  The Soviet side will provide and operate at least one earth station in its territory for

the satellite communications circuit in the Intelsat system, and will also arrange for the use of suitable earth station facilities in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Molniya II system.The United States side, through a governmental agency or other United States legal entity, will make appropriate arrangements with Intelsat with regard to access for the Soviet Intelsat earth station to the Intelsat space segment, as well as for the use of the applicable portion of the Intelsat space segment.  The United States side will provide and operate at least one earth station in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Molniya II system, and will also arrange for the use of suitable earth station facilities in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Intelsat system. (f) Each earth station shall conform to the performance specifications and operating procedures at the corresponding satellite communications system and the ratio of antenna gain to the equivalent noise temperature should be no less than 31 decibels.Any deviation from these specifications and procedures which may be required in any unusual situation shall be worked out and mutually agreed upon by the designated agencies of both Parties after consultation. (g) The operational commissioning dates for the satellite communications circuits based on the Intelsat and Molniya II systems shall be as agreed upon by the designated agencies of the Parties through consultations. (h) The United States side shall bear the costs of: (1) providing and operating the Molniya II earth station in its territory; (2) the use of the Intelsat earth station in its territory; and (3) the transmission of messages via the Intelsat system.The Soviet side shall bear the costs of: (1) providing and operating the Intelsat earth station in its territory; (2) the use of the Molniya II earth station in its territory; and (3) the transmission of messages via the Molniya II system. Payment of the costs of the satellite communications circuits shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the Parties. (i) Each Party shall be responsible for providing to the other Party notification of any proposed modification or replacement of the communications satellite system containing the circuit provided by it that might require accommodation by earth stations using that system or otherwise affect the maintenance or operation of the Direct Communications Link. Such notification should be given sufficiently in advance to enable the designated agencies to consult and to make, before the modification or replacement is effected, such preparation as may be agreed upon for accommodation by the affected earth stations.

26  T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS

II. Terminals (a) Each Party shall establish a system of terminals in its territory for the exchange of messages with the other Party, and shall determine the locations and number of terminals in such a system. Terminals of the Direct Communications Link shall be designated “U.S.A.” and “USSR.” (b) Each Party shall take necessary measures to provide for rapidly switching circuits among terminal points in such a manner that only one terminal location is connected to the circuits at any one time. (c) Each Party shall use teleprinter equipment from its own sources to equip the additional terminals for the transmission and reception of messages from the United States to the Soviet Union in the English language and from the Soviet Union to the United States in the Russian language. (d) The terminals of the Direct Communications Link shall be provided with encoding equipment. One-time tape encoding equipment shall be used for transmissions via the Direct Communications Link. A mutually agreed quantity of encoding equipment of a modern and reliable type selected by the United States side, with spares, test equipment, technical literature and operating supplies, shall be furnished by the United States side to the Soviet side against payment of the cost thereof by the Soviet side; additional spares for the encoding equipment supplied will be furnished as necessary. (e) Keying tapes shall be supplied in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963. Each Party shall be responsible for reproducing and distributing additional keying tapes for its system of terminals and for implementing procedures which ensure that the required synchronization of encoding equipment can be effected from any one terminal at any time. III. Other Matters Each Party shall designate the agencies responsible for arrangements regarding the establishment of the additional circuits and the systems of terminals provided for in this Agreement and Annex, for their operation and for their continuity and reliability.These agencies shall, on the basis of direct contacts: (a) arrange for the exchange of required performance specifications and operating procedures for the earth stations of the communications systems using Intelsat and Molniya II satellites; (b) arrange for testing, acceptance and commissioning of the satellite circuits and for operation of these circuits after commissioning; and, (c) decide matters and develop instructions relating to the operation of the secondary teleprinter multiplex system used on the satellite circuits.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS TO E XPAND THE U.S.A.-USSR D IRECT C OMMUNICATIONS L INK Signed at Washington July 17, 1984 Entered into force July 17, 1984 The Department of State, referring to the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed June 20, 1963; to the Agreement on Measures to Improve

T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS  27

the Direct Communications Link, signed September 30, 1971; and to the exchange of views between the two parties in Moscow and Washington during which it was deemed desirable to arrange for facsimile communication in addition to the current teletype Direct Communications Link, proposes that for this purpose the parties shall: 1. Establish and maintain three transmission links employing INTELSAT and STATSIONAR satellites and cable technology with secure orderwire circuit for operational monitoring. In this regard: (a) Each party shall provide communications circuits capable of simultaneously transmitting and receiving 4800 bits per second. (b) Operation of facsimile communication shall begin with the test operation over the INTELSAT satellite channel as soon as development, procurement and delivery of the necessary equipment by the sides are completed. (c) Facsimile communication via STATSIONAR shall be established after transition of the Direct Communications Link teletype circuit from MOLNIYA to STATSIONAR using mutually agreeable transition procedures and after successful tests of facsimile communication via INTELSAT and cable. 2. Employ agreed-upon information security devices to assure secure transmission of facsimile materials. In this regard: (a) The information security devices shall consist of microprocessors that will combine the digital facsimile output with buffered random data read from standard 5 inch floppy disks.The American side shall provide a specification describing the key data format and necessary keying material resident on a floppy disk for both parties until such time as the Soviet side develops this capability. Beyond that time, each party shall provide necessary keying material to the other. (b) The American side shall provide to the Soviet side the floppy disk drives integral to the operation of the microprocessor. (c) The necessary security devices as well as spare parts for the said equipment shall be provided by the American side to the Soviet side in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side. 3. Establish and maintain at each operating end of the Direct Communications Link facsimile terminals of the same make and model. In this regard: (a) Each party shall be responsible for the acquisition, installation, operation and maintenance of its own facsimile machines, the related information security devices, and local transmission circuits appropriate to the implementation of this understanding, except as otherwise specified. (b) A Group III facsimile unit which meets CCITT Recommendations T.4 and T.30 and operates at 4800 bits per second shall be used for this purpose. (c) The necessary facsimile equipment as well as spare parts for the said equipment shall be provided to the Soviet side by the American side in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side. 4. Establish and maintain secure orderwire communications necessary for coordination of facsimile operation. In this regard: (a) The orderwire terminals used with the information security devices described in Paragraph 2(a) shall incorporate standard USSR Cyrillic and United States Latin keyboards and cathode ray tube displays to permit telegraphic exchange of information between operators. The specific layout of the Cyrillic keyboard shall be as specified by the Soviet side.

28  T HE “H OT L INE ” AGREEMENTS

(b) To coordinate the work of the facsimile equipment operators, an orderwire shall be configured so as to permit, prior to the transmission and reception of facsimile messages, the exchange of all information pertinent to the coordination of such messages. (c) Orderwire messages concerning facsimile transmissions shall be encoded using the same information security devices specified in Paragraph 2(a). (d) The orderwire shall use the same modem and communications link as used for facsimile transmission. (e) A printer shall be included to provide a record copy of all information exchanged on the orderwire. (f) The necessary orderwire equipment as well as spare parts for the said equipment shall be provided by the American side to the Soviet side, in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side. 5. Ensure the exchange of information necessary for the operation and maintenance of the facsimile system. 6. Take all possible measures to assure the continuous, secure and reliable operation of the facsimile equipment, information security devices and communications links including orderwire, for which each party is responsible in accordance with this agreement. The Department of State also proposes that the parties, in consideration of the continuing advances in information and communications technology, conduct reviews as necessary regarding questions concerning improvement of the Direct Communications Link and its technical maintenance. It is also proposed to note that the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed on June 20, 1963, with the Annex thereto; the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the Direct Communications Link, with the Annex thereto, signed on September 30, 1971; those Understandings, with Attached Annexes, reached between the United States and Union of Soviet Republics, shall constitute an agreement, effective on the date of the Embassy’s reply. Kenneth W. Dean Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1984 Note: Soviet chargé d’affaires Isakov initialed the Soviet diplomatic note and the notes were exchanged on July 17, 1984.

4

The Limited Test Ban Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 prohibits nuclear weapons tests “or any other nuclear explosion” in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.While the treaty does not ban underground tests, it does prohibit nuclear explosions if such tests would cause “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control” the explosions were conducted. In accepting limitations on testing, the nuclear powers accepted as a common goal “an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances.”The fact that the word “debris” was not adequately defined led to many conflicts over alleged violations between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the United States insisting that this term include gaseous debris and the Soviet Union asserting that it applied only to particulate matter (or “fallout”). Efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the Subcommittee of Five (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union) of the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955, when the Soviet Union included discontinuance of weapons tests in its proposals. Several events leading to the Soviet proposal raised concern among the international community over weapons testing. The United States, in November 1952, and the Soviet Union, in August of the following year, each exploded their first hydrogen devices. In March 1954, the United States exploded an experimental thermonuclear device in the South Pacific that had an area of dangerous fallout that greatly exceeded predicted estimates.A Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon, was accidentally contaminated, and its crew suffered from radiation sickness, as did the inhabitants of an atoll in the area. In another such accident, rain containing radioactive debris from a Soviet hydrogen bomb test fell on Japan. Concern about radioactive fallout, the prospect of even more powerful explosions, and the potential for byproducts of such explosions to enter the food chain (particularly strontium 90 in milk) spurred efforts to halt testing. Even amid widespread international concern, the negotiations for a test ban treaty extended over an eight-year period and involved complex technical problems, both of verification and of the difficulties of reconciling deep-seated differences in approach to arms control and security. The primary issues of contention were (1) the relation of a test ban to other aspects of disarmament and (2) the question of verifying compliance.The Soviet Union and the Western powers involved in the negotiations all changed their positions multiple times on whether a test ban should be separate from other arms control agreements or linked to a comprehensive plan to reduce conventional forces and armaments and eliminate nuclear weapons. On the question of verification measures, the Western powers were determined to ensure that no agreement would be vulnerable to clandestine violation.This particularly applied to the potential for underground explosions, which could have been conducted in secret. In test

T

30  T HE L IMITED T EST B AN T REATY

ban negotiations, as well as in other arms control efforts, they considered that it would be dangerous to their security to accept simple pledges without the means of knowing that they would be observed. They also believed that such pledges would be misleading, creating illusions of secure progress toward disarmament.The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not believe formal verification measures were necessary, arguing that it would be impossible for any state to conduct an underground test without being noticed. On June 14, 1957, the Soviet Union for the first time offered test ban proposals that included international controls.The proposals were very general: establishment of an international supervisory commission for and control posts in, based on reciprocity, the territories of the three nuclear powers and the Pacific Ocean area. The Western powers suggested that a group of experts work out the details of a control system, while the delegates considered a temporary test ban in relation to other disarmament measures. The Soviet Union continued to press for an immediate suspension of tests, and the United States pressed for agreement on a control system as a necessary accompanying measure.The United States continued to be unwilling to accept the Soviets’ basic proposition that a test ban could be agreed to and controls instituted subsequently, or to accept indefinite test suspensions, which were tantamount to endorsing an uncontrolled prohibition. However, in 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced a U.S. test moratorium and the Soviet Union followed suit. In 1960, France conducted its first nuclear test in the Sahara Desert, and in 1961 the Soviet Union broke the moratorium with the largest nuclear explosion of all time—58.6 megatons.The United States responded with a vigorous test series. Thereafter, there was renewed effort to move the test ban negotiations forward. Verification and inspection issues remained the principal stumbling blocks.The United States wanted on-site inspections and unmanned seismic stations on Soviet territory. The Soviets accepted both in principle, but the two sides could not get together on the numbers: the United States wanted the right to seven inspections per year, while the Soviets would agree to only three.The same was true for remote sensors—the principle was agreed upon, but the numbers were not. The United States and the United Kingdom, in high-level correspondence with the Soviet Union, then sought to arrange three-power talks. Finally, on June 10, 1963, in a speech at American University, President John F. Kennedy announced that agreement had been reached to hold three-power meetings on the test ban in Moscow. In order to bypass the stalemate over verification, and at the same time address the environmental issues associated with testing, President Kennedy proposed a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, but not underground, where the disputed verification issues were unresolved. He also pledged that the United States would not be the first nation to resume tests in the atmosphere. The three-power meetings began on July 15, 1963.The long years of discussion had clarified views and greatly reduced areas of disagreement, and a treaty was negotiated within ten days. It was initialed on July 25, 1963, and formally signed at Moscow on August 5 by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and the British Foreign Minister Lord Alec Douglas Home. On September 24, after extensive hearings and almost three weeks of floor debate, the United States Senate consented to ratification of the treaty by a vote of 80 to 19. It was ratified by President Kennedy on October 7, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, when the three original signatories deposited their instruments of ratification. In Article I, parties to the treaty undertake “not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,” in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris to be present

T HE L IMITED T EST B AN T REATY  31

outside the borders of the state conducting the explosion.The treaty is of unlimited duration. Article II notes that any party may propose amendments, and that, if so requested by one-third or more of the states parties, the depositary governments are to convene a conference to consider the amendment. This article stipulates that any amendment must be approved by a majority of parties, including the three original parties.Article III opens the treaty to all states. Most of the countries of the world are parties to it.The treaty has since been signed by 116 countries, including states such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa— states which could (or in some cases have) developed nuclear weapons. Two major nuclear powers, France and China, have not signed the treaty, but both have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which France has ratified. In August 1988, six countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, and Venezuela) presented a proposal to the three depositary governments to amend the LTBT and to have a special amendment conference to consider their proposal, which would extend the LTBT’s prohibitions to all environments, thereby transforming it into a comprehensive test ban. By late March 1989 the depositary governments had received the requisite number of requests, in accordance with Article II of the treaty, to convene such a conference, which was held in January 1991. The United States strongly opposed using the LTBT as a vehicle for negotiating a comprehensive test ban and blocked any attempt to amend the LTBT by consensus.This effort was overtaken by events in 1993, however, when President Bill Clinton announced that that United States would continue the nine-month testing moratorium imposed by legislation in 1992. Thus, four of the five nuclear weapon states were observing moratoria (Russia and France had earlier announced moratoria, and the United Kingdom was bound by the U.S. action), which ultimately led to the signing of the CTBT in 1996.

TREATY B ANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER Signed at Moscow August 5, 1963 Entered into force October 10, 1963 The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Original Parties,” Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of mans environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

32  T HE L IMITED T EST B AN T REATY

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve. 2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article. Article II 1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties.The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties. Article III 1.This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties--the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3.This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5.The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article IV This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized

T HE L IMITED T EST B AN T REATY  33

the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance. Article V This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. For the Government of the United States of America Dean Rusk For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Sir Douglas Home For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics A. Gromyko States Parties1 Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China (Taiwan), Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria,Tanzania,Thailand,Togo,Tonga,Trinidad & Tobago,Tunisia,Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia), United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Western Samoa,Yemen,Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

1

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

5

The Outer Space Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the Outer Space Treaty, was the second of the so-called nonarmament treaties. Its concepts and some of its provisions were modeled on its predecessor, the Antarctic Treaty. Like that treaty, the Outer Space Treaty sought to prevent “a new form of colonial competition” and the possible damage that exploitation of these realms might cause. It also followed the Antarctic Treaty precedent of prohibiting the establishment of military bases and fortifications as well as military maneuvers and weapons testing on the moon or any other celestial body (Article IV). It went a step further, however: in the same article it prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space and the placement of such weapons in orbit around the Earth.Also of note is that later, in 1967, after the treaty was negotiated, the Soviet Union conducted a test of its fractional orbit bombardment system, a delivery system for nuclear weapons that utilized a fractional orbit. Because a complete orbit was not utilized, the United States promptly stated its judgment that this system was not inconsistent with the Outer Space Treaty. In early 1957—even before the Soviets launched Sputnik I, the first successful artificial satellite, in October—developments in rocketry had led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. Development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957.The Soviet Union, however, in the midst of testing its first ICBM and about to orbit its first satellite, did not accept these proposals. Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals that would bar the use of outer space for military purposes.Their successive plans for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. In an address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty be applied to outer space and celestial bodies. Soviet plans for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space.The Soviet Union, however, would not separate outer space from other disarmament issues. It declined to agree to restrict outer space to peaceful uses unless American foreign bases—where short-range and medium-range missiles were stationed—were eliminated also. After signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Soviet Union changed its position. It ceased to link an agreement on outer space with the question of foreign bases. On September 19, 1963, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the UN General Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of objects

T

T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY  35

carrying nuclear weapons.The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations,Adlai Stevenson, stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies, or stationing them in outer space. On October 14, 1963, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space. The United States supported the resolution, despite the absence of verification provisions: the capabilities of U.S. space-tracking systems, it estimated, would be adequate to detect launchings and devices in orbit. Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, in 1965 and 1966 the United States pressed for a treaty that would give further substance to the UN resolution. On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The U.S. draft dealt only with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the entire outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the treaty, and by September agreement was reached in discussions in Geneva on most treaty provisions. Differences on the few remaining issues—chiefly those involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration—were satisfactorily resolved in private consultations during the UN General Assembly session by December. On December 19, 1966, the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25 the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967. The substance of the arms control provisions is in Article IV. This article restricts military activities in two ways. First, the article contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction. Second, the article limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers. After the treaty entered into force, the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) collaborated in jointly planned and manned space enterprises.

TREATY IN THE

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE M OON AND OTHER C ELESTIAL B ODIES ON

Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, January 27, 1967 Entered into force October 10, 1967 The States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development,

36  T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963, Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963, Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space, Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed on the following: Article I The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation. Article II Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article III States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. Article IV States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of

T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY  37

any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited.The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. Article V States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle. In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties. States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts. Article VI States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization. Article VII Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Article VIII A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return. Article IX In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States

38  T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY

Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. Article X In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States. The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned. Article XI In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively. Article XII All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited. Article XIII The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations. Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international intergovernmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.

T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY  39

Article XIV 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5.The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it. Article XVI Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification. Article XVII This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this twenty-seventh day of January one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven. States Parties1 Afghanistan,Antigua and Barbuda,Argentina,Australia,Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-

1

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

40  T HE O UTER S PACE T REATY

Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saint ChristopherNevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand,Togo,Tonga,Trinidad and Tobago,Tunisia,Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia), United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen,Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

6

Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties B ACKGROUND

ON

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE Z ONES

uclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaties serve to enhance international regulation of nuclear arms by establishing large geographical regions wherein the testing, possession, and stationing of nuclear weapons are prohibited.The assumption embedded in the logic of NWFZs is that the creation of such regions will reduce the likelihood that states in the regions will be compelled to seek nuclear weapons in response to a neighbor, thereby decreasing their probability of becoming involved in a nuclear war. Further, as these regimes increase in number, the cause of nuclear arms control is advanced. Importantly, the strength of this assumption depends on the extent to which the nations within a particular NWFZ and the extra-zonal nuclear nations are prepared to uphold the letter and the spirit of the particular NWFZ treaty. The NWFZ regime formally began with the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which instituted such a zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is important to note that the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972) prohibited nuclear weapons on the Antarctic continent, in outer space, and on the international seabed respectively. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) helped to strengthen the movement by acknowledging, in Article VII, the “rights of states to establish NWFZs in their respective territories.” Seeking to both foster and regulate the emerging NWFZ regime, in 1975 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly generated a set of guidelines by which potential NWFZ regions could structure their treaties. The regulations prepared by the United Nations included stipulations that an NWFZ be free of nuclear weapons, that zone arrangements contain an effective verification system, and that the zone be established with unlimited duration. Following the lead of Tlatelolco, after some years a series of NWFZ treaties were concluded for the South Pacific in 1985 (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia in 1995 (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa in 1996 (Treaty of Pelindaba). In 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission adopted an even more specific set of guidelines for NWFZs. These guiding principles included a call for NWFZ parties to comply with full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, for nuclear weapon states to agree to legally binding protocols that prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against an NWFZ party, and for clauses in potential treaties to avoid violations of prior obligations under international law (in particular, those established by the Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States also has criteria for supporting such zones: all states in the region must join, transit of nuclear weapons through the region may not be affected, individual states parties are free to permit or deny port calls by U.S. warships (regardless of their weaponry), and the international law of freedom of the seas may not be infringed upon.

N

42  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

The current NWFZ regime contains 110 states and has, in effect, created a nuclearweapon-free southern hemisphere. Prospects for additional NWFZs include central Asia, northeast Asia, and the Middle East. In spite of a myriad of creative proposals, it is unlikely that all of these proposals will come to fruition in the near future. These challenges notwithstanding, the current NWFZ treaties remain a testament to the strength and momentum of the NWFZ regime.

T REATY

LATIN

OF

T LATELOLCO

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS AMERICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

he Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco—obligates parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, or to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Besides the agreement among the parties themselves, two additional protocols address matters that concern countries outside of the region. Protocol I involves an undertaking by outside countries that have territories in the NWFZ to adhere to the treaty’s terms for those territories. Protocol II involves a negative security assurance undertaking pursuant to which the NPT nuclear weapon states pledge never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a treaty party.The United States is a party to both protocols. The United States has favored the establishment of NWFZs where, inter alia, they would limit the spread of nuclear weapons; they would not disturb existing security arrangements; they would provide for adequate verification; the initiative for such zones would originate in the geographical area concerned; and all states important to denuclearization of the area would participate. In mid-1962, the Brazilian representatives to the UN General Assembly proposed making Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the seventeenth regular session of the General Assembly in October, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a draft resolution calling for such a zone was submitted by Brazil and supported by Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador.While asserting support for the principle, Cuba stipulated certain conditions, including the requirement that Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone be included in the NWFZ, and that foreign military bases, especially Guantanamo Naval Base, be eliminated.The draft resolution was not put to a vote at the General Assembly that year. On April 29, 1963, at the initiative of the president of Mexico, the presidents of five Latin American countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico—announced that they were prepared to sign a multilateral agreement that would make Latin America a nuclearweapon-free zone. On November 27, 1963, this declaration received the support of the UN General Assembly, with the United States voting in the affirmative. The Latin American nations followed this initiative with extensive and detailed negotiations among themselves. They were determined to avoid being caught up again in a future superpower confrontation, as they had during the Cuban Missile Crisis. At a conference in Mexico City held November 23–27, 1964, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was created and instructed to prepare a draft treaty.

T

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  43

Important differences among the Latin American countries emerged over questions of NWFZ boundary definitions, transit guarantees, and safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. On February 14, 1967, the treaty was signed at a regional meeting of Latin American countries at Tlatelolco, a section of Mexico City. On December 5, 1967, the UN General Assembly endorsed the treaty by vote of 82 to 0, with twenty-eight nations abstaining. The United States voted in support of the treaty. As of October 2002, the treaty had entered into force for all Latin American and Caribbean states except Cuba. Cuba signed the treaty in 1995 but has taken no further action. Initially Belize and Guyana were not invited to accede to the treaty, because a special regime was foreseen for those political entities whose territories are wholly or partially the subject of disputes or claims by an extra-continental state and one or more Latin American states.They have since become parties to the treaty. Like the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is designed to establish an NWFZ in Latin America. Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco makes a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, although the latter are strictly regulated. As stated above, the treaty has two accompanying protocols. Protocol I applies the treaty regime to territories under the jurisdiction of a state located outside the zone. Protocol II is a vehicle by which the five nuclear-weapon states agree to respect the treaty regime. The treaty has an elaborate structure for the application of its obligations. The treaty NWFZ comes into full effect only after all Latin American states are parties to it, both protocols are fully subscribed, and all Latin American states agree to apply IAEA safeguards. Such safeguards are also required of all non-nuclear weapon states parties by Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For an individual Latin American state to be actually obligated (even if it is a party), it must not only sign and ratify, but also formally declare that it waives the above requirements and is prepared to assume the treaty’s obligations. Several Latin American states have not negotiated IAEA safeguards; all save Cuba have ratified and waived.Thus, the treaty is in force for all Latin American states except Cuba, but the full treaty regime has not yet come into force. The basic obligations of the treaty are contained in Article I.The parties agree to prevent the testing, use, manufacture, production, storage, deployment, installation, or emplacement of nuclear weapons on their territories. Important provisions in the treaty deal with verification. Treaty parties undertake to negotiate agreements with the IAEA to apply its safeguards to their nuclear activities. The treaty also establishes an organization to help ensure compliance with treaty provisions—the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)—with a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat as its permanent organs.The five-member elected Council is empowered to perform “special inspections.” Of the accompanying protocols, Protocol I calls on nations outside the treaty zone to apply the treaty’s denuclearization provisions to their territories in the zone “for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible.” All four countries that have such territories have signed and ratified the protocol—the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and the United States. U.S. Protocol I territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S.Virgin Islands, and the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Since the Panama Canal treaties entered into force on October 1, 1979, U.S. obligations to the former Canal Zone are governed by those treaties and by Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. President Jimmy Carter signed Protocol I for the United States in 1977. In November 1981, the Senate completed its review of the protocol and gave advice and consent to ratification, subject to certain understandings that were supported by the executive branch as outlined below. President Ronald Reagan ratified Protocol I in November 1981, and

44  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

the U.S. instrument of ratification was deposited in Mexico City on November 23, 1981. Senate advice and consent to ratification of Protocol I was made subject to three understandings: 1. that the provisions of the treaty made applicable by the protocol do not affect the rights of the contracting parties to grant or deny transport and transit privileges to their own or other vessels’ aircraft regardless of cargo armaments; 2. that the provisions of the treaty made applicable by the protocol do not affect the right of the contracting parties regarding the exercise of freedom of seas or passage through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a state; and 3. that the understanding and declarations the United States attached to ratification of Protocol II apply also to ratification of Protocol I. In Protocol II, the nuclear weapon states undertake (1) to respect the denuclearized status of the zone; (2) to not contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties; and (3) to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against contracting parties.The five nuclear weapon states—France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Russia (in place of the Soviet Union)—are all parties to Protocol II. The United States signed Protocol II on April 1, 1968. When President Richard M. Nixon transmitted it to the Senate on August 13, 1970, he recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent subject to certain understandings and declarations set forth in a statement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee revised the statement slightly during its hearings on the protocol in September 1970 and February 1971, and the full Senate gave its consent to ratification on April 19, 1971, subject to the revised statement. President Nixon ratified the protocol on May 8, 1971, and the United States deposited the instrument of ratification on May 12, 1971, subject to the following understandings and declarations:  The treaty and its protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims.  The treaty does not affect the rights of the contracting parties to grant or deny transport and transit privileges to non–contracting parties.  With respect to the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the treaty parties, the United States would “have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it is assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty.”1  Considering the technology for producing nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes to be indistinguishable from that for making nuclear weapons, the United States regards the treaty’s prohibitions as applying to all nuclear explosive devices. However, the treaty would not prevent the United States, as a nuclear weapon state, from making nuclear explosion services (such as “construction services”) for peaceful purposes available “in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.” The treaty was amended four times between 1990 and 1995: first, to add “and the Carribean” to the title; second, to permit Belize and Guyana to join; third, to replace 1

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990. pp. 84–86.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  45

OPANAL by the IAEA for “special inspections” under the treaty; and, fourth, to facilitate Argentina and Brazil to assume the obligations of the treaty.

TREATY

FOR THE

PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN L ATIN A MERICA

Signed at Mexico City February 14, 1967 Entered into force April 22, 1968 Preamble In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness, Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a coordinated programme of disarmament “the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type,” Recalling that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1911 (XVIII), which established that the measures that should be agreed upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be taken “in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agreements,” Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), which established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and duties for the nuclear and nonnuclear powers, and Recalling that the Charter of the Organization of American States proclaims that it is an essential purpose of the Organization to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere, Convinced: That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind itself is to be assured, That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable, That general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world equally demand, That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament enormously difficult and would increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration, That the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones is closely linked with the maintenance of peace and security in the respective regions,

46  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

That the military denuclearization of vast geographical zones, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions where similar conditions exist, That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situation both in their own interest and for the good of mankind, That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources required for economic and social development, That the foregoing reasons, together with the traditional peace-loving outlook of Latin America, give rise to an inescapable necessity that nuclear energy should be used in that region exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the Latin American countries should use their right to the greatest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to expedite the economic and social development of their peoples, Convinced finally: That the military denuclearization of Latin America—being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories forever free from nuclear weapon—will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and will protect them against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, and will also constitute a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament, and That Latin America, faithful to its tradition of universality, must not only endeavour to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war, but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples, at the same time co-operating in the fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say, in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Charter of the Organization of American States. Have agreed as follows: Article 1. Obligations 1.The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and (b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. 2.The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon. Article 2. Definition of the Contracting Parties For the purposes of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties are those for whom the Treaty is in force.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  47

Article 3. Definition of Territory For the purposes of this Treaty, the term “territory” shall include the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation. Article 4. Zone of Application 1. The zone of application of this Treaty is the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force. 2. Upon fulfillment of the requirements of article 28, paragraph 1, the zone of application of this Treaty shall also be that which is situated in the western hemisphere within the following limits (except the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and its territorial waters): starting at a point located at 35 north latitude, 75 west longitude; from this point directly southward to a point at 30 north latitude, 75 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 30 north latitude, 50 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 5 north latitude, 20 west longitude; from there directly southward to a point 60 south latitude, 20 west longitude; from there, directly westward to a point at 60 south latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, directly northward to a point at 0 latitude, 115 west longitude; from there, along a loxodromic line to a point at 35 north latitude, 150 west longitude; from there, directly eastward to a point at 35 north latitude, 75 west longitude. Article 5. Definition of Nuclear Weapons For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes. An instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of the device is not included in this definition if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof. Article 6. Meeting of Signatories At the request of any of the signatory States or if the Agency established by article 7 should so decide, a meeting of all the signatories may be convoked to consider in common questions which may affect the very essence of this instrument, including possible amendments to it. In either case, the meeting will be convoked by the General Secretary. Article 7. Organization 1. In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties hereby establish an international organization to be known as the “Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,” hereinafter referred to as “the Agency.” Only the Contracting Parties shall be affected by its decisions. 2. The Agency shall be responsible for the holding of periodic or extraordinary consultations among Member States on matters relating to the purposes, measures and procedures set forth in this Treaty and to the supervision of compliance with the obligations arising therefrom. 3.The Contracting Parties agree to extend to the Agency full and prompt cooperation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Agency and of any agreements the Agency may conclude with any other international organization or body. 4.The headquarters of the Agency shall be in Mexico City. Article 8. Organs 1.There are hereby established as principal organs of the Agency a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat.

48  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

2. Such subsidiary organs as are considered necessary by the General Conference may be established within the purview of this Treaty. Article 9. The General Conference 1. The General Conference, the supreme organ of the Agency, shall be composed of all the Contracting Parties; it shall hold regular sessions every two years, and may also hold special sessions whenever this Treaty so provides or, in the opinion of the Council, the circumstances so require. 2.The General Conference: (a) May consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by this Treaty, within the limits thereof, including those referring to powers and functions of any organ provided for in this Treaty. (b) Shall establish procedures for the control system to ensure observance of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions. (c) Shall elect the Members of the Council and the General Secretary. (d) May remove the General Secretary from office if the proper functioning of the Agency so requires. (e) Shall receive and consider the biennial and special reports submitted by the Council and the General Secretary. (f) Shall initiate and consider studies designed to facilitate the optimum fulfillment of the aims of this Treaty, without prejudice to the power of the General Secretary independently to carry out similar studies for submission to and consideration by the Conference. (g) Shall be the organ competent to authorize the conclusion of agreements with Governments and other international organizations and bodies. 3.The General Conference shall adopt the Agency’s budget and fix the scale of financial contributions to be paid by Member States, taking into account the systems and criteria used for the same purpose by the United Nations. 4.The General Conference shall elect its officers for each session and may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. 5. Each Member of the Agency shall have one vote.The decisions of the General Conference shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting in the case of matters relating to the control system and measures referred to in article 20, the admission of new Members, the election or removal of the General Secretary, adoption of the budget and matters related thereto. Decisions on other matters, as well as procedural questions and also determination of which questions must be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be taken by a simple majority of the Members present and voting. 6.The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Article 10. The Council 1. The Council shall be composed of five Members of the Agency elected by the General Conference from among the Contracting Parties, due account being taken of equitable geographic distribution. 2. The Members of the Council shall be elected for a term of four years. However, in the first election three will be elected for two years. Outgoing Members may not be reelected for the following period unless the limited number of States for which the Treaty is in force so requires. 3. Each Member of the Council shall have one representative.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  49

4.The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. 5. In addition to the functions conferred upon it by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to it by the General Conference, the Council shall, through the General Secretary, ensure the proper operation of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and with the decisions adopted by the General Conference. 6.The Council shall submit an annual report on its work to the General Conference as well as such special reports as it deems necessary or which the General Conference requests of it. 7.The Council shall elect its officers for each session. 8. The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority of its Members present and voting. 9.The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Article 11. The Secretariat 1.The Secretariat shall consist of a General Secretary, who shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The term of office of the General Secretary shall be four years and he may be re-elected for a single additional term. The General Secretary may not be a national of the country in which the Agency has its headquarters. In case the office of General Secretary becomes vacant, a new election shall be held to fill the office for the remainder of the term. 2.The staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the General Secretary, in accordance with rules laid down by the General Conference. 3. In addition to the functions conferred upon him by this Treaty and to those which may be assigned to him by the General Conference, the General Secretary shall ensure, as provided by article 10, paragraph 5, the proper operation of the control system established by this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions taken by the General Conference. 4.The General Secretary shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Conference and of the Council and shall make an annual report to both bodies on the work of the Agency and any special reports requested by the General Conference or the Council or which the General Secretary may deem desirable. 5. The General Secretary shall establish the procedures for distributing to all Contracting Parties information received by the Agency from governmental sources and such information from nongovernmental sources as may be of interest to the Agency. 6. In the performance of their duties the General Secretary and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Agency and shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Agency; subject to their responsibility to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties in the Agency. 7. Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the General Secretary and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Article 12. Control System 1. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by the Contracting Parties in accordance with article 1, a control system shall be established which shall be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of articles 13-18 of this Treaty.

50  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

2.The control system shall be used in particular for the purpose of verifying: (a) That devices, services and facilities intended for peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not used in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons, (b) That none of the activities prohibited in article 1 of this Treaty are carried out in the territory of the Contracting Parties with nuclear materials or weapons introduced from abroad, and (c) That explosions for peaceful purposes are compatible with article 18 of this Treaty. Article 13. IAEA Safeguards Each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its safeguards to its nuclear activities. Each Contracting Party shall initiate negotiations within a period of 180 days after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of this Treaty. These agreements shall enter into force, for each Party, not later than eighteen months after the date of the initiation of such negotiations except in case of unforeseen circumstances or force majeure. Article 14. Reports of the Parties 1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories. 2.The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and to the application of safeguards. 3.The Contracting Parties shall also transmit to the Organization of American States, for its information, any reports that may be of interest to it, in accordance with the obligations established by the Inter-American System. Article 15. Special Reports Requested by the General Secretary 1. With the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate promptly and fully with the General Secretary. 2.The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies. Article 16. Special Inspections 1. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Council established by this Treaty have the power of carrying out special inspections in the following cases: (a) In the case of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty; (b) In the case of the Council: (i) When so requested, the reasons for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf, the Council shall immediately arrange for such an inspection in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  51

(ii) When requested by any Party which has been suspected of or charged with having violated this Treaty, the Council shall immediately arrange for the special inspection requested in accordance with article 10, paragraph 5. The above requests will be made to the Council through the General Secretary. 2.The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the Council concludes on the basis of the report on the special inspection that, in view of the circumstances existing in the case, such costs and expenses should be borne by the agency. 3.The General Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of the special inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article. 4.The Contracting Parties undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to all places and all information which may be necessary for the performance of their duties and which are directly and intimately connected with the suspicion of violation of this Treaty. If so requested by the authorities of the Contracting Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors designated by the General Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the work of the inspectors. 5.The Council shall immediately transmit to all the Parties, through the General Secretary, a copy of any report resulting from special inspections. 6. Similarly, the Council shall send through the General Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, and to the Council of the Organization of American States, for its information, a copy of any report resulting from any special inspection carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), sections (i) and (ii) of this article. 7. The Council may decide, or any Contracting Party may request, the convening of a special session of the General Conference for the purpose of considering the reports resulting from any special inspection. In such a case, the General Secretary shall take immediate steps to convene the special session requested. 8. The General Conference, convened in special session under this article, may make recommendations to the Contracting Parties and submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be transmitted to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. Article 17. Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Contracting Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress. Article 18. Explosions for Peaceful Purposes 1. The Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes— including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons—or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of this article and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5. 2. Contracting Parties intending to carry out, or to cooperate in carrying out, such an explosion shall notify the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as far in advance as the circumstances require, of the date of the explosion and shall at the same time provide the following information:

52  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(a) The nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained, (b) The place and purpose of the planned explosion, (c) The procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 3 of this article, (d) The expected force of the device, and (e) The fullest possible information on any possible radioactive fall-out that may result from the explosion or explosions, and measures which will be taken to avoid danger to the population, flora, fauna and territories of any other Party or Parties. 3. The General Secretary and the technical personnel designated by the Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency may observe all the preparations, including the explosion of the device, and shall have unrestricted access to any area in the vicinity of the site of the explosion in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information supplied under paragraph 2 of this article and the other provisions of this Treaty. 4.The Contracting Parties may accept the collaboration of third parties for the purpose set forth in paragraph 1 of the present article, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof. Article 19. Relations with Other International Organizations 1. The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty. 2.The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world. 3. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the International American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute. Article 20. Measures in the Event of Violation of the Treaty 1. The General Conference shall take note of all cases in which, in its opinion, any Contracting Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty and shall draw the matter to the attention of the Party concerned, making such recommendations as it deems appropriate. 2. If, in its opinion, such non-compliance constitutes a violation of this Treaty which might endanger peace and security, the General Conference shall report thereon simultaneously to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to the Council of the Organization of American States. The General Conference shall likewise report to the International Atomic Energy Agency for such purposes as are relevant in accordance with its Statute. Article 21. United Nations and Organization of American States None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties. Article 22. Privileges and Immunities 1. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties such legal capacity

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  53

and such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes. 2. Representatives of the Contracting Parties accredited to the Agency and officials of the Agency shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of their functions. 3.The Agency may conclude agreements with the Contracting Parties with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. Article 23. Notification of Other Agreements Once this Treaty has entered into force, the Secretariat shall be notified immediately of any international agreement concluded by any of the Contracting Parties on matters with which this Treaty is concerned; the Secretariat shall register it and notify the other Contracting Parties. Article 24. Settlement of Disputes Unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peaceful settlement, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty which is not settled shall be referred to the International Court of Justice with the prior consent of the Parties to the controversy. Article 25. Signature 1.This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by: (a) All the Latin American Republics, and (b) All other sovereign States situated in their entirety south of latitude 35 o north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such States which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference. 2.The General Conference shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity part or all of whose territory is the subject, prior to the date when this Treaty is opened for signature, of a dispute or claim between an extra-continental country and one or more Latin American States, so long as the dispute has not been settled by peaceful means. Article 26. Ratification and Deposit 1.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. 2. This Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Mexican United States, which is hereby designated the Depositary Government. 3.The Depositary Government shall send certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of signatory States and shall notify them of the deposit of each instrument of ratification. Article 27. Reservations This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Article 28. Entry into Force 1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, this Treaty shall enter into force among the States that have ratified it as soon as the following requirements have been met: (a) Deposit of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty with the Depositary Government by the Governments of the States mentioned in article 25 which are in existence on the date when

54  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

this Treaty is opened for signature and which are not affected by the provisions of article 25, paragraph 2; (b) Signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I annexed to this Treaty by all extra-continental or continental States having de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the zone of application of the Treaty; (c) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocol II annexed to this Treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons; (d) Conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements on the application of Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article 13 of this Treaty. 2. All signatory States shall have the imprescriptible right to waive, wholly or in part, the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph.They may do so by means of a declaration which shall be annexed to their respective instrument of ratification and which may be formulated at the time of deposit of the instrument or subsequently. For those States which exercise this right, this Treaty shall enter into force upon deposit of the declaration, or as soon as those requirements have been met which have not been expressly waived. 3. As soon as this Treaty has entered into force in accordance with this provisions of paragraph 2 for eleven States, the Depositary Government shall convene a preliminary meeting of those States in order that the Agency may be set up and commence its work. 4.After the entry into force of this Treaty for all the countries of the zone, the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons shall have the effect of suspending the execution of this Treaty for those countries which have ratified it without waiving requirements of paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, and which request such suspension; the Treaty shall remain suspended until the new power, on its own initiative or upon request by the General Conference, ratifies the annexed Additional Protocol II. Article 29. Amendments 1.Any Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Treaty and shall submit its proposals to the Council through the General Secretary, who shall transmit them to all the other Contracting Parties and, in addition, to all other signatories in accordance with article 6.The Council, through the General Secretary, shall immediately following the meeting of signatories convene a special session of the General Conference to examine the proposals made, for the adoption of which a two-thirds majority of the Contracting Parties present and voting shall be required. 2.Amendments adopted shall enter into force as soon as the requirements set forth in article 28 of this Treaty have been complied with. Article 30. Duration and Denunciation 1.This Treaty shall be of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may denounce it by notifying the General Secretary of the Agency if, in the opinion of the denouncing State, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or more Contracting Parties. 2.The denunciation shall take effect three months after the delivery to the General Secretary of the Agency of the notification by the Government of the signatory State concerned. The General Secretary shall immediately communicate such notification to the other Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. He shall also communicate it to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  55

Article 31. Authentic Texts and Registration This Treaty, of which the Spanish, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary Government in accordance with article 102 of the United Nations Charter.The Depositary Government shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratification and amendments relating to this Treaty and shall communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States for its information. Transitional Article Denunciation of the declaration referred to article 28, paragraph 2, shall be subject to the same procedures as the denunciation of this Treaty, except that it will take effect on the date of delivery of the respective notification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Treaty on behalf of their respective Governments. DONE at Mexico, Distrito Federal, on the Fourteenth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-seven.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments, Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 To undertake to apply the statute of denuclearization in respect of warlike purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty. Article 2 The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this Protocol is an annex, and the provisions regarding ratification and denunciation contained in the Treaty shall be applicable to it. Article 3 This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

56  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.2

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, furnished with full powers by their respective Governments, Convinced that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, negotiated and signed in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, represents an important step towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Aware that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but, rather, a means of achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage, and Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards promoting and strengthening a world at peace, based on mutual respect and sovereign equality of States, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect or warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this instrument is an annex, shall be fully respected by the Parties to this Protocol in all its express aims and provisions. Article 2 The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries undertake, therefore, not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies in accordance with article 4 thereof. Article 3 The Governments represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Article 4 The duration of this Protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of which this protocol is an annex, and the definitions of territory and nuclear weapons set forth in articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty shall be applicable to this Protocol, as well as the provisions regarding ratification, reservations, denunciation, authentic texts and registration contained in articles 26, 27, 30 and 31 of the Treaty. Article 5 This Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. 2

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  57

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form, sign this Additional Protocol on behalf of their respective Governments.

Proclamation by President Nixon on Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America Considering that: Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, done at the City of Mexico on February 14, 1967, was signed on behalf of the United States of America on April 1, 1968, the text of which Protocol is word for word as follows: [The text of the Protocol appears here.]

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 19, 1971, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of Additional Protocol II, with the following understandings and declarations: I That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to “its own legislation” to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of this Treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law. That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commissions interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under Article I of the Treaty. II That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore, the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined

58  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that Treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present Treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device. III That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties. The President ratified Additional Protocol II on May 8, 1971, with the above recited understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate. It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II that the Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification. The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was deposited on December 11, 1969 with understandings and a declaration, and the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12, 1971 with the above recited understandings and declarations. In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol entered into force for the United States of America on May 12, 1971, subject to the above recited understandings and declarations. NOW,THEREFORE, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, subject to the above recited understandings and declarations, on and after May 12, 1971 by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. DONE at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fifth.

T REATY

SOUTH

OF

R AROTONGA

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS PACIFIC NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

n August 6, 1985, the countries comprising the South Pacific Forum (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands,Tonga,Tuvalu,Vanuatu, and Western Samoa (now Samoa) opened the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, called the Treaty of Rarotonga, for signature.Three protocols attached to the treaty were opened for signature to extra-zonal states. Eight of the thirteen countries of the region endorsed the treaty in 1985. It entered into force on

O

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  59

December 11, 1986, after Australia became the eighth country to ratify. Since then, four additional countries have become parties to the treaty. The protocols have all been signed by the relevant extra-zonal states, and all but the United States have ratified them. The treaty prohibits, in Article I, any nuclear weapon or explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, regardless of its intended purpose.With these provisions, the Treaty of Rarotonga goes beyond the Treaty of Tlatalolco by prohibiting all nuclear explosive devices, even for peaceful purposes. Nuclear explosive testing is expressly prohibited in Article VI. In Article VI, the Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits the dumping of radioactive material anywhere in the South Pacific zone’s waters. In Article VII, the treaty also calls for full-scope IAEA safeguards to be applied to the parties’ nuclear activities, so that no exportation of nuclear material to or from non-nuclear weapon states can commence without safeguard application. The treaty creates an NWFZ within the territories of the South Pacific states, including the twelve-mile territorial sea.The treaty does not apply to the large ocean area of the South Pacific and, furthermore, expressly does not prohibit the transport of nuclear weapons through the zone on foreign vessels or aircraft. In addition to the aforementioned provisions, the Treaty of Rarotonga contains three protocols that describe the role of extra-zonal nations in the maintenance of the NWFZ.The first protocol requires extra-zonal nations with territories in the zone (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) to acknowledge the treaty’s mandate for their territories.The second protocol requires that the five nuclear weapon states respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zonal states and provide assurances that nuclear weapons will never be used or threatened against the parties. The third protocol requires the five nuclear weapon states to suspend and discontinue any nuclear testing within the zone. The impetus for the NWFZ in the South Pacific developed principally from increasing anxiety over the activities of nuclear states in the region. Specifically, the countries of the region wanted to terminate both the dumping and storing of nuclear waste material and nuclear testing by France in the South Pacific. In 1983,Australia submitted a proposal to the South Pacific Forum, and the Treaty of Rarotonga was endorsed the following year. However, securing endorsement of the protocols by the nuclear weapon states proved considerably more elusive.While China and Russia had signed and ratified the protocols by 1989, the United States and the United Kingdom were unwilling to endorse the additional protocols in view of continued French nuclear testing on the South Pacific island of Muruoa. When the French terminated nuclear testing on Mururoa in 1995, and in the wake of commitments made at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, all three Western nuclear powers agreed to sign the protocols, and did so on March 25, 1996. France and the United Kingdom have ratified the protocols; the United States has not.

SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE TREATY 1. On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Forum, a body comprising the independent and self-governing countries of the South Pacific (Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands,Tonga,Tuvalu,Vanuatu and Western Samoa), endorsed the text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and opened it for signature.

60  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

2. The attached text of the Treaty with its Annexes was formally communicated to the Director General by the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), who has been nominated as Depositary of the Treaty, and is herewith being circulated to all Member States for their information pursuant to a request made by the Director of SPEC. Preamble The Parties to this Treaty, United in their commitment to a world at peace; Gravely concerned that the continuing nuclear arms race presents the risk of nuclear war which would have devastating consequences for all people; Convinced that all countries have an obligation to make every effort to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the terror which they hold for humankind and the threat which they pose to life on earth; Believing that regional arms control measures can contribute to global efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race and promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all; Determined to ensure, so far as lies within their power, that the bounty and beauty of the land and sea in their region shall remain the heritage of their peoples and their descendants in perpetuity to be enjoyed by all in peace; Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing to world security; Noting, in particular, that Article VII of the NPT recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; Noting that the prohibitions of emplantation and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof contained in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof apply in the South Pacific; Noting also that the prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or under water, including territorial waters or high seas, contained in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water applies in the South Pacific; Determined to keep the region free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter; Guided by the decision of the Fifteenth South Pacific Forum at Tuvalu that a nuclear free zone should be established in the region at the earliest possible opportunity in accordance with the principles set out in the communique of that meeting; Have agreed as follows: Article 1. Usage of Terms For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocols: (a) “South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone” means the areas described in Annex 1 as illustrated by the map attached to that Annex; (b) “territory” means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters, the seabed and subsoil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them; (c) “nuclear explosive device” means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  61

includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it; (d) “stationing” means emplantation, emplacement, transportation on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment. Article 2. Application of the Treaty 1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas. Article 3. Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices Each Party undertakes: (a) not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere inside or outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; (b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device; (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State. Article 4. Peaceful Nuclear Activities Each Party undertakes: (a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to: (i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or (ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Any such provisions shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use; (b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. Article 5. Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices 1. Each Party undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device. 2. Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits. Article 6. Prevention of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices Each Party undertakes: (a) to prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

62  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(b) not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State. Article 7. Prevention of Dumping 1. Each Party undertakes: (a) not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. (b) to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in its territorial sea; (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping by anyone of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone; (d) to support the conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention relating to the protection of the natural resources and environment of the South Pacific region and its Protocol for the prevention of pollution of the South Pacific region by dumping, with the aim of precluding dumping at sea of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone anywhere in the region. 2. Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) of this Article shall not apply to areas of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in respect of which such a Convention and Protocol have entered into force. Article 8. Control System 1.The Parties hereby establish a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with their obligations under this Treaty. 2.The control system shall comprise: (a) reports and exchange of information as provided for in Article 9; (b) consultations as provided for in Article 10 and Annex 4 (1); (c) the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as provided for in Annex 2; (d) a complaints procedure as provided for in Annex 4. Article 9. Reports and Exchanges of Information 1. Each Party shall report to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (the Director) as soon as possible any significant event within its jurisdiction affecting the implementation of this Treaty.The Director shall circulate such reports promptly to all Parties. 2.The Parties shall endeavour to keep each other informed on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange information by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all Parties. 3.The Director shall report annually to the South Pacific Forum on the status of this Treaty and matters arising under or in relation to it, incorporating reports and communications made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and matters arising under Articles 8(2)(d) and 10 and Annex 2(4). Article 10. Consultations and Review Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties by other means, the Director, at the request of any Party, shall convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee established by Annex 3 for consultation and co-operation on any matter arising in relation to this Treaty or for reviewing its operation.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  63

Article 11. Amendment The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment of the provisions of this Treaty proposed by any Party and circulated by the Director to all Parties not less than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by consensus by the Consultative Committee shall be communicated to the Director who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties.An amendment shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by the depositary of acceptances from all Parties. Article 12. Signature and Ratification 1.This Treaty shall be open for signature by any Member of the South Pacific Forum. 2.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Director who is hereby designated depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols. 3. If a Member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 shall be deemed to be amended so far as is required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.The delineation of any area added pursuant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum. Article 13. Withdrawal 1.This Treaty is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that in the event of a violation by any Party of a provision of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty or of the spirit of the Treaty, every other Party shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty. 2. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the Director who shall circulate such notice to all other Parties. Article 14. Reservations This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Article 15. Entry into Force 1.This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification. 2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification. Article 16. Depositary Functions The depositary shall register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and shall transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Members of the South Pacific Forum and all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.3 DONE at Rarotonga, this sixth day of August, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-five, in a single original in the English language. Annex 1. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone A.The area bounded by a line: 3

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

64  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(1) commencing at the point of intersection of the Equator by the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea; (2) running thence northerly along that maritime boundary to its intersection by the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Papua New Guinea; (3) thence generally north-easterly, easterly and south-easterly along that outer limit to its intersection by the Equator; (4) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 163 degrees East; (5) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 3 degrees North; (6) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 171 degrees East; (7) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 4 degrees North; (8) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 180 degrees East; (9) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator; (10) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 165 degrees West; (11) thence north along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 5 degrees 30 minutes North; (12) thence east along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 154 degrees West; (13) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the Equator; (14) thence east along the Equator to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees West; (15) thence south along that meridian to its intersection by the parallel of Latitude 60 degrees South; (16) thence west along that parallel to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 115 degrees East; (17) thence north along that meridian to its southernmost intersection by the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia; (18) thence generally northerly and easterly along the outer limit of the territorial sea of Australia to its intersection by the meridian of Longitude 136 degrees 45 minutes East; (19) thence north-easterly along the geodesic to the point of Latitude 10 degrees 50 minutes South, Longitude 139 degrees 12 minutes East; (20) thence north-easterly along the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to where it joins the land border between those two countries; (21) thence generally northerly along that land border to where it joins the maritime boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, on the northern coastline of Papua New Guinea; and (22) thence generally northerly along that boundary to the point of commencement.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  65

B.The areas within the outer limits of the territorial seas of all Australian islands lying westward of the area described in paragraph A and north of Latitude 60 degrees South, provided that any such areas shall cease to be part of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone upon receipt by the depositary of written notice from the Government of Australia stating that the areas have become subject to another treaty having an object and purpose substantially the same as that of this Treaty. Annex 2. IAEA Safeguards 1.The safeguards referred to in Article 8 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. 2.The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, an agreement required in connection with the NPT on the basis of the material reproduced in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) of the IAEA. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that such an agreement is in force for it not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty. 3. For the purposes of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices. 4. Each Party agrees upon the request of any other Party to transmit to that Party and to the Director for the information of all Parties a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all Parties. Annex 3. Consultative Committee 1.There is hereby established a Consultative Committee which shall be convened by the Director from time to time pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 and Annex 4 (2).The Consultative Committee shall be constituted of representatives of the Parties, each Party being entitled to appoint one representative who may be accompanied by advisers. Unless otherwise agreed, the Consultative Committee shall be chaired at any given meeting by the representative of the Party which last hosted the meeting of Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum.A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of half the Parties. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, decisions of the Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.The Consultative Committee shall, adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees fit. 2.The costs of the Consultative Committee, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to Annex 4, shall be borne by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation. It may seek special funding should this be required. Annex 4. Complaints Procedure 1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall, before bringing such a complaint to the Director, bring the subject matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter. 2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to the Director with a request that the Consultative Committee be convened to consider it. Complaints shall be supported by an account of evidence of breach of obligations known to the complainant Party. Upon receipt of a complaint the Director shall convene the Consultative Committee as quickly as possible to consider it.

66  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

3.The Consultative Committee, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1, shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter. 4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Consultative Committee decides that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or elsewhere, the Consultative Committee shall direct that such special inspection be made as quickly as possible by a special inspection team of three suitably qualified special inspectors appointed by the Consultative Committee in consultation with the complained of and complainant Parties, provided that no national of either Party shall serve on the special inspection team. If so requested by the Party complained of, the special inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of special inspectors, nor the right to accompany special inspectors, shall delay the work of the special inspection team. 5. In making a special inspection, special inspectors shall be subject to the direction only of the Consultative Committee and shall comply with such directives concerning tasks, objectives, confidentiality and procedures as may be decided upon by it. Directives shall take account of the legitimate interests of the Party complained of in complying with its other international obligations and commitments and shall not duplicate safeguards procedures to be undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to agreements referred to in Annex 2 (1).The special inspectors shall discharge their duties with due respect for the laws of the Party complained of. 6. Each Party shall give to special inspectors full and free access to all information and places within its territory which may be relevant to enable the special inspectors to implement the directives given to them by the Consultative Committee. 7.The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the special inspection, and shall grant to special inspectors privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions, including inviolability for all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken and written, for the purpose of the special inspection. 8. The special inspectors shall report in writing as quickly as possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining their activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by them, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions. The Consultative Committee shall report fully to all Members of the South Pacific Forum, giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty. 9. If the Consultative Committee has decided that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, or at any time at the request of either the complainant or complained of Party, the Parties shall meet promptly at a meeting of the South Pacific Forum.

PROTOCOL 1 The Parties to this Protocol Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty) Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  67

3, 5 and 6, insofar as they related to the manufacture, stationing and testing of any nuclear explosive device within those territories, and the safeguards specified in Article 8(2)(c) and Annex 2 of the Treaty. Article 2 Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty. Article 3 This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Article 4 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 5 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 6 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol. DONE at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 2 The Parties to this Protocol Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty) Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against: (a) Parties to the Treaty; or (b) Any territory within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.

68  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

Article 2 Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act of a Party to the Treaty which constitutes a violation of the Treaty,or to any act of another Party to a Protocol which constitutes a violation of a Protocol. Article 3 Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty. Article 4 This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Article 5 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 6 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 7 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol. DONE at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language.

PROTOCOL 3 The Parties to this Protocol Noting the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty) Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  69

Article 2 Each Party may, by written notification to the depositary, indicate its acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty or by the extension of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Treaty. Article 3 This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Article 4 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 5 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 6 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.4

DONE at Suva, this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six, in a single original in the English language.

T REATY

SOUTHEAST

OF

B ANGKOK

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS ASIA NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE

n December 15, 1995, the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,Thailand, and Vietnam—opened the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Bangkok) for signature. A protocol, annexed to the treaty, was opened for signature to extra-zonal states. Five of the ten countries of the region ratified the treaty by 1996, and it entered into force on March 27, 1997, when Thailand became the seventh state to

O 4

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

70  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

ratify.Today, the treaty enjoys the ratification of all ten zonal countries.The protocol, however, has not been signed by any of the nuclear weapon states because none of the U.S. criteria was met, and the other four nuclear weapon states supported the U.S. criteria. In particular, transit and port calls were not made secure, and the treaty was judged to interfere with the freedom of seas due to the extension of the zone to the high seas within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the Law of the Sea Treaty as well as over the continental shelf. Article III of the treaty prohibits the developing, manufacturing, acquisition, possession, stationing, control, or testing of any nuclear weapon by treaty parties, Article I defines “nuclear weapon” as any explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner. Article III of the treaty prohibits the dumping of radioactive material anywhere in the zone’s territories (water or land), unless the disposal follows IAEA standards.Article X requires that full-scope IAEA safeguards be applied to peaceful nuclear activities, accompanied by full reports, exchanges of information, and the ability to request fact-finding missions to encourage and buttress compliance. Article VIII establishes the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to oversee the treaty’s implementation and enforce compliance with its provisions. The treaty creates an NWFZ within the signatories’ territories, including their continental shelves and EEZs.The attached protocol, open for signature to the five NPT nuclear weapon states, calls on those nations to adhere to and encourage compliance with the treaty as well as provide assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened against signatories of the treaty. The Southeast Asia NWFZ was first conceived of by ASEAN, which gave it shape in its 1971 Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPAN). However, a number of barriers prevented an NWFZ treaty from maturing out of ZOPAN. Instability in Cambodia and U.S. and Soviet military presence in the region were prominent among the obstacles. By 1995, relative stability had returned to Cambodia and the United States had closed its military bases in the Philippines, so the ASEAN members tabled the NWFZ proposal.The Treaty of Bangkok was endorsed by every state in the region on December 16, 1995. All five nuclear weapon states remain opposed to signing the protocol attached to the treaty. The United States argues that the demarcation of the territorial sea boundaries is inconsistent with the stipulations of the Law of the Sea Convention, which requires that movement of naval vessels and aircraft not be restricted.The United States also views the NWFZ as not adequately protecting port visits and transits through the zone by vessels that may be carrying nuclear weapons. China also took issue with the geographical scope of the treaty, arguing that its restrictions are unacceptable as long as competing claims over sea boundaries exist between China (particularly around the Spratley Islands) and several ASEAN members. Russia, the United Kingdom, and France support the views of the United States and China.The United States and the other nuclear weapon states sent delegations to ASEAN before and after the treaty was signed (technically the protocol remains “in draft”) to persuade them to modify the treaty and protocol provisions, but achieved only modest progress.

TREATY

OF

B ANGKOK

The States Parties to this Treaty: Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  71

Determined to take concrete action which will contribute to the progress towards general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and to the promotion of international peace and security; Reaffirming the desire of the Southeast Asian States to maintain peace and stability in the region in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding and cooperation as enunciated in various communique, declarations and other legal instruments; Recalling the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971 and the Programme of Action on ZOPFAN adopted at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in July 1993; Convinced that the establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, as an essential component of the ZOPFAN, will contribute towards strengthening the security of States within the Zone and towards enhancing international peace and security as a whole; Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in contributing towards international peace and security; Recalling Article VII of the NPT which recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly which encourages the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones; Recalling the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, that the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is important for the maximum effectiveness of this nuclear weapon-free zone treaty and its relevant protocols. Determined to protect the region from environmental pollution and the hazards posed by radioactive wastes and other radioactive material; Have agreed as follows; Article 1. Use of Terms For the purposes of this Treaty and its Protocol: (a) “Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone”, hereinafter referred to as the “Zone”, means the area comprising the territories of all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam, and their respective continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ); (b) “territory” means the land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, the seabed and the sub-soil thereof and the airspace above them; (c) “nuclear weapon” means any explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such device if separable from and not an indivisible part thereof; (d) “station” means to deploy, emplace, implant, install, stockpile or store; (e) “radioactive material” means material that contains radionuclides above clearance or exemption levels recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); (f) “radioactive wastes” means material that contains or is contaminated with radionuclides concentrations or activities greater than clearance levels recommended by the IAEA and for which no use is foreseen; and (g) “dumping” means

72  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(i) any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil insertion, of radioactive wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, and (ii) any deliberate disposal at sea, including seabed and subsoil insertion, of vessels, aircraft platforms or other man-made structures at sea, containing radioactive material, but does not include the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures, Article 2. Application of the Treaty 1. This Treaty and its Protocol shall apply to the territories, continental shelves, and EEZ of the States Parties within the Zone in which this Treaty is in force. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights or the exercise of these rights by any State under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, in particular with regard to freedom of the high seas, rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of ships and aircraft, and consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Article 3. Basic Undertakings 1. Each State Party undertakes not to, anywhere inside or outside the Zone: (a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; (b) station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; or (c) test or use nuclear weapons. 2. Each State Party also undertakes not to allow, in its territory, any other State to: (a) develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; (b) station nuclear weapons; or (c) test or use nuclear weapons. 3. Each State Party also undertakes not to: (a) dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the Zone any radioactive material or wastes; (b) dispose radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory of or under the jurisdiction of other States except as stipulated in Paragraph 2(e) of Article 4; or (c) allow, within its territory, any other State to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere any radioactive material or wastes. 4. Each State Party undertakes not to: (a) seek or receive any assistance in the commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2 and I of this Article; or (b) take any action to assist or encourage the commission of any act in violation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. Article 4. Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the right of the States Parties to use nuclear energy, in particular for their economic development and social-progress.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  73

2. Each State Party therefore undertakes: (a) to use exclusively for peaceful purposes nuclear material and facilities which are within its territory and areas under its jurisdiction and control; (b) prior to embarking on its peaceful nuclear energy programme, to subject its programme to rigorous nuclear safety assessment conforming to guidelines and standards recommended by the IAEA for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property in accordance with Paragraph 6 of Article III of the Statute of the IAEA; (c) upon request, to make available to another State Party the assessment except information relating to personal data, information protected by intellectual property rights or by industrial or commercial confidentiality, and information relating to national security; (d) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system; and (e) to dispose radioactive wastes and other radioactive material in accordance with IAEA standards and procedures on land within its territory or on land within the territory of another State which has consented to such disposal. 3. Each State Party further undertakes not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to: (a) any non-nuclear-weapon State except under conditions subject to the safeguards required by Paragraph 1 of Article III of the NPT; or (b) any nuclear-weapon State except in conformity with applicable safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Article 5. IAEA Safeguards Each State Party which has not done so shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full scope safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities not later than eighteen months after the entry into force for that State Party of this Treaty. Article 6. Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Each State Party which has not acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident shall endeavour to do so. Article 7. Foreign Ships and Aircraft Each State Party, on being notified, may decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage. Article 8. Establishment of the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 1. There is hereby established a Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”. 2. All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Commission. Each State Party shall be represented by its Foreign Minister or his representative accompanied by alternates and advisers.

74  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

3.The function of the commission shall be to oversee the implementation of this Treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions. 4. The Commission shall meet as and when necessary in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty including upon the request of any State Party. As far as possible, the commission shall meet in conjunction with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. 5. At the beginning of each meeting, the Commission shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next meeting. 6. Unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, two-thirds of the members of the commission shall be present to constitute a quorum. 7. Each member of the Commission shall have one vote. 8. Except as provided for in this Treaty, decisions of the Commission shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. 9.The Commission shall, by consensus, agree upon and adopt rules of procedure for itself as well as financial rules governing its funding and that of its subsidiary organs. Article 9. The Executive Committee 1.There is hereby established, as a subsidiary organ of the Commission, the Executive Committee. 2.The Executive Committee shall be composed of all States Parties to this Treaty. Each state Party shall be represented by one senior official as its representative, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 3.The functions of the Executive Committee shall be to: (a) ensure the proper operation of verification measures in accordance with the provisions on the Control System as stipulated in Article 10; (b) consider and decide on requests for clarification and for a fact-finding mission; (c) set up a fact-finding mission in accordance with the Annex of this Treaty; (d) consider and decide on the findings of a fact-finding mission and report to the Commission; (e) request the Commission to convene a meeting when appropriate and necessary; (f) conclude such agreements with the IAEA or other international organizations as referred to in Article 18 on behalf of the Commission after being duly authorized to do so by the commission; and (g) carry out such other tasks as may, from time to time, be assigned by the commission. 4. The Executive Committee shall meet as and when necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions.As far as possible, the Executive Committee shall meet in conjunction with the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting. 5.The Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be the representative of the Chairman of the commission. Any submission or communication made by a State Party to the Chairman of the Executive Committee shall be disseminated to the other members of the Executive Committee. 6.Two-thirds of the members of the Executive Committee shall be present to constitute a quorum. 7. Each member of the Executive Committee shall have one vote. 8. Decisions of the Executive Committee shall be taken by consensus or, failing consensus, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  75

Article 10. Control System 1. There is hereby established a control system for the purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations of the States Parties under this Treaty. 2.The Control System shall comprise: (a) the IAEA safeguards system as provided for in Article 5; (b) report and exchange of information as provided for in Article 11; (c) request for clarification as provided for in Article 12; and (d) request and procedures for a fact-finding mission as provided for in Article 13. Article 11. Report and Exchange of Information 1. Each State Party shall submit reports to the Executive Committee on any significant event within its territory and areas under its jurisdiction and control affecting the implementation of this Treaty. 2. The States Parties may exchange information on matters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. Article 12. Request for Clarification 1. Each State Party shall have the right to request another State Party for clarification concerning any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about the compliance of that State Party with this Treaty. It shall inform the Executive Committee of such a request. The requested State Party shall duly respond by providing without delay the necessary information and inform the Executive Committee of its reply to the requesting State Party. 2. Each State Party shall have the right to request the Executive committee to seek clarification from another State Party concerning any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance of that State Party with this Treaty. Upon receipt of such a request, the Executive Committee shall consult the State Party from which clarification is sought for the purpose of obtaining the clarification requested. Article 13. Request for a Fact-Finding Mission A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Committee to send a fact-finding mission to another State Party in order to clarify and resolve a situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with the procedure contained in the Annex to this Treaty. Article 14. Remedial Measures 1. In case the Executive Committee decides in accordance with the Annex that there is a breach of this Treaty by a State Party, that State Party shall, within a reasonable time, take all steps necessary to bring itself in full compliance with this Treaty and shall promptly inform the Executive Committee of the action taken or proposed to be taken by it. 2.Where a State Party fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article, the Executive Committee shall request the commission to convene a meeting in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 3(e) of Article 9. 3.At the meeting convened pursuant to Paragraph 2 of this Article, the Commission shall consider the emergent situation and shall decide on any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation, including the submission of the matter to the IAEA and, where the situation might endanger international peace and security, the Security council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

76  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

4. In the event of breach of the Protocol attached to this Treaty by a State Party to the Protocol, the Executive Committee shall convene a special meeting of the Commission to decide on appropriate measures to be taken. Article 15. Signature, Ratification, Accession, Deposit and Registration 1.This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States in Southeast Asia, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam. 2.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedure of the signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand which is hereby designated as the Depositary State. 3.This Treaty shall be open for accession.The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Depositary State. 4.The Depositary State shall inform the other States Parties to this Treaty on the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary state shall register this Treaty and its Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 16. Entry into Force 1.This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification and/or accession. 2. For States which ratify or accede to this Treaty after the date of this seventh instrument of ratification or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession. Article 17. Reservations This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Article 18. Relations with Other International Organizations The Commission may conclude such agreements with the IAEA or other international organizations as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the Control System established by this Treaty. Article 19. Amendments 1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty its Protocol and shall submit its proposals to the Executive Committee, which shall transmit them to all the other States Parties. The Executive Committee shall immediately request the Commission to convene a meeting to examine the proposed amendments. The quorum required for such a meeting shall be all the members of the Commission. Any amendment shall be adopted by a consensus decision of the Commission. 2. Amendments adopted shall enter into force 30 days after the receipt by the Depositary State of the seventh instrument of acceptance from the States Parties. Article 20. Review Ten years after this Treaty enters into force, a meeting of the Commission shall be convened for the purpose of reviewing the operation of this Treaty. A meeting of the Commission for the same purpose may also be convened at anytime thereafter if there is consensus among all its members.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  77

Article 21. Settlement of Disputes Any dispute arising from the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty shall be settled by peaceful means as may be agreed upon by the States Parties to the dispute. If within one month, the parties to the dispute are unable to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute by negotiation, mediation, enquiry or conciliation, any of the parties concerned shall, with the prior consent of the other parties concerned, refer the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. Article 22. Duration and Withdrawal 1.This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. 2. In the event of a breach by any State Party of this Treaty essential to the achievement of the objectives of this Treaty, every other State Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. 3.Withdrawal under Paragraph 2 of Article 22, shall be effected by giving notice twelve months in advance to the members of the Commission. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed this Treaty. DONE at Bangkok, this fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five, in one original in the English language. States Parties5 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,Vietnam. Annex Procedure for a Fact-Finding Mission 1.The State Party requesting a fact-finding mission as provided in Article 13, hereinafter referred to as the “requesting State”, shall submit the request to the Executive Committee specifying the following (a) the doubts or concerns and the reasons for such doubts or concerns; (b) the location in which the situation which gives rise to doubts has allegedly occurred; (c) the relevant provisions of this Treaty about which doubts of compliance have arisen; and (d) any other relevant information. 2. Upon receipt of a request for a fact-finding mission, the Executive Committee shall: (a) immediately inform the State Party to which the fact-finding mission is requested to be sent, hereinafter referred to as the “receiving State”, about the receipt of the request; and (b) not later than 3 weeks after receiving the request, decide if the request complies with the provisions of Paragraph 1 and whether or not it is frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Treaty. Neither the requesting nor receiving State Party shall participate in such decisions. 3. In case the Executive Committee decides that the request does not comply with the provisions of Paragraph 1, or that it is frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Treaty, it shall take no further action on the request and inform the requesting State and the receiving State accordingly.

5

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

78  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

4. In the event that the Executive Committee decides that the request complies with the provisions of Paragraph 1, and that it is not frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Treaty, it shall immediately forward the request for a fact-finding mission to the receiving State, indicating, inter alia, the proposed date for sending the mission. The proposed date shall not be later than 3 weeks from the time the receiving State receives the request for a fact-finding mission. The Executive Committee shall also immediately set up a fact-finding mission consisting of 3 inspectors from the IAEA who are neither nationals of the requesting nor receiving State. 5. The receiving State shall comply with the request for a fact-finding mission referred to in Paragraph 4. It shall cooperate with the Executive Committee in order to facilitate the effective functioning of the fact-finding mission, inter alia, by promptly providing unimpeded access of the fact-finding mission to the location in question. The receiving State shall accord to the members of the fact-finding mission such privileges and immunities as are necessary for them to exercise their functions effectively, including inviolability of all papers and documents and immunity from arrest, detention and legal process for acts done and words spoken for the purpose of the mission. 6.The receiving State shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosures of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty. 7.The fact-finding mission, in the discharge of its functions, shall: (a) respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State; (b) refrain from activities inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of this Treaty; (c) submit preliminary or interim reports to the Executive Committee; and (d) complete its task without undue delay and shall submit its final report to the Executive Committee within a reasonable time upon completion of its work. 8.The Executive Committee shall: (a) consider the reports submitted by the fact-finding mission and reach a decision on whether or not there is a breach of this Treaty; (b) immediately communicate its decision to the requesting State and the receiving State; and (c) present a full report on its decision to the Commission. 9. In the event that the receiving State refuses to comply with the request for a fact-finding mission in accordance with Paragraph 4, the requesting State through the Executive Committee shall have the right to request for a meeting of the Commission.The Executive Committee shall immediately request the Commission to convene a meeting in accordance with Paragraph 3(e) of Article 9.

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON SOUTHEAST ASIA NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE The States Parties to this Protocol, Desiring to contribute to efforts towards achieving general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons, and thereby ensuring international peace and security, including in Southeast Asia;

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  79

Noting the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, signed at Bangkok on the fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each State Party undertakes to respect the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”, and not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocol by States Parties to them. Article 2 Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. It further undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Article 3 This Protocol shall be open for signature by the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Article 4 Each State Party undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary State, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 19 thereof. Article 5 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme national interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary State twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme national interests. Article 6 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 7 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State Party on the date of its deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary State.The Depositary State shall inform the other States Parties to the Treaty and to this Protocol on the deposit of instruments of ratification. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.6 DONE at Bangkok this fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five, in one original in the English language.

6

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

80  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

T REATY

OF

P ELINDABA

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS AFRICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE n April 11, 1996, forty-eight African nations signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZone Treaty, known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, which was open for signature. Three protocols attached to the treaty were opened for signature by extra-zonal states.While the treaty has collected fifty signatures, it has been ratified by only eleven nations—well short of the twenty-eight required to bring it into force. Protocols I and II have been signed by all nuclear weapon states but have been ratified only by the United Kingdom, France, and China. Article III of the treaty bans the developing, manufacturing, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, or control of any nuclear explosive device. Moreover, and beyond the treaties of Rarotonga and Bangkok, Pelindaba bans the conducting of research and the seeking of assistance for research on nuclear explosive devices. Pelindaba’s definition of nuclear explosive device—identical to the Treaty of Rarotonga definition—is stated in Article I: “any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used.” Article VIII is similar to the Treaty of Rarotonga, but unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it forbids the dumping of radioactive material anywhere in the NWFZ’s territories. Article X calls for full-scope IAEA safeguards to be applied to peaceful nuclear activities. Accompanying these safeguards is the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to ensure compliance with the treaty’s provisions. Unique to the Treaty of Pelindaba is a call, in Article VI, for the dismantling and destruction of any nuclear device constructed prior to the treaty’s entry into force. Article XI prohibits armed attack against nuclear installations—another anomaly among NWFZ provisions. The treaty creates an NWFZ covering the territory (land, water, and air space above) of the continent of Africa, island states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and islands considered African in OAU resolutions. However, in Article II, Pelindaba acknowledges—as does the Treaty of Rarotonga—the precedence of the “freedom of the seas” law, and thereby prevents constraint on the presence of nuclear weapons beyond the territorial sea limit of the zonal states. The Treaty of Pelindaba contains three protocols that detail the role of extra-zonal nations in the NWFZ. Under Protocol I, the five nuclear weapon states are required to provide assurances that nuclear weapons will not be employed against states within the NWFZ. Under Protocol II, the five nuclear weapon states are required to refrain from testing nuclear devices anywhere within the African NWFZ. Under Protocol III, France and Spain, states with dependent territories in the region, are required to observe and uphold the provision of the treaty in these territories. France and Spain have signed this protocol, but only France has ratified it. The NWFZ in Africa was tabled by the OAU in July 1964 as the “Declaration on Denuclearization of Africa.”The declaration was created in response to a French nuclear test explosion in the Sahara Desert. However, the creation of an NWFZ did not become feasible until South Africa joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and discontinued its nuclear program in 1991. The termination of the South African nuclear program prompted the drafting of Article VI of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which calls for the destruction of nuclear

O

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  81

devices created prior to the treaty’s entry into force.The UN General Assembly approved the treaty on December 12, 1995, and it was opened for signature on April 11, 1996.

AFRICAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE-ZONE TREATY The Parties to this Treaty, Guided by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (hereinafter referred to as OAU) at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964 (AHG/Res. 11(l)), in which they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons, Guided also, by the resolutions of the fifty-fourth and fifty-sixth ordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers of OAU, held at Abuja from 27 May to 1 June 1991 and at Dakar from 22 to 28 June 1992 respectively (CM/Res.1342 (LIV) and CM/Res.1395 (LVI)), which affirmed that the evolution of the international situation was conducive to the implementation of the Cairo Declaration, as well as the relevant provisions of the 1986 OAU Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development, Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it considered nuclear-weapon-free zones one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons, Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, as well as of the obligations of all States to contribute to this end, Convinced also that the African nuclear-weapon-free zone will constitute an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security. Aware that regional disarmament measures contribute to global disarmament efforts, Believing that the African nuclear-weapon-free zone will protect African States against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, Noting with satisfaction existing NWFZs and recognizing that the establishment of other NWFZs, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the security of States Parties to the African NWFZ, Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) and the need for the implementation of all its provisions, Desirous of taking advantage of article IV of the NPT, which recognizes the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research on, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for such purposes, Determined to promote regional cooperation for the development and practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interest of sustainable social and economic development of the African continent, Determined to keep Africa free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter, Welcoming the cooperation of all States and governmental and non-governmental organizations for the attainment of these objectives,

82  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

Have decided by this treaty to establish the African NWFZ and hereby agree as follows: Article 1. Definition/Usage of Terms For the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols: (a) “African nuclear-weapon-free zone” means the territory of the continent of Africa, islands States members of OAU and all islands considered by the Organization of African Unity in its resolutions to be part of Africa; (b) “Territory” means the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the sea bed and subsoil beneath; (c) “Nuclear explosive device” means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it; (d) “Stationing” means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment; (e) “Nuclear installation” means a nuclear-power reactor, a nuclear research reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant, a separate storage installation and any other installation or location in or at which fresh or irradiated nuclear material or significant quantities of radioactive materials are present; (f) “Nuclear material” means any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and as amended from time to time by the IAEA. Article 2. Application of the Treaty 1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to the territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, as illustrated in the map in Annex I. 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas. Article 3. Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices Each Party undertakes: (a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere; (b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device; (c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device. Article 4. Prevention of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices 1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device. 2.Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  83

Article 5. Prohibition of Testing of Nuclear Explosive Devices Each Party undertakes: (a) Not to test any nuclear explosive device; (b) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device; (c) Not to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State anywhere. Article 6. Declaration, Dismantling, Destruction or Conversion of Nuclear Explosive Devices and the Facilities for Their Manufacture Each Party undertakes: (a) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; (b) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty; (c) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where possible, to convert them to peaceful uses; (d) To permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as IAEA) and the Commission established in article 12 to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production. Article 7. Prohibition of Dumping of Radioactive Wastes Each Party undertakes: (a) To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa in so far as it is relevant to radioactive waste; (b) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Article 8. Peaceful Nuclear Activities 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as to prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes. 2. As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and development, the Parties undertake to promote individually and collectively the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development.To this end they undertake to establish and strengthen mechanisms for cooperation at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels. 3. Parties are encouraged to make use of the programme of assistance available in IAEA and, in this connection, to strengthen cooperation under the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as AFRA). Article 9.Verification of Peaceful Uses Each Party undertakes: (a) To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses; (b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of this article;

84  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA. Article 10. Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities Each Party undertakes to maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. To that end each Party, inter alia, undertakes to apply measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by IAEA for that purpose. Article 11. Prohibition of Armed Attack on Nuclear Installations Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Article 12. Mechanism for Compliance 1. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with their undertakings under this Treaty, the Parties agree to establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the Commission) as set out in Annex III. 2.The Commission shall be responsible inter alia for: (a) Collating the reports and the exchange of information as provided for in Article 13; (b) Arranging consultations as provided for in Annex IV, as well as convening conferences of Parties on the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties on any matter arising from the implementation of the Treaty; (c) Reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by IAEA as elaborated in Annex II; (d) Bringing into effect the complaints procedure elaborated in Annex IV; (e) Encouraging regional and subregional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology; (f) Promoting international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. 3. The Commission shall meet in ordinary session once a year, and may meet in extraordinary session as may be required by the complaints and settlement of disputes procedure in Annex IV. Article 13. Report and Exchanges of Information 1. Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Commission on its nuclear activities as well as other matters relating to the Treaty, in accordance with the format for reporting to be developed by the Commission. 2. Each Party shall promptly report to the Commission any significant event affecting the implementation of the Treaty. 3. The Commission shall request the IAEA to provide it with an annual report on the activities of AFRA. Article 14. Conference of Parties 1.A Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the Depositary as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to, inter alia, elect members of the commission and deter-

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  85

mine its headquarters. Further conferences of State Parties shall be held as necessary and at least every two years, and convened in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of article 12. 2.The Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall adopt the Commission's budget and a scale of assessment to be paid by the State Parties. Article 15. Interpretation of the Treaty Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Treaty shall be settled by negotiation, by recourse to the Commission or another procedure agreed to by the Parties, which may include recourse to an arbitral panel or to the International Court of Justice. Article 16. Reservations This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. Article 17. Duration This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely. Article 18. Signature, Ratification and Entry into Force 1.This Treaty shall be open for signature by any State in the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. It shall be subject to ratification. 2. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification. 3. For a signatory that ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification, it shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification. Article 19. Amendments 1.Any amendments to the Treaty proposed by a Party shall be submitted to the Commission, which shall circulate it to all Parties. 2. Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Parties either through written communication to the Commission or through a conference of Parties convened upon the concurrence of a simple majority. 3. An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Parties after receipt by the Depositary of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Parties. Article 20. Withdrawal 1. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests. 2.Withdrawal shall be effected by a Party giving notice, which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary.The Depositary shall circulate such notice to all other Parties. Article 21. Depositary Functions 1.This Treaty, of which the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of OAU, who is hereby designated as Depositary of the Treaty. 2.The Depositary shall: (a) Receive instruments of ratification;

86  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(b) Register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations; (c) Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all States in the African nuclearweapon-free zone and to all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify them of signatures and ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols. Article 22. Status of the Annexes The annexes form an integral part of this Treaty.Any reference to this Treaty includes the annexes. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Treaty.7 Annex I. Map of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Annex II. Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1.The safeguards referred to in subparagraph (b) of the article 9 shall in respect of each Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the Agency on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. 2.The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153 corrected). A Party that has already entered into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA is deemed to have already complied with the requirement. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 is in force for it not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty. 3. For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown. 4. Each Party shall include in its annual report to the Commission, in conformity with article 13, for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and advise the Commission promptly of any change in those conclusions.The information furnished by a Party shall not be, totally or partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the reports, except when that Party gives its express consent. Annex III. African Commission on Nuclear Energy 1. The Commission established in Article 12 shall be composed of twelve Members elected by Parties to the Treaty for a three-year period, bearing in mind the need for equitable geographical distribution as well as to include Members with advanced nuclear programmes. Each Member shall have one representative nominated with particular regard for his/her expertise in the subject of the Treaty. 2. The Commission shall have a Bureau consisting of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Executive Secretary. It shall elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairman.The Secretary-General of the organization of African Unity, at the request of Parties to the Treaty and in consultation with the chairman, shall designate the Executive Secretary of the Commission. For the first meeting a quorum shall be constituted by representatives of two thirds of the Members of the Commission. For that meeting decisions of the Commission shall be taken as far as possible by consensus or 7

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  87

otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the commission. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure at that meeting. 3. The Commission shall develop a format for reporting by States as required under Articles 12 and 13. 4. (a) The budget of the Commission, including the costs of inspections pursuant to Annex IV to this Treaty, shall be borne by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with a scale of assessment to be determined by the Parties; (b) The Commission may also accept additional funds from other sources provided such donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty. Annex IV. Complaints Procedure and Settlement of Disputes 1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party or a Party to Protocol III is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall bring the subject-matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter thirty days to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter.This may include technical visits agreed upon between the Parties. 2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring this complaint to the Commission. 3.The Commission, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1 above, shall afford the Party complained of forty-five days to provide it with an explanation of the matter. 4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Commission considers that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant an inspection in the territory of that Party or territory of a Party to Protocol III, the Commission may request the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct such inspection as soon as possible. The Commission may also designate its representatives to accompany the Agency’s inspection team. (a) The request shall indicate the tasks and objectives of such inspection, as well as any confidentiality requirements; (b) If the Party complained of so requests, the inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party provided that the inspectors shall not be thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions; (c) Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all information and places within each territory that may be deemed relevant by the inspectors to the implementation of the inspection; (d) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the work of the inspection team, and shall accord them the same privileges and immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency; (e) The International Atomic Energy Agency shall report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to the Commission, outlining its activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by it, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions.The Commission shall report fully to all States Parties to the Treaty giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty; (f) If the Commission considers that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, States Parties to the Treaty shall meet in extraordinary session to discuss the matter;

88  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

(g) The States Parties convened in extraordinary session may as necessary, make recommendations to the Party held to be in breach of its obligations and to the organization of African Unity. The Organization of African Unity may, if necessary, refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council; (h) The costs involved in the procedure outlined above shall be borne by the Commission. In the case of abuse, the Commission shall decide whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications. 5.The Commission may also establish its own inspection mechanisms.

PROTOCOL I The Parties to this Protocol, Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end, Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG/Res.11(l)) of 1964, resolutions CM/Res.1342 (LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395 (LVI) Rev.1 of 1992 of the Council of Ministers of the organization of African Unity and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993, constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete disarmament, and enhancing regional and international peace and security, Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manners to the effectiveness of the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Protocol Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against: (a) Any Party to the Treaty; or (b) Any territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol III is internationally responsible as defined in annex 1. Article 2 Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol. Article 3 Each Protocol Party undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 19 of the Treaty. Article 4 This Protocol shall be open for signature by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  89

Article 5 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 6 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 7 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

PROTOCOL II The Parties to this Protocol, Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end, Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG/Res.11(l)) of 1964, resolutions CM/Res.1342 (LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395(LVI)/Rev.1 of 1992 of the Council of Ministers of the organization of African Unity and United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993, constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete disarmament, and enhancing regional and international peace and security, Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manners to the effectiveness of the Treaty, Bearing in mind the objective of concluding a treaty banning all nuclear tests, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Protocol Party undertakes not to test or assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Article 2 Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol. Article 3 Each Protocol Party undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 19 of the Treaty.

90  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

Article 4 This Protocol shall be open for signature by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Article 5 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 6 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 7 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

PROTOCOL III The Parties to this Protocol, Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end, Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG/Res.11(l)) of 1964, resolutions CM/Res.1342(LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395(LVI)/Rev.1 of 1992 of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity and United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993, constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete disarmament, and enhancing regional and international peace and security, Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manners to the effectiveness of the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Protocol Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is de jure or de facto internationally responsible situated within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone, the provisions contained in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Treaty and to ensure the application of safeguards specified in Annex II of the Treaty. Article 2 Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  91

Article 3 Each Protocol Party undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise of any alterations to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to article 19 of the Treaty. Article 4 This Protocol shall be open for signature by France and Spain. Article 5 This Protocol shall be subject to ratification. Article 6 This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article 7 This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments have signed this Protocol.8

M ONGOLIAN N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE Z ONE SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS MONGOLIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, the last Russian troops left Mongolia in 1992. On September 25 of that year, the president of Mongolia—a country with a land mass larger than that of central Europe and locked between two nuclear weapon states (the Russian Federation and China)—announced before the 47th session of the UN General Assembly that Mongolia’s territory would be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In his announcement, President Punsalmaagin Ochirbat noted that one of every four registered nuclear weapon tests conducted to that time occurred in the vicinity of his nation. President Ochirbat’s statement was made in the context of Mongolia’s efforts to define and pursue its own national interests and priorities after serving as a buffer and strategic springboard between the two regional powers. The Mongolian initiative is unique in the context of the development of NWFZs in that it does not comprise a group of countries

A

8

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

92  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

covering a vast geographic area, but rather a single state declaring its sovereign territory to be nuclear free. In 1976, a UN study on the question of NWFZs had suggested the possibility of a single-state zone, noting that obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by small groups of States and even individual countries. The term “individual countries” as a variation of the NWFZs was specifically recognized in the study. On December 4, 1998, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53/77 D welcoming Mongolia’s decision to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and committing to include the item “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” in the agenda for the next General Assembly sessions. On February 28, 2000, Ambassador Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan, permanent representative of Mongolia to the United Nations, transmitted to the UN secretary general the text of the Law of Mongolia on Its NuclearWeapon-Free Status, adopted by the Parliament of Mongolia on February 3, 2000.

LAW

OF

MONGOLIA ON ITS NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS ADOPTED ON 3 FEBRUARY 2000 Chapter One. General Provisions

Article 1. Purpose of the Law The purpose of the present Law is to regulate relations pertaining to the preservation of the territory of Mongolia in its entirety, including its air space, land, waters and the sub-soil free from nuclear weapons, which constitutes an important factor for ensuring Mongolia’s security. Article 2. Legislation on Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status 2.1 The legislation on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status shall consist of the Constitution of Mongolia, the present Law and other legislative acts adopted in conformity with them. 2.2 In case an international treaty to which Mongolia is a party contains provisions different from those provided for in the present Law, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail. Article 3. Definitions 3.1 The definitions contained in the present Law shall have the following meaning: 3.1.1 “nuclear weapon” means any explosive device that is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrollable manner and that can be used for hostile purposes; 3.1.2 “nuclear-weapon-free status” means a legal status of being free from nuclear weapons. Article 4. Prohibitions Resulting from the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status 4.1 An individual, legal person or any foreign State shall be prohibited on the territory of Mongolia from committing, initiating or participating in the following acts or activities relating to nuclear weapons:

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  93

4.1.1 develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; 4.1.2 station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; 4.1.3 test or use nuclear weapons; 4.1.4 dump or dispose nuclear weapons grade radioactive material or nuclear waste. 4.2 Transportation through the territory of Mongolia of nuclear weapons, parts or components thereof, as well as of nuclear waste or any other nuclear material designed or produced for weapons purposes shall be prohibited. Article 5. Uses of Nuclear Energy and Technology 5.1 The use of nuclear energy and technology shall be permitted only by the State administrative authority in charge of nuclear energy and solely for peaceful purposes such as health care, mining, energy production and scientific research in accordance with the provisions of the international treaties to which Mongolia is a party as well as in conformity with the norms and principles of international law. 5.2 For the purpose of implementing Article 5.1 of the present Law and banning the dumping or storage in the vicinity of the borders of Mongolia of nuclear material or waste that might directly or in the long run indirectly adversely affect the safety of the population and the environment, Mongolia shall cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other appropriate international organizations and the States that have nuclear programs.

Chapter Two.Verification Article 6. National Verification of the Implementation of the Legislation on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status 6.1 On the basis of the proposals of the central administrative authority in charge of foreign relations and of other organizations, the National Security Council of Mongolia shall, within its functions and competence, coordinate the following activities: 6.1.1 implementing of a single State policy concerning the prohibited and permitted activities pertaining to the nuclear-weapon-free status in Mongolia; 6.1.2 institutionalizing internationally Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status; 6.1.3 taking an active part in the activities of the appropriate international organizations, exchanging information on the prohibited and permitted activities in Mongolia and providing information to national organizations. 6.2 The competent authority of Mongolia shall have the right to gather information, stop, detain and search any suspected aircraft, train, vehicle, individual or group of persons. 6.3 The central administrative authority in charge of foreign relations shall be entrusted with monitoring the compliance with the present Law and the international commitments assumed by Mongolia in connection with the nuclear-weapon-free status. 6.4 Non-governmental organizations or individuals may, within the mandate provided for by the legislation, exercise public oversight of the implementation of the legislation on the nuclearweapon-free status and submit proposals thereon to the relevant State authority. Article 7. International Verification on the Implementation of the Legislation on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status 7.1 Mongolia shall conduct international verification over the implementation of the present Law in cooperation with the relevant international organizations or by concluding special international agreements thereon.

94  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

Chapter Three. Liability Article 8. Liability for Violation of the Legislation on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status 8.1 An individual or legal person that violates Article 4 of the present Law shall be held liable in accordance with the Criminal Code. 8.2 The facility, equipment, material, raw material or means of transportation used for the activities prohibited by Article 4.1 of the present Law shall be expropriated by the State. 8.3 An individual or legal person that violates the present Law shall pay compensation for the damage caused to the interests of Mongolia as well as to the population, the environment and the properties in accordance with the relevant legislation of Mongolia or in conformity with the appropriate international treaty, the principles and norms of international law. 8.4 In case of violation or suspected violation of the present Law by a foreign State, Mongolia shall, within its international treaty obligations or norms and principles of international law, officially notify the State concerned of the violation or suspected violation, request explanation and peacefully resolve any question that may arise therefrom. If deemed necessary, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other relevant bodies could be asked for assistance. In case of a dispute of a legal mature, measures could be taken up to referring the matter to the relevant international court or arbitration. Article 9. Amendment and Termination of the Law 9.1 If the vital interests of Mongolia are affected, the present Law may be amended or terminated.

RESOLUTION 19 OF THE STATE GREAT HURAL OF MONGOLIA ON M EASURES TO BE TAKEN IN C ONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE LAW ON ITS NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS, ADOPTED ON 3 FEBRUARY 2000 In its foreign policy, Mongolia sets the goal of pursuing its national interests, developing friendly cooperation with all the countries of the world as well as actively contributing, to the extent possible, to the efforts of the international community to strengthen peace and security. It is also pursuing a policy of refraining from joining any military alliance or grouping, or allowing the use of its territory against any other State as well as banning the stationing on its territory of foreign troops and weapons, including nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.With respect to its two neighboring States, Mongolia is pursuing the policy of maintaining balanced and friendly relations and developing broad cooperation. Mongolia consistently advocates disarmament and, on its part, is taking concrete steps to promote the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the framework of this policy, in 1992 Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has since been pursuing the policy of and taking the measures aimed at institutionalizing and guaranteeing it. One of the results of such a policy has been the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly at it 53rd regular session on 4 December, 1998 of the resolution 53/77D entitled “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”. Keeping Mongolia’s territory free of nuclear weapons is fully in line with its policy aimed at strengthening its national security by political and diplomatic means.

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  95

Strengthening Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status at the State policy level, further clearer defining of the status and its observance would be important in strengthening mutual confidence and Mongolia’s external security environment as well as in linking the country’s national security to regional security and stability. Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status represents a novel approach in the practice of international relations, which in its wider context could be considered as our country’s concrete contribution to the policy and efforts of the international community aimed at strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Based on the all above and in connection with the adoption of the Law of Mongolia on nuclearweapon-free status, the State Great Hural of Mongolia resolves: 1.To mandate the Government /R. Amarjargal/ to take the following measures: 1. to actively cooperate with and acquire assistance from the relevant States, international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, in implementing the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status and the United Nations General Assembly resolution entitled “Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status”; 2. to take the necessary measures to ensure normal functioning of the stations designed to monitor nuclear weapons tests, that are situated on the territory of Mongolia; 3. to report, as the case may be, to the Standing Committee on Security and Foreign Policy Affairs of the State Great Hural of Mongolia on the implementation of the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status, of the present Resolution and other legislative acts adopted in conformity with them. 2.The present Resolution shall be implemented from the day of the entry into force of the Law of Mongolia on the nuclear-weapon-free status.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/RES/53/77 GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT D MONGOLIA’ S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE STATUS The General Assembly, Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling also the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Welcoming the decision of Mongolia to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Taking note with satisfaction of the separate statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with Mongolia’s declaration of its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, in which the Conference welcomed and supported Mongolia’s policy to institutionalize its single State nuclear-weapon-free status,

96  N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES

Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States, Bearing in mind its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection and security of small States, Welcoming Mongolia’s active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States, Convinced that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia’s security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance, 1.Welcomes the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status; 2. Endorses and supports Mongolia’s good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability; 3. Invites Member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States, to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy; 4. Appeals to the member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia’s efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements;

5. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to provide the necessary assistance to Mongolia, within existing resources, to take the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 3 above; 6. Requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution; 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session an item entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”.

P ROPOSALS

FOR

A DDITIONAL

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE Z ONES CENTRAL ASIA n 1992, Mongolia became the first nation of central Asia to declare (unilaterally) NWFZ status. In February 1997, the presidents of five states in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) articulated their support for the establishment of a regional NWFZ. The increased importance of nuclear weapons to Russian security policy and other issues, have stalled the creation of an NWFZ in this region, though productive discussions have continued.

I

N UCLEAR -W EAPON -F REE -Z ONE T REATIES  97

NORTHEAST ASIA his NWFZ would encompass Japan and both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). In 1991, a treaty between North and South Korea attempted to create a non-nuclear peninsula through a process of mutual inspections and restrictions that went beyond typical NWFZ treaties.The agreement has yet to be implemented by the two states due to continuing disagreement over the scope of verification measures. Mitigation of current North Korean security tensions (exacerbated in October 2002 by Pyongyang’s revelation of a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the NPT and the 1994 Agreed Framework), coupled with successful implementation of the proposals in the Agreed Framework (if this remains possible) would significantly augment the prospects for a Northeast Asia NWFZ.

T

CENTRAL

AND

EASTERN EUROPE

n 1990, the government of Belarus tabled a proposal that would create an NWFZ running from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. This idea was pressed vigorously by Belarus and Ukraine at the 1995 NPT Conference.The proposal was claimed by Belarus and Ukraine to be designed to prevent the stationing of Russian nuclear weapons on their territories in response to the potential eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).The proposal has met considerable criticism in the West, as it would directly affect three of the five nuclear weapon states (France, the United Kingdom, and the United States— through NATO). It remains unclear how feasible such a plan would be.

I

MIDDLE EAST he Committee for Denuclearization of the Arab-Israeli Conflict first proposed a Middle East NWFZ in 1962. In 1990, the president of Egypt proposed the creation of a Middle East zone free of any weapon of mass destruction. Current obstacles to the establishment of such a zone are numerous. The primary barrier is Israel’s unofficial nuclear weapon status, coupled with an increasingly destabilizing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It seems likely that a proposal for a Middle East NWFZ will become realistic only as part of a comprehensive peace settlement.

T

7

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

major step in multilateral nuclear arms control was achieved with the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) on July 1, 1968, and its entry into force on March 5, 1970.The treaty provides for two categories of nations.Article IX defines a nuclear weapon state party (nuclear weapon state) as one of the five states that had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union (now Russia), France, and China (the only nations that fit that definition). The non-nuclear weapon states parties (non-nuclear weapon states) are all other parties.When the treaty opened for signature it included the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and fifty-nine non-nuclear weapon states. France and China became parties in 1991 and 1992, respectively, and today, there are 183 non-nuclear weapon states parties. India, Pakistan, Israel, and East Timor are the only countries that are not parties to the treaty. Article I of the NPT provides that each nuclear weapon state undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive device “to any recipient whatsoever” or to assist any state in acquiring nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive device. Article II contains the companion commitment that no non-nuclear weapon state shall receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any other state, manufacture such device itself, or seek to receive assistance in developing such devices from any other state. These obligations do not just apply among parties to the treaty. A nuclear weapon state may not transfer a nuclear device to any other state, whether or not it is a party to the NPT; likewise, a non-nuclear weapon state cannot receive such a device from any other state. The treaty’s definition of a nuclear weapon state creates an interesting potential challenge because, should India and Pakistan decide to become parties, despite their May 1998 series of nuclear tests, they would not meet the NPT qualifications of nuclear weapon states status because India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 and Pakistan in 1998. Article III, a central part of the NPT, provides for “full-scope” safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of all declared nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon states.This is the all-important verification regime of the treaty.These safeguards are governed by agreements negotiated between individual non-nuclear weapon states and the IAEA. An interesting exception was granted to the European Atomic Energy Agency Community (EURATOM), a single entity composed of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg, countries that were authorized to negotiate safeguards as a group.The nuclear weapon states are not required to accept safeguard agreements (although the United States and the other NPT nuclear weapon states have agreed to voluntarily accept safeguards in designated facilities).

A

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  99

NPT Article IV contains the commitment of the nuclear weapon states to share technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy with non-nuclear weapon states. This commitment is to ensure that pledges to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons do not limit nations’ ability to develop nuclear power, radiological media, and other peaceful uses of the atom. Article VI provides that the parties pursue negotiations in good faith toward an early cessation of the nuclear arms race and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.At NPT review conferences, which are held every five years (pursuant to Article VIII), this provision has been often argued by non-nuclear weapon states to be, among other things, a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty in exchange for the non-nuclear weapon states’ commitment to not possess nuclear weapons. Article VII preserves the parties’ right to negotiate nuclear-free areas (such as the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed on February 14, 1967).

History The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of the United Nations (UN) Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. The so-called Baruch plan of 1946 offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control. But early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964 tested nuclear weapons, and increasingly it became apparent that earlier assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate. By the mid-1960s, some were predicting that more than two dozen states would have nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals by the end of the 1970s. Other developments further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear reactors were operating, under construction, or on order in countries all over the world, including some states thought at the time to be considering the pursuit of nuclear weapons, such as India, Germany, Sweden, Israel, and Switzerland. Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but also plutonium—a fissionable material that can be chemically separated from the waste product of nuclear reactors and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 the quantity of plutonium being produced by nuclear power reactors would make possible the construction of fifteen to twenty nuclear bombs daily, depending on the level of technology employed. If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to weapons programs was not prevented by an international system of safeguards, and if a growing number of nations came to possess nuclear arsenals, the risk of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security. A succession of initiatives by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers sought to check proliferation and prevent this from becoming reality. Indeed, the effort to achieve a test ban, which led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (and, later, the CTBT in 1996), had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But well before that, in August

100  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

1957, a group of Western powers (consisting of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted a package of measures in a subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except for self-defense. Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation, it claimed that this formula would allow an aggressor to judge its own actions and to use nuclear weapons under cover of the alleged right of self-defense. Moscow sought to couple a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries—a proposal that, in the context of the Cold War and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States rejected. In 1961, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution proposed by Ireland calling on all states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the general disarmament plans that had been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 to 1962 included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons. On January 21, 1964, in a message from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the United States outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race. This program, unlike the 1957 proposal, was not a “package.” It included a nondissemination and nonacquisition proposal based on the Irish resolution and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.These commitments were combined with acceptance by the major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities would undergo increasingly the same inspection they recommended for other states. While the Irish resolution and the 1964 U.S. proposal represented progress toward a nonproliferation agreement, the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies would emerge as the principal stumbling block for the next three years. The Soviet Union strongly objected to the MLF plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on non-proliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These arrangements would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving West Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons. On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the ENDC that would oblige nuclear weapon powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any country that did not have them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of IAEA or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.A Soviet draft treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1965. In an accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF).The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons “directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons.” It would have also banned nuclear powers from transferring “nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use” 1 to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if they were placed under joint command.The draft included no safeguard provisions. In March 1966 the United States tabled amendments to its draft treaty in the ENDC, seeking to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not violate the principle of non-proliferation. The U.S. representative to the ENDC stressed 1

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990. p. 91.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  101

that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons and that, as a result, the MLF or ANF would not represent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.The Soviet Union objected that the proposed amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons because alliance arrangements such as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command—despite the U.S. retention of a veto—would not provide security against dissemination. Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on non-proliferation. Moreover, pressure from non-nuclear powers was increasingly strong. The latter was manifested in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that non-proliferation receive priority attention. In May 1966 the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island and fifty-five other senators commending efforts to reach a non-proliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts. In the fall of 1966 the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions of a treaty as well as a number of other aspects. There followed a long and arduous series of consultations between the United States and its allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the draft treaty on NATO nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. The United States considered that the treaty covered nuclear weapons or explosive devices but not delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, or ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members. It would not “bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members.”The allies’ questions and the U.S. answers were provided to the Soviet Union, which did not challenge the U.S. interpretations. On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to submit separate but identical texts of a draft to the ENDC. Other ENDC members proposed numerous amendments, largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states. In response to these, the drafts underwent several revisions, and the co-chairmen tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968.With additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the UN General Assembly, where it was extensively debated. Further suggestions for strengthening the treaty were made, in light of which the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a new revision—the seventh—to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31. On June 12, 1968, the General Assembly approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depository governments to open it for signature. France abstained in the General Assembly vote, stating that while it would not sign the treaty, it “would behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the treaty.” 2 In the course of these extended negotiations, the concerns of the non-nuclear weapon states centered particularly on three main issues.These concerns were answered as set forth below, but not sufficiently to prevent Sweden,West Germany, and Italy from opposing permanent status for the NPT in the ENDC. As a result, Article X gave the NPT a twenty-five-year life span, after which the parties were to meet and decide by majority vote on a one-time basis—without requiring an amendment and the requisite referral to more than 150 national legislatures— whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods.These three concerns are discussed below. 2

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements:Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990. p. 92.

102  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Safeguards There was a general agreement that the treaty should include a provision designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use.Two problems were involved. One was to reconcile the Soviets’ insistence that all non-nuclear parties accept IAEA safeguards with the desires of EURATOM’s non-nuclear members (Belgium,West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) to preserve their regional system of controls.To meet this concern, the final draft provided that the non-nuclear parties could negotiate safeguard agreements with the IAEA either individually or together with other states. Thus, the EURATOM members could negotiate group safeguards. The other problem was to satisfy widespread concern among non-nuclear states that IAEA safeguards might place them at commercial and industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful use, since the nuclear weapon states would not be required to accept safeguards.To allay these misgivings, on December 21, 1967, the United States offered to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards as stated under the NPT in all nuclear facilities in the United States, excluding only those with “direct national security significance.” The United Kingdom announced that it would take similar action. Its safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded in 1976.The U.S.-IAEA agreement, signed on November 18, 1977, was submitted by President Jimmy Carter to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on February 9, 1978, and entered into force on December 9, 1980. In 1977, France opened negotiations with the IAEA, and a safeguards agreement entered into force on September 12, 1981. In June 1982, the Soviet Union announced its readiness to put some of its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, and on June 10, 1985, its safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered into force. In September 1985, China declared at the IAEA that it would place some of its civil nuclear facilities under international safeguards, and a safeguard agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1988.

Balanced Obligations Throughout the NPT negotiations, most non-nuclear states held that their renunciation of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to make progress on comprehensive disarmament measures. General provisions were attached to the treaty affirming the intentions of the parties to negotiate in good faith to achieve cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.This, in effect, meant that the NPT included a basic bargain whereby the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to foreswear nuclear weapons in exchange for unfettered access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and a pledge from the nuclear weapon states to eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals.This led to a continuing problem, as the non-nuclear weapon states have never believed that the nuclear weapon states have lived up to their side of the NPT basic bargain. The non-nuclear weapon states believed that, at a minimum, this meant negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), the negotiation of deep reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, legally binding security assurances, additional nuclear-weapon-free zones (including the Middle East), and a fissile material cutoff treaty. In 1995, in exchange for agreeing to a permanent NPT at the Review and Extension Conference (held pursuant to NPT Article X), the nuclear weapon states finally agreed to complete a CTBT—a goal long-resisted by the nuclear weapon states—by the end of 1996, as well as responding to their other objectives.While the CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 1996, and despite the fact that ninety-six nations

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  103

have ratified it, it cannot enter into force until forty-four specific states named therein ratify it.The United States, one of the requisite forty-four states, signed the treaty, but in October 1999 the U.S. Senate voted against ratification. Thirteen of the required forty-four have not ratified (including China), however, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia have ratified, but three of those (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have not even signed. On reductions in strategic arsenals, significant progress was made in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty until 1993, when the START II Treaty was signed. Since then, however, the nuclear arms reduction process has been stalled with the failure of the United States and Russia to bring START II into force or make progress on a START III. The May 2002 Moscow Treaty on strategic offensive reductions may allay some concerns. On nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), in addition to the Latin America NWFZ negotiated before the NPT was completed, NWFZs have been negotiated in Africa, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. Efforts are also under way to negotiate a central Asia NWFZ. On the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, while all the NPT parties agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to conclude a treaty by the 2005 conference, the Conference on Disarmament has made no progress. While the nuclear weapon states agreed to updated negative and positive security assurances in the context of the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, they were not made legally binding. Four of the five nuclear weapon states and NATO have long maintained policies inconsistent with the negative security assurances (see below). Thus, since none of these objectives has been fully realized, many non-nuclear weapon states parties have asserted that the NPT is a discriminatory agreement. Further, related to the question of balanced obligations and possible discriminatory effects of the treaty, the NPT sought to ensure that the non-nuclear weapon states were not denied non-weapons-related uses of the atom.This was of particular concern because—as mentioned above—while all non-nuclear weapon states were required to submit to some form of IAEA safeguards, the nuclear weapon states were not.While the nuclear weapon states would eventually submit to the safeguards voluntarily, during the NPT negotiations, the non-nuclear weapon states wanted additional assurances that they would not suffer a disproportionate economic cost as a result of their participation in the treaty. Thus, Article IV stipulated that parties were to participate in and have fullest access to materials and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article V also provided that any potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be made available to non-nuclear weapon parties on a nondiscriminatory basis, although this provision has long been a dead letter given the identity of weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Security Assurances Non-nuclear weapon states also sought guarantees that renunciation of nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But the nuclear weapon states argued that, since security interests of the various states and groups of states were not identical, any effort to frame treaty provisions to meet these diverse requirements—particularly with respect to unforeseeable future contingencies—would create inordinate complexities. To resolve the issue, on March 7, 1968, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom submitted in the ENDC a tripartite proposal that security assurances take the form of a UN Security Council resolution supported by declarations of the three powers.The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear

104  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

aggression creates a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members. Following submission of the treaty to the General Assembly, the tripartite resolution was submitted to the Security Council (UNSC Resolution 255). In a formal declaration, the United States asserted its intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty that was the object of nuclear aggression and threats.The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom made similar declarations. France abstained from voting on the Security Council resolution; the French representative said that France did not intend its abstention to be an obstacle to adoption of the tripartite proposal but that France did not believe nations would receive adequate security guarantees without nuclear disarmament. In addition to this “positive” security alliance, the United States in 1978 issued a policy statement on “negative” security assurances in connection with the first UN Special Session on Disarmament. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made the following statement on June 12, 1978: After reviewing the current status of the discussion in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, after consultations with our principal allies, and on the basis of studies made in preparation for the Special Session, the President has decided to elaborate the U.S. position on the question of security assurances. His objective is to encourage support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to increase international security, and to create a more positive environment for success of the Special Session. To this end, the President declares: ‘The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT or any comparable international binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state, or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.’ 3 The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union made similar declarations. In 1982, ACDA Director Eugene Rostow reaffirmed the assurance at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1995 a new attempt to provide security assurances was undertaken as part of the efforts to indefinitely extend the NPT at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Satisfactorily resolving this issue was essential to achieving indefinite NPT extension in 1995 and remains central to the treaty’s ongoing viability. Since France had joined the NPT in 1991 and the People’s Republic of China in 1992, all five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states could join in this negotiation.The end result represented forward progress, but not to the satisfaction of the non-nuclear weapon states—after all, as they saw it, if they were being asked to undertake a legal commitment never to have nuclear weapons, the least the nuclear weapon states could do would be to undertake a legal commitment not to attack them with such weapons. But this was not the result in 1995. The nuclear weapon states only seemed willing to undertake such a legal commitment in the context of NWFZ treaties.The NPT security assurances were essentially an update of the 1978 declarations, with the addition of France (China held to its generalized no-first-use policy) and with a somewhat narrower 3

Thomas Graham, Jr. and Leonor Tomero,“Obligations for Us All: NATO and Negative Security Assurances,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 49.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  105

exception from the 1978 U.S. version, which thereby provided that an attack by a nonnuclear weapon state would have to be actually carried out in cooperation with a nuclear weapon state, rather than a paper alliance that included a nuclear weapon state in order to create an exception to the security assurance. Positive security assurances, too, have changed little since the original March 1968 offerings. Updating the NPT-related security assurances was accomplished as part of a 1995 UN resolution with national statements of negative security assurances attached. Although solemnly undertaken, none of it is legally binding. Moreover, it is national policy of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, as well as that of the NATO alliance (which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, and France), to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear states.

Entry into Force and Review Conferences The NPT opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and was signed on that day by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and fifty-nine other countries.According to Article IX, the treaty would enter into force after it was ratified by its designated depositaries (the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union) and an additional forty state signatories. On July 9, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson transmitted it to the Senate, but prospects for early U.S. ratification dimmed after the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August.The Senate adjourned without voting on the treaty. In February 1969, President Richard M. Nixon requested Senate approval of the treaty, and in March the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification.The treaty entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification on March 5, 1970. Article VIII of the treaty provides for a conference of the parties every five years to “review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized.” Six such review conferences have been held since the treaty entered into force. The first review conference, held in Geneva from May 5 to 30, 1975, produced a strong reaffirmation of support for the treaty by the parties. The conferees also expressed solid support for IAEA safeguards and recommended greater efforts to make them universal and more effective. The 1975 conference urged that common export requirements be designed to extend safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities (the so-called comprehensive safeguards), specifically with regard to the export of nuclear equipment and materials to non-nuclear weapon states not party to the treaty, and urged all suppliers and recipients to accept these requirements. It also concluded that NPT adherence should facilitate access to peaceful nuclear assistance. But remaining differences over disarmament issues were essentially papered over by the conference president, who pushed through her own final document. At the second review conference, held in Geneva August 11–September 7, 1980, the conferees heard a thorough exchange of views on progress toward fulfillment of the treaty’s objectives. Although the participants failed to agree on a final document, the national statements of the parties present and the ensuing debate revealed continued strong support for the NPT and its objectives. The major sticking point was the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to commit to a CTBT. The third conference to review the implementation of the treaty was held August 27–September 21, 1985, in Geneva.The conference adopted by consensus a final declaration that reaffirmed the parties’ support for the NPT and their appreciation of its essential contribution to international peace and security.Although essentially a pasting together of different views (“on the one hand … on the other hand …”), the conference reaffirmed the impor-

106  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

tance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and concluded that the treaty continued to meet this basic objective. It also affirmed that the NPT’s non-proliferation and safeguard commitments provide an essential framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and acknowledged appreciable bilateral cooperation and multilateral technical assistance in the area of peaceful nuclear uses.Ways to strengthen peaceful nuclear cooperation were identified, and the conference strongly endorsed the IAEA and its safeguard system, as well as efforts to enhance its effectiveness. Although unable to agree that comprehensive safeguards should be a precondition of significant nuclear exports to non-NPT, non-nuclear weapon states, the conferees agreed not only on the desirability of such safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states, but also that effective steps should be taken to achieve them. As expected, at the 1985 review conference, evaluation of post-1970 progress toward achieving Article VI arms control and disarmament goals revealed the greater disappointment among non-nuclear weapon states and produced the most criticism of the treaty. In particular, virtually all non-nuclear weapon states parties present supported immediate negotiations on and the urgent conclusion of a CTBT. The United States, while stating its commitment to the long-term goal of a CTBT, stressed its conviction that deep reductions in existing nuclear arsenals should have the highest priority, and that it would continue to negotiate seriously and flexibly to that end. Both views were set out in the Final Declaration. The Fourth Review Conference, held from August 20 to September 14, 1990, was a failure in that the conference broke down in the last days over the unwillingness of nuclear weapon states to commit to a CTBT and the insistence of many non-nuclear weapon states that they do so. In 1995, the long-awaited Review and Extension Conference took place, resulting in agreement by consensus to the indefinite extension of the NPT without condition; that is, with no legal caveats.The NPT is now a permanent part of the national security landscape. However, important political conditions accompanied the decision on extension.The parties agreed to a more extensive review process by calling for preparatory committee meetings in three of the four years prior to each review conference, and agreed the enhanced review process would monitor progress toward disarmament goals.The parties agreed to the politically binding Statement of Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which contains the following commitments accepted by all parties, including the nuclear weapon states:  a CTBT by 1996, a fissile material cutoff treaty, and reaffirmation of Article VI

commitments;  continued pursuit of nuclear weapons reductions leading toward eventual elimina-

tion;  additional NWFZs, including one in the Middle East;  enhanced verification; and  universality of NPT membership.

Thus, three resolutions were sponsored by the conference president: one implementing the agreed strengthening of the review process for the treaty, the second setting forth the Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and the third providing for the extension of the NPT, which is legally binding. In addition, the depository states (the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia) sponsored a resolution on the Middle East, which called on all non-NPT parties in the Middle East to join the NPT. While Djibouti, Israel, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the nonNPT parties in the region, the objective of the resolution was to draw attention to the fact

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  107

that Israel had not joined the treaty and should do so as a non-nuclear weapon state. Djibouti, Oman, and the UAE joined the NPT not long after the conference. While the indefinite extension resolution and the two resolutions associated with it passed by consensus, as a result of general concern about the lack of disarmament progress, a number of significant countries—including Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia—accepted this arrangement only reluctantly. Between 1995 and 2000 there was little progress in implementing the commitments of the statement of principles.The African NWFZ treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) was concluded in 1996 with several protocols, one of which, most importantly for the NPT, contains a legally binding negative security assurance for the African non-nuclear weapon states, as did protocols to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga.All the nuclear weapon states have signed and all except the United States and Russia have ratified this protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba. The comparable protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga was signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in 1995 after the conference (Russia and China having already signed); of the five nuclear weapon states, only the United States has not ratified. Also, an additional protocol for verification (which would significantly improve NPT verification by expanding authority to conduct off-site inspection, including environmental sampling, permitting, for example, the detection of distant nuclear activity by sampling river water to disclose upstream activity) was negotiated at the IAEA and completed in 1997. But to date only some eighteen NPT parties have ratified it.The CTBT was signed by seventy-one states in September 1996, and the list of signatories has since grown to 166, but as mentioned earlier, its entry into force has been hindered by the failure of several key states to sign or ratify it. There was no progress in negotiating nuclear weapon reductions, in negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty, or in making the NPT negative security assurances legally binding. Moreover, in May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted nuclear weapon tests and declared themselves to be nuclear weapon states. Thus, in April 2000 when the parties gathered for the sixth review conference, there was much trepidation for the future of the regime. But the result was surprisingly positive, largely as a result of the successful negotiation by the New Agenda Coalition, a group of states—Mexico, Egypt, New Zealand, Brazil, Ireland, Sweden, and South Africa—that banded together in 1997 to promote disarmament progress by nuclear weapon states. The result was the first truly agreed final document in NPT review conference history.The Final Document contained an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons, without this being stated as an “ultimate” objective; a recognition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability”; and a commitment to a continuing moratorium on nuclear weapon tests until the CTBT entered into force. However, the facts remain gloomy for the NPT regime. A U.S. spokesman said immediately after the review conference held in May 2000 that the Final Document represented no policy changes for the United States.The Bush administration threatened to withdraw from or abrogate the ABM Treaty, gave a six-month notice of withdrawal on December 13, 2001, and formally withdrew on June 13, 2002. There is no progress in sight for legally binding negative security assurances, a fissile material cut-off treaty, or CTBT entry into force. However, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the constructive formation of the anti-terrorism coalition by the Bush administration, the United States and Russia agreed to reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and a new strategic framework. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the 1995 and 2000 conferences were only respites in the gradual dissolution of the NPT regime, or whether they represent a new beginning for world security.

108  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

TREATY

NON-PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ON THE

OF

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 Entered into force March 5, 1970 The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”, Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows:

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  109

Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

110  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

2.All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty.Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  111

to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1.This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5.The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight. Signatories and Parties to the NPT Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,

112  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Former Yugoslavia, Republic of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent & the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé & Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu,Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe4

DOCUMENTS FROM THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND E XTENSION C ONFERENCE Decision 1 Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty 1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. 2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000. 3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference. 4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference.These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference. 4

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  113

5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee. 6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference. 7.The Conference further agreed that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.

Decision 2 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed, Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives: Universality 1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective. Non-Proliferation 2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its

114  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Nuclear Disarmament 3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the Cold War.The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in Article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below: (a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint; (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein; (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 5.The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed. 6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome. 7.The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols. Security Assurances 8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. Safeguards 9.The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  115

obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. 10. All States parties required by Article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay. 11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. 12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty. 15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. 16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account. 17.Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. 18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. 19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources. 20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force

116  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

Decision 3 Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, and Article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Having reaffirmed Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference, Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with Article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with Article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.

RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Recognizing that, pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security, Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994, Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  117

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof, Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995, Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995, 1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction; 2. Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference “call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities”; 3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in Section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; 4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; 5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective; 6. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

FINAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE 5 Part I Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Article I and II and Preambular Paragraphs 1 to 3 1.The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its

5

The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of four parts in three volumes.This manuscript only includes the substantive, nonorganizational elements of the Final Document, including Part 1 of Volume One.

118  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all Parties with its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. 2. The Conference recalls that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty. 3. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 4.The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 5. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. 6. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States Parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move to full compliance with their obligations. 7.The Conference welcomes the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty. 8. The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. 9.The Conference deplores the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in 1998. The Conference declares that such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever.The Conference calls upon both States to undertake the measures set out in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). 10.The Conference also calls upon all State Parties to refrain from any action that may contravene or undermine the objectives of the Treaty as well as of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). 11. The Conference notes that the two States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Conference regrets that the signing and ratifying has not yet taken place despite their pledges to do so. 12.The Conference reiterates the call on those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear-weapon development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  119

Article III and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5, Especially in Their Relationship to Article IV and Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7 13. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decision of the l995 Review and Extension Conference entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, noting paragraph 1 of the principles and objectives and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9–13 and 17–19, and to Article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5–7. It also recalls and reaffirms the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by that Conference. 14. The Conference notes that recommendations made at previous Conferences for the future implementation of Article III provide a helpful basis for States parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings. 15. The States parties urge the international community to enhance cooperation in the field of non-proliferation issues and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues related to non-proliferation in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments. 16.The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal, and they urge all four States not parties to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to it without delay and without conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols consistent with the Model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). 17.The Conference reaffirms the fundamental importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements. 18.The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear cooperation. 19.The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. 20.The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States Parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State Party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty. 21. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and General Assembly by IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with Article XII.C. of the Statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), and the role of promptly the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.

120  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

22. The Conference considers that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States to demonstrate this compliance. 23.The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 24. The Conference stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources. 25.The Conference reiterates the call by previous conferences of the States parties for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.The Conference notes with satisfaction that, since 1995, 28 States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA in compliance with Article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, 25 of which have brought the agreements into force.6 26.The Conference notes with concern that IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in that country. 27. The Conference looks forward to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fulfilling its stated intention to come into full compliance with its Treaty safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea preserving and making available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial declaration. 28. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should regularly be assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented. 29. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State’s declaration so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. 30.The Conference notes the measures endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1995 for strengthening and making more efficient the safeguards system and that these measures are being implemented pursuant to the existing legal authority conferred upon IAEA by comprehensive safeguards agreements. 31.The Conference also fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol will provide IAEA with, inter alia, enhanced information about a State’s nuclear activities and complementary access to locations within a State.

6 Algeria,Antigua and Barbuda,Argentina,Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Namibia, St. Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  121

32. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 have been successful in its main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and has also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol will provide, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are now being introduced as an integral part of the IAEA’s safeguards system. The Conference notes, in particular, the relationship between the additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between IAEA and a State party as set out in Article I of the Model Additional Protocol. In this regard, it recalls the interpretation provided by IAEA secretariat on 31 January 1997 and set out in document GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once concluded, the two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement. 33.The Conference notes the high priority that IAEA attaches, in the context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating traditional nuclear-material verification activities with the new strengthening measures and looks forward to an expeditious conclusion of this work. It recognizes that the aim of these efforts is to optimize the combination of all safeguards measures available to IAEA in order to meet the Agency’s safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. Furthermore, the Conference notes that credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, notably those related to enrichment and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit corresponding reduction in the level of traditional verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear material in that State, which is less sensitive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The Conference notes the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization and development of integrated safeguards approaches, and encourages continuing work by IAEA in further developing and implementing these approaches on a high-priority basis. 34. The Conference recognizes that measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to providing credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented by all States parties to the NPT, including the nuclear-weapon States.The Conference also recognizes that the interests of nuclear non-proliferation will be effectively served by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards strengthening measures by States with item-specific safeguards agreements.The Conference welcomes the additional protocol concluded by Cuba and urges it also to bring the protocol into force as soon as possible. 35.The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighboring States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among its member States and in contributing effectively to the nonproliferation regime. 36.The Conference stresses the need to respect the letter and the spirit of the Treaty with respect to technical cooperation with States not party to the Treaty. 37. The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, as appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards agreements. 38.The Conference notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and is consistent with that State’s obligations under Article I of the Treaty. The Conference invites such States to keep the scope of those additional protocols under review.

122  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

39.The Conference commends the IAEA for making its experience in the verification of nuclear non-proliferation available to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 40. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes, and the initiatives stemming from it. 41. The Conference underlines the importance of international verification of nuclear material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. The Conference supports recent unilateral offers and mutual initiatives to place excess material under appropriate IAEA verification arrangements. Nuclear materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for military purposes should as soon as practicable be placed under IAEA or other relevant verification. 42.The Conference notes the considerable increase in the Agency’s safeguards responsibilities since 1995. It further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon all States parties, noting their common but differentiated responsibilities, to continue their political, technical, and financial support of IAEA in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities. 43.The Conference welcomes the significant contributions by States parties through their support programmes to the development of technology and techniques that facilitate and assist the application of safeguards. 44. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely impact the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation.The allocation of resources should take into account all of the Agency’s statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer. 45. The Conference recognizes that the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States’ obligations under the Treaty. 46.The Conference, recalling the obligations of all States parties under Articles I, II and III of the Treaty, calls upon all States parties not to cooperate or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclearrelated field to States not party to the Treaty in a manner which assists them to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 47. The Conference reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by Article III of the Treaty. 48. The Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of Decision 2 (Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the NPT Review and Extension Conference. 49. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear-related dual-use items of equipment, technology, and materials not identified in Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole.The Conference calls on all States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear-related dual-use items to States not party to the Treaty do not assist any nuclear-weapons programme.The Conference reiterates that each State Party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty. 50.The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards on unirradiated direct-use nuclear material, and notes the projections by IAEA that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  123

purposes is expected to increase over the next several years. The Conference recognizes the nonproliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The Conference notes with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in favor of low-enriched uranium fuel as a result of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Programme. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing, to the storage of separated plutonium and to uranium enrichment. 51.The Conference welcomes the additional transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium resulting from the establishment, in 1997, of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549), setting out the policies that several States, including the nuclearweapon States, have decided to adopt. 52.The Conference welcomes the announcement made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 53. The Conference notes the conclusion drawn by the Board of Governors of IAEA that the proliferation risk with regard to neptunium is considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or plutonium and that at present there is practically no proliferation risk with regard to americium. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the recent decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors, which enabled IAEA to enter into exchanges of letters with States, on a voluntary basis, to ensure the regular and timely receipt of information as well as the application of measures required for efficient implementation of certain monitoring tasks regarding the production and transfer of separated neptunium, and which requested the Director General of IAEA to report to the Board when appropriate with respect to the availability of separated americium, using relevant information available through the conduct of regular IAEA activities and any additional information provided by States on a voluntary basis. 54. The Conference notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and calls on all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In this regard, the Conference notes that 63 States have become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 55. Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Conference urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material. The Conference welcomes the activities in the fields of prevention, detection and response being undertaken by IAEA in support of efforts against illicit trafficking.The Conference acknowledges the Agency’s efforts to assist member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including its ongoing work on a registry of sealed sources. It also welcomes the Agency’s activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information among its Member States, including the continued maintenance of the illicit trafficking database. The Conference recognizes the importance of enhancing cooperation and coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other radioactive material. 56.The Conference notes that 51 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements,7 and urges them to do so as soon as possible.This includes States parties without substantial nuclear activities.The Conference notes that in the case of States without substantial nuclear activities, the conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures. The 7 Andorra,Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Liberia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,Tajikistan, Tanzania,The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,Togo,Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,Vanuatu, Yemen

124  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA continue his efforts to further facilitate and assist these States parties in the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements. 57. The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements with 43 States and that 12 of those additional protocols are currently being implemented. The Conference encourages all States parties, in particular those States parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible. 58. The Conference urges IAEA to continue implementing strengthened safeguards measures as broadly as possible, and further urges all States with safeguards agreements to cooperate fully with IAEA in the implementation of these measures. 59.The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA and the IAEA member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements. 60.The Conference calls on all States parties to give their full and continuing support to the IAEA safeguards system. 61.The Conference notes the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States to convert in Russia 500 tonnes of high enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia’s nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for use in commercial reactors. It welcomes the conversion to date of over 80 tonnes of HEU in the framework of this agreement.The Conference also recognizes the affirmation by Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 tonnes of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programmes and convert it so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. 62. The Conference requests that IAEA continue to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including its safeguards verification responsibilities. It strongly urges all States to ensure that IAEA is provided with these resources. 63.The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual use items to all States taking into account Articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and, for States parties, also fully respecting Article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate national rules and regulations. 64.The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with Article III.2, be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity, and changes in procurement practices. 65. The Conference requests that any supplier arrangement should be transparent and should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with Articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty. 66.The Conference recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty. 67.The Conference encourages all other states that separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  125

68.The Conference urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomes the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Article IV and Preambular Paragraph 6 and 7 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 1.The Conference affirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. 2.The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.The Conference recognizes that this fight constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, the Conference confirms that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. 3.The Conference also reaffirms the undertaking by all parties to the Treaty to facilitate and have the fight to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States parties to the Treaty. The Conference notes the contribution that such uses can make to progress in general and to help to overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries. 4. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account. 5. Referring to paragraphs 14 to 20 of the Principles and Objectives decision of 1995, the Conference reasserts the need to continue to enhance the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all States parties and cooperation among them. 6. The Conference underlines the role of IAEA in assisting developing countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the development of effective programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological, and regulatory capabilities. In this context, the Conference takes note of the medium-term strategy of IAEA. 7.The Conference affirms that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary to effectively meet its responsibilities as foreseen in Article III.A of the Statute of IAEA. 8.The Conference recognizes the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Conference endorses the role of IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in formulating projects that meet the objective of protecting the global environment by applying sustainable development approaches. The Conference recommends that IAEA continue taking this objective into account when planning its future activities. It further notes that IAEA regularly reports to the General Assembly on progress made in these fields. 9. The Conference recognizes the importance of safety and non-proliferation features, as well as aspects related to radioactive waste management being addressed in nuclear power development as well as other nuclear activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle at the technological level. The

126  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Conference recalls the role of IAEA in the assessment of prospective nuclear power technologies in this respect. 10.The Conference commends IAEA for its efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme and to ensure the continuing relevance of the programme to the changing circumstances and needs of recipient Member States. In this context, the Conference welcomes the new strategy for technical cooperation, which seeks to promote socio-economic impact within its core competencies, by integrating its assistance into the national development programme of each country with a view to ensure sustainability through expanding partnerships in development, model project standards and use of country programme frameworks and thematic plans. The Conference recommends that IAEA continue taking this objective and the needs of developing countries, notably least-developed countries, into account when planning its future activities. 11. The Conference acknowledges the need for the parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly and take specific steps towards the implementation of Article IV of the Treaty. Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Radioactive Waste and Liability Nuclear and Radiation Safety 1.The Conference affirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can help to ensure that international cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety will take place within an appropriate non-proliferation framework. The Conference acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories, or under their jurisdiction, and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management. 2. The Conference notes that a demonstrated global record of safety is a key element for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety are maintained at the optimal level.Although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is indispensable. The Conference encourages the efforts of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture.The Conference welcomes and underlines the intensification of national measures and international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management, including activities conducted in this area by IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase the awareness in these fields, through appropriate training. 3.The Conference welcomes the activities of IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors. The Conference further endorses the work of IAEA in the organization of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of Member States through the Technical Cooperation Programme, the safety standards advisory commission and committees in the preparation of internationally recognized safety standards, the emergency response unit and the continuing work on transport safety matters. 4. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and encourages all States, in particular those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do so. It would also welcome a voluntary application of the related provisions of the Convention to other relevant nuclear installations dedicated to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.The Conference also expresses its satisfaction with the outcome of the first review meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and looks forward to the report from the next review meeting, in particular with respect to those areas where the first review meeting found that there was room for safety improvements.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  127

5. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 6.The Conference notes the bilateral and multilateral activities that have enhanced the capabilities of the international community to study, minimize and mitigate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in support of the actions taken by the Governments concerned. 7. The Conference considers that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 8. The Conference notes the importance of openness, transparency and public information concerning the safety of nuclear facilities. Safe Transport of Radioactive Material 9.The Conference endorses the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials and urges States to ensure that these standards are maintained. The Conference notes the decision in 1997 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to incorporate the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (INF Code) into the international Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. 10. The Conference underlines the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of States concerned, from the risks of transportation of radioactive materials. The Conference affirms that it is in the interests of all States that any transportation of radioactive materials be conducted in compliance with the relevant international standards of nuclear safety and security and environmental protection, without prejudice to the freedoms, rights and obligations of navigation provided for in international law. The Conference takes note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea. 11. Recalling resolution GC(43)/Res/11 of the General Conference of IAEA, adopted by consensus in 1999, the Conference invites States shipping radioactive materials to provide, as appropriate, assurances to concerned States, upon their request, that the national regulations of the shipping State take IAEA transport regulations into account and to provide them with relevant information relating to shipments of such materials.The information provided should in no case be contradictory to the measures of physical security and safety. 12. The Conference notes that States panics have been working bilaterally and through international organizations to improve cooperation and exchange of information among the States concerned. In this context, the Conference calls on States parties to continue working bilaterally and through the relevant international organizations to examine and further improve measures and international regulations relevant to international maritime transportation of radioactive material and spent fuel. Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste 13.The Conference notes that a major issue in the debate over the use of nuclear technologies is the safety of the management of spent fuel and of radioactive waste. The Conference notes the conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and encourages States that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do so. The Conference expresses the hope that this

128  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Convention will enter into force at the earliest date possible. The Conference underlines the importance that spent fuel and radioactive waste excluded from this Convention because they are within military or defense programmes in accordance with the objectives stated in this Convention. 14. The Conference commends the efforts of IAEA in radioactive waste management, and calls upon the Agency, in view of the increasing importance of all aspects of radioactive waste management, to strengthen its efforts in this field as resources permit. The Conference recognizes the activities of IAEA in the search for new approaches on radioactive waste management solutions that are both safe and publicly acceptable. It endorses IAEA programmes to assist member States in spent fuel and radioactive waste management through, inter alia, safety standards, peer reviews and Technical Cooperation activities. 15.The Conference also notes that the contracting parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) have urged all States that have not done so, to accept the 1993 amendment of Annex I of the London Convention, which prohibits contracting parties from dumping radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter at sea. Liability 16. The Conference notes the adoption of the 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The Conference also notes the existence of various national and international liability mechanisms. Furthermore, the Conference stresses the importance of having effective liability mechanisms in place. Technical Cooperation 17.The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of those parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing alone, or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 18. The Conference recognizes the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques in the fields referred to in Articles II and III of the Statute of the IAEA, and their contribution to achieving sustainable development in developing countries and for generally improving the well-being and the quality of life of the peoples of the world. 19.The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer among the international organizations referred to in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and affirms the importance of the Technical Cooperation activities of IAEA, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, in fulfilling the obligations set forth in Article IV of the Treaty. 20.The Conference recognizes that voluntary resources provided to and received from States parties to the Treaty under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund represent the most important contribution to the implementation of its Technical Cooperation Programme, the major instrument for its cooperation with developing countries. The Conference expresses its appreciation to all IAEA member States party to the Treaty, which respect their commitments to the Technical Cooperation Fund by pledging and paying in full their contributions. 21.The Conference notes, however, that there has been a growing gap between the approved target figures for the Technical Cooperation Fund and the actual payments. 22.The Conference stresses that every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA’s financial and human resources necessary for Technical Cooperation activities are assured, predictable and sufficient to meet the objectives mandated in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and Article II of the IAEA

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  129

Statute. The Conference notes the Resolutions of the General Conference of the IAEA GC(43)/RES/6 and GC(43)/RES/14, and urges member States of IAEA to make every effort to pay in full and on time their voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and reminds them of their obligation to pay their Assessed Programme Costs. It also encourages IAEA to continue to manage its Technical Cooperation activities in an effective and cost-efficient manner, and in accordance with Article III.C of the IAEA Statute. 23.The Conference notes the consultation among member States of the IAEA on the target for the Technical Cooperation Fund for the coming years and encourages member States to reach agreement on the Indicative Planning Figures (IPF). 24. The Conference notes that the special needs and priorities of the least developed countries parties to the Treaty should be taken into account in bilateral and multilateral nuclear technical assistance and cooperation programmes.The Conference recommends that the IAEA continue, through its Technical Cooperation Programme, to give special attention to the needs and priorities of least developed countries. 25. The Conference recognizes that regional cooperative arrangements for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the Technical Cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training (AFRA), the Regional Cooperative Agreements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), as well as the regional Technical Cooperation Programme in Central and Eastern Europe. 26.The Conference notes the significant level of bilateral cooperation between States parties in the worldwide peaceful uses of nuclear energy and welcomes the reports thereon. The Conference recognizes that it is the responsibility of States parties to create the conditions to enable this cooperation, in which commercial entities play an important role in a manner that conforms with the States parties’ obligations under Articles I and II of the Treaty.The Conference urges States in a position to do so to continue and where possible increase their cooperation in this field, particularly to developing countries and parties to the Treaty with economics in transition. 27. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate fight of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes. Transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty are to be encouraged. They would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation. Conversion of Nuclear Materials to Peaceful Uses 28.The Conference notes steps taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals and underlines the importance of international verification, as soon as practicable, of nuclear weapons material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military programmes and that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. This process requires strict procedures for the safe handling, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials, as well as the safe management of radioactive contaminants in strict compliance with highest possible standards of environmental protection and nuclear and radiation safety. 29. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including the measures in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes, and the initiatives stemming therefrom.

130  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

30. The Conference also notes that there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuelcycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. 31. The Conference calls upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance, as may be requested, for radiological assessment and remedial purposes in these affected areas, while noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard. Article V The Conference affirms that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty as regards the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Article VI and Preambular Paragraphs 8 to 12 32. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the States Parties of their commitment to Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Treaty. 33.The Conference notes that, despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reduction, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used. 34.The Conference takes note of the proposal made by the United Nations Secretary-General that the convening of a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers be considered at the Millennium Summit. 35.The Conference reaffirms that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and, therefore, to the further enhancement of international peace and security. 36.The Conference welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly and subsequent opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in New York on 24 September 1996, and notes that 155 States have signed it and that 56 of them, including 28 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited their instruments of ratification.The Conference welcomes the ratifications by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the recent decision by the Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty.The Conference calls upon all States, in particular on those 16 States whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. 37.The Conference welcomes the final declaration adopted at the Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, convened in Vienna in October 1999, in accordance with Article XIV of the Convention. 38.The Conference notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996. 39.The Conference notes the establishment, in August 1998, by the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee under Item 1 of its agenda entitled “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament” to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue as recommended in paragraph 4 (b) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  131

40. The Conference welcomes the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcomed. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority. 41. The Conference also welcomes the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon States, including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear weapon related facilities. 42. The Conference welcomes the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through initiatives on the verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes. 43. The Conference reiterates the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty through their voluntary withdrawal of all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories. 44. The Conference welcomes the signing, in September 1997, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America, of significant agreements relating to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, including a Memorandum of Understanding. The Conference welcomes the ratification of these documents by the Russian Federation. Ratification of these documents by the other countries remains a priority. 45. The Conference notes the nuclear-weapon States declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State. 46.The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”: 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 4.The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body. 5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI. 7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

132  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:  Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally  Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear

weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament  The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives

and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process  Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons

systems  A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that

these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination  The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process

leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes. 11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. 13.The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Article VII and the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States 47. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 48. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue. 49.The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances for non-nuclearweapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  133

50.The Conference notes the establishment in March 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 51. The Conference recognizes the important role which the establishment of new nuclearweapon-free zones and the signature to the protocols of new and previously existing zones by the nuclear-weapon States has played in extending negative security assurances to non-nuclearweapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the zones concerned.The Conference underlines the importance of concerned States taking steps to bring into effect the assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols. 52.The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weaponfree zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. 53.The Conference supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia. 54.The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weaponfree status, and takes note of the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining that status as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation and a practical contribution to promoting political stability and predictability in the region. 55. The Conference further welcomes the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and urges its rapid implementation. 56. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by these treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law. In this context, the Conference welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties in order to promote their common objectives. 57. The Conference stresses the importance of signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties, recognizing that security assurances are available to States parties to those treaties. In this context, the Conference takes note of the statement of the five nuclear-weapon States that the internal processes are under way to secure the few lacking ratifications to the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and that consultations with the States parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have been accelerated, paving the way for adherence by the five nuclear-weapon States to the protocol to that Treaty. 58.The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security.The Conference urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

134  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Weapons, and pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. 59. The Conference further welcomes the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999. 60.The Conference regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority, and in this respect supports the intention and commitment of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, welcomes the practical steps they have taken towards implementation of their initiative and notes with satisfaction the substantial progress they have made in drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. 61.The Conference, taking note of all initiatives by States parties, believes that the international community should continue to promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant UNDC guidelines and in that spirit welcomes the efforts and proposals that have been advanced by the States parties since 1995 in various regions of the world. 62. Regional issues The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East: 1.The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognizes that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. 2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. 3. The Conference recalls that operative paragraph 4 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.” The Conference notes, in this connection, that the report of the United Nations Secretariat on the Implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.2000/7) states that several States have acceded to the Treaty and that, with these accessions, all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference welcomes the accession of these States and reaffirms the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. 4.The Conference notes the requirement under Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of the Statute of the IAEA. In this regard, the Conference notes paragraph 44 of the review of Article III that nine States parties in the region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and invites those States to negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the conclusion of an Additional Protocol by Jordan and invites all other States in the Middle East, whether or not party to the Treaty, to participate in the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  135

5. The Conference notes the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its 1999 session, of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned (A/54/42).The Conference notes that, at that session, the Disarmament Commission encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass destruction. The Conference notes the adoption without a vote by the General Assembly, for the twentieth consecutive year, of a resolution proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. 6.The Conference invites all States, especially States of the Middle East, to reaffirm or declare their support for the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, to transmit their declarations of support to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to take practical steps towards that objective. 7.The Conference requests all States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It requests that the Secretariat prepare a compilation of these reports in preparation for consideration of these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2005 Review Conference. 8.The Conference requests the President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference to convey the Final Document of the Conference, including its conclusions and recommendations, to the Governments of all States, including those States Parties unable to attend the Conference and to States that are not party to the Treaty. 9. Recalling paragraph 6 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Conference reiterates the appeal to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.The Conference notes the statement by the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirming their commitment to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. 10. Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the NPT, the Conference notes the statement of 24 April 2000 by the IAEA Director-General that, since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq on 16 December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 687.The Conference further notes that the IAEA carried out an inspection in January 2000 pursuant to Iraq’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA during which the inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards (low enriched, natural and depleted uranium). The Conference reaffirms the importance of Iraq’s full continuous cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with its obligations. South Asia and other regional issues: 11. The Conference emphasizes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. 12.With respect to the nuclear explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in May 1998, the Conference recalls Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), adopted unanimously

136  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

on 6 June 1998, and calls upon both States to take all of the measures set out therein. Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclearweapon States. 13. The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Conference further urges both States to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. 14. The Conference notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Conference urges both States to sign the Treaty, in accordance with their pledges to do so. 15.The Conference notes the willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, the Conference urges both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of such material.The Conference also urges both States to join other countries in actively seeking an early commencement of negotiations on this issue, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, with a view to reaching early agreement. 16. The Conference notes with concern that, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Conference looks forward to the fulfillment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force.The Conference emphasizes the importance of action by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to preserve and make available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory. Article IX 63. The Conference reaffirms its conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and its strict implementation is essential to international peace and security. 64.The Conference recognizes the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 65.The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty only as non-nuclear-weapon States. 66.The Conference undertakes to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia. 67. The Conference reaffirms the long-held commitment of parties to the Treaty to universal membership and notes that this goal has been advanced by the accession to the Treaty of several new States since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, thereby bringing its membership to 187 States parties. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Treaty in establishing a norm of international behavior in the nuclear field. 68.The Conference therefore calls on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activi-

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  137

ties.These States are Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. In this context, the Conference welcomes the signature by Cuba of the protocol additional to its safeguards agreements with IAEA. 69.The Conference particularly urges those non-parties to the Treaty that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities—India, Israel and Pakistan—to take similar action, and affirms the important contribution this would make to regional and global security. 70. The Conference also takes note that the widening of the entry into force of protocols additional to safeguards agreements with IAEA will strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime and facilitate the exchange of nuclear and nuclear-related material in peaceful nuclear cooperation. 71. In this connection, the Conference underlines the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all existing parties with their obligations under the Treaty. 72. The Conference requests the President of the Conference to convey formally the views of States parties on this issue to all non-parties and to report their responses to the parties. Such efforts should contribute to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the adherence of nonparties to it. Improving the Effectiveness of the Strengthened Review Process for the NPT 73. The States parties reaffirmed the provisions in the Decision on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. 74. The States parties stressed that three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, normally for a duration of 10 working days each, should be held in the years prior to the review conference. A fourth session, would, if necessary, be held in the year of the review conference. 75.The States parties recommended that specific time be allocated at sessions of the Preparatory Committee to address specific relevant issues. 76. Recalling the Decision on subsidiary bodies of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1), subsidiary bodies can be established at the Review Conference to address specific relevant issues 77. The States parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to “consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality”. To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. 78. The States parties also agreed that the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee should carry out consultations with the States parties to prepare the ground for the outcome of the sessions as well as their agenda. 79.The consideration of the issues at each session of the Preparatory Committee should be factually summarized and its results transmitted in a report to the next session for further discussion. At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference. 80.The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the last session of the Preparatory Committee. 81.The States parties also agreed that a meeting be allocated to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference.

138  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

THE STRUCTURE

CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND S TATES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND

IAEA Document Number: INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) Date: June 1972

Part I Basic Undertaking 1. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article III.l of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Application of Safeguards 2. The Agreement should provide for the Agency’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Co-operation between the Agency and the State 3.The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein Implementation of Safeguards 4.The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed: a. To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; b.To avoid undue interference in the State’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and c. To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. 5.The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement, except that specific information relating to such implementation in the State may be given to the Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. Summarized information

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  139

on nuclear material being safeguarded by the Agency under the Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned agree. 6.The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of technological developments In the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use should be made, for example, of such means as: a. Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; b. Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and c. Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under the Agreement. National System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material 7.The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the State’s system.The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II below.The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the State’s system. Provision of Information to the Agency 8.The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II below, with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under the Agreement. Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In examining design information, the Agency shall, at the request of the State, be prepared to examine on premises of the State design information which the State regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information would not have to be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remained available for ready further examination by the Agency on premises of the State. Agency Inspectors 9.The Agreement should provide that the State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement.The Agency shall secure the consent of the State to the designation of Agency inspectors to that State. If the State, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the State an alternative designation or designations. The repeated refusal of a State to accept the designation of Agency inspectors which would impede the inspections conducted under the Agreement would be considered by the Board upon referral by the Director General with a view to appropriate action. The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and distur-

140  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

bance to the State and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected, as well as to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge. Privileges and Immunities 10. The Agreement should specify the privileges and immunities which shall be granted to the Agency and its staff in respect of their functions under the Agreement. In the case of a State party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency), the provisions thereof, as in force for such State, shall apply. In the case of other States, the privileges and immunities granted should be such as to ensure that: a. The Agency and its staff will be in a position to discharge their functions under the Agreement effectively; and b. No such State will be placed thereby in a more favourable position than States party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency. Termination of Safeguards Consumption or Dilution of Nuclear Material 11. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on n clear material subject to safeguards thereunder upon determination by the Agency that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable. Transfer of Nuclear Material out of the State 12. The Agreement should provide, with respect to nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder, for notification of transfers of such material out of the State, in accordance with the provisions set out in paragraphs 92–94 below. The Agency shall terminate safeguards under the Agreement on nuclear material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in paragraph 91.The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material. Provisions Relating to Nuclear Material to be Used in Non-nuclear Activities 13. The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such nuclear material may be terminated Non-application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material to be Used in Non-peaceful Activities 14.The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply: a.The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: i. That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and ii.That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  141

b.The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity.The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such material; and c. Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency.The Agency’s agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein. Finance 15.The Agreement should contain one of the following sets of provisions: a.An agreement with a Member of the Agency should provide that each party thereto shall bear the expense it incurs in implementing its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the State or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or b.An agreement with a party not a Member of the Agency should in application of the provisions of Article XIV.C of the Statute, provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs thereunder. However, if the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage 16.The Agreement should provide that the State shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of the Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the State. International Responsibility 17.The Agreement should provide that any claim by one party thereto against the other in respect of any damage, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, resulting from the implementation of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be settled in accordance with international law. Measures in Relation to Verification of Non-diversion 18.The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked. 19. The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C

142  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance. Interpretation and Application of the Agreement and Settlement of Disputes 20. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof. 21.The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board; and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. 22. The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 19 above or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: each party would designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, either party has not designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator had not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure would be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal would be binding on both parties. Final Clauses Amendment of the Agreement 23.The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either of them, consult each other on amendment of the Agreement.All amendments shall require the agreement of both parties. It might additionally be provided, if convenient to the State, that the agreement of the parties on amendments to Part II of the Agreement could be achieved by recourse to a simplified procedure.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of any amendment to the Agreement. Suspension of Application of Agency Safeguards under Other Agreements 24.Where applicable and where the State desires such a provision to appear, the Agreement should provide that the application of Agency safeguards in the State under other safeguards agreements with the Agency shall be suspended while the Agreement is in force. If the State has received assistance from the Agency for a project, the State’s undertaking in the Project Agreement not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply. Entry into Force and Duration 25.The Agreement should provide that it shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the State written notification that the statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the entry into force. 26.The Agreement should provide for it to remain in force as long as the State is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  143

Part II Introduction 27.The Agreement should provide that the purpose of Part II thereof is to specify the procedures to be applied for the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. Objective of Safeguards 28.The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. 29.To this end the Agreement should provide for the use of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. 30.The Agreement should provide that the technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated. National System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material 31.The Agreement should provide that pursuant to paragraph 7 above the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the State’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the State’s accounting and control activities. 32. The Agreement should provide that the State’s system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements for the establishment of such measures as: a. A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; b. The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty; c.Procedures for identifying,reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements; d. Procedures for taking a physical inventory; e. Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses; f. A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; g. Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and h. Procedures for the provisions of reports to the Agency in accordance with paragraphs 59–69 below. Starting Point of Safeguards 33.The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities.

144  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

34.The Agreement should provide that: a.When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in sub-paragraph (c) below is directly or indirectly exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State, the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; b.When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in sub-paragraph (c) below is imported, the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically nonnuclear purposes; and c. When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the State, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement. Termination of Safeguards 35. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder under the conditions set forth in paragraph 11 above.Where the conditions of that paragraph are not met, but the State considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency and the State shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. It should further be provided that safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement under the conditions set forth in paragraph 13 above, provided that the State and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable. Exemptions from Safeguards 36.The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall, at the request of the State, exempt nuclear material from safeguards, as follows: a. Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments; b. nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with paragraph 13 above, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and c. Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%. 37. The Agreement should provide that nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards at the request of the State, provided that nuclear material so exempted in the State may not at any time exceed: a. One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one of more of the following: i. Plutonium; ii. Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20% ) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and iii. Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment; b.Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%); c.Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  145

d.Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board of Governors for uniform application. 38.The Agreement should provide that if exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with safeguarded nuclear material, provision should be made for the re-application of safeguards thereto. Subsidiary Arrangements 39. The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in the Agreement are to be applied. Provision should be made for the possibility of an extension or change of the Subsidiary Arrangements by agreement between the Agency and the State without amendment of the Agreement. 40. It should be provided that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of the Agreement. The State and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within 90 days of the entry into force of the Agreement, a later date being acceptable only with the agreement of both parties. The State shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements.The Agreement should also provide that, upon its entry into force, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in paragraph 41 below. Inventory 41.The Agreement should provide that, on the basis of the initial report referred to in paragraph 62 below, the Agency shall establish a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the State subject to safeguards under the Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the State at agreed intervals. Design Information General 42. Pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements, and that the time limits for the provision of such information in respect of new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. It should further be stipulated that such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility. 43.The Agreement should specify that the design information in respect of each facility to be made available to the Agency shall include, when applicable: a.The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; b.A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; c. A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and d. A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking.

146  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

44.The Agreement should further provide that other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall be made available to the Agency in respect of each facility, in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control. It should also be provided that the State shall make available to the Agency supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall comply at the facility. 45.The Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes shall be provided for examination sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. Purposes of Examination of Design Information 46.The Agreement should provide that the design information made available to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes: a. To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; b.To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine the nuclear material flows and inventories; in determining such material balance area the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria: i. The size of the material balance area should be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; ii. In determining the material balance area advantage should be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby simplify the application of safeguards and concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; iii.A number of material balance area in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and iv. If the State so requests, a special material balance area around a process step involving commercially sensitive information may be established; c.To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory for Agency accounting purposes; d.To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; e. To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and f. To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. It should further be provided that the results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Re-examination of Design Information 47. The Agreement should provide that design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to paragraph 46 above.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  147

Verification of Design Information 48. The Agreement should provide that the Agency, in co-operation with the State, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to paragraphs 42–45 above for the purposes stated in paragraph 46. Information in Respect of Nuclear Material Outside Facilities 49. The Agreement should provide that the following information concerning nuclear material customarily used outside facilities shall be provided as applicable to the Agency: a.A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user’s name and address for routine business purposes; and b. A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control, including organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control. The Agreement should further provide that the Agency shall be informed on a timely basis of any change in the information provided to it under this paragraph. 50. The Agreement should provide that the information made available to the Agency in respect of nuclear material customarily used outside facilities may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in subparagraphs 46(b)(f) above. Records System General 51. The Agreement should provide that in establishing a national system of accounting for and control of nuclear material as referred to in paragraph 7 above, the State shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. Provision should also be made that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall describe the records to be kept in respect of each material balance area. 52.The Agreement should provide that the State shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish. 53.The Agreement should provide that the records shall be retained for at least five years. 54.The Agreement should provide that the records shall consist, as appropriate, of: a. Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement; and b. Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material. 55.The Agreement should provide that the system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards. Accounting Records 56. The Agreement should provide that the accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area: a. All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; b. All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and c. All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories. 57. The Agreement should provide that for all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data

148  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

and source data. Provision should further be included that records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. Furthermore, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated for each inventory change. Operating Records 58. The Agreement should provide that the operating records shall set forth as appropriate in respect of each material balance area: a.Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; b. The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; c. A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and d. A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur. Reports System General 59.The Agreement should specify that the State shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in paragraphs 60–69 below in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder. 60. The Agreement should provide that reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. 61.The Agreement should provide that reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with paragraphs 51–58 above and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports. Accounting Reports 62.The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall be provided with an initial report on all nuclear material which is to be subject to safeguards thereunder. It should also be provided that the initial report shall be dispatched by the State to the Agency within 30 days of the last day of the calendar month in which the Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. 63.The Agreement should stipulate that for each material balance area the State shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports: a. Inventory change reports showing changes in the inventory of nuclear material.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and b. Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date as required. 64. The Agreement should provide that inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient.These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes:

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  149

a. Explaining the inventory changes on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under subparagraph 58(a) above; and b. Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. 65. The Agreement should provide that the State shall report each inventory change adjustment and correction either periodically in a consolidated list or individually.The inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches; small amounts, such as analytical samples, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, may be combined and reported as one inventory change. 66.The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall provide the State with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards, for each material balance area as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. 67. The Agreement should specify that the material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the Agency and the State: a. Beginning physical inventory; b. Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); c. Ending book inventory; d. Shipper/receiver differences; e. Adjusted ending book inventory; f. Ending physical inventory; and g. Material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch shall be attached to each material balance report. Special Reports 68.The Agreement should provide that the State shall make special reports without delay a. If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits to be specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or b. If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible. Amplification and Clarification of Reports 69.The Agreement should provide that at the Agency’s request the State shall supply amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards. Inspections General 70. The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in paragraphs 71–82 below. Purposes of Inspections 71.The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to: a. Verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement;

150  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

b. Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the initial report; and c. Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in accordance with paragraphs 93 and 96 below, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the State. 72.The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make routine inspections in order to: a.Verify that reports are consistent with records; b. Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement; and c. Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. 73. The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make special inspections subject to the procedures laid down in paragraph 77 below: a. In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or b. If the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78–82 below, or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both. Scope of Inspections 74. The Agreement should provide that for the purposes stated in paragraphs 71–73 above the Agency may: a. Examine the records kept pursuant to paragraphs 51–58; b. Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement; c. Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; d. Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and e. Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible. 75. It should further be provided that within the scope of paragraph 74 above the Agency shall be enabled: a.To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accounting are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; b.To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accounting are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved; c.To make arrangements with the State that, if necessary: i. Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency’s use; ii.The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analysed; iii. Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  151

iv. Other calibrations are carried out; d.To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment; e.To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and f.To make arrangements with the State for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use. Access for Inspections

76.The Agreement should provide that: a. For the purposes specified in sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b) above and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency’s inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present; b. For the purposes specified in sub-paragraph 71(c) above the inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with sub-paragraphs 92(c) or 95(c) below; c. For the purposes specified in paragraph 72 above the Agency’s inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to paragraphs 1–58; and d. In the event of the State concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the State and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations.The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board. 77.The Agreement should provide that in circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in paragraph 73 above the State and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78–82 below, and may obtain access in agreement with the State to information or locations in addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 above for ad hoc and routine inspections. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with paragraphs 21 and 22; in case action by the State is essential and urgent, paragraph 18 above shall apply. Frequency and Intensity of Routine Inspections 78. The Agreement should provide that the number, intensity, duration and timing of routine inspections shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth therein, and that the Agency shall make the optimum and most economical use of available inspection resources. 79.The Agreement should provide that in the case of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms routine inspections shall not exceed one per year. For other facilities the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material. 80.The Agreement should provide that the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined as follows:

152  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

a. For reactors and sealed stores, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility in the State; b. For other facilities involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1. 5 man-years of inspection; and c. For all other facilities the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one-third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The Agreement should further provide that the Agency and the State may agree to amend the maximum figures specified in this paragraph upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable. 81. Subject to paragraphs 78–80 above the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections of any facility shall include: a.The form of nuclear material in particular, whether the material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility; b.The effectiveness of the State’s accounting and control system, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the State’s accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in paragraph 32 above have been implemented by the State; the promptness of reports submitted to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for as verified by the Agency; c. Characteristics of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated; d. International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activity by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the State’s nuclear activities are interrelated with those of other States; and e. Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material. 82. The Agreement should provide for consultation between the Agency and the State if the latter considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities. Notice of Inspections 83. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall give advance notice to the State before arrival of inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows: a. For ad hoc inspections pursuant to sub-paragraph 71(c) above, at least 24 hours, for those pursuant to sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in paragraph 48, at least one week; b. For special inspections pursuant to paragraph 73 above, as promptly as possible after the Agency and the State have consulted as provided for in paragraph 77, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  153

c. For routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 72 above, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in sub-paragraph 80(b) and sealed stores containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 59, and one week in all other cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance area outside facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside the State the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the State. 84. However, the Agreement should also provide that, as a supplementary measure, the Agency may carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 80 above in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by the State pursuant to paragraph 64(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise the State periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for facility operators and the State, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of paragraphs 44 above and 89 below. Similarly the State shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors. Designation of Inspectors 85.The Agreement should provide that: a.The Director General shall inform the State in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the State; b.The State shall inform the Director General within 30 days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal; c.The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the State as one of the inspectors for the State, and shall inform the State of such designations; and d.The Director General, acting in response to a request by the State or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the State of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the State.The Agreement should also provide, however, that in respect of inspectors needed for the purposes stated in paragraph 48 above and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within 30 days after the entry into force of the Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis. 86.The Agreement should provide that the State shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required for each inspector designated for the State. Conduct and Visits of Inspectors 87.The Agreement should provide that inspectors, in exercising their functions under paragraphs 48 and 71–75 above, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of paragraphs 74 and 75, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor. 88. When inspectors require services available in the State, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the State shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.

154  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

89.The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their inspections by representatives of the State, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. Statements on the Agency’s Verification Activities 90.The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall inform the State of: a.The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and b.The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the State, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck. International Transfers General 91. The Agreement should provide that nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards thereunder which is transferred internationally shall, for purposes of the Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of the State: a. In the case of import, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination; and b. In the case of export, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination.The Agreement should provide that the States concerned shall make suitable arrangements to determine the point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place. No State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over its territory or territorial waters, or that it is being transported under its flag or in its aircraft. Transfers out of the State 92. The Agreement should provide that any intended transfer out of the State of safeguarded nuclear material in an amount exceeding one effective kilogram or by successive shipments to the same State within a period of three months each of less than one effective kilogram but exceeding in total one effective kilogram shall be notified to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping. The Agency and the State may agree on different procedures for advance notification.The notification shall specify: a. The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come; b.The State for which the nuclear material is destined; c.The dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping; d.The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and e. At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material and the probable date on which this point will be reached. 93.The Agreement should further provide that the purpose of this notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement before it is transferred out of the State and, if the Agency so wishes or the State so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  155

prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to this notification. 94. The Agreement should provide that, if the nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State, the exporting State shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive, within three months of the time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material from the exporting State, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer. Transfers into the State 95. The Agreement should provide that the expected transfer into the State of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards in an amount greater than one effective kilogram or by successive shipments from the same State within a period of three months each of less than one effective kilogram but exceeding in total one effective kilogram shall be notified to the Agency as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material and in any case not later than the date on which the recipient State assumes responsibility therefor.The Agency and the State may agree on different procedures for advance notification.The notification shall specify: a. The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material; b. At what point of the transfer responsibility for the nuclear material will be assumed by the State for the purposes of the Agreement, and the probable date on which this point will be reached; and c.The expected date of arrival, the location to which the nuclear material is to be delivered and the date on which it is intended that the nuclear material should be unpacked. 96. The Agreement should provide that the purpose of this notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material subject to safeguards which has been transferred into the State, by means of inspection of the consignment at the time it is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to this notification. Special Reports 97. The Agreement should provide that in the case of international transfers a special report as envisaged in paragraph 68 above shall be made if any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material including the occurrence of significant delay during the transfer. Definitions 98.“Adjustment” means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for. 99. “Annual throughput” means, for the purposes of paragraphs 79 and 80 above, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity. 100. “Batch” means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items. 101. “Batch data” means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate.The units of account shall be as follows: a. Grams of contained plutonium;

156  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

b. Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and c. Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium. For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. 102. “Book inventory of a material balance area” means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. 103. “Correction” means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. 104.“Effective kilogram” means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.The quantity in “effective kilograms” is obtained by taking: a. For plutonium, its weight in kilograms; b. For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%); and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; c. For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (–1%); and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and d. For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. 105. “Enrichment” means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question. 106.“Facility” means: a. A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or b. Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. 107.“Inventory change” means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following: a. Increases: i. Import; ii. Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a nonsafeguarded (non-peaceful) activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards; iii. Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and iv. De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity. b. Decreases: i. Export; ii. Domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for a nonsafeguarded (non-peaceful) activity; iii. Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  157

iv. Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; v. Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; vi. Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and vii. Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft. 108. “Key measurement point” means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory.“Key measurement points” thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas. 109. “Man-year of inspection” means, for the purposes of paragraph 80 above, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours. 110.“Material balance area” means an area in or outside of a facility such that: a.The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each “material balance area” can be determined; and b.The physical inventory of nuclear material in each “material balance area” can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established. 111. “Material unaccounted for” means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory. 112.“Nuclear material” means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute.The term “source material” shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the State. 113.“Physical inventory” means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area obtained in accordance with specified procedures. 114. “Shipper/receiver difference” means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. 115. “Source data” means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated. 116.“Strategic point” means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all “strategic points” taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a “strategic point” may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

158  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN .......... AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IAEA Document Number: INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) Date: September 1997

Preamble Whereas .......... (hereinafter referred to as “..........”) is a party to (an) Agreement(s) between ......... and the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”) for the application of safeguards [full title of the Agreement(s) to be inserted] (hereinafter referred to as the “Safeguards Agreement(s)”), which entered into force on ...........; Aware of the desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system; Recalling that the Agency must take into account in the implementation of safeguards the need to: avoid hampering the economic and technological development of .......... or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge; Whereas the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Protocol shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards; Now therefore .......... and the Agency have agreed as follows:

Relationship between the Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement Article 1 The provisions of the Safeguards Agreement shall apply to this Protocol to the extent that they are relevant to and compatible with the provisions of this Protocol. In case of conflict between the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and those of this Protocol, the provisions of this Protocol shall apply.

Provision of Information Article 2 a. .......... shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing: (i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities not involving nuclear material carried out anywhere that are funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, .......... . (ii) Information identified by the Agency on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or efficiency, and agreed to by .........., on operational activities of safeguards relevance at facilities and at locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  159

(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not apparent from that description, its contents.The description shall include a map of the site. (iv) A description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol. (v) Information specifying the location, operational status and the estimated annual production capacity of uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants, and the current annual production of such mines and concentration plants for .......... as a whole. .......... shall provide, upon request by the Agency, the current annual production of an individual mine or concentration plant. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy. (vi) Information regarding source material which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, as follows: (a) The quantities, the chemical composition, the use or intended use of such material, whether in nuclear or non-nuclear use, for each location in ......... at which the material is present in quantities exceeding ten metric tons of uranium and/or twenty metric tons of thorium, and for other locations with quantities of more than one metric ton, the aggregate for .......... as a whole if the aggregate exceeds ten metric tons of uranium or twenty metric tons of thorium. The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy; (b) The quantities, the chemical composition and the destination of each export out of .........., of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: (1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive exports of uranium from ........... to the same State, each of less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year; (2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive exports of thorium from .......... to the same State, each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year; (c) The quantities, chemical composition, current location and use or intended use of each import into ..........of such material for specifically non-nuclear purposes in quantities exceeding: (1) Ten metric tons of uranium, or for successive imports of uranium into .......... each of less than ten metric tons, but exceeding a total of ten metric tons for the year; (2) Twenty metric tons of thorium, or for successive imports of thorium into .......... each of less than twenty metric tons, but exceeding a total of twenty metric tons for the year; it being understood that there is no requirement to provide information on such material intended for a non-nuclear use once it is in its non-nuclear end-use form. (vii) (a) Information regarding the quantities, uses and locations of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to [paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153/2]; (b) Information regarding the quantities (which may be in the form of estimates) and uses at each location, of nuclear material exempted from safeguards pursuant to [paragraph 36(b) of INFCIRC/153/2] but not yet in a non-nuclear end-use form, in quantities exceeding those set out in [paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153].8 The provision of this information does not require detailed nuclear material accountancy. (viii) Information regarding the location or further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 on which safeguards have 8

The reference to the corresponding provision of the relevant Safeguards Agreement should be inserted where bracketed references to INFCIRC/153 are made.

160  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

been terminated pursuant to [paragraph 11 of INFCIRC/153/2]. For the purpose of this paragraph,“further processing” does not include repackaging of the waste or its further conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal. (ix) The following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: (a) For each export out of .......... of such equipment and material: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date or, as appropriate, expected date, of export; (b) Upon specific request by the Agency, confirmation by .........., as importing State, of information provided to the Agency by another State concerning the export of such equipment and material to ...........”. (x) General plans for the succeeding ten-year period relevant to the development of the nuclear fuel cycle (including planned nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities) when approved by the appropriate authorities in .......... . b. .......... shall make every reasonable effort to provide the Agency with the following information: (i) A general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities not involving nuclear material which are specifically related to enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233 that are carried out anywhere in .......... but which are not funded, specifically authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, .......... . For the purpose of this paragraph, “processing” of intermediate or high-level waste does not include repackaging of the waste or its conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal. (ii) A general description of activities and the identity of the person or entity carrying out such activities, at locations identified by the Agency outside a site which the Agency considers might be functionally related to the activities of that site.The provision of this information is subject to a specific request by the Agency. It shall be provided in consultation with the Agency and in a timely fashion. c. Upon request by the Agency, .......... shall provide amplifications or clarifications of any information it has provided under this Article, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards. Article 3 a. .......... shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)(a), (vii) and (x) and Article 2.b.(i) within 180 days of the entry into force of this Protocol. b. .......... shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, updates of the information referred to in paragraph a. above for the period covering the previous calendar year. If there has been no change to the information previously provided, .......... shall so indicate. c. .......... shall provide to the Agency, by 15 May of each year, the information identified in Article 2.a.(vi)(b) and (c) for the period covering the previous calendar year. d. .......... shall provide to the Agency on a quarterly basis the information identified in Article 2.a.(ix)(a).This information shall be provided within sixty days of the end of each quarter. e. .......... shall provide to the Agency the information identified in Article 2.a.(viii) 180 days before further processing is carried out and, by 15 May of each year, information on changes in location for the period covering the previous calendar year. f. .......... and the Agency shall agree on the timing and frequency of the provision of the information identified in Article 2.a.(ii).

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  161

g. .......... shall provide to the Agency the information in Article 2.a.(ix)(b) within sixty days of the Agency’s request.

Complementary Access Article 4 The following shall apply in connection with the implementation of complementary access under Article 5 of this Protocol: a.The Agency shall not mechanistically or systematically seek to verify the information referred to in Article 2; however, the Agency shall have access to: (i) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(i) or (ii) on a selective basis in order to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities; (ii) Any location referred to in Article 5.b. or c. to resolve a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information provided pursuant to Article 2 or to resolve an inconsistency relating to that information; (iii) Any location referred to in Article 5.a.(iii) to the extent necessary for the Agency to confirm, for safeguards purposes, ..........’s declaration of the decommissioned status of a facility or of a location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. b. (i) Except as provided in paragraph (ii) below, the Agency shall give .......... advance notice of access of at least 24 hours; (ii) For access to any place on a site that is sought in conjunction with design information verification visits or ad hoc or routine inspections on that site, the period of advance notice shall, if the Agency so requests, be at least two hours but, in exceptional circumstances, it may be less than two hours. c. Advance notice shall be in writing and shall specify the reasons for access and the activities to be carried out during such access. d. In the case of a question or inconsistency, the Agency shall provide .......... with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of the question or inconsistency. Such an opportunity will be provided before a request for access, unless the Agency considers that delay in access would prejudice the purpose for which the access is sought. In any event, the Agency shall not draw any conclusions about the question or inconsistency until .......... has been provided with such an opportunity. e. Unless otherwise agreed to by .........., access shall only take place during regular working hours. f. .......... shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their access by representatives of .........., provided that the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. Article 5 .......... shall provide the Agency with access to: a. (i) Any place on a site; (ii) Any location identified by .......... under Article 2.a.(v)–(viii); (iii) Any decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used. b. Any location identified by .......... under Article 2.a.(i), Article 2.a.(iv), Article 2.a.(ix)(b) or Article 2.b, other than those referred to in paragraph a.(i) above, provided that if .......... is unable

162  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

to provide such access, .......... shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, through other means. c. Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, provided that if .......... is unable to provide such access, .......... shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements, without delay, at adjacent locations or through other means. Article 6 When implementing Article 5, the Agency may carry out the following activities: a. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(i) or (iii): visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; application of seals and other identifying and tamper indicating devices specified in Subsidiary Arrangements; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board of Governors (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) and following consultations between the Agency and ........... b. For access in accordance with Article 5.a.(ii): visual observation; item counting of nuclear material; non-destructive measurements and sampling; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of records relevant to the quantities, origin and disposition of the material; collection of environmental samples; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and ........... c. For access in accordance with Article 5.b.: visual observation; collection of environmental samples; utilization of radiation detection and measurement devices; examination of safeguards relevant production and shipping records; and other objective measures which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and ........... d. For access in accordance with Article 5.c.: collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency pursuant to Article 5.c., utilization at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by .......... and the Agency, other objective measures. Article 7 a. Upon request by .........., the Agency and .......... shall make arrangements for managed access under this Protocol in order to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. Such arrangements shall not preclude the Agency from conducting activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at the location in question, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of the information referred to in Article 2 or of an inconsistency relating to that information. b. .......... may, when providing the information referred to in Article 2, inform the Agency of the places at a site or location at which managed access may be applicable. c. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, ......... may have recourse to managed access consistent with the provisions of paragraph a. above..10 Article 8 Nothing in this Protocol shall preclude .......... from offering the Agency access to locations in addition to those referred to in Articles 5 and 9 or from requesting the Agency to conduct verification activities at a particular location. The Agency shall, without delay, make every reasonable effort to act upon such a request.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  163

Article 9 .......... shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out widearea environmental sampling, provided that if .......... is unable to provide such access it shall make every reasonable effort to satisfy Agency requirements at alternative locations.The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefor have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and ........... Article 10 The Agency shall inform .......... of: a. The activities carried out under this Protocol, including those in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of .........., within sixty days of the activities being carried out by the Agency. b.The results of activities in respect of any questions or inconsistencies the Agency had brought to the attention of .........., as soon as possible but in any case within thirty days of the results being established by the Agency. c. The conclusions it has drawn from its activities under this Protocol. The conclusions shall be provided annually.

Designation of Agency Inspectors Article 11 a. (i) The Director General shall notify .......... of the Board’s approval of any Agency official as a safeguards inspector. Unless ........... advises the Director General of its rejection of such an official as an inspector for .......... within three months of receipt of notification of the Board’s approval, the inspector so notified to .......... shall be considered designated to ........... ; (ii) The Director General, acting in response to a request by .......... or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform .......... of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for .......... . b. A notification referred to in paragraph a. above shall be deemed to be received by .......... seven days after the date of the transmission by registered mail of the notification by the Agency to ...........

Visas Article 12 .......... shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of .......... for the purpose of carrying out his/her functions. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector’s designation to .......... .

Subsidiary Arrangements Article 13 a.Where .......... or the Agency indicates that it is necessary to specify in Subsidiary Arrangements how measures laid down in this Protocol are to be applied, .......... and the Agency shall agree on such Subsidiary Arrangements within ninety days of the entry into force of this Protocol or, where

164  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

the indication of the need for such Subsidiary Arrangements is made after the entry into force of this Protocol, within ninety days of the date of such indication. b. Pending the entry into force of any necessary Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the measures laid down in this Protocol.

Communications Systems Article 14 a. .......... shall permit and protect free communications by the Agency for official purposes between Agency inspectors in .......... and Agency Headquarters and/or Regional Offices, including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices.The Agency shall have, in consultation with .........., the right to make use of internationally established systems of direct communications, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication, not in use in ........... At the request of .......... or the Agency, details of the implementation of this paragraph with respect to the attended or unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. b. Communication and transmission of information as provided for in paragraph a. above shall take due account of the need to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information or design information which .......... regards as being of particular sensitivity.

Protection of Confidential Information Article 15 a.The Agency shall maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge, including such information coming to the Agency’s knowledge in the implementation of this Protocol. b.The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall include, among others, provisions relating to: (i) General principles and associated measures for the handling of confidential information; (ii) Conditions of staff employment relating to the protection of confidential information; (iii) Procedures in cases of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality. c.The regime referred to in paragraph a. above shall be approved and periodically reviewed by the Board.

Annexes Article 16 a.The Annexes to this Protocol shall be an integral part thereof. Except for the purposes of amendment of the Annexes, the term “Protocol” as used in this instrument means the Protocol and the Annexes together. b. The list of activities specified in Annex I, and the list of equipment and material specified in Annex II, may be amended by the Board upon the advice of an open-ended working group of experts established by the Board. Any such amendment shall take effect four months after its adoption by the Board.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  165

Entry into Force Article 17 a. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from .......... written notification that ..........’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. OR 9 upon signature by the representatives of .......... and the Agency. b. .......... may, at any date before this Protocol enters into force, declare that it will apply this Protocol provisionally. c.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Protocol.

Definitions Article 18 For the purpose of this Protocol: a. Nuclear fuel cycle–related research and development activities means those activities which are specifically related to any process or system development aspect of any of the following:  conversion of nuclear material,  enrichment of nuclear material,  nuclear fuel fabrication,  reactors,  critical facilities,  reprocessing of nuclear fuel,  processing (not including repackaging or conditioning not involving the separation of elements, for storage or disposal) of intermediate or highlevel waste containing plutonium, high enriched uranium or uranium-233, but do not include activities related to theoretical or basic scientific research or to research and development on industrial radioisotope applications, medical, hydrological and agricultural applications, health and environmental effects and improved maintenance. b. Site means that area delimited by .......... in the relevant design information for a facility, including a closed-down facility, and in the relevant information on a location outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used, including a closed-down location outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used (this is limited to locations with hot cells or where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication or reprocessing were carried out). It shall also include all installations, co-located with the facility or location, for the provision or use of essential services, including: hot cells for processing irradiated materials not containing nuclear material; installations for the treatment, storage and disposal of waste; and buildings associated with specified activities identified by .......... under Article 2.a.(iv) above. 9

The choice of alternative depends on the preference of the State concerned according to its internal legal requirements.

166  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

c. Decommissioned facility or decommissioned location outside facilities means an installation or location at which residual structures and equipment essential for its use have been removed or rendered inoperable so that it is not used to store and can no longer be used to handle, process or utilize nuclear material. d. Closed-down facility or closed-down location outside facilities means an installation or location where operations have been stopped and the nuclear material removed but which has not been decommissioned. e. High enriched uranium means uranium containing 20 percent or more of the isotope uranium-235. f. Location-specific environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at, and in the immediate vicinity of, a location specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities at the specified location. g. Wide-area environmental sampling means the collection of environmental samples (e.g., air, water, vegetation, soil, smears) at a set of locations specified by the Agency for the purpose of assisting the Agency to draw conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities over a wide area. h. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute.The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue.Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute of the Agency after the entry into force of this Protocol which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Protocol only upon acceptance by ........... i. Facility means: (i) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or (ii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. j. Location outside facilities means any installation or location, which is not a facility, where nuclear material is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or less.

Annex I. List of Activities Referred to in Article 2.A.(IV) of the Protocol (i) The manufacture of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges. Centrifuge rotor tubes means thin-walled cylinders as described in entry 5.1.1(b) of Annex II. Gas centrifuges means centrifuges as described in the Introductory Note to entry 5.1 of Annex II. (ii) The manufacture of diffusion barriers. Diffusion barriers means thin, porous filters as described in entry 5.3.1(a) of Annex II. (iii) The manufacture or assembly of laser-based systems. Laser-based systems means systems incorporating those items as described in entry 5.7 of Annex II. (iv) The manufacture or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators. Electromagnetic isotope separators means those items referred to in entry 5.9.1 of Annex II containing ion sources as described in 5.9.1(a) of Annex II. (v) The manufacture or assembly of columns or extraction equipment.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  167

Columns or extraction equipment means those items as described in entries 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.5, 5.6.6, 5.6.7 and 5.6.8 of Annex II. (vi) The manufacture of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes. Aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes means separation nozzles and vortex tubes as described respectively in entries 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 of Annex II. (vii) The manufacture or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems. Uranium plasma generation systems means systems for the generation of uranium plasma as described in entry 5.8.3 of Annex II.AII/2. (viii) The manufacture of zirconium tubes. Zirconium tubes means tubes as described in entry 1.6 of Annex II. (ix) The manufacture or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium. Heavy water or deuterium means deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000. (x) The manufacture of nuclear grade graphite. Nuclear grade graphite means graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm3. (xi) The manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel. A flask for irradiated fuel means a vessel for the transportation and/or storage of irradiated fuel which provides chemical, thermal and radiological protection, and dissipates decay heat during handling, transportation and storage. (xii) The manufacture of reactor control rods. Reactor control rods means rods as described in entry 1.4 of Annex II. (xiii) The manufacture of criticality safe tanks and vessels. Criticality safe tanks and vessels means those items as described in entries 3.2 and 3.4 of Annex II. (xiv) The manufacture of irradiated fuel element chopping machines. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines means equipment as described in entry 3.1 of Annex II. (xv) The construction of hot cells. Hot cells means a cell or interconnected cells totalling at least 6 m3 in volume with shielding equal to or greater than the equivalent of 0.5 m of concrete, with a density of 3.2 g/cm3 or greater, outfitted with equipment for remote operations.

Annex II. List of Specified Equipment and Non-nuclear Material for the Reporting of Exports and Imports According to Article 2.A.(IX) 10 1. Reactors and equipment therefor 1.1. Complete nuclear reactors

10

This is the list which the Board agreed at its meeting on 24 February 1993 would be used for the purpose of the voluntary reporting scheme, as subsequently amended by the Board.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  168

Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year. EXPLANATORY NOTE A “nuclear reactor” basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core. It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as “zero energy reactors”. 1.2. Reactor pressure vessels Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant. EXPLANATORY NOTE A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2. as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel. Reactor internals (e.g., support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel.These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely. 1.3. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available. 1.4. Reactor control rods Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above. EXPLANATORY NOTE This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor if supplied separately. 1.5. Reactor pressure tubes Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above at an operating pressure in excess of 5.1 MPa (740 psi).

169  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

1.6. Zirconium tubes Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight. 1.7. Primary coolant pumps Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. above. EXPLANATORY NOTE Especially designed or prepared pumps may include elaborate sealed or multi-sealed systems to prevent leakage of primary coolant, canned-driven pumps, and pumps with inertial mass systems. This definition encompasses pumps certified to NC-1 or equivalent standards. 2. Non-nuclear materials for reactors 2.1. Deuterium and heavy water Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months. 2.2. Nuclear grade graphite Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm3 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above in quantities exceeding 3 x 10 4 kg (30 metric tons) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months. NOTE For the purpose of reporting, the Government will determine whether or not the exports of graphite meeting the above specifications are for nuclear reactor use. 3. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and equipment especially designed or prepared therefore INTRODUCTORY NOTE Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However, over the years Purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent. Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage.There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between Purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility.

170  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

A “plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements” includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams.These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (e.g., by geometry), radiation exposure (e.g., by shielding), and toxicity hazards (e.g., by containment). Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase “and equipment especially designed or prepared” for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include: 3.1. Irradiated fuel element chopping machines INTRODUCTORY NOTE This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment, such as lasers, may be used. Remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods. 3.2. Dissolvers INTRODUCTORY NOTE Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream. Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained. 3.3. Solvent extractors and solvent extraction equipment INTRODUCTORY NOTE Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions. Especially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials. 3.4. Chemical holding or storage vessels INTRODUCTORY NOTE Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all three streams, as follows: (a) The pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide.This oxide is re-used in the nuclear fuel cycle. (b) The intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate.This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  171

(c) The pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream. Especially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel.The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality: (1) walls or internal structures with a boron equivalent of at least two per cent, or (2) a maximum diameter of 175 mm (7 in) for cylindrical vessels, or (3) a maximum width of 75 mm (3 in) for either a slab or annular vessel. 3.5. Plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion system INTRODUCTORY NOTE In most reprocessing facilities, this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide.The main functions involved in this process are: process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control. Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards. 3.6. Plutonium oxide to metal production system INTRODUCTORY NOTE This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag.The main functions involved in this process are: fluorination (e.g. involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (e.g. employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control. Complete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards. 4. Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements A “plant for the fabrication of fuel elements” includes the equipment: (a) Which normally comes in direct contact with, or directly processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or (b) Which seals the nuclear material within the cladding. 5. Plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium and equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared therefor Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase “equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared” for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:

172  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

5.1. Gas centrifuges and assemblies and components especially designed or prepared for use in gas centrifuges INTRODUCTORY NOTE The gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin-walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimize the unbalance. In contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterized by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting the UF6 gas and featuring at least 3 separate channels, of which 2 are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber.Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. 5.1.1. Rotating components (a) Complete rotor assemblies: Thin-walled cylinders, or a number of interconnected thin-walled cylinders, manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in section 5.1.1.(c) following.The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled. (b) Rotor tubes: Especially designed or prepared thin-walled cylinders with thickness of 12 mm (0.5 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), and manufactured from one or more of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. (c) Rings or Bellows: Components especially designed or prepared to give localized support to the rotor tube or to join together a number of rotor tubes.The bellows is a short cylinder of wall thickness 3 mm (0.12 in) or less, a diameter of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in), having a convolute, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. (d) Baffles: Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to be mounted inside the centrifuge rotor tube, in order to isolate the take-off chamber from the main separation chamber and, in some cases, to assist the UF6 gas circulation within the main separation chamber of the rotor tube, and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. (e) Top caps/Bottom caps: Disc-shaped components of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter especially designed or prepared to fit to the ends of the rotor tube, and so contain the UF6 within the rotor tube, and in some cases to support, retain or contain as an integrated part an element of

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  173

the upper bearing (top cap) or to carry the rotating elements of the motor and lower bearing (bottom cap), and manufactured from one of the high strength to density ratio materials described in the EXPLANATORY NOTE to this Section. EXPLANATORY NOTE The materials used for centrifuge rotating components are: (a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2.05 x 10 9 N/m2 (300,000 psi) or more; (b) Aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0.46 x 10 9 N/m2 (67,000 psi) or more; (c) Filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of 12.3 x 10 6 m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0.3 x 10 6 m or greater (‘Specific Modulus’ is the Young’s Modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3; ‘Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength’ is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3 ). 5.1.2. Static components (a) Magnetic suspension bearings: Especially designed or prepared bearing assemblies consisting of an annular magnet suspended within a housing containing a damping medium.The housing will be manufactured from a UF6-resistant material (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to Section 5.2.).The magnet couples with a pole piece or a second magnet fitted to the top cap described in Section 5.1.1.(e).The magnet may be ring-shaped with a relation between outer and inner diameter smaller or equal to 1.6:1.The magnet may be in a form having an initial permeability of 0.15 H/m (120,000 in CGS units) or more, or a remanence of 98.5% or more, or an energy product of greater than 80 kJ/m3 (10 7 gauss-oersteds). In addition to the usual material properties, it is a prerequisite that the deviation of the magnetic axes from the geometrical axes is limited to very small tolerances (lower than 0.1 mm or 0.004 in) or that homogeneity of the material of the magnet is specially called for. (b) Bearings/Dampers: Especially designed or prepared bearings comprising a pivot/cup assembly mounted on a damper. The pivot is normally a hardened steel shaft with a hemisphere at one end with a means of attachment to the bottom cap described in section 5.1.1.(e) at the other.The shaft may however have a hydrodynamic bearing attached. The cup is pellet-shaped with a hemispherical indentation in one surface.These components are often supplied separately to the damper. (c) Molecular pumps: Especially designed or prepared cylinders having internally machined or extruded helical grooves and internally machined bores.Typical dimensions are as follows: 75 mm (3 in) to 400 mm (16 in) internal diameter, 10 mm (0.4 in) or more wall thickness, with the length equal to or greater than the diameter. The grooves are typically rectangular in cross-section and 2 mm (0.08 in) or more in depth. (d) Motor stators: Especially designed or prepared ring-shaped stators for high speed multiphase AC hysteresis (or reluctance) motors for synchronous operation within a vacuum in the frequency range of 600–2000 Hz and a power range of 50–1000 VA. The stators consist of multi-phase windings on a laminated low loss iron core comprised of thin layers typically 2.0 mm (0.08 in) thick or less.

174  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

(e) Centrifuge housing/recipients: Components especially designed or prepared to contain the rotor tube assembly of a gas centrifuge.The housing consists of a rigid cylinder of wall thickness up to 30 mm (1.2 in) with precision machined ends to locate the bearings and with one or more flanges for mounting. The machined ends are parallel to each other and perpendicular to the cylinder’s longitudinal axis to within 0.05 degrees or less.The housing may also be a honeycomb type structure to accommodate several rotor tubes.The housings are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. (f) Scoops: Especially designed or prepared tubes of up to 12 mm (0.5 in) internal diameter for the extraction of UF6 gas from within the rotor tube by a Pitot tube action (that is, with an aperture facing into the circumferential gas flow within the rotor tube, for example by bending the end of a radially disposed tube) and capable of being fixed to the central gas extraction system.The tubes are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. 5.2. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gas centrifuge enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ‘product’ and ‘tails’ UF6 from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant. Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The ‘product’ and ‘tails’ UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K (–70˚C)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards. 5.2.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems including: Feed autoclaves (or stations), used for passing UF6 to the centrifuge cascades at up to 100 kPa (15 psi) and at a rate of 1 kg/h or more; Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the cascades at up to 3 kPa (0.5 psi) pressure.The desublimers are capable of being chilled to 203 K (–70˚C) and heated to 343 K (70˚C); ‘Product’ and ‘Tails’ stations used for trapping UF6 into containers. This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards. 5.2.2. Machine header piping systems Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the ‘triple’ header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers.There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  175

its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards. 5.2.3. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking ‘on-line’ samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics: 1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320; 2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3. Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4. Having a collector system suitable for isotopic analysis. 5.2.4. Frequency changers Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1.2.(d), or parts, components and sub-assemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics: 1. A multiphase output of 600 to 2000 Hz; 2. High stability (with frequency control better than 0.1%); 3. Low harmonic distortion (less than 2%); and 4. An efficiency of greater than 80%. EXPLANATORY NOTE The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade. Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel. 5.3. Especially designed or prepared assemblies and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment INTRODUCTORY NOTE In the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control valves, and pipelines. Inasmuch as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6.A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. 5.3.1. Gaseous diffusion barriers (a) Especially designed or prepared thin, porous filters, with a pore size of 100–1,000 Å (angstroms), a thickness of 5 mm (0.2 in) or less, and for tubular forms, a diameter of 25 mm (1 in) or less, made of metallic, polymer or ceramic materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, and (b) especially prepared compounds or powders for the manufacture of such filters. Such compounds and powders include nickel or alloys containing 60 per cent or more nickel, aluminium oxide, or UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers having a purity of

176  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

99.9 per cent or more, a particle size less than 10 microns, and a high degree of particle size uniformity, which are especially prepared for the manufacture of gaseous diffusion barriers. 5.3.2. Diffuser housings Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm (12 in) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation. 5.3.3. Compressors and gas blowers Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m3 /min or more of UF6, and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kPa (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF6 environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6. 5.3.4. Rotary shaft seals Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than 1000 cm3/min (60 in3/min). 5.3.5. Heat exchangers for cooling UF6 Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 Pa (0.0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kPa (15 psi). 5.4. Especially designed or prepared auxiliary systems, equipment and components for use in gaseous diffusion enrichment INTRODUCTORY NOTE The auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the ‘product’ and ‘tails’ UF6 from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shut-down, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in all technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant.All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems. Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework.The ‘product’ and ‘tails’ UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout.The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  177

5.4.1. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kPa (45 psi) or less, including: Feed autoclaves (or systems), used for passing UF6 to the gaseous diffusion cascades; Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from diffusion cascades; Liquefaction stations where UF6 gas from the cascade is compressed and cooled to form liquid UF6; ‘Product’ or ‘tails’ stations used for transferring UF6 into containers. 5.4.2. Header piping systems Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades.This piping network is normally of the ‘double’ header system with each cell connected to each of the headers. 5.4.3.Vacuum systems (a) Especially designed or prepared large vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min (175 ft3/min) or more. (b) Vacuum pumps especially designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres made of, or lined with, aluminium, nickel, or alloys bearing more than 60% nickel.These pumps may be either rotary or positive, may have displacement and fluorocarbon seals, and may have special working fluids present. 5.4.4. Special shut-off and control valves Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm (1.5 to 59 in) for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants. 5.4.5. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking “on-line” samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics: 1. Unit resolution for atomic mass unit greater than 320; 2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3. Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis. EXPLANATORY NOTE The items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade.All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of, or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers. 5.5. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in aerodynamic enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE In aerodynamic enrichment processes, a mixture of gaseous UF6 and light gas (hydrogen or

178  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

helium) is compressed and then passed through separating elements wherein isotopic separation is accomplished by the generation of high centrifugal forces over a curved-wall geometry. Two processes of this type have been successfully developed: the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube process. For both processes the main components of a separation stage include cylindrical vessels housing the special separation elements (nozzles or vortex tubes), gas compressors and heat exchangers to remove the heat of compression. An aerodynamic plant requires a number of these stages, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use. Since aerodynamic processes use UF6, all equipment, pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6. EXPLANATORY NOTE The items listed in this section either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade.All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or protected by UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to aerodynamic enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers. 5.5.1. Separation nozzles Especially designed or prepared separation nozzles and assemblies thereof. The separation nozzles consist of slit-shaped, curved channels having a radius of curvature less than 1 mm (typically 0.1 to 0.05 mm), resistant to corrosion by UF6 and having a knife-edge within the nozzle that separates the gas flowing through the nozzle into two fractions. 5.5.2.Vortex tubes Especially designed or prepared vortex tubes and assemblies thereof.The vortex tubes are cylindrical or tapered, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, having a diameter of between 0.5 cm and 4 cm, a length to diameter ratio of 20:1 or less and with one or more tangential inlets.The tubes may be equipped with nozzle-type appendages at either or both ends. EXPLANATORY NOTE The feed gas enters the vortex tube tangentially at one end or through swirl vanes or at numerous tangential positions along the periphery of the tube. 5.5.3. Compressors and gas blowers Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal or positive displacement compressors or gas blowers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 and with a suction volume capacity of 2 m3/min or more of UF6/carrier gas (hydrogen or helium) mixture. EXPLANATORY NOTE These compressors and gas blowers typically have a pressure ratio between 1.2:1 and 6:1. 5.5.4. Rotary shaft seals Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture. 5.5.5. Heat exchangers for gas cooling Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  179

5.5.6. Separation element housings Especially designed or prepared separation element housings, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for containing vortex tubes or separation nozzles. EXPLANATORY NOTE These housings may be cylindrical vessels greater than 300 mm in diameter and greater than 900 mm in length, or may be rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, and may be designed for horizontal or vertical installation. 5.5.7. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including: (a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process; (b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating; (c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form; (d) ‘Product’ or ‘tails’ stations used for transferring UF6 into containers. 5.5.8. Header piping systems Especially designed or prepared header piping systems, made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, for handling UF6 within the aerodynamic cascades.This piping network is normally of the ‘double’ header design with each stage or group of stages connected to each of the headers. 5.5.9.Vacuum systems and pumps (a) Especially designed or prepared vacuum systems having a suction capacity of 5 m3/min or more, consisting of vacuum manifolds, vacuum headers and vacuum pumps, and designed for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres, (b) Vacuum pumps especially designed or prepared for service in UF6-bearing atmospheres and made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6.These pumps may use fluorocarbon seals and special working fluids. 5.5.10. Special shut-off and control valves Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of aerodynamic enrichment plants. 5.5.11. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking ‘on-line’ samples of feed,‘product’ or ‘tails’, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics: 1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320; 2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3. Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis. 5.5.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems

180  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas (hydrogen or helium). EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems are designed to reduce the UF6 content in the carrier gas to 1 ppm or less and may incorporate equipment such as: (a) Cryogenic heat exchangers and cryoseparators capable of temperatures of –120˚C or less, or (b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of –120˚C or less, or (c) Separation nozzle or vortex tube units for the separation of UF6 from carrier gas, or (d) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of –20˚C or less. 5.6. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in chemical exchange or ion exchange enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE The slight difference in mass between the isotopes of uranium causes small changes in chemical reaction equilibria that can be used as a basis for separation of the isotopes. Two processes have been successfully developed: liquid-liquid chemical exchange and solid-liquid ion exchange. In the liquid-liquid chemical exchange process, immiscible liquid phases (aqueous and organic) are countercurrently contacted to give the cascading effect of thousands of separation stages. The aqueous phase consists of uranium chloride in hydrochloric acid solution; the organic phase consists of an extractant containing uranium chloride in an organic solvent. The contactors employed in the separation cascade can be liquid-liquid exchange columns (such as pulsed columns with sieve plates) or liquid centrifugal contactors. Chemical conversions (oxidation and reduction) are required at both ends of the separation cascade in order to provide for the reflux requirements at each end.A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the process streams with certain metal ions. Plastic, plastic-lined (including use of fluorocarbon polymers) and/or glass-lined columns and piping are therefore used. In the solid-liquid ion-exchange process, enrichment is accomplished by uranium adsorption/desorption on a special, very fast-acting, ion-exchange resin or adsorbent. A solution of uranium in hydrochloric acid and other chemical agents is passed through cylindrical enrichment columns containing packed beds of the adsorbent. For a continuous process, a reflux system is necessary to release the uranium from the adsorbent back into the liquid flow so that ‘product’ and ‘tails’ can be collected. This is accomplished with the use of suitable reduction/oxidation chemical agents that are fully regenerated in separate external circuits and that may be partially regenerated within the isotopic separation columns themselves.The presence of hot concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions in the process requires that the equipment be made of or protected by special corrosion-resistant materials. 5.6.1. Liquid-liquid exchange columns (Chemical exchange) Countercurrent liquid-liquid exchange columns having mechanical power input (i.e., pulsed columns with sieve plates, reciprocating plate columns, and columns with internal turbine mixers), especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, these columns and their internals are made of or protected by suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or glass.The stage residence time of the columns is designed to be short (30 seconds or less). 5.6.2. Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors (Chemical exchange) Liquid-liquid centrifugal contactors especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. Such contactors use rotation to achieve dispersion of the

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  181

organic and aqueous streams and then centrifugal force to separate the phases. For corrosion resistance to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions, the contactors are made of or are lined with suitable plastic materials (such as fluorocarbon polymers) or are lined with glass.The stage residence time of the centrifugal contactors is designed to be short (30 seconds or less). 5.6.3. Uranium reduction systems and equipment (Chemical exchange) (a) Especially designed or prepared electrochemical reduction cells to reduce uranium from one valence state to another for uranium enrichment using the chemical exchange process. The cell materials in contact with process solutions must be corrosion resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions. EXPLANATORY NOTE The cell cathodic compartment must be designed to prevent re-oxidation of uranium to its higher valence state.To keep the uranium in the cathodic compartment, the cell may have an impervious diaphragm membrane constructed of special cation exchange material. The cathode consists of a suitable solid conductor such as graphite. (b) Especially designed or prepared systems at the product end of the cascade for taking the U 4+ out of the organic stream, adjusting the acid concentration and feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems consist of solvent extraction equipment for stripping the U 4+ from the organic stream into an aqueous solution, evaporation and/or other equipment to accomplish solution pH adjustment and control, and pumps or other transfer devices for feeding to the electrochemical reduction cells. A major design concern is to avoid contamination of the aqueous stream with certain metal ions. Consequently, for those parts in contact with the process stream, the system is constructed of equipment made of or protected by suitable materials (such as glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate, polyether sulfone, and resinimpregnated graphite). 5.6.4. Feed preparation systems (Chemical exchange) Especially designed or prepared systems for producing high-purity uranium chloride feed solutions for chemical exchange uranium isotope separation plants. EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems consist of dissolution, solvent extraction and/or ion exchange equipment for purification and electrolytic cells for reducing the uranium U 6+ or U 4+ to U 3+. These systems produce uranium chloride solutions having only a few parts per million of metallic impurities such as chromium, iron, vanadium, molybdenum and other bivalent or higher multivalent cations. Materials of construction for portions of the system processing high-purity U 3+ include glass, fluorocarbon polymers, polyphenyl sulfate or polyether sulfone plastic-lined and resin-impregnated graphite. 5.6.5. Uranium oxidation systems (Chemical exchange) Especially designed or prepared systems for oxidation of U 3+ to U 4+ for return to the uranium isotope separation cascade in the chemical exchange enrichment process. EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems may incorporate equipment such as: (a) Equipment for contacting chlorine and oxygen with the aqueous effluent from the isotope separation equipment and extracting the resultant U 4+ into the stripped organic stream returning from the product end of the cascade,

182  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

(b) Equipment that separates water from hydrochloric acid so that the water and the concentrated hydrochloric acid may be reintroduced to the process at the proper locations. 5.6.6. Fast-reacting ion exchange resins/adsorbents (ion exchange) Fast-reacting ion-exchange resins or adsorbents especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process, including porous macroreticular resins, and/or pellicular structures in which the active chemical exchange groups are limited to a coating on the surface of an inactive porous support structure, and other composite structures in any suitable form including particles or fibers.These ion exchange resins/adsorbents have diameters of 0.2 mm or less and must be chemically resistant to concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions as well as physically strong enough so as not to degrade in the exchange columns.The resins/adsorbents are especially designed to achieve very fast uranium isotope exchange kinetics (exchange rate half-time of less than 10 seconds) and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100˚C to 200˚C. 5.6.7. Ion exchange columns (Ion exchange) Cylindrical columns greater than 1000 mm in diameter for containing and supporting packed beds of ion exchange resin/adsorbent, especially designed or prepared for uranium enrichment using the ion exchange process.These columns are made of or protected by materials (such as titanium or fluorocarbon plastics) resistant to corrosion by concentrated hydrochloric acid solutions and are capable of operating at a temperature in the range of 100˚C to 200˚C and pressures above 0.7 MPa (102 psia). 5.6.8. Ion exchange reflux systems (Ion exchange) (a) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical reduction systems for regeneration of the chemical reducing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades. (b) Especially designed or prepared chemical or electrochemical oxidation systems for regeneration of the chemical oxidizing agent(s) used in ion exchange uranium enrichment cascades. EXPLANATORY NOTE The ion exchange enrichment process may use, for example, trivalent titanium (Ti 3+ ) as a reducing cation in which case the reduction system would regenerate Ti 3+ by reducing Ti 4+. The process may use, for example, trivalent iron (Fe 3+ ) as an oxidant in which case the oxidation system would regenerate Fe 3+ by oxidizing Fe 2+. 5.7. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in laser-based enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include: first category—atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA); second category—molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS) and chemical reaction by isotope selective laser activation (CRISLA). The systems, equipment and components for laser enrichment plants embrace: (a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapor (for selective photo-ionization) or devices to feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation); (b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as ‘product’ and ‘tails’ in the first category, and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as ‘product’ and unaffected material as ‘tails’ in the second category; (c) process laser systems to selectively excite the uranium-235 species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any of a number of available laser technologies.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  183

EXPLANATORY NOTE Many of the items listed in this section come into direct contact with uranium metal vapor or liquid or with process gas consisting of UF6 or a mixture of UF6 and other gases.All surfaces that come into contact with the uranium or UF6 are wholly made of or protected by corrosionresistant materials. For the purposes of the section relating to laser-based enrichment items, the materials resistant to corrosion by the vapor or liquid of uranium metal or uranium alloys include yttria-coated graphite and tantalum; and the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include copper, stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60 % or more nickel and UF6-resistant fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers. 5.7.1. Uranium vaporization systems (AVLIS) Especially designed or prepared uranium vaporization systems which contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm. 5.7.2. Liquid uranium metal handling systems (AVLIS) Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles. EXPLANATORY NOTE The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof. 5.7.3. Uranium metal ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collector assemblies (AVLIS) Especially designed or prepared ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collector assemblies for uranium metal in liquid or solid form. EXPLANATORY NOTE Components for these assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor or liquid (such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum) and may include pipes, valves, fittings, ‘gutters’, feed-throughs, heat exchangers and collector plates for magnetic, electrostatic or other separation methods. 5.7.4. Separator module housings (AVLIS) Especially designed or prepared cylindrical or rectangular vessels for containing the uranium metal vapor source, the electron beam gun, and the ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collectors. EXPLANATORY NOTE These housings have multiplicity of ports for electrical and water feed-throughs, laser beam windows, vacuum pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring. They have provisions for opening and closure to allow refurbishment of internal components. 5.7.5. Supersonic expansion nozzles (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared supersonic expansion nozzles for cooling mixtures of UF6 and carrier gas to 150 K or less and which are corrosion resistant to UF6. 5.7.6. Uranium pentafluoride product collectors (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared uranium pentafluoride (UF5) solid product collectors consisting of filter, impact, or cyclone-type collectors, or combinations thereof, and which are corrosion resistant to the UF5/UF6 environment. 5.7.7. UF6/carrier gas compressors (MLIS)

184  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

Especially designed or prepared compressors for UF6/carrier gas mixtures, designed for long term operation in a UF6 environment.The components of these compressors that come into contact with process gas are made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6. 5.7.8. Rotary shaft seals (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared rotary shaft seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against out-leakage of process gas or in-leakage of air or seal gas into the inner chamber of the compressor which is filled with a UF6/carrier gas mixture. 5.7.9. Fluorination systems (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared systems for fluorinating UF5 (solid) to UF6 (gas). EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems are designed to fluorinate the collected UF5 powder to UF6 for subsequent collection in product containers or for transfer as feed to MLIS units for additional enrichment. In one approach, the fluorination reaction may be accomplished within the isotope separation system to react and recover directly off the ‘product’ collectors. In another approach, the UF5 powder may be removed/transferred from the ‘product’ collectors into a suitable reaction vessel (e.g., fluidized-bed reactor, screw reactor or flame tower) for fluorination. In both approaches, equipment for storage and transfer of fluorine (or other suitable fluorinating agents) and for collection and transfer of UF6 are used. 5.7.10. UF6 mass spectrometers/ion sources (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking ‘on-line’ samples of feed,‘product’ or ‘tails’, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics: 1. Unit resolution for mass greater than 320; 2. Ion sources constructed of or lined with nichrome or monel or nickel plated; 3. Electron bombardment ionization sources; 4. Collector system suitable for isotopic analysis. 5.7.11. Feed systems/product and tails withdrawal systems (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared process systems or equipment for enrichment plants made of or protected by materials resistant to corrosion by UF6, including: (a) Feed autoclaves, ovens, or systems used for passing UF6 to the enrichment process (b) Desublimers (or cold traps) used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process for subsequent transfer upon heating; (c) Solidification or liquefaction stations used to remove UF6 from the enrichment process by compressing and converting UF6 to a liquid or solid form; (d) ‘Product’ or ‘tails’ stations used for transferring UF6 into containers. 5.7.12. UF6/carrier gas separation systems (MLIS) Especially designed or prepared process systems for separating UF6 from carrier gas.The carrier gas may be nitrogen, argon, or other gas. EXPLANATORY NOTE These systems may incorporate equipment such as: (a) Cryogenic heat exchangers or cryoseparators capable of temperatures of –120˚C or less, or

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  185

(b) Cryogenic refrigeration units capable of temperatures of –120˚C or less, or (c) UF6 cold traps capable of temperatures of –20˚C or less. 5.7.13. Laser systems (AVLIS, MLIS and CRISLA) Lasers or laser systems especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes. EXPLANATORY NOTE The laser system for the AVLIS process usually consists of two lasers: a copper vapor laser and a dye laser.The laser system for MLIS usually consists of a CO2 or excimer laser and a multipass optical cell with revolving mirrors at both ends. Lasers or laser systems for both processes require a spectrum frequency stabilizer for operation over extended periods of time. 5.8. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in plasma separation enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE In the plasma separation process, a plasma of uranium ions passes through an electric field tuned to the U-235 ion resonance frequency so that they preferentially absorb energy and increase the diameter of their corkscrew-like orbits. Ions with a large-diameter path are trapped to produce a product enriched in U-235.The plasma, which is made by ionizing uranium vapor, is contained in a vacuum chamber with a high-strength magnetic field produced by a superconducting magnet. The main technological systems of the process include the uranium plasma generation system, the separator module with superconducting magnet and metal removal systems for the collection of ‘product’ and ‘tails’. 5.8.1. Microwave power sources and antennae Especially designed or prepared microwave power sources and antennae for producing or accelerating ions and having the following characteristics: greater than 30 GHz frequency and greater than 50 kW mean power output for ion production. 5.8.2. Ion excitation coils Especially designed or prepared radio frequency ion excitation coils for frequencies of more than 100 kHz and capable of handling more than 40 kW mean power. 5.8.3. Uranium plasma generation systems Especially designed or prepared systems for the generation of uranium plasma, which may contain high-power strip or scanning electron beam guns with a delivered power on the target of more than 2.5 kW/cm. 5.8.4. Liquid uranium metal handling systems Especially designed or prepared liquid metal handling systems for molten uranium or uranium alloys, consisting of crucibles and cooling equipment for the crucibles. EXPLANATORY NOTE The crucibles and other parts of this system that come into contact with molten uranium or uranium alloys are made of or protected by materials of suitable corrosion and heat resistance. Suitable materials include tantalum, yttria-coated graphite, graphite coated with other rare earth oxides or mixtures thereof. 5.8.5. Uranium metal ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collector assemblies Especially designed or prepared ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collector assemblies for uranium metal in solid form.These collector assemblies are made of or protected by materials resistant to the heat and corrosion of uranium metal vapor, such as yttria-coated graphite or tantalum.

186  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

5.8.6. Separator module housings Cylindrical vessels especially designed or prepared for use in plasma separation enrichment plants for containing the uranium plasma source, radio-frequency drive coil and the ‘product’ and ‘tails’ collectors. EXPLANATORY NOTE These housings have a multiplicity of ports for electrical feed-throughs, diffusion pump connections and instrumentation diagnostics and monitoring.They have provisions for opening and closure to allow for refurbishment of internal components and are constructed of a suitable non-magnetic material such as stainless steel. 5.9. Especially designed or prepared systems, equipment and components for use in electromagnetic enrichment plants INTRODUCTORY NOTE In the electromagnetic process, uranium metal ions produced by ionization of a salt feed material (typically UCl4) are accelerated and passed through a magnetic field that has the effect of causing the ions of different isotopes to follow different paths. The major components of an electromagnetic isotope separator include: a magnetic field for ion-beam diversion/separation of the isotopes, an ion source with its acceleration system, and a collection system for the separated ions.Auxiliary systems for the process include the magnet power supply system, the ion source high-voltage power supply system, the vacuum system, and extensive chemical handling systems for recovery of product and cleaning/recycling of components. 5.9.1. Electromagnetic isotope separators Electromagnetic isotope separators especially designed or prepared for the separation of uranium isotopes, and equipment and components therefor, including: (a) Ion sources Especially designed or prepared single or multiple uranium ion sources consisting of a vapor source, ionizer, and beam accelerator, constructed of suitable materials such as graphite, stainless steel, or copper, and capable of providing a total ion beam current of 50 mA or greater. (b) Ion collectors Collector plates consisting of two or more slits and pockets especially designed or prepared for collection of enriched and depleted uranium ion beams and constructed of suitable materials such as graphite or stainless steel. (c) Vacuum housings Especially designed or prepared vacuum housings for uranium electromagnetic separators, constructed of suitable non-magnetic materials such as stainless steel and designed for operation at pressures of 0.1 Pa or lower. EXPLANATORY NOTE The housings are specially designed to contain the ion sources, collector plates and watercooled liners and have provision for diffusion pump connections and opening and closure for removal and reinstallation of these components. (d) Magnet pole pieces Especially designed or prepared magnet pole pieces having a diameter greater than 2 m used to maintain a constant magnetic field within an electromagnetic isotope separator and to transfer the magnetic field between adjoining separators.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  187

5.9.2. High voltage power supplies Especially designed or prepared high-voltage power supplies for ion sources, having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuous operation, output voltage of 20,000 V or greater, output current of 1 A or greater, and voltage regulation of better than 0.01% over a time period of 8 hours. 5.9.3. Magnet power supplies Especially designed or prepared high-power, direct current magnet power supplies having all of the following characteristics: capable of continuously producing a current output of 500 A or greater at a voltage of 100 V or greater and with a current or voltage regulation better than 0.01% over a period of 8 hours. 6. Plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor INTRODUCTORY NOTE Heavy water can be produced by a variety of processes. However, the two processes that have proven to be commercially viable are the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process (GS process) and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. The GS process is based upon the exchange of hydrogen and deuterium between water and hydrogen sulphide within a series of towers which are operated with the top section cold and the bottom section hot. Water flows down the towers while the hydrogen sulphide gas circulates from the bottom to the top of the towers. A series of perforated trays are used to promote mixing between the gas and the water. Deuterium migrates to the water at low temperatures and to the hydrogen sulphide at high temperatures. Gas or water, enriched in deuterium, is removed from the first stage towers at the junction of the hot and cold sections and the process is repeated in subsequent stage towers.The product of the last stage, water enriched up to 30% in deuterium, is sent to a distillation unit to produce reactor grade heavy water, i.e., 99.75% deuterium oxide. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can extract deuterium from synthesis gas through contact with liquid ammonia in the presence of a catalyst.The synthesis gas is fed into exchange towers and to an ammonia converter. Inside the towers the gas flows from the bottom to the top while the liquid ammonia flows from the top to the bottom.The deuterium is stripped from the hydrogen in the synthesis gas and concentrated in the ammonia.The ammonia then flows into an ammonia cracker at the bottom of the tower while the gas flows into an ammonia converter at the top. Further enrichment takes place in subsequent stages and reactor grade heavy water is produced through final distillation.The synthesis gas feed can be provided by an ammonia plant that, in turn, can be constructed in association with a heavy water ammonia-hydrogen exchange plant. The ammonia-hydrogen exchange process can also use ordinary water as a feed source of deuterium. Many of the key equipment items for heavy water production plants using GS or the ammoniahydrogen exchange processes are common to several segments of the chemical and petroleum industries.This is particularly so for small plants using the GS process. However, few of the items are available “off-the-shelf ”. The GS and ammonia-hydrogen processes require the handling of large quantities of flammable, corrosive and toxic fluids at elevated pressures. Accordingly, in establishing the design and operating standards for plants and equipment using these processes, careful attention to the materials selection and specifications is required to ensure long service life with high safety and reliability factors.The choice of scale is primarily a function of economics and need.Thus, most of the equipment items would be prepared according to the requirements of the customer. Finally, it should be noted that, in both the GS and the ammonia-hydrogen exchange processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for heavy water

188  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

production can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for producing heavy water.The catalyst production system used in the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process and water distillation systems used for the final concentration of heavy water to reactor-grade in either process are examples of such systems. The items of equipment which are especially designed or prepared for the production of heavy water utilizing either the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process or the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process include the following: 6.1. Water–hydrogen sulphide exchange towers Exchange towers fabricated from fine carbon steel (such as ASTM A516) with diameters of 6 m (20 ft) to 9 m (30 ft), capable of operating at pressures greater than or equal to 2 MPa (300 psi) and with a corrosion allowance of 6 mm or greater, especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process. 6.2. Blowers and compressors Single stage, low head (i.e., 0.2 MPa or 30 psi) centrifugal blowers or compressors for hydrogensulphide gas circulation (i.e., gas containing more than 70% H2S) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the water-hydrogen sulphide exchange process.These blowers or compressors have a throughput capacity greater than or equal to 56 m 3 /second (120,000 SCFM) while operating at pressures greater than or equal to 1.8 MPa (260 psi) suction and have seals designed for wet H2S service. 6.3. Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers Ammonia-hydrogen exchange towers greater than or equal to 35 m (114.3 ft) in height with diameters of 1.5 m (4.9 ft) to 2.5 m (8.2 ft) capable of operating at pressures greater than 15 MPa (2225 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.These towers also have at least one flanged axial opening of the same diameter as the cylindrical part through which the tower internals can be inserted or withdrawn. 6.4. Tower internals and stage pumps Tower internals and stage pumps especially designed or prepared for towers for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.Tower internals include especially designed stage contactors which promote intimate gas/liquid contact. Stage pumps include especially designed submersible pumps for circulation of liquid ammonia within a contacting stage internal to the stage towers. 6.5. Ammonia crackers Ammonia crackers with operating pressures greater than or equal to 3 Mpa (450 psi) especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. 6.6. Infrared absorption analyzers Infrared absorption analyzers capable of “on-line” hydrogen/deuterium ratio analysis where deuterium concentrations are equal to or greater than 90%. 6.7. Catalytic Burners Catalytic burners for the conversion of enriched deuterium gas into heavy water especially designed or prepared for heavy water production utilizing the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process.

T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY  189

7. Plants for the conversion of uranium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor INTRODUCTORY NOTE Uranium conversion plants and systems may perform one or more transformations from one uranium chemical species to another, including: conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3, conversion of UO3 to UO2, conversion of uranium oxides to UF4 or UF6, conversion of UF4 to UF6, conversion of UF6 to UF4, conversion of UF4 to uranium metal, and conversion of uranium fluorides to UO2. Many of the key equipment items for uranium conversion plants are common to several segments of the chemical process industry. For example, the types of equipment employed in these processes may include: furnaces, rotary kilns, fluidized bed reactors, flame tower reactors, liquid centrifuges, distillation columns and liquid-liquid extraction columns. However, few of the items are available “off-the-shelf ”; most would be prepared according to the requirements and specifications of the customer. In some instances, special design and construction considerations are required to address the corrosive properties of some of the chemicals handled (HF, F2, ClF3, and uranium fluorides). Finally, it should be noted that, in all of the uranium conversion processes, items of equipment which individually are not especially designed or prepared for uranium conversion can be assembled into systems which are especially designed or prepared for use in uranium conversion. 7.1. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of uranium ore concentrates to UO3 can be performed by first dissolving the ore in nitric acid and extracting purified uranyl nitrate using a solvent such as tributyl phosphate. Next, the uranyl nitrate is converted to UO3 either by concentration and denitration or by neutralization with gaseous ammonia to produce ammonium diuranate with subsequent filtering, drying, and calcining. 7.2. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UF6 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UO3 to UF6 can be performed directly by fluorination. The process requires a source of fluorine gas or chlorine trifluoride. 7.3. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO3 to UO2 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UO3 to UO2 can be performed through reduction of UO3 with cracked ammonia gas or hydrogen. 7.4. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UO2 to UF4 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UO2 to UF4 can be performed by reacting UO2 with hydrogen fluoride gas (HF) at 300–500˚C. 7.5. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to UF6 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF4 to UF6 is performed by exothermic reaction with fluorine in a tower reactor. UF6 is condensed from the hot effluent gases by passing the effluent stream through a cold trap cooled to –10o C.The process requires a source of fluorine gas.

190  T HE N UCLEAR N ON -P ROLIFERATION T REATY

7.6. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF4 to U metal EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF4 to U metal is performed by reduction with magnesium (large batches) or calcium (small batches). The reaction is carried out at temperatures above the melting point of uranium (1130˚C). 7.7. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UO2 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF6 to UO2 can be performed by one of three processes. In the first, UF6 is reduced and hydrolyzed to UO2 using hydrogen and steam. In the second, UF6 is hydrolyzed by solution in water, ammonia is added to precipitate ammonium diuranate, and the diuranate is reduced to UO2 with hydrogen at 820˚C. In the third process, gaseous UF6, CO2, and NH3 are combined in water, precipitating ammonium uranyl carbonate.The ammonium uranyl carbonate is combined with steam and hydrogen at 500–600˚C to yield UO2. UF6 to UO2 conversion is often performed as the first stage of a fuel fabrication plant. 7.8. Especially designed or prepared systems for the conversion of UF6 to UF4 EXPLANATORY NOTE Conversion of UF6 to UF4 is performed by reduction with hydrogen.

8

Special Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreements T HE U.S. VOLUNTARY S AFEGUARD AGREEMENT SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he agreement between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of IAEA safeguards in designated facilities in the United States originated during the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) negotiation for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT). During those negotiations, Japan and the European Community non-nuclear weapon states opposed the NPT provision (Article III) that required that only non-nuclear weapon states party to the treaty accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.They argued that the absence of any requirement for IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapon states would place the industries of non-nuclear weapon states at a commercial disadvantage, because the safeguards would interfere with efficient operation of commercial facilities and would compromise, through IAEA personnel, industrial trade secrets. Efforts to negotiate acceptable treaty provisions for IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapon states were unsuccessful, and by late 1967 the safeguard issue was a serious obstacle to acceptance of the NPT by major industrialized non-nuclear weapon states. In an effort to break the impasse, on December 2, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that the United States was not asking any country to accept obligations that the United States was unwilling to accept and that “… when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance.”1 The United Kingdom announced a similar offer on December 4, 1967. These offers were instrumental in gaining acceptance of the NPT by key industrialized countries, and their importance was emphasized in public statements by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Japan, and other nations. In the course of hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in July 1968 the Johnson administration explained that the U.S. offer would be fulfilled by conclusion of a formal agreement with the IAEA. Shortly after the NPT entered into force in March 1970, the IAEA Safeguards Committee undertook to advise the IAEA Board of Governors on the form and content of the safeguard activities that would result from the NPT. Only in that context did the

T

1

Address by President Lyndon B. Johnson on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first nuclear reactor, December 2, 1967. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 1083–1085.

192  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

committee address the manner in which the offers by the United States and the United Kingdom might be implemented. It was recognized that the number of facilities in those two countries that would come within the terms of their offer would equal the total number of facilities in all non-nuclear weapon states.Thus, if the IAEA were to apply its safeguards in all facilities under the offers, the IAEA’s budget for safeguard activities would double. Accordingly, a number of non-nuclear weapon states, led by Australia, proposed that the purpose of the offer could be achieved at reasonable cost to the IAEA by full inspection of only those facilities in the United States and the United Kingdom that were of advanced design or were sensitive in terms of international competition. Under the proposal, which was endorsed by Italy, Japan, and West Germany, the IAEA would apply something less than the full regime of inspections to all other eligible facilities in the two offering countries.Australia’s proposal succeeded in demonstrating to the committee that the costs of implementing the offers could be kept within reason, while achieving their purpose. By March 1971, the Safeguards Committee completed its formulation of detailed provisions for the individual safeguard agreements. The IAEA Board of Governors approved the document, and shortly thereafter Austria and Finland negotiated safeguard agreements with the IAEA that became the models for future agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. In order for the U.S. offer to achieve its purpose, it was essential that the IAEA, in applying its safeguards to a particular type of U.S. facility, use the same procedures it followed in similar facilities in non-nuclear weapon states. Many of the model provisions could therefore be incorporated into the U.S.-IAEA agreement without change. Other provisions required adaptation in light of fundamental differences between the terms of the U.S. offer and the obligations of a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. The provisions that differ are identified and explained in detail in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommending Senate advice and consent to ratification of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement. These differences reflect several facts. The U.S. offer excludes activities of direct national security significance and does not contain any limitations on use of nuclear material by the United States. (Thus, the agreement provides that at any time the United States can remove a facility from the list of those eligible for safeguards should the facility become associated with activities of direct national security significance, and the United States can transfer nuclear material from eligible facilities to any location, including noneligible facilities.) The United States has sole authority to decide which U.S. facilities will be eligible for safeguards.The IAEA has sole authority to decide which eligible facilities will be selected for safeguards (although the IAEA is obliged to take into account the requirement that the U.S. government avoid discriminatory treatment between similarly situated U.S. commercial firms so as to not to interfere with the competitive marketplace). Last, the United States had made separate commitments to provide to the IAEA, for safeguard purposes, information on imports and exports of nuclear material. The U.S.-IAEA agreement addresses only the selection of facilities for the application of the full regime of safeguard procedures, including routine inspections. Australia and several other key non-nuclear weapon states had also proposed in the Safeguards Committee that all of the eligible facilities bear some burden of safeguards. In further consultations, it appeared that a satisfactory arrangement would be for facilities not selected for safeguard applications to submit design information, permit IAEA inspectors to verify such information in the facility, maintain accounting records, and provide accounting reports to the IAEA.The IAEA, however, was concerned that its staff would be overwhelmed by the negotiation of individual arrangements and wholesale submission of verification information. Consequently, the concept of a secondary selection was introduced; complete flexibility was provided to the IAEA, so that any or all of the eligible facilities could be required to submit the specified

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  193

information, maintain records, and so on. For ease of drafting and to maintain the distinction between “safeguards” (which includes routine inspections by the IAEA) and the submission of information and maintenance records, provisions dealing with the secondary category of selected facilities are grouped into a protocol to the agreement. The technical provisions in the protocol follow closely the comparable provisions in the agreement. In September 1976, when the safeguard agreements between the IAEA and the European Community non-nuclear weapon states had been negotiated and negotiations with Japan appeared to be approaching completion, the U.S.–IAEA agreement was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval.The board at that time included West Germany, Italy, and Japan. The IAEA director general informed the board that, in selecting facilities in which the IAEA would apply the full regime of safeguards, including inspections, the IAEA would take into account the need to avoid discrimination among commercial firms in the United States. The IAEA, the inspector general stated, would also observe the selection criteria proposed by Australia and others—advanced-design facilities and those sensitive to international competition. The board, acting by consensus, authorized the director general to conclude the agreement. On February 8, 1978, the agreement was submitted to the U.S. Senate, which gave its advice and consent to ratification unanimously, with understandings, on July 2, 1980. One of these understandings was that the president would establish an appropriate interagency mechanism for dealing with implementation of the agreement.This was done by establishing the Interagency Steering Group for International Safeguards (ISG) to deal with policy matters and two subgroups, the Safeguards Agreement Working Group to monitor implementation and take necessary actions, and the Negotiating Team to negotiate the necessary subsidiary arrangements for implementing the agreement.As organized, all three groups were chaired by officials of the Department of State and included representatives of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, the ISG included representatives of the National Security Council and, for matters dealing with facilities eligible for safeguards under the agreement, the Department of Defense. The agreement was brought into force on December 9, 1980. At that time the United States submitted to the IAEA a list of more than 200 eligible facilities, including facilities licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and eligible license-exempt facilities of the Department of Energy. The IAEA was notified as charges occurred in the list, and in 1986 an updated list was submitted to the IAEA. This new list contained 128 commercial power reactors, including those under construction and licensed to possess nuclear material; 73 research reactors and critical assemblies; 14 conversion and fuel fabrication plants; and 22 storage, research and development, and other types of facilities. In early 1981, the IAEA made its initial selection of facilities in which the full regime of safeguards, including inspection, was applied, pursuant to the agreement proper.Two operating commercial power reactors and one commercial fuel fabrication plant were selected.The facilities submitted design information, and negotiations began regarding each of the detailed “facility attachments.”While the negotiations proceeded, the IAEA carried out ad hoc inspections in the facilities as permitted by the agreement. The facility attachments entered into force in early 1982.Also at that time, the IAEA made its first selections under the protocol of two commercial fuel fabrication plants. From 1982 until 1988 the IAEA followed a practice of selecting for safeguards, at approximately two-year intervals, a different commercial fuel fabrication plant and two power reactors. Each time new facilities were selected, the current ones were removed from selection under the agreement, and the fabrication plant was moved to selection under the protocol. By the end of 1984 all commercial plants fabricating fuel for power reactors were selected under either the agreement or the protocol. In 1988, the IAEA selected for safeguards

194  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

one commercial fuel fabrication plant and no power reactors and an additional fabrication plant in 1989.This practice more or less has continued to the present day. In August 1981, the IAEA also selected for safeguards a decommissioned governmentowned research reactor in which a quantity of plutonium was stored. The reason for this selection was to satisfy an existing obligation of the United States and the IAEA for safeguards on two kilograms of plutonium.After this plutonium was shipped from the United States the obligation ceased, and in October 1984 the research reactor was removed from the list of facilities selected for safeguard application. In July 1983, the United States added the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, gas centrifuge enrichment plant to the eligible list, and in the following August it was selected by the IAEA for safeguards.This was part of an arrangement to apply IAEA safeguards worked out with the IAEA and other states that had or were constructing gas centrifuge enrichment plants. After the Department of Energy terminated the gas centrifuge project in June 1985 and the nuclear material was removed from the facility, it was removed from the eligible list. In September 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States would place material deemed excess to its defense needs under IAEA safeguards.As a result, HEU, at facilities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Hanover, Washington, were placed under safeguards, never to be used for nuclear weapons.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE I NTERNATIONAL ATOMIC E NERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES Signed at Vienna November 18, 1977 Entered into force December 9, 1980 Whereas the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “United States”) is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) which was opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970; Whereas States Parties to the Treaty undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Agency”) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities; Whereas non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the Agency, on all source or special fissionable material in all their peaceful nuclear activities for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Whereas the United States, a nuclear-weapon State as defined by the Treaty, has indicated that at such time as safeguards are being generally applied in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, the United States will permit the Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance—by concluding a safeguards agreement with the Agency for that purpose; Whereas the United States has made this offer and has entered into this agreement for the purpose of encouraging widespread adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to non-nuclear-weapon

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  195

States that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards pursuant to the Treaty; Whereas the purpose of a safeguards agreement giving effect to this offer by the United States would thus differ necessarily from the purposes of safeguards agreements concluded between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty; Whereas it is in the interest of Members of the Agency, that, without prejudice to the principles and integrity of the Agency’s safeguards system, the expenditure of the Agency’s financial and other resources for implementation of such an agreement not exceed that necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Agreement; Whereas the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”), to conclude such a safeguards agreement; Now, therefore, the United States and the Agency have agreed as follows:

Part I Article 1 (a) The United States undertakes to permit the Agency to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States, with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement. (b) The United States shall, upon entry in force of this Agreement, provide the Agency with a list of facilities within the United States not associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States and may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Part II of this Agreement, add facilities to or remove facilities from that list as it deems appropriate. (c) The United States may, in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Agreement, withdraw nuclear material from activities in facilities included in the list referred to in Article 1(b). Article 2 (a) The Agency shall have the right to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all facilities within the United States, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct national security significance to the United States, with a view to enabling the Agency to verify that such material is not withdrawn, except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement. (b) The Agency shall, from time to time, identify to the United States those facilities, selected from the then current list provided by the United States in accordance with Article 1(b), in which the Agency wishes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. (c) In identifying facilities and in applying safeguards thereafter on source or special fissionable material in such facilities, the Agency shall proceed in a manner which the Agency and the United States mutually agree takes into account the requirement on the United States to avoid discriminatory treatment as between United States commercial firms similarly situated. Article 3 (a) The United States and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement.

196  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) The source or special fissionable material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be that material in those facilities which shall have been identified by the Agency at any given time pursuant to Article 2(b). (c) The safeguards to be applied by the Agency under this Agreement on source or special fissionable material in facilities in the United States shall be implemented by the same procedures followed by the Agency in applying its safeguards on similar material in similar facilities in nonnuclear-weapon States under agreements pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty. Article 4 The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the United States or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; (b) To avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear activities of the United States and in particular in the operation of facilities; and (c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. Article 5 (a) The agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement. (b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement. (ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon the decision of the Board if the United States agrees thereto. Article 6 (a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. (b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as: (i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; (ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and (iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under this Agreement. Article 7 (a) The United States shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  197

(b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in accordance with Article 3(c) in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no withdrawal of nuclear material, except as provided for in this Agreement, from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement, findings of the accounting and control system of the United States. The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the system of the United States. Article 8 (a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, the United States shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. (b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement. (ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. (c) If the United States so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on premises of the United States design information which the United States regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on premises of the United States. Article 9 (a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the United States to the designation of Agency inspectors to the United States. (ii) If the United States, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the United States an alternative designation or designations. (iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the United States to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Director General”) with a view to its taking appropriate action. (b) The United States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. (c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: (i) To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the United States and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and (ii) To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge. Article 10 The provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act of the United States of America2 shall apply to Agency inspectors performing functions in the United States under this Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them. 2

59 Stat. 669; U.S.C. 288 note.

198  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 11 Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable. Article 12 (a) If the United States intends to exercise its right to withdraw nuclear material from activities in facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) other than those facilities removed, pursuant to Article 34(b)(i) from the list provided for by Article 1(b) and to transfer such material to a destination in the United States other than to a facility included in the list established and maintained pursuant to Articles 1(b) and 34, the United States shall notify the Agency in advance of such withdrawal. Nuclear material in respect of which such notification has been given shall cease to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement as from the time of its withdrawal. (b) Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the right of the United States to transfer material subject to safeguards under this Agreement to destinations not within or under the jurisdiction of the United States.The United States shall provide the Agency with information with respect to such transfers in accordance with Article 89.The Agency shall keep records of each such transfer and, where applicable, of the reapplication of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material. Article 13 Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the United States shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated. Article 14 The United States and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the United States or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request. Article 15 In carrying out its functions under this Agreement within the United States, the Agency and its personnel shall be covered to the same extent as nationals of the United States by any protection against third-party liability provided under the Price-Anderson Act,3 including insurance or other indemnity coverage that may be required by the Price-Anderson Act with respect to nuclear incidents. Article 16 Any claim by the United States against the Agency or by the Agency against the United States in respect to any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law. Article 17 If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the United States is essential and urgent in order to ensure compliance with this Agreement, the Board may call upon 3

71 Stat. 576; 42 U.S.C. 2210.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  199

the United States to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 21 for the settlement of a dispute. Article 18 If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, determines there has been any non-compliance with this Agreement, the Board may call upon the United States to remedy forthwith such non-compliance. In the event there is a failure to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the United States every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance. Article 19 The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Article 20 The United States shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite the United States to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. Article 21 Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a determination by the Board under Article 18 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a determination which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows:The United States and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the United States or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either the United States or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the United States and the Agency. Article 22 The Parties shall institute steps to suspend the application of Agency safeguards in the United States under other safeguards agreements with the Agency while this Agreement is in force. However, the United States and the Agency shall ensure that nuclear material being safeguarded under this Agreement shall be at all times at least equivalent in amount and composition to that which would be subject to safeguards in the United States under the agreements in question. The detailed arrangements for the implementation of this provision shall be specified in the subsidiary arrangements provided for in Article 39, and shall reflect the nature of any undertaking given under such other safeguards agreements. Article 23 (a) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other on amendments to this Agreement.

200  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) All Amendments shall require the agreement of the United States and the Agency. Article 24 This Agreement or any amendments thereto shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the United States written notification that statutory and constitutional requirements of the United States for entry into force have been met. Article 25 The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement, or of any amendments thereto. Article 26 The Agreement shall remain in force as long as the United States is a party to the Treaty except that the Parties to this Agreement shall, upon the request of either of them, consult and, to the extent mutually agreed, modify this Agreement in order to ensure that it continues to serve the purpose for which it was originally intended. If the Parties are unable after such consultation to agree upon necessary modifications, either Party may, upon six months notice, terminate this Agreement.

Part II Article 27 The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. Article 28 The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is the timely detection of withdrawal, other than in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, of significant quantities of nuclear material from activities in facilities while such material is being safeguarded under this Agreement. Article 29 For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Article 30 The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated. Article 31 Pursuant to Article 7, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the United States system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the United States accounting and control activities. Article 32 The United States system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provi-

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  201

sion, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as: (a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory. (b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty; (c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements; (d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory; (e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses; (f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; (g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and (h) Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 57 through 63 and 65 through 67. Article 33 Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities. Article 34 The United States may, at any time, notify the Agency of any facility or facilities to be added to or removed from the list provided for in Article 1(b): (a) In case of addition to the list, the notification shall specify the facility or facilities to be added to the list and the date upon which the addition is to take effect; (b) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities then currently identified pursuant to Articles 2(b) or 39(b): (i) The Agency shall be notified in advance and the notification shall specify: the facility or facilities being removed, the date of removal, and the quantity and composition of the nuclear material contained therein at the time of notification. In exceptional circumstances, the United States may remove facilities without giving advance notification; (ii) Any facility in respect of which notification has been given in accordance with subparagraph (i) shall be removed from the list and the nuclear material contained therein shall cease to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with and at the time specified in the notification by the United States. (c) In the case of removal from the list of a facility or facilities not then currently identified pursuant to Articles 2(b) or 39(b), the notification shall specify the facility or facilities being removed and the date of removal. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the list at the time specified in the notification by the United States. Article 35 (a) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that Article are not met, but the

202  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

United States considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the United States and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. (b) Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the United States and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable. Article 36 At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material, which would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, as follows: (a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments; (b) Nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and (c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%. Article 37 At the request of the United States, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in the United States in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed: (a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following: (i) Plutonium; (ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and (iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment. (b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%); (c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and (d) Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application. Article 38 If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the reapplication of safeguards thereto. Article 39 (a) The United States and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall: (i) contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(b) and thus containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (ii) specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  203

(b) (i) After entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall identify to the United States, from the list provided in accordance with Article 1(b), those facilities to be included in the initial Subsidiary Arrangements listing; (ii) The Agency may thereafter identify for inclusion in the Subsidiary Arrangements listing additional facilities from the list provided in accordance with Article 1(b) as that list may have been modified in accordance with Article 34. (c) The Agency shall also designate to the United States those facilities to be removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing which have not otherwise been removed pursuant to notification by the United States in accordance with Article 34. Such facility or facilities shall be removed from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing upon such designation to the United States. (d) The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Agency and the United States without amendment to this Agreement. Article 40 (a) With respect to those facilities which shall have been identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(i), such Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, entry into force of this Agreement.The United States and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the United States and the Agency. (b) With respect to facilities which, after the entry into force of this Agreement, have been identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(ii) for inclusion in the Subsidiary Arrangements listing, the United States and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve the entry into force of such Subsidiary Arrangements within ninety days following such identification to the United States; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the Agency and the United States. (c) Upon identification of a facility by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), the United States shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements, and the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures set forth in this Agreement to the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 41, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force. Article 41 The Agency shall establish, on the basis of the initial reports referred to in Article 60(a) below, a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the United States subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports concerning those facilities, of the initial reports referred to in Article 60(b), of subsequent reports concerning the facilities listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the United States at intervals to be agreed. Article 42 Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of facilities identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(i) shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements.The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of any facility which is identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b)(ii) shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible after such identification. Article 43 The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), when applicable:

204  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; (b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; (c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and (d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. Article 44 Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 39(b), in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control.The United States shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall comply at the facility. Article 45 The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. Article 46 The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes: (a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria: (i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; (ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; (iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and (iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information; (c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes; (d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  205

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and (f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques at the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 47 Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to Article 46. Article 48 The Agency, in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 42 through 45, for the purposes stated in Article 46. Article 49 In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, the United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b).The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 50 The United States shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records referred to in Article 49 by inspectors. Article 51 Records referred to in Article 49 shall be retained for at least five years. Article 52 Records referred to in Article 49 shall consist, as appropriate, of: (a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (b) Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material. Article 53 The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards. Article 54 The accounting records referred to in Article 52(a) shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b): (a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; (b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and (c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

206  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 55 For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article 52(a) shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material:material identification,batch data and source data.The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient shall be indicated. Article 56 The operating records referred to in Article 52(b) shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b): (a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; (b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; (c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and (d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur. Article 57 The United States shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 58 through 67 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. Article 58 Reports shall be made in English. Article 59 Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 49 through 56 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports. Article 60 The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on all nuclear material contained in each facility which becomes listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements in accordance with Article 39(b): (a) With respect to those facilities listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(i), such reports shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. (b) With respect to each facility listed pursuant to Article 39(b)(ii), an initial report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which the Agency identifies the facility to the United States and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. Article 61 The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b): (a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  207

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required. Article 62 Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(a) shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient.These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes: (a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and (b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. Article 63 The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear materials, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change. Article 64 The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. Article 65 Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 61(b) shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the Agency: (a) Beginning physical inventory; (b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); (c) Ending book inventory; (d) Shipper/receiver differences; (e) Adjusted ending book inventory; (f) Ending physical inventory; and (g) Material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report. Article 66 The United States shall make special reports without delay: (a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the United States to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or

208  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement has become possible. Article 67 If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Articles 57 through 63, 65 and 66, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards. Article 68 The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Articles 69 through 82. Article 69 The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to: (a) Verify the information contained in the initial reports submitted in accordance with Article 60; (b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the relevant initial report; and (c) Identify and if possible verify the quantity and composition of the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in respect of which the information referred to in Article 89(a) has been provided to the Agency. Article 70 The Agency may make routine inspections in order to: (a) Verify that reports submitted pursuant to Articles 57 through 63, 65 and 66 are consistent with records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56; (b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. Article 71 Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special inspections: (a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports submitted in accordance with Article 66; or (b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the United States, including explanations from the United States and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 through 80, or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both. Article 72 For the purposes specified in Articles 69 through 71, the Agency may: (a) Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 49 through 56; (b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  209

(c)Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; (d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and (e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible. Article 73 Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled: (a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; (b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved; (c) To make arrangements with the United States that, if necessary: (i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency’s use; (ii) The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analyzed; (iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and (iv) Other calibrations are carried out; (d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to install such equipment; (e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (f) To make arrangements with the United States for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use. Article 74 (a) For the purposes specified in Articles 69 (a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out therewith indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is present. (b) For the purposes specified in Article 69(c), the inspectors shall have access to any facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) or 39(b) in which nuclear material referred to in article 69(c) is located. (c) For the purposes specified in Article 70 the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 49 through 56; and (d) In the event of the United States concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the United States and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations.The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board. Article 75 In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 71 the United States and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may:

210  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(a) Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 through 80; and (b) Obtain access, in agreement with the United States, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 20 and 21; in case action by the United States is essential and urgent, Article 17 shall apply. Article 76 The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of inspection resources available to it. Article 77 The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms. Article 78 The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows: (a) For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility; (b) For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 manyears of inspection; and (c) For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The United States and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable. Article 79 Subject to Articles 76 through 78 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39 shall include: (a) The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  211

(b) The effectiveness of the United States accounting and control system, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the United States accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 32 have been implemented by the United States; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency; (c) Characteristics of that part of the United States fuel cycle in which safeguards are applied under this Agreement, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated; (d) International interdependence, in particular the extent to which nuclear material, safeguarded under this Agreement, is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which activities in facilities in which safeguards are applied under this Agreement are interrelated with those of other States; and (e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material. Article 80 The United States and the Agency shall consult if the United States considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities. Article 81 The Agency shall give advance notice to the United States of the arrival of inspectors at facilities listed in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 39, as follows: (a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Articles 69(a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at least one week; (b) For special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after the United States and the Agency have consulted as provided for in Article 75, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and (c) For routine inspections pursuant to Article 70 at least twenty-four hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5% and one week in all other cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside the United States the Agency shall also give advance notice of place and time of their arrival in the United States. Article 82 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by the United States pursuant to Article 62(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise the United States periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying

212  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for the United States and facility operators bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 87. Similarly the United States shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors. Article 83 The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors: (a) The Director General shall inform the United States in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the United States; (b) The United States shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal; (c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the United States as one of the inspectors for the United States, and shall inform the United States of such designations; and (d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the United States or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the United States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the United States. However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69 (a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis. Article 84 The United States shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each inspector designated for United States. Article 85 Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Article 48 and 69 to 73, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of paragraphs 72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor. Article 86 When inspectors require services available in the United States, including the use of the equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the United States shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors. Article 87 The United States shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their inspections by its representatives, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. Article 88 The Agency shall inform the United States of:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  213

(a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the United States, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 46(b) which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck. Article 89 (a) Information concerning nuclear material exported from and imported into the United States shall be provided to the Agency in accordance with arrangements made with the Agency as, for example, those set forth in INFCIRC/207. (b) In the case of international transfers to or from facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) with respect to which information has been provided to the Agency in accordance with arrangements referred to in paragraph (a), a special report, as envisaged in Article 66, shall be made if any unusual incident or circumstances lead the United States to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during the transfer.

Definitions Article 90 For the purposes of this Agreement: A. Adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for. B.Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 77 and 78, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity. C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items. D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows: (a) Grams of contained plutonium; (b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and (c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium. For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. F. Correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:

214  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms; (b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; (c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and (d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question. I. Facility means: (a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or (b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following: (a) Increases: (i) Import; (ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a nonsafeguarded activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards; (iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and (iv) De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity. (b) Decreases: (i) Export; (ii) Domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for a nonsafeguarded activity; (iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions; (iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; (v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; (vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and (vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft. K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  215

L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours. M. Material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and (b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures; in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established. N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory. O. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the statute.The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the United States. P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures. Q. Shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated. S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE I NTERNATIONAL ATOMIC E NERGY AGENCY FOR THE A PPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES Article 1 This Protocol specifies the procedures to be followed with respect to facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol.

216  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 2 (a) The Agency may from time to time identify to the United States those facilities included in the list, established and maintained pursuant to Articles 1(b) and 34 of the Agreement, of facilities not associated with activities having direct national security significance to the United States, other than those which are then currently identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement, to which the provisions of this Protocol shall apply. (b) The Agency may also include among the facilities identified to the United States pursuant to the foregoing paragraph, any facility which had previously been identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement but which had subsequently been designated by the Agency pursuant to Article 39(c) of the Agreement for removal from the Subsidiary Arrangements listing. (c) In identifying facilities pursuant to the foregoing paragraphs and in the preparation of Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to Article 3 of this Protocol, the Agency shall proceed in a manner which the Agency and the United States mutually agree takes into account the requirement of the United States to avoid discriminatory treatment as between United States commercial firms similarly situated. Article 3 The United States and the Agency shall make Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements which shall: (a) Contain a current listing of those facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol; (b) Specify in detail how the procedures set forth in this protocol are to be applied. Article 4 (a) The United States and the Agency shall make every effort to complete the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements with respect to each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol within ninety days following such identification to the United States. (b) With respect to any facility identified pursuant to Article 2(b) of this Protocol, the information previously submitted to the Agency in accordance with Articles 42 through 45 of the Agreement, the results of the examination of the design information and other provisions of the Subsidiary Arrangements relative to such facility, to the extent that such information, results and provisions satisfy the provisions of this Protocol relating to the submission and examination of information and the preparation of Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, shall constitute the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements for such facility, until and unless the United States and the Agency shall otherwise complete Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements for such facility in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Article 5 In the event that a facility currently identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2(a) of this Protocol is identified by the Agency pursuant to Articles 2(b) and 39(b) of the Agreement, the Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements relevant to such facility shall, to the extent that such Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements satisfy the provisions of the Agreement, be deemed to have been made part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement. Article 6 Design information in respect of each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements.The information shall include, when applicable:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  217

(a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purpose; (b) A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; (c) A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and (d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. Article 7 Other information relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility identified by the Agency in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol, in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control.The United States shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which inspectors shall comply when visiting the facility in accordance with Article 11 of this Protocol. Article 8 The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification relevant to the application of the provisions of this Protocol, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 7 of this Protocol, sufficiently in advance for the procedures under this Protocol to be adjusted when necessary. Article 9 The design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, in anticipation of the application of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be used for the following purposes: (a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) To determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria: (i) The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; (ii) In determining the material balance area, advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; (iii) A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and (iv) A special material balance area may be established at the request of the United States around a process step involving commercially sensitive information;

218  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes; (d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; (e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and (f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 10 Design information provided in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol shall be reexamined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action taken pursuant to Article 9 of this Protocol. Article 11 (a) The Agency, in co-operation with the United States, may send inspectors to facilities identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol to verify the design information provided to the Agency in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, for the purposes stated in Article 9 of this Protocol or for such other purposes as may be agreed between the United States and the Agency. (b) The Agency shall give notice to the United States with respect to each such visit at least one week prior to the arrival of inspectors at the facility to be visited. Article 12 In establishing a national system of materials control as referred to in Article 7(a) of the Agreement, the United States shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol.The records to be kept shall be described in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 13 Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall be retained for at least five years. Article 14 Records referred to in Article 12 of this Protocol shall consist, as appropriate, of: (a) Accounting records of all nuclear material stored, processed, used or produced in each facility; and (b) Operating records for activities within each facility. Article 15 The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards. Article 16 The accounting records referred to in Article 14(a) of this Protocol shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  219

(a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; (b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and (c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories. Article 17 For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records referred to in Article 14(a) of this Protocol shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data.The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated. Article 18 The operating records referred to in Article 14(b) of this Protocol shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol: (a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; (b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; (c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and (d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur. Article 19 The United States shall provide the Agency with accounting reports as detailed in Articles 20 through 25 of this Protocol in respect of nuclear material in each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol. Article 20 The accounting reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 12 to 18 to this Protocol.They shall be made in English. Article 21 The United States shall provide the Agency with an initial report on nuclear material in each facility identified by the Agency pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol. Such report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which the facility is identified by the Agency and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. Article 22 The United States shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area determined in accordance with Article 9(b) of this Protocol: (a) Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the end of the month in which inventory changes occurred or were established; and

220  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports shall be based on data as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required. Article 23 Inventory change reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(a) of this Protocol shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change, and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient.These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes: (a) Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for in Article 18(a) of this Protocol; and (b) Describing, as specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational program, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. Article 24 The United States shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the relevant Transitional Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change. Article 25 Material balance reports submitted in accordance with Article 22(b) of the Protocol shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the United States and the Agency: (a) Beginning physical inventory; (b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); (c) Ending book inventory; (d) Shipper/receiver differences; (e) Adjusted ending book inventory; (f) Ending physical inventory; and (g) Material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report. Article 26 The Agency shall provide the United States with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material in facilities identified pursuant to Article 2 of this Protocol, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each statement. Article 27 (a) If the Agency so requests, the United States shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report submitted in accordance with Article 19 of this Protocol, in so far as consistent with the purpose of the Protocol.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  221

(b) The Agency shall inform the United States of any significant observations resulting from its examination of reports received pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol and from visits of inspectors made pursuant to Article 11 of this Protocol. (c) The United States and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Protocol, including corrective action which, in the opinion of the Agency, should be taken by the United States to ensure compliance with its terms, as indicated by the Agency in its observations pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Article. Article 28 The definitions set forth in Article 90 of the Agreement shall apply, to the extent relevant, to this Protocol.

EURATOM S AFEGUARDS SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he European Atomic Energy Agency Community (EURATOM) was formed in 1957 as part of the series of agreements signed in Rome to form various components of the European Community. Its purpose was twofold: (1) to foster collaboration among the parties in the development of commercial nuclear energy and (2) to ensure the peaceful uses of the atom among the non-nuclear members.This latter function took the following form:

T

 nominal EURATOM ownership of all fissile materials controlled by member states (although a “gentleman’s agreement” was worked out whereby EURATOM agreed not to press title claims as long as the member states notified the agency of any transfers of such materials);  EURATOM responsibility for all external commercial nuclear relations of the member states, including, for example, the purchase of fissile materials from suppliers; and  the world’s first multinational verification and inspection system, which was charged with verifying that fissile materials were used for declared purposes— meaning that the whole civilian fuel cycle in each member state was opened to safeguards, but not military fuel cycles in EURATOM’s nuclear weapon state members (France and the United Kingdom). As part of EURATOM’s verification mission, inspectors were granted unlimited access to all designated and suspected sites and sanctions, and fines could be levied against member states that failed to meet obligations. Pursuant to Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all non-nuclear weapon states must submit a declared list of nuclear facilities and make them available for “fullscope” safeguards by the IAEA.This is the treaty’s all-important verification regime, which is implemented and governed by agreements that the individual non-nuclear weapon states were required to negotiate with the IAEA. In most cases, these agreements were based upon the

222  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

model safeguards protocol outlined in IAEA INFCIRC/153. An interesting exception was permitted for Belgium,West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg (EURATOM’s five original non-nuclear members, with France being the sixth original member), in NPT Article III, which authorized EURATOM to negotiate safeguards as a group. Negotiating an arrangement to implement the group negotiation provision proved difficult. During the negotiations, EURATOM sought to protect its areas of responsibility, while the IAEA sought to ensure the global nature of its safeguard systems and to deal with concerns from Soviet-bloc states about self-policing on the part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in EURATOM. For their part, EURATOM members were concerned that differing standards for IAEA and EURATOM inspectors and political gamesmanship with the former would lead to competing results—for example, EURATOM finding a state to be in compliance while a Soviet bloc–dominated IAEA team found the same state to be noncompliant. Efforts to resolve the differences between IAEA and EURATOM led to the EURATOM safeguard arrangement included in IAEA INFCIRC/193 (the Agreement Between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and in subsequent addendums adding Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Pursuant to this arrangement, inspectors from both EURATOM and the IAEA were to participate in inspections, either in the form of “joint team” inspections or “observer regimes,” whereby EURATOM inspectors would conduct inspections jointly with, or under the observation of, IAEA inspectors depending on the type of facility being inspected. Moreover, INFCIRC/193 incorporated the stricter EURATOM standards, thereby ensuring that safeguards on EURATOM members would be among the most comprehensive in the world.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IRELAND, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC , THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III, (1) AND (4) OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IAEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: INFCIRC/193 Signed: 14 September 1973 Whereas the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter referred to as “the States”) are signatories of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and which entered into force on 5 March 1970; Recalling that pursuant to Article IV(1) of the Treaty nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  223

Recalling that according to Article IV(2) of the Treaty all the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; Recalling further that under the terms of the same paragraph the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organisations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty; Whereas Article III(1) of the Treaty provides that each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) in accordance with the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”) and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Whereas Article III(4) provides that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the Agency to meet the requirements of the said Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute; Whereas the States are Members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) (hereinafter referred to as “the Community”) and have assigned to institutions common to the European Communities regulatory, executive and judicial powers which these institutions exercise in their own right in those areas for which they are competent and which may take effect directly within the legal systems of the Member States; Whereas within this institutional framework, the Community has in particular the task of ensuring, through appropriate safeguards, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they were intended, and will, from the time of the entry into force of the Treaty within the territories of the States, thus be required to satisfy itself though the system of safeguards established by the EURATOM Treaty, that source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the States is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; Whereas these safeguards include notification to the Community of the basic technical characteristics of nuclear facilities, maintenance and submission of operating records to permit nuclear materials accounting for the Community as a whole, inspections by officials of the Community, and a system of sanctions; Whereas the Community has the task of establishing with other countries and with international organisations relations which may promote progress in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and is expressly authorised to assume special safeguard obligations in agreement with a third State of an international organisation; Whereas the Agency’s international safeguards system referred to in the Treaty comprises, in particular, provisions for the submission of design information to the Agency, the maintenance of records, the submission of reports on all nuclear material subject to safeguards to the Agency, inspections carried out by the Agency’s inspectors, requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material by a State, and measures in relation to verification of non-diversion; Whereas the Agency, in the light of its statutory responsibilities and its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, has the responsibility to assure the international community that effective safeguards are being applied under the Treaty; Noting that the States which were Members of the Community when they signed the Treaty, made it known on that occasion that safeguards provided for in Article III(1) of the Treaty would have

224  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

to be set out in a verification agreement between the Community, the States and the Agency and defined in such a way that the rights and obligations of the States and the Community would not be affected; Whereas the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) has approved a comprehensive set of model provisions for the structure and content of agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty; Whereas the Agency is authorised under Article III.A.5 of the Statute, to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy; Whereas it is the desire of the Agency, the Community and the States to avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities; Now, therefore, the Agency, the Community and the States have agreed as follows:

Part I Basic Undertaking Article 1 The States undertake, pursuant to Article III(1) of the Treaty, to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Application of Safeguards Article 2 The Agency shall have the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the States, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article 3 a.The Community undertakes, in applying its safeguards on source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within territories of the States, to co-operate with the Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, with a view to ascertaining that such source and special fissionable material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. b.The Agency shall apply its safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, is such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the Community’s system of safeguards. The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement.The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the effectiveness of the Community’s system of safeguards in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  225

Co-operation between the Agency, the Community and the States Article 4 The Agency, the Community and the States shall co-operate, in so far as each Party is concerned, to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities.

Implementation of Safeguards Article 5 The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed: a. To avoid hampering the economic and technicological development in the Community or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; b.To avoid undue interference in the peaceful nuclear activities in the Community, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and c. To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. Article 6 a. The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement. b. i.The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organisation or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement; ii. Summarised information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned or the Community, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, agree thereto. Article 7 a. In implementing safeguards under this Agreement, full account shall be taken of technological development in the field of safeguards, and every effort shall be made to ensure optimum costeffectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. b. In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as: i. Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; ii. Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and iii. Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimisation of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement.

226  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Provision of Information to the Agency Article 8 a. In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, the Community shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to such safeguards and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. b. i.The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement. ii. Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. c. If the Community so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on premises of the Community design information which the Community regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on premises of the Community.

Agency Inspectors Article 9 a. i.The Agency shall secure the consent of the Community and the States to the designation of Agency inspectors to the States. ii. If the Community, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the Community and the States an alternative designation or designations. iii. If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the Community to accept the designation of Agency inspectors, inspection to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Director General”), with a view to its taking appropriate action. b.The Community and The States concerned shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. c.The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: i.To reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the Community and the States and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and ii. To ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the knowledge of Agency inspectors.

Privileges and Immunities Article 10 Each State shall apply to the Agency, including its property, funds and assets, and to its inspectors and other officials, performing functions under this Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/9/Rev.2).

Consumption or Dilution of Nuclear Material Article 11 Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Community and the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  227

way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically irrecoverable.

Transfer of Nuclear Material out of the States Article 12 The Community shall give the Agency notification of transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of the States, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor as provided for in this Agreement.The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material.

Provisions Relating to Nuclear Material To Be Used in Non-nuclear Activities Article 13 Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, the Community shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards under this Agreement on such material may be terminated.

Non-application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material To Be Used in Non-peaceful Activities Article 14 If a State intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply: a.The Community and the State shall inform the Agency of the activity, and the State shall make it clear: i. That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and ii. That during the period of non-application of safeguards under this Agreement the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; b. The Agency and the Community shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which such safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such material out of that State or those States; and c. Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

Finance Article 15 The Agency, the Community and the States will bear the expenses incurred by each of them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the Community,

228  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

the States or person under their jurisdiction, incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case, the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which Agency inspectors may request.

Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage Article 16 The Community and the States shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security which may be available under their laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the States.

International Responsibility Article 17 Any claim by the Community or a State against the Agency or by the Agency against the Community or a State in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

Measures in Relation to Verification of Non-diversion Article 18 If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the Community or a State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon the Community or that State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 for the settlement of a dispute. Article 19 If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in Article XII(C) of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action, the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall offer the Community or the State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

Interpretation and Application of the Agreement and Settlement of Disputes Article 20 At the request of the Agency, the Community or a State, there shall be consultations about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Article 21 The Community and the States shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board.The Board shall invite

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  229

the Community and the State concerned to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. Article 22 Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action take by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Agency, the Community and the States shall, at the request of any one of them, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators.The Community and the States shall designate two arbitrators and the Agency shall also designate two arbitrators, and the four arbitrators so designated shall elect a fifth, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, the Community and the States, or the Agency, have not designated two arbitrators each, the Community or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint these arbitrators.The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the fourth arbitrator, the fifth arbitrator has not been elected.A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of at least three arbitrators.The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal.The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the Agency, the Community, and the States concerned.

Accession Article 23 a.This Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty which become Members of the Community, upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of this Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of this Agreement. b. Where the State concerned has concluded other agreements with the Agency for the application of Agency safeguards, upon the coming into force of this Agreement for that State, the application of Agency safeguards under such agreements shall be suspended while this Agreement is in force; provided, however, that the State's undertaking in those agreements not to use items which are subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply.

Amendment of the Agreement Article 24 a.The Agency, the Community and the States shall, at the request of any one of them, consult on amendment to this Agreement. b. All amendments shall require the agreement of the Agency, the Community and the States. c.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement.

Entry into Force and Duration Article 25 a. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from the Community and the States written notification that their own requirements for entry into force have been met.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.

230  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

b.This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the States are Parties to the Treaty.

Protocol Article 26 The Protocol attached to this Agreement shall be an integral part thereof.The term “Agreement” as used in this instrument means the Agreement and the Protocol together.

Part II Introduction Article 27 The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify, as required, the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

Objective of Safeguards Article 28 The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. Article 29 For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 28, material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Article 30 The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

The Community’s System of Safeguards Article 31 Pursuant to Article 3, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the Community’s system of safeguards. Article 32 The Community’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear material under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas.The Community, in applying its safeguards, will make use of and, to the extent necessary, make provision for, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements such measures as: a. A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; b.The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  231

c. Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements; d. Procedures for taking a physical inventory; e. Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured Inventory and unmeasured losses; f.A system of records and reports showing, for each material Balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; g. Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and h. Procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 59 to 65 and 67 to 69. Article 33 Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore processing activities. Article 34 a. When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported to a non-nuclearweapon State not Party to this Agreement, the Community shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; b. When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is imported into the States, the Community shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and c. When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the States, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.

Termination of Safeguards Article 35 a. Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material, under the conditions set forth in Article 11.Where the conditions of that article are not met, but the Community considers that the recovery of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency and the Community shall consult on the appropriate safeguard measures to be applied. b. Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that the Agency and the Community agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.

Exemption from Safeguards Article 36 At the request of the Community, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards under this Agreement, as follows:

232  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

a. Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments; b. nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 13, if such nuclear material is recoverable; and c. Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%. Article 37 At the request of the Community, the Agency shall exempt from safeguards under this Agreement nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to such safeguards, provided that the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in the States in accordance with this Article may not at any time exceed: a. One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following: i. Plutonium; ii. Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and iii. Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment; b. Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%); c.Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and d.Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application. Article 38 If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the re-application of such safeguards thereto.

Subsidiary Arrangements Article 39 The Community shall make Subsidiary Arrangements with the Agency which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by agreement between the Agency and the Community without amendment of this Agreement. Article 40 The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. The Agency, the Community and the States shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within ninety days of the entry into force of this Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between the Agency, the Community and the States.The Community shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  233

of the nuclear material listed in the inventor provided for in Article 41, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force.

Inventory Article 41 On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 62, the Agency shall establish a unified inventory of all nuclear material in the State subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the Community at intervals to be agreed.

Design Information General Provisions Article 42 Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency by the Community during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements.The time limits for the provisions of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility. Article 43 The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each facility, when applicable: a. The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; b. A description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; c. A description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and d. A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. Article 44 Other information relevant to the application of safeguards under this Agreement shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility, if so specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. The Community shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which Agency inspectors shall comply at the facility. Article 45 The Agency shall be provided by the Community with design information in respect of a modification relevant for purposes of safeguards under this Agreement for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 44, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be applied under this Agreement to be adjusted when necessary.

234  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 46 Purpose of Examination of Design Information The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes: a.To identify the feature of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; b.To determine material balance areas to be used for accounting purposes under this Agreement and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material in determining such material balance areas the following criteria shall, inter alia, be used: i.The size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; ii. In determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; iii. A special material balance area may be established at the request of the Community or of the State concerned around a process step involving commercially sensitive information; c. To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for accounting purposes under this Agreement; d.To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; e.To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and f. To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the design information, as agreed upon between the Agency and the Community, shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 47 Re-examination of Design Information Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of the experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying action pursuant to Article 46. Article 48 Verification of Design Information The Agency, in co-operation with the Community and the State concerned may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 42 to 4 for the purposes stated in Article 46.

Information in Respect of Nuclear Material Outside Facilities Article 49 The Agency shall be provided by the Community with the following information when nuclear material is to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  235

a. A general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user’s name and address for routine business purposes; and b. A general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. The Agency shall be informed by the Community, on a timely basis, of any change in the information provided to it under this Article. Article 50 The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 49 may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 46 (b) to (f).

Records System General Provisions Article 51 The Community shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area.The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 52 The Community shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by Agency inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish. Article 53 Records shall be retained for at least five years. Article 54 Records shall consist, as appropriate, of: a. Accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and b. Operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material. Article 55 The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.

Accounting Records Article 56 The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area: a. All inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; b. All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and c. All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories. Article 57 For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall

236  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated. Article 58 Operating Records The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area: a.Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; b.The data obtained from the calibration of tank and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; c. A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and d. A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

Reports System General Provisions Article 59 The Community shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 60 to 65 and 67 to 69 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. Article 60 Reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 61 Reports shall be based on the record kept in accordance with Articles 51 to 58 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting Reports Article 62 The Agency shall be provided by the Community with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month. Article 63 The Community shall provided the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area: a. Inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  237

b. Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a alter date, as required. Article 64 Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes: a. Explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 58(a); and b. Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. Article 65 The Community shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change. Article 66 The Agency shall provide the Community, for the use of the interested parties, with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. Article 67 Material balance reports shall include the following entries unless otherwise agreed by the Agency and the Community: a. Beginning physical inventory; b. Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); c. Ending book inventory; d. Shipper/receiver differences; e. Adjusted ending book inventory; f. Ending physical inventory; and g. Material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report. Article 68 Special Reports The Community shall make special reports without delay:

238  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

a. If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the Community to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purposed in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or b. If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible. Article 69 Amplification and Clarification of Reports If the Agency so requests, the Community shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards under this Agreement.

Inspections Article 70 General Provisions The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in this Agreement.

Purpose of Inspections Article 71 The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to: a. Verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred between the date of the initial report and the date of the entry into force of the Subsidiary Arrangements in respect of a given facility; and b. Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with Article 93 and 96, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the States except for transfers within the Community. Article 72 The Agency may make routine inspections in order to: a.Verify that reports are consistent with records; b.Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and c.Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. Article 73 Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 77, the Agency may make special inspections: a. In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or b. If the Agency considers that information made available by the Community including explanations from the Community and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in this Agreement or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  239

Scope of Inspections Article 74 For the purposes specified in Articles 71 to 73, the Agency may: a. Examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 51 to 58; b. Make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; c.Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; d. Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and e. Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible. Article 75 Within the scope of Article 74, the Agency shall be enabled: a.To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; b. To observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved; c. To make arrangements with the Community and to the extent necessary with the State concerned that, if necessary: i. Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency’s use; ii.The Agency’s standard analytical samples are analysed; iii. Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and iv. Other calibrations are carried out; d.To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to install such equipment; e. To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and f. To make arrangements with the Community or the State concerned for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use.

Access for Inspections Article 76 a. For the purposes specified in Article 71(a) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is present; b. For the purposes specified in Article 71(b) the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Articles 92(b)(iii) or 95(d)(iii); c. For the purposes specified in Article 72 the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 51 to 58; and

240  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

d. In the event of the Community concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, the Community and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board. Article 77 In the circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 73 the Community and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may: a. Make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in this Agreement; and b. Obtain access, in agreement with the Community, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76.Any disagreement shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22. In case action by the Community or a State, in so far as either Party is individually concerned, is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply.

Frequency and Intensity of Routine Inspections Article 78 The number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and optimum and most economical use of available inspection resources under the Agreement shall be made. Article 79 The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms. Article 80 The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities should be determined as follows: a. For reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility; b. For facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing by allowing for each such facility 30 x square root E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and c. For facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  241

The Parties to this Agreement may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable. Article 81 Subject to Article 78 to 80 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspection in respect of any facility shall include: a.The form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility; b. The effectiveness of the Community’s safeguards, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the Community’s safeguards; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 32 have been implemented by the Community; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency; c. Characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycle in the States, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards under this Agreement, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventor of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated; d. International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the nuclear activities in each State are interrelated with those in other States; and e.Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material. Article 82 The Agency and the Community shall consult if the latter considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

Notice of Inspections Article 83 The Agency shall give advance notice to the Community and to the States concerned before arrival of Agency inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows: a. For ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71(b), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 71(a) as well as the activities provided for in Article 48, at least one week; b. For special inspections pursuant to Article 73, as promptly as possible after the Agency and the Community have consulted as provided for in Article 77, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and c. For routine inspections pursuant to Article 72, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 80(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the Agency inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the period during which

242  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

they will be visited. If the Agency inspectors are to arrive from outside the States, the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the States. Article 84 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 83, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 80 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall take into account any operational programme provided to it pursuant to Article 64(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme it shall advise the Community and the State concerned periodically of its general programmed of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for the Community and the State concerned and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 44 and 89. Similarly the Community and the State concerned shall make every effort to facilitate the task of Agency inspectors.

Designation of Agency Inspectors Article 85 The following procedures shall apply to the designation of Agency inspectors: a.The Director General shall inform the Community and the States in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an Agency inspectors for the States; b. The Community shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether the proposal is accepted; c. The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the Community and the States as one of the Agency inspectors for the States, and shall inform the Community and the States of such designations; and d.The Director General, acting in response to a request by the Community or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the Community and the States of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an Agency inspector for the States. However, in respect of Agency inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 48 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 71 (a) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, Agency inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis. Article 86 The States shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each Agency inspector designated pursuant to Article 85.

Conduct and Visits of Agency Inspectors Article 87 Agency inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 48 and 71 to 75, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular, Agency inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If Agency inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 74 and 75, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  243

Article 88 When Agency inspectors require services available in a State, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the State concerned and the Community shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by Agency inspectors. Article 89 The Community and the States concerned shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their inspections by its inspectors and their representatives respectively, provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Statement on the Agency’s Verification Activities Article 90 The Agency shall inform the Community for the use of the interested parties of: a.The results of its inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and b.The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities.

Transfers into or out of the States Article 91 General Provisions Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred into or out of the States shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of the Community and of the State concerned: a. In the case of transfers into the States, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the State from which the material is transferred, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its destination; and b. In the case of transfers out of the States up to the time at which the recipient State has such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination. The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by the Community and the State concerned, on the one hand, and the state to which or from which the nuclear material is transferred, on the other hand. Neither the Community nor a State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over a State’s territory, or that it is being transported on a ship under a State's flag or in the aircraft of a State.

Transfers out of the States Article 92 a. The Community shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of the States of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or, for facilities which normally transfer significant quantities to the same State in shipments each not exceeding one effective kilogram, if so specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. b. Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and within the time limit specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. c.The Agency and the Community may agree on different procedures for advance notification. d.The notification shall specify:

244  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

i.The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and the composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come; ii.The State for which the nuclear material is destined; iii.The dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping; iv.The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and v. At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached. Article 93 The notification referred to in Article 92 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of the nuclear material before it is transferred out of the States, except for transfers within the Community and, if the Agency so wishes or the Community so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification. Article 94 If nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State the Community shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive within three months of the time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer.

Transfers into the States Article 95 a. The Community shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into the States of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or, for facilities to which significant quantities are normally transferred from the same State in shipments each not exceeding one effective kilogram, if so specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. b. The Agency shall be notified as much in advanced as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. c.The Agency and the Community may agree on different procedures for advance notification. d.The notification shall specify: i. The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material; ii. At what point of the transfer the Community and the State concerned will have responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached; and iii.The expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear material is intended to be unpacked. Article 96 The notification referred to in Article 95 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  245

nuclear material transferred into the States, except for transfers within the Community, at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action take or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification. Article 97 Special Reports The Community shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 68 if any unusual incident of circumstances lead the Community to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during transfer into or out of the States.

Definitions Article 98 For the purposes of this Agreement: 1. A. Community means both: a. The legal person created by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Party to this Agreement; and b.The territories to which the EURATOM Treaty applies. B. States means the non-nuclear-weapon States Members of the Community, Party to this Agreement. 2.A.Adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for. B. Annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 79 and 80, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity. C. Batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items. D. Batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate.The units of account shall be as follows: a. Grams of contained plutonium; b. Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and c. Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium. For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. E. Book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. F. Correction mean an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. G. Effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:

246  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

a. For plutonium, its weight in kilograms; b. For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; c. For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and d. For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. H. Enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question. I. Facility means: a. A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or b. Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. J. Inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following: a. Increases: i. Import; ii. Domestic receipt: receipts from within the States: from other material balance areas; from a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity; at the starting point of safeguards; iii. Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and iv. De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity. b. Decreases: i. Export; ii. Domestic shipment: shipments within the States to other material balance ares or for a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity; iii. Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions; iv. Measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; v. Retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; vi. Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and vii. Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft. K. Key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discarded) and storage in material balance areas.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  247

L. Man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 80, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours. M. Material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that: a.The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and b.The physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary in accordance with specified procedures, in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established. N. Material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory. O. Nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute.The term “source material” shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have the effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the Community and the States. P. Physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures. Q. Shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. R. Source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated. S. Strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

PROTOCOL Article 1 This Protocol amplifies certain provisions of the Agreement and, in particular, specifies the conditions and means according to which co-operation in the application of the safeguards provided for under the Agreement shall be implemented in such a way as to avoid unnecessary duplication of the Community’s safeguards activities. Article 2 The Community shall collect the information on facilities and on nuclear material outside facilities to be provided to the Agency under the Agreement on the basis of the agreed indicative questionnaire annexed to the Subsidiary Arrangements.

248  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 3 The Agency and the Community shall carry out jointly the examination of design information provided for in Article 46(a) to (f) of the Agreement and shall include the agreed results thereof in the Subsidiary Arrangements.The verification of design information provided for in Article 48 of the Agreement shall be carried out by the Agency in co-operation with the Community. Article 4 When providing the Agency with the information referred to in Article 2 of this Protocol, the Community shall also transmit information on the inspection methods which it proposes to use and the complete proposals, including estimates of inspection efforts for the routine inspection activities, for Attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements for facilities and material balance areas outside facilities. Article 5 The preparation of the Attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be performed together by the Community and the Agency. Article 6 The Community shall collect the reports from the operators, keep centralised accounts on the basis of these reports and proceed with the technical and accounting control and analysis of the information received. Article 7 Upon completion of the tasks referred to in Article 6 of this Protocol the Community shall, on a monthly basis, produce and provide the Agency with the inventory change reports within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Agreements. Article 8 Further, the Community shall transmit to the Agency the material balance reports and physical inventory listings with frequency depending on the frequency of physical inventory taking as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 9 The form and format of reports referred to in Articles 7 and 8 of this Protocol, as agreed between the Agency and the Community, shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 10 The routine inspection activities of the Community and of the Agency, including the inspections referred to in Article 84 of the Agreement, for the purposes of the Agreement, shall be coordinated pursuant to the provisions of Articles 11 to 23 of this protocol. Article 11 Subject to Articles 79 and 80 of the Agreement, in determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of the Agency inspections in respect of each facility, account shall be taken of the inspection effort carried out by the Community in the framework of its multinational system of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol. Article 12 Inspection efforts under the Agreement for each facility shall be determined by the use of the criteria of Article 81 of the Agreement. Such criteria shall be implemented by using the rules and

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  249

methods set forth in the Subsidiary Arrangements which have been used for the calculation of the inspection efforts in respect of specific examples attached to the Subsidiary Arrangements. These rules and methods shall be reviewed from time to time, pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement, to take into account new technological developments in the field of safeguards and experience gained. Article 13 Such inspection efforts, expressed as agreed estimates of the actual inspection efforts to be applied, shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements together with relevant descriptions of verification approaches and scopes of inspections to be carried out by the Community and by the Agency. These inspection efforts shall constitute, under normal operating conditions and under the conditions set out below, the actual maximum inspection efforts at the facility under the Agreement: a.The continued validity of the information on Community safeguards provided for in Article 32 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; b.The continued validity of the information provided to the Agency in accordance with Article 2 of this Protocol; c.The continued provision by the Community of the reports pursuant to Articles 60 and 61, 63 to 65 and 67 to 69 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; d.The continued application of the co-ordination arrangements for inspections pursuant to Articles 10 to 23 of this Protocol, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and e.The application by the Community of its inspection effort with respect to the facility, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, pursuant to this Article. Article 14 a. Subject to the conditions of Article 13 of this Protocol, the Agency inspections shall be carried out simultaneously with the inspection activities of the Community. Agency inspectors shall be present during the performance of certain of the Community inspections. b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its routine inspections set out in the Agreement, the Agency inspectors shall implement the provisions of Articles 74 and 75 of the Agreement through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors, provided, however, that: i. With respect to inspection activities of Agency inspectors to be implemented other than through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors, which can before seen, these shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and ii. In the course of an inspection, Agency inspectors may carry out inspection activities other than through the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors where they find this to be essential and urgent, if the Agency could not otherwise achieve the purpose of its routine inspections and this was unforeseeable. Article 15 The general scheduling and planning of the Community inspections under the Agreement shall be established by the Community in co-operation with the Agency. Article 16 Arrangements for the presence of Agency inspectors during the performance of certain of the Community inspections shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community for each type of facility, and to the extent necessary, for individual facilities.

250  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 17 In order to enable the Agency to decide, based on requirements for statistical sampling, as to its presence at a particular Community inspection, the Community shall provide the Agency with an advance statement of the numbers, types and contents of items to be inspected according to the information available to the Community from the operator of the facility. Article 18 Technical procedures in general for each type of facility and, to the extent necessary, for individual facilities, shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community, in particular with respect to: a.The determination of techniques for random selection of statistical samples; and b.The checking and identification of standards. Article 19 The co-ordination arrangements for each type of facility set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements shall serve as a basis for the co-ordination arrangements to be specified in each Facility Attachment. Article 20 The specific co-ordination actions on matters specified in the Facility Attachments pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol shall be taken between Community and Agency officials designated for that purpose. Article 21 The Community shall transmit to the Agency its working papers for those inspections at which Agency inspectors were present and inspection reports for all other Community inspections performed under the Agreement. Article 22 The samples of nuclear material for the Agency shall be drawn from the same randomly selected batches of items as for the Community and shall be taken together with Community samples, except when the maintenance of or reduction to the lowest practical level of the Agency inspection effort requires independent sampling by the Agency, as agreed in advance and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 23 The frequencies of physical inventories to be taken by facility operators and to be verified for safeguards purposes will be in accordance with those laid down as guidelines in the Subsidiary Arrangements. If additional activities under the Agreement in relation to physical inventories are considered to be essential, they will be discussed in the Liaison Committee provided for in Article 25 of this Protocol and agreed before implementation. Article 24 Whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its ad hoc inspections set out in the Agreement through observation of the inspection activities of Community inspectors, it shall do so. Article 25 a. With a view to facilitating the application of the Agreement and of this Protocol, a Liaison Committee shall be established, composed of representatives of the Community and of the Agency. b.The Committee shall meet at least once a year:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  251

i.To review, in particular, the performance of the co-ordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including agreed estimates of inspection efforts; ii.To examine the development of safeguards methods and techniques; and iii.To consider any questions which have been referred to it by the periodic meetings referred to in paragraph (c). c.The Committee shall meet periodically at a lower level to discuss, in particular and to the extent necessary, for individual facilities, the operation of the con-ordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including, in the light of technical and operational developments, up-dating of agreed estimates of inspection efforts with respect to changes in throughput, inventory and facility operational programmes, and the application of inspection procedures in different types of routine inspection activities and, in general terms, statistical sampling requirements. Any questions which could not be settled would be referred to the meetings mentioned in paragraph (b). d. Without prejudice to urgent actions which might be required under the Agreement, should problems arise in the application of Article 13 of this Protocol, in particular when the Agency considered that the conditions specified therein had not been met, the Committee would meet as soon as possible at the suitable level in order to asses the situation and to discuss the measures to be taken. If a problem could not be settled, the Committee may make appropriate proposals to the Parties, in particular with the view to modifying the estimates of inspection efforts for routine inspection activities. e. The Committee shall elaborate proposals, as necessary, with respect to questions which require the agreement of the Parties. DONE at Brussels in duplicate, on the fifth day of April in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGIUM, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL, THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IAEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: INFCIRC/193/ADD.2 Signed October 1982 Accession of Greece 1. Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193 of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and

252  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. 2. On 17 December 1981 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Greece the notification required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement, which therefore came into force for Greece on that date.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGIUM, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE N ETHERLANDS , P ORTUGAL , THE E UROPEAN ATOMIC E NERGY COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IAEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: INFCIRC/193/ADD.3 Date signed: July 1986 Accession of Portugal 1. Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. 2. On 1 July 1986 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Portugal the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement, which therefore came into force for Portugal on that date.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGIUM, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE N ETHERLANDS , P ORTUGAL , THE E UROPEAN ATOMIC E NERGY COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IAEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: INFCIRC/193/ADD.4 Date signed: May 1989

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  253

Accession of Spain 1. Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.3), the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. 2. On 5 April 1989 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Spain the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement, which therefore came into force for Spain on that date.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN BELGIUM, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, THE N ETHERLANDS , P ORTUGAL , THE E UROPEAN ATOMIC E NERGY COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IAEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: INFCIRC/193/ADD.5 Date signed: 19 February 1996 Accession of Sweden 1. Article 23(a) of the Agreement (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193) of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.2), Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.3), Spain (reproduced in document INFCIRC/193/Add.4), the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4)of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: i. Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and ii. Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement. 2. On 24 May 1995 the Agency received in respect of the European Atomic Energy Community and Sweden the notifications required by Article 23(a) of the Agreement. For practical accounting purposes as proposed in the notifications, the Agreement came into force for Sweden on 1 June 1995.

254  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

T HE A RGENTINE -B RAZILIAN N UCLEAR S AFEGUARDS AGREEMENT SUMMARY

AND

OF

1991

ANALYSIS

or a number of years, while both nations were ruled by military juntas, Argentina and Brazil stood aloof from the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, while engaging in nuclear weapon programs that created a nuclear arms race atmosphere in the southern cone of South America.With the overthrow of the military governments in the 1980s and the reemergence of civilian rule in both countries, the atmosphere changed.The two countries issued several joint declarations on nuclear policy, which led to the signing on July 18, 1991, of the Bilateral Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which symbolized the fundamental change that had occurred. The bilateral agreement entered into force on December 12, 1991. It set up the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC) of those materials. Based on the bilateral agreement—which called on the parties to use nuclear materials and facilities under their control only for peaceful purposes; not to participate in any way in the testing or acquisition of nuclear weapons; and to submit all nuclear materials and activities under their control to the SCCC—Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC, and the IAEA signed the quadripartite safeguards agreement in December 1991. Under the agreement, Argentina and Brazil accepted IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials and activities within their territories and agreed to cooperation between ABACC and the IAEA on implementing those safeguards. The agreement entered into force in March 1994. During the period leading to the negotiation of the bilateral and quadripartite agreements, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile proposed amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that would allow the three countries to adhere to it and thus bring it fully into force.After approval by the OPANAL Council (OPANAL is the implementing body created pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco), the treaty came into force for Argentina and Brazil in January and May 1994, respectively. In February 1995, Argentina became an NPT non-nuclear weapon state, as did Brazil in July 1998.

F

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA, THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, THE BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE A PPLICATION OF S AFEGUARDS Whereas the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil (hereinafter referred to as “the States Parties”) are parties to the Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter referred to as “the SCCC Agreement”), which established the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (hereinafter referred to as “the SCCC”);

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  255

Recalling the undertakings of the States Parties in the SCCC Agreement; Recalling that, pursuant to the SCCC Agreement, none of its provisions shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the parties thereto to carry out research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I to IV of the SCCC Agreement; Whereas the States Parties are members of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (hereinafter referred to as “ABACC”), to which the implementation of the SCCC has been entrusted; Whereas the States Parties have decided to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) a joint safeguards agreement, with the SCCC as a basis for the agreement; Whereas the States Parties have further voluntarily requested the Agency to apply its safeguards taking into account the SCCC; Whereas it is the desire of the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities; Whereas the Agency is authorized, pursuant to Article III.A.5 of its Statute (hereinafter referred to as “the Statute”), to conclude safeguards agreements at the request of Member States; Now therefore the States Parties, ABACC and the Agency have agreed as follows:

Part I Basic Undertakings Article 1 The States Parties undertake to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within their territories, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices. Article 2 (a) The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties, under their jurisdiction or carried out under their control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (b) ABACC undertakes, in applying its safeguards on nuclear material in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties, to co-operate with the Agency, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, with a view to ascertaining that such nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (c) The Agency shall apply its safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material to any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, findings of the SCCC.The Agency’s verification shall include, inter alia , independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency, in accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement.The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the SCCC.

256  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 3 (a) The States Parties,ABACC and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement. (b) ABACC and the Agency shall avoid unnecessary duplication of safeguards activities.

Implementation of Safeguards Article 4 The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties or international co-operation in the field of nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; (b) to avoid undue interference in the States Parties’ nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; (c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities; and (d) to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets. Article 5 (a) The Agency shall take every precaution to protect any confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Agreement. (b) (i) The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Board “) and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement. (ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States Parties directly concerned agree thereto. Article 6 (a) In implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, full account shall be taken of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and every effort shall be made to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. (b) In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as: (i) containment and surveillance as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting and control purposes; (ii) statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and (iii) concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification proce-

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  257

dures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement.

Provision of Information to the Agency Article 7 (a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, ABACC shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material; (b) (i) The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement. (ii) Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. (c) If a State Party so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examined directly on the premise either of that State Party or of ABACC, design information which the State Party regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on the premise either of that State Party or of ABACC.

Agency Inspectors Article 8 (a) (i) The Agency shall secure the consent of the States Parties through ABACC to the designation of Agency inspectors to the States Parties. (ii) If the States Parties through ABACC, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, object to the designation, the Agency shall propose an alternative designation or designations. (iii) If, as a result of the repeated refusal of the States Parties through ABACC to accept the designation of Agency inspectors,inspections to be conducted under this Agreement would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Director General”), with a view to its taking appropriate action. (b) ABACC and the States Parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. (c) The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as: (i) to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the States Parties and ABACC and to the nuclear activities inspected; (ii) to ensure protection of any confidential information coming to the knowledge of Agency inspectors; and (iii) to take into account ABACC activities to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts.

Starting Point of Safeguards Article 9 (a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (b) is imported into a State Party to this Agreement, that State Party shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and

258  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into a State Party to this Agreement, the nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this Agreement.

Termination of Safeguards Article 10 (a) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by ABACC and the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable. (b) Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics,ABACC shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the safeguards under this Agreement on such material may be terminated.

Exemption from Safeguards Article 11 (a) Nuclear material shall be exempted from safeguards in accordance with the provision specified in Article 35 of this Agreement. (b) Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in non-nuclear activities which, in the opinion of either ABACC or the Agency, will not render the material practicably irrecoverable, ABACC shall agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which such material may be exempted from safeguards.

Transfer of Nuclear Material out of the States Parties Article 12 (a) ABACC shall give the Agency notification of transfers of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of the States Parties, in accordance with the provisions set out in this Agreement. Safeguards on nuclear material in the States Parties under this Agreement shall terminate when the recipient State has assumed responsibility there for, as provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear material. (b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in Article 9(b) is directly or indirectly exported by a State Party to this Agreement to any State not Party to this Agreement, the State Party shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically nonnuclear purposes.

Special Procedures Article 13 If a State Party intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement for nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency, the following procedures shall apply: (a) that State Party shall inform the Agency, through ABACC, of the activity, and shall make it clear:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  259

(i) that the use of the nuclear material in such an activity will not be in conflict with any undertaking of the State Party under agreements concluded with the Agency in connection with Article XI of the Statute of the Agency or any other agreement concluded with the Agency in connection with INFCIRC/26 (and Add.1) or INFCIRC/66 (and Rev.1 or 2), as applicable; and (ii) that during the period of application of the special procedures the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) the State Party and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, these special procedures shall apply only while the nuclear material is used for nuclear propulsion or in the operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes, or in such other non-proscribed nuclear activity as agreed between the State Party and the Agency. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which the special procedures shall be applied. In any event, the other procedures provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a nuclear activity other than the above.The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such material in that State Party and of any export of such material; and (c) each arrangement shall be concluded between the State Party concerned and the Agency as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of such activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.

Measures in Relation to Verification of Non-diversion Article 14 If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by ABACC and/or a State Party is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Board may call upon ABACC and/or the State Party concerned to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this Agreement for the settlement of a dispute. Article 15 If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action, the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State Party concerned every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

Privileges and Immunities Article 16 Each State Party shall apply to the Agency, including its property, funds and assets, and to its inspectors and other officials performing functions under this Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Finance Article 17 The States Parties, ABACC and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if the States Parties, or persons under their jurisdiction, or ABACC, incurs extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific

260  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case, the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which Agency inspectors may request.

Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage Article 18 Each State Party shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to residents of that State Party.

International Responsibility Article 19 Any claim by ABACC or a State Party against the Agency or by the Agency against ABACC or a State Party in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

Interpretation and Application of the Agreement and Settlement of Disputes Article 20 At the request of the Agency, ABACC or a State Party or States Parties, there shall be consultations about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. Article 21 ABACC and the States Parties shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board.The Board shall invite all Parties to the Agreement to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. Article 22 Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 15 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the State Party or States Parties concerned, ABACC and the Agency shall, at the request of any of them, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators.The States Parties and ABACC shall designate two arbitrators and the Agency shall also designate two arbitrators, and the four arbitrators so designated shall elect a fifth, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the Agency or the States Parties and ABACC have not designated two arbitrators each, either the Agency or the States Parties and ABACC may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint these arbitrators.The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the fourth arbitrator, the fifth arbitrator has not been elected.A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of at least three arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the States Parties,ABACC and the Agency.

Suspension of Application of Agency Safeguards under Other Agreements Article 23 Upon the coming into force of this Agreement for a State Party, the application of Agency safeguards in that State Party under other safeguards agreements with the Agency not involving

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  261

third parties will be suspended while this Agreement is in force.The Agency and the State Party concerned shall initiate consultations with the third party concerned with a view to suspending the application of safeguards in that State Party under safeguards agreements involving third parties. The State Party’s undertaking in the agreements referred to above not to use items which are subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply.

Amendment of the Agreement Article 24 (a) ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency shall, at the request of any one of them, consult on amendment to this Agreement. (b) All amendments shall require the agreement of ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency. (c) Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force in the same conditions as the entry into force of the Agreement itself. (d) The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of any amendment to this Agreement.

Entry into Force and Duration Article 25 This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Agency receives from ABACC and from the States Parties written notification that their respective requirements for entry into force have been met.The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement. Article 26 This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the States Parties are Parties to the SCCC Agreement.

Protocol Article 27 The Protocol attached to this Agreement shall be an integral part thereof.The term “Agreement” as used in this instrument means the Agreement and the Protocol together.

Part II Introduction Article 28 The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I,

Objective of Safeguards Article 29 The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful-nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

262  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 30 For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 29, nuclear material accountancy shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Article 31 The technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

Common System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material Article 32 Pursuant to Article 2, the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the SCCC and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC’s accounting and control activities. Article 33 ABACC’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear material under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas and shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the establishment of such measures as: (a) a measurement system for the determinations of the quantities of nuclear material received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; (b) the evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty; (c) procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements; (d) procedures for taking a physical inventory; (e) procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses; (f) a system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area; (g) provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and (h) procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles 57 to 63 and 65 to 67.

Termination of Safeguards Article 34 (a) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material under the conditions set forth in Article 10(a).Where the conditions of Article 10(a) are not met, but ABACC considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, ABACC and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. (b) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material under the conditions set forth in Article 10(b) provided that ABACC and the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  263

(c) Safeguards under this Agreement shall terminate on nuclear material transferred out of the States Parties, under the conditions set forth in Article 12(a) and the procedures specified in Articles 89 to 92.

Exemptions from Safeguards Article 35 At the request of ABACC, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from safeguards as follows: (a) special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments, (b) nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with Article 11 (b); (c) if the total quantity of nuclear material which has been exempted in each State Party in accordance with this sub-Article does not at any time exceed: (i) one kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following: (1) plutonium; (2) uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and (3) uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment and; (ii) ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%); (iii) twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and (iv) twenty metric tons of thorium; or (d) plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%. Article 36 If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the re-application of safeguards thereto.

Subsidiary Arrangements Article 37 Taking into account the SCCC, ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied. By agreement between ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements may, without amendment of this Agreement, be extended or changed or, in respect of a particular facility terminated. Article 38 The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within one hundred and eighty days of the entry into force of this Agreement ;an extension of that period shall require agreement between ABACC, the States Parties and the Agency. The State Party concerned through ABACC shall

264  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 39 even if the Subsidiary Arrangements have not yet entered into force.

Inventory Article 39 On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 60, the Agency shall establish unified inventories of all nuclear material in each State Party subject to safeguards under this Agreement, irrespective of its origin and shall maintain these inventories on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventories shall be made available to ABACC at intervals to be agreed.

Design Information GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 40 Pursuant to Article 7, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency by the State Party concerned through ABACC during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements.The time limits for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility. Article 41 The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include in respect of each facility, when applicable: (a) the identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; (b) a description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, ,to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material; (c) a description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and (d) a description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical inventory taking. Article 42 Other information relevant to the application of safeguards under this Agreement shall also be provided to the Agency in respect of each facility if so specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. ABACC shall provide the Agency with supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the Agency inspectors shall comply at the facility. Article 43 The Agency shall be provided by the State Party concerned through ABACC with design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes under this Agreement, for

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  265

examination, and shall be informed of any change in the information provided to it under Article 42, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary. Article 44 Purposes of Examination of Design Information The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes: (a) to identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) to determine material balance areas to be used for accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such material balance areas the following criteria inter alia, shall be used: (i) the size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established; (ii) in determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points; (iii) a special material balance area may be established at the request of the State Party concerned through ABACC around a process step involving technologically, industrially or commercially sensitive information; and (iv) for installations of particular sensitivity, key measurement points may be selected in such a way as to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets; (c) to establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of nuclear material for accounting purposes under this Agreement; (d) to establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; (e) to establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and (f) to select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the design information, as agreed upon between ABACC and the Agency, shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 45 Re-examination of Design Information Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action taken pursuant to Article 44. Article 46 Verification of Design Information The Agency, in co-operation with ABACC and the State Party concerned, may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 40 to 43, for the purposes stated in Article 44.

266  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Information in Respect of Nuclear Material Outside Facilities Article 47 The Agency shall be provided by the State Party concerned through ABACC with the following information when nuclear material is to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable: (a) a general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and the user's name and address for routine business purposes; and (b) a general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control. The Agency shall be informed by ABACC, on a timely basis, of any changes in the information provided to it under this Article. Article 48 The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 47 may be used, to the extend, relevant for the purposes set out in Article 44 (b) to (f).

Records System GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 49 ABACC shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area.The records to be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 50 ABACC shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian or Spanish. Article 51 Records shall be retained for at least five years. Article 52 Records shall consist as appropriate, of: (a) accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (b) operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material. Article 53 The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards

ACCOUNTING RECORDS Article 54 The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance area: (a) all inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time; (b) all measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and (c) all adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories and physical inventories.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  267

Article 55 For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear material. For each inventory change the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated. Article 56 Operating Records The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material balance area: (a) those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of nuclear material; (b) the data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; (c) a description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and (d) a description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

Reports System GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 57 ABACC shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 58 to 63 and 65 to 67 in respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement. Article 58 Reports shall be made in English, French or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 59 Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 49 to 56 and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting Reports Article 60 The Agency shall be provided by ABACC with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.The initial report shall be dispatched by ABACC to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation in each State Party as of the last day of that month. Article 61 ABACC shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each material balance area: (a) inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material.The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and, in any event, within thirty days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and

268  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(b) material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and, in any event, within thirty days after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date, as required. Article 62 Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes: (a) explaining the inventory changes on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under Article 56(a); and (b) describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational program, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. Article 63 ABACC shall report each inventory change adjustment and correction, either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches.As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and reported as one inventory change. Article 64 The Agency shall provide ABACC with semi-annual statements of book inventory of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. Article 65 Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by ABACC and the Agency: (a) beginning physical inventory; (b) inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); (c) ending book inventory; (d) shipper/receiver differences; (e) adjusted ending book inventory; (f) ending physical inventory; and (g) material unaccounted for. A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material balance report. Article 66 Special Reports ABACC shall make special reports without delay:

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  269

(a) if any unusual incident or circumstances lead ABACC to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or (b) if the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible. Article 67 Amplification and clarification of reports If the Agency so requests, ABACC shall provide it with amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards under this Agreement.

Inspections Article 68 General Provisions The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in this Agreement.

Purposes of Inspections Article 69 The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to: (a) verify the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (b) identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred between the date of the initial report and the date of entry into force of the Subsidiary Arrangements in respect of a given facility and, in the event that Subsidiary Arrangements cease to be in force, in respect of a given facility; and (c) identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement in accordance with Articles 91, 94 and 96 before its transfer out of, into or between States Parties. Article 70 The Agency may make routine inspections in order to: (a) verify that reports are consistent with records; (b) verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and (c) verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory Article 71 Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 75, the Agency may make special inspections: (a) in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or (b) if the Agency considers that information made available by ABACC, including explanations from ABACC and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in articles 76 to 80 or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in Article 74 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.

270  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Scope of Inspections Article 72 For the purposes specified in Articles 69 to 71, the Agency may: (a) examine the records kept pursuant to articles 49 to 56; (b) make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (c) verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; (d) apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and (e) use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible. Article 73 Within the scope of Article 72, the Agency shall be enabled: (a) to observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; (b) to observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved; (c) to make arrangements with ABACC and, to the extent necessary, with the State Party concerned that, if necessary: (i) additional measurements are made and additional samples take for the Agency’s use; (ii) the Agency’s standard analytical samples are analyzed; (iii) appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and (iv) other calibrations are carried out; (d) to arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance and, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment; (e) to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (f) to make arrangements with ABACC or the State Party concerned for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency’s use.

Access for Inspections Article 74 (a) For the purposes specified in Article 69(a) and (b) and until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, or in the event that the Subsidiary Arrangements cease to be in force, the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present; (b) For the purposes specified in Article 69(c) the Agency inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Articles 90(d) (iii), 93(d)(iii) or 95; (c) For the purposes specified in Article 70, the Agency inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to Articles 49 to 56; and

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  271

(d) In the event of ABACC concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the Agency, ABACC and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations.The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board. Article 75 In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in Article 71, the State Party concerned, ABACC and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may: (a) make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in Articles 76 to 80; and (b) obtain access, in agreement with the State Party concerned and ABACC, to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 74. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action by ABACC, a State Party or States Parties is essential and urgent, Article 14 shall apply. Frequency and intensity of routine inspections Article 76 The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections, applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most economical use of inspection resources available to it. Article 77 The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual through put, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms. Article 78 The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective kilograms shall be determined on the basis that, in the maximum or limiting case, the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows: (a) for reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility; (b) for facilities other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 x V E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of inspection; and (c) for facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

272  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

The Parties to this Agreement may agree to amend the figures for the maximum inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable. Article 79 Subject expressed in effective kilograms. to Articles 76 to 78, the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall include: (a) the form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items, its chemical and isotopic composition and its accessibility; (b) the effectiveness of ABACC’s safeguards, including the extent to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of ABACC’s safeguards; the extent to which the measures specified in Article 33 have been implemented by ABACC; the promptness of reports provided to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency’s independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency; (c) characteristics of the nuclear fuel cycles in the States Parties, in particular, the number and types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material balance areas can be correlated; (d) international interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the nuclear activities in each State Party are interrelated with those of other States; and (e) technical developments in the field of safeguards including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material. Article 80 ABACC and the Agency shall consult if ABACC or the State Party concerned considers that the inspection effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.

Notice of Inspections Article 81 The Agency shall give advance notice to ABACC and to the State Party concerned before arrival of Agency inspectors at facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows: (a) for ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(c), at least 24 hours; for those pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 46, at least one week; (b) for special inspections pursuant to Article 71, as promptly as possible after ABACC, the State Party concerned and the Agency have consulted, as provided for in Article 75, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and (c) for routine inspections pursuant to Article 70, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities referred to in Article 78(b) and sealed storage installations containing plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the Agency inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the Agency inspectors are to arrive from outside the States Parties, the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the States Parties.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  273

Article 82 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 81, the Agency may, as a supplementary measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to Article 78 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational program provided pursuant to Article 62(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational program, it shall periodically advise ABACC and the State Party concerned, through the procedures specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, of its general program of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for ABACC and the State Party concerned and for facility operators, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 42 and 87. Similarly,ABACC and the State Party concerned shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the Agency inspectors.

Designation of Agency Inspectors Article 83 The following procedures shall apply to the designation of Agency inspectors: (a) the Director General shall inform the States Parties, through ABACC, in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the States Parties; (b) the States Parties, through ABACC, shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of such a proposal whether they accept the proposal; (c) the Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the States Parties, through ABACC, as one of the Agency inspectors for the States Parties, and shall inform the States Parties, through ABACC, of such designations; and (d) the Director General, acting in response to a request by the States Parties, through ABACC, or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the States Parties, through ABACC, of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an Agency inspector for the States Parties. However, in respect of Agency inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 46 and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 69(a) and (b),the designation procedures shall be completed, if possible, within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, Agency inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis. Article 84 The States Parties shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each Agency inspector designated pursuant to Article 83.

Conduct and Visits of Agency Inspectors Article 85 Agency inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 46 and 69 to 73, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular, Agency inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If Agency inspectors consider that, in pursuance of Articles 72 and 73, particular operations in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

274  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 86 When Agency inspectors require services available in a State Party, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, ABACC and the State Party concerned shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by Agency inspectors. Article 87 ABACC and the State Party concerned shall have the right to have Agency inspectors accompanied during their inspections by its inspectors and representatives of that State Party, respectively, provided that Agency inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

Statements on the Agency’s Verification Activities Article 88 The Agency shall inform ABACC of: (a) the results of its inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (b) the conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the State Party concerned, in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.

Transfers into, out of and between the States Parties Article 89 General Provisions Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement which is transferred out of, into or between the States Parties shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of ABACC and of the State Party concerned: (a) in the case of import into the States Parties from another State, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the material reaches its destination; (b) in the case of export out of the States Parties to another State, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination; and (c) in the case of transfer between the States Parties, from the time of transfer of responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material reaches its destination. The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by ABACC and the State Party or States Parties concerned and, in the case of transfers into or out of the States Parties, the State to which or from which the nuclear material is transferred. Neither ABACC, a State Party to this Agreement nor any other State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over the territory of a State, or that it is being transported on a ship under its flag or in its aircraft.

Transfers out of the States Parties Article 90 (a) ABACC shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of the States Parties of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  275

kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be made to the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping. (c) ABACC and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification. (d) The notification shall specify: (i) the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from which it will come; (ii) the State for which the nuclear material is destined; (iii) the dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping; (iv) the approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and (v) at what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached. Article 91 The notification referred to in Article 90 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material before it is transferred out of the States Parties and, if the Agency so wishes or ABACC so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by any inspection or verification action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such notification. Article 92 Nuclear material subject to Agency safeguards in a State Party shall not be exported unless such material will be subject to safeguards in the recipient State and until the Agency has made appropriate arrangements to apply safeguards to such material.

Transfers into the States Parties Article 93 (a) ABACC shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into the States Parties of nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate shipments are to be received from the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram. (b) The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case not later than the date on which the State Party assumes responsibility for the nuclear material. (c) ABACC and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance notification. (d) The notification shall specify: i. the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the nuclear material;

276  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

ii. at what point of the transfer the State Party will assume responsibility for the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on which that point will be reached; and iii. the expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the nuclear material is intended to be unpacked. Article 94 The notification referred to in Article 93 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material at the time the consignment is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a notification.

Transfers between the States Parties Article 95 The Subsidiary Arrangements shall specify the Agency’s procedures for notification and verification of domestic transfers of nuclear material for transfers of nuclear material between the States Parties. While Subsidiary Arrangements are not in force, the Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the transfer, but in any event, not less than two weeks before the transfer takes place. Article 96 The notification referred to in Article 95 shall be such as to enable the Agency to make, if necessary, a routine or ad hoc inspection, as appropriate, to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, the nuclear material before it is transferred between the States Parties and, if the Agency so wishes or ABACC so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has been prepared for shipping.

Special Reports Article 97 ABACC shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 66 if any unusual incident or circumstances lead ABACC to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during a transfer into, out of or between the States Parties.

Definitions Article 98 For the purposes of this Agreement: 1. ABACC means the legal person created by the SCCC Agreement. 2. A. adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for. B. annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 77 and 78, the amount of nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity. C. batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  277

D. batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate.The units of account shall be as follows: (a) grams of contained plutonium; (b) grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and (c) kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium. For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. E. book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. F. correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. G. effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material.The quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking: (a) for plutonium, its weight in kilograms; (b) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment; (c) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and (d) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005. H. enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of isotopes uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question. I. facility means: (a) a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or (b) any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used. J. inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following: (a) increases: (i) import; (ii) domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from activity referred to in Article 13, or receipts at the starting point of safeguards; (iii) nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and deexemption: re-application of safeguards on nuclear material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity. (b) decreases: (i) export;

278  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(ii) domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments for an activity referred to in Article 13; (iii) nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions; (iv) measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; (v) retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; (vi) exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and (vii) other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft. K. key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storage in material balance areas. L. man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 78, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours. M. material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and (b) the physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures; in order that the material balance for Agency Safeguards purposes can be established. N. material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and physical inventory use or quantity. 0. nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by ABACC and the States Parties. P. physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures. Q. shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the receiving material balance area. R. significant quantity means the significant quantity of nuclear material as set by the Agency. S. source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  279

T. strategic point means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed. DONE at Vienna, on the 13th day of December 1991, in quadruplicate, in the English language.

PROTOCOL Article 1 This Protocol amplifies certain provisions of the Agreement and, in particular, specifies the arrangements for co-operation in the application of the safeguards provided for under the Agreement. In implementing these arrangements, the Parties to the Agreement shall be guided by the following principles: (a) the need for ABACC and the Agency each to reach its own independent conclusions; (b) the need to co-ordinate to the extent possible the activities of ABACC and the Agency for the optimum implementation of this Agreement, and in particular to avoid unnecessary duplication of ABACC’s safeguards; (c) when performing their activities,ABACC and the Agency shall work jointly, wherever feasible, in accordance with compatible safeguards criteria of the two organizations; and (d) the need to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets. Article 2 In the implementation of the Agreement, the Agency shall accord to the States Parties and to ABACC treatment not less favorable than the treatment it accords to States and regional systems of verification with a level of functional independence and technical effectiveness comparable to that of ABACC. Article 3 ABACC shall collect the information on facilities and on nuclear material outside facilities to be provided to the Agency under the Agreement on the basis of the Agency’s design information questionnaire annexed to the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 4 ABACC and the Agency shall each carry out the examination of design information provided for in Article 44(a) to (f) of the Agreement and shall include the results thereof in the Subsidiary Arrangements.The verification of design information provided for in Article 46 of the Agreement shall be carried out by the Agency in co-operation with ABACC. Article 5 In addition to the information referred to in Article 3 of this Protocol,ABACC shall also transmit information on the inspection methods which it proposes to use, including estimates of its inspection efforts for the routine inspection activities for facilities and material balance areas outside facilities.

280  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Article 6 The preparation of the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be the joint responsibility of ABACC, the Agency and the State Party concerned. Article 7 ABACC shall collect reports from the States Parties based on records kept by the operators, keep centralized accounts on the basis of these reports and proceed with the technical and accounting control and analysis of the information received. Article 8 Upon completion of the tasks referred to in Article 7 of this Protocol ABACC shall, on a monthly basis, produce and provide the Agency with the inventory change reports within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 9 Further, ABACC shall transmit to the Agency the material balance reports and physical inventory listings with the frequency and form specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 10 The form and format of reports referred to in Articles 8 and 9 of this Protocol, as agreed between ABACC and the Agency, shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and shall be compatible with those used in the general practice of the Agency. Article 11 The routine inspection activities of ABACC and of the Agency, including, to the extent feasible, the inspections referred to in Article 82 of the Agreement, shall be co-ordinated pursuant to the provisions of Articles 12 to19 of this Protocol and to the Subsidiary Arrangements. Article 12 Subject to Articles 77 and 78 of the Agreement, account shall also be taken of the inspection activities carried out by ABACC in determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of the Agency inspections in respect of each facility. Article 13 Inspection effort under the Agreement for each facility shall be determined by the use of the criteria set forth in Article 79 of the Agreement. Such inspection effort, expressed as agreed estimates of the actual inspection effort to be applied, shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements, together with the descriptions of verification approaches and the scope of inspections to be carried out by ABACC and by the Agency. These estimates shall constitute, under normal operating conditions and under the conditions set out below, the actual inspection effort at each facility under the Agreement: (a) the continued validity of the information on the SCCC provided for in Article 35 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; (b) the continued validity of the information provided to the Agency in accordance with Article 3 of this Protocol; (c) the continued provision by ABACC of the reports pursuant to Articles 62 and 63, 65 to 67 and 69 to 71 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements;

SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS  281

(d) the continued application of the co-ordination arrangements for inspections pursuant to Articles 11 to 19 of this Protocol, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (e) the application by ABACC of its inspection effort with respect to the facility, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, pursuant to this Article. Article 14 The general scheduling and planning of the inspections under the Agreement, including arrangements for the presence of ABACC and Agency inspectors during the performance of inspections under this Agreement, shall be established in co-operation between ABACC and the Agency, taking into account the scheduling of the Agency’s other safeguards activities in the region. Article 15 The technical procedures in general for each type of facility and for individual facilities shall be compatible with those of the Agency and shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, in particular with respect to: (a) the determination of techniques for random selection of statistical samples; (b) the checking and identification of standards; (c) containment and surveillance measures; and (d) verification measures. ABACC and the Agency shall consult and identify in advance the containment and surveillance measures and the verification measures to be applied in each individual facility until the time the Subsidiary Arrangements enter into force. Such measures shall similarly be compatible with those of the Agency. Article 16 ABACC shall transmit to the Agency its inspection reports for all ABACC inspections performed under the Agreement. Article 17 The samples of nuclear material for ABACC and the Agency shall be drawn from the same randomly selected items and shall be taken together, except when ABACC does not require samples. Article18 The frequency of physical inventories to be taken by facility operators and to be verified for safeguards purposes shall be in accordance with the requirements of the relevant Facility Attachment. Article 19 (a) With a view to facilitating the application of the Agreement and of this Protocol, a Liaison Committee shall be established, composed of representatives of ABACC, of the States Parties and of the Agency. (b) The Committee shall meet at least once a year: (i) to review, in particular, the performance of the co-ordination arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including agreed estimates of inspection efforts;

282  SPECIAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

(ii) to examine the development of safeguards methods and techniques; and (iii) to consider any questions which have been referred to it by the Sub-Committee referred to in paragraph (c). (c) The Committee may appoint a Sub-Committee to meet periodically to discuss outstanding safeguards implementation issues arising from the application of safeguards under this Agreement. Any questions which cannot be settled by the Sub-Committee will be referred to the Liaison Committee. (d) Without prejudice to urgent actions which might be required under the Agreement, should problems arise in the application of Article 13 of this Protocol, in particular when the Agency considers that the conditions specified therein have not been met, the Committee or the SubCommittee shall meets at soon as possible in order to assess the situation and to discuss the measures to be taken. If a problem cannot be settled, the Committee may make appropriate proposals to the Parties, in particular with the view to modifying the estimates of inspection efforts for routine inspection activities. DONE at Vienna, on the 13th day of December 1991, in quadruplicate, in the English language.

9

The Seabed Arms Control Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

ike the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Latin American Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof—the Seabed Arms Control Treaty—sought to prevent the introduction of international conflict and nuclear weapons into an area previously free of them. Reaching agreement on the seabed, however, involved problems not met in framing the other two agreements. In the 1960s, advances in the technology of ocean sciences and exploration and greatly increased interest in the vast and virtually untapped resources of the ocean floor led to concern that the absence of clearly established rules of law might lead to strife. Concurrently, some nations feared that others might use the seabed as a new environment for military installations, including those capable of launching nuclear weapons. In keeping with a proposal submitted in August 1967 to the UN secretary general by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta, on December 18, 1967, the UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to study ways to reserve the seabed for peaceful purposes.The objective was to ensure “that the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor should be conducted in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and to maintain international peace and security and for the benefit of all mankind.” The committee was given permanent status the following year. At the same time, seabed-related military and arms control issues were referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and its successor, the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The Geneva-based ENDC became known as the CCD after its enlargement in 1969, and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) after its subsequent further enlargement in 1979. Currently, the CD has sixty-six members. In a March 18, 1969, statement to the ENDC, President Richard M. Nixon said the American delegation to the ENDC should seek discussion of the factors necessary for an international agreement prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and pointed out that an agreement of this kind would, like the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties, “prevent an arms race before it has a chance to start.” In 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union each submitted draft treaties. However, the two drafts differed importantly on what was to be permitted. On March 18, 1969, the Soviet Union presented a draft treaty that provided for the complete demilitarization of the seabed beyond a twelve-mile limit and making all seabed installations open to treaty parties on the basis of reciprocity. The Soviet treaty would have banned all military uses of the seabed: for example, it would have precluded submarine surveillance systems that were fixed

L

284  THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY

to the ocean floor. The United States regarded such systems as essential to its defense. The U.S. draft treaty, submitted on May 22, 1969, prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor beyond a three-mile band. This, the United States held, was the urgent problem, and complete demilitarization would not be verifiable. The two drafts represented differing approaches to the issue of verification. As in the Outer Space Treaty, the Soviets proposed that all installations and structures be open to inspection, provided that reciprocal rights to inspect were granted.The United States contended that no claims of national jurisdiction existed on the moon, and that provisions of the Outer Space Treaty suitable for the moon would not be adequate for the seabed, where many claims of national jurisdiction already existed and many kinds of activities were in progress or possible. Moreover, the United States felt that to attempt to inspect for the emplacement of all kinds of weapons would make the problems connected with verification virtually insuperable. On the other hand, the United States argued that any structures capable of handling nuclear devices would necessarily be large and elaborate; their installation would require extensive activity that would be difficult to conceal; and there would probably be a number of devices involved, as it would not be worth violating the treaty simply to install one or two weapons. Violations, therefore, would be readily observed and evoke the appropriate steps: first an effort to deal directly with the problem through consultations with the country violating the treaty; if that failed, cooperative action; and, as a last resort, appeal to the UN Security Council. Comments on the two drafts in the ENDC, U.S. consultations with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and private U.S.-Soviet talks at the ENDC eventually led to the framing of a joint draft by the United States and the Soviet Union, submitted on October 7, 1969, to the CCD.This joint draft underwent intensive discussion and was revised three times in response to suggestions made in the CCD and at the United Nations. Discussion centered on a few difficult issues. In international law, there was much confusion about how territorial waters were to be defined. Some countries claimed up to 200 miles, and international conventions on the subject contained ambiguities. In its final form, the treaty adopted a twelve-mile limit to define the seabed area that corresponded to the territorial seas as defined in the Convention on the Territorial Sea (as distinguished from the 200-mile exclusive economic zone). The verification provisions (set forth in Article III) also were a subject of intensive discussion.They allow parties to undertake verification using their own means, with the assistance of other parties, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its charter.These provisions permit parties to assure themselves that treaty obligations are being fulfilled without interfering with legitimate seabed activities. Coastal states were concerned about whether their rights would be protected under Article III. Smaller states had doubts as to their ability to check on violations. Some felt that the United Nations should play a larger role; some wondered whether the verification procedures would really be effective. Reassurances were given to the coastal states. Smaller states could apply for assistance to another state to help in case of a suspected violation. After more than two years of negotiation, the final draft was approved by the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1970, by a vote of 104 to 2 (El Salvador and Peru), with two abstentions (Ecuador and France).The Seabed Arms Control Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on February 11, 1971. It entered into force May 18, 1972, when the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and more than twenty-two other nations had deposited instruments of ratification. Article I sets forth the principal obligation of the treaty. It prohibits parties from emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a

THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY  285

twelve-mile coastal zone.Article II provides that the “seabed zone” is to be measured in accordance with the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.To make clear that none of the treaty’s provisions should be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the positions of any party regarding law-of-the-sea issues, a broad disclaimer provision to this effect was included as Article IV. In recognition of the feeling that efforts to achieve a more comprehensive agreement should continue, Article V of the treaty bound parties to work for further measures to prevent an arms race on the seabed. The SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) treaties extended this prohibition to the beds of internal waters (i.e., lakes, rivers, territorial seas) of the United States, and the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the parties to the START I Treaty that replaced the Soviet Union). Article VII included a provision for a review conference to be held in five years.The first Seabed Arms Control Treaty review conference was held in Geneva from June 20 to July 1, 1977.The conference concluded that the first five years in the life of the treaty had demonstrated its effectiveness. The second review conference, held in Geneva in September 1983, concluded that the treaty continued to be an important and effective arms control measure. The third review conference, held in Geneva in September 1989, confirmed results of previous meetings. It was agreed that the next review conference would be convened in Geneva no earlier than 1996. No further review conferences have been held.

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971 Entered into force May 18, 1972 The States Parties to this Treaty, Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes, Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions and strengthens friendly relations among States, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end, Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, Have agreed as follows:

286  THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY

Article I 1.The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in Article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 2.The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to the seabed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within such seabed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the seabed beneath its territorial waters. 3.The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and not to participate in any other way in such actions. Article II For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958, and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of part I, section II, of that Convention and in accordance with international law. Article III 1. In order to promote the objectives of and insure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observations the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in Article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. 2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in Article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and cooperation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures. 3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and cooperate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to cooperate. 4. If consultation and cooperation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have not removed the doubts concerning the activities and there remains a serious question concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY  287

5.Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. 6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves. Article IV Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, including, inter alia, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the seabed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves. Article V The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Article VI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and, thereafter, for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article VII Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments.The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened. Article VIII Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests. Article IX The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons. Article X 1.This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States.Any State which does not sign theTreaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

288  THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY

2.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3.This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty. 4. For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this eleventh day of February, one thousand nine hundred seventy-one. States Parties 1 Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, China, Republic of China (Taiwan), Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,Tanzania,Togo,Tunisia,Turkey, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia), United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,Vietnam,Yemen,Yugoslavia, Zambia

1

Dates of signatures and ratifications for the States Parties can be found in the appendix.

10

The “Accidents Measures” Agreement SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he very existence of nuclear weapon systems, even under the most sophisticated command-and-control procedures, is a source of constant concern. Despite the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure (a misinterpreted incident or unauthorized action) could trigger a nuclear disaster. In the course of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union reached two agreements that manifested increasing recognition of the need to reduce such risks and complemented the central goal of the negotiations. In early sessions, discussions held in parallel to the main SALT negotiations uncovered a degree of mutual concern about potential problems that could result in accidental war. In particular, in 1970 the Soviet Union raised the possibility of a provocative act by a “third country” (they were alluding to China), which might cause nuclear war to break out between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the need for joint measures to address this and other risks. These preliminary explorations resulted in the establishment of two special working groups under the direction of the two SALT delegations. One group focused on arrangements for exchanging information to reduce uncertainties and prevent misunderstandings in the event of a nuclear incident; the other addressed a related topic, ways to improve the direct communications link between Washington and Moscow (see Chapter 3). By the summer of 1971, major substantive issues had been resolved and the SALT delegations had referred the two draft international agreements to their governments. Both agreements were signed in Washington, D.C., on September 30, 1971, and came into force on that date. The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, often referred to as the “Accidents Measures Agreement,” covers three main areas:

T

1. a pledge by both sides to take measures each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; 2. arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems, or from any accidental, unauthorized, or other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and 3. advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.

290  THE “ACCIDENTS MEASURES” AGREEMENT

The agreement provides that, for urgent communication “in situations requiring prompt clarification,” the “hot line” (see Chapter 3) will be used.The duration of the agreement is not limited, and the parties undertake to consult on questions that may arise and to discuss possible amendments aimed at further reduction of risks. Russia has succeeded to the obligations of the Soviet Union under this agreement. In fact, in 1998 U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced an initiative that would build on the 1971 agreement by encouraging information exchanges regarding missile launches.

AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF N UCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS Signed at Washington September 30, 1971 Entered into force September 30, 1971 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties: Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of outbreak of such a war, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way contrary to the interests of any other country, Bearing in mind that continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve, as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control. Article 2 The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of such an incident, the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without its causing damage. Article 3 The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

THE “ACCIDENTS MEASURES” AGREEMENT  291

Article 4 Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party. Article 5 Each Party, in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents, undertakes to act in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or request information when in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Article 6 For transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Direct Communications Link between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For transmission of other information, notification and requests for information, the Parties, at their own discretion, may use any communications facilities, including diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency. Article 7 The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this Agreement. Article 8 This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. Article 9 This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. DONE at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: William P. Rogers For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: A. Gromyko

11

The Biological Weapons Convention SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

iological and chemical weapons have generally been linked together in the public mind, and the extensive use of poison gas in World War I (resulting in over a million casualties and over 100,000 deaths) led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of both poison gas and bacteriological weapons in warfare (see Chapter 1). Between 1932 and 1937, unsuccessful attempts were made to work out an agreement that would prohibit the production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons. During World War II, though new and more toxic nerve gases were developed, and research and development was begun on biological weapons, neither side used such weapons. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a statement warning the Axis powers against the use of chemical weapons, declared:

B

Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.1 In the postwar negotiations on disarmament, biological and chemical weapons were usually considered together with nuclear and conventional weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, in the 1962 sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), offered plans for general and complete disarmament that included provisions for eliminating chemical and biological weapons. An issue that long hindered progress was whether chemical and biological weapons should continue to be linked. A British draft convention submitted to the ENDC on July 10, 1969, concentrated on the elimination of biological weapons only. A draft convention proposed in the UN General Assembly by the Soviet Union and its allies on September 19, 1969, dealt with both chemical and biological weapons. The Soviet representative argued that they had been treated together in the Geneva Protocol and in General Assembly resolutions, and should continue to be addressed in the same instrument.A separate biological weapons convention, he warned, might serve to intensify the chemical arms race. The United States supported the British position and stressed the difference between the two kinds of weapons. Unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons have actually been used in modern warfare. Many states maintained chemical weapons in their arsenals to deter the use of this type of weapon against them and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence failed. Many of these nations, the United States argued, would be reluctant to give up this capability without 1

Walter Schmeir, "The Campaign to Make Chemical Warfare Respectable," Reporter, Reprint, October 1, 1959.

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  293

reliable assurance that other nations were not developing, producing, and stockpiling chemical weapons. While the United States did not consider prohibition of one of these classes of weapons less urgent or important than the other, it held that biological weapons presented less difficult problems, and an agreement on banning them should not be delayed until agreement on the reliable prohibition of chemical weapons could be reached. Shortly after President Richard M. Nixon took office, he ordered a review of U.S. policies and programs regarding biological and chemical warfare. On November 26, 1969, the president declared that the United States unilaterally renounced the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. At the same time, President Nixon announced plans to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.The president asserted that biological weapons were inherently unreliable and declared that the United States would unconditionally eliminate from its arsenal all types of biological agents for use in war. Henceforth, the U.S. biological program would be confined to research on strictly defined defensive measures, such as immunization.The Department of Defense was ordered to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. On February 14, 1970, the White House announced an extension of the ban to cover toxins (substances falling between biological and chemical weapons in that they act like chemicals but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbic processes). The U.S. action was widely welcomed internationally, and other nations followed suit. Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom stated that they had no biological weapons and did not intend to produce any. It was generally recognized, however, that unilateral actions could not take the place of a binding international commitment. A number of nations, including the Soviet Union and its allies, continued to favor a comprehensive agreement covering both chemical and biological weapons. Discussion throughout 1970 in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)—as the ENDC was renamed after its enlargement to twenty-six members in 1969—produced no agreement. A breakthrough came on March 30, 1971, when the Soviet Union and its allies changed their position and introduced a revised draft convention limited to biological weapons and toxins. It then became possible for the cochairs of the CCD—the U.S. and Soviet representatives—to work out an agreed draft, as they had done with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Seabed treaties. On August 5, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted separate but identical texts of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). On December 16, the General Assembly approved a resolution, adopted by a vote of 110 to 0, commending the BWC and expressing hope for the widest possible adherence. The French representative abstained, explaining that the BWC, although a step forward, might weaken the Geneva Protocol, because adequate international controls were not provided. He announced, however, that France would enact domestic legislation prohibiting biological weapons, which was done in June of the next year. China did not participate in the negotiations on the convention and did not sign it. The BWC was opened for signature at Washington, D.C., London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972. President Nixon submitted it to the Senate on August 10, calling it “the first international agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of nations.” The Senate Foreign Relations Committee delayed action on the convention, however, holding it for consideration until after resolution of the herbicide and riot-control issues involved in the Geneva Protocol debate (see Chapter 1). In the latter part of 1974, the Ford administration undertook a new initiative to obtain Senate consent and ratification of both the Geneva Protocol and the BWC, and the director

294  THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Dr. Fred Ikle, testified on both instruments before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 10. Director Ikle made clear in his testimony that the BWC was in the interest of the United States even though it was not verifiable, in view of the U.S. unilateral renunciation. Soon thereafter the committee voted unanimously to send the two agreements to the Senate floor, and on December 16 the Senate voted its approval, also unanimously. President Gerald R. Ford signed instruments of ratification for the two agreements on January 22, 1975. The BWC entered into force on March 26, 1975. Article I of the convention provides that the parties “never in any circumstances” will develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain “biological agents, or toxins . . . of types and in qualities” that cannot be justified for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” as well as weapons, equipment, or means of delivery to use such agents or toxins “for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”Thus, the intent of the convention, is to bind the parties not to acquire biological weapons under any circumstance, for example, even if attacked by a hostile state with such weapons. Since the convention does not allow parties to take reservations, its effect is to replace the no-first-use regime of the Geneva Protocol for biological weapons.Whether an agent qualifies as a biological weapon is based on whether it exists in types and amounts that have no apparent justification for peaceful purposes. Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery for such agents cannot be acquired if they are designed to use such agents in “armed conflict” or even for hostile “purposes”; therefore an international armed conflict is not necessarily required to trigger this provision.The effect of this article is to eliminate such agents and weapons systems from the parties’ arsenals, except where agents can be shown to have justifiable laboratory research purposes. Article II requires such agents to be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes within nine months of entry into force. Article III prohibits states from transferring to any recipient whatsoever, or inducing or assisting in any way, any third state or international organization to acquire any of the items proscribed by Article I.Thus, as in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, assisting a third state (and the convention adds an international organization), whether or not it is a party, to acquire biological weapons is prohibited. Article IV obligates the parties to adopt implementing legislation to the extent this is required by their constitutional processes. In the United States, there was a lively debate for many years as to whether this was necessary in view of existing regulatory legislation, but after fifteen years it was finally resolved in the affirmative. Legislation was passed in 1990 making it a criminal act for a private person to possess biological weapons in contravention of the BWC. 2 Articles V,VI, and VII provide the verification mechanism—such as it is—of this agreement.The parties are required to consult with one another in solving any problems that may arise as to the BWC’s application.A party has the right to lodge a complaint of violation with the UN Security Council and all parties are required to cooperate with any investigation that the Security Council may order. If the Security Council decides that a party has been exposed to a danger as a result of a violation of the convention, upon request, all parties are required to provide assistance to the endangered party. Article VIII makes clear that the constraints of the Geneva Protocol are in no way derogated as a result of the total and unconditional ban on the possession of biological weapons. Article IX reaffirms the objective of an agreement prohibiting chemical weapons and Article X, again as in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, requires all parties to share 2

Public Law No. 101–298, “A Bill to Implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction by Prohibiting Certain Conduct Relating to Biological Weapons, and for Other Purposes,” became law on May 22, 1990.

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  295

scientific information and technology relative to the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins.The remaining provisions are procedural, but the provisions of Article XIII providing for unlimited duration (while permitting withdrawal in case a party’s supreme interests are jeopardized, a standard clause in arms control agreements since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963) should be noted. Under the terms of the convention, the parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes,” as well as weapons and means of delivery.All such material is to be destroyed within nine months of the convention’s entry into force. In January 1976, all heads of U.S. departments and agencies were in full compliance with the convention. As stated above, the U.S. executive branch, represented by ACDA Director Ikle and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, in the ratification hearings for the convention before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1974, testified that the BWC was not verifiable, but remained in the interest of the United States in view of the U.S. unilateral renunciation. Nevertheless, at the first BWC review conference held in March 1980 (as called for by Article XII), the United States charged, based on information provided by Soviet defectors, that an explosion in the city of Sverdlovsk in 1979 revealed that an illegal biological weapons plant was operating at that site. The issue of Soviet BWC violations was also discussed at the second BWC review conference, held in 1986. At that review conference, the United States alleged that the Soviets were involved in producing, transferring, and using mycotoxins (the so-called poisonous “yellow rain” in Southeast Asia) and had maintained an offensive biological warfare program in violation of Article I.The conferees agreed on certain measures to strengthen the implementation of Article V, and to increase confidence they agreed on measures to prevent or reduce ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions.These measures included (1) exchange of data on activities, research centers, and laboratories; (2) exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases caused by toxins; (3) publication of biological research results; and (4) promotion of scientific research. In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed that the Soviet Union had engaged in a massive and systematic violation of the BWC from the very beginning and had constructed a huge infrastructure to do so. Negotiations with the Russian government in the 1990s led to gradual immobilization and partial conversion of this infrastructure to peaceful purposes. An additional, and perhaps central, issue after the signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention, with its intrusive on-site inspection, was whether parties to the BWC should adopt a protocol calling for similar on-site inspection. In the mid-1990s an effort began in Geneva to develop a verification protocol for the BWC. Six years of negotiations on a BWC verification and enforcement protocol led to the tabling of a draft by an ad hoc group of states parties on July 23, 1999. A vote was scheduled for the BWC parties for November 2001 on the proposed protocol, which called for routine plant inspections by four-person teams on two weeks’ notice. However, unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, there was little support for this effort from U.S. industry. Rather, the U.S. biotechnology industry regarded the possibility of on-site inspection as a direct threat to trade secrets.The revelation after the Gulf War of Iraq’s massive undertaking to develop biological weapons, combined with the discovery in the 1990s that the Soviet Union had continued a huge biological weapons program in massive violation of its BWC obligations, had spurred the efforts in Geneva. Nevertheless, by the summer of 2001 it appeared the United States would abandon the effort, and the United States essentially repudiated the newly crafted inspection process at the end of the BWC review conference in December 2001. In the fall of 2002, modest efforts to keep the process alive were agreed upon in Geneva.

296  THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF B ACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10,1972 Entered into force March 26, 1975 The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war, Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere, Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents, Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end, Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  297

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Article II Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment. Article III Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention. Article IV Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. Article V The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Article VI (1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. (2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation. Article VII Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

298  THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Article VIII Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925. Article IX Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes. Article X (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes. (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Article XI Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention.Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. Article XII Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Article XIII (1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. (2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  299

of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XIV (1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time. (2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. (3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twentytwo Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention. (4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. (5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. (6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XV This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two. States Parties Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon., Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, SerbiaMontenegro (Formerly Yugoslavia), Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland,

300  THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,Vanuatu,Venezuela,Vietnam,Yemen, Zaire, Zimbabwe Signatory Countries 3 Burundi, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates

3

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

12

The Incidents at Sea Agreement SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

n the late 1960s, several incidents involving U.S. and Soviet naval forces occurred. These included aircraft of the two nations passing near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In March 1968, the United States proposed talks to prevent such incidents from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds—October 1, 1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C. The result was the Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed by U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972. Specifically, the parties agreed on steps to avoid collisions; to prevent interference in each other’s naval formations; to avoid maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic; to keep surveillance ships a safe distance from objects being observed so as to avoid “embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance”; to use accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another; to refrain from ships simulating attacks on, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the other party’s ships; to inform vessels when submarines are exercising near them; to require that aircraft commanders use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching the other party’s aircraft and ships; and to prohibit aircraft from simulating attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them.The agreement also provides for: (1) three to five days’ advance notice of any projected actions that might “represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight”; (2) the channeling of information on incidents through naval attachés assigned to the respective capitals; and (3) annual meetings to review the agreement’s implementation. The agreement includes a protocol that grew out of the first meeting of the Consultative Committee established by the agreement. Each side recognized that its effectiveness could be enhanced by additional understanding relating to nonmilitary vessels. In the protocol signed in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1973, each party pledged not to make simulated attacks against the other’s nonmilitary ships. Like other confidence-building measures, the Incidents at Sea Agreement does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or military force structure of the parties. Its purpose is to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or miscommunication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis.The agreement has been successful. It remains in force today, with the Russian Federation assuming the responsibilities of the Soviet Union.

I

302  THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF I NCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE H IGH S EAS Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972 Entered into force May 25, 1972 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and Guided by the principles and rules of international law, Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows: Article I For the purpose of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply: 1.“Ship” means: (a) A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline; (b) Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by either Party. 2.“Aircraft” means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft. 3. “Formation” means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together. Article II The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Road.The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Article III 1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision. 2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation. 3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT  303

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance. 5.When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions. 6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party. 7.When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area. 8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4 (c) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear. Article IV Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation. Article V 1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft. 2.Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights. Article VI Both Parties shall: 1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight. 2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night, or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision. 3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

304  THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT

Article VII The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collision, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attaché in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow. Article VIII This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party. Article IX The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide. Article X The Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement.The Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft.The Committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX. DONE in duplicate on the 25th day of May 1972 in Moscow in the English and Russian languages each being equally authentic. For the Government of the United States of America: John W.Warner, Secretary of the Navy For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Sergei G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE G OVERNMENT OF THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS SIGNED MAY 25, 1972 Signed at Washington May 22, 1973 Entered into force May 22, 1973 The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein referred to as the Parties,

THE INCIDENTS AT SEA AGREEMENT  305

Having agreed on measures directed to improve the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, Recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by additional understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships and military aircraft with respect to the non-military ships of each Party, Further agree as follows: Article I The Parties shall take measures to notify the non-military ships of each Party on the provisions of the Agreement directed at securing mutual safety. Article II Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation. Article III This Protocol will enter into force on the day of its signing and will be considered as an integral part of the Argument between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas which was signed in Moscow on May 25, 1972. DONE on the 22nd of May, 1973 in Washington, in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts having the same force. For the Government of the United States of America: J. P.Weinel,Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Alekseyev, Admiral

13

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks S UMMARY

AND

A NALYSIS

ALT I, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, extended from November 1969 to May 1972. During that period the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the first agreements to place limits and restraints on some of their central and most important armaments. In the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty), the two nations moved to limit an emerging competition in defensive systems that threatened to spur offensive competition to still greater heights. In the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the two nations took the first steps to check the rivalry in their most powerful land- and sea-based offensive nuclear weapons. The earliest efforts to halt the growth in strategic arms had met with no success. Strategic weapons had been included in U.S. and Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament, but the failure of these comprehensive schemes left strategic arms unrestrained. The United States was first to suggest dissociating them from the comprehensive disarmament plans, proposing at the Geneva-based Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in January 1964 that the two sides explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of their strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The competition in offensive and defensive armaments continued. By 1966 the Soviet Union had begun to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense around Moscow. In 1964, China successfully tested a nuclear weapon. In the United States, research and development was leading to U.S. deployment of its own ABM system. In March 1967, after an exchange of communication with the Soviet leaders, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that Premier Aleksei Kosygin had indicated a willingness to begin discussions.Attempts to get talks under way, however, were not successful. On September 18, 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in a speech in San Francisco announced that the United States would begin deployment of a thin, so-called anti-Chinese ABM system. He emphasized that the deployment was intended to meet a possible limited Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat, to underscore U.S. security assurances to its allies by reinforcing the U.S. deterrent, and to add protection against “the improbable but possible

S

1

Robert A. Divine, "Lyndon Johnson and Strategic Arms Limitation," in Divine, ed., The Johnson Years,Volume Three: LBJ at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 254–58, and Morton Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," in Halperin, National Security Policy-Making (Lexington, Ky.: Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 111–40.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  307

accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by one of the nuclear powers.”1 This program for limited ABM defense brought sharply divided views to the public and congressional debate regarding the efficiency and desirability of an ABM system and its possible effects on the arms race. In announcing the U.S. decision, Secretary McNamara said, “Let me emphasize—and I cannot do so too strongly—that our decision to go ahead with a limited ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is in any way less urgent or desirable.” Through diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, discussions with Soviet representatives in the ENDC, and exchanges at the highest levels of the two governments, the United States continued to press for a Soviet commitment to discuss strategic arms limitation. But it was not until the following year that evidence of a Soviet reassessment of its position emerged. On July 1, 1968, at the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Johnson announced that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to begin discussions on limiting and reducing both strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and defenses against ballistic missiles. The date and place for the talks had not yet been announced when, on August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union began its invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the talks were indefinitely postponed. They were taken up again by the incoming Nixon administration. On January 20, 1969, the White House and the Kremlin announced that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would begin in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, “for preliminary discussion of the questions involved.”The director of the U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Ambassador Gerard Smith, was named head of the U.S. delegation and led it throughout the two-and-a-half-year series of SALT I negotiations.Thus, in 1969, negotiations began on the central delivery systems of strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union.The efforts were bilateral and conducted in secrecy. In the first session of the talks, from November 17 to December 22, each side gained a better understanding of the other’s views and of the range of questions to be considered. It was agreed that the talks would be in private, to encourage a free and frank exchange, and the stage was set for the main negotiations, which opened in Vienna in April 1970. Sessions thereafter alternated between Helsinki and Vienna until the first accords were reached on May 26, 1972, at a Presidential Summit in Moscow. (When SALT II began, in November 1972, to reduce the administrative burdens involved in changing sites, it was agreed to hold the talks henceforth in one place—Geneva.) There are three basic types of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The first, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), are land-based ballistic missiles with a sufficient range to enable them to strike targets at intercontinental distances. (As defined in an agreed statement associated with the interim agreement, ICBMs are missiles with a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union; or, as later defined in the SALT II Treaty, more than 5,500 kilometers.) The second, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), although of shorter range and launched from under the sea, are considered capable of striking intercontinental targets.The third, certain heavy bombers, were recognized by the two sides as being capable of operating at intercontinental distances. Starting in the mid1970s, long-range cruise missiles–highly accurate, air-breathing systems that can be based at sea, on the ground, or in the air—were a fourth weapon type added to this list of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Only the first two of these types of strategic offensive arms were addressed in SALT I. On the defensive side, the key systems are ABMs, which are designed to intercept strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) in flight. Air defense systems, including surface-to-air

308  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

missiles (SAMs), have tactical and conventional roles as well as strategic and nuclear roles, and are not subject to direct limitations. As the SALT I negotiations evolved, it became apparent that a relatively complete approach to strategic defense, but only a partial coverage for strategic offense, was possible. There was some discussion of a prohibition on multiple independently targettable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), which are devices carried on ballistic missiles capable of directing a number of nuclear warheads at widely dispersed targets. MIRV systems first began to be deployed by the United States in 1970. Negotiations of such a ban, however, were never seriously attempted.The Soviet Union commenced testing MIRVs in 1975.With the advent of MIRVs on both sides, a first strike capable of destroying the other side’s strategic weapons became theoretically possible. Soviet and American weapon systems were far from symmetrical.The Soviet Union had continued its development and deployment of heavy ballistic missiles and had overtaken the U.S. lead in land-based ICBMs. During the SALT I years alone, the Soviets’ ICBM arsenal rose from around 1,000 to around 1,500, and they were being deployed at the rate of some 200 annually. Soviet submarine-based launchers quadrupled. The huge payload capacity (throw weight) of some Soviet missiles was seen as a possible threat to U.S. land-based strategic missiles even in heavily protected (hardened) launch sites. The United States had not increased its deployment of strategic missiles since 1967, when its ICBMs numbered 1,054 and its SLBMs 656, but it was conducting a vigorous program of deploying missiles with MIRVs. MIRVs gave the United States a lead in number of warheads, and it retained a lead in long-range bombers. The Soviet Union had a limited ABM system around Moscow; and the United States had shifted from its earlier plan for a thin ABM defense of certain American cities and had begun to deploy ABMs at two land-based ICBM missile sites to protect its retaliatory forces. (The full program envisaged twelve such ABM complexes.) In addition to the asymmetries in strategic forces, the defense needs and commitments of the two parties differed materially.The United States had obligations to defend allies overseas, such as western Europe and Japan, while the Soviet Union’s allies were its nearby neighbors. All these circumstances made for difficulties in equating specific weapons or categories of weapons, and in defining overall strategic equivalence. Two initial disagreements presented obstacles.The Soviet representatives sought to define as “strategic”—i.e., negotiable in SALT—any U.S. or Soviet weapon system capable of reaching the territory of the other side.This would have included U.S. forward-based systems, chiefly short-range or medium-range bombers on aircraft carriers or based in Europe, but it would have excluded, for example, Soviet intermediate-range missiles aimed at western Europe.The United States held that weapons to be negotiated in SALT comprised intercontinental systems. Its forward-based forces served to counter Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft aimed at U.S. allies. To accept the Soviet approach would have prejudiced alliance commitments. After initial attempts to reach a comprehensive agreement failed, the Soviets sought to restrict negotiations to ABM systems, maintaining that limitations on offensive systems should be deferred. The U.S. position was that to limit ABM systems but allow the unrestricted growth of offensive weapons would be incompatible with the basic objectives of SALT, and that it was essential to make at least a beginning to limiting offensive systems as well. A long deadlock on the question was finally broken by exchanges at the highest levels of both governments. On May 20, 1971,Washington and Moscow announced that an understanding had been reached to concentrate on a permanent treaty to limit ABM systems and to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive and long-term agreement on the latter while negotiating a partial and interim solution on strategic offensive forces.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  309

At a summit meeting in Moscow, after two and a half years of negotiation, the first round of SALT concluded on May 26, 1972, when U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. Both entered into force on October 3, 1972. Intensive research had gone into finding ways to verify possible agreements without requiring access to the other side’s territory. Both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement stipulate that compliance is to be assured by “national technical means of verification” (primarily photographic satellites and systems located in third countries). Moreover, the agreements include provisions that are important steps to strengthen assurances against violations: the two parties undertake not to interfere with national technical means of verification (e.g., photographic satellites), and both parties agree not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification. The ABM Treaty is the more complete of the two principal documents negotiated during SALT I.The other, the Interim Agreement—often referred to simply as SALT I—was the first attempt through bilateral negotiations to attempt to limit the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons.The objective of the SALT I negotiations was to place initial limits on the strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems of the two superpowers.

T HE 1972 A NTIBALLISTIC M ISSILE T REATY n the the ABM Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that each may have only two ABM deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the base for developing one. Each country thus leaves unchallenged the penetration capability of the other’s strategic nuclear missile forces. The treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM deployment site to protect its national capital and another to protect an ICBM deployment area.The two sites must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to prevent them from working together to create the base for a regional defense or the beginnings of a nationwide system. The ABM Treaty, unlike the Interim Agreement, is an agreement of indefinite duration. For purposes of the treaty, Article II defines three ABM components designed to intercept strategic ballistic missiles in flight trajectory: ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles, and ABM radars. Article III limits the number of ABM interceptor missile launchers to 100 per site, or 200 for each party, and contains strict limits on the ABM radars deployed at each site. Article I of the ABM Treaty includes the fundamental obligation not to create an ABM defense of the national territory, or the base for such a defense, and prohibits creation of an ABM defense of a region except for such deployment as permitted by Article III. An agreed statement provides that if ABM systems based on future technologies (“other physical principles” in the terms of Agreed Statement D), such as lasers or particle beams, should be created in the future, land-based systems based on such future technologies can be tested but cannot be deployed unless the treaty is amended.Article IV provides an exception to the deployment limitations of Article III for ABM launchers at ABM test ranges. Article V prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems or components (regardless of the technology employed) that are not fixed and land-based (i.e., sea-based, space-based, air-based, or mobile land-based systems).This sweeping prohibition on ABM systems or components (except fixed land-based) is designed to reinforce the constraints

I

310  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

of Article I. Further to the same objective are two constraints in Article VI. One prohibits the upgrade, or improvement, of air defense systems to ABM capability.The second, in conjunction with another agreed statement that applies to deployment of large, phased-array radars (the then relevant modern technology), covers radars that are not ABM radars but that are deployed in the future to provide early warning of ballistic missile attack (as opposed to an ABM role directing missiles to intercept incoming weapons). Such radars must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward, so that such deployment does not contribute to the creation of a base for nationwide defense.This provision was the subject of a much-discussed Soviet violation in the 1980s when construction of a large, phased-array radar with early warning capabilities began near Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. The radar was neither located on the periphery nor oriented outward.After years of disagreement, the Soviet Union finally agreed to dismantle it. The objective of the ABM Treaty, in essence, is to eliminate the deployment of a largescale ABM strategic defense, making each party a hostage to the other.The ABM Treaty was amended in 1974 by a protocol reducing each party’s permitted deployment areas from two to one, thereby reducing strategic defense deployments to a level just short of abolition.The entire structure of the ABM Treaty is designed to interact so that all provisions operate in a manner that reinforces the fundamental goal set forth in Article I.The Soviet Union chose to maintain its ABM defense of Moscow, and the United States chose to maintain defense of its ICBM deployment near Grand Forks, North Dakota. To allow some flexibility, the protocol allows each side to reverse its original choice. That is, the United States may dismantle or destroy its ABM system at Grand Forks and deploy an ABM defense of Washington. The Soviet Union (Russia—see later discussion of ABM Treaty succession), similarly, can decide to shift to an ABM defense of a missile field rather than Moscow. Each side can make such a change only once.Advance notice must be given, and this may be done only during a year in which a review of the ABM Treaty is scheduled.The treaty prescribes reviews every five years; the first such review was in 1977, and subsequent reviews were held in 1982, 1988, 1993, and 1999. While the system the United States chose to deploy (Grand Forks) was placed on inactive status in 1976, after only six months of operation, the Russian ABM defense around Moscow remains operational, though its effectiveness is uncertain.

INTERPRETATION DEBATE n 1985, a dispute arose within the U.S. government over the meaning of Article V, Paragraph I, of the ABM Treaty, which provides that “Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.” One side argued that a broad interpretation of the provision’s language is legally permissible. Such an interpretation would have limited application of this provision to ABM technology actually in existence when the treaty was signed in 1972.Thus, it was argued that the only limitation on ABM systems employing future technology is the development ban in Agreed Statement D. In this view, the definition of ABM systems set forth in Article II, Paragraph 1, limits all subsequent articles of the treaty to existing technology. It reads as follows:

I

For the purpose of this Treaty, an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles … (b) ABM launchers … and (c) ABM radars …

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  311

Further, Agreed Statement D provides that In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. The broad interpretation argument posited that no agreement existed in 1972 limiting the testing of ABM devices that use future technologies. Thus the Article II “currently consisting of ” language means that the list of ABM components in Article II was intended to be complete, so all subsequent articles limit only 1972-vintage ABM launchers,ABM missiles, and ABM radars.Therefore, there are no treaty limits on ABM systems based on future systems except in Agreed Statement D, which contains only a deployment limitation. Because there are no testing limits on ABM systems based on future technology, the testing of future technology ABM systems—whether based in the ground, in air, or in space—would be permissable. The other side of the debate adhered to the traditional interpretation of Article VI: that the testing prohibition applied to all types of mobile ABM systems, regardless of technology. Those arguing for this interpretation asserted that the broad interpretation is inconsistent with the treaty’s structure and purposes, starting with the basic obligation of Article I not to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or to provide a base for such defense. Future ABM systems, based on technology such as lasers and particle beams, are capable of much wider area coverage than 1972-vintage ABM launchers, ABM missiles, and ABM radars. Article V, which bans development and testing of all mobile-type systems, thereby reinforces Article I. The proponents of the traditional interpretation maintained that an ABM system is defined as a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, with the treaty noting that it only “currently” consists of ABM launchers, ABM missiles, and ABM radars. Future ABM systems are contemplated by both parties to be included within this definition of an ABM system. Agreed Statement D reinforces deployment limitations to the one permitted land-based site by prohibiting (without an amendment of the treaty), for example, ABM laser interceptors, which could cover a wider area than conventional ABM interceptor missiles. The Reagan administration adopted the broad interpretation in 1985, but Congress included language in the 1988 Defense authorization bill that, in effect, denied funding for tests inconsistent with the traditional interpretation. After this debate became public, the Soviet Union publicly stated that it adhered to the traditional interpretation. In June 1993, the Clinton administration repudiated the “broad” interpretation.There was never a real legal basis for it; it was essentially an attempt to put aside the ABM Treaty by the back door for the benefit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The treaty on its face, in the “currently consisting of ” language in Article II, made clear that it applies to all types of ABM technologies; therefore the Article V ban is comprehensive. The traditional interpretation is consistent with the objectives set forth in Article I, and both the United States and the Soviet Union, in their treaty subsequent practice, unquestionably adhered to the traditional interpretation. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, recognized as codifying customary international law on this issue, the primary source of treaty interpretation is the language of the treaty itself, read in the light of the parties’ subsequent practice.

312  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

In the 1990s, two agreements associated with the ABM Treaty were negotiated at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), the ABM Treaty implementing body.The negotiations began in 1993, and the two agreements were signed in New York in September 1997. The first agreement, referred to as the demarcation agreement, provides that the line between unregulated tactical ABM systems and strategic ABM systems covered by the treaty is testing against a target vehicle with reentry speed of greater than 5 kilometers per second or testing an ABM interceptor missile with a speed of greater than 3 kilometers per second.This is an amendment to the ABM Treaty, requiring Senate approval as the earlier understanding between the parties was that the line of demarcation was a reentry speed of 3.2 kilometers per second for the test target vehicle. The other agreement, referred to as the succession agreement, simply recognizes that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have succeeded the Soviet Union as ABM Treaty parties.This agreement did not require Senate consent, but by its terms it is to be submitted to the Senate for approval.As of December 2001, at the time of the U.S. announcement of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, neither agreement had been submitted to the Senate.

LEGAL DEBATE

ON THE

ABM TREATY SUCCESSION

n 1998, against the backdrop of a debate over U.S. national missile defense (NMD) policy, several prominent Republican senators sent a letter to President Clinton asserting that the ABM Treaty had disappeared because the Soviet Union had dissolved. Thus another legal debate had begun. The treaty disappeared, the senators asserted, with no involvement of the president and contrary to his expressed policies.Again, the real issue was not the ABM Treaty, but whether the United States should promptly build a nationwide NMD system, and, in that context, either renegotiate the ABM Treaty or withdraw from it pursuant to its terms.This, in the U.S. system of government, is a presidential decision, as would be declaring the United States no longer bound by the ABM Treaty because of a fundamental change of circumstances or impossibility of performance as a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Congress has a role through its power over the purse, but it cannot on its own declare a treaty null and void or force the president to withdraw from a treaty. Determination of succession is part of the president’s power to determine foreign policy. The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties provides that a state may withdraw from a treaty on, among other grounds, fundamental change of circumstance or impossibility of performance; the ABM Treaty has a withdrawal clause permitting a party to withdraw on six-month notice if it believes that its supreme interests are threatened. But treaties do not just vanish or go away; a party must declare that it is withdrawing or that it regards itself as no longer bound for one of the reasons stated above or for some other legitimate reason. It is the head of state or government that makes this decision and declaration—in the case of the United States, the president.Thus the ABM Treaty survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beginning in January 2001, there was much discussion within the new administration about possible U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in order to build a non-treaty-compliant national missile defense. In the fall of 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin were moving toward agreement on a new strategic framework, which would include significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and ABM Treaty amendments that would permit the U.S. government to conduct NMD tests while preserving the treaty’s viability. When negotiations with Russia failed to produce mutually agreeable amendments, however, the administration began to lay the groundwork for U.S.

I

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  313

withdrawal from the treaty. On December 13, 2001, the United States formally gave notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty pursuant to Article XV, and on June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the treaty.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-B ALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty. Article II 1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

314  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode. 2.The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are: (a) operational; (b) under construction; (c) undergoing testing; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or (e) mothballed. Article III Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that: (a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and (b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars. Article IV The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges. Article V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. Article VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  315

Article VII Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Article VIII ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Article IX To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. Article X Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. Article XII 1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

316  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms. 2.The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article XIV 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty. Article XV 1.This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI 1.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2.This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF A NTI -B ALLISTIC M ISSILES 1. Agreed Statements The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added): Agreed Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  317

[A] The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained. [B] The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million. [C] The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers. [D] In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. [E] The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead. [F] The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. [G] The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the United States and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

2. Common Understandings Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations: A. Location of ICBM Defenses The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers.

318  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement:“The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.” In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed Statement C.) B. ABM Test Ranges The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that “the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.”We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes.The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed test ranges” to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges. On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to “additionally agreed” test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges. C. Mobile ABM Systems On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on development of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types.At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation.“Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. sides interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?” On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter. D. Standing Consultative Commission Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972: The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty’s Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,1 agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels. Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  319

E. Standstill On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents. In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force.This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval. The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation: A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.The United States does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position. B. Tested in an ABM Mode On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term “tested in an ABM mode,” in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing.We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent

320  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.To clarify our interpretation of “tested in an ABM mode,” we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be “tested in an ABM mode” if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria. C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make.The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms.The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution. D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the United States would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.

MEMORANDUM

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A S TANDING C ONSULTATIVE C OMMISSION OF

I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing Consultative Commission. II. The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30, 1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  321

III. Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by such staff as it deems necessary. IV. The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible, following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner. V. The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may amend them as it deems appropriate. VI. The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may also meet at such other places as may be agreed. Done in Geneva, on December 21, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION PROTOCOL Pursuant to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, dated December 21, 1972, the undersigned, having been duly appointed by their respective Governments as Commissioners of said Standing Consultative Commission, hereby establish and approve, in the form attached, Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters of the Commission, which Regulations shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force until and unless amended by the undersigned or their successors. Done in Geneva on May 30, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Standing Consultative Commission Regulations 1. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, shall consist of a U.S. component and Soviet component, each of which shall be headed by a Commissioner. 2.The Commissioners shall alternatively preside over the meetings. 3. The Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in advance of the matters to be submitted for discussion, but may at a meeting submit for discussion any matter within the competence of the Commission. 4. During intervals between sessions of the Commission, each Commissioner may transmit written or oral communications to the other Commissioner concerning matters within the competence of the Commission.

322  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

5. Each component of the Commission may invite such advisers and experts as it deems necessary to participate in a meeting. 6.The Commission may establish working groups to consider and prepare specific matters. 7.The results of the discussion of questions at the meetings of the Commission may, if necessary, be entered into records which shall be in two copies, each in the English and the Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 8. The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners. 9. Each component of the Commission shall bear the expenses connected with its participation in the Commission

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE L IMITATION OF A NTI -B ALLISTIC M ISSILE S YSTEMS Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974 Entered into force May 24, 1976 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972, Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security, Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol. 2.Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  323

Article II 1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years of periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty.This right may be exercised only once. 2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty. 3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission. Article III The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty. Article IV This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM S YSTEMS AND T HEIR C OMPONENTS ON

Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.

324  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

The Parties have also agreed on the following general guidelines: 1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; 2.Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; 3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or their components, related to implementation of the provisions of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that those systems or their components and facilities associated with those components, except for facilities at test ranges, would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those units would not be substantially less than the time required for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in dismantling or destruction; 4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM launchers and for ABM radars; 5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the Treaty; 6.After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements; and 7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used for replacement. This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROCEDURES GOVERNING DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND N OTIFICATION T HEREOF, FOR ABM S YSTEMS AND T HEIR COMPONENTS I. Excess ABM Launchers at Test Ranges 1.Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the sites, and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. Launch-pad debris may be removed and after six months the location covered with earth. 2. Silo launchers shall be made unusable by dismantling or destruction of their above-ground structures and headworks, and removal of launch rails. Silo-launcher debris may be removed and after six months the silos may be filled with earth.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  325

3.The dismantling or destruction actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be completed no later than three months after their initiation. 4. Facilities associated with dismantled or destroyed ABM launchers at test ranges may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, and applicable Agreed Statements. 5. Notification of the completion of the activities provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission twice annually reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of a regular session of the Commission. II. ABM Facilities at Malmstrom 1. Metal reinforcing rods on radar buildings shall be cut off. 2. Radar buildings for which wall construction had commenced shall be left uncovered in their uncompleted state for six months, after which they may be covered with earth. 3. Launcher facilities and radar buildings for which only foundations had been completed shall be covered with earth. 4. Earth grading of the entire area shall be accomplished and construction materials removed. 5. Dismantling or destruction activities shall be initiated no later than six months after agreement on these Procedures. 6. Notification that the above activities have been completed shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND T HEIR C OMPONENTS OF J ULY 3, 1974 Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Agreed Statements regarding the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission and in implementation of the provisions of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment to this Supplementary Protocol. This Supplementary Protocol and the attached Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol.The attached Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Supplementary Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems appropriate. Done at Geneva on October 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

326  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM S YSTEMS AND T HEIR C OMPONENTS

OR

I. General 1. These Procedures shall constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974, and shall be considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The Procedures shall apply to ABM systems or their components, when they are being replaced within a deployment area on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, as well as when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged on the basis of the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974. 2. Replacement of an ABM system or its components within a deployment area or exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out so that components of an ABM system, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, in their total number and composition, shall be consistent with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. 3. When an ABM system or its components are being replaced within a deployment area or when a deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, for each type of component being deployed or replaced an event, verifiable by national technical means, shall be identified which indicates the initiation of its deployment or the initiation of its dismantling or destruction. After such an event, a component correspondingly shall be included in the number specified by the Treaty and Protocol thereto for such components or shall be excluded therefrom. 4.Within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components replacement of an ABM system shall be carried out by replacing its components. Dismantling or destruction of components being replaced and deployment of replacement components of an ABM system shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Section II and III of these Procedures. 5. If a replacement component of an ABM system is deployed at the location of the ABM system component being replaced, so that dismantling or destruction of the latter is a necessary part of the construction or installation of the replacement component, the manner and extent of dismantling or destruction of the component being replaced shall be at the discretion of the Party carrying out the replacement. Removal and replacement of ABM interceptor missiles shall be carried out at the discretion of the Party carrying out such replacement, subject to compliance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. 6. Exchange of a deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be carried out through coordinated activities with respect to the dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged and with respect to the deployment of the ABM system or its components in the replacement area pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section IV of these Procedures. 7. Notification of the replacement of components of an ABM system, both within a deployment area and when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, shall be given twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission at the beginning of regular SCC sessions, reflecting the actual status as of the beginning of that session and covering the period since the last notification in the Commission. In this connection, the Party carrying out the replacement shall notify the other Party of the number and type (above-ground or silo) of ABM launchers, of the number and type (large phased-array ABM

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  327

radars or ABM radars with a potential less than three million) of ABM radars, and of the number of ABM radar complexes, on which dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in process, and of the number of ABM launchers,ABM radars and ABM radar complexes which have been replaced. 8. Notification of the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be given in the Standing Consultative Commission pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty. Such notification shall be given before initiation within the replacement area of any construction activities associated with the exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components and shall contain the time of initiation of these activities as well as the location of the new deployment area (the direction and distance to the new area in relation to the center of the area being exchanged). Upon completion of dismantling or destruction of the ABM system or its components in the area being exchanged, the Party which has carried out the exchange of the deployment area of the ABM system or its components shall notify the other Party of having carried out the exchange of the area, at the next regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission. 9. Each Party may on a voluntary basis add other information to the notifications if it considers such information necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. II. Procedures for ABM Launchers 1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM launchers may be replaced by above-ground or silo ABM launchers within a deployment area as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged. 2.With respect to replacement of ABM launchers within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with the building of replacement ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) shall constitute initiation of deployment of these launchers, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) Removal from the launch site of all above-ground launcher elements, and in addition, for a silo launcher, dismantling or destruction and removal from the launch site of the silo door or cover and dismantling or destruction of the headworks shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (c) Prior to initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) being replaced, all ABM interceptor missiles associated with them, as well as the warheads for these interceptor missiles, shall be removed from the launch site. 3.When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) Above-ground launchers and associated equipment shall be removed from the launch sites and the entire part of the launch pad containing the launcher mount and reinforcements shall be dismantled or destroyed. (b) Above-ground structures and headworks of ABM silo launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed; dismantled or destroyed silo doors or covers, as well as equipment associated with these launchers, shall be removed from the launch sites.The silo shall be destroyed by dismantling or destroying its concrete elements to a depth of at least five meters from the upper edge of the headworks.The silo shaft shall remain open for at least six months.

328  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

4. Deployment of replacement ABM launchers within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM launchers being replaced in that area. 5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers being replaced shall be completed no later than three months after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures. Debris remaining after dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers (above-ground and silo) may be removed, and after six months the former ABM launcher locations may be covered with earth. III. Procedures for ABM Radars and ABM Radar Complexes 1. Subject to compliance with the limitations provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes may be replaced within a deployment area, as well as when the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged. ABM Radars 2.With respect to replacement of ABM radars within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The beginning of any construction or assembly work associated with the building of antennas (arrays),ABM radar antenna structures, or antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radars, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) Removal or destruction of antenna protective covers, dismantling or destruction of antennas (arrays) and antenna structures, as well as opening of those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted, shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. 3. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) ABM radar instruments and equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site. (b) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed. (c) ABM radar antennas (arrays) with their structures or with antenna pedestal supports which are not parts of ABM radar buildings as well as the pads occupied by the bases and reinforcements of such supports shall be dismantled or destroyed. The dismantled elements shall be removed from the ABM radar sites. (d) Those parts of ABM radar buildings in which antennas (arrays) had been mounted as integral parts thereof shall be opened and destroyed in such a manner that there will remain no more than half of the perimeter of the opening formed as a result of opening that part of the building where antennas (arrays) had been mounted.The buildings shall remain in such a condition for six months, after which they may be restored but not beyond that level to which destruction is required. (e) Debris remaining after completion of dismantling or destruction of ABM radars may be removed after six months. 4. Deployment of replacement ABM radars within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of the ABM radars being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radars to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (b) of the Treaty, subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph and the applicable Agreed Statements concerning the potential of radars.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  329

5. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the ABM system currently deployed by each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures. 6. After dismantling or destruction of ABM radars has been completed in accordance with the above procedures, facilities remaining at ABM radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for purposes which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. ABM Radar Complexes 7. With respect to replacement of ABM radar complexes within a deployment area of an ABM system or its components, as well as when the deployment area is being exchanged: (a) The initiation of deployment, as defined in subparagraph 2(a) of this Section of the Procedures, of even one ABM radar of an ABM radar complex being deployed shall constitute initiation of deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes, after which they shall be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. (b) The initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in subparagraph 2(b) of this Section of the Procedures, of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced shall constitute initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced, after which they shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty. 8. Deployment of replacement ABM radar complexes within the deployment area of an ABM system or its components shall be initiated no earlier than the initiation of dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced in that area, and shall be carried out in such a manner that it will not cause the number of ABM radar complexes to exceed the number specified in Article III, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty, subject to compliance with the provisions of that subparagraph concerning the size and circular shape of the area of each ABM radar complex. 9. Dismantling or destruction of ABM radar complexes being replaced shall be completed by dismantling or destruction of all ABM radars of each ABM radar complex being replaced in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section of the Procedures no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in subparagraph 7(b) of this Section of the Procedures. IV. Procedures for Exchange of the Deployment Area of an ABM System or Its Components 1. When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged, no construction activity associated with the deployment of an ABM system or its components in the replacement area shall begin until appropriate notification is given to the other Party pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures. 2.When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components is being exchanged: (a) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM launcher (above-ground or silo) in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in Section II, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM launchers in the area being exchanged. (b) Initiation of deployment, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(a) of these Procedures, of even one ABM radar, including one which is part of an ABM radar complex, in the replacement area shall be carried out no earlier than completion of the initiation of dismantling or destruction, as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, of all ABM radars, including those which are parts of ABM radar complexes, in the area being exchanged. 3. Prior to completion of dismantling or destruction of 50 percent of the number of ABM launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes in the area being exchanged, the Party carrying out the exchange may initiate deployment of no more than 50 percent of the number of ABM

330  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

launchers, ABM radars or ABM radar complexes which is specified in Article III of the Treaty for the replacement deployment area of an ABM system or its components. 4. Each Party may, at its discretion, completely dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area being exchanged, and thereafter deploy an ABM system or its components in the other area permitted in Article III of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto, provided that, prior to initiation of construction, notification is given pursuant to Article II of the Protocol to the Treaty and Section I, paragraph 8, of these Procedures. 5.When the deployment area of an ABM system or its components centered on the national capital is being exchanged, those non-phased-array ABM radars which were operational within that area on the date of signature of the Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed. When carrying out dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars, the following actions shall be accomplished: (a) Antenna protective covers shall be dismantled or destroyed. (b) Antennas, antenna structures and ABM radar equipment shall be dismantled and removed from the radar site. Buildings and facilities remaining after dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Dismantling or destruction of these ABM radars shall be completed no later than accomplishment of the other actions provided for in these Procedures for exchange of the deployment area of an ABM system or its components. 6. Dismantling or destruction of ABM launchers, ABM radars and ABM radar complexes within the area being exchanged shall be carried out in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 3 and 5, and Section III, paragraphs 3, 5 and 9 of these Procedures.

Standing Consultative Commission Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5 of the Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components Attached to the Supplementary Protocol of October 28, 1976 Agreeing that dismantling or destruction of ABM radars being replaced, which are components of the currently deployed ABM system of each Party, shall be completed without unreasonable delays no later than one year after initiation thereof as defined in Section III, subparagraph 2(b) of these Procedures, the Parties understand that if, in the future, either Party operationally deploys ABM radars of another type as a component of an ABM system, the periods of time for dismantling or destruction of such radars would be subject to agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission, but in any case would not exceed one year.

Standing Consultative Commission Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  331

26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached mutual understanding regarding the following:

I. Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty 1.The test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are any test ranges at which an ABM system or at least one ABM launcher, regardless of whether or not it contains an ABM interceptor missile, or one ABM radar is located or constructed for purposes of testing. 2. Any other types of weapons or military equipment may also be located at such test ranges for testing according to their mission or for range safety purposes. Such location, testing, or use of these other types of weapons or military equipment, provided it is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty, shall not constitute a basis for considering them ABM system components. 3.The current test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are those test ranges which each Party had on the date of signature of the Treaty, that is, on May 26, 1972. Both the USA and USSR had on May 26, 1972, and have at the present time, two current test ranges: for the USA in the vicinity of White Sands, New Mexico, and on Kwajalein Atoll and for the USSR in the vicinity of Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. 4. Each Party may establish test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty as “additionally agreed” and locate therein for testing ABM systems or their components as they are defined in Article II of the Treaty, provided that the establishment of such ranges is consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and, in particular, with the obligations of each Party provided for in Article I of the Treaty not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense. 5. In the event of establishment of an additional test range by either Party, the Party carrying out such action shall provide, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, notification of the location of such a test range no later than thirty days after the beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork (excavation), associated with locating or constructing at that test range an ABM launcher or antenna (array), ABM radar antenna structures, or an antenna pedestal support which is not a part of an ABM radar building. After presentation of such notification and, if necessary, clarification in the Standing Consultative Commission of any aspects of this notification which are not clear to the Party being notified, the test range being newly established will be considered an “additionally agreed test range,” referred to in Article IV of the Treaty.

II. The Term “Tested in an ABM Mode” Used in the Treaty 1.The term “tested in an ABM mode,” which is used in Article II of the Treaty for defining ABM system components, refers to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, which are tested in an ABM mode separately or in conjunction with other ABM system components after the date of signature of the Treaty, that is after May 26, 1972. The term does not refer to components which were tested by the Parties in an ABM mode prior to that date. 2.Testing in an ABM mode is the testing, which, in accordance with the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty regarding locations of ABM systems or their components, is carried out only at test ranges or in an ABM system deployment area, for the purpose of determining the capabilities of an ABM system or its individual components (ABM interceptor missiles,ABM launchers, or ABM radars)

332  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

to perform the functions of countering strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. 3. As applied to testing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the term “strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,” used in the Treaty, also refers to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements. 4.The term “tested in an ABM mode” used in Article II of the Treaty refers to: (a) an ABM interceptor missile if while guided by an ABM radar it has intercepted a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory regardless of whether such intercept was successful or not; or if an ABM interceptor missile has been launched from an ABM launcher and guided by an ABM radar. If ABM interceptor missiles are given the capability to carry out interception without the use of ABM radars as the means of guidance, application of the term “tested in an ABM mode” to ABM interceptor missiles in that event shall be subject to additional discussion and agreement in the Standing Consultative Commission; (b) an ABM launcher if it has been used for launching an ABM interceptor missile; (c) an ABM radar if it has tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guided an ABM interceptor missile toward them regardless of whether the intercept was successful or not; or tracked and guided an ABM interceptor missile; or tracked a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM radar, which is tracking a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guiding an ABM interceptor missile toward them or is tracking and guiding an ABM interceptor missile. 5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section shall be applied taking into account Article VI, subparagraph (a), of the Treaty concerning the obligations of the Parties not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM system components, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The term “tested in an ABM mode” shall not be applied to radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, or to radars, including phased-array radars, used for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification. 6.The term “tested in an ABM mode” shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. 7.The term “tested in an ABM mode” shall not be applied to a radar, including a phased-array radar, which is not an ABM radar or a radar referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, if strategic ballistic missiles or their elements passed through the field of view of the radar while it was operating in accordance with its mission, and it was not, at that time, performing functions inherent only to an ABM radar, and it was not functioning in conjunction with an ABM radar. In the event that ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term “tested in an ABM mode” to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, the Parties, in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will consider such questions in the Standing Consultative Commission and resolve them on a mutually acceptable basis. 8. Deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except as provided in Articles III and IV of the Treaty, to carry out any functions would be inconsistent with the obligation of each Party not to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  333

III. Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of the Treaty 1. Utilization of air defense radars located at or near a test range to carry out air defense functions, including providing for the safety of that range, is not limited by the provisions of the Treaty and is independent of the testing carried out at that range. 2.When air defense components and ABM system components are co-located at a test range, the Parties, in order to preclude the possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, will refrain from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system components at that range. 3. In utilizing air defense radars as instrumentation equipment at test ranges the Parties will not use such radars to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.

Statement by Commissioner Buchheim November 1, 1978 Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed. FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term “tested in an ABM mode” shall not be applied to radars, including phasedarray radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment.With respect to such radars the Parties understand that: (a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty; (b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing; (c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty; (d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions. When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars.The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.

334  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term “tested in an ABM mode” to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Statement by Commissioner Ustinov November 1, 1978 Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed. FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term “tested in an ABM mode” shall not be applied to radars, including phasedarray radars, which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to such radars the Parties understand that: (a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty; (b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic missiles are launched for testing; (c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding three million and which do not make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty; (d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions.When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions, strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  335

If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the term “tested in an ABM mode” to individual radars which track strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this common understanding constitutes a component part of the general understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.

Standing Consultative Commission Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred To in Article IV of That Treaty In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto, in further development of the agreement recorded in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, with a view to precluding the possibility of ambiguous situations at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty, have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, additionally agreed that: each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of such a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components located at that range; in agreeing to the foregoing the Parties recognize the possibility of circumstances—the appearance of a hostile or unidentified aircraft—in which, for the purpose of providing for air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense components, located at the test range for carrying out air defense functions including providing for range safety, may arise unexpectedly during the launch of a strategic ballistic missile to the area of the test range or during the launch of an ABM interceptor missile at that range. Should such an event occur, the Party which had such a concurrent operation will, as soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification to the other Party describing the circumstances of the event. It will, if necessary, on a voluntary basis, also inform the other Party about the event or hold consultations with it within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, as provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission. This Common Understanding constitutes a component part of the agreement reached between the Parties with regard to the provisions of paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and does not affect other provisions of that Agreed Statement or the provisions of the common understandings thereto reached by Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission on November 1, 1978. The provisions of this Common Understanding will be used by the Parties in their implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, beginning on the date of signature of this Common Understanding, that is, June 6, 1985.

336  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

T HE 1972 SALT I I NTERIM AGREEMENT SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

s its title suggests, the Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Offensive Arms was limited in duration and scope. It was intended to remain in force for five years. Both countries undertook to continue negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement as soon as possible, and the scope and terms of any new agreement were not to be prejudiced by the provisions of the 1972 accord.Thus, the Interim Agreement was considered a holding action, designed to complement the ABM Treaty by limiting competition in offensive strategic arms and to provide time for further negotiations.The agreement froze the number of strategic missile launchers, operational or under construction, on each side at existing levels and permitted an increase in SLBM launchers to an agreed level for each party only with the dismantling or destruction of a corresponding number of older ICBM or SLBM launchers. Pursuant to the terms of the Interim Agreement, the United States was permitted launchers of 1,054 deployed ICBMs and 656 deployed SLBMs; and the Soviet Union was permitted launchers of 1,608 deployed ICBMs and 740 deployed SLBMs. The limitation on ICBMs was achieved indirectly by a ban on construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM silo launchers in Article I.The Interim Agreement, and later the SALT II Treaty, utilized missile launchers as the unit of account because the resulting agreements could be verified by national technical means. The term “national technical means of verification” includes photographic satellites that, in the 1960s, the Soviets had claimed violated international law, but which were implicitly recognized in the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement as operating in accordance with “generally recognized principles of international law.” Both agreements contained further commitments not to interfere with or deliberately conceal activities from such satellites. Launchers were also considered appropriate limits because neither ICBM silo launchers nor SLBM launch tubes were viewed as reloadable with sufficient speed to affect the outcome of a strategic exchange. Unlike the treatment of ICBMs, the SLBM limitations were explicitly set forth in the protocol to the Interim Agreement.The initial limits, of 656 for the United States and 740 for the Soviet Union, could be increased if certain older ICBM launchers (i.e., the Titan II for the United States and the SS-7s and SS-8s for the Soviet Union) were dismantled. Article II banned the conversion of “light” ICBM launchers, or certain older ICBM launchers, to modern “heavy” ICBM launchers, thus fixing the number of deployed modern heavy ICBMs at zero for the United States and 308 for the Soviet Union.The sides were never able to negotiate a legal definition of heavy ICBMs—this, amidst much controversy, was left for SALT II—but the only modern heavy ICBM in existence in 1972 was the Soviet SS-9 missile system (the distinction between heavy and light ICBM was negotiated in the SALT II agreement as a threshold determined by a missile type’s launch weight and throw weight). In addition, as indicated, each side had a number of certain older ICBMs, defined as those deployed prior to 1964: 54 U.S.Titan II missiles and 210 Soviet SS-7 and SS-8 missiles. Under Article III of the Interim Agreement and the protocol, these older missile launchers could be exchanged for SLBM launchers.While the Soviets did eliminate their older SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs in exchange for new SLBM launchers, the United States did not exchange its Titan missiles for SLBM launchers.Thus, the numbers were 1,000 ICBM launchers (plus 54 old Titan IIs) and 656 SLBM launchers for the United States, and 1,398 ICBM launchers and 950 SLBM launchers for the Soviet Union. The Interim Agreement had a five-year term. The United States considered

A

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  337

acceptable the Soviet Union’s approximately 50 percent advantage in strategic missile launchers in view of two factors: the ongoing U.S. MIRV deployment program, and the fact that the Interim Agreement did not limit heavy bombers, for which the United States had a significant lead (approximately 450 to 150). Land-mobile ICBM launchers were not limited by the Interim Agreement; the United States made a unilateral statement at the close of the negotiations that it “would consider the development of land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement.” Neither party developed land-mobile ICBM launchers during the term of the Interim Agreement. The reason for the indirect delineation of numbers in the Interim Agreement was Soviet unwillingness to disclose or even discuss their numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers.While the development and acceptance of the legality of photographic satellites under the rubric of “national technical means” made SALT I possible, the Soviet penchant for secrecy in military matters under negotiation made the agreements more controversial in the United States. Achieving equal numbers of treaty-limited strategic systems, a definition of heavy ICBMs, some limits on MIRVs, and an agreed statement on data became major objectives for the United States in the SALT II negotiations. Once the Soviet Union began to deploy MIRVS, there was also concern in the United States about the greater size and lifting capability, or throw weight, of Soviet missiles due to the theoretical capability of Soviet ICBMs to carry many more warheads than U.S. ICBMs.This disparity was due to the U.S. preference for light, miniaturized systems in the earliest days of the ICBM programs, whereas the Soviet Union preferred larger, cruder systems.Throw weight was a controversial issue during SALT II, but even in these negotiations, only initial steps were taken, including defining heavy ICBMs in terms of throw weight (and launch weight) and banning increased throw weights of heavy ICBMs, thus preventing any further growth in greater capability of such missiles. Negotiations to eliminate the throw-weight disparity were left to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations in the 1980s.2

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON C ERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972 Entered into force October 3, 1972 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, 2 The Standing Consultative Commission Interim Agreement Dismantling Procedures are not included herein for reasons of space and because, by its terms, the Interim Areement expired in 1977, and its subsequent informaal observance by the parties was terminated in 1986.

338  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972. Article II The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. Article III The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines. Article IV Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken. Article V 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement.This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Article VI To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article. Article VII The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations. Article VIII 1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  339

instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. 2.This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement, Have agreed as follows: The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force: The United States may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines.The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines. Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the United States—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the USSR—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines. The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the United States and the USSR. This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

340  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

DONE at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972 For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND U NILATERAL S TATEMENTS R EGARDING THE I NTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON C ERTAIN M EASURES WITH R ESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 1. Agreed Statements The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added): Agreed Statements Regarding the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [A] The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental USSR. [B] The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed. [C] The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased. [D] The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs.The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training. [E] The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  341

replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

2. Common Understandings Common Understanding of the Parties on the Following Matters Was Reached During the Negotiations: A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: The Parties agree that the term “significantly increased” means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers. Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding. B. Standing Consultative Commission Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972: The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty’s Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement. The agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels. Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding. C. Standstill On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents. In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force.This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval. The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

3. Unilateral Statements (a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:

342  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.The United States does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position. B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the United States would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement. C. Covered Facilities The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines. D. “Heavy” ICBMs The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following:The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The United States proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration. On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral “Statement of the Soviet Side”: Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the United States, but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim Freeze Agreement the United States and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  343

submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the United States.Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the United States, will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations. On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: The United States side has studied the “statement made by the Soviet side” of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement. On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 17. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

SALT II SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

n Article VII of the Interim Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union committed themselves to continue active negotiations on strategic offensive arms; those negotiations, called SALT II, began in November 1972. The primary goal of SALT II was to replace the Interim Agreement with a long-term comprehensive treaty that would provide broad limits on strategic offensive weapon systems. As the SALT II negotiations began, the principal U.S. objectives were to provide for equal numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to impose restraints on qualitative developments that could threaten future stability. Early discussion between the sides focused on the weapon systems to be included and factors affecting equality in numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, taking into account the important differences between the two sides’ military forces, bans on new systems, qualitative limits, and a Soviet proposal to include U.S. forward-based systems.The U.S. and Soviet positions on many of these issues differed widely. A major breakthrough occurred at a meeting in Vladivostok in November 1974 between U.S. President Gerald R. Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.At this meeting, both sides agreed to a basic framework for the SALT II agreement. The aide-mémoire that subsequently recorded this agreement included the following basic elements:  an aggregate limit of 2,400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;  ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface missiles for each side, but the two sides did not agree on whether this term covered only ballistic missiles (the U.S. position) or ballistic and cruise missiles (the Soviet position), and there was disagreement as to whether the Soviet Backfire bomber should be considered a heavy bomber;  an aggregate limit of 1,320 MIRVed systems;

I

344  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  a ban on construction of new land-based ICBM launchers;  limits on deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms; and  incorporation of important elements of the interim agreement (e.g., those relating

to verification). In addition, the aide-mémoire stated that the duration of the new agreement would be through 1985. In early 1975, the delegations resumed negotiations in Geneva, working toward an agreement based on this general framework. During this time, a joint draft text was prepared and many limitations were agreed upon. During the negotiations, however, it became clear that the two sides had fundamental disagreements on two major issues: how cruise missiles should be addressed, and whether the new Soviet bomber known to the United States as Backfire would be considered a heavy bomber and therefore counted in the 2,400 aggregate as the United States insisted after Vladivostok.While there was disagreement on other issues, such as MIRV verification provisions, restrictions on new systems, and missile throw-weight ceilings, progress was made in these areas. However, the cruise missile and Backfire issues remained unresolved. When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, his administration placed renewed emphasis on SALT and undertook a comprehensive interagency review of the negotiations. Building on the work of the Ford administration, particularly the Vladivostok accord and subsequent agreement on many issues in Geneva, the United States made a comprehensive proposal, which Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented to the Soviets in March 1977.The proposal would have added significant reductions and qualitative constraints to the ceilings agreed to at Vladivostok.At the same time, the United States presented an alternative proposal for a SALT II agreement similar to the framework agreed to at Vladivostok, with the Backfire and cruise missile issues deferred until SALT III. The Soviets rejected both proposals as inconsistent with their understanding of the Vladivostok accord. In subsequent negotiations, the sides agreed on a general framework for SALT II that accommodated both the Soviet desire to retain the Vladivostok framework and the U.S. desire for more comprehensive limitations.The agreement would consist of three parts: 1. a treaty that would be in force through 1985 based on the Vladivostok accord; 2. a protocol of about three years’ duration, which would cover such issues as cruise missile constraints, mobile ICBM limits, and qualitative constraints on ICBMs, while deferring further negotiations on these issues to SALT III; and 3. a joint statement of principles, which would be an agreed set of guidelines for future negotiations. Within this framework, negotiations to resolve the remaining differences continued on several levels. President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Washington in September 1977. Further high-level meetings were held in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva during 1978 and 1979. In addition, the U.S. and Soviet SALT delegations in Geneva were in session nearly continuously following the 1974 Vladivostok meeting to work out agreed treaty language on issues for which agreement in principle had been reached at the ministerial level. The completed SALT II Treaty was signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter transmitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on June 22. On January 2, 1980, however, President Carter requested that the Senate majority leader delay consideration of the treaty on the Senate floor in view of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  345

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.Although the treaty remained unratified, under the terms of international law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, each party was individually bound to refrain from acts that would defeat the treaty’s object and purpose until it had made its intentions clear not to become a party. In 1980, President Carter announced the United States would comply with the treaty’s provisions as long as the Soviet Union reciprocated. General Secretary Brezhnev made a similar statement regarding Soviet intentions. In May 1982, President Ronald Reagan stated he would do nothing to undercut the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union showed equal restraint.The Soviet Union again agreed to abide by the unratified treaty. Subsequently, in 1984 and 1985, President Reagan declared that the Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to observe the SALT II Treaty. President Reagan decided however, that an interim framework of mutual restraint remained in the U.S. interest and, in June 1985, declared that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva. On May 26, 1986, President Reagan stated that he had again reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy and that, as he had documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, the Soviet Union had not complied with its political commitment to observe the SALT agreements, including the SALT II Treaty, nor had the Soviet Union indicated its readiness to join in a framework of truly mutual restraint. He declared that, “Given this situation, . . . in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure. . . .” In his statement, President Reagan said that he did not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces and that, assuming no significant change in the threat, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviets.The United States would, in sum, “. . . continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides.” He again called upon the Soviet Union to join the United States “. . . in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.”3 The SALT II Treaty had as its objective the completion of the limitations on strategic offensive systems begun with SALT I. The Interim Agreement had, as have all arms control agreements beginning with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (except the Outer Space Treaty, which permits withdrawal on one-year notice for any reason), a provision permitting withdrawal on three or six months’ notice if an “extraordinary event” related to the subject matter of the agreement should “jeopardize the supreme interests” of a party. At the close of SALT I, the United States stated that if a more complete agreement limiting strategic offensive arms was not achieved in the five-year term of the Interim Agreement, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized.The more complete agreement referred to in this statement was what the SALT II Treaty was intended to be. When the SALT II Treaty had not been completed by 1977, the Interim Agreement was extended indefinitely by parallel policy statements of the parties at the time of its expiration. Unlike the similar step taken with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (see Chapter 14), many senators objected to this arrangement as being in violation of U.S. domestic law, specifically Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which required that arms control agreements be approved subject to U.S. constitutional processes as a treaty or pursuant to 3

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,Washington, D.C., 1990. pp. 263–264.

346  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

further affirmative legislation. After a tumultuous debate, the Senate passed a resolution approving informal extension of the Interim Agreement. The SALT II Treaty was similarly observed through an informal arrangement, initially by an exchange of oral statements between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the fall of 1991. As stated above, the SALT II Treaty was signed in June 1979, two years after the formal expiration of the interim agreement. By its terms it was to continue in force until the end of 1985. It implemented the Vladivostok Accord of 1974, in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the principle of equal aggregate limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The SALT II Treaty established an aggregate limitation of 2,400 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. This aggregate was to be reduced to 2,250 eighteen months after entry into force. Consistent with the Vladivostok accord, limitations were placed on multiple warhead systems, which were ultimately to include heavy bombers carrying long-range (in excess of 600 kilometers), air-launched cruise missiles, and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped for MIRVs.The treaty established a limit of 1,320 such multiple-warhead systems, 1,200 launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped for MIRVs, and 820 launchers of ICBMs equipped for MIRVs (viewed as the most threatening of strategic systems). A definition of heavy ICBMs was achieved in terms of launch weight and throw weight. A heavy ICBM was an ICBM greater in either of these two measures than the largest light ICBM, by then the Soviet SS-19, a MIRVed, substantially larger, and much more capable replacement for the less accurate, single-warhead SS-11, which had been the largest light ICBM in 1972. The provision codifying the Soviet monopoly in heavy ICBMs was carried over from the interim agreement. In Article IV, Paragraph 7 a cap in terms of launch weight and throw weight was placed on missile growth beyond the parameters of the SS-18, a heavy ICBM that was a MIRVed and much more capable replacement for the SS-9. Two important verification counting rules were achieved. By national technical means, it is not possible to determine how many individual warheads, below maximum capacity for a particular type, are actually deployed on specific missiles tested with MIRVs. Likewise, it is not possible to determine what type of missile, MIRVed or non-MIRVed, is actually deployed in a particular launcher, hence the “type” rules set forth in Article II, Paragraph 5 (i.e., once a launcher of a particular type has had a missile equipped with MIRVs flight tested from it, all launchers of that type shall be included in the MIRV launcher aggregate total, regardless of the type of missile that is actually deployed in any such missile launcher; further, that once a type of missile has been flight tested with MIRVs, all missiles of that type are considered to be equipped with MIRVs). Article IV of the SALT II Treaty contains many provisions that are important to the treaty’s operation. Paragraph 3 is the above-mentioned provision codifying the Soviet Union’s monopoly of ICBMs at 308.This provision takes the form of a ban on the conversion of a launcher of a light ICBM to a launcher of a heavy ICBM and necessitates the definition of heavy ICBMs found in Article II, Paragraph 7. Article IV also contains the upper limit, in terms of launch weight and throw weight, on heavy ICBMs. Paragraph 8 prohibits conversion of medium-range ballistic missiles to ICBMs, which is accompanied by a common understanding banning the Soviet SS-16 ICBM. Since the Soviet SS-20 mediumrange ballistic missile was simply the first two of the three missile stages of the SS-16 ICBM, this provision was designed to prevent breakout from the SALT II limitations by the deployment of a third stage on the unregulated SS-20. A protocol to the SALT II Treaty of three years’ duration prohibited the flight testing of land-mobile ICBMS and the deployment of land-mobile ICBM launchers, after which, pursuant to the treaty, such systems would be permitted and included in the limitations unless further constraints should be agreed. The

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  347

protocol banned deployment of long-range, sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles for three years. Article IV, Paragraphs 9 through 11, contains elaborate provisions designed to limit growth of ICBM capability. Each party is limited to one “new type” of light ICBM, defined as a change in the propellant (liquid or solid) or more than 5 percent change in length, largest diameter, or throw weight.The one permitted new type can have no more than ten reentry vehicles, and each existing type ICBM cannot be tested with more than the maximum number of reentry vehicles it was tested with.These numbers are listed for each ICBM type. An exception is made for the U.S. Minuteman III, once tested with seven very small reentry vehicles, which is capped at three. In addition, testing or deploying of an SLBM with more than fourteen reentry vehicles is prohibited. The SALT II Treaty was to be verified by national technical means. In a common understanding associated with Article XV, encoding (encryption) of telemetry signals from an ICBM to the ground during a test flight that impedes (not prevents, but impedes) verification is prohibited.The treaty also contains, in Article XII, a prohibition on the circumvention of the limitations of the treaty through a third state or states or in any other manner.This provision, in a vague and general way, was designed to reduce the potential of the United States to evade the limitations of the treaty by transferring systems limited by the treaty to its allies, although the United States made clear its existing programs of cooperation would not be affected. Finally, the Soviet Backfire bomber was not included in the heavy bomber aggregate, but at the Vienna summit meeting where the Salt II Treaty was signed in June 1979, President Carter negotiated with President Brezhnev constraints in upgrading its capability, such as a prohibition on giving it in-flight refueling capability. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified, and strategic offensive nuclear arms negotiations began again in 1982 under the rubric of the START negotiations.Verification of START was to be not only by national technical means but also by extensive and intrusive on-site inspection. The limitations were placed on warheads directly, as well as on missiles and associated launchers.These are the legacies of the arms control breakthrough codified in the INF Treaty.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, TOGETHER WITH AGREED STATEMENTS AND COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE TREATY Signed at Vienna June 18, 1979 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972, Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and determined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the

348  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972, Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Guided by the principle of equality and equal security, Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament, Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each Party undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, to limit strategic offensive arms quantitatively and qualitatively, to exercise restraint in the development of new types of strategic offensive arms, and to adopt other measures provided for in this Treaty. Article II For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers are land-based launchers of ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental part of the territory of the United States of America and the northwestern border of the continental part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. First Agreed Statement.4 The term “intercontinental ballistic missile launchers,” as defined in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, includes all launchers which have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs. Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms provided for in Article III of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

4

The text of the SALT II Treaty and Protocol, as signed in Vienna, is accompanied by a set of Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, also signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev, which is prefaced as follows: In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed on the following Agreed Statements and Common Understandings undertaken on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: As an aid to the reader, the texts of the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings are beneath the articles of the Treaty or Protocol to which they pertain.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  349

Third Common Understanding. The one hundred and seventy-seven former Atlas and Titan I ICBM launchers of the United States of America, which are no longer operational and are partially dismantled, shall not be considered as subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Second Agreed Statement. After the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, mobile ICBM launchers shall be subject to the relevant limitations provided for in the Treaty which are applicable to ICBM launchers, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after that date. 2. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers are launchers of ballistic missiles installed on any nuclear-powered submarine or launchers of modern ballistic missiles installed on any submarine, regardless of its type. Agreed Statement. Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are: for the United States of America, missiles installed in all nuclear-powered submarines; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type installed in nuclear-powered submarines made operational since 1965; and for both Parties, submarine-launched ballistic missiles first flight-tested since 1965 and installed in any submarine, regardless of its type. 3. Heavy bombers are considered to be: (a) currently, for the United States of America, bombers of the B-52 and B-1 types, and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, bombers of the Tupolev-95 and Myasishchev types; (b) in the future, types of bombers which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of bombers listed in subparagraph (a) above; (c) types of bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and (d) types of bombers equipped for ASBMs. First Agreed Statement. The term “bombers,” as used in paragraph 3 of Article II and other provisions of the Treaty, means airplanes of types initially constructed to be equipped for bombs or missiles. Second Agreed Statement. The Parties shall notify each other on a case-by-case basis in the Standing Consultative Commission of inclusion of types of bombers as heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty; in this connection the Parties shall hold consultations, as appropriate, consistent with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty. Third Agreed Statement. The criteria the Parties shall use to make case-by-case determinations of which types of bombers in the future can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber in a manner similar or superior to that of current heavy bombers, as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. Fourth Agreed Statement. Having agreed that every bomber of a type included in paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty is to be considered a heavy bomber, the Parties further agree that: (a) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a heavy bomber type shall not be considered to be bombers of a heavy bomber type if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber; (b) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article

350  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; and (c) airplanes which otherwise would be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they have functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs, except that heavy bombers of current types, as designated in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty, which otherwise would be of a type equipped for ASBMs shall not be considered to be heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable differences from heavy bombers of a type equipped for ASBMs. First Common Understanding. Functionally related observable differences are differences in the observable features of airplanes which indicate whether or not these airplanes can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for ASBMs. Functionally related observable differences shall be verifiable by national technical means. To this end, the Parties may take, as appropriate, cooperative measures contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means. Fifth Agreed Statement. Tupolev-142 airplanes in their current configuration, that is, in the configuration for anti-submarine warfare, are considered to be airplanes of a type different from types of heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty and not subject to the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty.This Agreed Statement does not preclude improvement of Tupolev-142 airplanes as an anti-submarine system, and does not prejudice or set a precedent for designation in the future of types of airplanes as heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article II of the Treaty or for application of the Fourth Agreed Statement to paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty to such airplanes. Second Common Understanding. Not later than six months after entry into force of the Treaty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give its thirty-one Myasishchev airplanes used as tankers in existence as of the date of signature of the Treaty functionally related observable differences which indicate that they cannot perform the mission of a heavy bomber. Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers referred to in subparagraph 3(a) of Article II of the Treaty correspond in the following manner: Heavy bombers of the types designated by the United States of America as the B-52 and the B-1 are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Tupolev-95 are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bear type; and Heavy bombers of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the Myasishchev are known to the United States of America as heavy bombers of the Bison type. 4. Air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are any such missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings. 5. Launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are launchers of the types developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  351

First Agreed Statement. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. First Common Understanding. If a launcher contains or launches an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, that launcher shall be considered to have been developed and tested for launching ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. Second Common Understanding. If a launcher has been developed and tested for launching an ICBM or an SLBM equipped with MIRVs, all launchers of that type, except for ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers, shall be included in the corresponding aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty, pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty. Second Agreed Statement. ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs are ICBMs and SLBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. As of the date of signature of the Treaty, such ICBMs and SLBMs are: for the United States of America, Minuteman III ICBMs, Poseidon C-3 SLBMs, and Trident C-4 SLBMs; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, RS-16, RS-18, RS-20 ICBMs and RSM-50 SLBMs. Each Party will notify the other Party in the Standing Consultative Commission on a case-by-case basis of the designation of the one new type of light ICBM, if equipped with MIRVs, permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty when first flight-tested; of designations of additional types of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs when first installed on a submarine; and of designations of types of ASBMs equipped with MIRVs when first flight-tested. Third Common Understanding. The designations by the United States of America and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs correspond in the following manner:  Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Minuteman III

and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;  Missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Poseidon C-3 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1968 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;  Missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Trident C-4 and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation, an SLBM that was first flight-tested in 1977 and that has been flight-tested with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;  Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-16 and known to the United States of America as the SS-17, a light ICBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;  Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-18 and known to the United States of America as the SS-19, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of light ICBMs, which has been flighttested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;  Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-20

and known to the United States of America as the SS-18, the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of heavy ICBMs, which has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles;

352  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  Missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSM-

50 and known to the United States of America as the SS-N-18, an SLBM that has been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle and with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Third Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems; (b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future. Fourth Common Understanding. For the purposes of this Treaty, all ICBM launchers in the Derazhnya and Pervomaysk areas in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are included in the aggregate numbers provided for in Article V of the Treaty. Fifth Common Understanding. If ICBM or SLBM launchers are converted, constructed or undergo significant changes to their principal observable structural design features after entry into force of the Treaty, any such launchers which are launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs, and any such launchers which are launchers of missiles not equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from launchers of missiles equipped with MIRVs, on the basis of externally observable design features of the launchers. Submarines with launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs shall be distinguishable from submarines with launchers of SLBMs not equipped with MIRVs on the basis of externally observable design features of the submarines. This Common Understanding does not require changes to launcher conversion or construction programs, or to programs including significant changes to the principal observable structural design features of launchers, underway as of the date of signature of the Treaty. 6.ASBMs equipped with MIRVs are ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs. First Agreed Statement. ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with MIRVs are all ASBMs of the types which have been flight-tested with two or more independently targetable reentry vehicles, regardless of whether or not they have also been flight-tested with a single reentry vehicle or with multiple reentry vehicles which are not independently targetable. Second Agreed Statement. Reentry vehicles are independently targetable: (a) if, after separation from the booster, maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of devices which are installed in a self-contained dispensing mechanism or on the reentry vehicles, and which are based on the use of electronic or other computers in combination with devices using jet engines, including rocket engines, or aerodynamic systems; (b) if maneuvering and targeting of the reentry vehicles to separate aim points along trajectories which are unrelated to each other are accomplished by means of other devices which may be developed in the future. 7. Heavy ICBMs are ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement.The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  353

Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding. The term “other appropriate devices,” as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article II of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. 8. Cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapon-delivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on aircraft, that is, air-launched cruise missiles, or such vehicles which are referred to as cruise missiles in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX. First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapondelivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features. Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Treaty to flighttest from or deploy on aircraft unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flight-testing or deployment.This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones.

354  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Article III 1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each Party undertakes to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,400. 2. Each Party undertakes to limit, from January 1, 1981, strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number. 3.Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates. 4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of such missiles for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. 5.A heavy bomber equipped only for ASBMs shall not itself be included in the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. 6. Reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be carried out as provided for in Article XI. Article IV 1. Each Party undertakes not to start construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. 2. Each Party undertakes not to relocate fixed ICBM launchers. 3. Each Party undertakes not to convert launchers of light ICBMs, or of ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into launchers of heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time. 4. Each Party undertakes in the process of modernization and replacement of ICBM silo launchers not to increase the original internal volume of an ICBM silo launcher by more than thirty-two percent.Within this limit each Party has the right to determine whether such an increase will be made through an increase in the original diameter or in the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher, or in both of these dimensions. Agreed Statement. The word “original” in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty refers to the internal dimensions of an ICBM silo launcher, including its internal volume, as of May 26, 1972, or as of the date on which such launcher becomes operational, whichever is later. Common Understanding. The obligations provided for in paragraph 4 of Article IV of the Treaty and in the Agreed Statement thereto mean that the original diameter or the original depth of an ICBM silo launcher may not be increased by an amount greater than that which would result in an increase in the original internal volume of the ICBM silo launcher by thirty-two percent solely through an increase in one of these dimensions. 5. Each Party undertakes: (a) not to supply ICBM launcher deployment areas with intercontinental ballistic missiles in excess of a number consistent with normal deployment, maintenance, training, and replacement requirements; (b) not to provide storage facilities for or to store ICBMs in excess of normal deployment requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers; (c) not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers. Agreed Statement. The term “normal deployment requirements,” as used in paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty, means the deployment of one missile at each ICBM launcher. 6. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms referred to in paragraph 1 of Article III in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  355

Common Understanding. A normal construction schedule, in paragraph 6 of Article IV of the Treaty, is understood to be one consistent with the past or present construction practices of each Party. 7. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ICBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throwweight, respectively, of the heavy ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement.The launch-weight of an ICBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. Second Agreed Statement. The throw-weight of an ICBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding. The term “other appropriate devices,” as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an ICBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article IV of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity or more than 1,000 meters per second. 8. Each Party undertakes not to convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles which are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, and not to test them for this purpose. Common Understanding. During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-14 and known to the United States of America as the SS-16, a light ICBM first flight-tested after 1970 and flight-tested only with a single reentry vehicle; this Common Understanding also means that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce the third stage of that missile, the reentry vehicle of that missile, or the appropriate device for targeting the reentry vehicle of that missile. 9. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs, that is, types of ICBMs not flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of light ICBM. First Agreed Statement.The term “new types of ICBMs,” as used in paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, refers to any ICBM which is different from those ICBMs flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 in any one or more of the following respects: (a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or the throwweight, of the missile; (b) the type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of any of its stages. First Common Understanding. As used in the First Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term “different,” referring to the length, the diameter, the launch-weight, and the throw-weight of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent. Second Agreed Statement. Every ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall have the same number of stages and the same type of propellant (that is, liquid or solid) of each stage as the first ICBM of the one new type of light ICBM launched by that Party. In addition, after the twenty-fifth launch of an ICBM of that type, or after the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier, ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to that Party shall not be

356  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

different in any one or more of the following respects: the length, the largest diameter, the launchweight, or the throw-weight, of the missile. A Party which launches ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty shall promptly notify the other Party of the date of the first launch and of the date of either the twenty-fifth or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier. Second Common Understanding. As used in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, the term “different,” referring to the length, the diameter, the launchweight, and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier.The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than ten percent from any other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those twelve launches. Third Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throwweight, provided for in the First Agreed Statement and the First Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent. In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launchweight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, and the decrease in launch-weight and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant. Fourth Common Understanding. The limitations with respect to launch-weight and throwweight, provided for in the Second Agreed Statement and the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, do not preclude the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, even if this results in a decrease in launch-weight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent. In addition to the aforementioned cases, those limitations do not preclude a decrease in launchweight or in throw-weight in excess of five percent, in the case of the flight-testing or the deployment of ICBMs of that type with a lesser quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, than the maximum quantity of propellant, including the propellant of a self-contained dispensing mechanism or other appropriate device, with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, provided that such an ICBM is at the same time flight-tested or deployed with fewer reentry vehicles, or fewer penetration aids, or both, than the maximum number of reentry vehicles and the maximum number of penetration aids with which ICBMs of that type have been flight-tested, and the decrease in launch-weight

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  357

and throw-weight in such cases results only from the reduction in the number of reentry vehicles, or penetration aids, or both, and the reduction in the quantity of propellant. 10. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979 with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date. First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below: For the United States of America ICBMs of the Minuteman III type—Seven reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type—Fourteen reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type—Seven reentry vehicles. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ICBMs of the RS-16 type—Four reentry vehicles; ICBMs of the RS-18 type—Six reentry vehicles; ICBMs of the RS-20 type—Ten reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the RSM-50 type—Seven reentry vehicles. Common Understanding. Minuteman III ICBMs of the United States of America have been deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles. During the term of the Treaty, the United States of America has no plans to and will not flight-test or deploy missiles of this type with more than three reentry vehicles. Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979, the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement “procedures for releasing or for dispensing” are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. Third Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes: (a) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with multiple reentry vehicles, of a type flighttested as of May 1, 1979, with reentry vehicles the weight of any of which is less than the weight of the lightest of those reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of that date; (b) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and without an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle on an ICBM of a type equipped with MIRVs and flight-tested by that Party as of May 1, 1979; and (c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle and with an appropriate device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than fifty percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. 11. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs of the one new type permitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten.

358  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

First Agreed Statement. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy the one new type of light ICBM permitted to each Party pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of that type has been flight-tested as of the twenty-fifth launch or the last launch before deployment begins of ICBMs of that type, whichever occurs earlier. Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement “procedures for releasing or for dispensing” are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 12. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an SLBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, fourteen. First Agreed Statement. The following types of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs have been flight-tested with the maximum number of reentry vehicles set forth below: For the United States of America ICBMs of the Minuteman III type—Seven reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the Poseidon C-3 type—Fourteen reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the Trident C-4 type—Seven reentry vehicles. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ICBMs of the RS-16 type—Four reentry vehicles; ICBMs of the RS-18 type—Six reentry vehicles; ICBMs of the RS-20 type—Ten reentry vehicles; SLBMs of the RSM-50 type—Seven reentry vehicles. Second Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement “procedures for releasing or dispensing” are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM of either Party has been flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, that is, ten. Agreed Statement. During the flight-testing of any ICBM, SLBM, or ASBM after May 1, 1979 the number of procedures for releasing or for dispensing may not exceed the maximum number of reentry vehicles established for missiles of corresponding types as provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. In this Agreed Statement “procedures for releasing or for dispensing” are understood to mean maneuvers of a missile associated with targeting and releasing or dispensing its reentry vehicles to aim points, whether or not a reentry vehicle is actually released or dispensed. Procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids will not be considered to

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  359

be procedures for releasing or for dispensing a reentry vehicle so long as the procedures for releasing anti-missile defense penetration aids differ from those for releasing or for dispensing reentry vehicles. 14. Each Party undertakes not to deploy at any one time on heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers a number of such cruise missiles which exceeds the product of 28 and the number of such heavy bombers. First Agreed Statement. For the purposes of the limitation provided for in paragraph 14 of Article IV of the Treaty, there shall be considered to be deployed on each heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers the maximum number of such missiles for which any bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. Second Agreed Statement. During the term of the Treaty no bomber of the B-52 or B-1 types of the United States of America and no bomber of the Tupolev-95 or Myasishchev types of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be equipped for more than twenty cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Article V 1. Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, and heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,320,455. 2.Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 1,200. 3.Within the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, each Party undertakes to limit launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs to an aggregate number not to exceed 820. 4. For each bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall include the maximum number of ASBMs for which a bomber of that type is equipped for one operational mission. Agreed Statement. If a bomber is equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs, all bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. 5.Within the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Article and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of these aggregates. Article VI 1.The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are: (a) operational; (b) in the final stage of construction; (c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed; (d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion. 2.Those arms in the final stage of construction are: (a) SLBM launchers on submarines which have begun sea trials; (b) ASBMs after a bomber of a type equipped for such missiles has been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where its final assembly or conversion for the purpose of equipping it for such missiles has been performed;

360  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

(c) other strategic offensive arms which are finally assembled in a shop, plant, or other facility after they have been brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where their final assembly has been performed. 3. ICBM and SLBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation as follows: (a) fixed ICBM launchers when work on their conversion reaches the stage which first definitely indicates that they are being so converted; (b) SLBM launchers on a submarine when that submarine first goes to sea after their conversion has been performed. Agreed Statement. The procedures referred to in paragraph 7 of Article VI of the Treaty shall include procedures determining the manner in which mobile ICBM launchers of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, which undergo conversion into launchers of a type subject to that limitation, shall become subject to that limitation, unless the Parties agree that mobile ICBM launchers shall not be deployed after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force. 4.ASBMs on a bomber which undergoes conversion from a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are not subject to the limitation provided for in Article V into a bomber of a type equipped for ASBMs which are subject to that limitation shall become subject to that limitation when the bomber is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where such conversion has been performed. 5.A heavy bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V shall become subject to that limitation when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a heavy bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.A bomber of a type not subject to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 or 2 of Article III shall become subject to that limitation and to the limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V when it is brought out of the shop, plant, or other facility where it has been converted into a bomber of a type equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 6. The arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty shall continue to be subject to these limitations until they are dismantled, are destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under procedures to be agreed upon. Agreed Statement. The procedures for removal of strategic offensive arms from the aggregate numbers provided for in the Treaty, which are referred to in paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty, and which are to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission, shall include: (a) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Article V of the Treaty, of ICBM and SLBM launchers which are being converted from launchers of a type subject to the limitation provided for in Article V of the Treaty, into launchers of a type not subject to that limitation; (b) procedures for removal from the aggregate numbers, provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty, of bombers which are being converted from bombers of a type subject to the limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty or in Articles III and V of the Treaty into airplanes or bombers of a type not so subject. Common Understanding. The procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) of the Agreed Statement to paragraph 6 of Article VI of the Treaty for removal of bombers from the aggregate numbers provided for in Articles III and V of the Treaty shall be based upon the existence of functionally related observable differences which indicate whether or not they can perform the mission of a heavy bomber, or whether or not they can perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  361

7. In accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the Parties will agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article. Article VII 1.The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or to space vehicle launchers for exploration and use of outer space. ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers are ICBM and SLBM launchers used only for testing or training. Common Understanding. The term “testing,” as used in Article VII of the Treaty, includes research and development. 2.The Parties agree that: (a) there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers of heavy ICBMs; (b) construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training; (c) there shall be no conversion of ICBM test and training launchers or of space vehicle launchers into ICBM launchers subject to the limitations provided for in Article III. First Agreed Statement. The term “significant increase,” as used in subparagraph 2(a) of Article VII of the Treaty, means an increase of fifteen percent or more.Any new ICBM test and training launchers which replace ICBM test and training launchers at test ranges will be located only at test ranges. Second Agreed Statement. Current test ranges where ICBMs are tested are located: for the United States of America, near Santa Maria, California, and at Cape Canaveral, Florida; and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the areas of Tyura-Tam and Plesetskaya. In the future, each Party shall provide notification in the Standing Consultative Commission of the location of any other test range used by that Party to test ICBMs. First Common Understanding. At test ranges where ICBMs are tested, other arms, including those not limited by the Treaty, may also be tested. Second Common Understanding. Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. Dismantling or destruction of the twelve launchers shall begin upon entry into force of the Treaty and shall be completed within eight months, under procedures for dismantling or destruction of these launchers to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. These twelve launchers shall not be replaced. Conversion of the six launchers may be carried out after entry into force of the Treaty.After entry into force of the Treaty, fractional orbital missiles shall be removed and shall be destroyed pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX and of Article XI of the Treaty and shall not be replaced by other missiles, except in the case of conversion of these six launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization. After removal of the fractional orbital missiles, and prior to such conversion, any activities associated with these launchers shall be limited to normal maintenance requirements for launchers in which missiles are not deployed.These six launchers shall be subject to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty and, if converted, to the provisions of the Fifth Common Understanding to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty. Article VIII 1. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or ASBMs from aircraft other than bombers or to convert such aircraft into aircraft equipped for such missiles.

362  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Agreed Statement. For purposes of testing only, each Party has the right, through initial construction or, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, by conversion, to equip for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs no more than sixteen airplanes, including airplanes which are prototypes of bombers equipped for such missiles. Each Party also has the right, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, to flight-test from such airplanes cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers and, after the date on which the Protocol ceases to be in force, to flighttest ASBMs from such airplanes as well, unless the Parties agree that they will not flight-test ASBMs after that date. The limitations provided for in Article III of the Treaty shall not apply to such airplanes.The aforementioned airplanes may include only: (a) airplanes other than bombers which, as an exception to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, have been converted into airplanes equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs; (b) airplanes considered to be heavy bombers pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) or 3(d) of Article II of the Treaty; and (c) airplanes other than heavy bombers which, prior to March 7, 1979, were used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The airplanes referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Agreed Statement shall be distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers or for ASBMs. The airplanes referred to in subparagraph (c) of this Agreed Statement shall not be used for testing cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers after the expiration of a six-month period from the date of entry into force of the Treaty, unless by the expiration of that period they are distinguishable on the basis of functionally related observable differences from airplanes which otherwise would be of the same type but cannot perform the mission of a bomber equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. First Common Understanding. The term “testing,” as used in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty, includes research and development. Second Common Understanding. The Parties shall notify each other in the Standing Consultative Commission of the number of airplanes, according to type, used for testing pursuant to the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Such notification shall be provided at the first regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission held after an airplane has been used for such testing. Third Common Understanding. None of the sixteen airplanes referred to in the Agreed Statement to paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty may be replaced, except in the event of the involuntary destruction of any such airplane or in the case of the dismantling or destruction of any such airplane.The procedures for such replacement and for removal of any such airplane from that number, in case of its conversion, shall be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. 2. Each Party undertakes not to convert aircraft other than bombers into aircraft which can carry out the mission of a heavy bomber as referred to in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II. Article IX 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy: (a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  363

Common Understanding to subparagraph (a). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IX of the Treaty do not affect current practices for transporting ballistic missiles. (b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers; Agreed Statement to subparagraph (b). The obligations provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article IX of the Treaty shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. (c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles; Common Understanding to subparagraph (c). The provisions of subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX of the Treaty do not require the dismantling or destruction of any existing launchers of either Party. (d) mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; (e) SLBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty, or launchers of such SLBMs; or (f) ASBMs which have a launch-weight greater or a throw-weight greater than that of the heaviest, in terms of either launch-weight or throw-weight, respectively, of the light ICBMs deployed by either Party as of the date of signature of this Treaty. First Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The launch-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the weight of the fully loaded missile itself at the time of launch. Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM is the sum of the weight of: (a) its reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles; (b) any self-contained dispensing mechanisms or other appropriate devices for targeting one reentry vehicle, or for releasing or for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and (c) its penetration aids, including devices for their release. Common Understanding to subparagraphs (e) and (f). The term “other appropriate devices,” as used in the definition of the throw-weight of an SLBM or of an ASBM in the Second Agreed Statement to subparagraphs 1(e) and (f) of Article IX of the Treaty, means any devices for dispensing and targeting two or more reentry vehicles; and any devices for releasing two or more reentry vehicles or for targeting one reentry vehicle, which cannot provide their reentry vehicles or reentry vehicle with additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. 2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from aircraft cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads and not to deploy such cruise missiles on aircraft. Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile.

364  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Article X Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. Article XI 1. Strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate numbers provided for in this Treaty as well as strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be dismantled or destroyed under procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission. 2. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 1 of Article III shall begin on the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and shall be completed within the following periods from that date: four months for ICBM launchers; six months for SLBM launchers; and three months for heavy bombers. 3. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms which would be in excess of the aggregate number provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III shall be initiated no later than January 1, 1981, shall be carried out throughout the ensuing twelve-month period, and shall be completed no later than December 31, 1981. 4. Dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms prohibited by this Treaty shall be completed within the shortest possible agreed period of time, but not later than six months after the entry into force of this Treaty. Article XII In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state or states, or in any other manner. Article XIII Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty. Article XIV The Parties undertake to begin, promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, active negotiations with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is also the objective of the Parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this Treaty upon its expiration. Article XV 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. First Agreed Statement. Deliberate concealment measures, as referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, are measures carried out deliberately to hinder or deliberately to impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  365

Second Agreed Statement. The obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures, provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, does not preclude the testing of anti-missile defense penetration aids. First Common Understanding. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement thereto apply to all provisions of the Treaty, including provisions associated with testing. In this connection, the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing. Second Common Understanding. Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. Third Common Understanding. In addition to the obligations provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty shall be used over ICBM silo launchers. Article XVI 1. Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory. First Common Understanding. ICBM launches to which the obligations provided for in Article XVI of the Treaty apply, include, among others, those ICBM launches for which advance notification is required pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971, and the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed May 25, 1972. Nothing in Article XVI of the Treaty is intended to inhibit advance notification, on a voluntary basis, of any ICBM launches not subject to its provisions, the advance notification of which would enhance confidence between the Parties. Second Common Understanding. A multiple ICBM launch conducted by a Party, as distinct from single ICBM launches referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty, is a launch which would result in two or more of its ICBMs being in flight at the same time. Third Common Understanding. The test ranges referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty are those covered by the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty. 2.The Parties shall agree in the Standing Consultative Commission upon procedures to implement the provisions of this Article. Article XVII 1.To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972. 2.Within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, the Parties will: (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

366  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification, and questions involving unintended impeding of verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty; (d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures for replacement, conversion, and dismantling or destruction, of strategic offensive arms in cases provided for in the provisions of this Treaty and upon procedures for removal of such arms from the aggregate numbers when they otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, and at regular sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission, notify each other in accordance with the aforementioned procedures, at least twice annually, of actions completed and those in process; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty; (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. 3. In the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain by category the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms of June 18, 1979. Agreed Statement. In order to maintain the agreed data base on the numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the Treaty, at each regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties will notify each other of and consider changes in those numbers in the following categories: launchers of ICBMs; fixed launchers of ICBMs; launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs; launchers of SLBMs; launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs; heavy bombers; heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers; heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs; ASBMs; and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. Article XVIII Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty. Article XIX 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall remain in force through December 31, 1985, unless replaced earlier by an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms. 2.This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  367

For the United States of America: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS , TOGETHER WITH AGREED S TATEMENTS AND C OMMON U NDERSTANDINGS REGARDING THE PROTOCOL The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Having agreed on limitations on strategic offensive arms in the Treaty, Having agreed on additional limitations for the period during which this Protocol remains in force, as follows: Article I Each Party undertakes not to deploy mobile ICBM launchers or to flight-test ICBMs for such launchers. Article II 1. Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers. 2. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers which are equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads from sea-based launchers or from land-based launchers. Agreed Statement. Warheads of a cruise missile are independently targetable if maneuvering or targeting of the warheads to separate aim points along ballistic trajectories or any other flight paths, which are unrelated to each other, is accomplished during a flight of a cruise missile. 3. For the purposes of this Protocol, cruise missiles are unmanned, self-propelled, guided, weapondelivery vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and which are flight-tested from or deployed on sea-based or land-based launchers, that is, sea-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, respectively. First Agreed Statement. If a cruise missile is capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. First Common Understanding. If a cruise missile has been flight-tested to a range in excess of 600 kilometers, it shall be considered to be a cruise missile capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Second Common Understanding. Cruise missiles not capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers shall not be considered to be of a type capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers if they are distinguishable on the basis of externally observable design features from cruise missiles of types capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

368  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Second Agreed Statement. The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. Third Agreed Statement. If an unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all vehicles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Third Common Understanding. Unmanned, self-propelled, guided vehicles which sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of their flight path and are not weapondelivery vehicles, that is, unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles, shall not be considered to be cruise missiles if such vehicles are distinguishable from cruise missiles on the basis of externally observable design features. Fourth Common Understanding. Neither Party shall convert unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles into cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers, nor shall either Party convert cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers into unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles. Fifth Common Understanding. Neither Party has plans during the term of the Protocol to flight-test from or deploy on sea-based or land-based launchers unarmed, pilotless, guided vehicles which are capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers. In the future, should a Party have such plans, that Party will provide notification thereof to the other Party well in advance of such flighttesting or deployment.This Common Understanding does not apply to target drones. Article III Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy ASBMs. Article IV This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force through December 31, 1981, unless replaced earlier by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA B ASE ON THE N UMBERS OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have considered data

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  369

on numbers of strategic offensive arms and agree that as of November 1, 1978 there existed the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today. Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with MIRVs

U.S.A.

USSR

1,054 1,054 550 656 496 574

1,398 1,398 576 950 128 156

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

At the time of entry into force of the Treaty the Parties will update the above agreed data in the categories listed in this Memorandum. DONE at Vienna on June 18, 1979, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Ralph Earle II, Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: V. Karpov, Chief of the USSR Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE T REATY The United States of America declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today: Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with MIRVs

1,054 1,054 550 656 496 573 3 0 0 0

370  THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE T REATY The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that as of June 18, 1979 it possesses the following numbers of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty which is being signed today: Launchers of ICBMs Fixed launchers of ICBMs Launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs Launchers of SLBMs Launchers of SLBMs equipped with MIRVs Heavy bombers Heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers Heavy bombers equipped only for ASBMs ASBMs ASBMs equipped with MIRVs

1,398 1,398 608 950 144 156 0 0 0 0

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND B ASIC GUIDELINES FOR S UBSEQUENT N EGOTIATIONS ON THE L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC A RMS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Having concluded the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Reaffirming that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security, Convinced that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, Have agreed as follows: First.The Parties will continue to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation. In furtherance of existing agreements between the Parties on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, the Parties will continue, for the purposes of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to seek measures to strengthen strategic stability by, among other things, limitations on strategic offensive arms most destabilizing to the strategic balance and by measures to reduce and to avert the risk of surprise attack. Second. Further limitations and reductions of strategic arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means, using additionally, as appropriate, cooperative measures

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS  371

contributing to the effectiveness of verification by national technical means.The Parties will seek to strengthen verification and to perfect the operation of the Standing Consultative Commission in order to promote assurance of compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties. Third.The Parties shall pursue in the course of these negotiations, taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation, the following objectives: 1) significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms; 2) qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing, and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms; 3) resolution of the issues included in the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in the context of the negotiations relating to the implementation of the principles and objectives set out herein. Fourth.The Parties will consider other steps to ensure and enhance strategic stability, to ensure the equality and equal security of the Parties, and to implement the above principles and objectives. Each Party will be free to raise any issue relative to the further limitation of strategic arms. The Parties will also consider further joint measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. Vienna, June 18, 1979 For the United States of America: Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev, General Secretary for the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

SOVIET B ACKFIRE STATEMENT On June 16, 1979, President Brezhnev handed President Carter the following written statement The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet “Tu-22M” airplane, called “Backfire” in the U.S.A., is a medium-range bomber, and that it does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the U.S.A. Nor does it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner, including by in-flight refueling. At the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to the present rate. President Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Backfire production rate would not exceed 30 per year. President Carter stated that the United States enters into the SALT II Agreement on the basis of the commitments contained in the Soviet statement and that it considers the carrying out of these commitments to be essential to the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Cyrus Vance

14

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), was signed in July 1974. It establishes a nuclear “threshold,” by prohibiting nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The threshold was militarily important since it removed the possibility of testing new or existing nuclear weapons beyond the fractionalmegaton range. In the previous decade, both countries conducted many tests greater than 150 kilotons.The mutual restraint undertaken significantly reduced the yields of subsequent weapon tests. Of particular significance is the relationship between explosive power of reliable, tested warheads and a perceived first-strike capability. The task of negotiating a comprehensive test ban remained on the agenda, and in Article I the parties undertook an obligation to continue negotiations toward that goal. The first major negotiations with the Soviet Union for an effectively controlled test ban began in Geneva in 1958, with the United Kingdom also participating (see Chapter 28). Titled the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, it produced no agreement.The problem of working out verification procedures to ensure compliance with a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests in all environments proved to be intractable at that time.The procedures deemed necessary by the United States and the United Kingdom were not acceptable to the Soviet Union and vice versa. In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was signed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom.The LTBT prohibited nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The parties also agreed not to carry out any nuclear weapon test, or any other nuclear explosion, in any other environment (i.e., underground) that would cause radioactive debris to be present beyond the borders of the country in which the explosion took place. The 1963 treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear explosions, although in the treaty preamble and Article I the LTBT parties pledged to seek “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. . . .” The United States and Soviet Union agreed in the spring of 1974 to pursue the possibilities of further restrictions on nuclear testing. Accordingly, a team of U.S. experts was sent to Moscow for technical talks. The alternatives considered were a limit on the number of underground tests or a limit on their yield or explosive power. The U.S. government decided to propose a yield limit of 150 kilotons, slightly more than ten times that of the atomic explosion at Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. The United States judged that such a limit would not hinder its basic program to support nuclear deterrence and would limit the Soviet Union’s high-yield programs associated with their very large, or “heavy,” ICBMs.The proposal to limit underground nuclear weapon tests to 150 kilotons

T

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  373

was made to the Soviets, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty codifying this constraint was negotiated at a summit meeting Moscow in June 1974. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty includes a protocol that details technical data to be exchanged and limits weapon testing to specific designated test sites to assist verification.The data to be exchanged includes information on geographical boundaries and geology of the testing areas. Geological data, including such factors as density of rock formation, water saturation, and depth of water table, are useful in verifying test yields because the seismic signal produced by a given underground nuclear explosion at a given test location will vary with these factors. After an actual test has taken place, the geographic coordinates of the test location are to be furnished to the other party, to help in siting the test in a proper geological setting and thus assessing the yield. Other information available to the United States was used to cross-check the data provided. The treaty also stipulated that data would be exchanged on a certain number of tests for calibration purposes. By establishing the correlation between the stated yields of explosions at specified sites and the seismic signals produced, the data exchange would improve both parties’ assessments of the explosion yields based primarily on measurements derived from their seismic instruments.The calibration tests could be those conducted in the past or new tests.Agreement to exchange the detailed data described above represented a significant degree of direct cooperation by the major nuclear powers in the effort to control nuclear weapons. For the first time, each party made available to the other data relating to its nuclear weapon test program. The technical problems associated with a yield threshold were recognized by the sides in the spring of 1974, during negotiation of the TTBT. In this context, the Soviet Union mentioned the idea of some kind of a “mistakes” understanding concerning occasional, minor, unintended breaches. Discussion about such an understanding took place in autumn 1974 and spring 1976. The United States informed the Soviet Union that the understanding reached would be included as part of the public record associated with submitting the TTBT to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.The entire understanding is as follows: Both Parties will make every effort to comply fully with all provisions of the TTB Treaty. However, there are technical uncertainties associated with predicting the precise yields of nuclear weapons tests. These uncertainties may result in slight, unintended breaches of the 150-kiloton threshold.Therefore, the two sides have discussed this problem and agreed that: (1) One or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation of the Treaty; (2) such breaches would be a cause for concern, however, and, at the request of either Party, would be the subject for consultations. The Soviet Union was also informed that while the United States would not consider such a slight, unintentional breach a violation, it would carefully review each such breach to ensure that it is not part of a general attempt to exceed the confines of the treaty.The understanding in its entirety was included in the transmittal documents that accompanied the TTBT and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty when they were submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on July 29, 1976. Although the TTBT was signed in 1974, it was not sent to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification until July 1976. Submission was held in abeyance until the companion treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes had been successfully negotiated in accordance TTBT Article III. The TTBT was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974.Article I contains the operative provision, limiting underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons after March 31, 1976.This date was

374  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

chosen to allow time to negotiate a companion treaty limiting underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes, which were regarded as indistinguishable.The protocol to the TTBT calls for the exchange of certain verification information and defines nuclear weapon tests as those conducted at designated nuclear weapon test sites. This protocol was replaced by the subsequent verification protocol completed and signed in 1990. Article II provides for national technical means of verification.Article III calls for negotiation of an associated agreement to limit underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Immediately after the conclusion of TTBT negotiations, work on the companion treaty began. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, known as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE Treaty), was signed on May 28, 1976. On March 31, 1976, the parties agreed to act consistently, with the 150-kiloton threshold of the two treaties pending entry into force.This statement was the basis of the regime for the next fifteen years, because ratification would not be achieved until 1990, after an additional protocol for each treaty was negotiated permitting in intrusive on-site inspection. During the years between 1976 and 1990, there were many assertions by the United States that the Soviet Union had exceeded the 150-kiloton threshold, particularly by the Reagan administration in the 1980s. The treaty’s critics pointed out that if, for example, remote seismic instruments read that an event in the Soviet Union had a “central value” of 100 kilotons, the event was only verifiable by a factor of two and therefore had an equal likelihood of having been from half to twice the recorded yield, or between 50 and 200 kilotons.Thus, a recording of a central value above 100 kilotons—for example 150 kilotons—created a range of 75 to 300 kilotons, which the critics always assumed to be on the higher end.Thus, Senate approval could not be achieved prior to the 1987–1990 Geneva negotiations for verification protocols, which permitted emplacement of seismic monitors at the test site itself and the drilling of an instrumentation shaft where the nuclear device was emplaced to provide as accurate a reading of Soviet nuclear tests (using the hydrodynamic yield measurement method for all tests with a planned yield of more than 50 kilotons) as the United States could achieve at its own test site. There would also be on-site inspections for all tests with a planned yield in excess of 35 kilotons. The Soviets were given comparable rights at the Nevada Test Site. The TTBT and PNET, along with the 1990 verification protocols, were approved by the Senate on June 28, 1990 by a vote of 98 to 0 and ratified by President George H.W. Bush on December 11, 1990. In 1992, Russian succeeded the former Soviet Union as the U.S. treaty partner for the TTBT (as well as the PNE Treaty).

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974 Entered into force December 11, 1990 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  375

general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end, Noting that the adoption of measures for the further limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the achievement of these objectives and would meet the interests of strengthening peace and the further relaxation of international tension, Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976. 2. Each Party shall limit the number of its underground nuclear weapon tests to a minimum. 3. The Parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests. Article II 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty the Parties shall, as necessary, consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries. Article III The provisions of this Treaty do not extend to underground nuclear explosions carried out by the Parties for peaceful purposes. Underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated and concluded by the Parties at the earliest possible time. Article IV This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. Article V 1.This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years. Unless replaced earlier by an agreement in implementation of the objectives specified in paragraph 3 of Article I of this Treaty, it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty and to introduce possible amendments to the text of the Treaty.

376  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3.This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Richard Nixon,The President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE L IMITATION OF U NDERGROUND N UCLEAR W EAPON T ESTS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Section I. Definitions For the purposes of this Protocol: 1.The term “test site” means a geographical area for the conduct of underground nuclear weapon tests, specified in paragraph 1 or in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol. 2. The term “underground nuclear weapon test,” hereinafter “test,” means either a single underground nuclear explosion conducted at a test site, or two or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometers and conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 second. The yield of a test shall be the aggregate yield of all explosions in the test. 3.The term “explosion” means the release of nuclear energy from an explosive canister. 4.The term “explosive canister” means, with respect to every explosion, the container or covering for one or more nuclear explosives. 5.The term “Testing Party” means the Party conducting a test. 6. The term “Verifying Party” means the Party entitled to carry out, in accordance with this Protocol, activities related to verification of compliance with the Treaty by the Testing Party. 7.The term “Designated Personnel” means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Designated Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  377

Protocol, to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol in the territory of the Testing Party. 8.The term “Transport Personnel” means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Transport Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, to provide transportation for Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party between the territory of the Verifying Party and the point of entry in the territory of the Testing Party. 9.The term “point of entry” means Washington, D.C. (Dulles International Airport), for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel, and Travis Air Force Base, California, for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and for equipment specified in Section VIII of this Protocol, with respect to the United States of America; and Moscow (Sheremetyevo-2 International Airport) for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and for equipment specified in Section VIII of this Protocol, and Leningrad (Pulkovo-2 International Airport) for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel, with respect to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Other locations may serve as points of entry for specific tests, as agreed by the Parties. 10. The term “hydrodynamic yield measurement method” means the method whereby the yield of a test is derived from on-site, direct measurement of the properties of the shock wave as a function of time during the hydrodynamic phase of the ground motion produced by the test. 11.The term “seismic yield measurement method” means the method whereby the yield of a test is derived from measurement of parameters of elastic ground motion produced by the test. 12.The term “on-site inspection” means activities carried out by the Verifying Party at the test site of the Testing Party, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, for the purposes of independently obtaining data on conditions under which the test will be conducted and for confirming the validity of data provided by the Testing Party. 13.The term “emplacement hole” means any drill-hole, shaft, adit or tunnel in which one or more explosive canisters, associated cables, and other equipment are installed for the purposes of conducting a test. 14. The term “end of the emplacement hole” means the reference point established by the Testing Party beyond the planned location of each explosive canister along the axis of the emplacement hole. 15.The term “satellite hole” means any drill-hole, shaft, adit or tunnel in which sensing elements and cables and transducers are installed by the Verifying Party for the purposes of hydrodynamic measurement of the yield of a specific test. 16.The term “standard configuration” means either the standard vertical configuration or the standard horizontal configuration of a test described in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 17. The term “non-standard configuration” means a configuration of a test different from that described in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 18. The term “hydrodynamic measurement zone” means a region, the dimensions of which are specified in paragraph 1 of Section V of this Protocol, within which hydrodynamic yield measurements are carried out. 19. The term “reference test” means a test, identified by the Testing Party as a reference test, that meets the requirements of paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol. 20.The term “emplacement point” means the point in the emplacement hole that coincides with the center point of an emplaced explosive canister. 21. The term “choke section” means a barrier designed to restrict the flow of energy from an explosive canister.

378  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

22.The term “area of a pipe” or “area of a cableway” means the area of the external cross section of that pipe or cableway measured in a plane perpendicular to the axis of that pipe or cableway at the point within the zone specified in paragraph 2(c), 3(e), or 3(f) of Section V of this Protocol where its cross section is largest. 23.The term “sensing elements and cables” means switches, cables, and cable segments that provide direct measurement of the position of a shock front as a function of time, and are installed in a satellite hole by the Verifying Party for the purposes of use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 24.The term “transducer” means a device that converts physical properties of a shock wave, such as stress and particle velocity, into a recordable signal, and is installed in a satellite hole by the Verifying Party, with associated power supplies, for the purposes of use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, with respect to explosions having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol. 25.The term “core sample” means an intact cylindrical sample of geologic material having dimensions no less than two centimeters in diameter and two centimeters in length. 26.The term “rock fragment” means a sample of geologic material having an irregular shape and a volume no less than 10 cubic centimeters. 27. The term “geodetic measurements” means the determination of the geometric position of points within tunnels or cavities. 28. The term “Designated Seismic Station” means any one of the seismic stations designated by each Party, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol, at which activities related to verification are carried out in accordance with this Protocol. 29. The term “Bilateral Consultative Commission” means the Commission established in accordance with Section XI of this Protocol. 30. The term “Coordinating Group” means a working group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission that is established for each test with respect to which activities related to verification are carried out. 31.The term “coordinated schedule” means the schedule, including the specific times and durations for carrying out activities related to verification for a specific test, established in the Coordinating Group as specified in paragraph 12 of Section XI of this Protocol. 32.The term “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers” means the Centers located in Washington, D.C., and Moscow, established in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. Section II. Test Sites 1.The test sites for the Parties are: the Nevada Test Site, for the United States of America; and the Northern Test Site (Novaya Zemlya) and the Semipalatinsk Test Site, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, each Party, for each of its test sites, shall provide the other Party with: (a) a precise written description of the boundaries; and (b) a diagram with geographic coordinates of the boundaries to the nearest second, to a scale no smaller than 1:250,000. 2. Following entry into force of the Treaty, if a Party decides to establish a new test site or to change the boundaries of a test site specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the description and diagram specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be transmitted to the other Party no less than 12

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  379

months prior to the planned date for conducting the first test at the new test site or area of expansion of a previously specified test site. 3. A test site of a Party shall be located only within its territory. All tests shall be conducted solely within test sites specified in paragraph 1 or in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. For the purposes of the Treaty and this Protocol, all underground nuclear explosions at test sites specified in paragraph 1 or in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section shall be considered underground nuclear weapon tests and shall be subject to all provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. Section III.Verification Measures 1. For purposes of verification of compliance with the Treaty, in addition to using available national technical means, the Verifying Party shall have the right, with respect to tests that are conducted 200 days or more following entry into force of the Treaty: (a) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to each explosion in the test; (b) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with use of the seismic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol; and (c) with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, to carry out any or all of the verification activities associated with on-site inspection, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, with respect to each explosion in the test, except that such activities may be carried out with respect to a test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons only if the Verifying Party does not use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 2. In addition to the rights specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, for the purposes of building confidence in the implementation of this Protocol and improving its national technical means of verification, the Verifying Party shall have the right: (a) if, in each of the five calendar years immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, the Testing Party does not conduct at least two tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to two tests from among those having the highest planned yields that the Testing Party conducts in that calendar year; (b) if, in the sixth calendar year following entry into force of the Treaty and in each calendar year thereafter, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Testing Party does not conduct at least one test having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with respect to one test from among those having the highest planned yield that the Testing Party conducts in that calendar year; (c) if, in any calendar year, the Testing Party postpones a test having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less to the following calendar year, after having been notified by the Verifying Party of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to that test, to use such method with respect to that test in the following calendar year. This right shall be additional to the rights specified in paragraph 1(a) of this Section and in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph; and (d) in addition to the rights specified in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph, if, in each of the five calendar years beginning with the conduct of the first test by the Testing Party at a new test site, the Testing Party does not conduct at least two tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons at the new test site, the Verifying Party shall have the right to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, with

380  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

respect to two tests from among those having the highest planned yields that the Testing Party conducts at the new test site in that calendar year. 3. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a specific test including more than one explosion, unless the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test: (a) the distance between the closest points of any two adjacent explosive canisters shall be no less than 50 meters; and (b) the time of each explosion shall be established by the Testing Party so as to permit the carrying out of hydrodynamic yield measurements for each explosion for a distance of no less than 30 meters in the satellite hole closest to the emplacement hole with which it is associated. 4. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a specific test, and if that test is conducted in more than one emplacement hole, the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct that test only if no more than one emplacement hole has characteristics or contains explosive canisters having characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section V of this Protocol with respect to a test of standard configuration, unless the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test. 5. The Testing Party shall have the right to conduct a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons within a time period of less than two seconds of any other test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons only if the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such tests. No test shall be conducted within 15 minutes prior to or following a reference test, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 6. The Testing Party shall have the right to conduct a test having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons in a cavity having a volume exceeding 20,000 cubic meters only if the Parties agree on verification measures with respect to such a test. 7.The Verifying Party, by notifying the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, shall have the right to require a reference test for this non-standard test, in order to compare the yields measured through its national technical means for these two associated tests with the yield obtained by carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurement of the reference test. The right of the Verifying Party to a reference test shall be independent of whether or not it actually carries out hydrodynamic yield measurements of the test of nonstandard configuration. 8.With respect to the requirement for a reference test: (a) if the Testing Party, at the time it provides notification of a test, identifies that test as a reference test for a future test of non-standard configuration, and if the Verifying Party does not use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to the identified reference test, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to require a reference test for that test of non-standard configuration and for any subsequent test of non-standard configuration that would be associated with that reference test, if the Testing Party conducts the identified reference test; (b) the Testing Party shall have the right to identify only one test of standard configuration as a reference test not associated with any specific test of non-standard configuration until it has conducted an associated test of non-standard configuration for which this test serves as a reference test, or unless it simultaneously provides notification of the associated test of non-standard configuration; and (c) if the Testing Party, at the time it provides notification of a test of standard configuration, indicates that the test will satisfy a requirement for a reference test for a previously conducted test of non-standard configuration, and if the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party of its

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  381

intent not to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to that reference test, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to require a reference test for the previously conducted test of non-standard configuration. In that case, the Testing Party shall have the right to cancel that reference test. 9. Following notification by the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of this Protocol, of whether or not it intends to carry out any of the activities related to verification for a specific test, and, if so, which activities, the Verifying Party shall forfeit its right to revise that notification unless the Testing Party changes the previously declared location of that test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude or changes the planned yield of a test from 50 kilotons or less to a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons. If the Testing Party makes any such change, the Verifying Party shall have the right to revise its previous notification and to carry out any of the activities specified in paragraph 1 or 2 of this Section and, if the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification with respect to that test, in accordance with paragraph 20 of Section IV of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall not conduct the test less than 180 days following the date of the revised notification by the Verifying Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 10. Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, 24 hours a day, provided such activities are consistent with the safety requirements of the Testing Party at the test site or Designated Seismic Station. All operations and procedures that require the participation of Designated Personnel and personnel of the Testing Party shall be carried out in accordance with the technical operations and practices at the test site or Designated Seismic Station of the Testing Party, and in this connection: (a) Designated Personnel: (i) shall not interfere with activities of personnel of the Testing Party at the test site or Designated Seismic Station; and (ii) shall be responsible for the working of their equipment, its timely installation and operation, participation in such operations, including dry runs, as the Testing Party may request, and recording of data; and (b) the Testing Party: (i) shall be under no obligation to delay the test because of any malfunction of the equipment of the Verifying Party or inability of Designated Personnel to carry out their functions, unless the Testing Party caused such a situation to arise; and (ii) shall bear full responsibility for the preparation and conduct of the test and shall have exclusive control over it. 11. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification for a specific test, the Testing Party shall have the right to make changes in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of that test, except that the Testing Party shall not make changes in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of that test that would preclude Designated Personnel from carrying out their rights related to verification provided in this Protocol. If the Testing Party notifies the Verifying Party of a change in the timing of its operations that the Verifying Party deems would either preclude or significantly limit the exercise of such rights, the Coordinating Group shall meet at the request of the Representative of the Verifying Party to the Coordinating Group, to consider the change in order to ensure that the rights of the Verifying Party are preserved. If the Coordinating Group cannot agree on a revision to the coordinated schedule that will ensure the rights of both Parties as provided in this Protocol, there shall be no advancement of events within the coordinated schedule due to such a change. Either Party may request that the Bilateral Consultative Commission consider any such change in timing of operations or in the coordinated schedule, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section XI of this Protocol.

382  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Section IV. Notifications and Information Relating to Tests 1. Unless otherwise provided in this Protocol, all notifications required by this Protocol shall be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers may also be used, as appropriate, to transmit other information provided in accordance with this Protocol. 2. Not later than the June 1 immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, and not later than June l of each year thereafter, each Party shall provide the other Party with the following information on tests that it intends to conduct in the following calendar year: (a) the projected number of tests having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons; (b) the projected number of tests having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons; and (c) if the number of tests declared in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph is less than the number of tests for which rights are specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Protocol, whether it intends to conduct a sufficient number of other tests to permit the Verifying Party to exercise fully the rights specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Protocol. 3. On the date of entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with the information specified in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of this Section for the remainder of the calendar year in which the Treaty enters into force, and, if the Treaty enters into force after June 1, information specified in paragraph 2 of this Section for the following calendar year. 4. No less than 200 days prior to the planned date of any test with respect to which the Verifying Party has the right to carry out any activity related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the following information to the extent and degree of accuracy available at that time: (a) the planned date of the test and its designation; (b) the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosive canisters; (c) the location of the test, expressed in geographic coordinates to the nearest minute; (d) whether the planned yield of the test exceeds 35 kilotons; (e) whether the planned yield of the test exceeds 50 kilotons; (f) if the planned yield is 50 kilotons or less, whether the test is one of the tests with respect to which the Verifying Party has the right to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of this Protocol; (g) the planned depth of each emplacement hole to the nearest 10 meters; (h) the type or types of rock in which the test will be conducted, including the depth of the water table; (i) whether the test will be of standard or non-standard configuration; and (j) whether the test will serve as a reference test for: (i) a previously conducted test of non-standard configuration with which such a reference test is associated; (ii) a future test of non-standard configuration for which notification has been provided or is being simultaneously provided in accordance with paragraph 8(b) of Section III of this Protocol; or (iii) a future test of non-standard configuration for which the Testing Party has not yet provided notification.

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  383

5. Within 20 days following receipt of information specified in paragraph 4 of this Section, the Verifying Party shall inform the Testing Party, in a single notification, whether or not it intends to carry out, with respect to this test, any activities related to verification that it has a right to carry out, in accordance with Section III of this Protocol, and, if so, whether it intends: (a) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol; (b) to use the seismic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol; and (c) to carry out on-site inspection, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol. 6.Within 30 days following notification by the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol, that it requires a reference test for a test of non-standard configuration, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party whether it will meet the requirement for a reference test through: (a) the identification of a previously conducted reference test; (b) the identification of a previously conducted test of standard configuration, meeting the requirements for a reference test, with respect to which the Verifying Party carried out hydrodynamic yield measurements; (c) the identification of a previously notified test of standard configuration, meeting the requirements for a reference test, with respect to which the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party of its intent to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements; or (d) the conduct of a reference test within 12 months of the non-standard test, whose identification as a reference test will be made in the notification,in accordance with paragraph 4(j) of this Section. 7. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the following information: (a) a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the test location, which shall include: the depth of the water table; the stratigraphic column, including the lithologic description of each formation; the estimated physical parameters of the rock, including bulk density, grain density, compressional velocity, porosity, and total water content; and information on any known geophysical discontinuities in the media within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (b) the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement hole in each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (c) the location and configuration of any known voids larger than one cubic meter within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (d) a description of materials, including their densities, to be used to stem each emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (e) whether it is planned that each emplacement hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (f) whether it is planned that each satellite hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (g) a topographic map to a scale no smaller than 1:25,000 and a contour interval of 10 meters or less showing: (i) an area with a radius of no less than two kilometers centered on the entrance to each emplacement hole, that shall include the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters centered directly above the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; and

384  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(ii) a one-kilometer wide corridor centered on the planned location of the above-ground cables of the Verifying Party; (h) overall drawings showing the external dimensions of each explosive canister and each choke section, and any pipes or cableways passing through a choke section, as well as any other pipes and cableways connected to that explosive canister and located within five meters of that explosive canister; (i) the specific locations, referenced to the entrance to each vertical satellite hole or to the surface location of the entrance to each horizontal emplacement hole, at which individual gasblocking devices shall be installed if such devices are used on the electrical cables specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol; and (j) whether the Testing Party will provide satellite communications as specified in paragraph 13 of Section X of this Protocol for use by Designated Personnel. 8. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to use the seismic yield measurement method, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the information specified in paragraphs 9(a), 9(b), and 9(c) of this Section. 9. If the Verifying Party notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party, no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the test, with the following information: (a) a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the test location, which shall include: the depth of the water table; the stratigraphic column, including the lithologic description of each formation; the estimated physical parameters of the rock, including bulk density, grain density, compressional velocity, porosity, and total water content; and information on any known geophysical discontinuities in the media within a radius of 300 meters of the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; (b) the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement hole in the portion within 300 meters of the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; (c) the location and configuration of any known voids larger than 1000 cubic meters within a radius of 300 meters of the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; (d) whether it is planned that each emplacement hole will be fully or partially cased, and, if so, a description of materials of this casing; (e) a topographic map to a scale no smaller than 1:25,000 and a contour interval of 10 meters or less showing an area with a radius of no less than two kilometers centered on the entrance to each emplacement hole, that shall include the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters centered directly above the planned emplacement point of each explosive canister; and (f) whether the Testing Party will provide satellite communications as specified in paragraph 13 of Section X of this Protocol for use by Designated Personnel. 10. The Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 2, 3, 4(a), 4(c), 4(d), 4(e), 4(f) or 4(j) of this Section, and: (a) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 4(b), 4(g), 4(h), 4(i), 6 or 7 of this Section, or paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol; (b) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 4(g), 4(h) or 8 of this Section; and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  385

(c) if the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 4(b), 4(g), 4(h) or 9 of this Section, or paragraph 10(a) of Section XI of this Protocol. 11. If the Testing Party makes changes in the information specified in paragraph 4(a), 10(a), 10(b) or 10(c) of this Section related to a specific test for which Designated Personnel are present in the territory of the Testing Party, it shall also immediately notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader carrying out activities related to verification of that test at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station of such changes. 12.The Testing Party shall immediately inform the Verifying Party of any change in the timing of its operations related to the conduct of a specific test that affects the coordinated schedule, and if Designated Personnel are present in the territory of the Testing Party, it shall also immediately notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader carrying out activities related to verification of that test at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station. 13. If, in carrying out activities related to verification of a specific test, Designated Personnel are present at the test site or any Designated Seismic Station: (a) no less than 48 hours prior to the initial planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the time for beginning the period of readiness for the test and the planned time of the test, to the nearest second. This and all subsequent notifications shall be referenced to Universal Time Coordinated and to local time at the test site or the Designated Seismic Station; (b) except as otherwise provided in this Section, if the Testing Party changes the planned time of the test, it shall immediately notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test; (c) the Testing Party shall conduct the test only within a period of readiness; (d) unless the Parties otherwise agree, the period of readiness shall begin: (i) no less than six days following completion of stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zone of all satellite holes, if verification activities in accordance with Section V of this Protocol are carried out; and (ii) no more than five days prior to the planned date of the test, if verification activities in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol are carried out; (e) the Testing Party may terminate the period of readiness at any time.The Testing Party shall then immediately notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, that the period of readiness has been terminated; and (f) if the Testing Party terminates the period of readiness or changes the time for beginning the period of readiness, it shall provide notice of the time for beginning a new period of readiness to each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, no less than 12 hours prior to beginning this new period of readiness. 14. Following notification in accordance with paragraph 13(a) or 13(b) of this Section, the Testing Party, without further notification, may advance the time of the test by no more than five minutes. 15. After the event readiness signal specified in paragraph 10(b) of Section V of this Protocol has been started: (a) if the Testing Party delays the test and terminates the event readiness signal at least one second prior to the planned time of the test, it may carry out the test, without further notification, at any time within no more than 60 minutes after the planned time of the test, provided it generates a new event readiness signal; and

386  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(b) if the Testing Party subsequently delays the test without ending the event readiness signal at least one second prior to the planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall end the event readiness signal and shall not begin a new event readiness signal within 20 minutes following that planned time of the test. The Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test, at least 10 minutes prior to the beginning of the new event readiness signal for that test. 16. Following notification in accordance with paragraph 13(a) or 13(b) of this Section, if the test is delayed by more than 60 minutes the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the new planned time of the test no less than 30 minutes prior to the new planned time of the test. 17. During the period of readiness, if a test is delayed by more than three hours from the last notification of the planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the period during which the test will not be conducted. 18. No less than one hour following the test, the Testing Party shall notify each Designated Personnel Team Leader, in writing, of the actual time of the test to the nearest 0.1 second. 19. For each test for which notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, no less than 48 hours prior to the initial planned time of the test, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party of the planned time of the test to the nearest one second. If the Testing Party subsequently delays the planned time of the test by more than 24 hours, it shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of the new planned time of the test to the nearest one second. No less than three days following the test, the Testing Party shall notify the Verifying Party of the actual time of the test, referenced to Universal Time Coordinated, to the nearest 0.1 second. 20.The Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of a change in the location of a test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude or of a change in the planned yield of a test from 50 kilotons or less to a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons.The Verifying Party shall notify the Testing Party, within 20 days following receipt of notification of such a change in the location or planned yield of the test, whether it intends to carry out for this test any activities related to verification in accordance with paragraph 9 of Section III of this Protocol. If the Verifying Party, in this revised notification, notifies the Testing Party that it intends to carry out any of the activities related to verification that it has a right to carry out in accordance with Section III of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the information that it is required to provide in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of this Section and paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol. 21. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables shall not occur less than 90 days after notification of any change in the location of the test by more than one minute of latitude or longitude, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 22. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it does not intend to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements for a specific test, the Testing Party shall have the right to change the configuration of that test from standard to non-standard or vice versa, without notifying the Verifying Party of such change. 23. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements for a specific test, the Testing Party shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of a change in the configuration of that test from standard to non-standard, or vice versa, or of any increase in the number of emplacement holes or explosive canisters of the test. The Verifying Party shall, within five days of notification of any such change, notify the Testing Party whether it will revise its initial notification and whether it deems that this change would either preclude or significantly limit the exercise of its rights provided in this Protocol. If so, the Coordinating Group shall immediately meet to consider a revision in the coordinated schedule that will ensure the

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  387

rights of both Parties provided in this Protocol. If the Parties cannot agree on a revised coordinated schedule within 15 days following notification by the Testing Party of such a change, the date of notification of the change shall be deemed the initial notification of a test in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, and the test shall be conducted no less than 180 days following the date of notification of the change. 24. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection with respect to a specific test, and if the Testing Party notifies the Verifying Party of an increase in the number of explosive canisters or an increase in the number of emplacement holes, the Verifying Party shall, within five days of notification of any such change, notify the Testing Party whether it deems that this change would significantly limit the exercise of its rights provided in this Protocol. If so, the Coordinating Group shall immediately meet to consider a revision in the coordinated schedule that will ensure the rights of both Parties provided in this Protocol. If the Parties cannot agree on a revised coordinated schedule within 15 days following notification by the Verifying Party that it deems that, as a result of such an increase, its rights would be significantly limited, the date of that notification shall be deemed notification by the Verifying Party that it intends to carry out on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section, and the test shall be conducted no less than 165 days following the date of such notification. 25.The Verifying Party may at any time, but no later than one year following the test, request from the Testing Party clarification of any point of information provided in accordance with this Section. Such clarification shall be provided in the shortest possible time, but no later than 30 days following receipt of the request. Section V. Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement Method 1.The hydrodynamic measurement zone is: (a) with respect to a test of standard configuration, described in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the cylindrical region 25 meters in diameter whose axis is midway between the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole, extending from a point 30 meters below the end of the emplacement hole to a point 100 meters from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the cylindrical region 25 meters in diameter whose axis is midway between the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole, extending from a point 15 meters beyond the end of the emplacement hole to a point 65 meters from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (b) with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the cylindrical region 200 meters in diameter coaxial with the emplacement hole, extending from a point 30 meters below the end of the emplacement hole to a point 100 meters from the center point of the explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the cylindrical region 130 meters in diameter whose axis is coaxial with the emplacement hole, extending from a point 15 meters beyond the end of the emplacement hole to a point 65 meters from the center point of the explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole. 2. For the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a test shall be deemed of standard vertical configuration if: (a) each emplacement hole is vertical and cylindrical, and is drilled or excavated with a diameter no greater than four meters;

388  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(b) the bottom of each emplacement hole is filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, to form a plug no less than three meters thick, and the top of this plug of stemming material is the end of the emplacement hole for the explosive canister emplaced farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole; (c) any pipe or cableway connected to an explosive canister passes through a choke section. This choke section is installed on the top of the explosive canister and has the following characteristics: (i) the diameter of the choke section is no less than that of the explosive canister; (ii) the choke section is no less than one meter thick; (iii) the sum of the areas of all pipes and cableways within the choke section does not exceed 0.5 square meters; (iv) the area of each pipe or cableway within the choke section does not exceed 0.3 square meters; (v) the part of the choke section in contact with the explosive canister consists of a steel plate having a thickness no less than 0.005 meters; and (vi) the choke section, except for pipes and cableways, is filled, prior to emplacement, with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, and has a product of density and thickness no less than 250 grams per square centimeter; (d) the length of each explosive canister does not exceed 12 meters and, after an explosive canister is emplaced, the lowest part of the choke section is no more than 12 meters above the end of the emplacement hole; (e) the diameter of each explosive canister does not exceed three meters; (f) each emplacement hole has been drilled or excavated with a diameter, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, no more than one meter greater than the diameter of each explosive canister; or, if an emplacement hole has been cased, the inside diameter of the casing, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, is no more than one meter greater than the diameter of each explosive canister. Within the 15-meter segment above the end of each emplacement hole for each explosive canister, no washouts penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the emplacement hole; (g) all voids in or connected to an emplacement hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, external to: (i) any explosive canister; (ii) any choke sections; (iii) any diagnostic canisters; and (iv) associated cables and pipes are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (h) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, all voids greater than 10 cubic meters, external and unconnected to an emplacement hole or a satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter, within two meters of the wall of a satellite hole or any part of an explosive canister, are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; and (i) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, the distance between a satellite hole and any other drilled hole or excavation is no less than the distance between that satellite hole and the emplacement hole with which it is associated.

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  389

3. For the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a test shall be deemed of standard horizontal configuration if: (a) each emplacement hole is horizontal, with an excavated cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than five meters by five meters for the first 65 meters from the end of the emplacement hole for each explosive canister, except that any diagnostic canister associated with it shall occupy, in an emplacement hole, space having a cross section no greater than 3.5 meters by 3.5 meters for the first 50 meters of the emplacement hole from the choke section of each explosive canister in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole; (b) the end of each emplacement hole is either: (i) unsupported native rock, the surface of which is essentially perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole; or (ii) the surface of a plug no less than three meters thick, formed of stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (c) the length of each explosive canister does not exceed 12 meters and, after it is emplaced, the end of the explosive canister farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole is no less than one meter and no more than two meters from the end of the emplacement hole; (d) the cross section of each explosive canister measured in the plane perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole does not exceed three meters by three meters; (e) any pipe or cableway connected to an explosive canister and lying entirely within the emplacement hole passes through a choke section.This choke section is installed at the end of the explosive canister nearest to the entrance of the emplacement hole and has the following characteristics: (i) the dimensions of the choke section perpendicular to the axis of the emplacement hole are no less than those of the explosive canister; (ii) the choke section is no less than one meter thick; (iii) the sum of the areas of all pipes and cableways within the choke section, plus the sum of the areas of pipes and cableways specified in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph, does not exceed 0.5 square meters; (iv) the area of each pipe or cableway within the choke section does not exceed 0.3 square meters; and (v) the choke section, except for pipes and cableways meeting the requirements of subparagraphs (e)(iii) and (e)(iv) of this paragraph, is filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock, and has a product of density and thickness no less than 250 grams per square centimeter; (f) any pipe or cableway connected to any surface of an explosive canister and not lying entirely within the emplacement hole has the following characteristics: (i) the area of each pipe or cableway within five meters of the explosive canister does not exceed 0.05 square meters; and (ii) the sum of the areas of all such pipes and cableways within five meters of the explosive canister does not exceed 0.1 square meters; (g) any diagnostic canister connected to the pipes or cableways specified in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph lies entirely outside the hydrodynamic measurement zone; (h) all voids in or connected to an emplacement hole, including any bypass or access tunnels within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, external to:

390  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(i) any explosive canister; (ii) any choke sections; (iii) any diagnostic canisters; and (iv) associated cables and pipes are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 60 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (i) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, all voids greater than 10 cubic meters, external and unconnected to an emplacement hole or a satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter, within two meters of the wall of a satellite hole or any part of an explosive canister, are filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; and (j) within the portion of each hydrodynamic measurement zone extending from the end of the emplacement hole in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, the distance between a satellite hole and any other tunnel or excavation is no less than the distance between that satellite hole and the emplacement hole with which it is associated. 4.With respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (a) personnel of the Testing Party, using their own equipment, shall drill or excavate a satellite hole associated with each emplacement hole, at a time of their own choosing.The Testing Party shall have the right to complete drilling or excavation of a satellite hole for a specific test prior to the arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site to carry out activities related to use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method for that test. Each satellite hole shall meet the following requirements: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the axis of the associated satellite hole shall be located 11 meters, plus or minus three meters, from the axis of the emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If an emplacement hole is horizontal, the axis of the associated satellite hole shall be located 11 meters, plus or minus two meters, from the axis of the emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, and it may be drilled or excavated either as a single continuous hole or in separate consecutive segments associated with each hydrodynamic measurement zone.The axis of any satellite hole shall be no less than six meters from the wall of any drilled or excavated cavity or hole; (ii) its end shall be no less than 30 meters below the level of the end of the associated vertical emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole, or no less than 15 meters beyond the point at which the satellite hole is closest to the end of the associated horizontal emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole; (iii) if it is prepared by drilling, it shall be drilled no less than 0.3 meters and no more than 0.5 meters in diameter. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, no washouts shall penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the hole; and (iv) if it is prepared by excavation, it shall have an excavated cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than 2.5 meters by 2.5 meters within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the activities of the personnel of the Testing Party carried out to meet the specifications set forth in paragraph 2(b) of this Section and, if applicable, set forth in paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of the stemming material used to form the plugs specified in paragraphs 2(b) and 3(b)(ii) of this Section shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  391

(c) Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel, directional surveys and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole and emplacement hole prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables; (d) equipment specified in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be operated by Designated Personnel and shall be installed, in accordance with installation instructions provided in accordance with paragraph 6(c) of Section VIII of this Protocol, by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel.The location of each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party and the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party specified in paragraph 10(l) of this Section shall be determined by the Testing Party in consultation with the Verifying Party in the Coordinating Group no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. Areas for the installation of these facilities, cable supports, and cableways for protection of cables of the Verifying Party, specified in paragraphs 3(b), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol, shall be prepared by the Testing Party in accordance with requirements agreed upon in the Coordinating Group. Only cables of the Verifying Party shall be installed in these cableways. Designated Personnel shall have access, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, to the cables specified in paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to the cableways in which they are installed, at all times. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have access to these cableways only under observation of Designated Personnel; (e) Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own primary electrical power sources to supply electrical power to hydrodynamic equipment specified in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol. At the request of the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall supply electrical power from the standard electrical network of its test site through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, by agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party; (f) for each test, the only equipment installed in a satellite hole shall be that of the Verifying Party specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol. If an emplacement hole is vertical, the end point of the equipment farthest from the entrance to the satellite hole shall be installed no less than 30 meters below the level of the end of the emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole. If an emplacement hole is horizontal, the end point of this equipment shall be installed no less than 15 meters beyond the point at which a satellite hole is closest to the end of the emplacement hole farthest from the entrance to the emplacement hole. For each satellite hole, Designated Personnel shall have the right to install no more than six sensing elements and cables, without regard to the number of switches. Personnel of each Party shall have the right to measure the location of the installed sensing elements and cables; (g) Designated Personnel shall have the right to conduct a final directional survey and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole upon completion of installation of sensing elements and cables; (h) personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall fill all voids in or connected to each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone with a stemming material agreed upon by the Parties, having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention.The methods and materials used for stemming satellite holes and any hydrodynamic measurement equipment emplacement pipe shall: (i) be consistent with the containment practices of the Testing Party; (ii) be chosen to minimize voids around sensing elements and cables; and

392  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(iii) be chosen to avoid damage to the sensing elements and cables; (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of each emplacement hole in accordance with paragraphs 2(g) and 3(h) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention; (j) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each emplacement hole; and (k) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each satellite hole, provided that: (i) sensing elements and cables can be installed as specified in subparagraph (f) of this paragraph; (ii) casing or lining material in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is agreed upon by the Parties; and (iii) casing or lining in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is affixed to the surrounding formation with material agreed upon by the Parties. 5. In preparation for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (a) upon their arrival at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program, to enable the Testing Party to read digital data if digital recordings of hydrodynamic data will be made by Designated Personnel; (b) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the test site with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and satellite hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole, each satellite hole, and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant to the geology and geophysics of each hydrodynamic measurement zone, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (c) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and depth or distance measurements to determine the dimensions and the relative locations of the emplacement hole and satellite hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (ii) if an emplacement hole is vertical, within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of either the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, of the satellite hole, gammagamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, and television logging; (iii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole, as well as in the drilled holes specified in subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and distance measurements to determine the dimensions and relative location of these holes, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  393

(iv) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the drilled holes specified in subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, and within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole, or, at the option of the Testing Party, of the satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, and acoustic logging; (d) all logging data and geometrical measurements obtained by Designated Personnel, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of the data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to departure from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out these measurements. Calibration data shall include information necessary to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; (e) Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, from the satellite hole, extracted at no more than 10 depths within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, specified by Designated Personnel. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each depth shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, the satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If core samples are extracted from the emplacement hole or, at the option of the Testing Party, from an excavated satellite hole, they shall be extracted during drilling from each of no more than 10 holes drilled at stations specified by Designated Personnel.The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole or satellite hole at this station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along each drilled hole. If core samples are extracted from a drilled satellite hole, they shall be extracted by personnel of the Testing Party during the drilling of the satellite hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, at no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel and under their observation. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole at each of no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel. Core samples and rock fragments may be taken from no more than a total of 10 stations. If an emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole is lined at any station specified by Designated Personnel for extracting core samples or rock fragments, personnel of the Testing Party shall enable Designated Personnel to extract core samples or rock fragments at such a station from native rock.The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (f) core samples or rock fragments may be extracted in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; (g) if personnel of the Testing Party do not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right, using their own equipment, to extract such core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; (h) if an emplacement hole is vertical, and if the Testing Party, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site: (i) has cased a total of 20 meters or more of the emplacement hole or the satellite hole within any hydrodynamic measurement zone, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out,

394  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

in the uncased hole, the activities specified in subparagraph (c)(ii) of this paragraph and to receive core samples or rock fragments from the uncased hole, extracted in accordance with subparagraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph; or (ii) has cased a total of 20 meters or more of both the emplacement hole and the satellite hole within any hydrodynamic measurement zone, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole with respect to which Designated Personnel shall have the same rights as those specified for the emplacement hole and the satellite hole in subparagraphs (c), (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph.The axis of this uncased hole shall be within 22 meters of the axes of the emplacement hole and the satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of the hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of the uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in subparagraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party; and (j) logging, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and extracting of core samples or rock fragments carried out in accordance with subparagraphs (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of this paragraph shall begin at times chosen by the Testing Party and specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 21 days, to carry out logging, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and coring activities, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule.The Testing Party shall not emplace any explosive until the activities specified in this paragraph have been completed. 6.With respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (a) personnel of the Testing Party, using their own equipment and at a time of their own choosing, shall drill or excavate up to three satellite holes associated with the emplacement hole. The location of the satellite holes shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 11(b)(i) of Section XI of this Protocol. The Testing Party shall have the right to complete drilling or excavation of satellite holes for the specific test prior to the arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site for that test.The satellite holes shall meet the following requirements: (i) with respect to the first satellite hole, its length shall be as specified in paragraph 4(a)(ii) of this Section; (ii) with respect to the second and third satellite holes, if such are required by the Verifying Party, the axis of each satellite hole shall be within three meters of the axis specified by the Verifying Party. Its length shall be specified by the Verifying Party and in no case shall it extend beyond the hydrodynamic measurement zone associated with that explosion; (iii) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, the axis of each satellite hole shall be essentially parallel to the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is vertical, or shall be essentially straight, if the emplacement hole is horizontal.Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, its axis shall be no less than eight meters from the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is vertical, or no less than 10 meters from the axis of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is horizontal, and no less than six meters from the wall of any drilled or excavated cavity or hole; (iv) with respect to a drilled satellite hole, it shall be drilled no less than 0.3 meters and no more than 0.5 meters in diameter, unless the Parties otherwise agree.Within each hydrody-

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  395

namic measurement zone, no washouts shall penetrate more than one meter into the wall of the hole; (v) with respect to an excavated satellite hole, it shall have a cross section, measured in the plane perpendicular to its axis, no greater than 2.5 meters by 2.5 meters within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; and (vi) within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, except for any drilled or excavated cavity or hole, all voids, external and unconnected to any satellite hole, greater than 10 cubic meters in volume, within six meters of the axis of any satellite hole, and all voids greater than one cubic meter in volume, within two meters of the axis of any satellite hole, shall be filled with stemming material having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock; (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel, directional surveys and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole and emplacement hole prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers; (c) equipment specified in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be operated by Designated Personnel and shall be installed, in accordance with installation instructions provided in accordance with paragraph 6(c) of Section VIII of this Protocol, by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and with their assistance, if such assistance is requested by Designated Personnel. The location of each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party and the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party specified in paragraph 10(l) of this Section shall be determined by the Testing Party in consultation with the Verifying Party in the Coordinating Group no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. Areas for the installation of these facilities, cable supports, and cableways for protection of cables of the Verifying Party specified in paragraphs 3(b), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be prepared by the Testing Party in accordance with requirements agreed upon in the Coordinating Group. Only cables of the Verifying Party shall be installed in these cableways. Designated Personnel shall have access, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, to the cables specified in paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to the cableways in which they are installed, at all times. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have access to these cableways only under observation of Designated Personnel; (d) Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own primary electrical power sources to supply electrical power to hydrodynamic equipment specified in paragraph 3 of Section VIII of this Protocol. At the request of the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall supply electrical power from the standard electrical network of its test site through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, upon agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party; (e) for each test, the only equipment installed in each satellite hole shall be that of the Verifying Party specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol.This equipment shall be installed in each satellite hole at the locations specified by Designated Personnel. Designated Personnel shall have the right to install in each satellite hole no more than six sensing elements and cables, without regard to the number of switches, and no more than six transducers together with no more than 14 cables for information transmission and power supply.The total number of cables in each satellite hole shall not exceed 20. Personnel of each Party shall have the right to measure the location of the installed sensing elements and cables and transducers; (f) Designated Personnel shall have the right to conduct a final directional survey and geodetic measurements of each satellite hole upon completion of installation of sensing elements and cables and transducers;

396  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(g) personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall fill all voids in or connected to each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone with a stemming material agreed upon by the Parties, having a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention.The methods and materials used for stemming satellite holes and any hydrodynamic measurement equipment emplacement pipe shall: (i) be consistent with the containment practices of the Testing Party; (ii) be chosen to minimize voids around sensing elements and cables and transducers; and (iii) be chosen to avoid damage to the sensing elements and cables and transducers; (h) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of each emplacement hole in accordance with paragraph 9(d) of this Section. A representative sample of no less than 1000 cubic centimeters in volume of each stemming material used in each hydrodynamic measurement zone shall be provided to Designated Personnel for retention; (i) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each emplacement hole; and (j) the Testing Party shall have the right to case or line each satellite hole, provided that: (i) sensing elements and cables and transducers can be installed as specified in subparagraph (e) of this paragraph; (ii) casing or lining material in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is agreed upon by the Parties; and (iii) casing or lining in each hydrodynamic measurement zone is affixed to the surrounding formation with material agreed upon by the Parties. 7. In preparation for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (a) upon their arrival at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program, to enable the Testing Party to read digital data if digital recordings of hydrodynamic data will be made by Designated Personnel; (b) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the test site with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and satellite hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole, each satellite hole, and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant to the geology and geophysics of each hydrodynamic measurement zone, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (c) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and depth or distance measurements to determine the dimensions and the relative locations of the emplacement hole and each satellite hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  397

(ii) if an emplacement hole is vertical, within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, and television logging; (iii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, as well as in the drilled holes specified in subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, caliper logs, directional surveys, geodetic measurements, and distance measurements to determine the dimensions and relative location of these holes, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of all voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone using, in a nondestructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (iv) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the drilled holes specified in subparagraph (e)(ii) of this paragraph, and within the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole and each associated satellite hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, and acoustic logging; and (v) magnetic surveys, in vertical satellite holes and drilled horizontal satellite holes, to obtain information necessary for the installation and positioning of transducers; (d) all logging data and geometrical measurements obtained by Designated Personnel, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of the data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to departure from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out these measurements. Calibration data shall include information necessary to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; (e) Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole and from each satellite hole, extracted at no more than 10 depths within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, specified by Designated Personnel.The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each depth shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or, at the option of Designated Personnel, rock fragments from the emplacement hole and each satellite hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. If core samples are extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole, they shall be extracted during drilling from each of no more than 10 holes drilled at stations specified by Designated Personnel.The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole or satellite hole at this station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along each drilled hole. If core samples are extracted from a drilled satellite hole, they shall be extracted by personnel of the Testing Party during the drilling of the satellite hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, at no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel and under their observation. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole at each of no more than 10 stations specified by Designated Personnel. Core samples and rock fragments may be taken from no more than a total of 10 stations for each hole. If an emplacement hole or an excavated satellite hole is lined at any station specified by Designated Personnel for extracting core samples or rock fragments, personnel of the Testing Party shall enable Designated Personnel to extract core samples or rock fragments at such a station from native rock. The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree;

398  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(f) core samples or rock fragments may be extracted in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; (g) if personnel of the Testing Party do not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right, using their own equipment, to extract such core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (e) of this paragraph, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; (h) if an emplacement hole is vertical, and if the Testing Party, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site, has cased a total of 20 meters or more of the emplacement hole or any satellite hole within any hydrodynamic measurement zone, and if within 22 meters from this cased hole there is no uncased hole with a diameter no less than 0.3 meters, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole for each hole so cased, with respect to which the Verifying Party shall have the same rights as those specified in subparagraphs (c), (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph. Within each hydrodynamic measurement zone the axis of each uncased hole shall be no less than 11 and no more than 22 meters from such a cased hole. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of the hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of the uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in subparagraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party; and (j) logging, directional surveys, magnetic surveys, geodetic measurements, and extracting of core samples or rock fragments carried out in accordance with subparagraphs (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) of this paragraph shall begin at times chosen by the Testing Party and specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 25 days, to carry out logging, directional surveys, magnetic surveys, geodetic measurements, and coring activities, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule. The Testing Party shall not emplace any explosive until the activities specified in this paragraph have been completed. 8. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, and that it requires a reference test in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol, the Testing Party shall provide for such a reference test for the nonstandard test.To serve as a reference test, a test shall: (a) have a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons; (b) be of standard configuration; (c) have a single explosive canister; (d) meet the following spacing criteria: (i) the horizontal separation between the emplacement point of the reference test and each emplacement point of the non-standard test at which any explosive canister or its emplacement conditions differ from those specified for a test of standard configuration shall be no less than 300 meters and no more than 2000 meters; (ii) each explosive canister of the test of non-standard configuration and the explosive canister of the associated reference test shall all be emplaced above the water table or shall all be emplaced below the water table; and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  399

(iii) the depth of all emplacement points of the test of non-standard configuration shall be within 150 meters of the depth of the emplacement point of its associated reference test; and (e) be conducted either prior to, or within 12 months following, the conduct of the test of nonstandard configuration for which it serves as a reference test. 9. Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) to have access along agreed routes to the location of the test to carry out activities related to use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method; (b) to have access to their equipment associated with the hydrodynamic yield measurement method from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site, until it is transferred to personnel of the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 7(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (c) with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, prior to the lowering of the explosive canister into the emplacement hole, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of that canister and the choke section; to confirm by direct measurement that the choke section conforms to the specifications set forth in paragraph 2(c) of this Section; to observe continuously the explosive canister and any choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this subparagraph, begin; to observe the emplacement of the explosive canister into the emplacement hole and stemming of the emplacement hole from the time the entire explosive canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole until completion of stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole; to determine by direct measurement the depth of emplacement of the bottom part of any choke section; and to observe the stemming of the entire satellite hole; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, following placement of explosive canisters in the emplacement hole, and prior to the beginning of stemming around explosive canisters, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of each explosive canister; to confirm by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to the specifications set forth in paragraph 3(e) of this Section; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this subparagraph, begin, until the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section, or, at the option of the Testing Party, until the explosive canister and choke section are fixed in place with solidified stemming material, in which case, after a period of no more than 24 hours for placement of explosives, to observe the explosive canister, the choke section, and the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section; and to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole, the stemming of any access or bypass drifts, the stemming of any voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone connected to the emplacement hole; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (d) with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, prior to the lowering of an explosive canister into the emplacement hole, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the external structure of each canister and each choke section; to confirm by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to any specifications provided by the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 10(c)(iii) of Section XI of this

400  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Protocol; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this subparagraph, begin; to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister into the emplacement hole and stemming of the emplacement hole from the time an entire explosive canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole until completion of stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole; to determine by direct measurement the depth of emplacement of the upper surface of each explosive canister; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, following placement of all explosive canisters in the emplacement hole and prior to the beginning of stemming around the explosive canister, to confirm by direct measurement the external dimensions of each explosive canister; to inspect visually the entire external structure of each explosive canister; to confirm by direct measurement that each choke section conforms to any specifications provided by the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 10(c)(iii) of Section XI of this Protocol; to observe continuously each explosive canister and each choke section from the time inspections and measurements, carried out in accordance with this subparagraph, begin, until the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section, or, at the option of the Testing Party, until the explosive canister and choke section are fixed in place with solidified stemming material, in which case, after a period of no more than 24 hours for placement of explosives, to observe the explosive canister, the choke section, and the completion of stemming around each explosive canister and choke section; to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole, the stemming of any access or bypass drifts, the stemming of any voids in each hydrodynamic measurement zone connected to the emplacement hole, except those voids and any access or bypass drifts designated by the Testing Party to remain unstemmed in accordance with paragraph 10(c) of Section XI of this Protocol; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; and (iii) if a test is conducted in a cavity, to measure the shape and volume of the cavity after excavation and once again immediately prior to placement of explosive canisters with explosives or placement of explosives into explosive canisters.After placement of explosive canisters with explosives or placement of explosives into explosive canisters, Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe explosive canisters and to observe the stemming of each hydrodynamic measurement zone of the emplacement hole and any access or bypass drifts, and of any voids connected to the emplacement hole, within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, except those voids and any access or bypass drifts designated by the Testing Party to remain unstemmed, in accordance with paragraph 10(c) of Section XI of this Protocol; and to observe the entire stemming of each associated satellite hole; (e) with respect to a test of standard configuration, as well as with respect to any explosion having a planned yield of 50 kilotons or less: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to unobstructed visual observation of the entrance to the emplacement hole and associated satellite hole from completion of stemming of the satellite hole and of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to unobstructed visual observation of sensing elements and cables until completion of stemming of each associated satellite hole, and of cables specified in paragraph 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol until completion of their installation in protective cableways specified in paragraph 4(d) of this Section, as well as observation of the entrance to the emplacement hole from completion of stemming of each satellite hole and of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  401

(f) with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons and characteristics differing from those set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section with respect to a test of standard configuration: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to unobstructed visual observation of the entrance to the emplacement hole and each satellite hole from completion of stemming of all satellite holes and the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to unobstructed visual observation of the sensing elements and cables and transducers until completion of stemming of all associated satellite holes, and of cables specified in paragraph 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol until completion of their installation in protective cableways specified in paragraph 6(c) of this Section of the Protocol, as well as the entrance to the emplacement hole from completion of stemming of all satellite holes and the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole until departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; (g) to monitor electrically the integrity and performance of their equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and to observe continuously the cables specified in paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol and the cableways in which they are installed as specified in paragraphs 4(d) and 6(c) of this Section, from the time emplacement of sensing elements and cables and transducers begins until departure of all personnel from the test location. Following departure of personnel and until reentry of personnel to the test location following the test, Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe remotely, by means of closed-circuit television, the surface area containing their hydrodynamic yield measurement equipment; (h) to monitor electrically the integrity and performance of their equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 3(f), and 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol from the command and monitoring facility specified in paragraph 3(e) of Section VIII of this Protocol, from commencement of its use by Designated Personnel until completion of the activities specified in paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of this Section; (i) to transmit from the command and monitoring facility to each hydrodynamic recording facility the commands required for operation of that hydrodynamic recording facility; (j) to use channels provided by the Testing Party within its telemetry system for transmission of information specified in subparagraphs (h), (i), (k), and (l) of this paragraph, if such a system is used at the test site of the Testing Party, or to use for these purposes its own cables, specified in paragraph 3(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol; (k) to carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements and to record the hydrodynamic data; (l) to transmit the hydrodynamic yield measurement data from each hydrodynamic recording facility to the command and monitoring facility; and (m) to reenter the area containing each hydrodynamic recording facility at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party, and to have access, in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Parties and accompanied by personnel of the Testing Party, to each hydrodynamic recording facility, for the purposes of retrieving and verifying the authenticity of recorded data and assessing the performance of the equipment of the Verifying Party during data recording and transmission. 10. During the carrying out of hydrodynamic yield measurements: (a) the Representative of the Testing Party shall notify, in writing, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site of the beginning of the period of readiness and the planned time of the test, in accordance with paragraph 13 of Section IV of this Protocol;

402  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(b) the Testing Party shall produce an event readiness signal in the interval from seven to 15 minutes prior to the planned time of the test, as specified by the Verifying Party, with an accuracy of plus or minus 100 milliseconds. The parameters for this signal, produced by the Testing Party, and procedures for its transmission and reception shall be agreed upon by the Parties; (c) Designated Personnel shall have the right to generate, using the trigger conditioner devices approved by the Parties, a timing reference signal using an electromagnetic pulse from their sensing elements and cables. This timing reference signal shall be generated, transmitted, and used by Designated Personnel without intervention by personnel of the Testing Party. For each explosion in a test, the trigger conditioner shall receive signals from one or two hydrodynamic yield measurement cables; (d) Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall have the right to install the trigger conditioner devices. From the time of installation of these devices until the time of the test: (i) Designated Personnel shall have the right to test and monitor the operation of the devices; (ii) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to monitor the operation of the devices and to monitor and record the timing reference signal; and (iii) neither Designated Personnel nor personnel of the Testing Party shall have physical access to the devices, except under observation of personnel of the other Party; (e) the Testing Party shall provide, at the request of the Verifying Party, an electrical pulse corresponding to the nuclear explosion zero-time, with an accuracy of plus or minus one microsecond, for each explosion.The parameters for this signal and procedures for its transmission and reception shall be agreed upon by the Parties; (f) the Testing Party shall have exclusive control over the generation of signals specified in subparagraphs (b) and (e) of this paragraph; (g) Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall install in each cable from each satellite hole to a hydrodynamic recording facility an anti-intrusiveness device for interrupting the transmission, from the sensing elements and cables and transducers to the hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party, of any signal unrelated to hydrodynamic yield measurements.These devices shall be provided by the Testing Party from among those approved by both Parties and shall not interfere with the ability of Designated Personnel to record data required for hydrodynamic yield measurements of each explosion in a test. From the time of installation of these devices until the final dry run, personnel of each Party shall have the right to test and monitor the operation of the devices and to have physical access to them only under observation of personnel of the other Party. Sole control over the triggering of these devices shall be transferred to the Testing Party at the time of departure of all personnel from the test location prior to the test; (h) each hydrodynamic recording facility shall have an independent grounding loop with an impedance no greater than 10 ohms; (i) the shields of all cables associated with sensing elements and cables and transducers of the Verifying Party shall be grounded: (i) at the input to each hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party; (ii) at the output of each anti-intrusiveness device; (iii) at the input of each trigger conditioner device; and (iv) in those cables associated with sensing elements and cables in which no trigger conditioner device is installed, at the input of the anti-intrusiveness device;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  403

(j) grounding of each hydrodynamic recording facility, as well as grounding of cables associated with the sensing elements and cables and transducers of the Verifying Party, shall be carried out by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. The grounding system of each hydrodynamic recording facility, as well as of cables associated with the sensing elements and cables and transducers shall be under the joint control of the Parties; (k) Designated Personnel shall have the right to install, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, an isolation transformer at the input of each anti-intrusiveness device or trigger conditioner device. From the time of installation of these devices until the time of the test, neither Designated Personnel nor personnel of the Testing Party shall have physical access to these devices, except under observation of personnel of the other Party; (l) the Testing Party shall have the right to install, at a distance of no less than 50 meters from each hydrodynamic recording facility, a facility containing instrumentation for monitoring and recording the timing reference signal, for controlling and monitoring the operation of the antiintrusiveness devices, and for the transmission of control and trigger signals. Signals between the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party and each hydrodynamic recording facility shall be transmitted over fiber optic cables. The Testing Party shall provide for the installation, in each hydrodynamic recording facility, of terminal devices for converting optical signals into electrical signals produced in accordance with subparagraphs (b) and (e) of this paragraph, and for monitoring the interval of interruption and for monitoring the power supply of the anti-intrusiveness device, in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph.The Verifying Party shall provide for the installation in the facility of the Testing Party of a terminal device for converting an optical signal into an electrical time referencing signal provided in accordance with subparagraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph. These provided devices shall be installed under observation of personnel of both Parties and sealed by the Party providing the device.The instrumentation facilities specified in this subparagraph shall be under the exclusive control of the Testing Party; and (m) upon arrival at the test site, Designated Personnel shall provide the Testing Party with a copy of the block diagram of the equipment configuration for hydrodynamic yield measurements for the test together with notification of any changes from the block diagram approved during the familiarization process provided in paragraph 6(d)(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol. No less than two days prior to the final dry run, Designated Personnel shall notify the Testing Party, in writing, of any additional changes in this block diagram. In the event of any changes in the block diagram, the Testing Party shall have the right, within one day following such notification, to disapprove any changes it finds inconsistent with its non-intrusiveness, containment, safety, or security requirements. Such disapproval shall be provided, in writing, to the Designated Personnel Team Leader, stating the specific reasons for disapproval.Any changes not disapproved shall be deemed accepted. If a change is disapproved, Designated Personnel shall configure the equipment in accordance with the block diagram previously approved in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless the Testing Party otherwise agrees. 11. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe use of equipment by Designated Personnel at the test site, with access to each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party subject to the following: (a) at any time prior to the test that Designated Personnel are not present in these facilities, these facilities shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties. Seals shall be removed only under observation of personnel of both Parties; (b) prior to the test, except for periods specified in subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph, personnel of the Testing Party may enter these facilities only with the agreement of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Team Leader or his designated representative; (c) for the period of two hours prior to the final dry run, and for the period of two hours prior to the time fixed for withdrawal of all personnel to the area designated for occupation during

404  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

the test, personnel of the Testing Party, not to exceed two, shall have the right to join Designated Personnel in each hydrodynamic recording facility, to observe final preparations of the equipment and to confirm the agreed configuration of that equipment. All personnel shall leave the facility together; and (d) for a period beginning two hours prior to a test and ending upon completion of the activities specified in paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of this Section, personnel of the Testing Party, not to exceed two, shall have the right to join Designated Personnel in the command and monitoring facility to observe final command and monitoring of the recording equipment and acquisition and duplication of data, and to receive a copy of these data. 12. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs taken by personnel of the Testing Party using photographic cameras of the Testing Party or, at the option of the Testing Party, photographic cameras provided by the Verifying Party. These photographs shall be taken under the following conditions: (a) the Testing Party shall identify those of its personnel who will take photographs; (b) photographs shall be taken at the request and under observation of Designated Personnel. If requested by Designated Personnel, such photographs shall show the size of an object by placing a measuring scale, provided by Designated Personnel, alongside that object during the photographing; (c) Designated Personnel shall determine whether photographs conform to those requested, and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken; and (d) before completion of any photographed operation related to emplacement, and prior to the time at which an object that is being photographed becomes permanently hidden from view, Designated Personnel shall determine whether requested photographs are adequate. If they are not adequate, before the operation shall proceed additional photographs shall be taken until the Designated Personnel determine that the photographs of that operation are adequate. This photographic process shall be undertaken as expeditiously as possible, and in no case shall the cumulative delay resulting from this process exceed two hours for each of the operations specified in paragraphs 13(a), 13(b), 13(d), 13(e), and 13(f) of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree, except that stemming shall not be interrupted as a result of the photographic process. 13. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs, taken in accordance with paragraph 12 of this Section, of the following: (a) the emplacement and installation of equipment associated with the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, including all sensing elements and cables and transducers and their connections, each hydrodynamic recording facility, the command and monitoring facility, antiintrusiveness devices, and trigger conditioner devices; (b) the stemming of all satellite holes; (c) all choke sections and the exterior of each explosive canister; (d) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the emplacement of each explosive canister and the stemming of the hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole; (e) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the interior of the emplacement hole within 20 meters of the emplacement point of each installed explosive canister and the stemming of hydrodynamic measurement zones of the emplacement hole; (f) core samples and rock fragments obtained in accordance with paragraphs 5(e), 5(f), 5(g), 5(h), 7(e), 7(f), 7(g), and 7(h) of this Section, the equipment and activities associated with extracting such samples, as well as the interior of the emplacement hole, if an emplacement hole is horizontal, at the stations where core samples or rock fragments were extracted; and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  405

(g) with the agreement of the Testing Party, other activities of Designated Personnel directly related to the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 14.The following procedures shall apply to the recovery and transfer of data: (a) no later than the final dry run, Designated Personnel shall inform personnel of the Testing Party of the procedures for recovering and verifying the authenticity of data and shall advise personnel of the Testing Party, at the time of data recovery, of any changes Designated Personnel make in those procedures and the reasons for such changes; (b) following the test, Designated Personnel, in the presence of personnel of the Testing Party, shall enter the hydrodynamic recording facility and recover all recordings of data taken at the time of the test. Designated Personnel shall prepare two identical copies of such data. Personnel of the Testing Party shall select one of the two identical copies. Designated Personnel shall retain the other copy, but no other such data; and (c) following the completion of the activities specified in paragraph 9(m) of this Section and subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall leave the hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have no further access to their hydrodynamic recording facility, command and monitoring facility, or equipment until these are returned to the Verifying Party in accordance with paragraph 7(i)(ii) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless the Parties otherwise agree, in which case access by Designated Personnel to their facilities and equipment shall be under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. 15. Designated Personnel shall not be present in areas from which all personnel of the Testing Party have been withdrawn in connection with the test, but shall have the right to reenter those areas, as provided in this Protocol, at the same time as personnel of the Testing Party. 16. All hydrodynamic yield measurement activities shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel who will carry out the activities specified in this Section and in paragraph 7(e) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall arrive at the test site in accordance with the coordinated schedule, but no less than three days prior to the date specified by the Testing Party for the beginning of these activities. 17. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a test of standard configuration conducted in a single emplacement hole, without regard to the number of ends of that emplacement hole, as these are specified in paragraph 3(b) of this Section, shall not exceed, at any time, 35 individuals, and the number of Designated Personnel, at any time, carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a test of non-standard configuration or a test conducted in more than one emplacement hole shall not exceed, at any time, 45 individuals, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Within these totals, the coordinated schedule shall be developed so as to ensure that the number of Designated Personnel for carrying out hydrodynamic yield measurements with respect to a specific test shall not exceed: (a) if a test is of standard configuration, for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, other than activities specified in paragraph 5(j) of this Section, 26 individuals and, for carrying out activities specified in paragraph 5(j) of this Section: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, 18 individuals; or (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, 22 individuals; or (b) if a test is of non-standard configuration or is conducted in more than one emplacement hole, for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements other than activities specified in paragraph 5(j) or 7(j) of this Section, 35 individuals and, for carrying out activities specified in paragraph 5(j) or 7(j) of this Section, 26 individuals; and (c) Designated Personnel shall include at least two individuals fluent in the language of the Testing Party.

406  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Section VI. Seismic Yield Measurement Method 1. For the purposes of the use of the seismic yield measurement method, the Verifying Party shall have the right to carry out independent seismic measurements at three Designated Seismic Stations in the territory of the Testing Party, in accordance with this Section. Designated Seismic Stations of each Party shall meet the following criteria: (a) be located within its continental territory; (b) each shall have an Lg-wave signal-to-noise ratio not less than nine for any test in its territory having a yield of 150 kilotons.The signal-to-noise ratio shall be defined as one-half of the maximum peak amplitude of the Lg-wave signal divided by the root-mean-square value of the seismic noise in the recording segment immediately preceding the arrival of the P-wave signal and having a duration of no less than one minute.The signals and the noise shall be measured on a vertical component of the recording in the frequency range typical of Lg-waves recorded at the Designated Seismic Station; (c) ensure wide azimuthal coverage of each of its test sites, insofar as permitted by their geographic location; and (d) be chosen from those existing seismic stations that provide earthquake and other seismic event data, including tests, to archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party. 2.The United States of America designates the following three seismic stations as meeting the criteria specified in paragraph 1 of this Section:Tulsa, Oklahoma (TUL) (35˚55'N; 095˚48'W); Black Hills, South Dakota (RSSD)(44˚07'N; 104˚02'W); and Newport,Washington (NEW) 48˚16'N; 117˚07'W). 3. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics designates the following three seismic stations as meeting the criteria specified in paragraph 1 of this Section: Arti (ARU)(56˚26'N; 058˚34'E); Novosibirsk (NVS)(54˚51'N; 083˚16'E); and Obninsk (OBN)(55˚07'N; 036˚34'E). 4. Upon entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with the following information on each of its Designated Seismic Stations: (a) a site diagram of the station showing the areas assigned for use by Designated Personnel; (b) elevation above mean sea level to the nearest 10 meters; and (c) types of rock on which it is located. 5.The Testing Party shall have the right to replace one or more of its Designated Seismic Stations, provided: (a) the new Designated Seismic Station meets all the criteria specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; (b) notification of the decision of the Testing Party to select a new Designated Seismic Station, together with the station name and its reference code, the station coordinates to the nearest one minute of geographic latitude and longitude, and the information and site diagram for the new station specified in paragraph 4 of this Section, is provided to the Verifying Party no less than 90 days prior to the planned date of any test with respect to which the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the seismic yield measurement method and for which this Designated Seismic Station would be used; and (c) seismic data, for the period from entry into force of the Treaty until the new Designated Seismic Station begins use as a Designated Seismic Station, are placed in archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party. If a Designated Seismic Station is replaced within the first four years following entry into force of the Treaty, seismic data for at least four years of operation of the new Designated Seismic Station shall be placed in archives in the territory of the Testing Party, accessible to the Verifying Party.

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  407

6. If any Designated Seismic Station does not meet the criteria specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the Verifying Party shall have the right to request its replacement with another Designated Seismic Station that meets such criteria. Any request by the Verifying Party for replacement shall state the reasons this Designated Seismic Station does not meet the criteria specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, and shall be transmitted to the Testing Party through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. If the Parties are unable to resolve the issue of replacement of a Designated Seismic Station, it shall immediately be referred to the Bilateral Consultative Commission in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of Section XI of this Protocol for resolution. 7.The Testing Party shall bear the costs of replacing any Designated Seismic Station in its territory, including any costs of eliminating the previous Designated Seismic Station and the costs of preparing a new Designated Seismic Station in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section. 8. If requested by the Verifying Party, the Testing Party shall provide, according to agreed technical specifications, at each Designated Seismic Station, for the exclusive use of Designated Personnel: (a) a surface vault and pier for the installation of seismic sensors, to be located not less than 100 meters and not more than 200 meters from the seismometers of the Testing Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (b) a borehole for installation of seismic sensors, to be located not less than 100 meters and not more than 200 meters from the seismometers of the Testing Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (c) a working facility with an area not less than 20 square meters, for the installation and operation of equipment by Designated Personnel and situated not less than 75 meters and not more than 125 meters from the seismometers of the Verifying Party, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (d) a covered cableway that will allow Designated Personnel to connect devices in the facilities specified in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph; (e) a facility for the storage of shipping containers and spare parts for the use of Designated Personnel while carrying out their activities at the Designated Seismic Stations; and (f) electrical power from its standard electrical network through converters provided by the Verifying Party or, by agreement of the Parties, by the Testing Party. 9. At each Designated Seismic Station, personnel of the Testing Party shall: (a) have the right to observe the installation and calibration of equipment by Designated Personnel, but at all other times they may be present only at the invitation of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative; (b) not interfere with the activities of Designated Personnel with regard to the installation, calibration, adjustment, and operation of equipment; and (c) provide assistance and logistical support to Designated Personnel in accordance with paragraph 13 of Section XI of this Protocol, and, by agreement of the Parties, other assistance and logistical support requested by Designated Personnel. 10. In carrying out seismic measurements at the Designated Seismic Stations, Designated Personnel shall have the right to: (a) confirm that the agreed technical specifications for the installation and operation of the equipment have been met during the time periods specified in the coordinated schedule; (b) have access to their equipment from the time of the arrival of Designated Personnel at, and until their departure from, each Designated Seismic Station, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (c) install, calibrate, adjust, and continuously operate their equipment;

408  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(d) record seismic signals and universal time signals continuously from the time their equipment is installed until two hours after the test, as well as process data to monitor the quality of recorded data and retrieve and copy all recorded data; (e) use their own electrical sources to supply electrical power to their equipment specified in paragraph 4 of Section VIII of this Protocol; (f) install and operate tamper-detection equipment and observe the cableway and the exterior of the facility in which the seismic sensors are installed; (g) assess the integrity and performance of their equipment and confirm that there has been no interference with seismic measurements and the recording of such measurements; and (h) lock and seal the facilities specified in paragraphs 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), and 8(e) of this Section with their own seals. 11.The Representative of the Testing Party shall notify, in writing and referenced to Universal Time Coordinated, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at each Designated Seismic Station of the beginning of the period of event readiness and the planned time of the test, to the nearest one second, in accordance with paragraph 13 of Section IV of this Protocol. 12. At each Designated Seismic Station, Designated Personnel shall: (a) upon arrival, provide the Representative of the Testing Party with a description of the recording format and the computer program to enable the Testing Party to read digital data, if digital recordings of data are made; (b) prior to departure, provide the Representative of the Testing Party with the following: (i) a copy of all data recorded by all equipment used by Designated Personnel, on the same medium as that on which these data were recorded; (ii) a graphic representation on a paper medium of the seismic data of the test for a period of time beginning one minute prior to the test and ending 30 minutes following the test; and (iii) the results of the calibration of all seismic equipment, including the amplitude-frequency characteristics of the equipment used to measure and record the seismic data; and (c) prior to their departure, prepare for inspection, storage in accordance with the conditions chosen by the Testing Party, or shipment of their equipment. 13. Designated Personnel shall have the right to acquire photographs of operations and activities related to seismic yield measurement at the Designated Seismic Stations. Photographs shall be taken by personnel of the Testing Party, using their own photographic cameras, or, at the option of the Testing Party, by Designated Personnel using their own photographic cameras. (a) If the Testing Party takes photographs, the following conditions shall be met: (i) the Testing Party shall identify those of its personnel who will take photographs; (ii) photographs shall be taken at the request and under observation of Designated Personnel. If requested by Designated Personnel, such photographs shall show the size of an object being photographed by placing a measuring scale, provided by Designated Personnel, alongside that object during the photographing; and (iii) Designated Personnel shall determine whether photographs that were taken conform to those requested, and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken. (b) If Designated Personnel take photographs, the following conditions shall be met: (i) the Verifying Party shall identify those of its Designated Personnel who will take photographs; and

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  409

(ii) photographs shall be taken under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. 14.All activities of Designated Personnel at the Designated Seismic Stations shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall arrive at the Designated Seismic Stations in accordance with this schedule, but no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test. Designated Personnel shall depart the Designated Seismic Station within two days following the test. 15. If the planned date of a test is postponed by more than 10 days following receipt of the most recent notification, Designated Personnel shall have the right to leave the Designated Seismic Stations or, if requested by the Representative of the Testing Party, shall depart the Designated Seismic Stations for a mutually agreed location within the territory of the Testing Party or depart the territory of the Testing Party through the point of entry. If Designated Personnel leave the Designated Seismic Stations, they shall have the right to seal their equipment located at the stations. The seals shall not be broken except by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have the right to reoccupy the Designated Seismic Stations no less than 72 hours prior to the next planned time of the test. 16. The number of Designated Personnel carrying out seismic measurements at each Designated Seismic Station shall not exceed five. At least one individual fluent in the language of the Testing Party shall be among Designated Personnel at each Designated Seismic Station. Section VII. On-site Inspection 1. In carrying out on-site inspection, the Verifying Party shall have the right to confirm the validity of the geological, geophysical, and geometrical information provided in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 9 of Section IV of this Protocol, in accordance with the following procedures: (a) the Testing Party shall provide Designated Personnel, upon their arrival at the test site, with the results of any studies of core samples and rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, and the results of logging and geodetic measurements carried out in each emplacement hole and any exploratory holes and tunnels, relevant to the geology and geophysics of the emplacement medium, if the Testing Party carried out such studies and measurements; (b) using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel shall have the right to carry out: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, in the emplacement hole, from the end of the hole to the entrance to the hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, television, and caliper logging, and measurements of the depth and cross section of the emplacement hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of voids, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, in the holes specified in subparagraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph, and in the emplacement hole in the regions extending from each end of the emplacement hole to a point located 300 meters from the corresponding emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, acoustic, and caliper logging, and measurements of the length and cross section of the emplacement hole, as well as measurements to determine the location and volume of voids, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (c) all logging and geometrical measurement data obtained by Designated Personnel in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and a copy of these data shall be provided to personnel of the Testing Party prior to the depar-

410  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

ture from the test site of Designated Personnel who have carried out those measurements. Calibration data shall include information needed to confirm the sensitivity of logging equipment under the conditions in which it is used; (d) Designated Personnel shall have the right to receive: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel, extracted from the emplacement hole at 10 depths specified by Designated Personnel, plus one additional depth for every complete 50-meter distance between the uppermost and lowest emplacement points.The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each of the specified depths shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel, from the emplacement hole in the regions extending from each end of the emplacement hole to a point located 300 meters from the corresponding emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole. Core samples shall be extracted during drilling from each of five holes drilled at stations in the emplacement hole, specified by Designated Personnel.These five stations shall be separated from each other by no less than 15 meters. At each station the hole shall be drilled in a direction specified by Designated Personnel, except that at each station within 65 meters of each emplacement point the Testing Party shall have the right to exclude two 90-degree sectors separated by a sector of 90 degrees.The diameter of each drilled hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters and no more than 0.15 meters, and the depth of each hole shall be no more than the diameter of the emplacement hole at that station. Core samples shall be extracted at locations specified by Designated Personnel along the drilled hole. Rock fragments shall be extracted from the walls of the emplacement hole at five stations specified by Designated Personnel.The total volume of core samples or rock fragments extracted at each station shall be no less than 400 cubic centimeters and no more than 3000 cubic centimeters, unless the Parties otherwise agree. (e) core samples or rock fragments, at the option of Designated Personnel, shall be extracted, in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, by personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, or by Designated Personnel, at the option of the Testing Party; (f) if the Testing Party does not extract core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall have the right to do so, using their own equipment and under observation of personnel of the Testing Party; (g) if, prior to arrival of Designated Personnel at the test site, the Testing Party has cased more than a total of 20 meters within any 100-meter segment of a vertical emplacement hole in the region extending from the end of the emplacement hole to a point 300 meters from the planned emplacement point in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole, the Testing Party shall provide an uncased hole with respect to which the Verifying Party shall have the same rights as those specified for an emplacement hole in subparagraphs (b), (d), (e), and (f) of this paragraph.This uncased hole shall be located no more than 50 meters from the emplacement hole and shall have a depth no less than that of the emplacement hole. If personnel of the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, extract core samples through coring during the drilling of this uncased hole, the diameter of this hole shall be no less than 0.09 meters. If Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, extract core samples from this uncased hole following drilling, the diameter of this uncased hole shall be no less than 0.3 meters; and (h) Designated Personnel shall have the right to retain core samples and rock fragments specified in subparagraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) of this paragraph. Any such core samples or rock fragments shall be prepared in accordance with the procedures agreed upon by the Parties for shipment to the territory of the Verifying Party.

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  411

2. Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister into the emplacement hole from the time the bottom of the canister is last visible above the entrance of the emplacement hole, and to determine by direct measurement the depth of emplacement of the bottom of the canister; (b) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to determine by direct measurement the location of each explosive canister in the emplacement hole, and to confirm the presence of at least 10 meters of stemming, as specified in subparagraph (c)(ii) of this paragraph, in any previously stemmed tunnel that had provided access to an explosive canister, using, in a non-destructive way, such methods as electromagnetic measurements, radar, and acoustic sounding; (c) to observe stemming of each emplacement hole: (i) if an emplacement hole is vertical, until a solid concrete plug no less than three meters thick is installed above the explosive canister closest to the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (ii) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, until access to any explosive canister has been prevented by installation of stemming material for a distance no less than 10 meters, including the installation of a solid concrete plug no less than three meters thick; (d) to have access along agreed routes to the location of the test to carry out activities related to on-site inspection; (e) to have access to their equipment associated with the carrying out of on-site inspection from the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel at the test site, until it is transferred to personnel of the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 9(g) of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless otherwise provided in this Protocol; (f) if an emplacement hole is vertical, to have access, for the purpose of visual inspection of the ground surface, to the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters, centered on the entrance to the emplacement hole; and (g) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, to have access, for the purpose of visual inspection of the ground surface, to the area delineated by a circle having a radius of 300 meters, centered directly above the emplacement point of each explosive canister. 3. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs associated with on-site inspection, which shall be taken in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section V of this Protocol, of the following: (a) if an emplacement hole is vertical, the emplacement of each explosive canister and the stemming of the emplacement hole specified in paragraph 2(c)(i) of this Section; (b) if an emplacement hole is horizontal, the interior of the emplacement hole within 20 meters of the emplacement point of each explosive canister, and the stemming of the emplacement hole specified in paragraph 2(c)(ii) of this Section; (c) core samples and rock fragments, extracted in accordance with paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), and 1(g) of this Section, the equipment and activities associated with extracting such samples, as well as the interior of the emplacement hole, if the emplacement hole is horizontal, at the stations where core samples and rock fragments were extracted; and (d) with the agreement of the Testing Party, other activities of Designated Personnel directly related to on-site inspection. 4. In no case shall the cumulative delay resulting from the photographic process specified in paragraph 3 of this Section exceed two hours for each of the operations specified in paragraph 3 of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree, except that stemming shall not be interrupted as a result of the photographic process.

412  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

5.All on-site inspection activities shall be carried out in accordance with the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel shall have the right, within a period not to exceed 15 days, to carry out logging and coring activities specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree and so specify in the coordinated schedule.These activities shall be completed no less than one day prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives. Upon completion of the activities specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, Designated Personnel shall depart the territory of the Testing Party, except that Designated Personnel who will also participate in the activities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section shall remain at the test site, if the Parties decide that this is required by the coordinated schedule. Otherwise, Designated Personnel shall depart the territory of the Testing Party or, if agreed by the Parties, they may depart to another point within the territory of the Testing Party. All Designated Personnel who will carry out the activities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section shall arrive at the test site in accordance with the coordinated schedule, but no less than three days prior to the date specified by the Testing Party for the beginning of these activities. 6.The number of Designated Personnel carrying out the activities specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not exceed 23 at any time.The number of Designated Personnel carrying out activities specified in paragraphs 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) of this Section shall not exceed five at any time. At least one individual fluent in the language of the Testing Party shall be among Designated Personnel. Section VIII. Equipment 1. Designated Personnel, in carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, shall have the right to bring into the territory of the Testing Party, install, and use: (a) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 3 of this Section; (b) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the seismic yield measurement method, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 4 of this Section; (c) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to carry out on-site inspection, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 5 of this Section; (d) maintenance and support equipment and spare parts necessary for the installation and functioning of equipment of the Verifying Party; (e) electrical power supplies, converters, and associated cables; (f) photographic equipment, if the Testing Party does not provide such equipment; (g) locks, seals, and equipment necessary for installing seals of the Verifying Party and checking their integrity; (h) medical and health physics equipment and supplies, personal protective gear, recreational items, and such other items as may be agreed upon by the Parties; (i) office equipment and supplies, including, but not limited to, copying and facsimile machines, and personal computers; (j) closed-circuit television equipment for the purpose of carrying out remote observation by Designated Personnel, in accordance with paragraph 9(g) of Section V of this Protocol, if the Testing Party does not provide such equipment; and (k) satellite communications equipment, if the Testing Party does not provide satellite communications for Designated Personnel. 2. During the first meeting of the Coordinating Group for a specific test, the Parties shall agree, within 15 days, upon such additional materials, temporary structures, and equipment as may be requested in writing by the Verifying Party and which shall be supplied by the Testing Party for use

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  413

by Designated Personnel. Such additional materials, temporary structures, and equipment, with their descriptions and operating instructions, shall be provided to Designated Personnel in accordance with the coordinated schedule. 3. The list of equipment for the purposes of the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method in accordance with Section V of this Protocol shall include: (a) sensing elements and cables and transducers; (b) electrical cables for transmission of hydrodynamic data from the entrance of each horizontal satellite hole to the entrance of the horizontal emplacement hole with which it is associated; (c) the hydrodynamic recording facilities, with equipment, including computers, for acquiring, recording, and processing data and timing signals, as well as for transmitting and receiving hydrodynamic data and command and monitoring signals between each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility, and the shock mitigation platforms for installing each hydrodynamic recording facility, and with equipment for distributing electrical analogs of the signals arriving from the instrumentation facility of the Testing Party; (d) trigger conditioner devices for generating a timing reference signal from the electrical cables of the Verifying Party, and terminal devices for converting an optical signal into an electrical signal; (e) the command and monitoring facility, with equipment, including computers, for generating and recording command and monitoring signals, for transmitting and receiving command and monitoring signals between each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility, as well as for retrieving, storing, and processing hydrodynamic data; (f) electrical cables for transmission of hydrodynamic data from the entrance of each vertical satellite hole or from the entrance of each horizontal emplacement hole to the hydrodynamic recording facility of the Verifying Party; (g) electrical cables for the grounding of equipment and for above-ground transmission of electrical power, and electrical and fiber optic cables for above-ground transmission of command and monitoring signals and hydrodynamic data; (h) measuring and calibration instrumentation, support equipment, and equipment for installing and positioning sensing elements and cables and transducers; (i) equipment specified in paragraph 5 of this Section for confirming the characteristics of emplacement holes and satellite holes; and (j) directional survey and magnetic survey equipment and equipment for determining the distance between emplacement holes and satellite holes, and equipment for detecting voids and determining their relative locations and volumes. 4.The list of equipment for the purposes of the use of the seismic yield measurement method at each Designated Seismic Station in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol shall include: (a) seismic sensors capable of recording ground movements in three orthogonal directions within the frequency range from 0.1 to 10 hertz; (b) equipment for amplifying, filtering, and digitizing the output signals of the seismic sensors; (c) equipment for recording seismic data, and cables for interconnecting the equipment described in this paragraph; (d) equipment for controlling sensors and recorders and for calibrating equipment; (e) means of recording Universal Time Coordinated and referencing the recorded seismic data to it;

414  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(f) equipment, including computers, to process data, to monitor the quality of the recorded data, as well as to display, store, and copy data; and (g) equipment, including that using digital algorithms, for assessing the validity of recorded seismic data. 5. The list of equipment for the purposes of carrying out on-site inspection in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol shall include: (a) equipment for obtaining the following logging data: gamma-gamma, gamma, neutron, electrical resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, gravity, television, acoustic, and caliper, as well as equipment for measuring the depth and cross section of emplacement holes and for measuring the volume of voids; (b) equipment, including computers, for calibrating logging equipment, for monitoring the quality of the recorded data, as well as for recording, displaying, and copying data from logging equipment; (c) equipment for extracting core samples and rock fragments; and (d) geologist’s field tools and kits, and equipment for the recording of field data. 6.The Testing Party shall have the right, for the purposes of an initial familiarization, to inspect the equipment and every component thereof that the Verifying Party intends to use in carrying out activities related to verification, and thereafter shall have the right to familiarize itself with the equipment and every component thereof that had not previously been provided for this purpose in accordance with this paragraph. For these purposes: (a) the equipment subject to familiarization by the Testing Party shall include: (i) a set of equipment for hydrodynamic yield measurements, specified in paragraph 3 of this Section; (ii) a set of equipment for seismic yield measurements, specified in paragraph 4 of this Section; (iii) a set of equipment for on-site inspection, specified in paragraph 5 of this Section; and (iv) the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), 1(j), and 1(k) of this Section; (b) the Verifying Party shall initiate the familiarization process by notifying the Testing Party no less than 30 days prior to the date on which it intends to deliver equipment to the point of entry.This notification shall include a preliminary inventory of the equipment and the planned date of its delivery; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of such equipment, which shall also specify which equipment, in accordance with paragraph 7(h) of this Section, will be removed from the facilities of the Verifying Party immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run and immediately prior to the test. At the same time the Verifying Party shall provide instructions on the installation and operation of equipment with functional and technical descriptions and specifications, including electrical diagrams, as well as block diagrams of the system and its components; (d) no more than 45 days following receipt of the equipment, the Testing Party, taking into account the equipment specified for removal in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, shall specify, in writing, to the Verifying Party: (i) the equipment approved by it for use by Designated Personnel in accordance with the information provided in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph; and (ii) the characteristics of any equipment component it finds unacceptable because it is inconsistent with its non-intrusiveness, containment, safety, or security requirements;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  415

(e) no more than 50 days following its initial delivery to the point of entry, equipment shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; and (f) following receipt of the written evaluation provided by the Testing Party in accordance with subparagraph (d)(ii) of this paragraph, the Verifying Party may deliver to the Testing Party, for familiarization in accordance with procedures specified in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, modified or replacement equipment to eliminate the unacceptable characteristics specified by the Testing Party, after which the procedures specified in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph shall be followed with respect to the modified or replacement equipment. 7.The following procedures shall apply to equipment for use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with subparagraph (j) of this paragraph, no less than 60 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), 1(k), 3(i), and 3(j) of this Section; (b) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with subparagraph (j) of this paragraph, no less than 45 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry two identical sets of the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) of this Section, and, at its option, either one or two sets of the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(j), 3(f), 3(g), and 3(h) of this Section, and, if it has not been delivered in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), and 1(k) of this Section; (c) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (d) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment, specifying which equipment, in accordance with subparagraph (h) of this paragraph, will be removed from the facilities of the Verifying Party immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run and immediately prior to the test; (e) if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment: (i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel, with the exception of the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived.The set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party. Seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; (ii) with respect to the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section, the Testing Party, under observation of Designated Personnel, shall remove the seals of the

416  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Verifying Party, combine the two sets of equipment, and randomly redistribute the items of each type of such equipment in order to produce two new identical sets.The Testing Party shall choose one of these new identical sets for use by Designated Personnel, and both Parties shall affix their own seals to the containers of that set. The set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with procedures specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph; (iii) if the Verifying Party has delivered the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section with individual gas-blocking devices installed in the cables, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall cut each cable at points three meters on either side of each gas-blocking device and shall place these gas-blocking devices and their attached cable segments in separate containers. If the Verifying Party delivered this equipment without individual gas-blocking devices installed, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall cut a three-meter segment from each end of each cable and shall place these segments in separate containers. Personnel of each Party, under observation of personnel of the other Party, shall seal these separate containers of cable segments or gas-blocking devices with cable segments.The remainder of this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with subparagraph (e)(i) of this paragraph, except that during inspection of this equipment the Testing Party may remove up to 150 meters of cable from the set chosen for inspection, in no more segments than twice the number of cables in that set; the set of equipment not chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be subject to inspection by the Testing Party; (iv) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of the equipment chosen by it for use by Designated Personnel and the sealed containers specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph while they are in its territory, and shall transport this equipment to the test site in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the test site, and from the time of its arrival at the test site until the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel, this equipment shall be kept sealed, in storage under conditions agreed upon by the Parties; (v) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the test site. The equipment specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel for use at the test site no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The equipment specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site for use no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; (vi) seals affixed to the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a), 3(b), and 3(d) of this Section shall not be removed prior to either the conduct of pressure tests and non-destructive inspections, in accordance with subparagraphs e(vii) and (e)(viii) of this paragraph, or preparation for installation of such equipment, at which time personnel of each Party shall remove their seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party.Thereafter, personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe all activities of Designated Personnel related to this equipment;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  417

(vii) the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct pressure tests on the portions of cables with individual gas-blocking devices specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph, in accordance with its technical operations and practices and under observation of Designated Personnel, to ensure that the individual gas-blocking devices meet the containment requirements of the Testing Party.These pressure tests shall be conducted at a time specified by the Testing Party, at which time personnel of each Party shall verify the integrity of their seals on the containers specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph and shall remove their seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party.The Testing Party shall also have the right to conduct non-destructive inspections, under observation of Designated Personnel, on the set of cables chosen for use, to ensure that the cables chosen for use are identical in construction to those chosen for inspection. Such non-destructive inspections shall be carried out at a time specified by the Testing Party. All tests and non-destructive inspections related to the containment requirements of the Testing Party shall be completed, and the results communicated to the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. If all of the individual gas-blocking devices removed from cables in the set chosen for inspection, in accordance with subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph, successfully meet the containment requirements, and if cables chosen for use are found to be identical in construction to those chosen for inspection, then the set chosen for use shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties, which shall not be removed prior to preparation for installation of such equipment. Following the pressure tests, the Testing Party shall have the right to retain the individual gas-blocking devices with their attached cable segments from the set chosen for inspection; (viii) if the Verifying Party delivered the equipment specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of this Section without individual gas-blocking devices installed in the cables, the Testing Party shall have the right to conduct pressure tests, in accordance with its technical operations and practices, to ensure that the gas-blocking properties of these cables meet the containment requirements of the Testing Party. These tests shall be performed under observation of Designated Personnel on the segments of cables specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph as well as on a three-meter segment of each cable of the set chosen for use, removed by Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, from the end of the cable that will extend to the ground surface. These pressure tests shall be conducted at a time specified by the Testing Party, at which time personnel of each Party shall verify the integrity of their seals on the containers specified in subparagraph (e)(iii) of this paragraph, as well as on the containers with the set of equipment chosen for use, specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), and shall remove their seals under observation of personnel of the other Party. All tests related to the containment requirements of the Testing Party shall be completed, and the results communicated to the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site, no less than 10 days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables. If all of the cable segments removed from the set chosen for use and the set chosen for inspection meet the containment requirements of the Testing Party, then the set chosen for use shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties, which shall not be removed prior to preparation for installation of such equipment and its use in hydrodynamic yield measurements; and (ix) if, within one day following the completion of testing and non-destructive inspections specified in subparagraphs (e)(vii) and (e)(viii) of this paragraph, the Verifying Party so requests, the Testing Party shall provide cables that meet its containment requirements.The Testing Party shall deliver these cables to Designated Personnel at the test site no more than two days following the request of the Verifying Party but no less than seven days prior to the planned date for the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (f) if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment:

418  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties, after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall transport all approved equipment to the test site and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel.The equipment specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree.The equipment specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within five days following delivery of equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify, in writing, to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the test site is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (g) upon completion of inspection of the equipment, in accordance with subparagraphs (e)(i) and (f)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the test site, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with subparagraph (i) of this paragraph; (h) immediately prior to the beginning of the final dry run, Designated Personnel, under observation of personnel of the Testing Party, shall remove from each hydrodynamic recording facility and the command and monitoring facility all items specified in accordance with paragraph 6(c) of this Section for removal at that time. These items shall be placed under the seals of both Parties and stored at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Upon departure of personnel of both Parties from each hydrodynamic recording facility immediately prior to the test, all remaining maintenance and support equipment and spare parts shall be removed by Designated Personnel, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (i) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. For these purposes: (i) the equipment used for carrying out activities specified in paragraphs 4(g), 5(c), and 5(f) or 5(g) or 5(h), and 6(b), 6(f), 7(c), and 7(f) or 7(g) or 7(h) of Section V of this Protocol shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all these activities, unless the Parties agree that equipment for any specific activity may be transferred upon completion of that activity; (ii) all other equipment, except that specified in paragraphs 1(e), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), and 1(k) of this Section, shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities specified in paragraphs 9(m) and 14(b) of Section V of this Protocol;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  419

(iii) equipment specified in paragraphs 1(e), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), and 1(k) of this Section shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities of Designated Personnel specified in Section V of this Protocol; and (iv) during inspection of equipment specified in paragraphs 3(f) and 3(g) of this Section, after it has been used for carrying out activities related to hydrodynamic yield measurements, the Testing Party shall have the right to remove and retain no more than 150 meters of those cables, in no more segments than twice the number of cables in each set, with the exception of the fiber optic cables and the electrical cables for above-ground transmission of electrical power; (j) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed upon by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (k) with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection, in accordance with subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within five days following completion of inspection of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment; or (ii) within five days following completion of inspection of equipment in accordance with subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at a location chosen by the Testing Party, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Designated Personnel shall examine, inventory, and pack their equipment in containers. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe these activities.Within five days following receipt of their equipment, Designated Personnel shall transfer to the Testing Party the packed containers, along with inventories of the equipment to be stored and the equipment to be shipped.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within 10 days following receipt of the equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall deliver it to the point of entry; and (l) if stored equipment is to be used for activities related to verification of a subsequent test, it shall be subject to further inspection only after such use.The equipment specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel for use at the test site no less than 25 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives or the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, whichever occurs earlier, unless the Parties otherwise agree.The equipment specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel at the test site no later than 10 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and cables, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 8. The following procedures shall apply to equipment for use of the seismic yield measurement method: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with subparagraph (h) of this paragraph, no less than 45 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver

420  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), and 4 of this Section; (b) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment; (d) if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment: (i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived; (ii) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of this equipment while it is in its territory, and shall transport this equipment to the Designated Seismic Stations in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the Designated Seismic Stations, and from the time of its arrival at the Designated Seismic Stations until the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel, the set of equipment chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be kept sealed, in storage under conditions agreed upon by the Parties; (iii) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the Designated Seismic Stations.This equipment shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at Designated Seismic Stations for installation and use no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; and (iv) seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; (e) if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment: (i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties, after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall transport all approved equipment to the Designated Seismic Stations and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel no less than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within three days following delivery of the equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify in writing to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the Designated Seismic Station is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (f) upon completion of inspection of the equipment, in accordance with subparagraphs (d)(iv) and (e)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  421

equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the Designated Seismic Station, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the Designated Seismic Station of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party.Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at a Designated Seismic Station until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with subparagraphs (g) and (j) of this paragraph; (g) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for activities related to seismic yield measurements for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. If the Testing Party decides to inspect that equipment, it shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of activities specified in Section VI of this Protocol; (h) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed upon by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (i) if the Testing Party inspects the equipment, with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within five days following completion of inspection of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment; or (ii) within five days following completion of inspection of equipment in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at a location chosen by the Testing Party in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Designated Personnel shall examine, inventory, and pack their equipment in containers. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe these activities.Within five days following receipt of their equipment, Designated Personnel shall transfer to the Testing Party the packed containers, along with inventories of the equipment to be stored and the equipment to be shipped.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within 10 days following receipt of equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall deliver it to the point of entry; (j) if the Testing Party chooses not to inspect the equipment upon completion of activities related to seismic yield measurements, Designated Personnel shall prepare the equipment for storage or shipment to their territory prior to departure from the Designated Seismic Station and, upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party, shall provide complete inventories of

422  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories. Equipment to be shipped shall be returned to the Verifying Party at the point of entry within 10 days following departure of Designated Personnel from the Designated Seismic Station. Equipment to be stored shall be prepared for storage, in accordance with agreed procedures for the conditions of storage chosen by the Testing Party; and (k) if stored equipment is to be used for activities related to verification of a subsequent test, it shall be subject to further inspection only after such use.This equipment shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel for use at the Designated Seismic Stations no later than 10 days prior to the planned date of the test, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 9.The following procedures shall apply to equipment for carrying out on-site inspection: (a) with the exception of that equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use from the equipment stored in accordance with subparagraph (h) of this paragraph, no less than 55 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers to the point of entry, at its option, either one or two sets of all or part of the equipment specified in paragraphs 1(d), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h), 1(i), 1(k), and 5 of this Section; (b) these sets of equipment shall have the same components with the same functional and technical descriptions and specifications as the equipment approved by the Testing Party in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section; (c) no less than seven days prior to the date of delivery of equipment to the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide a complete inventory of this equipment; (d) if the Verifying Party provides two identical sets of equipment: (i) the Testing Party shall choose, at the point of entry, one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel, and shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which that set of equipment arrived; (ii) the Testing Party shall ensure protection of this equipment while it is in its territory, and shall transport this equipment to the test site in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received by the Testing Party. Prior to shipment to the test site, and from the time of its arrival at the test site until the time of its transfer to Designated Personnel, the set of equipment chosen by the Testing Party for use by Designated Personnel shall be kept sealed, in storage under conditions agreed upon by the Parties; (iii) personnel of the Testing Party shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours prior to its shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to verify the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany it from the point of entry to the test site.This equipment shall be delivered to Designated Personnel at the test site no less than 20 days before the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Personnel of each Party shall remove their seals from the equipment under observation of personnel of the other Party. Prior to removing their seals, personnel of each Party shall have the right to verify the integrity of those seals, under observation of personnel of the other Party; and (iv) seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment chosen by the Testing Party for inspection, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Testing Party without the presence of Designated Personnel for a period of no more than 30 days, after which time it shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry;

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  423

(e) if the Verifying Party provides only one set of equipment: (i) upon arrival of the equipment at the point of entry, the seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from this equipment in the presence of personnel of both Parties, after which the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect this equipment for no more than 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel; (ii) upon completion of the inspection, the Testing Party shall transport all approved equipment to the test site and deliver it, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel no less than 20 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree; and (iii) within five days following delivery of equipment to Designated Personnel, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall certify, in writing, to the Representative of the Testing Party that the equipment delivered to the test site is in working condition or, in the event of damage to the equipment, shall report such damage in writing; (f) upon completion of inspection of the equipment in accordance with subparagraphs (d)(iv) and (e)(i) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall inform the Verifying Party, in writing, of any equipment that does not conform to that approved previously in accordance with paragraph 6(d)(i) of this Section and shall specify the non-conforming characteristics of any such equipment or component thereof. Prior to shipment to the test site, in the case of equipment provided in one set, or at the time of delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site of the set of equipment chosen for use, in the case of equipment provided in two sets, the equipment that does not conform to that approved previously shall be removed by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Testing Party and placed under seals of both Parties in storage at a location chosen by the Testing Party. Any such equipment shall be returned by the Testing Party to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, following completion of the activity related to verification for which it was originally provided. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, equipment approved by the Testing Party shall remain under the exclusive control of Designated Personnel from the time of its delivery to Designated Personnel at the test site until it is transferred to the Testing Party in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph; (g) personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to inspect equipment after it has been used for carrying out activities related to on-site inspection, for a period of 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. For these purposes: (i) the equipment used for carrying out activities specified in paragraphs 1(b), 1(c), 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), and 1(h) of Section VII of this Protocol shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all these activities, unless the Parties agree that equipment for any specific activity may be transferred upon completion of that activity; and (ii) all other equipment shall be transferred to the Testing Party upon completion of all activities of Designated Personnel specified in Section VII of this Protocol; (h) the Verifying Party shall have the right to store for subsequent use part or all of its equipment in the territory of the Testing Party. Storage shall be under conditions agreed by the Parties, at a location chosen by the Testing Party and under its protection; (i) with respect to inventory and shipment or storage of this equipment, the following procedures, at the option of the Verifying Party, shall be applied: (i) upon transfer of equipment to the Testing Party for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, Designated Personnel shall provide complete inventories of equipment to be stored and equipment to be shipped to their territory.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within five days following completion of inspection of the equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall return this

424  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

equipment to Designated Personnel at the point of entry, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment; or (ii) within five days following completion of inspection of equipment in accordance with subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return this equipment to Designated Personnel at a location chosen by the Testing Party, in the same condition as that in which it was received. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Designated Personnel shall examine, inventory, and pack their equipment in containers. Personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right to observe these activities.Within five days following receipt of their equipment, Designated Personnel shall transfer to the Testing Party the packed containers, along with inventories of the equipment to be stored and the equipment to be shipped.These inventories shall be signed by the Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party, each of whom shall retain a copy of the inventories.Within 10 days following receipt of the equipment to be shipped, the Testing Party shall deliver it to the point of entry; and (j) if stored equipment is to be used for activities related to verification of a subsequent test, it shall be subject to further inspection only after such use.This equipment shall be delivered, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel at the test site no less than 20 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives for that test, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Section IX. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel 1. No later than 10 days following entry into force of the Treaty each Party shall provide the other Party with a list of its proposed Designated Personnel who will carry out activities in accordance with this Protocol and a list of its proposed Transport Personnel who will provide transportation for these Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party.These lists shall contain name, date of birth, and sex of each individual of its proposed Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel. The list of Designated Personnel shall at no time include more than 300 individuals, and the list of Transport Personnel shall at no time include more than 200 individuals. 2. Each Party shall review the list of Designated Personnel and the list of Transport Personnel proposed by the other Party. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed accepted. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is not acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list of its objection within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed unaccepted and shall be deleted from the list. 3. Each Party may propose the addition or substitution of individuals on its list of Designated Personnel or its list of Transport Personnel at any time, who shall be designated in the same manner as provided in paragraph 2 of this Section with regard to the initial lists. Annually, no more than 100 individuals from the list of Designated Personnel shall be subject to substitution.This limitation shall not apply to the replacement of individuals due to permanent physical incapacity or death, or to deletion of an individual from the list of Designated Personnel in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section. Replacement of an individual due to permanent physical incapacity, death or deletion from the list shall be accomplished in the same manner as provided in paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. Following receipt of the initial list of Designated Personnel or the initial list of Transport Personnel or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall prepare for the issuance of such visas and other documents as may be required to ensure that each individual on the list of Designated Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel who has been accepted may enter and remain in its territory for the purpose of carrying out activities in accordance with this

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  425

Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be provided by the Testing Party only to the individuals whose names are included in the notification provided by the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section X of this Protocol, upon receipt of such notification. Such visas and documents shall be valid for multiple entry throughout the period required for Designated Personnel to carry out their activities related to verification of a specific test. 5. If a Party determines that an individual included on the list of Designated Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel of the other Party has violated the provisions of this Protocol or has ever committed a criminal offense in its territory, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense, or has ever been expelled from its territory, the Party making such a determination shall notify the other Party of its objection to the continued inclusion of this individual on the list. If at that time this individual is present in the territory of the Party raising the objection, then the other Party shall immediately recall this individual from the territory of the Party raising this objection and immediately thereafter delete that individual from the list of Designated Personnel or from the list of Transport Personnel. 6. Designated Personnel with their personal baggage and equipment of the Verifying Party shall be permitted to enter the territory of the Testing Party at the designated point of entry, to remain in that territory, and to exit that territory through the designated point of entry. 7. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities for the entire period they are in the territory of the Testing Party and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions as Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel: (a) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961; (b) living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the quarters of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (c) archives, documents, papers, and correspondence of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall enjoy the inviolability accorded the archives, documents, papers, and correspondence of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 24 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft or other transport vehicles of the Verifying Party shall be inviolable; (d) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Immunity from jurisdiction of Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel may be waived by the Verifying Party in those cases in which it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol.Waiver must always be express; (e) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (f) living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded mission premises pursuant to Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (g) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the Testing Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their

426  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. 8. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit in the territory of the Testing Party. 9. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the Testing Party and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that Party. 10. If the Testing Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in paragraph 7 of this Section, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. Section X. Entry, Transport, Food, Lodging, and Provision of Services for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel 1.The Testing Party shall ensure Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel access to its territory for the purposes of carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, and shall provide these personnel with such other assistance as may be necessary to enable them to carry out these activities. Designated Personnel shall have the right to be present at the test site and at Designated Seismic Stations in the territory of the Testing Party to carry out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol at such times and for such periods as required to carry out these activities.The specific times and periods for carrying out such activities shall be specified in the coordinated schedule. 2. No less than 20 days prior to the planned date of arrival of its Designated Personnel at the point of entry for participation in activities related to verification of a specific test, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with: (a) a list of the names of the Designated Personnel with their passports and documentation, who will carry out activities related to verification of a specific test; (b) the names of the Designated Personnel Team Leader or Leaders and the names of Designated Personnel who will escort equipment of the Verifying Party to the test site or each Designated Seismic Station; (c) confirmation of the point of entry to be used; (d) the planned date and the estimated time of arrival of these Designated Personnel at the point of entry; and (e) the mode of transport to be used. No more than 15 days following receipt of the list and passports and documentation specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the Testing Party shall return those passports to the Verifying Party with the visas and all necessary documents specified in paragraph 4 of Section IX of this Protocol. 3. No less than 20 days prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel at the point of entry, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with the number of Transport Personnel. No less than three days prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party with a list of the names of those Transport Personnel with their passports and documentation. No less than one day prior to the planned date of arrival of Transport Personnel, the Testing Party shall return those passports to the Verifying Party with the visas and all necessary documents specified in paragraph 4 of Section IX of this Protocol. 4.The number of Designated Personnel present at a test site or Designated Seismic Station to carry out activities related to verification of a specific test shall be governed by the relevant restrictions specified in Sections V,VI, and VII of this Protocol. Designated Personnel shall leave the test site or

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  427

Designated Seismic Station upon completion of activities related to verification of a specific test as specified in the coordinated schedule. Designated Personnel who have been present at the test site for a period of six consecutive weeks or more may be replaced by individuals included on the list submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol. Designated Personnel who have not been present at the test site for a period of six consecutive weeks may be replaced only for reasons of injury, illness, or family emergency, and shall be replaced by individuals included on the list submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol. 5. If a transport aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial aircraft is used by the Verifying Party for transportation between the territory of the Verifying Party and the point of entry, its flight path shall be along airways agreed upon by the Parties, and its flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft, including in the remarks section of the flight plan a confirmation that the appropriate clearance has been obtained.The Testing Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for aircraft of the Verifying Party at the point of entry.The Verifying Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing. 6.The Testing Party shall ensure that all necessary clearances or approvals are granted so as to enable Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party to arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival date and time. 7.The Testing Party shall assist Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and their baggage in passage through customs without undue delay. The Testing Party shall provide transportation between the point of entry and the test site or the Designated Seismic Stations for Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party, so as to enable such personnel to exercise their rights and functions in the time periods provided in this Protocol and specified in the coordinated schedule. 8.The Testing Party shall have the right to assign its personnel to escort Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel while they are in its territory. 9. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, movement and travel of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel in the territory of the Testing Party, from the time of their arrival at the point of entry until their departure from the territory of the Testing Party at the point of entry, shall be subject to the authorization of the Testing Party. 10. During the period Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel are in the territory of the Testing Party, the Testing Party shall provide food, hotel-like living accommodations, working facilities, transportation, and medical services for such personnel, including access to its medical facilities for out-patient treatment and in-patient treatment, and also secure places for storing equipment. If the Verifying Party desires to provide its own food for its Designated Personnel and its Transport Personnel during their stay in the territory of the Testing Party, the Testing Party shall provide such assistance as may be necessary for such food to arrive at the appropriate locations. Designated Personnel shall have the use of a complete kitchen at all times during their stay at the test site and at each Designated Seismic Station. 11.The Verifying Party shall have the right to include among its Designated Personnel a medical specialist, who shall be allowed to bring medications, medical instruments, and portable medical equipment agreed upon by the Parties. If Designated Personnel are treated in a medical facility of the Testing Party, the medical specialist shall have the right to consult on the recommended treatment and monitor the course of medical treatment at all times. The medical specialist of the Verifying Party shall have the right to require the Testing Party to provide emergency evacuation of any individual of the Designated Personnel who is ill or has suffered an accident to a mutually agreed medical facility in the territory of the Testing Party or to the point of entry for emergency medical evacuation by the Verifying Party. Designated Personnel shall have the right to refuse any treatment prescribed by medical personnel of the Testing Party, and in this case the Testing Party shall not be responsible for any consequences of such refusal. Such refusal must always be express.

428  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

12.The Testing Party shall provide the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative at all times access to: (a) telephone communications between the embassy of the Verifying Party in the territory of the Testing Party and the working facilities and living accommodations of Designated Personnel at each test site and each Designated Seismic Station; and (b) an international telephone network from their working facilities and living accommodations at each test site and each Designated Seismic Station. 13.The Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative shall have the right to use at all times satellite communications to ensure communications via the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) commercial satellite system, or a system of equivalent performance, between each test site in the territory of the Testing Party and the telephone communications system of the Verifying Party. If the Testing Party does not provide such communications, Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own equipment specified in paragraph 1(k) of Section VIII of this Protocol. In this case, installation and alignment of all such equipment shall be done jointly.All equipment of this system, except the remote control unit, shall be locked and placed under seals of both Parties, and personnel of neither Party shall have access to this equipment except under observation of personnel of the other Party. Only Designated Personnel shall use the remote control unit. If the Verifying Party provides satellite communications equipment, personnel of the Testing Party shall have the right, under observation of Designated Personnel, to make the following modifications provided they do not degrade the quality of the communications: (a) install bandpass filters, to limit the frequency range, in the antenna signal transmission and reception lines; (b) modify the remote control unit to prevent manual tuning; and (c) modify the satellite communications equipment to allow the Testing Party to monitor all transmissions. 14.The Testing Party shall provide the following for use by Designated Personnel: (a) portable radios for communications at the test location; (b) telephones for communications between work areas and between work areas and living quarters of Designated Personnel at the test site or Designated Seismic Stations; and (c) access to Testing Party-controlled vehicle-mounted radios for communications with the test location, work areas, or living quarters while Designated Personnel are in transit at the test site. 15. At the test site and each Designated Seismic Station, Designated Personnel shall observe all safety rules and regulations applicable to the personnel of the Testing Party, as well as all those additional restrictions with regard to access and movement as may be established by the Testing Party. Designated Personnel shall have access only to the areas in which they will directly exercise their rights and functions in accordance with Sections V, VI, VII, and VIII of this Protocol. The areas at the test site or the Designated Seismic Station in which Designated Personnel shall have freedom of movement during the conduct of a specific test without the mandatory escort of personnel of the Testing Party shall be marked on the diagrams of the test site or the Designated Seismic Stations provided to the Verifying Party at the first meeting of the Coordinating Group specified in paragraph 10 of Section XI of this Protocol. In all other cases, the permission of the Representative of the Testing Party, and escort by, personnel of the Testing Party shall be required. 16. Designated Personnel shall not be given or seek access by physical, visual, or technical means to the interior of any explosive canister, to documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive, or to equipment for control and firing of an explosive.The Testing Party

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  429

shall not locate documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive in such ways as to impede Designated Personnel in carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol. 17. Possession or use by Designated Personnel of firearms, ammunition, or substances containing narcotics, with the exception of those prescribed by a physician, in the territory of the Testing Party is prohibited. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, possession or use by Designated Personnel of the following items is also prohibited at the test site or a Designated Seismic Station: (a) photographic and video recording equipment; (b) radio transmitters or receivers other than those supplied by the Testing Party; (c) sound recorders; (d) teleoptical devices; and (e) personal computers. 18. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol or as may be approved in writing by the Representative of the Testing Party, Designated Personnel are prohibited from removing any of the following items from the test site or a Designated Seismic Station: (a) soil samples; (b) plant samples; (c) water and air samples; (d) animals; (e) metal objects; and (f) rock samples or debris. 19. Designated Personnel shall have the right to remove from the territory of the Testing Party all items, including data, obtained in accordance with this Protocol. 20. The Testing Party shall have the right to inspect, in the presence of Designated Personnel, baggage and personal possessions of Designated Personnel upon their entry to or departure from the test site or Designated Seismic Stations.The Testing Party shall also have the right to inspect, in the presence of Designated Personnel, any packages received by Designated Personnel during their stay at the test site or Designated Seismic Stations or prepared for shipment by Designated Personnel from the test site or Designated Seismic Stations. 21. Except as provided in paragraphs 22, 23, and 24 of this Section or unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Verifying Party shall bear all costs of verification activities of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel set forth in the coordinated schedule, including costs for use or consumption of materials, equipment, transportation, food, living and working facilities, medical assistance, communications, and services requested by and provided to the Verifying Party.The Verifying Party shall also bear the costs associated with transport aircraft in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section. 22.The Testing Party shall bear all costs related to the preparation of its test sites, Designated Seismic Stations, and equipment storage facilities within its territory for the use of Designated Personnel as provided for in this Protocol. 23.With respect to a test of non-standard configuration: (a) the Testing Party shall bear the costs of the activities specified in paragraph 6(a) of Section V of this Protocol that are carried out with respect to the second and third satellite holes, if requested by the Verifying Party in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol; and

430  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(b) the Testing Party shall bear the costs related to the conduct of a test identified by it as a reference test to satisfy the request of the Verifying Party in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section XI of this Protocol. 24. The Testing Party shall bear all costs related to transportation of equipment of the Verifying Party between: (a) the point of entry and the location at which such equipment is subject to familiarization or inspection by the Testing Party in accordance with Section VIII of this Protocol; (b) the location for familiarization or inspection by the Testing Party and the location at which such equipment is returned to the Verifying Party; (c) the location at which such equipment is turned over to the Testing Party for storage and the storage location; and (d) the storage location and the location at which such equipment is returned to theVerifying Party. 25. If the Verifying Party decides not to carry out activities related to verification that it specified in its initial notification, after technical and logistical support for these activities has been agreed upon in the Coordinating Group in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section XI of this Protocol, the Verifying Party shall reimburse the Testing Party for the costs of such agreed technical and logistical support incurred by the Testing Party prior to receipt of notification that the Verifying Party will not carry out the initially declared activities related to verification. Section XI. Procedures for Consultation and Coordination 1. For the purposes of implementation of the Treaty and this Protocol, the Parties shall, immediately following entry into force of the Treaty, establish a Bilateral Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they shall meet, at the request of either Party, to: (a) consider any questions relating to implementation of the Treaty and this Protocol; (b) consider any suggestions for amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol; (c) consider any technical or administrative changes to this Protocol of the nature provided in paragraph 2, 3, or 4 of this Section; (d) consider any questions relating to compliance with the Treaty and this Protocol; (e) consider any new verification technologies having a bearing on the Treaty or this Protocol; (f) seek agreement on those matters specified in this Protocol as requiring agreement of the Parties; and (g) seek agreement on questions related to costs for verification activities and procedures for reciprocal payments of such costs between the Parties. 2. If the Parties determine that the periods of time specified with respect to notifications in Section IV of this Protocol create practical difficulties and do not serve the interest of effective implementation of this Protocol, they may change such periods of time by agreement in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Such agreed changes shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 3. If the Parties determine that, in the interest of effective implementation of this Protocol, the arrangements set forth in Section X of this Protocol regarding transportation, lodging, food, and services require modification, the provisions of Section X of this Protocol may be changed by agreement of the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Such agreed changes shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 4. If the Parties determine that modifications to verification procedures, including modifications resulting from improvements in existing technologies, would enhance effective implementation of

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  431

the basic aims of the Treaty or this Protocol, they may, in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, agree upon such modifications. Such agreed modifications shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty or this Protocol. 5. The Parties, through consultation, shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, regulations to govern the operations of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 6. For each test with respect to which activities related to verification are carried out in accordance with this Protocol, the Parties shall establish a Coordinating Group of the Bilateral Consultative Commission that shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of the Verifying Party with the activities of the Testing Party.The Bilateral Consultative Commission may, as necessary, establish and amend procedures governing the activities of the Coordinating Group. 7.The Coordinating Group shall operate throughout the entire period of preparing and carrying out activities related to verification of a specific test, until departure of Designated Personnel from the territory of the Testing Party. 8.All members of the Coordinating Group from the Verifying Party shall be drawn from the list of Designated Personnel.The Representative of the Verifying Party to the Coordinating Group shall be the Principal Designated Personnel Team Leader, whose name shall be provided simultaneously with the notification of intent to carry out activities related to verification of a specific test.Within 15 days following receipt of this notification, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the name of its Representative to the Coordinating Group. 9.The first meeting of the Coordinating Group shall be convened in the capital of the Testing Party within 25 days following notification by the Verifying Party that it intends to carry out activities related to verification of a specific test.Thereafter, the Coordinating Group shall meet at the request of either Party. 10. On the first day of the first meeting of the Coordinating Group, the Testing Party shall present a list, including times and durations, of all activities it intends to carry out that could affect the rights of the Verifying Party provided in this Protocol with respect to activities declared by it and related to verification of a specific test. If the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent: (a) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or carry out an on-site inspection, the Testing Party shall provide the Verifying Party with the following information: (i) the number of emplacement holes for the specific test; (ii) with respect to each emplacement hole, whether, for the purposes of this Protocol, the emplacement hole shall be deemed vertical or horizontal; and (iii) the number of explosions included in the test and the location of each planned end of each emplacement hole and of the corresponding planned emplacement point, to the nearest 10 meters; (b) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of standard configuration that includes more than one explosion, the Testing Party shall provide, in addition to the information specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the following information: (i) whether any explosion has a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, and, if so, which explosion or explosions; and (ii) whether any explosion has a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, and, if so, which explosion or explosions; and (c) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration, the Testing Party shall provide the information specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, as well as the following information:

432  THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(i) a detailed description, including dimensions, of each emplacement hole and any access or bypass tunnels connected to each emplacement hole if any portion of an access or bypass tunnel is within the hydrodynamic measurement zone; (ii) the dimensions of each explosive canister and its orientation in the emplacement hole; (iii) the density and dimensions of each choke section; and (iv) the location and configuration of any access or bypass tunnels and any known voids with a volume larger than one cubic meter, within 50 meters of the wall of each emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, and the bulk density of the stemming material if these voids are to be stemmed. 11. Within 15 days following the convening of the first meeting of the Coordinating Group, the Verifying Party shall provide the Testing Party, in the Coordinating Group, with a list of the activities it intends to carry out, as well as those activities provided for in this Protocol that it intends not to carry out.The Verifying Party shall also provide the Testing Party, in the Coordinating Group, with a preliminary statement of its requirements for technical and logistical support for the activities related to verification that it intends to carry out and whether it will require the Testing Party to provide the cables specified in paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol for its use. If the Verifying Party has notified the Testing Party that it intends to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to a test of non-standard configuration, the Verifying Party also shall inform the Testing Party: (a) whether it requires a reference test; and (b) whether it will actually carry out hydrodynamic yield measurements of the test of nonstandard configuration, and, if so, which measurements, and: (i) the number of satellite holes required and the specific distance and azimuth relative to the emplacement hole of the second and third satellite holes, if such are requested by the Verifying Party and, if the Testing Party is unable to prepare the first satellite hole in accordance with the conditions for such hole in the standard configuration, the distance and azimuth of that satellite hole relative to the emplacement hole; and (ii) in which satellite holes the Verifying Party intends to use transducers and associated power supplies. 12.Within 10 days following receipt by the Testing Party of the information specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, the Parties, in the Coordinating Group, shall develop and agree upon a coordinated schedule, which shall include specific times and durations for carrying out activities related to verification, ensuring the rights of each Party provided in this Protocol, and taking into account the number of Designated Personnel that will carry out activities related to verification of a specific test in accordance with Sections V, VI, and VII of this Protocol. The coordinated schedule shall reflect those numbers. 13. Agreement of the Representative of each Party to the Coordinating Group shall constitute agreement of the Parties for the purposes of this Protocol with the exception of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of Section III of this Protocol and paragraph 2 of Section XII of this Protocol. 14. Upon completion of activities related to verification of a specific test, the Designated Personnel Team Leader at the test site or at each Designated Seismic Station shall prepare a written report, in the language of each Party. The report shall be factual. It shall list activities carried out by Designated Personnel, with dates of their completion, and shall include lists of information, data, photographs, and samples obtained by Designated Personnel or provided by the Testing Party in accordance with this Protocol.The report shall list technical and logistical activities carried out by the Testing Party in support of activities related to verification. The Designated Personnel Team Leader shall include in the report comments on any ambiguities not resolved during the carrying out of activities related to verification.The Representative of the Testing Party may include in the

THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY  433

report comments responding to these ambiguities. The Designated Personnel Team Leader shall complete the report prior to the scheduled departure of Designated Personnel from the test site or Designated Seismic Station.The Designated Personnel Team Leader and the Representative of the Testing Party shall each sign the report and retain a copy. 15. If, in the course of implementing activities related to verification of a specific test, in accordance with this Protocol, questions arise requiring prompt resolution, such questions shall be considered by the Coordinating Group. If the Coordinating Group is unable to resolve such questions, they shall immediately be referred to the Bilateral Consultative Commission for resolution. Section XII. Release of Information 1. Nothing in the Treaty and this Protocol shall affect the proprietary rights of either Party in information provided by it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol, or in information that may be disclosed to the other Party or that may become known to the other Party in preparing for or conducting a test. Claims to such proprietary rights, however, shall not impede implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 2. Public release of the information provided in accordance with this Protocol or publication of material using such information may take place only with the agreement of the Testing Party. Public release of the results of observation or measurements made by Designated Personnel may take place only with the agreement of both Parties. Section XIII. Entry into Force This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

15

The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

n preparing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in July 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the need to establish an appropriate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). There is no essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device that would be used as a weapon and that of one used for a peaceful purpose. Hence, the agreement in TTBT Article III assures that “underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall be governed by an agreement which is to be negotiated.” Negotiations on the PNE agreement began in Moscow on October 7, 1974, and after six negotiating sessions over eighteen months resulted in the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives or PNE Treaty) in April 1976.The agreement consists of a treaty, a detailed protocol to the treaty, and an agreed statement delineating certain important activities that do not constitute a peaceful application as that term is used in the treaty. Both the PNE Treaty and the TTBT were submitted to the United States Senate on July 29, 1976, for advice and consent. The PNE Treaty governed all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapon test sites specified under the TTBT. Pursuant to Article III of the treaty, the two nations agreed not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosion (consisting of a number of individual explosions in rapid sequence) having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. In Article III, the parties also reaffirmed their obligations to comply fully with the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.The parties reserved the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the territory of another country if requested to do so, but only in full compliance with the yield limitations and other provisions of the PNE Treaty and in accord with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is now recognized as impossible.Articles IV and V of the PNE Treaty set forth the agreed verification arrangements. In addition to the use of national technical means, the treaty states that each side will provide information and access to sites of explosions.The treaty also includes a commitment not to interfere with verification means and procedures. The protocol to the PNE Treaty sets forth the specific agreed arrangements for assuring that no weapon-related benefits precluded by the TTBT are derived by carrying out a PNE. It includes provisions calling for detailed information exchanges and establishes the rights and functions of observers.The central problem to be solved through observation procedures is to ensure that no single nuclear device is exploded with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. It is

I

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  435

necessary for observers, using appropriate equipment, to be at the site of a group explosion to determine the yield of each individual explosive device composing the group explosion.This was one of the first on-site verification procedures the Soviets agreed to, and it provided a precedent for the 1990 Verification Protocols (addressed in Chapter 14), which permitted U.S. Senate approval of the TTBT and PNE Treaty. The protocol spelled out procedures to be followed during the observation process, including the specific number of observers, the geographical extent of their access, and the provision of certain information, such as maps of the explosion area, to assist in planning activities. In addition, the protocol provided that certain privileges and immunities will be granted observer personnel and their equipment, and that housing and working facilities will be provided to ensure they are free to carry out their rights and functions effectively. The agreed statement that accompanies the treaty specifies that a “peaceful application” of an underground nuclear explosion would not include developmental testing of any nuclear explosive. Such testing must be carried out at the nuclear weapon test sites specified by the terms of the TTBT and therefore is treated as the testing of a nuclear weapon. The PNE Treaty provisions, together with those of the TTBT, establish a comprehensive system of regulations to govern all U.S. and Soviet underground nuclear explosions.The interrelationship of the TTBT and the PNE Treaty is further recognized by their identical five-year durations and by the provision that neither party may withdraw from the PNE Treaty while the TTBT remains in force. Conversely, either party may withdraw from the PNE Treaty upon termination of the TTBT. Both treaties have been somewhat overtaken by events as a result of the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The PNE Treaty applies the 150-kiloton limit of the TTBT to all nuclear explosions not conducted at designated weapon test sites. By definition, these are underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.The PNE Treaty also places a 1.5-megaton limit on all group nuclear explosions, defined in Article II as nuclear explosions conducted at an interval of five seconds or less within a short distance of one another. Group explosions were permitted in 1976 because the Soviet government still believed that nuclear explosives could be used for public works projects, such as digging canals.Verification of the PNE Treaty is by national technical means, which are supplemented by certain additional agreed procedures because PNEs may be conducted in areas with seismic qualities that are not well known. In addition, special, very intrusive, on-site measures were provided for in the protocol whenever the aggregate yield of a group explosion exceeds 150 kilotons. The treaty also created the Joint Consultative Commission to address questions of compliance with the PNE Treaty and, by implication, with the TTBT.This body was replaced by the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which was created pursuant to the 1990 verification protocol to the TTBT. Since the PNE Treaty was not completed by March 31, 1976, the stated date of operation of the TTBT, both signatories issued statements that it was in their interest to abide by the TTBT’s 150-kiloton testing limit until PNE Treaty negotiations were concluded. This exchange of statements had larger implications than were foreseen in 1976. The two treaties were sent to the Senate in July 1976.The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in 1977, and reported both treaties to the full Senate by a wide margin. However, the Senate became involved in acrimonious debate over the abortive 1977–1979 attempts by the Carter administration to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, and the treaties were never brought to vote in the Senate.The TTB and PNE treaties were returned to committee in 1978, at the end of the Congress, where they languished for twelve years. Successive administrations, relying on the 1976 statement, continued to informally observe the 150-kiloton ceiling.The 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which established the U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, provided that the executive branch is

436  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

not empowered to enter into an international agreement that would “obligate” the United States to “Disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power . . . or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation . . .” Informal observance of the TTB and the PNE treaties was never challenged within the United States. However, informal observance of the SALT I Interim Agreement (see the section titled “The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement” in Chapter 13) which began in 1977, was immediately challenged in the U.S. Senate, albeit ultimately ineffectively. Likewise, informal observance of the SALT II Treaty (also discussed below) came under challenge as well. Subsequently, with respect to the testing treaties, the two parties expressed their adherence to the obligation in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to defeat the “object and purpose” of a treaty pending ratification. The Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the United States, but its substantive provisions are widely recognized, including by the United States, to reflect customary international law binding on all states.This recognition provided the legal basis for U.S. observance of the PNE and TTB treaties, despite the absence of the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification. In November 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union began new negotiations on additional verification provisions that would make it possible for the United States to ratify the two treaties. On June 1, 1990, both nations signed verification protocols for the two treaties, which replaced the existing TTBT and PNE Treaty protocols. The new protocols provided for intrusive on-site verification, including the down-hole-yield measuring system that the United States uses at its Nevada Test Site as well as on-site seismic monitoring. In September 1990, the U.S. Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of the treaties with the two new protocols by a vote of 98 to 0. The Supreme Soviet approved the two treaties shortly thereafter. The TTB and PNE treaties finally entered into force on December 11, 1990, approximately fifteen years after they were first signed.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES Signed at Washington and Moscow May 28, 1976 Entered into force December 11, 1990 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from a desire to implement Article III of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which calls for the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives and principles of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and their determination to observe strictly the provisions of these international agreements, Desiring to assure that underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes shall not be used for purposes related to nuclear weapons,

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  437

Desiring that utilization of nuclear energy be directed only toward peaceful purposes, Desiring to develop appropriately cooperation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. The Parties enter into this Treaty to satisfy the obligations in Article III of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and assume additional obligations in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2.This Treaty shall govern all underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes conducted by the Parties after March 31, 1976. Article II For the purposes of this Treaty: (a) “explosion” means any individual or group underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes; (b) “explosive” means any device, mechanism or system for producing an individual explosion; (c) “group explosion” means two or more individual explosions for which the time interval between successive individual explosions does not exceed five seconds and for which the emplacement points of all explosives can be interconnected by straight line segments, each of which joins two emplacement points and each of which does not exceed 40 kilometers. Article III 1. Each Party, subject to the obligations assumed under this Treaty and other international agreements, reserves the right to: (a) carry out explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control outside the geographical boundaries of test sites specified under the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests; and (b) carry out, participate or assist in carrying out explosions in the territory of another State at the request of such other State. 2. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and further undertakes not to carry out, participate or assist in carrying out anywhere: (a) any individual explosion having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; (b) any group explosion: (1) having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons except in ways that will permit identification of each individual explosion and determination of the yield of each individual explosion in the group in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of and the Protocol to this Treaty; (2) having an aggregate yield exceeding one and one-half megatons; (c) any explosion which does not carry out a peaceful application; (d) any explosion except in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other international agreements entered into by that Party.

438  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

3. The question of carrying out any individual explosion having a yield exceeding the yield specified in paragraph 2(a) of this article will be considered by the Parties at an appropriate time to be agreed. Article IV 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall: (a) use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law; and (b) provide to the other Party information and access to sites of explosions and furnish assistance in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Protocol to this Treaty. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1(a) of this article, or with the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of this article. Article V 1.To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Joint Consultative Commission within the framework of which they will: (a) consult with each other, make inquiries and furnish information in response to such inquiries, to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with the means for assuring compliance with the provisions of this Treaty; (d) consider changes in technology or other new circumstances which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; and (e) consider possible amendments to provisions governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 2.The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Joint Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Article VI 1.The Parties will develop cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit, equality, and reciprocity in various areas related to carrying out underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. 2.The Joint Consultative Commission will facilitate this cooperation by considering specific areas and forms of cooperation which shall be determined by agreement between the Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures. 3.The Parties will appropriately inform the International Atomic Energy Agency of results of their cooperation in the field of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Article VII 1. Each Party shall continue to promote the development of the international agreement or agreements and procedures provided for in Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and shall provide appropriate assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  439

2. Each Party undertakes not to carry out, participate or assist in the carrying out of any explosion in the territory of another State unless that State agrees to the implementation in its territory of the international observation and procedures contemplated by Article V of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the provisions of Article IV of and the Protocol to this Treaty, including the provision by that State of the assistance necessary for such implementation and of the privileges and immunities specified in the Protocol. Article VIII 1.This Treaty shall remain in force for a period of five years, and it shall be extended for successive five-year periods unless either Party notifies the other of its termination no later than six months prior to its expiration. Before the expiration of this period the Parties may, as necessary, hold consultations to consider the situation relevant to the substance of this Treaty. However, under no circumstances shall either Party be entitled to terminate this Treaty while the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests remains in force. 2.Termination of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests shall entitle either Party to withdraw from this Treaty at any time. 3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification of such amendments. Article IX 1.This Treaty, including the Protocol which forms an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.This Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. 2.This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Washington and Moscow, on May 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Gerald R. Ford,The President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of May 28, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

440  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

Taking into account the fact that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are conducted outside national nuclear test sites under various geological conditions, Convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Section I. Definitions In addition to the definitions of terms set forth in Article II of the Treaty, for the purposes of this Protocol: 1.The term “emplacement hole” means the entire interior of any drill hole, shaft, adit or tunnel in which an explosive, associated cables, and other equipment are installed for the purposes of carrying out an explosion. 2. The term “Verifying Party” means the Party entitled to carry out, in accordance with this Protocol, activities related to verification of compliance with the Treaty by the Party carrying out an explosion. 3. The term “Designated Personnel” means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Designated Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, to carry out activities related to verification, in accordance with this Protocol, in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion. 4.The term “Transport Personnel” means personnel appointed by the Verifying Party from among its nationals and included on its list of Transport Personnel, in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, to provide transportation for Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party between the territory of the Verifying Party and the point of entry in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion. 5.The term “point of entry” means Washington, D.C. (Dulles International Airport) with respect to the United States of America; and Moscow (Sheremetyevo-2 Airport) with respect to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Other locations may serve as points of entry for specific explosions, as agreed by the Parties. 6.The term “on-site inspection” means activities carried out by the Verifying Party in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, for the purposes of independently obtaining data on conditions under which the explosion will be conducted and confirming the validity of data provided by the Party carrying out the explosion. 7.The term “hydrodynamic yield measurement method” means the method whereby the yield of an explosion is derived from on-site, direct measurement of the position of the shock front as a function of time during the hydrodynamic phase of the ground motion produced by the explosion. 8. The term “local seismic network” means the array of seismic stations and the control point temporarily deployed, in accordance with this Protocol, for the purpose of identifying the number of individual explosions in a specific group explosion. 9. The term “Joint Consultative Commission” means the Commission established in accordance with Article V of the Treaty. 10. The term “Coordinating Group” means a working group of the Joint Consultative Commission, established in accordance with Section XI of this Protocol. 11.The term “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers” means the Centers located in Washington, D.C., and Moscow, established in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  441

Section II. Explosion Depth and Composition 1. No explosion shall be conducted at a distance in meters from the ground surface less than 30 times the 3.4 root of the planned yield of that explosion in kilotons. 2. No group explosion shall have an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the Parties agree on specific procedures to implement appropriate provisions of this Protocol so as to permit identification of each individual explosion and determination of the yield of each individual explosion in the group. 3. No explosion having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons shall be conducted in a cavity having a volume exceeding 20,000 cubic meters, unless the Parties agree on verification measures for such an explosion. Section III.Verification Measures 1. For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground nuclear explosions conducted outside national nuclear test sites shall be considered underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes subject to all the provisions of the Treaty. For purposes of verification of compliance with the Treaty, in addition to using available national technical means, the Verifying Party shall have the right: (a) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, to measure the yield of each explosion that the Party carrying out the explosion notifies, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol, to have a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons; (b) to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, to monitor the yield of each individual explosion in a group explosion that the Party carrying out the explosion notifies, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol, to have a planned aggregate yield exceeding 50 kilotons; (c) to use, in conjunction with the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a local seismic network, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol, for each group explosion that the Party carrying out the explosion notifies, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol, to have a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and (d) to carry out on-site inspection, in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol, with respect to any explosion that the Party carrying out the explosion notifies, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol, to have a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons and, with respect to any explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, only if the Verifying Party has decided not to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 2.The Party carrying out the explosion shall bear full responsibility for, and have exclusive control over, the conduct of the explosion. 3. Designated Personnel shall be responsible for the working of their equipment, its timely installation and operation, for participating in such operations, including dry runs, as the Party carrying out the explosion may request, and for recording data at the time of the explosion. The Party carrying out the explosion shall be under no obligation to change the time of the explosion because of any malfunction of the equipment of the Verifying Party or inability of Designated Personnel to carry out their functions, unless actions of the Party carrying out the explosion have caused such a situation to arise. Section IV. Notifications and Information Relating to Explosions 1. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, all notifications provided for in this Protocol shall be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers may also be used, as appropriate, to transmit other information provided in accordance with this Protocol.

442  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

2. Not later than July 1 following entry into force of the Treaty, and each July 1 thereafter, each Party shall inform the other Party whether or not it intends to conduct, during the following calendar year, any individual or group explosion for peaceful purposes having a planned aggregate yield exceeding 35 kilotons, and, if so, how many. On the date of entry into force of the Treaty, information specified by this paragraph shall be provided by each Party for the remainder of the calendar year in which the Treaty enters into force and for the period from January 1 through December 31 of the succeeding year. In the event of changes in the information provided in accordance with this paragraph, such changes shall be immediately provided to the other Party. 3. No less than 180 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of the explosive or explosives for every explosion having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, the Party carrying out the explosion shall notify the Verifying Party of its intention to carry out the explosion and shall provide the Verifying Party with the following information, to the extent and degree of accuracy available at the time when it is provided: (a) the planned date of the explosion; (b) the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of the explosive or explosives; (c) the purpose of the explosion; (d) the location of the explosion, expressed in geographic coordinates to the nearest minute; (e) the planned yield of the explosion; (f) the number of explosives, and the planned yield of each individual explosive; (g) the planned depth of emplacement of each explosive to the nearest 10 meters; (h) the type or types of rock in which the explosion will take place, including the depth of the water table; and (i) a description of specific technological features of the project of which the explosion is a part that may affect determination of its yield and confirmation of its purpose. 4. Following receipt of information specified in paragraph 3 of this Section, the Verifying Party shall inform the Party carrying out the explosion, no less than 150 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, in a single notification, whether or not it intends to carry out one of the following activities related to verification: (a) with respect to an explosion having a planned yield exceeding 35 kilotons, to carry out onsite inspection in accordance with Section VII of this Protocol; or (b) with respect to an explosion having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, in accordance with Section V of this Protocol, and, with respect to a group explosion having a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons, to use, in conjunction with the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, a local seismic network, in accordance with Section VI of this Protocol. 5. If the Verifying Party: (a) declares its intention not to conduct activities described in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of this Section, it shall thereby forfeit its right to conduct such activities unless the Party carrying out the explosion provides notification, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, of a change in the location by more than one minute of latitude or longitude or of a change in the planned date of the explosion that changes the date indicated in the initial notification by 60 days or more.Within 30 days of notification by the Party carrying out the explosion of any such change in location or planned date of the explosion, the Verifying Party shall have the right to revise the notification it provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section. In the event the Verifying Party elects to revise its notification and to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or to carry out on-site inspection, the beginning of emplacement of explosives shall

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  443

not occur less than 90 days from the date of the Verifying Party’s revised notification, unless the Parties otherwise agree. The Party carrying out the explosion shall thereafter provide the Verifying Party with the information specified in paragraph 6 or 7 of this Section; or (b) decides not to conduct the activities related to verification specified by it in its initial notification, after technical and logistical support requirements for these activities have been agreed upon in the Coordinating Group, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section XI of this Protocol, the Verifying Party shall reimburse the Party carrying out the explosion for costs for such technical and logistical support incurred by the Party carrying out the explosion prior to receipt of notification that the Verifying Party will not carry out the initially-declared activities related to verification. 6. In the event of receipt by the Party carrying out the explosion of notification from the Verifying Party of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the Party carrying out the explosion shall provide the Verifying Party not less than 60 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives with the following information: (a) the number of explosives; the planned yield of each explosive; the planned depth of emplacement of each explosive with an accuracy of 10 meters; the planned point of emplacement of each explosive to be used in a group explosion relative to all other explosives in the group with an accuracy of 10 percent of the distance between that explosive and the nearest other explosive, but in no case shall the error be greater than 100 meters; and the planned time intervals between individual explosions in each group explosion with an accuracy of 0.1 second; (b) a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the site of each explosion that could influence determination of the yield, which shall include: the depth of the water table; a stratigraphic column above each emplacement point; the position of each emplacement point relative to nearby geological and other features that influenced the design of the project of which the explosion is a part; and the estimated physical parameters of the rock within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, including bulk density, grain density, compressional and shear-wave velocities, porosity, and total water content; (c) the locations and purposes of facilities and installations that are associated with the conduct of the explosion; (d) the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of each explosive; (e) a topographic chart, marked with geographic coordinates accurate to one minute of latitude and longitude, of the areas circumscribed by circles of 15 kilometer radius centered on points on the surface of the earth above the points of emplacement of each explosive, at a scale of 1:24,000 or l:25,000 with a contour interval of 10 meters or less.The planned location of each explosive shall be marked on this chart with an accuracy of 50 meters; (f) the length of each canister in which an explosive will be contained, hereinafter referred to as an explosive canister; (g) the dimensions of any pipe or other device that will be used to emplace each explosive canister; (h) the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zones; (i) a description of materials, including their densities, to be used to stem the emplacement hole within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; and (j) the location and configuration of any known voids larger in volume than one cubic meter within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. 7. In the event of receipt by the Party carrying out the explosion of notification from the Verifying Party of its intent to carry out on-site inspection, the Party carrying out the explosion shall provide

444  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

the Verifying Party, not less than 60 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, with the following information: (a) the number of explosives; the planned yield of each explosive; the planned depth of emplacement of each explosive with an accuracy of 10 meters; the planned point of emplacement of each explosive to be used in a group explosion relative to all other explosives in the group with an accuracy of 10 percent of the distance between that explosive and the nearest other explosive, but in no case shall the error be greater than 100 meters; and the planned time intervals between individual explosions in each group explosion with an accuracy of 0.1 second; (b) a description of the geological and geophysical characteristics of the site of each explosion that could influence determination of the yield, which shall include: the depth of the water table; a lithologic column above each emplacement point; the position of each emplacement point relative to nearby geological and other features that influenced the design of the project of which the explosion is a part; and the estimated physical parameters of the rock within each hydrodynamic measurement zone, including bulk density, grain density, porosity, and total water content; (c) the locations and purposes of facilities and installations that are associated with the conduct of the explosion; (d) the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of each explosive; (e) a topographic chart, marked with geographic coordinates accurate to one minute of latitude and longitude, of the areas circumscribed by circles of 15 kilometer radius centered on points on the surface of the earth above the points of emplacement of each explosive, at a scale of 1:24,000 or 1:25,000 with a contour interval of 10 meters or less.The planned location of each explosive shall be marked on this chart with an accuracy of 50 meters; (f) the planned cross-sectional dimensions of each emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zones; and (g) the location and configuration of any known voids larger in volume than one cubic meter within each hydrodynamic measurement zone. 8. For each explosion, the Party carrying out the explosion shall inform the Verifying Party, no less than two days prior to the explosion, of the planned time of detonation of each explosive, with an accuracy of 0.1 second. In the event the Party carrying out the explosion decides to change the detonation time, the Verifying Party shall be notified of this change immediately after this decision has been taken. No more than 10 days following the explosion the Verifying Party shall be informed of the actual detonation time. 9.The Party carrying out the explosion shall immediately notify the Verifying Party of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 3, 6, or 7 of this Section. If the Verifying Party has provided notification under paragraph 4 of this Section of its decision to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or to carry out on-site inspection, the emplacement of explosives shall not begin less than 90 days following notification of any change in any information provided in accordance with paragraph 3, 6, or 7 of this Section that requires more extensive verification procedures than are required on the basis of initial information, unless an earlier date for the beginning of emplacement of explosives has been agreed upon by the Parties. Such changes include: (a) change in the location of the explosion by more than one minute of latitude or longitude; (b) change in the number of explosives in a group explosion; (c) change in the yield of the explosion; (d) change in the purpose of the explosion; and (e) delay in the planned date of the explosion by more than 90 days.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  445

10. In using an explosion to decrease the consequences of an emergency situation related to an unforeseen set of circumstances and requiring immediate action, by virtue of which it would be practically impossible to adhere to the requirements of paragraph 3 of this Section concerning the time period, the following conditions shall be fulfilled: (a) the Party making the decision to carry out an explosion for such a purpose shall notify the Verifying Party of this decision immediately after it has been made and shall describe the circumstances and provide the planned yield for such an explosion; (b) the planned aggregate yield for such an explosion shall not exceed 100 kilotons and the explosion shall not include more than three individual explosions, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (c) the Party carrying out such an explosion shall provide the Verifying Party with the information specified in paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Section, to the extent such information is available, after making the decision on carrying out the explosion, but no less than 60 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives; and (d) if, within 15 days following receipt of notification of such an explosion, the Verifying Party has made the decision to carry out verification of that explosion using the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, it shall deliver hydrodynamic yield measurement equipment to the point of entry in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion no less than 35 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, in accordance with paragraphs 8(b), 8(c), 8(d), 8(e), and 8(f) of Section VIII of this Protocol.This equipment shall be handed over, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to Designated Personnel at the site of the explosion for emplacement, installation, and use no less than 20 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives. 11. The Party carrying out an explosion shall have the right to make changes in the schedule of operations related to the conduct of the explosion. In the event the Verifying Party exercises its rights to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or to carry out on-site inspection, in accordance with Section III of this Protocol, the Party carrying out the explosion shall immediately inform the Verifying Party of any such change in the schedule of operations. In the event the Verifying Party has provided notification, under paragraph 4 of this Section, of its decision to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method or to carry out on-site inspection, the explosion shall not be carried out more than five days prior to the planned date of the explosion indicated in the initial notification, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 12. The Verifying Party may at any time, but no more than one year after the explosion, request from the Party carrying out the explosion clarification of any point of information provided in accordance with this Section. Such clarification shall be provided in the shortest possible time, but no more than 30 days following receipt of a request. Section V. Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement Method 1.The hydrodynamic measurement zone for each explosive means a cylindrical region coaxial with the emplacement hole of that explosive.This region extends in the direction of the entrance to the emplacement hole from the midpoint of the canister containing that explosive to the point at which the axis of the emplacement hole intersects a spherical surface whose radius, measured from the midpoint of the canister containing the explosive, is equal in meters to 10 times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of that explosive, or 25 meters, whichever is greater.The length of this region in the opposite direction from the same midpoint of the canister is equal in meters to three times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of that explosive, or 7.5 meters, whichever is greater. The radius of this region is equal in meters to three times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of that explosive, or 7.5 meters, whichever is greater. 2. For hydrodynamic yield measurement the following procedures shall apply:

446  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

(a) Designated Personnel shall emplace, for each explosive, the equipment specified in paragraph 5(a) of Section VIII of this Protocol in the same emplacement hole as the explosive.The equipment specified in paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be installed, in accordance with installation instructions provided in accordance with paragraph 8(a)(i) of Section VIII of this Protocol, by Designated Personnel under observation of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion and with their assistance, if Designated Personnel have requested such assistance. The location of each recording facility and the command and monitoring facility of the Verifying Party shall be determined by agreement of the Parties with respect to each particular explosion.This equipment shall be operated by Designated Personnel; (b) for each explosive, the equipment specified in paragraph 5(a) of Section VIII of this Protocol shall be installed so that the end point of the equipment farthest from the emplacement hole entrance is three meters from the surface of the explosive canister closest to the emplacement hole entrance as measured along the axis of the emplacement hole.The location of this equipment relative to the axis of the emplacement hole shall be agreed upon by the Parties. No more than six sensor channels shall be installed for each explosive. Each Party shall make documented records of measured distances to the sensors.These records shall be exchanged by the Parties; (c) explosive canisters with a length greater than 10 meters or a diameter greater than three meters shall be used only if prior agreement has been reached between the Parties establishing, in each specific case, provisions for their use; and (d) the Party carrying out the explosion shall fill all voids other than the explosive canister within the hydrodynamic measurement zone of each explosive in each emplacement hole with stemming material.This stemming material, beginning no more than three meters from each explosive canister cover towards the entrance of the hole, and proceeding in that direction, shall have a bulk density no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock. An alternate stemming material may be used for filling the remainder of the hydrodynamic measurement zone of that explosive. For any explosive emplaced in an emplacement hole whose diameter is less than 30 centimeters and emplaced at a distance of more than 1.5 kilometers from the entrance of the hole, an alternate stemming material may be used for filling the entire hydrodynamic measurement zone of that explosive. If more than one explosive is emplaced in a single emplacement hole, the Parties shall agree upon an alternate stemming material for filling the entire hydrodynamic measurement zone of each explosive other than the explosive nearest the entrance of the emplacement hole if the emplacement hole diameter is greater than 30 centimeters but less than 60 centimeters. Any alternate stemming material shall have a bulk density no less than 1.2 grams per cubic centimeter. Pipes located within the hydrodynamic measurement zone need not be filled with stemming material if they have a cross-sectional area less than 10 square centimeters, or if they have a cross-sectional area less than 100 square centimeters and a length less than one meter. Costs incurred by the Party carrying out the explosion to ensure, within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, a density of stemming material no less than 70 percent of the average density of the surrounding rock shall be borne by the Verifying Party. 3. For a group explosion the Party carrying out the explosion shall ensure that the emplacement point of each explosive canister, the detonation sequence, and the time intervals between individual explosions are such that no explosion in the group shall interfere with the hydrodynamic yield measurement of any other individual explosion.With the exception of group explosions provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol, if the technological characteristics of the project of which the group explosion is a part make it impossible to satisfy this requirement, the Parties, prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives, shall agree upon alternative hydrodynamic or other verification procedures. 4. In preparation for the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, the Verifying Party shall have the right to confirm the validity of the geological and geophysical information provided in accordance with Section IV of this Protocol, in accordance with the following procedures:

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  447

(a) Designated Personnel may analyze relevant studies and measurement data, including logging data, of the Party carrying out the explosion, the core samples or rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zone, as well as any logging data and core samples from existing exploratory holes, which shall be provided to Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the explosion site, if the Party carrying out the explosion carried out relevant studies, measurements, and coring; and (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe logging and the extraction of core samples or rock fragments from locations agreed upon by the Parties within the hydrodynamic measurement zone in the emplacement hole or from an exploratory hole at depth intervals agreed upon by the Parties. Any such exploratory hole shall be no farther from the emplacement hole than a distance in meters of 10 times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of the emplaced explosive; or (c) if the Party carrying out the explosion does not take core samples or rock fragments in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph or does not drill an exploratory hole meeting the requirements specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the Verifying Party shall have the right to extract sidewall rock samples from the emplacement hole with its own equipment, to drill such an exploratory hole, and to core this hole. Such operations shall be conducted in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. Such an exploratory hole shall be stemmed by the Party carrying out the explosion, at the expense of the Verifying Party; and (d) Designated Personnel shall have the right to examine and remove from the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion logging data, core samples, sidewall rock samples, and rock fragments referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph, as selected by Designated Personnel. 5. While using the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) to confirm by direct measurement the validity of the information provided in accordance with paragraphs 6(f), 6(g), and 6(h) of Section IV of this Protocol; (b) to confirm the validity of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 6(i) of Section IV of this Protocol, and to receive, upon request, a sample of each batch of stemming material as this material is placed in the emplacement hole within the hydrodynamic measurement zone; and (c) to confirm the validity of the information provided in accordance with paragraphs 6(b) and 6(j) of Section IV of this Protocol, by observing, upon request, relevant field measurements being made by the Party carrying out the explosion if such measurements are made by the Party carrying out the explosion, and by making field measurements with its own logging equipment, to include determination of the location and configuration of any voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone or, at the option of the Verifying Party under leasing conditions, with the logging equipment of the Party carrying out the explosion, if the Party carrying out the explosion has such equipment. Such field measurements shall be made in the presence of personnel of both Parties.All of the data produced by either Party, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and one copy of the data shall be provided to each Party. Calibration data for the equipment shall include information to confirm the sensitivity of the equipment under the conditions in which it is utilized for this explosion. 6. Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) to have access to the site of the explosion and to facilities and structures related to the conduct of the explosion, along agreed routes; (b) to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister, to confirm, by direct measurement, the depth of emplacement of each explosive canister and, for explosives in a group, the

448  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

relative location of their points of emplacement, and to observe the stemming of each emplacement hole; (c) to have access to their equipment associated with the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method from commencement of its use by Designated Personnel at the explosion site until the departure of all personnel from the explosion area prior to the explosion; (d) to unimpeded visual observation of the entrance area to each emplacement hole at any time from the moment of emplacement of each explosive until the departure of all personnel from the explosion area prior to the explosion; (e) to observe remotely by means of closed-circuit television equipment their hydrodynamic yield measurement equipment specified in paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c) of Section VIII of this Protocol; (f) to observe the explosion; and (g) to monitor electrically the integrity and performance of their equipment in each recording facility from the command and monitoring facility, to transmit the hydrodynamic yield measurement data from each recording facility to the command and monitoring facility, and to transmit the commands required for operation of each recording facility from the command and monitoring facility to each recording facility. 7. The Party carrying out the explosion shall produce, at the request of the Verifying Party, a timing reference command signal to each recording facility at two minutes, plus or minus 100 milliseconds, before the moment of the explosion, or before the first explosion in a group, and a zero-time reference signal to each corresponding recording facility for each explosion, with an accuracy of plus or minus one microsecond. The parameters for these signals, produced by the Party carrying out the explosion, and procedures for their transmission and reception shall be agreed upon by the Parties. At the Verifying Party’s option, it shall have the right to generate a timing reference signal for each explosion, using the electromagnetic pulse from its hydrodynamic measurement cables.These timing reference signals shall be transmitted, used, and recorded by the Verifying Party without intervention by the Party carrying out the explosion. 8. Designated Personnel shall have the right to acquire photographs taken by the Party carrying out the explosion, with photographic cameras provided by the Verifying Party, under the following conditions: (a) the Party carrying out the explosion shall identify those of its personnel who will take photographs; (b) photographs shall be taken as requested by, and in the presence of, Designated Personnel. If requested by Designated Personnel, such photographs shall show the size of an object by placing a measuring scale, provided by the Verifying Party, alongside that object during the photographing; (c) Designated Personnel shall determine whether photographs conform to those requested and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken; and (d) before completion of any photographed operation related to emplacement, and prior to the time at which an object being photographed becomes permanently hidden from view, Designated Personnel shall determine whether requested photographs are adequate. If they are not adequate, before the operation shall proceed, additional photographs shall be taken until the Designated Personnel determine that the photographs of that operation are adequate. This photographic process shall be carried out as expeditiously as possible, and in no case shall the cumulative delay resulting from this process exceed two hours for each emplacement operation, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  449

9. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs of the following: (a) the exterior of installations and structures associated with the conduct of the explosion; (b) the emplacement of each explosive canister and stemming of each emplacement hole as specified in paragraph 6(b) of this Section; (c) geological samples used for confirming the validity of geological and geophysical information as provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, and equipment used in obtaining such samples; (d) emplacement and installation of hydrodynamic yield measurement method equipment and cables associated with it; (e) containers, facilities and structures for storing and operating the equipment used by Designated Personnel; and (f) with the agreement of the Party carrying out the explosion, other activities of Designated Personnel directly related to the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. 10. Equipment identified by the Party carrying out the explosion, in accordance with paragraph 8(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol, as unacceptable for use at the time of the explosion shall be sealed by both Parties and placed in the custody of the Party carrying out the explosion at a time agreed upon by the Party carrying out the explosion and by Designated Personnel. 11. Two individuals from the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to join Designated Personnel in the command and monitoring facility at the time of the explosion, to observe command and monitoring of the recording equipment and acquisition and duplication of data transmitted from each recording facility, and to receive a copy of the data. Designated Personnel, in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion, shall recover all recordings of data taken at the time of the explosion and prepare two identical copies of such data. Personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall select one of the two identical copies by lot, and Designated Personnel shall retain the other copy. Designated Personnel shall retain no other such data, and shall have no further access to their recording facilities, their command and monitoring facility, and their equipment until these are returned to the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VIII of this Protocol, unless the Parties otherwise agree, in which case access of the Designated Personnel to their recording facilities, their command and monitoring facility, and their equipment shall be under the observation of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. Designated Personnel shall provide the Party carrying out the explosion with information on sensor location in relation to the explosive canister. With respect to digital recording of signals, the Verifying Party shall provide a description of the recording format and a sample of the computer program for reading digital data.The program shall be provided by Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the point of entry. 12. Designated Personnel shall not be present in areas from which all personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion have been withdrawn in connection with carrying out an explosion, but shall have the right to reenter those areas at the same time as personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. Section VI. Local Seismic Network 1. For any group explosion that the Party carrying out the explosion has notified to have a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons, and with respect to which the Verifying Party has notified its intention to measure the yield of the explosion using the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, Designated Personnel, in addition to using the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, shall have the right to install and use, under the observation and with the assistance of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion if Designated Personnel request such assistance, a local seismic network.

450  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

2. Such a network shall be installed and used at locations agreed upon by the Parties within an area circumscribed by circles of 15 kilometer radius centered on points on the surface of the earth above the points of emplacement of the explosives.The number of stations of the network shall be determined by the Verifying Party, but shall not exceed the number of explosives in the group plus eight. 3. The control point of the local seismic network shall be installed at a location that the Parties agree is outside the areas specified in paragraph 12 of Section V of this Protocol and within the area specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, unless the Parties otherwise agree. Designated Personnel shall have the right to have access to their equipment in the control point at any time from commencement of installation of the local seismic network until five days following the explosion, subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Section V, if applicable, and paragraph 10(e) of Section VIII of this Protocol. 4. Installation of a local seismic network may commence 20 days prior to the planned date of the explosion, and its operation shall continue no more than three days following the explosion, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 5. Designated Personnel shall have the right to use radio communication for the transmission and reception of data and control signals between seismic stations and the control point of the local seismic network. Frequencies and maximum power output of radio transmitters, frequency range and sensitivity of radio receivers, orientation of transmitting and receiving antennas, and period of operation of the local seismic network radio transmitters and radio receivers prior to the explosion shall be agreed upon by the Parties. Operation of the radio equipment following the explosion shall continue for no more than three days, unless the Parties otherwise agree. 6. Designated Personnel shall have access along agreed routes to the stations and the control point of the local seismic network for the purpose of carrying out activities related to the installation and use of the local seismic network. 7. In installing and using a local seismic network, Designated Personnel shall have the right to use and retain the topographic chart provided in accordance with paragraph 6(e) of Section IV of this Protocol. 8. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs associated with the local seismic network, which shall be taken by the Party carrying out the explosion at the request of Designated Personnel in accordance with applicable provisions of paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol. 9.Within five days following the explosion, Designated Personnel shall provide the Party carrying out the explosion with the original and one copy of the data from the local seismic network stations recorded on the primary medium, graphic representation of recording materials on a paper medium, and the results of calibration of seismic channels. Upon receipt of these materials the Party carrying out the explosion, in the presence of Designated Personnel, shall select and retain either the copy or the original of each recording, graphic representation, and results of calibration of the seismic channels. The set of data not selected by the Party carrying out the explosion shall be retained by Designated Personnel. For digital recording of seismic signals, the Verifying Party shall provide the description of the recording format and a sample of the computer program for reading digital data. Designated Personnel shall provide the program sample upon arrival at the point of entry. Seismic recordings provided to the Party carrying out the explosion shall cover a time period beginning no less than 30 seconds prior to the time of arrival of the first explosion-generated P-wave at any station of the local seismic network and ending no more than three days after the explosion, unless the Parties otherwise agree.All seismic recordings shall include a common time reference agreed upon by the Parties. Section VII. On-site Inspection 1. In carrying out on-site inspection, the Verifying Party shall have the right to confirm the validity of the geological and geophysical information provided in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Section IV of this Protocol in accordance with the following procedures:

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  451

(a) Designated Personnel may analyze relevant studies and measurement data, including logging data, of the Party carrying out the explosion, the core samples or rock fragments extracted from each emplacement hole from the bottom of the hole to a distance above the point of emplacement in meters equal to 40 times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of the emplaced explosive, as well as any logging data and core samples from existing exploratory holes, which shall be provided to Designated Personnel upon their arrival at the explosion site, if the Party carrying out the explosion carried out relevant studies, measurements, and coring; (b) Designated Personnel shall have the right to observe logging and the extraction of core samples or rock fragments from locations agreed upon by the Parties within the portion of the emplacement hole specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an exploratory hole, provided that it is located no farther from the emplacement hole than a distance in meters equal to 10 times the cube root of the planned yield in kilotons of the emplaced explosive at depth intervals agreed upon by the Parties if such operations are carried out by the Party carrying out the explosion; (c) Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own equipment for logging the emplacement hole and extracting sidewall rock samples within the portion of the emplacement hole identified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. Such operations shall be conducted in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion; and (d) all logging data produced by either Party, including calibration data, shall be duplicated, and one copy of the data shall be provided to each Party. Calibration data shall include information needed to confirm the sensitivity of the equipment under the conditions in which it is used. Designated Personnel shall have the right to examine and remove from the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion core samples, sidewall rock samples, and rock fragments specified in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this paragraph, as selected by Designated Personnel. 2. In carrying out on-site inspection, Designated Personnel shall have the right: (a) to confirm by direct measurement the validity of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 7(f) of Section IV of this Protocol; (b) to confirm the validity of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 7(g) of Section IV of this Protocol, by observing relevant measurements being made, and by having access to the data obtained if such measurements are conducted by the Party carrying out the explosion, and by making measurements with their own equipment to determine the location and configuration of any voids within each hydrodynamic measurement zone; (c) to have access to the site of the explosion and to facilities and structures related to the conduct of the explosion, along agreed routes; (d) to observe the emplacement of each explosive canister, to confirm the depth of its emplacement and the relative location of explosives in a group, and to observe the stemming of each emplacement hole; (e) to have access to their equipment associated with carrying out on-site inspection from commencement of its use by Designated Personnel at the explosion site until the departure of all personnel from the explosion area prior to the explosion; (f) to unimpeded visual observation of the entrance area to each emplacement hole at any time from the moment of emplacement of each explosive until the departure of all personnel from the explosion area prior to the explosion; and (g) to observe the explosion. 3. Designated Personnel shall have the right to obtain photographs associated with carrying out on-site inspection, which shall be taken by the Party carrying out the explosion at the request of Designated Personnel, in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V of this Protocol.

452  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

Section VIII. Equipment 1. Designated Personnel, in carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, shall have the right to bring into the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, install, and use the following equipment: (a) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 5 of this Section; (b) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use a local seismic network, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 6 of this Section; (c) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to carry out on-site inspection, part or all of the equipment specified in paragraph 7 of this Section; (d) geologist’s field tools and kits, geodetic equipment, topographic survey equipment, equipment for recording of field data, and equipment for rapid photo processing; (e) portable short-range communication equipment, whose power and frequency shall conform to restrictions established by the Party carrying out the explosion; (f) mobile work stations and temporary facilities; (g) medical and health physics equipment and supplies, personal protective gear, personal computers, recreational and other items as may be agreed by the Parties; and (h) satellite communications equipment, if the Party carrying out the explosion does not provide satellite communications for Designated Personnel. 2. At the choice of the Party carrying out the explosion, closed-circuit television equipment shall be provided by the Verifying Party or the Party carrying out the explosion, for the purpose of remote observation by the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraph 6(e) of Section V of this Protocol. 3. Designated Personnel, in carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, shall have the right to bring into the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, for use by the personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol, photographic cameras, film, and related photographic equipment. 4. No less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, the Parties shall agree upon the list of such additional equipment as may be requested by the Verifying Party, and which shall be supplied by the Party carrying out the explosion for use by Designated Personnel. Such additional equipment with its description and operating instructions shall be provided to Designated Personnel upon arrival at the site of the explosion. 5.The complete list of equipment for hydrodynamic yield measurement shall include: (a) sensing elements and associated cables for use in the emplacement hole; (b) the recording facility or facilities, including equipment for sending and recording commands, equipment for generation of a timing reference signal from hydrodynamic measurement cables, and equipment for data acquisition, recording and processing, and, with respect to a group explosion in which any individual explosion in the group is separated from any other explosion by more than two kilometers, radio equipment for monitoring the operational status of the equipment and for transmitting and receiving control signals. Frequencies and maximum power output of radio transmitters, frequency range and sensitivity of radio receivers, and orientation of transmitting and receiving antennas shall be agreed upon by the Parties. Operation of the radio equipment shall begin at the time of the beginning of emplacement of sensing elements and associated cables and shall end at the time of the explosion. Designated Personnel shall notify the Party carrying out the explosion in advance of any activation or deactivation of the radio equipment;

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  453

(c) cables for above-ground transmission of electrical power, control signals and data; (d) electrical power supplies; (e) measuring and calibration instruments, support equipment, maintenance equipment, and spare parts necessary for ensuring the functioning of sensing elements, cables and equipment of the recording facilities and the command and monitoring facility; (f) logging and sidewall rock sampling equipment necessary for confirming geological and geophysical characteristics of the emplacement hole as well as for obtaining data on the spatial location of points of emplacement of each explosive canister; (g) coring equipment and drilling equipment for the drilling of an exploratory hole for coring purposes. Upon agreement between the Parties, the Verifying Party, under leasing conditions, may use for these purposes the coring and drilling equipment of the Party carrying out the explosion; and (h) the command and monitoring facility, with equipment, including computers, for generating and recording command and monitoring signals, for transmitting and receiving command and monitoring signals between each recording facility and the command and monitoring facility, as well as for retrieving, storing, and processing hydrodynamic data. 6.The complete list of equipment for a local seismic network shall include: (a) seismic stations, each of which contains seismic instruments, an electrical power supply and associated cables, and radio equipment for receiving and transmitting control signals and data; (b) equipment for the control point, including electrical power supplies, equipment for sending and recording control signals and data, and data processing equipment; and (c) measuring and calibration instruments, support equipment, maintenance equipment, and spare parts necessary for ensuring the functioning of the complete network. 7. The complete list of equipment for on-site inspection shall include logging and sidewall rock sampling equipment necessary for confirming geological and geophysical characteristics of the emplacement hole as well as for obtaining data on the spatial location of points of emplacement of each explosive canister. 8. The following procedures shall be followed with respect to the equipment for hydrodynamic yield measurement, the equipment for on-site inspection, and the equipment for a local seismic network: (a) no less than 140 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, the Verifying Party, if it has declared its intention to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, shall provide the Party carrying out the explosion with the equipment and information specified in subparagraph (a)(i) of this paragraph and, if the Verifying Party has declared its intention to use a local seismic network, the equipment and information specified in subparagraph (a)(ii) of this paragraph; or, if it has declared its intention to conduct on-site inspection, equipment and information specified in subparagraph (a)(iii) of this paragraph, in order to enable the Party carrying out the explosion to familiarize itself with such equipment, if such equipment and information have not previously been provided. If, upon completion of familiarization with the equipment provided in accordance with this subparagraph, the Party carrying out the explosion concludes that use of any element of the equipment provided would be inconsistent with its containment or security requirements, the Party carrying out the explosion shall promptly, but no less than 120 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, so inform the Verifying Party, and shall specify the modifications that must be made in this equipment to satisfy the requirements of the Party carrying out the explosion.The equipment provided in accordance with this subparagraph shall be returned in the same condition as that in which it was received to the Verifying Party at the point of entry

454  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

no less than 90 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives. The following equipment and information shall be provided: (i) one set of equipment specified in paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 5(d), 5(e), 5(f) and 5(h) of this Section, as well as electrical and mechanical design information, specifications, and installation and operating instructions for this equipment; (ii) one set of equipment specified in paragraph 6 of this Section, including one seismic station, as well as electrical and mechanical design information, specifications, and installation and operating instructions for this equipment; and (iii) one set of equipment specified in paragraph 7 of this Section, as well as electrical and mechanical design information, specifications, and operating instructions for this equipment; (b) no less than 50 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, the Verifying Party shall deliver in sealed containers, to the point of entry in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, two identical sets of each type of equipment that it intends to use for activities related to verification for that explosion, with a complete inventory of equipment, specifying any components that do not perform functions directly related to measurements during the explosion.These sets of equipment shall have the same components and technical characteristics as the equipment specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or, if specified by the Party carrying out the explosion in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, shall contain modifications made in accordance with the requirements of the Party carrying out the explosion with regard to containment and security. Each of the two identical sets shall include the following: (i) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method, equipment specified in paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), and 5(h) of this Section; and (ii) if the Verifying Party has provided notification of its intent to use a local seismic network, equipment specified in paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of this Section; (c) the Party carrying out the explosion shall choose one of the two identical sets of each type of equipment for use by Designated Personnel; (d) at the point of entry the Party carrying out the explosion shall affix its own seals to the sealed containers in which the equipment chosen for use arrived, shall ensure protection of this equipment throughout the entire period it is in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, and shall transport that equipment to the site of the explosion. Prior to shipment to the site of the explosion, the set of equipment chosen for use shall be kept sealed at the point of entry, and the time of its shipment to the site of the explosion shall be determined by the Party carrying out the explosion. The Party carrying out the explosion shall consult with Designated Personnel regarding plans and schedule of shipment of the equipment no less than 48 hours in advance of the shipment. Designated Personnel shall have the right to unimpeded verification of the integrity of their seals, to observe their equipment, and to accompany their equipment. This equipment shall be handed over to Designated Personnel at the site of the explosion for emplacement, installation, and use no less than 20 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, and it shall thereafter remain under the control of Designated Personnel; seals affixed to the equipment specified in paragraph 5(a) of this Section shall not be removed prior to preparation for installation of such equipment, at which time the seals shall be removed by Designated Personnel in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion, and personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion thereafter shall have the right to observe all activities relating to the installation of such equipment; (e) seals of the Verifying Party shall be removed from equipment not chosen for use, in the presence of personnel of both Parties, and thereafter this equipment shall be retained for inspection by the Party carrying out the explosion without the presence of Designated Personnel for

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  455

a period ending no more than 30 days following the explosion, at which time such equipment shall be returned in the same condition as that in which it was received to the Verifying Party at the point of entry; (f) no less than 50 days prior to the planned date of the beginning of emplacement of explosives, the Verifying Party shall provide, at its option, either one or two sets of the equipment that the Verifying Party intends to use for activities related to verification for this explosion, other than equipment specified in paragraph 8(b) of this Section.A complete inventory of such equipment, specifying any components that do not perform functions directly related to measurements during the explosion, shall be provided to the Party carrying out the explosion at least one week prior to the planned arrival of the equipment at the point of entry. If only one set of equipment is provided by the Verifying Party, the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to inspect this equipment upon its arrival at the point of entry for up to 30 days, without the presence of Designated Personnel. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the Party carrying out the explosion shall identify any equipment that it deems unacceptable for delivery to the site of the explosion, in which case such equipment shall be removed by the Verifying Party and returned to its territory. All equipment deemed acceptable for delivery to the site of the explosion shall be shipped to the site of the explosion so as to enable Designated Personnel to carry out their activities related to verification as set forth in the coordinated schedule specified in paragraph 6 of Section XI of this Protocol, but in no case less than 20 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives. The Party carrying out the explosion shall transport this equipment in such a manner as to ensure that it is delivered to Designated Personnel in the same condition as that in which it was received. If two sets of equipment are provided by the Verifying Party, the procedures specified in paragraphs 8(b), 8(c), 8(d), and 8(e) of this Section for selection and inspection of equipment shall be followed. If the Verifying Party under leasing conditions uses coring and drilling equipment of the Party carrying out the explosion, such equipment shall be provided to Designated Personnel at the site of the explosion so as to enable Designated Personnel to carry out their activities related to verification as set forth in the coordinated schedule referred to in paragraph 6 of Section XI of this Protocol, but in no case less than 20 days prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives, unless the Parties otherwise agree; (g) with respect to the equipment specified in paragraphs 5(a) and 5(c) of this Section, the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to retain for its own purposes up to 150 meters of each type of cable in the set being inspected.The cable segments to be retained may be taken from any place along the length of the cable, but the number of individual segments shall not exceed the number of reels of cable in a set of equipment; and (h) after inspecting the equipment in accordance with paragraphs 8(e) and 8(f) of this Section, the Party carrying out the explosion shall inform Designated Personnel what equipment of that delivered to the site of the explosion it deems unacceptable for use during the explosion. 9. Prior to the beginning of emplacement of explosives, Designated Personnel shall certify in writing to the personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion that the equipment delivered to the site of the explosion is in working condition. 10. Personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to observe use of equipment by Designated Personnel at the site of the explosion, with access to the recording facilities, the command and monitoring facility, the control point, and seismic stations of the local seismic network of the Verifying Party being subject to the following: (a) at any time prior to the explosion that Designated Personnel are not present in the recording facilities, in the command and monitoring facility, in the control point, or at the seismic stations, these facilities, control point, and stations shall be sealed by the seals of both Parties. Seals may be removed by Designated Personnel only in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion;

456  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

(b) prior to the explosion, personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion may enter the recording facilities, the command and monitoring facility, or the control point of the Verifying Party for the purpose of conducting operations that require the participation of both Parties only with the agreement of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative; (c) at all other times prior to the explosion, personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion may enter the recording facilities, the command and monitoring facility, or the control point of the Verifying Party only at the express invitation of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and when accompanied by the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative; (d) following the explosion, Designated Personnel shall have the right to enter the recording facilities for data recovery only when accompanied by personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. No later than the final dry run, Designated Personnel shall inform the Party carrying out the explosion of procedures for recovering such data and shall advise the Party carrying out the explosion at the time of data recovery of any changes the Designated Personnel make in those procedures and the reasons for such changes. Personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall observe the process of data recovery from instrumentation in the recording facilities and the command and monitoring facility, and shall leave the recording facilities and the command and monitoring facility at the same time as Designated Personnel; and (e) at any time following the explosion, personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to observe the activities of Designated Personnel in the control point. Personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall be present in the control point to observe recovery of the initial data, which shall take place within one hour following the explosion.At any time following the explosion that Designated Personnel are not present in the control point, the control point shall be sealed with the seals of both Parties. The seals may be removed by Designated Personnel only in the presence of personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. Within five days following the explosion, Designated Personnel shall leave the control point at the same time as personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion. 11. Following data recovery, the equipment used for activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol may be retained by the Party carrying out the explosion and be subject to its exclusive control for a period ending no more than 30 days following data recovery, at which time this equipment shall be returned, in the same condition as that in which it was received, to the Verifying Party at the point of entry. Elimination of information stored in memories shall not be deemed damage to the equipment. Section IX. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel 1. No later than 10 days following entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with a list of its proposed Designated Personnel who will carry out the activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol and a list of its proposed Transport Personnel who will provide transportation for these Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party. These lists shall contain name, date of birth, and sex of each individual of its proposed Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel.The list of Designated Personnel shall at no time include more than 200 individuals, and the list of Transport Personnel shall at no time include more than 200 individuals. 2. Each Party shall review the list of Designated Personnel and the list of Transport Personnel proposed by the other Party. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed accepted. If the Party reviewing a list determines that an individual included thereon is not acceptable to it, it shall so inform the Party providing the list of its objection within 20 days following receipt of the list, and such an individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the list.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  457

3. Each Party may propose the addition or substitution of individuals on its list of Designated Personnel or its list of Transport Personnel at any time, who shall be designated in the same manner as is provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section with regard to the initial lists. Annually, no more than 40 individuals from the list of Designated Personnel shall be subject to substitution. This limitation shall not apply to the replacement of individuals due to permanent physical incapacity or death, or to deletion of an individual from the list of Designated Personnel in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section. Replacement of an individual due to permanent physical incapacity, death or deletion from the list shall be accomplished in the same manner as is provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. Following receipt of the initial list of Designated Personnel or the initial list of Transport Personnel or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall prepare for the issuance of such visas and other documents as may be required to ensure that each individual on the list of Designated Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel to whom it has agreed may enter and remain in its territory for the purpose of carrying out activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be provided by the Party carrying out the explosion only to the individuals whose names are included on the lists provided by the Verifying Party, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section X of this Protocol, upon receipt of such lists. Such visas and documents shall be valid for multiple entry throughout the period of preparation and conduct of the particular explosion. 5. If a Party determines that an individual included on the list of Designated Personnel or the list of Transport Personnel of the other Party has violated the provisions of this Protocol or has ever committed a criminal offense in its territory, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense, or has ever been expelled from its territory, the Party making such a determination shall so notify the other Party of its objection to the continued inclusion of this individual on the list. If at that time this individual is present in the territory of the Party raising the objection, the other Party shall immediately recall this individual from the territory of the Party raising this objection and immediately thereafter delete that individual from the list of Designated Personnel or from the list of Transport Personnel. 6. Designated Personnel with their personal baggage and equipment of the Verifying Party shall be permitted to enter the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion at the designated point of entry, to remain in that territory and to exit through the designated point of entry. 7. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities for the entire period they are in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions as Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel: (a) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961; (b) living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the quarters of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (c) archives, documents, papers and correspondence of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall enjoy the inviolability accorded the archives, documents, papers and correspondence of missions and diplomatic agents pursuant to Articles 24 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft or other transport vehicles of the Verifying Party shall be inviolable; (d) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on

458  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

Diplomatic Relations. Immunity from jurisdiction of Designated Personnel or Transport Personnel may be waived by the Verifying Party in those cases in which it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol.Waiver must always be express; (e) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (f) living and working quarters occupied by Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded mission premises pursuant to Article 23 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (g) Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. 8. Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion. 9. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the Party carrying out the explosion and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that Party. 10. If the Party carrying out the explosion considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in paragraph 7 of this Section, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. Section X. Entry, Transport, Food, Lodging and Provision of Services for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel 1.The Party carrying out the explosion shall ensure Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel access to its territory for the purposes of carrying out activities related to verification, in accordance with this Protocol, and shall provide these personnel with such other assistance as may be necessary to enable them to carry out these activities. Following notification by the Verifying Party of its intention to conduct hydrodynamic yield measurement or to carry out on-site inspection, Designated Personnel shall have the right to be present at the site of the explosion to carry out activities in accordance with this Protocol at such times and for such periods as required to carry out these activities.The specific times and periods for carrying out such activities shall be specified in the coordinated schedule specified in paragraph 6 of Section XI of this Protocol. 2.The number of Designated Personnel shall not exceed: (a) when exercising their rights and functions associated with drilling, logging, hole surveying, and coring, if this work is carried out by Designated Personnel operating their own equipment or equipment leased from the Party carrying out the explosion, 25; (b) when exercising their rights and functions associated with observing drilling, logging, hole surveying, and coring performed by the Party carrying out the explosion, or when Designated Personnel perform logging, hole surveying, or sidewall rock sampling, 10; (c) when exercising their rights and functions associated with the confirmation of the validity of geological and geophysical information, the number of emplacement holes plus three; (d) when exercising their rights and functions associated with the use of hydrodynamic yield measurement equipment, the number of explosives plus three, plus the number of recording

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  459

facilities specified in paragraph 5 of Section VIII of this Protocol multiplied by seven; and, with respect to group explosions in which radio controlled recording facilities are employed, three per recording facility, plus seven for the command and monitoring facility; (e) when exercising their rights and functions associated with the use of a local seismic network, 15; (f) for administrative, coordination, clerical, and health and safety matters, when Designated Personnel described in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph are present, eight; and (g) if the Verifying Party provides food and housing for Designated Personnel identified in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of this paragraph, six. 3. No less than 20 days prior to the planned arrival of its Designated Personnel or equipment at the point of entry to carry out activities related to verification of a particular explosion, the Verifying Party shall provide the Party carrying out the explosion with: (a) a list of the names of the Designated Personnel, their passports and documentation, and a list of the names of the Transport Personnel, their passports and documentation, who will carry out activities related to verification of a particular explosion; (b) the names of the Designated Personnel Team Leader and deputy team leader, and the names of those individuals from the Designated Personnel who will escort equipment of the Verifying Party to the site of the explosion; (c) confirmation of the point of entry to be used; (d) the scheduled date and the estimated time of arrival of Designated Personnel at the point of entry; and (e) designation of the mode of transport to be used. No more than 15 days following receipt of the lists, passports, and documentation specified in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the Party carrying out the explosion shall return those passports to the Verifying Party with the visas and documents specified in paragraph 4 of Section IX of this Protocol. 4. If a transport aircraft other than a regularly scheduled commercial aircraft is used for transportation, its flight path shall be along airways that are agreed upon by the Parties, and its flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft, including in the remarks section of the flight plan a confirmation that the appropriate clearance has been obtained. The Party carrying out the explosion shall provide parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for the aircraft of the Verifying Party at the point of entry.The Verifying Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing. 5.The Party carrying out the explosion shall ensure that any necessary clearances or approvals are granted so as to enable Designated Personnel, their baggage, and equipment of the Verifying Party to arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival date and time. 6.The Party carrying out the explosion shall assist Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel and their baggage in passage through customs without undue delay. The Party carrying out the explosion shall provide transportation between the point of entry and the site of the explosion for Designated Personnel, for their baggage and equipment of the Verifying Party, so as to enable such personnel to exercise their rights and functions in the time periods provided for in this Protocol. 7. The Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to assign its personnel to escort Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel while they are in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion.

460  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

8. Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, movement and travel of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel shall be subject to the authorization of the Party carrying out the explosion. 9. During the period Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel are in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, the Party carrying out the explosion shall provide food, living and working facilities, secure places for storing equipment, transportation, and medical services for such personnel. If the Verifying Party desires to provide its own food or housing units for its Designated Personnel, or food for its Transport Personnel during their stay in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion, the Party carrying out the explosion shall provide such assistance as may be necessary for such food and housing units to arrive at the appropriate locations. If the Verifying Party provides its own housing units, they shall be delivered to the point of entry no less than 30 days prior to the arrival of Designated Personnel. The Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right to inspect these housing units upon their arrival at the point of entry for a 30day period, without the presence of personnel of the Verifying Party. 10.The Party carrying out the explosion shall ensure the Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative access at all times to means of direct communications between the site of the explosion and the embassy of the Verifying Party, and shall provide Designated Personnel with telephone communications between their working facilities and living accommodations at the site of the explosion.The Designated Personnel Team Leader or his designated representative shall also have the right to use at all times satellite communications to ensure communications via the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) commercial satellite system, or a system of equivalent performance, between the site of the explosion and the telephone communications system of the Verifying Party. If the Party carrying out the explosion does not provide such communications, Designated Personnel shall have the right to use their own equipment specified in paragraph 1(h) of Section VIII of this Protocol. In this case, installation and alignment of all such equipment shall be done jointly.All equipment of this system, except the remote control unit, shall be locked and placed under seals of both Parties, and neither Party shall have access to this equipment except under the observation of personnel of the other Party. Designated Personnel shall have exclusive use of the remote control unit. If the Verifying Party provides satellite communications equipment, personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion shall have the right, under the observation of Designated Personnel, to make the following modifications provided they do not degrade the quality of communications: (a) install bandpass filters, to limit the frequency range, in the antenna signal transmission and reception lines; (b) modify the remote control unit to prevent manual tuning; and (c) modify the satellite communications equipment to allow the Party carrying out the explosion to monitor all transmissions. 11. At the site of the explosion, Designated Personnel shall observe all safety rules and regulations applicable to the personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion, as well as those additional restrictions with regard to access and movement as may be established by the Party carrying out the explosion. Designated Personnel shall have access only to the areas where they will directly exercise their rights and functions in accordance with Sections V,VI, and VII of this Protocol. 12. Designated Personnel shall not be given or seek access by physical, visual or technical means to the interior of the explosive canister, to documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive, or to equipment for control and firing of explosives.The Party carrying out the explosion shall not locate documentary or other information descriptive of the design of an explosive in such ways as to impede Designated Personnel in carrying out their activities in accordance with this Protocol.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  461

13.With the exception of those cases in which the Parties otherwise agree, all costs related to the activities of Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel carried out in accordance with this Protocol shall be borne by the Verifying Party, including costs for materials, equipment, leased equipment, and services that have been requested by and provided to the Verifying Party, as well as costs for transportation, food, living and working facilities, provision of medical assistance, and communications.These costs shall be billed at the standard or official rates existing in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion. 14.The Verifying Party shall have the right to include among its Designated Personnel a medical specialist, who shall be allowed to bring medications, medical instruments, and portable medical equipment agreed upon by the Parties. If Designated Personnel are treated in a medical facility of the Party carrying out the explosion the medical specialist shall have the right to consult on the recommended treatment and monitor the course of medical treatment at all times. The medical specialist of the Verifying Party shall have the right to require the Party carrying out the explosion to provide emergency evacuation of any individual of Designated Personnel who is ill or suffered an accident to a mutually agreed medical facility in the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion or to the point of entry for emergency medical evacuation by the Verifying Party. Designated Personnel shall have the right to refuse any treatment prescribed by medical personnel of the Party carrying out the explosion, and in this case the Party carrying out the explosion shall not be responsible for any consequences of such refusal. Such refusal must always be express. Section XI. Procedures for Consultation and Coordination 1. To facilitate the implementation of this Protocol, the Parties shall use the Joint Consultative Commission, as provided for in the Treaty, that shall meet at the request of either Party. For each explosion for which activities are carried out in accordance with this Protocol, the Parties shall establish a Coordinating Group of this Commission. 2.The Coordinating Group shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of the Verifying Party with the activities of the Party carrying out the explosion. 3.The Coordinating Group shall operate throughout the entire period of preparing and carrying out of the activities related to verification for a particular explosion, until the departure of Designated Personnel from the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion. 4.The Representative of the Verifying Party to the Coordinating Group shall be the Designated Personnel Team Leader, whose name shall be provided simultaneously with the notification of intent to carry out activities related to verification for a particular explosion.All members of the Coordinating Group from the Verifying Party shall be drawn from the list of Designated Personnel.Within 15 days following receipt of this notification, the Party carrying out the explosion shall provide the Verifying Party with the name of its Representative to the Coordinating Group. 5. The first meeting of the Coordinating Group shall be convened in the capital of the Party carrying out the explosion within 25 days following notification by the Verifying Party of its intent to conduct activities related to verification for a particular explosion.Thereafter, the Coordinating Group shall meet at the request of either Party. 6. At the first meeting of the Coordinating Group, the Party carrying out the explosion shall present a list, including times and durations, of all its planned activities that are to be carried out as from the first day of this meeting and affect the rights of the Verifying Party provided in this Protocol.The Verifying Party shall provide a preliminary statement of its requirements for technical and logistical support for the activities related to verification that it intends to carry out.Within 10 days the Parties shall develop and agree upon a coordinated schedule, including specific times and durations for carrying out activities related to verification, that shall ensure the rights of each Party provided in this Protocol.

462  THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY

7. Agreement of the Representative of each Party in the Coordinating Group shall constitute agreement of the Parties with respect to the following specific provisions of this Protocol: (a) Section I: paragraph 5; (b) Section IV: paragraphs 9, 10(b), and 11; (c) Section V: paragraphs 2, 3, 4(b), 6(a), 7, 8(d), 9(f), 10, and 11; (d) Section VI: paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9; (e) Section VII: paragraphs 1(b) and 2(c); (f) Section VIII: paragraphs 1(g), 4, 5(b), 5(g), and 8(f); (g) Section X: paragraphs 4 and 13; and (h) Section XI: paragraph 6. 8. Upon completion of activities related to verification at the site of an explosion, the Designated Personnel Team Leader shall prepare, at his option, either at the site of the explosion or in the capital of the Party carrying out the explosion, a report of the activities provided for in this Protocol that were carried out by Designated Personnel.The report shall be factual, and shall list the types of activities in chronological order. Lists of information, of photographs, and of data required in accordance with this Protocol and provided by Designated Personnel to the Party carrying out the explosion and received by Designated Personnel from the Party carrying out the explosion in the course of conducting activities related to verification on the territory of the Party carrying out the explosion shall be appended to the report. The report shall be provided to the Party carrying out the explosion in its capital by the Designated Personnel Team Leader within 15 days following completion of activities related to verification at the site of the explosion. 9. If, in the course of implementing activities related to verification in accordance with this Protocol, questions arise requiring prompt resolution, such questions shall be considered by the Coordinating Group. If the Coordinating Group is unable to resolve such questions, they shall immediately be referred to the Joint Consultative Commission for resolution. 10.Within 30 days after the Party carrying out the explosion provides notification of its intent to carry out a group explosion having a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons, a meeting of the Joint Consultative Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party with the goal of reaching agreement on specific procedures as specified in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol. The explosion shall be conducted no less than 150 days following agreement of the Parties upon such procedures. 11. The Joint Consultative Commission may, as necessary, establish and amend procedures governing the activities of the Coordinating Group. Section XII. Release of Information 1. Nothing in the Treaty and this Protocol shall affect the proprietary rights of either Party in information provided by it in accordance with the Treaty and this Protocol, or in information that may be disclosed to the other Party or that may become known to the other Party in preparing for, or carrying out, explosions. Claims to such proprietary rights, however, shall not impede implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 2. Public release of the information provided in accordance with this Protocol or publication of material using such information may take place only with the agreement of the Party carrying out an explosion. Public release of the results of observation or measurements made by Designated Personnel may take place only with the agreement of both Parties.

THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY  463

Section XIII. Entry into Force This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George Bush, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

16

The Environmental Modification Convention SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

se of environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes has not played a major role in military planning for many years, and it does not at the present time. Such techniques might be developed in the future, however, and would pose a threat of serious damage unless action was taken to prohibit their use. In July 1972, the U.S. government renounced the use of climate modification techniques for hostile purposes, even if their development proved to be feasible in the future. Beginning at that time, both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the potential for environmental modification threats. In 1973 the Senate adopted a resolution1 calling for an international agreement “prohibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war. . . .” In response to this resolution, President Richard M. Nixon ordered the Department of Defense to undertake an in-depth review of the military aspects of weather and other environmental modification techniques.The results of this and a subsequent interagency study led the U.S. government to decide to explore the possibilities of an international agreement with the Soviet Union. During the summit meeting in Moscow in July 1974, President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev formally agreed to hold bilateral discussions on how to bring about “the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.”Three sets of discussions were held in 1974 and 1975, resulting in agreement on a common approach and common language. In August 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union tabled, in parallel, identical draft texts of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.The draft convention defines environmental modification techniques as changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition, or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space. Changes in weather or climate patterns, in ocean currents, or in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, or an upset in the ecological balance of a region are some of the effects that might result from the use of environmental modification techniques discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Intensive CCD negotiations held during the spring and summer of 1976 resulted in a modified text and understanding regarding four of the treaty articles.The text and understandings were transmitted to the UN General Assembly for consideration during the fall session.

U

1

S. Res. 71, passed on July 11, 1973.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION  465

Article I sets forth the following basic commitment:“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.” An understanding defines the term “widespread, long-lasting, or severe.” Widespread is defined as encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; long-lasting is defined as lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; and severe is defined as involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources, or other assets. With regard to peaceful uses of environmental modification techniques, the convention provides that the parties shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information. In addition to providing for mutual consultation regarding complaints and for recourse to the UN Security Council, the revised draft establishes the framework for the Consultative Committee of Experts, which would meet on an ad hoc basis when requested by a party in order to clarify the nature of activities suspected to be in violation of the convention. Responding to many delegations’ suggestion, the revised text incorporates a provision for periodic conferences to review the convention’s operation. During the 1976 fall session, the UN General Assembly held extensive debate on the draft convention, including several resolutions relating to it. On December 10, 1976, by a vote of 96 to 8 with 30 abstentions, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that referred the convention to all member nations for their consideration, signature, and ratification, and requested the UN secretary general to open the convention for signature. The UN secretary general officiated at the signing ceremony in Geneva on May 18, 1977. The United States joined thirty-three other nations in signing the convention. It entered into force on October 5, 1978, when the twentieth state to sign deposited its instrument of ratification. President Jimmy Carter transmitted the convention to the Senate on September 22, 1978.The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on November 28, 1979, by a vote of 98 to 0. President Carter ratified the convention for the United States on December 12, 1979.The convention entered into force for the United States on January 17, 1980, when the U.S. instrument of ratification was deposited in New York with the UN secretary general. At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, after Iraqi troops had torched the Kuwaiti oil fields, consideration was given in the U.S. government to charging Iraq with a violation of the convention. However, it was concluded that this act was not in fact a use of environmental modification as a weapon of war as defined in the convention.

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES Signed in Geneva May 18, 1977 Entered into force October 5, 1978 The States Parties to this Convention, Guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete disarmament under strict and effec-

466  THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION

tive international control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare, Determined to continue negotiations with a view to achieving effective progress towards further measures in the field of disarmament, Recognizing that scientific and technical advances may open new possibilities with respect to modification of the environment, Recalling the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, Realizing that the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations, Recognizing, however, that military or any other hostile use of such techniques could have effects extremely harmful to human welfare, Desiring to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use, and affirming their willingness to work towards the achievement of this objective, Desiring also to contribute to the strengthening of trust among nations and to the further improvement of the international situation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. 2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. Article II As used in Article I, the term “environmental modification techniques” refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. Article III 1. The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to the generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use. 2.The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. States Parties in a position to do so shall contribute, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation, improvement, and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION  467

Article IV Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control. Article V 1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. These international procedures may include the services of appropriate international organizations, as well as of a Consultative Committee of Experts as provided for in paragraph 2 of this article. 2. For the purposes set forth in paragraph 1 of this article, the Depositary shall, within one month of the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Convention, convene a Consultative Committee of Experts.Any State Party may appoint an expert to the Committee whose functions and rules of procedure are set out in the annex, which constitutes an integral part of this Convention. The Committee shall transmit to the Depositary a summary of its findings of fact, incorporating all views and information presented to the Committee during its proceedings.The Depositary shall distribute the summary to all States Parties. 3. Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity. 4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation. 5. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention. Article VI 1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to the Convention.The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. 2. An amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties.Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance. Article VII This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. Article VIII 1. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of the States Parties to the Convention shall be convened by the Depositary at Geneva, Switzerland. The conference shall

468  THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION

review the operation of the Convention with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized, and shall in particular examine the effectiveness of the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. 2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, a majority of the States Parties to the Convention may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, the convening of a conference with the same objectives. 3. If no conference has been convened pursuant to paragraph 2 of this article within ten years following the conclusion of a previous conference, the Depositary shall solicit the views of all States Parties to the Convention, concerning the convening of such a conference. If one third or ten of the States Parties, whichever number is less, respond affirmatively, the Depositary shall take immediate steps to convene the conference. Article IX 1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2.This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 3.This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty Governments in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article. 4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5.The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices. 6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X This Convention, of which the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at Geneva on the eighteenth day of May, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven. DONE at Geneva on May 18, 1977.

Annex to the Convention Consultative Committee of Experts 1.The Consultative Committee of Experts shall undertake to make appropriate findings of fact and provide expert views relevant to any problem raised pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V of this Convention by the State Party requesting the convening of the Committee.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION  469

2. The work of the Consultative Committee of Experts shall be organized in such a way as to permit it to perform the functions set forth in paragraph 1 of this annex. The Committee shall decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting.There shall be no voting on matters of substance. 3.The Depositary or his representative shall serve as the Chairman of the Committee. 4. Each expert may be assisted at meetings by one or more advisers. 5. Each expert shall have the right, through the Chairman, to request from States, and from international organizations, such information and assistance as the expert considers desirable for the accomplishment of the Committees work.

Understandings Regarding the Convention2 Understanding Relating to Article I It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of this Convention, the terms, “widespread”,“long-lasting” and “severe” shall be interpreted as follows: (a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres; (b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; (c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets. It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in connexion with any other international agreement. Understanding Relating to Article II It is the understanding of the Committee that the following examples are illustrative of phenomena that could be caused by the use of environmental modification techniques as defined in Article II of the Convention: earthquakes, tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere. It is further understood that all the phenomena listed above, when produced by military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, would result, or could reasonably be expected to result, in widespread, long-lasting or severe destruction, damage or injury. Thus, military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as defined in Article II, so as to cause those phenomena as a means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party, would be prohibited. It is recognized, moreover, that the list of examples set out above is not exhaustive. Other phenomena which could result from the use of environmental modification techniques as defined in Article II could also be appropriately included. The absence of such phenomena from the list does not in any way imply that the undertaking contained in Article I would not be applicable to those phenomena, provided the criteria set out in that article were met.

2 These are not incorporated into the Convention but are part of the negotiating record and were included in the report transmitted by the CCD to the UN General Assembly in September 1976.

470  THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION

Understanding Relating to Article III It is the understanding of the Committee that this Convention does not deal with the question whether or not a given use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes is in accordance with generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law. Understanding Relating to Article VIII It is the understanding of the Committee that a proposal to amend the Convention may also be considered at any conference of Parties held pursuant to Article VIII. It is further understood that any proposed amendment that is intended for such consideration should, if possible, be submitted to the Depositary no less than 90 days before the commencement of the conference. States Parties3 Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Belarus, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Romania, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia), United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,Vietnam,Yemen, Zaire

3

Dates of signatures and ratifications for each State Party can be found in the appendix.

17

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material provides for certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear material. It also establishes a general framework for cooperation among states to protect, recover, and return stolen nuclear material. Further, the convention lists certain serious offenses involving nuclear material, which state parties are to make punishable and for which offenders shall be subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution. This nuclear material protection convention resulted from a U.S. initiative in 1974, which was subsequently endorsed at the 1975 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Two provisions of the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 called for the negotiation of such a convention, though negotiation of the convention had already begun in 1977. The convention was adopted at a meeting of government representatives in Vienna on October 26, 1979, and signed by the United States on March 3, 1980. The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent for ratification on July 30, 1981, by a vote 98 to 0. President Ronald Reagan ratified it on September 4, 1981. Legislation to implement the convention was enacted on October 18, 1982.The United States deposited its instrument of ratification December 13, 1982. The convention entered into force February 8, 1987, in accordance with the provision for entry into force thirty days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the twenty-first state, which was Switzerland.

T

CONVENTION OF

PHYSICAL PROTECTION NUCLEAR MATERIAL

ON THE

Signed at New York March 3, 1980 Entered into force February 8, 1987 The States Parties to This Convention, Recognizing the right of all States to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy, Convinced of the need for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy,

472  THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL

Desiring to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material, Convinced that offenses relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the prevention, detection and punishment of such offenses, Aware of the Need for international co-operation to establish, in conformity with the national law of each State Party and with this Convention, effective measures for the physical protection of nuclear material, Convinced that this Convention should facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, Stressing also the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, Recognizing the importance of effective physical protection of nuclear material used for military purposes, and understanding that such material is and will continue to be accorded stringent physical protection, Have Agreed as follows: Article 1 For the purposes of this Convention: (a) “nuclear material” means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or oreresidue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; (b) “uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233” means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature; (c) “international nuclear transport” means the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material by any means of transportation intended to go beyond the territory of the State where the shipment originates beginning with the departure from a facility of the shipper in that State and ending with the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the State of ultimate destination. Article 2 1.The Convention shall apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport. 2. With the exception of articles 3 and 4 and paragraph 3 of article 5, this Convention shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport. 3. Apart from the commitments expressly undertaken by States Parties in the articles covered by paragraph 2 with respect to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage and transport, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereign rights of a State regarding the domestic use, storage and transport of such nuclear material. Article 3 Each State Party shall take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.

THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL  473

Article 4 1. Each State Party shall not export or authorize the export of nuclear material unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will be protected during the international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I. 2. Each State Party shall not import or authorize the import of nuclear material from a State not party to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances that such material will during the international nuclear transport be protected at the levels described in Annex I. 3.A State Party shall not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal waterways or through its airports or seaports of nuclear material between States that are not parties to this Convention unless the State Party has received assurances as far as practicable that this nuclear material will be protected during international nuclear transport at the levels described in Annex I. 4. Each State Party shall apply within the framework of its national law the levels of physical protection described in Annex I to nuclear material being transported from a part of that State to another part of the same State through international waters or airspace. 5.The State Party responsible for receiving assurances that the nuclear material will be protected at the levels described in Annex I according to paragraphs 1 to 3 shall identify and inform in advance States which the nuclear material is expected to transit by land or internal waterways, or whose airports or seaports it is expected to enter. 6. The responsibility for obtaining assurances referred to in paragraph 1 may be transferred, by mutual agreement, to the State Party involved in the transport as the importing State. 7. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State, including that over its airspace and territorial sea. Article 5 1. States Parties shall identify and make known to each other directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency their central authority and point of contact having responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material and for coordinating recovery and response operations in the event of any unauthorized removal, use or alteration of nuclear material or in the event of credible threat thereof. 2. In the case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material or of credible threat thereof, States Parties shall, in accordance with their national law, provide co-operation and assistance to the maximum feasible extent in the recovery and protection of such material to any State that so requests. In particular: (a) a State Party shall take appropriate steps to inform as soon as possible other States, which appear to it to be concerned, of any theft, robbery or other unlawful taking of nuclear material or credible threat thereof and to inform, where appropriate, international organizations; (b) as appropriate, the States Parties concerned shall exchange information with each other or international organizations with a view to protecting threatened nuclear material, verifying the integrity of the shipping container, or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material and shall: (i) co-ordinate their efforts through diplomatic and other agreed channels; (ii) render assistance, if requested; (iii) ensure the return of nuclear material stolen or missing as a consequence of the abovementioned events. The means of implementation of this co-operation shall be determined by the States Parties concerned.

474  THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL

3. States Parties shall co-operate and consult as appropriate, with each other directly or through international organizations, with a view to obtaining guidance on the design, maintenance and improvement of systems of physical protection of nuclear material in international transport. Article 6 1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures consistent with their national law to protect the confidentiality of any information which they receive in confidence by virtue of the provisions of this Convention from another State Party or through participation in an activity carried out for the implementation of this Convention. If States Parties provide information to international organizations in confidence, steps shall be taken to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is protected. 2. States Parties shall not be required by this Convention to provide any information which they are not permitted to communicate pursuant to national law or which would jeopardize the security of the State concerned or the physical protection of nuclear material. Article 7 1.The intentional commission of: (a) an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property; (b) a theft or robbery of nuclear material; (c) an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; (d) an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of intimidation; (e) a threat: (i) to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage, or (ii) to commit an offense described in subparagraph (b) in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act; (f) an attempt to commit any offense described in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); and (g) an act which constitutes participation in any offense described in paragraphs (a) to (f) shall be made a punishable offense by each State Party under its national law. 2. Each State Party shall make the offenses described in this article punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature. Article 8 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in article 7 in the following cases: (a) when the offense is committed in the territory of that State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State. 2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over these offenses in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 11 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1.

THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL  475

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. 4. In addition to the State Parties mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2, each State Party may, consistent with international law, establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in article 7 when it is involved in international nuclear transport as the exporting or importing State. Article 9 Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall take appropriate measures, including detention, under its national law to ensure his presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. Measures taken according to this article shall be notified without delay to the States required to establish jurisdiction pursuant to article 8 and, where appropriate, all other States concerned. Article 10 The State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present shall, if it does not extradite him, submit, without exception whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Article 11 1.The offenses in article 7 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition Treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future extradition Treaty to be concluded between them. 2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a Treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition Treaty, it may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of those offenses. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 3. State Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a Treaty shall recognize those offenses as extraditable offenses between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State. 4. Each of the offenses shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the State Parties required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 8. Article 12 Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offenses set forth in article 7 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings. Article 13 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offenses set forth in article 7, including the supply of evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. The law of the State requested shall apply in all cases. 2.The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not affect obligations under any other Treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern, in whole or in part, mutual assistance in criminal matters. Article 14 1. Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to this Convention.The depositary shall communicate such information periodically to all States Parties.

476  THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL

2.The State Party where an alleged offender is prosecuted shall, wherever practicable, first communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the States directly concerned.The State Party shall also communicate the final outcome to the depositary who shall inform all States. 3.Where an offense involves nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage or transport, and both the alleged offender and the nuclear material remain in the territory of the State Party in which the offense was committed, nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as requiring that State Party to provide information concerning criminal proceedings arising out of such an offense. Article 15 The Annexes constitute an integral part of this Convention. Article 16 1.A conference of States Parties shall be convened by the depositary five years after the entry into force of this Convention to review the implementation of the Convention and its adequacy as concerns the preamble, the whole of the operative part and the annexes in the light of the then prevailing situation. 2. At intervals of not less than five years thereafter, the majority of States Parties may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the depositary, the convening of further conferences with the same objective. Article 17 1. In the event of a dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, such States Parties shall consult with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation, or by any other peaceful means of settling disputes acceptable to all parties to the dispute. 2. Any dispute of this character which cannot be settled in the manner prescribed in paragraph 1 shall, at the request of any party to such dispute, be submitted to arbitration or referred to the International Court of Justice for decision.Where a dispute is submitted to arbitration, if, within six months from the date of the request, the parties to the dispute are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, a party may request the President of the International Court of Justice or the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint one or more arbitrators. In case of conflicting requests by the parties to the dispute, the request to the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall have priority. 3. Each State Party may at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by either or both of the dispute settlement procedures provided for in paragraph 2.The other States Parties shall not be bound by a dispute settlement procedure provided for in paragraph 2, with respect to a State Party which has made a reservation to that procedure. 4. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the depositary. Article 18 1.This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York from 3 March 1980 until its entry into force. 2.This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory States. 3. After its entry into force, this Convention will be open for accession by all States.

THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL  477

4. (a) This Convention shall be open for signature or accession by international organizations and regional organizations of an integration or other nature, provided that any such organization is constituted by sovereign States and has competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of international agreements in matters covered by this Convention. (b) In matters within their competence, such organizations shall, on their own behalf, exercise the rights and fulfill the responsibilities which this Convention attributes to States Parties. (c) When becoming party to this Convention such an organization shall communicate to the depositary a declaration indicating which States are members thereof and which articles of this Convention do not apply to it. (d) Such an organization shall not hold any vote additional to those of its Member States. 5. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the depositary. Article 19 1.This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary. 2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the date of deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Article 20 1.Without prejudice to article 16 a State Party may propose amendments to this Convention.The proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary who shall circulate it immediately to all States Parties. If a majority of States Parties request the depositary to convene a conference to consider the proposed amendments, the depositary shall invite all States Parties to attend such a conference to begin not sooner than thirty days after the invitations are issued. Any amendment adopted at the conference by a two-thirds majority of all States Parties shall be promptly circulated by the depositary to all States Parties. 2.The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment on the thirtieth day after the date on which two thirds of the States Parties have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval with the depositary.Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for any other State Party on the day on which that State Party deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. Article 21 1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the depositary. 2. Denunciation shall take effect one hundred and eighty days following the date on which notification is received by the depositary. Article 22 The depositary shall promptly notify all States of: (a) each signature of this Convention; (b) each deposit of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession; (c) any reservation or withdrawal in accordance with article 17;

478  THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL

(d) any communication made by an organization in accordance with paragraph 4(c) of article 18; (e) the entry into force of this Convention; (f) the entry into force of any amendment to this Convention; and (g) any denunciation made under article 21. Article 23 The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency who shall send certified copies thereof to all States.

Annex I Levels of Physical Protection to be Applied in International Transport of Nuclear Material as Categorized in Annex II 1. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during storage incidental to international nuclear transport include: (a) For Category III materials, storage within an area to which access is controlled; (b) For Category II materials, storage within an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of points of entry under appropriate control or any area with an equivalent level of physical protection; (c) For Category I material, storage within a protected area as defined for Category II above, to which, in addition, access is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined, and which is under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context should have as their object the detection and prevention of any assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material. 2. Levels of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport include: (a) For Category II and III materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions including prior arrangements among sender, receiver, and carrier, and prior agreement between natural or legal persons subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of exporting and importing States, specifying time, place and procedures for transferring transport responsibility; (b) For Category I materials, transportation shall take place under special precautions identified above for transportation of Category II and III materials, and in addition, under constant surveillance by escorts and under conditions which assure close communication with appropriate response forces; (c) For natural uranium other than in the form of ore or ore-residue, transportation protection for quantities exceeding 500 kilograms U shall include advance notification of shipment specifying mode of transport, expected time of arrival and confirmation of receipt of shipment. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at Vienna and at New York on 3 March 1980.

THE CONVENTION

ON THE

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL  479

Annex II Table: Categorization of Nuclear Material Category II

Material

Form

I

1. Plutonium 1

Unirradiated 2

2 kg or more

Less than 2 but more than 500 g

500g or less but more than 15 g

2. Uranium-235

Unirradiated 2 uranium enriched to 20% U 235

5 kg or more

Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg

1 kg or less but more than 15 g

uranium enriched to 10% U 235 but less than 20%

-----

10 kg or more

Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg

uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% U 235

-----

-----

10 kg or more

3. Uranium-233

Unirradiated 2

2 kg or more

Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g

500 g or less but more than 15 g

4. Irradiated fuel

-----

-----

Depleted or natural uranium, thorium or low enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content).4, 5

-----

1

III3

All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. 3 Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. 4 Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection. 5 Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I and II before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. 2

18

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW), formally known as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, was negotiated in the late 1970s and concluded in 1980. It opened for signature in New York on April 10, 1981.The negotiation was sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to address the question of indiscriminate weapons.The convention entered into force on December 2, 1983. The CCCW is a general agreement serving as a kind of chapeau for the four substantive protocols that must be signed separately Throughout the CCCW process, the distinction between arms control treaty law, laws of war, and international humanitarian law was blurred, with the result being a mix with an attendant burden on the compliance process. The convention itself is largely composed of administrative provisions, such as those related to signature, entry into force, reviews, amendments, and so on.The first of the substantive protocols—Protocol I, which entered into force on December 2, 1983, along with the CCCW—prohibits fragmentation weapons. These are weapons that create fragments in the bodies of their victims, with the fragments in some cases being small enough to escape detection by X ray. Protocol II restricts the use of landmines, booby traps, and similar devices. It requires that mines not be used in populated areas unless near a military objective; that minefields be recorded; and that—if remotely delivered—mines, booby traps, and comparable devices cannot be used in the form of an apparently harmless portable object and/or attached to such items as international signs, wounded persons, or children’s toys. Protocol II also calls for international cooperation in clearing minefields after the termination of hostilities. It was amended at a conference of states parties in 1996, and Amended Protocol II entered into force in December 1998. It enhanced the regime limiting mine warfare by extending existing constraints to internal conflicts; establishing reliability standards for remotely delivered mines; and prohibiting the use of nondetectable antipersonnel landmines (as opposed to antiequipment mines). Negotiations on the amended protocol failed to produce a ban on indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines, thus giving rise to the process that led to the negotiation of the Ottawa Convention, signed in 1997 (see Chapter 29). Protocol III, which also entered into force in December 1983, prohibits the use of any incendiary weapons against civilian populations and prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against military targets located within a concentration of civilians. Protocol IV was negotiated in 1995 and entered into force in July 1998. It prohibits the use of laser weapons that cause permanent blindness. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s,

T

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  481

some 4,000 Iranian soldiers sustained injuries due to Iraqi laser systems. In 1989 the ICRC called for international controls, which led eventually to the negotiation of Protocol IV. The CCCW has seventy-nine parties. The United States signed it in 1982, but never ratified it.The United States did, however, ratify Protocols I and II in 1995 and the amended Protocol II in 1997.

CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF C ERTAIN C ONVENTIONAL W EAPONS W HICH M AY B E DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS Opened for signature 10 April 1981 Entry into force 2 December, 1983 The High Contracting Parties, Recalling that every State has the duty, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, Further recalling the general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, Basing themselves on the principle of international law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, Also recalling that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, Confirming their determination that in cases not covered by this Convention and its annexed Protocols or by other international agreements, the civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience, Desiring to contribute to international detente, the ending of the arms race and the building of confidence among States, and hence to the realization of the aspiration of all peoples to live in peace, Recognizing the importance of pursuing every effort which may contribute to progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Reaffirming the need to continue the codification and progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, Wishing to prohibit or restrict further the use of certain conventional weapons and believing that the positive results achieved in this area may facilitate the main talks on disarmament with a view to putting an end to the production, stockpiling and proliferation of such weapons, Emphasizing the desirability that all States become parties to this Convention and its annexed Protocols, especially the militarily significant States,

482  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Bearing in mind that the General Assembly of the United Nations and the United Nations Disarmament Commission may decide to examine the question of a possible broadening of the scope of the prohibitions and restrictions contained in this Convention and its annexed Protocols, Further bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament may decide to consider the question of adopting further measures to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article 1. Scope of Application This Convention and its annexed Protocols shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, including any situation described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions. Article 2. Relations with Other International Agreements Nothing in this Convention or its annexed Protocols shall be interpreted as detracting from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict. Article 3. Signature This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York for a period of twelve months from 10 April 1981. Article 4. Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession 1.This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories. Any State which has not signed this Convention may accede to it. 2. The instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 3. Expressions of consent to be bound by any of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall be optional for each State, provided that at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or of accession thereto, that State shall notify the Depositary of its consent to be bound by any two or more of these Protocols. 4. At any time after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or of accession thereto, a State may notify the Depositary of its consent to be bound by any annexed Protocol by which it is not already bound. 5. Any Protocol by which a High Contracting Party is bound shall for that Party form an integral part of this Convention. Article 5. Entry into Force 1. This Convention shall enter into force six months after the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  483

3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention. 4. For any State which notifies its consent to be bound by a Protocol, annexed to this Convention after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it, the Protocol shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has notified its consent so to be bound. Article 6. Dissemination The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed conflict, to disseminate this Convention and those of its annexed Protocols by which they are bound as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military instruction, so that those instruments may become known to their armed forces. Article 7. Treaty Relations upon Entry into Force of this Convention 1.When one of the parties to a conflict is not bound by an annexed Protocol, the parties bound by this Convention and that annexed Protocol shall remain bound by them in their mutual relations. 2. Any High Contracting Party shall be bound by this Convention and any Protocol annexed thereto which is in force for it, in any situation contemplated by Article 1, in relation to any State which is not a party to this Convention or bound by the relevant annexed Protocol, if the latter accepts and applies this Convention or the relevant Protocol, and so notifies the Depositary. 3.The Depositary shall immediately inform the High Contracting Parties concerned of any notification received under paragraph 2 of this Article. 4.This Convention, and the annexed Protocols by which a High Contracting Party is bound, shall apply with respect to an armed conflict against that High Contracting Party of the type referred to in Article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims: (a) where the High Contracting Party is also a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority referred to in Article 96, paragraph 3, of that Protocol has undertaken to apply the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 3, of the said Protocol, and undertakes to apply this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict; or (b) where the High Contracting Party is not a party to Additional Protocol I and an authority of the type referred to in subparagraph (a) above accepts and applies the obligations of the Geneva Conventions and of this Convention and the relevant annexed Protocols in relation to that conflict. Such an acceptance and application shall have in relation to that conflict the following effects: (i) the Geneva Conventions and this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are brought into force for the parties to the conflict with immediate effect; (ii) the said authority assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols; and (iii) the Geneva Conventions, this Convention and its relevant annexed Protocols are equally binding upon all parties to the conflict. The High Contracting Party and the authority may also agree to accept and apply the obligations of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on a reciprocal basis.

484  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Article 8. Review and Amendments 1. (a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Convention or any annexed Protocol by which it is bound. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall notify it to all the High Contracting Parties and shall seek their views on whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority, that shall not be less than eighteen of the High Contracting Parties, so agree, he shall promptly convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties shall be invited. States not parties to this Convention shall be invited to the conference as observers. (b) Such a conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted and shall enter into force in the same manner as this Convention and the annexed Protocols, provided that amendments to this Convention may be adopted only by the High Contracting Parties and that amendments to a specific annexed Protocol may be adopted only by the High Contracting Parties which are bound by that Protocol. 2. (a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols.Any such proposal for an additional protocol shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall notify it to all the High Contracting Parties in accordance with subparagraph 1 (a) of this Article. If a majority, that shall not be less than eighteen of the High Contracting Parties, so agree, the Depositary shall promptly convene a conference to which all States shall be invited. (b) Such a conference may agree, with the full participation of all States represented at the conference, upon additional protocols which shall be adopted in the same manner as this Convention, shall be annexed thereto and shall enter into force as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5 of this Convention. 3. (a) If, after a period of ten years following the entry into force of this Convention, no conference has been convened in accordance with subparagraph 1 (a) or 2 (a) of this Article, any High Contracting Party may request the Depositary to convene a conference to which all High Contracting Parties shall be invited to review the scope and operation of this Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments of this Convention or of the existing Protocols. States not Parties to this Convention shall be invited as observers to the conference.The conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with subparagraph 1 (b) above. (b) At such conference consideration may also be given to any proposal for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols. All States represented at the conference may participate fully in such consideration. Any additional protocols shall be adopted in the same manner as this Convention, shall be annexed thereto and shall enter into force as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5 of this Convention. (c) Such a conference may consider whether provision should be made for the convening of a further conference at the request of any High Contracting Party if, after a similar period to that referred to in subparagraph 3 (a) of this Article, no conference has been convened in accordance with subparagraph 1 (a) or 2 (a) of this Article. Article 9. Denunciation 1.Any High Contracting Party may denounce this Convention or any of its annexed Protocols by so notifying the Depositary. 2. Any such denunciation shall only take effect one year after receipt by the Depositary of the notification of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of that year the denouncing High Contracting Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article 1, the Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Convention and of the relevant annexed Protocols until the end of the armed conflict or occupation and, in any case, until the termination of opera-

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  485

tions connected with the final release, repatriation or reestablishment of the person protected by the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in the case of any annexed Protocol containing provisions concerning situations in which peace-keeping, observation or similar functions are performed by United Nations forces or missions in the area concerned, until the termination of those functions. 3. Any denunciation of this Convention shall be considered as also applying to all annexed Protocols by which the denouncing High Contracting Party is bound. 4. Any denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing High Contracting Party. 5.Any denunciation shall not affect the obligations already incurred, by reason of an armed conflict, under this Convention and its annexed Protocols by such denouncing High Contracting Party in respect of any act committed before this denunciation becomes effective. Article 10. Depositary 1.The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Convention and of its annexed Protocols. 2. In addition to his usual functions, the Depositary shall inform all States of: (a) signatures affixed to this Convention under Article 3; (b) deposits of instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of or accession to this Convention deposited under Article 4; (c) notifications of consent to be bound by annexed Protocols under Article 4; (d) the dates of entry into force of this Convention and of each of its annexed Protocols under Article 5; and (e) notifications of denunciation received under article 9, and their effective date. Article 11. Authentic Texts The original of this Convention with the annexed Protocols, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Depositary, who shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all States.

PROTOCOL

ON

NON-DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS (PROTOCOL I)

It is prohibited to use any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays.

PROTOTOL ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF MINES, BOOBY-TRAPS AND OTHER DEVICES (PROTOCOL II) Article 1. Material Scope of Application This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways.

486  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Article 2. Definitions For the purpose of this Protocol: 1. “Mine” means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and “remotely delivered mine” means any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from an aircraft. 2.“Booby-trap” means any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act. 3. “Other devices” means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time. 4. “Military objective” means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 5.“Civilian objects” are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 4. 6.“Recording” means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps. Article 3. General Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 1.This Article applies to: (a) mines; (b) booby-traps; and (c) other devices. 2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians. 3.The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons: (a) which is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or (b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 4. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. Article 4. Restrictions on the Use of Mines Other than Remotely Delivered Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices in Populated Areas 1.This Article applies to:

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  487

(a) mines other than remotely delivered mines; (b) booby-traps; and (c) other devices. 2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either: (a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging to or under the control of an adverse party; or (b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the issue of warnings or the provision of fences. Article 5. Restrictions on the Use of Remotely Delivered Mines 1.The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives, and unless: (a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article 7(1)(a); or (b) an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine, that is to say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to render a mine harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine will no longer serve the military purpose for which it was placed in position, or a remotely-controlled mechanism which is designed to render harmless or destroy a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position. 2. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Article 6. Prohibition on the Use of Certain Booby-Traps 1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use: (a) any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to detonate when it is disturbed or approached; or (b) booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated with: (i) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals; (ii) sick, wounded or dead persons; (iii) burial or cremation sites or graves; (iv) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation; (v) children’s toys or other portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children; (vi) food or drink; (vii) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or military supply depots; (viii) objects clearly of a religious nature; (ix) historic monuments, works of art or places or worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; (x) animals or their carcasses.

488  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap which is designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Article 7. Recording and Publication of the Location of Minefields, Mines and Booby-Traps 1.The parties to a conflict shall record the location of: (a) all pre-planned minefields laid by them; and (b) all areas in which they have made large-scale and pre-planned use of booby-traps. 2.The parties shall endeavour to ensure the recording of the location of all other minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or placed in position. 3. All such records shall be retained by the parties who shall: (a) immediately after the cessation of active hostilities: (i) take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such records, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps; and either (ii) in cases where the forces of neither party are in the territory of the adverse party, make available to each other and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information in their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in the territory of the adverse party; or (iii) once complete withdrawal of the forces of the parties from the territory of the adverse party has taken place, make available to the adverse party and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information in their possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby traps in the territory of the adverse party; (b) When a United Nations force or mission performs functions in any area, make available to the authority mentioned in Article 8 such information as is required by that Article; (c) whenever possible, by mutual agreement, provide for the release of information concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby traps, particularly in agreements governing the cessation of hostilities. Article 8. Protection of United Nations Forces and Missions from the Effects of Minefields, Mines and Booby-Traps 1.When a United Nations force or mission performs functions of peace-keeping, observation or similar functions in any area, each party to the conflict shall, if requested by the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, as far as it is able: (a) remove or render harmless all mines or booby-traps in that area; (b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect the force or mission from the effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps while carrying out its duties; and (c) make available to the head of the United Nations force or mission in that area, all information in the party’s possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in that area. 2. When a United Nations fact-finding mission performs functions in any area, any party to the conflict concerned shall provide protection to that mission except where, because of the size of such mission, it cannot adequately provide such protection. In that case it shall make available to the head of the mission the information in its possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps in that area.

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  489

Article 9. International Co-operation in the Removal of Minefields, Mines and Booby-Traps After the cessation of active hostilities, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provision of information and technical and material assistance—including, in appropriate circumstances, joint operations—necessary to remove or otherwise render ineffective minefields, mines and booby-traps placed in position during the conflict.

Technical Annex to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) Guidelines on Recording Whenever an obligation for the recording of the location of minefields, mines and booby traps arises under the Protocol, the following guidelines shall be taken into account. 1.With regard to pre-planned minefields and large-scale and pre-planned use of booby-traps: (a) maps, diagrams or other records should be made in such a way as to indicate the extent of the minefield or booby-trapped area; and (b) the location of the minefield or booby-trapped area should be specified by relation to the co-ordinates of a single reference point and by the estimated dimensions of the area containing mines and booby traps in relation to that single reference point. 2.With regard to other minefields, mines and booby-traps laid or placed in position: In so far as possible, the relevant information specified in paragraph 1 above should be recorded so as to enable the areas containing minefields, mines and booby-traps to be identified.

PROTOCOL OF

PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE INCENDIARY WEAPONS (PROTOCOL III)

ON

Article 1. Definitions For the purpose of this Protocol: 1.“Incendiary weapon” means any weapon or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or a combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target. (a) Incendiary weapons can take the form of, for example, flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendiary substances. (b) Incendiary weapons do not include: (i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems; (ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.

490  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

2.“Concentration of civilians” means any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads. 3.“Military objective” means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 4.“Civilian objects” are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 3. 5.“Feasible precautions” are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. Article 2. Protection of Civilians and Civilian Objects 1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons. 2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons. 3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives.

DOCUMENTS OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS Vienna, 25 September–13 October 1995 Geneva, 22 April–3 May 1996 (Resumed Session)

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as Amended on 3 May 1996) Annexed to the Convention Article 1. Amended Protocol The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  491

Indiscriminate Effects (“the Convention”) is hereby amended.The text of the amended Protocol shall read as follows:

Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II as Amended on 3 May 1996) Article 1. Scope of Application 1. This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices, defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland waterways. 2.This Protocol shall apply, in addition to situations referred to in Article 1 of this Convention, to situations referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts. 3. In case of armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply the prohibitions and restrictions of this Protocol. 4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State. 5. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs. 6. The application of the provisions of this Protocol to parties to a conflict, which are not High Contracting Parties that have accepted this Protocol, shall not change their legal status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly. Article 2. Definitions For the purpose of this Protocol: 1. “Mine” means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle. 2. “Remotely-delivered mine” means a mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be “remotely delivered”, provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of this Protocol. 3. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. 4.“Booby-trap” means any device or material which is designed, constructed, or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act. 5.“Other devices” means manually-emplaced munitions and devices including improvised explosive devices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.

492  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

6. “Military objective” means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 7. “Civilian objects” are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 6 of this Article. 8. “Minefield” is a defined area in which mines have been emplaced and “mined area” is an area which is dangerous due to the presence of mines.“Phoney minefield” means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield.The term “minefield” includes phoney minefields. 9.“Recording” means a physical, administrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices. 10. “Self-destruction mechanism” means an incorporated or externally attached automaticallyfunctioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached. 11.“Self-neutralization mechanism” means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated. 12. “Self-deactivating” means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition. 13.“Remote control” means control by commands from a distance. 14.“Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine. 15.“Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced mines. Article 3. General Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 1.This Article applies to: (a) mines; (b) booby-traps; and (c) other devices. 2. Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict is, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, responsible for all mines, booby-traps, and other devices employed by it and undertakes to clear, remove, destroy or maintain them as specified in Article 10 of this Protocol. 3. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any mine, booby-trap or other device which is designed or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 4. Weapons to which this Article applies shall strictly comply with the standards and limitations specified in the Technical Annex with respect to each particular category. 5. It is prohibited to use mines, booby-traps or other devices which employ a mechanism or device specifically designed to detonate the munition by the presence of commonly available mine detectors as a result of their magnetic or other non-contact influence during normal use in detection operations.

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  493

6. It is prohibited to use a self-deactivating mine equipped with an anti-handling device that is designed in such a manner that the anti-handling device is capable of functioning after the mine has ceased to be capable of functioning. 7. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians or civilian objects. 8.The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited. Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons: (a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective. In case of doubt as to whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used; (b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 9. Several clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects are not to be treated as a single military objective. 10.All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.These circumstances include, but are not limited to: (a) the short- and long-term effect of mines upon the local civilian population for the duration of the minefield; (b) possible measures to protect civilians (for example, fencing, signs, warning and monitoring); (c) the availability and feasibility of using alternatives; and (d) the short- and long-term military requirements for a minefield. 11. Effective advance warning shall be given of any emplacement of mines, booby-traps and other devices which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Article 4. Restrictions on the Use of Anti-personnel Mines It is prohibited to use anti-personnel mines which are not detectable, as specified in paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex. Article 5. Restrictions on the Use of Anti-personnel Mines Other than Remotely-Delivered Mines 1.This Article applies to anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines. 2. It is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex, unless: (a) such weapons are placed within a perimeter-marked area which is monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from the area.The marking must be of a distinct and durable character and must at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area; and

494  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

(b) such weapons are cleared before the area is abandoned, unless the area is turned over to the forces of another State which accept responsibility for the maintenance of the protections required by this Article and the subsequent clearance of those weapons. 3. A party to a conflict is relieved from further compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article only if such compliance is not feasible due to forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action, including situations where direct enemy military action makes it impossible to comply. If that party regains control of the area, it shall resume compliance with the provisions of sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b) of this Article. 4. If the forces of a party to a conflict gain control of an area in which weapons to which this Article applies have been laid, such forces shall, to the maximum extent feasible, maintain and, if necessary, establish the protections required by this Article until such weapons have been cleared. 5. All feasible measures shall be taken to prevent the unauthorized removal, defacement, destruction or concealment of any device, system or material used to establish the perimeter of a perimeter-marked area. 6.Weapons to which this Article applies which propel fragments in a horizontal arc of less than 90 degrees and which are placed on or above the ground may be used without the measures provided for in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of this Article for a maximum period of 72 hours, if: (a) they are located in immediate proximity to the military unit that emplaced them; and (b) the area is monitored by military personnel to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Article 6. Restrictions on the Use of Remotely-Delivered Mines 1. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines unless they are recorded in accordance with subparagraph 1 (b) of the Technical Annex. 2. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and self-deactivation in the Technical Annex. 3. It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than anti-personnel mines, unless, to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position. 4. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of remotely-delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. Article 7. Prohibitions on the Use of Booby-Traps and Other Devices 1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use booby-traps and other devices which are in any way attached to or associated with: (a) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals; (b) sick, wounded or dead persons; (c) burial or cremation sites or graves; (d) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation; (e) children’s toys or other portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children; (f) food or drink;

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  495

(g) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or military supply depots; (h) objects clearly of a religious nature; (i) historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; or (j) animals or their carcasses. 2. It is prohibited to use booby-traps or other devices in the form of apparently harmless portable objects which are specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material. 3.Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3, it is prohibited to use weapons to which this Article applies in any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be imminent, unless either: (a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective; or (b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for example, the posting of warning sentries, the issuing of warnings or the provision of fences. Article 8. Transfers 1. In order to promote the purposes of this Protocol, each High Contracting Party: (a) undertakes not to transfer any mine the use of which is prohibited by this Protocol; (b) undertakes not to transfer any mine to any recipient other than a State or a State agency authorized to receive such transfers; (c) undertakes to exercise restraint in the transfer of any mine the use of which is restricted by this Protocol. In particular, each High Contracting Party undertakes not to transfer any antipersonnel mines to States which are not bound by this Protocol, unless the recipient State agrees to apply this Protocol; and (d) undertakes to ensure that any transfer in accordance with this Article takes place in full compliance, by both the transferring and the recipient State, with the relevant provisions of this Protocol and the applicable norms of international humanitarian law. 2. In the event that a High Contracting Party declares that it will defer compliance with specific provisions on the use of certain mines, as provided for in the Technical Annex, sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article shall however apply to such mines. 3.All High Contracting Parties, pending the entry into force of this Protocol, will refrain from any actions which would be inconsistent with sub-paragraph 1(a) of this Article. Article 9. Recording and Use of Information on Minefields, Mined Areas, Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 1. All information concerning minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Annex. 2. All such records shall be retained by the parties to a conflict, who shall, without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, take all necessary and appropriate measures, including the use of such information, to protect civilians from the effects of minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control. At the same time, they shall also make available to the other party or parties to the conflict and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all such information in their possession concerning minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by them in areas no longer under

496  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

their control; provided, however, subject to reciprocity, where the forces of a party to a conflict are in the territory of an adverse party, either party may withhold such information from the Secretary-General and the other party, to the extent that security interests require such withholding, until neither party is in the territory of the other. In the latter case, the information withheld shall be disclosed as soon as those security interests permit.Wherever possible, the parties to the conflict shall seek, by mutual agreement, to provide for the release of such information at the earliest possible time in a manner consistent with the security interests of each party. 3.This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 10 and 12 of this Protocol. Article 10. Removal of Minefields, Mined Areas, Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices and International Cooperation 1.Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined areas, mines, boobytraps and other devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or maintained in accordance with Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Protocol. 2. High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas under their control. 3.With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid by a party in areas over which it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide to the party in control of the area pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to fulfil such responsibility. 4. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international organizations, on the provision of technical and material assistance, including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfil such responsibilities. Article 11. Technological Cooperation and Assistance 1. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Protocol and means of mine clearance. In particular, High Contracting Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes. 2. Each High Contracting Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations System, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance. 3. Each High Contracting Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance through the United Nations System, other international bodies or on a bilateral basis, or contribute to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. 4. Requests by High Contracting Parties for assistance, substantiated by relevant information, may be submitted to the United Nations, to other appropriate bodies or to other States.These requests may be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to all High Contracting Parties and to relevant international organizations. 5. In the case of requests to the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations, within the resources available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, may take appropriate steps to assess the situation and, in cooperation with the requesting High Contracting Party, determine the appropriate provision of assistance in mine clearance or implementation of the Protocol.The Secretary-General may also report to High Contracting Parties on any such assessment as well as on the type and scope of assistance required.

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  497

6.Without prejudice to their constitutional and other legal provisions, the High Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate and transfer technology to facilitate the implementation of the relevant prohibitions and restrictions set out in this Protocol. 7. Each High Contracting Party has the right to seek and receive technical assistance, where appropriate, from another High Contracting Party on specific relevant technology, other than weapons technology, as necessary and feasible, with a view to reducing any period of deferral for which provision is made in the Technical Annex. Article 12. Protection from the Effects of Minefields, Mined Areas, Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 1. Application (a) With the exception of the forces and missions referred to in sub-paragraph 2(a)(i) of this Article, this Article applies only to missions which are performing functions in an area with the consent of the High Contracting Party on whose territory the functions are performed. (b) The application of the provisions of this Article to parties to a conflict which are not High Contracting Parties shall not change their legal status or the legal status of a disputed territory, either explicitly or implicitly. (c) The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to existing international humanitarian law, or other international instruments as applicable, or decisions by the Security Council of the United Nations, which provide for a higher level of protection to personnel functioning in accordance with this Article. 2. Peace-keeping and certain other forces and missions (a) This paragraph applies to: (i) any United Nations force or mission performing peace-keeping, observation or similar functions in any area in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and (ii) any mission established pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and performing its functions in the area of a conflict. (b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a force or mission to which this paragraph applies, shall: (i) so far as it is able, take such measures as are necessary to protect the force or mission from the effects of mines, booby-traps and other devices in any area under its control; (ii) if necessary in order effectively to protect such personnel, remove or render harmless, so far as it is able, all mines, booby-traps and other devices in that area; and (iii) inform the head of the force or mission of the location of all known minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in the area in which the force or mission is performing its functions and, so far as is feasible, make available to the head of the force or mission all information in its possession concerning such minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices. 3. Humanitarian and fact-finding missions of the United Nations System (a) This paragraph applies to any humanitarian or fact-finding mission of the United Nations System. (b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall: (i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and

498  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

(ii) if access to or through any place under its control is necessary for the performance of the mission’s functions and in order to provide the personnel of the mission with safe passage to or through that place: (aa) unless on-going hostilities prevent, inform the head of the mission of a safe route to that place if such information is available; or (bb) if information identifying a safe route is not provided in accordance with subparagraph (aa), so far as is necessary and feasible, clear a lane through minefields. 4. Missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross (a) This paragraph applies to any mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross performing functions with the consent of the host State or States as provided for by the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional Protocols. (b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall: (i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and (ii) take the measures set out in sub-paragraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article. 5. Other humanitarian missions and missions of enquiry (a) Insofar as paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article do not apply to them, this paragraph applies to the following missions when they are performing functions in the area of a conflict or to assist the victims of a conflict: (i) any humanitarian mission of a national Red Cross or Red Crescent society or of their International Federation; (ii) any mission of an impartial humanitarian organization, including any impartial humanitarian demining mission; and (iii) any mission of enquiry established pursuant to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, where applicable, their Additional Protocols. (b) Each High Contracting Party or party to a conflict, if so requested by the head of a mission to which this paragraph applies, shall, so far as is feasible: (i) provide the personnel of the mission with the protections set out in sub-paragraph 2(b)(i) of this Article; and (ii) take the measures set out in subparagraph 3(b)(ii) of this Article. 6. Confidentiality All information provided in confidence pursuant to this Article shall be treated by the recipient in strict confidence and shall not be released outside the force or mission concerned without the express authorization of the provider of the information. 7. Respect for laws and regulations Without prejudice to such privileges and immunities as they may enjoy or to the requirements of their duties, personnel participating in the forces and missions referred to in this Article shall: (a) respect the laws and regulations of the host State; and (b) refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties.

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  499

Article 13. Consultations of High Contracting Parties 1.The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult and cooperate with each other on all issues related to the operation of this Protocol. For this purpose, a conference of High Contracting Parties shall be held annually. 2. Participation in the annual conferences shall be determined by their agreed Rules of Procedure. 3.The work of the conference shall include: (a) review of the operation and status of this Protocol; (b) consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to paragraph 4 of this Article; (c) preparation for review conferences; and (d) consideration of the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines. 4.The High Contracting Parties shall provide annual reports to the Depositary, who shall circulate them to all High Contracting Parties in advance of the conference, on any of the following matters: (a) dissemination of information on this Protocol to their armed forces and to the civilian population; (b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes; (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of this Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto; (d) legislation related to this Protocol; (e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; and (f) other relevant matters. 5.The cost of the Conference of High Contracting Parties shall be borne by the High Contracting Parties and States not parties participating in the work of the conference, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. Article 14. Compliance 1. Each High Contracting Party shall take all appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. 2.The measures envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article include appropriate measures to ensure the imposition of penal sanctions against persons who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of this Protocol, wilfully kill or cause serious injury to civilians and to bring such persons to justice. 3. Each High Contracting Party shall also require that its armed forces issue relevant military instructions and operating procedures and that armed forces personnel receive training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities to comply with the provisions of this Protocol. 4.The High Contracting Parties undertake to consult each other and to cooperate with each other bilaterally, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations or through other appropriate international procedures, to resolve any problems that may arise with regard to the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Protocol.

500  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Technical Annex 1. Recording (a) Recording of the location of mines other than remotely-delivered mines, minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices shall be carried out in accordance with the following provisions: (i) the location of the minefields, mined areas and areas of booby-traps and other devices shall be specified accurately by relation to the coordinates of at least two reference points and the estimated dimensions of the area containing these weapons in relation to those reference points; (ii) maps, diagrams or other records shall be made in such a way as to indicate the location of minefields, mined areas, booby-traps and other devices in relation to reference points, and these records shall also indicate their perimeters and extent; and (iii) for purposes of detection and clearance of mines, booby-traps and other devices, maps, diagrams or other records shall contain complete information on the type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and life time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices (if any) and other relevant information on all these weapons laid.Whenever feasible the minefield record shall show the exact location of every mine, except in row minefields where the row location is sufficient. The precise location and operating mechanism of each booby-trap laid shall be individually recorded. (b) The estimated location and area of remotely-delivered mines shall be specified by coordinates of reference points (normally corner points) and shall be ascertained and when feasible marked on the ground at the earliest opportunity.The total number and type of mines laid, the date and time of laying and the self-destruction time periods shall also be recorded. (c) Copies of records shall be held at a level of command sufficient to guarantee their safety as far as possible. (d) The use of mines produced after the entry into force of this Protocol is prohibited unless they are marked in English or in the respective national language or languages with the following information: (i) name of the country of origin; (ii) month and year of production; and (iii) serial number or lot number. The marking should be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects, as far as possible. 2. Specifications on detectability (a) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997, such mines shall incorporate in their construction a material or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass. (b) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced before 1 January 1997, such mines shall either incorporate in their construction, or have attached prior to their emplacement, in a manner not easily removable, a material or device that enables the mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass. (c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot immediately comply with sub-paragraph (b), it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol that it will defer compliance with sub-paragraph (b) for a period not to exceed 9

CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS  501

years from the entry into force of this Protocol. In the meantime it shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of anti-personnel mines that do not so comply. 3. Specifications on self-destruction and self-deactivation (a) All remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines shall be designed and constructed so that no more than 10% of activated mines will fail to self-destruct within 30 days after emplacement, and each mine shall have a back-up self-deactivation feature designed and constructed so that, in combination with the self-destruction mechanism, no more than one in one thousand activated mines will function as a mine 120 days after emplacement. (b) All non-remotely delivered anti-personnel mines, used outside marked areas, as defined in Article 5 of this Protocol, shall comply with the requirements for self-destruction and selfdeactivation stated in sub-paragraph (a). (c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot immediately comply with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b), it may declare at the time of its notification of consent to be bound by this Protocol, that it will, with respect to mines produced prior to the entry into force of this Protocol, defer compliance with sub-paragraphs (a) and/or (b) for a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol. During this period of deferral, the High Contracting Party shall: (i) undertake to minimize, to the extent feasible, the use of anti-personnel mines that do not so comply; and (ii) with respect to remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines, comply with either the requirements for self-destruction or the requirements for self-deactivation and, with respect to other anti-personnel mines comply with at least the requirements for self-deactivation. 4. International signs for minefields and mined areas: Signs similar to the example attached and as specified below shall be utilized in the marking of minefields and mined areas to ensure their visibility and recognition by the civilian population: (a) size and shape: a triangle or square no smaller than 28 centimetres (11 inches) by 20 centimetres (7.9 inches) for a triangle, and 15 centimetres (6 inches) per side for a square; (b) colour: red or orange with a yellow reflecting border; (c) symbol: the symbol illustrated in the Attachment, or an alternative readily recognizable in the area in which the sign is to be displayed as identifying a dangerous area; (d) language: the sign should contain the word “mines” in one of the six official languages of the Convention (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and the language or languages prevalent in that area; and (e) spacing: signs should be placed around the minefield or mined area at a distance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian approaching the area. Attachment [Sign with Distances]

Article 2. Entry into Force This amended Protocol shall enter into force as provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article 8 of the Convention.

502  CONVENTION

ON

CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS Vienna, 13 October 1995 Article 1. Additional Protocol The following protocol shall be annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (“the Convention”) as Protocol IV:

Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) Article 1 It is prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices. The High Contracting Parties shall not transfer such weapons to any State or non-State entity. Article 2 In the employment of laser systems, the High Contracting Parties shall take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Such precautions shall include training of their armed forces and other practical measures. Article 3 Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol. Article 4 For the purpose of this Protocol “permanent blindness” means irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious disability is equivalent to visual acuity of less than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes. Entry into Force This Protocol shall enter into force as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 5 of the Convention.

19

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

s the result of a U.S. initiative, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed at the November 1985 Geneva Summit to have experts explore the possibility of establishing centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The impetus for this initiative grew out of consultations between the Reagan administration and Congress, particularly Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner. U.S. and Soviet experts held informal meetings in Geneva on May 5 and 6 and August 25, 1986. In October 1986, at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev indicated satisfaction with the progress made at the experts meetings and agreed to begin formal negotiations to establish nuclear risk reduction centers.Those negotiations were held in Geneva on January 13 and May 3 and 4, 1987.The negotiations resulted in the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement, which was signed in Washington on September 15, 1987, by U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Under the agreement, which is of unlimited duration, each party agrees to establish a nuclear risk reduction center in its capital and to establish a special facsimile communications link between the centers.The nuclear risk reduction centers became operational on April 1, 1988.The U.S. center is located in Washington, D.C., and is staffed by Americans.The Russian center is located in Moscow and is staffed by Russians. The centers are intended to supplement existing means of communication and to provide direct, reliable, high-speed systems for transmitting notifications and communications at the government-to-government level.The centers communicate by direct satellite links that can rapidly transmit full texts and graphics. In this respect, the centers have a communications capability very similar to—but separate from—the modernized hot line, which is reserved for heads of government. The nuclear risk reduction centers do not replace normal diplomatic channels of communication or the hot line, and they are not intended to have a crisis management role. The centers’ principal function is to exchange information and notifications as required under various arms control treaties and other confidence-building agreements. There are two protocols to the agreement. Protocol I identifies the notifications the parties agreed to exchange.These include ballistic missile launches required under Article 4 of the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War and under Article VI, Paragraph 1 of the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas.The agreement provides that the list of notifications transmitted through the centers may be altered by agreement between the parties as relevant new agreements are reached. Since the agreement was signed, the parties have additionally agreed to exchange through the centers inspection and compliance notifications, as well as other information, required under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty and notifications called

A

504  NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

for under the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement as well as other agreements. Either side may use the centers to transmit additional communications as a display of goodwill and with a view to building confidence. Protocol II establishes the technical specifications of the communications and facsimile links, the operating procedures to be employed, and the terms for transfer of, and payment for, equipment required by the system. To ensure the centers’smooth operation,the agreement calls for regular meetings at least once a year between representatives of the two national centers to discuss operation of the system.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS Signed at Washington September 15, 1987 Entered into force September 15, 1987 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident, Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, and the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Each Party shall establish, in its capital, a national Nuclear Risk Reduction Center that shall operate on behalf of and under the control of its respective Government. Article 2 The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to transmit notifications identified in Protocol I which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. In the future, the list of notifications transmitted through the Centers may be altered by agreement between the Parties, as relevant new agreements are reached. Article 3 The Parties shall establish a special facsimile communications link between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in accordance with Protocol II which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS  505

Article 4 The Parties shall staff their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers as they deem appropriate, so as to ensure their normal functioning. Article 5 The Parties shall hold regular meetings between representatives of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers at least once each year to consider matters related to the functioning of such Centers. Article 6 This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements. Article 7 This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature. The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party. DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George P. Shultz For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Eduard A. Shevardnadze

PROTOCOL I TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Parties shall transmit the following types of notifications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: (a) notifications of ballistic missile launches under Article 4 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971; (b) notifications of ballistic missile launches under paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972.

506  NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Article 2 The scope and format of the information to be transmitted through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers shall be agreed upon. Article 3 Each Party also may, at its own discretion as a display of good will and with a view to building confidence, transmit through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers communications other than those provided for under Article 1 of this Protocol. Article 4 Unless the Parties agree otherwise, all communications transmitted through and communications procedures of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers’ communication link will be confidential. Article 5 This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force. DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George P. Shultz For the Union of Soviet America Socialist Republics: Eduard A. Shevardnadze

PROTOCOL II TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the Parties have agreed as follows: Article 1 To establish and maintain for the purpose of providing direct facsimile communications between their national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established in accordance with Article 1 of this Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the national Centers, an INTELSAT satellite circuit and a STATSIONAR satellite circuit, each with a secure orderwire communications capability for operational monitoring. In this regard: (a) There shall be terminals equipped for communication between the national Centers; (b) Each Party shall provide communications circuits capable of simultaneously transmitting and receiving 4800 bits per second;

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS  507

(c) Communication shall begin with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit, as soon as purchase, delivery and installation of the necessary equipment by the Parties are completed. Thereafter, taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status; (d) To the extent practicable, test operation of the STATSIONAR satellite circuit shall begin simultaneously with test operation of the INTELSAT satellite circuit.Taking into account the results of test operations, the Parties shall agree on the transition to a fully operational status. Article 2 To employ agreed-upon information security devices to assure secure transmission of facsimile messages. In this regard: (a) The information security devices shall consist of microprocessors that will combine the digital message output with buffered random data read from standard 5 1/4 inch floppy disks; (b) Each Party shall provide, through its Embassy, necessary keying material to the other. Article 3 To establish and maintain at each operating end of the two circuits, facsimile terminals of the same make and model. In this regard: (a) Each Party shall be responsible for the purchase, installation, operation and maintenance of its own terminals, the related information security devices, and local transmission circuits appropriate to the implementation of this Protocol; (b) A Group III facsimile unit which meets CCITT Recommendations T.4 and T.30 and operates at 4800 bits per second shall be used; (c) Direct facsimile messages from the USSR national Center to the U.S. national Center shall be transmitted and received in the Russian language, and from the U.S. national Center to the USSR national Center in the English language; (d) Transmission and operating procedures shall be in conformity with procedures employed on the Direct Communications Link and adapted as necessary for the purpose of communications between the national Centers. Article 4 To establish and maintain a secure orderwire communications capability necessary to coordinate facsimile operation. In this regard: (a) The orderwire terminals used with the information security devices described in paragraph (a) of Article 2 shall incorporate standard USSR Cyrillic and United States Latin keyboards and cathode ray tube displays to permit the exchange of messages between operators. The specific layout of the Cyrillic keyboard shall be as specified by the Soviet side; (b) To coordinate the work of operators, the orderwire shall be configured so as to permit, prior to the transmission and reception of messages, the exchange of all information pertinent to the coordination of such messages; (c) Orderwire messages concerning transmissions shall be encoded using the same information security devices specified in paragraph (a) of Article 2; (d) The orderwire shall use the same modem and communications link as used for facsimile message transmission; (e) A printer shall be included to provide a record copy of all information exchanged on the orderwire.

508  NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

Article 5 To use the same type of equipment and the same maintenance procedures as currently in use for the Direct Communications Link for the establishment of direct facsimile communications between the national Centers. The equipment, security devices, and spare parts necessary for telecommunications links and the orderwire shall be provided by the United States side to the Soviet side in return for payment of costs thereof by the Soviet side. Article 6 To ensure the exchange of information necessary for the operation and maintenance of the telecommunication system and equipment configuration. Article 7 To take all possible measures to assure the continuous, secure and reliable operation of the equipment and communications link, including the orderwire, for which each Party is responsible in accordance with this Protocol. Article 8 To determine, by mutual agreement between technical experts of the Parties, the distribution and calculation of expenses for putting into operation the communication link, its maintenance and further development. Article 9 To convene meetings of technical experts of the Parties in order to consider initially questions pertaining to the practical implementation of the activities provided for in this Protocol and, thereafter, by mutual agreement and as necessary for the purpose of improving telecommunications and information technology in order to achieve the mutually agreed functions of the national Centers. Article 10 This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, remains in force. DONE at Washington on September 15, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George P. Shultz For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Eduard A. Shevardnadze

20

The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Agreement on Notifications of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Launches, signed in 1988, requires the United States and the former Soviet Union (succeeded by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) to notify the other of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact, of any launch of an ICBM or an SLBM. Notifications are to be made through the nuclear risk reduction centers (see Chapter 19) at least twenty-four hours in advance. The notification agreement reflected the continuing U.S. and Soviet interest in reducing the risk of nuclear war as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan proposed a number of new confidence-building measures for discussion at the U.S.–Soviet Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START); among them, a proposal for prior notification of all launches of ICBMs and SLBMs. During the START negotiations, both sides drafted similar launch notification procedures, which were incorporated into the joint draft of the START agreement text. Given this common approach, the United States proposed that launch notification provisions of the joint draft text become a separate agreement.The Soviets agreed, and on May 31, 1988, in Moscow, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Notifications of ICBM and SLBM Launches. The agreement entered into force on the date it was signed. In 1991, the START I Treaty was signed. It required that information be provided in accordance with the provisions of the original agreement and expanded the notification requirements to require additional telemetry-related information, such as broadcast frequencies, modulation types, and whether encapsulation or encryption would be used during the flight test. On December 16, 2000, the United States and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on notifications of missile launches that establishes a pre- and post-launch notification system for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

T

510  THE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF LAUNCHES OF INTERCONTINENTAL B ALLISTIC MISSILES AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED B ALLISTIC MISSILES Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988 Entered into Force May 31, 1988 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident, Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas of May 25, 1972, and the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each Party shall provide the other Party notification, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, no less than twentyfour hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile: an intercontinental ballistic missile (hereinafter “ICBM”) or a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (hereinafter “SLBM”). Article II A notification of a planned launch of an ICBM or an SLBM shall be valid for four days counting from the launch date indicated in such a notification. In case of postponement of the launch date within the indicated four days, or cancellation of the launch, no notification thereof shall be required. Article III 1. For launches of ICBMs or SLBMs from land, the notification shall indicate the area from which the launch is planned to take place. 2. For launches of SLBMs from submarines, the notification shall indicate the general area from which the missile will be launched. Such notification shall indicate either the quadrant within the ocean (that is, the ninety-degree sector encompassing approximately one-fourth of the area of the ocean) or the body of water (for example, sea or bay) from which the launch is planned to take place.

THE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENT  511

3. For all launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, the notification shall indicate the geographic coordinates of the planned impact area or areas of the reentry vehicles. Such an area shall be specified either by indicating the geographic coordinates of the boundary points of the area, or by indicating the geographic coordinates of the center of a circle with a radius specified in kilometers or nautical miles.The size of the impact area shall be determined by the notifying Party at its discretion. Article IV The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement.Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon. Article V This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements. Article VI This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature. The duration of this Agreement shall not be limited. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party. DONE at Moscow on May 31, 1988, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George P. Shultz For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Eduard A. Shevardnadze

21

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, required destruction of the parties’ ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures, and support equipment within three years after the treaty enters into force. The INF negotiations began in November 1981. The principal U.S. objective in the negotiations was to limit the Soviets’ growing, modern, highly accurate, road-mobile, MIRVed (multiple independently targettable reentry vehicles), medium-range ballistic missile force (the SS-20s), which replaced its older, less accurate, single-warhead, silo-based, medium-range ballistic missiles (SS-4s and SS-5s).The Soviets finally agreed to eliminate all SS-20s (as well as SS-4s and SS-5s) in exchange for elimination of the U.S. Pershing II missiles and the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which began to be deployed in Europe in 1983 to counter the SS-20. These deployments were made pursuant to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision in 1979 to deploy the missiles unless an arms control alternative to deployment could be found by 1983. The INF Treaty contains a ban on intermediate-range missiles (those with ranges from 1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) held by the parties worldwide (including beyond the Ural Mountains outside of European Russia). In the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union also agreed to ban worldwide, shorterrange missiles (500 to 1,000 kilometers), in particular the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 ballistic missiles and the U.S. Pershing I ballistic missile. In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity vis-à-vis the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union began replacing older, intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range missile (SS-20), bringing about what was perceived by the United States to be a qualitative and quantitative change in European security. The SS-20 was mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and rapidly redeployed. It carried three independently targetable warheads, as distinguished from the single warheads carried by its predecessors.The SS-20’s 5,000-kilometer range permitted it to cover targets in western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and, from bases in the eastern Soviet Union, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska. In late 1977, NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group ordered a study of the alliance’s long-term theater nuclear forces (TNF) modernization needs, consistent with the doctrine of flexible response. In the spring of 1979, NATO established the Special Consultative Group to formulate guiding principles for future arms control efforts involving these forces. That summer, NATO produced the Integrated Decision Document, which set forth the basic aims of the

T

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  513

alliance’s TNF policy. It called for complementary programs of force modernization and arms control. On November 12, 1979, the NATO ministers unanimously adopted a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce TNF forces to the lowest possible level: the second track called for deployment in western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-warhead U.S. GLCMs missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles if arms control negotiations did not succeed. Initially the Soviet Union refused to engage in preliminary talks unless NATO revoked its deployment decision. However, by July 1980, the Soviet position changed, and preliminary discussions on TNF began in Geneva in the fall of 1980.The U.S. approach to the negotiations, developed through extensive consultations within NATO, required that any agreement must (1) provide for equality both in limits and rights between the United States and the Soviet Union, (2) be strictly bilateral and thus exclude British and French systems, (3) limit systems on a global basis, (4) not adversely affect NATO’s conventional defense capability; and (5) be effectively verifiable.The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to begin formal talks on September 23, 1981.After some months of discussion, the U.S. and the Soviets agreed to call those negotiations the INF negotiations. On November 18, President Ronald Reagan announced a negotiating proposal in which the United States would agree to eliminate its Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviet Union would dismantle all of its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS5s.This proposal became known as the zero-option.The negotiations began on November 30, and in early discussions the Soviet Union opposed the deployment of any U.S. INF missiles in Europe and proposed a ceiling of 300 medium-range missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft for both sides, with British and French nuclear forces counting toward the ceiling for the West. During the first two years of the talks, which ended with a Soviet walkout when the first U.S. Pershing II missiles arrived in Germany on November 23, 1983, the United States continued to emphasize its preference for the zero-option (that is, elimination of all INF systems), even while introducing the concept of an interim agreement based on equally low numbers of INF systems. In 1982, U.S. Ambassador Paul Nitze and Soviet Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinski developed a formula of equal numbers of INF systems and no account taken of British and French systems. The U.S. would have only the GLCM and not the Pershing II, while the Soviet Union would have theater ballistic missiles but no cruise missiles.This joint proposal of the two ambassadors, known as “the walk in the woods” understanding, was never agreed to by their governments. During 1984 there were no INF negotiations. U.S. deployments were carried out as planned in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, and the United Kingdom, while preparations for deployment continued in Belgium. In January 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on INF, strategic offensive arms (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, START), and defense and space issues as part of a new bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST). The United States and the Soviet Union agreed that all questions regarding these three areas would be considered in their interrelationship. Negotiations would be conducted by a single delegation from each side, divided into three groups—one for defense and space, one for START, and one for INF. Formal talks resumed in March 1985 in all three areas. In the fall of 1985, the Soviet Union hinted at the possibility of an INF agreement independent of START or defense and space issues.As U.S. GLCM deployments continued, the Soviet Union outlined an interim INF agreement that would permit some U.S. GLCMs in Europe, but which would permit SS-20 warheads equal to the sum of all warheads on U.S., British, and French systems combined. The Soviets also offered to freeze INF systems

514  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

in Asia, contingent on U.S. acceptance of their proposals and provided the Asian strategic situation did not change. In November 1985, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva, where they issued a joint statement calling for an “interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces.”At the end of 1985, the United States proposed a limit of 140 launchers in Europe for both sides and proportionate reductions in Asia, while emphasizing collateral constraints on shorter-range missiles, since these systems can cover the same targets as longer-range systems. On January 15, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a Soviet proposal for a three-stage program to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2000, which included elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles in Europe. In late February 1986, the United States proposed a limit of 140 INF launchers in Europe and a concurrent proportionate reduction in Asia.This proposal also called for both sides to reduce their INF missile launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50 percent in 1988 and, finally, to eliminate all INF weapons by the end of 1989. There would be no constraints on British and French nuclear forces. Moreover, as of the end of 1987, shorterrange missiles would be limited equally either to current Soviet levels or to levels existing on January 1, 1982.The United States also presented an outline for comprehensive verification. A series of high-level discussions took place in August and September 1986, followed by a meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986, where the sides agreed to equal global ceilings of 100 deployed INF missile warheads, none of which would be deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union also proposed a freeze on shorter-range missile deployments and agreed in principle to intrusive on-site verification. Several months later, on February 28, 1987, the Soviet Union announced that it was prepared to reach a separate INF agreement. On March 4, 1987, the United States tabled a draft INF Treaty text, which reflected the agreement reached at Reykjavik, and submitted a comprehensive verification regime. In April, the Soviet Union presented its own draft treaty, and by July it had agreed in principle to some of the provisions in the U.S. comprehensive verification regime, including data exchange, on-site observation of elimination, and on-site inspection of INF missile inventories and facilities. In a major shift, however, the Soviet side proposed the inclusion of U.S.-owned warheads on the West German Pershing IA missile systems.The United States responded by restating that the INF negotiations were bilateral, covering only U.S. and Soviet missiles, and could not involve third-country systems or affect existing patterns of cooperation. During April meetings with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed the possible elimination of U.S. and Soviet shorter-range missiles.At the June 1987 meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council, NATO foreign ministers announced support for the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. On June 15, President Reagan proposed the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems, the double zero-option. On July 22, 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a double global zero treaty to eliminate intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. On August 26, 1987, in light of the double global zero understanding, the United States modified its requirements for a verification regime by dropping the provision for stationing inspectors outside all INF missile productions and assembly plants and limiting short-notice, on-site inspections to declared INF facilities. On August 26,West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) would dismantle its seventy-two Pershing IA missiles and not replace them with more modern weapons if the United States and the Soviet Union scrapped all of their INF missiles as foreseen in the emerging treaty.This was a unilateral declaration by Kohl and is not part of the INF Treaty. In September, the two sides reached

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  515

agreement in principle to complete the treaty before the end of the year. On December 8, 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the treaty at a summit meeting in Washington, D.C. The treaty that the United States and the Soviet Union signed in Washington on December 8 includes the comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, the Protocol on Inspections, and the Protocol on Elimination. Because of concerns raised by the Senate during the ratification hearings, and because of issues that arose during technical consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the spring of 1988, this package was augmented by three exchanges of diplomatic notes—one on May 12, 1988, and two on May 21, 1988—and an agreed minute signed May 12, 1988, which, among other things, confirms that the INF Treaty applies to systems based on future as well as current technology.The Senate resolution of ratification required that the president, prior to exchanging instruments of ratification, obtain Soviet agreement that the four documents “are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty.”This was done through an exchange of notes on May 28, 1988.The treaty entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification in Moscow on June 1, 1988. Article XIII established the Special Verification Commission (SVC) to discuss further issues raised during technical consultations and to determine the characteristics and methods of use of inspection equipment as anticipated by Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection. The sides resolved many of those issues during the first SVC session and agreed to utilize the agreements reached until the two sides signed a document embodying them. During the third SVC session in December 1988 the sides signed an agreed statement on inspection procedures at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk (discussed below) and a memorandum of understanding on operating procedures for the SVC. At the 1986 Reykjavik summit, the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of intrusive onsite inspection in the INF Treaty. This was a true breakthrough in nuclear arms control agreements. Ironically, in 1990, almost two years after the entry into force of the INF Treaty, it was learned that the Soviet Union had transferred SS-23 missiles to the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in the mid-1980s, creating a serious diplomatic problem.The Soviets maintained that the transfer did not involve an INF Treaty violation because the Soviet Union did not “possess” (the treaty term) these missiles at the time of its entry into force. However, that the Soviet Union had made much of the U.S. Pershing I missiles transferred to West Germany and had insisted on their elimination, not to mention that it had itself transferred SS-23 missiles during the negotiations, was indefensible. The United States did not want to include a noncircumvention provision in the INF negotiation because the lack of clarity of the meaning of such an obligation in the SALT II Treaty had received much criticism in the U.S. Senate. However, the issue of the seventy-two Pershing I missiles that the United States had transferred to the Federal Republic of Germany was strongly asserted by the Soviet Union to be a problem that the INF Treaty needed to address in some way.The United States did not want these missiles included under the treaty because they belonged to a sovereign third state, even though the United States controlled the nuclear warheads. Eventually, as stated, West Germany unilaterally announced that it would destroy these missiles prior to completion of missile elimination under the INF Treaty, and the United States agreed to destroy the associated reentry vehicles after the missiles were eliminated. A similar arrangement, in the view of the United States, should have been developed for the transferred Soviet SS-23 missiles. The INF Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. In addition to completely eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapon delivery systems, the most notable feature of the INF Treaty is the far-reaching on-site inspection regime.

516  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Article IV of the INF Treaty provides that all intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, support structures, and support equipment of the parties be eliminated within three years of entry into force in two phases. The first phase lasted twenty-nine months; the second lasted for the remaining thirty-six months. Article IV provided for the elimination of all shorterrange missiles, launchers, and associated support equipment of the parties within eighteen months of entry into force. Article IV was regarded during the negotiations as the strongest bulwark of verification in the treaty. This article prohibits production and flight-testing of the missiles to be eliminated under the treaty. Thus, even if the national technical means and on-site inspection verification regimes miss a number of covert missiles, their value would dramatically decline over time due to lack of flight-testing.This provision is demonstratively verifiable by national technical means. Article VIII, Paragraph 1, of the INF Treaty required that, after entry into force, all intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles (including stages) be located only at deployment areas, at missile support facilities or in transit. Paragraph 6 further required that thirty days after entry into force, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (including stages) and launchers of such missiles not be located at missile or launcher production facilities or at test ranges. Article IX provides for a comprehensive exchange of data on systems subject to the treaty. The data are to be contained in the Memorandum on Data, and shall be updated thirty days after the entry into force and thirty days after the end of each six-month period thereafter. The data to be exchanged include the number of missiles, launchers, support structures, and equipment for all missile systems subject to the treaty. In addition, Article IX, Paragraph 5, required the following:  thirty-day advance notification of elimination of a deployment area, missile-

operating base, or missile support facility;  ten-day advance notification of changes in the number and location of elimination

facilities and of the scheduled date of elimination (except launchers for purposes of elimination;  notification forty-eight hours after they occur of changes in the number of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment as the result of elimination pursuant to the Protocol of Elimination; and  notification no later than forty-eight hours after it has been completed of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, as well as training missiles and launchers of these types. Elimination is an INF Treaty term that means removal from the aggregate numbers covered by the treaty. Elimination is to be accomplished primarily by destruction. However, in limited numbers of a limited period, SS-20s could be launched to destruction under the treaty. Elimination could also be effected by accident and in small numbers under strict regulation by placement in static display museums. Article X requires that missile systems subject to the treaty be eliminated in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination and subjected to on-site inspection pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection.The Protocol on Elimination in general provides for elimination by explosive demolition, cutting, crushing, or flattening, depending on the nature of the piece of equipment being eliminated. Article X, Paragraph 5, permits a party in the first six months after entry into force to eliminate, by launching, up to one hundred intermediate-range missiles. The purpose of this provision was to permit the Soviet Union to meet the time schedule set

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  517

forth in the treaty, given the large number of SS-20s it possessed. Never-deployed experimental missiles—of which each party had one type—had to be eliminated within six months after entry into force. Paragraph 7 provides that missile systems are considered to be eliminated under the treaty once all the requirements of the Protocol on Elimination are met and notification given pursuant to Article IX. Article XI, along with the greatly detailed Protocol on Inspection, sets forth the on-site inspection regime of the treaty. Paragraph 2 provides that such inspections may be conducted on the territory of the parties as well as within the territories of third party–basing countries (permitted by an associated Basing Country Agreement).Article XI, Paragraph 3, provides that no later than thirty days after entry into force each party shall have the right to conduct onsite inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities) listed in the Memorandum on Data, and at all missile elimination facilities contained in the first data update called for in Article XI, Paragraph 3.These inspections must be completed thirty days after entry into force.This is the so-called baseline inspection for the purpose of verifying the initial data. Paragraph 4 provides for on-site inspection of the elimination of missile operating bases and support facilities. These inspections were required to be conducted within sixty days of the scheduled date.This is termed the closeout inspection. Paragraph 5 contains the right to conduct inspections, beginning ninety days after entry into force, of missile operating bases, missile support facilities (other than elimination sites), and missile production facilities to verify the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment located at such sites, as well as former missile operating bases and support facilities that have been eliminated.This right is to exist for thirteen years under the INF Treaty, the three-year elimination period, and for ten years thereafter.A declining number of inspections is provided; that is, twenty per calendar year during the first three years, and ten per year in the last five years. No more that half of these inspections by each party in any one year may be on the territory of one basing country. During the negotiations, the United States learned that the first two stages of the SS-25 land-mobile ICBM are identical (“outwardly similar” in the treaty language) to the two stages of the SS-20. The United States insisted upon the right of continuous inspection at the one SS-25 final assembly plant, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, located in the town of Votkinsk in the Ural Mountains, to assure itself that covert SS-20s were not produced there. Paragraph (6)a of the Protocol on Inspection grants the United States this right. For the purposes of reciprocity only, a similar right was granted the Soviet Union at a former U.S. Pershing II production facility at Magna, Utah, in Paragraph 6(b).The parameters of the inspection are governed by the protocol, which, in summary, establishes a perimeter with portals through which the missile must leave the plant and, in appropriate cases, imaging of the missile canisters and the right to open up to eight missile canisters a year. (Unlike U.S. ballistic missiles, Soviet ballistic missiles have a final assembly facility and are subsequently deployed inside canisters.) This right is effective six months after entry into force and will terminate if there has been no final assembly at such a plant for a previous twelve-month period. Paragraph 7 sets forth the right of on-site inspection of the elimination process by means of launching pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 5. Inspectors conducting these inspections are required to confirm that the process of elimination has been completed in each specific case before the data may be changed, The final principal part of the verification regime is Article XIII, Paragraph 3, termed “national technical means enhancement.” Up to six times a year, for the three-year elimination period, the United States may, upon six hours’ notice, request cooperative measures at deployment bases of SS-25 ICBMs that are not former SS-20 operating bases (where a right to inspect

518  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

would already exist under Article XI, Paragraph 5), whereby the roofs of all fixed structures for SS-25s shall be opened and all missiles displayed on launchers in the open. After the demise of the Soviet Union, all twelve newly independent states (NISs) succeeding to the territory of the Soviet Union became INF Treaty parties. Six of these countries became active INF Treaty parties (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) as INF equipment and facilities were located in their territory. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan became active participants in the implementation process, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan assumed a less active role. The other six NISs, which had no INF equipment and facilities on their territories, became “inactive” INF Treaty parties. It was considered desirable that the INF Treaty missile prohibition run to the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. In 2000, the last of the inspection rights were terminated, the INF missile systems having long since been eliminated.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF T HEIR I NTERMEDIATE -R ANGE AND S HORTER -R ANGE M ISSILES Signed at Washington December 8, 1987 Entered into force June 1, 1988 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: Article I In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty. Article II For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term “ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle. 2.The term “cruise missile” means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.The term “ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)” means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  519

3.The term “GLBM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erectorlauncher mechanism for launching a GLBM. 4.The term “GLCM launcher” means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erectorlauncher mechanism for launching a GLCM. 5.The term “intermediate-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. 6.The term “shorter-range missile” means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. 7.The term “deployment area” means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located. 8.The term “missile operating base” means: (a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and (b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. 9. The term “missile support facility,” as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding. 10.The term “transit” means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. 11.The term “deployed missile” means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. 12. The term “non-deployed missile” means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base. 13.The term “deployed launcher” means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. 14.The term “non-deployed launcher” means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base. 15. The term “basing country” means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be “located.” Article III 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

520  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively. 2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are: (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively. Article IV 1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party. 2.To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that: (a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty: (i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads; (ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads; (iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; (iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and (v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and nondeployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and (b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  521

structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated. Article V 1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party. 2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorterrange missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers. Article VI 1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall: (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or (b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. Article VII For the purposes of this Treaty: 1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. 2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. 3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply. 4.The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a

522  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. 5.The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorterrange missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of the type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs. 8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM. 9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding. 10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply: (a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile; (b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and (c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile. 11.A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers. 12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that: (a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty; (b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves; (c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and (d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  523

Article VIII 1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere. 2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas. 3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere. 4.Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days. 5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area. 6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediaterange or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. 7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. 8.A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. 9.Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article. Article IX 1.The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. 2.The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. 3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. 4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the

524  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes. 5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party: (a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility; (b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change; (c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including: (i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated; (ii) the elimination site; (iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and (iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility; (d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including: (i) the type of missiles to be eliminated; (ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series; (iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and (iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility; (e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including: (i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and (ii) the date and location of such elimination; and (f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including: (i) the number of missiles or launchers; (ii) the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival; (iii) the mode of transport; and

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  525

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit. 6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty. Article X 1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 2.Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection. 3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions. 4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. 5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles. 6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are: (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4. 7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty. 8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities.A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled: (a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

526  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and (c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there. Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated. 9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. Article XI 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries. 3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted. 5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct: (a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  527

ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and (b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities. 6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring: (a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or (b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. 7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed. 8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination. Article XII 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Neither Party shall: (a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or (b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph

528  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers. 3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures: (a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and (b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation. Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time. Article XIII 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty. 2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination; (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty; (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty. Article XIV The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions. Article XV 1.This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  529

its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVI Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty. Article XVII 1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2.This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

MEMORANDUM

UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA B ASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES OF

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. I. Definitions For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection: 1.The term “missile production facility” means a facility for the assembly or production of solidpropellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs. 2. The term “missile repair facility” means a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

530  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

3.The term “launcher production facility” means a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. 4.The term “launcher repair facility” means a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. 5. The term “test range” means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorterrange missiles takes place. 6.The term “training facility” means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located. 7.The term “missile storage facility” means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of such missiles are stored. 8. The term “launcher storage facility” means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored. 9. The term “elimination facility” means a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. 10.The term “support equipment” means unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding. 11.The term “support structure” means a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding. 12.The term “research and development launch site” means a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched. II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the Treaty 1.The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follows: USA

USSR

Deployed missiles Non-deployed missiles Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles Aggregate number of second stages

429 260 689 236

470 356 826 650

Deployed launchers Non-deployed launchers Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers

214 68 282

484 124 608

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  531

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follows:

Deployed missiles Non-deployed missiles Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles Aggregate number of second stages Deployed launchers Non-deployed launchers Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers

USA

USSR

0 170 170 175 0 1 1

387 539 926 726 197 40 237

III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated with Such Missiles and Launchers 1. Deployed The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways.

Missiles

Launchers

Support Structures and Equipment

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (i) Pershing II Deployment Area One The Federal Republic of Germany Boundaries: The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany. Missile Operating Bases Schwaebisch-Gmuend 48 48 54 N 009 48 29 E

40 (includes 4 spares)

36

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-24

Neu Ulm 48 22 40 N 010 00 45 E

40 (includes 4 spares)

43 (includes 7 spares)

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-24

Waldheide-Neckarsulm 49 07 45 N 009 16 31 E

40 (includes 4 spares)

36

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-24

532  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(ii) BGM-109G Deployment Area One The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Boundaries: The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by the English Channel; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea. Missile Operating Base Greenham Common 51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W

101 with launch canister (includes 5 spares)

29 (includes 5 spares)

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-7

Deployment Area Two The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Boundaries: The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea. Missile Operating Base Molesworth

181 with launch canister

61

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-7

Deployment Area The Republic of Italy Boundaries:The territory of The Republic of Italy within the boundaries of the Island of Sicily. Missile Operating Base Comiso 36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E

108 with launch canister

31 (includes 7 spares)

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-7

Deployment Area The Kingdom of Belgium Boundaries:The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium. Missile Operating Base Florennes 50 13 35N 004 39 00E

1

In preparation for operational status.

20 with launch canister (includes 14 spares)

12 (includes 8 spares)

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-7

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  533

Deployment Area Two The Federal Republic of Germany Boundaries: The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the west by the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany. Missile Operating Base Wueschheim 50 02 33 N 007 25 40 E

62 with launch canister (includes 14 spares)

21 (includes 9 spares)

Training Missile-1 Training Launch Canister-10

Deployment Area The Kingdom of the Netherlands Boundaries: The territory of The Kingdom of the Netherlands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within the national boundaries of The Kingdom of the Netherlands. Missile Operating Base Woensdrecht 51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E

0 with launch canister

0

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-0

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (i) SS-20 Deployment Area Postavy 55 12 13 N 027 00 00 E 54 52 47 026 41 18 54 43 58 026 04 07 55 01 13 026 03 43 Missile Operating Base Postavy 55 09 47 N 026 54 21 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

534  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Vetrino 55 28 44 N 028 42 29 E 55 01 03 028 15 03 55 01 16 027 48 46 55 16 22 027 49 05 Missile Operating Base Vetrino 55 24 19 N 028 33 29 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Polotsk 55 37 36 N 028 23 49 E 55 28 07 029 20 25 54 32 15 029 09 47 54 39 32 028 10 40 Missile Operating Base Polotsk 55 22 34 N 028 44 17 E

Deployment Area Smorgon’ 54 37 43 N 026 52 34 E 54 22 37 026 52 37 54 37 18 025 41 58 54 45 21 026 15 13 Missile Operating Base Smorgon’ 54 36 16 N 026 23 05 E

Deployment Area Smorgon’ 54 29 01 N 026 26 40 E 54 05 04 025 53 59 54 24 14 025 31 18 54 35 27 026 19 10 Missile Operating Base Smorgon’ 54 31 36 N 026 17 20 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  535

Deployment Area Lida 53 45 24 N 025 29 02 E 53 34 00 024 49 35 53 42 25 024 38 15 53 58 05 025 10 17 Missile Operating Base Lida 53 47 39 N 025 20 27 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0 Deployment Area

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Gezgaly 53 38 53 N 025 25 38 E 53 23 48 025 26 12 53 12 46 025 08 38 53 22 57 024 35 43 Missile Operating Base Gezgaly 53 32 50 N 025 16 48 E

Deployment Area Slonim 52 58 15 N 025 55 42 E 52 45 02 025 31 08 53 04 08 025 09 00 53 08 45 025 30 20 Missile Operating Base Slonim 52 55 54 N 025 21 59 E

Deployment Area Ruzhany 52 55 21 N 024 58 40 E 52 46 32 024 48 25 52 45 52 024 16 26 53 07 34 024 22 14 Missile Operating Base Ruzhany 52 49 29 N 024 45 45 E

536  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Zasimovichi 52 37 55 N 024 48 50 E 52 22 00 024 10 52 52 32 36 023 56 54 52 45 52 024 16 26 Missile Operating Base Zasimovichi 52 30 38 N 024 08 43 E

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Mozyr’ 52 05 31 N 029 13 04 E 51 39 05 029 39 31 51 42 00 029 01 30 51 52 57 028 51 32 Missile Operating Base Mozyr’ 52 02 27 N 029 11 15 E

Deployment Area Petrikov 52 16 29 N 029 03 04 E 52 08 06 028 48 40 52 08 33 028 13 37 52 27 47 028 28 17 Missile Operating Base Petrikov 52 10 29 N 028 34 52 E

Deployment Area Zhitkovichi 52 23 40 N 028 10 31 E 52 08 35 028 10 07 52 08 55 027 14 01 52 24 01 027 14 06 Missile Operating Base Zhitkovichi 52 11 36 N 027 48 07 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  537

Deployment Area Rechitsa 52 26 34 N 030 21 10 E 52 05 27 030 43 26 51 47 47 030 23 27 52 13 08 030 00 53 Missile Operating Base Rechitsa 52 11 58 N 030 07 11 E

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Slutsk 53 28 29 N 027 57 50 E 53 02 31 028 07 59 53 13 35 027 25 09 53 28 40 027 28 55 Missile Operating Base Slutsk 53 14 20 N 027 42 15 E

Deployment Area Lutsk 51 08 14 N 025 54 51 E 50 50 45 025 34 49 51 16 24 025 16 49 51 20 51 025 26 59 Missile Operating Base Lutsk 50 56 07 N 025 36 26 E

Deployment Area Lutsk 51 10 05 N 025 27 21 E 50 43 54 025 07 49 50 47 35 024 33 38 51 11 22 024 35 49 Missile Operating Base Lutsk 50 50 06 N 025 04 02 E

538  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Brody 50 14 00 N 025 29 11 E 50 00 46 025 09 30 50 17 32 024 41 55 50 22 10 024 58 33 Missile Operating Base Brody 50 06 09 N 025 12 14 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Chervonograd 50 41 07 N 024 33 58 E 50 13 10 024 38 45 50 19 02 024 11 30 50 36 26 024 17 15 Missile Operating Base Chervonograd 50 22 45 N 024 18 16 E

Deployment Area Slavuta 50 18 55 N 027 03 22 E 50 08 07 027 03 21 50 07 59 026 16 22 50 29 38 026 29 34 Missile Operating Base Slavuta 50 17 05 N 026 41 31 E

Deployment Area Belokorovichi 51 10 19 N 028 12 04 E 50 51 05 027 51 07 51 21 28 027 01 43 51 21 22 027 37 54 Missile Operating Base Belokorovichi 51 10 45 N 028 03 20 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  539

Deployment Area Lipniki 51 11 38 N 029 10 28 E 50 52 28 028 55 56 51 05 53 028 22 14 51 20 57 028 26 07 Missile Operating Base Lipniki 51 12 22 N 028 26 37 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

6

6

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-6 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Vysokaya Pech’ 50 29 13 N 028 21 10 E 50 09 49 028 20 37 50 10 10 027 40 19 50 29 33 027 43 58 Missile Operating Base Vysokaya Pech’ 50 10 11 N 028 16 22 E

Deployment Area Vysokaya Pech’ 50 13 33 N 029 01 05 E 49 56 07 029 10 23 49 52 42 028 06 47 50 07 39 028 20 33 Missile Operating Base Vysokaya Pech’ 50 05 43 N 028 22 09 E

Deployment Area Korosten’ 50 54 31 N 029 02 51 E 50 41 34 029 02 16 50 42 05 028 28 20 50 55 01 028 28 44 Missile Operating Base Korosten’ 50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E

540  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Lebedin 50 35 26 N 034 41 41 E 50 12 10 034 00 31 50 14 25 033 50 28 50 35 42 034 21 21 Missile Operating Base Lebedin 50 33 06 N 034 26 02 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Glukhov 52 02 16 N 033 52 28 E 51 36 21 033 55 26 51 34 22 033 27 42 52 02 21 033 38 28 Missile Operating Base Glukhov 51 41 00 N 033 30 56 E

Deployment Area Glukhov 51 42 59 N 033 27 47 E 51 23 31 033 37 56 51 23 37 032 56 33 51 43 02 033 10 25 Missile Operating Base Glukhov 51 36 44 N 033 29 17 E

Deployment Area Akhtyrka 50 17 58 N 034 54 32 E 49 49 59 034 50 05 50 10 03 033 57 06 50 18 24 034 24 13 Missile Operating Base Akhtyrka 50 16 01 N 034 49 53 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  541

Deployment Area Akhtyrka 50 10 43 N 035 34 34 E 49 54 08 035 00 16 50 18 14 034 24 13 50 26 42 034 48 07 Missile Operating Base Akhtyrka 50 21 59 N 034 57 03 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Novosibirsk 55 51 09 N 083 52 28 E 55 14 33 083 49 49 55 21 52 083 08 41 55 30 29 083 09 09 Missile Operating Base Novosibirsk 55 22 05 N 083 13 52 E

Deployment Area Novosibirsk 55 06 17 N 083 34 11 E 54 57 40 083 33 38 55 04 53 082 52 45 55 24 16 082 53 40 Missile Operating Base Novosibirsk 55 22 57 N 082 55 16 E

Deployment Area Novosibirsk 55 31 47 N 084 08 57 E 55 13 26 082 56 55 55 20 01 082 49 41 55 40 13 084 00 42 Missile Operating Base Novosibirsk 55 19 32 N 082 56 18 E

542  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Novosibirsk 55 08 01 N 083 53 07 E 54 52 56 083 52 02 55 11 17 082 56 49 55 22 00 083 01 07 Missile Operating Base Novosibirsk 55 18 44 N 083 01 38 E

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Novosibirsk 55 03 58 N 084 18 27 E 54 53 12 084 19 10 55 04 49 082 56 30 55 22 00 083 01 07 Missile Operating Base Novosibirsk 55 19 07 N 083 09 59 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Drovyanaya 51 44 02 N 113 08 33 E 51 22 28 113 07 32 51 22 49 112 46 52 51 44 16 112 54 39 Missile Operating Base Drovyanaya 51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E

Deployment Area Drovyanaya 51 37 34 N 113 08 14 E 51 22 28 113 07 32 51 18 39 112 36 23 51 27 14 112 40 08 Missile Operating Base Drovyanaya 51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  543

Deployment Area Drovyanaya 51 24 52 N 112 53 51 E 51 20 36 112 50 13 51 18 54 112 15 44 51 23 13 112 15 51 Missile Operating Base Drovyanaya 51 22 59 N 112 49 55 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Drovyanaya 51 26 54 N 113 00 50 E 51 18 13 113 03 54 51 18 47 112 26 03 51 29 39 112 19 29 Missile Operating Base Drovyanaya 51 20 18 N 113 00 54 E

Deployment Area Drovyanaya 51 33 19 N 113 04 35 E 51 22 32 113 04 05 51 22 49 112 46 52 51 33 36 112 47 17 Missile Operating Base Drovyanaya 51 23 49 N 112 52 13 E

Deployment Area Barnaul 53 54 32 N 084 01 02 E 53 43 46 084 01 48 53 35 30 083 43 07 53 44 16 083 36 24 Missile Operating Base Barnaul 53 46 08 N 083 57 11 E

544  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Barnaul 53 29 21 N 084 31 45 E 52 58 43 083 47 57 53 13 47 083 48 56 53 29 02 084 17 18 Missile Operating Base Barnaul 53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

Deployment Area Barnaul 53 16 38 N 084 43 16 E 52 59 32 084 51 20 52 55 09 084 47 58 53 16 02 084 14 31 Missile Operating Base Barnaul 53 13 29 N 084 40 10 E

Deployment Area Barnaul 53 27 33 N 084 49 55 E 53 16 42 084 46 52 53 16 02 084 14 31 53 26 58 084 21 02 Missile Operating Base Barnaul 53 18 47 N 084 30 27 E

Deployment Area Kansk 56 32 14 N 096 12 14 E 56 15 16 095 34 54 56 28 30 095 20 13 56 34 39 095 36 13 Missile Operating Base Kansk 56 22 31 N 095 28 35 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  545

Deployment Area Kansk 56 30 47 N 095 12 33 E 56 19 53 095 19 41 56 13 45 094 59 58 56 31 03 094 56 58 Missile Operating Base Kansk 56 20 09 N 095 16 34 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

9

9

Launch Canister-9

Deployment Area Kansk 56 19 29 N 096 20 56 E 56 08 43 096 21 41 56 08 17 096 02 24 56 19 14 095 50 42 Missile Operating Base Kansk 56 11 19 N 096 03 13 E

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0 Deployment Area Kansk 56 14 50 N 096 05 46 E 55 59 57 096 14 35 55 59 41 096 03 03 56 15 00 095 46 30 Missile Operating Base Kansk 56 02 19 N 096 04 58 E

9

9

Launch Canister-9 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-9 Training Missile-0

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-11 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-52 Training Missile-6

(ii) SS-4 Deployment Area Sovetsk 55 05 33 N 021 52 38 E 55 03 22 021 56 20 54 57 04 021 29 58 55 01 23 021 26 16 Missile Operating Base Sovetsk 54 59 07 N 021 36 36 E

546  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Gusev 54 46 02N 022 07 07 E 54 24 14 022 28 42 54 20 01 022 21 10 54 43 58 021 55 53 Missile Operating Base Gusev 54 43 59 N 022 03 27 E

5

7 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-52 Training Missile-7

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-14 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-48 Training Missile-5

5

5 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-13 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-47 Training Missile-6

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-11 Missile Erector-5 Propellant Tank-51 Training Missile-6

Deployment Area Malorita 51 53 50 N 024 05 39 E 51 43 09 024 09 49 51 42 59 023 57 07 51 53 45 023 57 50 Missile Operating Base Malorita 51 51 47 N 024 01 55 E

Deployment Area Pinsk 52 15 03 N 025 49 43 E 52 04 09 025 39 30 52 03 56 025 22 00 52 14 54 025 35 40 Missile Operating Base Pinsk 52 10 56 N 025 41 27 E

Deployment Area Vyru 57 49 33 N 027 00 00 E 57 43 05 027 00 00 57 43 04 026 43 54 57 49 32 026 43 51 Missile Operating Base Vyru 57 45 47 N 026 47 13 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  547

Deployment Area Aluksne 57 25 51 N 026 56 00 E 57 21 32 026 56 01 57 17 12 026 40 06 57 25 49 026 40 01 Missile Operating Base Aluksne 57 25 04 N 026 49 46 E

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-45 Training Missile-6

5

8 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-48 Training Missile-6

5

5 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-13 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-47 Training Missile-6

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-14 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-50 Training Missile-6

Deployment Area Ostrov 57 38 21 N 028 20 22 E 57 21 04 028 23 43 57 21 14 028 07 47 57 38 28 028 08 19 Missile Operating Base Ostrov 57 31 53 N 028 12 19 E

Deployment Area Karmelava 55 06 12 N 024 22 04 E 54 57 49 024 33 51 54 55 00 024 04 05 55 01 28 024 03 36 Missile Operating Base Karmelava 55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E

Deployment Area Ukmerge 55 17 41 N 024 59 06 E 55 04 25 024 40 58 55 08 35 024 33 12 55 19 43 024 51 26 Missile Operating Base Ukmerge 55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E

548  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Deployment Area Taurage 55 18 07 N 022 30 42 E 55 09 30 022 30 22 55 03 10 022 18 52 55 13 35 022 21 01 Missile Operating Base Taurage 55 04 58 N 022 19 38 E

5

5 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-47 Training Missile-6

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-46 Training Missile-7

5

7 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-7 Propellant Tank-49 Training Missile-7

5

6 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Missile Erector-6 Propellant Tank-46 Training Missile-5

Deployment Area Kolomyya 48 45 01 N 024 55 59 E 48 36 23 024 56 20 48 36 04 024 40 04 48 44 42 024 39 40 Missile Operating Base Kolomyya 48 39 32 N 024 48 04 E

Deployment Area Stryy 49 19 59 N 023 58 46 E 49 11 22 023 58 29 49 21 09 023 31 57 49 29 46 023 32 24 Missile Operating Base Stryy 49 25 23 N 023 34 56 E

Deployment Area Skala-Podol’skaya 48 54 37 N 026 17 26 E 48 48 09 026 17 32 48 48 02 026 01 12 48 54 30 026 01 04 Missile Operating Base Skala-Podol’skaya 48 51 02 N 026 08 36 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  549

2. Non-Deployed The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. (a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (i) Pershing II Missile Production Facilities: Hercules Plant #1 Magna, Utah 40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W

0

Launcher Production Facilities: Martin Marietta 0 Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 76 24 W

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

Missile Storage Facilities: Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W

11

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-4

Redstone Arsenal Huntsville,Alabama 34 36 N 086 38 W

1

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-20

Weilerbach 12 Federal Republic of Germany 49 27 N 007 38 E

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

1

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

0

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

EMC Hausen Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany 50 08 N 008 38 E

0

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

Redstone Arsenal Huntsville,Alabama 34 37 N 086 38 W

0

10

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 40 N 098 24 W

0

2

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

Launcher Storage Facilities: Redstone Arsenal Huntsville,Alabama 34 35 N 086 37 W

0

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 18 N 104 19 W Launcher Repair Facilities:

550  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W

0

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

3

0

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-0

0

38

Launch Pad Shelter-0 Training Missile Stage-78

0

Training Missile Stage-4

52 with launch canister

0

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-0

General Dynamics 48 Kearney Mesa, California with launch 32 50 N 117 08 W canister

0

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-0

4

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-0

0

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-0

0 with launch canister

0

Training Missile-0 Launch Training Canister-0

0 with launch

7

Training Missile-2 Training Launch Canister-27

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: Complex 16 Cape Canaveral, Florida 28 29 N 080 34 W Training Facilities: Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 41 N 098 34 W

Elimination Facilities: (Not determined) Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: 0 (ii) BGM-109G Missile Production Facilities: McDonnell-Douglas Titusville, Florida 28 32 N 080 40 W

Launcher Production Facilities: Air Force Plant 19 2 San Diego, with launch California canister 32 45 N 117 12 W Missile Storage Facilities: NONE Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: SABCA Gosselies, Belgium 50 27 N 004 27 E

16 with launch canister

Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah 40 22 N 113 04 W Training Facilities: Davis-Monthan AFB Tucson,Arizona 32 11 N 110 53 W

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  551

Ft. Huachuca Ft. Huachuca,Arizona 31 29 N 110 19 W

0 with launch canister

6

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-8

0

Training Missile-0 Training Launch Canister-2

Elimination Facilities: (Not determined) Missiles, Launchers, and Support 15 Equipment in Transit: with launch canister

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (i) SS-20 Missile Production Facilities: Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E

362

Launcher Production Facilities: Barrikady Plant 0 Volgograd 48 44 N 044 32 E

0

Launch Canister-36 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

1

Launch Canister-0 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Missile Storage Facilities: NONE Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:

2

Postavy 55 10 N 026 55 E

2

3

Launch Canister-3 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-1

Gezgaly 53 36 N 025 28 E

2

2

Launch Canister-6 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-4

Mozyr’ 52 03 N 029 11 E

2

2

Launch Canister-4 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

Lutsk 50 53 N 025 30 E

1

1

Launch Canister-3 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

In various stages of manufacture.

552  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Belokorovichi 51 09 N 028 00 E

2

2

Launch Canister-3 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-1

Lebedin 50 36 N 034 25 E

2

1

Launch Canister-5 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-3

Novosibirsk 55 16 N 083 02 E

1

1

Launch Canister-3 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

Drovyanaya 51 30 N 113 03 E

2

2

Launch Canister-4 Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

Kansk 56 16 N 095 39 E

1

1

Launch Canister-2 Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-1

Barnaul 53 34 N 083 48 E

1

1

Launch Canister-1 Missile Transporter Vehicle-3 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Kolosovo 53 31 N 026 55 E

144

0

Launch Canister-144 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Zherebkovo 47 51 N 029 54 E

20

0

Launch Canister-21 Missile Transporter Vehicle-2 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-1

0

11

Launch Canister-2 Missile Transporter Vehicle-4 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

0

8

Launch Canister-0 Missile Transporter Vehicle-3 Fixed Structure for Launcher-1 Training Missile-0

Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: Bataysk 47 08 N 039 47 E

Test Ranges: Kapustin Yar 48 37 N 046 18 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  553

Training Facilities: Serpukhov 54 54 N 037 28 E

0

6

Launch Canister-4 Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-4

Krasnodar 40 03 N 038 58 E

0

1

Launch Canister-2 Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-2

Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar 48 38 N 046 10 E

0

7

Launch Canister-12 Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Fixed Structure for Launcher-3 Training Missile-12

Elimination Facilities: Sarny 52 21 N 026 35 E

29

68

Launch Canister-32 Missile Transporter Vehicle-35 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-3

Aral’sk 46 50 N 61 18 E

0

0

Launch Canister-0 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Chita 52 22 N 113 17 E

0

0

Launch Canister-0 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Kansk 56 20 N 095 06 E

0

0

Launch Canister-0 Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Fixed Structure for Launcher-0 Training Missile-0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE (ii) SS-4 Missile Production Facilities: NONE Launch Production Facilities: NONE Missile Storage Facilities: NONE Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: Kolosovo 53 31 N 026 55 E

35

1 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-9 Missile Erector-10 Propellant Tank-59 Training Missile-31

554  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Zherebkovo 47 51 N 029 54 E

56

3 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-5 Missile Erector-4 Propellant Tank-11 Training Missile-30

0

0 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Missile Erector-0 Propellant Tank-0 Training Missile-6

14

2 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-4 Missile Erector-2 Propellant Tank-4 Training Missile-1

0

0 (Launch Stand)

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Missile Erector-0 Propellant Tank-0 Training Missile-0

Missile Repair Facilities: Bataysk 47 08 N 039 47 E

Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: Kapustin Yar 48 35 N 046 18 E

Training Facilities: NONE Elimination Facilities: Lesnaya 52 59 N 025 46 E

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE (iii) SS-5 Missile Production Facilities: NONE Launcher Production Facilities: NONE Missile Storage Facilities: Kolosovo 53 31 N 026 55 E

6

0

Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: NONE Elimination Facilities: Lesnaya 52 59 N 025 46 E

0

0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  555

3.Training Launchers In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is: (a) for the United States of America—29; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—65. Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Equipment Associated with Such Missiles and Launchers 1. Deployed The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

Missiles

Launchers

Support Structures and Equipment

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (i) Pershing IA Missile Operating Base: NONE

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (i) SS-12 Missile Operating Bases: Koenigsbrueck, German Democratic Republic 51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E

19

11

Missile Transporter Vehicle-9 Training Missile-10

Bischofswerda, German Democratic Republic 51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E

8

5

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-4

Waren, German Democratic Republic 53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E

22

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-9 Training Missile-7

Wokuhl, German Democratic Republic 53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E

5

6

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-7

Hranice, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E

39

24

Missile Transporter Vehicle-15 Training Missile-13

556  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Pashino 55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E

0

4

Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Training Missile-5

Gornyy 51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E

36

14

Missile Transporter Vehicle-4 Training Missile-10

Lapichi 53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E

9

5

Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Training Missile-10

Kattakurgan 39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E

9

5

Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Training Missile-6

Saryozek 44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E

36

15

Missile Transporter Vehicle-3 Training Missile-16

Novosysoyevka 44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E

37

14

Missile Transporter Vehicle-5 Training Missile-17

Weissenfels, German Democratic Republic 51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E

6

4

Missile Transporter Vehicle-3 Training Missile-18

Jena-Forst, German Democratic Republic 50 54 55 N 011 32 40 E

47

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-8 Training Missile-3

Stan’kovo 53 38 30 N 027 13 20 E

40

18

Missile Transporter Vehicle-18 Training Missile-10

Tsel’ 53 23 38 N 028 28 06 E

26

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-11 Training Missile-9

Slobudka 52 30 30 N 024 31 30 E

26

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Training Missile-10

Bayram-Ali 37 36 18 N 062 10 40 E

0

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Training Missile-0

Semipalatinsk 50 23 00 N 080 09 30 E

22

12

Missile Transporter Vehicle-12 Training Missile-4

(ii) SS-23 Missile Operating Bases:

2. Non-Deployed The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

Missiles (a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (i) Pershing IA Missile Production Facilities:

Launchers

Support Structures and Equipment

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  557

Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant Marshall,Texas 32 39 N 094 08 W Launcher Production Facilities: Martin Marietta Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 076 24 W Missile Storage Facilities: Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W

0

0

Training Missile Stage-0

0

0

Training Missile Stage-0

169

0

Training Missile Stage-53

1

Training Missile Stage-0

0

Training Missile Stage-0

Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W

0

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: NONE Elimination Facilities: (Not determined) Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: 1

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (i) SS-12 Missile Production Facilities: Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E Launcher Production Facilities: Barrikady Plant Volgograd 48 46 50 N 044 35 44 E Missile Storage Facilities: Lozovaya 48 55 N 036 22 E

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

126

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0

72

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-18

Training Missile-12 Ladushkin 54 35 N 020 12 E

558  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Bronnaya Gora 52 37 N 025 04 E

170

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-3

Balkhash 46 50 N 075 36 E

138

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-47

0

15

Missile Transporter Vehicle-10 Training Missile-0

Launcher Storage Facilities: Berezovka 50 20 N 028 26 E

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: Saratov 51 34 N 046 01 E

0

3

Missile Transporter Vehicle-2 Training Missile-0

Kazan’ 55 58 N 049 11 E

0

2

Missile Transporter Vehicle-2 Training Missile-0

Kamenka 53 11 N 044 04 E

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

Elimination Facilities: Saryozek (Missiles) 44 32 N 077 46 E Stan’kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles) 53 38 N 027 13 E

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE (ii) SS-23 Missile Production Facilities: Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

Missile Storage Facilities: Ladushkin 54 35 N 020 12 E

33

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-42

Launcher Storage Facilities: Berezovka 50 20 N 028 26 E

0

13

Missile Transporter Vehicle-5 Training Missile-0

Launcher Production Facilities: V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant Petropavlovsk 54 51 N 069 09 E

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  559

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: Saratov 51 34 N 046 01 E

0

3

Missile Transporter Vehicle-2 Training Missile-0

Kazan’ 55 58 N 049 11 E

0

3

Missile Transporter Vehicle-2 Training Missile-0

Kamenka 53 11 N 044 04 E

0

1

Missile Transporter Vehicle-1 Training Missile-0

Saryozek (Missiles) 44 32 N 077 46 E

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

Stan’kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles) 53 38 N 027 13 E

0

0

Missile Transporter Vehicle-0 Training Missile-0

Elimination Facilities:

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry into Force of the Treaty The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

Missiles (a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (i) Pershing IB Missile Production Facilities: NONE Launcher Production Facilities: NONE Missile Storage Facilities: NONE Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE

Launchers

Support Structures and Equipment

560  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: NONE Elimination Facilities: NONE Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (i) SSC-X-4 Missile Production Facilities: NONE Launcher Production Facilities: Experimental Plant of the 0 Amalgamated Production with launch Works “M.I. Kalinin cannister Machine Building Plant,” Sverdlovsk 56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E

0

Missile Storage Facilities: NONE Launcher Storage Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: Jelgava 84 56 40 N 024 06 E with launch canister

6

Missile Repair Facilities: NONE Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: NONE Test Ranges: NONE Training Facilities: NONE Elimination Facilities: Jelgava 56 40 N 024 06 E

0 with launch canister

0

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit: NONE VI. Technical Data Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. P-II 1. Intermediate-Range Missiles (a) Missile Characteristics:

BGM109G SS-20 SS-4

SS-5

SSCX-4

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  561

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile

1

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)

10.61 6.40

(iii) Length of 1st stage 2nd stage (meters)

3.68 2.47

18.60 21.62 —— ——

—— ——

(iv) Maximum diameter of 1st stage 2nd stage (meters)

—— 0.53 —— 1.65 2.40 1.02 —— 1.79 —— —— 1.02 —— 1.47 —— ——

0.51 —— ——

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty weight) 1st stage 2nd stage Missile in canister

6.78 4.15 2.63 ——

4.99 —— —— ——

—— —— —— ——

(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons (with fuel) In canister Without canister

—— 1.71 —— 1.47

—— —— —— —— —— ——

2.44 1.70

1

3

1

16.49 22.77 24.30

—— 8.58 —— 4.60

—— —— —— ——

1

—— 26.63 8.63 42.70

3.35 —— —— ——

1 8.09

(b) Launcher Characteristics: (i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)

9.60 2.49 2.86

10.64 16.81 3.02 2.44 3.20 3.20 2.64 2.94 3.27

—— —— ——

12.80 3.05 3.80

(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time

1

4

——

6

(iii) Weight (in metric tons)

12.04 14.30 40.25 6.90

——

29.10

(i) Fixed structure for a launcher

—— —— 27.70 —— —— —— —— 9.07 —— —— —— —— 6.82 —— ——

—— —— ——

(ii) Launch pad shelter

74.00 —— —— —— —— 14.60 —— —— —— —— 10.00 —— —— —— ——

—— —— ——

1

1

(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated with Such Missiles and Launchers: Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers: Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters): (i) Launch canister Diameter)

—— 6.94 —— 0.53

19.32 —— —— 2.14 —— ——

8.39 0.65

(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of

—— —— 17.33 22.85 —— —— —— 3.20 2.72 ——

—— ——

562  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

missiles per vehicle) (iii) Missile erector

(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable) Fuel

Oxidizer

—— —— 2.90

2.50

——

——

——- —-

(1)

——

——

—— —— 15.62 —— —— —— —— 3.15 —— —— —— —— 3.76 —— ——

—— —— ——

—— —— —— 11.38 —— —— —— —— 2.63 —— —— —— —— 2.96 ——

—— —— ——

—— —— —— 10.70 10.70 —— —— —— 2.63 —— —— —— —— 3.35 ——

10.70 —— ——

(1)

Pershing IA

Pershing IB

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile

1

1

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)

10.55 8.13

(iii) Length of 1st stage 2nd stage (meters)

2.83 2.67

3.68 4.38 —— 5.37

5.17 ——

(iv) Maximum diameter of 1st stage 2nd stage (meters)

1.02 1.02

1.02 1.01 —— 1.01

0.97 ——

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section) 1st stage 2nd stage

4.09 2.45 1.64

4.15 8.80 —— 4.16 —— 4.64

3.99 —— ——

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)

9.98 2.44 3.35

9.60 2.49 2.86

13.26 11.76 3.10 3.13 3.45 3.00

(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time

1

1

1

(iii) Weight (in metric tons)

8.53

12.04 30.80 24.07

2. Shorter-Range Missiles (a) Missile Characteristics: 1

1

12.38 7.52

(b) Launcher Characteristics:

1

(c) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated with Such Missile and Launchers: Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters): Missile transporter —— vehicle (number of —— missiles per vehicle) —— ——

—— —— —— ——

13.15 3.10 3.50 (1)

11.80 3.13 3.00 (1)

SS-12 SS-23

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  563

VII. Research and Development Booster Systems Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research and development booster systems. 1. Research and Development Launch Sites

Number of Launchers

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Eastern Test Range, Florida 28 27 N 080 42 W

1

Eglin AFB, Florida 30 36 N 086 48 W

5

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 32 30 N 106 30 W

4

Green River, Utah 38 00 N 109 30 W

2

Poker Flats Research Range,Alaska 65 07 N 147 29 W

6

Roi Namur, Kwajalein 09 25 N 167 28 E

3

Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii 22 06 N 159 47 W

4

Western Test Range, California 34 37 N 120 37 W

1

Cape Cod, Massachusetts 42 01 N 070 07 W

1

Wake Island 19 18 N 166 37 E

2

Wallops Island,Virginia 37 51 N 075 28 W

1

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS Plesetskaya 62 53 N 040 52 E

3

Kapustin Yar 48 32 N 046 18 E

2

Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained herein. This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America

564  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central, Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE M ISSILE S YSTEMS S UBJECT TO THE T REATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty. I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to Elimination The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are: 1. For the United States of America: Pershing II: BGM-109G: Pershing IA: Pershing IB:

missile, launcher and launch pad shelter; missile, launch canister and launcher; missile and launcher; and missile.

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: SS-20: SS-4: SS-5: SSC-X-4: SS-12: SS-23:

missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher; missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks; missile; missile, launch canister and launcher; missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.

3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination. 4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination. 5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination. II. Procedures for Elimination at Elimination Facilities 1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this Protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  565

preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below. 2.The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection.The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date. 3. Prior to a missile’s arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed. 4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection. 5.The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section. 6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters. 7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed. 8.The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section. 9.The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

566  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

10.The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph: For the Pershing II: Missile: (a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning; (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size. For the BGM-109G: Missile: (a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces; (b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. Launch Canister: launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size. For the Pershing IA: Missile: (a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  567

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size. For the Pershing IB: Missile: (a) missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning; (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. For the SS-20: Missile: (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages; (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. Launch Canister: launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis; (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

568  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. Missile Transporter Vehicle: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis; (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis; (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis; (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. For the SS-4: Missile: (a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints; (b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (d) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened. Launch Stand: launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size. Missile Erector: (a) jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and (b) jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size. Missile Transporter Vehicle: mounting components for a missile and for a missile erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints. For the SS-5: Missile: (a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints; (b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  569

For the SSC-X-4: Missile: (a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces; (b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened. Launch Canister: launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis; (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) the launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined by measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle. For the SS-12: Missile: (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages; (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis; (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

570  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

Missile Transporter Vehicle: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis; (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis; (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis; (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. For the SS-23: Missile: (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage; (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile. Launcher: (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body; (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body; (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body; (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (f) each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (g) a portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. Missile Transporter Vehicle: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body; (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body; (c) all components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (d) control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  571

(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 11.The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows: Training Missile and Training Missile Stage: training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion. Training Launch Canister: training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion. Training Launcher: training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile. III. Elimination of Missiles by Means of Launching 1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched. 2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor. 3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches. 4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes. 5.The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. 6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. IV. Procedures for Elimination In Situ 1. Support Structures (a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated in situ. (b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1(d) of this Section. (c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.

572  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows: (i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation; (ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion; (iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and (iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed. 2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites. 3.Training Missiles,Training Missile Stages,Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers (a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated in situ. (b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated in situ shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol. (c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. (d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3(c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date. (e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this Section. V. Other Types of Elimination 1. Loss or Accidental Destruction (a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated. (b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item, its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction. (c) In such case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to provide confidence that the item has been eliminated. 2. Static Display (a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles,

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  573

15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display. (b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative. (c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may take place. (d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2(c) of this Section. (e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty. DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central, Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF T HEIR I NTERMEDIATE -R ANGE AND S HORTER -R ANGE M ISSILES Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty. I. Definitions For the purposes of this Protocol, the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Protocol on Elimination: 1.The term “inspected Party” means the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection as provided for by Article XI of the Treaty.

574  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

2.The term “inspecting Party” means the Party to the Treaty carrying out an inspection. 3.The term “inspector” means an individual designated by one of the Parties to carry out inspections and included on that Party’s list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol. 4.The term “inspection team” means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection. 5.The term “inspection site” means an area, location or facility at which an inspection is carried out. 6.The term “period of inspection” means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre-and post-inspection procedures. 7. The term “point of entry” means: Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, California, the United States of America; Brussels (National Airport),The Kingdom of Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase),The Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino),The Republic of Italy; Schiphol, The Kingdom of the Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the German Democratic Republic; and International Airport Ruzyne, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 8.The term “in-country period” means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until its departure from the country through the point of entry. 9.The term “in-country escort” means individuals specified by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as necessary throughout the in-country period. 10.The term “aircrew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Partys list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol. II. General Obligations 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate inspection by the other Party pursuant to this Protocol. 2. Each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other Party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the basing countries to the effect that the basing countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, on their territories. III. Pre-inspection Requirements 1. Inspections to ensure verification of compliance by the Parties with the obligations assumed under the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section. 2. No later than one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party: a list of its proposed aircrew members; a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. None of these lists shall contain at any time more than 200 individuals. 3. Each Party shall review the lists of inspectors and aircrew members proposed by the other Party. With respect to an individual included on the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, if such an individual is unacceptable to the Party reviewing the list, that Party shall, within 20 days, so inform the Party providing the list, and the individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  575

list.With respect to an individual on the list of proposed aircrew members or the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party, within 20 days after the receipt of such lists, shall inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed. Inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. 4. Each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors and aircrew members. New inspectors and aircrew members shall be designated in the same manner as set forth in paragraph 3 of this Section with respect to the initial lists. 5.Within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall provide, or shall ensure the provision of, such visas and other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located throughout the in-country period for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months. 6. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded, throughout the in-country period, privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site as set forth in the Annex to this Protocol. 7.Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country. 8.Within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon by the Parties as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. IV. Notifications 1. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection shall be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The receipt of this notification shall be acknowledged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the inspected Party within one hour of its receipt. (a) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include: (i) the point of entry; (ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; (iii) the date and time when the specification of the inspection site will be provided; and (iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

576  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(b) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include: (i) the point of entry; (ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; (iii) the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and (iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members. 2. The date and time of the specification of the inspection site as notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of this Section shall fall within the following time intervals: (a) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry; and (b) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry. 3. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, for its flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation:“Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required.” 4. No less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 5. Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party. V. Activities Beginning upon Arrival at the Point of Entry 1.The in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to the Government of either the inspected Party or the basing country in which the inspection site is located shall meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry as soon as the airplane of the inspecting Party lands.The number of aircrew members for each airplane shall not exceed ten. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew, their baggage, and equipment and supplies necessary for inspection, into the country in which the inspection site is located. A diplomatic aircrew escort shall have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In the case of an inspection taking place on the territory of a basing country, the in-country escort may include representatives of that basing country. 2. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed his duties upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has left the territory of the inspected Party or basing country. 3. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all customs duties.

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  577

4. Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Partys equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a “dual key” system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies. 5.Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party. 6.The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel for the airplane of the inspecting Party at the point of entry.The inspecting Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing. 7. For inspections conducted on the territory of the Parties, the inspection team shall enter at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is closest to the inspection site. In the case of inspections carried out in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time notified, pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of this Protocol, inform the inspected Party at the point of entry through the incountry escort of the type of inspection and the inspection site, by place-name and geographic coordinates. VI. General Rules for Conducting Inspections 1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol. 2. Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended. 3. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation. 4. Inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified by the inspecting Party under paragraph 1(b) of Section IV or paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol. 5. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as considered necessary by the inspected Party throughout the in-country period. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort. 6. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

578  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

7. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party. 8. At the inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the incountry escort. 9.The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties.The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above, shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party.At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Partys camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph. 10. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection by the inspection team. 11. Measurements recorded during inspections shall be certified by the signature of a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort when they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report. 12. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph the object or building as requested by the inspecting Party for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken shall be included in the inspection report. 13. In carrying out their activities, inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and equipment shall be provided by the inspected Party, as necessary. 14. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour.The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures.The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the incountry escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours. 15.An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that Article, which shall include no more than 20 inspectors and an inspec-

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  579

tion team conducting inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Article, which shall include no more than 30 inspectors.At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the inspected Party.An inspection team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. There shall be no more than one inspection team at an inspection site at any one time. 16. Except in the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities and shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using its own airplane. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it shall either: (a) notify the inspected Party of its intent upon return to the point of entry; or (b) notify the inspected Party of the type of inspection and the inspection site upon completion of the post-inspection procedures. In this case it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to ensure that the inspection team reaches the next inspection site without unjustified delay. The inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and route involved in such travel. With respect to subparagraph (a), the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of this Protocol shall apply. VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty 1.Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site. 2.The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site so that the inspection team arrives at the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol. 3. In the event that an inspection is conducted in a basing country, the aircrew of the inspected Party may include representatives of the basing country. 4. Neither Party shall conduct more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than 10 inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time. 5. The boundaries of the inspection site at the facility to be inspected shall be the boundaries of that facility set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. 6. Except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the site that are subject to the Treaty and provide the inspection team leader with a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of these missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the inspection site.

580  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

7. Subject to the procedures of paragraphs 8 through 14 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding for the missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party. 8. A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister. 9. A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. 10.Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection. 11.The inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and station inspectors at the exits of the site for the duration of the inspection. 12.The inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty at any time during the course of an inspection and no such vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until inspected at site exits by the inspection team. 13. Prior to inspection of a building within the inspection site, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits of the building that are large enough to permit passage of any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the time that the building is being inspected, no vehicle or object capable of containing any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be permitted to leave the building until inspected. 14. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  581

of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister. VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination. (a) Upon arrival at the elimination facility, inspectors shall be provided with a schedule of elimination activities. (b) Inspectors shall check the data which are specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party regarding the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated against the number and type of such items which are at the elimination facility prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures. (c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination. (d) During the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspectors shall have the right to ascertain by visual observation that a missile prepared for launch is a missile of the type subject to elimination.The inspectors shall also be allowed to observe such a missile from a safe location specified by the inspected Party until the completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches for the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transport and route for the transportation of inspectors between inspection sites. 2. Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV, and V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties. IX. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 1.The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal. 2. For the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty shall be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs.

582  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

3. There shall not be more than two other exits from the inspection site. Such exits shall be monitored by appropriate sensors. The perimeter of and exits from the inspection site may be monitored as provided for by paragraph 11 of Section VII of this Protocol. 4.The inspecting Party shall have the right to establish continuous monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section and appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems. 5. The inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following: (a) all necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring systems, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating and sewage; (b) basic construction materials including concrete and lumber; (c) the site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, appropriate sensors for other exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and the center for collecting data obtained during inspections. Such preparation may include ground excavation, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations and utility connections; (d) transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site; and (e) a minimum of two telephone lines and, as necessary, high frequency radio equipment capable of allowing direct communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the country in which the site is located. 6. Outside the perimeter of the inspection site, the inspecting Party shall have the right to: (a) build no more than three buildings with a total floor space of not more than 150 square meters for a data center and inspection team headquarters, and one additional building with floor space not to exceed 500 square meters for the storage of supplies and equipment; (b) install systems to monitor the exits to include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems and vehicle dimensional measuring equipment; (c) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section equipment for measuring the length and diameter of missile stages contained inside of launch canisters or shipping containers; (d) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section non-damaging image producing equipment for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers declared to contain missiles or missile stages as provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section; (e) install a primary and back-up power source; and (f) use, as necessary, data authentication devices. 7. During the installation or operation of the monitoring systems, the inspecting Party shall not deny the inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems.The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to such structures without consent of the inspected Party. If the Parties agree that such structures are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation. 8.The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict the access of the inspection team to such equipment. 9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use its own two-way systems of radio communication between inspectors patrolling the perimeter and the data collection center. Such

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  583

systems shall conform to power and frequency restrictions established on the territory of the inspected Party. 10. Aircraft shall not be permitted to land within the perimeter of the monitored site except for emergencies at the site and with prior notification to the inspection team. 11.Any shipment exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section which is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be declared by the inspected Party to the inspection team before the shipment arrives at the portal. The declaration shall state whether such a shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. 12.The inspection team shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site to ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. These measurements shall be performed so as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting the site. Vehicles that are either not large enough or not heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall not be subject to further inspection. 13.Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures. (a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles. (b) If the inspecting Party can determine by visual observation or dimensional measurement that, inside a particular vehicle, there are no containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, then that vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party. 14.Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures. (a) The inspecting Party shall preserve the integrity of the inspected missile or stage of a missile. (b) Measuring equipment shall be placed only outside of the launch canister or shipping container; all measurements shall be made by the inspecting Party using the equipment provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section. Such measure-ments shall be observed and certified by the in-country escort. (c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year.The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

584  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened; (ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and (iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. (d) The inspecting Party shall also have the right to inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside the vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 13 of this Section. X. Cancellation of Inspection An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. XI. Inspection Report 1. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report. 2. For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages.The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month.The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report. 3.The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report. 4.The Parties shall, when possible, resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. The report shall be

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  585

signed by the inspection team leader and by one of the members of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty. DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central, Committee of the CPSU

Annex Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members In order to exercise their function effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members referred to in Section III of this Protocol shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained in this Annex. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member. 1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. 2.The living quarters and office premises occupied by an inspector carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 3. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable. 4. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.Waiver must always be express. 5. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 6. Inspectors and aircrew members of a Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the other Party or a basing country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. 7.An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party or that of the basing countries.

586  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

8. If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

CORRIGENDA The following are corrections to the text of the Treaty that were agreed between the Parties in an exchange of diplomatic notes on May 21, 1988. 1. In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base for the Treaty, Section II, paragraph 1, concerning intermediate-range missiles and launchers, for the United States: the number of non-deployed missiles should read “266,” the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles should read “695,”and the aggregate number of second stages should read “238.” 2. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 1(A)(II), for missile operating base Wueschheim—the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 007˚25'40" E., and the number of launchers should read “21.” 3. In the MOU, Section III, paragraph 2(A)(I), for launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta— the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39˚19' N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity—the number of missiles should read “120”; Redstone Arsenal—the number of training missile stages should read “0”;Weilerbach—the number of missiles should read “9.” For launcher storage facilities: Redstone Arsenal—the number of training stages should read “4.” For launcher repair facilities: Redstone Arsenal—the number of training missile stages should read “20”; Ft. Sill—the number of launchers should read “1”; Pueblo Depot activity—the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 38˚17' N. For training facilities: Ft. Sill—the number of training missile stages should read “76.” 4. In paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section III and in paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding, the geographic coordinates for the Barrikady Plant,Volgograd, should be 48˚46' 50" N and 44˚35'44" E. 5. In paragraph 2(b)(i) of Section III of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Elimination Facility at Aralsk with the coordinates 46˚50' N and 61˚18' E should be changed to the Elimination Facility at Kapustin Yar with the coordinates 48˚46' N and 45˚59' E. 6. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 2(A)(I), for missile production facilities: Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant—the number of missiles should read “8” and the number of training missile stages should read “1.” For launcher production facilities: Martin Marietta—the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 39˚19' N. For missile storage facilities: Pueblo Depot activity—the number of missiles should read “162” and the number of training missile stages should read “63.” For missiles, launchers, and support equipment in transit the number of missiles should read “0” and the number of training missile stages should read “6.” 7. In paragraph 2(b)(ii) of Section IV of the Memorandum of Understanding, the geographic coordinates for the V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant, Petropavlovsk, should be 54˚54'20" N and 69˚09'58" E. 8. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(A)(IV) for the BGM 109G, the maximum diameter of the missile should read “0.52.” 9. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(B)(I), for the BGM 109G launcher the maximum length should read “10.80” and the maximum height should read “3.5.” 10. In the MOU, Section VI, paragraph 1(D)(I) for the BGM 109G launch canister the maximum length should read “6.97” and the maximum diameter should read “0.54.”

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  587

11. In the Protocol Regarding Inspections, paragraph 7 of Section I regarding points of entry for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should read “Moscow or Ulan Ude.” 12. In the Protocol Regarding Inspections, Section XI, paragraph 1, the reference to “paragraph 10 of Section VI of this protocol” should read “paragraph 11 of Section VI of this protocol.”

AGREED MINUTE Geneva May 12, 1988 Representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed the following issues related to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles, signed in Washington on 8 December, 1987, during the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva on 11–12 May 1988. As a result of these discussions, the Parties agreed on the points that follow. 1. In accordance with paragraph 7 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, during baseline, closeout and short-notice inspections, the Parties will be inspecting the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, capable of containing: for the United States—the second stage of the Pershing II, and the BGM-109G cruise missile; for the USSR—the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23 missile, the SSCX-4 cruise missile and the SS-4 launch stand. 2. Regarding the second stages of United States GLBMs, the aggregate numbers of these stages are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding and will be updated in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and at six-month intervals thereafter. Except in the case of close-out inspections and inspections of formerly declared facilities, the United States in-country escort is obliged to provide the Soviet inspection team leader with the number of such second stages at the inspection site as well as a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of those stages. Finally, as set forth in the Elimination Protocol, Soviet inspectors will observe the elimination of all the stages of United States GLBMs. 3.The entire area of an inspection site, including all buildings, within the outer boundaries depicted on the site diagrams are subject to inspection. In addition, anything depicted outside these outer boundaries on the site diagrams is subject to inspection. Any technical corrections to the site diagrams appended to the Memorandum of Understanding will be made via the corrigendum exchange of notes prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Such corrections will not involve the exclusion of buildings, structures or roads within or depicted outside the outer boundaries depicted on the site diagrams currently appended to the Memorandum of Understanding. 4.The Soviet side assured the United States side that, during the period of continuous monitoring of facilities under the Treaty, no shipment shall exit a continuous monitoring facility on the territory of the USSR whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions of the SS-20 missile without its front section but less than the dimensions of an SS-20 launch canister, as those dimensions are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. For the purposes of this assurance, the length of the SS-20 missile without its front section will be considered to be 14.00 meters. In the context of this assurance, the United States side will not be inspecting any shipment whose dimensions are less than those of an SS-20 launch canister, as listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. 5. Inspection teams may bring to the inspection site the equipment provided for in the Inspection Protocol. Use of such equipment will be implemented in accordance with the procedures set forth

588  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

in that Protocol. For example, if the inspecting Party believes that an ambiguity has not been removed, upon request the inspected Party shall take a photograph of the object or building about which a question remains. 6. During baseline inspections, the Parties will have the opportunity, on a one-time basis, to verify the technical characteristics listed in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding, including the weights and dimensions of SS-20 stages, at an elimination facility. Inspectors will select at random one of each type of item to weigh and measure from a sample presented by the inspected Party at a site designated by the inspected Party. To ensure that the items selected are indeed representative, the sample presented by the inspected Party must contain an adequate number of each item (i.e., at least 8-12, except in the case of the United States Pershing IA launcher, only one of which exists). 7. Immediately prior to the initiation of elimination procedures, an inspector shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters. This visual inspection can include looking into the launch canister once it is opened at both ends. It can also include use of the equipment and procedures that will be used eight times per year at Votkinsk and Magna to measure missile stages inside launch canisters (i.e., an optical or mechanical measuring device). If it should turn out, in particular situations, that the inspector is unable to confirm the missile type using the above techniques, the inspected Party is obligated to remove the inspectors doubts so that the inspector is satisfied as to the contents of the launch canister. 8.The length of the SS-23 missile stage will be changed, in a corrigendum to the Memorandum of Understanding, to 4.56 meters.The length of the SS-12 first stage will continue to be listed as 4.38 meters, which includes an interstage structure. 9.The sides will exchange additional photographs no later than May 15, 1988. For the United States side, these photographs will be of the Pershing IA missile and the Pershing II missile with their front sections attached and including a scale. For the Soviet side, these photographs will be of the SS-23, SS-12, and SS-4 with their front sections attached, and of the front section of the SS-20. 10. In providing notifications of transit points in accordance with paragraph 5(f)(iv) of Article IX of the Treaty, the Parties will specify such intermediate locations by providing the place-name and its center coordinates in minutes. 11. The United States side has informed the Soviet side that Davis Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona will serve as the elimination facility for the United States BGM-109G cruise missile. In order to address Soviet concerns on a related matter, the United States will formally inform the Soviet side before entry into force of the Treaty, of an elimination facility for each of its Treatylimited items. These points reflect the understandings of the two Parties regarding their obligations under the Treaty.

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS In light of the discussions between the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Geneva and Moscow on April 14 and April 21–22, 1988, and the Foreign Ministers letter to the Secretary of State, dated April 15, 1988, the Government of the United States of America wished to record in an agreement concluded by exchange of notes the common understanding reached between the two

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  589

Governments as to the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorterrange Missiles (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty”), signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies and as to the related question of the definition of the term “weapon-delivery vehicle” as used in the Treaty. It is the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as defined by the Treaty, both at present and in the future, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty. In this connection, it is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the term “weapon-delivery vehicle” in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon—that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Therefore, the Treaty requires elimination and bans production and flight-testing of all such missiles tested or deployed to carry or be used as weapons based on either current or future technologies, with the exception of missiles mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. It is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the Treaty does not cover non-weapon-delivery vehicles. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the above reflects the common view of the two Governments on these matters. If so, the Government of the United States of America proposes that this note and the Soviet reply note confirming that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America, as set forth above, shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Max M. Kampelman Geneva, May 12, 1988

NOTE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acknowledges receipt of the note of the Government of the United States of America of May 12, 1988, as follows: “In light of the discussion between the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Geneva and Moscow on April 14 and April 21–22, 1988, and the Foreign Ministers letter to the Secretary of State, dated April 15, 1988, the Government of the United States of America wished to record in an agreement concluded by exchange of notes the common understanding reached between the two Governments as to the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorterrange Missiles (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty”), signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies and as to the related question of the definition of the term “weapon-delivery vehicle” as used in the Treaty.

590  THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

It is the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as defined by the Treaty, both at present and in the future, are subject to the provisions of the Treaty. In this connection, it is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the term “weapon-delivery vehicle” in the Treaty means any ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile in the 500 kilometer to 5500 kilometer range that has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapo—that is, any warhead, mechanism or device, which, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it. Therefore, the Treaty requires elimination and bans production and flight-testing of all such missiles tested or deployed to carry or be used as weapons based on either current or future technologies, with the exception of missiles mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty. It is also the position of the Government of the United States of America that the Parties share a common understanding that the Treaty does not cover non-weapon-delivery vehicles. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States of America that the above reflects the common view of the two Governments on these matters. If so, the Government of the United States of America proposes that this note and the Soviet reply note confirming that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America, as set forth above, shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it is in full accord with the text and contents of the note of the Government of the United States of America as quoted above and fully shares the understanding of the Government of the United States of America set forth in the above note. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the note of the Government of the United States of America of May 12, 1988, and this note in reply thereto, constitute an agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediaterange and Shorter-range Missiles is applicable to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles flight-tested or deployed to carry weapons based on either current or future technologies, and also regarding the related question of the definition of the term “weapon-delivery vehicle” as used in the Treaty. Geneva, May 12, 1988

EXCHANGE

NOTES AT MOSCOW MAY 28, 1988 IDENTIFYING AND CONFIRMING WHICH DOCUMENTS, IN A DDITION TO THE T REATY, H AVE THE S AME F ORCE AND EFFECT AS THE TREATY OF

Embassy of the United States of America Moscow, May 28, 1988 No. MFA/148/88 The Government of the United States of America has the honor to refer:

THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY  591

1) to the notes exchanged in Geneva on May 12, 1988, between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the application of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (the INF Treaty); 2) to the agreed minute concluded in Geneva on May 12, 1988, concerning certain issues related to the Treaty; and 3) to the agreements concluded by exchanges of notes, signed on May 21, 1988, in Vienna and Moscow, respectively, correcting the site diagrams and certain technical errors in the Treaty. The Government of the United States proposes, in connection with the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty, that the two Governments signify their agreement that these documents are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty, and that this note together with the reply of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments to that effect. John M. Joyce Chargé d’Affaires a.i. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics May 29, 1988 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms receipt of U.S. Government Note no. MFA/148/88, which reads as follows: [The Russian text of Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, agrees in all substantive respects with the original English text] The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that documents mentioned in U.S. Government Note no. MFA/148/88 of May 28, 1988, are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and that this note and the reply thereto shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to that effect. Moscow May 29, 1988 [S.] V. Karpov

22

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he process of limiting conventional forces in Europe began with the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and accelerated after the termination of the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations, which concluded in 1987 after fourteen years with no progress. The Helsinki Final Act was a three-year negotiation long sought by the Soviet Union to ratify post–World War II borders; however, the West insisted on a number of humanitarian and freedom of expression provisions as its price. It also included the first East-West confidence-building measures for military forces.The MBFR negotiations had as their objective the stabilization of the military situation in Central Europe, focusing primarily on personnel limitations, as opposed to equipment limitations as in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Nevertheless, it did set the stage for the CFE Treaty. In 1986, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) parties decided that a new arms control negotiation would take place on the balance of forces in Europe.The CSCE was the institutionalization of parties to the Helsinki Final Act, and had already sponsored the successful Stockholm negotiation on confidence-building measures related to the military situation in Europe (see Chapter 27).The CFE process began in January 1989 and concluded in November 1990. However, the CFE process itself was preceded by the mandate talks, which lasted from 1987 to 1989. The first issue that arose was the question of whether the new negotiation should involve all CSCE parties (including neutral states such as Sweden,Austria, and Yugoslavia) or whether it should involve only members of the two opposing alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Over the objections of France, but pressed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others, the CSCE opted for the latter course. In January 1987, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Mandate talks began among the members of the two opposing alliances. Those talks, set to last until a fixed date in early January 1989, focused on the basic parameters of the negotiations to follow, including such matters as the area of application and the items to be limited. Limitations would apply to an “area of application” that stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals, excluding Siberian Russia, representing a concept of Europe. It was agreed in the Mandate negotiations to focus on equipment limitations, precisely on the large weapon systems that form the basis of a combined arms assault. Unlike the ill-fated MBFR talks, since limitations on personnel were essentially unverifiable, they would not be pursued in the CFE process. However, the Soviets wanted to include combat aircraft and attack helicopters, along with battle tanks, artillery, and armed combat vehicles.The West did not wish to do this, but in March 1989 President George H.W. Bush decided to concede combat aircraft and attack helicopters, and the CFE negotiations began.

T

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  593

The Mandate talks had to be extended artificially for six days, in January 1989, while Greece and Turkey fought over whether the port of Mersin in eastern Turkey was in or out of the area of application, in the Turkish zone of exclusion and thus outside the area of application or not. The Turks were allowed to exclude a 350-square-mile area in eastern Turkey from the treaty restrictions because of their need to deter neighbors such as Iraq.The status of Mersin, which was important for Greece because it was the port from which Turkey had launched an invasion of Cyprus, was resolved by an ambiguous provision.While no compliance issue involving Mersin ever eventuated, the issue would come back again in the CFE negotiations proper. Indeed, the CFE negotiations were among the most difficult and unique in the history of arms control. During the course of the negotiations, which lasted about twenty months, five negotiating parties changed their names and one disappeared (the German Democratic Republic—the GDR or East Germany—merged into the Federal Republic of Germany— the FRG, formerly West Germany—on October 3, 1990). In fact, the last change to the CFE Treaty was on the morning that the final text was to be agreed upon in Vienna. Ambassador James Woolsey received a call from the Bulgarian ambassador asking that the name of Bulgaria be changed from the People’s Republic of Bulgaria to Bulgaria as the Parliament had acted the previous day. Previous negotiations on conventional arms involved a limited space (Central Europe) and a limited number of parties in Europe and focused on manpower.The CFE was different in all these respects. It covers all of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains (the area of application). All twenty-two NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (minus East Germany) were signatories to the treaty. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the eight successor states that have territory in the CFE Treaty’s area of application (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Kazahkstan) became parties; Czechoslovakia split in two and both the Czech Republic and Slovakia became parties after entry into force as well. As a result of all the political reorganization, today there are thirty parties to the CFE Treaty. Instead of personnel limits, the treaty addresses equipment, in particular the five major categories of equipment that are viewed as necessary for a combined-arms surprise attack in Europe like the Nazi blitzkrieg at the beginning of World War II or similar major offensive action. The focus on equipment limitations was present from the beginning of the CFE negotiations.The CFE negotiations were designed to deal with the threat that the West faced from the beginning of the Cold War to its end—the huge Soviet conventional military superiority, spearheaded by heavily armored forces, pointed westward.That was a reality in Europe for forty-five years, and it was what the CFE negotiations focused on redressing.The Western objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and eliminating the capability of launching a surprise attack were completely realized. Europe was changed forever as a result when the CFE Treaty entered into force. The treaty was and remains the basis of certainty and confidence in an era of change. It fixed strict, precise equipment limits on the size of forces in Europe on a permanent basis. It also fixed legally binding limits on the forces of all thirty parties, including NATO parties (the original sixteen, now nineteen) and the remaining post–Cold War Eastern European countries. This is the central accomplishment of the CFE Treaty. There are also very extensive, on-site verification and information exchange provisions, which aid in confidence building, openness, and transparency with respect to military policy and systems in Europe. The CFE Treaty, when signed in 1990, established a limit of 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles (ACVs)—with sublimits of 18,000 for armored infantry fighting vehicles and 1,500 for heavy ACVs—20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters for each of the two groups of countries, which were coterminous with

594  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

NATO and Warsaw Pact membership. In addition, the sufficiency rule in the treaty established that no one country may have more than approximately one-third of all such arms in the area of application. In 1988, the Soviets alone had 41,000 battle tanks, 57,000 ACVs, and 42,000 pieces of artillery in the area of application. Under the sufficiency rule, the Soviets were permitted only 13,300 battle tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,700 artillery pieces, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 attack helicopters. Thus, the sufficiency rule itself imposed a very significant reduction in Soviet military power in Europe. After the demise of the Soviet Union, these allocations were divided among the eight successor states party to the treaty, pursuant to the 1992 Treaty of Tashkent, although the figure for Kazakhstan was zero, as there were no forces on the ground there. Further, under Article VII of the treaty, binding national limits were imposed on each of the thirty parties after each nation’s total holdings were allocated within each group. For example, NATO divided its 20,000 tanks among its then sixteen member countries. Those decisions are made within each group, then, pursuant to the terms of the treaty, all other parties are notified. When that notification takes place, they become legally binding obligations and remain so until there is a further, subsequent allocation, and parties are notified of new legally binding limits or allocations. In Eastern Europe, given the state of the Warsaw Pact, it was necessary to negotiate a treaty (the 1991 Treaty of Budapest) among the six remaining countries (that is, the Warsaw Pact states in 1990 minus East Germany) to set these limits. Under that treaty, the Soviets were allowed a little less than what the sufficiency rule would have permitted them in some categories. For example, they were allowed 150 fewer tanks than the sufficiency rule allocation; thus they were limited, within the area of application, to 13,150 battle tanks, as opposed to the 41,000 they held two years prior. In addition, there are active unit limits, which are about 10 to 15 percent lower than the total holdings in each weapon category. The remainder is to be stored in designated permanent storage sites, which are open to inspection. The treaty also contains regional sublimits intended to prevent the establishment of concentrations of forces. The treaty provides for a Joint Consultative Group composed of all thirty parties.The treaty provided that the Joint Consultative Group could begin meeting provisionally even before the treaty entered into force. By the end of 1990, the group had already held some two and a half weeks of meetings.The signatories initially discussed data, in particular Soviet data and other related issues. An interesting aspect of CFE is the origin of the concept of “groups of countries” as opposed to “alliances.” Early in the negotiation, in September 1989, the Hungarians made it very clear to the United States that they did not intend to stay in the Warsaw Pact. The United States, in its original treaty draft, had referred to the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But if one country was going to leave an alliance, it was necessary to develop a formula that would permit the treaty regime to continue even if one or more countries should do so. So the idea of “groups of states parties” was developed, rather than basing the agreement on then current alliance memberships: one group just happened to coincide with NATO, and the other group just happened to coincide with the Warsaw Pact. Also interesting was the Article VII national provision, which was conceived by the British and the French. The U.S. draft, which was taken to Brussels for clearance by NATO as the NATO draft treaty, had in it simply group limits, not individual country limits. That is how the United States conceived of this negotiation from the beginning. But the British and the French did not want to tie the treaty to existing alliances. They wanted something else that imposed national limits on countries. In their view it was necessary under the treaty to have a means of establishing national limits, because in 1989 they did not believe that the existing alliances were going to last forever.The United States initially strongly resisted this idea, but

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  595

the text of a provision that was acceptable to all parties was finally worked out, which also fit in with the thinking of the non-Soviet Eastern European countries. Another example of the group-versus-national-limits issue was that the West originally proposed inspections only of members of the other group. In other words, the United Kingdom could only inspect members of the Warsaw Pact and not, for example, the Netherlands.The French were reluctant to support this arrangement for the same reason they supported the national levels article.They never liked the idea of a bloc-to-bloc negotiation, and they certainly believed that a new era had come. Nevertheless, they went along with this concept. But the Hungarians absolutely refused: for them it was a treaty breaker.They had to have the right to inspect members of their own group. Finally, the Soviets conceded after a long argument near the end of the negotiation.The treaty permitted each country to inspect any other member of its own group, up to five times a year for each country. The total disintegration of the Warsaw Pact became an important factor late in the negotiations. By the end, it had almost become a negotiation between twenty-one and one—that is, twenty-one countries and the Soviet Union—with subsidiary negotiations among certain parties on such questions as flank limits. This latter was a five-sided negotiation, with the United States mediating among Norway,Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. In the closing days of the negotiation, because of the shortness of time, it was necessary for the United States, in effect, to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union on behalf of the NATO alliance. With regional issues and Turkish concerns over Soviet paramilitary forces being paramount, along with definitional issues, several members of the U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Woolsey, made a trip to Moscow about eleven or twelve days before the negotiations ended.The delegates joined a group from Washington that had come to Moscow for this purpose. Ambassador Woolsey and his colleagues returned with a completed text that was agreed to in several days in Vienna by the other delegates, although a number of changes were made at the request of the Germans, British, and French. This enabled the text to be agreed to by the various governments, translated into the other five official languages—the negotiation having been in English—initialed by the negotiators, and taken to Paris for signature by the heads of state at the CSCE Summit on November 19,1990. The CFE Treaty was followed by a negotiation on personnel limits that ended in a political document that made broad commitments on personnel.These commitments were based on a German unilateral political statement at the close of the CFE negotiations that it would limit its military personnel to 370,000. At the time, this was important to the Soviets in the context of a united Germany. One of the important issues in these negotiations, recognized early on, was how to deal with paramilitary units. Equipment that is allocated to paramilitary units is not considered to be “in service,” which is what the treaty fundamentally applies to.That equipment is nevertheless, in most cases, counted against the treaty ceilings. Battle tanks, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft held by paramilitary units, even though they are not considered to be in service, are counted against the totals in various provisions. ACVs are not. However—and this was an issue that particularly interested the Turks—a provision was worked out in Moscow in the last days of the negotiation that only 1,000 ACVs in paramilitary units are exempt from the totals. Any number above 1,000 for any single party must be counted toward the limits; in addition, only 600 armored combat vehicles may be deployed by a party in the flank zone within its country. In the case of the Soviet Union, that was a small part of its territory, but in the case of Bulgaria, that was its totality. So, only 600 ACVs in paramilitary units on the flanks, and only 1,000 overall, were exempt from ceilings. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the flank limits became highly controversial for the Russians because of the wars in the Caucasus.This led to a new negotiation on the flank

596  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

issue, which concluded at the 1996 CFE Treaty review conference, somewhat modifying the restrictions by an adjustment of the borders of the treaty-defined flank areas. However, there was still trouble until an understanding was reached between Russia and Turkey in 1999, in the context of the treaty adaptation process. The CFE Treaty went through many trials prior to entry into force.At the time the treaty was signed in Vienna in 1990 it was clear that the Soviet Union had understated its destruction obligation, in part by asserting that more treaty-limited equipment (TLE) had been taken over the Urals and outside the area of application than was in fact the case and in part by claiming that TLE assigned to units subordinated to naval forces did not count, which was obviously untrue.This necessitated a lengthy negotiation, which concluded in an agreement signed in June 1991 that TLE belonging to marine infantry within the zone would be included in the totals.The TLE taken over the Urals by then matched what the Russians had claimed, and it was agreed that they would remain in the open (where they would more rapidly deteriorate) for verification purposes. Next, the CFE negotiating parties meeting in an extraordinary conference (permitted by the Provisional Application Protocol, which brought certain procedural provisions into force in order to provide for the orderly implementation of the treaty obligations), agreed that the territory of the Baltic states would be excluded from the area of application as they declared their independence of the Soviet Union. Then the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,Azerbaijan, Georgia,Armenia, and Kazakhstan had to be accepted as successors even though the CFE Treaty was not yet in force. This was accomplished by another extraordinary conference in Oslo in the spring of 1992. It was hoped that the CFE Treaty would be brought into force at the July 1992 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, the follow-on organization to the CSCE) meeting in Helsinki, because there were rumors that Czechoslovakia would soon split and the parties did not want to have to deal with another successor situation. However, by the end of June, Armenia and Belarus had not yet ratified, and there was no immediate likelihood that they would do so. All signatories had to ratify to achieve entry into force. Accordingly, the signatories at the Helsinki meeting in July brought the entire treaty into force for four months—the length of the baseline on-site inspection period—once again using the Provisional Application Protocol. During this four-month period, Armenia and Belarus did ratify, and on November 16, 1992, the CFE Treaty fully entered into force. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in January 1993, but this was treated as a normal successor state situation (meaning that the Czech Republic and Slovakia simply succeeded to the obligations of Czechoslovakia, dividing up allotments where appropriate). Thus, the long effort was over. Subsequent to the decision to expand NATO from sixteen to nineteen members, beginning in the wake of the 1996 CFE Review Conference, the parties began negotiating an adaptation of the treaty to reflect post–Cold War realities, which produced an agreement in principle on March 31, 1999, that was completed in the fall of 1999. The revision is based on national and territorial (including stationed forces) limits, rather than group limits and zones. The United States insisted on essentially unlimited temporary reinforcement rights, even to the three new NATO countries, which the Russians opposed. This was finally resolved on the basis of the Russians conceding to the United States on the redeployment rights issue in exchange for flexibility on the flanks negotiated with Turkey.This resolution was converted into a complete treaty revision and signed at the November 1999 OSCE Summit. However, as of December 2002, the adapted CFE Treaty had not been submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification because the NATO nations were withholding ratification pending Russian compliance with several commitments made at the

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  597

1999 OSCE Summit. Nevertheless the regime established by the CFE Treaty is likely to be the basis for overall European and North American security, and derivatively, world security, for many decades to come. The CFE Treaty is composed of twenty-one articles and a number of attached documents, some of which are rather technical, including the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments (the Protocol on Existing Types or POET); the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorization of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorization of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information (Protocol on Information Exchange); the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Protocol on Provisional Application). The POET lists the existing types of armaments covered by the treaty, and it is amendable as new types appear. The Protocol on Information Exchange provides the procedures by which the parties exchange the vast amount of information concerning their weapon systems as required by the treaty. The Protocol on Inspection establishes the highly complicated and intrusive inspection regime envisaged by the treaty. The Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) established the procedures by which the implementing body of the treaty, the JCG, operates. The Provisional Application Protocol permits certain provisions of the treaty to be made operational upon signature, rather than upon entry into force, in order to ensure effective operation of the information exchange and verification and inspection arrangement established by the treaty regime. Article II contains the many important definitions on which the treaty regime is based. They include the following:  the definition of the two groups of states parties (coterminus with the two alliances

in 1990);  the area of application of the treaty, the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, with the

special settlement for Greece and Turkey on the port of Mersin—the language describing the line of demarcation as it crosses Turkey so as to delineate the area of application of the treaty as well as the Turkish exclusion zone where it nears the Mediterranean coast simply says,“and thence to the sea” from a point in Turkey, leaving it ambiguous whether Mersin is within or outside the area of application1 of the treaty;  battle tank, which is both a description and a definition—a compromise between generals and lawyers;  other weapon systems limited by the treaty (ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters); and  important treaty terms, such as stationed conventional armed forces, designated permanent storage site, and in service. This article also provides for the updating of the POET and declares these changes are not treaty amendments. 1

To continue the line delineating the area of application in the same direction as the line is already going from the last named point would have the line reaching the coast to the west of Turkey, and thus placing Mersin in the Turkish exclusion zone.This is the line the Turks stated represented the correct interpretation.To draw the line as directly to the sea as possible would have the line reach the coast to the east of Mersin, and thus place it within the area of application.This was the interpretation stated by the Greeks to be the correct one. Despite the differing interpretations, no compliance issue involving Mersin has ever been raised.

598  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article III sets forth counting rules, which determine whether a particular weapon is subject to the treaty limitations. Article IV sets forth the basic group limits along with the limits of the nested subzones, which provide treaty limits for the entire area of application, then provide for smaller and smaller zones ending with limits for central Europe. Article V is designed to limit the flow of equipment limited by the treaty out to the flank areas as tight constraints are imposed in the central zone. Article VI is the sufficiency rule, pursuant to which no one party may possess more than one-third of each category of arms limited by the treaty. This served to limit the Soviet Union even more than the general limits. Article VII provides for the division of the group limits, which, when notified, are binding national limits until another intra-group division is made. Article VIII contains the schedule for reduction under the CFE Treaty regime. Reductions are to be competed in three phases: after entry into force each party is to have completed 25 percent of its reduction obligation established within sixteen months, 60 percent within twenty-eight months, and all obligated reductions to be accomplished within forty months. Article XIII provides for the information exchange regime, which is far-reaching.Article XIV establishes the basis for Inspection Protocol and the purposes of the inspection regime. Article XV reserves a place in verification for national technical means (observation satellites) as well as multinational technical means. Article XVI establishes the JCG. Article XX provides for a review conference forty-six months after entry into force and at five-year intervals thereafter.This article also provides for extraordinary conferences of states parties, a device used several times as the Soviet Union dissolved and adjustments had to be made.

TREATY

ON

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE

The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having conducted this negotiation in Vienna beginning on March 9, 1989, Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted, Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in Europe, Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe, Striving to replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to overcoming the division of Europe,

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  599

Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe, Recalling that they signed or acceded to the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, the Treaty of Washington of 1949 or the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 and that they have the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, Committed to the objective of ensuring that the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application of this Treaty do not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters, Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect adversely the security interests of any State, Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, including those obligations relating to the following five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. 2. Each State Party also shall carry out the other measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security and stability both during the period of reduction of conventional armed forces and after the completion of reductions. 3. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types, with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of CombatCapable Trainer Aircraft Into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorization of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorization of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Provisional Application. Each of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty. Article II 1. For the purposes of this Treaty: (A) The term “group of States Parties” means the group of States Parties that signed the Treaty of Warsaw2 of 1955 consisting of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Union of

2

The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed in Warsaw, 14 May 1955

600  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Soviet Socialist Republics, or the group of States Parties that signed or acceded to the Treaty of Brussels3 of 1948 or the Treaty of Washington4 of 1949 consisting of the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. (B) The term “area of application” means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line extending from the point of intersection of the Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gzne and thence to the sea. (C) The term “battle tank” means a self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with a high level of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped primarily to transport combat troops. Such armoured vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of ground-force tank and other armoured formations. Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight and which are armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 millimeters calibre. In addition, any wheeled armoured fighting vehicles entering into service which meet all the other criteria stated above shall also be deemed battle tanks. (D) The term “armoured combat vehicle” means a self-propelled vehicle with armoured protection and cross-country capability. Armoured combat vehicles include armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles. The term “armoured personnel carrier” means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped to transport a combat infantry squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an integral or organic weapon of less than 20 millimeters calibre. The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle”means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimeters calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of armoured infantry or mechanized infantry or motorized infantry formations and units of ground forces. The term “heavy armament combat vehicle” means an armoured combat vehicle with an integral or organic direct fire gun of at least 75 millimeters calibre, weighing at least 6.0 metric tonnes unladen weight, which does not fall within the definitions of an armoured personnel carrier, or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle or a battle tank. (E) The term “unladen weight” means the weight of a vehicle excluding the weight of ammunition; fuel, oil and lubricants; removable reactive armour; spare parts, tools and accessories; removable snorkeling equipment; and crew and their personal kit. 3 4

The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense signed in Brussels, 17 March 1948 The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, 4 April 1949

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  601

(F) The term “artillery” means large calibre systems capable of engaging ground targets by delivering primarily indirect fire. Such artillery systems provide the essential indirect fire support to combined arms formations. Large calibre artillery systems are guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems with a calibre of 100 millimeters and above. In addition, any future large calibre direct fire system which has a secondary effective indirect fire capability shall be counted against the artillery ceilings. (G) The term “stationed conventional armed forces” means conventional armed forces of a State Party that are stationed within the area of application on the territory of another State Party. (H) The term “designated permanent storage site” means a place with a clearly defined physical boundary containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, which are counted within overall ceilings but which are not subject to limitations on conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units. (I) The term “armoured vehicle launched bridge” means a self-propelled armoured transporterlauncher vehicle capable of carrying and, through built-in mechanisms, of emplacing and retrieving a bridge structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge structure operates as an integrated system. (J) The term “conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV,V and VI. (K) The term “combat aircraft” means a fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction, as well as any model or version of such an aircraft which performs other military functions such as reconnaissance or electronic warfare. The term “combat aircraft” does not include primary trainer aircraft. (L) The term “combat helicopter” means a rotary wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets or equipped to perform other military functions. The term “combat helicopter” comprises attack helicopters and combat support helicopters. The term “combat helicopter” does not include unarmed transport helicopters. (M) The term “attack helicopter” means a combat helicopter equipped to employ anti-armour, air-to-ground, or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons. The term “attack helicopter” comprises specialized attack helicopters and multi-purpose attack helicopters. (N) The term “specialized attack helicopter” means an attack helicopter that is designed primarily to employ guided weapons. (O) The term “multi-purpose attack helicopter” means an attack helicopter designed to perform multiple military functions and equipped to employ guided weapons. (P) The term “combat support helicopter” means a combat helicopter which does not fulfill the requirements to qualify as an attack helicopter and which may be equipped with a variety of self-defense and area suppression weapons, such as guns, cannons and unguided rockets, bombs or cluster bombs, or which may be equipped to perform other military functions. (Q) The term “conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes subject to information exchange in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.

602  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(R) The term “in service,” as it applies to conventional armed forces and conventional armaments and equipment, means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes that are within the area of application, except for those that are held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions or that meet any of the exceptions set forth in Article III. (S) The terms “armoured personnel carrier look-alike” and “armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike” mean an armoured vehicle based on the same chassis as, and externally similar to, an armoured personnel carrier or armoured infantry fighting vehicle, respectively, which does not have a cannon or gun of 20 millimeters calibre or greater and which has been constructed or modified in such a way as not to permit the transportation of a combat infantry squad.Taking into account the provisions of the Geneva Convention “For the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field” of 12 August 1949 that confer a special status on ambulances, armoured personnel carrier ambulances shall not be deemed armoured combat vehicles or armoured personnel carrier look-alike. (T) The term “reduction site” means a clearly designated location where the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII takes place. (U) The term “reduction liability” means the number in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party commits itself to reduce during the period of 40 months following the entry into force of this Treaty in order to ensure compliance with Article VII. 2. Existing types of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types.The lists of existing types shall be periodically updated in accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) and Section IV of the Protocol on Existing Types. Such updates to the existing types lists shall not be deemed amendments to this Treaty. 3.The existing types of combat helicopters listed in the Protocol on Existing Types shall be categorized in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization. Article III 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties shall apply the following counting rules: All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, within the area of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in Articles IV,V and VI, with the exception of those which in a manner consistent with a State Party’s normal practices: (A) are in the process of manufacture, including manufacturing-related testing; (B) are used exclusively for the purposes of research and development; (C) belong to historical collections; (D) are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned from service in accordance with the provisions of Article IX; (E) are awaiting, or are being refurbished for, export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange or at no more than 10 such declared sites which shall have been notified in the previous year’s annual information exchange. In the latter case, they shall be separately distinguishable from conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  603

(F) are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles or multi-purpose attack helicopters, held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; or (G) are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application, and are in the area of application for no longer than a total of seven days. 2. If, in respect of any such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, the notification of which is required under Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a State Party notifies an unusually high number in more than two successive annual information exchanges, it shall explain the reasons in the Joint Consultative Group, if so requested. Article IV 1.Within the area of application, as defined in Article II, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs, as defined in Article II, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: (A) 20,000 battle tanks, of which no more than 16,500 shall be in active units; (B) 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 27,300 shall be in active units. Of the 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, no more than 18,000 shall be armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles; of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles, no more than 1,500 shall be heavy armament combat vehicles; (C) 20,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 17,000 shall be in active units; (D) 6,800 combat aircraft; and (E) 2,000 attack helicopters. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery not in active units shall be placed in designated permanent storage sites, as defined in Article II, and shall be located only in the area described in paragraph 2 of this Article. Such designated permanent storage sites may also be located in that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Odessa Military District and the southern part of the Leningrad Military District. In the Odessa Military District, no more than 400 battle tanks and no more than 500 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. In the southern part of the Leningrad Military District, no more than 600 battle tanks, no more than 800 armoured combat vehicles, including no more than 300 armoured combat vehicles of any type with the remaining number consisting of armoured personnel carriers, and no more than 400 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. The southern part of the Leningrad Military District is understood to mean the territory within that military district south of the line East-West 60 degrees 15 minutes northern latitude. 2.Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics west of the Ural Mountains comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow and Volga-Ural Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after

604  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed: (A) 15,300 battle tanks, of which no more than 11,800 shall be in active units; (B) 24,100 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 21,400 shall be in active units; and (C) 14,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 11,000 shall be in active units. 3.Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian and Kiev Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed: (A) 10,300 battle tanks; (B) 19,260 armoured combat vehicles; and (C) 9,100 pieces of artillery; and (D) in the Kiev Military District, the aggregate numbers in active units and designated permanent storage sites together shall not exceed: (1) 2,250 battle tanks; (2) 2,500 armoured combat vehicles; and (3) 1,500 pieces of artillery. 4.Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed: (A) 7,500 battle tanks; (B) 11,250 armoured combat vehicles; and (C) 5,000 pieces of artillery. 5. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties may locate battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in active units in each of the areas described in this Article and Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) up to the numerical limitations applying in that area, consistent with the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII and provided that no State Party stations conventional armed forces on the territory of another State Party without the agreement of that State Party. 6. If a group of States Parties’ aggregate numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in active units within the area described in paragraph 4 of this Article are less than the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 4 of this Article, and provided that no State Party is thereby prevented from reaching its maximum levels for holdings notified in accordance with Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, then amounts equal to the difference between the aggregate

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  605

numbers in each of the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the specified numerical limitations for that area may be located by States Parties belonging to that group of States Parties in the area described in paragraph 3 of this Article, consistent with the numerical limitations specified in paragraph 3 of this Article. Article V 1.To ensure that the security of each State Party is not affected adversely at any stage: (A) within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Leningrad, Odessa,Transcaucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed the difference between the overall numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is: (1) 4,700 battle tanks; (2) 5,900 armoured combat vehicles; and (3) 6,000 pieces of artillery; (B) notwithstanding the numerical limitations set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a State Party or States Parties may on a temporary basis deploy into the territory belonging to the members of the same group of States Parties within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph additional aggregate numbers in active units for each group of States Parties not to exceed: (1) 459 battle tanks; (2) 723 armoured combat vehicles; and (3) 420 pieces of artillery; and (C) provided that for each group of States Parties no more than one-third of each of these additional aggregate numbers shall be deployed to any State Party with territory within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, that is: (1) 153 battle tanks; (2) 241 armoured combat vehicles; and (3) 140 pieces of artillery. 2. Notification shall be provided to all other States Parties no later than at the start of the deployment by the State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the recipient State Party or States Parties, specifying the total number in each category of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery deployed. Notification also shall be provided to all other States Parties by the State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the recipient State Party or States Parties within 30 days of the withdrawal of those battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery that were temporarily deployed. Article VI With the objective of ensuring that no single State Party possesses more than approximately one-third of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles,

606  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the numbers within the area of application for that State Party do not exceed: (A) 13,300 battle tanks; (B) 20,000 armoured combat vehicles; (C) 13,700 pieces of artillery; (D) 5,150 combat aircraft; and (E) 1,500 attack helicopters. Article VII 1. In order that the limitations set forth in Articles IV,V and VI are not exceeded, no State Party shall exceed, from 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, the maximum levels which it has previously agreed upon within its group of States Parties, in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article, for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and of which it has provided notification pursuant to the provisions of this Article. 2. Each State Party shall provide at the signature of this Treaty notification to all other States Parties of the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. The notification of the maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty provided by each State Party at the signature of this Treaty shall remain valid until the date specified in a subsequent notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article. 3. In accordance with the limitations set forth in Articles IV,V and VI, each State Party shall have the right to change the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Any change in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party shall be notified by that State Party to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, on which such a change takes effect. In order not to exceed any of the limitations set forth in Articles IV and V, any increase in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party that would otherwise cause those limitations to be exceeded shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the previously notified maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of one or more States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties.The notification of a change in the maximum levels for holdings shall remain valid from the date specified in the notification until the date specified in a subsequent notification of change pursuant to this paragraph. 4. Each notification required pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 of this Article for armoured combat vehicles shall also include maximum levels for the holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles of the State Party providing the notification. 5. Ninety days before expiration of the 40-month period of reductions set forth in Article VIII and subsequently at the time of any notification of a change pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, each State Party shall provide notification of the maximum levels for its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery with respect to each of the areas described in Article IV, paragraphs 2 to 4 and Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). 6. A decrease in the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by a State Party and subject to notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase the maximum levels for its holdings subject to notification pursuant to this Article. 7. It shall be the responsibility solely of each individual State Party to ensure that the maximum levels for its holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article are not exceeded. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall consult in order to ensure that the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article, taken together as appropriate, do not exceed the limitations set forth in Articles IV,V and VI.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  607

Article VIII 1.The numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI shall be achieved only by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, the Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types and the Protocol on Inspection. 2.The categories of conventional armaments and equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types. (A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, placement on static display, use as ground targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, modification in accordance with the Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types. (B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled artillery, by use as ground targets. (C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer aircraft. (D) Specialized attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or use for ground instructional purposes. (E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or recategorization. 3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article and upon notification as required by these Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV,V and VI. 4. Reductions shall be effected in three phases and completed no later than 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, so that: (A) by the end of the first reduction phase, that is, no later than 16 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at least 25 percent of its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced; (B) by the end of the second reduction phase, that is, no later than 28 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at least 60 percent of its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced; (C) by the end of the third reduction phase, that is, no later than 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall have reduced its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. States Parties carrying out conversion for non-military purposes shall have ensured that the conversion of all battle tanks in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction shall have been completed by the end of the third reduction phase; and (D) armoured combat vehicles deemed reduced by reason of having been partially destroyed in accordance with Section VIII, paragraph 6 of the Protocol on Reduction shall have been fully converted for non-military purposes, or destroyed in accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on Reduction, no later than 64 months after entry into force of this Treaty. 5. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty to be reduced shall have been declared present within the area of application in the exchange of information at signature of this Treaty.

608  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

6. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of its reduction liability. 7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8 of this Article, a State Party’s reduction liability in each category shall be no less than the difference between its holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force of this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII. 8. Any subsequent revision of a State Party’s holdings notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange or of its maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII shall be reflected by a notified adjustment to its reduction liability. Any notification of a decrease in a State Party’s reduction liability shall be preceded or accompanied by either a notification of a corresponding increase in holdings not exceeding the maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII by one or more States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties, or a notification of a corresponding increase in the reduction liability of one or more such States Parties. 9. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, of the locations of its reduction sites, including those where the final conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles for non-military purposes will be carried out. 10. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement. 11. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of this Article, during the baseline validation period, that is, the interval between entry into force of this Treaty and 120 days after entry into force of this Treaty, reduction shall be carried out simultaneously at no more than two reduction sites for each State Party. 12. Reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, within the area of application. 13.The reduction process, including the results of the conversion of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes both during the reduction period and in the 24 months following the reduction period, shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection. Article IX 1. Other than removal from service in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application shall be removed from service only by decommissioning, provided that: (A) such conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are decommissioned and awaiting disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be notified as declared sites in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be identified in such notifications as holding areas for decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain any other conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and (B) the numbers of such decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty do not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, one percent of its notified holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a total

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  609

of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50 shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft. 2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the number and type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange. Article X 1. Designated permanent storage sites shall be notified in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange to all other States Parties by the State Party to which the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained at designated permanent storage sites belong.The notification shall include the designation and location, including geographic coordinates, of designated permanent storage sites and the numbers by type of each category of its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at each such storage site. 2. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only facilities appropriate for the storage and maintenance of armaments and equipment (e.g., warehouses, garages, workshops and associated stores as well as other support accommodation). Designated permanent storage sites shall not contain firing ranges or training areas associated with conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only armaments and equipment belonging to the conventional armed forces of a State Party. 3. Each designated permanent storage site shall have a clearly defined physical boundary that shall consist of a continuous perimeter fence at least 1.5 meters in height.The perimeter fence shall have no more than three gates providing the sole means of entrance and exit for armaments and equipment. 4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of this Article. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units. 5.Active units or formations shall not be located within designated permanent storage sites, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article. 6. Only personnel associated with the security or operation of designated permanent storage sites, or the maintenance of the armaments and equipment stored therein, shall be located within the designated permanent storage sites. 7. For the purpose of maintenance, repair or modification of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites, each State Party shall have the right, without prior notification, to remove from and retain outside designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of the notified holdings of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 items of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each category in each designated permanent storage site, whichever is less. 8. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, no State Party shall remove conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty from designated permanent storage sites unless notification has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days in advance of such removal. Notification shall be given by the State Party to which the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty belong. Such notification shall specify:

610  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(A) the location of the designated permanent storage site from which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are to be removed and the numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of each category to be removed; (B) the dates of removal and return of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and (C) the intended location and use of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty while outside the designated permanent storage site. 9. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from and retained outside designated permanent storage sites by States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall at no time exceed the following levels: (A) 550 battle tanks; (B) 1,000 armoured combat vehicles; and (C) 300 pieces of artillery. 10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Article shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than 42 days after their removal, except for those items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed for industrial rebuild. Such items shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately on completion of the rebuild. 11. Each State Party shall have the right to replace conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located in designated permanent storage sites. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, at the beginning of replacement, of the number, location, type and disposition of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being replaced. Article XI 1. Each State Party shall limit its armoured vehicle launched bridges so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges in active units within the area of application does not exceed 740. 2.All armoured vehicle launched bridges within the area of application in excess of the aggregate number specified in paragraph 1 of this Article for each group of States Parties shall be placed in designated permanent storage sites, as defined in Article II. When armoured vehicle launched bridges are placed in a designated permanent storage site, either on their own or together with conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, Article X, paragraphs 1 to 6 shall apply to armoured vehicle launched bridges as well as to conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.Armoured vehicle launched bridges placed in designated permanent storage sites shall not be considered as being in active units. 3. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, armoured vehicle launched bridges may be removed, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, from designated permanent storage sites only after notification has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days prior to such removal.This notification shall specify: (A) the locations of the designated permanent storage sites from which armoured vehicle launched bridges are to be removed and the numbers of armoured vehicle launched bridges to be removed from each such site; (B) the dates of removal of armoured vehicle launched bridges from and return to designated permanent storage sites; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  611

(C) the intended use of armoured vehicle launched bridges during the period of their removal from designated permanent storage sites. 4. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from designated permanent storage sites shall be returned to them no later than 42 days after the actual date of removal. 5. The aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from and retained outside of designated permanent storage sites by each group of States Parties shall not exceed 50 at any one time. 6. States Parties shall have the right, for the purpose of maintenance or modification, to remove and have outside of designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of their notified holdings of armoured vehicle launched bridges in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 armoured vehicle launched bridges from each designated permanent storage site, whichever is less. 7. In the event of natural disasters involving flooding or damage to permanent bridges, States Parties shall have the right to withdraw armoured vehicle launched bridges from designated permanent storage sites. Notification to all other States Parties of such withdrawals shall be given at the time of withdrawal. Article XII 1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations of a State Party designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, which are not structured and organized for ground combat against an external enemy, are not limited by this Treaty. The foregoing notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such armaments held by such organizations shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such armaments in excess of 1,000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles assigned by a State Party to organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels specified in Articles IV, V and VI. No more than 600 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles of a State Party, assigned to such organizations, may be located in that part of the area of application described in Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). Each State Party shall further ensure that such organizations refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements. 2. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched bridges in service with its conventional armed forces to any organization of that State Party not a part of its conventional armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than the date such reassignment takes effect. Such notification shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned. Article XIII 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notifications and exchange information pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange. 2. Such notifications and exchange of information shall be provided in accordance with Article XVII. 3. Each State Party shall be responsible for its own information; receipt of such information and of notifications shall not imply validation or acceptance of the information provided.

612  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article XIV 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of application, inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. 2.The purpose of such inspections shall be: (A) to verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI; (B) to monitor the process of reduction of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on Reduction; and (C) to monitor the certification of recategorized multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, respectively. 3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in respect of States Parties which belong to the group of States Parties to which it belongs in order to elude the objectives of the verification regime. 4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty. 5.The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to accept during each specified time period shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that Protocol. 6.Upon completion of the 120-day residual level validation period,each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application. Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall be developed during negotiations referred to in Article XVIII. Article XV 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, a State Party shall have the right to use, in addition to the procedures referred to in Article XIV, national or multinational technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2.A State Party shall not interfere with national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices associated with normal personnel training, maintenance or operations involving conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Article XVI 1.To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties hereby establish a Joint Consultative Group. 2.Within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, the States Parties shall: (A) address questions relating to compliance with or possible circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  613

(B) seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may become apparent in the way this Treaty is implemented; (C) consider and, if possible, agree on measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; (D) update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2; (E) resolve technical questions in order to seek common practices among the States Parties in the way this Treaty is implemented; (F) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences convened under this Treaty and the distribution of costs of inspections between or among States Parties; (G) consider and work out appropriate measures to ensure that information obtained through exchanges of information among the States Parties or as a result of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account the particular requirements of each State Party in respect of safeguarding information which that State Party specifies as being sensitive; (H) consider, upon the request of any State Party, any matter that a State Party wishes to propose for examination by any conference to be convened in accordance with Article XXI; such consideration shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI; and (I) consider matters of dispute arising out of the implementation of this Treaty. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to raise before the Joint Consultative Group, and have placed on its agenda, any issue relating to this Treaty. 4. The Joint Consultative Group shall take decisions or make recommendations by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection by any representative of a State Party to the taking of a decision or the making of a recommendation. 5. The Joint Consultative Group may propose amendments to this Treaty for consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX. The Joint Consultative Group may also agree on improvements to the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its provisions. Unless such improvements relate only to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature, they shall be subject to consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX before they can take effect. 6. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prohibit or restrict any State Party from requesting information from or undertaking consultations with other States Parties on matters relating to this Treaty and its implementation in channels or fora other than the Joint Consultative Group. 7.The Joint Consultative Group shall follow the procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group. Article XVII The States Parties shall transmit information and notifications required by this Treaty in written form.They shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, including in particular a communications network to be established by a separate arrangement. Article XVIII 1.The States Parties, after signature of this Treaty, shall continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same Mandate and with the goal of building on this Treaty.

614  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

2.The objective for these negotiations shall be to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and pursuant to the Mandate, including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application. 3.The States Parties shall seek to conclude these negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Helsinki in 1992. Article XIX 1.This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It may be supplemented by a further treaty. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. Each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if another State Party increases its holdings in battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are outside the scope of the limitations of this Treaty, in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application. Article XX 1.Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, which shall circulate it to all the States Parties. 2. If an amendment is approved by all the States Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into force of this Treaty. Article XXI 1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of this Treaty. 2.The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties, if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Treaty have arisen, in particular, in the event that a State Party has announced its intention to leave its group of States Parties or to join the other group of States Parties, as defined in Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for this conference, the request shall include the reason why that State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be necessary.The conference shall consider the circumstances set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of this Treaty.The conference shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, shall last no longer than three weeks. 3. The Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to consider an amendment proposed pursuant to Article XX, if requested to do so by three or more States Parties. Such a conference shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the necessary requests. 4. In the event that a State Party gives notice of its decision to withdraw from this Treaty pursuant to Article XIX, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  615

Article XXII 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby designated the Depositary. 2.This Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble. 3.The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Parties of: (A) the deposit of each instrument of ratification; (B) the entry into force of this Treaty; (C) any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and its effective date; (D) the text of any amendment proposed in accordance with Article XX; (E) the entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty; (F) any request to convene a conference in accordance with Article XXI; (G) the convening of a conference pursuant to Article XXI; and (H) any other matter of which the Depositary is required by this Treaty to inform the States Parties. 4.This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XXIII The original of this Treaty, of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary to all the States Parties.

PROTOCOL

EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ON

The States Parties hereby agree upon: (a) lists, valid as of the date of Treaty signature, of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the measures of limitation, reduction, information exchange and verification; (b) procedures for the provision of technical data and photographs relevant to such existing types of conventional armaments and equipment; and (c) procedures for updating the lists of such existing types of conventional armaments and equipment, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Section I. Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty 1. Existing types of battle tanks are: M-1 T-34 M-60 T-54 M-48 T-55 M-47 T-62 Leopard 1 T-64 Leopard 2 T-72 AMX-30 T-80

616  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Challenger TR-85 Chieftain TR-580 Centurion M-41 NM-116 T-54 T-55 T-72 All models and versions of an existing type of battle tank listed above shall be deemed to be battle tanks of that type. 2. Existing types of armoured combat vehicles are: (A) Armoured Personnel Carriers: YPR-765 BTR-40 AMX-13 VTT BTR-152 M113 BTR-50 M75 BTR-60 Spartan OT-62(TOPAS) Grizzly OT-64(SKOT) TPz-1 Fuchs OT-90 VAB FUG D-442 M59 BTR-70 Leonidas BTR-80 VCC1 BTR-D VCC2 TAB-77 Saxon OT-810 AFV 432 PSZH D-944 Saracen TABC-79 Humber TAB-71 BDX MLVM BMR-600 MT-LB5 Chaimite V200 V150S EBR-ETT M3A1 YP 408 BLR VIB LVTP-7 6614/G BTR-152 BTR-50 BTR-60 BTR-70 MT-LB 6

5, 6

This multi-purpose lightly armoured vehicle may be exceptionally modified within 40 months of entry into force of the Treaty into an armoured personnel carrier look-alike listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol as MT-LB-AT by alteration of the interior of the vehicle through the removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and the floor at a minimum of six points so that the vehicle is not capable of transporting a combat infantry squad. Such modifications may be accomplished at locations other than reduction sites. MT-LB armoured personnel carriers that have not been modified shall be reported in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange as armoured personnel carriers.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  617

All models and versions of an existing type of armoured personnel carrier listed above shall be deemed to be armoured personnel carriers of that type, unless such models and versions are included in the armoured personnel carrier look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. (B) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles: YPR-765 (25mm) BMP-1/BRM-1 Marder BMP-2 AMX-10P BMP-23 Warrior MLI-84 M2/M3 Bradley BMD-1 AFV 432 Rarden BMD-2 NM-135 BMP-3 BMP-1/BRM-1 BMP-2 All models and versions of an existing type of an armoured infantry fighting vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be armoured infantry fighting vehicles of that type, unless such models and versions are included in the armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 2 of this Protocol. (C) Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles: AMX-10RC PT-76 ERC 90 Sagaye SU-76 BMR-625-90 SU-100 Commando V150 ISU-152 Scorpion Saladin JPK-90 M-24 AMX-13 EBR-75 Panhard PT-76 All models and versions of an existing type of heavy armament combat vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be heavy armament combat vehicles of that type. 3. Existing types of artillery are: (A) Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers: 105mm: 105 Light Gun M18 105 Krupp Gun 105 R Metal Gun 105 Pack How M 56 Pack How M 101 Towed How M102 Towed How Abbot SP Gun M108 SP How M52 SP How 105 HM-2 How M-38 Gun (Skoda) 105 AU 50 How R58/M26 Towed How

618  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

122mm: 122/46 Field Gun D30 How M 30 How 2S1 SP How 130mm: M-46 Gun 140mm: 5.5" (139.7mm)Towed How 150mm: 150 Skoda Gun 152mm: D20 Gun-How 2S3 SP How 155mm: M114 Towed How M114/39 (M-139) Towed How FH-70 Towed How M109 SP How M 198 Towed How 198 Towed How 155 TRF1 Gun 155 AUF1 Gun 155 AMF3 Gun 155 BF50 Gun M44 SP How M59 Towed Gun SP70 SP How M107 SP Gun 175mm: M115 Towed How 203mm: M110 SP How M55 SP How 100mm: BS-3 Field Gun Model 53 Field Gun Skoda How (Model 1914/1934, 1930, 1934) Skoda How (Model 1939) 105mm: Schneider Field Gun (Model 1936) 120mm: 2B16 How 2S9 SP How 122mm: D30 How M-30 How D74 How 2S1 SP How A19 Gun (Model 31/37) Model 89 SP How 130mm: Gun 82 M-46 Gun

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  619

150mm: Skoda How (Model 1934) Ceh How (Model 1937) 152mm: D1 How 2S3 SP How 2A65 How ML20 How-Gun D20 Gun-How Gun 81 2A36 Gun Dana SP Gun-How M77 2S5 SP Gun 2S19 SP How Gun-How 85 How Model 1938 How 81 203mm: B4 How 2S7 SP Gun (B) Mortars: 107mm: 4.2" (ground mounted or on M106 armored vehicle) 120mm: Brandt (M60, M-120-60; SLM-120-AM-50) M120 RTF 1 M120 M51 Soltam/Tampella (ground mounted or on M113 armored vehicle) Ecia Mod L (ground mounted M-L or mounted on either the BMR-600 or M113 armoured vehicle) HY12 (Tosam) 2B11 (2S12) 107mm: Mortar M-1938 120mm: 2B11 (2S12) M 120 Model 38/43 Tundzha/Tundzha Sani SP Mortar (mounted on MT-LB) Mortar Model 1982 B24 160mm: M160 240mm: M240 2S4 SP Mortar (C) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems: 110mm: LARS BM-21 122mm: RM-70 140mm: Teruel MLAS

620  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

227mm: MLRS 122mm: BM-21 (BM-21-1, BM-21V) RM-70 APR-21 APR-40 130mm: M-51 RM-130 BM-13 R.2 BM-14 140mm: BM-22/27 220mm: BM-24 240mm: Uragan 9P140 280mm: Smerch 300mm: All models and versions of an existing type of artillery listed above shall be deemed to be artillery of that type. 4. Existing types of combat aircraft are: A-7 IAR-93 A-10 IL-28 Alpha Jet A MiG-15 AM-X MiG-17 Buccaneer MiG-21 Canberra MiG-23 Draken MiG-25 F-4 MiG-27 F-5 MiG-29 F-15 MiG-31 F-16 SU-7 F-18 SU-15 F-84 SU-17 F-102 SU-20 F-104 SU-22 F-111 SU-24 G-91 SU-25 Harrier SU-27 Hunter TU-16 Jaguar TU-22 Lightning TU-22M MiG-21 TU-128 MiG-23 Yak-28 MiG-29 MB-339 Mirage F1 Mirage III

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  621

Mirage IV Mirage V Mirage 2000 SU-22 Tornado All models or versions of an existing type of combat aircraft listed above shall be deemed to be combat aircraft of that type. 5. Existing types of attack helicopters are: (A) Specialised Attack Helicopters: A-129 Mangusta Mi-24 AH-1 Cobra AH-64 Apache Mi-24 Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or versions of an existing type of specialised attack helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be specialised attack helicopters of that type. (B) Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters: A-109 Hirundo IAR-316 Alouette III Mi-8/Mi-17 BO-105/PAH-1 Fennec AS 550 C-2 Gazelle Lynx Mi-8 OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136 Scout Wessex Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or versions of an existing type of multi-purpose attack helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be multi-purpose attack helicopters of that type. Section II. Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment not Limited by the Treaty 1. Existing types of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes are: YPR-765 MILAN BTR-40 CP CP PRCOC1 BTR-50 PU PRCOC2 PUM PRCOC4 P PRCOC5 PUR 82 PRMR PK (MRF) UR-67 AMX-13 VTT MILAN PK (B) PC MTP-1 BTR-152 CP M113 MILAN A1/A2 (ATGW) BTR-60 PU E/W TOW PU-12/PA PU-12

622  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

ARTFC PAU ARTOBS BBS FACONT ABS MORTFC R-137 B A1E R-140 BM Mortar Carrier R-145 SIG R-156 HFTRSM R-409 BM CP P-238BT CPSVC P-240BT A1CP P-241BT A1ECP E-351BR 4.2"/M106 A1 4.2" R-975 M106 81mm MTP-2 M-125 81mm 1V18, 1V19 M125 A1 81mm 1V118 M125 A2 81mm B NM-125 81mm BTR-70 KShM TPz-1 FUCHS HFTRSM SPR-2 AD CP BREM CP ZS-88 ENGRCP Kh ELOKA NBC BTR-80 1V119 RASIT RCHM-4 M59 CP BTR-D ZD RD LEONIDAS 1 OT-62(TOPAS) CP VAB PC WPT/DPT-62 BREM BMR-600 SIG R-2M PC R-3M 81mm R-3MT R-4MT SPARTAN STRIKER SAMSON OT-64(SKOT) CP CP R-3Z JAVELIN R-2M MILAN R-3MT R-4 SAXON AD R-4MT CP R-2AM MAINT PROPAGANDA R-4M AFV 432 CP/RA R-6 81mm WPT/DR-64 CYMB BREM AFV 435 S-260 inz. AFV 436 S-260 art. AFV 439 OT-810 OT-810/R-112 HUMBER SQUIRT

IN

EUROPE TREATY

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

OT 90 VP 90 SARACEN SQUIRT CP FUG D-442 VS ADR MRP OT-65/R-112 YP 408 PWMR OT-65 DP PWCO OT-65 CH PWAT PWRDR PSZH D-944 CP PWV MT-LB AT BTR-50 PU KShM-R-81 PK(MRF) R-80 PK(B) 9S743 PI BTR-60 PU-12/PA PU-12 1W-13-16 BBS 1W-21-25 ABS 1W-12 R-137B MP-21-25 R-140BM AFMS R-145 R-381T R-156 R-330P R-409 BM Beta 3M P-238 BT SPR-1 P-240 BT WPT/DTP P-241 BT BREM B TRI MTP-LB MT-LB PI BRM Sova/ MP-21-25 BRM 30 1W-13-16 AFMS TAB-71 A R-381 T TERA-71-L R-330 P AR Beta 3M MTP-LB TAB-77 A TERA-77-L RCH-84 PCOMA TABC-79 AR A-POMA TAB TCG-80 MLVM AR 2. Existing types of armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes are: WARRIOR RA BMP-1 KSh REP 9S743 REC PRP-3, -4 MP-31 BMP-1 MTP B MP-31 SVO DTB-80 VPV IRM MTP BREM-4, -2,-D BMD-1 KSh BRM-1 KSh

IN

EUROPE TREATY  623

624  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3. Existing types of primary trainer aircraft which are designed and constructed for primary flying training and which may possess only limited armament capability necessary for basic training in weapon delivery techniques are: Alpha Jet E I-22 C-101 Aviojet IAR-99 Fouga L-29 Hawk L-39 Jet Provost TS-11 L-39 MB-326 PD-808 T-2 T-33/CT-133 T-37 T-38 4. Existing types of combat support helicopters are: A-109 Hirundo IAR-316 AB-412 IAR-330 Alouette II Mi-2 Alouette III Mi-6 Blackhawk Mi-8/Mi-17 Bell 47/AB 47/Sioux BO-105 CH53 Chinook Fennec AS 555 A Hughes 300 Hughes 500/OH-6 Mi-8 OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136 Puma Sea King UH-1A/1B/AB-204 UH-1D/1H/AB-205 UH-1N/AB-212 Wessex 5. Existing types of unarmed transport helicopters which are not equipped for the employment of weapons are: AB 47 Mi-2 AB-412 Mi-26 Alouette II SA-365N Dauphin CH53 W-3 Sokol Chinook Cougar AS 532 U Dauphin AS 365 N1 Hughes 300 NH 500 Puma Sea King/H-3F/HAR 3 SH-3D UH-1D/1H/AB-205 UH-1N/AB-212

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  625

6. Existing types of armoured vehicle launched bridges are: M47 AVLB MTU M48 AVLB MT-20 M60 AVLB MT-55A Centurion AVLB MTU-72 Chieftain AVLB BLG-60 Brueckenlegepanzer Biber/Leopard 1 AVLB BLG-67M BLG-67M2 Section III. Technical Data and Photographs 1.Technical data, in accordance with the agreed categories in the Annex to this Protocol, together with photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front views for each of its existing types of conventional armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall be provided by each State Party to all other States Parties at the signature of the Treaty. In addition, photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes shall include a view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which distinguishes this particular vehicle as a look-alike. Photographs in addition to those required by this paragraph may be provided at the discretion of each State Party. 2. Each existing type of conventional armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall have a model or version of that type designated as an exemplar. Photographs shall be provided for each such designated exemplar pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section. Photographs shall not be required of models and versions of a type that have no significant externally observable differences from the exemplar of that type.The photographs of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the existing type designation and national nomenclature for all models and versions of the type that the photographs of the exemplar represent. The photographs of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the technical data for that type in accordance with the agreed categories in the Annex to this Protocol. In addition, the annotation shall indicate all models and versions of the type that the photographs of the exemplar represent. Such technical data shall be annotated on the side view photograph. Section IV. Updates of Existing Types Lists and Obligations of the States Parties 1.This Protocol constitutes agreement by the States Parties only with respect to existing types of conventional armaments and equipment as well as with respect to the categories of technical data set forth in Sections I and II of the Annex to this Protocol. 2. Each State Party shall be responsible for the accuracy of technical data for only its own conventional armaments and equipment provided in accordance with Section III of this Protocol. 3. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, upon the entry into service with the armed forces of that State Party within the area of application, of: (a) any new type of conventional armaments and equipment which meets one of the definitions in Article II of the Treaty or which falls under a category listed in this Protocol, and (b) any new model or version of a type listed in this Protocol. At the same time, each State Party shall provide all other States Parties with the technical data and photographs required by Section III of this Protocol. 4. As soon as possible, and in any case no later than 60 days following a notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the States Parties shall initiate update actions, in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article XVI of the Treaty and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, for the lists of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment in Sections I and II of this Protocol.

626  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Annex to the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Section I. Agreed Categories of Technical Data The following are agreed categories of technical data for each model and version of existing types of conventional armaments and equipment: 1. Battle Tanks Existing Type National Nomenclature Main Gun Calibre Unladen Weight 2. Armoured Combat Vehicles Armoured Personnel Carriers Existing Type National Nomenclature Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles Existing Type National Nomenclature Type and Calibre of Armaments Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles Existing Type National Nomenclature Main Gun Calibre Unladen Weight 3. Artillery Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers Existing Type National Nomenclature Calibre Mortars Existing Type National Nomenclature Calibre Multiple Launch Rocket Systems Existing Type National Nomenclature Calibre 4. Combat Aircraft Existing Type National Nomenclature 5. Attack Helicopters Existing Type National Nomenclature 6. Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes Existing Type National Nomenclature Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  627

7. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes Existing Type National Nomenclature Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any 8. Primary Trainer Aircraft Existing Type National Nomenclature Type of Armaments, if any 9. Combat Support Helicopters Existing Type National Nomenclature 10. Unarmed Transport Helicopters Existing Type National Nomenclature 11. Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges Existing Type National Nomenclature Section II. Specifications for Photographs Photographs provided pursuant to Section III of this Protocol shall be in black and white. The use of flash and lighting equipment shall be allowed.The object being photographed shall contrast with the background of the photograph.All photographs shall be of high definition, with continuous tone and in sharp focus. Photographs measuring 13 centimetres by 18 centimetres, not including a border, shall be provided. For aspects other than overhead, all photographs shall be taken from the same level as the equipment being photographed, with the camera placed along or perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object being photographed; for the top view, photographs shall show the top and may show the rear aspects of the equipment.The object being photographed shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph in either horizontal or vertical aspect. A reference gauge shall be included in each photograph together with the object.The gauge shall have alternating half-metre sections in black and white. It shall be long enough to provide accurate scaling and shall be placed on or against the object or in close proximity to it. Each photograph shall be labelled to provide the information required by Section III, paragraph 2 of this Protocol as well as the date when the photograph was taken.

PROTOCOL

PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE RECLASSIFICATION OF SPECIFIC MODELS OR VERSIONS COMBAT-C APABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT INTO UNARMED TRAINER AIRCRAFT ON

OF

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and provisions governing total disarming and certification of the unarmed status of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

628  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Section I. General Provisions 1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty only those specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol. (A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol that have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol only by total disarming and certification. (B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol that do not have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol by certification alone. 2. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty until such aircraft have been certified as unarmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty no more than 550 such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the MiG-25U model or version. 3. No later than entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of: (A) the total number of each specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party intends to disarm and certify in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), Section III and Section IV of this Protocol; and (B) the total number of each specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party intends to certify alone, in accordance with Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) and Section IV of this Protocol. 4. Each State Party shall use whatever technological means it deems necessary to implement the total disarming procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol. Section II. Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft Eligible for Total Disarming and Certification 1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol only the following specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft: SU-15U, SU-17U, MiG15U, MiG-21U, MiG-23U, MiG-25U, UIL-28 2. The foregoing list of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft is final and not subject to revision. Section III. Procedures for Total Disarming 1. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft being totally disarmed shall be rendered incapable of further employment of any type of weapon system as well as further operation of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems by the removal of the following components: (A) provisions specifically for the attachment of weapon systems, such as special hardpoints, launching devices, or weapon mounting areas; (B) units and panels of weapon control systems including weapon selection, arming and firing or launching systems;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  629

(C) units of aiming equipment and weapon guidance systems not integral to navigation and flight control systems; and (D) units and panels of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems including associated antennae. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Section, any special hardpoints which are integral to the aircraft, as well as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which are designed for use only with the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, shall be rendered incapable of further employment with such systems. Electrical circuits of the weapon, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance systems described in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be rendered incapable of further employment by removal of the wiring or, if that is not technically practicable, by cutting out sections of the wiring in accessible areas. 3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information, no less than 42 days in advance of the total disarming of the first aircraft of each model or version of combatcapable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol: (A) a basic block diagram portraying all major components of weapon systems including aiming equipment and weapon guidance systems, provisions designed for the attachment of weapons as well as components of electronic warfare and reconnaissance systems, the basic function of the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, and the functional connections of such components to each other; (B) a general description of the disarming process including a list of components to be removed; and (C) a photograph of each component to be removed illustrating its position in the aircraft prior to its removal, and a photograph of the same position after the corresponding component has been removed. Section IV. Procedures for Certification 1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify, or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not possess any of the components listed in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first certification of an aircraft that does not require total disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the certification shall provide to all other States Parties the information required in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this Protocol for an armed model or version of the same aircraft type. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. 4.The process of total disarming and certification, or certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and reclassification provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved.

630  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification. 6. Certification shall be conducted in the area of application. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification. Section V. Procedures for Information Exchange and Verification All models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft certified as unarmed shall be subject to information exchange, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and verification, including inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Section I. General Requirements for Reduction 1. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol and the other protocols listed in Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty.Any one of such procedures shall be deemed sufficient, when conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Treaty or this Protocol, to carry out reduction. 2. Each State Party shall have the right to use any technological means it deems appropriate to implement the procedures for reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to remove, retain and use those components and parts of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are not themselves subject to reduction in accordance with the provisions of Section II of this Protocol, and to dispose of debris. 4. Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol, conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced so as to preclude their further use or restoration for military purposes. 5.After entry into force of the Treaty, additional procedures for reduction may be proposed by any State Party. Such proposals shall be communicated to all other States Parties and shall provide the details of such procedures in the same format as the procedures set forth in this Protocol.Any such procedures shall be deemed sufficient to carry out the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty upon a decision to that effect by the Joint Consultative Group. Section II. Standards for Presentation at Reduction Sites 1. Each item of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which is to be reduced shall be presented at a reduction site. Each such item shall consist, at a minimum, of the following parts and elements: (A) for battle tanks: the hull, turret and integral main armament. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament of a battle tank shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion mounts;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  631

(B) for armoured combat vehicles: the hull, turret and integral main armament, if any. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament of an armoured combat vehicle shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion mounts. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament shall be deemed not to include machine guns of less than 20 millimetre calibre, all of which may be salvaged; (C) for artillery: the tube, breech system, cradle including trunnions and trunnion mounts, trails, if any; or launcher tubes or launcher rails and their bases; or mortar tubes and their base plates. In the case of self-propelled pieces of artillery, the vehicle hull and turret, if any, shall also be presented; (D) for combat aircraft: the fuselage; and (E) for attack helicopters: the fuselage, including the transmission mounting area. 2. In each case, the item presented at the reduction site in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall consist of a complete assembly. 3. Parts and elements of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, as well as parts and elements which are not affected by reduction under the procedures of this Protocol, including the turrets of armoured personnel carriers equipped only with machine guns, may be disposed of as the State Party undertaking the reduction decides. Section III. Procedures for Reduction of Battle Tanks by Destruction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of battle tanks at reduction sites. 2. Procedure for destruction by severing: (A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of onboard armament systems; (B) removal of the turret, if any; (C) for the gun breech system, either: (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; (D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; (E) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; (F) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and (G) severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that, the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions. 3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: (A) hull, hatches and cornerplates shall be open to maximise venting; (B) an explosive charge shall be placed inside the gun tube where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle;

632  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(C) an explosive charge shall be placed on the outside of the hull between the second and third road wheels, or between the third and fourth road wheels in a six road wheel configuration, avoiding natural weaknesses such as welds or escape hatches.The charge must be located within the radius of the turret casting.A second charge shall be placed on the inside of the hull on the same side of the tank, offset and opposite to the external charge; (D) an explosive charge shall be placed on the inside of the turret casting in the area of the main armament mounting; and (E) all charges shall be fired simultaneously so that the main hull and turret are cracked and distorted; the breech block is stripped from the gun tube, fused or deformed; the gun tube is split or longitudinally cut; the gun mount or cradle is ruptured so as to be unable to mount a gun tube; and damage is caused to the running gear so that at least one of the road wheel stations is destroyed. 4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: (A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of onboard armament systems; (B) removal of the turret, if any; (C) for the gun breech system, either: (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; (D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; (E) severing of either of the gun trunnions; and (F) the hull and turret shall be deformed so that their widths are each reduced by at least 20 percent. 5. Procedure for destruction by smashing: (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret in at least one place; (B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and (C) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent. Section IV. Procedures for the Reduction of Armoured Combat Vehicles by Destruction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites. 2. Procedure for destruction by severing: (A) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems; (B) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  633

(C) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the front wheel final gearbox mounting areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the front wheel final gearbox mounting areas are included in the severed portions at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts; and (D) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles: (1) removal of the turret; (2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; (3) for the gun breech system: (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or (c) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts; (4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; and (5) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle. 3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: (A) an explosive charge shall be placed on the interior floor at the mid-point of the vehicle; (B) a second explosive charge shall be placed as follows: (1) for heavy armament combat vehicles, inside the gun where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle; (2) for armoured infantry fighting vehicles, on the exterior of the receiver/breech area and lower barrel group; (C) all hatches shall be secured; and (D) the charges shall be detonated simultaneously so as to split the sides and top of the hull. For heavy armament combat vehicles and armoured infantry fighting vehicles, damage to the gun system shall be equivalent to that specified in paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) of this Section. 4. Procedure for destruction by smashing: (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and the turret, if any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret, if any, in one place; (B) in addition, for heavy armament combat vehicles: (1) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and shall deform visibly the breech ring; and (2) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent. Section V. Procedures for the Reduction of Artillery by Destruction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems or mortars at reduction sites.

634  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

2. Procedure for destruction by severing of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, or mortars, that are not self-propelled: (A) removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar; (B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, either: (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; (C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; (D) severing of the left trunnion of the cradle and the mounting area of that trunnion in the upper carriage; and (E) severing of the trails, or the base plate of the mortar, into two approximately equal parts. 3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers that are not self-propelled: (A) explosive charges shall be placed in the tube, on one cradle mount in the upper carriage and on the trails, and detonated so that: (1) the tube is split or longitudinally torn within 1.5 metres of the breech; (2) the breech block is torn off, deformed or partially melted; (3) the attachments between the tube and the breech ring and between one of the trunnions of the cradle and the upper carriage are destroyed or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative; and (4) the trails are separated into two approximately equal parts or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative. 4. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of mortars that are not self-propelled: explosive charges shall be placed in the mortar tube and on the base plate so that, when the charges are detonated, the mortar tube is ruptured in its lower half and the base plate is severed into two approximately equal parts. 5. Procedure for destruction by deformation of mortars that are not self-propelled: (A) the mortar tube shall be visibly bent approximately at its mid-point; and (B) the base plate shall be bent approximately on the centreline at an angle of at least 45 degrees. 6. Procedure for destruction by severing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: (A) removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar; (B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, either: (1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  635

(C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; (D) severing of the left trunnion and trunnion mount; and (E) severing of sections of both sides from the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions. 7. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: (A) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars with a turret: the method specified for battle tanks in Section III, paragraph 3 of this Protocol shall be applied in order to achieve results equivalent to those specified in that provision; and (B) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars without a turret: an explosive charge shall be placed in the hull under the forward edge of the traversing deck that supports the tube, and detonated so as to separate the deck plate from the hull. For the destruction of the weapon system, the method specified for guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers in paragraph 3 of this Section shall be applied in order to achieve results equivalent to those specified in that provision. 8. Procedure for destruction by smashing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: (A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate places and the turret in at least one place; (B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and (C) the tube shall be visibly cracked or bent at approximately its mid-point. 9. Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple launch rocket systems: (A) removal of special equipment from the multiple launch rocket system, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of its combat systems; and (B) removal of tubes or launch rails, screws (gears) of elevation mechanism sectors, tube bases or launch rail bases and their rotatable parts and severing them into two approximately equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints. 10. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of multiple launch rocket systems: a linear shaped charge shall be placed across the tubes or launcher rails, and tube or launcher rail bases. When detonated, the charge shall sever the tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and their rotatable parts, into two approximately equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints. 11. Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple launch rocket systems: all tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and the sighting system shall be visibly bent at approximately the mid-point. Section VI. Procedures for the Reduction of Combat Aircraft by Destruction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of combat aircraft at reduction sites.

636  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

2. Procedure for destruction by severing: the fuselage of the aircraft shall be divided into three parts not on assembly joints by severing its nose immediately forward of the cockpit and its tail in the central wing section area so that assembly joints, if there are any in the areas to be severed, shall be contained in the severed portions. 3. Procedure for destruction by deformation: the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression, so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent. 4. Procedure for destruction by use as target drones: (A) each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as target drones no more than 200 combat aircraft during the 40 month reduction period; (B) the target drone shall be destroyed in flight by munitions fired by the armed forces of the State Party owning the target drone; (C) if the attempt to shoot down the target drone fails and it is subsequently destroyed by a selfdestruct mechanism, the procedures of this paragraph shall continue to apply. Otherwise the target drone may be recovered or may be claimed destroyed by accident in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, depending on the circumstances; and (D) notification of destruction shall be made to all other States Parties. Such notification shall include the type of the destroyed target drone and the location where it was destroyed.Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party claiming such reduction shall send documentary evidence, such as a report of the investigation, to all other States Parties. In the event of ambiguities relating to the destruction of a particular target drone, reduction shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the matter. Section VII. Procedures for the Reduction of Attack Helicopters by Destruction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of attack helicopters at reduction sites. 2. Procedure for destruction by severing: (A) the tail boom or tail part shall be severed from the fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the severed portion; and (B) at least two transmission mounts on the fuselage shall be severed, fused or deformed. 3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: any type and number of explosives may be used so that, at a minimum, after detonation the fuselage is cut into two pieces through that section of the fuselage that contains the transmission mounting area. 4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent. Section VIII. Rules and Procedures for Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty by Conversion for Non-military Purposes 1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce a certain number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles by conversion.The types of vehicles that may be converted are listed in paragraph 3 of this Section and the specific non-military purposes for which they may be converted are listed in paragraph 4 of this Section. Converted vehicles shall not be placed in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party. 2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert.This number shall not exceed: (A) for battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 battle tanks) of the maximum level for holdings of battle tanks it notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items whichever is the greater; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  637

(B) for armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the maximum level for holdings of armoured combat vehicles it notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items whichever is the greater. 3.The following vehicles may be converted for non-military purposes:T-54,T-55,T-62,T-64,T-72, Leopard 1, BMP-1, BTR-60, OT-64. The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of vehicles which may be converted to nonmilitary purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. 4. Such vehicles shall be converted for the following specific non-military purposes: (A) general purpose prime movers; (B) bulldozers; (C) fire fighting vehicles; (D) cranes; (E) power unit vehicles; (F) mineral fine crushing vehicles; (G) quarry vehicles; (H) rescue vehicles; (I) casualty evacuation vehicles; (J) transportation vehicles; (K) oil rig vehicles; (L) oil and chemical product spill cleaning vehicles; (M) tracked ice breaking prime movers; (N) environmental vehicles. The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of specific non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. 5. On entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles that it plans to convert in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Notification of a State Party’s intention to carry out conversion in accordance with this Section shall be given to all other States Parties at least 15 days in advance in accordance with Section X, paragraph 5 of the Protocol on Inspection. It shall specify the number and types of vehicles to be converted, the starting date and completion date of conversion, as well as the specific non-military purpose vehicles to emerge after conversion. 6. The following procedures shall be carried out before conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites: (A) for battle tanks: (1) removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems; (2) removal of the turret, if any; (3) for the gun breech system, either:

638  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; (4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; (5) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; and (6) cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour beginning from the front glacis to the middle of the hull turret aperture, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of no less than 200 millimetres (for the T-64 and T-72, no less than 100 millimetres) below the level of the hull top armour, as well as the associated portion of the front glacis plate severed at the same height.The severed portion of this front glacis plate shall consist of no less than the upper third; and (B) for armoured combat vehicles: (1) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board armament systems; (2) for rear-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour from the front glacis to the bulkhead of the engine-transmission compartment, together with the associated portions of the side and front armour at a height of no less than 300 millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment; (3) for front-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour plate from the bulkhead of the engine-transmission compartment to the rear of the vehicle, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of no less than 300 millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment ; and (4) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles: (a) removal of the turret; (b) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; (c) for the gun breech system: (i) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; (ii) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or (iii) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts; and (d) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring. 7. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles being reduced pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be deemed reduced upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section and notification in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. 8. Vehicles reduced pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section shall remain subject to notification pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange until final conversion for nonmilitary purposes has been completed and notification has been made in accordance with Section X, paragraph 12 of the Protocol on Inspection. 9.Vehicles undergoing final conversion for non-military purposes shall also be subject to inspection in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, with the following changes:

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  639

(A) the process of final conversion at a reduction site shall not be subject to inspection; and (B) all other States Parties shall have the right to inspect fully converted vehicles, without right of refusal, upon receipt of a notification from the State Party conducting final conversion specifying when final conversion procedures will be completed. 10. If, having completed the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall be destroyed within the time limits for conversion set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol. Section IX. Procedure in the Event of Destruction by Accident 1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its reduction liability for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5 percent of the maximum levels for holdings it notified at the signature of the Treaty for that category. 2. An item of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed reduced, in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty, if the accident in which it was destroyed is notified to all other States Parties within seven days of its occurrence. Notification shall include the type of the destroyed item, the date of the accident, the approximate location of the accident and the circumstances related to the accident. 3. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party claiming such reduction shall provide documentary evidence, such as a report of the investigation, to all other States Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. In the event of ambiguities relating to the accident, such reduction shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the matter. Section X. Procedure for Reduction by Means of Static Display 1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by means of static display a certain number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more than one percent or eight items, whichever is the greater number, of its maximum levels for holdings it declared at the signature of the Treaty for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, each State Party also shall have the right to retain in working order two items of each existing type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for the purpose of static display. Such conventional armaments and equipment shall be displayed at museums or other similar sites. 4. Conventional armaments and equipment placed on static display or in museums prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including the numerical limitations set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section. 5. Such items to be reduced by means of static display shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites: (A) all items to be displayed that are powered by self-contained engines shall have their fuel tanks rendered incapable of holding fuel and: (1) have their engine(s) and transmission removed and their mounts damaged so that these pieces cannot be refitted; or (2) have their engine compartment filled with concrete or a polymer resin; (B) all items to be displayed equipped with 75 millimetre or larger guns with permanently fixed elevation and traversing mechanisms shall have their elevation and traversing mechanisms

640  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

welded so that the tube can be neither traversed nor elevated. In addition, those items to be displayed which use pinion and rack or pinion and ring mechanisms for traversing or elevating shall have three consecutive gear teeth cut off from the rack or ring on each side of the pinion of the gun tube; (C) all items to be displayed which are equipped with weapon systems that do not meet the criteria set forth in subparagraph (B) this paragraph shall have their barrel and receiver group filled with either concrete or a polymer resin, beginning at the face of the bolt/breech and ending within 100 millimetres of the muzzle. Section XI. Procedure for Reduction by Use as Ground Targets 1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets a certain number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and self-propelled pieces of artillery. 2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater than 2.5 percent of its maximum level for holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. In addition, no State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery. 3. Conventional armaments and equipment in use as ground targets prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V or VI of the Treaty, or to the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. Such items to be reduced by use as ground targets shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites: (A) for battle tanks and self-propelled pieces of artillery: (1) for the breech system, either: (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; (2) severing of either of the trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; and (3) severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, such that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions; and (B) for armoured combat vehicles: (1) for the gun breech system: (a) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; (b) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or (c) severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts; (2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; (3) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the severed portions; and (4) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the front wheel final gearbox mounting areas by vertical, horizontal and irreg-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  641

ular cuts in the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the front wheel final gear box mounting areas are included in the severed portions at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts. Section XII. Procedure for Reduction by Use for Ground Instructional Purposes 1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use for ground instructional purposes a certain number of combat aircraft and attack helicopters. 2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack helicopters greater than five percent of its maximum level for holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. 3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in use for ground instructional purposes prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Article IV,V or VI of the Treaty, or the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2 of this Section. 4. Such items to be reduced by use for ground instructional purposes shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites: (A) for combat aircraft: (1) severing of the fuselage into two parts in the central wing area; (2) removal of engines, mutilation of engine mounting points and either filling of all fuel tanks with concrete, polymer or resin setting compounds or removal of the fuel tanks and mutilation of the fuel tank mounting points; or (3) removal of all internal, external and removable armament and armament systems equipment, removal of the tail fin and mutilation of the tail fin mounting points, and filling of all but one fuel tank with concrete, polymer or resin setting compounds; and (B) for attack helicopters: severing of the tail boom or tail part from the fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the severed portion.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE C ATEGORISATION OF C OMBAT H ELICOPTERS AND THE R ECATEGORISATION OF MULTI-PURPOSE ATTACK HELICOPTERS The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and provisions governing the categorisation of combat helicopters and recategorisation of multi-purpose attack helicopters as provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Section I. General Requirements for the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters 1. Combat helicopters shall be categorised as specialised attack, multi-purpose attack or combat support helicopters and shall be listed as such in the Protocol on Existing Types. 2. All models or versions of a specialised attack helicopter type shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological

642  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. 4. Each State Party that holds both combat support and multi-purpose attack models or versions of a helicopter type shall categorise as attack helicopters all helicopters which have any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol and shall have the right to categorise as combat support helicopters any helicopters that have none of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 5. Each State Party that holds only combat support models or versions of a helicopter type included on both the Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopter and the Combat Support Helicopter lists in the Protocol on Existing Types shall have the right to categorise such helicopters as combat support helicopters. Section II. General Requirements for Recategorisation 1. Only combat helicopters that are categorised as multi- purpose attack helicopters in accordance with the categorisation requirements set forth in this Protocol shall be eligible for recategorisation as combat support helicopters. 2. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that have any of the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol only by conversion and certification. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that do not have any of the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol by certification alone. 3. Each State Party shall use whatever technological means it deems necessary to implement the conversion procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol. 4. Each combat helicopter subject to the recategorisation procedure shall bear the original manufacturer’s serial number permanently stamped in a main airframe structural member. Section III. Procedures for Conversion 1. Multi-purpose attack helicopters being converted shall be rendered incapable of further employment of guided weapons by the removal of the following components: (A) provisions specifically for the attachment of guided weapons, such as special hardpoints or launching devices. Any such special hardpoints which are integral to the helicopter, as well as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which are designed for use only by guided weapons, shall be rendered incapable of further employment with guided weapons; and (B) all integrated fire control and aiming systems for guided weapons, including wiring. 2. A State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information, either at least 42 days in advance of the conversion of the first helicopter of a type or at entry into force of the Treaty in the event that a State Party declares both multi-purpose attack helicopters and combat support helicopters of the same type: (A) a basic block diagram portraying all major components of guided weapon integrated fire control and aiming systems as well as components of equipment designed for the attachment of guided weapons, the basic function of the components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, and the functional connections of such components to each other; (B) a general description of the conversion process, including a list of components to be removed; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  643

(C) a photograph of each component to be removed, illustrating its position in the helicopter prior to its removal, and a photograph of the same position after the corresponding component has been removed. Section IV. Procedures for Certification 1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose attack helicopters shall comply with the following certification procedures, in order to ensure that such helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of each certification in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of helicopters in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. 4.The process of recategorisation shall be deemed complete when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and recategorisation process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved. 5.The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification and recategorisation. 6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification. Section V. Procedures for Information Exchange and Verification All combat helicopters within the area of application shall be subject to information exchange in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange and verification, including inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

PROTOCOL

ON

NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF I NFORMATION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and provisions regarding notification and exchange of information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Section I. Information on the Structure of Each State Party’s Land Forces and Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces within the Area of Application 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information about the structure of its land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the area of application: (A) the command organisation of its land forces, specifying the designation and subordination of all combat, combat support and combat service support formations and units at each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level, including air defence

644  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated; and (B) the command organisation of its air and air defence aviation forces, specifying the designation and subordination of formations and units at each level of command down to wing/air regiment or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the wing/air regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the wing/air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated. Section II. Information on the Overall Holdings in Each Category of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on: (A) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and (B) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery limited by the Treaty in each of the areas described in Articles IV and V of the Treaty. Section III. Information on the Location, Numbers and Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment in Service with the Conventional Armed Forces of the States Parties 1. For each of its formations and units notified pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information: (A) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) battle tanks; (2) armoured combat vehicles; (3) artillery; (4) combat aircraft; and (5) attack helicopters; (B) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of the conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of: (1) combat support helicopters; (2) unarmed transport helicopters; (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying those in active units; (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  645

(6) primary trainer aircraft; (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty 7; (C) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units, other than those notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) this paragraph, at which the following categories of conventional armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) combat support helicopters; (2) unarmed transport helicopters; (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges; (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; (6) primary trainer aircraft; (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty 8; and (D) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) in each category specified above; and, in the case of armoured vehicle launched bridges, those which are in active units. 2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation forces, specifying: (A) the designation and peacetime location of its formations and units down to the level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or are independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) battle tanks; (2) armoured combat vehicles; (3) artillery; (4) combat aircraft; and (5) attack helicopters; and (B) the holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of: 7 8

Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation. Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

646  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(1) combat support helicopters; (2) unarmed transport helicopters; (3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying those in active units; (4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; (6) primary trainer aircraft; (7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty. 9 3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information: (A) the location of its designated permanent storage sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section held at such sites; (B) the location of its military storage sites not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification, independent repair and maintenance units, military training establishments and military airfields, specifying geographic name and coordinates, at which conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section are held or routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each category at such locations; and (C) the location of its sites at which the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by type in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a reduction site. Section IV. Information on the Location and Numbers of Battle Tanks, Armoured Combat Vehicles, Artillery, Combat Aircraft and Attack Helicopters within the Area of Application but Not in Service with Conventional Armed Forces 1. Each State Party shall provide information to all other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application not in service with its conventional armed forces but of potential military significance. (A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the following information: (1) in respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by organisations down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in these categories held by each such organisation; (2) in respect of its armoured personnel carriers, heavy armament combat vehicles and multipurpose attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the aggregate numbers in each category of such armaments and equipment in each administrative region or division; 9

Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  647

(3) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; (4) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, an identifiable location of each site at which there are normally more than a total of 15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery or more than five combat aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters which are, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (E) of the Treaty, awaiting or are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, the numbers of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.The States Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, agree as to the form in which the information on the numbers shall be provided pursuant to this provision; (5) in respect of its battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles which have been reduced and are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; and (6) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of research and development pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol the aggregate numbers in each category of such conventional armaments and equipment. Section V. Information on Objects of Verification and Declared Sites 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information specifying its objects of verification, including the total number and the designation of each object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing the following information on each site: (A) the site’s designation and location, including geographic name and coordinates; (B) the designation of all objects of verification, as specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J) of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being understood that subordinate elements at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment or wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each other or of the headquarters immediately superior to such elements may be deemed as not separately located, if the distance between such separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres; (C) the overall numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by each object of verification, as well as those belonging to any object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation of each such object of verification; (D) in addition, for each such declared site, the number of conventional armaments and equipment not in service with its conventional armed forces, indicating those that are:

648  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(1) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting conversion pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction; and (2) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; (E) declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export and temporarily retained within the area of application or used exclusively for research and development shall be identified as such, and the aggregate numbers in each category at that site shall be provided; and (F) point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared site, including geographic name and coordinates. Section VI. Information on the Location of Sites from which Conventional Armaments and Equipment Have Been Withdrawn 1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, information about the locations of sites which have been notified previously as declared sites from which all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations of these sites shall be notified for three years following such withdrawal. Section VII. Timetable for the Provision of Information in Sections I to V of This Protocol 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this Protocol as follows: (A) upon signature of the Treaty, with information effective as of that date; and, no later than 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group any necessary corrections to its information reported pursuant to Sections III, IV and V of this Protocol. Such corrected information shall be deemed information provided at Treaty signature and valid as of that date; (B) 30 days following entry into force of the Treaty, with information effective as of the date of entry into force; (C) on the 15th day of December of the year in which the Treaty comes into force (unless entry into force occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December), and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year; and (D) following completion of the 40-month reduction period specified in Article VIII of the Treaty, with information effective as of that date. Section VIII. Information on Changes in Organisational Structures or Force Levels 1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of: (A) any permanent change in the organisational structure of its conventional armed forces within the area of application as notified pursuant to Section I of this Protocol at least 42 days in advance of that change; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  649

(B) any change of 10 percent or more in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service support formations and units down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol since the last annual exchange of information. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such change occurs, indicating actual holdings after the notified change. Section IX. Information on the Entry into and Removal from Service with the Conventional Armed Forces of a State Party of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol: (A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which entered into service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months; and (B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which have been removed from service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months. Section X. Information on Entry into and Exit from the Area of Application of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty in Service with the Conventional Armed Forces of the States Parties 1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol: (A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have entered the area of application within the last 12 months and whether any of these armaments and equipment were organised in a formation or unit; (B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have been removed from, and remain outside of, the area of application within the last 12 months and the last reported locations within the area of application of such conventional armaments and equipment; and (C) conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application which exit and re-enter the area of application, including for such as training or military activities, within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the reporting provisions in this Section. Section XI. Conventional Armaments and Equipment in Transit through the Area of Application 1.The provisions of this Protocol shall not apply to conventional armaments and equipment that are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application. Conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which entered the area of application in transit shall be reported pursuant to this Protocol if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days.

650  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Section XII. Format for the Provision of Information 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information specified in this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to the Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. Section XIII. Other Notifications Pursuant to the Treaty 1. After signature of the Treaty and prior to its entry into force, the Joint Consultative Group shall develop a document relating to notifications required by the Treaty. Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to this document, including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.

Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in accordance with the formats specified in this Annex.The information in each data listing shall be provided in mechanically or electronically printed form and in one of the six official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In each table (column a), each data entry shall be assigned a sequential line number. 2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page showing the name of the State Party providing the listings, the language in which the listings are being provided, the date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the effective date of the information set forth in the listings. Section I. Information on the Structure of Land Forces and Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces within the Area of Application 1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the command organisation of its land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings as set forth in Chart I. 2.The data listings shall be provided beginning at the highest level and proceeding through each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or their equivalent. For example, a military district/army/corps would be followed by any subordinate independent regiments, independent battalions, depots, training establishments, then each subordinate division with its regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be followed for air and air defence aviation forces. (A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b) by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record number) which shall be used on subsequent listings with that organisation and for all subsequent information exchanges; its national designation (i.e., name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions, brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery, fighter, bomber, supply); and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  651

(B) for each organisation, the two levels of command within the area of application immediately superior to that organisation shall be designated (columns d and e). Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Section II. Information on Overall Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Subject to Numerical Limitations Pursuant to Articles IV and V of the Treaty 1. Pursuant to Section II of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV and V of the Treaty (column b), and on its overall holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV of the Treaty (column b). 2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and their number (column f/e) and type (column e/d) in each of these subcategories (column d/c). 3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery and armoured vehicle launched bridges, stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total of such equipment in designated permanent storage sites shall be specified (column g). Chart IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Chart IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Section III. Information on the Location, Numbers, and Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment in Service with the Conventional Armed Forces 1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data listing of all its land forces’ and air and air defence aviation forces’ organisations reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1 of the Protocol, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and installations at which conventional armaments and equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3 of the Protocol. 2. For each organisation and installation, the information shall reflect: (A) the formation or unit record number (column b) and designation of the organisation (column c) reported in Chart I. Separately located battalions/squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and installations listed in accordance with Section III, paragraph 3 of the Protocol shall also be given a unique formation or unit record number (column b), and their national designation (i.e., name) (column c) shall be provided.Their position on the listing shall reflect their subordination with the exception of formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol, which shall be specified together at the conclusion of the listing: (1) designated permanent storage sites shall be identified with the notation “DPSS” following the national designation; and (2) reduction sites shall be identified with the notation “reduction” following the national designation;

652  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(B) location (column d), including the geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds. For locations containing stationed forces, the host State Party shall also be included; (C) for each level of command from the highest down to the division/air division level, the overall total of conventional armaments and equipment in each category (columns f to m/l). For example, the overall total held by a division would be the sum of the holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and (D) for each level of command at the division level and below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the number of conventional armaments and equipment by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA and IIIB (columns f to m/l). In the armoured combat vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the subcategories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the attack helicopter column (column k/i), the subcategories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose attack) shall be presented separately. The column (l) labelled “other” in Chart IIIB shall include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and air defence aviation forces. Chart IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Section IV. Information on Conventional Armaments and Equipment not in Service with the Conventional Armed Forces Provided Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange 1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the location, number and type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application but not in service with its conventional armed forces. 2. For each location, the information shall reflect: (A) the provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant to which the information is being provided (column b); (B) the location (column c): (1) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph A), subsubparagraphs (1), (3) and (5) of the Protocol, the geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing such equipment; and (2) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, the national designation of the administrative region or division containing such equipment; (C) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1) and (2) of the Protocol, the national-level designation of organisations holding the equipment specified (column c); and (D) for each location, the number by type under the headings specified in Chart IV (columns d to h), except as follows: in respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  653

IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, only the numbers in each category shall be provided solely for the administrative region or division specified (column c). Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Section V. Information on Objects of Verification and Declared Sites 1. Pursuant to Section V of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in alphabetical order. 2. Information about each declared site shall include: (A) a unique designator (i.e., declared site record number) (column b) which shall be used with that site for all subsequent information exchanges; (B) the site’s name and location using geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column c). For locations containing objects of verification of stationed forces, the host State Party shall also be included; (C) the point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared site (column d); (D) a unique sequential number and the designation and formation or unit record number of all objects of verification stationed at the declared site as specified in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the number assigned to the last object of verification appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party’s total number of objects of verification; and (E) the overall number of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of the Protocol held at the declared site and by each object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying, in addition: (1) conventional armaments and equipment held in each category on the declared site belonging to an object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation and formation or unit record number of each such object of verification (column e); and (2) conventional armaments and equipment not belonging to an object of verification shall be identified with the following notations immediately following/below each such entry in columns f to p: (a) equipment held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, with the notation “security”; (b) decommissioned equipment, with the notation “decommissioned”; (c) equipment awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export, with the notation “export”; (d) reduced equipment awaiting conversion, with the notation “reduced”; and (e) equipment used exclusively for research and development, with the notation “research.” Chart V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) 3. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of entry/exit (Chart VI).The listing shall assign a unique sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C) of this Section.The location shall include the geographic name (column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10

654  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation acceptable—”air,” “sea,” “ground”—for each point of entry/exit also shall be specified (column e). Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)

PROTOCOL

ON I NSPECTION

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Section I. Definitions 1. For the purposes of the Treaty: (A) The term “inspected State Party” means a State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out in compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty: (1) in the case of inspection sites where only a stationing State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present, such a stationing State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and (2) in the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each such State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, each in respect of its own conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located. (B) The term “stationing State Party” means a State Party stationing conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces outside its own territory and within the area of application. (C) The term “host State Party” means a State Party receiving on its territory within the area of application conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of another State Party stationed by that State Party. (D) The term “inspecting State Party” means a State Party which requests and is therefore responsible for carrying out an inspection. (E) The term “inspector” means an individual designated by one of the States Parties to carry out an inspection and who is included on that State Party’s accepted list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol. (F) The term “transport crew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of a transportation means and who is included on a State Party’s accepted list of transport crew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol. (G) The term “inspection team” means a group of inspectors designated by an inspecting State Party to conduct a particular inspection. (H) The term “escort team” means a group of individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a particular inspection, as well as to assume other responsibilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the case of inspection of a stationing State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, an escort team shall

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  655

include individuals assigned by both the host and stationing States Parties, unless otherwise agreed between them. (I) The term “inspection site” means an area, location or facility where an inspection is carried out. (J) The term “object of verification” means: (1) any formation or unit at the organisational level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion, independent squadron or equivalent as well as any separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent unit at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at a location notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (2) any designated permanent storage site, military storage site not organic to formations and units referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this subparagraph, independent repair or maintenance unit, military training establishment or military airfield at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being permanently or routinely present; (3) a reduction site for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraph (C) of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (4) in the case of units below the level of battalion holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that are directly subordinate to a unit or formation above the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit or formation to which the units below the level of battalion are subordinated shall be considered an object of verification, if it has no subordinate unit or formation at the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent; and (5) a formation or unit holding conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, but not in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party shall not be considered an object of verification. (K) The term “military airfield” means a permanent military complex, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e., launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or subject to internal inspection is routinely performed. (L) The term “military training establishment” means a facility, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which a military unit or subunit using at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty is organised to train military personnel. (M) The term “military storage site” not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification means any storage site, other than designated permanent storage sites or sites subordinate to organisations designed and structured for internal security purposes, holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty without respect to organisational or operational status. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall constitute a portion of the permitted holdings counted in active units pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty. (N) The term “declared site” means a facility or precisely delineated geographic location which contains one or more objects of verification. A declared site shall consist of all territory within its man-made or natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as associated territory comprising firing ranges, training areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter airfields and

656  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

railroad loading facilities at which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified, combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present. (O) The term “specified area” means an area anywhere on the territory of a State Party within the area of application other than a site inspected pursuant to Section VII, IX or X of this Protocol within which a challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol. A specified area shall not exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line between any two points in that area shall exceed 16 kilometres. (P) The term “sensitive point” means any equipment, structure or location which has been designated to be sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party through the escort team and to which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or refused. (Q) The term “point of entry/exit” means a point designated by a State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out, through which inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the territory of that State Party and through which they depart from the territory of that State Party. (R) The term “in-country period” means the total time spent continuously on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out by an inspection team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit until the return of the inspection team to a point of entry/exit after completion of that inspection team’s last inspection. (S) The term “baseline validation period” means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the first 120 days following entry into force of the Treaty. (T) The term “reduction period” means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the three years following the 120-day baseline validation period. (U) The term “residual level validation period” means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period consisting of the 120 days following the three-year reduction period. (V) The term “residual period” means, for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time period following the 120-day residual level validation period for the duration of the Treaty. (W) The term “passive declared site inspection quota” means the total number of inspections of objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be obliged to receive within a specified time period at inspection sites where its objects of verification are located. (X) The term “passive challenge inspection quota” means the maximum number of challenge inspections within specified areas pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol that each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to receive within a specified time period. (Y) The term “active inspection quota” means the total number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be entitled to conduct within a specified time period. (Z) The term “certification site” means a clearly designated location where the certification of recategorised multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  657

accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification takes place. (AA) The term “calendar reporting period” means a period of time defined in days during which the intended reduction of the planned number of items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty is to be carried out. Section II. General Obligations 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State Party shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol. 2. In the case of conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party stationed in the area of application outside national territory, the host State Party and the stationing State Party shall, in fulfillment of their respective responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this Protocol.The stationing State Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces stationed on the territory of the host State Party. 3.The escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of the inspected State Party: (A) in the case of inspection sites at which only a stationing State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present and are under this State Party’s command, the escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of a representative of the stationing State Party for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where the stationing State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and (B) in the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of both the host State Party and the stationing State Party, the escort team shall be composed of representatives from both States Parties when conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party are actually inspected. During the inspection within that inspection site, the host State Party shall exercise the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party with the exception of those rights and obligations related to the inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party, which shall be exercised by this stationing State Party. 4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. 5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject to inspection only when that other State Party’s representative is on the escort team. 6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party. 7. No more than one inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol may be present at the same time at any one inspection site. 8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections during the in-country period.

658  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

9.Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection shall be borne by the inspecting State Party. 10. Each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection quota for each specified time period: a 120-day baseline validation period, a three-year reduction period, a 120-day residual level validation period and a residual period for the duration of the Treaty. The passive declared site inspection quota shall be determined for each specified time period as a percentage of that State Party’s objects of verification, excluding reduction sites and certification sites, located within the area of application of the Treaty: (A) during the first 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (B) during each year of the reduction period, after completion of the initial 120-day period, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 10 percent of a State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (C) during the first 120 days after completion of the three-year reduction period, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; and (D) each year, commencing after completion of the 120-day residual level validation period, for the duration of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 15 percent of a State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange. 11. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept challenge inspections as follows: (A) during the baseline validation period, during each year of the reduction period and during the residual level validation period, up to 15 percent of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification as well as of objects of verification belonging to stationing States Parties; and (B) during each year of the residual period, up to 23 percent of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification and of objects of verification belonging to stationing States Parties. 12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each year of its objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol. 13. Inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of that State Party whose object of verification is inspected. 14.The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol on the territory of a host State Party within a specified time period used to inspect objects of verification belonging to a stationing State Party shall be no greater than the proportion which that stationing State Party’s objects of verification constitute of the total number of objects of verification located on the territory of that host State Party. 15. The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of objects of verification within a specified time period on any State Party’s territory shall be calculated as a percentage of the total number of objects of verification present on that State Party’s territory.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  659

16. Inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol within one specified area shall count as one inspection against the passive challenge inspection quota and one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is conducted. 17. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and the inspection team, an inspection team’s in-country period shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number of hours calculated according to the following formula: (A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area; plus (B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area. 18. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 17 of this Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 24 hours in inspection within a specified area. 19. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the most expeditious means available. If the time between completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if the time between completion of the last inspection conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine hours, such excess time shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period. 20. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of objects of verification that are to be inspected during a specified time period on the territory of that State Party, whichever number is greater. 21. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of its objects of verification that are to be inspected during a specified time period, whichever number is greater. 22. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 20 and 21 of this Section, each State Party with military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol within any one of those military districts. 23. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site inspection quota in a calendar year from the same State Party. 24. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections within the area of application on the territory of other States Parties. However, no State Party shall conduct more than five inspections annually pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol of another State Party belonging to the same group of States Parties. Any such inspections shall count against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party being inspected. It shall otherwise be the responsibility solely of each group of States Parties to determine the allocation of inspections for each State Party within its group of States Parties. Each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties its active inspection quota:

660  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(A) for the baseline validation period, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty; (B) for the first year of the reduction period, no later than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and (C) for each subsequent year of the reduction period, for the residual level validation period and for each year of the residual period, no later than the 15th day of January preceding each such specified time period. Section III. Pre-inspection Requirements 1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section. 2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State Party or other States Parties. 3. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew members, containing the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 600 individuals. 4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided to it by other States Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall provide notification to the State Party providing that list of any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that list. 5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and transport crew members for whom deletion has not been requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section. 6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty. Thereafter, each State Party may once every six months propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors and transport crew members, provided that such amended lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. 7.A State Party may request, without right of refusal, deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided by any other State Party. 8. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter and remain in the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any other necessary documents shall be provided either: (A) within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months; or (B) within one hour after the arrival of the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for the duration of their inspection activities. 9.Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the transportation means of that State Party transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established international airways or other routes that

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  661

are agreed upon by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by airlines.The provisions of this paragraph relating to diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights. 10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in respect of each declared site with its objects of verification. Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to receive the transportation means of the inspecting State Party.At least one airport shall be notified as a point of entry/exit associated with each declared site.The location of any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 of this Protocol. 11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a change becomes effective. 12. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the official language or languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces. Section IV. Notification of Intent to Inspect 1.The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty. In the case of inspection of stationed conventional armed forces, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties. In the case of inspection of certification or reduction procedures carried out by a stationing State Party, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties. 2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include: (A) the point of entry/exit to be used; (B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) a statement of whether the first inspection shall be conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these; (E) the time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site; (F) the language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol; (G) the language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol; (H) the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number; and (I) the likely number of sequential inspections. 3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX and X of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96 hours in advance of

662  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include: (A) the point of entry/exit to be used; (B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) for each inspection at a reduction or certification site, reference to the notification provided pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 3 or Section X, paragraph 5 of this Protocol; (E) the language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol; (F) the language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol; and (G) the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. 4.The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours. Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B) or paragraph 3, subparagraph (B) of this Section. 5. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt send copies of such notification to all other States Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. 6. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out is unable to allow the entry of the inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of that State Party within two hours before or after the notified estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later than 24 hours following the issuance of the original notification. 7. If the inspection team finds itself delayed more than two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section of: (A) a new estimated time of arrival, which in no case shall be more than six hours beyond the initial estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section; and (B) if the inspecting State Party desires, a new time interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site. 8. In the event non-commercial flights are used to transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. The flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organisation applicable to civil aircraft.The inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: “CFE inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required.” 9. No more than three hours following the receipt of a flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  663

out shall ensure that the flight plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival. Section V. Procedures upon Arrival at Point of Entry/Exit 1. The escort team shall meet the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their arrival. 2. A State Party which utilises structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a liaison officer to the escort team who will be available as needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team. 3.Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection team and the escort team. 4.The State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/exit. 5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that territory. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the escort team in the presence of the inspection team members. 6. If the escort team determines upon examination that an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is capable of performing functions inconsistent with the inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 15 of this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later than the time when the inspection team which brought that impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country. 7. If a State Party has not participated during examination of equipment of an inspection team at the point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party. 8.Throughout the period in which the inspection team and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care or any other emergency assistance. 9.The State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out shall provide accommodation, security protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit. Section VI. General Rules for Conducting Inspections 1.An inspection team may include inspectors from States Parties other than the inspecting State Party. 2. For inspections conducted in accordance with Sections VII,VIII, IX and X of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide itself into up to three subteams. In the case of simultaneous inspections on the territory of States Parties that do not have military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty or within a single military district of a State Party with such military districts, only one inspection team may divide itself at the inspection site into three sub-teams, the others into two sub-teams.

664  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some clear identification of their respective roles. 4. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party through the point of entry/exit. 5.The number of transport crew members shall not exceed 10. 6. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the event that the inspected State Party determines that an inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the inspecting State Party, which upon the request of the inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew members. If the individual is on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State Party shall promptly remove that individual from that territory. 7.The inspected State Party shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport crew members from the time they arrive at the point of entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to depart the territory of that State Party. 8.The escort team shall assist the inspection team in carrying out its functions.At its discretion, the escort team may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs that territory. 9. The inspecting State Party shall ensure that the inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team in the language notified in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) and paragraph 3, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol.The inspected State Party shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely in this language with the inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members of the escort team may also communicate in other languages. 10. No information obtained during inspections shall be publicly disclosed without the express consent of the inspecting State Party. 11. Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means provided by the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall also provide means of communication between the sub-teams of an inspection team. 12.The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a means and route selected by the inspected State Party. The inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a request.Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State Party will be permitted to use its own land vehicles. 13. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team, which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary, shall provide appropriate means of transportation. 14.The inspected State Party shall provide for use by the inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest breaks and meals.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  665

15. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be permitted to bring and use portable passive night vision devices, binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State Party.Throughout the in-country period, the escort team shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment that has been approved by the escort team in accordance with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7 of this Protocol. 16. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, the inspection team shall specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate cross-country vehicles at the inspection site. 17. Whenever possible, subject to the safety requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol. 18.The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20 square kilometres in area. 19. The inspected State Party shall have the right to delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection site. Photography of or above sensitive points during helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 20.The duration of such helicopter overflights at an inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one hour, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team. 21.Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the inspection team and at least one member of the escort team. Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of the inspection site any of the equipment specified in paragraph 15 of this Section. The inspection team shall advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it intends to take photographs. A helicopter shall afford the inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground. 22. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting safe operation. 23. Except as provided for in paragraphs 24 to 29 of this Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area, inspectors shall be permitted access, entry and unobstructed inspection: (A) in the case of a specified area, within the entire specified area; or (B) in the case of an object of verification, within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. 24. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas cited in paragraph 23 of this Section, to enter any location, structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched

666  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas within structures the entry points to which are physically accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres in width and to which access is denied by the escort team. 25. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 24 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier lookalikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside. 26. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 27 to 33 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model or version. 27.The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud individual sensitive items of equipment. 28.The escort team shall have the right to deny access to sensitive points, the number and extent of which should be as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which is less than two metres.Whenever a sensitive point is designated, or shrouded objects or containers are present, the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point, shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version. 29. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point, shrouded object or container does contain any of the conventional armaments and equipment specified in paragraph 28 of this Section, then the escort team shall display or declare such conventional armaments and equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared number of such conventional armaments and equipment are present. 30. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on the multipurpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be a combat support helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi-24K helicopter is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Protocol. 31. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of combatcapable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have been certified an unarmed in accordance with the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Protocol. 32. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  667

present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be opened so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be shrouded. 33. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, items of equipment declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such items of equipment to confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction. 34. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites, or other storage sites containing more than 50 such conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall be limited to 35mm cameras and to cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. The inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall cooperate with the inspection team’s taking of photographs. 35. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 36. Except as provided for in paragraph 38 of this Section, photography of interiors of structures other than storage sites specified in paragraph 34 of this Section shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 37. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections. Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a member of the escort team immediately after they are taken. Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection report. 38. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual information. Whenever inspectors request the escort team to clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision in paragraph 35 of this Section, cooperate with the inspection team’s taking of appropriate photographs using a camera capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be included in the inspection report in accordance with Section XII of this Protocol. 39. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to have been completed once the inspection report has been signed and countersigned. 40. No later than completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall designate at that time the next inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in Section VII, paragraphs 6 and 17 and Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible after completion of the previous inspection. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection, then the provisions in paragraphs 42 and 43 of this Section shall apply. 41. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State Party on which that inspection team has conducted the preceding inspection:

668  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(A) at any declared site associated with the same point of entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived; or (B) within any specified area for which the point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; or (C) at any location within 200 kilometres of the preceding inspection site within the same military district; or (D) at the location which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, is the temporary location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured vehicle launched bridges which were absent during inspection of an object of verification at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment constitute more than 15 percent of the number of such conventional armaments and equipment notified in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange; or (E) at the declared site which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, is the site of origin for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured vehicle launched bridges at the preceding inspection site which are in excess of the number provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange as being present at that preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the number of such conventional armaments and equipment so notified. 42. After completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has been declared, then the inspection team shall be transported to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possible and shall depart the territory of the State Party where the inspection was carried out within 24 hours. 43.The inspection team shall leave the territory of the State Party where it has been conducting inspections from the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party has provided the necessary notification in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. Section VII. Declared Site Inspection 1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 7 and 20 to 22 of this Protocol. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section. 3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and the inspected State Party has not previously notified a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2 of this Protocol the desired ground border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit. The inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV, paragraph 4 of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  669

inspected State Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point through which the inspection team and transport crew members may arrive on its territory. 4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using ground transportation means. 5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being associated with the declared site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the inspected State Party shall facilitate access to this declared site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8 of this Section. 6. The inspected State Party shall have the right to utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site. 7. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first declared site to be inspected. 8. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after designation of that inspection site. Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period. 9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site, unless such a diagram has been provided in a previous exchange of site diagrams.The declared site diagram, provided upon arrival at the declared site, shall contain an accurate depiction of the: (A) geographic coordinates of a point within the inspection site, to the nearest 10 seconds, with indication of that point and of true north; (B) scale used in the site diagram; (C) perimeter of the declared site; (D) precisely delineated boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to each object of verification, indicating the formation or unit record number of each object of verification to which each such area belongs and including those separately located areas where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of verification are permanently assigned; (E) major buildings and roads on the declared site; (F) entrances to the declared site; and

670  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(G) location of an administrative area for the inspection team provided in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 14 of this Protocol. 10.Within one-half hour after receiving the diagram of the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the object of verification to be inspected.The inspection team shall then be given a preinspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements: (A) safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site; (B) modalities of transportation and communication for inspectors at the inspection site; and (C) holdings and locations at the inspection site, including within the common areas of the declared site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging to separately located subordinate elements belonging to the same object of verification to be inspected. 11. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters or armoured vehicle launched bridges present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the following provisions: (A) if the numbers of such conventional armaments and equipment present at the inspection site are less than the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include the temporary location of such conventional armaments and equipment; and (B) if the numbers of such armaments and equipment present at the inspection site exceed the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include specific information on the origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival and projected stay at the inspection site of such additional conventional armaments and equipment. 12. When an inspection team designates an object of verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to inspect all territory delineated on the site diagram as belonging to that object of verification, including those separately located areas on the territory of the same State Party where conventional armaments and equipment belonging to that object of verification are permanently assigned. 13.The inspection of one object of verification at a declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. 14. If the escort team informs the inspection team that battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being held by one object of verification at a declared site are present within an area delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part of the same inspection, has access to such conventional armaments and equipment. 15. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team to which object of verification such conventional armaments and equipment belong.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  671

16. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if such an accounting is requested by another State Party. 17. If, during an inspection at a declared site, the inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site an inspection of an object of verification that had not been previously designated, the inspection team shall have the right to commence such inspection within three hours of that designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given a briefing on the object of verification designated for the next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section. Section VIII. Challenge Inspection within Specified Areas 1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance with this Protocol. 2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a challenge inspection within a specified area as the first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit: (A) it shall include in its notification pursuant to Section IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within that specified area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party’s chosen means of transportation; and (B) at the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first specified area it wishes to inspect.Whenever a specified area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide to the escort team a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of that area. The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect. 3.The State Party on whose territory a challenge inspection is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that specified area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries. 4. The inspected State Party shall have the right to refuse challenge inspections within specified areas. 5.The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection team within two hours after the designation of a specified area whether the inspection request will be granted. 6. If access to a specified area is granted: (A) the inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area; (B) the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first specified area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after such an inspection is accepted.Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period; and (C) the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply.Within such specified area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours the inspection team shall have the right to cancel the inspection.

672  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

The period of delay shall not count against the in-country period or the maximum time allowed within a specified area. 7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request.The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. 8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this briefing. 9. If access to a specified area is denied: (A) the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall provide all reasonable assurance that the specified area does not contain conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If such armaments and equipment are present and assigned to organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions in the area defined in Article V of the Treaty, the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall allow visual confirmation of their presence, unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as soon as practicable; and (B) no inspection quota shall be counted, and the time between the designation of the specified area and its subsequent refusal shall not count against the in-country period.The inspection team shall have the right to designate another specified area or declared site for inspection or to declare the inspection concluded. Section IX. Inspection of Certification 1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect, without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each certification site. 2. In conducting an inspection of certification in accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to spend up to two days at a certification site, unless otherwise agreed. 3. No less than 15 days before the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide to all other States Parties notification of: (A) the site at which the certification is to take place, including geographic coordinates; (B) the scheduled dates of the certification process; (C) the estimated number and type, model or version of helicopters or aircraft to be certified; (D) the manufacturer’s serial number for each helicopter or aircraft; (E) the unit or location to which the helicopters or aircraft were previously assigned; (F) the unit or location to which the certified helicopters or aircraft will be assigned in the future;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  673

(G) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team; and (H) the date and time by which an inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the certification. 4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to include checking the manufacturer’s serial number, without right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification. 5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels covering the position from which components and wiring were removed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. 6. Inspectors shall have the right to request and observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification, the activation of any weapon system component in multipurpose attack helicopters being certified or declared to have been recategorised. 7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification, the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XII of this Protocol. 8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another certification site or at a reduction site if the appropriate notification has been provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol.The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time. 9.Within seven days after completion of the certification, the State Party responsible for the certification shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the certification. Such notification shall specify the number, types, models or versions and manufacturer’s serial numbers of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site involved, the actual dates of the certification, and the units or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or reclassified aircraft will be assigned. Section X. Inspection of Reduction 1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant to Sections I to VIII and X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each reduction site. 2.The inspected State Party shall have the right to organise and implement the process of reduction subject only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the implementation of the process of reduction. 3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be conducted in accordance with schedules of such use provided by each State Party using the reduction site. 4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify all other States Parties which conventional armaments and equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no less than 30 days.This provision shall

674  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

apply whenever reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a continuous or intermittent basis. 5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period notification. Such notification shall include the designation of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled date for completion of the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment identified for reduction during the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification shall identify: (A) the estimated number and type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced; (B) the object or objects of verification from which the items to be reduced have been withdrawn; (C) the reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced; (D) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection of reduction notified for that calendar reporting period; and (E) the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the conventional armaments and equipment before the initiation of their reduction. 6. Except as specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from a reduction site at any time during the calendar reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to remain at the reduction site throughout one or more calendar reporting periods provided that these periods are not separated by more than three days. Throughout the period that the inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction. 7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely record factory serial numbers from the conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special marks on such equipment before reduction and to record subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced conventional armaments and equipment as specified in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Reduction or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for non-military purposes shall be available for inspection for at least three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been completed earlier. 8. The State Party engaged in the process of reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed.This register shall also include aggregate data for each calendar reporting period.The register shall be made available to the inspection team for the period of inspection. 9.At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader and a representative of the inspected State Party.The provisions of Section XII of this Protocol shall apply. 10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a certification site if the appropriate notification has been provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol.The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the reduction site and, if appropriate, of its intention

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  675

to proceed to another reduction site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time. 11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10 inspections each year to validate the completion of conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into vehicles for nonmilitary purposes pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section with the following exceptions: (A) the notification pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (E) of this Section shall identify only the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the items of equipment at the completion of their conversion into vehicles for nonmilitary purposes; and (B) the inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from the reduction site only during the three days beyond the end of the notified completion date of conversion. 12. Within seven days after the completion of the process of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of reduction for that period. Such notification shall specify the number and types of conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall also specify the location at which such conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall specify the reduction site at which final conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which each item designated for conversion will be transferred. Section XI. Cancellation of Inspections 1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 6 of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled. 2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the first designated inspection site within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 or Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted against any quotas provided for in the Treaty. Section XII. Inspection Reports 1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in accordance with Section VII,VIII, IX or X of this Protocol, and before leaving the inspection site: (A) the inspection team shall provide the escort team with a written report; and (B) the escort team shall have the right to include its written comments in the inspection report and shall countersign the report within one hour after having received the report from the inspection team, unless an extension has been agreed between the inspection team and the escort team. 2.The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of the escort team.

676  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3.The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint Consultative Group prior to entry into force of the Treaty, taking into account paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. 4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include: (A) the inspection site; (B) the date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site; (C) the date and time of departure of the inspection team from the inspection site; and (D) the number and type, model or version of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that were observed during the inspection, including, if appropriate, an indication of the object of verification to which they belonged. 5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX and X of this Protocol shall include: (A) the reduction or certification site at which the reduction or certification procedures were carried out; (B) the dates the inspection team was present at the site; (C) the number and type, model or version of conventional armaments and equipment for which the reduction or certification procedures were observed; (D) a list of any serial numbers recorded during the inspections; (E) in the case of reductions, the particular reduction procedures applied or observed; and (F) in the case of reductions, if an inspection team was present at the reduction site throughout the calendar reporting period, the actual dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed. 6.The inspection report shall be written in the official language of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G) or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F) of this Protocol. 7.The inspecting State Party and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of the report. At the discretion of either State Party, the inspection report may be forwarded to other States Parties and, as a rule, made available to the Joint Consultative Group. 8.The stationing State Party shall in particular: (A) have the right to include written comments related to the inspection of its stationed conventional armed forces; and (B) retain one copy of the inspection report in the case of inspection of its stationed conventional armed forces. Section XIII. Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Transport Crew Members 1. To exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29;Article 30, paragraph 2;Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. 2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  677

on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party. 3.The transportation means of the inspection team shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty. 4.The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew members in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.The immunity of inspectors and transport crew members who are not nationals of the inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States Parties of which those inspectors are nationals.Waiver must always be express. 5.The privileges and immunities provided for in this Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew members: (A) while transiting through the territory of any State Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on the territory of another State Party; (B) throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where the inspection is carried out; and (C) thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or transport crew member. 6. If the inspected State Party considers that an inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in Section VI, paragraph 6 of this Protocol shall apply. At the request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

PROTOCOL

ON THE J OINT

CONSULTATIVE GROUP

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and other provisions relating to the Joint Consultative Group established by Article XVI of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 1. The Joint Consultative Group shall be composed of representatives designated by each State Party.Alternates, advisers and experts of a State Party may take part in the proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group as deemed necessary by that State Party. 2.The first session of the Joint Consultative Group shall open no later than 60 days after the signing of the Treaty.The Chairman of the opening meeting shall be the representative of the Kingdom of Norway. 3.The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular sessions to be held two times per year. 4. Additional sessions shall be convened at the request of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group, who shall promptly inform all other States Parties of the request. Such sessions shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of such a request by the Chairman. 5. Sessions of the Joint Consultative Group shall last no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise. 6. States Parties shall assume in rotation, determined by alphabetical order in the French language, the Chairmanship of the Joint Consultative Group. 7.The Joint Consultative Group shall meet in Vienna, unless it decides otherwise.

678  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

8. Representatives at meetings shall be seated in alphabetical order of the States Parties in the French language. 9.The official languages of the Joint Consultative Group shall be English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. 10. The proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group shall be confidential, unless it decides otherwise. 11.The scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the Joint Consultative Group, as follows: 

10.35% for the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;  6.50% for Canada;  5.20% for the Kingdom of Spain;  4.00% for the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland;  2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Hungary and the Kingdom of Norway;  0.88% for the Hellenic Republic, Romania and the Republic of Turkey;  0.68% for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Portuguese Republic; and 0.16% for the Republic of Iceland. 12. During the period that this Protocol is applied provisionally in accordance with the Protocol on Provisional Application, the Joint Consultative Group shall: (A) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences, and the distribution of the costs of inspections between or among States Parties, in accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) of the Treaty; and (B) consider, upon the request of any State Party, issues relating to the provisions of the Treaty that are applied provisionally.

PROTOCOL ON THE PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE To promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States Parties hereby agree to the provisional application of certain provisions of the Treaty. 1.Without detriment to the provisions of Article XXII of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally the following provisions of the Treaty: (A) Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; (B) Article VIII, paragraphs 5, 6, and 8; (C) Article IX; (D) Article XIII; (E) Article XVI, paragraphs 1, 2(F), 2(G), 4, 6, and 7; (F) Article XVII; (G) Article XVIII:

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  679

(H) Article XXI, paragraph 2; (I) Protocol on Existing Types, Sections III and IV; (J) Protocol on Information Exchange, Sections VII, XII and XIII; (K) Protocol on Inspection, Section II, paragraph 24, subparagraph (A) and Section III, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; (L) Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and (M) Protocol on Reduction, Section IX. 2.The States Parties shall apply provisionally the provisions listed in paragraph 1 of this Protocol in the light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. 3.This Protocol shall enter into force at the signature of the Treaty. It shall remain in force for 12 months, but shall terminate earlier if: (A) the Treaty enters into force before the period of 12 months expires; or (B) a State Party notifies all other States Parties that it does not intend to become a party to the Treaty. The period of application of this Protocol may be extended if all the States Parties so decide.

ASSOCIATED STATEMENTS

AND

DOCUMENTS

The representatives of the States that participated in the Negotiation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe between March 9, 1989, and November 18, 1990, in Vienna hereby certify that the foregoing texts of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish languages are authentic and definitive. November 18, 1990

Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Personnel Strength of German Armed Forces In connection with the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany confirms the declaration made by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30 August 1990 in the plenary session of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which reads as follows: “The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will commence on the entry into force of the first CFE agreement. Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Federal Government regards its commitment to reduce ground and air forces as a significant German contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. It assumes that in follow-on negotiations the other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their

680  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, including measures to limit personnel strengths.”

Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength In connection with the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, and with a view to the follow-on negotiations referred to in Article XVIII of that Treaty, the States Parties to that Treaty declare that, for the period of these negotiations, they will not increase the total peacetime authorized personnel strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the Mandate in the area of application.

Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft To promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the States Parties to the Treaty undertake the following political commitments outside the framework of the Treaty. 1. No one State will have in the area of application of the Treaty more than 400 permanently landbased combat naval aircraft. It is understood that this commitment applies to combat aircraft armed and equipped to engage surface or air targets and excludes types designed as maritime patrol aircraft. 2.The aggregate number of such permanently land-based combat naval aircraft held by either of the two groups of States defined under the terms of the Treaty will not exceed 430. 3. No one State will hold in its naval forces within the area of application any permanently landbased attack helicopters. 4.The limitations provided for in this Declaration will apply beginning 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 5. This Declaration will become effective as of entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States Paris, 19 November 1990 The Heads of State or Government of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America Greatly welcoming the historic changes in Europe, Gratified by the growing implementation throughout Europe of a common commitment to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are essential to lasting security on the continent,

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  681

Affirming the end of the era of division and confrontation which has lasted for more than four decades, the improvement in relation among their countries and the contribution this makes to the security of all, Confident that the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe represents a major contribution to the common objective of increased security and stability in Europe, and Convinced that these developments must form part of a continuing process of cooperation in building the structures of a more united continent, Issue the following Declaration: The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship. They recall their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirm all of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act.They stress that all of the ten Helsinki Principles are of primary significance and that, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. In that context, they affirm their obligations and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons will ever be used except in selfdefense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the Untied Nations. They recognize that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They undertake to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defense.They will bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines. They reaffirm that every State has the right to be or not to be a party to a treaty of alliance. They note with approval the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence. They welcome in this context the positive responses made to recent proposals for new regular diplomatic liaison. They declare their determination to contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all. In particular, they call for the early entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and commit themselves to continue the process of strengthening peace in Europe through conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE. They welcome the prospect of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of their short range nuclear forces. They welcome the contribution that confidence and security building measures have made to lessening tensions and fully support the further development of such measures.They reaffirm the importance of the “Open Skies” initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. They pledge to work together with the other CSCE participating States to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe.They recognize in particular the need to enhance political consultations among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms.They are convinced that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CSBM’s, together with new patterns

682  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

of cooperation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe. They believe that the preceding points reflect the deep longing of their peoples for close cooperation and mutual understanding and declare that they will work steadily for the further development of their relations in accordance with the present Declaration as well as with the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act.

Agreement on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Arms and Equipment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in Connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Budapest, 3 November 1990 The governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, The Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, hereinafter known as the parties, Having in mind the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter known as the Treaty. Striving for the consistent performance of all obligations resulting from the Treaty, Conscious that cooperation and contacts between them are factors in the effective functioning of the Treaty, Confirming that the objective of this agreement is the determination, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, of the maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment and the mechanism for changes to them, Taking into account the security interests of all the Parties, Have agreed to the following: Article I 1.The Parties establish, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, their maximum levels for holdings of the Treatylimited armaments and equipment of the Parties, notification of which shall be made at signature of the Treaty, as follows: People’s Republic of Bulgaria Tanks Armored Combat Vehicles of which armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack helicopters

not more than 1475 units not more than 2000 units not more than 1100 units not more than 100 units not more than 1750 units not more than 235 units not more than 67 units

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

Hungarian Republic Tanks Armored Combat Vehicles of which armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters Republic of Poland Tanks Armored Combat vehicles which armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters Romania Tanks Armored Combat Vehicles of which armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Tanks Armored Combat Vehicles of which infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Tanks Armored Combat Vehicles of which armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles including heavy armament combat vehicles Artillery Combat Aircraft Attack Helicopters

IN

EUROPE TREATY  683

not more than 835 units not more than 1700 units not more than 1020 units not more than 85 units not more than 840 units not more than 180 units not more than 108 units not more than 1730 units not more than 2150 units not more than 1700 units not more than 107 units not more than 1610 units not more than 460 units not more than 130 units not more than 1375 units not more than 2100 units not more than 500 units not more than 105 units not more than 1475 units not more than 430 units not more than 120 units not more than 13,150 units not more than 20,000 units not more than 12,250 units not more than 1000 units not more than 13,175 units not more than 5150 units not more than 1500 units not more than 1435 units not more than 2050 units not more than 1430 units not more than 103 units not more than 1150 units not more than 345 units not more than 75 units

2.The provisions of this Article in parts concerning the notifications given at signature of the Treaty concerning the maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armaments and equipment of the Parties, as stated in paragraph 1 of this article, take effect on a provisional basis from the moment of signature of this Agreement.

684  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article II The Parties have the right to change their maximum levels for holdings of Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Agreement. A Party intending to carry out changes in its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armaments and equipment shall give notice of such intention to all the other Parties. In cases where a Party gives notice of its intention to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armament and equipment, interested Parties shall inform all other Parties not later than 14 days after receiving such notification regarding their position on the questions presented by the notification. In the absence of consensus, the Party intending to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment shall, not later than 21 days after receiving the latter notification, convene consultations of interested Parties to review the questions presented by the notification. A party intending to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armaments and equipment shall have the right to carry out such increase only with the consent of all other interested Parties and in such a way so as not to violate corresponding treaty provisions. Reduction of numbers of Treaty limited conventional armaments ad equipment held by a Party shall not in and of itself give the right to another Party to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armaments and equipment. The use of its own maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited conventional armaments and equipment is the exclusive prerogative of each Party. Article III The parties shall limit the number of their armored vehicle launched bridges in active units as specified in the Annex to this Agreement. Article IV Any Party shall have the right to offer corrections to this Agreement, for the study of which consultations may be convened.The corrections shall take effect after being ratified by all Parties. In cases where corrections to the treaty take effect the functioning of this Agreement, the latter shall be subject to review. Article V Each Party shall have the right to convene consultations of all Parties to discuss questions relating to the implementation of this Agreement. Such consultations shall be held not later than 15 days after all Parties are sent notification of the consultations. Article VI 1. In the case of a withdrawal of a Party from the Treaty, it ceases to be a Party to this Agreement. 2. Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Agreement is it decides that its supreme interests are threatened by exceptional circumstances relating to the content of this Agreement. Parties intending to withdraw from this Agreement shall send notification of such intent to the Depository of this Agreement no less than 90 days before the proposed withdrawal. Such notification shall include presentation of the reasons for the withdrawal. The Depositary shall inform all other Parties of this notification.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  685

3. No later than 21 days after receipt of notification of the withdrawal from the Treaty of this Agreement of a Party, the Depository of this agreement shall convene consultations of the Parties for discussion of the questions related to such withdrawal. Article VII 1.This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. 2.This Agreement takes effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and remains in force s long as the Treaty remains in force. Done in Budapest on the third of November, 1990 in one copy in Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Russian and Czech/Slovak languages with each text having equal force.The original of this Agreement will be held in the archives of the Government of the Hungarian Republic, which is hereby designated Depositary. Certified copies of the agreement shall be distributed to Parties by the Depositary. Annex Having in mind that each group of States Parties shall have the right under the Treaty to hold in active units no more than 740 armored vehicle launched bridges, the Parties have agreed to limit their numbers as follows: People’s Republic of Bulgaria Hungarian Republic Republic of Poland Romania USSR Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

79 units 29 units 60 units 60 units 462 units 50 units

Changes in the abovementioned numbers of AVLB’s in active units shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this agreement. Agreed Protocollary Note to the Agreement on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in Connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1.The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that within the framework of its national levels, as envisioned by the Agreement concluded between the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment, in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, no more than 2650 battle tanks, 2080 armored combat vehicles and 2350 artillery systems shall be held in designated permanent storage sites; 2.The governments of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria,The Hungarian Republic,The Republic of Poland, Romania and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic State their agreement with the fact that, in accordance with the provisions in the article on maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, within a reasonable period agreement will be reached on the problem of storage of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery systems located at designated permanent storage sites in accordance with articles of the Treaty on storage, providing the levels of storage of Treaty limited armaments and equipment indicated above for the Soviet Union are not changed.

686  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group Vienna, 14 June 1991 In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe of November 19,1990, (the Treaty) I have been instructed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the following. 1.The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 1991–1995, destroy or convert into civilian equipment no less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion specified in the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of June 14,1991 concerning obligations outside the frame work of the Treaty. These armaments will be destroyed or converted under procedures that will provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Advance notification and information will be provided to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or conversion. Elimination of armaments in the Treaty limited categories will also be carried out subsequently as their operational and service life is expended. 2.The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the period between January 1989 and signature of the Treaty on November 19,1990, in connection with activities related to unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the countries of Eastern Europe and adaptation of the armed forces to the new defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following numbers of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories: 16,400 battle tanks, 15,900 armored combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery. Of these number of armaments and equipment, 8,000 battle tanks, 11,200 armored combat vehicles and 1,600 pieces of artillery have been turned over to military units and subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of reequipping them and supplementing their armaments. Another part of the conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories, which have been transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700 armored combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces of artillery), has been placed in storage. In addition, 7,000 pieces of artillery are being used for replacement and repair. These stored conventional armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will be used up in the process of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment that have expended their established operational and service life and, in the eastern Soviet Union, also in supplementing units. With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred beyond the Urals before signature of the Treaty that have been placed in storage or are used for replacement and repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty information will be provided to all States Parties about the locations and number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of July 1, 1991. Armaments in each of these categories (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be stored separately. 3.The conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories withdrawn beyond the Urals prior to signature of the Treaty will not be used to create a strategic reserve or operational and will not be stored in a way permitting their rapid return to the area of application of

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  687

the Treaty, that is, such armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in sets for military formations. Military formations and units deployed within the area of application of the Treaty will be organized in line with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into account the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty for a single State.

Statement by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vienna, 14 June 1991 In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it assumes the following obligations outside the framework of the Treaty. I The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within the area of application of the Treaty conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories not to exceed: in Coastal Defense forces 813 battle tanks, 972 armored combat vehicles and 846 pieces of artillery; in Naval Infantry 120 battle tanks, 753 armored combat vehicles and 234 pieces of artillery; in the Strategic Rocket Forces 1,701 armored combat vehicles, each being an armored personnel carrier as that term is defined in the Treaty. II Forty months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the obligation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery shall be less than its maximum levels for holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry within the area of application of the Treaty. For example, with regard to battle tanks, unless the maximum numbers of holdings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are revised in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, the numbers for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the area of application of the Treaty including battle tanks in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry, will not exceed: 13,150 overall; 10,500 in active units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region described in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the Treaty; and 1,850 in active units within the area described in Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Treaty. III 1.The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall reduce, in addition to the reduction liability established for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty on the basis of information it supplied, its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories within the area of application of the Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of the signature of the Treaty in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry, that is, by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armored combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery. 2. Such additional reduction shall be carried out by means of destruction or conversion into civilian equipment of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of artillery. Of the 1,725 armored combat vehicles to be additionally reduced, 972 armored combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted into civilian equipment and 753 armored combat vehicles of the MTLB type, declared as of the date of signature of the Treaty, shall be modified, in accordance with the

688  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Protocol on Existing Types, into armored personnel carrier lookalikes of the MTLBAT type, which are not limited by the treaty. 3. Fifty percent of 933 battle tanks and 972 armored combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent of 1,080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the area of application of the Treaty, within the time limits and in accordance with procedures established by the Treaty.The remainder of these conventional armaments and equipment shall be withdrawn from the area of application of the Treaty; an equivalent number of conventional armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted outside of the area of application of the Treaty within the time limits established by the Treaty and in accordance with procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable.The States Parties to the Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, number and types of conventional armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted. IV The holdings of armored combat vehicles in Strategic Rocket Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be subject to the numerical limitations of the Treaty, in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (F) of the Treaty.These forces shall not be equipped with conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories, other than armored personnel carriers. V The conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry in the categories subject to the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. Effective verification of such armaments and equipment shall be ensured. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide separate information to all States Parties on such armaments and equipment of the same scope and with the same degree of detail as provided for in Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and under the same timetable for the provision of information as provided for in Section VII of that Protocol. VI Unless otherwise specified (a) in this Statement, (b) in the Treaty, or (c) in the Declaration of LandBased Naval Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty limited categories, based on land within the area of application of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be subject to all numerical limitations of the Treaty. VII This Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic regarding the aforementioned obligations assumed outside the framework of the Treaty shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration asthe Treaty.

Statement of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Vienna, 14 June 1991 The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hereby agrees that the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of today’s date provides a satisfactory basis

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  689

for proceeding toward ratification and implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19,1990 (the Treaty). The aforementioned Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and this Statement of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands shall be equally legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group Vienna, 18 October 1991 1. I hereby record that: a.The States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, acknowledge that in view of the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the area of application defined in Article II of the Treaty does not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. b. I have today received a statement from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as follows: “In order to fulfill the legally binding obligations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and of the agreements entered into by the States Parties on 14 June 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall treat all its conventional armaments and equipment in the categories defined in Article II of the Treaty present, on or after 19 November 1990, on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as subject to all provisions of the Treaty and associated documents. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reductions liability.This statement shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.” c. I have also received statements from the representatives of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America that, in accordance with the legally binding commitment entered into by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 14 June 1991. In particular, conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall be notified as part of Soviet holdings and shall count towards the Soviet reduction liability. d. The States Parties acknowledge the arrangements for inspection of the above mentioned conventional armaments and equipment on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will require the consent and cooperation of those States. 2. This Chairman’s statement, recording the above legally binding agreement among the States Parties, which will not be considered a precedent, will be recorded in the Journal, transmitted to the Depositary and deposited together with the instruments of ratification.

690  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Tashkent, 15 May 1992 The Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Georgia, as states successors of the USSR in regard to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its associated documents, and hereinafter referred to as the Contracting Parties; Affirming their adherence to the goals and tasks of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Considering the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, as one of the basic elements of the foundation of the new system of security in Europe; Seeking consistent implementation of all obligations arising from the Treaty and its associated documents; Taking into account the security interests of all Contracting parties; Have agreed the following: Article 1 Each contracting party shall fully exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations provided for in the Treaty and its associated documents unless otherwise provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. The Russian Federation shall exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations contained in the Treaty and its associated documents with regard to forces and also conventional armaments and equipment stationed on the territory of the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania,The Polish Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Republic of Estonia, and subject to the withdrawal to the territory of the Russian Federation. In the event of their withdrawal to the territory of another Contracting Party, the exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations under the Treaty shall rest with that Contracting Party. The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in exercising the rights and fulfilling the obligations resulting from the Treaty and its associated documents. Article 2 In the framework of the obligations resulting from provisions of the Treaty there shall be established for each of the Contracting parties, under corresponding protocols: Maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment; The levels of armored vehicle launched bridges in active units; The number of Mi-24K and Mi-24R helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical / biological / radiological sampling which are not subject to the limitations on attack helicopters. The maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments by a Contracting Party shall not in total exceed the ceilings established for the USSR in the Treaty and in the agreement on maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Hungary, the Polish Republic, Romania, the USSR and the Czech and Slovak

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  691

Federative Republic in connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 3, 1990. The numbers of armaments and equipment listed in subparagraphs b and c of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not in total exceed the levels and numbers established for the USSR in the Treaty and its associated documents. Following the entry into force of the Treaty, the Contracting Parties will coordinate their efforts on questions of the implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents, including questions of the allocation of maximum levels for holding of armaments and equipment for each of the Parties in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, with the goal of ensuring regional, national and collective security in Europe. Article 3 The Contracting Parties shall observe the provisions of the Statement of the Government of the USSR of June 14, 1991 as it applies to conventional armaments and equipment in categories limited by the Treaty and located in the coastal defense forces, naval infantry, and strategic rocket forces. In the framework of the obligations resulting from the above mentioned statement, a corresponding protocol shall establish for the Contracting Parties the maximum levels of conventional armament and equipment in categories limited by the Treaty and located in the coastal defense forces, naval infantry, and strategic rocket forces. Article 4 Upon mutual agreement and in keeping with the reduction liabilities and other requirements of the Treaty and its associated documents, the Contracting Parties shall transfer to each other conventional armaments and equipment that are subject to reduction. With the aim of optimal organization of the reduction process of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, and lowering of costs of reduction, the Contracting States shall jointly utilize reduction sites.The procedure for the use of reduction sites and also of the arms and equipment that have been reduced shall be determined by the Contracting Parties on the basis of corresponding agreements. Article 5 The Contracting States shall cooperate as necessary on questions of the preparation and transmission of information and notifications provided for by the Treaty and its associated documents during the period of its provisional application and following its entry into force. The Contracting Parties affirm that the information on conventional armaments and equipment provided at Treaty signature by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including technical data and photographs of conventional armaments and equipment, remains in force. Simultaneously with the deposit of their ratification instruments with the Treaty Depositary, the Contracting Parties shall transmit to all the States Parties information intended for the provision before the entry into force of the Treaty. Article 6 The Contracting States confirm that during the first 120 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, their aggregate passive inspection quota will not be less than the passive quota of the former Soviet Union, determined for it according to the data on the number of objects of verification notified in accordance with the Protocol on the Exchange of information at Treaty signature.

692  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

The Contracting States shall cooperate in carrying out inspection activities. They shall also cooperate in the formation of multinational inspection teams for the conduct of inspections on the territory of State Parties of the Treaty that are not Contracting States. Article 7 At the request of any of the Contracting Parties, the Depositary of this Agreement shall convene consultations of all Contracting Parties for the discussion of issues linked to the implementation of this Agreement. Such consultations shall take place no later than 15 days following the dispatch of a notification to this effect to all of the Contracting Parties. Article 8 In the event of the withdrawal of a Contracting Party from the Treaty such a Party shall cease to be a Party to this Agreement. Each Contracting Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Agreement. The Contracting Parties intending to withdraw from this Agreement shall no later than 90 days prior to the proposed date of the withdrawal from the Agreement, send a notification to this effect to all the other Contracting Parties. No later than 21 days following the dispatch of such a notification, the Depositary of this Agreement shall convene consultations of the Contracting Parties to discuss issues connected to such a withdrawal. Article 9 Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as affecting the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties including those resulting from the adoption by them of acts regarding their state sovereignty as independence. Article 10 The following shall constitute integral parts of this Agreement: the Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty; the Protocol on Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active units; the Protocol on Combat Helicopters Mi-24K and Mi-24R Not Subject to Limitations on Attack Helicopters; The Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment in Categories Limited by the Treaty Located in Coastal defense Forces, Naval Infantry and Strategic Rocket Forces. Article 11 Each Contracting Parties, as a Successor of the USSR in Regard to the Treaty signed by the USSR November 19, 1990, undertakes to ratify the Treaty as quickly as possible and to deposit its instrument of ratification with the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Article 12 This Agreement shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Contracting Parties simultaneously with the ratification of the Treaty. Documents regarding the ratification of the Agreement shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary. The Agreement shall enter into force 10 days after the deposit with the Depositary of the Agreement of documents of ratification by all Contracting Parties, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. This Agreement will be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  693

Done at Tashkent this 15th day of May 1992, in one copy each in the Azerbaiji, Armenian, Belarusian, Georgian, Kazakh, Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts having equal force. The original of this Agreement shall be held in the archives of the government of the Republic of Belarus, which is hereby designated Depositary. Certified copes of the Agreement shall be transmitted by the Depositary to the Contracting Parties and other States Parties of the Treaty.

PROTOCOL ON MAXIMUM LEVELS FOR HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE R EPUBLIC OF A ZERBAIJAN , THE R EPUBLIC OF A RMENIA , THE R EPUBLIC OF B ELARUS , THE R EPUBLIC OF K AZAKHSTAN , THE R EPUBLIC OF M OLDOVA , THE R USSIAN F EDERATION , UKRAINE, AND THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA The Contracting Parties, as successors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with regard to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter called the Treaty and the agreement on the maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter called the Budapest Agreement, hereby affirm that their maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment will not, in total, exceed the maximum levels established for the former USSR in the Treaty and the Budapest Agreement. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and Article 1 of the Budapest Agreement, the following maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are established for each of the Contracting States: Republic of Azerbaijan battle tanks: – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 135 units not more than 11 units not more than 285 units not more than 285 units not more than 100 units not more than 50 units

Republic of Armenia battle tanks: – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 135 units not more than 11 units not more than 285 units not more than 285 units not more than 100 units not more than 50 units

694  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Republic of Belarus battle tanks: – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery not more than 1615 units – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 1375 units not more than 260 units not more than 80 units

Republic of Kazakhstan (in the area of application) battle tanks: – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units not more than 0 units

Republic of Moldova battle tanks – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 210 units not more than 210 units not more than 210 units not more than 210 units not more than 130 units not more than 10 units not more than 250 units not more than 250 units not more than 50 units not more than 50 units

Russian Federation (in the area of application) battle tanks: – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACV artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 6400 units not more than 4975 units not more than 11,480 units not more than 10,525 units not more than 7030 units not more than 574 units not more than 6415 units not more than 5105 units not more than 3450 units not more than 890 units

not more than 1800 units not more than 1525 units not move than 2600 units not more than 2175 units not more than 1590 units not more than 130 units

including active units, on the territory of the Russian Federation within the area of application in accordance with Article V, para. 1 of the Treaty battle tanks – including in storage armored combat vehicles – including in storage

not more than 1300 units not more than 600 units not more than 1380 units not more than 800 units

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

artillery – including in storage

IN

EUROPE TREATY  695

not more than 1680 units not more than 400 units

Ukraine battle tanks: not more than 4080 units – including in active units not more than 3130 units armored combat vehicles not more than 5050 units – including in active units not more than 4350 units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs not more than 3095 units – including HACVs not more than 253 units artillery not more than 4040 units – including in active units not more than 3240 units – combat aircraft not more than 1090 units – attack helicopters not more than 330 units including active units, on the territory of the Ukraine within the area of application in accordance with Article V, para. 1 of the Treaty battle tanks – including in storage armored combat vehicles artillery – including in storage

not more than 680 units not more than 400 units not more than 350 units not more than 890 units not more than 500 units

Republic of Georgia battle tanks – including in active units armored combat vehicles – including in active units – of these,AIFVs and HACVs – including HACVs artillery – including in active units – combat aircraft – attack helicopters

not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 220 units not more than 135 units not more than 11 units not more than 285 units not more than 285 units not more than 100 units not more than 50 units

In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol, the Contracting States shall have the right to change their maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment. A Contracting State that intends to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment shall have the right to carry out such increase only with the agreement of all interested Contracting Parties and in such a manner that corresponding provisions of the Treaty are not violated. In the event that a Contracting party makes a notification of its intent to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment, the interested Contracting States shall, no later than 14 days after receipt of such notification, inform all other Contracting Parties of the position on the issue set forth in the notification. In the absence of consensus, the Contracting State intending to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment shall, no later than 21 days after the receipt of the last notification, convene consultations of all interested Contracting States to discuss issues set forth in the notification. A decrease in the quantity of Treaty limited armaments and equipment held by a Contracting State does not in and of itself confer the right to another Contracting State to increase its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment.

696  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

The use of its maximum levels for holdings of Treaty limited armaments and equipment is the exclusive prerogative of each Contracting State.

PROTOCOL

ON

ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGES IN ACTIVE U NITS

Based on the fact that, in accordance to the Budapest Agreement of November 3, 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could hold in active units not more than 462 armored vehicle launched bridges, the Contracting States have agreed to limit their quantities in the following manner: Republic of Azerbaijan Armenian Republic Belarusian Republic Georgian Republic Republic of Kazakhstan Moldovan Republic Russian Federation Ukraine

8 units 8 units 64 units 8 units 0 units 7 units 233 units 144 units

The increase by any Contracting States of the above quantity of armored vehicle launched bridges should, by agreement of the Contracting States, be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding reduction by one or more Contracting States in their quantity of armored vehicle launched bridges.

PROTOCOL ON COMBAT HELICOPTERS MI-24K AND MI-24R NOT S UBJECT TO L IMITATIONS ON ATTACK H ELICOPTERS Proceeding from the fact that, in accordance with the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could hold an overall aggregate number not exceeding 100 Mi-24K and Mi-24R helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling that were not subject to the limitations on attack helicopters, the Contracting States have agreed to limit their quantities in the following manner: Republic of Azerbaijan Armenian Republic Belarusian Republic Georgian Republic Republic of Kazakhstan Moldovan Republic Russian Federation Ukraine

4 units 4 units 16 units 4 units 0 units 4 units 50 units 18 units

The increase by any Contracting States of the above quantity of Mi-24K and Mi-24R helicopters not subject to the limitations on attack helicopters should, by agreement of the Contracting States, be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding reduction by one or more Contracting States in their quantity of these helicopters.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  697

PROTOCOL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN C ATEGORIES L IMITED BY THE T REATY AND L OCATED IN C OASTAL D EFENSE F ORCES , N AVAL I NFANTRY, AND STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES Confirming all commitments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set forth in the statement of the government of the USSR of June 14, 1991, concerning conventional armaments and equipment in categories limited by the Treaty located in coastal defense forces, naval infantry, and strategic rocket forces, hereinafter referred to as the Statement, the Contracting States have agreed that the responsibility rests:  for conventional armaments and equipment of coastal defense forces and naval infantry,

with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine;

 for conventional armaments and equipment (APC’s) in strategic rocket forces with the

Belarusian Republic, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine; On the territory of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine within the area of application of the Treaty, stationed conventional armaments and equipment in categories limited by the Treaty shall not exceed the following quantities:  in coastal defense forces: on the territory of the Russian Federation 542 battle tanks, 488

ACV’s, and 686 artillery units; on the territory of the Ukraine 271 battle tanks, 484 ACV’s, and 160 artillery units.  in naval infantry: on the territory of the Russian Federation 120 battle tanks, 488 ACV’s, and 186 artillery units; on the territory of the Ukraine 265 ACV’s, 48 artillery units. The destruction or conversion of conventional armaments and equipment set forth in Section III, paragraph 3 of the Statement shall be carried out in the following manner:  by the Russian Federation as foreseen in Section II, paragraph 3 of the Declaration;  by Ukraine fully within the area of application of the Treaty.

Within the area of application of the Treaty, the Belarusian Republic, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall have conventional armaments and equipment (APC’s) in strategic rocket forces in quantities not exceeding; Belarusian Republic 585 APC’s; Russian Federation 700 APC’s; Ukraine 416 APC’s. For the Belarusian Republic and the Ukraine, the established quantities for APC’s shall remain in force until the complete removal of strategic rocket force sites on their territories. In proportion to the removal of strategic rocket force sites from the territories of these states, their quota of these APC’s shall be transferred to the Russian Federation.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC , THE ARMENIAN REPUBLIC , THE REPUBLICS OF BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND M OLDOVA , THE R USSIAN F EDERATION , U KRAINE AND THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC , IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE With the aim of furthering the implementation of the CFE treaty and documents related to it, Azerbaijan Republic, Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Georgian Republic declare the following:

698  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Georgian Republic confirm their adherence to the provisions of the Declaration of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty with Regard to Personnel Strength. The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Georgian Republic adhere to the provisions of the Declaration of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty with Regard to Land-Based Naval Aircraft and recognize that the number of permanently land-based naval combat aircraft, specified in paragraph 1 of the Declaration, refers to the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, with the Russian Federation having not more than 300 combat aircraft in the area of application of the Treaty, and Ukraine not more than 100 combat aircraft. The Russian Federation shall fulfill the provisions of the statement of the representative of the USSR in the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991 with regard to armaments and equipment withdrawn beyond that area of application in the period before the signing of the treaty. Taking account of the political nature of the documents referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Statement, the obligations that arise from these paragraphs have a politically binding nature. The Azerbaijan Republic, the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova, and the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Georgian Republic confirm that all decisions taken previously within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group are binding on all these States. Done in Tashkent this 15th day of May 1992 in one original copy in the Russian language. The original copy shall be held in the archives of the government of the Republic of Belurus, which will send a certified copy to all states that have signed this Statement, and to the Depositary and the States Parties of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE THE S TATES PARTIES TO THE T REATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OSLO, 5 JUNE 1992

OF

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties. Reaffirming their determination to bring into force the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, by the time of the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on July 9–10, 1992, Desiring to meet the objectives and requirements of the Treaty while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed, Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  699

necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defense and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking, Having met together at an Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Kingdom of Spain in Oslo on June 5, 1992, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty as provisionally applied, Have agreed as follows: 1.The understandings, notifications, confirmations, and commitments contained or referred to in this Final Document and its Annexes A and B. together with the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the States Parties, shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions.Accordingly, the Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after the last such instrument has been deposited. 2. In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement of May 15, 1992, on the Principles and Procedures of Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the four Protocols to that Agreement and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on June 1, 1992, by that Agreement’s Depositary to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 of that Agreement, the four Protocols to that Agreement and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contain necessary confirmations and information. 3.The States Parties confer the understandings as elaborated in the Joint Consultative Group, and specified in Annex A of this Final Document. 4.The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group. 5.This Final Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents. 6.This Final Document shall enter into force upon signature by all of the States Parties. 7. This Final Document, together with its Annexes A and B. which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties.

Annex A. Understandings 1.The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read: “The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,” 2.The second paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read: “Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989,”

700  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

The third paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read: “Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted in Vienna beginning March 9, 1989,” 3.With regard to the ninth paragraph of the preamble of the Treaty, it is noted that the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 is no longer in force, and that some of the States Parties in the first group specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex did not sign or accede to that Treaty. 4.The “groups of States Parties” referred to in paragraph I (A) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of: “the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine,” and “the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.” 5.The first two sentences of paragraph 1 (B) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to read: “The term “area of application” means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Russian Federation. In the case of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea.” 6. In Article IV of the Treaty, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty: The second sentence of the second part of paragraph 1 shall be understood to read: “Such designated permanent storage sites may also be located in the Republic of Moldova, that part of Ukraine composing the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, and that part of the territory of the Russian Federation comprising the southern part of the Leningrad Military District.” the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read: “Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the VolgaUral Military District on its territory west of the

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  701

Ural Mountains, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the Ukraine composing the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland each States Parties shall limit as necessary, and reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:” the first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read: “Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Kingdom of Spain, that part of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each States Parties shall limit as necessary, and reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:” the first sentence in paragraph 3(D) shall be understood to read: “In that part of Ukraine comprising the former Kiev Military District, the aggregate numbers in active units and designated permanent storage sites together shall not exceed:” 7. The first sentence of Paragraph 1 (A) of Article V of the Treaty shall be understood, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty to read: “Within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Republic of Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation comprising the Leningrad Northern Caucus Military Districts, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of Ukraine comprising the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, each State Party shall limit as necessary, and reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed the difference between the overall numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is:” 8. Paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorization of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorization of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters shall be understood to read: “Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine may hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of this

702  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

limit shall be categorized as specialized attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty.” 9.With reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the proportion of the expenses of the Joint Consultative Group allocated to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall become the collective responsibility of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Annex B. Notifications, Confirmations and Commitments I. Notifications 1.The States Parties note that each State Party has provided to all other States Parties notifications of maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Article VII, paragraph 2) in advance of the Extraordinary Conference. 2. Each State Party shall provide the following notifications and information, where applicable, to all other States Parties no later than July l, 1992: A) in view of the inspection requirements in the Treaty, information on its objects of verification and declared sites effective as of November 19,1990 (Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section V and Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V); B) list of its points of entry/exit (Annex on Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V, paragraph 3); C) notification of changes to its points of entry/exit (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 11); D) lists of its proposed inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 3); E) notification of deletions from the lists of inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraphs 4 and 7); F) notification of its standing diplomatic clearance numbers for transportation means (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 9); G) notification of the official language or languages to be used by inspection teams (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 12); H) notification of its active inspection quota for the baseline validation period (Protocol on Inspection, Section II, paragraph 24); I) notification of entry into service of new types, models or versions of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty (Protocol on Existing Types, Section IV, paragraph 3); J) notification in the event of destruction by accident, and documentary evidence supporting destruction by accident, of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Protocol on Reduction, Section IX, paragraphs 2 and 3). II. Confirmations 1.With regard to Article VIII, paragraph 7, of the Treaty, the States Parties confirm that, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, their respective reduction liabilities in each category shall be

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  703

no less than the difference between their respective holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, as of the signature of the Treaty, and their respective maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII. In this regard for those States Parties that have jointly confirmed the validity for them of holdings as of the signature of the Treaty, the sum of their reduction liabilities in each category shall, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, be no less than the difference between the jointly confirmed holdings and the sum of their maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII. 2. The States Parties confirm their commitment, in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength of November 19, 1990, not to increase during the period of the negotiations referred to in Article XVIII of the Treaty the total peacetime authorized personnel strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the Mandate in the area of application. 3. The States Parties confirm their commitment to the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Land-based Naval Aircraft of November 19, 1990. 4. The States Parties confirm their adherence to the agreement set out in the Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group on October 18, 1991. III. Commitments A. Costs 1. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2(F), of the Treaty and with reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the Joint Consultative Group shall review its scale of distribution of expenses after entry into force of the Treaty in the light of decisions taken on the scale of distribution of expenses of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. B. Article XII 1. In order to meet the security interests of all States Parties in light of new circumstances in Europe, the States Parties shall as a first priority seek to reach agreement, immediately after entry into force of the Treaty, on Article XII, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. 2. In this context, the States Parties will cooperate to respect the security objectives of Article XII within the area of application of the Treaty. In particular, no State Party will increase, within the area of application, its holdings of armored infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of signature of the Treaty, as notified pursuant to the information exchange effective as of November 19, 1990. 3. Notwithstanding the political commitment set forth in paragraph 2 above, any State Party that had an aggregate number of armored infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions on its territory, as notified effective as of November 19, 1990, that was less than five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armored combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or less than 100 such armored infantry fighting vehicles, whichever is greater, will have the right to increase its holdings of such armored infantry fighting vehicles to an aggregate number not to exceed five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armored combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or to an aggregate number not to exceed 100, whichever is greater. DONE at Oslo, this fifth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-two.

704  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

PROVISIONAL APPLICATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OF NOVEMBER 19, 1990 Helsinki, 10 July 1992 The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19. 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Recalling the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties of June 5, 1992, wherein they reaffirmed their determination to bring into force the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, by the time of the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on July 10, 1992, Recognizing that the Treaty is an important achievement on which to build the new Europe proclaimed by the Charter of Paris, Having due regard to the ratification procedures of their parliaments and governments, Taking note of the signing of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Having met together at an Extraordinary Conference chaired by the French Republic in Helsinki on July 10, 1992, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, as provisionally applied, Have agreed as follows: 1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article XXII of the Treaty and notwithstanding the Protocol on Provisional Application of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally all of the provisions of the Treaty, beginning on July 17, 1992, on the basis of the agreement reached by all States Parties expressed hereby.The States Parties deem that such provisional application constitutes an improvement to the Treaty. 2. Such provisional application of the Treaty shall be for a period of 120 days but shall terminate upon entry into force of the Treaty if the Treaty enters into force before such 120day period expires. 3. In order to enhance the operation of the Treaty, during such period of provisional application as well as following entry into force of the Treaty, the date set forth in paragraph 1 above shall be used as the basis for determining the timing of all rights and obligations of the States Parties that are specifically tied to the date of entry into force of the Treaty. 4.An extraordinary conference shall be convened, in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, in connection with entry into force of the Treaty in order to assess the implementation of the Treaty in light of its provisional application pursuant hereto. 5.This document, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depository for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this document to all the States Parties.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  705

Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Vienna, 13 November 1992 I. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, the designated Depositary for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, convened on November 13, 1992 an Extraordinary Conference pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, and to paragraph 4 of the document on Provisional Application of the Treaty, done at the Extraordinary Conference in Helsinki on July 10, 1992, at the Meeting of Heads of State or Government. II.At the Conference, the Depositary confirmed that instruments of ratification had been deposited by all States Parties to the Treaty as of October 30, 1992.Accordingly, the States Parties noted that the Treaty had entered into force on November 9, 1992, in conformity with Article XXII, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. III.The States Parties noted paragraphs 1 and 3 of the document on Provisional Application of the Treaty, done at the Extraordinary Conference in Helsinki on July 10, 1992 at the Meeting of Heads of State or Government, as follows: ‘1.Without prejudice to the provisions of Article XXII of the Treaty and notwithstanding the Protocol on Provisional Application of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally all of the provisions of the Treaty, beginning on July 17, 1992, on the basis of the agreement reached by all States Parties expressed hereby. The States Parties deem that such provisional application constitutes an improvement to the Treaty. 

3. In order to enhance the operation of the Treaty, during such period of provisional application as well as following entry into force of the Treaty, the date set forth in paragraph 1 above shall be used as the basis for determining the timing of all rights and obligations of the States Parties that are specifically tied to the date of entry into force of the Treaty.’ IV.This document, in all the official CSCE languages, shall be held by the Depositary and copies shall be circulated to all the States Parties.10

AGREEMENT

GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC ON THE P RINCIPLES AND P ROCEDURES FOR I MPLEMENTING THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE AND CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE BETWEEN THE

Prague, 12 January 1993 The Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, hereinafter referred to as the Contracting Parties, as Governments Successor State of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in regard to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 10

Dates of ratifications and signatures of States Parties can be found in the appendix.

706  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, and its associated documents and in regard to the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act; Affirming their adherence to he goals and tasks of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Considering the Treaty and the Concluding Act as the basic elements of the foundation of the new system of security in Europe; Seeking consistent implementation of all obligations arising from the Treaty and its associated documents and from the Concluding Act; Taking into account the security interest of both Contracting Parties; Have agreed to the following: Article I 1. Each Contracting Parties shall fully exercise the rights and fulfill all the obligations provided for in the Treaty, its associated documents and in the at beginning January 1, 1993. 2. The Contracting Parties shall cooperate, as necessary, in exercising the rights and fulfilling the obligations resulting from the Treaty, its associated documents and from the Concluding Act. Article II 1. In the framework of the obligations resulting from the Treaty and the Concluding Act there shall be established for each Contracting Party, under corresponding protocols: a. maximum levels for holdings of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; b. its national personnel limits; c. the levels of its armored vehicle launched bridges in active units; d. its reduction liability; e. the levels of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designed for conversion for nonmilitary purposes; f. the numbers of its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery and combat aircraft awaiting or being refurbished for export or reexport; g. the active and passive declared sites inspection quota for the first phase of the reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; h. the share of scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group. 2.The maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment of the Contracting Parties shall not exceed the ceilings established for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the agreement on maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Hungary, the Polish Republic, Romania, the USSR, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe of November 3, 1990. 3.The national personnel limits shall not in total exceed the national personnel limit declared by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the Concluding Act. 4. The maximum holdings and numbers referred to in protocols associated with this Agreement and mentioned under paragraphs lc, d, e, f, g, h of this Article shall not be exceeded.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  707

5.The Contracting Parties confirm the interpretative statements of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic concerning the designated permanent storage sites of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, made in Budapest on November 3, 1990 and in Vienna on June 14, 1991. Article III 1. Upon mutual agreement and in keeping with the reduction liability and other requirements of the Treaty and its associated documents, the Contracting Parties shall transfer to each other conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 2. The Contracting Parties undertake the commitment to divide the reduction liability of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and to continue in the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty according to the agreed rules and procedures and within time limits established in the Treaty and its associated documents. 3.With the aim of optimal organization of the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and the lowering of costs of reduction the Contracting Parties have agreed to utilize jointly the reduction sites as necessary. 4.The Contracting Parties undertake the commitment to begin, not later than on January 1, 1994, the reduction according to the rules and procedures established in the Treaty and its associated documents, of those conventional armaments and equipment now notified for export but not, by then, for any reason exported. Article IV 1.The Contracting Parties confirm that, during the first phase of the reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, their total passive declared site inspection quota will not be less than the passive declared site inspection quota of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, determined for it according to the data on the number of objects of verification notified in accordance with the Protocol on the Exchange of Information at the entry into force of the Treaty on July 17, 1992. 2.The Contracting Parties confirm that, during the first phase of the reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, their total active inspection quota will not be more than the active inspection quota of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic notified in accordance with the protocol on the Exchange of Information at the entry into force of the Treaty on July 17, 1992. 3.The Contracting Parties shall cooperate, as necessary, in carrying out inspection activities and in the formation of multinational inspection teams for the conduct of inspections on the territory of other State Parties of the Treaty that are not Contracting Parties. Article VI The following shall constitute integral parts of this Agreement: the Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and equipment Limited by the Treaty; the Protocol on National Personnel Limits; the Protocol on Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active Units; the Protocol on Reduction Liability; the Protocol on Maximum Numbers of Conventional Armaments Designed for Conversion for Nonmilitary Purposes; the Protocol on Maximum Numbers of Conventional Armaments Designed for Export; the Protocol on Numbers of Active and Passive Declared Site Inspections in the First Phase of the Reduction Period; the Protocol on the Scale of Distribution for the Common Expenses Associated with the Operation of the Joint Consultative Group.

708  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article VII The Agreement shall enter into force immediately after its signature. Its duration, the right to withdraw this Agreement will be governed by the relevant provisions of Article XIX of the Treaty. This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done in Prague on January 12,1993 in two copies in both the Czech and Slovak languages, each text having equal force. The Contracting Parties agree that the Government of the Czech Republic is hereby authorized to transmit certified copies to all Participating States of the Treaty, to the Depositary of the Budapest Agreement.

PROTOCOL

HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC ON

MAXIMUM LEVELS

FOR

The Contracting Parties, as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter called the Treaty, and the agreement on maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter called the Budapest Agreement, hereby affirm that: 1. Their maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will not, in total, exceed the maximum levels established for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the Budapest Agreement; 2. In accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Budapest Agreement, the following maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are established for each of the Contracting Party: The Czech Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles – of these AIFVs and HACVs – of these HACVs artillery combat aircraft attack helicopters

not more than 957 units not more than 1367 units not more than 954 units not more than 69 units not more than 767 units not more than 230 units not more than 50 units

The Slovak Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles – of these AIFVs and HACVs – of these HACVs artillery combat aircraft attack helicopters

not more than 478 units not more than 683 units not more than 476 units not more than 34 units not more than 383 units not more than 115 units not more than 25 units

3. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol, each Contracting Party shall have the right to change its maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equip-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  709

ment limited by the Treaty. A Contracting State that intends to increase its maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall have the right to carry out such increase only with the agreement of the other Contracting Party and in such a manner that corresponding provisions of the Treaty are not violated. In the event that a Contracting Party makes a notification of its intent to increase its maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, the other Contracting Party shall, no later than 14 days after receipt of such notification, inform the other Contracting Party of its position. In the absence of consensus, the Contracting Party intending to increase its maximum levels for holdings shall follow relevant procedures and provisions of the Treaty. A decrease in quantity of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by one of the Contracting Parties does not give the other Contracting Party the right to increase its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 4. The use of its conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty is the exclusive prerogative of each Contracting Party.

PROTOCOL

ON

NATIONAL PERSONNEL LIMITS

The Contracting Parties as successor states of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe hereby confirm that their national personnel limits will not, in total, exceed their national personnel limit declared by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on July 10, 1992. 1. In accordance with Article II, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act signed in Helsinki on July 10, 1992, the Contracting Parties hereby declare the following national personnel limits: The Czech Republic The Slovak Republic

not more than 93,333 personnel not more than 46,667 personnel

2. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and Protocol, each Contracting Party shall have the right to change its national personnel limit. A Contracting Party that intends to increase only with the agreement of the Contracting Party and in such manner that corresponding provisions of the Concluding Act are not violated. In the event that a Contracting Party makes a notification of its intent to increase its national personnel limit, the other Contracting Party shall, no later than 14 days after receipt of such notification, inform the other Contracting Party of its position. In the absence of consensus, the Contracting Party intending to increase its national personnel limit shall follow relevant procedures and provisions of the Concluding Act. A decrease in the quantity of national personnel limit of one Contracting Party does not give the other Contracting Party the right to increase its national personnel limit. 3.The use of its declared national personnel limit is the exclusive prerogative of each Contracting Party.

PROTOCOL

ON

ARMORED VEHICLE LAUNCHED BRIDGES IN ACTIVE U NITS

The Contracting Parties as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty hereby confirm that their maximum number of armored vehicle launched bridges in

710  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

active units shall not, in total, exceed the maximum number of armored vehicle launched bridges established for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 1. In accordance with the Budapest Agreement of November 3, 1990, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic could hold in active units not more than 50 armored vehicle launched bridges. The Contracting Parties have agreed to limit their quantities in the following manner: The Czech Republic The Slovak Republic

not more then 33 units not more than 17 units

2. The increase by either Contracting Party of the above quantity of armored vehicle launched bridges should, by agreement of the Contracting Parties, be preceded by a corresponding reduction of the other Contracting Party in its quantity of armored vehicle launched bridges in active units.

PROTOCOL

ON

REDUCTION LIABILITY

The Contracting Parties, as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty, hereby confirm that their reduction liabilities shall not, in total, be less than the reduction liability of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 1. In accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 6 of the Treaty, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic nodded as of July 17, 1992 its reduction liability in the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.The Contracting Parties agree to divide this reduction in the following manner: The Czech Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles – of these AIFVs and HACVs – of these HACVs artillery combat aircraft attack helicopters

not less than 846 units not less than 1149 units 0 units 0 units not less than 969 units not less than 5 units 0 units

The Slovak Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles – of these AIFVs and HACVs – of these HACVs artillery combat aircraft attack helicopters

not less than 423 units not less than 574 units 0 units 0 units not less than 485 units not less than 2 units 0 units

2. A Contracting Party that intends to change its reduction liability shall have the right to carry out that change in a manner which will conform to all provisions of the Treaty. An increase in reduction liability of one Contracting Party in any category of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty does not give the other Contracting Party the right to decrease its reduction liabilities in any category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 3. The Contracting Parties undertake the commitment to follow strictly the established procedures for reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty including the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 4 A, B, C, D of the Treaty concerning the phases of reduction.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  711

PROTOCOL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY DESIGNATED FOR CONVERSION FOR N ON - MILITARY P URPOSES The Contracting Parties as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty hereby confirm that they shall not, in total, exceed the number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designated for conversion for nonmilitary purposes notified by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In accordance with Article III Paragraph 9 of the Treaty, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic notified as of July 17, 1992 the number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designated for nonmilitary purposes.The Contracting Parties agree to divide the number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designated for conversion for nonmilitary purposes in the following manner: The Czech Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles

not more than 100 units not more than 67 units

The Slovak Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles

not more than 50 units not more than 33 units

PROTOCOL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY AWAITING EXPORT The Contracting Parties as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty hereby confirm that they will not, in total, export more conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty than was notified as awaiting export by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 1. In accordance with Section IV, Article 1, paragraph A (4) of Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information of the Treaty, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic notified as of July 17, 1992 the number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export. The Contracting Parties agree to divide the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export in the following manner: The Czech Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles artillery combat aircraft

not more than 332 units not more than 473 units not more than 519 units not more than 59 units

The Slovak Republic battle tanks armored combat vehicles artillery combat aircraft

not more than 168 units not more than 237 units not more than 259 units not more than 29 units

2. A decrease in the quantity of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export of one Contracting Party does not give the other Contracting Party the right to increase its number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export

712  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3. The Contracting Parties undertake the commitment that, in the event that the export of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and designated for export will not be realized for any other reason by the end of 1993, they will unconditionally begin the reduction of these armaments in accordance with the provisions and procedures of the Treaty and its associated documents. 4. The Contracting Parties also undertake the commitment that, in the event that the export of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and designated for export will not be realized by the end of 1993, they will add the number of these armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and designated for export to the reduction liabilities no later than January 1, 1994. The Contracting Parties will notify the change of their reduction liabilities in the exchange of information on December 15, 1993.

PROTOCOL

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DECLARED SITE INSPECTION QUOTAS FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF THE REDUCTION PERIOD

ON

The Contracting Parties, as successor of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty, hereby confirm that their active and passive declared site inspection quotas for the first phase of the reduction period will not, in total be less than the active and passive declared site inspection quota established for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic according to the number of objects of verification notified by the data exchanged as of July 17, 1992. In accordance with the Treaty and Section II, Article 24(B) of the Protocol on Inspection, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic notified as of July 17, 1992 its active inspection quota for the first phase of reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. The Contracting Parties hereby confirm that their active inspection quota will not, in total, exceed the active inspection quota notified by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 1.The Contracting Parties agree to divide the active and passive declared site inspection quotas for the first phase of the reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following manner: The Czech Republic passive declared site inspection quota active inspection quota

8 8

The Slovak Republic passive declared site inspection quota active inspection quota

3 3

2. In accordance with the Treaty and Section II, Article 24 of the Protocol on Inspection, the Contracting Parties agree to divide the active inspection quota conducted within the same group of State Parties in the first phase of reduction period of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following manner: The Czech Republic

3 active inspections

The Slovak Republic

2 active inspections

3.The Contracting Parties shall cooperate as necessary in carrying out their obligations under the inspection regime. They will also, as necessary, cooperate by establishing multilateral inspection teams for the conduct of inspections in the territory of other Participating States.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  713

4. A decrease or nonuse of the active inspection quota by one of the Contracting Parties does not give the other Contracting Party the right to increase its active inspection quota.

PROTOCOL ON THE SCALE DISTRIBUTION FOR THE COMMON EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE OPERATION OF THE J OINT C ONSULTATIVE G ROUP The Contracting Parties as successors of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic with regard to the Treaty hereby confirm that they undertake the commitments regarding the scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group.The Contracting Parties will act as the independent participants to the Treaty as of the signature of this Agreement. 1. In accordance with the Treaty and Article 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic agreed to accept 2.24% share of the costs of the Joint Consultative Group. The Contracting Parties agree to divide this share of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the following manner: The Czech Republic

1.56%

The Slovak Republic

0.78%

2.The Contracting Parties agree that, in case a new scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation on the Joint Consultative Group is agreed, each Contracting Party will act as an independent and sovereign State Party.

JOINT EXTRAORDINARY CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE TREATY ON C ONVENTIONAL A RMED F ORCES ON E UROPE AND THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE VIENNA, 5 FEBRUARY 1993 1. Upon the request of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic a joint Extraordinary Conference was convened in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992. 2. At the joint Extraordinary Conference: (a) The States Parties agreed on the Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annexes, as attached to this document; and (b) The participating States adopted the Document of the participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its Annex, as attached to this document. 3.The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will circulate this document, together with the attached Documents and their Annexes, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to all States Parties of the Treaty and participating States of the Concluding Act.

714  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

DOCUMENT OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON C ONVENTIONAL A RMED F ORCES IN E UROPE The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Committed to meeting the objectives and requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed, Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defense and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming commitment to that undertaking, Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4 of the Concluding Act, Have agreed as follows: 1. The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and its Annexes shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents. 2. In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993, on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Protocols to that Agreement, as transmitted on January 20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard,Articles I, II (paragraph 2), III (paragraphs 13), and Articles IVVII of that Agreement, the Protocol on Maximum Levels for Holdings of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the Protocol concerning Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges in Active Units, the Protocol on Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty Designated for Conversion for Non-Military Purposes, and the Protocol on Active and Passive Declared Site Inspection Quotas for the First Phase of the Reduction Period to that Agreement, and paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Protocol on the Reduction Liability to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments. 3.The States Parties note the notifications by the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic listed in the Annex to this Document on Notifications Related to the Treaty. 4. The States Parties confirm the understandings specified in the Annex to this Document on Understandings Related to the Treaty. 5.The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Treaty.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  715

6.This Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents. 7.This Document shall enter into force upon signature by all the States Parties. 8.This Document, together with its Annexes, which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depository for the Treaty, which shall circulate true copies of this Document to all the States Parties.

Annex on Notifications Related to the Treaty A.The States Parties note the following notifications from the Czech Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993: 1. Maximum level for holdings of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty; 2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armament and equipment limited by the Treaty; 3. Number of battle tanks and armored combat vehicles designated for conversion for nonmilitary purposes; 4. List of the points of entry/exit; 5. Lists of inspectors and transport crew members; 6. Diplomatic clearance number; 7. Official languages; 8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period; 9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 1, 1993); 10. Counting of the aircraft destructed by accident; 11. Armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Czech Republic (revised February 1, 1993); 12. List of reduction sites of the Czech Republic; 13. Aggregate number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for the purpose of research and development; 14. Number of armament and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/reexport; and 15. Number and types of conventional armament and equipment removed from service and reduced during previous 12 months. The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Czech Republic informed “all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Military Command West, Military Command Middle and all of the formations and units subordinated to them contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15,1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Czech Republic until superseded by a subsequent exchange of information of the Czech Republic.” B.The States Parties note the following notifications from the Slovak Republic as transmitted on January 29, 1993 (1 11) and February 4, 1993 (12 and 13): 1. Maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment and numbers of national personnel limits limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993);

716  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

2. Reduction liability in the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (revised February 2, 1993); 3. Number of battle tanks and armored combat vehicles designated for conversion for nonmilitary purposes; 4. List of the points of entry/exit into and out of the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993); 5. List of inspectors; 6. Standing diplomatic clearance number; 7. Official languages; 8. Passive inspection quota for the first year of reduction period; 9. Active inspection quota for the first year of reduction period (revised February 2, 1993); 10. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting export/ reexport and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic (revised February 2, 1993); 11. Numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment removed from service and reduced during previous 12 months; 12. Aggregate number of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty used exclusively for the purpose of research and development; and 13. Numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and retained outside the territory of the Slovak Republic. The States Parties also note that, by its Note Verbale of January 29, 1993, the Slovak Republic informed “all Delegations to the Joint Consultative Group that the data of Military Command East and of all formations and units subordinated to it contained in the Exchange of Information submitted by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on December 15, 1992 are valid for Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic until next exchange of information of the Slovak Republic in March 1993.”

Annex on Understandings Related to the Treaty 1.The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read: “the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties.” 2.The “groups of States Parties” referred to in paragraph 1 (A) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of: “the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine,”

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  717

and “the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.” 3. In Article IV of the Treaty: first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read: “within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the area of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the Volga-Ural Military District on its territory west of the Ural Mountains, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:” first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read: “within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Slovak Republic, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:” the first sentence of paragraph 4 shall be understood to read: “within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, and the Slovak Republic, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed:” In paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, and without prejudice to any review by the Joint Consultative Group of its scale of distribution of expenses in accordance with paragraph 2 (F) of Article XVI of the Treaty, the term “2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” shall be understood to read “1.56% for the Czech Republic” and “0.78% for the Slovak Republic.”

718  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

DOCUMENT OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, which are participating States of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the participating States, Committed to implementing fully the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of July 10, 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act, while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Concluding Act was signed, Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defense and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking, Having met together at a joint Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Hellenic Republic in Vienna on February 5, 1993, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and Section VII, paragraph 4, of the Concluding Act, Have adopted the following: 1.The understandings, notifications, confirmations, and commitments contained or referred to in this Document and in its Annex fulfill the requirements necessary in order for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic fully to implement the measures in the Concluding Act. 2. In this context, the participating States note the Agreement Between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic, of January 12, 1993 on the Principles and Procedures for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on January 20, 1993 by the Czech Republic to all participating States. In this regard, Article II (paragraph 3) of that Agreement and the Protocol on National Personnel Limits to that Agreement contain necessary confirmations, information, and commitments. 3.The participating States confirm the understanding specified in the Annex to this Document. 4. The participating States confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group related to the Concluding Act. 5. This Document in no way alters the measures adopted by the participating States in the Concluding Act. 6.The measures adopted in this Document are politically binding. Accordingly, this Document is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Document will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the Document of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreed by the States Parties at the joint Extraordinary Conference on February 5, 1993.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  719

7.The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will transmit true copies of this Document and its Annex, the original of which is in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to all participating States.

Annex on Understandings Related to the Concluding Act 1. In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic” and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order. 2. In the list of participating States set forth in Section II, paragraph 1 of the Concluding Act, it is understood that the reference to “the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic” is deleted and that “the Czech Republic” and “the Slovak Republic” are added to that list in appropriate alphabetical order. 3. In the list referenced in paragraph 2 above, it is understood that the Czech Republic has a national personnel limit of 93,333 and the Slovak Republic has a national personnel limit of 46,667.

Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the participating states, Recalling the obligations undertaken in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November l9, l990, hereinafter referred to as the CFE treaty, and the important achievements attained in that treaty, In accordance with the obligation in Article XVIII of the CFE treaty to continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and with the goal of building on the CFE Treaty and with the objective of concluding an agreement, no later than the 1992 follow-up of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe, Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having conducted negotiations in Vienna, Having decided to limit and, if applicable, reduce, on a national basis, the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces-within the area of application,11 Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the CSCE, within the framework of which these negotiations were conducted, 11

The area of application of the measures adopted in this act is the area of application of the CFE Treaty as defined in paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of Article II of the CFE Treaty, taking into account the understanding specified in paragraph 5 of the Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of June 5, 1992.

720  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Looking forward to a more structured cooperation among all CSCE participating states on security matters and to new negotiations on annex a of the final document of the extraordinary conference of the states parties to the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe of June 5, 1992. Disarmament and confidence- and security-building in accordance with their commitment in the charter of Paris for a new Europe, and, accordingly, to the possibility, within the context of those new negotiations, for all CSCE participating states to subscribe to a common regime based upon the measures adopted in this concluding act, hereinafter referred to as the act, Taking into account the principle of sufficiency, and recalling the undertaking of the participating states to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence, bearing in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, Recognizing the freedom of each participating state to choose its own security arrangements, Have adopted the following: Section I. Scope of Limitation 1. Each participating state “will limit, as specified in section ii of this act, its personnel based on land within the area of application in the following categories of conventional armed forces: A. All full-time military personnel serving with land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the protocol on information exchange of the CFE Treaty; B. All full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence aviation forces, including long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the protocol on information exchange of the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces; C. All full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence forces other than those specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph; D. All full-time military personnel, excluding naval personnel, serving with all central headquarters, command and staff elements E. All full-time military personnel, excluding naval personnel, serving with all centrallycontrolled formations, units and other organisations, including those of rear services; F. All full-time military personnel serving with all land-based naval formations and units which hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, or armoured personnel carrier look-alikes as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in the declaration of the states parties to the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe with respect to land-based naval aircraft of November 19, 1990; G. All full-time military personnel serving with all other formations, units and other organisations which hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in service with its conventional armed forces, as defined in article ii of the CFE Treaty; and H.All reserve personnel who have completed their initial military service or training and who are called up or report voluntarily for full-time military service or training in conventional armed forces for a continuous period of more than 90 days. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this section, the following categories of personnel are not included within the scope of limitation’ specified in this act: A. Personnel serving with organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  721

B. Personnel in transit from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application who are in the area of application for no longer than seven days; and C. Personnel serving under the compound of the United Nations. 3. If, after the date on which this act comes into effect, any land-based formations or units are formed within the area of application which, according to their structure and armaments, have a capability for ground combat outside national borders against an external enemy, a participating state may raise in the joint consultative group any issue regarding personnel serving with such formations and units.The joint consultative group will consider any such issue on the basis of all available information, including information provided by the participating states concerned, with a view to deciding whether the above-mentioned criteria are applicable to such formations and units; if such criteria are deemed to apply, the personnel serving with such formations and units will be included within the scope of limitations specified in this act. Section II. National Personnel Limits 1. Each participating state will limit its military personnel based on land within the area of application in the categories of conventional armed forces specified in section i, paragraph 1 of this act so that, 40 months after entry into force of the CFE Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number of such personnel will not exceed the number representing its national personnel limitation as specified in this paragraph: The Republic of Armenia The Republic of Azerbaijan The Republic of Belarus The Kingdom of Belgium The Republic of Bulgaria Canada The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic The Kingdom of Denmark The French Republic The Republic of Georgia The Federal Republic of Germany The Hellenic Republic The Republic of Hungary The Republic of Iceland The Italian Republic The Republic of Kazakhstan The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg The Republic of Moldova The Kingdom of The Netherlands The Kingdom of Norway The Republic of Poland The Portuguese Republic Romania The Russian Federation The Kingdom of Spain The Republic of Turkey Ukraine The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The United States of America

100,000 70,000 104,000 10,660 140,000 39,000 325,000 345,000 158,261 100,000 0 315,000 0 900 80,000 32,000 234,000 75,000 230,248 1,450,000 300,000 530,000 450,000 260,000 250,000

2. For the purpose of recording changes to the information specified in paragraph 1 of this section, the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will distribute to all the participating states a revised version of the information in that paragraph.

722  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3. Each participating state may revise its national personnel limit in accordance with Section IV of this act. Section III. Revision Procedures 1. A participating state may revise downward its national personnel limit by providing a notification of its revised limit to all other participating states. Such notification will specify the date on which the revised limit will become effective. 2. A participating state intending to revise upward its national personnel limit will provide notification of such intended revision to all other participating states. Such notification will include an explanation of the reasons for such a revision. Any participating state may raise any question concerning the intended revision.A revised national personnel limit will become effective 42 days after notification has been provided, unless a participating state raises an objection to such revision by providing notification of its objection to all other participating states. 3. If an objection is raised, any participating state may request the convening of an extraordinary conference which will examine the intended revision in the light of the explanations provided and seek to decide on a future national personnel limit.The extraordinary conference will open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three weeks. Section IV. Information Exchange 1. Each participating state hill provide to all other participating states, in accordance with the provisions of this section. The following information in respect of its personnel based on land within the area of application: A. In respect of all personnel specified in Section I, Paragraph I of this act, the aggregate number; B. In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation down to the brigade/regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation; C. In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with air and air defence aviation forces, including long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the Protocol On Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation of conventional armed forces down to the wing/air regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation; D. In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with air defence forces other than those specified in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, the aggregate number and the numbering each formation and other organisation down to the next level of command above division or equivalent level (i.e., air defence army or equivalent) specifying the command organisation, designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation and organisation; E. In respect of all full-time military personnel of conventional armed forces, excluding naval personnel, serving with all central headquarters, command and staff elements, the aggregate number;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  723

F. In respect of all full-time military personnel of conventional armed forces, excluding naval personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled formations, units and other organisations, including those of rear services, the aggregate number and the number in each formation, unit and other organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, specifying the compound organisation designation, subordination and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation; G. In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with all land-based naval formations and units thigh hold conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in the declaration of the states parties to the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe with respect to land-based naval aircraft of November 19, 1990, the aggregate number and the number in each formation and unit down to the brigade regiment/regiment wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation and unit; H. In respect of all full-time military personnel serving with all formations, units and other organisations of conventional armed forces specified in Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty, the number in each such formation, unit and organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime location, including the geographic name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and organisation; I. In respect of all personnel serving with all formations and units down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level which hold battle tangs, artillery, combat aircraft or specialised attack helicopters as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article II of the CFE Treaty, in organisation designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the number in each such formation and unit at each site at which such armaments and equipment are held, specifying the national-level designation of each such organisation and the location, including the geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held; J. In respect of all personnel serving with all formations and units in organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police forces and protective services, the aggregate number and the aggregate number in each administrative region or equivalent; K. In respect of all reserve personnel who have completed their military service or training and who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service or training in conventional armed forces since the most recent exchange of information provided in accordance with this section, the aggregate number, specifying the number, if any, of those who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for full-time military service or training in conventional armed forces for a continuous period of more than 90 days: L. In respect of all military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations, the aggregate number; and M. In respect of all military personnel serving with all other formations, units and other organisations of conventional armed forces, the aggregate number, specifying the designation of such formations, units and organisations. 2. In providing information on personnel, strengths in accordance with this section, each participating state will provide the peacetime authorized personnel strength, which will approximate the

724  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

number of personnel serving within the area of application with each of the formations, units and other organisations specified in paragraph I of this section. 3.The provisions of this section will not apply to personnel who are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application. Personnel in the categories specified in paragraph I of this section who entered the area of application in transit will be subject to the provisions of this section if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days. 4. Each participating state will be responsible for its own information; receipt of such information will not imply validation or acceptance of the information provided. 5.The participating states will provide the information specified in this section in accordance with the formats and procedures to be agreed in the joint consultative group. 6. Prior to the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this act, each participating state will provide to all other participating states the information specified in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a), (d), (e) and (g) to (k) of this section, as well as the information on aggregate numbers of personnel in the categories specified in subparagraphs (b) (c) and (f) of that paragraph, in written form, in one of the official CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them in accordance with the following timetable: A. No later than 30 days following entry into force of the CFE Treaty, with the information effective as of the date of entry into force of that treaty; and B. On the 15th day of December of the year in which the CFE Treaty comes into force unless entry into force of that treaty occurs within 60 days of the 1st day of December and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year. 7. Beginning with the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this act, each participating state will provide to all other participating states all the information specified in paragraph I of this section in written form, in one of the official CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, in accordance with the following timetable: A. On the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this act, with the information effective as of that date; and B. On the 15th day of December of the year in which the national personnel limits become effective in accordance with section ii of this act, and on the 15th day of December of every year thereafter, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year. 8. The participating states will, at the first review of the operation of this act in accordance with paragraph 3 of section vii of this act, consider issues relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of the disaggregation of the information specified in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (f) of this section. Section V. Stabilising Measures Notification of increases in unit strengths 1. Each participating state will notify all other participating states at least 42 days in advance of any permanent increase in the personnel strength of any formation, unit or other organisation which was reported in the most recent exchange of information at the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level in accordance with Section IV of this act then such increase equals 1,000 or more at the brigade/regiment level, or 500 or more at the wing/air regiment level, or equivalent levels.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  725

Notification of call-up of reserve personnel 2. Any participating state intending to call up reserve personnel of its conventional armed forces based on land within the area of application will notify all other participating states whenever the cumulative total of the personnel called up and retained on full-time military service will exceed a threshold of 35,000. 3. Such notification will be provided at least 42 days in advance of such threshold being exceeded. As an exception, in the case of emergency situations where advance notification is not practical, notification will be provided as soon as possible and, in any event, no later than the date such threshold is exceeded. 4. Such notification will include the following information: A. The total number of reserve personnel to be called up, specifying the number to be called up for more than 90 days; B. A general description of the purpose of the call-up; C.The planned start and end dates of the period during which such threshold will be exceeded; and D.The designation and location of any formation in which more than 7,000 at the division or equivalent level or more than 9,000 at the army/army corps or equivalent level of the personnel so called up will serve. Resubordination of units 1.After the first exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this act, a participating state intending to resubordinate formations, units or other organisations whose personnel are subject to limitation in accordance with Section I of this act to a formation, unit or other organisation whose personnel would not otherwise be subject to limitation will notify all other participating states of the planned resubordination no later than the date on which such resubordination will become effective. 2. Such notification will include the following information: A.The date on which such resubordination will become effective; B.The subordinational designation and peacetime location of each formation, unit and organisations to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective; and C.The peacetime authorized personnel strength for each formation, unit and, organisation to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective; D. The number, if any, of battle tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched bridges as defined in article ii of the CFE Treaty held by each formation, unit and organisation to be resubordinated, both before and after such resubordination will become effective. 3. Personnel serving with formations, units or other organisations resubordinated after the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this act will remain subject to limitation in accordance with Section I of this act until the date of the exchange of information in accordance with section iv of this act one year subsequent to the year in which such resubordination becomes effective, after which time the procedure specified in paragraph 8 of this section will apply. 4. Forty-two days prior to the end of the one-year period specified in paragraph 7 of this section, the participating state resubordinating such formations, units or other organisations will provide to all other participating states notification of the planned exclusion. Upon the request of any other

726  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

participating state, the participating state resubordinating such formations, units or other organisations, will provide all relevant information supporting such exclusion. Section VI.Verification/Evaluation 1. For the purpose of evaluating observance of national personnel limits and the other provisions of this act, participating states will apply Section VII and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty and other relevant provisions of that treaty, together with the provisions set out in this section. 2. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the preinspection briefing will include information on the number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in the most recent exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this act and which is located at that inspection site. If the number of such personnel differs from the number of personnel noted in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection team will be provided with an explanation of such difference.The preinspection briefing will also include information on the number of personnel serving with any other formation or unit down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as independent units at the battalion/squadron or equivalent level, in the categories specified in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c) and (f) of Section IV of this act, which is located at that inspection site. 3. In the case of all inspection pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the escort team will provide, if requested by the inspection team, information on the number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in the most recent exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of this act, which is located at that inspection site and those facilities are being inspected if the number of such personnel differs from the number of personnel notified in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection team will be provided with an explanation of such difference. 4. During an inspection pursuant to Section VII or Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, inspectors may have access, consistent with the provisions of that protocol, to all facilities subject to inspection at the inspection site, including those used by all formations, units and other organisations located at that inspection site. During such an inspection, the escort team will specify, if requested by the inspection team, whether a particular building on the inspection site is a personnel barracks or messing facility. 5. Inspectors will include in the inspection report prepared pursuant to Section XII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty information provided to the inspection team in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this section in a format to be agreed in the joint consultative group. Inspectors may also include in that report written comments pertaining to the evaluation of personnel strengths. 6. Evaluation of observance of the provisions of this act will be further facilitated through confidence- and security-building measures that have been developed and that may be developed in the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building following the Helsinki follow-up meeting. In this context, participating states are prepared to join in considering ways and means to refine the evaluation provisions specified in the Vienna Document 1992. Section VII. Review Mechanisms 1.The participating states will review the implementation of this act in accordance with the procedures set out in this section, using the relevant bodies and channels the within the framework of the CSCE process. 2. In particular, any participating state may at any time raise and clarify questions relating to the implementation of this act within the framework, as appropriate, of the Joint Consultative Group.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  727

The participating states will consider in the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building which will be conducted following the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in this regard, as appropriate. 3. Six months after the date on which national personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this act and at five-year intervals thereafter, the participating states will conduct a review of the operation of this act. 4. The participating states will meet in an extraordinary conference if requested to do so by any participating state which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this act have arisen. Such a request will be transmitted to all other participating states and will include an explanation of exceptional circumstances relating to this act, e.g., an increase in the number of military personnel in categories listed in Section I of this act in a manner or proportion which the participating state requesting such an extraordinary conference deems to be prejudicial to security and stability within the area of application.The conference will open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three weeks. Section VIII. Closing Provisions 1.The measures adopted in this act are politically binding. Accordingly, this act is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.This act will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty. 2.This act will have the same duration as the CFE Treaty and maybe supplemented, modified or superseded. 3.The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will transmit true copies of this act, the original of which is in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to all participating states, and bring this act to the attention of the Secretariat of the CSCE and the Secretary General of the United Nations. 4.Wherefore, we have subscribed our signatures below: Done at Helsinki on 10 July 1992, at the meeting of the heads of state or government of the participating states.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING VIENNA, 30 AUGUST 1995 On this day, the 30th of August 1995, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, represented by the Heads of their respective diplomatic mission accredited to the OSCE in Vienna, have reached the following understanding: 1. In view of the relevant provisions of the CFE Treaty and the Budapest Agreement of November 3, 1990, including the agreed protocol, the number of treaty limited armament and equipment (TLE) to be stored in Declared Permanent Storage Sites (DPSS) shall with effected maximum level for holdings (i.e. when actual national holdings equal the maximum level for holdings) be no less than: for Czech Republic 203 battle tanks 144 ACVs 138 pieces of artillery for Republic of Hungary 177 battle tanks 178 ACVs

728  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

152 pieces of artillery for Republic of Poland 368 battle tanks 226 ACVs 291 pieces of artillery for Slovak Republic 102 battle tanks 72 ACVs 69 pieces of artillery 2. In case, for a given TLE category, the actual national holdings are lower than the maximum level for holdings, the number of TLEs to be held by relevant country in DPSS can be decreased by the number corresponding to the difference between the two above mentioned values. 3.This Memorandum was done in 4 copies, each of them considered as original.

I. Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength Vienna, 15–31 May 1996 The Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Fulfilling the obligation set forth in Article XXI, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, to conduct a review of the operation of the Treaty, and thereby taking into account the Final Documents of the Extraordinary Conferences of the States Parties of 10 July 1992 in Helsinki and 13 November 1992 in Vienna, Acting in accordance with the provision of Section VII, paragraph 3, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 10 July 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding Act, Recalling the results of the Extraordinary Conferences held thus far, Reaffirming all the decisions of the Joint Consultative Group made thus far, Having met at the First Review Conference, chaired by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 15 to 31 May 1996 in Vienna, Have adopted the following: I. Introduction 1. The States Parties reaffirm the fundamental role of the Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and their adherence to its goals and objectives. It is in their common interest to preserve

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  729

the integrity of the Treaty and the Concluding Act as well as the predictability and transparency they have created.The States Parties reaffirm their determination to fulfil in good faith all obligations and commitments arising from the Treaty and its associated documents. Bearing that in mind, they commit themselves to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. 2.The negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the Treaty and the Concluding Act, as well as the ratification of the Treaty, took place in times of change during which the European security environment evolved significantly.The Warsaw Treaty Organization has ceased to exist. New States have emerged and became States Parties to the Treaty. At the same time, new risks and challenges to security have come to the fore. As a result of common efforts of the States Parties, the Treaty and the Concluding Act have remained vital stabilizing factors in this period of transition and contributed to its peaceful unfolding. 3. The States Parties stress that security and stability in Europe are vitally underpinned by the continuation and enhancement of robust arms control measures. Recognizing the evolution of the European political and security environment, the States Parties are resolved to continue the conventional arms control process, including through the enhancement of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.They see this as a common responsibility. 4.The States Parties recognize that the Treaty and the Concluding Act are essential contributions to the achievement of the goals and purposes of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in particular the promotion of confidence, stability and security in an undivided Europe. In that context, they stress the importance of the development of a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century, of the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies and of the ongoing security dialogue and negotiations in the Forum for Security Co-operation. II. Review of the Operation of the Treaty and the Concluding Act 5. The States Parties note with satisfaction that more than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings of conventional armaments and equipment within the area of application are substantially lower than the limits set in the Treaty. More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A permanent system for regular and routine exchange of Treaty notifications and other information has been developed.The Joint Consultative Group has been firmly established and has demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing Treaty forum. With regard to the Concluding Act, the States Parties note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed forces in the area of application was reduced by 1.2 million persons. 6. The States Parties note that the Treaty established a high degree of transparency in military relations through its comprehensive system for exchange of information and for verification. Together with the extensive reductions of conventional armaments and equipment, this has led to greater predictability and confidence in security relations. The Treaty has also nurtured the development of new patterns of co-operation in Europe and provides a basis for stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantially lower levels of conventional armaments and equipment than heretofore. Although risks and challenges still exist in some parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished substantially. Nevertheless, the achievement of the goals of the Treaty in the whole area of its application requires continuous efforts by the States Parties. 7.The States Parties reaffirm the continued relevance of the basic structures of the Treaty, including the principle of zonal limitations, as embodied in Articles IV and V of the Treaty. In this respect, and in line with the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States Parties have agreed on a Document, which is contained in Annex A, reflecting a combination of measures agreed in co-operative fashion and acceptable to all Parties to the Treaty.

730  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

8.The States Parties regret that not all reduction obligations pursuant to the Treaty have been met. They stress the necessity to complete as soon as possible reductions of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (TLE) in accordance with obligations under the Treaty.They note with satisfaction the reiterated commitment of those States Parties which still have to complete reductions to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents. All States Parties express their readiness to follow this process to its completion in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In this context, being aware of difficulties which have delayed the completion of reductions, they take positive note of efforts undertaken in order to meet fully obligations under the Treaty. 9.The States Parties express their concern with serious difficulties of some States Parties to comply fully, within their territory, with the provisions of the Treaty and its related documents due to TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled within the Treaty.This situation adversely affects the operation of the Treaty and complicates its implementation. They stress the need to reach as soon as possible relevant political solutions and to elaborate necessary measures to enable the implementation of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions. They express their readiness to address the issue of this TLE in the Joint Consultative Group, including the ways and means to facilitate the resolution of this issue. 10.The States Parties have adopted the understandings and agreed interpretations with regard to implementation and ways and means to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty as specified in Annex B of this Final Document. 11. The States Parties have agreed that the implementation issues contained in Annex C of this Final Document require further consideration and resolution in the Joint Consultative Group. 12.The States Parties reaffirm the arrangements regarding Article XII reached at the Extraordinary Conference in Oslo in 1992. They understand that for successor States that had become States Parties by 1992, paragraph 2 of the Article XII part of the Oslo arrangement should be read as:‘In particular, no State Party will increase within the area of application its holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of signature of the Treaty, as notified on their territory pursuant to the information exchange as of November 19, 1990.’ They agree to work further on the issue of Article XII in the Joint Consultative Group, taking into account the proposals made at the Review Conference. 13.The States Parties stressed the importance of full and continuous respect for the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5, in the context of maintaining the viability of the Treaty, as well as for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. The States Parties noted that, in certain instances, bilateral agreements are under negotiation— or in the process of ratification or implementation—which relate to the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5. The States Parties expressed their support for early and positive results of the ongoing process. The States Parties consider that the importance of the Article IV provisions on stationing forces should be recognized in the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final Document. 14. In the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final Document, the States Parties will examine different interpretations of temporary deployments so as to ensure that these temporary deployments do not become indefinite. 15. The States Parties recall that, according to Article II, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, the lists of existing types contained in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  731

Equipment (POET) shall be updated periodically by the Joint Consultative Group in accordance with Section IV of the POET. However, it has not been updated since the Treaty’s conclusion. The States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to update the POET. They further agreed that:  any inaccuracies should be corrected, including by removal of types, models and versions

of conventional armaments and equipment that do not meet Treaty criteria;

 the Joint Consultative Group should consider if a yearly update of the lists would be

appropriate;

 the Joint Consultative Group should consider an electronic version of the lists in all

official languages. 16.The States Parties also discussed the topics contained in Annex D of this Final Document. 17. The States Parties welcome the statement of the representative of the Russian Federation to promote the implementation of the statement of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group on 14 June 1991 in Vienna. The text of the Russian statement is given in Annex E of this Final Document. 18. The States Parties recommend that, in view of the issues that have been referred to the Joint Consultative Group, most effective use is made of the provisions of Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group in order to allow the Joint Consultative Group to address all those issues in a proper manner. III. Future Work on the Treaty 19. In view of Sections I and II of this Final Document, the States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint Consultative Group to expand upon their work in accordance with Article XVI of the Treaty. Taking fresh impetus from this Review Conference, they will immediately start a thorough process aimed at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it belongs to a politico-military alliance. As part of this process, the States Parties will consider measures and adaptations with the aim of promoting the objectives of the Treaty and of enhancing its viability and effectiveness, including but not limited to the consideration of proposals already made to that effect.The character of this process should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role in the European security architecture. Its scope and parameters should be defined as a matter of priority. 20. Until the entry into force of such measures and adaptations, the States Parties will observe all provisions of the Treaty and its associated documents. 21.The States Parties will consider a progress report on the intermediate results of this process at the time of the OSCE Lisbon Summit.That report will, inter alia, include recommendations on the way ahead. 

In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, the States parties look forward to gathering again in five years’ time at the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This Final Document, together with its Annexes A, B, C, D and E, which are integral to it, having been drawn up in all the official languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Document to all States Parties.

732  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Annex A. Document Agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 The 30 States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: I 1. Each State Party shall, taking into account the clarification set forth in this Document relating to the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty and taking into account the understandings on flexibility set forth in this Document, comply fully with the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V thereof, no later than 31 May 1999. 2. Paragraph 1 of this Section shall be understood as not giving any State Party, which was in compliance with the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V thereof, as of 1 January 1996, the right to exceed any of the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty. 3. Pursuant to the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States Parties shall co-operate to the maximum extent possible to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of this Document. II 1. Within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that, no later than 31 May 1999 and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: (A) 1,800 battle tanks; (B) 3,700 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more than 552 shall be located within the Astrakhan oblast; no more than 552 shall be located within the Volgograd oblast; no more than 310 shall be located within the eastern part of the Rostov oblast described in Section III, paragraph 1, of this Document; and no more than 600 shall be located within the Pskov oblast; and (C) 2,400 pieces of artillery. 2. Within the Odessa oblast, Ukraine shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that, upon provisional application of this Document and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: (A) 400 battle tanks; (B) 400 armoured combat vehicles; and (C) 350 pieces of artillery. 3. Upon provisional application of this Document and until 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, so that the aggregate numbers do not exceed: (A) 1,897 battle tanks; (B) 4,397 armoured combat vehicles; and (C) 2,422 pieces of artillery. III 1. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, the following territory, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of the Russian Federation shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  733

IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty: the Pskov oblast; the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya. 2. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, the territory of the Odessa oblast, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of Ukraine shall be deemed to be located in the area described in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty. IV 1. The States Parties shall, during the period before 31 May 1999, examine the Treaty provisions on designated permanent storage sites so as to allow all battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery in designated permanent storage sites, including those subject to regional numerical limitations, to be located with active units. 2.The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize to the maximum extent possible the provisions of the Treaty on temporary deployment of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery within its territory and outside its territory. Such temporary deployments on the territory of other States Parties shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. 3.The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize, to the maximum extent possible, reallocation, in accordance with existing agreements, of the current quotas for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery established by the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Tashkent on 15 May 1992. Such reallocations shall be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the States Parties involved. 4. The Russian Federation shall count against the numerical limitations established in the Treaty and paragraph 1 of Section II of this Document any armoured combat vehicles listed as ‘to be removed’ in its information exchange of 1 January 1996 that are not so removed by 31 May 1999. V 1. In addition to the annual information exchange provided pursuant to Section VII, subparagraph 1(C), of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to that reported in the annual information exchange on the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, upon provisional application of this Document and every six months after the annual information exchange. In the case of Kuskchevskaya, the Russian Federation shall provide such additional information every three months after the annual information exchange. 2. Upon provisional application of this Document, Ukraine shall provide ‘F21’ notifications for its holdings within the Odessa oblast on the basis of changes of five, rather than ten, per cent or more in assigned holdings. 3. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, the Russian Federation shall, upon provisional application of this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota established pursuant to Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on Inspection, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site inspections, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, at objects of verification: (A) located within the Pskov oblast; the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kuskchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Kasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya;

734  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(B) containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty designated by the Russian Federation in its annual information exchange of 1 January 1996 as ‘to be removed’, until such time that a declared site inspection confirms that such equipment has been removed. 4. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, Ukraine shall, upon provisional application of this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota established pursuant to Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on Inspection, up to a total of one supplementary declared site inspection, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, at objects of verification located within the Odessa oblast. 5. The number of supplementary declared site inspections conducted at objects of verification pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section shall not exceed the number of declared site passive quota inspections, established in accordance with Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on Inspection, conducted at those objects of verification in the course of the same year. 6. All supplementary declared site inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section: (A) shall be carried out at the cost of the inspecting State Party, consistent with prevailing commercial rates; and (B) at the discretion of the inspecting State Party, shall be conducted either as a sequential inspection or as a separate inspection. VI 1.This Document shall enter into force upon receipt by the Depositary of notification of confirmation of approval by all States Parties. Section II, paragraphs 2 and 3, Section IV and Section V of this Document are hereby provisionally applied as of 31 May 1996 through 15 December 1996. If this Document does not enter into force by 15 December 1996, then it shall be reviewed by the States Parties. 2.This Document, in all six official languages of the Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Document to all States Parties. Annex B. Understandings and Agreed Interpretations with Regard to Implementation and Ways and Means to Improve the Viability and Effectiveness of the Treaty 1.The States Parties stress the need to ensure that relevant Government authorities charged with Treaty implementation fulfil all the obligations of the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group on the cost of inspections dated 23 May 1995. 2.The States Parties agree that, pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection, Section VII, paragraph 1, (a) in case an inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons for this delay in detail; This should take place as follows:  if force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the inspection team, through the answer

to the relevant notifications;

 if force majeure is declared after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the

explanation should be presented as soon as possible, through diplomatic channels or other officials channels. (b) in case of such a delay due to force majeure, the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 2, of the Protocol on Inspection shall apply.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  735

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties annually, but not later than 15 December, the complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew members. In case of additions to the list of inspectors and transport crew members, the State Party shall provide the complete updated list, highlighting the additions. 4. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall provide to all other States Parties during the annual exchange of information the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for their aviation transportation means for the subsequent calendar year. 5. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties during the annual exchange of information the list of its officially recognized holidays for the subsequent calendar year. 6. The State Party whose inspection team intends to transit the territory of another State Party prior to concluding the inspection should inform the transited State(s) Party (Parties) about the estimated time of transit, cross-border points and transportation means to be used by the inspection team, as well as a list of inspectors and drivers with passport numbers. 7.The States Parties agree that a specified area may contain declared sites of their own and stationed forces; but all declared sites within a specified area are excluded from an inspection of the specified area (inspections in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection) as they can be inspected only in accordance with Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection. 8. The States Parties agree to send the notification of the intent to inspect simultaneously to the host and the stationing States Parties, if the inspecting State intends to conduct a sequential inspection which involves stationed forces. 9.Where appropriate and with the agreement of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of a stationing State Party, the stationing State Party shall assist the host nation in the provision of security protection to both the inspection team and the escort team for the duration of the inspection. 10. Notifications of changes of 10 per cent of holdings:  The States Parties agree that, pursuant to Section VIII, subparagraph 1(B), of the Protocol

on Notification and Exchange of Information, the most recent update of information on holdings will always constitute the basis for any subsequent change to be notified under this paragraph.  The notification of any change of 10 per cent or more shall be given no later than five days after such change occurs. The time period of five days is understood as being five working days. 11.The States Parties agree to notify:  Any changes in the designation of formations or units pursuant to Sections I, III and V

of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, at least 42 days in advance;  Any closures of objects of verification within the last month pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, on the fifteenth of each month;  Any creation of, or relocation of, an object of verification at least 42 days in advance. 12.The States Parties agree that, in addition to the requirements for the submission of information and notifications as prescribed in Article XVII of the Treaty and in paragraph 1 of the Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, they will endeavour to supplement the annual exchange of information pursuant to the aforementioned Protocol in written form by an electronic data version on diskette in the agreed format, the written form remaining the official version.

736  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

13. Each State Party should notify to all other States Parties its passive declared site inspection quota coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section VII, subparagraph 1(C). Annex C. Implementation Issues Requiring Further Consideration and Resolution in the Joint Consultative Group 1. Introducing of common procedures governing flights of the aviation transportation means with the inspection team. 2. Point of entry/exit. 3. Immunity of the transportation means of an inspection team. 4. Formulation of principles for the elaboration of declared site diagrams, including the possibility of a more precise formulation/interpretation of the term ‘routinely’. 5. Equipment to be used during inspections. 6. Rules on photography. 7. Calendar year/possibility of synchronization with implementation year. 8. Financing of the inspections. 9. Common understanding of the obligation pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section VIII, subparagraph 1(B). 10. Review and updating of the Treaty Notification Formats to ensure their continued viability. 11. The issue of TLE which has left, on a temporary basis, without reassignment, the normal peacetime locations, for commitments under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 12. The question whether, with reference to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section I, paragraph 1, all units and formations holding equipment subject to the Treaty, including depots, bases, and designated permanent storage sites, should be notified in both Charts I and III. 13. Disposal of TLE in excess of reduction liabilities and disposal of decommissioned TLE. 14. Rounding of passive inspection quotas. 15. Enhanced transparency measures on ambulances built on the chassis of ACVs or APC look-alikes as listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment. Annex D. Topics that Have Been Discussed During the Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1. Article II: Definitions of: ‘group of States Parties’; ‘area of application’; ‘accession of other OSCE States Parties’; ‘designated permanent storage site’; ‘armoured vehicle launched bridge’; ‘combat aircraft’; and ‘the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment’.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  737

2. Article III: Export of equipment; Transparency concerning TLE assigned to Internal Security Forces; United peacekeeping force proposal. 3. Article IV: Approach to limitations and maximum levels of holdings; stationing forces on the territory of another State Party. 4. Article V: Implementation; Temporary deployments; Stationed forces. 5. Article VI: Sufficiency rule. 6. Article X: Removal from designated permanent storage sites. 7. Article XI: Implementation; Limits; Removals from storage. 8. Article XII: Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by Internal Security Forces (pursuant to Oslo Final Document, 5 June 1992); Transparency; Needs of those States which joined the Treaty in 1992; Criteria concerning Internal Security Force levels. 9. Article XIV: Aerial inspections. 10. Article XVI: Future role of the Joint Consultative Group; Duration of sessions of the Joint Consultative Group. 11. Article XVIII: Follow-up negotiations; Modalities; Proposal for a Supplementary Agreement. 12. Miscellaneous United peacekeeping force proposal; Exceptional circumstances; Joint Consultative Group dialogue on a Treaty support fund. Annex E. Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation To promote the implementation of the Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991 (the Statement of the Soviet

738  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Representative), I have been instructed by the Government of the Russian Federation to state the following. 1. It is understood that conventional armaments and equipment in the three Treaty limited categories referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery) will be deemed destroyed or rendered militarily unusable, in accordance with that Statement, upon the application of any of the following methods: (A) Destruction or conversion of conventional armaments and equipment under procedures that provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable; (B) Provision of satisfactory documentary evidence as meeting requirements of sufficient visible evidence, only in case of such armaments and equipment destroyed prior to promulgation of this Statement. The Russian Federation intends to provide such documentary evidence with regard to armaments and equipment destroyed in the area of application of the Treaty after 17 November 1995; (C) Segregation of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles exposed to the influence of atmospheric factors, with hatches and covers of engine compartments opened, with the invitation of a group of experts to conduct—at its own expense—an examination of a random sample representative of those conventional armaments and equipment, prior to their removal from a display site for final disposal (scrapping), and notification of such removal; (D) Visit of group of experts, at its own expense and upon invitation, to count already derelict conventional armaments and equipment; (E) Notification preceding or accompanying each transfer of conventional armaments and equipment to other States Parties within the area of application of the Treaty, with equivalent relevant notification from the recipient State Party. Such transfers will be done in line with Treaty provisions and will be compatible with objectives and terms of the Statement of the Soviet Representative. 2. Continuing its efforts aimed at the implementation of the Statement of the Soviet Representative, the Russian Federation will apply methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Statement to conventional armaments and equipment located on its territory. It will co-operate with the Republic of Kazakstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in applying those methods to conventional armaments and equipment located on their territories.The Russian Federation will negotiate the necessary arrangements with those States for the purpose of completing by joint efforts the process referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative by the year 2000. 3. If, despite good faith efforts, the quota of 6,000 battle tanks subject to elimination is not fully met, the shortfall of not more than 2,300 battle tanks will be covered by applying methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Statement to an equal number of armoured combat vehicles in excess of the quota of 1,500 pieces; and thus the overall process referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative will be in general deemed completed. Notwithstanding that, a number of battle tanks equal to the above-mentioned shortfall will be subsequently eliminated.The envisaged date for the completion of the process of their elimination will depend on the duration of their operational and service life and on the availability of financial resources.That elimination will be carried out in line with paragraph 1 of this Statement. 4. Upon completion of initial visits referred to in paragraph 1 of this Statement, the Russian Federation will be ready to discuss in the JCG their results and in the light of these to make arrangements, as necessary, for further visits, as well as to discuss possible modalities for further visits. In general, relevant practices established in the process of Treaty implementation will be followed as much as applicable in the organization and conduct of the visits.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  739

Statements of the Chairman of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength:  ‘Notwithstanding the rights of each State as stated in Article XIV of the Treaty, each State

Party should attempt to avoid conducting inspections during the officially recognized holidays of the other State Party.’  ‘With regard to the phrase “on the availability of financial resources” in the Statement of the Representative of the Russian Federation as contained in Annex E of the Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, it is understood that this phrase is without prejudice to other arms control obligations.’  ‘Temporary deployment and reallocation of quotas referred to in Section IV, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Document contained in Annex A of this Final Document, will not be used in the context of the Azerbaijan Republic.’ In connection with the adoption of the Final Document, the following statements were made by delegations at the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, in Vienna, on 31 May 1996: The Russian Federation ‘Unless the flexibilities listed in the agreement on the flank issue are given effect by 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use the other Treaty flexibilities discussed but not referred to in the above agreement.’ The Kingdom of the Netherlands ‘It is the view of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance that any future flexibility must be consistent with the legal framework of the Treaty, as agreed by all 30 States Parties. It is requested that this statement be attached to the Final Document.’ Ukraine ‘In connection with the decision of 31 May 1996 of the Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to adopt the “Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990”, Ukraine gives its consent to that decision on the understanding that, in implementing its provisions, the States Parties will be guided by the following: 1.The rights and obligations of the Russian Federation set forth in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section V, paragraph 1, of the Document in relation to “the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed” shall not extend to the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, and Nikolayev, Zaporozhye and Kherson oblasts. 2. Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section IV, paragraph 2, of the Document shall not apply to that portion of the Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment of the Coastal Defence Forces and Naval Infantry of the Black Sea Fleet which, as a result of their division between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, will be assigned to the Russian Federation and be subject to withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine within the agreed time-limits. 3.The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 2, of the Document shall in no way restrict the right and possibilities of Ukraine to deploy on a temporary basis, in accordance with Article V, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, combat tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery within the “new” flank area.

740  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

4.The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 3, of the Document shall in no way affect the rights and obligations of Ukraine under the Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 15 May 1992. The delegation of Ukraine requests that this statement be distributed as an annex to the Final Document of the Conference.’ The Russian Federation ‘In connection with the statement by Ukraine of 31 May 1996 regarding the Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Russian Federation takes the position that the said statement will in no way impede the implementation of the aforementioned Document.’ Turkey ‘On the occasion of the adoption of the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Turkish Delegation registers the following understanding: 1.The Document in question does not change in any way the legally binding character of the CFE Treaty and its Associated Documents, or the obligations of individual States Parties to the Treaty. 2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document may not be interpreted in a manner which might prejudice the provision contained in Article IV, paragraph 5, of the CFE Treaty, or the principle of free consent enshrined in the OSCE documents on the use of such rights. 3.The “flexibilities” contained in the Treaty consist of those mentioned in the above paragraphs and may only be used in full respect of the relevant Treaty provisions and on the basis of agreements concluded and implemented with the free consent of the States Parties involved. 4. While the Turkish Delegation accepts an examination of the DPSS provisions, it makes it clear that it can accept eventual modifications only if they do not result in force concentrations prejudicial to regional balances and provided that a similar examination is carried out for the clarification of the question of “temporary deployments”, in particular with regard to their duration. 5. In view of the continued relevance of the regional sub-limits even under changing conditions, the Turkish Government will not enter into any negotiation prejudicial to the principle of regional sub-limits, nor will it accept any force limits that do not take due account of the size of its territory, population and the security environment in adjacent regions not subject to Treaty limitations. It is requested that this statement be attached to the Final Document.’ Georgia ‘The Georgian Delegation has considered paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document agreed among the States Parties on the flank issue very carefully. We still have some very serious concerns about the future implementation of their content. In this context we would like to make the following statement: Any agreement on temporary deployment of conventional armed forces on the territory of Georgia or on the reallocation of equipment quotas established by the Tashkent Agreement must be the result of free negotiation and must be taken with full respect for the sovereignty of Georgia and for its Constitution. All Parties must implement all the provisions of any such agreements in good faith and in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.’ Moldova ‘With reference to paragraph 7, Section II, of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following statement:

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  741

The early entry into force of the bilateral agreement on the withdrawal of Russian Troops, signed between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on 21 October 1994, will contribute to full implementation of the Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. With reference to paragraph 2, Section IV, of the Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contained in Annex A of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following interpretive statement: The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova has proclaimed the permanent neutrality of the country, prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic. In view of these constitutional provisions, the Republic of Moldova cannot allow even temporary deployment of conventional armaments belonging to other countries on its territory. The Delegation of Moldova would like to ask the Chairman to annex this statement to the Final Document in translation into all official languages.’

II. Errata In reproducing the texts of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related Documents, the following errors have occurred:  page 142: first paragraph, third line:‘herby’ should read ‘hereby’;  page 191: second paragraph, third line:‘Treaty limited’ should read ‘Treaty limited’, and in

the fourth paragraph, 6th line:‘mtending’ should read:‘intending’;

 page 265: the date of the matrix should be: 12 March 1996, rather than 12 March 1995

(corresponding with the 20th edition of the matrix produced by the Slovak delegation to the Joint Consultative Group).  The Document of the Extraordinary Conference of 13 November 1992 in Vienna is missing, and is reproduced herewith.

FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN E UROPE , 19 N OVEMBER 1999 The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Having met in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999, Guided by Section III of the Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength, of May 1996,

742  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Guided by the Document on the Scope and Parameters of the Process Commissioned in Paragraph 19 of the Final Document of the First CFE Treaty Review Conference adopted in Lisbon on 1 December 1996, Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/97 of 23 July 1997, concerning Certain Basic Elements for Treaty Adaptation, Recalling their commitment at the OSCE Oslo Ministerial Meeting in December 1998 to complete the process of adaptation of the Treaty by the time of the OSCE Summit in 1999, Taking into account the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 3/99 of 30 March 1999, Recalling the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group No. 8/99 of 11 November 1999 on the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Adaptation, Have taken note of the Statement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe issued by the North Atlantic Council and the Representatives of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland at the Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels on 8 December 1998, and have taken note of the commitments contained therein; Have taken note of the statement by the Russian Federation, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its commitments on restraint and the use of Treaty flexibilities in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast; Have noted with appreciation that in the course of the adaptation negotiations several States Parties have committed themselves to reducing their permitted levels of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, thus reflecting the fundamental changes in the European security environment since the signing of the Treaty in November 1990; Have further taken note of the statements by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding the future adjustment of their territorial ceilings, and the relevant conditions; Have taken note of the statements by the Republic of Belarus, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine, which are attached to this Final Act, concerning their commitments regarding their future use of the provisions on increasing territorial ceilings set forth in the Agreement on Adaptation, and the relevant conditions; Have undertaken to move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible, taking into account their common commitment to, and the central importance of, full and continued implementation of the Treaty and its associated documents until and following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation; and, in this context, have taken note of the statement by the Government of the Russian Federation on 1 November 1999, including its commitment, contained therein, to all obligations under the Treaty and, in particular, to agreed levels of armaments and equipment; Have welcomed the joint statement by Georgia and the Russian Federation of 17 November 1999, which is attached to this Final Act; Have taken note of the statement by the Republic of Moldova, which is attached to this Final Act, concerning its renunciation of the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory and have welcomed the commitment of the Russian Federation to withdraw and/or destroy Russian conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by the end of 2001, in the context of its commitment referred to in paragraph 19 of the Istanbul Summit Declaration;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  743

Have expressed their intention to review the above elements, as appropriate, at the Second Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty, which will take place in May 2001; Have noted that, following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, other participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with territory in the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains will have the possibility to apply for accession to the Treaty; Have noted that a consolidated version of the Treaty as amended by the Agreement on Adaptation is being produced for information and to facilitate implementation; Have adopted this Final Act at the time of signature of the Agreement on Adaptation. This Final Act, in all six official languages of the Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Act to all States Parties. Annex 1 Statement on behalf of the Czech Republic “Upon the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty the Czech Republic establishes its territorial and national ceiling at the level of its currently notified maximum national levels for holdings. The Czech Republic will reduce its territorial ceiling in all three ground categories of TLE by conversion of its DPSS entitlements not later than by the year 2002. This means that the Czech territorial and national ceiling will then be: battle tanks armoured combat vehicles artillery pieces

795 1,252 657

The reduced TC and NC in the three ground categories of TLE, will only take effect upon successful and satisfactory conclusion of the adaptation process. In deciding to exercise the above unilateral restraint, the Czech Republic reserves the right to receive on its territory exceptional temporary deployments up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces in excess of the country’s territorial ceiling.” Annex 2 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Hungary “Upon signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Republic of Hungary intends to establish its national and territorial ceiling at the level of its present Maximum National Levels for Holdings. However, in the current and foreseeable security environment, defence plans of the country make possible significant reductions in Treaty-Limited Equipment.The Republic of Hungary is ready to reduce its territorial ceiling in the three ground categories of TLE by conversion of the country’s DPSS entitlements by no later than the end of the year 2002. This means that the Hungarian national and territorial ceiling will be at that time: battle tanks armoured combat vehicles artillery pieces

710 1,560 750

The reduced Hungarian NC and TC will take effect only upon successful and satisfactory conclusion of the adaptation process. In undertaking the above unilateral restraint, the Republic of

744  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Hungary reserves the right to receive on its territory exceptional temporary deployments up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces in excess of the country’s territorial ceiling.” Annex 3 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Poland “The Republic of Poland commits herself politically to the following: At signature of the adapted CFE Treaty, Polish territorial ceilings equal our currently notified maximum national levels for holdings. In light of the on-going restructurization of the Polish armed forces, Polish actual holdings in the Treaty-limited ground categories of armament and equipment not later than the end of 2001 will not exceed: battle tanks armoured combat vehicles

1,577 1,780

and not later than the end of 2002 will not exceed: artillery pieces

1,370

Subject to reciprocal good will and restraint in the immediate neighbourhood of Poland, Polish territorial ceilings not later than the end of 2003 will be adjusted to match the above numbers for actual holdings, through the partial conversion of the DPSS, in accordance with the mechanisms envisaged in the adapted CFE Treaty. It is understood that during this period of time, Poland in accordance with her immediate and full access to Exceptional Temporary Deployments rights may host on its territory up to: battle tanks armoured combat vehicles artillery pieces

459 723 430.” Annex 4

Statement on behalf of the Slovak Republic “Upon the signature of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe the Slovak Republic establishes its Territorial and National Ceilings at the level of its currently notified Maximum National Levels for Holdings. The Slovak Republic undertakes a political commitment to reduce its territorial ceiling in the ground categories of the armament and equipment limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, through the partial conversion of the Designated Permanent Storage Site entitlements, in accordance with the mechanism provided for in the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Not later than by the end of the year 2003, the Territorial Ceiling of the Slovak Republic will be: battle tanks armoured combat vehicles artillery pieces

323 643 383

The Slovak Republic reserves the right to host on its territory Temporary Deployments in excess of the Territorial Ceiling established in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings up to 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 artillery pieces.”

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  745

Annex 5 Statement on behalf of the Russian Federation “In the context of the political commitments and efforts of other States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), in particular those aimed at further strengthening stability in Central Europe, the Russian Federation will show due restraint with regard to ground TLE levels and deployments in the region which includes the Kaliningrad oblast and the Pskov oblast. In the present politico-military situation, it has no reasons, plans or intentions to station substantial additional combat forces, whether air or ground forces, in that region on a permanent basis. If necessary, the Russian Federation will rely on the possibilities for operational reinforcement, including temporary deployments, in a manner compatible with the CFE Treaty mechanisms.” Annex 6 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Belarus “The Republic of Belarus undertakes the following political commitments: Taking into account the statements of other States Parties with regard to the reduction of their territorial ceilings (TCs), the Republic of Belarus will be prepared, upon signing of the adapted CFE Treaty, to make its national ceilings (NCs) equal to the existing maximum national levels for holdings (MNLHs) of Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment (TLE). The TCs of the Republic of Belarus for ground categories of TLE will thus be equal to its NCs. In addition, in current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of similar restraint by other States Parties, including those in the immediate vicinity of its borders, the Republic of Belarus will not make use of the general mechanism foreseen in the adapted Treaty for upward revision of its TCs.” Annex 7 Statement on behalf of the Czech Republic “In the current and foreseeable security circumstances, and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, the Czech Republic undertakes not to make use of the general mechanisms of the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of the territorial ceilings.” Annex 8 Statement on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Chairman, Under the agenda item “Statements on unilateral political commitments” I am authorized on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany to state the following: “The Federal Republic of Germany commits itself, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, not to make use of the general mechanisms provided for in an adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings.” Annex 9 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Hungary

746  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

“The Republic of Hungary declares that, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, the Republic of Hungary undertakes not to make use of the general mechanism provided in the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings.” Annex 10 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Poland “The Republic of Poland commits herself politically to the following: Under current and foreseeable security circumstances and depending on reciprocal measures of restraint in her immediate vicinity, including, in particular, the Russian Federation with regard to its current force levels in Kaliningrad, and Belarus with regard to its territorial ceilings at least not exceeding current MNLHs, Poland will not make use of her right for upward revision of her both current and future territorial ceilings, as envisaged in the adapted CFE Treaty.” Annex 11 Statement on behalf of the Slovak Republic “In the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of similar restraints by other States Parties, the Slovak Republic undertakes a political commitment not to make use of general mechanism provided for in the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe for upward revision of Territorial Ceilings.” Annex 12 Statement on behalf of Ukraine “Ukraine commits itself, in the current and foreseeable security circumstances and in the context of comparable commitments by other States Parties, not to make use of the general mechanism provided for in the adapted CFE Treaty for upward revision of territorial ceilings.” Annex 13 Statement on behalf of the Republic of Moldova “The Republic of Moldova renounces the right to receive a temporary deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the territory of Moldova.” Annex 14 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia Istanbul, 17 November 1999 The Russian Federation and Georgia, guided by paragraphs 14.2.3 and 14.2.7 of the Decision of the Joint Consultative Group of 30 March 1999 concerning adaptation of the CFE Treaty, confirming their intention to properly implement the adapted CFE Treaty as adopted, wishing to promote the development and strengthening of co-operative relations between the Russian Federation and Georgia, have agreed as follows.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  747

1.The Russian Side undertakes to reduce, by no later than 31 December 2000, the levels of its TLE located within the territory of Georgia in such a way that they will not exceed 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery systems. 2. No later than 31 December 2000, the Russian Side will withdraw (dispose of) the TLE located at the Russian military bases at Vaziani and Gudauta and at the repair facilities in Tbilisi. The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will be disbanded and withdrawn by 1 July 2001. The issue of the utilization, including the joint utilization, of the military facilities and infrastructure of the disbanded Russian military bases remaining at those locations will be resolved within the same time-frame. 3. The Georgian Side undertakes to grant to the Russian Side the right to basic temporary deployment of its TLE at facilities of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. 4. The Georgian Side will facilitate the creation of the conditions necessary for reducing and withdrawing the Russian forces. In this connection, the two Sides note the readiness of OSCE participating States to provide financial support for this process. 5. During the year 2000 the two Sides will complete negotiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within the territory of Georgia. 19 November 1999

AGREEMENT ON ADAPTATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE CFE.DOC/1/99 Signed 19 November 199912 The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Conscious of the fundamental changes that have occurred in Europe since the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Determined to sustain the key role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of European security, Noting the fulfilment of the objective of the original Treaty of ensuring that the numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty within the area of application of the 12

This agreement has not yet been ratified by all states parties.

748  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Treaty would not exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft and 4,000 attack helicopters, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The Preamble of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by: “The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 10 January 1989, Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Organization for (formerly Conference on) Security and Co-operation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted in Vienna, Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in Europe, Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in Europe, and bearing in mind their right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, Striving to develop further and consolidate a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to establishing a common and indivisible security space in Europe, Committed to the objectives of establishing maintaining a secure, and stable and balanced overall level of conventional armed forces in Europe lower than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe, Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect adversely the security interests of any State, Having taken note of the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe held in Istanbul from 17 to 19 November 1999, as well as of the statements made by certain States Parties concerning their political commitments referred to therein, Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional arms control process including negotiations, taking into account the opening of the Treaty for accession by other participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with territory in the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals Mountains as well as future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe, Have agreed as follows:”

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  749

Article 2 Article I of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article I 1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, including those obligations relating to the following five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters. 2. Each State Party shall also carry out the other measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security and stability. 3. Conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party in the categories limited by the Treaty shall only be present on the territory of another State Party in conformity with international law, the explicit consent of the host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Explicit consent must be provided in advance, and must continue to be in effect as provided for in Article XIII, paragraph 1. 4. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types, with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on National Ceilings; the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-purpose Attack Helicopters, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group. Each of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty.” Article 3 1. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (G) shall be deleted. 2. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “(B) The term “area of application” means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Russian Federation. In the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of Turkey, the area of application includes the territory of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line extending from the point of intersection of the

750  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gözne and thence to the sea.” 3. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (H) shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “(H) The term “designated permanent storage site” means a place with a clearly defined physical boundary containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are counted within national ceilings but which are not subject to limitations on conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.” 4. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J) shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “(J) The term “conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV,V,VII, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings.” 5. In Article II of the Treaty, paragraph 1, subparagraph (U) shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “(U) The term “reduction liability” means the number in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party commits itself to reduce pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, in order to ensure compliance with Article IV.” Article 4 In Article III of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties shall apply the following counting rules: All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, within the area of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in Articles IV,V,VI,VII, and in the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, with the exception of those which in a manner consistent with a State Party’s normal practices: (A) Are in the process of manufacture, including manufacturing-related testing; (B) Are used exclusively for the purposes of research and development; (C) Belong to historical collections; (D) Are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned from service in accordance with the provisions of Article IX; (E) Are awaiting, or being refurbished for, export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange or at no more than 10 such declared sites which shall have been notified in the previous year’s annual information exchange. In the latter case, they shall be separately distinguishable from conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; (F) Are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), heavy armament combat vehicles (HACVs) or multi-purpose attack helicopters, held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; or (G) Are in transit through the area of application from a location outside the area of application to a final destination outside the area of application, and are in the area of application for no longer than a total of seven days.”

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  751

Article 5 Article IV of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article IV 1.Within the area of application, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters so that the numbers do not exceed the national ceiling, the subceiling for active units and the subceiling for sub-categories established in accordance with this Article and the Protocol on National Ceilings for that State Party. The subceiling for active units shall establish the maximum number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery that a State Party may hold in active units within the area of application.The subceiling for active units shall be equal to the national ceiling unless otherwise specified by the Protocol on National Ceilings. Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery under a national ceiling in any category in excess of the corresponding subceiling for active units shall be located in designated permanent storage sites.The subceiling for sub-categories shall establish the maximum aggregate number of armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles and the maximum number of heavy armament combat vehicles that a State Party may hold within the area of application in the category of armoured combat vehicles. 2.Within the area of application all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty: shall be accounted for and controlled by a State Party; shall, in accordance with the provisions in Article III, be counted against the national ceiling of a State Party; shall in the area of application be transferred only to other States Parties as provided for in this Treaty; and shall be subject to the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange. In the case that a State Party is unable to exercise its authority in this respect, any State Party can raise the matter in accordance with the provisions in Article XVI and Article XXI with a view to addressing the situation and ensuring full observance of Treaty provisions with respect to such conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty.The inability of a State Party to exercise its authority in respect of the above mentioned conventional armaments and equipment in the categories limited by the Treaty shall not in itself release a State Party from any Treaty obligations. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to change its national ceiling, its subceiling for active units and its subceiling for sub-categories as follows: (A) Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 6 of this Article, to increase its national ceiling, its subceiling for active units and its subceiling for sub-categories in any category or sub-category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.Any such increase shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the national ceiling,the subceiling for active units or the subceiling for sub-categories of one or more other States Parties in the same category or sub-category, except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article.The State Party or States Parties undertaking the corresponding decrease in their national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories shall notify all States Parties of their consent to the corresponding increase in the national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories of another State Party. No national ceiling for a State Party with territory in the area of application shall exceed that State Party’s territorial ceiling in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. (B) Each State Party shall have the right to decrease unilaterally its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories in any category or sub-category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. A unilateral decrease in the national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories of a State Party shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories.

752  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

4.Within each five-year period between conferences of States Parties held in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, each State Party shall have the right to increase its national ceiling or subceiling for active units: (A) In the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by no more than 40 battle tanks, 60 armoured combat vehicles and 20 pieces of artillery or 20 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery, whichever is greater, but in no case exceeding 150 battle tanks, 250 armoured combat vehicles and 100 pieces of artillery; (B) In the categories of combat aircraft and attack helicopters by no more than 30 combat aircraft and 25 attack helicopters. Each State Party shall have the right to increase its national ceiling or subceiling for active units in excess of the levels set forth in paragraph 4, subparagraphs (A) and (B) above, subject to the consent of all other States Parties. 5.A State Party intending to change its national ceiling, subceiling for active units or subceiling for sub-categories shall provide notification to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, on which such a change is to take effect. For increases subject to the consent of all other States Parties, the change shall take effect on the date specified in the notification provided that no State Party, within 60 days of the notification, objects to the change and notifies its objection to all other States Parties.A national ceiling, a subceiling for active units or a subceiling for sub-categories shall remain in effect until a change to that ceiling or subceiling takes effect. 6. In addition to the provisions of paragraph 4, any State Party with a subceiling for active units lower than its national ceiling in the categories of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall have the right to increase that subceiling, provided that: (A) The increase in the subceiling for active units is accompanied by a decrease in its national ceiling in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; (B) For each battle tank, armoured combat vehicle or piece of artillery by which a State Party increases its subceiling for active units, that State Party will decrease its national ceiling by four in the same category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; (C) The resultant subceiling for active units does not exceed the new national ceiling achieved through the decrease mandated by subparagraph (B) above.” Article 6 Article V of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article V 1. Within the area of application, as defined in Article II, each State Party shall limit the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on its territory and of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery of other States Parties that it permits to be present on its territory and each State Party shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery present on the territory of other States Parties so that the overall numbers do not exceed the territorial ceilings and the territorial subceilings established in accordance with this Article and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, except as otherwise provided for in Article VII. 2. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on the territory of a State Party for an operation in support of peace conducted under and consistent with a resolution or a decision of the United Nations Security Council or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe shall be exempt from that State Party’s territorial ceiling or territorial

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  753

subceiling. The duration of the presence of these battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on the territory of a State Party shall be consistent with such a resolution or decision. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on the territory of a State Party for an operation in support of peace pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to notification in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange. 3. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit shall be exempt from the territorial ceilings of transited States Parties and from territorial subceilings without prejudice to the exemption from counting rules under Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (G), provided that: (A) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit to a location within the area of application do not cause the territorial ceiling of the State Party of final destination to be exceeded, except as otherwise provided for in Article VII. For battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit to a location outside the area of application there shall be no numerical limit; (B) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit do not remain on the territory of the transited States Parties in the area of application longer than a total of 42 days; and (C) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit do not remain on the territory of any single transited State Party, or on a territory with a territorial subceiling, in the area of application longer than 21 days. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit under this paragraph shall be subject to notification in accordance with Section XII of the Protocol on Information Exchange. Any State Party may request clarification in the Joint Consultative Group with regard to a notified transit. The States Parties involved shall respond within seven days of the request. 4. Each State Party shall have the right to change its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling as follows: (A) Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article, to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in any category.Any such increase shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the same category in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of one or more other States Parties, subject to the provisions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings regarding relevant territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings. The State Party or States Parties undertaking the corresponding decrease in their territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling shall notify all States Parties of their consent to the corresponding increase in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of another State Party. (B) Each State Party shall have the right to decrease unilaterally its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in any category; however, no territorial ceiling in any category shall be at any time lower than the corresponding national ceiling.A unilateral decrease in the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling of a State Party shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling. Any decrease in a national ceiling under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 6, shall result in a decrease of the corresponding territorial ceiling by an amount equal to the decrease in the national ceiling. 5. Subject to the provisions above, within each five-year period between conferences of States Parties held in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, each State Party shall have the right to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling by no more than 40 battle tanks, 60 armoured combat vehicles and 20 pieces of artillery or 20 percent of the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery, whichever is

754  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

greater, but in no case not exceeding 150 battle tanks, 250 armoured combat vehicles and 100 pieces of artillery. Each State Party shall have the right to increase its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling in excess of the levels set forth in this paragraph, subject to the consent of all other States Parties. 6. A State Party intending to change its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling in any category shall provide notification to all other States Parties at least 90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, on which such a change is to take effect. For increases subject to the consent of all other States Parties, the change shall take effect on the date specified in the notification provided that no State Party, within 60 days of the notification, objects to the change and notifies its objection to all other States Parties.A territorial ceiling, a subceiling for active units or a territorial subceiling for subcategories shall remain in effect until a change to that ceiling or subceiling takes effect.” Article 7 Article VI of the Treaty shall be deleted. Article 8 Article VII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article VII 1. Each State Party shall have the right to exceed on a temporary basis, for military exercises and temporary deployments, the territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings established in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, subject to the provisions of this Article. (A) Military exercises: (1) Each State Party shall have the right to host on its territory military exercises which cause its territorial ceiling to be exceeded, and, for States Parties with a territorial subceiling, to conduct or host exercises which cause its territorial subceiling to be exceeded in accordance with the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; (2) The number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery present on the territory of a State Party in excess of its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling for a military exercise, alone or in combination with any other military exercise or any temporary deployment on that territory, shall not exceed the number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery specified for each State Party in subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (1), of this paragraph and in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; (3) A military exercise or successive military exercises notified in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, that result in a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling being exceeded for more than 42 days shall thereafter be considered a temporary deployment as long as the territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling continues to be exceeded. (B) Temporary deployments: (1) Each State Party shall have the right to host on its territory temporary deployments in excess of its territorial ceiling, and, for States Parties with a territorial subceiling, to conduct or host temporary deployments in excess of their territorial subceiling. For this purpose, territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings may be exceeded, on a temporary basis, by no more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery, unless otherwise set forth in the relevant provisions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings. In exceptional circumstances and unless otherwise set forth in the relevant provi-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  755

sions of the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, a territorial ceiling may be exceeded, on a temporary basis, by no more than 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 pieces of artillery. (2) Upon notification of a temporary deployment exceeding a territorial ceiling by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles, and 140 pieces of artillery, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1. 2. Should a military exercise, in conjunction with a temporary deployment taking place simultaneously on the territory of the same State Party, cause the territorial ceiling to be exceeded by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery, any State Party shall have the right to request the Depositary to convene a conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1. For exercises and temporary deployments pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Article, an explanatory report shall be provided to the Joint Consultative Group by the States Parties involved. In the case of temporary deployments, the report shall be submitted as soon as possible and in any case no later than the notification foreseen in Section XVIII, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), and subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol on Information Exchange. Subsequent updates shall be provided every two months until the territorial ceiling or the territorial subceiling is no longer exceeded.” Article 9 Article VIII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article VIII 1. Any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters in excess of the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV and in the Protocol on National Ceilings shall be eliminated only by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, the footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Existing Types and the Protocol on Inspection. In the case of accession, any reductions by the acceding State as well as the time limit within which they shall be carried out shall be specified in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Accessionaccession agreement. 2. The categories of conventional armaments and equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types. (A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military purposes, placement on static display, use as ground targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, modification in accordance with the footnote to Section 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Existing Types. (B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled artillery, by use as ground targets. (C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer aircraft. (D) Specialised attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or use for ground instructional purposes.

756  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or recategorisation. 3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article and upon notification as required by these Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings. 4. Reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, within the area of application. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement. 5. Any reductions, including the results of the conversion of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes, shall be subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.” Article 10 Article IX of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article IX 1. In the case of removal from service by decommissioning of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, within the area of application: (A) Such conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be decommissioned and awaiting disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be notified as declared sites in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be identified in such notifications as holding areas for decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain any other conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and (B) The numbers of such decommissioned conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, one percent of its notified holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a total of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50 shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft. 2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the number and type of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States Parties in accordance with Section X, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of the Protocol on Information Exchange.” Article 11 1. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 4 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of this Article.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  757

Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in active units.” 2. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 9 shall be deleted. 3. In Article X of the Treaty, paragraph 10 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Article shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than 42 days after their removal, except for those items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty removed for industrial rebuild. Such items shall be returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately on completion of the rebuild.” Article 12 Article XI of the Treaty shall be deleted. Article 13 Article XII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article XII 1.Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations of a State Party designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions are not limited by this Treaty. 2.The foregoing notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such armaments held by such organisations of a State Party shall not be used to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such armaments in excess of the levels set forth in subparagraphs (A), (B) or (C) of this paragraph, whichever is greater, shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels in the category of armoured combat vehicles, as established in Articles IV and V and in the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, and changed in accordance with Articles IV and V: (A) Holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held, within the area of application, by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, present on the territory of the eachState Party as notified pursuant to the information exchange effective as of 19 November 1990; or (B) Five percent of the national ceiling established for the eachState Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in the category of armoured combat vehicles, as changed in accordance with Article IV; or (C) 100 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles. In the case of acceding States, the numbers shall be established in the accession agreement Agreement on Accession. 3. Each State Party shall further ensure that organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements. 4. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, artillery, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters in service with its conventional armed forces to any organisation of that State Party not a part of its conventional armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than the date such reassignment takes effect.

758  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Such notification shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned.” Article 14 1. In Article XIII of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notifications and exchange information pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment and to the conventional armaments and equipment of other States Parties that it permits to be present on its territory, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.” 2. In Article XIII of the Treaty, the following paragraph 1 bis shall be added: “1. bis The presence of conventional armaments and equipment of a State Party on the territory of another State Party as set forth in Article V, paragraph 1, for transit as set forth in Article V, paragraph 3, for military exercises as set forth in Article VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), and for temporary deployment as set forth in Article VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), shall be in accordance with Article I, paragraph 3. Consent of the host State Party shall be reflected through the appropriate notifications in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.” Article 15 Article XIV of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article XIV 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of application, inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. 2.The purpose of such inspections shall be: (A) To verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VII, the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; (B) To monitor any reductions of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites in accordance with ArticleVIII and the Protocol on Reduction; (C) To monitor the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, respectively. 3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in order to elude the objectives of the verification regime. 4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty. 5.The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to accept during each specified time period shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that Protocol. 6.The number of inspections, pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, that each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the State Party whose territorial ceiling or terri-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  759

torial subceiling is temporarily exceeded shall have the obligation to accept shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that Section. 7. Each State Party which carries out disposal of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in excess of reduction liabilities shall provide for confirmation of the results of the disposal either by inviting an observation team or through the use of cooperative measures, in accordance with the provisions of Section XII of the Protocol on Inspection.” Article 16 In Article XVI of the Treaty, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2.Within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, the States Parties shall: (A) Address questions relating to compliance with or possible circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty; (B) Seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may become apparent in the way this Treaty is implemented; (C) Consider and, if possible, agree on measures to enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; (D) Address, upon the request of any State Party, questions concerning the intention of any State Party to revise its national ceiling upwards under Article IV, paragraph 4, or its territorial ceiling under Article V, paragraph 5; (E) Receive and consider the explanatory report, and any subsequent updates, provided in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 2; (F) Update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2; (G) Consider measures of cooperation to enhance the verification regime of the Treaty, including through the appropriate utilisation of results of aerial inspections; (H) Resolve technical questions in order to seek common practices among the States Parties in the way this Treaty is implemented; (I) Work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, working methods, the scale of distribution of expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of conferences convened under this Treaty and the distribution of costs of inspections between or among States Parties; (J) Consider and work out appropriate measures to ensure that information obtained through exchanges of information among the States Parties or as a result of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account the particular requirements of each State Party in respect of safeguarding information which that State Party specifies as being sensitive; (K) Consider, upon the request of any State Party, any matter that a State Party wishes to propose for examination by any conference to be convened in accordance with Article XXI; such consideration shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI; (L) Consider any request to accede to this Treaty, pursuant to Article XVIII, by acting as the body through which the States Parties may establish, and recommend approval of, the terms under which a requesting State accedes to the Treaty; (M) Conduct any future negotiations, if the States Parties so decide; and (N) Consider matters of dispute arising out of the implementation of this Treaty.”

760  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article 17 Article XVII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article XVII The States Parties shall transmit information and notifications required by this Treaty in written form. They shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, including and in particular, the OSCE Communications Network.” Article 18 Article XVIII of the Treaty shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “Article XVIII [Placeholder for accession] 1.Any participating State of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe whose land territory lies in Europe within the geographic area between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains may submit to the Depositary a written request to accede to this Treaty. 2.The requesting State shall include in its request the following information: (A) The designation of its existing types of conventional armaments and equipment; (B) Its proposed national and territorial ceilings and the related subceilings for each category of armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and (C) Any other information deemed relevant by the requesting State. 3.The Depositary shall notify all States Parties of the request and of the information provided by the requesting State. 4. The requesting State may modify or supplement this information. Any State Party may request additional information. 5. States Parties shall, beginning no later than 21 days after the notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, hold meetings of the Joint Consultative Group at which the States Parties shall address the request, conduct negotiations and establish the terms for accession.The requesting State may be invited to attend meetings of the Joint Consultative Group if the States Parties so decide. 6. Each request shall be considered individually by the States Parties in an expeditious manner. Any decision shall be taken by consensus. 7. The agreed terms for accession shall be enshrined in an Agreement on Accession between the States Parties and the requesting State, which shall be circulated to all States Parties and the requesting State by the Depositary and deposited in the archives of the Depositary. 8. Upon the receipt of confirmation of approval of the Agreement on Accession by all States Parties, the Depositary shall so inform all States Parties and the requesting State. The requesting State may then, subject to ratification in accordance with its constitutional procedures, submit an instrument of accession to the Treaty that shall acknowledge the terms and conditions of the Agreement on Accession. 9.This Treaty shall enter into force for the requesting State 10 days after the deposit of its instrument of accession to the Treaty with the Depositary, at which time the requesting State shall become a State Party to the Treaty.”

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  761

Article 19 In Article XXI of the Treaty, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of this Treaty, to include, inter alia, a review of the operation and the levels of national ceilings, territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings, and related commitments, together with other Treaty elements, taking into account the need to ensure that the security of no State Party is diminished. 1. Upon notification of a temporary deployment exceeding a territorial ceiling by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles, or 140 pieces of artillery, or upon request by a State Party pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties at which the hosting and deploying States Parties shall explain the nature of the circumstances which have given rise to the temporary deployment.The conference shall be convened without delay but no later than seven days after the notification and shall continue for up to 48 hours unless otherwise agreed by all States Parties.The Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group shall inform the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of the situation. 2.The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to this Treaty have arisen. In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for this conference, the request shall include the reason why that State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be necessary.The conference shall consider the circumstances set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of this Treaty. The conference shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, shall last no longer than three weeks.” Article 20 1. In Article XXII of the Treaty, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures; it shall be open for accession by new States pursuant to Article XVIII. Instruments of ratification and, in the case of accession, instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby designated the Depositary.” 2. In Article XXII of the Treaty, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “3.The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Parties of: (A) The deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession; (B) The entry into force of this Treaty; (C) Any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and its effective date; (D) The text of any amendment proposed in accordance with Article XX; (E) The entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty; (F) Any request to accede to the Treaty pursuant to Article XVIII; (G) Any request to convene a conference in accordance with Article XXI; (H) The convening of a conference pursuant to Article XXI; and (I) Any other matter of which the Depositary is required by this Treaty to inform the States Parties.”

762  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Article 21 The following Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be added: “PROTOCOL ON NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE The States Parties hereby agree upon the following national ceilings, subceilings for active units and subceilings for sub-categories pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty.

Armoured Combat Vehicles

State Party The Republic of Armenia The Republic of Azerbaijan The Republic of Belarus(1) The Kingdom of Belgium The Republic of Bulgaria Canada The Czech Republic(2) The Kingdom of Denmark The French Republic Georgia The Federal Republic of Germany The Hellenic Republic The Republic of Hungary(3) The Republic of Iceland The Italian Republic The Republic of Kazakhstan The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg The Republic of Moldova The Kingdom of the Netherlands The Kingdom of Norway The Republic of Poland(4) The Portuguese Republic Romania The Russian Federation(5) The Slovak Republic(6) The Kingdom of Spain The Republic of Turkey Ukraine(7) The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The United States of America

Battle tanks

of which Pieces Attack AIFVs of which of Combat heliTotal & HACVs HACVs artillery aircraft copters

220 220 1,800 300 1,475 77 957 335 1,226 220

220 220 2,600 989 2,000 263 1,367 336 3,700 220

135 135 1,590 600 1,100 263 954 210 1,983 135

11 11 130 237 100 0 69 17 535 11

285 285 1,615 288 1,750 32 767 446 1,192 285

100 100 294 209 235 90 230 82 800 100

50 50 80 46 67 13 50 18 374 50

3,444 1,735 835 0 1,267 50

3,281 2,498 1,700 0 3,172 200

3,281 1,599 1,020 0 1,970 0

80 70 85 0 0 0

2,255 1,920 840 0 1,818 100

765 650 180 0 618 15

280 65 108 0 142 20

0 210

0 210

0 130

0 10

0 250

0 50

0 50

520 170 1,730 300 1,375 6,350 478 750 2,795 4,080

864 275 2,150 430 2,100 11,280 683 1,588 3,120 5,050

718 181 1,700 267 552 7,030 476 1,228 1,993 3,095

0 0 107 77 72 574 34 191 93 253

485 491 1,610 450 1,475 6,315 383 1,276 3,523 4,040

230 100 460 160 430 3,416 100 310 750 1,090

50 24 130 26 120 855 40 80 130 330

843 1,812

3,017 3,037

1,335 2,372

200 0

583 1,553

855 784

350 396

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  763

(1) Of which no more than 1,525 battle tanks, 2,175 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 1,375 pieces of artillery in active units. (2) Of which no more than 754 battle tanks, 1,223 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 629 pieces of artillery in active units. (3) Of which no more than 658 battle tanks, 1,522 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 688 pieces of artillery in active units. (4) Of which no more than 1,362 battle tanks, 1,924 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 1,319 pieces of artillery in active units. (5) Of which no more than 5,575 battle tanks and 5,505 pieces of artillery in active units. (6) Of which no more than 376 battle tanks, 611 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 314 pieces of artillery in active units. (7) Of which no more than 3,130 battle tanks, 4,350 armoured combat vehicles ACVs and 3,240 pieces of artillery in active units.” Article 22 The following Protocol on Territorial Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be added: “PROTOCOL ON TERRITORIAL CEILINGS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE The States Parties hereby agree upon the following territorial ceilings and territorial subceilings pursuant to Article V of the Treaty.

State Party

Battle tanks

The Republic of Armenia (3)(4) The Republic of Azerbaijan (3)(4) The Republic of Belarus (5) The Kingdom of Belgium (5) The Republic of Bulgaria (3)(4) The Czech Republic (5) The Kingdom of Denmark (5) The French Republic (5) Georgia (3)(4) The Federal Republic of Germany (5) The Hellenic Republic (3)(4) The Republic of Hungary (5) The Republic of Iceland (3)(4) The Italian Republic (5) The Republic of Kazakhstan (5) The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (5) The Republic of Moldova (3)(4) The Kingdom of the Netherlands (5) The Kingdom of Norway (3)(4) The Republic of Poland (5) The Portuguese Republic (5) Romania (3)(4) The Russian Federation (5)

220 220 1,800 544 1,475 957 335 1,306 220 4,704 1,735 835 0 1,642 50 143 210 809 170 1,730 300 1,375 6,350

Armoured Pieces combat of vehicles artillery 220 220 2,600 1,505 2,000 1,367 336 3,820 220 6,772 2,498 1,700 0 3,805 200 174 210 1,220 282 2,150 430 2,100 1,300

285 285 1,615 497 1,750 767 446 1,292 285 3,407 1,920 840 0 2,062 100 47 250 651 557 1,610 450 1,475 11,280

764  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

– of which (1)(3)(4) The Slovak Republic (5) The Kingdom of Spain (5) The Republic of Turkey (3)(4) Ukraine (5) – of which (2)(3)(4) The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(5)

IN

EUROPE TREATY

2,140 478 891 2,795 4,080 400

6,315 683 2,047 3,120 400 4,040

1,680 383 1,370 3,523 5,050 350

843

3,029

583

(1) In the Leningrad Military District, excluding the Pskov oblast;, and in the North Caucasus Military District, excluding: the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya.This territorial subceiling shall not be exceeded pursuant to ArticleVII for military exercises and temporary deployments in the category of armoured combat vehicles. (2) In the Odessa oblast. (3) Territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings States Parties which shall increase their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article V, paragraph 5, only in conjunction with a corresponding decrease, pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), in the territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings of other States Parties, as identified by this footnote. (4) Territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings States Parties which shall not exceeded their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery. (5) Territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings States Parties which shall not exceeded their territorial ceilings or territorial subceilings pursuant to Article VII by more than 459 battle tanks, 723 armoured combat vehicles and 420 pieces of artillery in excess of their territorial ceilings.” Article 23 In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft into Unarmed Trainer Aircraft: 1. In Section I, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings only those specific models or versions of com4bat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Protocol. (A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol that have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol only by total disarming and certification. (B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings individual aircraft of the specific models or versions listed in Section II, paragraph 1, of this Protocol that do not have any of the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol by certification alone. 2. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings until such aircraft have been

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  765

certified as unarmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings no more than 550 such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the MiG-25U model or version.” 2. In Section II, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol only the following specific models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft: SU-15U SU-17U MiG-15U MiG-21U MiG-23U MiG-25U UIL-28” 3. Section IV shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION 1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify, or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not possess any of the components listed in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 2, of this Protocol. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first certification of an aircraft that does not require total disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the certification shall provide to all other States Parties the information required in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C), of this Protocol for an armed model or version of the same aircraft type. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. 4. The process of total disarming and certification, or certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and reclassification provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved. 5.The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification. 6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.” Article 24 In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe:

766  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

1. In Section VIII, paragraphs 2 and 10 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert.This number shall not exceed: (A) for battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 battle tanks) of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater; and (B) for armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater.” “10. If, having completed the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall be destroyed in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol.” 2. In Section IX, paragraph 1 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its reduction liability for each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in that category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.” 3. In Section X, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more than one percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or eight items, whichever is the greater number.” 4. In Section XI, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater than 2.5 percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each of those two categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. In addition, no State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery.” 5. In Section XII, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack helicopters greater than 5five percent of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings in each of those two categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.” Article 25 In the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters: 1. In Section 1I, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section, and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine shall have the right to hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/ radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of informa-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  767

tion in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspections in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 33, of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of the following limits: Republic of Armenia: 4; Republic of Azerbaijan: 4; Republic of Belarus: 16; Georgia: 4; Republic of Kazakhstan: 0; Republic of Moldova: 4; Russian Federation: 50; Ukraine: 18, shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Article IV of the Treaty and in the Protocol on National Ceilings.The provisions of Article IV, paragraph 3, and Article IV, paragraph 5, of the Treaty shall apply, mutatis mutandis, in respect of any changes to the above limits.” 2. Section IV shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION 1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose attack helicopters shall comply with the following certification procedures, in order to ensure that such helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of each certification in accordance with Section X, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Inspection. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the certification of helicopters in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. 4.The process of recategorisation shall be deemed complete when the certification procedures set forth in this Section have been completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of this Section and Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of completion of the certification and recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the certification and recategorisation process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the ambiguity is resolved. 5.The State Party conducting the certification shall notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the certification and recategorisation. 6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of application. States Parties shall have the right to share locations for certification.” Article 26 The Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, with an Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and provisions regarding notification and exchange of information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

768  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF EACH STATE PARTY’S LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information about the structure of its land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the area of application: (A) The command organisation of its land forces, specifying the designation and subordination of all combat, combat support and combat service support formations and units at each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated; (B) The command organisation of its air and air defence aviation forces, specifying the designation and subordination of formations and units at each level of command down to wing/air regiment or equivalent level. Independent units at the next level of command below the wing/air regiment level directly subordinate to formations above the wing/air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall be identified, with the information indicating the formation or unit to which such units are subordinated; and (C) The designation and subordination of military installations as specified in Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol. SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVETIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on: (A) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings; (B) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by States Parties’ territory and territory with a subceiling as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings; (C) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of combat aircraft and attack helicopters by States Parties’ territory as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings; and (D) Overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings of the following conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty: (1) Armoured vehicle launched bridges; (2) Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; (3) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters having been decommissioned and awaiting disposal; and (4) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  769

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES 1. For each of its formations and units notified pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information: (A) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) Battle tanks; (2) Armoured combat vehicles; (3) Artillery; (4) Combat aircraft; and (5) Attack helicopters; (B) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of the conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of: (1) Combat support helicopters; (2) Unarmed transport helicopters; (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges; (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; (6) Primary trainer aircraft; (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings; (C) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units, other than those notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, at which the following categories of conventional armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) Combat support helicopters; (2) Unarmed transport helicopters; (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges; (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; (6) Primary trainer aircraft; (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and

770  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings; (D) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) in each category specified above. 2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information on conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation forces, specifying: (A) The designation and peacetime location of its formations and units down to the level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as units at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are separately located or are independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the following categories are held, including headquarters, specifying the geographic name and coordinates: (1) Battle tanks; (2) Armoured combat vehicles; (3) Artillery; (4) Combat aircraft; and (5) Attack helicopters. (B) The holdings of its formations and units notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, giving numbers (by type in the case of formations and units at the level of division or equivalent and below) of conventional armaments and equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of: (1) Combat support helicopters; (2) Unarmed transport helicopters; (3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges; (4) Armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; (5) Armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; (6) Primary trainer aircraft; (7) Reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and (8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings. 3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information: (A) The location of its designated permanent storage sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Section held at such sites; (B) The location of its military storage sites not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification, independent repair and maintenance units, military training establishments and military airfields, specifying geographic name and coordinates, at which conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Section are held or routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each category at such locations; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  771

(C) The location of its sites at which the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by type in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a reduction site. SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND NUMBERS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION BUT NOT IN SERVICE WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 1. Each State Party shall provide information to all other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application not in service with its conventional armed forces but of potential military significance. (A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the following information: (1) In respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by organisations down to the independent or separately located battalion or equivalent level designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment in these categories held by each such organisation; (2) In respect of its armoured personnel carriers, heavy armament combat vehicles and multi-purpose attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the aggregate numbers in each category of such armaments and equipment in each administrative region or division; (3) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of sites at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; (4) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters which are awaiting or are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol, an identifiable location of each site at which there are normally more than a total of 15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery or more than five combat aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters which are, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (E), of the Treaty, awaiting or are being refurbished for export or re-export and are temporarily retained within the area of application. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties, following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each exchange of information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol: (a) The numbers of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters as of 1 January of the following year; and (b) The total number by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters removed from the “awaiting export” category during the previous 12 months and their disaggregation by disposition: reassigned to the conventional

772  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

armed forces or to internal security forces, transferred to the category “decommissioned and awaiting disposal”, disposed of or transferred outside of the area of application. The States Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, agree as to the form in which the information on the numbers shall be provided pursuant to this provision; (5) In respect of its battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles which have been reduced and are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, including geographic name and coordinates, of each site at which such armaments and equipment are held and the numbers and types at each site; and (6) In respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of research and development pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each exchange of information pursuant to SectionVII, paragraph 1, of this Protocol the aggregate numbers in each category of such conventional armaments and equipment. SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information specifying its objects of verification, including the total number and the designation of each object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing the following information on each site: (A) The site’s designation and location, including geographic name and coordinates; (B) The designation of all objects of verification, as specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (I), of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being understood that subordinate elements at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment or wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each other or of the headquarters immediately superior to such elements may be deemed as not separately located, if the distance between such separately located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres; (C) The overall numbers by type of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by each object of verification, as well as those belonging to any object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation of each such object of verification; (D) In addition, for each such declared site, the number of conventional armaments and equipment not in service with its conventional armed forces, indicating those that are: (1) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters awaiting disposal having been decommissioned in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting conversion pursuant to the Protocol on Reduction; and (2) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions; (E) Declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export and temporarily retained within the area of application or used exclusively for research and development shall be identified as such, and the aggregate numbers in each category at that site shall be provided; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  773

(F) Point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared site, with geographic name and coordinates, including at least one commercial airport, if possible operating international flights. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of its passive declared site inspection quota calculated in accordance with Section II, paragraph 10, of the Protocol on Inspection. SECTION VI. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF SITES FROM WHICH CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN 1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol, information about the locations of sites which have been notified previously as declared sites from which all conventional armaments and equipment in the categories listed in Section III, paragraph 1, of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations of these sites shall be notified for three years following such withdrawal. SECTION VII. TIMETABLE FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN SECTIONS I TO V OF THIS PROTOCOL 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this Protocol as follows: (A) 30 days following entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, with information effective as of the date of entry into force, unless entry into force occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December, in which case: (1) If entry into force occurs subsequent to the 15th day of December, the annual exchange that took place on the 15th day of December shall be considered the information exchange pursuant to paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) above, and may be supplemented, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, as agreed by the States Parties; or (2) If entry into force occurs prior to the 15th day of December, the exchange of information scheduled for the 15th day of December shall take place 30 days after entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation, unless the States Parties otherwise agree, pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol; and (B) Thereafter on the 15th day of December of every year, with the information effective as of the first day of January of the following year. 2. No later than the first day of July of each year, the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to that in the annual information exchange on its forces in the geographic area subject to being reported on in the additional information provided by the Russian Federation as of 1 July 1999. SECTION VIII. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OR HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY 1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of: (A) Any permanent change in the organisational structure of its conventional armed forces within the area of application as notified pursuant to Section I of this Protocol, including separately located units which are identified as objects of verification; any change in the designation or any change of the location of formations or units as notified pursuant to Sections I and III of this Protocol; any creation of an object of verification or of a declared site; and any redesignation or relocation of an object of verification as notified pursuant to SectionV of this Protocol. Such notification shall be given at least 42 days in advance; and

774  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(B) Any change of 10 percent or more, calculated on the basis of the most recent update of the annual exchange of information, including the most recent applicable notification of a change in holdings of 10 percent or more, in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service support formations and units down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol or permanently present at or assigned to any of its installations notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), which are identified as objects of verification. Such notification shall be given no later than five working days after such a change occurs and shall include the actual holdings after the notified change.The closure of an object of verification shall be indicated. The notification shall include information about the source of armaments and equipment added, including but not limited to new production, import, transfer from conventional armed forces, transfer from forces other than the conventional armed forces, or relocation from outside the area of application. If the armaments and equipment have been transferred from another unit or installation identified as an object of verification within the area of application, the notification shall include the designation, unit record number and the location of the losing unit or installation identified as an object of verification if there has been a 10 percent or greater change in that losing unit or installation identified as an object of verification.The notification shall also include information about the disposition of the armaments and equipment withdrawn, including but not limited to decommissioning, disposal, withdrawal from the area of application, transfer to conventional armed forces, transfer to forces other than conventional armed forces or awaiting export. If the armaments and equipment have been transferred to another unit or installation identified as an object of verification within the area of application, the notification shall include the designation, the unit record number and the location of the gaining unit or installation identified as an object of verification if there has been a 10 percent or greater change in that gaining unit or installation identified as an object of verification. For a source or destination outside of the area of application, only that fact shall be noted. 2. Ukraine shall provide information for changes of five percent or more in any one of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of its combat, combat support or combat service support formations and units down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), and paragraph 2, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of this Protocol in respect of its assigned holdings within the Odessa oblast reported in the annual information exchange. Such notification shall be given no later than five working days after such a change occurs and shall include the actual holdings after the notified change. SECTION IX. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY LIMITED BY THE TREATY WHICH ARE NOT ON THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE PARTY THAT IS DECLARED AS THEIR PEACETIME LOCATION AS OF 1 JANUARY 1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties by 21 January each year, with information effective as of 1 January, about its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery which are, as of 1 January, not situated on the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling that is declared as their peacetime location, as reported pursuant to the annual exchange of information: (A) The notified peacetime location, by State Party and territory with a subceiling, the designation of formation or unit, the unit record number, if applicable, and the number of its absent battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by types; and

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  775

(B) The actual location of such armaments and equipment as of 1 January, unless located as part of the unit to which they are assigned in which case the actual location of the unit by geographic coordinates by State Party and territory with a subceiling shall be reported, or unless the actual location is a declared site, in which case the location of the declared site, its record number and site name shall be reported. 2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties by 21 January each year, with information effective as of 1 January, about its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery which have been moved from outside of the area of application onto the territory of a State Party in the area of application or territory with a subceiling and were not reported pursuant to the annual exchange of information at their actual location.The notification shall include the number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery by types; and the actual location of such armaments and equipment as of 1 January, unless located as part of the unit to which they are assigned in which case the actual location of the unit by geographic coordinates by State Party and territory with a subceiling shall be reported, or unless the actual location is a declared site, in which case the location of the declared site, its record number and site name shall be reported. SECTION X. INFORMATION ON THE ENTRY INTO AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF A STATE PARTY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol: (A) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which entered into service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months, and their disaggregation by source, including but not limited to new production, import or transfer from outside the area of application, resubordination from internal security forces; and (B) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which: (1) Have been removed from service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application during the previous 12 months, their last reported location and their disaggregation by disposition, including but not limited to decommissioning, resubordination to internal security forces, awaiting export, disposal through destruction/modification, withdrawal from the area of application; and (2) Have been withdrawn from the “decommissioned and awaiting disposal” category during the previous 12 months and their disaggregation by disposition, including but not limited to reassignment to internal security forces, placement in the category of awaiting export, recommissioning, disposal through destruction/modification, withdrawal from the area of application. SECTION XI. INFORMATION ON ENTRY INTO AND EXIT FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES 1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other States Parties following entry of the force of the Treaty and coincident with each annual exchange of information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol: (A) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces

776  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

that have entered the area of application within the last 12 months and whether any of these armaments and equipment were organised in a formation or unit; (B) Aggregate information on the numbers and types of each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces that have been removed from, and remain outside of, the area of application within the last 12 months and the last reported locations within the area of application of such conventional armaments and equipment; and (C) Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its conventional armed forces within the area of application which exit and re-enter the area of application, including for purposes such as training or military activities, within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the reporting provisions in this Section. SECTION XII. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT THROUGH OR WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION 1. Conventional armaments and equipment in the categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which entered the area of application in transit shall be reported pursuant to this Protocol only if they remain within the area of application for a period longer than seven days. 2. In the case of transit of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in accordance with Article V of the Treaty, each State Party undertaking such transit shall provide to all other States Parties the following information no later than the day the conventional armaments and equipment in transit enter the territory of the first transited State Party or a territory with a subceiling: (A) Start date of the transit; (B) Mode of transportation; (C) First State Party transited; (D) The categories of armaments and equipment in transit; and (E) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling into which the conventional armaments and equipment in transit entered the area of application; or (F) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling of origin of the conventional armaments and equipment in transit, as applicable. 3. Each State Party undertaking such transit shall provide to all other States Parties the following information as soon as possible, but no later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment in transit enter the territory of the first transited State Party or a territory with a subceiling: (A) Start date of the transit; (B) Mode of transportation; (C) The States Parties or territories with subceilings to be transited; (D) The State Party of final destination, if applicable; (E) The expected duration of the transit through the territory of each transited State Party or the territory with subceilings; (F) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery in transit; and (G) Additional information, to include related notifications.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  777

4. Each transited State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the following information no later than five days after the date the battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in transit enter its territory: (A) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or pieces of artillery involved; (B) The expected duration of the transit through its territory; and (C) Additional information, to include related notifications. 5. If the final destination is within the area of application, the State Party of final destination shall notify all other States Parties that the transit is over not later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment arrive on its territory. 6. Each State Party undertaking transit of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall notify all other States Parties no later than five days after the conventional armaments and equipment in transit entered the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling of final destination or departed the area of application of the following information: (A) Reference to the notifications issued pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section; (B) Start and end dates of the transit; (C) The State Party or the territory with a subceiling where transit began; (D) The total numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery involved; (E) The States Parties or territories with subceilings that were transited; (F) The territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling of final destination or the territory of the State Party or the territory with a subceiling transited prior to departure from the area of application, as applicable; and (G) Additional information, to include notifications resulting from the arrival of the conventional armaments and equipment in transit at its final destination, if it is in the area of application. SECTION XIII. QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE AREA OF APPLICATION AND ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY 1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of the total numbers of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery actually present in the area of application by territory of a State Party and territory with a subceiling as countable against the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings. 2. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall notify all other States Parties of the total number of its and the total number of any other State Party ‘ battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery actually present on its territory and on territory with a subceiling as countable against its numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings. 3. The information pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section shall be provided on each 31 January, with the information effective as of 1 January; on each 30 April, with the information effective as of 1 April; on each 31 July, with the information effective as of 1 July; and on each 31 October, with the information effective as of 1 October. SECTION XIV. QUARTERLY INFORMATION ON COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS ACTUALLY PRESENT IN THE AREA OF APPLICATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY 1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of the total numbers of its combat aircraft and attack helicopters actually present in the area of application and countable against its

778  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, including the numbers by States Parties’ territory where assigned. The information shall be provided on each 31 January, with the information effective as of 1 January; on each 30 April, with the information effective as of 1 April; on each 31 July, with the information effective as of 1 July; and on each 31 October, with the information effective as of 1 October. SECTION XV. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS,ARMOURED COMBATVEHICLES, OR ARTILLERY PRESENT ON THETERRITORY OF A STATE PARTY OR IN A TERRITORY WITH A SUBCEILING 1. Each State Party shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol and excluding armaments and equipment which have been notified pursuant to Sections XII, XVIII and XX of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes, in any territory or territory with a subceiling, to the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to Section XIII of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph, whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 30 battle tanks or 30 armoured combat vehicles or 10 pieces of artillery.The notifications shall contain the following information: (A) The previously notified levels of holdings, by territory of a State Party or territory with a subceiling; (B) The amount by which the notified levels have been changed; (C) The new levels of holdings, by territory of a State Party or territory with a subceiling; and (D) The effective date of the change. 2. Notifications pursuant to this Section shall be given no later than five working days after the previously notified levels have been exceeded. SECTION XVI. INFORMATION RELATING TO CERTAIN EVENTS INVOLVING COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS 1. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes in the total number of its combat aircraft and of its attack helicopters countable against numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 18 combat aircraft or 18 attack helicopters above the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to: (A) Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph; or (B) Section XIV of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph if these levels exceed the levels notified under subparagraph (A) above. 2. Each State Party without territory in the area of application shall, subject to the provisions of Section XI, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), of this Protocol, notify all other States Parties of changes in the total number of its combat aircraft and of its attack helicopters countable against numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings whenever the level of change equals or exceeds 18 combat aircraft or 18 attack helicopters above or below the levels in the most recent notification provided pursuant to either: (A) Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph; or (B) Section XIV of this Protocol and subsequent notifications provided pursuant to this paragraph.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  779

3. Notifications pursuant to this Section shall be given no later than five working days after each such change occurs and shall include: (A) The previously notified levels of holdings; (B) The amount by which the notified levels have changed; (C) The new levels of holdings; and (D) The effective date of the change. SECTION XVII. INFORMATION ON AUTHORISATION TO MAKE USE OF A STATE PARTY’S HEADROOM 1. Each State Party with territory in the area of application shall notify all other States Parties of the entitlement authorised for use by another State Party of the headroom between its national holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery on its territory and its territorial ceiling in those categories. Such notification shall be provided no later than the effective date of the authorisation and shall specify the maximum headroom authorised for use by a State Party, the start date and the effective duration of the authorisation.The notifying State Party shall update its notification if it modifies the authorisation. 2.The total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery set out in an authorisation shall not exceed, in any of these categories, the amount of headroom not already taken up by all extant authorisations for any period of time. SECTION XVIII. INFORMATION WHEN A TERRITORIAL CEILING OR A TERRITORIAL SUBCEILING IS TEMPORARILY EXCEEDED 1. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall notify all other States Parties whenever its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is temporarily exceeded in accordance with Article VII of this Treaty. 2. Each State Party which participates with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in an activity that results in exceeding either another State Party’s territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling or its own territorial subceiling shall notify all other States Parties. 3. Where a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded as a result of a military exercise: (A) The State Party on whose territory the military exercise is to be conducted shall notify all other States Parties no later than 42 days in advance of the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is to be exceeded of the following: the designation and the general purpose of the exercise; the participating States Parties; the date of the start of the exercise and its estimated duration; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery involved in the exercise and the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; the dates of the beginning and of the end of that stage of the exercise during which a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling will remain exceeded; and the area of the exercise defined by geographic coordinates; (B) Each State Party which participates in the exercise with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery shall notify all other States Parties no later than 42 days in advance of the date a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is to be exceeded of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved in the military exercise; where applicable, the location of the objects of verification of origin, the command element of origin, the designation of formations and units and unit record numbers; the area of deployment, defined by geographic coordinates, and estimated dates of arrival and departure of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery; and additional explanatory information;

780  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(C) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, the notifications pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall be updated if there is any change to the data notified 42 days in advance; (D) Where a State Party exceeds its own territorial subceiling, all notifications pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by that State Party; (E) If a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is to remain exceeded for more than 42 days, as soon as possible but no later than on day 43 after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling has been exceeded: (1) The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is exceeded shall provide notification of the purpose and estimated duration of the exceeding; the States Parties involved in the exceeding; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; and the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates; and (2) Each State Party which participates in the temporary deployment with its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery shall provide notification of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates; (F) Each State Party shall provide notification whenever a cumulative increase of 30 battle tanks, 30 armoured combat vehicles, or 10 pieces of artillery to the numbers previously notified pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph occurs. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such an increase occurs. 4. Where a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded as a result of temporary deployment: (A) The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling is exceeded shall provide notification to all other States Parties: (1) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, the date of exceeding; the designation of the operation, its purpose and estimated duration; the States Parties involved; the total number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; and the area of deployment; (2) No later than 21 days after the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded a notification to update the information pursuant to sub-subparagraph (1) of this paragraph including the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates shall be issued; and (3) Whenever the numbers of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of the corresponding territorial ceiling exceed the levels of 153 battle tanks or 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery; (B) The State Party which deploys battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling shall notify all other States Parties: (1) No later than the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, of the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and the area of deployment; and (2) No later than 21 days after the date a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is exceeded, of the purpose and anticipated duration of the temporary deployment, the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved, the area of deployment defined by geographic coordinates, and where applicable, the objects of verifi-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  781

cation, their locations and the command element of origin, and the designation of formations and units and unit record numbers; (C) Subsequent updates shall be provided every 90 days until a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling is no longer exceeded; (D) Each State Party shall provide notification whenever a cumulative increase of 30 battle tanks, 30 armoured combat vehicles, or 10 pieces of artillery occurs in addition to the numbers previously notified by that State Party pursuant to subparagraph (A), (B) or (C) of this paragraph. Such notification shall be given no later than five days after such an increase occurs; (E) Where a State Party exceeds its own territorial subceiling, all notifications pursuant to this paragraph shall be provided by that State Party. 5.The State Party whose territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling has been exceeded as a result of a military exercise or as a result of a temporary deployment shall notify all other States Parties whenever the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery present on its territory no longer exceed its territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling. 6. If a territorial ceiling is exceeded at or below the levels of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery, such armaments and equipment shall not be subject to information exchange pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), paragraph 4, subparagraph (B), sub-subparagraph (2), and paragraph 4, subparagraph (C), of this Section if all of those armaments and equipment are properly declared at their actual temporary location on the territory of another State Party in the information exchange pursuant to Section VII, paragraph (1), subparagraph (A), of this Protocol and thereafter in each annual information exchange. SECTION XIX. INFORMATION ON ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER AMBULANCES 1.Without prejudice to the principle that armoured ambulances shall not be subject to Treaty limitations, annually each State Party shall provide, on the 15th day of December, all other States Parties with information on the overall holdings of armoured personnel carrier ambulances and locations containing more than 18 armoured personnel carrier ambulances. SECTION XX. INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF PEACE 1. Each State Party which deploys battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery on the territory of another State Party for an operation in support of peace in accordance with Article V, paragraph 2, of the Treaty shall, no later than five days after the start of the deployment of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery, provide information on the mandate, anticipated duration and designation of the operation, the total number of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery involved in the operation and the command authority under which they operate; the objects of verification and command element of origin, where applicable; and the intended territory of destination of the armaments and equipment within the area of application. 2.Subsequent updates shall be provided by each State Party issuing notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section every 90 days until the end of the operation and the complete withdrawal of the armaments and equipment involved. SECTION XXI. FORMAT FOR THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties the information specified in this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, changes to the

782  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. SECTION XXII. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE TREATY 1.The Joint Consultative Group shall develop a document relating to notifications required by the Treaty. Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, changes to this document, including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. ANNEX ON THE FORMAT FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in accordance with the formats specified in this Annex.The information in each data listing shall be provided in written form supplemented by an electronic data version on diskette in the agreed format.The written text in one of the six official languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe shall be the official version. In each table (column a), each data entry shall be assigned a sequential line number. 2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page showing the name of the State Party providing the listings, the language in which the listings are being provided, the date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the effective date of the information set forth in the listings. The cover page shall be followed by a table of contents, a list of abbreviations used, an index showing the relation between unit record number, Chart and page, Charts I to VI as specified in this Annex, a list of annual notifications, a list of standing diplomatic clearance numbers, complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew members, if applicable, and additional related information to include a list of officially recognised holidays. SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF APPLICATION 1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the command organisation of its land forces, including air defence formations and units subordinated at or below the military district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings as set forth in Chart I. 2.The data listings shall be provided beginning at the highest level and proceeding through each level of command down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or their equivalent. Each designated permanent storage site, military storage site, independent repair and maintenance unit, military training establishment and military airfield shall be included. For example, a military district/army/corps could be followed by any subordinate independent regiments, independent battalions, depots, training establishments, then each subordinate division with its regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be followed for air and air defence aviation forces. (A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b) by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record number) which shall be used on subsequent listings with that organisation and for all subsequent information exchanges; its national designation (i.e., name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions, brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery, fighter, bomber, supply); and (B) For each organisation, the two levels of command within the area of application immediately superior to that organisation shall be designated (columns d and e).

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  783

CHART I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND ON THE OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TRAETY 1. Pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings, and the number by types of those overall holdings countable against any of the limits set forth in the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings (column b), and on its overall holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Protocol on National Ceilings) (column b) and pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C), the number of those holdings located on the territory of each State Party. 2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and their number (column f/e) and type (column e/d) in each of these sub-categories (column d/c). 3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total of such armaments and equipment in designated permanent storage sites shall be specified (column g). 4. Pursuant to Section II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (D), of this Protocol, each State Party shall provide data (Chart IIC) on its overall holdings by type of: (A) Armoured vehicle launched bridges (columns a to d); (B) Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions (columns a to d); (C) Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters having been decommissioned and awaiting disposal (columns a to d); and (D) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters (columns a to d). CHART IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIC: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IID: INFORMATION ON AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data listing of all its land forces’ and air and air defence aviation forces’ organisations reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, of the Protocol, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol

784  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

and installations at which conventional armaments and equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3, of the Protocol. 2. For each organisation and installation, the information shall reflect: (A) The formation or unit record number (column b) and designation of the organisation (column c) reported in Chart I. Separately located battalions/squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol and installations listed in accordance with Section III, paragraph 3, of the Protocol shall also be given a unique formation or unit record number (column b), and their national designation (i.e., name) (column c) shall be provided. Their position on the listing shall reflect their subordination with the exception of formations and units reported pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2, of the Protocol, which shall be specified together at the conclusion of the listing: (1) Designated permanent storage sites shall be identified with the notation “DPSS” following the national designation; and (2) Reduction sites shall be identified with the notation “reduction” following the national designation; (B) Location (column d), including the State Party and territory with a subceiling, geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds; (C) For each level of command from the highest down to the division/air division level, the overall total of conventional armaments and equipment in each category (columns f to m/1). For example, the overall total held by a division would be the sum of the holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and (D) For each level of command at the division level and below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the number of conventional armaments and equipment by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA and IIIB (columns f to m/n). In the armoured combat vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the sub-categories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the attack helicopter column (column k/i), the sub-categories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose attack) shall be presented separately.The column (1) labelled “other” in Chart IIIB shall include battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and air defence aviation forces. CHART IIIA. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT IN SERVICE WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE 1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide information on the location, number and type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of application but not in service with its conventional armed forces.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  785

2. For each location, the information shall reflect: (A) The provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant to which the information is being provided (column b); (B) The location (column c): (1) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1), (3) and (5), of the Protocol, the geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing such armaments and equipment; and (2) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol, and the national designation of the administrative region or division containing such armaments and equipment; (C) In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1) and (2), of the Protocol, the nationallevel designation of organisations holding the armaments and equipment specified (column c); and (D) For each location, the number by type under the headings specified in Chart IV (columns d to i), except as follows: In respect of conventional armaments and equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraph (2), of the Protocol, only the numbers in each category shall be provided solely for the administrative region or division specified (column c). Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES 1. Pursuant to SectionV of the Protocol, each State Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in alphabetical order and by State Party and, where applicable, by territory with a subceiling. 2. Information about each declared site shall include: (A) A unique designator (i.e., declared site record number) (column b) which shall be used with that site for all subsequent information exchanges; (B) The site name and location using geographic name and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column c); (C) The point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared site (column d); (D) A unique sequential number and the designation and formation or unit record number of all objects of verification stationed at the declared site as specified in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the number assigned to the last object of verification appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party’s total number of objects of verification; and (E) The overall number of conventional armaments and equipment in each category specified in Section III of the Protocol held at the declared site and by each object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying, in addition:

786  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(1) Conventional armaments and equipment held in each category on the declared site belonging to an object of verification located at another declared site, specifying the designation and formation or unit record number of each such object of verification (column e); and (2) Conventional armaments and equipment not belonging to an object of verification shall be identified with the following notations immediately following/below each such entry in columns f to p: (a) Armaments and equipment held by organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, with the notation “security”; (b) Decommissioned armaments and equipment, with the notation “decommissioned”; (c) Armaments and equipment awaiting or being refurbished for export or re-export, with the notation “export”; (d) Reduced araments and equipment awaiting conversion, with the notation “reduced”; and (e) Armaments and equipment used exclusively for research and development, with the notation “research.” 3.The last entry in ChartV shall indicate the passive declared sites inspection quota of the State Party for the following Treaty year. CHART V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) 4. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of entry/exit (Chart VI). The listing shall assign a unique sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C), of this Section.The location shall include the geographic name (column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation acceptable - “air,” “sea,” “ground” - for each point of entry/exit also shall be specified (column e). CHART VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date)1 CHART IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIC: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPEMENT SUBJECT TO THE TREATY OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IID: INFORMATION ON AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  787

SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) CHART VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) Article 27 The Protocol on Inspection shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. SECTION I. DEFINITIONS 1. For the purposes of the Treaty: (A) The term “inspected State Party” means a State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out in compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty: (1) In the case of inspection sites where conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of only one State Party are present, that State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and (2) In the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each such State Party shall exercise, in compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, each in respect of its own conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party as set forth in this Protocol for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where its conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; (B) The term “host State Party” means a State Party receiving on its territory within the area of application conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of another State Party; (C) The term “inspecting State Party” means a State Party which requests and is therefore responsible for carrying out an inspection; (D) The term “inspector” means an individual designated by one of the States Parties to carry out an inspection and who is included on that State Party’s accepted list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol; (E) The term “transport crew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of a transportation means and who is included on a State Party’s accepted list of transport crew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol; (F) The term “inspection team” means a group of inspectors from one or more States Parties led by a representative of the inspecting State Party to conduct a particular inspection;

788  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(G) The term “escort team” means a group of individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a particular inspection, as well as to assume other responsibilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the case of an inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of one State Party that is on the territory of another State Party, each of the two States Parties shall designate individuals that shall be included in the escort team, unless otherwise agreed between them; (H) The term “inspection site” means an area, location or facility where an inspection is carried out; (I) The term “object of verification” means: (1) Any formation or unit at the organisational level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion, independent squadron or equivalent as well as any separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent unit at the next level of command below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty at a location notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (2) Any designated permanent storage site, military storage site not organic to formations and units referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this subparagraph, independent repair or maintenance unit, military training establishment or military airfield at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B), of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being permanently or routinely present; (3) A reduction site for conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, subparagraph (C), of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (4) In the case of units below the level of battalion holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that are directly subordinate to a unit or formation above the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit or formation to which the units below the level of battalion are subordinated shall be considered an object of verification, if it has no subordinate unit or formation at the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent; and (5) A formation or unit holding conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, but not in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party shall not be considered an object of verification; (J) The term “military airfield” means a permanent military complex, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e., launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or subject to internal inspection is routinely performed; (K) The term “military training establishment” means a facility, not otherwise containing an object of verification, at which a military unit or subunit using at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty is organised to train military personnel; (L) The term “military storage site” not organic to formations and units identified as objects of verification means any storage site, other than designated permanent storage sites or sites subordinate to organisations designed and structured for internal security purposes, holding conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty without respect to organisational or operational status. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall constitute a portion of the permitted holdings counted in active units pursuant to the Protocol on National Ceilings;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  789

(M) The term “declared site” means a facility or precisely delineated geographic location which contains one or more objects of verification.A declared site shall consist of all territory within its man-made or natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as associated territory comprising firing ranges, training areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter airfields and railroad loading facilities at which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present; (N) The term “specified area” means an area anywhere on the territory of a State Party within the area of application other than a site inspected pursuant to Section VII, X or XI of this Protocol within which a challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol.A specified area shall not exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line between any two points in that area shall exceed 16 kilometres; (O) The term “designated area” means a single area on the territory of a State Party within the area of application within which an inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol is conducted. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 3, of this Protocol, the size of a designated area shall not exceed either twice the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Information Exchange or 10,000 square kilometres, whichever is smaller, but shall not be smaller than 1,000 square kilometres. If the size of the notified area is less than or equal to 5,000 square kilometres, the designated area shall include the entire notified area. If the size of the notified area is greater than 5,000 square kilometres, at least half of the designated area shall overlap with the notified area.The designated area shall be configured so that no straight line between any two points within the area exceeds 350 kilometres unless the configuration of the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Information Exchange permits a straight line of maximum length between any two points within the notified area to exceed 350 kilometres, in which case the designated area may be configured to contain a straight line that falls along the maximum length straight line in the notified area and shall be of no greater length; In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX, paragraphs 4 and 5, of this Protocol the size of a designated area shall not exceed 10,000 square kilometres. At least 25 percent of the designated area shall overlap with the notified area.The designated area shall be configured so that no straight line between any two points within the area exceeds 350 kilometres unless the configuration of the area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange permits a straight line of maximum length between any two points within the notified area to exceed 350 kilometres, in which case the designated area may be configured to contain a straight line that falls along the maximum length straight line in the notified area and shall be of no greater length; (P) The term “sensitive point” means any equipment, structure or location which has been designated to be sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party through the escort team and to which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or refused; (Q) The term “point of entry/exit” means a point designated by a State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out, through which inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the territory of that State Party and through which they depart from the territory of that State Party; (R) The term “in-country period” means the total time spent continuously on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out by an inspection team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection team at the

790  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

point of entry/exit until the return of the inspection team to a point of entry/exit after completion of that inspection team’s last inspection; (S) The term “passive declared site inspection quota” means the total number of inspections of objects of verification pursuant to SectionVII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be obliged to receive within a Treaty year at inspection sites where its objects of verification are located; (T) The term “passive challenge inspection quota” means the maximum number of challenge inspections within specified areas pursuant to SectionVIII of this Protocol that each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to receive within a Treaty year; (U) The term “active inspection quota” means the total number of inspections pursuant to SectionsVII and VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be entitled to conduct within a Treaty year; (V) The term “certification site” means a clearly designated location where the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification takes place; (W) The term “calendar reporting period” means a period of time defined in days during which the intended reduction of the planned number of items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty is to be carried out. SECTION II. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State Party shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol. 2. In the case of conventional armaments and equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a State Party in the area of application on the territory of another State Party, such States Parties shall, in fulfilment of their respective responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this Protocol. Each State Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces on the territory of another State Party. 3.The escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of the inspected State Party: (A) In the case of inspection sites at which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty only of a State Party other than the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out are present, and are under the command of that State Party only, the escort team shall be placed under the responsibility of a representative of that State Party for the duration of the inspection within that inspection site where the State Party’s conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are located; (B) In the case of inspection sites containing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of both the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out and another State Party, the escort team shall be composed of representatives from both States Parties when conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the other State Party are actually inspected. During the inspection within that inspection site, the State Party on whose territory the inspection is being carried out shall exercise the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party with the exception of those rights and obligations related to the inspection of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of the other State Party, which shall be exercised by that State Party; (C) With the agreement of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of another

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  791

State Party, that State Party shall assist the host State Party in the provision of security protection to both the inspection team and the escort team for the duration of the inspection. 4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. 5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject to inspection only when that other State Party’s representative is on the escort team. 6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party. 7. No more than one inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to SectionVII orVIII of this Protocol may be present at the same time at any one inspection site. 8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections during the in-country period. 9. Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection shall be borne by the inspecting State Party. 10. Each Treaty year each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection quota.The passive declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent, rounded to the nearest whole number, of that State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange. 11. Each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a number of challenge inspections up to 23 percent, rounded to the nearest whole number, of the number of inspections of declared sites which that State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its own objects of verification and of objects of verification belonging to other States Parties. 12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each Treaty year of its objects of verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each Treaty year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol. 13.The cost of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall be covered as follows: (A) A number of inspections equal to 75 percent of the passive declared site inspection quota, rounded to the nearest whole number but not less than one inspection pursuant to SectionVII and one inspection pursuant to SectionVIII of this Protocol shall be conducted at the expense of the inspected State Party; and (B) A number of inspections equal to 25 percent of the passive declared site inspection quota, rounded to the nearest whole number, shall be conducted at the expense of the inspecting States Parties.The modalities for such payment shall be decided by the Joint Consultative Group. 14.The inspections pursuant to Section IX shall be conducted at the expense of the inspected State Party.

792  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

15. Each Treaty year the Russian Federation shall accept in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota calculated pursuant to paragraph 10 of this Section, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site inspections conducted at the expense of the inspecting States Parties, allocated as follows: (A) Up to four inspections to the area consisting of the Pskov oblast; the Volgograd oblast; the Astrakhan oblast; that part of the Rostov oblast east of the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar kray leading to Kushchevskaya; (B) Up to six inspections to the area consisting of the Leningrad Military District and North Caucasus Military District, excluding the area described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. 16. Each Treaty year Ukraine shall accept in addition to its passive declared site inspection quota calculated pursuant to paragraph 10 of this Section, up to one supplementary declared site inspection in the Odessa oblast conducted at the expense of the inspecting State Party. 17.The number of supplementary declared site inspections conducted at declared sites pursuant to paragraph 15 or 16 of this Section shall not exceed the number of declared site passive quota inspections conducted at declared sites located in the areas specified in paragraphs 15 and 16 of this Section in the course of the same Treaty year. 18. Inspection pursuant to SectionVII of this Protocol of one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of that State Party whose object of verification is inspected. 19.The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol on the territory of a State Party used to inspect objects of verification belonging to another State Party shall be no greater than the proportion which that State Party’s objects of verification constitute of the total number of objects of verification located on the territory of that host State Party. 20.The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of objects of verification on any State Party’s territory shall be calculated as a percentage of the total number of objects of verification present on that State Party’s territory. 21. Inspection pursuant to SectionVIII of this Protocol within one specified area shall count as one inspection against the passive challenge inspection quota and one inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is conducted. 22. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and the inspection team, an inspection team’s in-country period shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number of hours calculated according to the following formula: (A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area; plus (B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area. 23. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 22 of this Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to SectionVII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 24 hours in inspection within a specified area. 24.The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the most expeditious means available. If the time between completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if the time between completion of the last inspection conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine hours, such excess time shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  793

25. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its territory within the area of application simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII,VIII and IX of this Protocol. 26. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept simultaneously no more than two inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces pursuant to SectionsVII,VIII and IX of this Protocol. 27. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site inspection quota in a Treaty year from the same State Party. 28. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections within the area of application on the territory of other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties its active inspection quota for each Treaty year, no later than 15th day of January. 29.Without prejudice to the right to conduct inspections and to the principle that the verification of compliance is a national prerogative, as a general practice inspections may be multinational in character.The States Parties may coordinate their inspection activities as they deem appropriate.The States Parties shall ensure equal treatment of the inspectors regardless of their nationality and gender. 30. Each State Party shall provide all other States Parties no later than the 15th day of December each year with a list of its officially recognised holidays for the subsequent calendar year. SECTION III. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section. 2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State Party or other States Parties. 3.Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew members, containing the full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more than 600 individuals. 4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided to it by other States Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall provide notification to the State Party providing that list of any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that list. 5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and transport crew members for whom deletion has not been requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section. 6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty.Thereafter, twice every year, if possible by the first day of April and the first day of October, each State Party may propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided that such amended lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. Each State Party shall provide all other States Parties annually, no later than the 15th day of December, with a consolidated list of inspectors and transport crew members, which shall include all changes highlighted that have been notified and accepted since the submission of the previous consolidated list. Notifications to correct typing errors may be provided at any time.

794  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

7. A State Party may request, without right of refusal, deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors and transport crew members provided by any other State Party. 8.The State Party on whose territory an inspection is conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter and remain in the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any other necessary documents shall be provided either: (A) Within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months; or (B) Within one hour after the arrival of the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for the duration of their inspection activities. 9. Each year no later than 15th day of December, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for their transportation means of transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established international airways or other routes that are agreed upon by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by airlines. The provisions of this paragraph relating to diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights. 10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in respect of each declared site with its objects of verification. Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to receive the transportation means of the inspecting State Party. At least one commercial airport, if possible operating international flights, shall be notified as a point of entry/exit associated with each declared site.The location of any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site within the time specified in SectionVII, paragraph 8, of this Protocol. Each State Party may designate additional points of entry/exit to facilitate the conduct of inspections. 11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a change becomes effective. 12.Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties of the official language or languages of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to be used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces. SECTION IV. NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO INSPECT 1.The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty. In the case of inspection pursuant to SectionVII of this Protocol of conventional armed forces of a State Party other than the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, that State Party shall also be notified, regardless of whether it will be the first or a sequential inspection. In the case of inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall notify the host State Party.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  795

In the case of inspection of certification or reduction procedures carried out by a State Party on the territory of another State Party, the inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host State Party and the other State Party. 2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include: (A) The point of entry/exit to be used; (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) A statement of whether the first inspection shall be conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol and whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by crosscountry vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these; (E) The time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection site; (F) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol; (G) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol; (H) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number; (I) The likely number of sequential inspections; and (J) Whether the inspection is to be at the expense of the inspected State Party. 3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include: (A) The designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within the designated area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party’s chosen means of transportation; (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) A statement of whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these; (E) The time interval between the arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the designated area; (F) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol; (G) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol; (H) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number. 4. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections X and XI of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96 hours in

796  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall include: (A) The point of entry/exit to be used; (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) For each inspection at a reduction or certification site, reference to the notification provided pursuant to Section X, paragraph 3, or Section XI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol; (E) The language to be used by the inspection team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol; (F) The language to be used for the inspection report prepared in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol; and (G) The full names of inspectors and transport crew members; their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number. 5. The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours. Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B), or paragraph 3, subparagraph (B), of this Section. 6. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt notify all other States Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty of the type of the inspection requested and the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit. In the case of inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol the available passive declared site inspection quota, the likely number of sequential inspections and the State Party covering the cost of each inspection shall be included. 7. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out is unable to allow the entry of the inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of that State Party within two hours before or after the notified estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later than 24 hours following the issuance of the original notification. 8. If the inspection team finds itself delayed more than two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section of: (A) A new estimated time of arrival, which in no case shall be more than six hours beyond the initial estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section; and (B) If the inspecting State Party desires, a new time interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and the designation of the inspection site. 9. In the event non-commercial flights are used to transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. The International Civil Aviation Organization regulated Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network shall be considered one of the official channels for submission of the flight plans.The

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  797

flight plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft.The inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks Section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: “CFE inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required”. 10. No more than three hours following the receipt of a flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that the flight plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival. 11. If an inspection team travelling by means of ground transportation to or from the territory of the inspected State Party intends to transit through the territory of another State Party, the transited State Party shall be provided well in advance with the information relevant to its obligations pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (A), of Section XV of this Protocol. As a minimum, such information should include the cross-border points, the estimated time of crossing each border, the means of transportation to be used by the inspection team, the names of the inspectors and drivers, their nationalities and passport numbers. SECTION V. PROCEDURES UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT OF ENTRY/EXIT 1.The escort team shall meet the inspection team and transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their arrival. 2.A State Party which utilises structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a liaison officer to the escort team who will be available as needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team. 3.Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection team and the escort team. 4. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/exit. 5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that territory.This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the escort team in the presence of the inspection team members. 6. If the escort team determines upon examination that an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is capable of performing functions inconsistent with the inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 18 of this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later than the time when the inspection team which brought that impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country. 7. If a State Party has not participated during examination of equipment of an inspection team at the point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party. 8.Throughout the period in which the inspection team and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party shall

798  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care or any other emergency assistance. 9. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out shall provide accommodation, security protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit. SECTION VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS 1. Inspections may be delayed in cases of force majeure. In case the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons for this delay in detail and the estimated duration of the delay, as follows: (A) If force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the inspection team, through the answer to the relevant notification of intent to inspect; (B) If force majeure is declared after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry/exit, the explanation should be presented to the inspection team and as soon as possible through diplomatic channels or other official channels to all States Parties. 2. In case of a delay due to force majeure, the provisions of Section XIII, paragraph 2, of this Protocol shall apply. 3.An inspection team may include inspectors from States Parties other than the inspecting State Party. 4. For inspections conducted in accordance with Sections VII,VIII, X and XI of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide itself into up to three sub-teams. 5. For inspections conducted in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, an inspection team shall consist of up to 20 inspectors or of five inspectors from the inspecting State Party plus one inspector from each of the remaining States Parties interested in participating in such inspection, whichever is greater. No State Party shall have more than nine inspectors in an inspection team. An inspection team may divide itself into up to four sub-teams. 6. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some clear identification of their respective roles. 7. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party through the point of entry/exit. 8.The number of transport crew members shall not exceed 10. 9. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the event that the inspected State Party determines that an inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the inspecting State Party, which upon the request of the inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew members. If the individual is on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State Party shall promptly remove that individual from that territory.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  799

10.The inspected State Party shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport crew members from the time they arrive at the point of entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to depart the territory of that State Party. 11.The escort team shall assist the inspection team in carrying out its functions. At its discretion, the escort team may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs that territory. 12.The inspecting State Party shall ensure that the inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team in the language notified in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (F), paragraph 3, subparagraph (F), and paragraph 4, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol.The inspected State Party shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely in this language with the inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members of the escort team may also communicate in other languages. 13. No information obtained during inspections shall be publicly disclosed without the express consent of the inspecting State Party. 14.Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means provided by the inspected State Party.The inspected State Party shall also provide means of communication between the sub-teams of an inspection team. 15.The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a means and route selected by the inspected State Party.The inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a request.Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State Parry will be permitted to use its own land vehicles. 16. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team, which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary, shall provide appropriate means of transportation. 17.The inspected State Party shall provide for the exclusive use by the inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest breaks and meals. 18.The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be permitted to bring and use portable passive night vision devices, binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State Party. Throughout the in-country period, the escort team shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment that has been approved by the escort team in accordance with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7, of this Protocol. 19. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to SectionVII,VIII or IX of this Protocol, the inspection team shall specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate cross-country vehicles at the inspection site for each sub-team.

800  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

20.Whenever possible, subject to the safety requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Section VII,VIII or IX of this Protocol. 21.The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20 square kilometres in area. 22.The inspected State Party shall have the right to delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection site. Photography of or above sensitive points during helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 23.The duration of such helicopter overflights at an inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one hour in the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII and seven hours in the case of an inspection pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team. 24.Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the inspection team and at least one member of the escort team. Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of the inspection site any of the equipment specified in paragraph 18 of this Section. The inspection team shall advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it intends to take photographs.A helicopter shall afford the inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground. 25. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting safe operation. 26. Except as provided for in paragraphs 27 to 32 of this Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area, inspectors shall be permitted access, entry and unobstructed inspection: (A) In the case of a specified area, within the entire area excluding declared sites within the boundary of the area, if any; or (B) In the case of a designated area, within the entire area including declared sites within the boundary of the area; or (C) In the case of an object of verification, within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. 27. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area pursuant to Section VII,VIII or IX of this Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas cited in paragraph 26 of this Section, to enter any location, structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas within structures the entry points to which are physically accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres in width and to which access is denied by the escort team. 28. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or a designated area pursuant to Section VII,VIII or IX of this Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  801

capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 27 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside. 29. During an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or a designated area pursuant to Section VII,VIII or IX of this Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 30 to 36 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model or version. 30. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud individual sensitive items of equipment. 31. The escort team shall have the right to deny access to sensitive points, the number and extent of which should be as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which is less than two metres. Whenever a sensitive point is designated, or shrouded objects or containers are present, the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point, shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combatcapable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version. 32. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point, shrouded object or container does contain any of the conventional armaments and equipment specified in paragraph 31 of this Section, then the escort team shall display or declare such conventional armaments and equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared number of such conventional armaments and equipment are present. 33. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on the multipurpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be a combat support helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi24K helicopter is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3, of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section X, paragraphs 4 to 6, of this Protocol. 34. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to SectionVII or VIII of this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have been certified as unarmed in accordance with the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section X, paragraphs 4 and 5, of this Protocol. 35. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area or within a designated area pursuant to Section VII, VIII or IX of this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be

802  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

opened so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be shrouded. 36. If, during an inspection of an object of verification or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, armaments and equipment declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such armaments and equipment to confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction. If, during an inspection within a designated area pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery declared by the escort team to have been reduced in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery to confirm that they have been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction. 37. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites, or other storage sites containing more than 50 such conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall be limited to 35 mm cameras and to cameras capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. The inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall cooperate with the inspection team’s taking of photographs. 38. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 39. Except as provided for in paragraph 41 of this Section, photography of interiors of structures other than storage sites specified in paragraph 37 of this Section shall be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 40. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections. Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a member of the escort team immediately after they are taken. Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection report. 41. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual information.Whenever inspectors request the escort team to clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision in paragraph 38 of this Section, cooperate with the inspection team’s taking of appropriate photographs using a camera capable of producing instantly developed photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be included in the inspection report in accordance with Section XIV of this Protocol. 42. For inspections conducted pursuant to SectionsVII,VIII and IX of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to have been completed once the inspection report has been signed and countersigned. 43. No later than completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall designate at that time the next inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in SectionVII, paragraphs 6 and 20, and SectionVIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible after completion of the previous inspection. The time-limits specified in SectionVII, paragraph 8, or SectionVIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B),

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  803

of this Protocol, whichever is applicable, shall apply. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection, then the provisions in paragraphs 45 and 46 of this Section shall apply. 44. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of SectionsVII andVIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State Party on which that inspection team has conducted the preceding inspection: (A) At any declared site associated with the same point of entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived; or (B) Within any specified area for which the point of entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; or (C) At any location within 200 kilometres of the preceding inspection site within the same military district; or (D) At the location which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 12, subparagraph (A), of this Protocol, is the temporary location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft which were absent during inspection of an object of verification at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment constitute more than 15 percent of the number of such conventional armaments and equipment notified in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange; or (E) At the declared site which the inspected State Party claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 12, subparagraph (B), of this Protocol, is the site of origin for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft at the preceding inspection site which are in excess of the number provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange as being present at that preceding inspection site, if such conventional armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the number of such conventional armaments and equipment so notified. 45.After completion of an inspection at a declared site or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has been declared, or after completion of an inspection within a designated area, the inspection team shall be transported to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possible and shall depart the territory of the State Party where the inspection was carried out within 24 hours. 46.The inspection team shall leave the territory of the State Party where it has been conducting inspections from the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party has provided the necessary notification in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 1, of this Protocol. 47. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to Section VII and/or VIII of this Protocol, the inspected State Party shall, not later than 72 hours after the departure of the inspection team upon completion of the inspection or inspections, notify all other States Parties of the number of inspections conducted, of the declared sites and objects of verification or specified areas that have been inspected, the State Party covering the cost of each inspection, its remaining passive declared site inspection quota as a total number and the number of inspections to be conducted at the expense of the inspecting State Party. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to Section IX, the State Party on whose territory the inspection was conducted shall notify all other States Parties not later than 72 hours after the departure of the inspection team of the designated area that has been inspected.

804  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

SECTION VII. DECLARED SITE INSPECTION 1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with Section II, paragraphs 7, 25 and 26, of this Protocol. In the case of force majeure the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 1, of this Protocol shall apply. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section. 3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and the inspected State Party has not previously notified a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to SectionV of the Protocol on Information Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, of this Protocol the desired ground border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit.The inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV, paragraph 5, of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the inspected State Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified pursuant to SectionV of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point through which the inspection team and transport crew members may arrive on its territory. 4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using ground transportation means. 5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange as being associated with the declared site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the inspected State Party shall facilitate access to this declared site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8 of this Section. 6.The inspected State Party shall have the right to utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site. 7.At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first declared site to be inspected. 8.The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after designation of that inspection site.Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  805

9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, as defined in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (M), of this Protocol the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site.The diagram of the declared site, provided upon arrival at the declared site, in addition to the elements described in the definition of the declared site, shall contain an accurate depiction of: (A) A reference point within the boundary of the declared site which is accessible within the inspection site, showing its geographic coordinates, rounded up to the nearest 10 seconds, with an indication of true north; (B) The scale used in the site diagram, which should be large enough to allow an accurate depiction of its elements listed in this Section; (C) A clear indication of the perimeter of the declared site and its area in square kilometres; (D) Precisely delineated boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to each object of verification at the declared site, indicating also the relevant formation or unit record number of each object of verification to which each such area belongs and including those separately located areas where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier lookalikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of verification are permanently assigned; (E) The major buildings and roads on the declared site; (F) The entrances to the declared site; (G) The location of the administrative area, medical and mess facilities, and helicopter landing site, if applicable, to be used by the inspection team; and (H) Any additional information deemed useful by the inspected State Party. 10.Within one half-hour after receiving the diagram of the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the object of verification to be inspected. The inspection team shall then be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements: (A) Safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site; (B) Modalities of transportation and communication for inspectors at the inspection site; (C) Holdings and locations at the inspection site, including within the common areas of the declared site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier lookalikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging to separately located subordinate elements belonging to the same object of verification to be inspected; and (D) Information pursuant to Section VI, paragraph 2, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 11. At the discretion of the inspected State Party the pre-inspection briefing may allow for a separate diagram of the area of the object of verification subject to inspection or an elaboration of the declared site diagram to be provided to the inspection team. That diagram shall depict the following elements: (A) All the territory belonging to the declared site with an outline clearly indicating the boundaries of those areas belonging exclusively to the object of verification subject to inspection, including all separately located territory where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and

806  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

armoured vehicle launched bridges belonging to it and present at the inspection site are located; (B) True north; (C) The scale used, which should be large enough to allow an accurate depiction of the elements listed in this Section; (D) All roads and major buildings, highlighting also: (1) The location of all conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty present at the inspection site; (2) Those buildings with doors wider than two metres; and (3) The barracks and mess facilities used by personnel of the object of verification subject to inspection and by all other units located in common areas of the declared site; (E) All entrances to the object of verification subject to inspection, including those permanently or temporarily inaccessible; and (F) Any additional information deemed useful by the inspected State Party. 12. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or combat helicopters present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the following provisions: (A) If the numbers of such conventional armaments and equipment present at the inspection site are less than the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include the temporary location, the date of departure and the expected date of return of such conventional armaments and equipment; and (B) If the numbers of such armaments and equipment present at the inspection site exceed the numbers provided in that most recent notification, such explanation shall include specific information on the origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival and projected stay at the inspection site of such additional conventional armaments and equipment. 13. In addition, the pre-inspection briefing shall include information on the total number of armoured personnel carrier ambulances present at the inspection site. 14. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 44, subparagraph (D), of this Protocol, if the conventional armaments and equipment reported under paragraph 12, subparagraph (A) above, absent from the object of verification constitute more than 30 conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single category, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to visit one of the locations within the territory of the inspected State Party which the inspected State Party claims is the temporary location of such battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters or combat aircraft in order to inspect the armaments and equipment if that location is within 60 kilometres of the inspection site.The travel time shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period. The provision of this paragraph shall not apply when a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling has been exceeded as a result of a military exercise or a temporary deployment when such a location is either in an area notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3 or 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange or in a designated area declared pursuant to Section IX, paragraph 12, of this Protocol. 15. When an inspection team designates an object of verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of verification, to

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  807

inspect all territory delineated on the site diagram as belonging to that object of verification, including those separately located areas on the territory of the same State Party where conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty belonging to that object of verification are permanently assigned. 16. The inspection of one object of verification at a declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the declared site except within those areas delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification which the inspection team has not designated for inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. 17. If the escort team informs the inspection team that battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being held by one object of verification at a declared site are present within an area delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part of the same inspection, has access to such conventional armaments and equipment. 18. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are present within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team to which object of verification such conventional armaments and equipment belong. 19. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if such an accounting is requested by another State Party. 20. If, during an inspection at a declared site, the inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site an inspection of an object of verification that had not been previously designated, the inspection team shall have the right to commence such inspection within three hours of that designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given a briefing on the object of verification designated for the next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 12 of this Section. SECTION VIII. CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHIN A SPECIFIED AREA 1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance with this Protocol. 2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a challenge inspection within a specified area as the first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit: (A) It shall include in its notification pursuant to Section IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit nearest to or within that specified area capable of receiving the inspecting State Party’s chosen means of transportation; and (B) At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the first specified area it wishes to inspect. Declared sites located within the boundaries of a specified area shall not be subject to inspection in accordance with this Section.Whenever a specified area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide to the escort team a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of area.The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect.

808  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

3. The State Party on whose territory a challenge inspection is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that specified area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries. 4.The inspected State Party shall have the right to refuse challenge inspections within specified areas. 5.The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection team within two hours after the designation of a specified area whether the inspection request will be granted. 6. If access to a specified area is granted: (A) The inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the specified area; (B) The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the first specified area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after such an inspection is accepted. Travel time in excess of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team’s in-country period; and (C) The provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. Within such specified area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours the inspection team shall have the right to cancel the inspection.The period of delay shall not count against the in-country period or the maximum time allowed within a specified area. 7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request.The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. 8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this briefing. 9. If access to a specified area is denied: (A) The inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall provide all reasonable assurance that the specified area does not contain conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If such armaments and equipment are present and assigned to organisations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions, the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall allow visual confirmation of their presence, unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as soon as practicable; and (B) No inspection quota shall be counted, and the time between the designation of the specified area and its subsequent refusal shall not count against the in-country period. The inspection team shall have the right to designate another specified area or declared site for inspection or to declare the inspection concluded.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  809

SECTION IX. INSPECTION WITHIN A DESIGNATED AREA 1. An inspection in a designated area shall be in response to the notification of an exceeded territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling as a result of a military exercise or a temporary deployment. Thus, notwithstanding the provisions of Section VI, paragraphs 27, 28 and 29, of this Protocol, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery shall be the subject of this inspection; but observation of combat aircraft and attack helicopters shall be permitted. 2. An inspection within a designated area shall not be refused. Such inspection shall have priority over any inspection notified subsequently to be conducted in the same area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, which shall be carried out after the completion of the inspection within the designated area. In cases of force majeure, the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 1, of this Protocol shall apply. 3.When, as a result of a military exercise: (A) A territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party is exceeded on a temporary basis for more than 21 days, that State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area.The inspection may take place no earlier than seven days after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling was notified to be exceeded and may be conducted no later than seven days following the notification provided pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 5, of the Protocol on Information Exchange; and (B) A territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party continues to be exceeded on a temporary basis for more than 42 days, that exercise shall be considered a temporary deployment and shall be subject to an additional inspection no earlier than 60 days after a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling was notified to be exceeded.Any subsequent inspections shall take place not earlier than day 150 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and thereafter every 90 days. 4. When a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling of a State Party has been temporarily exceeded as a result of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery at or below the level of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery: (A) That State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area not earlier than day 30 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling; (B) If the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a second inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 90 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling; and (C) If the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a third inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 180 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling, and thereafter one additional inspection within a designated area after every 90 days. 5. When a territorial ceiling of a State Party has been temporarily exceeded as a result of temporarily deployed battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or artillery above the level of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery: (A) That State Party shall accept one inspection within a designated area not earlier than day 27 of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling; (B) If the exceeding of the territorial ceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a second inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 75 of the exceeding of the territorial ceiling; and (C) If the exceeding of the territorial ceiling continues, that State Party shall accept a third inspection within a designated area no earlier than day 180 of the exceeding of the territorial

810  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

ceiling and thereafter one additional inspection within a designated area after every 90 days. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 above, if a territorial ceiling is exceeded at or below the levels of 153 battle tanks, 241 armoured combat vehicles or 140 pieces of artillery the armaments and equipment shall not create an inspection obligation pursuant to this Section, if all of these armaments and equipment are properly declared at their actual temporary location on the territory of another State Party in the information exchange pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange and thereafter in each annual information exchange. 7. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in an inspection within a designated area except the State Party whose territorial ceiling or subceiling is temporarily exceeded and the States Parties having conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty on the territory of that State Party.As a general rule, the inspection team shall be multinational. One of the States Parties participating in the inspection team shall assume the responsibilities of the inspecting State Party in accordance with this Protocol. 8. The States Parties intending to participate in an inspection within a designated area shall cooperate in its planning. 9. In the case of inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, subparagraph (A), of this Section the following procedure shall apply: (A) Each State Party interested in participating in an inspection shall notify all other States Parties no later than one day after the date of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling as notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 3, subparagraph (A) or (C), of the Protocol on Information Exchange. If a State Party is interested in assuming the obligations of the inspecting State Party this should be indicated in its notification. Copies of this notification shall be provided simultaneously to all delegations to the Joint Consultative Group and to the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group; (B) Thereafter, the States Parties which have given notification of their interest in participating in an inspection shall consult within one day in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, unless they decide otherwise, to determine: (1) The inspecting State Party; (2) The composition of the inspection team, taking into consideration the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol; and (3) Any other modalities of the inspection which they deem appropriate. 10. In the case of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 or 5 of this Section the following procedure shall apply: (A) Each State Party interested in participating in an inspection pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), or paragraph 5, subparagraph (A), of this Section shall notify all other States Parties no later than nine days after the date of the exceeding of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling as notified pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraph 4, subparagraph (A), of the Protocol on Information Exchange. If a State Party is interested in assuming the obligations of the inspecting State Party this should be indicated in its notification. Copies of this notification shall be provided simultaneously to all delegations to the Joint Consultative Group and to the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group; (B) In the event of consequent inspection pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (B) or (C), or to paragraph 5, subparagraph (B) or (C), or to paragraph 3, subparagraph (B), of this Section, each State Party interested in participating in such an inspection shall notify all other States Parties no later than the nine days prior to the date when the obligation to accept such a consequent inspection is effective;

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  811

(C) Thereafter, the States Parties which have given notification, pursuant to paragraph (A) or (B) above, of their interest in participating in an inspection shall consult within three days in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, unless they decide otherwise, to determine: (1) The inspecting State Party; (2) The composition of the inspection team, taking into consideration the provisions of Section VI, paragraph 5, of this Protocol; and (3) Any other modalities of the inspection which they deem appropriate. 11.An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to this Section shall spend no more than 72 hours within the designated area. 12. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 3, subparagraph (E), of this Protocol, which shall be no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate a designated area it wishes to inspect.Whenever a designated area is designated, the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection request, provide the escort team with a geographic description delineating the outer boundaries of the area. The inspection team shall have the right, as part of that request, to identify any structure or facility it wishes to inspect. 13.The State Party on whose territory an inspection within a designated area is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a designation of a designated area, inform all other States Parties which have forces or utilise structures or premises by agreement with the inspected State Party of that designated area, including its geographic description delineating the outer boundaries. (A) The inspected State Party shall have the right to use up to six hours after the designation of the designated area to prepare for the inspection; (B) The inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team travels to the designated area by the most expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible after the designation of the site to be inspected, but no later than nine hours after the designation of the designated area, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is difficult. In such cases, the inspection team shall be transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours after the designation of the site to be inspected. 14. On arrival at the designated area the inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility and shall be provided with a map (scale no larger than 1:250,000) and a geographic description of the designated area, to include declared site locations, areas in which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty and subject to this inspection are deployed and their estimated numbers, helicopter landing sites and the location of the briefing facility and the administrative area for the inspectors. 15.Within one half-hour after arrival at the briefing facility in the designated area the inspection team shall be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last no more than one hour and shall include the following elements: (A) Safety and administrative procedures at the inspection site; (B) Modalities of transportation, helicopter landing sites and communication for inspectors at the inspection site; (C) The latest available information on the total numbers, by States Parties, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery actually present on the territory of the inspected State Party or a territory with a subceiling, as follows: (1) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or its territory with a subceiling and actually present;

812  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

(2) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or its territory with a subceiling, but actually present and within the corresponding territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling; (3) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party or territory with a subceiling but actually present in excess of the corresponding territorial ceiling or territorial subceiling. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles or pieces of artillery actually present in excess of a territorial ceiling or a territorial subceiling and the corresponding numbers provided pursuant to Section XVIII, paragraphs 3 or 4, of the Protocol on Information Exchange; (D) The latest available information on the total numbers, by States Parties, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery actually present in the designated area, as follows: (1) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations within the designated area and actually present in the designated area; (2) Declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party that are not within the designated area, but actually present in the designated area; (3) Not declared in the annual information exchange at locations on the territory of the inspected State Party but actually present in the designated area; (E) The latest available information on the holdings at each declared site within the designated area of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery notified as of 1 January, reflecting any updating notification, and actually present; and (F) Additional information that might facilitate the inspection team to conduct the inspection. 16.After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall declare the plan for the conduct of the inspection. This is without prejudice to the right of the inspection team to alter the initially declared plan in the course of the inspection. 17. During the inspection the inspection team may be provided with additional information to include briefings, charts and maps in order to facilitate the conduct of the inspection. 18. In the event that the inspection team wishes to inspect a declared site, the escort team shall, at the request of the inspection team, provide for a briefing about that declared site. 19.Within the designated area the escort team may delay access to or overflight of particular parts of that designated area. If the delay exceeds more than four hours, the time of delay in excess of four hours shall not count against the maximum time allowed within the designated area. 20. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or premises which another State Party utilises by agreement with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. SECTION X. INSPECTION OF CERTIFICATION 1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect, without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  813

Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each certification site. 2. In conducting an inspection of certification in accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to spend up to two days at a certification site, unless otherwise agreed. 3. No less than 15 days before the certification of recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide to all other States Parties notification of: (A) The site at which the certification is to take place, including geographic coordinates; (B) The scheduled dates of the certification process; (C) The estimated number and type, model or version of helicopters or aircraft to be certified; (D) The manufacturer’s serial number for each helicopter or aircraft; (E) The unit or location to which the helicopters or aircraft were previously assigned; (F) The unit or location to which the certified helicopters or aircraft will be assigned in the future; (G) The point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team; and (H) The date and time by which an inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the certification. 4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to include checking the manufacturer’s serial number, without right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification. 5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels covering the position from which components and wiring were removed in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. 6. Inspectors shall have the right to request and observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the certification, the activation of any weapon system component in multi-purpose attack helicopters being certified or declared to have been recategorised. 7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification, the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XIV of this Protocol. 8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another certification site or at a reduction site if the appropriate notification has been provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3, of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time. 9. Within seven days after completion of the certification, the State Party responsible for the certification shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the certification. Such notification shall specify the number, types, models or versions and manufacturer’s serial numbers of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site involved, the actual dates of

814  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

the certification, and the units or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or reclassified aircraft will be assigned. SECTION XI. INSPECTION OF REDUCTION 1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant to Sections I toVIII and X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Such inspections shall not count against the quotas established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such inspections may be composed of representatives of different States Parties.The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each reduction site. 2. The inspected State Party shall have the right to organise and implement the process of reduction subject only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the implementation of the process of reduction. 3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be conducted in accordance with schedules of such use provided by each State Party using the reduction site. 4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify all other States Parties which conventional armaments and equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no less than 30 days.This provision shall apply whenever reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a continuous or intermittent basis. 5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period notification. Such notification shall include the designation of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled date for completion of the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment identified for reduction during the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification shall identify: (A) The estimated number and type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced; (B) The object or objects of verification from which the items to be reduced have been withdrawn; (C) The reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced; (D) The point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection of reduction notified for that calendar reporting period; and (E) The date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the conventional armaments and equipment before the initiation of their reduction. 6. Except as specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from a reduction site at any time during the calendar reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the inspection team shall have the right to remain at the reduction site throughout one or more

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  815

calendar reporting periods provided that these periods are not separated by more than three days.Throughout the period that the inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction. 7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely record factory serial numbers from the conventional armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special marks on such equipment before reduction and to record subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced conventional armaments and equipment as specified in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Protocol on Reduction or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for non-military purposes shall be available for inspection for at least three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been completed earlier. 8.The State Party engaged in the process of reducing conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed.This register shall also include aggregate data for each calendar reporting period.The register shall be made available to the inspection team for the period of inspection. 9. At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader and a representative of the inspected State Party.The provisions of Section XIV of this Protocol shall apply. 10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a certification site if the appropriate notification has been provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 4, of this Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of its intended departure from the reduction site and, if appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another reduction site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the intended departure time. 11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10 inspections each year to validate the completion of conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into vehicles for nonmilitary purposes pursuant to SectionVIII of the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section with the following exceptions: (A) The notification pursuant to paragraph 5, subparagraph (E), of this Section shall identify only the date and time by which an inspection team must arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the armaments and equipment at the completion of their conversion into vehicles for non-military purposes; and (B) The inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart from the reduction site only during the three days beyond the end of the notified completion date of conversion. 12.Within seven days after the completion of the process of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of reduction for that period. Such notification shall specify the number and types of conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall also specify the location at which such conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to

816  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the notification shall specify the reduction site at which final conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which each item designated for conversion will be transferred. SECTION XII. DISPOSAL OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN EXCESS OF REDUCTION LIABILITIES THROUGH DESTRUCTION/MODIFICATION 1. Each State Party intending to carry out disposal of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in excess of reduction liabilities through destruction/modification shall provide notification to all other States Parties no later than 15 days before the initiation of disposal. Such notification shall include information on the designation of the disposal site with geographic coordinates, the scheduled dates for initiation and for completion of the disposal, the estimated number and type of each item of equipment to be destroyed/modified, the method of destruction/modification, the suggested way of confirming the results of the process of destruction/modification as specified in paragraphs 4 and 11 of this Section. 2. The State Party which carried out a disposal through destruction/modification shall provide notification to all other States Parties no later than seven days after the completion of the disposal. Such notification shall specify the designation of the disposal site with geographic coordinates, the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the disposal process, the number of armaments and equipment disposed of, including the type and factory serial numbers of each item of equipment disposed of, and the method of destruction/modification. 3. Each State Party which carries out disposal shall provide for the confirmation of the results of the disposal, either by: (A) Inviting an observation team in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section, or (B) The use of cooperative measures in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 11 of this Section for the destruction of conventional armaments and equipment under procedures that provide sufficient visible evidence which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. 4. Each State Party which carries out a disposal shall have the right to choose one of the following modalities for an observation visit in the case of disposal of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters in excess of reduction liabilities through destruction/modification: (A) An immediate observation visit at the time of completion of each disposal process; (B) Postponed observation visit to cover two or more disposal processes which took place within 90 days after a notification pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section has been issued. In this case the State Party which carried out disposal through destruction/modification shall retain the destroyed/modified armaments and equipment from all disposal processes until the date of the observation visit; (C) Invitation of an observation team to conduct an inspection to observe the disposal. Such an inspection shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, except as provided for in this Section, and shall not count as an inspection under any of the quotas established under Section II of this Protocol. Only the disposed armaments and equipment notified pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section shall be subject to such an inspection. 5. In the case of an observation visit the specified time for the observation visit and the point of entry/exit to be used by the observation team shall be included in the notification pursuant

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  817

to paragraph 1 of this Section.The observation team shall arrive at or depart from a disposal site during the period of time specified by the inviting State Party. 6. The State Party that intends to conduct an observation visit shall notify the inviting State Party no less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the observation team at the suggested point of entry/exit. Such notification shall include: (A) The point of entry/exit to be used; (B) The estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (C) The means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; (D) The language to be used by the observation team, which shall be a language designated in accordance with Section III, paragraph 12, of this Protocol; (E) The full names of observers and transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth, nationality and passport number. Unless otherwise agreed the observers and transport crew members shall be drawn from the lists of inspectors and transport crew members, provided pursuant to Section III, paragraph 6, of this Protocol. 7. The State Party receiving the notification of an intended observation visit will, upon its receipt, send copies of such notification to all other States Parties. 8. The State Party which carries out disposal will provide an opportunity for observation of the final results of the process of disposal through destruction/modification by the observation team. During the observation visit, the observation team shall have the right to record the factory serial numbers of each item of equipment that has been destroyed/modified. 9. An observation visit and inspections pursuant to paragraph 4, subparagraph (C), of this Section shall be conducted at the expense of the observing State Party.The modalities for such payment will be decided on by the Joint Consultative Group. 10. Without delay the observing State Party shall inform all other States Parties about the results of the visit. 11. In the case of cooperative measures for the provision of sufficient visible evidence of the destruction of conventional armaments and equipment, the following procedures shall apply: (A) Each item of equipment to be disposed of shall be displayed in complete assembly in a clearly delineated area where the disposal is to take place, no later than 14 days before the initiation of the actual destruction; and (B) After destruction, the parts of each complete assembly shall be displayed in the same delineated area for a period of 14 days after the completion of the actual destruction. SECTION XIII. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS 1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 7, of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, of this Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled. 2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the designated inspection site within the time specified in Section VI, paragraph 43, or Section VII, paragraph 8, or Section VIII, paragraph 6, subparagraph (B), or Section IX, paragraph 12, of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection pursuant to SectionVII orVIII is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted against any quotas provided for in the Treaty.

818  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

SECTION XIV. INSPECTION REPORTS 1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in accordance with Section VII,VIII, IX, X or XI of this Protocol, and before leaving the inspection site: (A) The inspection team shall provide the escort team with a written report; and (B) The escort team shall have the right to include its written comments in the inspection report and shall countersign the report within one hour after having received the report from the inspection team, unless an extension has been agreed between the inspection team and the escort team. 2. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of the escort team. 3. The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint Consultative Group. 4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include: (A) The inspection site; (B) The date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site; (C) The date and time of departure of the inspection team from the inspection site; and (D) The number and type, model or version of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that were observed during the inspection, including, if appropriate, an indication of the object of verification to which they belonged. 5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Section IX of this Protocol shall include: (A) The designated area defined by geographic coordinates; (B) The date and time of arrival of the inspection team at the designated area; (C) The date and time of departure of the inspection team from the designated area; (D) The number and type, model or version of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery that were observed during the inspection as a total and by States Parties. 6. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to Sections X and XI of this Protocol shall include: (A) The reduction or certification site at which the reduction or certification procedures were carried out; (B) The dates the inspection team was present at the site; (C) The number and type, model or version of conventional armaments and equipment for which the reduction or certification procedures were observed; (D) A list of any serial numbers recorded during the inspections; (E) In the case of reductions, the particular reduction procedures applied or observed; and (F) In the case of reductions, if an inspection team was present at the reduction site throughout the calendar reporting period, the actual dates on which the reduction procedures were initiated and completed. 7.The inspection report shall be written in the official language of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G), or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F), of this Protocol.

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  819

8. The inspecting State Party and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of the report.The inspecting State Party shall make the inspection report available to each State Party upon request. 9.Any State Party whose conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty have been inspected shall in particular: (A) Have the right to include written comments related to the inspection of its conventional armed forces; and (B) Retain one copy of the inspection report in the case of inspection of its conventional armed forces. SECTION XV. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND TRANSPORT CREW MEMBERS 1.To exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29; Article 30, paragraph 2;Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. 2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party. 3. The transportation means of the inspection team shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty. 4.The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew members in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.The immunity of inspectors and transport crew members who are not nationals of the inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States Parties of which those inspectors are nationals.Waiver must always be express. 5.The privileges and immunities provided for in this Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew members: (A) While transiting through the territory of any State Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on the territory of another State Party; (B) Throughout their presence on the territory of the State Party where the inspection is carried out; and (C) Thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or transport crew member. 6. If the inspected State Party considers that an inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in Section VI, paragraph 9 of this Protocol shall apply.At the request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.” Article 28 1. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 3 shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

820  THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY

“3.The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular sessions to be held two times per year, unless it decides otherwise.” 2. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 11 shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “11.The scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the Joint Consultative Group, as follows: 10.73% for the French Republic, for the Federal Republic of Germany, for the Italian Republic, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and for the United States of America; 9.00% for the Russian Federation; 6.49% for Canada; 5.15% for the Kingdom of Spain; 4.23% for the Kingdom of Belgium and for the Kingdom of the Netherlands; 2.47% for the Kingdom of Denmark and for the Kingdom of Norway; 1.75% for Ukraine; 1.72% for the Republic of Poland; 1.20% for the Republic of Turkey; 0.84% for the Hellenic Republic, for the Republic of Hungary and for Romania; 0.81% for the Czech Republic; 0.70% for the Republic of Belarus; 0.67% for the Republic of Bulgaria, for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and for the Portuguese Republic; 0.40% for the Slovak Republic; 0.20% for the Republic of Armenia, for the Republic of Azerbaijan, for Georgia, for the Republic of Iceland, for the Republic of Kazakhstan and for the Republic of Moldova.” 3. In the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, paragraph 12 shall be deleted. Article 29 The Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe shall be repealed. Article 30 1. Changes to maximum levels for holdings, notified under the provisions of the Treaty during the period between signature and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Agreement on Adaptation, shall also be considered changes to the levels specified in the Protocol on National Ceilings and, if the State Party concerned so requests, to the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings, provided that: (A) Such changes are consistent with the limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article V, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the Treaty, and (B) The numerical limits set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the

THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

IN

EUROPE TREATY  821

Treaty are applied in proportion to the time that has elapsed between signature and entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation. 2. In the case where such changes would require the consent of all other States Parties as set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the Treaty, such changes shall be considered changes to the levels specified in the Protocol on National Ceilings, provided that no State Party provides a written objection to such changes within 60 days of entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 and 2 of this Article, notified changes shall not be considered changes to the Protocol on National Ceilings and the Protocol on Territorial Ceilings where a State Party is notifying a unilateral decrease in its maximum levels for holdings, unless that State Party so requests. Article 31 1.This Agreement on Adaptation shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures. 2. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Depositary. 3. This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form. 4. Upon entry into force of this Agreement on Adaptation, the numerical levels set forth in Article IV, paragraph 4, and Article V, paragraph 5, of the Treaty shall be reduced in proportion to the time remaining between the date of entry into force and the next review conference pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 1. 5.The original of this Agreement on Adaptation, of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Agreement on Adaptation shall be transmitted by the Depositary to all States Parties. 6.This Agreement on Adaptation shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. In witness thereof, the undersigned duly authorised have signed this Agreement on Adaptation. Done at Istanbul, this nineteenth day of November nineteen hundred and ninety-nine, in the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish languages. 19 November 1999

23

The Open Skies Treaty SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he idea of the Open Skies Treaty dates back to the Quadripartite (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and France) Summit Conference in Geneva in July 1955. In a speech to the conference, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to permit aerial reconnaissance flights over each other’s territory.This was in the days prior to the development of photographic reconnaissance satellites.When President Eisenhower made his proposal, the lights suddenly went out in the conference hall. Despite the accidental theatrics, the Soviets rejected Eisenhower’s proposal, claiming that the overflights could be used for extensive spying. The idea lay largely dormant for a generation, before being revived by President George H.W. Bush in 1989. Negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact began in Ottawa in February 1990. Other neutral members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) attended as observers. Talks continued until April 1990 but no conclusive agreement was reached.The negotiations resumed in Vienna in 1991, and the treaty was signed in Helsinki on March 24, 1992.The agreement was thought to be a useful adjunct to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regime, given the amount of Soviet equipment taken over the Ural Mountains (see Chapter 22). The treaty entered into force sixty days after the deposit of twenty instruments of ratification, including all states with a passive quota (see below) of eight or more (Belarus, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States). Twenty-seven states signed the treaty and all but Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgystan ratified it reasonably promptly. The United States ratified in 1993. However, for years entry into force was delayed by the fact that Belarus and Russia had not ratified. Because they signed the treaty together and share a passive quota of forty-two, they were necessary parties. Both concluded ratification proceedings in 2001 and deposited their instruments of ratification in the fall of that year.The Open Skies Treaty formally entered into force on January 11, 2002, forty-seven years after it was first proposed by President Eisenhower. The treaty will now undergo a three-year, phased implementation period. During this period restrictions will be placed on sensors the parties may use for observation flights, and the passive quotas will be reduced by 25 percent. After this initial period, full passive quotas apply, and all sensor types allowed by the treaty can be used. The sensor types permitted by the treaty for observation flights are as follows (with the resolution indicated):

T

 optical panoramic and framing cameras (30 cm);  video cameras (30 cm);

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  823  infrared line scanning devices (50 cm); and  sideways-looking synthetic aperture radars (3 m).

Each state party is allocated an “active” quota of observation flights that it may conduct over the territory of other states and a “passive” quota of observation flights that it must accept over its own territory.A party’s passive quota is loosely determined by its geographic size, and each state party is authorized to conduct an equal number of overflights over any states that overfly it. A state party’s active quota cannot exceed its passive quota, and a single state party cannot request more than half of another state’s passive quota. Passive quotas of the parties are as follows: Belarus and Russia together, 42; the United States, 42; Canada, 12; France, 12; Germany, 12; Italy, 12;Turkey, 12; Ukraine, 12; and the United Kingdom, 12. An observing state party must provide at least seventy-two hours’ advance notice to the host.The host country has twenty-four hours to acknowledge the request and to inform the observing party whether it may use its own observation plane or whether it must use a plane supplied by the host. At least twenty-four hours before the flight the observing party must supply its flight plan, which the host has four hours to review, and it can only be changed by the host upon request for safety and logistical reasons.The observing party must complete the mission within ninety-six hours of arriving in the country, and a copy of the data resulting from the overflight must be provided to the host. The treaty also lays out the standards for aircrafts used for the observation flights, and all aircraft must pass certification procedures. Provisional application of the treaty began upon signature and was extended several times. The parties have conducted a large number of joint training exercises over the years. For example, in July 2000, Russia did an overflight of the United States (accompanied by two German representatives); the United States overflew Slovenia in August 2000 (accompanied by representatives from Germany, France, Italy, Croatia, Czech Republic, and Hungary); the United States and Canada overflew Ukraine in September 2000; and Ukraine overflew the United States in September 2000. The Open Skies Consultative Commission is the implementing body for the treaty and meets three times a year.

TREATY

ON

OPEN SKIES

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to collectively as the States Parties or individually as a State Party, Recalling the commitments they have made in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to promoting greater openness and transparency in their military activities and to enhancing security by means of confidence- and security-building measures, Welcoming the historic events in Europe which have transformed the security situation from Vancouver to Vladivostok, Wishing to contribute to the further development and strengthening of peace, stability and cooperative security in that area by the creation of an Open Skies regime for aerial observation, Recognizing the potential contribution which an aerial observation regime of this type could make to security and stability in other regions as well, Noting the possibility of employing such a regime to improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to

824  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in other relevant international institutions, Envisaging the possible extension of the Open Skies regime into additional fields, such as the protection of the environment, Seeking to establish agreed procedures to provide for aerial observation of all the territories of States Parties, with the intent of observing a single State Party or groups of States Parties, on the basis of equity and effectiveness while maintaining flight safety, Noting that the operation of such an Open Skies regime will be without prejudice to States not participating in it, Have agreed as follows: Article I. General Provisions 1. This Treaty establishes the regime, to be known as the Open Skies regime, for the conduct of observation flights by States Parties over the territories of other States Parties, and sets forth the rights and obligations of the States Parties relating thereto. 2. Each of the Annexes and their related Appendices constitutes an integral part of this Treaty. Article II. Definitions For the purposes of this Treaty: 1.The term “observed Party” means the State Party or group of States Parties over whose territory an observation flight is conducted or is intended to be conducted, from the time it has received notification thereof from an observing Party until completion of the procedures relating to that flight, or personnel acting on behalf of that State Party or group of States Parties. 2. The term “observing Party” means the State Party or group of States Parties that intends to conduct or conducts an observation flight over the territory of another State Party or group of States Parties, from the time that it has provided notification of its intention to conduct an observation flight until completion of the procedures relating to that flight, or personnel acting on behalf of that State Party or group of States Parties. 3.The term “group of States Parties” means two or more States Parties that have agreed to form a group for the purposes of this Treaty. 4.The term “observation aircraft” means an unarmed, fixed wing aircraft designated to make observation flights, registered by the relevant authorities of a State Party and equipped with agreed sensors. The term “unarmed” means that the observation aircraft used for the purposes of this Treaty is not equipped to carry and employ weapons. 5. The term “observation flight” means the flight of the observation aircraft conducted by an observing Party over the territory of an observed Party, as provided in the flight plan, from the point of entry or Open Skies airfield to the point of exit or Open Skies airfield. 6.The term “transit flight” means a flight of an observation aircraft or transport aircraft conducted by or on behalf of an observing Party over the territory of a third State Party enroute to or from the territory of the observed Party. 7.The term “transport aircraft” means an aircraft other than an observation aircraft that, on behalf of the observing Party, conducts flights to or from the territory of the observed Party exclusively for the purposes of this Treaty. 8.The term “territory” means the land, including islands, and internal and territorial waters, over which a State Party exercises sovereignty.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  825

9.The term “passive quota” means the number of observation flights that each State Party is obliged to accept as an observed Party. 10.The term “active quota” means the number of observation flights that each State Party has the right to conduct as an observing Party. 11. The term “maximum flight distance” means the maximum distance over the territory of the observed Party from the point at which the observation flight may commence to the point at which that flight may terminate, as specified in Annex A to this Treaty. 12. The term “sensor” means equipment of a category specified in Article IV, paragraph 1 that is installed on an observation aircraft for use during the conduct of observation flights. 13. The term “ground resolution” means the minimum distance on the ground between two closely located objects distinguishable as separate objects. 14.The term “infra-red line-scanning device” means a sensor capable of receiving and visualizing thermal electro-magnetic radiation emitted in the invisible infra-red part of the optical spectrum by objects due to their temperature and in the absence of artificial illumination. 15.The term “observation period” means a specified period of time during an observation flight when a particular sensor installed on the observation aircraft is operating. 16.The term “flight crew” means individuals from any State Party who may include, if the State Party so decides, interpreters and who perform duties associated with the operation or servicing of an observation aircraft or transport aircraft. 17.The term “pilot-in-command” means the pilot on board the observation aircraft who is responsible for the operation of the observation aircraft, the execution of the flight plan, and the safety of the observation aircraft. 18.The term “flight monitor” means an individual who, on behalf of the observed Party, is on board an observation aircraft provided by the observing Party during the observation flight and who performs duties in accordance with Annex G to this Treaty. 19.The term “flight representative” means an individual who, on behalf of the observing Party, is on board an observation aircraft provided by the observed Party during an observation flight and who performs duties in accordance with Annex G to this Treaty. 20.The term “representative” means an individual who has been designated by the observing Party and who performs activities on behalf of the observing Party in accordance with Annex G during an observation flight on an observation aircraft designated by a State Party other than the observing Party or the observed Party. 21. The term “sensor operator” means an individual from any State Party who performs duties associated with the functioning, operation and maintenance of the sensors of an observation aircraft. 22.The term “inspector” means an individual from any State Party who conducts an inspection of sensors or observation aircraft of another State Party. 23.The term “escort” means an individual from any State Party who accompanies the inspectors of another State Party. 24.The term “mission plan” means a document, which is in a format established by the Open Skies Consultative Commission, presented by the observing Party that contains the route, profile, order of execution and support required to conduct the observation flight, which is to be agreed upon with the observed Party and which will form the basis for the elaboration of the flight plan. 25.The term “flight plan” means a document elaborated on the basis of the agreed mission plan in the format and with the content specified by the International Civil Aviation Organization,

826  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

hereinafter referred to as the ICAO, which is presented to the air traffic control authorities and on the basis of which the observation flight will be conducted. 26.The term “mission report” means a document describing an observation flight completed after its termination by the observing Party and signed by both the observing and observed Parties, which is in a format established by the Open Skies Consultative Commission. 27.The term “Open Skies airfield” means an airfield designated by the observed Party as a point where an observation flight may commence or terminate. 28. The term “point of entry” means a point designated by the observed Party for the arrival of personnel of the observing Party on the territory of the observed Party. 29. The term “point of exit” means a point designated by the observed Party for departure of personnel of the observing Party from the territory of the observed Party. 30. The term “refuelling airfield” means an airfield designated by the observed Party used for fuelling and servicing of observation aircraft and transport aircraft. 31.The term “alternate airfield” means an airfield specified in the flight plan to which an observation aircraft or transport aircraft may proceed when it becomes inadvisable to land at the airfield of intended landing. 32. The term “hazardous airspace” means the prohibited areas, restricted areas and danger areas, defined on the basis of Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, that are established in accordance with Annex 15 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in the interests of flight safety, public safety and environmental protection and about which information is provided in accordance with ICAO provisions. 33.The term “prohibited area” means an airspace of defined dimensions, above the territory of a State Party, within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited. 34. The term “restricted area” means an airspace of defined dimensions, above the territory of a State Party, within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with specified conditions. 35. The term “danger area” means an airspace of defined dimensions within which activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specified times. Article III. Quotas Section I. General Provisions 1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct observation flights in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept observation flights over its territory in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct a number of observation flights over the territory of any other State Party equal to the number of observation flights which that other State Party has the right to conduct over it. 4.The total number of observation flights that each State Party is obliged to accept over its territory is the total passive quota for that State Party.The allocation of the total passive quota to the States Parties is set forth in Annex A, Section I to this Treaty. 5.The number of observation flights that a State Party shall have the right to conduct each year over the territory of each of the other States Parties is the individual active quota of that State Party with respect to that other State Party.The sum of the individual active quotas is the total active quota of that State Party.The total active quota of a State Party shall not exceed its total passive quota.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  827

6.The first distribution of active quotas is set forth in Annex A, Section II to this Treaty. 7.After entry into force of this Treaty, the distribution of active quotas shall be subject to an annual review for the following calendar year within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission. In the event that it is not possible during the annual review to arrive within three weeks at agreement on the distribution of active quotas with respect to a particular State Party, the previous year’s distribution of active quotas with respect to that State Party shall remain unchanged. 8. Except as provided for by the provisions of Article VIII, each observation flight conducted by a State Party shall be counted against the individual and total active quotas of that State Party. 9. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Section, a State Party to which an active quota has been distributed may, by agreement with the State Party to be overflown, transfer a part or all of its total active quota to other States Parties and shall promptly notify all other States Parties and the Open Skies Consultative Commission thereof. Paragraph 10 of this Section shall apply. 10. No State Party shall conduct more observation flights over the territory of another State Party than a number equal to 50 percent, rounded up to the nearest whole number, of its own total active quota, or of the total passive quota of that other State Party, whichever is less. 11.The maximum flight distances of observation flights over the territories of the States Parties are set forth in Annex A, Section III to this Treaty. Section II. Provisions for a Group of States Parties 1. A.Without prejudice to their rights and obligations under this Treaty, two or more States Parties which hold quotas may form a group of States Parties at signature of this Treaty and thereafter. For a group of States Parties formed after signature of this Treaty, the provisions of this Section shall apply no earlier than six months after giving notice to all other States Parties, and subject to the provisions of paragraph 6 of this Section. B. A group of States Parties shall co-operate with regard to active and passive quotas in accordance with the provisions of either paragraph 2 or 3 of this Section. 2. A. The members of a group of States Parties shall have the right to redistribute amongst themselves their active quotas for the current year, while retaining their individual passive quotas. Notification of the redistribution shall be made immediately to all third States Parties concerned. B. An observation flight shall count as many observation flights against the individual and total active quotas of the observing Party as observed Parties belonging to the group are overflown. It shall count one observation flight against the total passive quota of each observed Party. C. Each State Party in respect of which one or more members of a group of States Parties hold active quotas shall have the right to conduct over the territory of any member of the group 50 percent more observation flights, rounded up to the nearest whole number, than its individual active quota in respect of that member of the group or to conduct two such overflights if it holds no active quota in respect of that member of the group. D. In the event that it exercises this right the State Party concerned shall reduce its active quotas in respect of other members of the group in such a way that the total sum of observation flights it conducts over their territories shall not exceed the sum of the individual active quotas that the State Party holds in respect of all the members of the group in the current year. E.The maximum flight distances of observation flights over the territories of each member of the group shall apply. In case of an observation flight conducted over several members, after completion of the maximum flight distance for one member all sensors shall be switched off until the observation aircraft reaches the point over the territory of the next member of the

828  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

group of States Parties where the observation flight is planned to begin. For such follow-on observation flight the maximum flight distance related to the Open Skies airfield nearest to this point shall apply. 3.A. group of States Parties shall, at its request, be entitled to a common total passive quota which shall be allocated to it and common individual and total active quotas shall be distributed in respect of it. B. In this case, the total passive quota is the total number of observation flights that the group of States Parties is obliged to accept each year.The total active quota is the sum of the number of observation flights that the group of States Parties has the right to conduct each year. Its total active quota shall not exceed the total passive quota. C.An observation flight resulting from the total active quota of the group of States Parties shall be carried out on behalf of the group. D. Observation flights that a group of States Parties is obliged to accept may be conducted over the territory of one or more of its members. E.The maximum flight distances of each group of States Parties shall be specified pursuant to Annex A, Section III and Open Skies airfields shall be designated pursuant to Annex E to this Treaty. 4. In accordance with the general principles set out in Article X, paragraph 3, any third State Party that considers its rights under the provisions of Section I, paragraph 3 of this Article to be unduly restricted by the operation of a group of States Parties may raise this problem before the Open Skies Consultative Commission. 5.The group of States Parties shall ensure that procedures are established allowing for the conduct of observation flights over the territories of its members during one single mission, including refuelling if necessary. In the case of a group of States Parties established pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, such observation flights shall not exceed the maximum flight distance applicable to the Open Skies airfields at which the observation flights commence. 6. No earlier than six months after notification of the decision has been provided to all other States Parties: A. a group of States Parties established pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section may be transformed into a group of States Parties pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Section; B. a group of States Parties established pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Section may be transformed into a group of States Parties pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section; C. a State Party may withdraw from a group of States Parties; or D. a group of States Parties may admit further States Parties which hold quotas. 7. Following entry into force of this Treaty, changes in the allocation or distribution of quotas resulting from the establishment of or an admission to or a withdrawal from a group of States Parties according to paragraph 3 of this Section shall become effective on 1 January following the first annual review within the Open Skies Consultative Commission occurring after the six-month notification period. When necessary, new Open Skies airfields shall be designated and maximum flight distances established accordingly. Article IV. Sensors 1. Except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, observation aircraft shall be equipped with sensors only from amongst the following categories:

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  829

A. optical panoramic and framing cameras; B. video cameras with real-time display; C. infra-red line-scanning devices; and D. sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar. 2. A State Party may use, for the purposes of conducting observation flights, any of the sensors specified in paragraph 1 above, provided that such sensors are commercially available to all States Parties, subject to the following performance limits: A. in the case of optical panoramic and framing cameras, a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimetres at the minimum height above ground level determined in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, Appendix 1, obtained from no more than one panoramic camera, one vertically-mounted framing camera and two obliquely-mounted framing cameras, one on each side of the aircraft, providing coverage, which need not be continuous, of the ground up to 50 kilometres of each side of the flight path of the aircraft; B. in the case of video cameras, a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimetres determined in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, Appendix 1; C. in the case of infra-red line-scanning devices, a ground resolution of no better than 50 centimetres at the minimum height above ground level determined in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, Appendix 1, obtained from a single device; and D. in the case of sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, a ground resolution of no better than three metres calculated by the impulse response method, which, using the object separation method, corresponds to the ability to distinguish on a radar image two corner reflectors, the distance between the centres of which is no less than five metres, over a swath width of no more than 25 kilometres, obtained from a single radar unit capable of looking from either side of the aircraft, but not both simultaneously. 3. The introduction of additional categories and improvements to the capabilities of existing categories of sensors provided for in this Article shall be addressed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission pursuant to Article X of this Treaty. 4. All sensors shall be provided with aperture covers or other devices which inhibit the operation of sensors so as to prevent collection of data during transit flights or flights to points of entry or from points of exit over the territory of the observed Party. Such covers or such other devices shall be removable or operable only from outside the observation aircraft. 5. Equipment that is capable of annotating data collected by sensors in accordance with Annex B, Section II shall be allowed on observation aircraft. The State Party providing the observation aircraft for an observation flight shall annotate the data collected by sensors with the information provided for in Annex B, Section II to this Treaty. 6. Equipment that is capable of displaying data collected by sensors in real-time shall be allowed on observation aircraft for the purposes of monitoring the functioning and operation of the sensors during the conduct of an observation flight. 7. Except as required for the operation of the agreed sensors, or as required for the operation of the observation aircraft, or as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, the collection, processing, retransmission or recording of electronic signals from electro-magnetic waves are prohibited on board the observation aircraft and equipment for such operations shall not be on that observation aircraft. 8. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by, the observing Party, the observing Party shall have the right to use an observation aircraft equipped with sensors in each sensor category that do not exceed the capability specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.

830  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

9. In the event that the observation aircraft used for an observation flight is provided by the observed Party, the observed Party shall be obliged to provide an observation aircraft equipped with sensors from each sensor category specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, at the maximum capability and in the numbers specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, subject to the provisions of Article XVIII, Section II, unless otherwise agreed by the observing and observed Parties. The package and configuration of such sensors shall be installed in such a way so as to provide coverage of the ground provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the latter shall provide a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar with a ground resolution of no worse than six metres, determined by the object separation method. 10.When designating an aircraft as an observation aircraft pursuant to Article V of this Treaty, each State Party shall inform all other States Parties of the technical information on each sensor installed on such aircraft as provided for in Annex B to this Treaty. 11. Each State Party shall have the right to take part in the certification of sensors installed on observation aircraft in accordance with the provisions of Annex D. No observation aircraft of a given type shall be used for observation flights until such type of observation aircraft and its sensors has been certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to this Treaty. 12. A State Party designating an aircraft as an observation aircraft shall, upon 90-day prior notice to all other States Parties and subject to the provisions of Annex D to this Treaty, have the right to remove, replace or add sensors, or amend the technical information it has provided in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of this Article and Annex B to this Treaty. Replacement and additional sensors shall be subject to certification in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to this Treaty prior to their use during an observation flight. 13. In the event that a State Party or group of States Parties, based on experience with using a particular observation aircraft, considers that any sensor or its associated equipment installed on an aircraft does not correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, the interested States Parties shall notify all other States Parties of their concern. The State Party that designated the aircraft shall: A. take the steps necessary to ensure that the sensor and its associated equipment installed on the observation aircraft correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, including, as necessary, repair, adjustment or replacement of the particular sensor or its associated equipment; and B. at the request of an interested State Party, by means of a demonstration flight set up in connection with the next time that the aforementioned observation aircraft is used, in accordance with the provisions of Annex F, demonstrate that the sensor and its associated equipment installed on the observation aircraft correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex O. Other States Parties that express concern regarding a sensor and its associated equipment installed on an observation aircraft shall have the right to send personnel to participate in such a demonstration flight. 14. In the event that, after the steps referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article have been taken, the States Parties remain concerned as to whether a sensor or its associated equipment installed on an observation aircraft correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D, the issue may be referred to the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Article V. Aircraft Designation 1. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as observation aircraft one or more types or models of aircraft registered by the relevant authorities of a State Party. 2. Each State Party shall have the right to designate types or models of aircraft as observation aircraft or add new types or models of aircraft to those designated earlier by it, provided that it notifies all

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  831

other States Parties 30 days in advance thereof.The notification of the designation of aircraft of a type or model shall contain the information specified in Annex C to this Treaty. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to delete types or models of aircraft designated earlier by it, provided that it notifies all other States Parties 90 days in advance thereof. 4. Only one exemplar of a particular type and model of aircraft with an identical set of associated sensors shall be required to be offered for certification in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to this Treaty. 5. Each observation aircraft shall be capable of carrying the flight crew and the personnel specified in Article VI, Section III. Article VI. Choice of Observation Aircraft, General Provisions for the Conduct of Observation Flights, and Requirements for Mission Planning Section I. Choice of Observation Aircraft and General Provisions for the Conduct of Observation Flights 1. Observation flights shall be conducted using observation aircraft that have been designated by a State Party pursuant to Article V. Unless the observed Party exercises its right to provide an observation aircraft that it has itself designated, the observing Party shall have the right to provide the observation aircraft. In the event that the observing Party provides the observation aircraft, it shall have the right to provide an aircraft that it has itself designated or an aircraft designated by another State Party. In the event that the observed Party provides the observation aircraft, the observing Party shall have the right to be provided with an aircraft capable of achieving a minimum unrefueled range, including the necessary fuel reserves, equivalent to one-half of the flight distance, as notified in accordance with paragraph 5, subparagraph (G) of this Section. 2. Each State Party shall have the right, pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, to use an observation aircraft designated by another State Party for observation flights. Arrangements for the use of such aircraft shall be worked out by the States Parties involved to allow for active participation in the Open Skies regime. 3. States Parties having the right to conduct observation flights may co-ordinate their plans for conducting observation flights in accordance with Annex H to this Treaty. No State Party shall be obliged to accept more than one observation flight at any one time during the 96-hour period specified in paragraph 9 of this Section, unless that State Party has requested a demonstration flight pursuant to Annex F to this Treaty. In that case, the observed Party shall be obliged to accept an overlap for the observation flights of up to 24 hours. After having been notified of the results of the co-ordination of plans to conduct observation flights, each State Party over whose territory observation flights are to be conducted shall inform other States Parties, in accordance with the provisions of Annex H, whether it will exercise, with regard to each specific observation flight, its right to provide its own observation aircraft. 4. No later than 90 days after signature of this Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all other States Parties: A. of the standing diplomatic clearance number for Open Skies observation flights, flights of transport aircraft and transit flights; and B. of which language or languages of the Open Skies Consultative Commission specified in Annex L, Section I, paragraph 7 to this Treaty shall be used by personnel for all activities associated with the conduct of observation flights over its territory, and for completing the mission plan and mission report, unless the language to be used is the one recommended in Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation,Volume II, paragraph 5.2.1.1.2.

832  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

5. The observing Party shall notify the observed Party of its intention to conduct an observation flight, no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the observing Party at the point of entry of the observed Party. States Parties providing such notifications shall make every effort to avoid using the minimum pre-notification period over weekends. Such notification shall include: A. the desired point of entry and, if applicable, Open Skies airfield where the observation flight shall commence; B. the date and estimated time of arrival of the observing Party at the point of entry and the date and estimated time of departure for the flight from the point of entry to the Open Skies airfield, if applicable, indicating specific accommodation needs; C. the location, specified in Annex E, Appendix 1, where the conduct of the pre-flight inspection is desired and the date and start time of such pre-flight inspection in accordance with the provisions of Annex F; D. the mode of transport and, if applicable, type and model of the transport aircraft used to travel to the point of entry in the event that the observation aircraft used for the observation flight is provided by the observed Party; E. the diplomatic clearance number for the observation flight or for the flight of the transport aircraft used to bring the personnel in and out of the territory of the observed Party to conduct an observation flight; F. the identification of the observation aircraft, as specified in Annex C; G. the approximate observation flight distance; and H. the names of the personnel, their gender, date and place of birth, passport number and issuing State Party, and their function. 6.The observed Party that is notified in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section shall acknowledge receipt of the notification within 24 hours. In the event that the observed Party exercises its right to provide the observation aircraft, the acknowledgement shall include the information about the observation aircraft specified in paragraph 5, subparagraph (F) of this Section.The observing Party shall be permitted to arrive at the point of entry at the estimated time of arrival as notified in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section.The estimated time of departure for the flight from the point of entry to the Open Skies airfield where the observation flight shall commence and the location, the date and the start time of the pre-flight inspection shall be subject to confirmation by the observed Party. 7. Personnel of the observing Party may include personnel designated pursuant to Article XIII by other States Parties. 8.The observing Party, when notifying the observed Party in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section, shall simultaneously notify all other States Parties of its intention to conduct the observation flight. 9. The period from the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry until completion of the observation flight shall not exceed 96 hours, unless otherwise agreed. In the event that the observed Party requests a demonstration flight pursuant to Annex F to the Treaty, it shall extend the 96-hour period pursuant to Annex F, Section III, paragraph 4, if additional time is required by the observing Party for the unrestricted execution of the mission plan. 10. Upon arrival of the observation aircraft at the point of entry, the observed Party shall inspect the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors to confirm that they are in their proper position pursuant to Annex E, unless otherwise agreed by all States Parties involved. 11. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, upon the arrival of the observation aircraft at the point of entry or at the Open Skies airfield where the observation flight commences, the observed Party shall have the right to carry out the pre-flight inspection

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  833

pursuant to Annex F, Section I. In the event that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section, an observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to carry out the pre-flight inspection of sensors pursuant to Annex F, Section II. Unless otherwise agreed, such inspections shall terminate no less than four hours prior to the scheduled commencement of the observation flight set forth in the flight plan. 12.The observing Party shall ensure that its flight crew includes at least one individual who has the necessary linguistic ability to communicate freely with the personnel of the observed Party and its air traffic control authorities in the language or languages notified by the observed Party in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section. 13.The observed Party shall provide the flight crew, upon its arrival at the point of entry or at the Open Skies airfield where the observation flight commences, with the most recent weather forecast and air navigation information and information on flight safety, including Notices to Airmen. Updates of such information shall be provided as requested. Instrument procedures, and information about alternate airfields along the flight route, shall be provided upon approval of the mission plan in accordance with the requirements of Section II of this Article. 14. While conducting observation flights pursuant to this Treaty, all observation aircraft shall be operated in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and in accordance with the approved flight plan.Without prejudice to the provisions of Section II, paragraph 2 of this Article, observation flights shall also be conducted in compliance with: A. published ICAO standards and recommended practices; and B. published national air traffic control rules, procedures and guidelines on flight safety of the State Party whose territory is being overflown. 15. Observation flights shall take priority over any regular air traffic.The observed Party shall ensure that its air traffic control authorities facilitate the conduct of observation flights in accordance with this Treaty. 16. On board the aircraft the pilot-in-command shall be the sole authority for the safe conduct of the flight and shall be responsible for the execution of the flight plan. 17.The observed Party shall provide: A. a calibration target suitable for confirming the capability of sensors in accordance with the procedures set forth in Annex D, Section III to this Treaty, to be overflown during the demonstration flight or the observation flight upon the request of either Party, for each sensor that is to be used during the observation flight.The calibration target shall be located in the vicinity of the airfield at which the pre-flight inspection is conducted pursuant to Annex F to this Treaty; B. customary commercial aircraft fuelling and servicing for the observation aircraft or transport aircraft at the point of entry, at the Open Skies airfield, at any refuelling airfield, and at the point of exit specified in the flight plan, according to the specifications that are published about the designated airfield; C. meals and the use of accommodation for the personnel of the observing Party; and D. upon the request of the observing Party, further services, as may be agreed upon between the observing and observed Parties, to facilitate the conduct of the observation flight. 18.All costs involved in the conduct of the observation flight, including the costs of the recording media and the processing of the data collected by sensors, shall be reimbursed in accordance with Annex L, Section I, paragraph 9 to this Treaty. 19. Prior to the departure of the observation aircraft from the point of exit, the observed Party shall confirm that the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors are in their proper position pursuant to Annex E to this Treaty.

834  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

20. Unless otherwise agreed, the observing Party shall depart from the point of exit no later than 24 hours following completion of the observation flight, unless weather conditions or the airworthiness of the observation aircraft or transport aircraft do not permit, in which case the flight shall commence as soon as practicable. 21.The observing Party shall compile a mission report of the observation flight using the appropriate format developed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission. The mission report shall contain pertinent data on the date and time of the observation flight, its route and profile, weather conditions, time and period for each sensor, the approximate amount of data collected by sensors, and the result of inspection of covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors in accordance with Article VII and Annex E.The mission report shall be signed by the observing and observed Parties at the point of exit and shall be provided by the observing Party to all other States Parties within seven days after departure of the observing Party from the point of exit. Section II. Requirements for Mission Planning 1. Unless otherwise agreed, the observing Party shall, after arrival at the Open Skies airfield, submit to the observed Party a mission plan for the proposed observation flight that meets the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Section. 2. The mission plan may provide for an observation flight that allows for the observation of any point on the entire territory of the observed Party, including areas designated by the observed Party as hazardous airspace in the source specified in Annex I.The flight path of an observation aircraft shall not be closer than, but shall be allowed up to, ten kilometres from the border with an adjacent State that is not a State Party. 3.The mission plan may provide that the Open Skies airfield where the observation flight terminates, as well as the point of exit, may be different from the Open Skies airfield where the observation flight commences or the point of entry.The mission plan shall specify, if applicable, the commencement time of the observation flight, the desired time and place of planned refuelling stops or rest periods, and the time of continuation of the observation flight after a refuelling stop or rest period within the 96-hour period specified in Section I, paragraph 9 of this Article. 4.The mission plan shall include all information necessary to file the flight plan and shall provide that: A. the observation flight does not exceed the relevant maximum flight distance as set forth in Annex A, Section I; B. the route and profile of the observation flight satisfies observation flight safety conditions in conformity with ICAO standards and recommended practices, taking into account existing differences in national flight rules, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section; C. the mission plan takes into account information on hazardous airspace, as provided in accordance with Annex I; D. the height above ground level of the observation aircraft does not permit the observing Party to exceed the limitation on ground resolution for each sensor, as set forth in Article IV, paragraph 2; E. the estimated time of commencement of the observation flight shall be no less than 24 hours after the submission of the mission plan, unless otherwise agreed; F. the observation aircraft flies a direct route between the co-ordinates or navigation fixes designated in the mission plan in the declared sequence; and G. the flight path does not intersect at the same point more than once, unless otherwise agreed, and the observation aircraft does not circle around a single point, unless otherwise agreed.The

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  835

provisions of this subparagraph do not apply for the purposes of taking off, flying over calibration targets, or landing by the observation aircraft. 5. In the event that the mission plan filed by the observing Party provides for flights through hazardous airspace, the observed Party shall: A. specify the hazard to the observation aircraft; B. facilitate the conduct of the observation flight by co-ordination or suppression of the activity specified pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or C. propose an alternative flight altitude, route, or time. 6. No later than four hours after submission of the mission plan, the observed Party shall accept the mission plan or propose changes to it in accordance with Article VIII, Section I, paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of this Section. Such changes shall not preclude observation of any point on the entire territory of the observed Party, including areas designated by the observed Party as hazardous airspace in the source specified in Annex I to this Treaty. Upon agreement, the mission plan shall be signed by the observing and observed Parties. In the event that the Parties do not reach agreement on the mission plan within eight hours of the submission of the original mission plan, the observing Party shall have the right to decline to conduct the observation flight in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of this Treaty. 7. If the planned route of the observation flight approaches the border of other States Parties or other States, the observed Party may notify that State or those States of the estimated route, date and time of the observation flight. 8. On the basis of the agreed mission plan the State Party providing the observation aircraft shall, in co-ordination with the other State Party, file the flight plan immediately, which shall have the content specified in Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and shall be in the format specified by ICAO Document No. 4444-RAC/501/12, “Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services”, as revised or amended. Section III. Special Provisions 1. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, the observed Party shall have the right to have on board the observation aircraft two flight monitors and one interpreter, in addition to one flight monitor for each sensor control station on board the observation aircraft, unless otherwise agreed. Flight monitors and interpreters shall have the rights and obligations specified in Annex G to this Treaty. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Section, in the event that an observing Party uses an observation aircraft which has a maximum take-off gross weight of no more than 35,000 kilograms for an observation flight distance of no more than 1,500 kilometres as notified in accordance with Section I, paragraph 5, subparagraph (G) of this Article, it shall be obliged to accept only two flight monitors and one interpreter on board the observation aircraft, unless otherwise agreed. 3. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observed Party shall permit the personnel of the observing Party to travel to the point of entry of the observed Party in the most expeditious manner.The personnel of the observing Party may elect to travel to the point of entry using ground, sea, or air transportation, including transportation by an aircraft owned by any State Party. Procedures regarding such travel are set forth in Annex E to this Treaty. 4. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to have on board the observation aircraft two flight representatives and one interpreter, in addition to one flight representative for each sensor control station on the aircraft, unless otherwise agreed. Flight representatives and interpreters shall have the rights and obligations set forth in Annex G to this Treaty.

836  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

5. In the event that the observing State Party provides an observation aircraft designated by a State Party other than the observing or observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to have on board the observation aircraft two representatives and one interpreter, in addition to one representative for each sensor control station on the aircraft, unless otherwise agreed. In this case, the provisions on flight monitors set forth in paragraph 1 of this Section shall also apply. Representatives and interpreters shall have the rights and obligations set forth in Annex G to this Treaty. Article VII. Transit Flights 1.Transit flights conducted by an observing Party to and from the territory of an observed Party for the purposes of this Treaty shall originate on the territory of the observing Party or of another State Party. 2. Each State Party shall accept transit flights. Such transit flights shall be conducted along internationally recognized Air Traffic Services routes, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties involved, and in accordance with the instructions of the national air traffic control authorities of each State Party whose airspace is transited.The observing Party shall notify each State Party whose airspace is to be transited at the same time that it notifies the observed Party in accordance with Article VI. 3. The operation of sensors on an observation aircraft during transit flights is prohibited. In the event that, during the transit flight, the observation aircraft lands on the territory of a State Party, that State Party shall, upon landing and prior to departure, inspect the covers of sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors to confirm that they are in their proper position. Article VIII. Prohibitions, Deviations from Flight Plans and Emergency Situations Section I. Prohibition of Observation Flights and Changes to Mission Plans 1.The observed Party shall have the right to prohibit an observation flight that is not in compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. 2.The observed Party shall have the right to prohibit an observation flight prior to its commencement in the event that the observing Party fails to arrive at the point of entry within 24 hours after the estimated time of arrival specified in the notification provided in accordance with Article VI, Section I, paragraph 5, unless otherwise agreed between the States Parties involved. 3. In the event that an observed State Party prohibits an observation flight pursuant to this Article or Annex F, it shall immediately state the facts for the prohibition in the mission plan.Within seven days the observed Party shall provide to all States Parties, through diplomatic channels, a written explanation for this prohibition in the mission report provided pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 21.An observation flight that has been prohibited shall not be counted against the quota of either State Party. 4.The observed Party shall have the right to propose changes to the mission plan as a result of any of the following circumstances: A. the weather conditions affect flight safety; B. the status of the Open Skies airfield to be used, alternate airfields, or refuelling airfields prevents their use; or C. the mission plan is inconsistent with Article VI, Section II, paragraphs 2 and 4. 5. In the event that the observing Party disagrees with the proposed changes to the mission plan, it shall have the right to submit alternatives to the proposed changes. In the event that agreement on a mission plan is not reached within eight hours of the submission of the original mission plan,

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  837

and if the observing Party considers the changes to the mission plan to be prejudicial to its rights under this Treaty with respect to the conduct of the observation flight, the observing Party shall have the right to decline to conduct the observation flight, which shall not be recorded against the quota of either State Party. 6. In the event that an observing Party declines to conduct an observation flight pursuant to this Article or Annex F, it shall immediately provide an explanation of its decision in the mission plan prior to the departure of the observing Party. Within seven days after departure of the observing Party, the observing Party shall provide to all other States Parties, through diplomatic channels, a written explanation for this decision in the mission report provided pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 21. Section II. Deviations from the Flight Plan 1. Deviations from the flight plan shall be permitted during the observation flight if necessitated by: A. weather conditions affecting flight safety; B. technical difficulties relating to the observation aircraft; C. a medical emergency of any person on board; or D. air traffic control instructions related to circumstances brought about by force majeure. 2. In addition, if weather conditions prevent effective use of optical sensors and infra-red linescanning devices, deviations shall be permitted, provided that: A. flight safety requirements are met; B. in cases where national rules so require, permission is granted by air traffic control authorities; and C. the performance of the sensors does not exceed the capabilities specified in Article IV, paragraph 2, unless otherwise agreed. 3.The observed Party shall have the right to prohibit the use of a particular sensor during a deviation that brings the observation aircraft below the minimum height above ground level for operating that particular sensor, in accordance with the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2. In the event that a deviation requires the observation aircraft to alter its flight path by more than 50 kilometres from the flight path specified in the flight plan, the observed Party shall have the right to prohibit the use of all the sensors installed on the observation aircraft beyond that 50-kilometre limit. 4.The observing Party shall have the right to curtail an observation flight during its execution in the event of sensor malfunction.The pilot-in-command shall have the right to curtail an observation flight in the event of technical difficulties affecting the safety of the observation aircraft. 5. In the event that a deviation from the flight plan permitted by paragraph 1 of this Section results in curtailment of the observation flight, or a curtailment occurs in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, an observation flight shall be counted against the quotas of both States Parties, unless the curtailment is due to: A. sensor malfunction on an observation aircraft provided by the observed Party; B. technical difficulties relating to the observation aircraft provided by the observed Party; C. a medical emergency of a member of the flight crew of the observed Party or of flight monitors; or D. air traffic control instructions related to circumstances brought about by force majeure. In such cases the observing Party shall have the right to decide whether to count it against the quotas of both States Parties.

838  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

6.The data collected by the sensors shall be retained by the observing Party only if the observation flight is counted against the quotas of both States Parties. 7. In the event that a deviation is made from the flight plan, the pilot-in-command shall take action in accordance with the published national flight regulations of the observed Party. Once the factors leading to the deviation have ceased to exist, the observation aircraft may, with the permission of the air traffic control authorities, continue the observation flight in accordance with the flight plan. The additional flight distance of the observation aircraft due to the deviation shall not count against the maximum flight distance. 8. Personnel of both States Parties on board the observation aircraft shall be immediately informed of all deviations from the light plan. 9. Additional expenses resulting from provisions of this Article shall be reimbursed in accordance with Annex L, Section I, paragraph 9 to this Treaty. Section III. Emergency Situations 1. In the event that an emergency situation arises, the pilot-in-command shall be guided by “Procedures for Air Navigation Services—Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services”, ICAO Document No. 4444-RAC/501/12, as revised or amended, the national flight regulations of the observed Party, and the flight operation manual of the observation aircraft. 2. Each observation aircraft declaring an emergency shall be accorded the full range of distress and navigational facilities of the observed Party in order to ensure the most expeditious recovery of the aircraft to the nearest suitable airfield. 3. In the event of an aviation accident involving the observation aircraft on the territory of the observed Party, search and rescue operations shall be conducted by the observed Party in accordance with its own regulations and procedures for such operations. 4. Investigation of an aviation accident or incident involving an observation aircraft shall be conducted by the observed Party, with the participation of the observing Party, in accordance with the ICAO recommendations set forth in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Investigation of Aviation Accidents”) as revised or amended and in accordance with the national regulations of the observed Party. 5. In the event that the observation aircraft is not registered with the observed Party, at the conclusion of the investigation all wreckage and debris of the observation aircraft and sensors, if found and recovered, shall be returned to the observing Party or to the Party to which the aircraft belongs, if so requested. Article IX. Sensor Output from Observation Flights Section I. General Provisions 1. For the purposes of recording data collected by sensors during observation flights, the following recording media shall be used: A. in the case of optical panoramic and framing cameras, black and white photographic film; B. in the case of video cameras, magnetic tape; C. in the case of infra-red line-scanning devices, black and white photographic film or magnetic tape; and D. in the case of sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, magnetic tape. The agreed format in which such data is to be recorded and exchanged on other recording media shall be decided within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application of this Treaty.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  839

2. Data collected by sensors during observation flights shall remain on board the observation aircraft until completion of the observation flight. The transmission of data collected by sensors from the observation aircraft during the observation flight is prohibited. 3. Each roll of photographic film and cassette or reel of magnetic tape used to collect data by a sensor during an observation flight shall be placed in a container and sealed in the presence of the States Parties as soon as is practicable after it has been removed from the sensor. 4. Data collected by sensors during observation flights shall be made available to States Parties in accordance with the provisions of this Article and shall be used exclusively for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty. 5. In the event that, on the basis of data provided pursuant to Annex B, Section I to this Treaty, a data recording medium to be used by a State Party during an observation flight is incompatible with the equipment of another State Party for handling that data recording medium, the States Parties involved shall establish procedures to ensure that all data collected during observation flights can be handled, in terms of processing, duplication and storage, by them. Section II. Output from Sensors that Use Photographic Film 1. In the event that output from duplicate optical cameras is to be exchanged, the cameras, film and film processing shall be of an identical type. 2. Provided that the data collected by a single optical camera is subject to exchange, the States Parties shall consider, within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application of this Treaty, the issue of whether the responsibility for the development of the original film negative shall be borne by the observing Party or by the State Party providing the observation aircraft.The State Party developing the original film negative shall be responsible for the quality of processing the original negative film and producing the duplicate positive or negative. In the event that States Parties agree that the film used during the observation flight conducted on an observation aircraft provided by the observed Party shall be processed by the observing Party, the observed Party shall bear no responsibility for the quality of the processing of the original negative film. 3. All the film used during the observation flight shall be developed: A. in the event that the original film negative is developed at a film processing facility arranged for by the observed Party, no later than three days, unless otherwise agreed, after the arrival of the observation aircraft at the point of exit; or B. in the event that the original film negative is developed at a film processing facility arranged for by the observing Party, no later than ten days after the departure of the observation aircraft from the territory of the observed Party. 4.The State Party that is developing the original film negative shall be obliged to accept at the film processing facility up to two officials from the other State Party to monitor the unsealing of the film cassette or container and each step in the storage, processing, duplication and handling of the original film negative, in accordance with the provisions of Annex K, Section II to this Treaty.The State Party monitoring the film processing and duplication shall have the right to designate such officials from among its nationals present on the territory on which the film processing facility arranged for by the other State Party is located, provided that such individuals are on the list of designated personnel in accordance with Article XIII, Section I of this Treaty. The State Party developing the film shall assist the officials of the other State Party in their functions provided for in this paragraph to the maximum extent possible. 5. Upon completion of an observation flight, the State Party that is to develop the original film negative shall attach a 21-step sensitometric test strip of the same film type used during the observation flight or shall expose a 21-step optical wedge onto the leader or trailer of each roll of

840  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

original film negative used during the observation flight. After the original film negative has been processed and duplicate film negative or positive has been produced, the States Parties shall assess the image quality of the 21-step sensitometric test strips or images of the 21-step optical wedge against the characteristics provided for that type of original film negative or duplicate film negative or positive in accordance with the provisions of Annex K, Section I to this Treaty. 6. In the event that only one original film negative is developed: A. the observing Party shall have the right to retain or receive the original film negative; and B. the observed Party shall have the right to select and receive a complete first generation duplicate or part thereof, either positive or negative, of the original film negative. Unless otherwise agreed, such duplicate shall be: 1. of the same format and film size as the original film negative; 2. produced immediately after development of the original film negative; and 3. provided to the officials of the observed Party immediately after the duplicate has been produced. 7. In the event that two original film negatives are developed: A. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, the observed Party shall have the right, at the completion of the observation flight, to select either of the two original film negatives, and the original film negative not selected shall be retained by the observing Party; or B. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to select either of the original film negatives, and the original film negative not selected shall be retained by the observed Party. Section III. Output from Sensors that Use Other Recording Media 1.The State Party that provides the observation aircraft shall record at least one original set of data collected by sensors using other recording media. 2. In the event that only one original set is made: A. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, the observing Party shall have the right to retain the original set and the observed Party shall have the right to receive a first generation duplicate copy; or B. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to receive the original set and the observed Party shall have the right to receive a first generation duplicate copy. 3. In the event that two original sets are made: A. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, the observed Party shall have the right, at the completion of the observation flight, to select either of the two sets of recording media, and the set not selected shall be retained by the observing Party; or B. if the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to elect either of the two sets of recording media, and the set not selected shall be retained by the observed Party. 4. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observing Party, the observed Party shall have the right to receive the data collected by a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar in the form of either initial phase information or a radar image, at its choice. 5. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party, the observing Party shall have the right to receive the data collected by a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar in the form of either initial phase information or a radar image, at its choice.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  841

Section IV. Access to Sensor Output Each State Party shall have the right to request and receive from the observing Party copies of data collected by sensors during an observation flight. Such copies shall be in the form of first generation duplicates produced from the original data collected by sensors during an observation flight. The State Party requesting copies shall also notify the observed Party. A request for duplicates of data shall include the following information: A. the observing Party; B. the observed Party; C. the date of the observation flight; D. the sensor by which the data was collected; E. the portion or portions of the observation period during which the data was collected; and F. the type and format of duplicate recording medium, either negative or positive film, or magnetic tape. Article X. Open Skies Consultative Commission 1. In order to promote the objectives and facilitate the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties hereby establish an Open Skies Consultative Commission. 2. The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall take decisions or make recommendations by consensus. Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection by any State Party to the taking of a decision or the making of a recommendation. 3. Each State Party shall have the right to raise before the Open Skies Consultative Commission, and have placed on its agenda, any issue relating to this Treaty, including any issue related to the case when the observed Party provides an observation aircraft. 4. Within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission the States Parties to this Treaty shall: A. consider questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Treaty; B. seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may become apparent in the way this Treaty is implemented; C. consider and take decisions on applications for accession to this Treaty; and D. agree as to those technical and administrative measures, pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty, deemed necessary following the accession to this Treaty by other States. 5.The Open Skies Consultative Commission may propose amendments to this Treaty for consideration and approval in accordance with Article XVI.The Open Skies Consultative Commission may also agree on improvements to the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its provisions. Improvements relating only to modification of the annual distribution of active quotas pursuant to Article III and Annex A, to updates and additions to the categories or capabilities of sensors pursuant to Article IV, to revision of the share of costs pursuant to Annex L, Section I, paragraph 9, to arrangements for the sharing and availability of data pursuant to Article IX, Sections III and IV and to the handling of mission reports pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 21, as well as to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature, shall be agreed upon within the Open Skies Consultative Commission and shall not be deemed to be amendments to this Treaty. 6.The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall request the use of the facilities and administrative support of the Conflict Prevention Centre of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, or other existing facilities in Vienna, unless it decides otherwise.

842  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

7. Provisions for the operation of the Open Skies Consultative Commission are set forth in Annex L to this Treaty. Article XI. Notifications and Reports The States Parties shall transmit notifications and reports required by this Treaty in written form. The States Parties shall transmit such notifications and reports through diplomatic channels or, at their choice, through other official channels, such as the communications network of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Article XII. Liability A State Party shall, in accordance with international law and practice, be liable to pay compensation for damage to other States Parties, or to their natural or juridical persons or their property, caused by it in the course of the implementation of this Treaty. Article XIII. Designation of Personnel and Privileges and Immunities Section I. Designation of Personnel 1. Each State Party shall, at the same time that it deposits its instrument of ratification to either of the Depositaries, provide to all other States Parties, for their review, a list of designated personnel who will carry out all duties relating to the conduct of observation flights for that State Party, including monitoring the processing of the sensor output. No such list of designated personnel shall include more than 400 individuals at any time. It shall contain the name, gender, date of birth, place of birth, passport number, and function for each individual included. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its list of designated personnel until 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty and once every six months thereafter. 2. In the event that any individual included on the original or any amended list is unacceptable to a State Party reviewing the list, that State Party shall, no later than 30 days after receipt of each list, notify the State Party providing that list that such individual shall not be accepted with respect to the objecting State Party. Individuals not declared unacceptable within that 30-day period shall be deemed accepted. In the event that a State Party subsequently determines that an individual is unacceptable, that State Party shall so notify the State Party that designated such individual. Individuals who are declared unacceptable shall be removed from the list previously submitted to the objecting State Party. 3.The observed Party shall provide visas and any other documents as required to ensure that each accepted individual may enter and remain on the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out duties relating to the conduct of observation flights, including monitoring the processing of the sensor output. Such visas and any other necessary documents shall be provided either: A. no later than 30 days after the individual is deemed to be accepted, in which case the visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 months; or B. no later than one hour after the arrival of the individual at the point of entry, in which case the visa shall be valid for the duration of that individual’s duties; or C. at any other time, by mutual agreement of the States Parties involved. Section II. Privileges and Immunities 1. In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing this Treaty and not for their personal benefit, personnel designated in accordance with the provisions of Section I, paragraph 1 of this Article shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29;Article 30, paragraph 2;Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention. In addition, designated personnel shall be accorded the privi-

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  843

leges enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention, except in relation to articles, the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. 2. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to designated personnel for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the observed Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. Such personnel shall also, when transiting the territory of other States Parties, be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention. 3.The immunity from jurisdiction may be waived by the observing Party in those cases when it would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to this Treaty. The immunity of personnel who are not nationals of the observing Party may be waived only by the States Parties of which such personnel are nationals.Waiver must always be express. 4. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities or the rights of the observing Party set forth in this Treaty, it is the duty of designated personnel to respect the laws and regulations of the observed Party. 5.The transportation means of the personnel shall be accorded the same immunities from search, requisition, attachment or execution as those of a diplomatic mission pursuant to Article 22, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention, except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty. Article XIV. Benelux 1. Solely for the purposes of Articles II to IX and Article XI, and of Annexes A to I and Annex K to this Treaty, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands shall be deemed a single State Party, hereinafter referred to as the Benelux. 2.Without prejudice to the provisions of Article XV, the above-mentioned States Parties may terminate this arrangement by notifying all other States Parties thereof.This arrangement shall be deemed to be terminated on the next 31 December following the 60-day period after such notification. Article XV. Duration and Withdrawal 1.This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. A State Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. A State Party intending to withdraw shall provide notice of its decision to withdraw to either Depositary at least six months in advance of the date of its intended withdrawal and to all other States Parties.The Depositaries shall promptly inform all other States Parties of such notice. 3. In the event that a State Party provides notice of its decision to withdraw from this Treaty in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, the Depositaries shall convene a conference of the States Parties no less than 30 days and no more than 60 days after they have received such notice, in order to consider the effect of the withdrawal on this Treaty. Article XVI. Amendments and Periodic Review 1. Each State Party shall have the right to propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of each proposed amendment shall be submitted to either Depositary, which shall circulate it to all States Parties for consideration. If so requested by no less than three States Parties within a period of 90 days after circulation of the proposed amendment, the Depositaries shall convene a conference of the States Parties to consider the proposed amendment. Such a conference shall open no earlier than 30 days and no later than 60 days after receipt of the third of such requests. 2. An amendment to this Treaty shall be subject to the approval of all States Parties, either by providing notification, in writing, of their approval to a Depositary within a period of 90 days after

844  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

circulation of the proposed amendment, or by expressing their approval at a conference convened in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.An amendment so approved shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, paragraph 1, and shall enter into force 60 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by the States Parties. 3. Unless requested to do so earlier by no less than three States Parties, the Depositaries shall convene a conference of the States Parties to review the implementation of this Treaty three years after entry into force of this Treaty and at five-year intervals thereafter. Article XVII. Depositaries, Entry into Force and Accession 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of Canada or the Government of the Republic of Hungary or both, hereby designated the Depositaries.This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositaries pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. This Treaty shall enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments of ratification, including those of the Depositaries, and of States Parties whose individual allocation of passive quotas as set forth in Annex A is eight or more. 3.This Treaty shall be open for signature by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgistan, Moldova,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and shall be subject to ratification by them.Any of these States which do not sign this Treaty before it enters into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article may accede to it at any time by depositing an instrument of accession with one of the Depositaries. 4. For six months after entry into force of this Treaty, any other State participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe may apply for accession by submitting a written request to one of the Depositaries.The Depositary receiving such a request shall circulate it promptly to all States Parties.The States applying for accession to this Treaty may also, if they so wish, request an allocation of a passive quota and the level of this quota. The matter shall be considered at the next regular meeting of the Open Skies Consultative Commission and decided in due course. 5. Following six months after entry into force of this Treaty, the Open Skies Consultative Commission may consider the accession to this Treaty of any State which, in the judgement of the Commission, is able and willing to contribute to the objectives of this Treaty. 6. For any State which has not deposited an instrument of ratification by the time of entry into force, but which subsequently ratifies or accedes to this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force 60 days after the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession. 7.The Depositaries shall promptly inform all States Parties of: A. the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and the date of entry into force of this Treaty; B. the date of an application for accession, the name of the requesting State and the result of the procedure; C. the date of deposit of each instrument of accession and the date of entry into force of this Treaty for each State that subsequently accedes to it; D. the convening of a conference pursuant to Articles XV and XVI; E. any withdrawal in accordance with Article XV and its effective date; F. the date of entry into force of any amendments to this Treaty; and

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  845

G. any other matters of which the Depositaries are required by this Treaty to inform the States Parties. Article XVIII. Provisional Application and Phasing of Implementation of the Treaty In order to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty, certain of its provisions shall be provisionally applied and others shall be implemented in phases. Section I. Provisional Application 1.Without detriment to Article XVII, the signatory States shall provisionally apply the following provisions of this Treaty: A. Article VI, Section I, paragraph 4; B. Article X, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7; C. Article XI; D. Article XIII, Section I, paragraphs 1 and 2; E. Article XIV; and F. Annex L, Section I. 2.This provisional application shall be effective for a period of 12 months from the date when this Treaty is opened for signature. In the event that this Treaty does not enter into force before the period of provisional application expires, that period may be extended if all the signatory States so decide.The period of provisional application shall in any event terminate when this Treaty enters into force. However, the States Parties may then decide to extend the period of provisional application in respect of signatory States that have not ratified this Treaty. Section II. Phasing of Implementation 1. After entry into force, this Treaty shall be implemented in phases in accordance with the provisions set forth in this Section.The provisions of paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Section shall apply during the period from entry into force of this Treaty until 31 December of the third year following the year during which entry into force takes place. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 1, no State Party shall during the period specified in paragraph 1 above use an infra-red line-scanning device if one is installed on an observation aircraft, unless otherwise agreed between the observing and observed Parties. Such sensors shall not be subject to certification in accordance with Annex D. If it is difficult to remove such sensor from the observation aircraft, then it shall have covers or other devices that inhibit its operation in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4 during the conduct of observation flights. 3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 9, no State Party shall, during the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, be obliged to provide an observation aircraft equipped with sensors from each sensor category, at the maximum capability and in the numbers specified in Article IV, paragraph 2, provided that the observation aircraft is equipped with: A. a single optical panoramic camera; or B. not less than a pair of optical framing cameras. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Annex B, Section II, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) to this Treaty, data recording media shall be annotated with data in accordance with existing practice of States Parties during the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Section.

846  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI, Section I, paragraph 1, no State Party during the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall have the right to be provided with an aircraft capable of achieving any specified unrefueled range. 6. During the period specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the distribution of active quotas shall be established in accordance with the provisions of Annex A, Section II, paragraph 2 to this Treaty. 7. Further phasing in respect of the introduction of additional categories of sensors or improvements to the capabilities of existing categories of sensors shall be addressed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 3 concerning such introduction or improvement. Article XIX. Authentic Texts The originals of this Treaty, of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositaries. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositaries to all the States Parties. Annex A. Quotas and Maximum Flight Distances Section I. Allocation of Passive Quotas 1.The allocation of individual passive quotas is set forth as follows and shall be effective only for those States Parties having ratified the Treaty: For the Federal Republic of Germany For the United States of America For the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties For Benelux For the Republic of Bulgaria For Canada For the Kingdom of Denmark For the Kingdom of Spain For the French Republic For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland For the Hellenic Republic For the Republic of Hungary For the Republic of Iceland For the Italian Republic For the Kingdom of Norway For the Republic of Poland For the Portuguese Republic For Romania For the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic For the Republic of Turkey For Ukraine

12 42 42 6 4 12 6 4 12 12 4 4 4 12 7 6 2 6 4 12 12

2. In the event that an additional State ratifies or accedes to the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII and Article X, paragraph 4, subparagraph (C), and taking into account Article X, paragraph 4, subparagraph (D), an allocation of passive quotas to such a State shall be considered during the regular session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession. Section II. First Distribution of Active Quotas for Observation Flights 1.The first distribution of active quotas pursuant to Article III, Section I, paragraph 6 of the Treaty shall be such that each State Party shall be obliged to accept over its territory a number of obser-

847  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  847

vation flights no greater than 75 percent, rounded down to the nearest whole number, of the individual passive quota allocated as set forth in Section I, paragraph 1 of this Annex. On this basis, and for those States Parties which have conducted negotiations in the framework of the Open Skies Conference in Vienna, the first distribution in respect of each other shall be valid from the date of entry into force of the Treaty until 31 December following the year during which the Treaty has entered into force and shall be effective only for those States Parties having ratified the Treaty.This first distribution is set forth as follows:  The

Federal Republic of Germany shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  The United States of America shall have the right to conduct eight observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight, shared with Canada, over the territory of Ukraine;  The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of Benelux, as referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty, two observation flights over the territory of Canada, two observation flights over the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, three observation flights over the territory of the French Republic, three observation flights over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, two observation flights over the territory of the Italian Republic, two observation flights over the territory of the Kingdom of Norway, two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Turkey, three observation flights over the territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and four observation flights over the territory of the United States of America;  The Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, referred to as the Benelux, shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland;  The Republic of Bulgaria shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Italian Republic, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Turkey;  Canada shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland, and one observation flight, shared with the United States of America, over the territory of Ukraine;  The Kingdom of Denmark shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland;  The Kingdom of Spain shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic;  The French Republic shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Romania;  The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  The Hellenic Republic shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, and one observation flight over the territory of Romania;

848  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  The

Republic of Hungary shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of Romania, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  The Italian Republic shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, and one observation flight, shared with the Republic of Turkey, over the territory of Ukraine;  The Kingdom of Norway shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland;  The Republic of Poland shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  Romania shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine;  The Republic of Turkey shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and two observation flights, one of which is shared with the Italian Republic, over the territory of Ukraine;  Ukraine shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland, one observation flight over the territory of Romania, and two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Turkey. 2. Following this first distribution and until the date of full implementation of the Treaty specified in Article XVIII to that effect for the use of active quotas, annual distributions shall be based on the 75 percent rule established in paragraph 1 of this Section in relation to the allocation of individual passive quotas. 3. From the date of full implementation of the Treaty each State Party shall accept during subsequent distributions of active quotas over its territory, if so requested, a number of observation flights up to the full amount of its individual passive quota. Whenever possible or requested and unless otherwise agreed, those distributions shall be based on a proportionate increase of the active quotas distributed in the first distribution. 4. In the event that an additional State ratifies or accedes to the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII, the distribution of active quotas to such State shall be considered during the regular session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission following the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, subject to the following provisions: (A) the ratifying or acceding State shall have the right to request observation flights over the territories of States Parties within the passive quota allocated to that State in accordance with the provisions of Section I, paragraph 3 of this Annex, and within the passive quotas of the States Parties requested for observation flights, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties involved; and (B) all States Parties shall have at the same time the right to request observation flights over the territory of that signing or acceding State within their active quotas and within the passive quota allocated to that State.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  849

Section III. Maximum Flight Distances of Observation Flights The maximum flight distances of observation flights over the territories of observed Parties commencing from each Open Skies airfield are as follows: The Federal Republic of Germany Wunstorf Landsberg-Lech

1,200 kilometres 1,200 kilometres

The United States of America Washington-Dulles Travis AFB Elmendorf AFB Lincoln-Municipal

4,900 kilometres 4,000 kilometres 3,000 kilometres 4,800 kilometres

The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties Kubinka Ulan Ude Vorkuta Magadan

5,000 kilometres 5,000 kilometres 6,500 kilometres 6,500 kilometres

Benelux Zaventem/Melsbroek

945 kilometres

The Republic of Bulgaria Sofia Burgas

660 kilometres 660 kilometres

Canada Ottawa Iqaluit Yellowknife

5,000 kilometres 6,000 kilometres 5,000 kilometres

The Kingdom of Denmark Metropolitan Faroe Islands Greenland

800 kilometres 250 kilometres 5,600 kilometres

The Kingdom of Spain Getafe Gando Valencia Valladolid Moron

1,300 kilometres 750 kilometres 1,300 kilometres 1,300 kilometres 1,300 kilometres

The French Republic Orleans-Bricy Nice-Côte D’Azur Toulouse-Blagnac

1,400 kilometres 800 kilometres 700 kilometres

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Brize Norton Scampton Leuchars with Scilly Islands with Shetland Islands

1,150 kilometres 1,150 kilometres 1,150 kilometres 1,500 kilometres 1,500 kilometres

850  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

The Hellenic Republic Thessaloniki Elefsis with Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes, Kos Islands The Republic of Hungary Budapest-Ferihegy

900 kilometres 900 kilometres 1,100 kilometres 860 kilometres

The Republic of Iceland

1,500 kilometres

The Italian Republic Milano-Malpensa Palermo-Punta Raisi

1,130 kilometres 1,400 kilometres

The Kingdom of Norway Oslo-Gardermoen Tromsoe-Langnes

1,700 kilometres 1,700 kilometres

The Republic of Poland Warszawa-Okecie

1,400 kilometres

The Portuguese Republic Lisboa Sta. Maria Porto Santo

1,200 kilometres 1,700 kilometres 1,030 kilometres

Romania Bucharest-Otopeni Timisoara Bacau

900 kilometres 900 kilometres 900 kilometres

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Praha Bratislava Kosice

600 kilometres 700 kilometres 400 kilometres

The Republic of Turkey Eskisehir Diyarbakir

1,500 kilometres 1,500 kilometres

Ukraine Borispol

2,100 kilometres Annex B. Information on Sensors

Section I. Technical Information 1. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 10, each State Party shall inform all other States Parties of the applicable technical information listed in this Section on each sensor installed on the observation aircraft designated by that State Party pursuant to Article V of the Treaty. 2. The following technical information shall be provided for optical panoramic and framing cameras: (A) type and model; (B) field of view along and across the flight path, or scan angles, in degrees; (C) frame size, in millimetres by millimetres; (D) exposure times, in seconds;

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  851

(E) types and colours of optical filters used and their filter factor; (F) for each lens: (1) name; (2) focal length, in millimetres; (3) maximum relative aperture of the lens; (4) resolving power at a contrast ratio of 1000 to 1 or the equivalent modulation of 1.0, at the maximum relative aperture, in lines per millimetre; (G) minimum and maximum photographic time intervals, in seconds, or cycle rates, in frames per second, if applicable; (H) maximum velocity over height ratio, if applicable; (I) for optical framing cameras, the maximum angle measured from the horizontal, or the minimum angle measured from the vertical, in degrees; and (J) maximum altitude for operation in metres, if applicable. 3.The following technical information shall be provided for video cameras: (A) type and model; (B) field of view, along and across the flight path, in degrees; (C) for the lens: (1) focal length, in millimetres; (2) maximum relative aperture; (3) resolving power at a contrast ratio of 1000 to 1 or the equivalent modulation of 1.0, at the maximum relative aperture, in lines per millimetre; (D) detector element size, in micrometres, or equivalent information on the tube; (E) number of detector elements; (F) system light sensitivity, in lux or watts per square centimetre; and (G) spectral bandwidth, in nanometres. 4.The following technical information shall be provided for infra-red line-scanning devices: (A) type and model; (B) field of view or scan angles, in degrees; (C) minimum instantaneous field of view, along and across the flight path, in milliradians; (D) spectral bandwidth, in micrometres; (E) minimum resolvable temperature difference, in degrees Celsius; (F) temperature of detector during operation, in degrees Celsius; (G) time required from switch-on for the system to start up and cool down to its normal operating temperature, in minutes; (H) maximum operating time, if applicable; (I) maximum velocity over height ratio; and (J) maximum altitude for operation in metres, if applicable.

852  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

5.The following technical information shall be provided for sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar: (A) type and model; (B) radar frequency bands, and specific operating frequency, in megahertz; (C) polarisations; (D) number of radar pulses, per metre or second; (E) near range angular limit of operation, in degrees from vertical; (F) swath width, in kilometres; (G) ground resolution in range and azimuth, in the slant plane, in metres; (H) maximum altitude for operation in metres, if applicable; and (I) transmitter output power, in watts. 6. The following technical information shall be provided for sensors that record data on photographic film: (A) the types of film that may be used with each sensor; (B) width of film, in millimetres; (C) film resolution at a contrast ratio of 1000 to 1 or the equivalent modulation of 1.0, in lines per millimetre; and (D) capacity of magazine for each type of film, in metres. 7. The following technical information shall be provided for sensors that record data on other recording media: (A) type and model of the data recording equipment; (B) type and format of data recording media; (C) bandwidth, in hertz, if applicable; (D) data recording rate, in megabits per second, if applicable; (E) capacity of recording media, in minutes or megabits; and (F) format for storage of data collected by sensors and data annotation. Section II. Annotation of Data 1. The following items of information shall be annotated on data collected by sensors during an observation period on the leader of each roll of the original film negative or at the beginning of each other recording medium in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 1 to this Annex: (A) observation flight reference number; (B) date of observation flight; (C) sensor description; (D) sensor configuration; and (E) focal length, if applicable. 2.The following items of information shall be recorded manually or electronically from the navigation and avionics systems of the observation aircraft and annotated on data collected by sensors during an observation period in a manner that does not obscure detail, in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 1 to this Annex:

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  853

(A) for optical cameras: (1) at the start of the observation period and at any intermediate location during the observation period where there is a significant change of height above ground level, heading or groundspeed, and at intervals to be determined by the Open Skies Consultative Commission within the period of provisional application: (a) height above ground level; (b) location; (c) true heading; and (d) scan angle; (2) on every frame of photographic film: (a) frame number; (b) time; and (c) roll angle; (B) for video cameras and infra-red line-scanning devices, at the start of the observation period and at any intermediate location during the observation period where there is a significant change of height above ground level, heading or groundspeed, and at intervals to be determined by the Open Skies Consultative Commission within the period of provisional application: (1) date and time; (2) height above ground level; (3) location; (4) true heading; and (5) scan angle; (C) for sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar: (1) at the start of the observation period and at any intermediate location during the observation period where there is a significant change of height above ground level, heading or groundspeed, and at intervals to be determined by the Open Skies Consultative Commission within the period of provisional application: (a) date and time; (b) height above ground level; (c) location; (d) true heading; (e) look down angle to the nearest point of the swath width; (f) swath width; and (g) polarisations; (2) each time they are measured in order to ensure correct processing of the image: (a) groundspeed; (b) drift; (c) pitch angle; and (d) roll angle.

854  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

3. For copies of single frames or strips of imagery produced from the original film negative or other recording media, the items of information listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section shall be annotated on each positive print. 4. States Parties shall have the right to annotate data collected during an observation flight using either alphanumeric values, or codes to be agreed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. Appendix 1 to Annex B. Annotation of Data Collected during an Observation Flight 1. The reference number of the observation flight shall be indicated by a single group of six alphanumeric characters in accordance with the following convention: (A) the letters “OS”; (B) the last digit of the calendar year for which the individual active quota applies; and (C) a three-digit number to represent each individual observation flight comprising the active quota distributed during the annual review within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission for a calendar year to a State Party over the territory of another State Party. 2.The sensor description shall be indicated by a single block of up to six alphanumeric characters comprising two groups in accordance with the following convention: (A) a group of up to four characters to represent the category of the sensor in accordance with the following convention: (1) “OP”—optical panoramic camera; (2) “OF”—optical framing camera; (3) “TV”—video camera; (4) “IRLS”—infra-red line-scanning device; or (5) “SAR”—sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar; (B) a group of two characters to represent the type of the recording medium in accordance with the following convention: (1) “BI”—black and white, iso-panchromatic; (2) “BM”—black and white, monochromatic; (3) “BP”—black and white, panchromatic; (4) “BR”—black and white, reversal; (5) “TA”—tape, analogue; or (6) “TD”—tape, digital. 3.The sensor configuration shall be indicated by a single block of up to nine alphanumeric characters comprising three groups in accordance with the following convention: (A) a group of four alphanumeric characters to represent the installation of the sensor on the observation aircraft either as: (1) an internal installation, which shall be denoted by the code “INT”, followed by a number to indicate the relative location of the installation of the sensor on the observation aircraft in sequence from nose to tail of the observation aircraft; or (2) a podded installation, which shall be denoted by the code “POD”, followed by one of the following three letters:

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  855

(a) “L”—mounted under left wing; (b) “R”—mounted under right wing; or (c) “C”—mounted on the aircraft centre line; (B) a group of up to three alphanumeric characters to represent the type of installation in accordance with the following convention: (1) a vertical installation in which the sensor is not tilted more than five degrees from the vertical shall be denoted by the letter “V”; (2) an oblique installation in which the sensor is tilted more than five degrees from the vertical shall be denoted by one of the following two letters, followed by the depression angle in degrees: (a) “L”—left pointing; (b) “R”—right pointing; (3) a fan installation of two or more sensors shall be denoted by the letter “F”; (C) for a fan installation, a group of up to two numbers to indicate the number and position of the sensors as follows: (1) the first number to indicate the total number of sensors in that installation; and (2) the second number to indicate the individual sensor position, in sequence from left to right relative to the direction of flight of the observation aircraft. 4.The focal length of a lens shall be provided in millimetres. 5.The date and time shall be provided to the nearest minute of Co-ordinated Universal Time. 6.The average height above ground level of the observation aircraft shall be denoted by a five-digit number, followed by a code to represent the units of measurement in either feet, by the letter “F”, or metres, by the letter “M”. 7.The latitude and longitude of the location of the observation aircraft shall be provided in degrees to the nearest one-hundredth of a degree, in the format “dd.dd(N or S) ddd.dd(E or W)”, or in degrees and minutes to the nearest minute, in the format “dd mm(N or S) ddd mm(E or W)”. 8.The true heading of the observation aircraft shall be provided in degrees to the nearest degree. 9. The roll angle of the observation aircraft shall be provided in degrees followed by a code to indicate whether the roll is to the left, by the letter “L”, or to the right, by the letter “R”. 10.The pitch angle of the observation aircraft shall be provided in degrees followed by a code to indicate whether the pitch is up, by the letter “U”, or down, by the letter “D”, relative to the horizontal. 11.The drift angle of the observation aircraft shall be provided in degrees followed by a code to indicate whether the drift is to the left, by the letter “L”, or to the right, by the letter “R”, relative to the flight path of the observation aircraft. 12.The groundspeed of the observation aircraft shall be denoted by a three-digit number followed by a two-letter code to indicate the units of measurement in either nautical miles, by the letters “NM”, or kilometres, by the letters “KM”, per hour. 13.The nearest point of the swath width shall be provided in kilometres. 14.The look down angle shall be provided in degrees measured from the vertical. 15.The swath width shall be provided in kilometres.

856  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

16. For photographic film, each magazine used during an observation flight from the same sensor shall be numbered in sequence starting from one. Each frame on the original film negative exposed by each sensor shall be individually numbered in sequence, from the first frame to the last frame of that magazine of that sensor. In each case when the film is numbered using one or two numbers per frame, a single frame shall be defined without ambiguity by specifying either the number closest to the centre of the frame, or, in the event that the numbers are equidistant from the centre, the smaller whole number. Annex C. Information on Observation Aircraft Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, States Parties, when designating aircraft as observation aircraft, shall notify all other States Parties of the information specified below. 1. Identification: (A) type and model; and (B) number, category, type and configuration of each sensor installed on the observation aircraft, as provided in accordance with the provisions of Annex B to the Treaty; 2. Mission Planning: (A) for each type and configuration of sensor installed on the observation aircraft: (1) for which ground resolution is dependent upon height above ground level, the height above ground level in metres at which that sensor achieves the ground resolution for that category of sensor specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (2) for which ground resolution is not dependent upon height above ground level, the altitude for maximum range; (B) optimum cruising speed in kilometres per hour at each altitude specified in accordance with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; (C) fuel consumption in kilograms per hour at optimum cruising speed at each altitude specified in accordance with subparagraph (A) of this paragraph. 3. Navigation, Communications and Landing Aids: (A) each type of navigation equipment installed on the observation aircraft, including its positional accuracy, in metres; and (B) radio communications, approach and landing aid equipment installed on the observation aircraft, in accordance with standard ICAO practice. 4. Ground Handling: (A) length, wingspan, maximum height, wheel base, and turning radius; (B) maximum take-off weight and maximum landing weight; (C) airfield runway length and pavement strength required at maximum take-off and landing weights, including any capability for landing on unpaved strips; (D) types and capacities of fuel, oils, hydraulic fluid and oxygen; (E) types of electrical servicing and starting units; and (F) any special requirements. 5. Accommodation facilities: (A) number of flight crew; (B) number of sensor operators;

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  857

(C) number of flight representatives, flight monitors or representatives who could be seated on board; and (D) sleeping berths. Annex D. Certification of Observation Aircraft and Sensors Section I. General Provisions 1. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the certification of an observation aircraft of each type and model and its associated set of sensors designated by another State Party pursuant to Article V of the Treaty, during which the observation aircraft and its sensors shall be examined both on the ground and in-flight. 2. Each certification shall be conducted in order to establish: (A) that the aircraft is of a type and model designated pursuant to Article V of the Treaty; (B) that the sensors installed on the observation aircraft are of a category specified in Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and satisfy the requirements specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (C) that the technical information has been provided in accordance with the provisions of Annex B, Section I to the Treaty; (D) in the event that the ground resolution of a sensor is dependent upon height above ground level, the minimum height above ground level from which each such sensor installed on an observation aircraft of that type and model may be operated during an observation flight, pursuant to the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (E) in the event that the ground resolution is not dependent upon height above ground level, the ground resolution of each such sensor installed on an observation aircraft of that type and model, pursuant to the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; and (F) that the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors are in their proper position in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4 of the Treaty. 3. Each State Party conducting a certification shall notify all other States Parties, no less than 60 days in advance, of the period of seven days during which the certification of that observation aircraft and its sensors will take place. Such notification shall specify: (A) the State Party conducting the certification of the observation aircraft and its sensors; (B) the point of entry at which personnel of the States Parties taking part in the certification should arrive; (C) the location at which the certification is to be conducted; (D) the dates on which the certification is to begin and end; (E) the number, type and model of each observation aircraft to be certified; and (F) the type and model, description and configuration of each sensor installed on the observation aircraft to be certified, in accordance with the format specified in Annex B,Appendix 1 to the Treaty. 4. No later than ten days after receipt of the notification pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Section, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of its intention to participate in the certification of such aircraft and its sensors pursuant to the provisions of Article IV,

858  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

paragraph 11. The number of individuals that shall participate in the certification from amongst those States Parties that notified their intention to participate shall be decided upon within the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Unless otherwise agreed, the number of individuals shall total no more than 40 and include no more than four from any one State Party. In the event that two or more States Parties notify their intention to conduct a certification during the same period, it shall be decided within the Open Skies Consultative Commission which of them shall conduct the certification in this period. 5. Each State Party taking part in the certification shall notify the State Party conducting the certification no less than 30 days prior to the date on which the certification of the observation aircraft is to begin, as notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, of the following: (A) the names of the individuals taking part in the certification and, in the event that a noncommercial transport aircraft is used to travel to the point of entry, a list of the names of the crew members, in each case specifying gender, date of birth, place of birth and passport number. All such individuals shall be on the list of individuals designated pursuant to Article XIII, Section I of the Treaty; (B) the date and the estimated time of arrival of such individuals at the point of entry; and (C) the mode of transport used to arrive at the point of entry. 6. No less than 14 days prior to the date on which the certification of the observation aircraft is to begin, as notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide the States Parties which are taking part in the certification with the following information for each sensor installed on the observation aircraft, and for associated equipment used for the annotation of data collected by sensors: (A) a description of each constituent part of the sensor, including its purpose, and any connection to associated equipment used for the annotation of data; (B) photographs taken of each sensor separate from the observation aircraft, in accordance with the following specifications: (1) each sensor shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph either horizontally or vertically; (2) such photographs may be either colour or black and white and shall measure 18 centimetres by 24 centimetres, excluding the border; and (3) each photograph shall be annotated with the category of the sensor, its type and model, and the name of the State Party that is presenting the sensor for certification; (C) instructions on the in-flight operation of each sensor. 7. In the event that no State Party notifies its intention to take part in the certification in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, the State Party shall conduct by itself an in-flight examination in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Annex and complete a certification report in accordance with the provisions of Section IV of this Annex. 8.The provisions of Article XIII, Section II of the Treaty shall apply to the personnel of each State Party taking part in the certification during the entire period of their stay on the territory of the State Party conducting the certification. 9.The personnel of each State Party taking part in the certification shall leave the territory of the State Party conducting the certification promptly after signing the certification report. Section II. Ground Examination 1.With the approval of the State Party conducting the certification, ground examinations by more than one State Party may be conducted simultaneously. States Parties shall have the right jointly to conduct a ground examination of the observation aircraft and its sensors. The State Party

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  859

conducting the certification shall have the right to determine the number of personnel engaged at any one time in the ground examination of an observation aircraft and its sensors. 2. Unless otherwise agreed, the ground examination shall not exceed three eight-hour periods for each observation aircraft and its sensors. 3. Prior to the commencement of the ground examination, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide the States Parties taking part in the certification with the following information: (A) for optical panoramic and framing cameras: (1) the modulation transfer curve of the response of the lens to spatial frequency (frequency/contrast characteristic) at the maximum relative aperture of that lens, in lines per millimetre; (2) specifications of the black and white aerial film that will be used to collect data during an observation flight, or for the duplication of such data, in accordance with the provisions of Annex K, Section I, paragraph 2 to the Treaty; (3) specifications of the film processors which will be used to develop original film negatives and duplicators that will be used to produce film positives or negatives, in accordance with the provisions of Annex K, Section I, paragraph 1 to the Treaty; and (4) flight test data showing ground resolution as a function of height above ground level for each type of aerial film that will be used with the optical camera; (B) for video cameras, flight test data from all output devices showing ground resolution as a function of height above ground level; (C) for infra-red line-scanning devices, flight test data from all output devices showing ground resolution as a function of height above ground level; and (D) for sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, flight test data from all output devices showing ground resolution as a function of slant range from the aircraft. 4. Prior to the commencement of the ground examination, the State Party conducting the certification shall provide a briefing to the State Party or States Parties taking part in the certification on: (A) its plan for the conduct of the ground examination of the observation aircraft and its sensors; (B) the observation aircraft, as well as its sensors, associated equipment and covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors, indicating their location on the observation aircraft with the help of diagrams, photographs, slides and other visual materials; (C) all necessary safety precautions that shall be observed during the ground examination of the observation aircraft and its sensors; and (D) the inventory procedures that escorts of the State Party conducting the certification intend to use pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section. 5. Prior to the commencement of the ground examination, each State Party taking part in the certification shall deliver to the State Party conducting the certification a list of each item of equipment to be used during the ground examination or in-flight examination. The States Parties conducting the examination shall be permitted to take on board the observation aircraft and use video cameras, hand-held audio recorders and hand-held electronic computers.The States Parties taking part in the certification shall be permitted to use other items of equipment, subject to the approval of the State Party conducting the certification. 6.The States Parties taking part in the certification shall, together with the State Party conducting the certification, conduct an inventory of each item of equipment provided for in paragraph 5 of

860  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

this Section, and review the inventory procedures which shall be followed to confirm that each item of equipment brought on board the observation aircraft by the States Parties taking part in the certification has been removed from the observation aircraft upon conclusion of the examination. 7. Personnel of each State Party taking part in the certification shall have the right to conduct the following activities during the ground examination on the observation aircraft and of each sensor installed on the observation aircraft: (A) confirm that the number and configuration of each sensor installed on the observation aircraft correspond to the information provided in accordance with the provisions of Section I, paragraph 6 of this Annex, Annex C and Annex B, Section I; (B) familiarize themselves with the installation of each sensor on the observation aircraft, including the constituent parts thereof and their connections to each other and to any associated equipment used for the annotation of data; (C) obtain a demonstration of the control and operation of each sensor; and (D) familiarize themselves with the flight test data provided in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Section. 8. At the request of any State Party taking part in the certification, the State Party conducting the certification shall photograph any sensor installed on the observation aircraft, the associated equipment on the observation aircraft, or the sensor apertures with their covers or devices which inhibit the operation of sensors. Such photographs shall fulfil the requirements specified in Section I, paragraph 6, subparagraphs (B)(1), (2) and (3) of this Annex. 9. The State Party conducting the certification shall have the right to designate personnel to accompany throughout the ground examination the personnel of the States Parties taking part in the certification to confirm compliance with the provisions of this Section.The personnel of the State Party conducting the certification shall not interfere with the activities of the States Parties taking part in the certification, unless such activities conflict with the safety precautions provided for in paragraph 4, subparagraph (C) of this Section. 10.The State Party conducting the certification shall provide the States Parties taking part in the certification access to the entire observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment and sufficient power to operate its sensors and associated equipment. The State Party conducting the certification shall open such compartments or remove panels or barriers, to the extent necessary to permit examination of any sensor and associated equipment subject to certification. 11. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Section, the ground examination shall be conducted in a manner that does not: (A) degrade, damage, or prevent subsequent operation of the observation aircraft or its sensors; (B) alter the electrical or mechanical structure of the observation aircraft or its sensors; or (C) impair the airworthiness of the observation aircraft. 12.The States Parties taking part in the certification shall have the right to take measurements, and make notes, sketches, similar records and recordings using the items of equipment listed in paragraph 5 of this Section, relating to the observation aircraft, its sensors and their associated equipment. Such working materials may be retained by the State Party taking part in the certification and shall not be subject to any review or examination by the State Party conducting the certification. 13.The State Party conducting the certification shall make every effort to answer questions of the States Parties taking part in the certification that pertain to the ground examination. 14. Upon completion of the ground examination, the States Parties taking part in the certification shall leave the observation aircraft, and the State Party conducting the certification shall have the

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  861

right to use its own inventory procedures set forth in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section to confirm that all the equipment used during the ground examination in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section has been removed from the observation aircraft. Section III. In-flight Examination 1. In addition to conducting a ground examination of the observation aircraft and its sensors, the State Party conducting the certification shall conduct one in-flight examination of its sensors which shall be sufficient to: (A) permit observation of the operation of all the sensors installed on the observation aircraft; (B) in the event that the ground resolution of a sensor is dependent upon height above ground level, establish the minimum height above ground level from which each such sensor installed on an observation aircraft of that type and model shall be operated for any observation flight, in accordance with the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; and (C) in the event that the ground resolution of a sensor is not dependent upon height above ground level, establish the ground resolution of each such sensor installed on an observation aircraft of that type and model is in accordance with the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. 2. Prior to the commencement of the in-flight examination of the sensors, the State Party conducting the certification shall brief the States Parties participating in the certification on its plan for the conduct of the in-flight examination.This briefing shall include the following information: (A) a diagram of the calibration targets that it intends to use for the in-flight examination in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 1, Section I, paragraph 5 to this Annex; (B) the estimated time, meteorological conditions, number, direction and height above ground level of each pass over the calibration target appropriate to each sensor to be certified; and (C) all necessary safety precautions that shall be observed during the in-flight examination of the observation aircraft and its sensors. 3. Prior to and during the conduct of the in-flight examination, States Parties taking part in the certification shall have the right to visit the location of the calibration targets. The State Party conducting the certification shall provide such items of equipment as required to confirm that the calibration targets meet the specifications set forth in Appendix 1, Section I to this Annex. 4. The in-flight examination shall be conducted during clear atmospheric daytime conditions, unless otherwise agreed, over the calibration targets appropriate to each category of sensor installed on the observation aircraft in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 1, Section II to this Annex, to determine the ground resolution of each sensor. 5.The State Party conducting the certification shall provide such data on the meteorological conditions at the location of the calibration targets during the in-flight examination of the sensors as are necessary to make the calculations in accordance with the methodologies specified in Appendix 1, Section III to this Annex. 6. Each State Party shall have the right to designate personnel to take part in the in-flight examination. In the event that the number of individuals so designated exceeds the passenger capacity of the observation aircraft, the States Parties participating in the certification shall agree which of its personnel shall participate in the in-flight examination. 7. Personnel of the States Parties designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall have the right to observe the operation of the sensors by personnel of the State Party conducting the certification.

862  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

8. Personnel of the States Parties taking part in the certification shall have the right to monitor the unsealing of the film cassette and the storage, processing and handling of the original film negative exposed during the in-flight examination, in accordance with the provisions of Annex K, Section II to the Treaty. Section IV. Certification Report 1. Upon completion of the ground and in-flight examinations, data collected by sensors and from the calibration targets shall be examined jointly by the State Party conducting the certification and the States Parties taking part in the certification. These States Parties shall prepare a certification report which shall establish: (A) that the observation aircraft is of a type and model designated pursuant to Article V of the Treaty; (B) that the sensors installed on the observation aircraft are of a category provided for in Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and satisfy the requirements of Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (C) that the technical information on sensors has been provided in accordance with Annex B, Section I to the Treaty; (D) in the event that the ground resolution of a sensor is dependent upon height above ground level, the minimum height above ground level at which each such sensor on an observation aircraft of that type and model may be operated during an observation flight pursuant to the limitation on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (E) in the event that the ground resolution is not dependent upon height above ground level, the ground resolution of each such sensor installed on an observation aircraft of that type and model, pursuant to the limitations on ground resolution specified in Article IV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; and (F) that the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors are in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4 of the Treaty. 2. A copy of the information for each sensor provided pursuant to Section I, paragraph 6 and Section II, paragraphs 3 and 8 of this Annex shall be attached to the certification report. 3. Copies of the certification report shall be provided to all other States Parties by the State Party conducting the certification. States Parties that did not take part in the certification shall not have the right to reject the conclusions contained in the certification report. 4.An observation aircraft and its associated set of sensors shall be deemed to be certified unless the States Parties taking part in the certification are unable to reach agreement on the contents of the certification report. 5. In the event that the State Party conducting the certification and States Parties taking part in the certification are unable to reach agreement on the contents of the certification report, the observation aircraft shall not be used for observation flights until the issue is resolved. Appendix 1 to Annex D. Methodologies for the Verification of the Performance of Sensors Installed on an Observation Aircraft The ground resolution of each sensor installed on the observation aircraft, and, where its performance depends on height above ground level, the minimum height above ground level at which this sensor may be operated during an observation flight, shall be determined and confirmed on the basis of data collected over calibration targets appropriate to each category of sensor in accordance with the specifications in Section I and calculated in accordance with the methodologies to be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  863

Section I. Specifications for Calibration Targets 1. Calibration targets shall be provided by the State Party conducting the certification in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. Such calibration targets shall be used to establish the ground resolution of sensors, of a type appropriate to each sensor category, and designed in accordance with characteristics specified below. 2. Calibration targets for establishing the ground resolution of optical cameras shall consist of a series of groups of alternating black and white bars. Each group of bars shall consist of a minimum of two black bars separated by a white bar.The width of black and white bars within a group shall remain constant.The width of the bars in groups of bars in the calibration target shall change in steps sufficient to ensure accurate measurement of the ground resolution. The length of the bars shall remain constant within each group. The contrast ratio of the black to white bars shall be consistent throughout the target and shall be at least 5 to 1 (equivalent to a modulation of 0.66). 3. Calibration targets for establishing the ground resolution of infra-red line-scanning devices shall be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. 4. Calibration targets for establishing the ground resolution of sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar shall consist of arrays of trihedral corner reflectors whose configuration shall be in accordance with the methodologies determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. 5. Each State Party shall provide all other States Parties with a diagram of the calibration targets that it intends to use for the purpose of in-flight examination. Such diagrams shall be annotated with the overall dimensions of the calibration targets, their locations and the type of terrain on which they are deployed, as well as the information appropriate to each type of calibration target as determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. Section II. Conduct of In-flight Examination 1. In order to establish the ground resolution of panoramic or vertically-installed framing cameras, the line of flight of the observation aircraft shall be directly over and parallel to the calibration target. In order to establish the ground resolution of obliquely-installed framing cameras, the line of flight of the observation aircraft shall be parallel to the calibration target at a range such that the image of the calibration target appears in the foreground of the field of view of the optical camera set at its maximum angle measured from the horizontal or minimum angle measured from the vertical. 2. In order to establish the ground resolution of an infra-red line-scanning device, the line of flight of the observation aircraft shall be directly over and parallel to the calibration target at an agreed range of heights above ground level. 3. In order to establish the ground resolution of a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, the line of flight of the observation aircraft shall be to the side of the array of the corner reflectors. Section III. Analysis of Data Collected during the In-flight Examination 1. Following the in-flight examination, the State Party conducting the certification and the States Parties taking part in the certification shall jointly analyse the data collected during the in-flight examination pursuant to Annex D, Section IV, paragraph 1 to the Treaty. 2.The methodology for calculating the minimum height above ground level at which each optical camera installed on the observation aircraft may be operated during an observation flight, including the value of the contrast ratio or the equivalent modulation to be used in this calculation, which shall be not less than 1.6:1 (correspondingly 0.23) and not greater than 4:1 (correspondingly 0.6),

864  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

shall be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application and prior to 30 June 1992. The ground resolution of optical cameras shall be determined from a visual analysis of the image of the calibration target on the original film negative.The numerical value of ground resolution shall be equal to the width of the smallest bar of the calibration target that is distinguishable as a separate bar. 3.The methodology for calculating the minimum height above ground level at which each video camera installed on the observation aircraft may be operated during an observation flight shall be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. 4.The methodology for calculating the minimum height above ground level at which an infra-red line-scanning device installed on the observation aircraft may be operated during an observation flight, including the value of the minimum resolvable temperature difference to be used in this calculation, shall be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. 5.The methodology for calculating the ground resolution of a sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, including the determination of the relationship between the impulse response method and the object separation method, shall be determined within the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application. Annex E. Procedures for Arrivals and Departures 1. Each State Party shall designate one or more points of entry, one or more points of exit, and one or more Open Skies airfields on its territory. Points of entry and points of exit may or may not be the same as the Open Skies airfields. Unless otherwise agreed, if an Open Skies airfield is different from a point of entry, the Open Skies airfield shall be designated so that the observing Party can reach the Open Skies airfield within five hours from the point of entry either in its own observation aircraft or in transportation provided by the observed Party.The observing Party, after arriving at a point of entry or an Open Skies airfield, shall have the right to a rest period, subject to the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty. 2. Each State Party shall have the right to designate entry fixes and exit fixes. If a State Party elects to designate entry fixes and exit fixes, such fixes shall facilitate flight from the territory of the observing Party to the point of entry of the observed Party. Planned flights between entry fixes and points of entry and between points of exit and exit fixes shall be conducted in accordance with published ICAO standards and recommended practices and national regulations. In the event that portions of the flights between entry fixes and points of entry or between points of exit and exit fixes lie in international airspace, the flight through international airspace shall be conducted in accordance with published international regulations. 3. Information on points of entry and points of exit, Open Skies airfields, entry fixes and exit fixes, refuelling airfields, and calibration targets shall initially be as specified in Appendix 1 to this Annex. 4.A State Party shall have the right to introduce changes to Appendix 1 to this Annex by notifying all other States Parties of such changes, in writing, no less than 90 days before such changes become effective. 5. Each State Party shall ensure effective observation of its entire territory as follows: (A) for its mainland territory, Open Skies airfields shall be designated in such a way that no point on its territory is farther from one or more such airfields than 35 percent of the maximum flight distance or distances established for that State Party in accordance with Annex A to the Treaty; (B) for portions of its territory that are separated from the mainland territory: (1) that State Party shall apply the provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  865

(2) in the event that the portion or portions of the territory are separated from the mainland territory by more than 600 kilometres, or if agreed between that State Party and the observing Party, or if otherwise provided for in Annex A, that State Party shall provide special procedures, including the possible use of refuelling airfields; or (3) in the event that a portion or portions of the territory are separated from the mainland territory by less than 600 kilometres, and such portion or portions of the territory are not covered by the provisions of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, that State Party may specify a separate maximum flight distance in Annex A to cover such portion or portions of its territory. 6. Immediately upon the arrival of an observation aircraft at the point of entry, and immediately prior to the departure of an observation aircraft from the point of exit, both the observed and observing Parties shall inspect the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors installed in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 4. In the event that the point of entry is different from the Open Skies airfield from which the observation flight commences, both the observed and observing Parties shall inspect the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors immediately prior to departure of the observation aircraft from the point of entry en route to the Open Skies airfield from which the observation flight commences. In the event that the point of exit is different from the Open Skies airfield at which the observation flight terminates, both the observed and observing Parties shall inspect the covers for sensor apertures or other devices that inhibit the operation of sensors immediately prior to departure of the observation aircraft from such airfield en route to the point of exit. 7.A State Party shall have the right to conduct an examination and inventory of the items of equipment that the other State Party intends to use for the purpose of conducting a pre-flight inspection of sensors and, if applicable, the observation aircraft, as well as items that the flight representatives intend to bring on board the observation aircraft.This examination and inventory: (A) shall begin no later than one hour after arrival of such items at the point of entry or the Open Skies airfield, at the choice of the State Party conducting the inventory, and shall be completed within one hour; and (B) shall be carried out in the presence of one or more designated individuals of the other State Party. 8. If, during the examination and inventory of the items of equipment to be used in the sensor inspection and, if applicable, observation aircraft inspection, as well as the items that the flight representatives intend to bring on board the observation aircraft, the State Party conducting the examination and inventory determines that the items do not conform to the list of authorized equipment contained in Annex D, Section II, paragraph 5, or to the items described in Annex G, Section I, paragraph 4, it shall have the right to deny permission for the use of such items. Items so identified that are brought into the territory of the observed Party by the observing Party shall be, unless otherwise agreed: (A) placed in a sealed container for safekeeping; and (B) subsequently removed from the territory of the observed Party at the earliest opportunity, but not later than the departure of the observing Party from the territory of the observed Party. 9. In the event that the observing Party travels to the point of entry specified in the notification provided in accordance with Article VI, Section I, paragraph 5 of this Treaty, using a transport aircraft registered with the observing Party or with another State Party, the transport aircraft shall be permitted: (A) to depart from the territory of the observed Party; (B) in the event that the point of entry is the same as the point of exit, to remain at the point of entry until departure of the observing Party from the territory of the observed Party; or

866  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

(C) in the event that the point of entry is not the same as the point of exit, to fly to the point of exit in sufficient time for further crew rest prior to departure of all the personnel of the observing Party from the territory of the observed Party. 10. In the event that the observation aircraft is provided by the observed Party and the observing Party does not use its own transport aircraft for transporting its personnel from the point of entry to the Open Skies airfield, the observed Party shall ensure that the personnel of the observing Party are transported from the point of entry to the Open Skies airfield and from the Open Skies airfield to the point of exit. Appendix 1 to Annex E Section I. Designation of Sites The sites to be used as points of entry, points of exit, Open Skies airfields, refuelling airfields, calibration targets, and, if applicable, entry fixes and exit fixes are initially as specified in Section II of this Appendix.The designation includes: (A) Site: name of point of entry, point of exit, Open Skies airfield, entry fix, exit fix, refuelling airfield, and calibration target; (B) Location: latitude and longitude of the respective site, to the nearest second; and (C) Inspection: whether or not the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft or the sensors can be conducted at this site. Section II. Points of Entry, Points of Exit, Open Skies Airfields, Entry Fixes, Exit Fixes, Refuelling Airfields, and Calibration Targets SITE OF AIRCRAFT/SENSORS LOCATION INSPECTION State Party:The Federal Republic of Germany Point of Entry/Exit Köln/Bonn (EDDK) Open Skies Airfields Wunstorf (EDNW) Landsberg/Lech (EDSA) Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets Köln/Bonn State Party:The United States of America Points of Entry/Exit Washington DullesInternational, DC Travis AFB, California Open Skies Airfields Washington Dulles International, DC Travis AFB, California Elmendorf AFB, Alaska Lincoln Municipal, Nebraska Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Honolulu International, Hawaii Malmstrom AFB, Montana Phoenix-Sky Harbor International, Arizona

N 50-52-02, E 007-08-37

Yes

N 52-27-48, E 009-25-70 N 48-04-28, E 010-54-42 To be determined

No No

To be determined

N 38-56-36,W 077-27-24 N 38-15-48,W 121-55-48

Yes Yes

N 38-56-36,W 077-27-24 N 38-15-48,W 121-55-48 N 61-15-12,W 149-47-30 N 40-51-00,W 096-45-30 To be determined

Yes Yes Yes No

N 21-19-06,W 157-55-24 N 47-30-18,W 111-11-00 N 33-26-12,W 112-00-24

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  867

General Mitchell International,Wisconsin McGhee Tyson,Tennessee Calibration Targets Washington Dulles Travis AFB Elmendorf AFB

N 42-56-48,W 087-53-36 N 35-48,W 083-59-36-48 To be determined To be determined To be determined

State Party: Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of States Parties Points of Entry/Exit Kubinka N 55-36-30, E 036-39-10 Ulan-Ude N 51-48-00, E 107-27-00 Open Skies Airfields Kubinka N 55-36-30, E 036-39-10 Ulan-Ude N 51-48-00, E 107-27-00 Magadan N 59-54-06, E 150-03-01 Vorkuta N 67-29-00, E 063-59-00 Entry/Exit Fixes To be determined Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets State Party: Benelux Point of Entry/Exit Zaventem/ Melsbroek Open Skies Airfield Zaventem/ Melsbroek Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets Volkel State Party: Republic of Bulgaria Point of Entry/Exit Sofia Open Skies Airfields Sofia Burgas Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Sofia Burgas Calibration Targets State Party: Canada Point of Entry/Exit Ottawa(CYOW) Open Skies Airfields Ottawa Iqaluit Yellowknife Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Edmonton Halifax Winnipeg Churchill

Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

N 50-54-01,W 004-59-09

Yes

N 50-54-01,W 004-59-09 To be determined

Yes

N 54-39-03,W 005-42-02

N 42-41-07, E 023-24-05

Yes

N 42-41-07, E 023-24-05 N 42-34-00, E 027-30-00 To be determined

Yes No

N 42-41-07, E 023-24-05 N 42-34-00, E 027-30-00

N 45-19-21,W 075-40-10

Yes

N 45-19-21,W 075-40-10 N 63-45-22,W 068-33-25 N 62-27-45,W 114-26-20 To be determined

Yes No No

N 53-18-35,W 113-34-43 N 44-52-51,W 063-30-33 N 49-54-39,W 097-14-35 N 58-44-13,W 094-03-26

868  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

Calibration Targets Ottawa area State Party:The Kingdom of Denmark Points of Entry/Exit Copenhagen International Airport (EKCH) Military Airfield Vaerloese (EKVL) Open Skies Airfield Military Airfield Vaerloese Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Vagar Airport (EKVG) Soendre Stroemfjord International Airport (BGSF) Calibration Targets Military Airfield Vaerloese State Party:The Kingdom of Spain Point of Entry/Exit Getafe Point of Entry/Exit FOR CANARY ISLANDS Gando Open Skies Airfields Getafe Valencia Valladolid Moron Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets State Party:The French Republic Point of Entry/Exit Orleans-Bricy Open Skies Airfields Orleans-Bricy Toulouse-Blagnac Nice-Côte d’Azur Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets

To be determined

N 55-37-07, E 012-39-26

No

N 55-46-09, E 012-19-34

Yes

N 55-46-09, E 012-19-34 To be determined

Yes

N 62-03-51,W 007-16-26 N 67-01-05,W 050-41-39 N 55-46-09, E 012-19-34

N 40-17-43,W 003-43-21

Yes

N 27-55-49,W 015-23-05

Yes

N 40-17-43,W 003-43-21 N 39-29-26,W 000-28-50 N 41-42-26,W 004-51-02 N 37-10-34,W 005-36-53 To be determined Nil

Yes No No No

N 47-59-12, E 001-45-43

Yes

N 47-59-12, E 001-45-43 N 43-37-26, E 001-22-53 N 43-39-47, E 007-12-09 To be determined Nil

Yes No No

State Party:The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Points of Entry/Exit Brize Norton N 51-44-97,W 001-34-93 Yes Heathrow N 51-28-72,W 000-27-47 No Note: Heathrow is for arrival of personnel on scheduled passenger services only. Not for observation or transport aircraft. Open Skies Airfields Brize Norton N 51-44-97,W 001-34-93 Yes Scampton N 53-18-45,W 000-32-95 Yes Leuchars N 55-22-38,W 000-52-03 Yes Entry/Exit Fixes To be determined by FAA Refuelling Airfields Nil

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  869

Calibration Targets Boscombe Down State Party:The Hellenic Republic Point of Entry/Exit Thessaloniki International Open Skies Airfields Thessaloniki International Elefsis Entry/Exit fix Chouchouligovo Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets State Party:The Republic of Hungary Points of Entry/Exit Budapest/Ferihegy (LHBP) Tokol (LHTL) Open Skies Airfields Budapest/Ferihegy (LHBP) Tokol (LHTL) Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields None Calibration Targets State Party:The Republic of Iceland Point of Entry/Exit Keflavik Open Skies Airfields Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets State Party:The Republic of Italy Points of Entry/Exit Milano-Malpensa Palermo-Punta Raisi Open Skies Airfields Milano-Malpensa Palermo-Punta Raisi Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields The above-mentioned Open Skies airfields Calibration Targets State Party:The Kingdom of Norway Point of Entry/Exit Oslo-Gardermoen (ENGM) Open Skies Airfields Oslo-Gardermoen (ENGM) Tromsoe-Langnes (ENTC) Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Trondheim-Vaernes (ENVA)

N 51-09-10,W 001-44-76

N 40-27-22, E 022-59-21

Yes

N 40-27-22 E 022-59-21 N 38-04-00, E 023-33-38

Yes Yes

N 41-24-40, E 023-22-02

N 47-26-18, E 019-15-48 N 47-21-14, E 018-58-08

Yes Yes

N 47-26-18, E 019-15-48 N 47-21-14, E 018-58-08 To be determined

Yes Yes

To be determined

N 63-59-48,W 022-36-30 N 63-59-07,W 022-36-20 To be determined

Yes

N 45-38-00, E 008-44-00 N 38-10-40, E 013-05-20

Yes Yes

N 45-38-00, E 008-44-00 N 38-10-40, E 013-05-20 To be determined

Yes Yes

N 60-12-10, E 011-05-08

Yes

N 60-12-10, E 011-05-08 N 69-40-53, E 018-55-10 To be determined

Yes No

N 63-27-29, E 010-55-33

870  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

Calibration Targets State Party:The Republic of Poland Point of Entry/Exit Warszawa-Okecie Open Skies Airfield Warszawa-Okecie Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets State Party:The Portuguese Republic Point of Entry/Exit Lisboa International Open Skies Airfields Sta. Maria Porto Santo Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Lisboa International Sta. Maria International Porto Santo Calibration Targets Lisboa International State Party: Romania Points of Entry/Exit Bucharest-Otopeni International Airport Timisoara Airport Open Skies Airfields Bucharest-Otopeni International Airport Timisoara Airport Bacau Airport Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Bucharest-Otopeni International Airport Timisoara Airport Calibration Targets Urlati Dunavat Nord Murighiol State Party:The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Point of Entry/Exit Praha International Open Skies Airfields Praha International Bratislava International Kosice International Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Bratislava International Kosice International

N 52-13-10, E 021-01-10

Yes

N 52-13-10, E 021-01-10 To be determined

Yes

N 38-46-22,W 009-07-58

Yes

N 36-58-22,W 025-10-17 N 33-04-01,W 016-20-44 To be determined

No No

N 38-46-22,W 009-07-58 N 36-58-22,W 025-10-17 N 33-04-01,W 016-20-44 To be determined

N 44-34-30, E 026-05-10

Yes

N 45-48-37, E 021-20-22

Yes

N 44-34-30, E 026-05-10

Yes

N 45-48-37, E 021-20-22 N 46-31-19, E 026-54-41 To be determined

Yes No

N 44-34-30, E 026-05-10 N 45-48-37, E 021-20-22 N 45-55-45, E 026-05-11 N 45-02-10, E 029-13-20

N 50-06-10, E 014-15-40

Yes

N 50-06-10, E 014-15-40 N 49-10-10, E 017-12-50 N 48-40-10, E 021-14-40 To be determined

Yes No No

N 49-10-10, E 017-12-50 N 48-40-10, E 021-14-40

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  871

Calibration Targets Praha International State Party:The Republic of Turkey Points of Entry/Exit Eskisehir Diyarbakir Open Skies Airfields Eskisehir Diyarbakir Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Calibration Targets Eskisehir Diyarbakir State Party: Ukraine Point of Entry/Exit Borispol/Kiev Open Skies Airfield Borispol/Kiev Entry/Exit Fixes Refuelling Airfields Lvov Odessa Calibration Targets

To be determined

N 39-47-00, E 030-35-00 N 30-50-00, E 040-05-00

Yes Yes

N 39-47-00, E 030-35-00 N 30-50-00, E 040-05-00 To be determined To be determined To be determined

Yes Yes

To be determined

N 50-20-07, E 030-53-07

Yes

N 50-20-07, E 030-53-07 To be determined

Yes

N 49-48-07, E 023-57-03 N 46-25-06, E 030-40-07

Annex F. Pre-flight Inspections and Demonstration Flights Section I. Pre-flight Inspection of Observation Aircraft and Sensors of the Observing Party 1. The purpose of the pre-flight inspection of observation aircraft and sensors provided by the observing Party is to confirm that the observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. The observed Party shall have the right to conduct a pre-flight inspection of an observation aircraft and its sensors provided by the observing Party to confirm that: (A) the observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment including, where applicable, lens and photographic film, correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty; and (B) there are no items of equipment on board the observation aircraft other than those permitted by Article IV of the Treaty. 2. Upon arrival of the observation aircraft at the point of entry the observed Party shall: (A) provide a list of the inspectors, the number of whom shall not exceed ten persons, unless otherwise agreed, including the general function of each of the inspectors; (B) provide a list of the items of equipment that they intend to use during the pre-flight inspection provided for in Annex D, Section II, paragraph 5 to the Treaty; and (C) inform the observing Party of its plan for the pre-flight inspection of the observation aircraft and its sensors. 3. Prior to the commencement of the pre-flight inspection, a designated individual from the observing Party shall:

872  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

(A) brief the observed Party on the inventory procedures which shall be followed to confirm that all inspection equipment, as well as any non-destructive-testing equipment as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Section, brought on board the observation aircraft by the inspectors has been removed from the observation aircraft upon conclusion of the pre-flight inspection; (B) together with the inspectors, conduct an examination and inventory of each item of equipment to be used during the pre-flight inspection; and (C) brief the inspectors on all safety precautions that they shall observe during the pre-flight inspection of the observation aircraft and its sensors. 4.The pre-flight inspection shall not begin until the completion of the formal arrival procedures and shall take no longer than eight hours. 5.The observing Party shall have the right to provide its own escorts to accompany the inspectors throughout the pre-flight inspection of the observation aircraft and its sensors to confirm that the inspection is conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section.The observing Party shall facilitate the inspection in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex D, Section II, paragraphs 7 and 8 to the Treaty. 6. In conducting the pre-flight inspection, the inspectors shall have the right of access to the observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment, in the same manner as provided for in Annex D, Section II, paragraph 10, and shall comply with the provisions of Annex D, Section II, paragraphs 11 and 12 to the Treaty. 7. For the purposes of this inspection, the observed Party shall have the right to take on board and use the following non-destructive-testing equipment: (A) video probe (borescope on video camera); (B) X-ray and backscatter X-ray imaging equipment; (C) ultrasonic imaging equipment; (D) logic/data analyser; (E) passive infra-red sensors; and (F) 35 millimetre camera. In addition, the observed Party shall have the right to take on board and use such other nondestructive-testing equipment as may be necessary to establish that no items of equipment are on board the observation aircraft other than those permitted by Article IV of the Treaty, as may be agreed by the Open Skies Consultative Commission prior to 30 June 1992. 8. Upon completion of the pre-flight inspection, the inspectors shall leave the observation aircraft, and the observing Party shall have the right to use its own inventory procedures to confirm that all inspection equipment used during the pre-flight inspection has been removed from the observation aircraft. If the observed Party is unable to demonstrate this to the satisfaction of the observing Party, the observing Party shall have the right to proceed with the observation flight or to cancel it, and when the observing Party is satisfied that it is safe to do so, depart from the territory of the observed Party. In the latter case, no observation flight shall be recorded against the quota of either State Party. 9.The inspectors shall immediately inform the observing Party if they establish that the observation aircraft, its sensors or associated equipment do not correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty, or that there are items of equipment on board the observation aircraft other than those permitted by Article IV of the Treaty. If the observing Party is unable to demonstrate that the observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty and that there are no items of equipment on board the observation aircraft other than those permitted by

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  873

Article IV of the Treaty, and if the observing and observed Parties do not agree otherwise, the observed Party shall have the right to prohibit the observation flight pursuant to ArticleVIII of the Treaty. If the observation flight is prohibited, the observation aircraft shall promptly depart from the territory of the observed Party and no observation flight shall be recorded against the quota of either State Party. 10. Upon completion of the pre-flight inspection of the observation aircraft and its sensors, the observed and observing Parties shall prepare a pre-flight inspection report which shall state that: (A) the observation aircraft, its sensors and associated equipment correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty; and (B) there are no items of equipment on board the observation aircraft other than those permitted by Article IV of the Treaty. 11. Signature of the pre-flight inspection report by the observed Party shall signify its agreement for the observing Party to use that observation aircraft to conduct an observation flight over the territory of the observed Party. Section II. Pre-flight Inspection of Sensors of the Observed Party 1. The purpose of the pre-flight inspection of the sensors on an observation aircraft provided by the observed Party is to confirm that the sensors and associated equipment correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. The observing Party shall have the right to conduct a pre-flight inspection of the sensors and associated equipment installed on an observation aircraft provided by the observed Party to confirm that its sensors and associated equipment correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. 2. Upon arrival of the inspectors of the observing Party at the location of the pre-flight inspection, the observing Party shall: (A) provide a list of the inspectors, the number of whom shall not exceed five persons, unless otherwise agreed, including the general function of each inspector; (B) provide a list of the items of equipment that the inspectors intend to use during the preflight inspection; and (C) inform the observed Party of its plan for the pre-flight inspection of the sensors and associated equipment on board the observation aircraft. 3. Prior to the commencement of the pre-flight inspection, a designated individual from the observed Party shall: (A) brief the observing Party on the inventory procedures that shall be followed to confirm that each item of equipment brought on board the observation aircraft by the inspectors has been removed from the observation aircraft upon conclusion of the pre-flight inspection; (B) together with the inspectors, conduct an examination and inventory of each item of equipment to be used during the pre-flight inspection; and (C) brief the inspectors on all necessary safety precautions that they must observe during the pre-flight inspection of the sensors and associated equipment installed on the observation aircraft. 4.The pre-flight inspection shall not begin until the completion of the formal arrival procedures and shall take no longer than eight hours. 5.The observed Party shall have the right to provide its own escorts to accompany the inspectors throughout the pre-flight inspection of the sensors and associated equipment on board the observation aircraft to confirm that the inspection is conducted in accordance with the provisions of this

874  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

Section.The observed Party shall facilitate the inspection of the sensors and associated equipment on board the observation aircraft by the inspectors in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex D, Section II, paragraph 7 to the Treaty. 6. In conducting the pre-flight inspection, the inspectors shall have the right of access to the sensors and associated equipment on board the observation aircraft in the same manner as provided for in Annex D, Section II, paragraph 10 and shall comply with the provisions of Annex D, Section II, paragraphs 11 and 12 to the Treaty. 7. Upon completion of the pre-flight inspection, the inspectors shall leave the observation aircraft and the observed Party shall have the right to use its own inventory procedures to confirm that all items of equipment have been removed from the observation aircraft. If the observing Party is unable to demonstrate this to the satisfaction of the observed Party, the observed Party shall have the right to prohibit the observation flight in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty, and no observation flight shall be recorded against the quota of either State Party. 8. The inspectors shall immediately inform the observed Party if they establish that any of the sensors or associated equipment on board the observation aircraft do not correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. If the observed Party is unable to demonstrate that the sensors or associated equipment on board the observation aircraft correspond to those certified in accordance with Annex D to the Treaty, the observing Party shall have the right to: (A) agree to use an alternative package of sensor types or capabilities proposed by the observed Party; (B) proceed according to the original mission plan; (C) accept a delay in the commencement of the observation flight to permit the observed Party to rectify the problem determined to exist by the observing Party pursuant to this paragraph. In the event that the problem is resolved to the satisfaction of the observing Party, the flight shall proceed according to the mission plan, revised as necessary due to any delay. In the event that the problem is not rectified to the satisfaction of the observing Party, the observing Party shall depart the territory of the observed Party; or (D) cancel the observation flight, and immediately depart the territory of the observed Party. 9. If the observing Party leaves the territory of the observed Party not having conducted an observation flight, as provided for in paragraph 8, subparagraphs (C) and (D) of this Section, no observation flight shall be counted against the quota of either State Party. 10. Upon completion of the pre-flight inspection of the sensors and associated equipment installed on the observation aircraft, the observed Party and the observing Party shall prepare a pre-flight inspection report that shall state that the sensors correspond to those certified in accordance with the provisions of Annex D to the Treaty. Signature of the pre-flight inspection report by the observing Party shall signify its agreement to use that observation aircraft to conduct an observation flight over the territory of the observed Party. Section III. Demonstration Flights 1. In the event that the aircraft is provided by the observing Party, at the request of the observed Party, the observing Party shall, following the pre-flight inspection, conduct a demonstration flight to allow the inspectors to observe the functioning of the sensors that are to be used during the observation flight and to collect sufficient data to allow them to confirm that the capability of those sensors is in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 8 of the Treaty. 2. In the event that the aircraft is provided by the observed Party, at the request of the observing Party, the observed Party shall, following the pre-flight inspection, conduct a demonstration flight to allow the inspectors to observe the functioning of the sensors that are to be used during the

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  875

observation flight and to collect sufficient data to allow them to confirm that the capability of those sensors is in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 9 of the Treaty. 3. In the event that either the observed or observing Party exercises its right to request a demonstration flight: (A) the demonstration flight shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of Annex D, Section III; (B) the demonstration flight shall last for no more than two hours; (C) the observed Party shall provide calibration targets in accordance with the specifications in Appendix 1 to Annex D to the Treaty in the vicinity of the airfield at which the pre-flight inspection is to be conducted; (D) any delay in carrying out a request for a demonstration flight caused by weather conditions or problems with the aircraft or sensors of the observed Party shall not count against the time allocated for such flights, unless otherwise agreed; (E) the observed Party shall process the data collected by sensors at a facility in the vicinity of the airfield at which the pre-flight inspection is to be conducted, in the presence of personnel of the observing Party, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX, Sections II and III of the Treaty; and (F) the cost of the demonstration flight, including the provision of data recording media and the processing of data, shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Annex L, Section I, paragraph 9 to the Treaty. 4. In the event that the observed Party exercises its right to request a demonstration flight, the observing Party shall have the right to add a period of up to 24 hours to the 96 hours allowed for the conduct of the observation flight, pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 9.This shall not affect the right of other States Parties to conduct observation flights after the original period of 96 hours as provided for in Article VI, Section I, paragraph 3 of the Treaty. 5. In the event that the observing Party exercises its right to request a demonstration flight, this shall be accomplished within the period of 96 hours allowed for the conduct of the observation flight, pursuant to Article VI, Section I, paragraph 9 of the Treaty. 6. In the event that the observed Party is not satisfied that the capability of any sensor installed on the observation aircraft provided by the observing Party is in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 8 of the Treaty, the observed Party shall have the right to: (A) in the case of a sensor for which ground resolution is dependent upon height above ground level, propose an alternative minimum height above ground level at which that sensor shall be permitted to be operated during the observation flight; (B) in the case of sensors for which ground resolution is not dependent upon height above ground level, prohibit the operation of that sensor during the observation flight; or (C) prohibit the observation flight pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII of the Treaty. 7. In the event that the observing Party is not satisfied that the capability of any sensor installed on the observation aircraft provided by the observed Party is in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 9 of the Treaty, the observing Party shall have the right to: (A) agree to use an alternative package of sensor types or capabilities proposed by the observed Party; (B) in the case of a sensor for which ground resolution is dependent upon height above ground level, propose an alternative minimum height above ground level at which that sensor shall be permitted to be operated during the observation flight;

876  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

(C) in the case of sensors for which ground resolution is not dependent upon height above ground level, conduct the observation flight as planned, and the cost of the data recording media for that sensor shall be borne by the observed Party; (D) accept a delay in the commencement of the observation flight to permit the observed Party to rectify the problem determined to exist by the observing Party. In the event that the problem is resolved to the satisfaction of the observing Party, the flight shall proceed according to the mission plan, revised as necessary due to any delay. In the event that the problem is not rectified to the satisfaction of the observing Party, the observing Party shall depart the territory of the observed Party; or (E) cancel the observation flight pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, and immediately depart the territory of the observed Party. 8. In the event that the observation flight is prohibited or cancelled by the State Party requesting the demonstration flight, no observation flight shall be counted against the quota of either State Party, and the State Party requesting the demonstration flight shall convey the matter to the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Annex G. Flight Monitors, Flight Representatives, and Representatives Section I. Flight Monitors and Flight Representatives 1. The provisions set forth in this Annex shall apply to personnel designated in accordance with Article XIII. Each State Party shall have the right to have at any one time the number of flight monitors and flight representatives on board the observation aircraft as set forth in Article VI, Section III.The provisions of that Section shall govern their activities with respect to the organization and conduct of observation flights. Each State Party shall facilitate the activities of the flight monitors and flight representatives pursuant to this Annex. 2. The observed Party shall appoint one of the flight monitors as chief flight monitor. The chief flight monitor shall be a national of the observed Party.The observing Party shall appoint one of the flight representatives as chief flight representative. The chief flight representative shall be a national of the observing Party. 3. In preparing for the observation flight, flight monitors and flight representatives shall have the right: (A) to acquaint themselves with the technical literature relating to the functioning and operation of the sensors and the flight operation manual of the observation aircraft; and (B) to acquaint themselves with the equipment of the observation aircraft relating to the control of the flight regime and the functioning and operation of the sensors installed on the observation aircraft. 4. Flight monitors and flight representatives shall have the right: (A) to remain on board the observation aircraft throughout the observation flight, including any stops for refuelling or emergencies; (B) to bring on board the observation aircraft and use maps, flight charts, publications, and operations manuals; (C) to move unencumbered about the observation aircraft, including the flight deck, during the observation flight, except for flight safety reasons. In exercising their rights, the flight monitors or flight representatives shall not interfere with the activities of the flight crew; (D) to monitor compliance with the flight plan and to observe the flight regime of the observation aircraft and the functioning and operation of the sensors;

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  877

(E) to listen to internal and external radio communications on board the aircraft and to make internal radio communications; and (F) to record the parameters of the flight regime and the functioning and operation of the sensors on maps, charts, and notepads. 5. In addition to those rights specified in paragraph 4 of this Section, the chief flight monitor shall have the right: (A) to consult the flight crew regarding compliance with national flight rules and the provisions of the Treaty; (B) to observe the activities of the flight crew, including activities on the flight deck, during the observation flight, as well as to monitor the functioning and operation of the flight and navigation instruments of the observation aircraft; (C) to provide recommendations to the flight crew regarding compliance with the flight plan; (D) to ask the flight crew, without interfering with their activities, for information on the flight regime; and (E) to communicate with air traffic control authorities, as appropriate, and to help relay and interpret communications from air traffic control authorities to flight crew and from the flight crew to the air traffic control authorities about the conduct of the observation flight; for this purpose, the chief flight monitor shall be permitted to make external radio communications using the radio equipment of the observation aircraft. 6. In the event that the chief flight monitor believes that the observation aircraft is deviating from its flight plan, the chief flight monitor shall advise the flight crew and may inform the air traffic control authorities of any deviations of the observation aircraft from the flight plan that the chief flight monitor believes could threaten flight safety. 7. In addition to the rights specified in paragraph 5 of this Section, the chief flight representative shall have: (A) the rights as described in paragraph 5, subparagraphs (A), (B) and (D) of this Section with regard to the flight crew; and (B) the right, in case of deviation from the flight plan, to receive an explanation from the flight crew as to the reasons for such a deviation. 8. Flight representatives shall have the right to direct the operation of the sensors during the observation flight. In addition, upon notification to the observed Party prior to the commencement of the observation flight, flight representatives shall have the right to operate the sensors during the observation flight. In the event that the flight representatives exercise their right to operate the sensors pursuant to this paragraph, the observed Party shall not be responsible for any failure or inadequacy in the quality of the data collected by the sensors due to the operation of the sensors by the flight representatives. Section II. Representatives 1. An observing Party using an observation aircraft designated by a third State Party shall have the right to have at any one time the number of representatives on board the observation aircraft set forth in Article VI, Section III of the Treaty. 2. The observing Party shall appoint one of its representatives as chief representative. The chief representative shall have the rights of the chief flight representative as specified in Section I of this Annex. In addition, the chief representative shall: (A) advise the pilot-in-command regarding compliance with the provisions of the Treaty;

878  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

(B) have the right to monitor compliance by the observed Party with the provisions of the Treaty; and (C) have the right, in case of deviations from the flight plan, to receive an explanation from the pilot-in-command as to the reasons for such a deviation. 3. Representatives shall have the rights of flight representatives as specified in Section I of this Annex. Annex H. Co-ordination of Planned Observation Flights 1. In order to avoid potential time conflicts regarding the conduct of observation flights over the same State Party, each State Party having the right to conduct observation flights following the annual distribution of active quotas may notify all other States Parties, no later than 1 November of each year, of its plans to utilize all or part of its active quota during the following year.The notification shall indicate the number of observation flights that the notifying State Party plans to conduct over the territory of other States Parties during each quarter of that year. 2. In no case shall the total number of observation flights planned and notified in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex over the territory of any one State Party during a given quarter exceed 16. Except as provided for in Article VI, Section I, paragraph 3, no State Party shall be obliged to accept more than one observation flight at any time during the period specified in Article VI, Section I, paragraph 9 of the Treaty. 3. States Parties that have notified, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, their plans to utilize one or more active quotas for observation flights over the territory of the same State Party during a given quarter or quarters shall hold consultations, if necessary, to avoid any conflict in their planned observation flights. In the event that agreement on avoidance of conflict cannot be reached through consultation among the States Parties involved, the issue shall be resolved by the drawing of lots by such States Parties. The first of those consultations, regarding observation flights in the quarter beginning 1 January of the following year, shall begin promptly following receipt of the notification provided for in paragraph 1 of this Annex. Subsequent consultations among the States Parties involved shall be conducted between 1 February and 15 February for the quarter beginning 1 April; between 1 May and 15 May for the quarter beginning 1 July; and between 1 August and 15 August for the quarter beginning 1 October. The States Parties involved shall notify the resulting sequence of observation flights established in these consultations to all States Parties no later than 15 November, 15 February, 15 May and 15 August, respectively. 4. No later than seven days after the notification of the sequence of observation flights established pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Annex, each State Party shall notify all States Parties planning to conduct observation flights over its territory during that quarter of each flight for which it intends to exercise the right to provide its own observation aircraft. 5. Each State Party that has not provided a notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex or has not notified its plans to utilize all of its active quotas, or has not conducted an observation flight during the quarter for which it had notified such planned flight, shall have the right to utilize such remaining active quotas, provided that such observation flights have been accommodated within the existing agreement reached pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Annex. Annex I. Information on Airspace and Flights In Hazardous Airspace 1. No earlier than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, at the request of any other State Party, a State Party shall provide, no later than 30 days after the receipt of such a request, the following information in accordance with ICAO provisions: (A) its airspace structure, as published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) series; (B) detailed information on all hazardous airspace; and

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  879

(C) airfield information and arrival and departure procedures for each of its: (1) points of entry and points of exit; (2) Open Skies airfields; and (3) alternate airfields and refuelling airfields for its points of entry, points of exit, and Open Skies airfields. 2. Each State Party shall promptly notify States Parties that have requested information in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Annex of any changes to the information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) need not be provided. 3. No later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of the source of the information to be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex. Annex J. Montreux Convention 1. Observation flights conducted under the provisions of the Treaty providing for the observation of the entire territory of States Parties shall not prejudice the Montreux Convention of 20 July 1936. 2. The routing and notification of transit flights of aircraft for the purpose of the Treaty falling within the scope of Article 23 of the Montreux Convention shall be governed by the provisions of that Article. Annex K. Information on Film Processors, Duplicators and Hotographic Films, and Procedures for Monitoring the Processing of Photographic Film Section I. Information on Film Processors, Duplicators and Photographic Films 1. Pursuant to Annex D, Section II, paragraph 3, subparagraph (A) (3) to the Treaty, each State Party, when notifying other States Parties of film processors or duplicators that it intends to use to develop original film negatives or produce duplicate film positives or negatives, shall provide the following manufacturer’s information: (A) the processor or duplicator name; (B) the maximum and minimum width and length, if applicable, of film which may be processed or duplicated; (C) each type of film that may be processed or duplicated in that film processor; and (D) each step in the process, including the range of exposure, temperature, duration, recommended film transport speed, chemicals and chemical mixes, for each type of film. 2. Pursuant to Annex D, Section II, paragraph 3, subparagraph (A) (2) to the Treaty, each State Party, when providing information on the types of black and white aerial film that it intends to use to collect data during the in-flight examination or an observation flight, or to duplicate such data, shall provide the following manufacturer’s information, for each type of aerial film that may be processed or duplicated by means of the film processors or duplicators referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, as necessary to confirm the capabilities of the film. Depending upon national practices of the film manufacturer, such information may include: (A) effective film speed; (B) resolution/modulation (C) spectral sensitivity; and

880  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

(D) optical specular density or sensitometric characteristics. 3. For the purposes of determining the sensitometric characteristics of aerial film materials in accordance with its own national methodology, each State Party shall have the right to receive, upon request, unexposed samples of all types of photographic film to be used as data recording media, the chemicals for processing them, and to receive instructions for processing and duplication of such photographic films. Such samples and instructions shall be provided no later than 30 days after receipt of such a request. Section II. Monitoring of Film Processing and Duplication 1. States Parties taking part in the certification of an observation aircraft and its sensors shall have the right to monitor the processing and duplication of the aerial film used during the in-flight examination. Personnel of the observed and observing Party shall have the right to monitor the processing and duplication of the aerial film used during a demonstration and observation flight. 2.While monitoring the processing and duplication of aerial film, the States Parties shall have the right to bring with them and use, in a manner that does not disrupt the processing or duplication of the film, the following equipment: (A) litmus papers; (B) thermometers; (C) chemical test equipment, including pH meters and hydrometers; (D) stopwatches; (E) sensitometers; (F) densitometers; and (G) 21-step sensitometric test strips and optical wedges. 3. Prior to the processing of the films exposed during the in-flight examination, demonstration flight and observation flight, States Parties shall check the film processing equipment and chemicals by processing a 21-step sensitometric test strip or exposing and processing a 21-step optical wedge to confirm that the sensitometric data for the processing of that type of film using that film process meets the specifications provided pursuant to Section I of this Annex. Unless otherwise agreed, the original or duplicate aerial film negatives or positives shall not be processed or duplicated until the processing of the 21-step sensitometric test strip or exposing and processing of the 21-step optical wedge meets the characteristics provided in accordance with the provisions of Section I of this Annex for that type of aerial film and film processor or duplicator. 4. Prior to the processing of the films exposed during the in-flight examination, demonstration flight and observation flight, States Parties shall have the right to check the film processing equipment and chemicals by exposing and processing a test film of the same type used during the in-flight examination, demonstration flight and observation flight to confirm that the washing and fixing process is suitable for the purposes of permanent archive storage. Annex L. Open Skies Consultative Commission Section I. General Provisions Procedures and other provisions relating to the Open Skies Consultative Commission are established in this Annex pursuant to Article X of the Treaty. 1. The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall be composed of representatives designated by each State Party. Alternates, advisers and experts of a State Party may take part in the proceedings of the Open Skies Consultative Commission as deemed necessary by that State Party.

THE OPEN SKIES TREATY  881

2.The initial session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall open within 60 days of the signature of the Treaty. The Chairman of the opening meeting shall be the representative of Canada. 3.The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall meet for no fewer than four regular sessions per calendar year unless it decides otherwise. Extraordinary sessions shall be convened at the request of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Open Skies Consultative Commission, who shall promptly inform all other States Parties of the request. Such sessions shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of such a request by the Chairman. 4. Sessions of the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall last no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise. 5. States Parties shall assume in rotation, determined by alphabetical order in the French language, the chairmanship of the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Each Chairman shall serve from the opening of a session until the opening of the following session, unless otherwise agreed. 6. Representatives at meetings shall be seated in alphabetical order of the States Parties in the French language. 7. The working languages of the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall be English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. 8.The proceedings of the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall be confidential, unless otherwise agreed. The Open Skies Consultative Commission may agree to make its proceedings or decisions public. 9. During the period of provisional application, and prior to 30 June 1992, the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall settle the distribution of costs arising under the Treaty. It shall also settle as soon as possible the scale of distribution for the common expenses associated with the operation of the Open Skies Consultative Commission. 10. During the period of provisional application of the Treaty the Open Skies Consultative Commission shall develop a document relating to notifications and reports required by the Treaty. Such document shall list all such notifications and reports and shall include appropriate formats as necessary. 11. The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall work out or revise, as necessary, its rules of procedure and working methods. Section II. Annual Review of Active Quotas Procedures for the annual review of active quotas as foreseen in Article III, Section I, paragraph 7 of the Treaty shall be as follows: 1. States Parties wishing to modify all or part of the past year’s distribution with respect to their active quota shall notify all other States Parties and the Open Skies Consultative Commission, by 1 October of each year, of those States Parties over which they wish to conduct their observation flights during the next calendar year. Such proposed modifications shall be considered by the States Parties during this review, according to the rules set forth in the following paragraphs of this Section. 2. If the requests for observation flights over the territory of any given State Party do not exceed its passive quota, then the distribution shall be established as requested, and presented to the Open Skies Consultative Commission for approval. 3. If the requests for observation flights over the territory of any given State Party exceed its passive quota, then the distribution shall be established by general agreement among the interested States Parties, and presented to the Open Skies Consultative Commission for approval.

882  THE OPEN SKIES TREATY

Section III. Extraordinary Observation Flights 1. The Open Skies Consultative Commission shall consider requests from the bodies of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe authorized to deal with respect to conflict prevention and crisis management and from other relevant international organizations to facilitate the organization and conduct of extraordinary observation flights over the territory of a State Party with its consent. 2.The data resulting from such observation flights shall be made available to the bodies and organizations concerned. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Treaty, States Parties may agree on a bilateral and voluntary basis to conduct observation flights over the territory of each other following the procedures regarding the conduct of observation flights. Unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties concerned, the data resulting from such observation flights shall be made available to the Open Skies Consultative Commission. 4. Observation flights conducted under the provisions of this Section shall not be counted against the active or passive quotas of the States Parties involved. Section IV. Additional Fields for the Use of the Open Skies Regime 1. States Parties may raise for consideration in the Open Skies Consultative Commission proposals for the use of the Open Skies regime in additional specific fields, such as the environment. 2.The Open Skies Consultative Commission may take decisions on such proposals or, if necessary, may refer them to the first and subsequent conferences called to review the implementation of the Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of Article XVI, paragraph 3 of the Treaty.1

1

Dates of signatures and ratifications of States Parties can be found in the appendix.

24

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II) SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he START I Treaty, in its detailed complexity, is a lawyer’s dream. It is the ultimate example of the 1980s approach of arms control conservatives that every element of an agreement had to have the same status as the treaty text, and that subordinate implementing agreements were just not acceptable. This approach gave rise to the doctrine of technical changes (as opposed to amendments) to the treaty text being authorized by the treaty regime; in case of doubt as to whether a particular change is actually a technical change and not an amendment, the change must be approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership. Otherwise, even minor inspection procedural changes (whether inspectors may carry flashlights, for example) would be treaty amendments requiring approval by the U.S. Senate, the Russian Duma, and the national legislatures of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in the case of START. There is a dizzying array of documents in the START I package.There is, of course, the treaty proper; then there are thirty-eight agreed statements on such subjects as nontransfer of strategic offensive arms, SS-11 reentry vehicle attribution, strategic offensive arms operations outside national territory, the relationship between the START and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaties, throw weight of new types of missiles deployed before the eighth flight test, reimbursement of costs for telemetry tape exchange. In START I there is a simple flat ban on the encryption of telemetry and provision for the exchange of telemetry tapes in some cases, a far cry from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) secrecy.There is an annex on definitions that defines 124 terms for the purposes of the START Treaty.There is a highly complex protocol on procedures governing conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. There is an even more complex protocol on inspections and continuous monitoring activities—the verification protocol (with twelve annexes on various technical issues and activities). There is a protocol on notifications to assist verification. There is the protocol on ICBM and SLBM throw weight, and procedures to determine and attribute throw-weight values to missiles and to verify them.There is an entire protocol on telemetric information, which ensures access to missile telemetry for verification purposes. There is a protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, the treaty’s implementing body. There is a very lengthy memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the establishment of a database, setting forth the basic information as to strategic systems on which the treaty is based.1 And then there are other related agreements, letters signed by the two negotiators containing certain commitments. This includes correspondence on various important issues

T

1 The MOU on establishing a database is not included herein for space reasons, and because the treaty has been fully implemented.

884  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

setting forth commitments signed by the U.S. secretary of state, the Soviet foreign minister, the Soviet defense minister, and in one case both the Soviet foreign and defense ministers (this latter statement is on the subject of the relocation of heavy SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and contains assurances that any new silos built will be solely for the purposes of replacement). There are joint delegation statements, as well as statements and declarations by one or the other delegations. All of these letters and statements address important subjects, but one deserves special attention. On June 13, 1991, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Obukhov, the last Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms negotiator, in a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Linton Brooks, read a statement on the interrelationship between the START and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties. It says that the Soviet side states that the START Treaty is effective and viable under conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the extraordinary events referred to in the supreme national interest withdrawal provision (Article XV) includes withdrawal by one of the parties from the ABM Treaty. (This occurred in June 2002, but Russia did not withdraw from START I—see Chapter 13.) Article II of the START I Treaty sets forth the central limits: 1,600 deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, including 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers (halving the longtime Soviet total); and 6,000 warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, with 4,900 attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,100 attributed to mobile ICBMs, and 1,540 to heavy ICBMs (10 warheads each, the existing number).The reductions were to take place in three stages: 1. Thirty-six months after entry into force the deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers are to be reduced to 2,100; 9,150 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and 8,050 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. 2. Sixty months after entry into force the relevant numbers are 1,900, 7,950, and 6,750. 3. All obligated reductions are to be completed by eighty-four months (or seven years) after entry into force. As the treaty entered into force in 1994 this means that reductions were to be completed by December 2001. On December 5, 2001, the United States and Russia formally declared that START I had been fully implemented. (Under the Lisbon Protocol, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazahkstan assumed the START obligations of the Soviet Union after its dissolution. But as a result of the Lisbon Protocol only the Soviet Union had reductions to make under the treaty.) Article III sets forth the counting rules. For example, if an ICBM is maintained in stages, the first stage shall count as an ICBM; for the United States up to 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)—conventional ALCMs and conventional sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMS), although externally identical, are exempt from treaty limits (elaborate verification arrangements address this issue)—shall be counted as 10 warheads each (U.S. bombers can carry 20) and beyond 150 with the number of nuclear ALCMs with which they are actually equipped (this arrangement potentially exempts 1,500 U.S. nuclear ALCMs). Article IV addresses limits on nondeployed systems, training launchers, and bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Other articles set up the relationship to the various protocols and annexes and the memorandum on databases. The START negotiations began in July 1982 as the Reagan administration’s alternative to the SALT process, which candidate Ronald Reagan had campaigned against in 1980.The Reagan administration asserted that this new process would correct the deficiencies of the

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  885

SALT process, would limit the real weapons—the warheads—rather than merely the delivery vehicles (as SALT did), and would pursue reductions rather than only capping the arms race, as exemplified by SALT II. While the START process after some years did produce two treaties that contain dramatic strategic reductions and many other important weapons limitations, the unit of amount is the warhead based on the missile attributed to the launcher or aircraft.The difference from SALT II is minor as this is the only effective way to count.Also, in 1981 the Reagan administration agreed with the Soviet Union to informally observe SALT II, which the U.S. had been doing with the SALT Interim Agreement since 1977, and continued to informally observe both agreements until May 1986, some five months after SALT II would have expired. The START process, which began in 1982, was terminated by the Soviet Union in December 1983, a few weeks after the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations in late November in protest of the first U.S. Pershing II deployments in Germany.After the dark days of the Cold War in 1984, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reconstituted the START process in January 1985 as part of a tripartite negotiation referred to as the Nuclear and Space Arms negotiations with three subnegotiations, START, INF, and defense and space.The process was formally initiated in March 1985 in Geneva and proceeded slowly at first.The defense and space subnegotiation never went anywhere, and it soon settled into a polemic between the United States and the Soviet Union over U.S. charges of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the merits of the continued viability of the ABM Treaty and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, which was made sharper by the debate over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The INF subnegotiation concluded successfully in December 1987 after President Gorbachev agreed to global double zero for INF systems flowing from the 1986 Helsinki agreements. Therefore, with the advent of the first Bush administration only the START process was still going in Geneva. President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker placed concluding a START treaty high on the U.S. agenda, reinvigorating the negotiations. Considerable progress was made and many issues were settled in 1989 and 1990, but by late spring 1991 there remained a long way to go. At this time U.S. President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to hold a summit meeting in Moscow on July 31, 1991 to sign the treaty.This put the negotiations into overdrive, and somehow the delegations were able to complete the treaty with its many associated documents and side agreements and deliver it to Moscow in time to be signed in the Kremlin on July 31, 1991.Whether President Bush’s insistence on an agreement before his August vacation was serendipity or prescience is arguable, but without the deadline there almost certainly never would have been a START I Treaty and the strategic arms negotiation process would have ended, probably forever. On August 19, a little over two weeks later, an attempted coup against Gorbachev began which led inexorably to the dissolution of the Soviet Union four months later. Renegotiating the hundreds of pages of delicately balanced agreements on strategic systems with four new states—Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—would have impossible. The Soviet Union passed into history on Christmas Day, 1991.The Baltic states had already become independent, and the Soviet Union was succeeded by twelve new states (referred to as the NIS, the newly independent states). Fortunately, Bush and Gorbachev made a very important informal agreement in October 1991 pursuant to which, among other things, the United States eventually eliminated 95 percent of its tactical nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union/Russia was to do the same, although today it is unclear how much of this has been actually accomplished by Russia. It also was agreed that nuclear weapons would no longer be deployed on surface ships, strategic bombers would be taken off alert, and strategic missile systems in excess of the START limits would be deactivated. Most significantly, in light of the

886  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

breakup, it was agreed that all tactical nuclear weapons scattered throughout the Soviet Union would be brought back to the territory of the Russian Federation.This was accomplished by January 1992. Because of these farsighted measures, the nuclear question was limited to only four of the successor states. Strategic offensive arms remained deployed on the territory of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. It was concluded in January 1992 that these were the relevant START successor states. Several alternatives were considered as to how to deal with the START Treaty given the new situation, but after some prodding by U.S. senators that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had to be included in START, all four states were regarded as replacing the Soviet Union for START. No one wanted to renegotiate the START Treaty. Secretary of State Baker made a brief tour of the four new states early in January 1992, shortly after which an arms control delegation visited Moscow, Kiev, Minsk, and Almaty beginning on January 10.The purpose of the trip was to speak with officials primarily about succession for START and CFE, and to urge adherence by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. Russia had already been accepted as the successor to the Soviet Union for the NPT, which was most important as the United States wanted to avoid the creation of additional nuclear weapon states in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russians were told that the United States recognized Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union for the NPT, and the need to provide for succession for START and CFE was discussed.The Russians mentioned the importance of all the NIS becoming NPT parties as non-nuclear weapon states. They also unequivocally stated the importance of the continued viability of the ABM Treaty in its relationship to START. The U.S. delegation agreed. The reception was different in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. While Belarus and Kazakhstan said they would cooperate with START, would join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, and would join CFE, Ukraine was more reluctant. Various concepts for dealing with START were advanced, but early in 1992 it was decided to multilateralize the treaty by having the four states where strategic arms were deployed be the successor states for the START Treaty. A difficult negotiation ensued, which led to the Lisbon Protocol of May 1992. By means of this protocol, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan agreed not to have strategic arms deployed on their territories and to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Persuading Ukraine to do these last two things was not easy. President Leonid Kravchuk agreed to provide President Bush a letter on the question of eliminating strategic offensive arms from the territory of Ukraine, so it was agreed that the elimination obligation would be adhered to outside of the protocol text.The draft letters from Belarus and Kazakhstan were straightforward, but there was much back and forth between Washington and Kiev on the text of President Kravchuk’s letter, which was ambiguous. Finally, it was agreed that the five states would meet in May in Lisbon to complete and sign the protocol making START multilateral. The Lisbon Protocol provides that Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus all are parties to the START I Treaty in place of the former Soviet Union. It obligates the four states to make the necessary arrangements among themselves to implement the treaty’s limits and restrictions, to allow the proper functioning of the treaty’s verification systems, and to allocate costs that would have been borne by the Soviet Union. It also clarifies how certain treaty terms are to be applied now that there are four states in place of the former Soviet Union.All provisions of the treaty not explicitly addressed remain the same, and any additional procedures required are to be worked out in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC); many have been. Additionally, the Lisbon Protocol obligates Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to adhere to

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  887

the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest possible period of time. Letters associated with the protocol from these three states obligate them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms from their territories within seven years of the START I entry into force, the same reduction period as the United States and Russia. (The treaty entered into force in 1994.) START I was submitted to the Senate on November 25, 1991.The Lisbon Protocol was signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992, by the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.The Lisbon Protocol is an integral part of the treaty, and it was submitted to the Senate in June 1992 to become part of the treaty package. START I, including the new protocol, was approved by the Senate in the fall of 1992. Russia ratified START I on November 4, 1992. As required, Belarus and Kazakhstan acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states on February 4, 1993, and December 13, 1993, respectively.They ratified START I on February 4, 1993, and July 2, 1993, respectively. Ukraine continued to be reluctant. Finally, after many diplomatic discussions, Ukraine ratified START I on February 3, 1994, and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on October 30, 1994. START was brought into force on the margins of the Budapest Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Summit on December 5,1994. Finally, the permanent strategic arms limitation treaty contemplated by the SALT Interim Agreement was in force after twenty-two years. In mid-June 1992, a month after the Lisbon Protocol was signed, President Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin held a summit in Washington, D.C., at which agreement in principle was reached between the United States and Russia to further reduce the START I levels.This agreement came to be known as START II, and it reduced the warhead levels from 6,000 to between 3,000 and 3,500 and put additional limitations on strategic bombers. The Russians wanted a level of 2,500 warheads, but the United States did not agree, so the Russians eventually accepted the 3,000 to 3,500 number, a level they could not financially support.The warhead level was an obstacle to Duma ratification of START II, until the parties agreed as part of the 1997 Helsinki Agreement on a START III level of 2,000 to 2,500, to be negotiated promptly after START II entered into force. The idea of START II was that it could be a short agreement in that it was based on the comprehensive START I Treaty. Also, the parties were limited to the United States and Russia. Pursuant to the START I agreement, strategic offensive arms would be eliminated from the territory of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. As draft START II texts were exchanged through diplomatic channels, some problems developed. The Russians wanted tighter constraints on U.S. bombers, and they wanted to be able to “download” their SS-19 ICBMs (that is, to reduce the number of warheads on a missile, which is not verifiable), just as the United States was going to “download” the D-5 missile on its Trident submarines in order to reach START II warhead levels. There would be on-site warhead inspection to attempt to verify this, although everyone recognized the breakout potential. Also, for economic reasons, the Russians wanted to continue to use the SS-18 silos for a single-warhead missile. One of the strengths of the START II agreement, from the U.S. point of view, was that land-based MIRVed (multiple independently targettable reentry vehicles) ICBMs (the Russians’ strong point) would be eliminated. One of the weaknesses of the agreement, from the Russian point of view, was that MIRVed SLBMs (the U.S. strong point) would not be severely impacted. Thus, the United States would have to eliminate its MX or Peacekeeper ICBM, but could keep the D-5 SLBM, perhaps with fewer warheads, but not as a singlewarhead missile. Russia would have to eliminate (or download, in the case of the SS-19) their SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the backbone of their strategic force.They could keep their single-warhead, mobile SS-25 ICBM.The Russian Duma saw this as an unequal deal; but only through U.S. reductions could the Russians hope to maintain parity. Eliminating MIRVed

888  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

ICBMs was a good deal for the United States. Writing a provision that would permit the Russians to keep SS-18 silos, but verifiably prevent them from using such silos for SS-18 ICBMs, and writing restrictions on the U.S. bomber force were sufficiently complicated tasks that it was clear by autumn that there would have to be a negotiation using delegations. A brief but intense negotiation of START II was held in Geneva from December 27, 1992, to January 2, 1993, and the START II Treaty was signed in Moscow on January 3, 1993, by President Bush and President Yeltsin. Article I of the START II Treaty provides for reductions from START I levels in two stages to a level of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads attributable to deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.Within such limitations, SLBMs are to be limited to 1,750, MIRVed ICBMs limited to zero, and heavy ICBMs limited to zero (thus the feared SS-18 would be eliminated). Article II provides for the elimination or conversion of all MIRVed ICBMs to a single-warhead ICBM. Article III indicates that START I rules are to be used for warhead attribution. Article IV eliminates the 150 nuclear ALCM bomber special treatment in the START I Treaty and the special treatment for bombers not carrying ALCMs. It also required that the number of warheads attributed to a heavy bomber in all cases must be the number with which such a bomber is actually equipped (set forth in the Memorandum on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data). Up to one hundred heavy bombers may be reoriented for a conventional role (that is, taken from their nuclear assignment), but they must be deployed separately from other heavy bombers, used only for non-nuclear missions, and have differences observable to NTM that would differentiate them from other heavy bombers of that type that have not been reoriented. These differences must distinguish such bombers from reoriented bombers of a type that have been returned to a nuclear role, as well as heavy bombers of the same type that were never reoriented. If not all bombers of a type are reoriented, one reoriented bomber must be exhibited in the open, to demonstrate to the other party the observable differences that distinguish it from other bombers of its type. Likewise, if not all reoriented bombers of a type are returned to a nuclear role, one such bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open. This will demonstrate to the other party the observable differences distinguishing the returned to nuclear-role bomber from other same-type, never-reoriented bombers and from those same-type reoriented bombers not returned to a nuclear role. These exhibitions are to be carried out pursuant to the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.These elaborate provisions are designed to permit the United States, its military being more dependent on bombers, to live with the tighter rules on bomber armament. Article V provides that the START I Treaty verification provisions are to be used for implementation of the START II Treaty except where otherwise explicitly provided. The Protocol on Elimination and Conversion of Heavy ICBMs sets forth the rules on removing heavy ICBM launchers and missiles from Russia’s inventory. The first section provides for complete elimination of the launcher and the missile, and the second section provides procedures for those cases in which Russia desires to retain the launcher for a single-warhead ICBM. It provides, among other things, that concrete is to be poured into the silo up to a height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher, and that this be measured and verified.Thus, should the START II Treaty ever somehow come into force, the heavy ICBM would finally be eliminated after many years. START I was approved by the U.S. Senate in the fall of 1992. It was a relatively problemfree ratification as the Lisbon Protocol was well received, despite a minor skirmish on the ABM Treaty. (Several senators wanted to question the continued viability of the ABM Treaty in the context of START ratification.) START II was a different matter.There was concern in the Clinton White House that if

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  889

U.S. senators spoke too favorably about the treaty the Russian Duma would react negatively. In 1993, after the Clinton administration took office, there was a great deal of debate about how to proceed.The administration decided to send the treaty forward, and to request ratification hearings but ask the Senate to delay floor consideration to permit the administration to gauge reaction in the Duma. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to START II by a vote of 84 to 7 on January 26, 1994. Because of many factors—including the perceived one-sidedness of START II, Russia’s reluctance to spend the money to achieve START II levels as its forces were deteriorating, NATO expansion, the war in the Balkans, and Russian domestic politics—the Duma did not approve the START II Treaty until April 2000. But, pursuant to agreement in Helsinki in 1997, the START II Treaty has amendments extending the reduction timeline from 2003 to 2007 in order to accommodate Russia. Thus the treaty had to be returned to the U.S. Senate, which must approve the amendments, before it could enter into force. By the end of 2000 and the close of the Clinton administration, START II still had not been resubmitted to the Senate. The administration, which committed itself to sending the 1997 ABM Demarcation Protocol and Memorandum on ABM Treaty Succession to the Senate at the same time, was concerned that sending all three documents would engender a major debate on national missile defense. Since then, the George W. Bush administration decided to pursue a new strategic framework with Russia that includes significant reductions in operational forces (but no actual eliminations) and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (see Chapter 30) rather than bring START II into force. In May 2002, Presidents Bush and Putin signed a brief agreement that would simply require that by December 31, 2012, neither party would deploy more than 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons (see Chapter 30). In June 2002, at the time the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia withdrew its ratification of START II.Thus it does not appear that START II will enter into force.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought, Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security, Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability, Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990, Have agreed as follows:

890  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Article I Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. Article II 1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed: (a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers; (b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including: (i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; (ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs; (iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. 2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed: (a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers: (i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers; (ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; (iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; (b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers: (i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers; (ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; (iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; (c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons. Article III 1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  891

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit. (b) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit. 2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers: (a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively. (b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher. (c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility. 3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: (a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. (c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type. (d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type. 4. For the purposes of counting warheads: (a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. (b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested.The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an

892  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested.The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force. (c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released.A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. (d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead. (e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped.The United States of America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based.The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. (f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of longrange nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based.The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped. (g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. 5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time. (a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following: (i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types; (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  893

(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs shall be carried out subject to the following: (i) Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. (ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty. (iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. (c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following: (i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party. (ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type. (iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty. (iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base. (v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean. (vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform. (d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. 6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows: (a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility; (b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs; (c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier; (d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the

894  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility; (e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; (f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched; (g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched; (h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. 7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows: (a) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first; (b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission; (c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed. 8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows: (a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; (b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires. 9. For the purposes of this Treaty: (a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. (b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. (c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  895

(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted. (e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than longrange nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another. (f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM.Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs. (g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed. (h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: (a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are: (i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon,Trident I, and Trident II, respectively; (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively. (b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are: (i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;

896  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively. (c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3. (d) Existing types of heavy bombers are: (i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2; (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively. (e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are: (i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129; (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively. Article IV 1. For ICBMs and SLBMs: (a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250.Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for railmobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125. (b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility. (c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than: (i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or (ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. (d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty.Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25. 2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers: (a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110.Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18. (b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  897

than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. (c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility. (d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty.Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40.Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. (e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification. 3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers: (a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75. (b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20. 4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space: (a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases. (b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed.Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed. (c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility. 5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30. 6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two. 7. For static displays and ground trainers: (a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this

898  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty. (b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty. 8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50. 9.With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms: (a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based. (b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit. (c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that: (i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins; (ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility; (iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and (iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time. (d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  899

(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs.The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. (f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers.Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers. 10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. 11.With respect to locational restrictions on facilities: (a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which nondeployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range. (b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested. (c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area. (d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range. (e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

900  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days. Article V 1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. 2. Each Party undertakes not to: (a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type; (b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs; (c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs; (d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded; (e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs; (f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs; (g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type. 3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on roadmobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs. 5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. 6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs. 7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporterloaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead. 8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. 9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  901

10. Each Party undertakes not to: (a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed; (b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type. 11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. 12. Each Party undertakes not to: (a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles; (b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type; (c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it; (d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type. 13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. 14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles. 15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties. 16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload. 17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines. 18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy: (a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices; (b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971; (c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit; (d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

902  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons. 19. Each Party undertakes not to: (a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments; (b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments; (c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs. 20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs. 21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs. 22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. 23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based. 24. Each Party undertakes not to convert: (a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; (b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; (c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category; (d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers. 25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines. 26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars. 27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  903

heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms. 28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory. 29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base. 30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for: (a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages; (b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and (c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions. Article VI 1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas.A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM. 2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more roadmobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area. 3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area.A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison.This distance shall be measured along the tracks.A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison. 5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails). 6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites. 7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration. 8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

904  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals. 10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation. 11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time. 12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration.All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Article VII 1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. 2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs. 4.The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Article VIII 1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  905

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol. 3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol: (a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data; (b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty; (c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol; (d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty; (e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification; (f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information; (g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds; (h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities; (i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and (j) notifications concerning operational dispersals. 4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt. 5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. 6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed.The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty.The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

906  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Article IX 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of this Article. 3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing.The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms. 4.To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol. Article X 1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements.The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information. 2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including: (a) the use of encryption; (b) the use of jamming; (c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and (d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles. 3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM. 4.After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test. 5.After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information. 6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  907

encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph. Article XI 1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. 6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them. 7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base. 8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms. 9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed. 10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. 11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items. 12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:

908  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable; (b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and (c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding.The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. 13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers.The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. 14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced. Article XII 1.To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures: (a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party.The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  909

of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display.The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures; (b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and (c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base.Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made. 2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Article XIII 1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below: (a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

910  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal. (d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. (e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal. (g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins. (h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted: (i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years; (ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections; (iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or (iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection. (i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal. (j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. 2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below: (a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  911

(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise. (d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins. (e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections. (f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise.The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty. Article XIV 1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers.There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals.When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below: (a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. (b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. 2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to: (a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol; (b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections; (c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and (d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually

912  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. 3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty. 4.When an operational dispersal is completed: (a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations. (b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations. (c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided. 5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty. Article XV To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Article XVI To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions.The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard.The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  913

Article XVII 1.This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. 3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article XVIII Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. Article XIX This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Annex Agreed Statements In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed as follows: First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree, in the interest of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to third States. The Parties further agree that this Agreed Statement and the provisions of Article XVI of the Treaty do not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third State. Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph (c) of Article XV of the Treaty. Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 13 of Article V and subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, ICBMs of the type designated by

914  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, which is known to the United States of America as SS-11, may be deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles, provided that such reentry vehicles are not independently targetable. Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in connection with the definition of the term “air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)” provided for in the Annex to the Treaty on Terms and Their Definitions, hereinafter referred to as the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path. Fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the replacement of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs under the provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall only take place in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require the relocation of existing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. If such relocation is required, the Party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation. Sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that three airplanes of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 3M, which is known to the United States of America as Bison, have been converted to transport oversized cargo; are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty; and are not reconnaissance airplanes, tanker airplanes, or jamming airplanes, and thus do not meet the definition of the term “former heavy bomber” provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty.These airplanes are not included within the totals listed in Section IV of, or Annex C to, the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties further agree that all other airplanes of the Bison type will be considered to be former heavy bombers. Seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the Treaty authorizing operational dispersals, such dispersals shall be conducted only for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces.The Parties further agree that, while there are no limits on the number and frequency of such operational dispersals, in practice they will occur rarely. Eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that: (a) With respect to paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, the strategic offensive arms of each Party shall be based only within its national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms.The obligations of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not affect the Parties’ rights under generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. (b) With respect to heavy bombers, the provisions of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of a Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. If a Party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period, except that, if a Party has stationed more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party within 48 hours. (c) The Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  915

Ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 19(a) of Article V of the Treaty, lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles shall not be flight-tested with, equipped for, or deployed with nuclear armaments. Tenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that: (a) With respect to B-52 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America will provide no technical data or photographs of heavy bombers of the variants designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, and will conduct no exhibitions of heavy bombers of such variants pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty or pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, of July 31, 1991. The Parties further agree that all such heavy bombers shall be located only at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is a specified conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and that each such heavy bomber shall not depart Davis-Monthan Air Force Base before it has been eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at DavisMonthan Air Force Base shall be subject to a baseline data inspection. If at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at DavisMonthan Air Force Base for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, this facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, which shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. (c) The procedures for baseline data inspections and data update inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base shall be as modified below: (i) Inspectors shall have the right only to count B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F heavy bombers, and to view them in situ, as they are found. (ii) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect other heavy bombers and former heavy bombers in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol, but only to the extent that the condition of such airplanes allows such procedures to be carried out. A member of the in-country escort shall provide the information on the condition of such airplanes. (d) If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future has a conversion or elimination facility where at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at such facility for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, such facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (c)(ii) of this Agreed Statement. Eleventh Agreed Statement. The Parties understand that the Conversion or Elimination Protocol does not provide procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections.The Parties agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers shall not be eliminated until the appropriate procedures have been agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.The Parties further agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers may be otherwise removed from accountability in accordance with the applicable procedures provided for in Section VII or VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

916  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Twelfth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of the term “former heavy bomber” provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the 37 airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D, and all airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-142, which are known to the United States of America as Bear F or Bear J, depending on how a particular airplane is equipped, shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers. The Parties further agree that all airplanes formerly known to the United States of America as Bear E and now known as Bear T, which are designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu95U, shall be considered to be training heavy bombers. Thirteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, United States of America, the number of which shall not exceed four. Such engineering models of silos shall be subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, and they shall be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as a separate category. Such engineering models of silos shall not be subject to inspection.The elimination of such engineering models of silos shall be carried out in accordance with procedures for silo training launchers in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fourteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 11(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, the existing storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be located no less than 20 kilometers from any deployment area, provided that the distance between such facilities and any restricted area or maintenance facility of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs is no less than 60 kilometers. Such storage facilities shall not be re-established after they have been eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fifteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall not be subject to the locational restriction on training facilities for ICBMs, provided for in subparagraph 11(d) of Article IV of the Treaty, with respect to any existing test range. No more than 12 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located at this training facility for ICBMs. After its elimination in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, this training facility for ICBMs shall not be reestablished Sixteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of subparagraph 9(d) of Article III of the Treaty, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding. Seventeenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the expression “not equipped” is understood to mean, for a heavy bomber or former heavy bombers, that such an airplane is not equipped for a particular kind of armament, which shall be confirmed by the necessary distinguishing features. Each Party shall determine the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. If the other Party considers such distinguishing features to be insufficient, it may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Eighteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, as of the date of signature of the Treaty, there are no heavy bombers permanently based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and that it therefore has not been specified as an air base for heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding.The Parties further agree that, if in the future the United States of America permanently bases heavy bombers at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, all applicable provisions of the Treaty will apply to that facility, including those that provide for listing the facility in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, for new facility inspections and data update inspections, and for notifications concerning the visits of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. Nineteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers, the

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  917

question could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such systems would be allowed, provided that: (a) Mobile space launchers and the space launch boosters associated with such launchers have differences from ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers and from ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively, observable by national technical means of verification; (b) Mobile space launchers do not contain an ICBM or SLBM; (c) The numbers of mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers that are produced and stored do not exceed space launch requirements; and (d) Mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers are not located at an ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.Additional provisions relevant to such systems could also be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Twentieth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty: (a) The United States of America shall have the right to refurbish and reuse, as launch canisters for mobile launchers of ICBMs, those launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that remain at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of such ICBMs. (b) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the same right, if it decides to change its existing practices for the elimination of such launch canisters. (c) Notification of the movement of such launch canisters from the place where the flight test occurred to a refurbishment location shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers no later than five days after the completion of the movement. Twenty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for “each change in data for categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding,” only one notification shall be required for each event that results in changed data, notwithstanding the number of categories of data for which data must be changed based on the occurrence of such event. Twenty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that: (a) Issues relating to the concurrent continuous monitoring activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty and continuous monitoring in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty, shall be agreed upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and within the framework of the Special Verification Commission. An agreement on these issues shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty. (b) For the purpose of reaching the agreement provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Agreed Statement, the Parties shall proceed as follows: (i) During the period when continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is conducted concurrently under the Treaty and under the INF Treaty, the Parties shall ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and of continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty.The engineering site survey provided for in the Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility. (ii) In cases where continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty are identical, those procedures may be

918  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

performed only once, with the results recorded, as appropriate, in the continuous monitoring report and in the inspection report. (iii) The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and of the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Agreement, on issues relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring that shall be suspended upon entry into force of the Treaty at facilities inspected by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty.Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper and shall not have the effect of amending the INF Treaty.The provisions of the INF Treaty to be suspended may be suspended by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by being treated as “measures to improve the viability and effectiveness” of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty.The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the above-mentioned provisions of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty and the Memorandum of Agreement, shall apply from the date of entry into force of the Treaty at such facilities. (iv) After continuous monitoring activities commence in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, continuous monitoring activities under the Treaty and continuous monitoring activities under the INF Treaty at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty. (v) Equipment used for the purposes of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant pursuant to the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring pursuant to the Treaty, including after termination of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides with the purpose of the equipment under the Treaty. Equipment used exclusively for the purpose of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk facility and the use of which is not provided for under the Treaty shall be used only pursuant to the INF Treaty. Continuous monitoring equipment for use exclusively under the Treaty may also be sent to, and installed at, the Votkinsk facility in accordance with the Treaty. (vi) Specific issues that may arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the framework of the Special Verification Commission. (c) Concurrent inspections under both Treaties may not be conducted at a facility subject to the Treaty and the INF Treaty.An inspection under one of the Treaties at such a facility shall be conducted no earlier than six days after an inspection has been conducted under the other Treaty at that facility. Twenty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of the prohibition of paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty and this Agreed Statement, the term “accessible” means able to be entered by waterborne craft on the surface of the water, while submerged, or while partially submerged.The Parties further agree that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not make the underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet (Kola Peninsula), the Yagel’naya Submarine Base (Kola Peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base (Primorskiy Kray), all of which are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, accessible by any waterborne craft of any displacement whatsoever. Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have the essen-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  919

tial features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. In particular, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have a selfcontained dispensing mechanism that dispenses reentry vehicles to different aim points sequentially. In addition, an ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, would not be considered to have a front section of a fundamentally new design. The Parties further agree that the fundamentally new nature of such a design would be verifiable by national technical means of verification. Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the definition of the term “variants,” an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than the appropriate new type criteria, shall be considered to be a variant. The Parties further agree that a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type. Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraphs 4(b) and 11(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a portion of the territory of an eliminated ICBM base may be declared to be a space launch facility after the following conditions are met: (a) All strategic offensive arms specified for that ICBM base and all support equipment have been removed and all silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except those located in the portion of the territory of the ICBM base that the Party intends to subsequently declare as a space launch facility, are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The provisions of that Protocol shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs located in that portion of the territory of the base declared as a space launch facility. (b) All activity associated with strategic offensive arms shall cease and shall not subsequently resume at the ICBM base. (c) A close-out inspection shall be conducted at the ICBM base to confirm that the elimination of the base has been completed. (d) Such eliminated ICBM bases shall not be reestablished. (e) Nothing in this Agreed Statement shall affect the obligation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to eliminate, no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, 154 silo launchers of ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS20, which is known to the United States of America as SS-18. In this regard, no SS-18 silo launchers of ICBMs among the 154 launchers to be eliminated shall be retained for use at a space launch facility.The Parties further agree that, during a formerly declared facility inspection of the ICBM base, a portion of the territory of which has been declared as a space launch facility, the space launch facility shall not be subject to inspection. Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the six existing soft-site launchers located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, United States of America, shall be exempt from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until such time that they contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty. Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister, may be located separate from other stages of such a missile only at a production facility for such ICBMs or SLBMs; a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and for SLBMs, another location where such an ICBM or SLBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph

920  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs or SLBMs. If, however, such a first stage is located, separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs or SLBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.The Parties further agree that an assembled missile or first stage of an ICBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in its launch canister, may be located outside its launch canister only at a production facility for such ICBMs; for first stages of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, locations specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where solid rocket motors of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs may be tested with or without nozzles attached; for other such ICBMs not subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, another location where such an ICBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs. If, however, such a missile is located outside its launch canister, or such a first stage is located separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed. Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the STARS booster shall not be considered to be the Polaris A-3 SLBM since that booster has a different number of stages. The STARS booster shall be considered to be a booster used only for research and development purposes, subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987. Thirtieth Agreed Statement. The Parties do not exclude the possibility that the bans on ballistic missiles on waterborne vehicles other than submarines and on launchers of such missiles contained in subparagraph 18(a) of Article V of the Treaty and the ban on air-to-surface ballistic missiles contained in subparagraph 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall not apply to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes, other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Should the Parties reach agreement concerning the possibility of using ICBMs and SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from such airplanes, provisions concerning procedures for such launches shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. By this Agreed Statement, the Parties do not waive any of their obligations or rights related to the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, stipulated in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990. Thirty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the provisions of Article X of the Treaty and of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, after such objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity. Thirty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 3(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol and paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on the procedures for establishing the throw-weight accountability of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type in the event that a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of that type prior to its eighth flight test. Thirty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for no more than two ballistic missile submarines of the United States of America that are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that are modified for use as special purpose submarines, the following provisions shall apply:

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  921

(a) Such submarines shall be permanently based only at ports that are not submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection. (b) In order to demonstrate that the launch tubes on such a submarine do not contain SLBMs, such tubes shall be opened, upon request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when such a submarine is located at the port at which it is permanently based, in accordance with the following procedures: (i) After receipt of a request for the display of special purpose submarines in such a port, the special purpose submarines shall not leave port until the display is completed. If both special purpose submarines are located in the same home port when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed, and the request shall count as one request for each such submarine. (ii) Within 24 hours of the receipt of such a request, the decks of the special purpose submarine shall be cleared and all tubes shall be opened for a period of no less than 12 hours. (c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the right to make two requests per submarine each year pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this Agreed Statement. If the requested Party is unable to conduct such a display because of the absence of such submarine from the port, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In such an event, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be decreased. (d) Until they are eliminated in accordance with Section IV of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the 16 launchers that are on each special purpose submarine shall continue to count as 16 launchers for such a submarine against the maximum aggregate limit of 1,600 provided for in Article II of the Treaty and to count as 160 against the 6,000 and 4,900 limits also provided therein.When all other launchers of Poseidon SLBMs have been converted or eliminated, except for test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities, the Poseidon SLBM shall be considered to be a retired type of SLBM. Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the criteria contained in subparagraph (f) of the definition of the term “new type” provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty: (a) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall exceed the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or of a previously declared new type by 21 percent or more.The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be a change in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of the same existing type or the same previously declared new type by five percent or more. (b) The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. (c) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be the accountable throw-weight of this existing type or previously declared new type, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. (d) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 9,500 kilometers for an SLBM. If an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type is not capable of being flight-tested to such a range, it shall be flight-tested to a range of no less than 10,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 8,500 kilometers for an SLBM.

922  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(e) Should an ICBM of any type be declared to be a new type in relation to the SS-25 ICBM on the basis of an increase of 21 percent or more in throw-weight in conjunction with a change of five percent or more in the length of the first stage, the throw-weight of an ICBM of such a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers. Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, if a Party provides, during any one year, telemetry data tapes for a greater number of flight tests, the other Party shall reimburse the tapeassociated costs resulting from the difference in the number of flight tests.The costs associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, shall be subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with regard to Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may conduct no more than one inspection at each of these Air Force Bases of the United States of America at any one time. Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that: (a) The limitations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed. (b) The limitations provided for in subparagraphs 1(d) and 4(c) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to: (i) ICBMs of retired types other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; (ii) SLBMs of retired types; and (iii) ICBMs or SLBMs of former types. (c) The locational restrictions provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. (d) ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases. (e) ICBMs and SLBMs of former and retired types shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding except for the categories of data contained in Annex F for such retired types. (f) Procedures contained in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for the elimination or removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed. (g) The provisions of Section IV of the Notification Protocol shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which more than one warhead was attributed. (h) Notifications concerning data with respect to launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type shall be provided in accordance with Sections I, II, and IV of the Notification Protocol and such launchers shall be subject to the limitations contained in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, except as provided for in subparagraph (i) of this Agreed Statement. (i) The one launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California test range, that is equipped for flight testing only the Minuteman I ICBM, shall not be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty. If this launcher is later converted to launch

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  923

other ICBMs or SLBMs, it will be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty. Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that there are no agreed provisions for establishing reference cylinders as provided for in the provisions in paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a first stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine.The Parties agree that such procedures will be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to the deployment of such ICBMs.

Definitions Annex Terms and Definitions This Annex contains definitions of terms that are used in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding. For the purposes of the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding: 1. (1)2 The term “air base” means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, a heavy bomber flight test center, or a training facility for heavy bombers, at which heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported. 2. (35) The term “aircraft” means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth’s surface. 3. (118) The term “aircrew member” means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on the inspecting Party’s list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. 4. (34) The term “air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)” means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986. 5. (95) The term “airplane” means a power-driven, heavier-than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight. 6. (6) The term “air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)” means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft. 7. (5) The term “ballistic missile” means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. 8. (10) The term “bomber” means an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles. 9. (30) The term “category” means, for heavy bombers, one of the following classifications based on the kind of armament for which they are equipped or on their purpose: heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bomber, or training heavy bomber. 10. (53) The term “continuous monitoring” means carrying out procedures in accordance with the Inspection Protocol that involve inspection of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles leaving a monitored facility. 2

( ) denotes the number of the term in the Russian text.

924  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

11. (21) The term “continuous monitoring activities” means activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, which, in accordance with the Inspection Protocol, include conducting an engineering site survey; establishing, operating, and maintaining a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and conducting continuous monitoring. 12. (46) The term “conversion or elimination facility” means: (a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs that remain after static testing; (b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs; (c) for SLBM launches, a specified facility for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers; (d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility for the conversion of heavy bombers, or the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. 13. (33) The term “cruise missile” means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapondelivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. 14. (91) The term “deployed heavy bomber” means any heavy bomber other than a test heavy bomber, a training heavy bomber, or a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 15. (86) The term “deployed ICBM” means an ICBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs. 16. (87) The term “deployed ICBM and its associated launcher” means a deployed ICBM and the deployed launcher of ICBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed ICBM. 17. (90) The term “deployed launcher of ICBMs” means: (a) any silo launcher of ICBMs other than a silo test launcher, a silo training launcher, or a silo launcher located at a space launch facility; or (b) any deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. 18. (89) The term “deployed launcher of SLBMs” means any SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. 19. (88) The term “deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means any mobile launcher of ICBMs, other than a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, that contains, or is considered to contain, an ICBM. 20. (84) The term “deployed SLBM” means an SLBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs. 21. (85) The term “deployed SLBM and its associated launcher” means a deployed SLBM and the deployed launcher of SLBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed SLBM. 22. (94) The term “deployment area” means an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted. 23. (68) The term “distinguishable” means different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  925

24. (13) The term “each year” means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date. 25. (29) The term “encapsulation” means, for telemetric information, recording and not broadcasting such information during the flight test of a missile, and recovering it subsequently. 26. (122) The term “encryption” means, for telemetric information, the reversible transformation of such information that gives it a random character to prevent unauthorized access to such information. 27. (60) The term “facility” means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site. 28. (63) The term “facility subject to continuous monitoring” means a facility at which continuous monitoring activities are permitted but continuous monitoring has not yet commenced. 29. (105) The term “fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs” means a fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 30. (104) The term “fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs” means a unique structure at a parking site for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that can contain a train of standard configuration with rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 31. (103) The term “fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs” means a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 32. (36) The term “flight test” means, for a missile, the launch and subsequent flight of a missile. 33. (12) The term “former heavy bomber” means a reconnaissance airplane, tanker airplane, or jamming airplane that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments and: (a) that was initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bombers and satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; or (b) that has been converted from a heavy bombers in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or in such a way that it satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 34. (11) The term “former type” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of existing ICBM or SLBM, any one of which had been deployed prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but none of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force and none of which are currently deployed. 35. (17) The term “front section” means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design, include a reentry vehicle platform, penetration aids, and a shroud. 36. (112) The term “heavy bomber” means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria: (a) its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or (b) it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it meets neither criterion (a) nor criterion (b), or if otherwise agreed. A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if it is not a model or modification of an accountable heavy bomber, and if it is tested,

926  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations. For the purposes of this definition, the term “modification of an accountable heavy bomber” is understood to mean an airplane having a design essentially identical to the design of an accountable heavy bomber. A bomber of a type, any one of which has an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters, but that is not declared by a Party as a heavy bomber, shall be considered to be a heavy bomber unless the deploying Party provides the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission with information demonstrating to the satisfaction of the other Party that this bomber does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (a) and does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (b). Heavy bombers of the Parties of the types existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty are specified in Article III of the Treaty. 37. (113) The term “heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments” means a non-modern heavy bomber that is equipped only for non-nuclear armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 38. (117) The term “heavy bomber flight test center” means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported. 39. (111) The term “heavy ICBM” means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms. 40. (110) The term “heavy SLBM” means an SLBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms. 41. (3) The term “ICBM base” means: (a) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which a rail garrison and one associated maintenance facility are located. Such a maintenance facility may be located either within or outside the rail garrison; (b) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more restricted areas and one associated maintenance facility are located; (c) for silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located. 42. (115) The term “ICBM emplacement equipment” means equipment used to install an ICBM into a silo launchers of ICBMs. 43. (38) The term “ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs” means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or has been declared an ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 44. (79) The term “ICBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM. 45. (42) The term “ICBM loading facility” means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs. 46. (39) The term “ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles” means an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle and has executed a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles during that flight test using a final stage engine; or an ICBM or SLBM that has released during a flight test of that missile a reentry vehicle or a penetration aid prior to termination of main engine thrust of the final stage and is an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  927

47. (37) The term “in-country escort” means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members throughout the incountry period, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol. 48. (71) The term “in-country period” means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team, monitors, or aircrew members at the point of entry until their departure from the country through the point of entry. 49. (24) The term “inspected Party” means the Party to the Treaty whose facilities and locations are subject to inspection or continuous monitoring pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. 50. (25) The term “inspecting Party” means the Party to the Treaty that conducts inspections or continuous monitoring activities. 51. (44) The term “inspection site” means a facility or location at which inspections may be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol. 52. (27) The term “inspection team” means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection. 53. (26) The term “inspector” means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspections and included on that Party’s list of inspectors. 54. (40) The term “intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)” means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. 55. (16) The term “jamming” means, for telemetric information broadcast from a missile, creating interference on frequencies used for broadcasting such information. 56. (96) The term “launch-associated railcar” means a railcar that is directly associated with a railmobile launcher of ICBMs and that together with it provides for the preparation for launch and launch of a missile. 57. (83) The term “launch canister” means a container, directly associated with an ICBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM can be or has been launched. 58. (102) The term “launch weight” means the maximum weight of a fully loaded ICBM or SLBM at the time of first stage ignition, demonstrated during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. 59. (32) The term “long-range ALCM” means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. 60. (58) The term “long-range non-nuclear ALCM” means a long-range ALCM that is not nuclear-armed. 61. (123) The term “long-range nuclear ALCM” means a long-range ALCM that is nuclear-armed. 62. (61) The term “maintenance facility” means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported. 63. (72) The term “missile tender” means a naval ship that is used for storing, transporting, and loading SLBMs into SLBM launches. 64. (49) The term “mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs or a railmobile launcher of ICBMs. 65. (50) The term “mobile training launcher” means a full-scale model of a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is not capable of launching an ICBM. 66. (52) The term “monitor” means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring activities and included on that Party’s list of monitors.

928  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

67. (51) The term “monitored facility” means a facility at which continuous monitoring has commenced. 68. (19) The term “monitoring team” means the group of monitors specified by the inspecting Party to conduct continuous monitoring activities. 69. (59) The term “new type” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from those of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects: (a) number of stages; (b) type of propellant of any stage; (c) launch weight, by ten percent or more; (d) length of either the assembled missile without front section, or length of the first stage, by ten percent or more; (e) diameter of the first stage, by five percent or more; or (f) throw-weight, by an increase of 21 percent or more, in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more. 70. (55) The term “non-deployed ICBM” means an ICBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs. 71. (56) The term “non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs” means a mobile test launcher, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain, and that is not considered to contain, an ICBM. 72. (54) The term “non-deployed SLBM” means an SLBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs. 73. (57) The term “non-modern heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber of a type, any one of which was initially based at an air base more than ten years earlier. 74. (124) The term “nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs” means, for heavy bombers, nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers and nuclear bombs. 75. (77) The term “parking site” means a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed railmobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. 76. (73) The term “payload” means, for a stage, all that separates from that stage, excluding the front section shroud and the propellant burned by that stage, beginning at the time when the velocity of the final stage is equal to 1,000 meters per second less than its velocity at the time of termination of main engine thrust of the final stage or at the time of the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid, whichever occurs earlier. 77. (97) The term “perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system” means the physical barriers, buildings, and equipment along the perimeter, at the portal, and at the other exits of a monitored facility, that may be established, operated, and maintained by the monitors for purposes of continuous monitoring of such a facility. 78. (93) The term “perimeter continuous monitoring area” means the space within which the inspecting Party has the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and to carry out continuous monitoring. 79. (70) The term “period of inspection” means the period of time from completion of the preinspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  929

80. (66) The term “procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles” means a maneuver of the selfcontained dispensing mechanism or of the final stage of a missile, associated with targeting to an aim point and releasing one or more reentry vehicles, whether or not a reentry vehicle was actually released. 81. (75) The term “produce” means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing. 82. (62) The term “production facility” means: (a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which: (i) ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of all stages and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters; (ii) ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages; (iii) first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled; (b) for ballistic missile submarines, a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed; (c) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled chassis, trailer chassis, railcar, or flatcar; (d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe or complete former heavy bomber airframe is performed. 83. (76) The term “prototype” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, none of which has been attributed with warheads or accountable throw-weight, no more than 20 of which have been flight-tested, and no launchers of which have been deployed. 84. (23) The term “rail garrison” means an area in which one or more parking sites are located and an associated maintenance facility may be located. 85. (22) The term “rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs” means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted. 86. (20) The term “range” means: (a) for an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be covered by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth’s sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact; (b) for a ballistic missile, the maximum distance measured by projecting the flight trajectory on the Earth’s sphere between the launch point of a missile of that type, and the point of impact of a reentry vehicle; (c) for an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer. In this connection, the fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks, and the distance covered during climb and descent shall be taken into account. 87. (98) The term “rapid reload” means reloading a silo launchers of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher.

930  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

88. (8) The term “reentry vehicle” means that part of the front section, that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth’s atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery. 89. (69) The term “relocation” means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. 90. (47) The term “repair facility” means: (a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs; (b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs; (c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. 91. (67) The term “residual propellant” means, when determining the maximum calculated throwweight of an ICBM or an SLBM, the unusable propellant of a stage and the propellant of a stage reserved for off-nominal missile technical characteristics and missile flight conditions, expressed as a percentage of the total propellant mass of that stage. 92. (65) The term “restricted area” means an area within a deployment area, limited in size, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. 93. (99) The term “retired type” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, any one of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force, but none of which are currently deployed due to the conversion or elimination of all launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type of ICBM or SLBM other than test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities. 94. (18) The term “road-mobile launcher of ICBMs” means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled or trailer chassis on which it is mounted. 95. (64) The term “routine movement” means the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison. 96. (2) The term “self-contained dispensing mechanism” means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section, and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids. 97. (120) The term “silo launcher of ICBMs” means a fixed launcher of ICBMs in a silo structure located in the ground. 98. (121) The term “silo training launcher” means a full-scale silo launcher specified for training purposes. 99. (119) The term “silo used as a launch control center” means a silo, other than a silo launcher of ICBMs, that is located at an ICBM base and that is used to control the launch of an ICBM. 100. (78) The term “SLBM launcher” means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM. 101. (41) The term “SLBM loading facility” means a shore-based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  931

102. (80) The term “soft-site launcher” means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher. 103. (107) The term”solid rocket motor” means that part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid fuel. 104. (43) The term “space launch facility” means a specified facility from which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. 105. (106) The term “stage” means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit and that can provide its payload with an additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second. 106. (31) The term “storage crane” means a floating crane that is used to store, transport, and load or unload SLBMs. 107. (48) The term “storage facility” means: (a)for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs; (b) for mobile launcher of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs; (c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. 108. (4) The term “submarine base” means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines are based and that provides shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. 109. (7) The term “submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)” means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in or launched from a submarine. 110. (15) The term “support equipment” means vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM. 111. (108) The term “telemetric information” means information that originates on board a missile during its flight tests that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery. 112. (81) The term “test launcher” means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. 113. (28) The term “test range” means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted. 114. (100) The term “train of standard configuration” means a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars. 115. (45) The term “training facility” means: (a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, or a submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers; (b) for heavy bombers, a facility where training heavy bombers are based. 116. (114) The term “training heavy bomber” means a heavy bomber used for training that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination. 117. (82) The term “training launcher” means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher.

932  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

118. (116) The term “training model of a missile” means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible during inspection. 119. (74) The term “transit” means the one-way movement from one facility or location to another facility or another location of: (a) a non-deployed ICBM, other than an ICBM of a retired or former type; (b) a non-deployed SLBM, other than an SLBM of a retired or former type; (c) a launch canister that remains after the flight test of an ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; or (d) a non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs. 120. (109) The term “transporter-loader” means a vehicle that is capable of transporting an assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and from which such an ICBM can be loaded directly onto a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or onto which such an ICBM can be unloaded directly from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, outside facilities where non-deployed ICBMs may be located. 121. (14) The term “variant” means: (a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category; (b) for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of items of the same type that are distinguishable from other items of the same type; (c) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type. 122. (92) The term “version” means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external differences from other such items for a particular type of ICBM or SLBM. 123. (9) The term “warhead” means a unit of account used for counting toward the 6000 maximum aggregate limit and relevant sublimits as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. 124. (101) The term “weapon-delivery vehicle” means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  933

the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty. I. General Obligations For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members 1. Inspections and continuous monitoring activities shall be conducted by inspectors and monitors. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall be transported to the territory of the inspected Party by inspection airplanes. Inspectors and monitors, as well as aircrew members that operate these airplanes, shall be assigned in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section and subject to provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991. 2.The list of inspectors shall not contain at any one time more than 400 individuals, and the list of monitors shall not contain at any one time more than 300 individuals.The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members shall not be limited. Inspectors and monitors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. The Parties shall have the right to change, by mutual agreement, the number of inspectors and monitors that each of these lists may contain. For each proposed inspector, monitor, and aircrew member, the lists shall contain first name, middle name or patronymic, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available. 3. Each Party shall have the right to inform the other Party of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector, monitor, and aircrew member proposed, by providing a notification in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol. 4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members no more than once in each 21-day period, by providing the other Party with a notification in accordance with paragraph 20 of Section III of this Protocol.With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25.The Party receiving notification of an amendment to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members shall provide notification to the other Party, in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol, of its agreement with or objection to the designation of each such inspector, monitor, or aircrew member. 5. No later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty, or no later than 30 days after receipt of a notification of amendments to the lists of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, the Party receiving such lists or proposed amendments thereto shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed, as may be required to ensure that each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of that Party throughout the in-country period.The inspected Party shall ensure that such visas and appropriate documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months, and the inspecting Party shall ensure that persons receiving such visas and appropriate documents shall use them only for the purpose of conducting inspections or continuous monitoring activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. 6.An individual on the list of inspectors may be objected to only if that individual is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or if that individual has been

934  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the Party reviewing the list. An individual on the list of monitors or aircrew members may be objected to if that individual is found unacceptable by the Party reviewing the list.The Party making such an objection shall so notify the other Party in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol. Individuals who are objected to shall be deleted from the lists. In the event the inspected Party subsequently determines that an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member of the other Party is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or has ever been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the inspected Party, or has violated the conditions governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities provided for in this Protocol, the inspected Party making such determination may so notify the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 22 of Section III of this Protocol. In the event that the inspecting Party is so notified, that Party shall promptly recall that individual from the territory of the inspected Party, if that individual is there at such a time.The inspecting Party shall also delete the individual from the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members. 7. In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities: (a) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. (b) The office premises, except for those in the operations center, and living quarters for monitors shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of the mission and private residences of diplomatic agents in accordance with Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (c) The papers and correspondence of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (d) Inspection airplanes shall be inviolable. This shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews. (e) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.The immunity from jurisdiction with respect to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.Waiver must always be express. (f) Monitors shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (g) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members of a Party shall have the right to bring into the territory of the other Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles, the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. (h) If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party shall take necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. The privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph shall be accorded for the entire time the inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members are within the territory of the other Party, and there-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  935

after with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. During their stay in the territory of the inspected Party, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party, shall be obliged not to interfere in its internal affairs, and shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party. III. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities 1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications provided for in this Section concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty. 2. Notification of the standing diplomatic clearance number for inspection airplanes shall be provided no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, for the period until the end of the current calendar year, and subsequently no less than 30 days prior to the beginning of each following calendar year, and shall include: (a) standing diplomatic clearance number; and (b) calendar year. 3. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, shall be provided no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; (c) the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection; and (d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members. 4.The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section subject to the following conditions: (a) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 or 4 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry. (b) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry. (c) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be no more than 48 hours after the notification of the completion of an exercise dispersal of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, or no more than four hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, whichever is earlier. 5. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

936  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(c) the inspection site and the type of inspection; and (d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members. 6. Notification of an intention to replace inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of replacement inspectors at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; (c) the inspection site; (d) the names of the incoming replacement inspectors and outgoing inspectors being replaced, including the name of the incoming inspection team leader, if such a replacement is planned; and (e) the names of aircrew members. 7. Notification of an intention to conduct a sequential inspection, as provided for in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be provided in writing through a member of the incountry escort and shall specify: (a) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, whether the inspection team intends to go directly to the next inspection site or return first to the point of entry; or (b) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the next inspection site. 8. Notification of the date and time for the designation of the next inspection site and the type of inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of Section VI or paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol, shall be made in writing through a member of the in-country escort. 9.The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, subject to the following conditions: If such notification is provided at the inspection site, the date and time for such designation shall be: (i) no earlier than 18 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, except for cases where the notification is provided pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol; (ii) no earlier than the completion of post-inspection procedures; and (iii) no later than 12 hours after the completion of post-inspection procedures. (b) If such notification is provided at the point of entry, the date and time for such designation shall be no earlier than four hours and no later than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry. 10. Notification of an intention to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring and of an intention to conduct an engineering site survey at such a facility, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry of the monitoring team and engineering site survey equipment and shall include: (a) the specification of the facility; (b) the point of entry;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  937

(c) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and (d) the names of the members of the monitoring team and aircrew members. 11. Notification of the date of commencement of continuous monitoring at a facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section and of the initial arrival of monitors at that facility to carry out continuous monitoring, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of monitors at the point of entry and shall include: (a) the specification of the facility; (b) the date when the procedures for continuous monitoring at that facility will commence; (c) the point of entry; (d) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and (e) the names of the monitors and aircrew members. 12. Notification containing a request for logistic support for a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section shall include: (a) the specification of the facility; and (b) the request for logistic support in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section XVI of this Protocol. 13. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section, shall be made no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present at that facility, and no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if no monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present or have been present at that facility and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; (c) the specification of the facility; and (d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members. 14. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to replace monitors at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 or 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; (c) whether the replacement shall be at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at the airport associated with such a facility; (d) the specification of the facility; (e) the names of the incoming monitors and aircrew members; and (f) the number of monitors to be replaced.

938  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

15. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility or facilities specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; (c) the specification of the facility or facilities; and (d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members. 16. Notification of an intention to move to another facility at which monitors are present, or to leave the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided no less than 48 hours in advance of the preferred time of departure, through a member of the in-country escort at the facility from which the monitors will leave, and shall include: (a) the preferred time of departure; (b) the destination; (c) the names of monitors; (d) for the movement to another monitored facility, the purpose of travel; and (e) the equipment and supplies to be transported by the monitors. 17. Notification of an intention to use an inspection airplane in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be provided no less than 20 days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include: (a) the type of airplane; (b) the specification of all the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities for which the equipment and supplies are intended; (c) the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility; (d) the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility; (e) for each facility specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the approximate number of separate palletized or oversize units of cargo, including modular structures, and the approximate weight and dimensions of each such unit of cargo; and (f) the type and approximate amounts of hazardous materials carried on the airplane that require special safety measures in transportation and handling. 18. Notification of the confirmation of an intention to use an inspection airplane that has been notified in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include: (a) the number, time, and date of the notification provided earlier in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section; (b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility; and (c) the names of aircrew members.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  939

19. Notification of the response to a request by the inspecting Party contained in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section to land an inspection airplane at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of its arrival specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, 15, or 18 of this Section, and shall include: (a) in case the inspected Party permits the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section: (i) the name of the airport; (ii) the route for the flight of the inspection airplane to the airport; and (iii) whether or not an escort crew will be provided and, if provided, a list of the members of that aircrew; or (b) in case the inspected Party does not permit the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section, the point of entry associated with the facility. 20. Notification of amendments made to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section II of this Protocol shall include: (a) the list or lists to be amended; (b) if any inspector, monitor, or aircrew member is removed from the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and the passport number, if available, of the person removed; and (c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion in the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available. 21. Notification of agreement with or objection to the designation by the other Party of each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion on the lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be provided no later than 20 days after entry into force of the Treaty or, with respect to subsequent amendments made to these lists, no later than 20 days after receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of this Section, and shall include: (a) the corresponding list or lists; (b) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available; and (c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, agreement with or objection to the designation of that person. 22. Notification of an objection to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member who is currently on the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, shall include: (a) the corresponding list or lists; (b) for each inspector, monitor, or air-crew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number if available; and (c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the reason for the objection to that person. 23. Notification of a change or addition to the points of entry to the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol through

940  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

diplomatic channels no less than five months prior to the beginning of the use of the new point of entry, and shall include: (a) the point of entry to be changed, if applicable; and (b) the new point of entry. 24. Notification containing data concerning the flight plan of an inspection airplane shall be provided no less than six hours prior to the scheduled departure time of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. 25. Notification of the approval of the flight plan of an inspection airplane filed in accordance with paragraph 24 of this Section shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours prior to the scheduled time for departure of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. 26. Notification of an intention to conduct the cargo examination at a location other than the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 120 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol. 27. Notification of a change of a route for flights of inspection airplanes to and from a point of entry established on the territory of a Party shall be provided by that Party no less than 30 days in advance of the effective date of such change and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the changed flight route, and (c) the effective date of such change. 28. Notification of the determination, in accordance with subparagraph 1(d) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no later than 48 hours after such determination and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the date of determination of the agreed geographic coordinates; (c) the agreed geographic coordinates of each of the reference points; and (d) a physical description of each of the reference points. 29. Notification of the intent to change, in accordance with subparagraph 1(h) of Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol, a reference point used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers, shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than seven days in advance of the proposed effective date of the change and shall include: (a) the point of entry; (b) the agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point to be changed; (c) the geographic coordinates of the new reference point; and (d) the proposed effective date of the change. IV. Arrangements for Air Transportation 1.The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall each establish on its territory no more than three and no fewer than two points of entry.The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall each establish one point of entry on its territory.The points of entry and their associated inspection sites shall be listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  941

Understanding. Each Party may change a point of entry to its territory by providing notification of such a change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 23 of Section III of this Protocol. 2. The inspected Party shall, for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, identify the airport associated with that facility. Provisions of this Protocol relating to points of entry, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 14 of Section V of this Protocol, shall apply to such airports while inspection airplanes or equipment and supplies transported by such airplanes in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section are located there. 3. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of the types specified in paragraph 2 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of inspectors or monitors to the points of entry on the territory of the inspected Party. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting inspectors, carry equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting monitors, carry equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities.The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane transporting inspectors or monitors in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, or 15 of Section III of this Protocol. 4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of types specified in paragraph 3 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of cargo specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting such cargo, carry monitors, and equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, and, if such airplanes arrive at the point of entry, also inspectors and equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may carry only equipment, only supplies, or both at one and the same time. Flights of such airplanes shall take place only to the points of entry, and, for airplanes not transporting inspectors, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, into airports associated with facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities. For airplanes making flights into airports associated with facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, the inspected Party shall have the right to provide an escort crew consisting of not more than two individuals (navigator and radio operator or navigator only) who shall board the inspection plane at the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane for the transportation of cargo in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section III of this Protocol and, if applicable, paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, or 18 of Section III of this Protocol. 5. During an operational dispersal conducted by one of the Parties, each flight of inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section, to transport monitors, and to transport cargo to the territory of the Party that has declared an operational dispersal, and to the territory of the Party that has declared the suspension of inspections in connection with such a dispersal conducted by the other Party, shall be agreed through diplomatic channels. 6.The inspecting Party shall have the right to use airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights to transport inspectors and monitors to those points of entry that are served by such airplanes. The provisions of this Protocol shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews. Inspectors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment intended for inspections. Monitors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities. 7.An inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section may transport equipment and supplies for more than one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility only if all such facilities are associated with the same point of entry and the flight is made to that point of entry.

942  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

8.The following routes for flights of inspection airplanes used in accordance with this Section to and from the points of entry shall be listed in paragraph 10 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding: (a) from the west, directly to and from the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States of America; (b) from the east, directly to and from the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation and the United States of America; (c) between the points of entry to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and western points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the west; (d) between the point of entry to the Republic of Kazakhstan and eastern points of entry to the Russian Federation. An inspection airplane of the United States of America shall use such routes only if it has arrived at one of these points of entry from the east. Such flights shall be the basis for issuing standing diplomatic clearance numbers. Each Party shall assign alternate airfields in accordance with the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization. Each Party may change routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from points of entry established on its territory by providing a notification of such change to the other Parties in accordance with paragraph 27 of Section III of this Protocol. 9. Flight plans for inspection airplanes shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation:“Inspection airplane. Priority clearance processing required.” 10. No less than three hours before the scheduled time for departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan of the inspection airplane, filed in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, is approved so that the inspection team or monitors may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 11.The call sign “START-XXX” shall be assigned to inspection airplanes.The same odd-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and the same even-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX). 12.The number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane shall not exceed ten, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of aircrew members by no more than 15 for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, for the purpose of assisting in the delivery or removal of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities or, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, for the purpose of conducting non-routine maintenance or repair of inspection airplanes located within the territory of the inspected Party. 13. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the inspected Party.The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  943

14. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be brought into or taken out by one flight of an airplane transporting monitors through the point of entry in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be 3,000 kilograms, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This limitation on weight shall not apply to the cargo specified in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol. V. Activities Beginning upon Arrival at the Point of Entry 1. Inspection teams, monitors, and air-crew members shall arrive at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is associated with the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. As soon as the airplane lands, the in-country escort shall meet: the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection air-plane; or the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight.The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members, their baggage, and equipment intended for inspections, or equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, into the territory of the inspected Party and shall accompany the inspection team and assist it in exercising its functions throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany monitors and shall assist them in exercising their functions throughout the incountry period. 2. As soon as an airplane lands, diplomatic officials of each Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall meet: (a) the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection airplane; or (b) the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight. Such diplomatic officials may accompany inspectors and monitors only during the stay of the inspectors and monitors at the point of entry, but may accompany the aircrew members throughout the in-country period. 3.An inspection airplane arriving at the San Francisco point of entry shall land at Travis Air Force Base. No more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to enter Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving there. For that purpose, no less than four hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of such an airplane at Travis Air Force Base, the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved.The diplomatic officials so identified shall be granted access to the base no less than 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival of such airplane. 4.The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for providing transportation to Travis Air Force Base of inspection teams and monitors that arrive at San Francisco International Airport on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights. In such cases, no more than two diplomatic officials of the Party that provided the notification of the inspection in accordance with Section III of this Protocol and no more than one diplomatic official of each other Party whose citizens are among the inspectors and monitors arriving at the point of entry shall be permitted to accompany such inspection teams or such monitors onto Travis Air Force Base. No less than two hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team or monitors at San Francisco International Airport,

944  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

the embassy or consular post of which such diplomatic officials are members shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, the names of the diplomatic officials involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved, for the purpose of providing the diplomatic officials so identified access to Travis Air Force Base in order to accompany inspection teams or monitors. 5. An inspector or monitor shall be considered to have assumed the duties of an inspector or monitor upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties after departure from the territory of the inspected Party through the point of entry. 6.Throughout the in-country period, inspectors and monitors shall wear civilian clothes. During their stay at the inspection site, in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, and at other locations, as agreed by the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort, the inspectors and monitors shall wear unique badges provided by the inspecting Party. 7. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all custom duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry. 8. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting Party, in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, brings into the country in which the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility is located shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that country. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors or monitors, or, for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, in the presence of aircrew members.The purpose of such examination shall be to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. 9. Equipment and supplies that inspectors or monitors bring on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol or on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights shall be examined by the in-country escort at the point of entry.The examination of such equipment and supplies shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team or monitors from the point of entry for the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility. 10. Equipment and supplies transported on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be examined in accordance with the provisions of Annex 7 to this Protocol. 11. If the inspected Party concludes as a result of an examination conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section that an item of equipment or supplies can perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspected Party may impound that item of equipment or supplies at the location of the examination. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility shall not be brought to an inspection site or to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party otherwise. 12. If, during the examination of equipment or supplies a member of the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies should not be cleared for use, the member of the in-country escort shall explain the reasons for that conclusion to the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team. If the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of inspections or continuous

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  945

monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document and each of them shall retain a copy of the document.The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties. 13. If the inspected Party has not informed the inspecting Party of a different decision, the equipment or supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be removed no later than the departure from the country of the inspection team that brought the impounded equipment or supplies or no later than the next departure of monitors from the country.The impounded equipment or supplies may be removed from the country, at the choice of the inspecting Party, either on an inspection airplane or on a civil aircraft making a regularly scheduled commercial flight. Until such equipment or supplies have been removed from the country, they shall be stored at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies. 14. Except as provided for in Annex 7 to this Protocol, each Party shall have the right to store equipment and supplies at the points of entry on the territory of the other Party. Storage of such equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within a secure structure or room. The inspecting Party may provide containers that are locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party, for storage of such equipment and supplies within the secure structure or room. The storage method used shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies. 15. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, designate in writing to the inspected Party through the in-country escort, of the type of inspection and the inspection site, indicating its name and geographic coordinates. Such a designation of the inspection site shall be made either at the time specified in that notification at the airport of the point of entry, or, prior to that time, at the airport of the point of entry or at another place within the point of entry. 16. For reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, if prior to the departure of the inspection team for the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that there are no deployed ICBMs or SLBMs in all of the restricted areas of the ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the rail garrison or at a submarine base to be inspected, no later than one hour after such notification, the inspection team leader shall have the right to: (a) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or of the submarine base shall take place. In this case such inspection shall count against the quota provided for in para-graph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol; (b) designate for inspection an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided in paragraph 15 of this Section or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol; (c) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 17. For a data update inspection at an air base for heavy bombers, except for an air base at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has

946  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

been flight-tested; an air base for former heavy bombers; a training facility for heavy bombers; or a storage facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, that has been designated for inspection: (a) If the number of heavy bombers, other than test heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are of types of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers based at the designated facility and that will be located at such facility at any time during the first 20 hours of the period of inspection, is less than 70 percent of the number of such airplanes specified as based at such facility, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site. In such a case, the inspection team leader shall have the right: (i) to inform a member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated facility will proceed; or (ii) to designate another inspection site; or (iii) to decline to conduct the inspection. In such a case, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. (b) If the inspection team leader is not so informed, or if the inspection team leader is so informed but decides to continue the inspection, then prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the name of the airfield within the national territory of the inspected Party at which will be located each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is specified as based at the facility designated for inspection, and that will be absent from the inspection site but located within the national territory of the inspected Party during the period of the inspection. A member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader of the number and type of test heavy bombers that will be located at the inspection site at any time during the period that pre-inspection restrictions on heavy bombers and former heavy bombers will be in effect. (c) For sequential inspections, the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be carried out at the location at which the inspection team leader designates the subsequent inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol. 18.Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the inspectors, and aircrew members of the inspecting Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the inspected Party. 19.The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, transportation, and, as necessary, urgent medical services for the monitors while the monitors are at the point of entry; shall provide or arrange for the provision of transportation in connection with travel between the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and between the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities; and, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services while monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The cost of all services provided for monitors shall be distributed as follows: (a) The cost of transportation and urgent medical services provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspected Party. (b) The cost of meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  947

(c) The cost of temporary and permanent lodging and work space provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, including utilities and maintenance for such lodging and work space, shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (d) The cost of meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (e) The cost of transportation of monitors that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (f) The cost of transportation of monitors, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (g) The cost of transportation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back, pursuant to paragraph 29 of Section XVI of this Protocol, as well as the provision of transportation, meals, and lodging during such travel, shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (h) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (i) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (j) The cost of urgent evacuation of monitors, at the request of the inspecting Party, from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (k) The cost of utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, shall be borne by the inspecting Party. (l) The cost of transportation provided for monitors within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol shall be borne by the inspected Party. (m) The cost of medical and other urgent services provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party. 20. For the goods and services provided by the inspected Party pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 19 of this Section, the following provisions shall apply: (a) Meals for monitors, inspectors, and aircrew members shall be prepared meals and shall be served either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.

948  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(b) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members shall be of the following types: (i) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members provided at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty at facilities where the elimination process occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-type accommodations. (ii) Lodging for inspectors provided in all other cases shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep. Such lodging need not be separate from the work space for inspectors provided at inspection sites. (c) Lodging for monitors shall be in buildings built by the inspected Party for the inspecting Party, except that lodging for monitors at the point of entry shall be hotel-type accommodations. Until construction of such buildings is completed the inspected Party shall provide monitors with apartment-type accommodations in existing buildings. (d) For transportation of inspectors and monitors, the following provisions shall apply: (i) At the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the inspection team, and up to five vehicles to transport the subgroups that may be designated by the inspection team leader. (ii) For monitors at the point of entry and within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and within the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide vehicles.The drivers of such vehicles shall be considered to be members of the in-country escort. 21.The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the escort crew of the inspected Party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol while such escort crew is at or in the vicinity of the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. Costs for all such services shall be borne by the inspecting Party.The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for transportation of the escort crew to the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.The cost for such travel shall be borne by the inspecting Party. 22. Coverage of the activities of inspection teams and monitoring teams by representatives of the mass media on the territory of the inspected Party shall be arranged as follows: (a) at the points of entry the inspected Party shall provide such representatives an opportunity to photograph and televise the arrival and departure of inspection teams and monitoring teams; (b) the Parties shall agree on a case-by-case basis through diplomatic channels to provide representatives of the mass media an opportunity to interview inspectors and monitors, to include taking photographs and making audio-visual recordings; (c) the activities of representatives of the mass media shall be arranged so that such activities do not interfere with the conduct of inspections, continuous monitoring activities, or the process of elimination; and (d) the Parties shall not allow representatives of the mass media to accompany inspectors during inspections or monitors during the conduct of continuous monitoring activities. VI. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities 1. Inspectors and monitors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  949

2. Inspectors and monitors shall not disclose information obtained during inspections or continuous monitoring activities except with the express consent of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignments as inspectors or monitors have ended. 3.The boundaries of an inspection site shall be the boundaries of the facility specified on the site diagram that is received pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams relating to the Treaty of July 31, l99l, or provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 4. At any facility containing non-contiguous parts of an inspection site that are connected with roads depicted on the site diagram, such roads shall not be considered part of the inspection site. Containers, launch canisters, or vehicles located on such roads shall not be subject to inspection until such containers, launch canisters, or vehicles enter the inspection site during the period of inspection. An item that is transported from one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility shall not be considered to be in transit provided it is transported directly on roads shown on the site diagram. 5. In discharging their functions, inspectors and monitors shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort. 6. Except as provided for in this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall not interfere with ongoing activities at an inspection site or a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and shall not hamper or delay the operation of a facility. Inspectors and monitors shall take no actions affecting the safe operation of a facility. 7. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and monitors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area including those for personal safety, as well as regulations for the protection of equipment and maintenance of the controlled environment within a facility.The in-country escort shall provide safety briefings in the inspected Party’s language. These briefings shall be interpreted by the inspected Party into the inspecting Party’s language.The inspected Party shall provide, as necessary, individual protective gear. 8. A member of the in-country escort shall ensure necessary lighting for inspectors and monitors to carry out the procedures provided for in this Protocol. 9. If inspectors or monitors, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the in-country escort may inform the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the in-country escort may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include in the report a response to such a statement. 10. If members of the in-country escort, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, may inform the in-country escort, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the in-country escort may include in the report a response to such a statement. 11. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort. In case of need for the urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors or monitors from the territory of the inspected Party or urgent travel to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the terri-

950  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

tory of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the need for each such departure, evacuation, or travel and the nature of the urgency or emergency. The inspected Party shall arrange without undue delay such departure, evacuation, or travel. The inspecting Party, may, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, evacuate inspectors or monitors, using its own airplane and at its own expense, from the airport closest to the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In all cases, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and routes involved in travel. During each such departure, evacuation, or travel, the inspected Party shall have the right to examine the personal baggage of inspectors or monitors, except papers. 12. At an inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the incountry escort. For continuous monitoring activities, the Parties shall designate, at each of their facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, an in-country escort. The inspected Party shall ensure that a member of the in-country escort at the facility is continuously available to monitors either in person or by telephone. 13.Throughout the period of stay at the point of entry, at the inspection site, or at the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall ensure that the inspectors and monitors can be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located on the territory of the inspected Party using telephonic communications provided by the inspected Party. Monitors shall also have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Section XVI of this Protocol, to use a satellite system for communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party.The inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. Such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party. 14. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, except that for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site no later than 24 hours after that time. If an inspection is conducted after completion of a previous inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of this Section, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site within the following time periods: (a) no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the point of entry; or (b) no later than 18 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the inspection site. 15. The inspection team shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V of this Protocol, to bring onto the inspection site documents intended for inspections, as well as equipment, the maximum number of which for any specific item shall not exceed the number specified in Annex 8 to this Protocol for the corresponding item in the list of equipment for any given type of inspection. During its stay at the inspection site the inspection team shall have the right to store the equipment in the work space for inspectors. Such equipment shall be stored under the control of the inspection team.Throughout the in-country period the inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment. 16. Monitors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to bring, and shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to deliver to each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility documents intended for

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  951

continuous monitoring activities, as well as equipment provided for in Annexes 8 and 9 to this Protocol and supplies.Throughout the in-country period the monitors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment and supplies, except when those supplies are located in the living quarters for the monitors, and except when such equipment and supplies are located in their office premises that enjoy inviolability or protection in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of Section II of this Protocol. 17.The inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment, provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, indicating the manufacturer’s name and the model, if not previously provided. Technical specifications of such items of equipment shall be agreed by the Parties without undue delay and prior to the first time such items of equipment are brought or delivered to the territory of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace, upon agreement with the inspected Party, equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol with other equipment, subject to the following provisions: (a) If the purpose and characteristics of the replacement equipment are similar to the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, such equipment shall, at the choice of the inspected Party, be agreed upon either before such equipment is delivered to the territory of the inspected Party or upon completion of the examination of the equipment conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol or in accordance with paragraph 4 or 8 of Annex 7 to this Protocol when applicable. For that purpose, the inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list and description of such equipment, indicating the manufacturer’s name and the model, if available, and the type of inspection or the place in the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system where the equipment will be used or installed.This list and this description shall be provided in the time agreed for the provision of the inventory in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol. (b) If the Parties have not reached agreement regarding the replacement equipment in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or if the purpose or characteristics of the replacement equipment differ from the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol, the question of the use of such equipment shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 18. During an inspection or continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to use any of the equipment specified in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol for a specific type of inspection or for continuous monitoring activities, except for cameras, which shall be used only by the inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of the inspectors or monitors, a member of the in-country escort shall take photographs in order to obtain two photographs of each object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area, designated by the inspectors or monitors, relating to which questions or ambiguities have arisen. One camera on a tripod shall be allowed for taking two photographs in sequence. Each Party shall retain one photograph of each item. The photographic equipment furnished by the inspecting Party shall be capable of producing instant development photographs. 19. Measurements recorded during inspections or continuous monitoring activities shall be certified by the signatures of an inspector or a monitor and a member of the in-country escort immediately after they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report.The result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions that deviates by no more than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable. 20. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection is understood to mean: (a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and

952  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or support equipment of the inspected Party; (b) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and close-out inspections at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber of the inspected Party; (c) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at weapons storage areas that are subject to inspection at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers: the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party; (d) for suspect-site inspections: an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party; and (e) for post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles: a mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site or, for such an inspection at a maintenance facility, a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site. 21. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of such an ICBM, if such an ICBM is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. 22. For the purposes of this Protocol, for each structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or object, the expression “large enough to contain” or “large enough to be” an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean that each of the measured linear dimensions, that is, length, width, height, and diameter, of such structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or other object is determined to be 97 percent or more of the corresponding linear dimensions specified for that item. 23. For each Party, the size criteria used in inspections shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of inspection of that Party, except that, for items of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM. The specific size criteria for inspections are provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex 12 to this Protocol.The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be: (a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: (i) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage; (ii) for ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of each type and 90 percent of the length of that stage, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and (iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, and for SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and trans-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  953

ported as assembled missiles: the diameter and length of an ICBM or SLBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM or SLBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Corrigenda, 19 December 91, Section II. (b) for suspect-site inspections: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage. 24. For each Party, the size criteria used in continuous monitoring shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of continuous monitoring of that Party, except that, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM.These criteria shall be used at the portals of all monitored facilities of the inspected Party. The specific size criteria for continuous monitoring are provided in paragraph 3 of Annex 12 to this Protocol.The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be determined as follows: (a) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters: 90 percent of the diameter and 90 percent of the length of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM of that type without the front section; (b) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter and length of the first stage of an ICBM of that type; and (c) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters: as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 25. The size criteria for inspection of containers or vehicles at a monitored facility producing ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a type of ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed, conducted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, shall be determined using a reference cylinder whose diameter is 97 percent of the diameter of the first stage and whose length is 97 percent of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage of an ICBM of that type. 26. If the inspection team or monitoring team is unable to carry out a procedure chosen by the inspected Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol to confirm that a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, vehicle, structure, or other object is or is not an item of inspection or an item of continuous monitoring either because such a team has not brought to the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area agreed equipment to carry out that procedure or if, through no fault of the inspected Party, equipment brought by the inspecting Party for that procedure cannot function, the inspected Party shall have the right to decline to choose another procedure for such demonstration. 27. During an inspection or during continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to request clarification. Such requests shall be made promptly through the incountry escort.The in-country escort shall provide clarifications that may be useful in resolving questions and ambiguities. In the event questions and ambiguities relating to an object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph such object or building at the request of the inspecting Party. If questions or ambiguities remain at the end of the inspection, or for continuous monitoring activities, at the end of the period covered by the report provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XVIII of this Protocol, relevant clarifications shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, and each photograph retained by the Party shall be considered to be an integral part of the report.

954  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

28. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty during the 165-day period after entry into force of the Treaty, shall include no more than 15 inspectors. After expiration of that period, such an inspection team shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 20 inspectors. A monitoring team shall include no more than 30 monitors, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of monitors at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility by: (a) no more than 15 monitors for the engineering site survey and establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for no more than an aggregate of 90 days, unless the Parties agree otherwise; (b) no more than five monitors for the maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for a period of no more than seven days for each visit by monitors for such purpose and for no more than an aggregate of 84 days each year for each monitored facility, after the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system is established, unless the Parties agree otherwise; and (c) no more than 10 monitors for a period of no more than five days during the replacement of monitors in accordance with paragraph 39 of this Section. At least two inspectors or monitors on each inspection team or monitoring team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team or monitoring team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. There shall be no more than one inspection team or monitoring team at each inspection site or at each perimeter continuous monitoring area, respectively, at any one time. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall have the right to indicate subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. 29. Pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and the provision of information relating to the conduct of the inspection and the inspection site, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team or monitors at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. 30. Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader may designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles leaving the inspection site in such a way that, in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, the operation of the facility is not hampered or delayed. If a subgroup of the inspection team is not designated, vehicles shall be free to depart the facility. 31. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours. By agreement with the incountry escort, the period of inspection may be extended by no more than eight hours, except that in case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 4, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall be extended for the time necessary to complete the inspection. Such an extension, with respect to baseline data inspections and new facility inspections of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be determined, as agreed by the Parties in each specific case, taking into account the time required to complete the inspection of all restricted areas and the maintenance facility of the designated base after the return of all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to the restricted areas. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall terminate upon completion of the inspection procedures, and as provided for in paragraph 16 of Annex 3 to this Protocol upon the arrival of the inspection team at the location designated by the inspected Party for conducting postinspection procedures.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  955

32. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XVIII of this Protocol, shall begin, when the period of inspection expires, at the location designated by the inspected Party and shall be completed no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at that location, or no later than three hours after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at that location, whichever is later. 33. For the purposes of this Protocol, a sequential inspection is understood to mean an inspection conducted by an inspection team after the completion of an inspection and prior to the departure of the team from the territory of the inspected Party. Sequential inspections shall be conducted only at facilities associated with the same point of entry by an inspection team that has not left the territory of the inspected Party. 34. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to an inspection of a structure within the inspection site, inspectors may be present at the exits of the structure whose entrances and exits are large enough to permit passage of an item of inspection. During an inspection of such a structure, no object, container, or vehicle shall leave the structure until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she has no intention to inspect it. 35. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall have the right during the period of inspection to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and to be present at the exits of the site. No vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the period of inspection until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it. 36. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the preinspection procedures, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol, and then, prior to completion of post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol. No facility may be designated for inspection more than one time by each inspection team. 37. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the postinspection procedures but no less than 24 hours before the planned commencement of the sequential inspection, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol.Arrangements for rest and the timing of the departure of the inspection team and of its arrival at the next inspection site shall be as agreed by the Parties. 38. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct another inspection, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures the inspection team shall return to the point of entry and then shall leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the inspected Party. 39. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace monitors, subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section: (a) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility no more than 34 times each year, provided that the replacement of monitors directly at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility may be conducted no more than once in each three-week period; and (b) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility when an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol arrives at such an airport. One replacement of monitors counted against the limits provided for in this paragraph is understood to mean one arrival of monitors on the territory of the inspected Party in accordance with the notification provided for in paragraph 14 of Section III of this Protocol.The number of depar-

956  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

tures of such monitors from the territory of the inspected Party shall not exceed 34 in each year. 40. Monitors for the purpose of maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party subject to the limits provided for in paragraph 39 of this Section and subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section. Such monitors may arrive together with or separately from replacement monitors. VII. Baseline Data Inspections, Data Update Inspections, and New Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections beginning 85 days after entry into force of the Treaty and ending 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of 15 such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each at any one facility. 3. In infrequent special cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt appropriate air bases from data update inspections. Notification of such exemptions shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for the exemption. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Such inspections shall be conducted at facilities that were not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol and that were specified in notifications provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted at such a facility no later than 60 days after such notification has been provided. Such a facility shall not be subject to any other inspection before a new facility inspection has been conducted or, if no such inspection has been conducted, before the 60-day period for conducting such an inspection has expired. 5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers, except for air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested; and air bases for former heavy bombers. In addition, only for the inspection of weapons storage areas, each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at air bases at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. 6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes its pre-inspection procedures, except as provided for in subparagraph 12(d) of this Section: (a) For facilities other than facilities specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, ICBMs or SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  957

of the inspected Party; containers, launch canisters, and closed vehicles large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party; and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection of the inspected Party, as determined by paragraph 22 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall not be removed from the inspection site. (b) For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types of airplanes based at the inspected facility, shall not leave the inspection site. However, test heavy bombers, information about which has been provided in accordance with subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, and heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, may leave the inspection site. For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, closed vehicles and containers large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, and ALCMs large enough to be long-range nuclear ALCMs of the inspected Party shall not be removed from the weapons storage area. (c) For facilities that contain non-contiguous parts of an inspection site, once pre-inspection restrictions are in effect at the facility, a container, launch canister, or vehicle that has departed one non-contiguous part of a facility and is en route to another non-contiguous part of the same facility shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions until the container, launch canister, or vehicle enters an inspection site. 7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than a total of ten baseline data inspections and new facility inspections at any one time, and no more than one such inspection at each facility. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one data update inspection at any one time. 8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of ICBMs, SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, ballistic missile submarines, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, empty launch canisters, support equipment, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers at that inspection site.At the same time, the member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the location at the inspection site of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located.The following shall also apply: (a) In the case of air bases at which, pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection, such information shall not be provided. (b) For an inspection conducted at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, if a member of the in-country escort informs the inspection team leader that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base than provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a member of the in-country escort shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs that do not contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty. (c) For an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and for an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, except for air bases at which only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, by category, type, and, if applicable, variant, of any heavy bombers that are on alert and the area where those heavy bombers are located. During pre-inspection procedures at air bases for heavy

958  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each type and variant of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs is actually equipped, indicating the numbers, by type and, if applicable, variant, of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs based and located at the air base that are specified, for the United States of America, to be in excess of 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(e) of Article III of the Treaty, or, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to be in excess of 180 heavy bombers equipped for longrange nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(f) of Article III of the Treaty. (d) If any of the items specified for an inspection site are absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type and, if applicable, variant, and the reason for the absence of each item. For a facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a member of the in-country escort shall also provide, in addition to the information provided at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, the category of each such heavy bomber and, for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are located outside national territory of the inspected Party, the general location of each such airplane. (e) At a facility that contains non-contiguous parts of an inspection site connected by roads depicted on a site diagram, if any of those items declared absent are located on the roads connecting one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type, and if applicable, variant of a type, and reason for the absence of each item, its approximate location, and, its estimated time of arrival at an inspection site. Such items shall return to the inspection site not later than 18 hours after the commencement of the inspection. 9. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs except for such ICBMs deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs and except for such ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure and for which a member of the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates in accordance with subparagraph 12(b) of this Section. 10. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles, or launch canisters declared to contain training models of missiles, are training models of missiles or contain such training models of missiles, unless such items are located in silo training launchers or in silo test launchers. 11. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. If the number of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base exceeds the number provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the silo launchers of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM. If the inspection team intends to inspect such silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader, upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs to be inspected and shall indicate a subgroup or subgroups, each consisting of no more than four inspectors, to conduct such inspections. No later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures, the inspected Party shall transport a subgroup of the inspection team to the silo launcher of ICBMs designated to be inspected.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  959

12. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) The inspected Party shall return all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside restricted areas to the restricted areas of the ICBM base to be inspected except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located at a maintenance facility, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are engaged in a relocation, and road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that cannot return to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure.The return of roadmobile launchers of ICBMs shall be completed within the following period of time: (i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection; or (ii) for data update inspections, no later than 24 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol. (b) For each restricted area, a member of the in-country escort shall, in addition to the information provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to the restricted area. Such information shall be provided within the following periods of time: (i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a) (i) of this paragraph has elapsed; or (ii) for data update inspections, during pre-inspection procedures, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a) (ii) of this paragraph has elapsed. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspected Party may, at its own choosing, either designate the geographic coordinates of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or transport the inspectors to such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. (c) Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate which restricted area or restricted areas are to be inspected. For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected. For these purposes, the inspection team may be divided into at least two subgroups, each of which may independently inspect the designated locations. For data update inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect one restricted area and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected. If an inspection of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by force majeure is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the inspection team leader shall also indicate whether the inspection team intends to inspect those road-mobile launchers of ICBMs whose geographic coordinates were not designated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and shall indicate the subgroup assigned for this purpose. (d) Pre-inspection restrictions with respect to each of the restricted areas designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until the arrival there of the inspectors. For data update inspections, pre-inspection restrictions with respect to restricted areas not designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures. (e) The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the restricted area designated for inspection without undue delay and within the following period of time:

960  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(i) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or (ii) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures. During the period of inspection, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within these restricted areas at the time the inspection begins may depart such areas only with the consent of the inspectors. (f) The maintenance facility and restricted areas shall be inspected subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol. 13. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility and the rail garrison, including all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, parking sites, and associated structures except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored, that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol. (b) For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspected Party shall concentrate at the inspected ICBM base all rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed to that ICBM base no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection. (c) During the period of inspection, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the inspected ICBM base at the time the inspection begins may leave it only with the consent of the inspectors. (d) The inspected Party shall provide the inspectors with the necessary transportation to permit them to inspect all rail lines within the inspected ICBM base during the daylight hours of the period of inspection. 14. For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers: (a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of a type specified as based at that air base, that were located at the inspected facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect or that have returned to the facility in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. Alert heavy bombers, however, shall be subject to inspection only in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph. Heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested and test heavy bombers shall not be subject to inspection. Such inspections shall be conducted to confirm the data on the numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers; and to confirm that: (i) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for more longrange nuclear ALCMs than the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of the Treaty, as applicable; (ii) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and (iii) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. (b) For baseline data and new facility inspections at such facilities, the inspected Party, no later than 20 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, shall concentrate at the inspected facility all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers specified for it except for such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure,

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  961

mechanical incapability, or temporary stationing outside the national territory of the inspected Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, cannot return to the inspected facility. (c) Inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol. (d) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect one alert heavy bomber of each type, category, and, if applicable, variant each year during baseline data inspections and data update inspections. Only heavy bombers loaded with nuclear armaments shall be considered to be alert heavy bombers. (e) For inspections at such facilities, except for inspections at air bases for heavy bombers only of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, the item of inspection shall be a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. For structures within the boundaries of the inspection site large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain whether or not that structure contains a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. (f) For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all weapons storage areas, and to inspect all covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of a type for which notifications of data according to categories of data contained in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding have been provided, to confirm the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Such inspections shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol. 15. For test ranges, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, with the following exceptions: (a) In carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol the inspected Party shall not be required to remove ICBMs or SLBMs contained in or located on soft-site launchers from such launchers, and such ICBMs and SLBMs shall not be subject to measurement; and (b) For silo launchers of ICBMs located at the test range being inspected, regardless of where they are shown on the site diagram of the test range, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain an ICBM or a training model of a missile. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM. 16. For facilities other than those facilities specified in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol. 17. For test ranges, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty at each test range, conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM base. 18. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Protocol, silo training launchers shall not be subject to inspection. VIII. Suspect-Site Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct suspect-site inspections. Following each suspect-site inspection conducted by the

962  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

inspecting Party, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be reduced by one for that year. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections at each facility specified as subject to suspect-site inspections in paragraph 12 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding or in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, if it is provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section. 3. A Party shall specify a facility as subject to suspect-site inspection and provide a notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for: (a) each facility that after entry into force of the Treaty begins to produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large or larger than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party and is not subject to continuous monitoring, unless otherwise agreed; and (b) each facility at which continuous monitoring has ceased. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one suspect-site inspection at any one time. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two such inspections each year at the same facility. 5. The Parties may agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection. 6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, vehicles, containers, and launch canisters large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site. 7. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, unless the Parties agree otherwise. IX. Reentry Vehicle Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right, 205 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct reentry vehicle inspections. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of ten reentry vehicle inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections at ICBM bases and at submarine bases. 3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one reentry vehicle inspection at any one time. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection simultaneously with any other type of inspection at the same facility. No more than one ICBM or SLBM may be inspected during each reentry vehicle inspection, except as provided for in paragraph 18 of this Section. 4. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding: (a) The inspected Party shall not open silo doors of silo launchers of ICBMs or hatches of launchers of SLBMs that were closed at the time the restrictions were implemented.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  963

(b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs or SLBMs from silo launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented. (c) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs. (d) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs in silo launchers of ICBMs or in launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented. (e) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. (f) The inspected Party shall not remove mobile launchers of ICBMs from restricted areas or from rail garrisons. (g) The inspected Party shall not move rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs into the maintenance facility. (h) The inspected Party shall not move any ballistic missile submarine from within the waters identified on the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, and shall not commence dry docking of ballistic missile submarines within such waters. 5. In addition to the provisions provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall not move mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located in restricted areas or the rail garrison, or ballistic missile submarines to which pre-inspection restrictions apply. 6. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall not apply to work conducted to deal with an emergency involving a launcher, missile, or submarine. 7. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall remain in effect until the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section have been completed, and for a launcher of ICBMs, fixed structure, restricted area, or ballistic missile submarine designated by the inspection team leader until inspectors have arrived at that location. 8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall: (a) For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, inform the inspection team leader of the number of silo launchers of ICBMs for each type of ICBM based there, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the designator and location of each of those launchers at that base. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that base, the site diagram shall show the silo launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM. (b) For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the type of ICBM for each restricted area. (c) For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base, if there is such a diagram, and a copy of the site diagram of the rail garrison annotated to show the location of each of the railmobile launchers of ICBMs located outside fixed structures at the rail garrison. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that ICBM base, the site diagram shall show the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility shall not be shown on the site diagram.

964  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(d) For submarine bases, inform the inspection team leader of the location and type of each ballistic missile submarine to which pre-inspection restrictions apply, and of the type of SLBM for each such submarine, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the coastlines and waters diagram provided pursuant to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, annotated to show the location of each ballistic missile submarine within the waters identified pursuant to that paragraph, and the number of launchers on each such submarine. 9. Upon the completion of pre-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall designate in writing to a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected. The inspection team leader shall also have the right to designate for inspection, in the cases provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, one of the launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs, one of the fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or one of the restricted areas declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, and shall designate a subgroup consisting of no more than four inspectors to conduct such an inspection. The inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol. The inspection of such a fixed structure shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. After a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs has been designated in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall brief the inspectors on the route they will travel to reach the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 10. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs: (a) If no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader. (b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its designator or geographic coordinates, the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected. (c) If the designated silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected. (d) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the silo launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs.The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM. 11. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader. (b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its name or geographic coordinates, the restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located. (c) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  965

in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located. (d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of that restricted area annotated to show the location of each of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside of fixed structures in this restricted area, and the inspection team leader shall designate, using that site diagram, the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, or fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, in which the ICBM to be inspected is located. (e) If a designated fixed structure contains more than one road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram.The inspection team leader shall designate on the annotated site diagram the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains the ICBM to be inspected. (f) If a designated fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated roadmobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected from among those fixed structures or launchers located in the same restricted area. (g) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that a member of the in-country escort has identified, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (f) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs.The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such fixed structures or such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs do not contain deployed ICBMs.The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate: (i) All fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located in one of the restricted areas of the inspected ICBM base, if a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that the ICBM base does not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. (ii) In all other cases, one of the fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, that, in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph, a member of the in-country escort has identified for the inspection team leader as not containing a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 12. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) If no rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader. (b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no railmobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader,using the annotated site diagram provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section,shall designate the launcher or fixed structure containing the ICBM to be inspected. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility may not be designated for reentry vehicle inspection. (c) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs contains more than one rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram.The inspection team leader shall designate on the site diagram the launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected. (d) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated railmobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the

966  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected. (e) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a fixed structure or such a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM. 13. For submarine bases: (a) If no launcher of SLBMs at the submarine base contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader. (b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher at the base contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using the annotated site diagram or map provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, the ballistic missile submarine containing the SLBM to be inspected. (c) If no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate for inspection, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another ballistic missile submarine. (d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate the SLBM launcher containing the SLBM to be inspected. (e) If the designated SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM, a member of the incountry escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another SLBM launcher from among those SLBM launchers located on the same ballistic missile submarine. (f) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the SLBM launchers identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (e) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed SLBMs.The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such an SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM. (g) SLBM launchers on submarines in dry dock may not be designated for a reentry vehicle inspection. 14.The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain the deployed ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, without undue delay and within the following period of time: (a) to a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs: no later than three hours after completion of preinspection procedures; (b) to an SLBM launcher: no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; (c) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; (d) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or (e) to a silo launcher of ICBMs: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  967

The times for transportation of an inspection team, provided for in this paragraph, shall also apply to the transportation of subgroups of an inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that they do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM. 15. For the purposes of this Section, a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs containing an ICBM or SLBM without a front section shall be considered not to contain an ICBM or SLBM; in this connection, the inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 7(c) of Annex 3 to this Protocol. 16. Reentry vehicle inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to this Protocol. 17. If a front section of an ICBM or SLBM to be inspected is viewed at a location outside the boundaries of the inspection site, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol pertaining to the inspection site shall apply to that location, except for paragraph 3 of Section VI of this Protocol. 18. If an inspection team subgroup conducting an inspection, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, of a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM discovers that such a launcher or fixed structure contains an ICBM or SLBM, the inspection team may inspect that ICBM or SLBM in addition to the ICBM or SLBM previously designated for inspection. The inspection of such an ICBM or SLBM shall not be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section. 19. If a member of the in-country escort has reported that the ICBM base or submarine base to be inspected does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, the inspection team leader shall have the right to: (a) designate an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided for in paragraph 16 of Section V, or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol; (b) designate for inspection a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, restricted area, or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, to confirm that such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, fixed structure, or restricted area does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs. In this case the inspection shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section; or (c) to decline to conduct an inspection and to leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections for deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. X. Post-Dispersal Inspections of Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Their Associated Missiles Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles after a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Such inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification, subject to the following: (a) for an exercise dispersal that involved only road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater;

968  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(b) for an exercise dispersal that involved only rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater; (c) for an exercise dispersal that involved both road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater, and no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for railmobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater. 2. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with any other type of inspection at the same inspection site. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct, at the same inspection site, a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with the implementation of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. 3. From the time of completion of an exercise dispersal specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification: (a) Mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall not be removed from restricted areas, rail garrisons, or maintenance facilities. (b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs, except that such work shall be permitted at the maintenance facility. Pre-inspection restrictions shall not apply to work carried out to deal with an emergency involving a launcher or a missile. 4. All ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall be designated by the inspection team leaders in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol and within the time provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section III of this Protocol. If an inspection team leader has designated an inspection site less than four hours after arrival at the point of entry and before the inspected Party has completed the examination of equipment brought in by the inspectors, the inspected Party shall have the right to complete that examination after the designation of the inspection site by the inspection team leader.The period for the transportation of the inspection team to the inspection site, provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall begin upon completion of the examination of equipment but no later than four hours after the designation of the inspection site. 5. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect until an inspection team or inspection teams specify all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. Pre-inspection restrictions at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall remain in effect until inspectors arrive there and pre-inspection procedures have been completed. 6. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the inspection site and all site diagrams of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the current location at the inspection site of such items and those structures in which they are located. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader, for each restricted area, of each road-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  969

mobile launcher of ICBMs within the deployment area that has not returned to the restricted area of the inspected ICBM base, except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are on relocation outside the deployment area or are being transported by air, rail, or by waterborne vehicles within the deployment area. 7. For each road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that has not returned to the restricted area and of which the inspection team leader was informed in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall, at the choice of that member, either designate the geographic coordinates of such a mobile launcher of ICBMs or ensure transportation of the inspectors to such a mobile launcher of ICBMs. 8. For an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader shall designate, upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the restricted area or restricted areas of the ICBM base that are to be inspected.The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team or subgroups of the inspection team to the designated restricted areas within the following time period: (a) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; (b) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures. 9. The inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected, or the rail garrison and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, if the inspection team intends to inspect road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have not been designated in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspection team leader shall also indicate the subgroup to conduct such an inspection. 10. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect in each restricted area, rail garrison, and maintenance facility to be inspected until inspectors arrive there. 11. Inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have been designated by a member of the incountry escort in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section. 12. During the period of inspection, mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas designated to be inspected or within a rail garrison designated to be inspected may leave those restricted areas or that rail garrison only with the consent of the inspectors. 13. During each post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain that the aggregate number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and the number of such items that have not returned there following the completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for the inspected ICBM base. For that purpose, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol. XI. Conversion or Elimination Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall conduct, and shall have the right to conduct, 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, conversion or elimination inspections in accordance with the provisions

970  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

provided for in this Section and the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 2. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the location specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide the inspection team with a schedule of conversion or elimination activities. 3.Within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections, each Party shall have the right to implement conversion or elimination procedures at no more than two sites at any one time if such procedures provide for conversion or elimination inspections. 4.The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace its inspectors conducting conversion or elimination inspections, subject to the following provisions: (a) For each inspection site, replacement of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks, and the number of inspectors subject to replacement in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of the inspectors located there. (b) Replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the inspection site, subject to the limitation on the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI to this Protocol. If at any time the total of the number of inspectors at the inspection site and the number of those arriving on the territory of the inspected Party for replacement exceeds the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI of this Protocol, the replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport closest to the inspection site. (c) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in the inspection report that the inspection team as then constituted has completed its inspection with respect to the items presented to that team and shall indicate the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. The specific procedures for eliminating the last item undergoing elimination at that site that were observed by the inspection team headed by the outgoing leader shall be completed before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site. (d) The inspected Party shall not resume the elimination procedures until the pre-inspection procedures have been completed for the newly arrived inspectors.Any delay in the resumption of the elimination procedures caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours. 5. In the case of a delay in the initiation of activities beyond the scheduled date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol: (a) if the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay; or (b) if the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party, unless the Parties agree otherwise. 6. For the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 7. At conversion or elimination facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters are eliminated by burning, explosive demolition, or explosion, as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the inspected Party

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  971

shall provide inspectors with binoculars that permit observation of the elimination process from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. 8. For the elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, railmobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers, inspectors shall make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 9. For the eliminated fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, inspectors shall have the right to make observations subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of such a fixed structure within the 90-day period beginning on the date of the completion of the elimination process. Such an inspection shall be conducted during a baseline data inspection, data update inspection, reentry vehicle inspection, post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, or close-out inspection at the facility at which the fixed structure was located. 10. For the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 8 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Except for those cases when the initiation of the process of elimination of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection, the inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 90-day period beginning on the date of completion of the elimination process to confirm that the elimination of each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed. 11. For converted heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 20-day period that begins on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility as provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, to confirm that it has been converted. 12. For changing the accountability of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers by placing them on static display, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection within the 30-day period that begins on the date of the receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. XII. Close-out Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted within 60 days after such notification has been provided, or, for facilities that were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding but not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections. No more than one close-out inspection shall be conducted at each facility. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or

972  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers; and air bases for former heavy bombers. 3.The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol no later than 48 hours after its arrival at the point of entry. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two close-out inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time. 5. A facility, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall not be subject to any inspection other than a close-out inspection until such an inspection is conducted or until the expiration of the 60-day period provided for such an inspection in paragraph 1 of this Section, whichever occurs earlier. If a facility that is specified in paragraph 2 of this Section is subject to a close-out inspection, that facility shall not be subject to a baseline data inspection. 6. During the course of each close-out inspection, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the elimination procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. XIII. Formerly Declared Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right, 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct formerly declared facility inspections. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of three such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. Such inspections may be conducted at facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. For each such facility, formerly declared facility inspections may be conducted after close-out inspections have been conducted or, if such an inspection was not conducted, beginning 60 days after notification has been provided, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, of the elimination of the facility. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; training facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; and test ranges. 3. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site, specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, containers, launch canisters, and enclosed vehicles, large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site. 4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two formerly declared facility inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time. 5. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  973

XIV. Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section and subparagraphs 5(c) and 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, technical characteristics exhibitions required by paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type and variant thereof, and each version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, of the ICBM or the SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties. 2. Subsequent technical characteristics exhibitions of ICBMs and SLBMs of each new type, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and of new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted at the times specified in such notifications. Technical characteristics exhibitions of mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be conducted at the same time as the technical characteristics exhibition of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, in close proximity, of the ICBM or SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable.Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections. 3. If, during exhibitions conducted in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the technical characteristics exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required.Technical characteristics exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated. 4.The technical characteristics exhibition sites shall be chosen by the inspected Party. 5. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner. 6. During pre-inspection procedures for technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the incountry escort shall: (a) inform inspectors of the numbers of each type, variant and version, whichever is applicable, of the exhibited items; and (b) point out to the inspectors, when applicable, in photographs, slides or drawings, the distinguishing features or external differences of such items.

974  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

7. During a technical characteristics exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall point out the specific places on each exhibited item where measurements were taken to obtain the specified technical data and to obtain the dimensions specified in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, and, if applicable, 15, of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. For measurements of the first stage of a solid propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall exhibit the first stage of such an ICBM in a configuration that permits inspectors to confirm the reference cylinder as provided for in subparagraph (a) (i) of paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol.A member of the in-country escort shall point out the places on such a first stage that permit measurement of the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case, and the maximum diameter of such a stage excluding protruding elements. If necessary, the in-country escort shall have the right to use diagrams or sketches to indicate such places. Inspectors shall have the right to make such measurements. Such measurements shall be recorded pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. 8. During technical characteristics exhibitions, inspectors shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage of an ICBM and SLBM of each type and variant, as well as the diameter of the second or third stage if that diameter differs from the diameter of the first stage, and the length and diameter of the assembled ICBM or SLBM, as provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol. 9. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if this new type is declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length used for confirming a new type, with or without a change in the throw-weight, compared to the first stage length of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the notifying Party shall: (a) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of the new type for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM; and (b) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of appropriate existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, if the length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM has not been previously confirmed on an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of such existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs. When necessary, specific procedures for measuring the first stage length used for confirming a new type of an ICBM or SLBM shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 10. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if that new type is declared on the basis of a change in the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of that new type from the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh, or to determine by other agreed means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM of the new type and ICBMs or SLBMs of an appropriate existing type or previously declared new type in order to verify their launch weights. Procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of such ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission before the beginning of deployment of an ICBM or SLBM of such a new type. 11. If one Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM that the other Party believes has demonstrated a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms, the other Party shall have the right to raise its concern in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Resolution of the issue may include, among other things, an agreement to weigh, or to determine by other means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM in question in order to assist in the verification of its launch weight.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  975

12. Procedures for weighing and for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission no later than one year after a Party has proposed procedures for weighing or for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs. 13. For an ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type or for an ICBM for railmobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, whichever is applicable, during the technical characteristics exhibition, the inspected Party shall demonstrate distinguishing features pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article III of the Treaty. (a) If an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type is larger either in length or diameter than the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type, technical characteristics exhibitions pursuant only to paragraph 2 of this Section shall be required. (b) For an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, exhibited in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, if the length and the diameter of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type are less than or equal to the length and less than or equal to the diameter, respectively, of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of an existing type or previously declared new type, and if either Party believes that the additional procedures during the exhibition are necessary, based on the information contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notification, with respect to the adequacy of the features that distinguish: the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type of ICBM from the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type of ICBM or previously declared new type of ICBM; the mobile launcher of ICBMs for ICBMs of the new type from the mobile launchers of ICBMs for ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type; the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of the new type installed from the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of each existing type or previously declared new type installed, then the Party that has provided the notification shall conduct such an exhibition subject to the following additional procedures, unless otherwise agreed: (i) The ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type shall be exhibited in close proximity to the launch canister for such an ICBM, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM; a launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM; and a mobile launcher of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM; (ii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate the functionally related and external differences that distinguish the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type from the launch canister of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and (iii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate that the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type, and that a launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type. If the incapability to carry out such launches has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party, the inspecting Party may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

976  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

14. Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to this Protocol. 15. During inspections conducted during technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the incountry escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team. XV. Distinguishability Exhibitions and Inspections and Baseline Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 12 and 13, Respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty, and Exhibitions of Long-range Non-nuclear ALCMs Conducted Pursuant to Notifications Provided in Accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol 1. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, distinguishability exhibitions, required by paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs of types, categories, and variants existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties. 2. Each Party shall conduct, no earlier than the completion of distinguishability exhibitions by that Party, but no later than 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty, baseline exhibitions, required by paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties. 3. Subsequent distinguishability exhibitions conducted in connection with events, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. During such a subsequent distinguishability exhibition, the inspected Party shall not be required to exhibit all categories or, if applicable, all variants of an item of a particular type, provided that the purpose of the exhibition is met by a combination of the current exhibition and previous distinguishability exhibitions concerning that type. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections. 4. Subsequent baseline exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 135 days after notification that a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. One such exhibition shall be conducted at each air base at which heavy bombers of that type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are specified to be based. Pre-inspection procedures for such an exhibition shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section VII of this Protocol, to the extent that such provisions relate to the heavy bombers to be exhibited. During such pre-inspection procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to designate for inspection no more than 30 percent of such heavy bombers specified to be based at each air base.The inspectors shall not have the right to designate alert heavy bombers for inspection during such baseline exhibitions. 5. Exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs pursuant to notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  977

later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections. 6. If, during exhibitions conducted pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of distinguishability exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the distinguishability exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required. Distinguishability exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated. 7.The sites of such exhibitions shall be chosen by the inspected Party. 8. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner. 9. Such exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol. 10. During inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and during inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraph 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team. XVI. Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. Each Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct continuous monitoring activities. 2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding. 3. Continuous monitoring activities shall cease at a monitored facility at which production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs has ceased, no later than one year after notification of the cessation of such production has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, except that if such production ceases prior to May 31, 1994, continuous monitoring activities shall be permitted until May 31, 1995. Beginning on the date on which continuous monitoring activities are no longer permitted at such a facility: (a) That facility shall be subject to a new facility inspection and data update inspections, in accordance with the provisions of Section VII of this Protocol, if it has been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol.

978  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(b) That facility shall be subject to suspect-site inspections if it has not been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol. 4. If the inspected Party intends to produce at a monitored facility ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs that are not subject to the numerical limits on non-deployed missiles provided for in paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty and that are as large as or larger than the size criteria as provided for in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than 180 days in advance of the planned exit of the first such ICBM, SLBM, or first stage. The Parties shall agree on additional verification procedures in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in an expeditious manner so as not to delay the exit of the first ICBM, SLBM, or first stage of an ICBM or SLBM. 5. The inspected Party shall determine the perimeter of each facility subject to continuous monitoring that has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol and shall not change it without prior notification to the inspecting Party.The inspected Party shall construct and maintain a fence around the perimeter of each such facility. 6. The inspected Party shall designate along the periphery of each facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, a perimeter continuous monitoring area the boundaries of which shall be agreed upon by the Parties for each such facility so that they shall be sufficient to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. 7. If the inspected Party intends to change the perimeter of a facility at which work on establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system has begun or at which such a system has already been established, it shall inform the inspecting Party, in advance, of its intention to carry out such work, shall indicate the date planned for such work to begin, and provide through diplomatic channels a site diagram of that facility annotated to indicate the proposed changes to the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Before work to change the perimeter is begun, the Parties shall agree upon the new boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area and upon the procedure for relocating the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.The procedure for relocating such equipment shall be agreed upon in such a way as to enable monitors to continue their continuous monitoring activities while work on changing the perimeter is in progress. The inspected Party shall bear the costs relating to relocation of the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system resulting from changing the perimeter. 8.The inspected Party shall define, separately for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, a zone within which monitors shall have the right to travel with the permission of the in-country escort, and, as considered necessary by the inspected Party, accompanied by escorts. Areas from which monitors shall be excluded within these zones may be defined by the inspected Party. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party shall define, if possible, a free movement zone within which the monitors shall have the right to move between their place of duty and their living quarters without the permission of the in-country escort. 9.The inspecting Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct an engineering site survey at a facility subject to continuous monitoring. The purpose of the engineering site survey is on-site familiarization with geological and topographic conditions and available logistical resources for establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. 10.Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.The equipment for such a system is specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  979

11. Monitors shall have the right of unlimited access, at times of their own choosing, to the perimeter continuous monitoring area. In each case, monitors shall inform a member of the incountry escort of their intent to examine the perimeter continuous monitoring area.The inspected Party shall maintain continuously, on a 24-hour basis, a member of the in-country escort at the monitored facility, to accompany monitors to any portion of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. For this purpose, a member of the in-country escort shall promptly provide monitors with a vehicle upon request. In the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the monitors shall be enabled to move around the entire monitored facility. 12. The monitors shall have the right to use in the perimeter continuous monitoring area their own systems for two-way radio communication with the operations center at the monitored facility that is provided for in subparagraph 22(a) of this Section. The operating frequency and power levels for these radio systems shall be agreed by the Parties prior to the use of such systems in the perimeter continuous monitoring area. These radio systems must operate only on a single agreed operating frequency and may not contain components permitting them to operate on other frequencies. A member of the in-country escort shall have the right to ascertain at any time that these radio systems are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency. 13. For a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line. All objects, containers, launch canisters, and vehicles that are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring of the inspected Party shall exit only through the portal commencing on the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section III of this Protocol. 14. Except for the portal, the monitored facility shall have no other rail exits and shall have no more than two other road exits. Such exits shall be monitored as provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol.The inspecting Party shall have the right to construct an environmental shelter with total floor space of up to 16 square meters at each exit. 15.There shall be no more than four additional exits from the monitored facility for personnel of the inspected Party.These exits shall be no wider than one meter. 16. No later than three months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of the inspecting Party, provide: (a) two dedicated telephone lines providing direct communications between the monitoring team and the embassy of the inspecting Party with a single termination point, specified by the inspecting Party, at each end of a telephone line; (b) one non-dedicated commercial telephone line for local and long distance communications throughout the existing telephone network within the territory of the inspected Party; and (c) satellite communications equipment providing access to a telephone communications systems channel of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) or to an equivalent satellite communication system for telephonic communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party, if such equipment is not provided by the inspecting Party at the request of the inspected Party. 17. All expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party. All expenses associated with the installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line shall be borne by the inspecting Party. All expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspected Party. If requested by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party may provide the satellite communications equipment. In such a case all expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In any case all expenses associated with the use of the satellite communications system shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

980  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

18. Satellite communications equipment shall be under the control of the inspected Party, except that it shall be under the control of both Parties if provided by the inspecting Party. Monitors shall have the right to use the satellite communications system any time a monitor and a member of the in-country escort conclude that facsimile communications with the territory of the inspecting Party via the dedicated direct telephone lines to its embassy cannot be established within 20 minutes. 19. No later than six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following logistic support: (a) all utilities for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating, and sewage; (b) basic construction materials, including concrete and lumber; (c) the site preparation for the establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, and for the operations center. Such preparation may include earth moving operations, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations, and utility connections; and (d) transportation to the perimeter continuous monitoring area of all tools, materials, and equipment necessary for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. 20. Equipment and supplies brought into the territory of the inspected Party, subject to the provisions of paragraph 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be delivered to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility without undue delay. 21. Prior to the completion of construction of the buildings or shelters provided for in paragraph 14 and subparagraph 22(b) of this Section, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall provide the monitors with temporary structures at the portal and road exits. Such temporary structures shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party. 22.Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to: (a) construct, operate, and maintain at the portal an operations center for receiving and storing data; (b) construct at the portal no more than three buildings with a total floor space of up to 150 square meters to house the operations center and monitoring team headquarters; and (c) install at the portal and the road exits provided for in paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Section, the equipment for a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol. 23.Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall construct one building with floor space specified in such request, but of no more than 500 square meters, for use by the monitors for storage of equipment for continuous monitoring activities and of supplies. 24.Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall have the right to construct at a location agreed upon with the inspecting Party, one building for conducting viewing procedures in accordance with this Protocol. 25.The monitoring team leader shall provide to the in-country escort: (a) installation drawings, installation manuals, and other documentation, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors at that facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to install or test the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  981

the inspected Party prior to the commencement of the work described therein. During such discussions, the monitors shall provide clarification concerning such documentation; and (b) manuals and any other documents, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors to operate and maintain the equipment for continuous monitoring activity within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to the use of such documentation for the operation and maintenance of equipment within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. During such discussions, monitors shall provide clarification concerning the use of such documentation. 26. The following restrictions shall apply within and near the perimeter continuous monitoring area: (a) Unobstructed tunnels shall not be permitted under the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed tunnels shall be subject to examination. (b) Waterways, canals, or unobstructed culverts shall not be permitted to cross the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed culverts shall be subject to examination. (c) Aircraft shall not be permitted to arrive within the perimeter of the monitored facility unless the monitors have been informed in advance of their arrival, except for an emergency at such a facility. In case of an emergency, the in-country escort shall inform the monitors of the arrival of an aircraft within the perimeter of that facility immediately after such an arrival. (d) Cranes shall not be permitted to be erected within 20 meters of either side of the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area unless the monitors have been informed in advance. 27. During the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, the inspecting Party shall not impede the inspected Party’s access to any structures or security systems. 28. The inspecting Party shall provide an escort into any of its portal buildings constructed in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23 of this Section, when the inspected Party desires access to such buildings. 29.Any two members of the monitoring team shall have the right to travel no more than one time per week to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party.The monitoring team leader or the authorized representative of such a team shall inform a member of the in-country escort of the planned date of each such trip.The inspected Party shall make arrangements for each such trip in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. 30. No more than nine diplomatic personnel of the inspecting Party who are members of the Treaty implementation unit of that Party’s embassy or consulate on the territory of the inspected Party, shall have the right to travel, no more than two times each year, to each facility subject to continuous monitoring, if monitors are present at such a facility, or monitored facility, with no more than two persons traveling each time and staying at such a facility for no more than two days. Arrangements for such travel shall be made in accordance with established procedures for travel by diplomats to open areas. Such personnel shall be permitted unrestricted movement in the free movement zone associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, the Parties agree to waive the inviolability of any article, including personal baggage, their diplomatic personnel may be carrying at the last airport prior to arrival at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, except that this waiver of immunity shall not apply to papers.This waiver shall not apply to any other privileges and immunities accorded diplomatic personnel. Other requests for visits shall be considered on a case-by-case basis.

982  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

31. Once notification in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section III of this Protocol has been provided, monitors shall have the right to move from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility directly to another such facility and take with them equipment and supplies. The inspected Party may assign escorts to the monitors during such movements.The equipment and supplies brought with them may be examined by the inspected Party upon arrival at another facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility under the same terms as when they arrived on the territory of the inspected Party. 32.The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to structures of the inspected Party without its consent. If the Parties agree that structures of the inspected Party are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation. 33.The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment of the inspecting Party or restrict the access of the monitors to such equipment.The in-country escort shall have the right to observe such equipment during its installation, testing, operation, and maintenance at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. 34.The inspected Party shall not interfere with continuous monitoring activities. 35. For the purpose of continuous monitoring after dark or during inclement weather the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall ensure sufficient lighting at the portal, road exits, and along the perimeter of the monitored facility to permit monitors to carry out their functions, including obtaining clear images of items being verified using a system of video cameras. 36. Continuous monitoring of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles exiting from the monitored facility shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol. XVII. Cancellation of Inspections 1.An inspection shall be canceled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is canceled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 2. In the case of a delay, including a delay due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, that prevents an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled due to delay, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 3. If the time to transport an inspection team or subgroup exceeds the times specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VII, paragraph 14 of Section IX, or paragraph 8 of Section X of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If such an inspection is canceled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 4. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection restrictions shall be canceled if, due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, items subject to pre-inspection restrictions must be removed from the inspection site. In the case of pre-inspection restrictions being canceled due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is canceled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced. 5. If the inspected Party interrupts the procedures for a reentry vehicle inspection for reasons of personnel or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel the inspection. In that case, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  983

XVIII. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring Reports 1. During post-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written inspection report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. Such a report shall be provided no later than two hours after the beginning of the post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at the location where such procedures are carried out, whichever is later.The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection conducted; the inspection site; the type and number of missiles, stages, launchers, heavy bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and all measurements recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection as well as the site diagram or map of the inspection site provided for in paragraph 8 of Section VII, paragraph 8 or subparagraph 11(d) of Section IX, or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, shall be considered to be part of the report.The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report. 2.Within three days after the end of each month, the monitoring team leader shall provide the incountry escort with an official written continuous monitoring report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain items of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that left the monitored facility through the portal specified in paragraph 13 of Section XVI of this Protocol during that month.The report shall also include all measurements of containers contained in these vehicles recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during continuous monitoring shall be considered to be a part of the report.The report shall be signed by the monitoring team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report. 3.The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report. 4. The Parties shall, when possible, clarify ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report or the continuous monitoring report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: George Bush President of the United States of America For the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics: M. Gorbachev President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Annex 1. Procedures for the Inspection of Covered Objects, Containers, Launch Canisters,Vehicles, and Structures 1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions of items of inspection that are specified for the facility to be inspected and declared for

984  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

the inspection site in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, and to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. For this purpose in carrying out the procedures for inspections provided for in this Annex the size criteria provided in paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used. 2. For an item of inspection that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of inspection designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of such viewing and measurements, the item of inspection shall not be subject to further inspection. 3. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of its external dimensions at locations on the object designated by a member of the in-country escort that it is not an item of inspection. 4. For a covered or environmentally protected object, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that such an object is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version, or that it is not an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection: (i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex. (iii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is an item of inspection, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 5, 6, or 7 of this Annex. (b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object: (i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, that object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. 5. For a container, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the container contains an item of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container: (i) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  985

(ii) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph. (b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents: (i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or confirm that the container does not contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. (c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container: (i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are an item of inspection or an unidentified object, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex. 6. For a launch canister that is declared to contain an item of inspection, a member of the incountry escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Inspectors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of its dimensions to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and the measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection. 7. For a launch canister declared not to contain an item of inspection, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister, by removing at least one of the end caps from the launch canister, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents. (i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. (b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister: (i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

986  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex. 8. For a launch canister that is declared to contain a training model of a missile, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors the features that confirm that such a launch canister contains a training model of a missile. 9. For a vehicle, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the vehicle contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space: (i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. (b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space. (i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. (c) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle. (i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, or a launch canister, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex. After inspectors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions, of items of inspection or to confirm the absence of an item of inspection, the

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  987

vehicle and the items of inspection, containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the inspection site. 10. For a structure other than a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the structure contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into the structure: (i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the structure shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. (b) Make measurements of the dimensions of the partitioned enclosed space within the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space: (i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. (c) View the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort.This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure: (i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex. 11. For a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the fixed structure contains one or more mobile launchers of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and, if applicable, version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and no other item of inspection or that it does not contain an item of inspection. Inspectors shall have the right:

988  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that such fixed structures in a restricted area cannot contain more than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area; (b) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the specified dimensions of such fixed structures; (c) To view the interior of each fixed structure from a place designated by a member of the incountry escort.This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs: (i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, the fixed structure shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex. (d) To read the data from the unique identifiers applied to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol. When carrying out procedures provided for in this paragraph, no more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed inside a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such a fixed structure contains a mobile launcher of ICBMs. Annex 2 Procedures for Inspection of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, and SLBM Launchers 1. For an inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right to ascertain that it is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs by comparing its geographic coordinates, determined using a satellite system receiver and the procedures provided for in Annex 8 to this Protocol, with the geographic coordinates specified for that silo launcher. After confirmation of coordinates, the inspected Party shall open the silo door.The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of this ICBM launcher from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or a first stage of an ICBM. 2. For an inspection of a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, if inspectors are unable to confirm by means of external viewing of the launcher that it does not contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of that road-mobile launcher of ICBMs through a maintenance hatch. 3. For an inspection of a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the railcar of such a launcher through a maintenance hatch or from the entry compartment of that railcar to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM. 4. For an inspection of an SLBM launcher declared not to contain an SLBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such an SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall open the SLBM launcher hatch. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the SLBM launcher, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an SLBM or the first stage of an SLBM. 5. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  989

subgroup shall return to the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or, for a reentry vehicle inspection after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, 3, or 4 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right, at its choice, to rejoin the inspection team or to go to the designated location where post-inspection procedures will be carried out. Annex 3. Procedures for Reentry Vehicle Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 1.The inspected Party shall have the right to prepare the front section for viewing in the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, in close proximity to it, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site determined by the inspected Party. 2. For silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers: (a) Upon arrival of the inspection team at a designated silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to this Protocol, that it is the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader. (b) Upon arrival of inspectors at the silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, a member of the in-country escort shall designate one or more places where the inspectors may be present.This place or these places shall be determined in a manner permitting inspectors to observe the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher and permitting inspectors to see any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher.The boundaries of that vicinity shall be determined by a member of the in-country escort.The place or places from which inspectors may observe the upper silo or tube edge of the ICBM or SLBM launcher shall be located no more than 50 meters from that launcher. In cases where a clear and unobstructed view cannot be achieved within a 50-meter distance, the inspection team leader and a member of the incountry escort may agree to a position or positions that permit a clear and unobstructed view of the upper edge of the launcher from a distance greater than 50 meters. (c) Upon the arrival of inspectors at the designated silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher, if requested by the inspection team leader, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the vicinity of this launcher in such a manner that inspectors may orient themselves and have an understanding of the relative positions of the launcher and such structures or vehicles as may be located in its vicinity. (d) Inspectors shall have the right to maintain continuous visual observation of the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher or of vehicles, devices, or temporary structures used for the removal of the missile or the front section from the launcher or for the preparation of the front section for viewing.The purpose of such observation shall be to ascertain that no reentry vehicle is removed from the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier. (e) Prior to the time of the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the opening. Inspectors shall have the right to observe the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch; the time of the opening shall be at the discretion of the inspected Party. (f) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of the preparation of the front

990  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier, do not contain reentry vehicles. 3. As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains an ICBM to be inspected may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an ICBM will be carried out, or where the front section will be separated from the ICBM. In that case, the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher of ICBMs. 4.As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a submarine whose launcher contains an SLBM to be inspected, may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an SLBM will be carried out, or where the SLBM will be removed from its launcher, or the front section will be separated from the SLBM. In that case, the submarine shall proceed on the surface to that site, and the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with that ballistic missile submarine. 5.The inspected Party shall not remove any reentry vehicles from the front section of the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected throughout the entire period of time between the time it is designated for inspection and the completion of the viewing of the front section. 6. If the front section is viewed directly in the ICBM or SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall prepare the front section for viewing subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 or 11 of this Section and shall give the inspection team an opportunity to view it. Preparation of the front section for viewing may include its partial separation from the missile. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to prepare the front section for viewing, prior to their use and after the completion of viewing of the front section.This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that such vehicles or devices do not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. For SLBMs, if the inspected Party places over an SLBM launcher a temporary structure specially intended for preparing the front section for viewing and for viewing it, inspectors shall have the right to inspect that temporary structure before it is put in place and after the viewing of the front section is completed.This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that the temporary structure does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. 7. For viewing of the front section carried out outside an ICBM or SLBM launcher: (a) The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to remove a missile or front section from an ICBM or SLBM launcher, prior to their use. This viewing shall be carried out to ascertain that such vehicles or devices do not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicles.After the removal of the missile or front section from a vehicle or device, inspectors shall have the right to view it again to ascertain that it contains no reentry vehicles. (b) The inspected Party shall separate the front section and remove it from the ICBM or SLBM launcher or remove the missile with its front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher. (c) If the inspected Party separates the front section in the ICBM or SLBM launcher and then removes it, no more than two inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the launcher for no more than one minute from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that the front section is completely separated. A member of the in-country escort shall designate this place in such a way as to provide an unobstructed view of the interior of the ICBM or SLBM launcher. (d) If, in the process of preparing for the demonstration, the front section or missile with its front section is placed into a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicle before the missile or front section is placed in it, in order to ascertain that it does not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicles.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  991

(e) If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, inspectors shall have the right to follow that vehicle during the transportation of the missile with its front section or of the front section in the vehicle to that site in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the vehicle; after the missile with its front section or the front section has been unloaded from that vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the vehicle again to ascertain the absence therein of reentry vehicles. 8. Preparation of the front section for viewing shall include full or partial removal of the shroud except for missiles that do not utilize a shroud.The process of preparation of the front section for viewing may be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from the front section. 9. If the front section is viewed in the vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to observe the vehicle throughout the entire period of time between the placement of the front section in the vehicle and the viewing of the front section. 10. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, the following procedures shall apply: (a) Before the shroud is removed inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. (b) During the entire process of preparation of the front section for viewing, inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from that site, or to seal all the exits with seals. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it. 11. Before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party may cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with covers, in such a manner that the covers shall not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. Inspectors shall have the right to view the covers and to measure hard covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles. 12. After the process of preparation of the front section for viewing has been completed, inspectors may view the front section continuously for no more than 15 minutes from a place or places designated by a member of the in-country escort no more than five meters from the front section and providing a clear, unobstructed view of the front section, to ascertain that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. 13. If a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle, the inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle. 14. If the preparation of the front section for viewing has been carried out outside the field of view of inspectors, the inspectors, upon completion of viewing of the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, may view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, to ascertain the absence of reentry vehicles outside the front section. 15.The in-country escort shall provide in the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher and at the site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, lighting sufficient for the conduct of the procedures provided for in this Annex. 16. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location designated by the inspected Party for carrying out post-inspection procedures.

992  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Annex 4. Procedures for Inspections of Heavy Bombers, Former Heavy Bombers, Long-range ALCMs, and Their Facilities I. For inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and for inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol: 1. Inspectors shall have the right to view a heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol, to confirm that the technical data and distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, as well as to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding, to the extent that such data is required to confirm the distinguishing features of such heavy bomber. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber that are not related to specified technical data or distinguishing features. 2. Inspectors shall have the right to view a former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type of such former heavy bomber, that make it distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements to confirm that the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type of such former heavy bomber, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features. 3. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range nuclear ALCM and to make linear measurements to confirm that the technical data correspond to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, variant of such long-range nuclear ALCM, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. 4. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the ALCM is non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, which have been specified in the notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, pursuant to subparagraph 9(f) of Article III of the Treaty. For long-range non-nuclear ALCMs stored in containers, prior to the commencement of such procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements of the dimensions of the container, and the in-country escort shall open the container and remove the missile. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the missile from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the missile and container are the same ones originally exhibited.The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation. 5. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made.The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item.The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. Photographs may be taken to document features of the exhibited items subject to procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of Section XV of this Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  993

6. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol. II. For inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and baseline exhibitions: 1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm, as provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VII of this Protocol, heavy bomber equipage and that a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, or a former heavy bomber satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. 2. Inspectors shall also have the right to view a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from other heavy bombers of the same type, or that make the former heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make those linear measurements that can be made without changing the configuration of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber by adding or removing equipment, to confirm that the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the heavy bomber is equipped or the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. During each inspection of a facility, however, at the request of the inspection team leader, the incountry escort shall remove one pylon from one non-alert heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, of a type specified not to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs on external attachment joints, or one pylon from one heavy bomber equipped for nonnuclear armaments.The particular heavy bomber and the particular pylon shall be designated by the inspection team leader. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features. 3.The inspection team leader shall designate prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures which of the heavy bombers subject to inspection and former heavy bombers located at the facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect are to be inspected. For a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that arrives at the facility during the period of inspection and that is subject to inspection, the inspection team leader shall, immediately upon the arrival of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, inform the in-country escort whether it is designated to be inspected. During the period of inspection, no heavy bomber or former heavy bomber designated for inspection shall depart the facility until inspected. 4. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made.The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item.The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. III. For inspections of alert heavy bombers conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(d) of Section VII of this Protocol: 1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to heavy bombers designated as alert heavy bombers during inspections of air bases for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. 2.At air bases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the location of alert heavy bombers.The in-country escort shall have the right to prepare such heavy

994  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

bombers for inspection at a location chosen by the inspected Party that shall permit inspectors to view the preparation. Preparation may involve the use of covering, provided that such covering allows the inspectors to confirm the data provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(i) or 14(a)(ii) of Section VII of this Protocol.The areas where alert heavy bombers are located shall not be subject to inspection except as provided for in this Section. 3. No more than a total of four inspectors shall inspect an alert heavy bomber for a total period of no more than 30 minutes. Measurements shall not be taken during such an inspection, except that closed weapons bay doors may be measured. For heavy bombers of a category, type, and, if applicable, variant, the internal weapons bays of which are specified to be large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, the weapons bay doors shall be opened, and inspectors may view the contents of the bay from a position external to the bay, designated by a member of the in-country escort, from which inspectors can accomplish the purpose provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(i) or 14(a)(ii) of Section VII of this Protocol. IV. For inspections of weapons storage areas conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of this Protocol: 1.The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers. 2. A member of the in-country escort shall, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures at a facility referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the location of weapons storage areas, and shall provide a site diagram of such areas depicting the structures that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM. 3. Inspections of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that inspections of containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, of a type for which data according to categories of data contained in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding have been specified, shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Section.Additionally, except as provided for in paragraph 4 or 5 of this Section, the inspectors may, in carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, make linear measurements only of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures. No more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed in a structure. 4. During the inspection of weapons storage areas at each facility, the inspectors may designate for further inspection no more than three containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM; or no more than three ALCMs stored outside containers; or any combination of no more than three such items: (a) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a designated container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to make additional linear measurements of the dimensions of such a container, and to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of the container. (ii) For containers inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM. (iii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  995

(iv) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe the removal of the contents of the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and the container are the items chosen by the inspectors.The inspectors shall have the right to view the contents of the container and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features that make the contents of the container distinguishable from longrange nuclear ALCMs. (v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. (b) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that a designated ALCM stored outside a container is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures: (i) Inspectors shall have the right to view such an ALCM to confirm the presence of the features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (ii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the ALCM shall not be subject to further inspection. (iii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, a member of the in-country escort may allow the inspectors to carry out additional actions, which may include making linear measurements and using radiation detection equipment, to confirm the presence of features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. (iv) If a member of the in-country escort does not allow such additional actions, or if, by carrying out such additional actions, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the ALCM subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. 5. For containers that are declared by a member of the in-country escort to be of types of containers exhibited pursuant to Section VII of the Notification Protocol as containers of longrange non-nuclear ALCMs, and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall also have the right to designate for inspection a total of no more than three such containers during each three-year period in order to confirm that a long-range nuclear ALCM is not contained therein, subject to the following procedures: (a) The in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM. (b) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection. (c) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the contents are non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make the contents of the container distinguishable from longrange nuclear ALCMs. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the contents from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the

996  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

contents and container are the same ones originally designated by the inspectors.The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation. (d) If, by making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, or that such a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, they shall record their findings in the inspection report.A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container or the container, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol. 6.A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected object where linear measurements may be made.The inspected Party may cover the object to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable.The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. 7. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol. V. Procedures for exhibitions of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range ALCMs: 1. During distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs: (a) For an exhibition conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall exhibit, for a type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, one heavy bomber of each category and, if applicable, variant of that type in close proximity to one another. In addition, the inspected Party shall exhibit, in close proximity to such heavy bombers, one long-range nuclear ALCM of each type and, if applicable, variant. Different types of heavy bombers from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested may be exhibited at separate sites. (b) For subsequent exhibitions conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section XV of this Protocol: (i) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one heavy bomber of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type. (ii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit, in close proximity to one another, one heavy bomber of the type specified in such notification equipped for longrange nuclear ALCMs, and one heavy bomber of each variant of the same type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. (iii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type specified in such notification. 2. During pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions: (a) A member of the in-country escort shall identify for inspectors each type, category, and, if applicable, variant of heavy bomber that is to be exhibited, and each type and, if applicable, variant of long-range nuclear ALCM that is to be exhibited. (b) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of heavy bomber and former heavy bomber to be

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  997

exhibited, the differences that make heavy bombers of each category and, if applicable, variant distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories and variants of that type and from a former heavy bomber of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. (c) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of long-range nuclear ALCM to be exhibited for which there are variants, the differences that make each variant of long-range nuclear ALCM of that type distinguishable from other variants of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. A member of the in-country escort shall also point out all the positions for long-range nuclear ALCMs on heavy bombers, of each type and variant, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and inform inspectors of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and, if applicable, each variant is equipped. 3. For exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the differences that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of the type exhibited distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs of each type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. 4. During baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall exhibit, at one or more exhibition sites, all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all former heavy bombers, and all training heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 5. During pre-inspection procedures for baseline exhibitions: (a) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of the numbers of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for non-nuclear armaments; of former heavy bombers of each type; and of training heavy bombers of each type that are to be exhibited. (b) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such heavy bombers during modification pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. (c) For exhibitions of former heavy bombers and training heavy bombers, a member of the incountry escort shall inform the inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such airplanes during modification pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or the recognition features of specified former heavy bombers. (d) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the features that make such heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers, of the same type, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Annex 5. Procedures for Continuous Monitoring 1. Monitors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring that are declared to exit from the monitored facility, and to confirm that no other items of continuous monitoring exit from the monitored facility. For this purpose, in carrying out the procedures for continuous monitoring provided for in this Annex, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used.

998  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. If any covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle exiting from the monitored facility through the portal is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall so declare to monitors no less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle at the portal. The declaration shall state whether or not such an object is an item of continuous monitoring, or whether or not such an object, container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring and the estimated time of its arrival at the portal. If such an object is an item of continuous monitoring or if a container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall specify in writing the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring. More than one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in a vehicle, but only one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in each container or in each launch canister. 3. Monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifier on each launch canister declared to contain an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, or on each first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters or in stages. 4. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle contains one or more items of continuous monitoring, of the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type declared. For this purpose, monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle. If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle contains a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or an item of continuous monitoring that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex. If inside such a vehicle there is a partitioned enclosed space that is declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph 9(b) of this Annex.After completion of those procedures, the vehicle may leave the monitored facility. 5. For a covered or environmentally protected object exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such an object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type. A member of the in-country escort shall partially or, if necessary, completely remove the cover or environmental protection. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is a container or launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or 7 of this Annex. 6. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such a container contains the item of continuous monitoring of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type. Monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a container. If by viewing the interior of the container, monitors are unable to confirm the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type of the item of continuous monitoring that is contained therein, a member of the in-country escort shall remove such an item from the container. In that event, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  999

7. For a launch canister exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Monitors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of the dimensions of the launch canister to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection. 8. For an item of continuous monitoring that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm the type and, if applicable, variant of the type of the declared item of continuous monitoring by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of continuous monitoring designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection. 9. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through the portal and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring.At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space: (i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) or (d) of this paragraph. (b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space: (i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) or (d) of this paragraph. (c) Weigh a vehicle with its contents: (i) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is not heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph.

1000  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(d) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort.This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the monitors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle: (i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle contains a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Annex. After monitors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, types, and if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring or to confirm the absence of an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle and the containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the monitored facility. 10. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring.At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container: (i) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b), (c), or (d) of this paragraph. (b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents: (i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph(c) or (d) of this paragraph. (c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container: (i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1001

(d) Image the contents of the container using non-damaging imaging equipment. If nondamaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a container be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a container, of the planned exit thereof. 11. For a launch canister that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister by removing at least one of the end caps of the launch canister and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents: (i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph. (b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister: (i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex. (c) Image the contents of the launch canister using non-damaging imaging equipment. If nondamaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a launch canister be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a launch canister, of the planned exit thereof. 12. For a covered or environmentally protected object that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures: (a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection: (i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by viewing, monitors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

1002  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(iii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is a container or a launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Annex. (b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object: (i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, that object shall not be subject to further inspection. (ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. 13. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by making measurements of its dimensions, at locations on the object designated by a member of the incountry escort, that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. 14. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through a road exit, monitors shall have the right to make measurements of any such vehicle to determine whether it is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring.Those measurements shall be made in such a way as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting from the facility.Vehicles large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall proceed to the portal.Vehicles that are not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection and may leave the monitored facility. 15. At monitored facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles are produced, monitors shall have the right, no more than five times each year, to inspect containers or vehicles to confirm that no solid rocket motors for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with nozzles attached, exit the monitored facility. In such cases, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used in carrying out the inspection procedures for containers and vehicles. For the purposes of these inspections, monitors shall have the right to request a member of the incountry escort to direct a vehicle that is large enough to contain a solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with a nozzle attached, to proceed to the portal. Monitors shall have the right to carry out the inspection procedures provided for in paragraph 9 or 10 of this Annex. 16.The Parties agree that railcars that would be subject to inspection shall be permitted to leave the monitored facility for the purpose of reversing direction, provided that the following procedures are used: (a) The inspected Party notifies the monitoring team leader of its intent to move a railcar out through the portal for the purpose of reversing its direction no less than 30 minutes before the railcar arrives at the portal; (b) Two monitors accompany the railcar from the time it arrives at the portal until it returns through the portal after having reversed direction and such monitors are permitted to observe this railcar throughout the entire procedure; (c) No cargo is removed from the railcar between the time it leaves through the portal until it returns through the portal of the monitored facility. Provided that the entire procedure for reversing direction is completed without delay, such railcars shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol during the conduct of this procedure.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1003

Annex 6. Procedures Relating to Unique Identifiers 1.A unique identifier is a non-repeating alpha-numeric production number, or a copy thereof, that has been applied by the inspected Party, using its own technology, to an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex. 2. Each Party shall provide the other Party with unique identifier data for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 3 or 13 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 3. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, unique identifiers shall be applied: (a) for ICBMs existing as of Treaty signature, on each launch canister of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; (b) for ICBMs leaving the production facility after Treaty signature, on each launch canister and on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.The data from such unique identifiers shall be provided in a form that establishes the “one-to-one” relationship between the data from the unique identifier applied on the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the data from the unique identifier applied on the launch canister associated with such an ICBM. Such unique identifiers may not be changed. 4. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as a unit without launch canisters or in stages, the unique identifiers shall be applied on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 5. During baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, post-dispersal inspections of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, and conversion or elimination inspections, as well as during the conduct of continuous monitoring, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifiers on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exceptions to the right to read the data from such unique identifiers are set forth in paragraph 9 of Section VII and paragraph 11 of Section X of this Protocol. The data from a unique identifier shall be read: (a) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(a) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; (b) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(b) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and if the unique identifier applied on the first stage of such a missile is accessible for external viewing and reading without opening the launch canister, or if during the process of elimination of such an ICBM the missile is removed from its launch canister, from the first stage of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; (c) for ICBMs specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, from the first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. 6.The place from which inspectors or monitors are allowed to read data from the unique identifier applied on each launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or each first stage of such an ICBM shall be specified by a member of the in-country escort in such a manner as to ensure an accurate reading of such data. If a unique identifier applied on a launch canister or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is not accessible for reading as provided for in paragraph 5 of this Annex, such a unique identifier shall be duplicated on the portion of the surface of the launch canister or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is accessible for reading its data by inspectors or monitors during viewing. 7. For a newly-produced ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall inform the monitors of the data from the unique identifier applied to such an ICBM, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex, before such an item exits through the portal of the monitored

1004  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

facility and shall provide to the inspecting Party such data in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Annex 7. Procedures for Delivering and Examining Equipment and Supplies Transported by Inspection Airplanes Used in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Section IV of This Protocol 1. Prior to the arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspecting Party, through its embassy, shall provide the inspected Party with an inventory of cargo being delivered that consists of equipment and supplies intended for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities.The inspecting Party shall provide this inventory to the inspected Party no less than ten days prior to the arrival of such an airplane, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such an inventory shall include: (a) to which facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility a particular palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, shall be delivered; (b) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, and, if necessary for facilitating transportation of separate items from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, black-andwhite photographs, or clear facsimile copies of photographs, of each such item; (c) whether there are modular structures in the cargo that is being delivered; (d) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure described in such a way that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item of equipment that is being delivered with the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol; and (e) for each major item of equipment specified in that inventory, the part of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol, in which that item of equipment is included. 2. Each shipping container on a pallet, listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, shall be marked with a freight marking, and shall have a complete packing list. One copy of that packing list shall also be included in the inventory. 3. At the choice of the inspected Party, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, may be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility. If the examination of such cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, such an examination, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, may be conducted in the presence of the aircrew members. Equipment and supplies carried separately from the cargo shall be examined at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 11, 12 and 13 of Section V of this Protocol. 4. During the examination of the cargo, the contents of each shipping container, and of each modular structure, shall be checked against the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol and against the inventory of equipment and supplies provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex. Based on the results of the examination of the cargo, a member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall draw up and sign a joint inventory of the equipment and supplies to reflect items actually delivered. After the joint inventory has been signed, the monitors shall have the right to begin using the cleared equipment, subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1005

Section XVI of this Protocol, and the cleared supplies, at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. 5. Until the joint inventory referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security and protection from inclement weather for the cargo. For that purpose the inspected Party shall provide storage areas for the equipment and supplies. If the examination of cargo is conducted at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party may conduct that examination in the building for the storage of equipment and supplies provided for in paragraph 23 of Section XVI of this Protocol. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies. 6. If the examination of the cargo is carried out at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, upon completion of the examination procedures, the inspecting Party shall repack the cargo, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in repacking the cargo. If the examination of the cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing for the security of the equipment and supplies during loading and unloading operations, in fastening the cargo for shipment, and in protecting the cargo from inclement weather. After the cargo has been packed, it shall be sealed with seals of each of the Parties. Upon arrival of the cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall jointly examine the seals.The monitors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort. 7. The monitors shall have the right to observe palletized or oversize items of cargo, including modular structures, at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observing the loading of such items of cargo onto the vehicles that will transport them to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or to an intermediate transfer point; observing the transfer of such items of cargo at an intermediate transfer point; and observing such items of cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility after the vehicles carrying such cargo arrive there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the monitors shall have the right to observe such items of cargo that are inside vehicles while such items of cargo are in transit. 8. If during the examination of cargo, or at any time during installation, operation, or maintenance of equipment, the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the requirements of continuous monitoring activities, such an item of equipment or supplies shall be impounded at the location of the examination. A member of the in-country escort shall explain to the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, the reasons for such a conclusion. If the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of continuous monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document, and each of them shall retain a copy of the document. The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall not be brought to such a facility. Equipment impounded at such a facility shall either not be installed

1006  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

or its use shall be discontinued, and supplies impounded at such a facility shall not be used. Unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party of a different decision, such equipment or supplies shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party. If necessary, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in delivering such equipment or supplies to the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. At the choice of the inspected Party, prior to removal from the territory of the inspected Party, such equipment or supplies shall be stored at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility.A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies. Annex 8. Equipment for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities l. Characteristics of equipment for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, suspect-site inspections, post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, conversion or elimination inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Article Xl of the Treaty. A. For the United States of America: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (b) 10 3-meter measuring tapes; (c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (d) 10 Plumb bobs; (e) 2 Plumb bob cords; (f) 10 Plumb bob targets; (g) 1 Roll of tape; and (h) 1 Inspection suitcase. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Lens; (c) 1 Flash; (d) 1 Exposure meter; (e) 1 Spare film back for camera; (f) 1 Tripod; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 8 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 2.5 meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1007

(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and (f) 1 Ionization dosimeter. 4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team); (a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units; (b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the followng: (i) 1 Portable receiver; (ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external); (iii) 16 Spare batteries; (iv) 1 Battery holder; (v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack; (vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit; (vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian; (viii) 1 Container; and (ix) 1 Equipment bag. (c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds); (ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual; iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection; (iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (v) 1 Tool kit; (vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes; (vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector; (viii) 1 Measuring tape; (ix) 2 Battery-powered lights; (x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual; (xi) 2 Thermometers; (xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and (xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes; (c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (d) 4 Plumb bobs; (e) 2 Plumb bob cords; (f) 4 Plumb bob targets; (g) 1 Roll of tape; and (h) 1 Inspection suitcase. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team); (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Tripod; (c) 1 Exposure meter; (d) 1 Lens;

1008  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(e) 1 Flash; (f) 1 Spare film back for camera; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 2 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 3-meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Ruler; and (f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter 4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following: (i) 1 Portable receiver; (ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external); (iii) 16 Spare batteries; (iv) 1 Battery holder; (v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack; (vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit; (vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian; (viii) 1Container; and (ix) 1 Equipment bag. (b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time–1000 seconds or 150 seconds); (ii) 1 Registering device; (iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (iv) 1 Charging unit; (v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery; (vi) 1 Measuring tape; (vii) 1 Battery-powered light; (viii) 1Stand for neutron detector; (ix) 1 Calculator; (x) 1 Stand for calibration source; (xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. II. Characteristics of equipment for reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. A. For the United States of America:

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1009

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 3-meter measuring tape; (b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Magnetic compass; (e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and (g) 1 Ionization dosimeter. 2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units; (b) 2 Satellite system receiver sets, each provided by the inspected Party and consisting of the following: (i) 1 Portable receiver; (ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external); (iii) 16 Spare batteries; (iv) 1 Battery holder; (v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack; (vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit; (vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian; (viii) 1 Container; and (ix) 1 Equipment bag. (c) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds); (ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual; (iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection; (iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (v) 1 Tool kit; (vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes; (vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector; (viii) 1 Measuring tape; (ix) 2 Battery-powered lights; (x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual; (xi) 2 Thermometers; (xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and (xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 5-meter measuring tape; (b) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (c) 1 Magnetic compass; (d) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (f) 1 Ruler; (g) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; (h) 1 Curvometer; and (i) 1 Pair of dividers.

1010  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Satellite system receiver sets provided by the inspected Party, each consisting of the following: (i) 1 Portable receiver; (ii) 1 Direct current adapter (external); (iii) 16 Spare batteries; (iv) 1 Battery holder; (v) 1 Rechargeable nickel-cadmium battery pack; (vi) 1 External antenna with cable and antenna installation kit; (vii) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian; (viii) 1 Container; and (ix) 1 Equipment bag. (b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time 1000 seconds or 150 seconds); (ii) 1 Registering device; (iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (iv) 1 Charging unit; (v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery; (vi) 1 Measuring tape; (vii) 1 Battery-powered light; (viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector; (ix) 1 Calculator; (x) 1 Stand for calibration source; (xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. III. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph Il of Article XI of the Treaty. A. For the United States of America: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 3 Measuring tape clamps; (b) 2 Tape tensioning scales; (c) 2 Magnifying glasses; (d) 2 Hand levels; (e) 2 String line levels; (f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw; (g) 2 Combination squares; (h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes; (j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (k) 3 Plumb bobs; (l) 1 Plumb bob cord; (m) 10 Plumb targets; (n) 3 Rolls of tape; (o) 3 Log books; (p) 2 Rod levels; (q) 2 2.5-meter range rods; and (r) 1 Tripod.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1011

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Lens; (c) 1 Flash; (d) 1 Exposure meter; (e) 1 Spare film back for camera; (f) 1 Tripod; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 8 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 2.5 meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and (f) 1 Ionization dosimeter. 4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team); (a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units. 5.Weighing Devices (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type). B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes; (c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (d) 4 Plumb bobs; (e) 2 Plumb bob cords; (f) 4 Plumb bob targets; (g) 1 Roll of tape; and (h) 1 Inspection suitcase. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Tripod; (c) 1 Exposure meter; (d) 1 Lens; (e) 1 Flash; (f) 1 Spare film back for camera; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 2 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

1012  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 3-meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Ruler; and (f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter. 4.Weighing device (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type). IV. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during heavy bomber distinguishability exhibitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article XI of the Treaty and during exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section Vll of the Notification Protocol. A. For the United States of America: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 3 Measuring tape clamps; (b) 2 Tape tensioning scales; (c) 2 Magnifying glasses; (d) 2 Hand levels; (e) 2 String line levels; (f) 2 Calipers with micrometer screw; (g) 2 Combination squares; (h) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes; (j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (k) 3 Plumb bobs; (l) 1 Plumb bob cord; (m) 10 Plumb targets; (n) 3 Rolls of tape; (o) 3 Log books; (p) 2 Rod levels; (q) 2 2.5-meter range rods; and (r) 1 Tripod. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Lens; (c) 1 Flash; (d) 1 Exposure meter; (e) 1 Spare film back for camera; (f) 1 Tripod;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1013

(g) 1 Cable release; (h) 8 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 2.5 meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter; and (f) 1 Ionization dosimeter. 4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team); (a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units; and (b) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal/power cables (counting time - 150 seconds); (ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual; (iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection; (iv) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (v) 1 Tool kit; (vi) 30 Spare batteries, miscellaneous sizes; (vii) 1 Stand for neutron detector; (viii) 1 Measuring tape; (ix) 2 Battery-powered lights; (x) 3 Programmable calculators, with instruction manual; (xi) 2 Thermometers; (xii) 1 Stand for calibration source; and (xiii) 4 Instruction manuals, two in English and two in Russian. B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes; (c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (d) 4 Plumb bobs; (e) 2 Plumb bob cords; (f) 4 Plumb bob targets; (g) 1 Roll of tape; and (h) 1 Inspection suitcase. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Tripod; (c) 1 Exposure meter;

1014  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(d) 1 Lens; (e) 1 Flash; (f) 1 Spare film back for camera; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 2 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for camera, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 3-meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Ruler; and (f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter. 4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) Set of radiation detection equipment consisting of the following: (i) 1 Neutron detector, including preamplifier with signal/power cables (counting time 1000 seconds or 150 seconds); (ii) 1 Registering device; (iii) 1 Americium-241-Lithium neutron source for calibration, emitting approximately 3000 neutrons per second, precalibrated by the inspecting Party; (iv) 1 Charging unit; (v) 1 Spare rechargeable battery; (vi) 1 Measuring tape; (vii) 1 Battery-powered light; (viii) 1 Stand for neutron detector; (ix) 1 Calculator; (x) 1 Stand for calibration source; (xi) 2 Instruction manuals, one in English and one in Russian. V. Characteristics of equipment for continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article Xl of the Treaty. A. For the United States of America: l. Tape measures, measuring sticks, and other devices as agreed between the Parties for measuring dimensions. 2. Camera equipment capable of producing instant development photographic prints, with tripod and measuring sticks as agreed by the Parties. 3. Flashlights. 4. Other equipment as agreed by the Parties. 5. Engineering site survey equipment: (a) 2 Theodolites, levels, survey chains, survey rods, and stakes; (b) 2 Light meters;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1015

(c) Engineering tape and stakes, as necessary; (d) 1 Measuring Wheel; (e) 6 Measuring tapes, two of each length (3, 30, and 100 meter); (f) Topographic maps, as necessary; (g) 2 Water sampling kits; (h) 2 Portable computers, printers, and accessories; (i) 1 Portable copier; (j) 1 Portable facsimile machine; (k) 2 Video cameras with portable recorders; (l) 1 Video cassette recorder, with video cassettes, and television monitor; (m) 2 Cameras with flash; and (n) Hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials, as required. B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes; (b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes; (c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks; (d) 4 Plumb bobs; (e) 2 Plumb bob cords; (f) 4 Plumb bob targets; (g) 1 Roll of tape; and (h) 1 Inspection suitcase. 2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team): (a) 2 Cameras with flash; (b) 1 Tripod; (c) 1 Exposure meter; (d) 1 Lens; (e) 1 Flash; (f) 1 Spare film back for camera; (g) 1 Cable release; (h) 2 Packs of photographic film; (i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter; (j) 1 Range rod point; (k) 1 Camera case; (l) 1 Package of lens tissue; (m) 1 Lens brush; (n) 1 3-meter range rod; and (o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber. 3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector): (a) 1 Flashlight (safety approved), with spare batteries and spare bulb; (b) 1 Magnetic compass; (c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries; (d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals; (e) 1 Ruler; and (f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter. 4. Engineering Site Survey Equipment: (a) 2 Theodolites, levels, measuring sticks, and level markers; (b) 2 Photo-range finders and reflectors; (c) 10 Measuring tapes or tape measures, two of each length (2, 3, 10, 30, and 100 meter);

1016  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(d) 1 Field laboratory (portable) for water sampling; (e) 1 Digital multimeter; (f) 2 Avometers; (g) 1 Photometer; (h) Topographic maps, as required; (i) 1 Fence vibration meter; (j) 1 Magnetograph; (k) 1 Oscillograph; (l) 1 Portable computer; (m) 1 Portable copier; (n) 2 Cameras with flash; and (o) Hand Tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials as required. VI. Methods of use of equipment. A.The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the following manner: 1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine length, width, and height of objects by measuring the straight-line distance between the extreme points of these objects or, if required, between tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces. 2.The diameter of any cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by measuring the distance between parallel lines that are vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at several points along the length of that object. 3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the results of the first two measurements are within one percent of each other, then the results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object. If the results of the first two measurements are not within one percent of each other, additional measurements shall be taken until results from two measurements are obtained that are within one percent of each other.The results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object. B.The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner: 1. Before a member of the in-country escort takes photographs, inspectors shall have the right to determine by observing through the viewfinder, that the object is in the camera’s field of view and is in focus.The inspected Party may take test photographs, which shall be the property of the inspected Party. 2.While taking photographs, the inspected Party shall, at the direction of inspectors or monitors place a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device perpendicular to the ground and directly against the object being photographed; the scale or length of such a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device may be verified and recorded in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, if the inspection team or monitoring team so desires. 3.The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at all inspection sites, and at facilities subject to continuous monitoring and monitored facilities. C.The Parties agree to use engineering site survey equipment in the following manner: 1. The portable facsimile machine shall be stored within a secure structure or room at the facility subject to continuous monitoring and the inspecting Party may provide a container that is locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party.The method of storage

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1017

shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the portable facsimile machine. The portable facsimile machine shall be operated by a member of the monitoring team in the presence of a member of the in-country escort.The inspected Party shall have the right to examine the information to be transmitted, prior to the use of the portable facsimile machine, in order to ascertain that it does not contain images that are not connected with the purposes of the engineering site survey. 2.At the request of the inspecting Party, the video camera and the portable recorder, and photographic cameras shall be used by a member of the in-country escort. D. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on methods of use for weighing devices for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type. E.The Parties agree to use satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party to confirm the geographic coordinates of silo launchers of ICBMs during reentry vehicle inspections and during the inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs from which an ICBM has been removed but which continues to be considered to contain an ICBM in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections. When providing receivers for receiving signals from the satellite system that are used for determining the coordinates of such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall ensure that such receivers are capable of providing such coordinate information at any time during the inspection for any silo launcher of ICBMs located on the territory of the inspected Party. The Parties agree to use such receivers in the following manner: 1. At the point of entry, the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the following procedures, that two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party are operable: (a) The first inspection team arriving at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 6 of Article Xl of the Treaty shall have the right to bring to that point of entry two satellite system receivers for the purpose of determining the geographic coordinates for four reference points. These reference points shall be proposed by the inspected Party, shall be within 20 kilometers of the airport of the point of entry, and shall be separated from each other by at least two kilometers. (b) For the purpose of comparing the reading of one satellite system receiver with the reading of another satellite system receiver the term “agree”shall mean that the reading of one satellite system receiver differs from the reading of the other satellite system receiver by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude. (c) For the purpose of confirming the operability of a satellite system receiver at the point of entry, the term “agree” shall mean that the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the agreed geographic coordinates of The reference point by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude. (d) Determination of the agreed geographic coordinates of reference points used at a point of entry for testing the operability of satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the following procedures: (i) At each proposed reference point the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team, and a member of the in-country escort shall use two satellite system receivers of the inspecting Party and two satellite system receivers of the inspected party, respectively, to determine geographic coordinate values. The inspected Party shall have the right to substitute a pmpedy operating satellite system receiver for a malfunctioning satellite system receiver provided by the inspected Party. However, no more than

1018  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

two satellite system receivers of the inspected Party may be used for the determination of agreed geographic coordinates for a reference point as described in subparagraphs (d)(ii) and (d)(iii) below; (ii) If at least three of the four latitude values thus obtained agree with each other; all of these latitude values that agree with at least two other of the four latitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed latitude value of the reference point; (iii) If at least three of the four longitude values thus obtained agree with each other, all of these longitude values that agree with at least two other of the four longitude values, shall be averaged, and that average shall be the agreed longitude value of the reference point; (iv) Agreed latitude values and agreed longitude values of the reference point thus obtained shall be recorded to the nearest second and shall be The agreed geographic coordinates of each reference point for the point of entry. A physical description of the reference point shall also be recorded for each reference point.The inspected Party shall provide notification of the determination of agreed geographic coordinates of reference points in accordance with paragraph 28 of Section III of this Protocol; (v) If agreed geographic coordinates for four reference points cannot be determined after the procedures provided for in this subparagraph have been attempted at no fewer than six proposed points, all agreed coordinates shall be discarded and the procedures provided for in this subparagraph shall be repeated when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection. (e) The operability of satellite system receivers shall be tested at each point of entry for which there is at least one associated facility with silo launchers of ICBMs subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 6 of Article Xl of the Treaty. After the baseline data inspection period, operability of the inspected Party’s satellite system receivers may be tested at such points of entry, at the discretion of the inspection team leader, for all inspections, except for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to the departure of the inspection team for the site at a time agreed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.The time shall be agreed to as soon as possible following the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.Testing shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph. (f) Only for inspections conducted during the baseline data inspection period, testing of the operability of the inspected Party’s satellite system receivers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph: (i) either after the inspection team leader has made the designation, provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this ProtocoI, of the type of inspection and inspection site, provided that the use of satellite system receivers is permitted for the designated type of inspection and inspection site; or (ii) prior to the designation by the inspection team leader provided for in paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol, of the type of inspection and inspection site, at a time agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort, provided that the inspection team leader declares the inspecting Party’s intent to use the satellite system receivers during the first or a sequential inspection for which satellite system receivers may be used. (g) The operability of each of the inspected Party’s satellite system receivers shall be tested at two reference points. These two reference points shall be selected from the four reference points with agreed geographic coordinates. The first reference point shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort, and the second reference point shall be selected by the inspection team leader or an authorized representative of such a team. A member of the in-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1019

country escort shall accompany the inspectors to each reference point and shall bring the inspected Party’s satellite system receivers to that reference point: (i) In order for an inspected Party’s satellite system receiver to be confirmed to be operable, at each of the two reference points the reading of the satellite system receiver must agree with the agreed geographic coordinates of that reference point; (ii) If, at either of the two reference points, the reading of an inspected Party’s satellite system receiver does not agree with The agreed geographic coordinates of the reference point, a member of the in-country escort shall take another reading using that satellite system receiver. If, after at least two additional attempts, the reading of the satellite system receiver still does not agree with the agreed geographic coordinates, the inspected Party shall replace the satellite system receiver. The replacement satellite system receiver shall be tested in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph.The testing of the inspected Party’s satellite system receivers shall continue until the inspected Party has provided two satellite system receivers that are confirmed to be operable or until at least four different satellite system receivers have been tested. (iii) If the inspected Party is unable to provide two satellite system receivers whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (g) of this paragraph, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed. (h) The inspected Party shall have the right to change the reference points for use in testing the operability of satellite system receivers. No more than two reference points may be changed at any one time, unless otherwise agreed.Agreed geographic coordinates for the new reference point shall be determined using the procedures in subparagraph 1(d) of this Subsection when an inspection team next arrives at this point of entry to conduct an inspection after the proposed effective date of a change specified in The notification provided by the inspected Party in accordance with paragraph 29 of Section III of this Protocol. The new reference point shall become effective upon determination of its agreed geographic coordinates. 2. After confirming that the two receivers are fanctioning, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of the inspection team leader, shall place the receivers in a case or container that shall be sealed by the inspection team leader and provided to a member of the in-country escort. 3.The sealed case or container shall remain in the custody of a member of the in-country escort until the arrival of the inspection team at the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader. 4. Upon arrival of the inspection team or subgroup of the inspection team at a silo launcher of ICBMs designated for inspection, inspectors shall use satellite system receivers that have been provided by the inspected Party to determine the geographic coordinates of such silo launchers of ICBMs in accordance with the following procedures: (a) The specific location where the readings of the satellite system receiver are taken shall be selected by a member of the in-country escort in such a way that, if possible, the designated silo launcher of ICBMs can be seen from that location; (b) while at this location, specified in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the inspectors shall examine the container and the seal placed on the container to determine whether the seal is intact and whether the container has been tampered with. If there is evidence that the seal has been broken or that the container has been tampered with, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue;

1020  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(c) A member of the in-country escort shall open the container and an inspector shall select one of the two satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 1(g) of this Subsection; (d) For the purpose of comparing the reading of a satellite system receiver with the geographic coordinates of a designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams,The term “agree” shall mean that: (i) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest second, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more than 12 seconds in both latitude and longitude; (ii) if the geographic coordinates are expressed to the nearest minute, the reading of the satellite system receiver differs from the geographic coordinates by no more that 60 seconds in both latitude and longitude; (e) An inspector shall take readings using the selected satellite system receiver. If the satellite system receiver readings and the geographic coordinates for the location of the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, agree, then the silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to be the designated silo launcher of ICBMs and the coordinates determined by the satellite system receiver shall be recorded in the inspection report despite the fact that the satellite system receiver readings might also agree with geographic coordinates for The locations of other nearby silo launchers of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams. If the satellite system receiver readings at the location selected by a member of the in-country escort do not agree with the geographic coordinates for the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, listed in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams, then inspectors shall use the second satellite system receiver. If a satisfactory result cannot be obtained with either of the two satellite system receivers, then a member of the incountry escort shall choose another location closer to the silo launcher of ICBMs where an inspector shall take readings using a satellite system receiver. If, after using both of the satellite system receivers at any of the locations chosen by a member of the in-country escort, inspectors establish that the readings of neither satellite system receiver agree with the geographic coordinates for this designated silo launcher of ICBMs, and the inspectors are thus unable to ascertain that the silo launcher of ICBMs is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue; (f) Upon completion of the satellite system receivers’ use, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors, shall place the satellite system receivers in a container. A representative of the inspection team shall seal the container and provide The container to a member of the in-country escort. F.The Parties agree to use radiation detection equipment in the following manner: 1. Radiation detection equipment shall be used to measure nuclear radiation levels in order to demonstrate that objects declared to be non-nuclear are non-nuclear. 2. The radiation detection equipment shall be provided by the inspecting Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. 3. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 6 or 12 of Article XI of The Treaty, the Parties shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 15 to this Protocol 4. During an inspection conducted in accordance with Section III or IV of Annex 15 to this Protocol, measurements of the radiation level shall be taken by the in-country escort in the presence of inspectors.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1021

Annex 9. Characteristics and Methods of Use of Equipment for the Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring System I. Equipment The inspecting Party shall have the right to install the equipment listed in this Section at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.The inspecting Party shall have the right to store such equipment that has not yet been installed and spare parts for such equipment in quantities sufficient for the continuous monitoring activities at the facility where that equipment is to be installed. A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Monitoring Equipment for the Portal: (a) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meterhigh assembled sectional masts. (b) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors. (c) Traffic signal and control equipment: (i) Electromechanical gate position sensors; (ii) Traffic lights; and (iii) Semaphore gates. (d) Equipment for additional lighting of the portal area: (i) General purpose lights; (ii) Emergency lights; (iii) Floodlights for contrast illumination of vehicles; (iv) Six-meter high metal poles; and (v) Three- or six-meter-high sectional masts. (e) Other equipment: (i) Fixed measuring rods; (ii) Portable measuring poles; (iii) Tape measures and other measuring devices; (iv) Cabling; and (v) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party). (f) Other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. 2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits: (a) Environmental shelter. (b) Equipment for monitoring each exit, to be installed in an environmental shelter: (i) Local control console for independent control of traffic control devices; (ii) Television monitors for the television surveillance system; (iii) Connector units for linking equipment at the exit with the operations center; (iv) Heating control units for infrared sensor protective glass; (v) Equipment for communications with the operations center; and (vi) Personal (micro)computers; (c) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meterhigh sectional masts. (d) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors. (e) Vehicle dimension screening system:

1022  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(i) Vertical receiving and transmitting arrays of infrared sensors; and (ii) Doppler road sensor. (f) Traffic signal and control equipment: (i) Electromechanical gate position sensors; (ii) Dual-signal traffic lights; and (iii) Semaphore gates. (g) Additional lighting equipment for road exit: (i) General purpose lights; (ii) Emergency lights; (iii) Six-meter-high metal poles; and (iv) Three- and six-meter-high masts. (h) Other equipment: (i) Fixed measuring rods; (ii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices; and (iii) Cabling. (i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. 3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment: (a) Perimeter fence integrity monitoring system: (i) Sensor elements; (ii) Section boxes; (iii) Signal cables; (iv) Equipment for telephone communication with the operations center; and (v) Cable conduits. (b) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. 4. Operations Center Equipment: (a) Operations center building; (b) Main control console; (c) Video data receiving, switching, and digital processing equipment; (d) Personal (micro)computers; (e) Television monitors; (f) Equipment for recording video data and information from sensors, and for recording the results of computer processing of data; (g) Equipment for receiving, processing, and storing data from the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system; (h) Telephone and radio communications equipment and fire alarm equipment; (i) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party); (j) Photocopying equipment; (k) Facsimile equipment; (l) Equipment for the power supply system; (m) Diesel generator with fuel tanks; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1023

(n) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. B. For the United States of America: 1. Equipment for use at the Portal: (a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment: (i) Infrared breakbeam system; and (ii) Metal base (for mounting of infrared sensors). (b) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party). (c) Surveillance system (some items of which will be located inside the Operations Center and Exit Shelters, as appropriate): (i) Character generators and mounting racks; (ii) Monochrome television cameras; (iii) Interconnect cables for the television cameras; (iv) Adjustable mounting head for television cameras; (v) Camera towers (in sections); (vi) Camera junction boxes; (vii) Video distribution amplifiers and mounting racks; (viii) Nine-inch (23-centimeters) television monitors and mounting racks; (ix) Videocassette recorder and mounting shelf; (x) Fiber-optic transmitter cards; (xi) Fiber-optic cables; (xii) Fiber-optic receiver cards; (xiii) Exterior lighting mounting poles; (xiv) High-pressure sodium lighting and supports; (xv) Instrument console and panels; (xvi) Video loss detectors and closure panel; (xvii) Video switching devices; (xviii) Data authentication devices; and (xix) Video foredrop (fixed measuring rod for video imaging). (d) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment: (i) Infrared breakbeam system; (ii) Induction loop-sensors; (iii) Gate opening sensors; (iv) Traffic signal lights; (v) Semaphore gates; (vi) Traffic control junction box; and (vii) Metal base (for mounting of sensors, signal lights, and semaphore gates). (e) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. 2. Equipment for use at the Road Exits, consisting of: (a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment (equipment as listed in sub-paragraph I.B.1.(a) of this Annex); (b) Surveillance system (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex); (c) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment (equipment as specified in subparagraph I.B.1.(d) of this Annex); (d) Communications equipment, to include telephones, intercom and hand-held radios specified in subparagraph I.B.4.(v) of this Annex;

1024  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(e) Environmental shelter (modular, with equipment specified in paragraph I.B.M. of this Annex, as necessary, for independent monitoring of a road exit); (f) Cabling, as required; (g) Gate Seals; (h) Data authentication devices; and (i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. 3. Equipment for use along the Perimeter, consisting of: (a) Surveillance System (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex); (b) Video motion-detection equipment; (c) Video switching equipment; (d) Data authentication devices; (e) Cabling, as required; and (f) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. 4. Operations Center Equipment: (a) Programmable logic controller; (b) Executive module for logic controller; (c) Memory module for logic controller; (d) Interface rack for logic controller; (e) Output module for logic controller; (f) Input module for logic controller; (g) Equipment control panel; (h) Printers for personal (micro)-computers; (i) Personal (micro)computers; (j) Hard and floppy disk, and tape drives for personal (micro)computers; (k) Keyboards for personal (micro)computers; (l) Display monitors for personal (micro)computers; (m) Desktop scanner and interface for personal (micro)computers; (n) Software for personal (micro)-computers; (o) Hardware and software for the personal (micro)computers for recording a digitized video image to computer memory; (p) Videocassette recorders; (q) Consoles for video, traffic control, and other subsystems; (r) Photocopying equipment; (s) Environmental control equipment; (t) Video equipment as specified for the surveillance system; (u) Data authentication equipment;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1025

(v) Communications equipment: (i) Laser facsimile equipment; (ii) Telephone system, to include wiring connectors, and switching equipment; (iii) Intercom system; (iv) Base station radio transceiver; (v) Hand-held radios; (vi) Antenna for base radio station; (vii) Fiber-optic cabling for connecting exit shelters and equipment at the exits to the operations center; and (viii) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party); (w) Operations center building (modular); (x) Power Supply Equipment: (i) Back-up power generator; (ii) Automatic switching equipment for generator; (iii) Generator fuel storage tank; (iv) Transformer for generator; and (v) Distribution panel for generator; (y) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties. II. Methods of Use of Equipment The Parties agree to use the equipment specified in Section I of this Annex as follows: A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 1. Equipment at the Portal: (a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen road and rail vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allow-ed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles and cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol. (b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the portal, produce a continuous videotape and video snapshots of vehicles proceeding through the portal, and perform remote dimensional screening of vehicles exiting the monitored facility.Television cameras shall be mounted on three- and six-meter-high assembled sectional masts.The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.Television cameras for remote dimensional screening of exiting vehicles shall be located no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicular route through the portal and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic. (ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors shall be installed in the screening area on both sides of the route of traffic and used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles, to identify vehicle locations, and to relay video snapshots of side views and front images of vehicles for the remote dimensional screening of vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an

1026  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

item of continuous monitoring. Infrared sensors shall be mounted on special supports on both sides of the screening area and shall register beam interruption by exiting vehicles. Magnetometric sensors shall be installed on one side of the screening area and shall be a back-up system that allows vehicles to be distinguished from other objects breaking the sensor beams. (iii) Traffic signal and control equipment consisting of electromechanical entrance and exit gate position sensors, traffic lights controlling the exit of a vehicle from the monitored facility, as well as a semaphore gate shall be used to control a vehicle in the portal area. (iv) The equipment for additional lighting of the portal areas shall include general purpose and emergency lights and flood lights for contrast lighting of vehicles while the side and front measurement television cameras are turned on. General purpose and emergency lights shall be mounted on six-meter-high assembled metal poles so as to ensure the lighting of the portal area. Floodlights for contrast lighting of vehicles shall be mounted on three- or six-meter-high sectional masts near the screening area along the vehicular route through the portal. (v) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol. (vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be used for visual evaluation of vehicle dimensions. (vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles, covered and environmentally protected objects, containers, launch canisters, and cargoes. (viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the portal and the operations center. 2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits: (a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles or cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargo are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall bring that to the attention of the in-country escort, and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicle or cargo to the portal of the monitored facility. (b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the road exits and remotely screen the dimensions of exiting vehicles by means of video information from the measurement television cameras. Television cameras shall be installed on three- and six-meter-high sectional masts. Surveillance television cameras shall monitor the entrance and exit gates as well as the area of the road exit. Measurement television cameras shall be installed no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicle route through the road exit and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic.The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. (ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors installed on both sides of the screening area of the road exit shall be used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles and exposed cargoes, relay video snapshots of side and frontal images of vehicles. (iii) The system for monitoring the dimensions of vehicles, consists of vertical arrays of infrared transmitters and receivers located on both sides of the screening area of the road

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1027

exit and of a doppler road sensor installed on the shoulder and beamed at the approaching exiting vehicle.The information from the doppler and infrared sensors is received in the operations center in order to produce a profile of the exiting vehicle or exposed cargo to determine whether the vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. (iv) The traffic signal and control equipment, consisting of electromechanical exit and entrance gate position sensors, dual-signal traffic lights and semaphore gates shall be used to control vehicles exiting the monitored facility. (v) The equipment for additional lighting of the road exit control area, which includes general purpose and emergency lights and floodlights, shall ensure the operation of the television measurement cameras. Such equipment shall be mounted on six-meter-high poles and three-meter-high masts. (vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be used for visual evaluation of the dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes. (vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures, and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles and exposed cargoes. (viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the exit with the operations center. 3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment: (a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. (b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) The perimeter fence integrity monitoring system shall consist of sensor elements and section boxes mounted on the perimeter mesh fence. A sensor element shall consist of segments of special cable up to 500 meters long, laid in two parallel “threads” along the fence and connected to a section box that is mounted on fence supports. (ii) The section boxes shall be connected to one another and to the operations center by a cable for signaling a possible perimeter violation and the location of the violation. (iii) The section boxes shall have telephone connections to the operations center as well. Conduits for cables connecting portal equipment to equipment at the road exits, shall be fastened onto the perimeter mesh fence supports. 4. Operations Center Equipment: (a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team. The operations center building shall be located at the portal within the perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall consist of five sections, three of which shall be used to house technical equipment and two shall be used as an off-duty area.The location of the building shall provide for an un-obstructed view of the portal. (b) The equipment located in the operations center may be used by monitors to: (i) Observe on television monitor screens the situation in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, at the portal, and at the road exits; (ii) Operate the traffic lights and semaphore gates;

1028  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(iii) Check color graphic displays of measurements of dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes obtained using infrared and television systems; (iv) Remotely control the lighting of the portal areas; (v) Control the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system; (vi) Receive, switch, and digitally process video information from surveillance and measurement television cameras; (vii) Control outside devices, monitor sensors, and determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring; (viii) Record video data, information from sensors, and computer processed information; (ix) Provide telephone communications, radio communications and fire alarms; and (x) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment, unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line. (c) Electrical power supply equipment shall be used to transform the voltages and the frequencies of the feeder network to supply uninterrupted power for technical systems in the event of a brief interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party. (d) A diesel generator with fuel tanks shall be located under an awning near the operations center and shall be used as an independent electrical power supply source for technical systems in the event of a protracted interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party. B. For the United States of America: 1. Equipment at the Portal: (a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen rail vehicles, road vehicles, and exposed cargoes to deter-mine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol. (b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching vehicle to the monitors in the operations center. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors. (ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control each vehicle’s passage through the portal so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices. (iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for video imaging), or other sensors.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1029

(iv) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol. (v) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities in the area of the portal from the operations center, to record video images, and to take, as necessary, video snapshots of vehicles moving through the portal.The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. (vi) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the portal area and for the video cameras. (vii) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of signals relayed from cameras and sensors to the operations center. 2. Equipment at the Road Exits: (a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring as determined by screening, such vehicles or cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, the monitors shall call this to the attention of the in-country escort and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicles or cargoes to the portal of the monitored facility. (b) The following equipment or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching road vehicle to the monitors in the operations center and exit shelter. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors. (ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control the passage of each vehicle or exposed cargo through the road exit so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices. (iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center and exit shelters in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for visual imaging) or other sensors. (iv) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities from the operations center and exit shelter, to record video images,and to take,as necessary,video snapshots of road vehicles and cargoes moving through the exit.The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. (v) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the exit area and for the video cameras. (vi) Environmental shelters for monitors shall contain equipment as specified in paragraph I.B.M. of this Annex, and telephone equipment for communications with the operations center. Such shelters shall be used to receive all data from equipment at the road exits when monitors are present at those exits. (vii) Gate seals may be used on the gates of a road exit when the exit is not in use.The seals shall be checked by monitors to verify that the gate was not used prior to the opening of the exit by the inspected Party.

1030  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(viii) Data authentication devices shall be used to confirm the validity of signals from the sensors and video cameras to the operations center and exit shelter. 3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment: (a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. (b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment that the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows: (i) Video cameras shall be located along the perimeter in such a way as to provide for viewing of the perimeter by monitors in the operations center.The distance between such cameras and the height of the cameras above the ground shall allow the cameras to provide for full viewing of corresponding sectors of the perimeter. Such cameras may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground.The fixed field of view shall be agreed to by the Parties; (ii) Video switching devices located in the operations center shall be used to select sectors of the perimeter for observation by the monitors; (iii) The surveillance system may include video motion detectors to signal the presence of a moving object within the field of view of a camera; (iv) Lights on poles shall provide illumination along the entire perimeter and allow for viewing by video cameras during periods of darkness. Lights may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground; (v) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of the signals transmitted by the video cameras to the operations center or shelters. 4. Operations Center: (a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team.The building for the operations center shall be located at the portal.The location of the building shall provide for an unobstructed view of the portal. (b) The equipment located in the operations center shall be used by monitors to: (i) Receive, review, and authenticate data from all portal, road exit, and perimeter monitoring equipment; (ii) Process data, display video images, and collect monitoring data; (iii) Operate all traffic control devices and vehicle sensors when such devices and sensors are not under the control of monitors at the road exits; (iv) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line; (v) Record and store video and sensor data; (vi) Provide telephone communications with monitors at exit shelters, at any other buildings or structures used for inspection of vehicles or their cargoes, at the storage building, and at the monitors’ living quarters; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1031

(vii) Provide two-way radio communications with monitors in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, including with monitors at the road exits. (c) A backup power generator shall be located near the operations center and shall be used to provide power to the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system in the event of an interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party. Annex 10. Types of Inspection Airplanes 1. Inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage. 2.The types of inspection airplanes that may be used to transport inspectors and monitors are: (a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-5, C-17, C-130, C141, KC-10, and KC-135; and (b) for the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the IL-62, IL-76, and IL-96. 3.The types of inspection airplanes that may be used for delivery and removal of cargoes consisting of equipment or supplies specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol are: (a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, types known as the C-5, C-17, C-130, C141, KC-10, and KC-135; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the IL-76 and An-124. 4. Each Party shall have the right to replace the types of airplanes specified in this Annex with other types of airplanes, as well as to add other types of airplanes after it has informed the other Party of such a replacement or addition. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, each such change shall enter into force three months after a Party has so informed the other. Annex 11. Procedures for Confirming the Dimensions of ICBMs and SLBMs 1. During confirmation of dimensions of the exhibited items the inspectors shall have the right to make measurements at the locations on the items, designated by a member of the in-country escort. 2. For liquid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types and new types, assembled missiles and separate first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs may be exhibited either with fuel or without fuel. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types, except for the SS-25 ICBM and the Trident II SLBM, assembled missiles shall be exhibited with propellant. Separate first stages for solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, the assembled missiles, at the choice of the inspected Party, may be exhibited with propellant, without propellant, or as an inert missile. If a solid propellant ICBM or SLBM of a new type is declared on the basis of a change in missile length, such an ICBM or SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, separate first stages shall be exhibited with propellant. 3.The self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited, either separately or with the third stage as a unit, for the purpose of confirming the length of an ICBM or SLBM, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. If the self-contained dispensing mechanism is exhibited separately, the inspectors shall have the right to measure its length.

1032  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

4. For ICBMs that are maintained, stored and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM, shall be exhibited. 5. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions, during technical characteristics exhibitions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures: (a) For the SS-25, SS-24, and SS-18 ICBMs, and each variant thereof, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. The assembled SS-25 ICBM outside its launch canister may be exhibited without propellant. The separate first stage of the SS-25 ICBM shall be exhibited with propellant. (b) For the SS-13 ICBM, the first stage shall be exhibited and measured separately, and the second and third stages shall be exhibited and measured as a unit.The SS-13 ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile. (c) For the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. Technical characteristics exhibitions for these ICBMs shall take place no later than one year after Treaty signature during an elimination of an ICBM of such a type. (d) For SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, assembled missiles shall be exhibited. Confirmation of the length and diameter of the first stages of such SLBMs shall take place on the assembled missile.The SS-N-17 SLBM has been retired prior to Treaty signature, and it will not be subject to a technical characteristics exhibition. If, after the technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America requests, through diplomatic channels, additional confirmation of dimensions of the first stage of any SLBM, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit such SLBM during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type. In its request for such an exhibition, the United States of America shall designate what it seeks to confirm regarding the dimensions of such a first stage. Procedures for such additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of SLBMs are provided for in Annex 13 to this Protocol, unless otherwise agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM shall be confirmed during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type. 6. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions during technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures: (a) For an ICBM or an SLBM of each type, except for the Peacekeeper ICBM, the separate first stage and the assembled missile shall be exhibited. For the Minuteman II ICBM, the guidance ring and the forward spacer ring shall be exhibited separately. For the Minuteman III ICBM, the self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited separately. (b) For the Peacekeeper ICBM, all stages shall be exhibited and measured separately. The Peacekeeper ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile. (c) The assembled Trident II SLBM may be exhibited without propellant or as an inert missile. The separate first stage of the Trident II SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant. 7. For a technical characteristics exhibition for an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or variant, the separate first stage, assembled missile outside its launch canister, and if applicable, either launch canister containing the assembled missile without front section, or, at the choice of the inspected

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1033

Party, the empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM or SLBM, shall be exhibited. If an ICBM or SLBM of a new type cannot be exhibited as an assembled missile, separate stages shall be exhibited.The first stage of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage, with or without a difference in throw-weight, shall be exhibited in a configuration that allows confirmation of the length of such first stage as defined in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Annex 12. Size Criteria To Be Used during Inspections and Continuous Monitoring 1. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex 1 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(a) of Section VI of this Protocol, for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, closeout inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and the associated missile types, are as follows: (a) United States of America Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

4.1 1.88 Trident I/Poseidon 6.3 1.68 Minuteman II/III

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

7.4 1.80 SS-25 6.9 1.86 RS-12M,Variant 2

2. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex 1 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(b) of Section VI of this Protocol, for suspect-site inspections, and the associated missile types, are as follows: (a) United States of America Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

7.4 2.3 Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

7.4 1.80 SS-25 6.9 1.86 RS-12M,Variant 2

3. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraphs 1 through 14 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraphs 21 and 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

1034  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) United States of America Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

8.4 2.3 Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

17.46 1.76 RS-12M,Variant 2

4. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows: (a) United States of America Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

8.2 2.2 Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Size Criteria Length (meters) Diameter (meters) Missile Type

8.2 2.3 SS-24

5. The size criteria indicated above are derived using data for ICBMs and SLBMs existing as of Treaty signature. In the event that a new type of ICBM or SLBM is deployed or in the event that a type of ICBM or SLBM is retired, these size criteria shall be changed, if necessary. In addition, these size criteria shall be confirmed based on the results of measurements taken during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on any changes to the size criteria within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Annex 13. Procedures for Additional Confirmation of the Dimensions of First Stages of SLBMS This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement No. 7 of April 14, 1993. I. Procedures for Conducting Exhibitions 1. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to in this Annex as the exhibiting Party, shall conduct exhibitions of SLBMs of the types designated by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively, for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of such SLBMs.The exhibition of an SLBM of each such type: (a) shall be considered to be a technical characteristics exhibition pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; (b) shall be conducted subject to the provisions of this Protocol, including paragraph 5 of Section III; paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V; paragraphs 15, 19, and 28 of Section VI; and paragraphs 4, 5, and 7 of Section XIV; and using any of the equipment specified in Section III of Annex 8 to this Protocol; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1035

(c) shall be conducted during the first elimination of an SLBM of each such type. 2.The exhibiting Party shall provide to the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the inspecting Party, a notification through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center no less than 30 days in advance of each exhibition conducted in accordance with this Annex. Such notification shall include:The type of SLBM to be exhibited, the location at which such exhibition will take place, and the date of such exhibition. 3.The exhibiting Party shall have the right, at its discretion, to either exhibit an SLBM and, simultaneously, a separate first stage of an SLBM of the same type, or to exhibit sequentially an SLBM and then its separated first stage.The SLBM being exhibited for the purpose of additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stage of an SLBM of that type shall be an SLBM on which the exhibiting Party shall have the right to carry out, before the exhibition, some of the procedures for the elimination of an SLBM, to include removing some assemblies and elements of the SLBM. For sequential exhibitions of the SLBM and its first stage, the exhibiting Party shall separate the first stage from the rest of the exhibited SLBM, subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex. 4.The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of the SLBM being exhibited that it is an SLBM of the declared type. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of SLBM, representatives of the exhibiting Party shall take steps to resolve the problem. Such steps shall include the opportunity for the inspecting Party to measure those removed assemblies and elements of the SLBM that contribute to the “Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section” for the type of SLBM being exhibited, specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding. Upon completion of such viewing and such measurements, the SLBM being exhibited shall not be subject to further inspection. 5. The inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the exhibited separate first stage of the SLBM, or first stage of the SLBM separated during the exhibition, by measurement of its dimensions. Such measurements shall be made in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 7 of Section XIV of this Protocol. 6.A member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the exhibited separate or separated first stage of the SLBM, in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol. 7.The exhibiting Party shall provide the inspection team with one photograph of the first stage of the exhibited SLBM. Such photograph shall meet the requirements of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on July 31, 1991, through the exchange of letters on the provisions of photographs of items subject to the Treaty. 8. Pursuant to subparagraph 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, during the exhibition of the first stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM provided for in this Annex, the inspecting Party shall also have the right to confirm the diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM. A member of the incountry escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM in order to obtain three photographs of that stage that meet the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the exhibiting Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the Incountry escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs using the camera system of the inspecting Party, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, this Protocol.

1036  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

II. Procedures for Separating an SLBM First Stage from the SLBM Being Exhibited 1. After the inspectors have confirmed the type of an SLBM pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex, the exhibiting Party shall have the right to separate, outside the field of view of inspectors, the first stage from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited at the location where the first stage separates from an SLBM during its flight, by mechanical severing of the missile’s airframe by pyrotechnic devices of the missile, provided that the process of separation is carried out in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the first stage, the dimensions of which they will confirm, belongs to the SLBM being exhibited, the type of which they had previously confirmed. 2. Before the first stage is separated from the rest of the SLBM being exhibited, inspectors shall have the right to view the room or area in which the first stage will be separated, to ascertain that the room or area does not contain another first stage of an SLBM of that type. 3. During the entire process of first stage separation, the inspectors shall have the right to observe all exits of the room or area where the process of separating the first stage from the SLBM is carried out. Annex 14. Settlement of Accounts This Annex is included in this Protocol pursuant to Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 30 of February 3, 1995. I. Principles and Procedures for Settlement of Accounts 1. The Parties shall use the principles and procedures for the settlement of accounts, specified in this Section, in connection with: (a) the costs of goods and services borne by the inspecting Party pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV, paragraph 19 of Section V, and paragraphs 17, 19, 21, 23, and 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol; and (b) the costs of goods and services associated with the purchase of tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto such tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements, and with the providing of training, maintenance, service, spare parts and replacement parts relating to telemetry equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1 to the Telemetry Protocol, and subparagraphs 4(d) and 4(e) and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol. 2.The United States of America shall submit to each other Party, and the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each submit to the United States of America, lists of goods and services provided, hereinafter referred to as itemized lists, in the categories contained in Section II of this Annex, except categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of that Section.These itemized lists shall contain the information specified in Section II of this Annex for the goods and services provided during the period covered by these itemized lists, except that goods and services provided in the category contained in paragraph 14 of Section II of this Annex may be included on the itemized lists covering the period when provision of such goods and services was completed. In addition, each Party shall submit with the itemized lists a summary list of all categories contained in Section II of this Annex for which goods and services have been provided, and the estimated overall total cost of the goods and services provided in each category. 3. Each Party shall submit itemized lists in accordance with the following schedule: (a) for the period from January 1 through March 31, no later than April 30; (b) for the period from April 1 through June 30, no later than July 31;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1037

(c) for the period from July 1 through September 30, no later than October 31; and (d) for the period from October 1 through December 31, no later than January 31. 4. For settlement of accounts for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to the Agreement on Early Exhibitions in the categories contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section II of this Annex, for construction activities related to the establishment of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring facility at Pavlograd in the categories contained in paragraphs 4 and 14 of Section II of this Annex, and for goods and services provided by the Parties pursuant to Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol in the categories contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 17 of Section II of this Annex, and provided by the Parties prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall use the following procedures: (a) itemized lists shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 12 of this Section no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty; (b) itemized lists shall be reviewed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section; (c) a confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted pursuant to paragraphs 6, 8, and 12 of this Section no later than 120 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and (d) a bill shall be paid pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 12 of this Section. 5.The following procedures shall be used after the submittal of itemized lists pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section: (a) each Party shall review the itemized lists to determine for each category, whether the goods and services that it received are comparable in quantity and quality to the goods and services that it provided; (b) if the United States of America and another Party determine that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are comparable in quantity and quality, then no exchange of funds shall be required. In this case, those Parties shall submit to each other a confirmation of goods and services received for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Section; and (c) if the United States of America or another Party determines that the goods and services provided by those Parties for a specific category are not comparable in quantity and quality, then an exchange of funds shall be required for payment of the difference in the cost of goods and services provided by those Parties in that category. In this case, such Party that incurred the greater cost shall submit a bill to such other Party for that category pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of this Section. 6. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the form specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex. A bill shall include the information specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex. 7. A confirmation of goods and services received or a bill shall be submitted: (a) for the period from January 1 through June 30, no later than August 31; and (b) for the period from July 1 through December 31, no later than the last day of February. 8.The United States of America shall denominate all bills submitted to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine in U.S. dollars.The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make all payments to the United States of America in U.S. dollars for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex.The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall denominate all bills submitted to the United States of America in both U.S. dollars and the local currency.The United States of America shall make all payments to the Republic of Belarus,

1038  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine in a freely convertible currency for all categories contained in Section II of this Annex. .

9. Bills shall be paid in accordance with the following: (a) a bill shall be paid within 30 days of its receipt; (b) each Party shall notify the other Party of a disputed bill within seven days of its receipt; and (c) if any undisputed bill is not paid within 180 days of its receipt, then the bill shall be subject to interest, from the date specified on the bill, at the current rate in use by the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America. 10.The goods and services provided in the categories contained in paragraph 6, subparagraph 7(b) and paragraph 8 of Section II of this Annex shall be paid for at the time such goods and services are received and shall be paid for at the commonly available tariffs or rates. 11.The costs for the categories specified in this paragraph shall be calculated in accordance with the following: (a) the costs for the goods and services provided in categories contained in subparagraphs 7(a) and 9(a) of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flights provided by the inspected Party by the agreed rate per flight: (i) for the category contained in subparagraph 7(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $15,000; and (ii) for the category contained in subparagraph 9(a) of Section II of this Annex, the agreed rate per flight shall be U.S. $36,000; (b) the costs for the category contained in paragraph 16 of Section II of this Annex shall be calculated by multiplying the number of flight tests conducted by each Party by the agreed rate for the purchase and copying of each telemetry data tape.This agreed rate shall be U.S. $0.00, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 12.The designated organizations for settlement of accounts shall be: (a) for the United States of America, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America shall submit to and receive from the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; (b) for the Republic of Belarus, the National Agency for Verification and Inspection shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America; (c) for the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America; (d) for the Russian Federation, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America; and (e) for Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine shall submit to and receive from the United States of America itemized lists, confirmations of goods and services received, and bills, and shall make payments of bills to, and receive payments of bills from, the United States of America.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1039

13. Each Party shall have the right to change the organization designated for settlement of accounts specified in paragraph 12 of this Section by informing all other Parties of the change no less than 90 days prior to the effective date of the change. 14.The organizations specified in paragraph 12 of this Section shall have the right to designate their respective authorized representatives. II. Categories of Goods and Services and Information to be Included in Itemized Lists This Section lists the categories of goods and services for settlement of accounts in connection with paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex. For each category, the subparagraphs specify the data that shall be included in the itemized lists for that category. 1. Fuel for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and fuel for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol: (a) type of airplane; (b) tail number or call sign of airplane; (c) type of fuel and its quantity in metric tons; (d) dates on which fuel was provided; (e) location where fuel was provided; (f) estimated cost of fuel, if available; and (g) payment, if any, made when the fuel was provided. 2. Services for inspection airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, and services for dedicated airplanes provided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol: (a) type of airplane; (b) tail number or call sign of airplane; (c) description of services provided; (d) dates on which services were provided; (e) location where services were provided; (f) estimated cost of services, if available; and (g) payment, if any, made when services were provided. 3. Meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol: (a) description of services provided; (b) dates on which services were provided; and (c) estimated cost of each service, if available. 4. Permanent lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol: (a) description of lodging and work space provided; (b) period for which lodging and work space were provided; and

1040  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(c) estimated cost of each service, if available. 5.Temporary lodging and work space for monitors, including utilities and maintenance, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(c) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol: (a) description of lodging; (b) period for which lodging was provided; (c) description of work space provided; (d) period for which work space was provided; and (e) estimated cost of each service, if available. 6. Meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while monitors are at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(d) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required. 7.Transportation of monitors and their baggage, and delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs: (a) from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(e) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol: (i) date of flight and type of airplane; and (ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane; (b) from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(f) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required. 8.Transportation, meals and lodging of monitors traveling from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consular post of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(g) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Provision of documentation is not required. 9. Delivery of equipment and supplies, including foodstuffs, for continuous monitoring activities and transportation of monitors that arrive on such an airplane: (a) from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such facility to the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 19(h) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (i) date of flight and type of airplane; and (ii) tail number or call sign of transporting airplane; (b) from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility pursuant to subparagraph 19(i) of Section V and subparagraph 19(d) of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (i) dates on which services were provided; (ii) types of transportation means used; and (iii) estimated cost of each service, if available. 10. Medical and other urgent services for monitors, including urgent evacuation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1041

associated with such a facility, provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility pursuant to subparagraphs 19(j) and 19(m) of Section V of the Inspection Protocol: (a) first and last name of monitor; (b) dates of treatment, description of treatment, and medications provided; (c) period of hospitalization; (d) date of urgent evacuation flight; (e) type of evacuation airplane, and its tail number or its call sign; and (f) estimated cost of each service, if available. 11. Utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, provided pursuant to subparagraph 19(k) of Section V and subparagraph 19(a) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (a) utilities: (i) description of utilities provided; (ii) dates on which utilities were provided; and (iii) estimated cost for each utility, if available; (b) maintenance: (i) location where work was done; (ii) description of services provided; (iii) type of engineering support provided; (iv) dates on which services were provided; and (v) estimated cost of each service, if available. 12. Installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (a) number of lines; (b) description of installation work performed; (c) dates on which installation work was performed; (d) description of maintenance and services provided; (e) dates on which services were provided; and (f) estimated cost for each service, if available. 13. Use of the satellite communications system pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (a) description of maintenance and services provided; (b) dates on which services were provided; and (c) estimated cost for each service, if available. 14. Site preparation and construction materials for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and for the operations center:

1042  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) construction of a building for the storage of equipment and supplies pursuant to paragraph 23 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (i) engineering description of work performed; (ii) description and quantity of materials provided; (iii) dates on which work was performed; and (iv) estimated cost of work and materials, if available; (b) all other general construction pursuant to subparagraphs 19(b) and 19(c) and paragraph 35 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (i) description and quantity of construction materials provided; (ii) dates on which construction materials were provided; (iii) location where site preparation work was done; (iv) engineering description of site preparation work; (v) dates on which site preparation work was performed; and (vi) estimated cost of work and materials, if available. 15.Temporary structures for monitors at the portal or road exits provided pursuant to paragraph 21 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol: (a) description of structures provided; (b) period for which structures were provided; and (c) estimated cost of each service, if available. 16.Tapes and the recording of telemetric information onto the tapes pursuant to the Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements: (a) dates of flight tests; (b) type of missile tested; (c) number of tapes provided; and (d) estimated cost of the magnetic tapes and of recording the telemetric information, if available. 17.Training and maintenance of telemetric playback equipment, and provision of spare parts and replacement parts for such equipment pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section I and paragraph 8 of Section II of Annex 1, and paragraph 6 of Annex 4 to the Telemetry Protocol: (a) type of service provided; (b) description and quantity of spare and replacement parts provided; (c) period of time during which services and spare and replacement parts were provided; (d) estimated cost of services and spare and replacement parts, if available; and (e) meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing or receiving Party. III. Form of a Confirmation of Goods and Services Received and Information to be Included in a Bill 1. A confirmation of goods and services received shall be in the following form:

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1043

CONFIRMATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES RECEIVED BY THE (RECEIVING PARTY) FROM THE (PROVIDING PARTY) DURING THE PERIOD FROM________ THROUGH ________ (SIX-MONTH PERIOD COVERED) This is to certify that the goods and services specified in (Reference to the appropriate itemized lists of goods and services submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex) in the categories of goods and services (Reference to the appropriate categories of goods and services contained in Section II of this Annex) were provided and were received and accepted. The quantity and quality of goods and services provided by each Party in these categories are certified to be comparable; therefore, no exchange of funds is required. Signature _________________________________________________________ Date __________________________________ Place __________________________________ The confirmation of goods and services received shall be signed by an individual authorized by the Party submitting the confirmation. 2. A bill shall be prepared in the English and Russian languages. A bill shall include the following information: (a) the Party being billed; (b) the Party submitting the bill and the name and address of the organization to which payment should be made; (c) the number and date of the bill; (d) reference to the category from those contained in Section II of this Annex for which the bill is submitted; (e) reference to numbers and dates of the itemized lists of goods and services, submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex; and (f) description and quantity of goods and services provided, the six-month period covered by the bill, and the amount to be paid. Annex 15. Procedures for the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment I. Examination and Storage of Radiation Detection Equipment at the Point of Entry 1. The inspecting Party, prior to beginning to use its radiation detection equipment during the first inspection conducted with the use of radiation detection equipment, shall deliver to the inspected Party, for purchase or examination by the inspected Party, one of each of the items in the sets of radiation detection equipment specified in Sections Il, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol, for each model, except for the calibration source. No later than 30 days after the inspected Party has received such items of radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use during inspections such radiation detection equipment until permission for the use of such radiation detection equipment is given by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall not bring to a point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party other radiation detection equipment. 2. For points of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used, the inspecting Party shall bring, at times agreed upon with the inspected Party, to each such point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party for use during inspections no less than one set of radiation detection equipment.

1044  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) Except as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section, each such set of radiation detection equipment shall be subject to examination and stored at the point of entry in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph. (b) The examination of such sets of radiation detection equipment shall be completed no later than five days after the date when these sets of radiation detection equipment are brought to the point of entry. During the examination of the radiation detection equipment, the inspected Party shall be permitted, in the presence of the inspecting Party, to partially disassemble such equipment and examine it using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection equipment to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty. Upon completion of the examination and prior to departure from the point of entry, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex in order to establish that its capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements under the Treaty has not been impaired as a result of the examination of such radiation detection equipment by the inspected Party. (c) Upon completion of the examination, the sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers provided by the inspecting Party, and shall be located within a secure structure or room in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section V of this Protocol. No more than three sets of radiation detection equipment shall be stored at each point of entry associated with inspection sites at which radiation detection equipment may be used. (d) The procedures for delivering radiation detection equipment for examination and storage at points of entry, the transportation and support for the stay of technical experts delivering and supporting the examination of such equipment on the territory of the inspected Party, and the reimbursement of associated costs shall be subject to agreement. 3. An inspection team shall be permitted to bring to a point of entry calibration sources that are part of the sets of radiation detection equipment stored at the point of entry, replacement spare batteries and rechargeable batteries, as well as an additional set of radiation detection equipment. All such equipment brought to the point of entry shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol. 4.An inspection team, upon arrival at the point of entry, shall have the right, in the presence of the in-country escort, to examine the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection equipment is stored and the radiation detection equipment in such containers.The inspection team shall have the right, as set forth below, to select one set of radiation detection equipment for use during the inspection from among the sets of such equipment stored at the point of entry in accordance with subparagraph 2(c) of this Section or an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team, and to confirm the operability of the selected set in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, for no more than four hours. (a) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the sets of radiation detection equipment have not been tampered with, and that the set of radiation detection equipment in such containers is operable in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section Il of this Annex, then such a set of radiation detection equipment shall be used in conducting the inspection. (b) If either the inspection team or the in-country escort determines that the containers for all the sets of radiation detection equipment have been tampered with, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and examined in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol, the operability of which has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex, in conducting the inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1045

(c) For containers that have not been tampered with, if either the inspection team or the incountry escort determines that all the sets of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers are not operable, the inspection team shall have the right to use an additional set of radiation detection equipment brought to the point of entry by the inspection team in conducting the inspection. In this case, the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section Ill of this Protocol shall be delayed, if necessary, until the in-country escort has completed its examination of such radiation detection equipment using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex, and the inspection team has confirmed the operability of such radiation detection equipment in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section Il of this Annex. In no case shall such delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and type of inspection beyond the time limit specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Protocol for the type of inspection being conducted. (d) If there are no signs that the containers have been tampered with and any set of radiation detection equipment stored in such containers is not operable, the inspecting Party shall return such a set or sets of radiation detection equipment and associated containers to the territory of the inspecting Party.The inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future. (e) If an additional set of radiation detection equipment is brought to the point of entry by the inspection team and is not used in conducting The inspection, such radiation detection equipment shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspection team when it leaves the territory of the inspected Party. (f) In all cases, only one set of radiation detection equipment whose operability has been confirmed in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Section II of this Annex shall be used during an inspection. II. Regarding the Use of Radiation Detection Equipment Prior to Measuring the Radiation Level of an Object 1. Before conducting measuring procedures using radiation detection equipment, inspectors and the in-country escort shall have the right to confirm the operability of the radiation detection equipment, using the following procedures: (a) For radiation detection equipment used pursuant to this paragraph, the counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections l, II, and IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively. (b) The operability of each neutron detector in a set of radiation detection equipment shall be confirmed. (c) The neutron detector shall be placed in a mutually agreed location. (d) The inspecting Party shall take two background radiation measurements with the calibration source at least Three meters from the neutron detector. If the difference between these two measurements is less than or equal to 30 percent of their average, the average of these measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. If the difference between these two background radiation measurements is more than 30 percent of their average, a third background radiation measurement shall be taken. The third background radiation measurement shall be compared with the previously taken background radiation measurement that is closest to the third background radiation measurement. If the difference between the third background radiation measurement and the closest previous background radiation measurement is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average of these

1046  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

two measurements, the average of these two measurements shall be recorded as the average background radiation value for the operability check. Otherwise, the results of all three background radiation measurements shall be recorded and the radiation detection equipment shall not be accepted as operable. (e) With the neutron detector in the same location used for the background radiation measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph(c) of this paragraph, the inspecting Party shall place the calibration source in contact with the neutron detector at the center of The detector’s sensitive area as indicated by the markings on the neutron detector. (f) The inspecting Party shall take two calibration measurements of the radiation level from the calibration source.The average of these two calibration measurements shall be recorded as the average value of the calibration measurement. (g) The following values shall be calculated: (i) the calculated calibration value, which is the difference between the average value of the calibration measurement determined in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph and the average background radiation value determined in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph; (ii) the product of the counting time for each measurement and the equivalent flux of the calibration source, which is a fixed value indicated on the calibration source; and (iii) the sensitivity of the neutron detector; which is the ratio of the values obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (g)(i) and (g)(ii) of this paragraph. (h) The radiation detection equipment shall be accepted as operable, provided: (i) the difference between the two calibration measurements taken in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph is less than or equal to 30 percent of the average value of the calibration measurement; and (ii) the difference between the value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector, determined in accordance with subparagraph (g)(iii) of this paragraph, and the laboratory value of the sensitivity of the neutron detector; as recorded on the neutron detector; is less than or equal to 15 percent of the average of these two sensitivity values. (i) The results of the measurements obtained in accordance with subparagraphs (d) and (f) of this paragraph shall be. recorded either in the inspection report or in a form, agreed upon by the Parties, used to record the confirmation of the operability of the radiation detection equipment at the point of entry. 2. At the inspection site, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the following procedures: (a) The counting time of each individual measurement shall be the counting time specified in Sections l, II, and IV of Annex 8 to This Protocol for the neutron detectors in the sets of radiation detection equipment of the United States of America or the Russian Federation, respectively. (b) The inspection team shall have the right to observe the use of the radiation detection equipment to confirm that the procedures provided for in this paragraph are followed. (c) After arrival at the inspection site, prior to conducting radiation measurements the inspection team shall confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section, that at least one neutron detector in the set of radiation detection equipment is operable. If the inspection team is unable to confirm the operability of at least one neutron detector; this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the inspection shall proceed without the use of radiation detection equipment.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1047

(d) Measurements of radiation levels, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex, of the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements shall be taken at the location selected for that purpose by the in-country escort, using a neutron detector whose operability has been confirmed pursuant to subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. (e) Background radiation measurements shall be taken by The in-country escort no less than ten meters from the object designated by the inspection team for radiation measurements. Such background radiation measurements shall be taken in accordance with the following procedures: (i) The inspection team shall identify to the in-country escort the front surface of the neutron detector that will be directed toward the object designated for measurement of the radiation level.The front surface of the neutron detector shall be positioned vertically, at approximately the same height at which measurements on the designated object will be taken. (ii) Two background radiation measurements shall be taken.The average of these two measurements shall be calculated and recorded in the inspection report as the average background radiation value. (iii) If the average background radiation value is greater than 450 counts, another location for taking the background radiation measurements shall be selected by the in-country escort. Background radiation measurements shall be taken until an average background radiation value is obtained that is less than 450 counts at a selected location. (iv) The square root of the average background radiation value shall be calculated to two decimal places and the result multiplied by four.This number shall be added to the average background radiation value and the result shall be rounded up to the higher whole number.This number shall be recorded in the inspection report as the comparison number to be used in paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraphs 7 and 8 of Section IV of this Annex. III. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 12 of Article Xl of the Treaty with Respect to Long-Range ALCMs and Containers for LongRange ALCMs 1. For inspecting long-range ALCMs and containers for long-range ALCMs in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section l, or paragraph 4 or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, the following procedures shall be used: (a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points along the ALCM or container at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken.A description of the ALCM or container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the ALCM or container, and the approximate location of each measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram. (b) The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the ALCM or container; with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing the point on The ALCM or container where the measurement will be taken. (c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number, shall be rounded up to the higher whole number.This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point.

1048  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(d) If the average measurement of the radiation level at each selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e) (iv) of Section II of this Annex, the ALCM or container shall not be subject to further inspection. (e) If the average measurement of the radiation level at any of the four selected points is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e) (iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report and the ALCM or container shall be subject to further inspection in accordance with subparagraph 4(a) (ii) or subparagraph 4(b) (iii) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, as applicable. 2.To confirm, pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section l or subparagraph 5(c) of Section IV of Annex 4 to this Protocol, that a container does not conceal the presence of radiation, the following procedures shall be used: (a) The inspection team shall select no more than four points on the container wall at which measurements of radiation levels will be taken for the purpose of measuring the radiation shielding effect.A description of the container shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the container and the approximate location of each measurement point shall be indicated on this diagram. (b) The in-country escort shall open the container and place the calibration source on its stand inside the container on the longitudinal axis of the container. The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector outside the container in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the container, with a maximum permissible deviation from established distances not to exceed 20 percent.The calibration source and neutron detector shall be placed on a horizontal straight line that passes through the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector; that lies on a plane perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the container, and that intersects the wall of the container at the selected point on the container.The distance between the center of the calibration source and the center of the neutron detector shall be recorded in the inspection report.The front surface of the neutron detector shall face the selected point. (c) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at each selected point on the container. The container shall remain closed during measurements of the radiation level. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average background radiation value, calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e) (ii) of Section II of this Annex, shall be subtracted from this average.The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed inside the container at that point. (d) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (b) and(c) of this paragraph shall be repeated until measurements have been taken at all the points on the container selected by the inspection team, and the results have been recorded in the inspection report. (e) The calibration source shall be removed from the container and the neutron detector repositioned no less than two meters from the container with its front surface no longer facing the container. (f) The in-country escort shall position the calibration source in front of the front surface of the neutron detector so that the distance between the front surface of the neutron detector and the calibration source is the same distance, within three percent, as that used for one of the measurements taken pursuant to subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. No objects that could interfere with the flow of neutrons to the neutron detector shall be located near the calibration source or the neutron detector. (g) The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level with the calibration source and the neutron detector positioned in accordance with subparagraphs (e) and (f) of this paragraph. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated. The average

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1049

background radiation value calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e) (ii) of Section II of this Annex shall be subtracted from this average.The result shall be recorded in the inspection report as the net average value of radiation obtained when the calibration source is placed outside the container at the distance used pursuant to subparagraph (f) of this paragraph. (h) The procedures provided for in subparagraphs (f) and (g) of this paragraph shall be repeated for each distance between the calibration source and the neutron detector used for the measurements of the radiation level taken pursuant to subparagraph(c) of this paragraph. (i) For each point on the container; calculations shall be carried out, in which the net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph(c) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed inside the container is divided by the corresponding net average value of the radiation level obtained pursuant to subparagraph (g) of this paragraph when the calibration source is placed outside the container. The division shall be carried out to two decimal places. If the result of the division with respect to any point is less than 0.5, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report. (j) For containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of a type for which a notification has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, if either the width or the diameter of such containers exceeds 190 centimeters, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on procedures for the placement of the neutron detector and the calibration source with respect to such containers. IV. For Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 1. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of ArticIe XI of the Treaty, radiation detection equipment shall be used in accordance with the procedures contained in this Section. 2. The in-country escort shall position, for radiation measurements, an object contained in The front section and declared by the in-country escort to be a non-nuclear object, hereinafter referred to as the inspected object, at a location specified by the in-country escort, at a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section, or shall provide for radiation measurements of the inspected object while it is in the front section. If radiation measurements of the inspected object are taken while it is in the front section, the in-country escort shall have the right to use special shields to prevent neutrons from a reentry vehicle or re en try vehicles remaining on the front section from striking the neutron detector; but which do not interfere with the flow of neutrons from the inspected object to the neutron detector; or to remove the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from The front section to a distance of no less than ten meters from the front section.‘whichever method is used for the placement of the inspected object for radiation measurements, the in-country escort shall ensure that the procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment, as set forth below, are carried out. 3.The process of removing the inspected object from the front section and moving it to a location where radiation measurements will be taken and the process of removing a reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, shall be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a manner as to permit inspectors to ascertain that the inspected object is that same inspected object. Before the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles are removed from the front section, inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain other objects similar to the inspected object. During the entire process of removing the inspected object or the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles from the front section, the inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no objects that are similar to the inspected object are delivered to that site, or to seal all the exits with seals.

1050  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

4.The inspection team shall select the point on the inspected object where radiation measurements will be taken. A description of the inspected object shall be recorded as a diagram in the inspection report. The approximate dimensions of the inspected object, determined visually without taking linear measurements, and the approximate location of the measurement point, shall be indicated on this diagram. 5.The in-country escort shall position the neutron detector in a location specified by the inspection team, no less than seven centimeters and no more than two meters from the surface of the inspected object, with a maximum permissible deviation from these established distances not to exceed 20 percent, so that the neutron detector is at the same level as the point where the measurement will be taken, with the front surface of the neutron detector facing The point on the inspected object where the measurement will be taken. 6.The in-country escort shall take two measurements of the radiation level at the selected point. The average of the two measurements shall be calculated, and if not a whole number; shall be rounded up to the higher whole number.This average shall be recorded in the inspection report as the average measurement at that point 7. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is less than or equal to the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2 (e) (iv) of Section II of this Annex, the inspected object is, in fact, a non-nuclear object. 8. If the average measurement of the radiation level at the selected point is greater than the comparison number calculated in accordance with subparagraph 2(e) (iv) of Section II of this Annex, this fact shall be recorded in the inspection report.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF THE ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms limited by the Treaty, as well as fixed structures and facilities. I. Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters 1. Elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection. 2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party: (a) shall remove the missile’s reentry vehicle or vehicles; (b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile’s guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1051

(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, disassemble the missile into stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, and detach rocket motor nozzles and interstage skirts of the missile from stages; (d) may remove propellant from stages; (e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister; (f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and (g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism. These actions may be carried out in any order. 3. After arrival of the inspection team, and prior to the initiation of the elimination process: (a) Inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the missiles and their launch canisters to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of the missile in its launch canister, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem, including removing the missile from its launch canister, if necessary; and (b) Inspectors and representatives of the inspected Party shall read the data from and inspect the unique identifier in accordance with Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol. After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the inspected Party may remove any remaining elements not subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section, and the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process. 4. Elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the stages shall be destroyed by explosive demolition or burned; (b) Rocket motor nozzles and cases, as well as the interstage skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(c), 2(d), and 4(a) of this Section, or after the completion of static testing provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and (c) The self-contained dispensing mechanism, as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion. 5. Elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) The body of the launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion; or (b) If the body of the launch canister is composed of segments, each of the segments shall be cut into two pieces at a location that is not an assembly joint. A launch canister, the body of which is of unitary construction, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or cut into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister. 6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

1052  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

7. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. II. Procedures for Elimination of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers, and Silo Test Launchers 1. Elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be carried out in situ and be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. 2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs and silo test launchers, all missiles and shipping containers for ICBMs or ICBM stages, as well as all support equipment, shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each such launcher to be eliminated. 3.A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers as soon as the silo doors have been opened, removed, or eliminated. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 4. A silo launcher of ICBMs in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 5. A silo test launcher or a silo training launcher in the process of being eliminated shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) or paragraph 7, respectively, of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 6. Elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs or silo test launchers: (a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; and (b) Following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the silo may be filled to the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation or explosion.To enhance safety, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 9 of this Section. 7. Elimination of a silo training launcher shall be accomplished by removing, dismantling, or destroying the silo door and by destroying the silo headworks by excavation or explosion. 8. The elimination process for a silo launcher of ICBMs, a silo training launcher, and a silo test launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such an elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 9. Silos shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period, after which they may be filled with earth. III. Procedures for Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs 1. Elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers carried out in accordance with the proce-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1053

dures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection. 2.After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section to be eliminated. After such confirmation, the elimination process may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process. 3. Elimination process for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and road-mobile training launchers: (a) The erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis; (b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the launcher chassis; (d) The mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size; (e) A portion of the self-propelled launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and no component, including those removed in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph, shall be mounted, welded, or attached by any other means to an eliminated launcher chassis so as to increase the length of such a chassis; and (f) If a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs is not mounted on a self-propelled launcher chassis, the trailer chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size. Upon completion of these elimination procedures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. 4. Elimination process for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile training launchers: (a) The erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar); (b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; (c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar); and (d) The railcar (or flatcar) shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size. 5. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. 6. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

1054  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

7. Elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in situ, shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification, and shall be subject to inspection pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty. 8. Elimination process for fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs: (a) The superstructure of each fixed structure shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation; and (b) The base or foundation of each such structure shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion. Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination process for those structures shall be considered to be completed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 9. The destroyed base or foundation of each such fixed structure shall remain visible to national technical means of verification: (a) for the 90-day period following the completion of the elimination process; or (b) until an inspection of each such fixed structure at a restricted area or rail garrison is conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty. 10. Upon completion of the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty or, if such an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 90-day period provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of this Section, the hole resulting from the excavation or explosion of each such structure may be filled and the remains of the destroyed base or foundation of each such structure may be removed from the restricted area or rail garrison. IV. Procedures for Elimination of SLBM Launchers 1. Elimination of SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for SLBM launchers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. 2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for SLBM launchers, all missiles shall be removed from such launchers. 3.A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for SLBM launchers as soon as the ballistic missile submarine has been positioned at the conversion or elimination facility with all missile launch tubes empty and launch-tube hatches opened or removed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 4. SLBM launchers in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain deployed SLBMs, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until all the missile launch-tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed from the ballistic missile submarine. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 5. Elimination process for SLBM launchers: (a) The missile section shall be removed from the submarine; or (b) The missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations shall be removed from the submarine. Missile launch tubes that have been removed shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and shall remain in the open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from the conversion or elimination facility.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1055

6. The elimination process for SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 5 (a) and 5(b) of this Section shall be completed no later than 270 days and 180 days, respectively, after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 7. A ballistic missile submarine shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. If the elimination process has been carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Section, then upon its completion, the submarine shall continue to be visible to national technical means of verification until provision of the notification provided for in paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol and for no less than the ten-day period following the provision of such a notification. 8. Upon completion of the elimination procedures for SLBM launchers, the submarine may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty after: (a) installing a section without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements; or (b) replacing the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure that were removed with portions without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements. Such submarines shall differ from ballistic missile submarines on the basis of external differences observable by national technical means of verification. Submarines that have been modified shall not have vertical launch tubes with a diameter large enough to accommodate the smallest SLBM of that Party. V. Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers 1. Elimination of soft-site launchers shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. 2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for soft-site launchers, all missiles, launch canisters, and shipping containers for ICBMs or SLBMs or for their stages shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each soft-site launcher to be eliminated. 3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for soft-site launchers as soon as it has begun implementation of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4 (a) of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. A soft-site launcher in the process of being eliminated shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV and paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 4. Elimination process for soft-site launchers: (a) All fixed launch and propellant-handling equipment, as well as erecting and handling equipment, and fuel tanks, associated with such a launcher shall be removed at least 1000 meters from the soft-site launcher to be eliminated. “Launch equipment” is understood to mean systems, components, and instruments required to launch missiles; (b) The entire area, at least 20 meters in diameter and centered on the soft-site launcher, shall be excavated or exploded to a depth of no less than two meters; and (c) To enhance safety, following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section.

1056  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

5.The elimination process for a soft-site launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 6. Soft-site launchers shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period.After the 90-day period has elapsed, the hole may be filled with earth. VI. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers and Elimination of Former Heavy Bombers 1. Elimination of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification and by inspection pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section. 2. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers has been completed, except for those cases when the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection. If an inspection is conducted, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable. 3. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, engines and equipment that are not part of the airframe may be removed except for the equipment that is necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to be eliminated. 4. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber as soon as the tail section with tail surfaces has been severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint. After this procedure has been carried out, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 5. Elimination process for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: (a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint; (b) The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and (c) The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint. 6. A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process.The elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be completed no later than 60 days after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. 7. Upon completion of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the remains of its airframe shall remain visible to national technical means of verification at the elimination site for a 90-day period, after which they may be removed. In the case of an inspection conducted to confirm that the elimination of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed, the remains of its airframe may be removed after the completion of such an inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1057

8. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable, that the inspection team has completed its inspection.This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. 9. Conversion of heavy bombers, carried out in accordance with this Section, shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, as follows: (a) Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs: (i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of this Section; (ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, as applicable; or (iii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, as applicable; (b) Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs: (i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section; or (ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Section, as applicable; (c) Conversion of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 12 of this Section. 10.To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all weapons bays equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs. All external attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs and all external attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs. 11.To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. All external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. 12. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, all weapons bays equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments. All external attachment joints for such armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for such armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-tosurface armaments. 13. Upon completion of the above requirements, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.The converting Party may also provide an additional notification regarding the planned

1058  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

date of arrival of such a heavy bomber at the viewing site.The Party receiving such notification or notifications shall have the right, within the 20-day period beginning on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site, to inspect it to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, whichever are applicable, have been completed. Upon completion of such inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20day period, the inspected Party shall have the right to remove the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber from the viewing site. 14. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, that the inspection team has completed its inspection.This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. 15. Upon completion of the inspection provided for in paragraph 13 of this Section or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the converted heavy bomber shall begin to be considered to be a heavy bomber of a different category or to be a former heavy bomber depending on the conversion procedures that have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. VII. Procedures for Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or Static Testing 1. Removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of flight tests shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. 2. Procedures for removal from accountability as a result of flight tests: (a) Notification shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol; and (b) The ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the flight tests. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 3. Procedures for removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of static testing: (a) The Party that has accomplished static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. (b) If static testing is accomplished through dissection, that is, removal of propellant segments for testing, each time the Party removes such a segment it shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. (c) The remains of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section I of this Protocol. VIII. Other Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability 1. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, their launch canisters, silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, soft-site launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, static display items, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3,6, or 8 of this Section, as applicable.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1059

2. Accidental loss: (a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an accident, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. (b) The item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty as of the date or assumed date of the accidental loss specified in such a notification. 3. Disablement beyond repair: (a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond repair, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. (b) The disabled item shall be eliminated at the site of disablement, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol, including inspection. 4. Procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section shall be used to change the accountability, as a result of static display, of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. 5. Static display: (a) Prior to being placed on static display, an item referred to in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. (b) Upon completion of the requirements in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, shall be transported to a location where it could be inspected. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. (c) A Party shall have the right, within the 30-day period beginning on the date of receipt of the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, to conduct an inspection of such an item. (d) If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of the item specified for static display, that the inspection team has completed its inspection.This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol. (e) Upon completion of the inspection provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, and after the item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, has been transported to and installed at its static display location, it shall be considered to be on static display. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 6. If the Party possessing the item removes it from static display, that item shall be eliminated at the site of static display, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol. Upon completion of such procedures, the eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. 7. Heavy bombers or former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers: (a) Procedures for changing accountability of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers as a result of conversion for use as ground trainers:

1060  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(i) At least one third of each wing or the entire vertical stabilizer of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be removed; and (ii) Upon completion of the above requirements, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber so converted shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II and in subparagraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. (b) Upon the completion of the conversion process, a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 90-day period. 8.A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer that is no longer used for such purposes shall be eliminated in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of this Protocol. Upon the completion of the appropriate elimination procedures, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. IX. Procedures for Elimination of Facilities 1. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of facilities provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XII of the Inspection Protocol has been completed.The completion of elimination of all other declared facilities shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. 2. Any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty as soon as all strategic offensive arms specified for such a facility, and all support equipment, have been removed and all silo launchers and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Protocol. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL

NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON THE R EDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1061

hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions that establish the procedures for, and the content of, the notifications provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty. I. Notifications Concerning Data with Respect to Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, According to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and Other Agreed Categories of Data Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(a) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data: 1. notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; 2. notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include, for each Party, all its data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, except that, if the data for Annex D, E, F, G, H, or I have not changed during such sixmonth period, a statement that no change has occurred in such annex since the previous six-month update notification may be substituted for the data for that annex; 3. notification, no later than five days after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding or other agreed categories of data, unless notification of such change has been provided in accordance with another paragraph of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the change in data, by number and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the items; the location of the items; the date on which such a change occurred; and, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier. Such notification shall also include the geographic coordinates of the location of the following that relate to the change: except for silo launcher groups, each facility, including any eliminated facility, any facility subject to continuous monitoring, and any monitored facility; each silo launcher of ICBMs; each silo used as a launch control center; each other launch control center; each deployment area; each rail garrison entrance/exit; each fixed test launcher; and each heavy bombers or former heavy bombers converted for use as a ground trainer. Such notification shall further include: (a) for the loss as the result of an accident of an item accountable under the terms of the Treaty: the approximate or assumed location of the accidental loss; the circumstances related to the loss, if such circumstances are known; and the assumed date of the loss; (b) for disablement beyond repair of an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty: the circumstances of the disablement; (c) for elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or softsite launcher, at which grading is not to be performed, a statement that the date specified is the date of completion of the elimination process for such a launcher; (d) for new facilities, for new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions: a statement that site diagrams for new facilities, and photographs of new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions of items that meet the requirements for site diagrams and photographs set forth in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph;

1062  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(e) for new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided; 4. notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of a reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs at an ICBM base or to SLBMs on ballistic missile submarines at submarine bases. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM or the type of SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads will be attributed; the reduced number of warheads that will be attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs of that type; the planned date on which the reduced number of warheads is to be attributed to such ICBMs or SLBMs; and the ICBM base for the ICBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed, or the submarine bases for the ballistic missile submarines for the SLBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed; 5. notification, no later than February 1 of each year, of planned changes, as of the end of that calendar year, in the number of deployed strategic offensive arms. Such notification shall include: the planned aggregate number as of the end of that calendar year of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers by type, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers by type, and deployed heavy bombers by type and category; the planned number of ICBMs and SLBMs to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of ICBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of SLBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; and the planned number of heavy bombers, by type and category, to be converted into heavy bombers of another category or into former heavy bombers, and the planned number of heavy bombers to be eliminated. If the expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms of any type will be greater as of the end of that year than the planned number that was specified in accordance with this paragraph, notification of such expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms as of the end of that year shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of such a change; 6. notification containing a request regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, the coordinates of which are provided to the nearest minute, that are considered by the Party receiving data on such locations to have the same appearance. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the locations; their geographic coordinates; and reasons that the Party considers such locations to have the same appearance; 7. notification, no later than 15 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the requested locations; information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the specified locations, or the geographic coordinates of the locations to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations; 8. notification, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, of the transfer of items to or from a third State in accordance with a pattern of cooperation existing at the time of signature of the Treaty referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items transferred; the date of transfer; and the location of transfer; 9. notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the exit from a newly constructed facility or a facility for which such items have not been specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, or no less than 30 days in advance of the appearance of an ICBM, SLBM, first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launcher of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or heavy bomber at such a facility, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of a new facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, or no less than 30 days in advance of the date to be specified in the notification of the change of category of a facility provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, of the existence of a new facility or a change of category of a facility. Such notification shall include: the name of the facility; its function according to the categories of data contained in the

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1063

Memorandum of Understanding; and its geographic coordinates. Such notification shall not be required if notification was provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section; 10. notification of the location of a production facility, not previously declared, at which production of ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs is planned, no less than 90 days in advance of the exit from such a facility of the first of the items specified in the notification. Such notification shall include: the name of the production facility; the type of items that will be produced at the facility; the planned date of the exit from the facility of the first of the items that will be produced at the facility; the geographic coordinates of the facility; and, if the production facility is a production facility for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs or if the ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of the ICBMs or SLBMs that will be produced at the facility are as large as or larger than the smallest ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a statement that the site diagram of the facility, which meets the requirements for site diagrams specified in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph; 11. notification, no later than five days after excavation begins, of the beginning of construction of a new silo launcher of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM which the silo launcher under construction will contain; the name of the ICBM base; the geographic coordinates of the silo launcher of ICBMs under construction; and the date on which excavation began; 12. notification, no later than five days after production has ceased, of the cessation of production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs at a monitored facility. Such notification shall include: the monitored facility and the date on which such production ceased; 13. notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing the data from the unique identifier for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the data from the unique identifier; the restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility at which the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is located, or, if the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is in transit or relocation, its destination; 14. notification declaring that ICBMs or SLBMs of a type shall be considered to be ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM or SLBM; 15. notification, beginning three months after the notification that ICBMs of a type for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to be ICBMs of a retired type in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section, and at each three-month period thereafter, of the number and location, by facility, of the retired ICBMs of that type. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs no later than the last day of each three-month period that follows the notification of the first retired type of such ICBM; 16. notification, beginning six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section and at each six-month period thereafter, of the type, number, and location of ICBMs and SLBMs of retired types, other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has ICBMs or SLBMs of such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs and SLBMs no later than the last day of each sixmonth period that follows the notification of the first retired type of ICBM or SLBM; 17. notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM; 18. notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types.The first

1064  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM. 19. Notification, no later than five days after the effective date of a change, of the change to the boundary of the facility specified on the site diagram. Such notification shall include: the name and function of the facility; the subtitle, if applicable; the geographic coordinates of the facility; the effective date of the change; the reference to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission document; and a statement that a revised site diagram for the facility and a site diagram of excluded portions of the facility will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph. II. Notifications Concerning Movement of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty: 1. notification, no later than 48 hours after its completion, of the transit of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs; launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs; and mobile training launchers. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items departed; the date of departure; the facility at which the items have arrived; the date of arrival; the mode of transport; and, for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; 2. notification, no later than eight hours after a visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has exceeded 24 hours in duration, of the visit of such an airplane to a specified facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers or to an eliminated facility. Such notification shall include, for each air base; production facility, repair facility, conversion or elimination facility, or storage facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers; heavy bomber flight test center; training facility for heavy bombers; or eliminated facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are visiting; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; the facility such airplanes are visiting; and the date and time of arrival; 3. notification, no later than 24 hours after departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. Such notification shall include, for each visited facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have concluded the visit; the facility visited by such airplanes; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; and the date and time of departure; 4. notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a rail garrison for routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles departing from the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of departure; 5. notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each rail-mobile test launcher from a test range. Such notification shall include: the number of rail-mobile test launchers and the number of launch-associated railcars departing the test range; the test range; and the date of departure; 6. notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile to the rail garrison from which it departed, of its return from

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1065

routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have returned to the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of return; 7. notification, no later than 24 hours after the return, of the return of each rail-mobile test launcher to the test range from which it departed. Such notification shall include: the date of return; and the test range; 8. notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of a train with rail-mobile test launchers to the test range from which it departed, of any variation from the configuration of the train that was specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section during the time the train was outside the test range. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation; and the extraordinary circumstances, which must exist for such a variation from the configuration of the train to take place, that required a variation from the configuration of the train; 9. notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility, for a relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or for each other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles; the point of departure, or the facility of origin; the destination; and the date of departure; 10. notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile at its destination, of the completion of the relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have relocated; the facility of origin and, if applicable, the point of departure; the date of departure; the facility at which each such launcher and its associated missile has arrived; the date of arrival; the data from the unique identifier for each of the ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in the relocation; and for those portions of the route taken by deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles outside the deployment area, the location, date and time at that location at least once every four days during the relocation; 11. notification, no later than 18 hours after the beginning of an exercise dispersal, of the beginning of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include: the ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are involved in such a dispersal; and the date and time of the beginning of the dispersal; 12. notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of an exercise dispersal, of the completion of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include, for each applicable ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the ICBM base; the date and time of the completion of the dispersal; and, for each specific restricted area or for each specific rail garrison of the ICBM base, the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have not returned to the restricted area or rail garrison. Such notification shall also include: (a) for each deployed road-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the restricted area and to which transportation for inspectors is not provided, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located; and the reason for its location there; (b) for each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the rail garrison, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located; and the reason for its location there;

1066  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

13. notification, no less than three hours in advance of the date of a variation from standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, of such a variation, if such variation will be the result of the departure of the train or of a portion of such a train for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison and if the return of that train to standard configuration cannot take place within the 12-hour period provided for the preparation for the implementation of a cooperative measure in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date when such variation will take place; the number of launchers and launchassociated railcars contained in the portion of the train that will depart for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison; and the parking site of the train with a variation in the standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site; 14. notification, no later than 24 hours after the completion of the routine movement or no later than 48 hours after the completion of the relocation, of any variation from the standard configuration of trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles during routine movements and relocations. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; and the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation; 15. notification, no later than 24 hours after the return to standard configuration, of the return to standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date on which the return to standard configuration took place; and the parking site of the train that has returned to standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site; 16. notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIII of the Treaty, of the beginning of such an exercise. Such notification shall include: the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers that are involved in the exercise; and the date and time of the beginning of the exercise; 17. notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of this Section, of the completion of that exercise. Such notification shall include the date and time of the completion of the exercise. III. Notifications Concerning Data on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight in Connection with the Throw-weight Protocol Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Throw-weight Protocol: 1. notification, no less than seven days in advance of the eighth flight test of an ICBM or SLBM of each new type, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in the course of the first seven flight tests; data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 8000; 9000; 10,000; 11,000; and 12,000 kilometers, or that an SLBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 6500; 7500; 8500; 9500; and 10,500 kilometers; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight; 2. notification, no less than 45 days in advance of each flight test conducted to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Section II of the Throw-weight Protocol, of data about such a flight test.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1067

Such notification shall include: the designation of the type of ICBM or SLBM; the planned date of the flight test; and the launch area and the planned reentry vehicle impact area, specified in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; 3. notification, no later than five days after an ICBM or SLBM of a new type first becomes subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the accountable throw-weight; the date on which the flight test with the accountable throw-weight was conducted; the data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight; 4. notification, no later than five days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which a throw-weight greater than its accountable throw-weight was demonstrated, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the new value of the accountable throw-weight; and the date on which the flight test with the new value of the accountable throw-weight was conducted. For an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the notification shall also include data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight; however, if such data has not changed with respect to the data previously declared for that type of missile, this data need not be included, but the number of the earlier notification containing such data shall be specified. IV. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty and Elimination of Facilities Subject to the Treaty Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty and elimination of facilities subject to the Treaty: 1. notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the respective processes of conversion or elimination of items, including placement of items on static display, of the intention to carry out the procedures for those processes provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol and in paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the item to be converted or eliminated, or placed on static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location of such item; the location at which such processes will take place; the procedures to be carried out; and in each case, the scheduled date of the initiation of such processes; 2. notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a conversion or elimination process, of the date on which that process began. Such notification shall include: the number of items, and, as applicable, the type, category, variant, and version of each item to be converted or eliminated; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location for such a process; for each item, the date of the initiation of the process; and the procedures being carried out during the process. Such notification shall not be required if such a process was subjected to inspection; 3. notification, no less than five days in advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the silo door was not removed. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM or type of the training model of a missile to be installed in that

1068  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

silo launcher of ICBMs; the location of that silo launcher of ICBMs; and the date on which an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type is to be installed in that silo launcher of ICBMs; 4. notification, no later than five days after completion, of the completion of: (a) the elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or softsite launcher, if grading was performed during the process of its elimination. Such notification shall include: location of the eliminated launcher; date of completion of elimination; and, in the case of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, or silo test launcher, the type of ICBM it was associated with; (b) the elimination of SLBM launchers. Such notification shall include: the number of SLBM launchers eliminated; the type of SLBM; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; the date of completion of elimination; and the elimination procedures that were carried out; (c) the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: by type, category, and variant, the number of heavy bombers, or, by type, the number of former heavy bombers; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; and the date of completion of elimination; (d) the conversion of a heavy bomber and of its arrival at a viewing site. Such notification shall include: type, category, and variant of the heavy bomber; the conversion or elimination facility at which such conversion was carried out; the conversion procedures that were carried out; and the date of arrival of the heavy bomber at a viewing site; (e) the elimination of an ICBM or SLBM, other than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the number and type of ICBMs or SLBMs eliminated; the location at which such elimination was carried out; the method of elimination; and the date of completion of the elimination; (f) procedures associated with making an item a static display. Such notification shall include: the type, and, if applicable, the category and variant of the item for static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the date of arrival and the location at which inspection of such an item may take place; and the name and coordinates of the location at which such an item is to be on static display; 5. notification, no later than five days after completion, of the static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or if such testing involved the removal of propellant segments by dissection, each time a propellant segment is removed from an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or from the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the ICBM type; the data from the unique identifier; the length of the remaining portion of the stage after segment removal, if static testing was accomplished through dissection; and the location and date of the static testing; 6. notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of each of the six subsequent one-year periods after entry into force of the Treaty, of the annual schedule for conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number and types of such items planned for conversion or elimination during that one-year period; and the planned date of the initiation of the conversion or elimination process of each such item; 7. notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process for the first ICBM of a particular type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of data to be used to identify the type of such an ICBM within its launch canister. Such notification shall include: the data to be used for the identification of the type of ICBM, including necessary dimensions; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1069

the proposed methods to be used by the inspectors to identify the type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. V. Notifications Concerning Cooperative Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of National Technical Means of Verification Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification: 1. notification containing a request for a display in the open of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at specified parking sites, or all heavy bombers located within a specified air base. Such notification shall include: (a) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the ICBM base and the restricted areas at that ICBM base at which the display is requested; (b) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the rail garrisons and the parking sites at those rail garrisons at which the display is requested; (c) for heavy bombers, the air base at which the display is requested. 2. notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, concerning heavy bombers that cannot be displayed on request because they are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such notification shall include: the air base; and the number, type, and category of heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations; 3. notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, of the cancellation due to circumstances brought about by force majeure of the display in the open of mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas or within specified parking sites or of heavy bombers located at a specified air base. Such notification shall include: the reasons for the cancellation of the display; the facility; and, if possible, the approximate date when conditions will permit a new display; 4. notification, no later than 24 hours after the exit, of the exit of a ballistic missile submarine from a covered facility in which conversion of its SLBM launchers was carried out. Such notification shall include: the date of exit; the facility where such conversion was carried out; the type of the submarine; and the type of SLBM before and after conversion; 5. notification containing a request for a display in the open of a special purpose submarine located at a specified port. Such notification shall include the name of the port at which the display is to be conducted. VI. Notifications Concerning Flight Tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and Notifications Concerning Telemetric Information Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(f) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information: 1. notification of any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, including any flight test of a prototype ICBM or SLBM and any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Such notification shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988. Such notification shall also include: telemetry broadcast frequencies to be used expressed in megahertz to the nearest one megahertz; modulation

1070  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

types; and information as to whether the flight test is to employ encapsulation or encryption pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty; 2. notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the demonstration pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the proposed date and place of the demonstration of the tapes or appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information recorded on those tapes; 3. notification, following the demonstration provided for in subparagraph 4(a) or 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the request for the opportunity to acquire playback equipment pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol; 4. notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, no later than 60 days after receipt of tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, of the determination by the Party that has received the tapes of the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow for the processing of such information. Such notification shall include: type of ICBM or type of SLBM; date of flight test; tape number; time periods during which incomplete or low quality recordings of telemetric information were received; and a description of the difficulties that arose during the processing of such information; 5. notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test after entry into force of the Treaty of an ICBM or SLBM of one existing type on which encryption of telemetric information will be carried out pursuant to subparagraph 2(a) of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, of the type of ICBM or type of SLBM, 6. notification containing a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the type of training requested, the number of trainee team members, the location of the training and the proposed date the training would begin; the type of maintenance requested, and the location of the maintenance; the manufacturer’s name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the malfunctioning equipment or its component, and a description of the specific equipment operating problems being experienced, including the results of any diagnostic or corrective maintenance procedures that have been attempted; the manufacturer’s name, model number, and part number, if applicable, of the spare parts or replacement parts requested; 7. notification, no later than 20 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: the proposed point of entry, the proposed date of arrival of the maintenance team or trainee team at the point of entry, the date the training will begin, the length of the training session, the maintenance team size, the estimated delivery date of the requested spare parts or replacement parts; and the estimated cost of the services to be provided; 8. notification, no later than 10 days after receipt of a response provided pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section. Such notification shall include, as appropriate: (a) acceptance of the proposed point of entry and proposed date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or (b) a proposal for an alternate point of entry and an alternate date of arrival of the team or the delivery of requested spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry; or (c) cancellation of a request regarding maintenance, training, spare parts, and replacement parts as contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 6 of this section. VII. Notifications Concerning Strategic Offensive Arms of New Types and New Kinds Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(g) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds:

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1071

1. notification, no less than 48 hours in advance, of the planned departure from a production facility of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM. Such notification shall include: the type of prototype ICBM or the type of prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the first stage of such a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the launch weight and maximum calculated throw-weight that the prototype ICBM could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers or that the prototype SLBM could deliver to a distance of 9500 kilometers; and the name and location of the production facility that will produce the prototype ICBM or the prototype SLBM; 2. notification, no later than five days after the first flight test of a prototype ICBM of a particular type from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or after the eighth flight test of a prototype ICBM of the same type from a fixed launcher of ICBMs, or after the exit of the twentieth prototype ICBM of the same type from a production facility, whichever is earlier, of whether ICBMs of that type shall be considered ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM; the name and location of the production facility; the basing mode of the new type of ICBM; and, if the prototype is declared to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, data on the technical characteristics of the prototype ICBM according to the categories of data specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding; 3. notification of a decision to forego deployment of an ICBM of a new type as an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for a new type of ICBM that had been considered to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section but that had not been flight-tested from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, and that such an ICBM is not subject to the provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM; and the name and location of the production facility; 4. notification, no later than five days after the twentieth flight test of a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a particular type or the declaration by the developing Party that the ICBM or SLBM of such particular type shall be accountable for the purposes of warhead and throw-weight attribution, or no less than 30 days in advance of the deployment of the first ICBM or SLBM of the same particular type, whichever is earlier, that the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered an ICBM or SLBM of a new type. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM of the new type or the type of SLBM of the new type; the name and location of the production facility; the data for the ICBM or SLBM of a new type by categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; if used as the basis for the new type, a statement whether the ICBM or SLBM of the new type differs from an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each existing type and previously declared new type in terms of the length of the first stage used for confirming the new type or in terms of the launch weight; the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided; 5. notification of the cessation of development of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type and of the intention not to deploy such ICBMs or SLBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the name and location of the production facility that produced the prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs; the number of prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs in existence; and the elimination facility for the prototype ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; 6. notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the departure, of the departure of a mobile launcher of prototype ICBMs from its production facility. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM for which the mobile launcher is intended; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of departure; 7. notification, no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first heavy bomber of a new type from the shop, plant, or building where its assembly was performed. Such notification shall

1072  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

include: the type and the category of the heavy bomber; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of exit; 8. notification, no later than five days after the arrival, of the arrival of the first heavy bomber of a new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type at the first air base at which any such heavy bomber has begun to be based. Such notification shall include: the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of the heavy bomber; the air base at which the heavy bomber has begun to be based; the date of its initial basing at that air base; the technical data for heavy bombers of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided; 9. notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; and either the date of exit of that first longrange nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers, whichever is applicable; 10. notification, no later than five days after the flight test, of the flight test of a long-range nuclear ALCM from a bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has previously been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of heavy bomber from which the longrange nuclear ALCM has been first flight-tested; the date of the flight test; the heavy bomber technical data provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided; 11. notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; the date of arrival; the technical data for a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition of a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided; 12. notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; either the date of exit of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located, whichever is applicable; and the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a longrange non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol; 13. notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 60 days in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1073

notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; the planned date of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided; 14. notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from an airplane of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nonnuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels.The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol; 15. notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type armed with two or more weapons. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels.The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol; 16. notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm, no later than 30 days after the first flight test of such an arm, unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised earlier within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such notification shall include: a description of the new kind of strategic offensive arm; and the date of its first flight test. VIII. Notifications Concerning Changes in the Content of Information Provided Pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, Including the Rescheduling of Activities Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(h) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to that Article, including the rescheduling of activities: 1. notification, no less than 12 hours in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change to information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the changed information. If the change in the scheduled date specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol is more than four days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol;

1074  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. notification, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change in the information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the new information. As an exception to the requirement to provide such notification five days in advance, such notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol if the following conditions are met: the change in the scheduled date results from a delay in the initiation of the activity, and the inspected Party determines, less than five days before the scheduled date or on that date, that a delay will occur. Regardless of when the delay in the initiation of the activity occurred, if the change in the scheduled date is more than five days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph l of Section IV of this Protocol. If there is a delay in an activity specified in an advance notification provided in accordance with a paragraph of this Protocol other than paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II, paragraph 1 of Section IV, or paragraph 1 of Section VI and if that delay exceeds twice the amount of tome in advance that is required for such notification, an additional notification shall be provided, subject to the same conditions as the original notification. IX. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(i) of Article VIII of the Treaty, notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Section III of the Inspection Protocol. X. Notifications Concerning Operational Dispersals Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(j) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning operational dispersals: 1. notification, no later than 18 hours after the dispersal begins, of the beginning of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal; and the reasons for the operational dispersal; 2. notification of the completion of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the completion of the operational dispersal; 3. notification of the suspension, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections during the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that are temporarily suspended; and the date on which such suspension began; 4. notification, before the time specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, of the resumption of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections that had been suspended in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the specific notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that will resume; and the date of such resumption; 5. notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing either: (a) that Party’s data updated for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and the notifications of incomplete movements that would have been provided pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; or

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1075

(b) all the notifications that should have been provided but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; 6. notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty and elected to provide updated data in accordance with subparagraph 5(a) of this Section, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing all the notifications that would have been provided in accordance with Sections III,VI, and VII of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; 7. notification, no later than three days after the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, of the location of all heavy bombers that were not located at their air bases as of such date and time. Such notification shall also include, for each heavy bomber that was not located at its air base: the specific air base to which the heavy bomber had not returned; and the name of the airfield within national territory, or the general location outside national territory, where such a heavy bomber was located. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Annex 1. Releasability of Information Contained in Notifications I. Prohibitions 1. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the original language texts of any notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are transmitted by any other Party. 2. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty except as otherwise provided for in this Annex. 3. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section III of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications. Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications. 4. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the information contained in the notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty that are listed in Section IV of this Annex for three months after the end of the activities described in such notifications.Thereafter, except as provided for in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to release the information contained in such notifications unless that Party is notified by the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty that the information contained in such notifications shall not be released to the public for a period of time as the Party that provided the information in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty may prescribe or until further notice.

1076  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

5. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the name or passport number of any person contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty. 6. Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the geographic coordinates of any facility or other location contained in any notification provided pursuant to the Treaty. 7. The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of certain information contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty. 8. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the releasability of information contained in the notifications that may be additionally provided for by the Parties to be used in implementing the Treaty, before such notifications are used. II. Non-releasable Information Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex: 4. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO ACCIDENTAL LOSS OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM 5. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, DUE TO DISABLEMENT BEYOND REPAIR OF A TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEM 20. NOTIFICATION OF DATA FROM UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS FOR ICBMS FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 36. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM CONFIGURATION OF TRAIN WITH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHERS WHILE TRAIN IS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE TEST RANGE 70. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 71. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 72. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF HEAVY BOMBERS 73. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY HEAVY BOMBERS THAT ARE NOT READILY MOVEABLE DUE TO MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONS 74. NOTIFICATION OF CANCELLATION OF DISPLAY IN THE OPEN DUE TO FORCE MAJEURE CIRCUMSTANCES 76. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR DISPLAY IN THE OPEN OF SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE 77. NOTIFICATION OF INABILITY TO DISPLAY SPECIAL PURPOSE SUBMARINE IN THE OPEN BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE IS NOT IN PORT 78. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM 81. NOTIFICATION OF INCOMPLETENESS OR INSUFFICIENT QUALITY OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON TAPES

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1077

130. NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTION TO INSPECTORS, MONITORS OR AIRCREW MEMBERS WHO ARE CURRENTLY ON LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS 135. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— REQUEST FOR MEETING 136. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— REPLY TO REQUEST FOR MEETING 137. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— OTHER MESSAGES 138. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— REQUEST TO CONVENE A SPECIAL SESSION 139. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION—RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO CONVENE SPECIAL SESSION 140. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION 141. NOTIFICATION OF JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION— RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO SPECIAL SESSION 151. NOTIFICATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF AGREED GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF A REFERENCE POINT AT A POINT OF ENTRY 152. NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENTION TO CHANGE A REFERENCE POINT FOR SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVERS AT A POINT OF ENTRY. 153. OTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO THE BOUNDARY OF A FACILITY SPECIFIED ON A SITE DIAGRAM III. Information Releasable after Three Months Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex: 1. NOTIFICATION OF DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CURRENT AS OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY 2. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF EACH SIX-MONTH PERIOD 3. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, UNLESS ANOTHER NOTIFICATION OF SUCH CHANGE HAS BEEN PROVIDED 6. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMs, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER, OR SOFT-SITE LAUNCHER, AT WHICH GRADING IS NOT TO BE PERFORMED 7. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, WITH REGARD TO NEW FACILITIES, FACILITIES WHOSE CATEGORY HAS BEEN CHANGED, NEW KINDS OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, AND NEW TYPES, CATEGORIES, VARIANTS, AND VERSIONS OF TREATY ACCOUNTABLE ITEMS

1078  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

8. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN DATA IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: EXHIBITIONS OF NEW VARIANTS OF ICBMs AND SLBMS, AND NEW VERSIONS OF MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 9. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN THE DATA IN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, RELATED TO ELIMINATION OF A DECLARED FACILITY 10. NOTIFICATION OF REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO A DEPLOYED ICBM OR SLBM 11. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED AGGREGATE NUMBER AND CHANGES OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 12. NOTIFICATION OF EXPECTED NUMBER OF DEPLOYED STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED PLANNED NUMBER 13. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER 14. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF LOCATIONS WITHIN ONE MINUTE OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE OF EACH OTHER 16. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A DECLARATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACILITY OR CHANGE IN CATEGORY OF A FACILITY 17. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATION OF A PRODUCTION FACILITY NOT PREVIOUSLY DECLARED AT WHICH PRODUCTION OF ICBMs OR SLBMS OR FIRST STAGES OF ICBMs OR SLBMS IS PLANNED 18. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMs 19. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF ICBMs FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs OR FIRST STAGES OF SUCH ICBMs AT A MONITORED FACILITY 21. NOTIFICATION THAT ICBMs OR SLBMS OF A TYPE ARE CONSIDERED ICBMs OR SLBMS OF A RETIRED TYPE 22. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMs OF A TYPE FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, WHICH ARE ICBMs OF A RETIRED TYPE 23. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMs AND SLBMS OF RETIRED TYPES, OTHER THAN ICBMs FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 24. NOTIFICATION OF TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMs AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES 25. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA CONCERNING TYPE, NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ICBMs AND SLBMS OF FORMER TYPES 26. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED ICBMs AND SLBMS 27. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF LAUNCH CANISTERS THAT REMAIN AFTER FLIGHT TESTS OF ICBMs FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1079

28. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF NON-DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 29. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF TRANSIT OF MOBILE TRAINING LAUNCHERS 30. NOTIFICATION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS 31. NOTIFICATION OF CONCLUSION OF VISIT OF HEAVY BOMBER OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBER TO A SPECIFIED FACILITY OR ELIMINATED FACILITY WHEN VISIT EXCEEDS 24 HOURS 46. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE 47. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE 49. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY 50. NOTIFICATION OF THROW-WEIGHT DATA FOR AN SLBM OF A NEW TYPE SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE TREATY 51. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN ICBM 52. NOTIFICATION OF INCREASE IN ACCOUNTABLE THROW-WEIGHT OF AN SLBM 53. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION 54. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION 55. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY 56. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF A CONVERSION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION 57. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF AN ELIMINATION PROCESS NOT SUBJECTED TO INSPECTION 58. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO INSTALL ICBM OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, OR TRAINING MODEL OF A MISSILE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE IN A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMs 59. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF A SILO LAUNCHER OF ICBMs, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHER, SILO TEST LAUNCHER OR A SOFTSITE LAUNCHER 60. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS 61. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF HEAVY BOMBERS OR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS 62. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBER AT THE VIEWING SITE 63. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER AND ITS ARRIVAL AT THE VIEWING SITE 64. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION OF ICBM OR SLBM OTHER THAN AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs

1080  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

65. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF PROCEDURES ASSOCIATED WITH PLACING AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY 66. NOTIFICATION OF STATIC TESTING OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs OR ITS FIRST STAGE 67. NOTIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF PROPELLANT SEGMENTS FROM ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs OR ITS FIRST STAGE 68. NOTIFICATION OF ANNUAL SCHEDULE FOR CONVERSION AND ELIMINATION 69. NOTIFICATION OF INITIATION OF ELIMINATION PROCESS FOR THE FIRST ICBM OF A PARTICULAR TYPE OF ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 75. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FROM COVERED FACILITY AFTER COMPLETION OF SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION 79. NOTIFICATION OF PROPOSED DATE AND PLACE OF DEMONSTRATION OF TELEMETRY TAPES OR APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT TO PLAY BACK TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RECORDED ON THOSE TAPES 80. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING REQUEST FOR OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUIRE PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT 83. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED DEPARTURE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY OF THE FIRST PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM 84. NOTIFICATION OF BASING MODE OF NEW TYPE OF ICBM 85. NOTIFICATION OF DECISION TO FORGO DEPLOYMENT OF AN ICBM OF A NEW TYPE AS AN ICBM FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs 86. NOTIFICATION THAT PROTOTYPE ICBM OR SLBM SHALL BE CONSIDERED TO BE A NEW TYPE 87. NOTIFICATION OF CESSATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF A NEW TYPE AND INTENTION NOT TO DEPLOY SUCH ICBMs OR SLBMS 88. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF MOBILE LAUNCHER OF PROTOTYPE ICBMs FROM ITS PRODUCTION FACILITY 89. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE SHOP, PLANT OR BUILDING WHERE ITS ASSEMBLY WAS PERFORMED 90. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST HEAVY BOMBER OF A NEW TYPE, CATEGORY, OR VARIANT AT THE FIRST AIR BASE AT WHICH ANY SUCH HEAVY BOMBER HAS BEGUN TO BE BASED 91. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM A PRODUCTION FACILITY 92. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED 93. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM FROM A BOMBER OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONGRANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED 94. NOTIFICATION OF ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1081

95. NOTIFICATION OF EXIT OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM THE PRODUCTION FACILITY 96. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NONNUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED SIX MONTHS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL 97. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED ARRIVAL OF FIRST LONG-RANGE NONNUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE AT THE FIRST AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AT WHICH IT WILL BE LOCATED 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF SUCH ARRIVAL 98. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE FROM AN AIRPLANE OF A TYPE FROM NONE OF WHICH A LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED 99. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF A LONG-RANGE NON-NUCLEAR ALCM OF A NEW TYPE ARMED WITH TWO OR MORE WEAPONS 104. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM A CONVERSION 105. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PERFORM AN ELIMINATION 106. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE INTENTION TO PLACE AN ITEM ON STATIC DISPLAY 111. NOTIFICATION OF UPDATED DATA FOR EACH CATEGORY OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, AFTER RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS THAT WERE SUSPENDED RELATED TO AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 112. NOTIFICATION OF THE PROVISION OF ALL NOTIFICATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS III,VI,AND VII OF THE NOTIFICATIONS PROTOCOL IF THERE HAD NOT BEEN A TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUCH NOTIFICATIONS 114. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE INITIAL LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS 115. NOTIFICATION OF STANDING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE NUMBER FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANES 116. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, OR 10 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY 117. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT INSPECTION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8, 9, 11, 12, OR 13 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY 118. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO REPLACE INSPECTORS CONDUCTING A CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION INSPECTION 119. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING AND OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT AN ENGINEERING SITE SURVEY AT SUCH A FACILITY 120. NOTIFICATION OF COMMENCEMENT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT A FACILITY AND THE INITIAL ARRIVAL OF MONITORS AT THE FACILITY

1082  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

121. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING 122. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO ESTABLISH PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY 123. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO REPLACE MONITORS 124. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO ENTER TERRITORY TO MAINTAIN PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM AT A FACILITY OR FACILITIES 125. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO USE AN INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO 126. NOTIFICATION OF CONFIRMATION OF INTENTION TO USE INSPECTION AIRPLANE FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO 127. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING RESPONSE TO REQUEST TO LAND INSPECTION AIRPLANE AT AIRPORT ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING 128. NOTIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS TO LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS 131. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING THE AGREED LIST OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS 132. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING FLIGHT PLAN INFORMATION FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE 133. NOTIFICATION OF FLIGHT PLAN APPROVAL FOR INSPECTION AIRPLANE 134. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT A SPECIAL START FLIGHT 145. NOTIFICATION OF PLANNED EXIT FROM A MONITORED FACILITY OF THE FIRST ICBM, SLBM, OR FIRST STAGE OF SUCH AN ICBM OR SLBM NOT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITS ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES 146. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO CONDUCT CARGO EXAMINATION AT LOCATION OTHER THAN A FACILITY SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING OR MONITORED FACILITY 147. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE TO A FLIGHT ROUTE 148. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT 149. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST REGARDING TRAINING, MAINTENANCE, SPARE PARTS, AND REPLACEMENT PARTS FOR TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT 150. NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE OF OR CHANGE TO THE PROPOSED POINT OF ENTRY,AND PROPOSED DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM OR OF THE DELIVERY OF SPARE PARTS OR REPLACEMENT PARTS AT THE POINT OF ENTRY, OR CANCELLATION OF A REQUEST REGARDING TELEMETRY EQUIPMENT

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1083

IV. Information Releasable after Three Months in Accordance with Paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex Release of the information contained in the notifications listed below shall be governed by paragraph 4 of Section I of this Annex: 15. NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF ITEMS TO OR FROM A THIRD STATE 32. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT 33. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE 34. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE TO THE RAIL GARRISON FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED AFTER ROUTINE MOVEMENT 35. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER TO THE TEST RANGE FROM WHICH IT DEPARTED 37. NOTIFICATION OF DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION 38. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF RELOCATION OF A DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE 39. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES 40. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF EXERCISE DISPERSAL OF DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES 41. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN UPON DEPARTURE OF DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR THE ASSOCIATED MAINTENANCE FACILITY 42. NOTIFICATION OF VARIATION FROM THE STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF TRAINS WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES DURING ROUTINE MOVEMENTS OR RELOCATIONS 43. NOTIFICATION OF RETURN TO STANDARD CONFIGURATION OF A TRAIN WITH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs AND THEIR ASSOCIATED MISSILES 44. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS 45. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISE INVOLVING HEAVY BOMBERS 48. NOTIFICATION OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT TEST TO DETERMINE BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT 82. NOTIFICATION OF FIRST FLIGHT TEST OF AN ICBM OR SLBM OF ONE EXISTING TYPE ON WHICH ENCRYPTION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT 100. NOTIFICATION OF DEVELOPMENT OF NEW KIND OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARM

1084  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

101. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FROM A RAIL GARRISON FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENT 102. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH RAIL-MOBILE TEST LAUNCHER FROM A TEST RANGE 103. NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN INFORMATION REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF EACH DEPLOYED MOBILE LAUNCHER OF ICBMs AND ITS ASSOCIATED MISSILE FOR RELOCATION 107. NOTIFICATION OF BEGINNING OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 108. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 109. NOTIFICATION OF SUSPENSION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS DURING AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 110. NOTIFICATION OF RESUMPTION OF OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATIONS, TO CARRY OUT COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN SUSPENDED IN CONNECTION WITH AN OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 113. NOTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS OF ALL HEAVY BOMBERS THAT WERE NOT LOCATED AT THEIR AIR BASES AT THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATIONAL DISPERSAL 129. NOTIFICATION OF AGREEMENT WITH OR OBJECTION TO PROPOSED INSPECTORS, MONITORS, OR AIRCREW MEMBERS 142. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING A REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION 143. NOTIFICATION CONTAINING CLARIFICATION, CORRECTION, OR MODIFICATION OF A NOTIFICATION 144. NOTIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL START MESSAGE

PROTOCOL ON ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT RELATING TO THE T REATY B ETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE U NION OF S OVIET S OCIALIST R EPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the determination and accountability of ICBM and SLBM throw-weight. I. Determination and Accountability of ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight 1.The throw-weight demonstrated in a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be: (a) for an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the aggregate weight of that stage including its propellant and elements not separated

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1085

from the stage, at the time at which the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid occurs, and its payload; (b) for an ICBM or SLBM that is not an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the weight of the payload of the final stage or final stages. 2. For each ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type. 3. For each ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type, which shall be determined subject to the following provisions: (a) The greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be no less than the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of that type could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers for ICBMs, or to a distance of 9500 kilometers for SLBMs. (b) None of the first seven flight tests shall be taken into account in determining the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type unless the throw-weight demonstrated in such a flight test exceeds the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in subsequent flight tests by more than 20 percent or 250 kilograms, whichever is less, prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty. 4.The maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of a new type could deliver to a particular distance shall be calculated by the Party developing such a missile using its own methods of calculation, subject to the following conditions: (a) the distance to which the throw-weight is delivered shall be measured along the projection of the missile’s flight trajectory on the Earth’s surface between the launch point and the point that a reentry vehicle that is released immediately after termination of the main engine thrust of the final stage is projected to impact the Earth; (b) a spherical, non-rotating Earth; (c) a vacuum ballistic trajectory for the reentry vehicle; (d) a full propellant load for each stage; and (e) the residual propellant in each stage shall not be greater than one percent for solidpropellant ICBMs or SLBMs, or two percent for liquid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs. 5. Each Party undertakes not to increase the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, as determined in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, by more than 21 percent of its initial accountable throw-weight. 6. Notifications concerning data on throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs in connection with this Protocol shall be provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol. Throwweight values, measured in kilograms, shall be specified to the nearest value evenly divisible by 50. 7. In the event of a dispute concerning the initial value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or an increased value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type, specified in a notification provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol, the accountable throw-weight shall be the value specified in such notification until such dispute is resolved in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. II.Verification 1.Verification of compliance with provisions of this Protocol shall be by national technical means of verification.

1086  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. To facilitate verification, for an ICBM and SLBM of each new type, two preannounced flight tests shall be conducted either in the 12-month period prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, or from among the last five flight tests prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty. 3. No more than one pre-announced flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section in any 30-day period. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND L IMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions and procedures associated with the fulfillment of obligations concerning telemetric information pursuant to Article X of the Treaty. I. Provision of Tapes that Contain a Recording of Telemetric Information 1. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM: (a) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information broadcast during the flight test; (b) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is encapsulated, if such tapes are recovered; and (c) a summary for each tape provided in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, including the following: (i) type of ICBM or SLBM, date of flight test, tape number, recorder type, and recording speed (meters/second or inches/second); (ii) information for each track, including track number, record period, record mode, and broadcast frequency (megahertz), except for track numbers for each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted;

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1087

(iii) digital data encoding methods employed and digital data recording formats, except for track numbers for each tape, and each portion of a tape, that contain a recording of telemetric information that has been encrypted; and (iv) identifications, and explanations where possible, keyed to a time standard, of the periods during the flight test for which no tape recordings were obtained or for which tape recordings are of inferior quality. 2. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine the method of recording the telemetric information on the tapes. 3. If the Party that receives the tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information determines that such tapes do not contain the complete set of telemetric information or that their quality is insufficient for processing such information, that Party shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. No later than 30 days after its receipt, the Party receiving such notification shall provide through diplomatic channels either a statement explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information or, if possible, new copies of the tapes. 4. In order to make it possible for the other Party to play back tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, each Party shall: (a) conduct, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, an initial demonstration of the tapes being used, and of the appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on such tapes; (b) conduct a demonstration of tapes or appropriate playback equipment that are different from the tapes or equipment previously demonstrated. Such demonstration shall be conducted no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which such tapes or equipment that are different are to be used. Notification of the date and place of such demonstration shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. If the recording format is the only difference in the tape that contains a recording of telemetric information, and this difference does not require different playback equipment, a Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, only information describing the format, no less than 60 days in advance of the flight test specified in this subparagraph; and (c) if requested, provide the opportunity to acquire the appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information that is contained on the tapes no less than 30 days in advance of the receipt of such tapes, unless otherwise agreed. Notification containing such a request shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. Equipment acquired following the initial demonstration, conducted pursuant to subparagraph 4(a) of this Section, shall be acquired in accordance with the provisions of Annex 1 to this Protocol. (d) if requested, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, ensure the timely provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts for equipment acquired pursuant to this paragraph or pursuant to paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Section I of Annex 1 to this Protocol. Provision of training, maintenance, spare parts, and replacement parts shall be in accordance with Annex 4 to this Protocol. The Parties shall agree within the frame-work of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for the demonstrations provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. II. Provision of Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information 1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, no later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the following interpretive data:

1088  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(a) for all telemetric information that is broadcast, except for telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle, a description of the format of the telemetry frame and methods of encoding, including but not limited to: (i) bits per standard word; (ii) standard words per frame; (iii) frames per second; (iv) location of synchronization words or bits; (v) location of information in the frame describing its formatting; (vi) designation and location of each data element within the frame throughout the flight and, if a given word location is time-shared by two or more data elements, the structure for such time-sharing; (vii) method of representing each data element, including the location of each bit in each data element, the order of the bits from least significant to most significant, and the method for representing negative values; and (viii) all information regarding encoding algorithms, including error detection and correction, data compression, and any conversion processes that are applied in the telemetry equipment to on-board measured parameter values prior to their broadcast; and (b) names of parameters and their locations in the telemetry frame, as well as conversion factors or analytic expressions for converting telemetric information to physical values of parameters, only for telemetric information necessary to determine: (i) acceleration of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM; (ii) separation times of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM; and (iii) times of reentry vehicle separation commands and times of reentry vehicle releases. 2. No later than 65 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a missile acceleration profile, for all its stages and its self-contained dispensing mechanism, having a precision better than one-tenth of a meter per second squared, with a rate of no less than five times per second, with these data provided relative to an inertial frame of reference in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. The missile acceleration profile shall be calculated on the basis of all relevant onboard and external measurements made during the flight test. In those cases when it is not possible to ensure the precision provided for in this paragraph, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide such a profile calculated to the greatest possible precision. 3. No later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels or during demonstrations provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of this Protocol, an example illustrative of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of this Section for one of the following ICBMs or SLBMs: (a) for the United States of America: Peacekeeper, Minuteman III,Trident I, or Trident II; and (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: SS-18, SS-24, SS-25, or SS-N-23. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the content of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in this paragraph.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1089

III. Provisions Concerning Encapsulation and Encryption of Telemetric Information 1. Encapsulation provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be conducted subject to the following: (a) Encapsulation shall be applied only to reentry vehicle measurements made during the plasma phase of flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs. Notwithstanding this provision, reentry vehicle measurements may be encapsulated throughout each flight test of the missile designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II. (b) When possible, the Party conducting the flight test shall broadcast, from the same reentry vehicle on which data are encapsulated, all measurements made before and after the plasma phase and, when possible, that Party shall broadcast, following the plasma phase, some measurements made and recorded during the plasma phase.The obligation to broadcast measurements made after the plasma phase shall not apply when impact of the reentry vehicle occurs during conditions of plasma formation. 2. Encryption provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be carried out subject to the following: (a) Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of former and retired types, as well as during no more than two flight tests each year of an ICBM or SLBM of only one existing type of each Party.The Party that exercises the right to use encryption during flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of such existing type shall provide the notification in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol . Subsequent notifications shall be provided only when the ICBM or SLBM, the notification of which has previously been provided, is retired. (b) Only telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements shall be encrypted, and only after that front section or its elements have separated from either: (i) the self-contained dispensing mechanism, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; or (ii) the final stage, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM that is not equipped with a selfcontained dispensing mechanism. (c) Each Party undertakes not to encrypt telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM. IV. Provisional Application 1. Beginning from the date of signature of the Treaty, the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, subparagraph 4(a) of Section I, and paragraph 3 of Section II of this Protocol shall apply provisionally. 2.The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of any such provisions; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of these provisions for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 3.The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for

1090  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Annex 1. Provision and Installation of Equipment Necessary For and Equipment Related To Playback of Telemetric Information that Is Contained on Tapes I. Provision of Equipment 1.The United States of America and the Russian Federation shall provide to each other the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided by the Parties pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty.The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section III of this Annex. 2. In addition to the equipment specified in paragraph 2 of Section III of this Annex, the United States of America shall, as a matter of goodwill, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment related to playback of telemetric information that is contained on tapes provided pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty.The quantity, description, make, and model number of such equipment are listed in paragraph 3 of Section III of this Annex. 3. The United States of America shall, in response to the request by the Russian Federation of September 25, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the Russian Federation the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on August 17, 1992, in Washington, D.C., pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol.The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex.The Russian Federation shall, in response to the request by the United States of America on January 28, 1992, and pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of this Protocol, provide to the United States of America the equipment necessary for playback of telemetric information that was demonstrated on January 25-27, 1993, in Moscow pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of this Protocol.The quantity, description, make, and model number of that equipment are listed in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex.The equipment specified in paragraph 4 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of Section II of this Annex.The equipment specified in paragraph 5 of Section III of this Annex shall be delivered and installed at the same time as the telemetry playback equipment specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Annex, and shall be subject to the provisions of this Annex. 4. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall provide all technical documentation necessary for operating and maintaining such equipment.There shall be no requirement to provide such documentation in a language other than that of the providing Party. 5. For the equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Section, the providing Party shall: (a) Install such equipment at a site selected, and prepared for installation in accordance with the technical requirements for such equipment, by the receiving Party; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1091

(b) ensure that the equipment is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation, exclusive of any warranty obligations noted therein. 6.The providing Party shall bear the cost of fulfilling its obligations pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section. 7. The providing Party shall, if requested by the receiving Party, ensure the provision of training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts for all equipment provided pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section.The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such training, maintenance, service, spare parts, and replacement parts. 8. Unless otherwise agreed, each Party undertakes not to transfer equipment, spare parts, or replacement parts, or to release technical documentation, received pursuant to this Section, to states other than the other Parties, or to individuals other than those who, because of their official responsibilities, require access to such equipment, spare parts, replacement parts, or technical documentation to carry out activities related to fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty. II. Delivery and Installation of Equipment 1. Regarding dates of delivery and installation: (a) No later that ten days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall provide a list of special technical requirements for site selection or preparation to the receiving Party. (b) No later than 60 days after the date this Annex begins to be applied, the providing Party shall deliver its equipment to the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. Specific dates of delivery and installation of such equipment shall be agreed upon by the providing and receiving Parties through diplomatic channels. (c) No less than 20 days in advance of delivery, the receiving Party shall state to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, the site where such equipment is to be installed. 2. Regarding delivery from the point of entry, the receiving Party shall bear responsibility for delivery, and safe-keeping during delivery, of provided equipment from the point of entry to the site where such equipment is to be installed. The receiving Party shall bear the cost of such delivery.The providing Party shall have the right to observe the provided equipment during such delivery. 3. Regarding the number and list of installation team members and the provision of visas: (a) A team for installation of equipment provided pursuant to Section I of this Annex shall include no more than 17 individuals. The installation team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for installation.The aircrew for delivery of all such equipment and for transport of the installation team shall include no more than 15 individuals. (b) The providing Party shall provide a list of installation team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 30 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol on objections to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to an individual installation team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than 15 days after receipt of such lists. (c) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the delivery and installation period. (d) The providing Party shall provide a list of tools and equipment required for installation no less than 30 days in advance of their delivery to the territory of the receiving Party. The

1092  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment. 4. Regarding the installation team: (a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing and the appropriate power supply connectors for the provided equipment, to the installation team in connection with the delivery and installation of the equipment. (b) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to installation team members and aircrew members. (c) Throughout the delivery and installation period, the receiving Party shall ensure that the installation team can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party, using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party. (d) The receiving Party shall treat with due respect the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party in its territory in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons. 5. Regarding arrangements for air transportation: (a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the equipment, the installation team, and the tools and equipment required for installation, and airplane flight routes to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to delivery. (b) For the purposes of this paragraph, points of entry shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, DC; and for the Russian Federation, Moscow. (c) The providing Party shall use only airplanes of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol. (d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane transporting the telemetry equipment of the providing Party at the point of entry.The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party. (e) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport installation team members and equipment no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the installation team members at the point of entry from outside the territory of the receiving Party. Such statement shall include: (i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and (ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the installation team members and aircrew members. (f) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of airplanes transporting installation team members and equipment. 6. Regarding the installation report and confidentiality requirements: (a) Before departing the installation site, the installation team leader and a representative of the receiving Party shall confirm in a factual written installation report that all the equip-

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1093

ment is installed and is operating in accordance with the specifications of the technical documentation. (b) Disclosure of information obtained by any Party in connection with the delivery and installation of equipment shall be only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty. (c) Installation team members shall not disclose information obtained during delivery or installation except with the express consent of the receiving party. 7. For the United States of America, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the On-Site Inspection Agency of the United States of America. For the Russian Federation, practical implementation of activities pursuant to this Annex shall be carried out through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation. 8. Regarding additional services, throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the installation team and aircrew members of the providing Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party. III. Quantity, Description, Make, and Model Number of Equipment 1. Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section I of this Annex: (a) 1 Modulator/Demodulator unit (including synchronization converter, information input unit, demodulator and playback unit, synchronizer and demodulator unit, frequency multiplier, signal imitator, and sound playback unit), BY 3 430 020; (b) 2 Magnetic tape recorders (including recording heads unit, playback heads unit, playback unit, control unit and tape transport mechanism), BY 3 060 032; (c) 1 Power supply distributor, BY 3 620 054; and (d) 1 Set interconnecting cables, BY 4 075 133. 2. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section 2 of this Annex: (a) 1 Analog tape recorder/playback unit (including I reproduce card for demodulation of IRIG Time Code at 900 KHz, Metrum 97; and (b) 1 Time code reader/generator, Datum 9310. 3. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Annex: (a) 1 Telemetry receiver (including 1 Pre-D multi-frequency playback converter, heterodyne, Microdyne 1481-PP2), Microdyne 1400-MR 3; (b) 1 (each) Second IF filter (4, 2, 1 MHz and 300 kHz), Microdyne 1433-I 3, 1430-I 3, 1428-I 3, 1425-I 3; (c) 1 FM demodulator, Microdyne 1444-D 3; (d) 1 Multi-mode telemetry demodulator, Microdyne 1458-D 3 (e) 1 Bit syncoronizer, Loral Data Systems 720; (f) 1 Low pass filter, Reactel 10L5-50KB11; and (g) 1 Set interconnection cables. 3

This equipment is an updated version of that demonstrated by the United States of America and is fully capable of serving as a substitute.

1094  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

4. Equipment provided by the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex: (a) 1 Video cassette recorder, Panasonic AG-1960; (b) 1 Color video monitor/receiver, RCA FX 209002; (c) 1 Device for decoding and display of time code signals, Datum 9520; (d) 1 Set cable connectors; and (e) 1 Set voltage transformers and adapters. 5. Equipment provided by the Russian Federation pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of this Annex: (a) 7S06/17S07 Magnetic recording unit for the RTS-9 System, consisting of: (i) 2 Magnetic recorder units (including playback preamplifier unit, 17B73; tape drive mechanism unit, 17B74; and magnetic recorder on/off unit, 17B75), 17B71; (ii) 2 Recording amplifier units, 17B77; (iii) 1 Final playback amplifier unit 17B76; (iv) 1 Magnetic recorder switcher unit, 17B78; (v) 1 Magnetic recorder testing and control unit, 17B79; (vi) 1 Power supply unit, 9198M1; (vii) 1 Poser supply unit, 9187M1; (viii) 1 Combination unit for reel storage; and (ix) 1 Set of interconnecting cables. (b) MR BI1.700.006 Magnetic recorder for the BRS-4LR System, consisting of: (i) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, tape drive mechanism, control unit for two magnetic accumulators, recording modules for two magnetic accumulators, playback modules, and power modules), MN1BI3.060.011; (ii) 1 Magnetic accumulator (including recording head unit, playback head unit, and tape drive mechanism), MN2-BI3.060.012; (iii) 1 Power distribution panel, BY3.620.054; and (iv) 1 Set of interconnecting cables.

Annex 2. Provision of Tapes and Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information, and the Use of Recording Media 1. With respect to subparagraph 1(a) and 1(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, the Party conducting the flight test shall have the right to provide either original tapes or copies of original tapes. All tapes shall be provided on reels that are compatible with the playback equipment provided. 2. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, each Party shall have the right to use recording media other than magnetic tapes to record telemetric information.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1095

Appropriate changes to Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, if necessary, shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 3.With respect to paragraph 1 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, a Party may, in fulfilling its obligation to provide interpretive data for a particular flight test, provide references to interpretive data that have been provided previously pursuant to that paragraph. In the event changes are made to the interpretive data previously provided, the Party that conducted the flight test shall, if requested by the receiving Party, provide a complete set of interpretive data through diplomatic channels no later than 30 days after receipt of such a request. 4.With respect to subparagraph 1(b)(i) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the interpretive data to be provided shall cover the entire period during which the telemetric information is broadcast, including the period after the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM have completed their functions. In this connection, the Parties understand that such data may not be useful, for the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, after the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism no longer respond to control signals. 5. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, the missile acceleration profile to be provided: (a) shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after completion of the last procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. For a missile that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism and to which only one warhead is attributed, the missile acceleration profile shall be terminated no less than ten seconds after the reentry vehicle is separated from the final stage of the missile; (b) may be terminated at the time of loss of active control, that is, at the time that the selfcontained dispensing mechanism, or, for a missile not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism, the final stage of the missile, no longer responds to control signals. If loss of active control is used as the reason for terminating the acceleration profile, the Party conducting the flight test shall inform the other Party, at the time that the acceleration profile is provided, that loss of active control is the reason for termination of the acceleration profile. 6.With respect to Sections I and II of the Telemetry Protocol, the tapes, tape summaries, interpretive data, and missile acceleration profile for a particular flight test shall be provided at the same time. Written materials may be provided in English or Russian, at the choice of the Party that conducted the flight test.

Annex 3. Releasability of Telemetric Information 1.The following data provided in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty shall not be released to the public by any Party other than the Party that provided such data in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty, unless otherwise agreed: (a) data and other information contained on tapes provided pursuant to Article X of the Treaty; and (b) data and other information provided in accordance with the Telemetry Protocol. 2. Additional data and other information may be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for inclusion in the list set forth in paragraph 1 of this Annex. 3.The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in the Treaty.

1096  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Annex 4. Logistical and Administrative Procedures for Conducting Training and Maintenance and for Providing Spare Parts and Replacement Parts for Telemetry Equipment 1. For purposes of this Annex: (a) the term “providing Party” means the Party that provided the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided; (b) the term “receiving Party” means the Party that received the equipment for which maintenance or training are being conducted or for which spare parts or replacement parts are being provided; (c) the term “maintenance team” means the group of individuals assigned by the providing Party to conduct maintenance or training on the territory of the receiving Party; (d) the term “trainee team” means the group of individuals assigned by the receiving Party to receive training on the territory of the providing Party. 2. Regarding the number and list of maintenance team members, the number and list of trainee team members, the number and list of aircrew members, and the provision of visas: (a) A maintenance team or trainee team shall include no more than 14 individuals. A maintenance team shall have the right to bring tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training.The aircrew for transport of team members, and delivery of tools and equipment, shall include no more than 15 individuals. (b) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of maintenance team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the receiving Party.The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a maintenance team member or aircrew member, except that the receiving Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists. (c) The receiving Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of trainee team members and a list of aircrew members no less than 15 days in advance of their arrival in the territory of the providing Party. The provisions of paragraph 6 of Section II and paragraphs 21 and 22 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol on an objection to an individual on the list of inspectors shall apply to an objection to a trainee team member or aircrew member, except that the providing Party shall notify its objection no later than seven days after receipt of such lists. (d) The receiving Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each maintenance team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the maintenance or training period. (e) The providing Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each trainee team member and each aircrew member to whom it has not objected, as may be required to ensure that each such team member and each such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory for the duration of the training period. (f) The providing Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a list of tools and equipment required for conducting maintenance or training no less than 15 days in advance of their

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1097

delivery to the territory of the receiving Party.The provisions of paragraphs 8 and 11 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol on examination of equipment and supplies shall apply to examination of such tools and equipment. 3. Regarding the maintenance team or trainee team: (a) The receiving Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the maintenance team members. (b) The providing Party shall provide necessary assistance, including a safety briefing, to the trainee team members. (c) The provisions of paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol on movement, travel, and urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall apply to trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members. (d) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the receiving Party, the receiving Party shall ensure that the maintenance team members can be in communication with the embassy of the providing Party located on the territory of the receiving Party using telephonic communications provided by the receiving Party. (e) Throughout the period of stay on the territory of the providing Party, the providing Party shall ensure that the trainee team members can be in communication with the embassy of the receiving Party located on the territory of the providing Party using telephonic communications provided by the providing Party. (f) The Parties shall treat with due respect the maintenance team members, trainee team members, and aircrew members of each Party in its territory and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom, and dignity. 4. Regarding arrangements for air transportation: (a) The Parties may use dedicated airplanes, inspection airplanes, airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights, or, if possible, other airplanes used for inspections related to arms control agreements, for the purpose of transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment to the point of entry. (b) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the receiving Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. (c) Diplomatic clearance numbers for dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, and routes for flights of such airplanes to and from the point of entry shall be provided, through diplomatic channels, by the providing Party no less than ten days prior to the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party. (d) The receiving Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the providing Party at the point of entry.The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the receiving Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the providing Party. (e) The providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial

1098  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

services, as well as additional services as requested, for the dedicated airplane of the receiving Party at the point of entry.The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the providing Party.The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the receiving Party. (f) The providing Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport maintenance team members, spare pares or replacement parts no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the maintenance team members, or delivery of spare parts or replacement parts at the point of entry on the territory of the receiving Party. The receiving Party shall state its intention, through diplomatic channels, to transport trainee team members no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the trainee team members at the point of entry on the territory of the providing Party. Such statements shall include: (i) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; and (ii) the names, dates of birth, and places of birth of the trainee team members, maintenance team members and aircrew members. (g) The provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol on flights of inspection airplanes shall apply to flights of dedicated airplanes transporting trainee team members, maintenance team members, as well as spare parts, replacement parts, tools and equipment. (h) If the Parties use dedicated airplanes, such airplanes shall be of the types specified in Annex 10 to the Inspection Protocol. 5. Regarding the report and the confidentiality requirements: (a) Before departing the site where maintenance or training was conducted, the maintenance team leader and a representative of the receiving Party, and if training is conducted on the territory of the Providing Party, the trainee team leader and a representative of the providing Party, shall describe, in a factual, written report, the activity that was carried out pursuant to a request provided for in paragraph 6 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, and confirm the completion of such activity. (b) Maintenance team members shall not disclose information obtained during maintenance or training except with the express consent of the receiving Party. (c) Trainee team members shall not disclose information obtained during training except with the express consent of the providing Party. 6.Throughout the in-country period, the receiving Party shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the maintenance team members and aircrew members of the providing Party. Throughout the in-country period, the providing Party, if training is conducted on its territory, shall provide meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the trainee team members and aircrew members of the receiving Party. The costs of all such services shall be borne by the receiving Party. 7.The receiving Party shall provide to the providing Party, through diplomatic channels, a confirmation of the receipt of spare parts or replacement parts. 8.The receiving Party shall assist the providing Party, if requested, with customs procedures, and in resolving any issues that may arise in connection with the delivery of spare parts, replacement parts, tools, and equipment.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1099

PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty. I. Composition of the Commission 1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty. 2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine may authorize any other of these Parties to represent its interests at a session of the Commission through the head representative of such other Party. Such authorization shall be provided in diplomatic notes to the representatives of all other Parties prior to the commencement of a session and shall state the subject matter, scope, and duration of the authorization. 3.The head representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed during a session. 4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission. II. Convening a Session of the Commission 1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following: (a) the questions that the Party intends to raise; (b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and (c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session. Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session.

1100  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. “A session of the Commission shall be convened on the date agreed by at least two Parties, including the United States of America, but no later than 30 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in subparagraph 1c of Section II of this Protocol.” 3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties. 4.The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions. III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission 1.A special session of the Commission shall be convened either at the request of the United States of America to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, or at the request of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the United States of America with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. All Parties shall have the right to participate in special sessions. All requests shall include, at a minimum, the following: (a) the nature of the concern, including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern; (b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and (c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session. The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place. 2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either: (a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or (b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party. 3.The response of the requested Party may also include: (a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit; or (b) a proposal for a specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit. If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session. Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable. 4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held. 5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1101

IV. Agenda 1.The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol. 2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission; provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required. 3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda. V. Work of the Commission The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Parties agree that, after at least two Parties, including the United States of America, sign an agreement, the United States of America shall provide the text of the agreement to the Parties that did not sign the agreement. Each Party that has signed the agreement shall have the right to identify the agreement as one to which the provisions of subparagraph (c) of this Section shall not apply.The head representative of each Party that made such an identification shall, during the session of the Commission at which the agreement was signed, provide to all Parties that have signed the agreement its reasons for making such identification. These reasons shall be provided by the United States of America to all Parties that have not signed the agreement when it provides the text of the agreement. Each Party that did not sign the agreement: (a) shall express its consent to be bound by the agreement by providing a diplomatic note of acceptance to all other Parties no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement; or (b) shall provide the substance of any objections to that agreement to all other Parties in a diplomatic note no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement. If a Party provides an objection, that Party shall attend the next session of the Commission, unless the objection is resolved before the next session convenes; or (c) shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound by the agreement if it does not provide a diplomatic note pursuant to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of this Section, provided that no Party that signed the agreement has identified that agreement, as provided for in this Section, as one to which the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply. Each agreement shall enter into force on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by that agreement,unless a later date is agreed by all Parties.The Parties agree that the United States of America shall notify all other Parties by diplomatic note of the date of entry into force of each agreement.” Parties that sign or otherwise consent to be bound by an agreement may, on a case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of that agreement, provided that the agreement does not alter the rights and obligations under the Treaty.Temporary observance shall remain in effect for an agreed period or until that agreement enters into force. VI. Costs Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission.

1102  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

VII. Communications “Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation or other equivalent continuous communications centers established by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine.All requests, responses, and notifications required by this Protocol shall be provided by the pertinent Party to all other Parties.” VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application 1.The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission. 2.The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 3.The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Annex 1. Additional Procedures Governing the Operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 1. With respect to paragraph 2 of Section I of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply: “The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine may authorize any other of these Parties to represent its interests at a session of the Commission through the head representative of such other Party. Such authorization shall be provided in diplomatic notes to the representatives of all other Parties prior to the commencement of a session and shall state the subject matter, scope, and duration of the authorization.” 2. Paragraph 3 of Section I of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision: “The head representatives of the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed during a session.”

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1103

3. Paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision: “A session of the Commission shall be convened on the date agreed by at least two Parties, including the United States of America, but no later than 30 days after the date proposed in the request provided for in subparagraph 1c of Section II of this Protocol.” 4. The first sentence of paragraph 1 of Section III of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions: “A special session of the Commission shall be convened either at the request of the United States of America to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, or at the request of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine to address what it considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the United States of America with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. All Parties shall have the right to participate in special sessions.” 5. The second sentence of Section V of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provision: “The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in five copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.” 6.With respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply: “The Parties agree that, after at least two Parties, including the United States of America, sign an agreement, the United States of America shall provide the text of the agreement to the Parties that did not sign the agreement. Each Party that has signed the agreement shall have the right to identify the agreement as one to which the provisions of subparagraph (c) of this Section shall not apply. The head representative of each Party that made such an identification shall, during the session of the Commission at which the agreement was signed, provide to all Parties that have signed the agreement its reasons for making such identification.These reasons shall be provided by the United States of America to all Parties that have not signed the agreement when it provides the text of the agreement. Each Party that did not sign the agreement: (a) shall express its consent to be bound by the agreement by providing a diplomatic note of acceptance to all other Parties no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement; or (b) shall provide the substance of any objections to that agreement to all other Parties in a diplomatic note no later than 30 days after receiving the text of the agreement. If a Party provides an objection, that Party shall attend the next session of the Commission, unless the objection is resolved before the next session convenes; or (c) shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound by the agreement if it does not provide a diplomatic note pursuant to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of this Section, provided that no Party that signed the agreement has identified that agreement, as provided for in this Section, as one to which the provisions of this subparagraph shall not apply. Each agreement shall enter into force on the date when all Parties have consented to be bound by that agreement, unless a later date is agreed by all Parties. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall notify all other Parties by diplomatic note of the date of entry into force of each agreement.” 7.With respect to Section V of this Protocol, the following additional provisions shall apply: “Parties that sign or otherwise consent to be bound by an agreement may, on a case-by-case basis, agree to temporary observance of that agreement, provided that the agreement does not alter the

1104  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

rights and obligations under the Treaty.Temporary observance shall remain in effect for an agreed period or until that agreement enters into force.” 8. Section VII of this Protocol shall be superseded by the following provisions: “Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through diplomatic channels; or shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America, and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation or other equivalent continuous communications centers established by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, or Ukraine.All requests, responses, and notifications required by this Protocol shall be provided by the pertinent Party to all other Parties.”

RELEVANT LETTERS Letter from the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus May 20, 1992 Dear Mr. President: In connection with the impending ratification by the Republic of Belarus of the 1991 Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, I have the honor to advise you that the Republic of Belarus, in implementing this Treaty, will be able to assume the following obligations. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, which has been given constitutional status, Belarus will take all the measures to achieve the status of a non-nuclear state. I note with satisfaction, Mr. President, that in its successful progress made in this direction, Belarus as of now has already completely freed itself of the tactical nuclear weapons that were located in its territory. The Republic of Belarus guarantees the elimination of all nuclear strategic offensive arms located in its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements concluded by Belarus and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty, on condition that the Russian Federation will be prepared to receive the nuclear strategic offensive arms removed from the territory of Belarus during this period of time. Naturally, Mr. President, the Republic of Belarus will conduct this activity with due account of its national security interests, and when controversial issues arise, the Republic of Belarus will consult with the other Parties to the Treaty. It is the view of the Republic of Belarus that the process of destruction of nuclear weapons should be carried out under rigorous and effective international control. Accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration. Letter from the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan May 19, 1992 To the President of the United States of America Mr. George Bush Dear Mr. President: In connection with the ratification by Kazakhstan of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1105

Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991, I have the honor to inform you that for the purposes of implementing the above mentioned Treaty, Kazakhstan undertakes the following obligation. Kazakhstan guarantees the carrying out of the elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located on its territory, over a period of seven years in accordance with the START Treaty. Letter from the President of Ukraine May 7, 1992 Dear Mr. President: In connection with the ratification by Ukraine of the 1991 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, I have the honor to advise you that Ukraine, in implementing this Treaty, shall assume the following obligations. In accordance with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, and with the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine adopted on October 24, 1991, Ukraine shall have a nonnuclear status, will abide by the three non-nuclear principles in the future, and emphasizes its right to control over the non-use of nuclear weapons deployed in its territory. Ukraine shall guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms, located in its territory in accordance with the relevant agreements and during the seven-year period as provided by the START Treaty and within the context of the Statement of the NonNuclear Status of Ukraine. Ukraine will take into account its national security interests in conducting this activity. In this connection, if any questions should arise Ukraine will consult with the other Parties to the Treaty. In addition, I should like to note that the process of elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should be carried out under reliable international control which should guarantee the non-use of nuclear charge components for repeated production of weapons and should prevent their export to other countries.

RELATED AGREEMENTS Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

1106  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Recognizing the advantages of providing each Party the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided in the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, Have agreed as follows: Article I Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, as provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty. The exhibiting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the inspectors in the conduct of inspections during such exhibitions. Article II The exhibitions and inspections provided for in Article I of this Agreement shall be conducted at locations chosen by the exhibiting Party on dates agreed upon through diplomatic channels.These exhibitions and inspections shall be completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Except as provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, such exhibitions and inspections shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these exhibitions and inspections. An inspection team conducting an inspection during exhibitions in accordance with this Agreement shall include no more than 15 inspectors. Article III 1. No less than 30 days prior to each exhibition, the inspecting Party shall provide to the exhibiting Party, for the purpose of such exhibition, a list of its proposed inspectors, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals, and a list of its proposed aircrew members, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals.The list of proposed inspectors and list of proposed aircrew members for each exhibition shall not be considered to be the lists provided in fulfillment of the obligations under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991. However, if the exchange of lists of proposed inspectors and aircrew members takes place in accordance with the aforementioned Agreement prior to such exhibitions, inspectors and aircrew members may be chosen from these lists for the purposes of such exhibitions. The lists for each exhibition shall contain first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available, for each inspector and aircrew member proposed. 2. For each exhibition, the exhibiting Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to each exhibition, of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed in connection with the exhibition.The exhibiting Party may object to an individual on the list only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each such inspector or such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory throughout the in-country period established for the exhibition.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1107

Article IV Arrangements for air transportation in connection with each exhibition shall be made in accordance with the provisions provided for in Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, except as provided for below: (a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the inspectors, and airplane routings to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the exhibiting Party no less than 30 days prior to each exhibition. (b) Points of entry under this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America,Washington, D.C., and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow. Article V The exhibiting Party shall treat with due respect the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party in its territory in connection with the conduct of these exhibitions and inspections, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons. Article VI This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty. Article VII This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibitions and inspections, and contained in the inspection reports, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Moscow, on July 31, 1991, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members Proposed for Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive

1108  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, including the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, Recognizing the advantages of providing both Parties ample time to review the lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members in order to inform the other Party of agreement with, or objection to, the names on such lists within the time period provided for in the Treaty, Considering their common interest in providing a mechanism for an exchange of such lists prior to entry into force of the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Article I On a date agreed upon by the Parties, which shall be no later than 30 days before entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members as provided for in Section II of the Protocol.The date of exchange of such lists shall be agreed upon by the Parties through diplomatic channels. Article II Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, provided that each Party may make a change to these lists no more than one time within any 21-day period commencing from the date of exchange of such lists.With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol, upon entry into force of the Treaty. Article III Each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists required by Article I of this Agreement, and amendments to such lists, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. Article IV This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty except as stated in Articles I and II of this Agreement. Article V This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature, and shall terminate upon entry into force of the Treaty. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Moscow, in two copies, on July 31, 1991, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1109

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident, Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, Recognizing the necessity to promote the increase of mutual trust and the strengthening of srategic stability, Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity, Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987, Have agreed as follows: Article I On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall notify the other Party no less than 14 days in advance about the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise which includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year. Article II 1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications required by Article I through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. 2.The notifications required by Article I shall be provided no less than 14 days prior to the date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during which the relevant exercise will commence. Article III The Parties shall undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement.Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon. Article IV This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements. Article V 1.This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. 2.This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

1110  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Article VI This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. DONE at Jackson Hole,Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic. Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security,

LETTERS SIGNED BY THE U.S. AND S OVIET R EPRESENTATIVES Phased Reductions of Heavy ICBMs July 30, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following: In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached. Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1111

Moscow, July 1991 His Excellency James A. Baker III Secretary of State of the United States Dear Mr. Secretary, On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding. Respectfully, Bessmertnykh U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms July 30, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows: In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached. Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. The United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union. This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

1112  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

BEAR D July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D. I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset,Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations. These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with airto-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases. Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows: (a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features.The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors. (b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request.The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons.The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit. (c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. (d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. (e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty.As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1113

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D. I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads: From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations. These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with airto-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases. Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows: (a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features.The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors. (b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request.The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons.The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

1114  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers. (d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. (e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above.This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms B-1 July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: (a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally. (b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane. (c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1115

which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped.These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. (d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. (e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections. (f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. (g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty. (h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flighttested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

1116  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: (a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a longrange nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally. (b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane. (c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped.These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments.These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. (d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. (e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections. (f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. (g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1117

ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty. (h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Silo Launch Control Centers July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall: (a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice; (b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or (c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes. If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels. The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty.The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit. If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of

1118  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs. Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall: (a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice; (b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or (c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes. If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels. The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty.The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1119

Launch Canisters July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: (a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters. (b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose. (c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

1120  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty: (a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters. (b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose. (c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1121

Engineering Site Surveys July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows: No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography: (a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits; (b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area; (c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines; (d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days; (e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase; (f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and (g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis. Each Party shall,whenever possible,provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information. If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

1122  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America,I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows: No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography: (a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits; (b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area; (c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines; (d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days; (e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase; (f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and (g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis. Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1123

Providing Photographs July 31, 1991 Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that: (a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty. (b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty. (c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty. (d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. (e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement. If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Annex 1. List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty: For the United States of America:

1124  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

ICBM Emplacement Equipment B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBM Emplacement Equipment Driver Training Vehicles Launch-Associated Support Vehicles Launch-Associated Railcars Annex 2. List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty: For the United States of America: ICBMs and Their Associated Systems: MMII without front section and without SCDM MMIII without front section and without SCDM MMII first stage MMIII first stage PK first stage PK second stage PK third stage PK SCDM SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile) TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile) TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile) POSEIDON first stage TRIDENT I first stage TRIDENT II first stage Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129 B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129 For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBMs and their Associated Systems: SS-11 in launch canister without front section SS-13 first stage second and third stages as a unit SS-17 in launch canister without front section SS-18 in launch canister without front section as a unit without front section and without self- contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister)

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1125

first stage SS-19 in launch canister without front section SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section (for silo launcher) first stage SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section (for rail-mobile launcher) first stage SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version “A” Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version “B” Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: SS-N-6 as a unit without front section SS-N-8 as a unit with front section SS-N-18 as a unit with front section SS-N-20 as a unit with front section SS-N-23 as a unit with front section Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear T training heavy bomber Bison A former heavy bomber AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM Annex 3. List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features: For the United States of America: Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBMs and Their Associated Systems: SS-114 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage SS-17 4 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage SS-19 4 as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage SS-24 5 (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) SS-24 5 (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) SS-25 5 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

4

5

To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty. To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

1126  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:6 SS-N-8 first stage SS-N-18 first stage SS-N-20 first stage SS-N-23 first stage July 31, 1991 Ambassador Linton F. Brooks Head of Delegation of the United States of America to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Dear Mr. Ambassador: On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that: (a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty. (b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty. (c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty. (d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. (e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement. This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period: (a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or (b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

6

To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1127

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin Head of Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Annex 1. List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty: For the United States of America: ICBM Emplacement Equipment B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBM Emplacement Equipment Driver Training Vehicles Launch-Associated Support Vehicles Launch-Associated Railcars Annex 2. List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty: For the United States of America: ICBMs and Their Associated Systems: MMII without front section and without SCDM MMIII without front section and without SCDM MMII first stage MMIII first stage PK first stage PK second stage PK third stage PK SCDM SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile) TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile) TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile) POSEIDON first stage TRIDENT I first stage TRIDENT II first stage Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129 B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

1128  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBMs and their Associated Systems: SS-11 in launch canister without front section SS-13 first stage second and third stages as a unit SS-17 in launch canister without front section SS-18 in launch canister without front section as a unit without front section and without self- contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister) first stage SS-19 in launch canister without front section SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section (for silo launcher) first stage SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section (for rail-mobile launcher) first stage SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version “A” Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version “B” Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: SS-N-6 as a unit without front section SS-N-8 as a unit with front section SS-N-18 as a unit with front section SS-N-20 as a unit with front section SS-N-23 as a unit with front section Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs Bear T training heavy bomber Bison A former heavy bomber AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM Annex 3. List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features: For the United States of America: Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs: B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ICBMs and Their Associated Systems: SS-117 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage SS-17 7 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage 7

To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1129

SS-19 7 as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage SS-24 8 (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) SS-24 8 (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) SS-25 8 as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: 9 SS-N-8 first stage SS-N-18 first stage SS-N-20 first stage SS-N-23 first stage

CORRESPONDENCES RELATED TO THE TREATY Third Country Basing July 31, 1991 His Excellency Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow Dear Mr. Minister: Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved. Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns: First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty. Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future. Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory. But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof: The Parties agreed that . . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to 8 9

To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions. To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

1130  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits. In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty. I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction. Sincerely, James A. Baker, III

July 31, 1991 His Excellency Mr. James A. Baker, III Secretary of State of the United States of America Dear Mr. Secretary: I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter. We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future. With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision: “The Parties agree that. . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.” In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty. I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction. Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Alexander A. Bessmertnykh Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1131

ALCMs with Multiple Weapons December 6, 1990 The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Dear Eduard, Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well. As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.Thus, let me make the following points: First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons. Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations. Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Finally, in accordance with Article XII of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side’s compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons. Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way. I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns.You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues. Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let’s do so now. Sincerely, James A. Baker, III December 6, 1990 His Excellency James A. Baker, III Secretary of State United States of America

1132  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Washington, D.C. Dear James, In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following: Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations. The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and longrange non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII10 of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature. There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement. Respectfully, E. Shevardnadze Tacit Rainbow May 19, 1990 The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Moscow Dear Eduard, I have just finished meeting with my arms control experts, who tell me that we are still some distance from completing an overall agreement on the question of air-launched cruise missiles because of continuing differences over the issue of Tacit Rainbow. In particular, my experts have reported your concerns and the three elements of your proposal.

10

As written, should be “XV.”

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1133

I have had an opportunity to study your ideas, and am persuaded that Tacit Rainbow need not be an obstacle to resolving the ALCM issue. In this message, I would like to give you a response that I believe offers a constructive means of resolving this matter. Let me make the following points: First, the December 31, 1988 cutoff date to distinguish between current and future ALCMs is of course acceptable to me. This makes clear (as President Gorbachev agreed) that Tacit Rainbow will be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM—which it is—and will thus be subject to the provisions in the Treaty that will enable both sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Second, I am able to confirm that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, and as such would be covered by our proposals of May 12, 1990 on how the START Treaty would identify non-nuclear ALCMs and distinguish them from nuclear ALCMs. In particular, I want to draw your attention to the language we proposed in the Notification Annex11 we recently presented in Geneva. (A copy is attached.) Under this provision we would formally notify you at least six months in advance that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, would tell you about its distinguishing features and would propose a date on which you could come for an exhibition of this missile. We have no plans to convert Tacit Rainbow to a nuclear ALCM. But if a non-nuclear ALCM were ever converted to a nuclear ALCM, that missile would then become subject to all of the START Treaty restrictions on nuclear long-range ALCMs. Third, on your concern about range. I am advised that its range is less than 800 km. As you know Tacit Rainbow only became an issue when we considered accepting your proposal for a 600 km ALCM range threshold. Under our preferred position of 800 km,Tacit Rainbow was not an issue. I believe that these points are responsive to your questions.You should feel free to share these points with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to come over to meet with you now to finalize this and any other issues. Eduard, I would like to conclude by reminding you that you gave me every reason to believe that if I could move to your position on ALCM range, we would finally put the ALCM issue behind us. Let’s do so now. Sincerely, James A. Baker, III The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow. Relocation of Heavy ICBM Silos The Honorable Richard Cheney Secretary of Defense of the United States Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Secretary, I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.

11

As written, should read “Protocol.”

1134  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York.The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit.Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers. I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety. In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries. Respectfully, D.Yazov Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union December 6, 1990 His Excellency James A. Baker, III Secretary of State United States of America Washington, D.C. His Excellency Richard B. Cheney Secretary of Defense United States of America Dear Sirs, In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs—in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990—we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications. First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits.As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction.An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life. We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where— in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers—their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability—within the appropriate Treaty limits.This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded. Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1135

country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize. At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs.Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility. We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue. Respectfully, E. Shevardnadze D.Yazov

JOINT STATEMENTS EXCHANGED AT THE FINAL PLENARY ON J ULY 29, 1991 Joint Statement on New Missile Production Technology Processes The Parties agree that: (a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both Parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively. (b) If in the future either Party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called “insertable cartridges” or any other technology that allows nondestructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that Party shall inform the other Party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles. Joint Statement Regarding Data Updates with Respect to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.

1136  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Joint Statement on Costs Related to the Convening of a Session of the JCIC on the Territory of One of the Parties In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session. Joint Statement on the Ban on Support Equipment at Eliminated Facilities The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles. Joint Statement on Narrow Directional Beaming The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure nearomnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals. Joint Statement on the Term “Ton” The Parties agree that the English words “metric ton” and the Russian word “ton” mean 1,000 kilograms. Joint Statement on Charter Flights The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Joint Statement Concerning Currency of Payment for Costs Relating to Implementation of the START Treaty The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations. Joint Statement Concerning Interpretive Data The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty. The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1137

Joint Statement on Weapon Storage Areas The Parties agree that the formulation “weapon storage area” as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. Joint Statement on Exchange of Site Diagrams Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty. Joint Statement in Connection with Procedures for Confirming Launch Weight The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM.The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

OTHER STATEMENTS Unilateral Statement by the United States of America Concerning the B-2 Heavy Bomber The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy bomber.This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding. The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy bomber will require that: B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B-2 heavy bombers. The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested

1138  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Statement of Policy by the United States of America Concerning Encryption and Jamming July 29, 1991 The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner. Statement of Policy by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Encryption and Jamming July 29, 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner. U.S. Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information July 29, 1991 The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20–23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Soviet Statement on Consultations Relating to the Release to the Public of Data and Other Information July 29, 1991 The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20–23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1139

the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty. U.S. Statement on Launch-associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles July 29, 1991 The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet sides statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Statement by the Soviet Side on Launch-associated Support Vehicles and Driver Training Vehicles July 29, 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility. U.S. Statement on Non-circumvention of the START Treaty July 29, 1991 The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom.The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent.This is what we have referred to as “the existing pattern of cooperation” between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that “the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.” Soviet Statement on Non-circumvention of the START Treaty July 29, 1991 The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom. It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the

1140  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that “the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.” If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty. Statement by the Soviet Side Concerning Patterns of Cooperation July 31, 1991 In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms. U.S. Statement on the SS-N-23 July 29, 1991 Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throwweight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol. The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method.While the U.S. side believes the SS-N23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method. Soviet Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 July 29, 1991 In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1141

U.S. Statement on Attachment Joints July 29, 1991 With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber. Soviet Statement Concerning the Purposes of Inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of Data on the Distance between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs July 29, 1991 The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs. Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon and distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped. The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a nonmandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding. U.S. Statement on Underground Structures July 29, 1991 The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force.The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint. Unilateral Statement of the Soviet Side Regarding Underground Structures Adjacent to Waters in which Ballistic Missile Submarines Operate July 29, 1991 Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground

1142  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means. The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force. Statements on the Relationship of START and ABM Read at a Meeting between U.S. Ambassador Brooks and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991. Statement by the U.S. Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party’s supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation.The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Statement by the Soviet Side at the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms Concerning the Interrelationship between Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms and Compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following: This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972. The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV12 of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach. Statements Exchanged at the Meeting between U.S. Ambassador Brooks and Soviet Ambassador Nazarkin on July 27, 1991. Statement of the U.S. Side Concerning the Statement of the Soviet Side on the TSSAM Cruise Missile The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is totally unfounded.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1143

The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement.The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement, which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.The TSSAM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START. The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B2 with TSSAM. Statement of the Soviet Side Concerning the Information of the U.S. Side about the TSSAM Cruise Missile for Inclusion in the Negotiating Record The Soviet side is gravely concerned over the plans to develop and mass produce in the United States of America a new TSSAM cruise missile, which follows from the information about the cruise missile presented by the U.S. side at the START negotiations on June 14, 1991.The concern of the Soviet side is due to the fact that deployment of large numbers of such missiles will have adverse implications for the durability of the START Treaty, confidence in its integrity and stability that it provides. Among our concerns is the fact that the multi-purpose suspension joints will be used for that missile on B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers, as follows from the explanations provided by the U.S. side. Because of that, in case of testing of TSSAM missiles from a B-2 heavy bomber the bomber might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Our concern increases in view of the fact that under certain circumstances B-2 heavy bombers are not subject to exhibitions and inspections. The Soviet side reserves the right to return to these questions subsequently.

DECLARATIONS Declaration of the United States of America Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles July 31, 1991 The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty.This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding. The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations.The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter. The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force. The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

12 As written, understood to mean “Article XVII”.Two Treaty Articles were included after the statement was made, but before the Treaty was signed.

1144  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations. Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers. The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons. The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future. For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification. Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles July 31, 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty.This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding. The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the United States of America will make comparable declarations.The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force. The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year. Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations. Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1145

sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future. For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification. Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the TU-22M Medium Bomber July 31, 1991 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the TU-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire.This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding. The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling. The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes.The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200. In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms,Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF S TRATEGIC O FFENSIVE A RMS The Republic of Byelarus13, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Reaffirming their support for the 13 Spelling as appears in the original English Text of Protocol. In other documents, the revised official spelling “Belarus” is used.

1146  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,Recognizing the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a number of independent states, Recalling the commitment of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that the nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be maintained under the safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority, Desiring to facilitate implementation of the Treaty in this altered situation, Have agreed as follows: Article I The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty. Article II The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty’s limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs Article III 1. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase, “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine 2. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase,“national territory,” when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. 3. For inspections and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital. 4. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital. 5.The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian. Article IV Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1147

Article V The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices. Article VI 1. Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures.The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America.The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification. 2. This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty. Done at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarusian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START II) The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening, Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to reduce further strategic offensive arms, in addition to the reductions and limitations provided for in the START Treaty, Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world order built on democratic values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of war, Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992. Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,

1148  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250. 2.Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed: (a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs; (b) 1200 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and (c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. 3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, s, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMS, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 3500. 4.Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed: (a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750; (b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and (c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. 5.The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall be completed no later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article. 6. Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by each Party no later than December 31, 2000. Article II 1. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1149

(including test launchers and training launchers), with the exception of those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Each Party shall carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article. 2. The obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of this Treaty. 3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of either: (a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty; or (b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted. 4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article. 5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall only be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article. 6. No later than January 1, 2003, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter. 7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty. 8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty. 9. Beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty. Article III 1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.

1150  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that: (a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty; (b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMS, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time exceed the limit of 500 warheads for each Party provided for in subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty; (c) each Party shall have the right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM.An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed has been reduced in accordance with this paragraph shall only be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and (d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is not required to be destroyed and replaced with a new reentry vehicle platform. 3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the START Treaty, each Party undertakes not to: (a)produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it under this Treaty; and (b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article Article IV 1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bombers shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs. 2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution. 3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the Memorandum on Attribution. 4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is actually equipped.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1151

5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandum on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification, or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped.The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution. 6.The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections. 7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for longrange nuclear ALCMS.The reorienting Party shall provide to the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such reorientation. No conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role. 8. Heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements (a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 at any one time; (b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles; (c) such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and (d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection. 9. Each Party shall have the right to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role.The Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber to a nuclear role no less than 90 days in advance of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a conventional role. 10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.

1152  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions. 12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party. 13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Party. 14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections. Article V 1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this Treaty. 2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty. Article VI 1.This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution., Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, but not prior to the entry into force of the START Treaty. 2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature. 3.This Treaty shall remain in force so long as the START Treaty remains in force. 4. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Article VII Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1153

Article VIII This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF HEAVY ICBMS RELATING TO THE T REATY BETWEEN THE U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA AND THE R USSIAN F EDERATION ON F URTHER R EDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such ICBMs I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters 1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty or shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988. 2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party: (a) shall remove the missile’s reentry vehicles; (b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile’s guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section; (c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages; (d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile; (e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister; (f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and (g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism. These actions may be carried out in any order. 3.After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures provided for in this

1154  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process. 4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMs: (a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed. 5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister. 6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the inspection team’s observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has completed its inspection. 7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty. II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for Heavy ICBMs, and Silo Test Launchers for Heavy ICBMs 1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to inspection. 2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher. 3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to the START Treaty. 4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps: (a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher; (b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and (c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the upper portion of the silo launcher.The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher. 5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these procedures have been carried out: (a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs: (i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence; and

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1155

(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section; and (b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted. 6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose: (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question; (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured; (c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened; (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections.The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections; (e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort; (f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and (g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty. 7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMs, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose: (a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete; (b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;

1156  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete; (d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and to remeasure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections; (e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher, measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened; (f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort; (g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and (h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty. 8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section. 9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive ring. 10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed. III. Equipment; Costs 1.To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher with concrete.The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1157

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty. This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL ON EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree to conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty. I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers 1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role. 2.The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions: (a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party; (b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the exhibition; (c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection for a period not to exceed two hours; (d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; (e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so as to

1158  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection; and (f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START Treaty. II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers 1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the inspection: (a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; (b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior; and (c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection, but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior. 2.At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection. 3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(b) or subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1159

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

MEMORANDUM

UNDERSTANDING ON WARHEAD ATTRIBUTION AND HEAVY BOMBER DATA RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped. No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty, according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the START Treaty are included in this Memorandum. I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers other than Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role 1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes not to have more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty. The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate the changed number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type are actually equipped:

1160  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

a. United States of America Heavy Bomber Types and Variant of a Type 14

Number of Warheads

B-52G B-52H B-1B B-2

12 20 16 16

Aggregate Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role b. Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Types and Variant of a Type

Number of Warheads

Bear B Bear G Bear H Bear H Blackjack

1 2 66 1616 12

Aggregate Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role 1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows: a. United States of America Heavy Bomber of Type and Variant of Type

Number

__________

__________

__________

__________

b. Russian Federation Heavy Bomber of Type and Variant of Type

Number

__________

__________

__________

__________

2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well as data on related air bases are as follows: a. United States of America Air Bases: Name/Location

Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

_________

_________

14 Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, located at the DavisMonthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1, 1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the sevenyear reductions period.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1161

_________

_________

Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

Number __________

b. Russian Federation Air Bases: Name/Location

Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

_________ _________

__________ __________

Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role

Number __________

3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows: a. United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

Difference

___________

_________

b. Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

Difference

__________

__________

4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role are as follows: a. United States of America Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

Difference

__________

__________

b. Russian Federation Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type

Difference

__________

__________

III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs of Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed 1. For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article III of the Treaty are as follows: a. United States of America Type of ICBM or SLBM Deployed ICBMS or Deployed SLBMs, on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

1162  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or Deployed SLBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs of that Type

____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced: Name/Location

ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to deployed ICBMs of that Type

____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced: Name/Location

SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to deployed SLBMs of that Type

____

b. Russian Federation Type of ICBM or SLBM Deployed ICBMS or Deployed SLBMs, on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1163

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or Deployed SLBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed SLBMs of that Type

____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced: Name/Location

ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to deployed ICBMs of that Type

____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced: Name/Location

SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced

____

Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM after Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It

____

Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM Was Reduced

____

Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to deployed SLBMs of that Type

____

IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs 1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

1164  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

a. United States of America Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location ______

ICBM type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher

Silo Launcher Group: (designation) ______ Silo Launchers: ______

______

b. Russian Federation Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____ ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs: Name/Location ______

ICBM type Installed in a Converted Silo Launcher

Silo Launcher Group: (designation) ______ Silo Launchers: ______

______

2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are as follows: a. United States of America Number Deployed Heavy ICBMs

____

Non-deployed Heavy ICBMs

____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs

____

b. Russian Federation Number Deployed Heavy ICBMs

____

Non-deployed Heavy ICBMs

____

Eliminated Heavy ICBMs

____

V. Changes Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum.

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1165

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy only of its own data. This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty. DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF J ANUARY 3, 1993 The United States of America and the Russian Federation, Reaffirming their commitment to the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, Desiring to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. In paragraph 1 of Article I of the Treaty the words “seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty” shall be replaced by the words “no later than December 31, 2004”. 2. In paragraph 3 of Article I of the Treaty the words “January 1, 2003” shall be replaced by the words “December 31, 2007”. 3. In paragraph 5 of Article I of the Treaty the words “seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty” shall be replaced by the words “December 31, 2004”. 4. Paragraph 6 of Article I of the Treaty shall be formulated in the following way: “The Parties may conclude an agreement on a program of assistance for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating such implementation.” Article II In paragraph 1, paragraph 6, and paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty the words “January 1, 2003” shall be replaced in each case by the words “December 31, 2007”.

1166  THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)

Article III 1.This Protocol shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. 2.This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force for the duration of the Treaty. DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

JOINT AGREED STATEMENT September 26, 1997 For the purposes of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993 (START II), and without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the Parties agree that Article III of START II shall be understood by both Parties as allowing reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs to be carried out at any time before December 31, 2007.

PRIMAKOV LETTER

ON

EARLY DEACTIVATION

26 September 1997 Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Dear Madam Secretary: On behalf of the Government of the Russian Federation, in connection with the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose that agreement be concluded between our Governments on deactivation of certain strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Under this agreement our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States of America shall deactivate, by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under the Treaty, by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps. Immediately upon entry into force of the Treaty, experts of the Parties will begin work simultaneously both on the understandings concerning methods of deactivation as well as parameters of an appropriate program of assistance of the United States of America in implementation of the deactivation mentioned above. Practical steps to implement deactivation will be undertaken on the basis of these understandings. Taking into account the supreme national interests of the country, the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START III Treaty will be achieved and enter into force. This letter together with your response shall constitute agreement between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I & II)  1167

the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Please accept, Madam Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.

ALBRIGHT LETTER

ON

EARLY DEACTIVATION

26 September 1997 The Secretary of State Washington Dear Mr. Minister: On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date to conclude, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of January 3, 1993, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, agreement between our Governments on deactivation of certain strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Under this agreement our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America and the Russian Federation shall deactivate, by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under the Treaty, by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps. Immediately upon entry into force of the Treaty, experts of the Parties will begin work simultaneously both on the understandings concerning methods of deactivation as well as parameters of an appropriate program of assistance of the United States of America in implementation of the deactivation mentioned above. Practical steps to implement deactivation will be undertaken on the basis of these understandings. The Government of the United States of America notes the statement of the Russian Federation position on the issue of START III entry into force. This response together with your letter shall constitute agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

25

The Chemical Weapons Convention SUMMARY

AND

ANALYSIS

he Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the companion agreement to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), prohibits the possession, manufacture, and use of chemical weapons. It was signed in early 1993.The CWC had long been of special interest to President George H.W. Bush, as it had been Vice-President Bush who introduced the U.S. draft in Geneva in 1984, and he was in office during the final push for its completion in 1992. The draft presented in 1984 contained the famous “anytime, anywhere” inspection provision developed by some U.S. delegates, with the expectation that the Soviet Union would never accept it. However, after U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986, the Soviet Union began to show real interest in on-site inspection.What was finally negotiated was a complex system of managed access that would provide for intrusive inspections while protecting sensitive facilities. In essence, the idea was to negotiate an inspection regime, on an ad hoc basis, where a sensitive facility was claimed. Australia played a key role in the negotiations’ endgame by developing a text that many states important to the negotiation could accept. But much credit should go to the German chairman of the negotiating committee at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Ambassador Adolf Von Wagner. Based on the Australian draft text tabled earlier,Von Wagner produced a chairman’s draft in June 1992 and pronounced the negotiations over. Five CD delegations refused to approve the text when it was forwarded to the United Nations (UN) in August, but did not attempt to block its transmittal.The United Nations broadly endorsed the CWC that fall, and 138 nations signed it in Paris on January 13, 1993. The CWC consists of twenty-four articles and two annexes, the Annex on Implementation and Verification and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. Article I to a degree mirrors BWC Article I. It provides that each party undertakes “never under any circumstances” to develop, acquire, or retain chemical weapons as defined by the convention. Article I extends this prohibition to the use of chemical weapons and to the engagement of military preparations for the use of such weapons. Like the BWC, the intent of the CWC is to bind states parties not to acquire and use chemical weapons even if attacked by hostile states with such weapons. Article XXII prohibits reservations to the convention; thus there could be no second-use reservations as with the Geneva Protocol. Article I also requires each party to destroy all chemical weapons that it possesses and all chemical weapons that it abandoned on the territory of another state (after January 1, 1925), and not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.This last requirement impacts the four exceptions associated with U.S. ratification of the Geneva Protocol (discussed in Chapter 1).

T

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1169

Chemical weapons, defined in Article II as toxic chemicals or their precursors, are listed in an attached schedule along with associated munitions and equipment. Such toxic chemicals and their precursors are not considered chemical weapons, pursuant to Article II, if used for purposes not prohibited by the convention. The allowed uses are defined as industrial, agricultural, or medical applications, the development of protective measures against toxic chemicals, military purposes not connected with chemical weapons, and law enforcement (including domestic riot control), as long as types and quantities possessed are consistent with these purposes. Article III requires states parties to make declarations of their inventories of chemical weapons and production facilities, and Article IV provides for the destruction of such weapons and facilities. Pursuant to Article IV, destruction is to begin no later than two years after entry into force for a particular party and to be completed no more than ten years after the convention’s entry into force. Detailed procedures for carrying out and verifying this obligation are in the Verification Annex. Each state party must assume the costs of its destruction obligations; this has been a particular problem for Russia, given the state of the Russian economy and the vast stockpile the country possesses. These declarations and the destruction of declared weapons and facilities are to be verified pursuant to the comprehensive Verification Annex, which includes detailed procedures for on-site inspection, including challenge inspections with managed access. Article VII requires the necessary national implementing measures, including implementing legislation, to be adopted by each party. Pursuant to Article VIII, the states parties established the CWC’s implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Conference of States Parties has overall management responsibilities for the organization. Its executive council (composed of forty-one members with worldwide geographic balance) deals with compliance issues, regulates the conduct of inspections, and oversees the organization’s day-to-day management.The technical secretariat actually conducts inspections called for under the CWC. Each state party has the right to submit an on-site challenge inspection request to the council. If this request meets the requirements set forth in the Verification Annex, the party to be inspected must allow the technical secretariat to conduct the inspection pursuant to the rules of the Inspection Annex. The inspection therefore goes forward, unless within twelve hours of receiving the inspection request the executive council decides by a three-quarters vote that the inspection request is frivolous, abusive, or clearly beyond the CWC’s scope.Thus, there is the presumption that the inspection will proceed. The executive council also reviews the technical secretariat’s final report and addresses any noncompliance concerns, whether the request was conducted within the CWC’s scope, and whether the challenge inspection provision was abused. If a compliance issue remains unresolved, the council will make recommendations to the conference. If the conference concludes that an act of noncompliance has taken place, it may take action pursuant to Article XII, which includes collective action by the parties consistent with international law and submission of the issue to the UN Security Council. The CWC was submitted to the United States Senate in 1994.The Senate approved it on April 24, 1997; there were twenty-six votes against, a large number given that banning chemical weapons is close to motherhood and the CWC was supported by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. The CWC, after pressure from the White House, was scheduled for a Senate floor vote on September 26, 1996. Senator Richard Lugar, the floor manager, had succeeded in achieving a favorable vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott had agreed to a date certain for a vote in September. The American Chemicals Manufacturers Association supported the treaty, as they had throughout the negotiations, but a sizable group of senators at the time

1170  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

appeared to comprise a permanent opposition to arms control faction in the Senate, and they resisted the CWC.All was ready for a successful vote on the Senate floor. However, an opposition group member persuaded someone on presidential candidate Robert Dole’s staff to put an anti-CWC letter in front of him, even though he had been favorable toward the CWC when he was Senate majority leader.The letter, which attacked the CWC’s verifiability and suggested that the vote be put off, came to light the morning of the scheduled vote. Secretary of State Warren Christopher contacted Senator Lugar and asked that the CWC be withdrawn from the Senate calendar, and the vote was postponed.Thus, the CWC was returned to the Foreign Relations Committee at the end of the year. No action was taken until the spring of 1997, when U.S. ratification of the CWC was becoming imperative as a result of its entry into force and implementation provisions. Pursuant to Article XXI, sixty-five ratifications would bring the CWC into force, and only those states that were original parties (defined as those parties that had ratified the convention by the time of entry into force) would participate directly in the development of the verification system to be negotiated within the OPCW. However, Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated that for the requisite hearings to be scheduled the Clinton administration had to commit itself to the merger into the State Department of the three U.S. foreign-policy-related agencies, the Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the Agency for International Development (AID). In April 1997, the Clinton administration announced an agreement on the issue: after a long negotiation, ACDA and USIA were absorbed by the State Department on April 1, 1999. AID successfully resisted merger and remained independent. Hearings on the CWC were held, and the Senate approved the treaty on April 24, 1997, by a vote of 74 to 26; President Clinton ratified it on April 24, 1997. The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997. It currently has 145 parties and 165 signatories.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Signed in Paris: 13 January 1993 Entered Into Force: 29 April 1997 Preamble The States Parties to this Convention, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925), Recognizing that this Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1171

Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind, Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties, Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives, Have agreed as follows: Article I. General Obligations 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons; (c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons; (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare. Article II. Definitions and Criteria For the purposes of this Convention: 1.“Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or separately: (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

1172  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b). 2.“Toxic Chemical” means: Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.) 3.“Precursor” means: Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system. (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, precursors which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.) 4. “Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical Systems” (hereinafter referred to as “key component”) means: The precursor which plays the most important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system. 5.“Old Chemical Weapons” means: (a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; or (b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons. 6.“Abandoned Chemical Weapons” means: Chemical weapons, including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 January 1925 on the territory of another State without the consent of the latter. 7.“Riot Control Agent” means: Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. 8.“Chemical Weapons Production Facility”: (a) Means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used at any time since 1 January 1946: (i) As part of the stage in the production of chemicals (“final technological stage”) where the material flows would contain, when the equipment is in operation: (1) Any chemical listed in Schedule 1 in the Annex on Chemicals; or (2) Any other chemical that has no use, above 1 tonne per year on the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, but can be used for chemical weapons purposes; or (ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk storage containers; the filling of chemicals into containers that

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1173

form part of assembled binary munitions and devices or into chemical sub munitions that form part of assembled unitary munitions and devices, and the loading of the containers and chemical submunitions into the respective munitions and devices; (b) Does not mean: (i) Any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne; (ii) Any facility in which a chemical specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was produced as an unavoidable by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, provided that the chemical does not exceed 3 percent of the total product and that the facility is subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex on Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as “Verification Annex”); or (iii) The single small-scale facility for production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as referred to in Part VI of the Verification Annex. 9.“Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention” means: (a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; (b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons; (c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; (d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes. 10.“Production Capacity” means: The annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific chemical based on the technological process actually used or, if the process is not yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design capacity. The nameplate capacity is the product output under conditions optimized for maximum quantity for the production facility, as demonstrated by one or more testruns.The design capacity is the corresponding theoretically calculated product output. 11. “Organization” means the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article VIII of this Convention. 12. For the purposes of Article VI: (a) “Production” of a chemical means its formation through chemical reaction; (b) “Processing” of a chemical means a physical process, such as formulation, extraction and purification, in which a chemical is not converted into another chemical; (c) “Consumption” of a chemical means its conversion into another chemical via a chemical reaction. Article III. Declarations 1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations, in which it shall: (a) With respect to chemical weapons: (i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any chemical weapons, or whether there are any chemical weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;

1174  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(ii) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Verification Annex, except for those chemical weapons referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii); (iii) Report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex; (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex; (v) Provide its general plan for destruction of chemical weapons that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex; (b) With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons: (i) Declare whether it has on its territory old chemical weapons and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the Verification Annex; (ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical weapons on its territory and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex; (iii) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of other States and provide all available information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex; (c) With respect to chemical weapons production facilities: (i) Declare whether it has or has had any chemical weapons production facility under its ownership or possession, or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946; (ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the Verification Annex, except for those facilities referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii); (iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility on its territory that another State has or has had under its ownership and possession and that is or has been located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State at any time since 1 January 1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the Verification Annex; (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for the production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the Verification Annex; (v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex; (vi) Specify actions to be taken for closure of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1 (i), of the Verification Annex; (vii) Provide its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, into a chemical weapons destruction facility, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 7, of the Verification Annex;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1175

(d) With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. Such declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites; (e) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for riot control purposes.This declaration shall be updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes effective. 2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. Article IV. Chemical Weapons 1.The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to all chemical weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies. 2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth in the Verification Annex. 3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. 4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic on-site verification. 5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments. 6. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as “order of destruction”). Such destruction shall begin not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate. 7. Each State Party shall: (a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next annual destruction period; (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period; and

1176  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed. 8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible.The order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council. 9.Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. 10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions. 11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. If they are not removed within one year, the State Party may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons. 12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other States Parties that request information or assistance on a bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons. 13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction among States Parties. To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that: (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex; (b) Implementation of such an agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities. 14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement. 15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex. 16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7. 17.The provisions of this Article and the relevant provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons buried on its territory

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1177

before 1 January 1977 and which remain buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985. Article V. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities 1.The provisions of this Article and the detailed procedures for its implementation shall apply to any and all chemical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. 2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this Article are set forth in the Verification Annex. 3.All chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex. 4. Each State Party shall cease immediately all activity at chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, except activity required for closure. 5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons production facilities or modify any existing facilities for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other activity prohibited under this Convention. 6. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (c), has been submitted, provide access to chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, for the purpose of systematic verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. 7. Each State Party shall: (a) Close, not later than 90 days after this Convention enters into force for it, all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex, and give notice thereof; and (b) Provide access to chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently destroyed. 8. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and related facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of destruction (hereinafter referred to as “order of destruction”). Such destruction shall begin not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such facilities at a faster rate. 9. Each State Party shall: (a) Submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, not later than 180 days before the destruction of each facility begins; (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the destruction of all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, not later than 90 days after the end of each annual destruction period; and (c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 have been destroyed. 10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 as soon as possible.The order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.

1178  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

11. Each State Party, during the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities in accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions. 12. Chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. 13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex. 14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in Schedule 1. 15. All converted facilities shall be subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex. 16. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex, the Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on verification of chemical weapons production facilities and their destruction among States Parties. To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit the verification to measures complementary to those undertaken pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it considers that: (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are consistent with the verification provisions of this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex; (b) Implementation of the agreement provides for sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant provisions of this Convention; and (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral agreement keep the Organization fully informed about their verification activities. 17. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to paragraph 16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement. 18. Nothing in paragraphs 16 and 17 shall affect the obligation of a State Party to make declarations pursuant to Article III, this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex. 19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification under this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7. Article VI. Activities Not Prohibited under This Convention 1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1179

2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex. 3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 (hereinafter referred to as “Schedule 1 chemicals”) to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to systematic verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex. 4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2 (hereinafter referred to as “Schedule 2 chemicals”) and facilities specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex. 5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 (hereinafter referred to as “Schedule 3 chemicals”) and facilities specified in Part VIII of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex. 6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in Part IX of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and eventual on-site verification in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 22, of the Verification Annex. 7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each State Party shall make an initial declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex. 8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations regarding the relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance with the Verification Annex. 9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the inspectors access to facilities as required in the Verification Annex. 10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party’s chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (hereinafter referred to as “Confidentiality Annex”). 11.The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Article VII. National Implementation Measures General undertakings 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall: (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;

1180  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law. 2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1. 3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard. Relations between the State Party and the organization 4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for it. 5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this Convention. 6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex. 7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat. Article VIII. The Organization A. General Provisions 1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. 2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization. 3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall be The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands. 4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat. 5.The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall abide by the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex. 6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1181

7.The costs of the Organization’s activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and this Organization, and subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. The budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs. 8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member. B. The Conference of the States Parties Composition, procedures and decision-making 9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as “the Conference”) shall be composed of all members of this Organization. Each member shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 10.The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Convention. 11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually unless it decides otherwise. 12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened: (a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive Council; (c) When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members; or (d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, unless specified otherwise in the request. 13.The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference in accordance with Article XV, paragraph 2. 14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise. 15.The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required.They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session. 16.A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum for the Conference. 17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the Conference. 18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this

1182  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. Powers and functions 19. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. 20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Convention, and act in order to promote its object and purpose.The Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with this Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions. 21.The Conference shall: (a) Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report, programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports; (b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 7; (c) Elect the members of the Executive Council; (d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Director-General”); (e) Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; (f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention; (g) Foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities; (h) Review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference; (i) Consider and approve at its first session any draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed by the Preparatory Commission; (j) Establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in accordance with Article X; (k) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention, in accordance with Article XII. 22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such other times within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments.At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1183

C. The Executive Council Composition, procedure and decision-making 23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council.The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Convention, due regard being specially paid to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of chemical industry, as well as to political and security interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows: (a) Nine States Parties from Africa to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine States Parties, three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these three members; (b) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these nine States Parties, four members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these four members; (c) Five States Parties from Eastern Europe to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these five States Parties, one member shall, as a rule, be the State Party with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating this one member; (d) Seven States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these seven States Parties, three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these three members; (e) Ten States Parties from among Western European and other States to be designated by States Parties located in this region. As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these 10 States Parties, 5 members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with the most significant national chemical industry in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these five members; (f) One further State Party to be designated consecutively by States Parties located in the regions of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.As a basis for this designation it is understood that this State Party shall be a rotating member from these regions. 24. For the first election of the Executive Council 20 members shall be elected for a term of one year, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 23. 25. After the full implementation of Articles IV and V the Conference may, upon the request of a majority of the members of the Executive Council, review the composition of the Executive Council taking into account developments related to the principles specified in paragraph 23 that are governing its composition. 26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.

1184  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

27.The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members. 28.The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions. 29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members.The Executive Council shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of all its members.When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. Powers and functions 30.The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference.The Executive Council shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and continuous implementation. 31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention. It shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties at their request. 32.The Executive Council shall: (a) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft programme and budget of the Organization; (b) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Convention, the report on the performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary or which the Conference may request; (c) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference including the preparation of the draft agenda. 33.The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the Conference. 34.The Executive Council shall: (a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject to prior approval by the Conference; (b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf of the Organization in connection with Article X and supervise the voluntary fund referred to in Article X; (c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties. 35.The Executive Council shall consider any issue or matter within its competence affecting this Convention and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and cases of noncompliance, and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference. 36. In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time.To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1185

(a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter; (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; (c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance. The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. It shall at the same time inform all States Parties of this step. D. The Technical Secretariat 37.The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions.The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification measures provided for in this Convention. It shall carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference and the Executive Council. 38.The Technical Secretariat shall: (a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization; (b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Convention and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request; (c) Provide administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary organs; (d) Address and receive communications on behalf of the Organization to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Convention; (e) Provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals. 39.The Technical Secretariat shall: (a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive Council; (b) Not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention, coordinate the establishment and maintenance of permanent stockpiles of emergency and humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance with Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) and (c).The Technical Secretariat may inspect the items maintained for serviceability. Lists of items to be stockpiled shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21 (i) above; (c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in Article X, compile declarations made by the States Parties and register, when requested, bilateral agreements concluded between States Parties or between a State Party and the Organization for the purposes of Article X. 40. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned. 41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.

1186  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

42.The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and shall act under the supervision of the Director-General. 43.The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. 44.The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. 45.The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board referred to in paragraph 21 (h).The Director-General shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity.The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Convention.The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General. 46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization.They shall refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Conference and the Executive Council. 47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. E. Privileges and Immunities 48.The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions. 49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the Executive Council together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. 50.The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the headquarters of the Organization is seated.These agreements shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to paragraph 21 (i). 51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the DirectorGeneral and the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in Part II, Section B, of the Verification Annex. Article IX. Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding 1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1187

framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Convention. 2.Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party which receives a request from another State Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an explanation of how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubt about compliance or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention. Procedure for requesting clarification 3.A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with this Convention.The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a concern. 4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply: (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned through the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its receipt; (b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the receipt of the request; (c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt; (d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification; (e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under subparagraph (d), the Executive Council may call on the Director-General to establish a group of experts from the Technical Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the concern. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings; (f) If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under subparagraphs (d) and (e) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a special session of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. In such a special session, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation. 5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to a concern about its possible non-

1188  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

compliance with this Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate. 6.The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties about any request for clarification provided in this Article. 7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a possible non-compliance has not been resolved within 60 days after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 12 (c). At such a special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation. Procedures for challenge inspections 8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible noncompliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the Verification Annex. 9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention as specified in the Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse.The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-compliance. 10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge inspection pursuant to paragraph 8. 11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate; (b) The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-compliance; and (c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this Convention. 12.With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: (a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the challenge inspection. (b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the observer in accordance with the Verification Annex. (c) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report. 13.The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for immediate processing.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1189

14.The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that the inspection request meets the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin. 15.The Director-General shall transmit the inspection request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. 16.After having received the inspection request, the Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-General’s actions on the request and shall keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its deliberations shall not delay the inspection process. 17. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this Convention as described in paragraph 8. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly. 18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection.The inspection mandate shall be the inspection request referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 put into operational terms, and shall conform with the inspection request. 19.The challenge inspection shall be conducted in accordance with Part X or, in the case of alleged use, in accordance with Part XI of the Verification Annex.The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission. 20.The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party proposes, pursuant to Part X, Section C, of the Verification Annex, arrangements to demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of demonstrating its compliance. 21.The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties. 22. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as to: (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred; (b) Whether the request had been within the scope of this Convention; and (c) Whether the right to request a challenge inspection had been abused. 23. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 22, it shall take the appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications of the challenge inspection.

1190  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

24.The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the right to participate in the review process.The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the process. 25. If the Executive Council has made specific recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall consider action in accordance with Article XII. Article X. Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons 1. For the purposes of this Article, “Assistance” means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures. 2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. 3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. 4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties. The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented. 6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance. 7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following measures: (a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the Conference at its first session; (b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the procurement, upon demand, of assistance; (c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organization. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph. 8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that: (a) Chemical weapons have been used against it;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1191

(b) Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or (c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I. 9.The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive Council and to all States Parties.The DirectorGeneral shall immediately forward the request to States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt of the request.The Director-General shall initiate, not later than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide foundation for further action. He shall complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report to the Executive Council. If additional time is required for completion of the investigation, an interim report shall be submitted within the same time-frame. The additional time required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the end of each additional period shall be submitted to the Executive Council.The investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed. 10.The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the investigation report and the decision taken by the Executive Council.When so decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations. The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance. 11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or other reliable sources would give sufficient proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his disposal for such contingencies.The Director-General shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph. Article XI. Economic and Technological Development 1.The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. 2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of international law, the States Parties shall: (a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer, and use chemicals; (b) Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this Convention;

1192  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; (d) Not use this Convention as grounds for applying any measures other than those provided for, or permitted, under this Convention nor use any other international agreement for pursuing an objective inconsistent with this Convention; (e) Undertake to review their existing national regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order to render them consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention. Article XII. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions 1.The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council. 2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the State Party fails to fulfill the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention. 3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under this Convention, in particular by Article I, the Conference may recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity with international law. 4.The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council. Article XIII. Relation to Other International Agreements Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972. Article XIV. Settlement of Disputes 1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 2.When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1193

conformity with the Statute of the Court. The States Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken. 3.The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article VIII, paragraph 21 (f). 5.The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization.An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 34 (a). 6.This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to the provisions on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions. Article XV. Amendments 1.Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention.Any State Party may also propose changes, as specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this Convention. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5. 2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and to the Depositary.The proposed amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference shall be convened if one third or more of the States Parties notify the Director-General not later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal.The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless the requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment. 3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the States Parties referred to under subparagraph (b) below: (a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote; and (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference. 4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of this Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification Annex, and those definitions in Part I of the Verification Annex which relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5. 5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures: (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General.Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be

1194  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary; (b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Convention and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council; (c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days; (d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation; (e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under subparagraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session; (f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph; (g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference. Article XVI. Duration and Withdrawal 1.This Convention shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Article XVII. Status of the Annexes The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention.Any reference to this Convention includes the Annexes. Article XVIII. Signature This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into force. Article XIX. Ratification This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1195

Article XX. Accession Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter. Article XXI. Entry into Force 1.This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. 2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession. Article XXII. Reservations The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and purpose. Article XXIII. Depositary The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, inter alia: (a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices; (b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States; and (c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article XXIV. Authentic Texts This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Convention. Done at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.

Annex on Chemicals A. Guidelines for Schedules of Chemicals Guidelines for Schedule 1 1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor should be included in Schedule 1: (a) It has been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II; (b) It poses otherwise a high risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its high potential for use in activities prohibited under this Convention because one or more of the following conditions are met:

1196  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(i) It possesses a chemical structure closely related to that of other toxic chemicals listed in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to have, comparable properties; (ii) It possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that would enable it to be used as a chemical weapon; (iii) It may be used as a precursor in the final single technological stage of production of a toxic chemical listed in Schedule 1, regardless of whether this stage takes place in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere; (c) It has little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Guidelines for Schedule 2 2.The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical not listed in Schedule 1 or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical or to a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2: (a) It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that could enable it to be used as a chemical weapon; (b) It may be used as a precursor in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A; (c) It poses a significant risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A; (d) It is not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. Guidelines for Schedule 3 3.The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor, not listed in other Schedules, should be included in Schedule 3: (a) It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon; (b) It poses otherwise a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention because it possesses such lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other properties that might enable it to be used as a chemical weapon; (c) It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part B; (d) It may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. B. Schedules of Chemicals The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purpose of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons. (Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted.A chemical marked “*” on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1197

Schedule 1

(CAS registry number)

A.Toxic chemicals: (1) 0-Alkyl (< C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates e.g. Sarin: 0-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Soman: 0-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate

(107-44-8) (96-64-0)

(2) 0-Alkyl (< C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidocyanidates e.g.Tabun: 0-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl phosphoramidocyanidate

(77-81-6)

(3) 0-Alkyl (H or < C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonothiolates and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g.VX: 0-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate

(50782-69-9)

(4) Sulfur mustards: 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether 0-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether

(2625-76-5) (505-60-2) (63869-13-6) (3563-36-8) (63905-10-2) (142868-93-7) (142868-94-8) (63918-90-1) (63918-89-8)

(5) Lewisites: Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine Lewisite 3:Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine

(541-25-3) (40334-69-8) (40334-70-1)

(6) Nitrogen mustards: HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine HN3:Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine

(538-07-8) (51-75-2) (555-77-1)

(7) Saxitoxin(35523-89-8) (8) Ricin(9009-86-3) B. Precursors: (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluorides e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride

(676-99-3)

(10) 0-Alkyl (H or < C10, incl. cycloalkyl) 0-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts e.g. QL: 0-Ethyl 0-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite

(57856-11-8)

(11) Chlorosarin: 0-Isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate

(1445-76-7)

(12) Chlorosoman: 0-Pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate

(7040-57-5)

1198  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Schedule 2

(CAS registry number)

A.Toxic chemicals: (1) Amiton: 0,0-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

(78-53-5)

(2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene

(382-21-8)

(3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*)

(6581-06-2)

B. Precursors: (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms, e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride Dimethyl methylphosphonate Exemption: Fonofos: 0-Ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonothiolothionate (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides

(676-97-1) (756-79-6) (944-22-9) ——

(6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates(7) Arsenic trichloride (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (9) Quinuclidine-3-ol (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2chlorides and corresponding protonated salts (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding protonated salts Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding protonated salts

(7784-34-1) (76-93-7) (1619-34-7) ——

(108-01-0) (100-37-8)

(12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts(13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide

(111-48-8)

(14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol

(464-07-3)

Schedule 3

(CAS registry number)

A.Toxic chemicals: (1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride

(75-44-5)

(2) Cyanogen chloride

(506-77-4)

(3) Hydrogen cyanide

(74-90-8)

(4) Chloropicrin:Trichloronitromethane

(76-06-2)

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1199

B. Precursors: (5) Phosphorus oxychloride

(10025-87-3)

(6) Phosphorus trichloride

(7719-12-2)

(7) Phosphorus pentachloride

(10026-13-8)

(8) Trimethyl phosphite

(121-45-9)

(9) Triethyl phosphite

(122-52-1)

(10) Dimethyl phosphite

(868-85-9)

(11) Diethyl phosphite

(762-04-9)

(12) Sulfur monochloride

(10025-67-9)

(13) Sulfur dichloride

(10545-99-0)

(14) Thionyl chloride

(7719-09-7)

(15) Ethyldiethanolamine

(139-87-7)

(16) Methyldiethanolamine

(105-59-9)

(17) Triethanolamine

(102-71-6)

Annex on Implementation and Verification (“Verification Annex”) Part I: Definitions 1.“Approved Equipment” means the devices and instruments necessary for the performance of the inspection team’s duties that have been certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with regulations prepared by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Part II, paragraph 27 of this Annex. Such equipment may also refer to the administrative supplies or recording materials that would be used by the inspection team. 2.“Building” as referred to in the definition of chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises specialized buildings and standard buildings. (a) “Specialized Building” means: (i) Any building, including underground structures, containing specialized equipment in a production or filling configuration; (ii) Any building, including underground structures, which has distinctive features which distinguish it from buildings normally used for chemical production or filling activities not prohibited under this Convention. (b) “Standard Building” means any building, including underground structures, constructed to prevailing industry standards for facilities not producing any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive chemicals. 3.“Challenge Inspection” means the inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party requested by another State Party pursuant to Article IX, paragraphs 8 to 25. 4.“Discrete Organic Chemical” means any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned.

1200  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

5.“Equipment” as referred to in the definition of chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises specialized equipment and standard equipment. (a) “Specialized Equipment” means: (i) The main production train, including any reactor or equipment for product synthesis, separation or purification, any equipment used directly for heat transfer in the final technological stage, such as in reactors or in product separation, as well as any other equipment which has been in contact with any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or would be in contact with such a chemical if the facility were operated; (ii) Any chemical weapon filling machines; (iii) Any other equipment specially designed, built or installed for the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons production facility, as distinct from a facility constructed according to prevailing commercial industry standards for facilities not producing any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive chemicals, such as: equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other special corrosion-resistant material; special equipment for waste control, waste treatment, air filtering, or solvent recovery; special containment enclosures and safety shields; non-standard laboratory equipment used to analyse toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; custom-designed process control panels; or dedicated spares for specialized equipment. (b) “Standard Equipment” means: (i) Production equipment which is generally used in the chemical industry and is not included in the types of specialized equipment; (ii) Other equipment commonly used in the chemical industry, such as: fire-fighting equipment; guard and security safety surveillance equipment; medical facilities, laboratory facilities; or communications equipment. 6.“Facility” in the context of Article VI means any of the industrial sites as defined below (“plant site”,“plant” and “unit”). (a) “Plant Site” (Works, Factory) means the local integration of one or more plants, with any intermediate administrative levels, which are under one operational control, and includes common infrastructure, such as: (i) Administration and other offices; (ii) Repair and maintenance shops; (iii) Medical centre; (iv) Utilities; (v) Central analytical laboratory; (vi) Research and development laboratories; (vii) Central effluent and waste treatment area; and (viii) Warehouse storage. (b) “Plant” (Production facility, Workshop) means a relatively self-contained area, structure or building containing one or more units with auxiliary and associated infrastructure, such as: (i) Small administrative section; (ii) Storage handling areas for feedstock and products; (iii) Effluent waste handling treatment area; (iv) Control analytical laboratory;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1201

(v) First aid service related medical section; and (vi) Records associated with the movement into, around and from the site, of declared chemicals and their feedstock or product chemicals formed from them, as appropriate. (c) “Unit” (Production unit, Process unit) means the combination of those items of equipment, including vessels and vessel set up, necessary for the production, processing or consumption of a chemical. 7. “Facility Agreement” means an agreement or arrangement between a State Party and the Organization relating to a specific facility subject to on-site verification pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI. 8. “Host State” means the State on whose territory lie facilities or areas of another State, Party to this Convention, which are subject to inspection under this Convention. 9.“In-Country Escort” means individuals specified by the inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, if they so wish, to accompany and assist the inspection team during the incountry period. 10. “In-Country Period” means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at a point of entry until its departure from the State at a point of entry. 11. “Initial Inspection” means the first on-site inspection of facilities to verify declarations submitted pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI and this Annex. 12. “Inspected State Party” means the State Party on whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control an inspection pursuant to this Convention takes place, or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a Host State is subject to such an inspection; it does not, however, include the State Party specified in Part II, paragraph 21 of this Annex. 13. “Inspection Assistant” means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat as set forth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex to assist inspectors in an inspection or visit, such as medical, security and administrative personnel and interpreters. 14.“Inspection Mandate” means the instructions issued by the Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of a particular inspection. 15.“Inspection Manual” means the compilation of additional procedures for the conduct of inspections developed by the Technical Secretariat. 16.“Inspection Site” means any facility or area at which an inspection is carried out and which is specifically defined in the respective facility agreement or inspection request or mandate or inspection request as expanded by the alternative or final perimeter. 17. “Inspection Team” means the group of inspectors and inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General to conduct a particular inspection. 18.“Inspector” means an individual designated by the Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth in Part II, Section A, of this Annex, to carry out an inspection or visit in accordance with this Convention. 19.“Model Agreement” means a document specifying the general form and content for an agreement concluded between a State Party and the Organization for fulfilling the verification provisions specified in this Annex. 20.“Observer” means a representative of a requesting State Party or a third State Party to observe a challenge inspection. 21.“Perimeter” in case of challenge inspection means the external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or description on a map.

1202  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(a) “Requested Perimeter” means the inspection site perimeter as specified in conformity with Part X, paragraph 8, of this Annex; (b) “Alternative Perimeter” means the inspection site perimeter as specified, alternatively to the requested perimeter, by the inspected State Party; it shall conform to the requirements specified in Part X, paragraph 17, of this Annex; (c) “Final Perimeter” means the final inspection site perimeter as agreed in negotiations between the inspection team and the inspected State Party, in accordance with Part X, paragraphs 16 to 21, of this Annex; (d) “Declared Perimeter” means the external boundary of the facility declared pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI. 22. “Period of Inspection”, for the purposes of Article IX, means the period of time from provision of access to the inspection team to the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings before and after the verification activities. 23.“Period of Inspection”, for the purposes of Articles IV, V and VI, means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings before and after the verification activities. 24. “Point of Entry” “Point of Exit” means a location designated for the in-country arrival of inspection teams for inspections pursuant to this Convention or for their departure after completion of their mission. 25. “Requesting State Party” means a State Party which has requested a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX. 26.“Tonne” means metric ton, i.e. 1,000 kg. Part II. General Rules of Verification A. Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants 1. Not later than 30 days after entry into force of this Convention the Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in writing, to all States Parties the names, nationalities and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experiences. 2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed for designation communicated to it.The State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat in writing of its acceptance of each inspector and inspection assistant, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list. Any inspector and inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing.The State Party may include the reason for the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in verification activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party which has declared its non-acceptance.The Technical Secretariat shall, as necessary, submit further proposals in addition to the original list. 3.Verification activities under this Convention shall only be performed by designated inspectors and inspection assistants. 4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, a State Party has the right at any time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been designated. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objec-

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1203

tion shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform the State Party concerned of the withdrawal of the designation of the inspector or inspection assistant. 5. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek to have removed from the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection team list. 6. The number of inspectors or inspection assistants accepted by and designated to a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability and rotation of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. 7. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors or inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the tasks of the Technical Secretariat, the DirectorGeneral shall refer the issue to the Executive Council. 8.Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of inspectors and inspection assistants are necessary or requested, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. 9. The members of the inspection team carrying out an inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party shall be designated in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as applied both to the inspected State Party and the Host State Party. B. Privileges and Immunities 10. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants or of changes thereto, provide multiple entry exit and or transit visas and other such documents to enable each inspector or inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities.These documents shall be valid for at least two years after their provision to the Technical Secretariat. 11. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and inspection assistants shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Convention and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. (a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. (b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat. (d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Convention and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations.

1204  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Convention shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. (g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations. (h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions. (i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State. 12. When transiting the territory of non-inspected States Parties, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment, carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 11 (c) and (d). 13.Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party or Host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party or Host State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. 14. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.Waiver must always be express. 15. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to inspectors pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 11 (d). C. Standing Arrangements Points of entry 16. Each State Party shall designate the points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection site from at least one point of entry within 12 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat. 17. Each State Party may change the points of entry by giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties. 18. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1205

19. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities or areas subject to inspection requires transit through the territory of another State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Annex.The Host State Party shall facilitate the inspection of those facilities or areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to inspect facilities or areas of an inspected State Party shall facilitate such transit. 20. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex.A State Party that has one or more facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the Host State of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access. 21. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected are located on the territory of a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Convention, the State Party shall take all necessary measures as would be required of an inspected State Party and a Host State Party to ensure that inspections of such facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.This paragraph shall not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected are those of the State Party. Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft 22. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other inspections where timely travel is not feasible using scheduled commercial transport, an inspection team may need to utilize aircraft owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting inspection teams and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. 23.When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft’s flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its owned or chartered flights, the Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft. 24. Not less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected State Party or Host State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 23 is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 25. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry when such aircraft is owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The Technical Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, security protection and servicing.

1206  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Administrative arrangements 26.The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the inspection team such as communication means, interpretation services to the extent necessary for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. In this regard, the inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization for such costs incurred by the inspection team. Approved equipment 27. Subject to paragraph 29, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing onto the inspection site such equipment, approved in accordance with paragraph 28, which the Technical Secretariat has determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall prepare and, as appropriate, update a list of approved equipment, which may be needed for the purposes described above, and regulations governing such equipment which shall be in accordance with this Annex. In establishing the list of approved equipment and these regulations, the Technical Secretariat shall ensure that safety considerations for all the types of facilities at which such equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. A list of approved equipment shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 28.The equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat and be designated, calibrated and approved by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall, to the extent possible, select that equipment which is specifically designed for the specific kind of inspection required. Designated and approved equipment shall be specifically protected against unauthorized alteration. 29.The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the prescribed time-frames, to inspect the equipment in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry, i.e., to check the identity of the equipment brought in or removed from the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State.To facilitate such identification, the Technical Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment.The inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfaction of the inspected State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment for the particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment without the above-mentioned authentication documents and devices. Procedures for the inspection of equipment shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 30. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary to use equipment available on site not belonging to the Technical Secretariat and requests the inspected State Party to enable the team to use such equipment, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can. D. Pre-inspection Activities Notification 31.The Director-General shall notify the State Party before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and within the prescribed time-frames, where specified, of its intention to carry out an inspection. 32. Notifications made by the Director-General shall include the following information: (a) The type of inspection; (b) The point of entry; (c) The date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; (d) The means of arrival at the point of entry;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1207

(e) The site to be inspected; (f) The names of inspectors and inspection assistants; (g) If appropriate, aircraft clearance for special flights. 33. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge the receipt of a notification by the Technical Secretariat of an intention to conduct an inspection, not later than one hour after receipt of such notification. 34. In the case of an inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the territory of another State Party, both States Parties shall be simultaneously notified in accordance with paragraphs 31 and 32. Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or Host State and transfer to the inspection site 35. The inspected State Party or Host State Party which has been notified of the arrival of an inspection team, shall ensure its immediate entry into the territory and shall through an in-country escort or by other means do everything in its power to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the inspection site(s) and to a point of exit. 36. The inspected State Party or Host State Party shall, as necessary, assist the inspection team in reaching the inspection site not later than 12 hours after the arrival at the point of entry. Pre-inspection briefing 37. Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the commencement of the inspection, the inspection team shall be briefed by facility representatives, with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate, on the facility, the activities carried out there, safety measures and administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the inspection.The time spent for the briefing shall be limited to the minimum necessary and in any event not exceed three hours. E. Conduct of Inspections General rules 38. The members of the inspection team shall discharge their functions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, as well as rules established by the Director-General and facility agreements concluded between States Parties and the Organization. 39. The inspection team shall strictly observe the inspection mandate issued by the DirectorGeneral. It shall refrain from activities going beyond this mandate. 40.The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party or Host State and disturbance to the facility or area inspected.The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid affecting its safety. In particular, the inspection team shall not operate any facility. If inspectors consider that, to fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried out in a facility, they shall request the designated representative of the inspected facility to have them performed. The representative shall carry out the request to the extent possible. 41. In the performance of their duties on the territory of an inspected State Party or Host State, the members of the inspection team shall, if the inspected State Party so requests, be accompanied by representatives of the inspected State Party, but the inspection team must not thereby be delayed or otherwise hindered in the exercise of its functions. 42. Detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections shall be developed for inclusion in the inspection manual by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account guidelines to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).

1208  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Safety 43. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and inspection assistants shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. In order to implement these requirements, appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). Communications 44. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-country period to communicate with the Headquarters of the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own, duly certified, approved equipment and may request that the inspected State Party or Host State Party provide them with access to other telecommunications.The inspection team shall have the right to use its own two-way system of radio communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and other members of the inspection team. Inspection Team and inspected State Party rights 45. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the relevant Articles and Annexes of this Convention as well as with facility agreements and procedures set forth in the inspection manual, have the right to unimpeded access to the inspection site.The items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors. 46. Inspectors shall have the right to interview any facility personnel in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party with the purpose of establishing relevant facts. Inspectors shall only request information and data which are necessary for the conduct of the inspection, and the inspected State Party shall furnish such information upon request.The inspected State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those questions are deemed not relevant to the inspection. If the head of the inspection team objects and states their relevance, the questions shall be provided in writing to the inspected State Party for reply. The inspection team may note any refusal to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given, in that part of the inspection report that deals with the cooperation of the inspected State Party. 47. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of their mission. 48. Inspectors shall have the right to have photographs taken at their request by representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility. The capability to take instant development photographic prints shall be available.The inspection team shall determine whether photographs conform to those requested and, if not, repeat photographs shall be taken.The inspection team and the inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of every photograph. 49.The representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to observe all verification activities carried out by the inspection team. 50. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat. 51. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the representative of the inspected State Party. The representative of the inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. If questions relating to an object or a building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the object or building shall, if requested, be photographed for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, the inspectors shall notify the Technical Secretariat immediately.The inspectors shall include in the inspection report any such unresolved question, relevant clarifications, and a copy of any photographs taken.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1209

Collection, handling and analysis of samples 52. Representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility shall take samples at the request of the inspection team in the presence of inspectors. If so agreed in advance with the representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility, the inspection team may take samples itself. 53. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be performed on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to perform on-site analysis of samples using approved equipment brought by it. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-site. Alternatively, the inspection team may request that appropriate analysis on-site be performed in its presence. 54.The inspected State Party has the right to retain portions of all samples taken or take duplicate samples and be present when samples are analysed on-site. 55.The inspection team shall, if it deems it necessary, transfer samples for analysis off-site at laboratories designated by the Organization. 56.The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for analysis off-site is protected.The Director-General shall do so in accordance with procedures, to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i), for inclusion in the inspection manual. He shall: (a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples; (b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis; (c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories, mobile analytical equipment and procedures, and monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories, mobile equipment and procedures; and (d) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations. 57.When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories.The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis.The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat. 58.The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to compliance with this Convention and include them in the final inspection report.The Technical Secretariat shall include in the report detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories. Extension of inspection duration 59. Periods of inspection may be extended by agreement with the representative of the inspected State Party. Debriefing 60. Upon completion of an inspection the inspection team shall meet with representatives of the inspected State Party and the personnel responsible for the inspection site to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide to the representatives of the inspected State Party its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any samples and copies of written information and data gathered and other material to be taken off-site. The document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that he has taken notice of the

1210  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document.This meeting shall be completed not later than 24 hours after the completion of the inspection. F. Departure 61. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State Party or the Host State. G. Reports 62. Not later than 10 days after the inspection, the inspectors shall prepare a factual, final report only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention, as provided for under the inspection mandate.The report shall also provide information as to the manner in which the State Party inspected cooperated with the inspection team. Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report.The report shall be kept confidential. 63. The final report shall immediately be submitted to the inspected State Party. Any written comments, which the inspected State Party may immediately make on its findings shall be annexed to it.The final report together with annexed comments made by the inspected State Party shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 days after the inspection. 64. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should cooperation between the National Authority and the inspectors not measure up to the standards required, the Director-General shall approach the State Party for clarification. 65. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts established are of a nature to suggest that obligations undertaken under this Convention have not been met, the Director-General shall inform the Executive Council without delay. H. Application of General Provisions 66.The provisions of this Part shall apply to all inspections conducted pursuant to this Convention, except where the provisions of this Part differ from the provisions set forth for specific types of inspections in Parts III to XI of this Annex, in which case the latter provisions shall take precedence. Part III. General Provisions for Verification Measures Pursuant to Articles IV,V and VI, Paragraph 3 A. Initial Inspections and Facility Agreements 1. Each declared facility subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV,V, and VI, paragraph 3, shall receive an initial inspection promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of this inspection of the facility shall be to verify information provided and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including on-site inspections and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, and to work on the facility agreements. 2. States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations and the initiation of the systematic verification measures can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at all facilities within the established time-frames after this Convention enters into force for them. 3. Each State Party shall conclude a facility agreement with the Organization for each facility declared and subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, paragraph 3. 4. Facility agreements shall be completed not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party or after the facility has been declared for the first time, except for a chemical weapons destruction facility to which paragraphs 5 to 7 shall apply.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1211

5. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility that begins operations more than one year after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the facility agreement shall be completed not less than 180 days before the facility begins operation. 6. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility that is in operation when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, or begins operation not later than one year thereafter, the facility agreement shall be completed not later than 210 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, except that the Executive Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, are sufficient. 7. In the case of a facility, referred to in paragraph 6, that will cease operations not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the Executive Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through onsite inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, are sufficient. 8. Facility agreements shall be based on models for such agreements and provide for detailed arrangements which shall govern inspections at each facility.The model agreements shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments and shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 9. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for photographs, plans and other information that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent inspections. B. Standing Arrangements 10.Where applicable, the Technical Secretariat shall have the right to have continuous monitoring instruments and systems and seals installed and to use them, in conformity with the relevant provisions in this Convention and the facility agreements between States Parties and the Organization. 11.The inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the inspection team and to have it tested in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party. The inspection team shall have the right to use the instruments that were installed by the inspected State Party for its own monitoring o the technological process of the destruction of chemical weapons.To this end, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect those instruments that it intends to use for purposes of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and to have them tested in its presence. 12.The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary preparation and support for the establishment of continuous monitoring instruments and systems. 13. In order to implement paragraphs 11 and 12, appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 14.The inspected State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat if an event occurs or may occur at a facility where monitoring instruments are installed, which may have an impact on the monitoring system.The inspected State Party shall coordinate subsequent actions with the Technical Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible. 15.The inspection team shall verify during each inspection that the monitoring system functions correctly and that emplaced seals have not been tampered with. In addition, visits to service the monitoring system may be required to perform any necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system as required.

1212  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

16. If the monitoring system indicates any anomaly, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately take action to determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the facility. If, after this examination, the problem remains unresolved, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection of, or visit to, the facility if necessary.The Technical Secretariat shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the inspected State Party which shall assist in its resolution. C. Pre-inspection Activities 17.The inspected State Party shall, except as specified in paragraph 18, be notified of inspections not less than 24 hours in advance of the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. 18. The inspected State Party shall be notified of initial inspections not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Part IV (A). Destruction of Chemical Weapons and Its Verification Pursuant to Article IV A. Declarations Chemical weapons 1.The declaration of chemical weapons by a State Party pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (ii), shall include the following: (a) The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared; (b) The precise location of each chemical weapons storage facility, expressed by: (i) Name; (ii) Geographical coordinates; and (iii) A detailed site diagram, including a boundary map and the location of bunkers storage areas within the Facility. (c) The detailed inventory for each chemical weapons storage facility including: (i) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in accordance with Article II; (ii) Unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, devices and equipment defined as chemical weapons; (iii) Equipment specially designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment specified in sub-subparagraph (ii); (iv) Chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment specified in sub-subparagraph (ii). 2. For the declaration of chemicals referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (i) the following shall apply: (a) Chemicals shall be declared in accordance with the Schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals; (b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals the information required for possible assignment of the chemical to the appropriate Schedule shall be provided, including the toxicity of the pure compound. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided; (c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in accordance with current International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1213

(d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each shall be provided, and the mixture shall be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical. If a component of a binary chemical weapon consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each provided; (e) Binary chemical weapons shall be declared under the relevant end product within the framework of the categories of chemical weapons referred to in paragraph 16. The following supplementary information shall be provided for each type of binary chemical munition device: (i) The chemical name of the toxic end-product; (ii) The chemical composition and quantity of each component; (iii) The actual weight ratio between the components; (iv) Which component is considered the key component; (v) The projected quantity of the toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis from the key component, assuming 100 per cent yield. A declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis assuming 100 per cent yield. f) For multicomponent chemical weapons, the declaration shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary chemical weapons; (g) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. munitions, sub-munitions, devices, equipment or bulk containers and other containers shall be declared. For each form of storage the following shall be listed: (i) Type; (ii) Size or calibre; (iii) Number of items; and (iv) Nominal weight of chemical fill per item. (h) For each chemical the total weight present at the storage facility shall be declared; (i) In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk, the percentage purity shall be declared, if known. 3. For each type of unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment, referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (ii), the information shall include: (a) The number of items; (b) The nominal fill volume per item; (c) The intended chemical fill. Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iii) 4.The declaration of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iii), shall contain all information specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 above. It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are located is not able to fulfil its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state the reasons therefor. Declarations of past transfers and receipts 5.A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers or receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iv), provided the amount trans-

1214  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

ferred or received exceeded 1 tonne per chemical per year in bulk and or munition form. This declaration shall be made according to the inventory format specified in paragraphs 1 and 2.This declaration shall also indicate the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the transfers or receipts and, as precisely as possible, the current location of the transferred items.When not all the specified information is available for transfers or receipts of chemical weapons for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration. Submission of the general plan for destruction of chemical weapons 6. The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), shall provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons destruction programme of the State Party and information on the efforts of the State Party to fulfil the destruction requirements contained in this Convention.The plan shall specify: (a) A general schedule for destruction, giving types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for each existing chemical weapons destruction facility and, if possible, for each planned chemical weapons destruction facility; (b) The number of chemical weapons destruction facilities existing or planned to be operated over the destruction period; (c) For each existing or planned chemical weapons destruction facility: (i) Name and location; and (ii) The types and approximate quantities of chemical weapons, and the type (for example, nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate quantity of chemical fill, to be destroyed; (d) The plans and programmes for training personnel for the operation of destruction facilities; (e) The national standards for safety and emissions that the destruction facilities must satisfy; (f) Information on the development of new methods for destruction of chemical weapons and on the improvement of existing methods; (g) The cost estimates for destroying the chemical weapons; and (h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction programme. B. Measures to Secure the Storage Facility and Storage Facility Preparation 7. Not later than when submitting its declaration of chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage facilities and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the facilities, except their removal for destruction. 8. A State Party shall ensure that chemical weapons at its storage facilities are configured to allow ready access for verification in accordance with paragraphs 37 to 49. 9.While a storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical weapons out of the facility other than their removal for destruction, a State Party may continue at the facility standard maintenance activities, including standard maintenance of chemical weapons; safety monitoring and physical security activities; and preparation of chemical weapons for destruction. 10. Maintenance activities of chemical weapons shall not include: (a) Replacement of agent or of munition bodies; (b) Modification of the original characteristics of munitions, or parts or components thereof. 11. All maintenance activities shall be subject to monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1215

C. Destruction Principles and methods for destruction of chemical weapons 12. “Destruction of chemical weapons” means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such. 13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities. 14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention. Order of destruction 15.The order of destruction of chemical weapons is based on the obligations specified in Article I and the other Articles, including obligations regarding systematic on-site verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties for undiminished security during the destruction period; confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.The order of destruction is based on the principle of levelling out. 16. For the purpose of destruction, chemical weapons declared by each State Party shall be divided into three categories: Category 1: Chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components; Category 2: Chemical weapons on the basis of all other chemicals and their parts and components; Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons. 17. A State Party shall start: (a) The destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons not later than two years after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete the destruction not later than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention.A State Party shall destroy chemical weapons in accordance with the following destruction deadlines: (i) Phase 1: Not later than two years after entry into force of this Convention, testing of its first destruction facility shall be completed. Not less than 1 percent of the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than three years after the entry into force of this Convention; (ii) Phase 2: Not less than 20 per cent of the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention; (iii) Phase 3: Not less than 45 per cent of the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than seven years after the entry into force of this Convention; (iv) Phase 4:All Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention. (b) The destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it and shall complete the destruction not later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Category 2 chemical weapons shall be destroyed

1216  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

in equal annual increments throughout the destruction period.The comparison factor for such weapons is the weight of the chemicals within Category 2; and (c)The destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons not later than one year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete the destruction not later than five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Category 3 chemical weapons shall be destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the destruction period. The comparison factor for unfilled munitions and devices is expressed in nominal fill volume (m3) and for equipment in number of items. 18. For the destruction of binary chemical weapons the following shall apply: (a) For the purposes of the order of destruction, a declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric basis assuming 100 per cent yield. (b) A requirement to destroy a given quantity of the key component shall entail a requirement to destroy a corresponding quantity of the other component, calculated from the actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of binary chemical munition device. (c) If more of the other component is declared than is needed, based on the actual weight ratio between components, the excess shall be destroyed over the first two years after destruction operations begin. (d) At the end of each subsequent operational year a State Party may retain an amount of the other declared component that is determined on the basis of the actual weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of binary chemical munition device. 19. For multicomponent chemical weapons the order of destruction shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary chemical weapons. Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines 20. The Executive Council shall review the general plans for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), and in accordance with paragraph 6, inter alia, to assess their conformity with the order of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15 to 19. The Executive Council shall consult with any State Party whose plan does not conform, with the objective of bringing the plan into conformity. 21. If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level of destruction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposal. 22. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with the destruction deadlines set forth in paragraph 17 (a) as changed pursuant to paragraph 21. However, if a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of the percentage of Category 1 chemical weapons required by an intermediate destruction deadline, it may request the Executive Council to recommend to the Conference to grant an extension of its obligation to meet that deadline. Such a request must be made not less than 180 days before the intermediate destruction deadline and shall contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the request and the plans of the State Party for ensuring that it will be able to fulfil its obligation to meet the next intermediate destruction deadline. 23. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall still be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. Extensions granted

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1217

pursuant to this Section shall not, in any way, modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy all Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention. Extension of the deadline for completion of destruction 24. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of all Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such chemical weapons. Such a request must be made not later than nine years after the entry into force of this Convention. 25.The request shall contain: (a) The duration of the proposed extension; (b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension; and (c) A detailed plan for destruction during the proposed extension and the remaining portion of the original 10-year period for destruction. 26. A decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council. Any extension shall be the minimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of the extension, including the specific verification measures deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. Costs of verification during the extension period shall be allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16. 27. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall take appropriate measures to meet all subsequent deadlines. 28. The State Party shall continue to submit detailed annual plans for destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 and annual reports on the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until all Category 1 chemical weapons are destroyed. In addition, not later than at the end of each 90 days of the extension period, the State Party shall report to the Executive Council on its destruction activity. The Executive Council shall review progress towards completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to document this progress. All information concerning the destruction activities during the extension period shall be provided by the Executive Council to States Parties, upon request. Detailed annual plans for destruction 29.The detailed annual plans for destruction shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days before each annual destruction period begins pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (a), and shall specify: (a) The quantity of each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and the inclusive dates when the destruction of each specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished; (b) The detailed site diagram for each chemical weapons destruction facility and any changes to previously submitted diagrams; and (c) The detailed schedule of activities for each chemical weapons destruction facility for the upcoming year, identifying time required for design, construction or modification of the facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-out and operator training, destruction operations for each specific type of chemical weapon, and scheduled periods of inactivity.

1218  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

30. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities, detailed facility information to assist the Technical Secretariat in developing preliminary inspection procedures for use at the facility. 31.The detailed facility information for each destruction facility shall include the following information: (a) Name, address and location; (b) Detailed, annotated facility drawings; (c) Facility design drawings, process drawings, and piping and instrumentation design drawings; (d) Detailed technical descriptions, including design drawings and instrument specifications, for the equipment required for: removing the chemical fill from the munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily storing the drained chemical fill; destroying the chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, and containers; (e) Detailed technical descriptions of the destruction process, including material flow rates, temperatures and pressures, and designed destruction efficiency; (f) Design capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon; (g) A detailed description of the products of destruction and the method of their ultimate disposal; (h) A detailed technical description of measures to facilitate inspections in accordance with this Convention; (i) A detailed description of any temporary holding area at the destruction facility that will be used to provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction facility, including site and facility drawings and information on the storage capacity for each specific type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at the facility; (j) A detailed description of the safety and medical measures in force at the facility; (k) A detailed description of the living quarters and working premises for the inspectors; and (l) Suggested measures for international verification. 32. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities, the plant operations manuals, the safety and medical plans, the laboratory operations and quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not include material previously provided. 33. A State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat of any developments that could affect inspection activities at its destruction facilities. 34. Deadlines for submission of the information specified in paragraphs 30 to 32 shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 35. After a review of the detailed facility information for each destruction facility, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, shall enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and that the facility operation allows appropriate verification. Annual reports on destruction 36. Information regarding the implementation of plans for destruction of chemical weapons shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction period and shall specify the actual amounts of

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1219

chemical weapons which were destroyed during the previous year at each destruction facility. If appropriate, reasons for not meeting destruction goals should be stated. D.Verification Verification of declarations of chemical weapons through on-site inspection 37.The purpose of the verification of declarations of chemical weapons shall be to confirm through on-site inspection the accuracy of the relevant declarations made pursuant to Article III. 38. The inspectors shall conduct this verification promptly after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia, verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number of munitions, devices and other equipment. 39. The inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at each storage facility. 40. As the inventory progresses, inspectors shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the storage facility during the inventory.After completion of the inventory, such seals will be removed unless otherwise agreed. Systematic verification of storage facilities 41. The purpose of the systematic verification of storage facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons from such facilities takes place. 42.The systematic verification shall be initiated as soon as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is submitted and shall continue until all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. It shall in accordance with the facility agreement, combine on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments. 43. When all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the systematic verification of the storage facility and shall promptly remove any monitoring instruments installed by the inspectors. Inspections and visits 44. The particular storage facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections shall be elaborated by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account the recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 45.The Technical Secretariat shall notify the inspected State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In cases of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened.The Technical Secretariat shall specify the purpose of the inspection or visit. 46.The inspected State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry to the storage facility.The facility agreement will specify administrative arrangements for inspectors. 47. The inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team upon its arrival at the chemical weapons storage facility to carry out an inspection, with the following data on the facility: (a) The number of storage buildings and storage locations; (b) For each storage building and storage location, the type and the identification number or designation, shown on the site diagram; and

1220  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(c) For each storage building and storage location at the facility, the number of items of each specific type of chemical weapon, and, for containers that are not part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of chemical fill in each container. 48. In carrying out an inventory, within the time available, inspectors shall have the right: (a) To use any of the following inspection techniques: (i) inventory all the chemical weapons stored at the facility; (ii) inventory all the chemical weapons stored in specific buildings or locations at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; or (iii) inventory all the chemical weapons of one or more specific types stored at the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; and (b) To check all items inventoried against agreed records. 49. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility agreements: (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting their activity, inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility.The items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors; and (b) Have the right, during the first and any subsequent inspection of each chemical weapons storage facility, to designate munitions, devices, and containers from which samples are to be taken, and to affix to such munitions, devices, and containers a unique tag that will indicate an attempt to remove or alter the tag. A sample shall be taken from a tagged item at a chemical weapons storage facility or a chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is practically possible in accordance with the corresponding destruction programmes, and, in any case, not later than by the end of the destruction operations. Systematic verification of the destruction of chemical weapons 50.The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical weapons shall be: (a) To confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed; and (b) To confirm that these stocks have been destroyed. 51. Chemical weapons destruction operations during the first 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention shall be governed by transitional verification arrangements. Such arrangements, including a transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for application of the arrangements, shall be agreed between the Organization and the inspected State Party.These arrangements shall be approved by the Executive Council not later than 60 days after this Convention enters into force for the State Party, taking into account the recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, which shall be based on an evaluation of the detailed facility information provided in accordance with paragraph 31 and a visit to the facility.The Executive Council shall, at its first session, establish the guidelines for such transitional verification arrangements, based on recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). The transitional verification arrangements shall be designed to verify, throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of chemical weapons in accordance with the purposes set forth in paragraph 50, and to avoid hampering ongoing destruction operations. 52.The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin not earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention. 53. On the basis of this Convention and the detailed destruction facility information, and as the case may be, on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1221

draft plan for inspecting the destruction of chemical weapons at each destruction facility.The plan shall be completed and provided to the inspected State Party for comment not less than 270 days before the facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party should be resolved through consultations.Any unresolved matter shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of this Convention. 54. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial visit to each chemical weapons destruction facility of the inspected State Party not less than 240 days before each facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this Convention, to allow it to familiarize itself with the facility and assess the adequacy of the inspection plan. 55. In the case of an existing facility where chemical weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, the inspected State Party shall not be required to decontaminate the facility before the Technical Secretariat conducts an initial visit.The duration of the visit shall not exceed five days and the number of visiting personnel shall not exceed 15. 56. The agreed detailed plans for verification, with an appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for review. The Executive Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, consistent with verification objectives and obligations under this Convention. It should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are consistent with verification aims and are efficient and practical.This review should be completed not less than 180 days before the destruction period begins. 57. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the plan for verification. If there are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action. 58. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they shall be referred to the Conference. 59. The detailed facility agreements for chemical weapons destruction facilities shall specify, taking into account the specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its mode of operation: (a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures; and (b) Provisions for verification through continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and physical presence of inspectors. 60. Inspectors shall be granted access to each chemical weapons destruction facility not less than 60 days before the commencement of the destruction, pursuant to this Convention, at the facility. Such access shall be for the purpose of supervising the installation of the inspection equipment, inspecting this equipment and testing its operation, as well as for the purpose of carrying out a final engineering review of the facility. In the case of an existing facility where chemical weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, destruction operations shall be stopped for the minimum amount of time required, not to exceed 60 days, for installation and testing of the inspection equipment. Depending on the results of the testing and review, the State Party and the Technical Secretariat may agree on additions or changes to the detailed facility agreement for the facility. 61. The inspected State Party shall notify, in writing, the inspection team leader at a chemical weapons destruction facility not less than four hours before the departure of each shipment of chemical weapons from a chemical weapons storage facility to that destruction facility. This notification shall specify the name of the storage facility, the estimated times of departure and arrival, the specific types and quantities of chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items are being moved, and the method of transportation.This notification may include

1222  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

notification of more than one shipment.The inspection team leader shall be promptly notified, in writing, of any changes in this information. Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities 62.The inspectors shall verify the arrival of the chemical weapons at the destruction facility and the storing of these chemical weapons.The inspectors shall verify the inventory of each shipment, using agreed procedures consistent with facility safety regulations, prior to the destruction of the chemical weapons.They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to destruction. 63. As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at chemical weapons storage facilities located at chemical weapons destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be subject to systematic verification in conformity with the relevant facility agreements. 64. At the end of an active destruction phase, inspectors shall make an inventory of the chemical weapons, that have been removed from the storage facility, to be destroyed. They shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons remaining, employing inventory control procedures as referred to in paragraph 62. Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical weapons destruction facilities 65. The inspectors shall be granted access to conduct their activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities during the entire active phase of destruction. 66. At each chemical weapons destruction facility, to provide assurance that no chemical weapons are diverted and that the destruction process has been completed, inspectors shall have the right to verify through their physical presence and monitoring with on-site instruments: (a) The receipt of chemical weapons at the facility; (b) The temporary holding area for chemical weapons and the specific type and quantity of chemical weapons stored in that area; (c) The specific type and quantity of chemical weapons being destroyed; (d) The process of destruction; (e) The end-product of destruction; (f) The mutilation of metal parts; and (g) The integrity of the destruction process and of the facility as a whole. 67. Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary holding areas at the chemical weapons destruction facilities. 68. To the extent that it meets inspection requirements, information from routine facility operations, with appropriate data authentication, shall be used for inspection purposes. 69. After the completion of each period of destruction, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the State Party, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons. 70. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility agreements: (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities, including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers, therein.The items to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in accordance with the verification plan that has been agreed to by the inspected State Party and approved by the Executive Council;

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1223

(b) Monitor the systematic on-site analysis of samples during the destruction process; and (c) Receive, if necessary, samples taken at their request from any devices, bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facility or the storage facility threat. Part IV (B). Old Chemical Weapons and Abandoned Chemical Weapons A. General 1. Old chemical weapons shall be destroyed as provided for in Section B. 2. Abandoned chemical weapons, including those which also meet the definition of Article II, paragraph 5 (b), shall be destroyed as provided for in Section C. B. Regime for Old Chemical Weapons 3.A State Party which has on its territory old chemical weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information, including, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of these old chemical weapons. In the case of old chemical weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the State Party shall submit to the Technical Secretariat a declaration pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (b) (i), including, to the extent possible, the information specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of this Annex. 4. A State Party which discovers old chemical weapons after this Convention enters into force for it shall submit to the Technical Secretariat the information specified in paragraph 3 not later than 180 days after the discovery of the old chemical weapons. 5.The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in order to verify the information submitted pursuant to paragraphs 3 and and in particular to determine whether the chemical weapons meet the definition of old chemical weapons as specified in Article II, paragraph 5. Guidelines to determine the usability of chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 6. A State Party shall treat old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), as toxic waste. It shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the steps being taken to destroy or otherwise dispose of such old chemical weapons as toxic waste in accordance with its national legislation. 7. Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), in accordance with Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex. Upon request of a State Party, the Executive Council may, however, modify the provisions on time-limit and order of destruction of these old chemical weapons, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. The request shall contain specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification. C. Regime for Abandoned Chemical Weapons 8.A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned chemical weapons (hereinafter referred to as the “Territorial State Party”) shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the abandoned chemical weapons.This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment.

1224  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

9. A State Party which discovers abandoned chemical weapons after this Convention enters into force for it shall, not later than 180 days after the discovery, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the discovered abandoned chemical weapons.This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment. 10. A State Party which has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of another State Party (hereinafter referred to as the “Abandoning State Party”) shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the abandoned chemical weapons.This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity as well as information on the abandonment, and the condition of the abandoned chemical weapons. 11.The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in order to verify all available relevant information submitted pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 10 and determine whether systematic verification in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 to 43, of this Annex is required. It shall, if necessary, verify the origin of the abandoned chemical weapons and establish evidence concerning the abandonment and the identity of the Abandoning State. 12. The report of the Technical Secretariat shall be submitted to the Executive Council, the Territorial State Party, and to the Abandoning State Party or the State Party declared by the Territorial State Party or identified by the Technical Secretariat as having abandoned the chemical weapons. If one of the States Parties directly concerned is not satisfied with the report it shall have the right to settle the matter in accordance with provisions of this Convention or bring the issue to the Executive Council with a view to settling the matter expeditiously. 13. Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3, the Territorial State Party shall have the right to request the State Party which has been established as the Abandoning State Party pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 12 to enter into consultations for the purpose of destroying the abandoned chemical weapons in cooperation with the Territorial State Party. It shall immediately inform the Technical Secretariat of this request. 14. Consultations between the Territorial State Party and the Abandoning State Party with a view to establishing a mutually agreed plan for destruction shall begin not later than 30 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in paragraph 13.The mutually agreed plan for destruction shall be transmitted to the Technical Secretariat not later than 180 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in paragraph 13. Upon the request of the Abandoning State Party and the Territorial State Party, the Executive Council may extend the time-limit for transmission of the mutually agreed plan for destruction. 15. For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical weapons, the Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation. 16. If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not a State Party, the Territorial State Party, in order to ensure the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons, may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons. 17. Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16, Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex shall also apply to the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, may modify or in exceptional cases suspend the application of provisions on destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which do not meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the request of

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1225

the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, may in exceptional circumstances modify the provisions on the time-limit and the order of destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention.Any request as referred to in this paragraph shall contain specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed modification. 18. States Parties may conclude between themselves agreements or arrangements concerning the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. The Executive Council may, upon request of the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, decide that selected provisions of such agreements or arrangements take precedence over provisions of this Section, if it determines that the agreement or arrangement ensures the destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 17. Part V. Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and Its Verification Pursuant to Article V A. Declarations Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities 1. The declaration of chemical weapons production facilities by a State Party pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (ii), shall contain for each facility: (a) The name of the facility, the names of the owners, and the names of the companies or enterprises operating the facility since 1 January 1946; (b) The precise location of the facility, including the address, location of the complex, location of the facility within the complex including the specific building and structure number, if any; (c) A statement whether it is a facility for the manufacture of chemicals that are defined as chemical weapons or whether it is a facility for the filling of chemical weapons, or both; (d) The date when the construction of the facility was completed and the periods during which any modifications to the facility were made, including the installation of new or modified equipment, that significantly changed the production process characteristics of the facility; (e) Information on the chemicals defined as chemical weapons that were manufactured at the facility; the munitions, devices, and containers that were filled at the facility; and the dates of the beginning and cessation of such manufacture or filling: (i) For chemicals defined as chemical weapons that were manufactured at the facility, such information shall be expressed in terms of the specific types of chemicals manufactured, indicating the chemical name in accordance with the current International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural formula, and the Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned, and in terms of the amount of each chemical expressed by weight of chemical in tonnes; (ii) For munitions, devices and containers that were filled at the facility, such information shall be expressed in terms of the specific type of chemical weapons filled and the weight of the chemical fill per unit; (f) The production capacity of the chemical weapons production facility: (i) For a facility where chemical weapons were manufactured, production capacity shall be expressed in terms of the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process actually used or, in the case of processes not actually used, planned to be used at the facility;

1226  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(ii) For a facility where chemical weapons were filled, production capacity shall be expressed in terms of the quantity of chemical that the facility can fill into each specific type of chemical weapon a year; (g) For each chemical weapons production facility that has not been destroyed, a description of the facility including: (i) A site diagram; (ii) A process flow diagram of the facility; and (iii) An inventory of buildings at the facility, and specialized equipment at the facility and of any spare parts for such equipment; (h) The present status of the facility, stating: (i) The date when chemical weapons were last produced at the facility; (ii) Whether the facility has been destroyed, including the date and manner of its destruction; and (iii) Whether the facility has been used or modified before entry into force of this Convention for an activity not related to the production of chemical weapons, and if so, information on what modifications have been made, the date such non-chemical weapons related activity began and the nature of such activity, indicating, if applicable, the kind of product; (i) A specification of the measures that have been taken by the State Party for closure of, and a description of the measures that have been or will be taken by the State Party to inactivate the facility; (j) A description of the normal pattern of activity for safety and security at the inactivated facility; and (k) A statement as to whether the facility will be converted for the destruction of chemical weapons and, if so, the dates for such conversions. Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c)(iii) 2.The declaration of chemical weapons production facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), shall contain all information specified in paragraph 1 above. It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located is not able to fulfil this obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor. Declarations of past transfers and receipts 3. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons production equipment since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers and receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iv), and in accordance with paragraph 5 below.When not all the specified information is available for transfer and receipt of such equipment for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever information is still available to it and provide an explanation as to why it cannot submit a full declaration. 4. Chemical weapons production equipment referred to in paragraph 3 means: (a) Specialized equipment; (b) Equipment for the production of equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with chemical weapons employment; and (c) Equipment designed or used exclusively for producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  1227

5. The declaration concerning transfer and receipt of chemical weapons production equipment shall specify: (a) Who received transferred the chemical weapons production equipment; (b) The identity of such equipment; (c) The date of transfer or receipt; (d) Whether the equipment was destroyed, if known; and (e) Current disposition, if known. Submission of general plans for destruction 6. For each chemical weapons production facility, a State Party shall supply the following information: (a) Envisaged time-frame for measures to be taken; and (b) Methods of destruction. 7. For each chemical weapons production facility that a State Party intends to convert temporarily into a chemical weapons destruction facility, the State Party shall supply the following information: (a) Envisaged time-frame for conversion into a destruction facility; (b) Envisaged time-frame for utilizing the facility as a chemical weapons destruction facility; (c) Description of the new facility; (d) Method of destruction of special equipment; (e) Time-frame for destruction of the converted facility after it has been utilized to destroy chemical weapons; and (f) Method of destruction of the converted facility. Submission of annual plans for destruction and annual reports on destruction 8. The State Party shall submit an annual plan for destruction not less than 90 days before the beginning of the coming destruction year.The annual plan shall specify: (a) Capacity to be destroyed; (b) Name and location of the facilities where destruction will take place; (c) List of buildings and equipment that will be destroyed at each facility; and (d) Planned method(s) of destruction. 9. A State Party shall submit an annual report on destruction not later than 90 days after the end of the previous destruction year.The annual report shall specify: (a) Capacity destroyed; (b) Name and location of each facility where destruction took place; (c) List of buildings and equipment that were destroyed at each facility; (d) Methods of destruction. 10. For a chemical weapons production facility declared pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), it is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located to make appropriate arrangements to ensure that the declarations specified in paragraphs 6 to 9 above are made. If the State Party on whose territory the facility is or has been located is not able to fulfil this obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.

1228  THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

B. Destruction General principles for destruction of chemical weapons production facilities 11. Each State Party shall decide on methods to be applied for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, according to the principles laid down in Article V and in this Part. Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons production facility 12.The purpose of the closure of a chemical weapons production facility is to render it inactive. 13. Agreed measures for closure shall be taken by a State Party with due regard to the specific characteristics of each facility. Such measures shall include, inter alia: (a) Prohibition of occupation of the specialized buildings and standard buildings of the facility except for agreed activities; (b) Disconnection of equipment directly related to the production of chemical weapons, including, inter alia, process control equipment and utilities; (c) Decommissioning of protective installations and equipment used exclusively for the safety of operations of the chemical weapons production facility; (d) Installation of blind flanges and other devices to prevent the addition of chemicals to, or the removal of chemicals from, any specialized process equi